


PEREIASLAV 1654:
A Historiographical Study

John Basarab



Extent of Khmelnytsky Revolt



Eastern Europe in the mid-seventeenth century



BOHDAN CHMIELNICKI EXERCITUS
ZAPOROVIEŃ PRÆFECTUS, BELLI SERVILIS AUTOR
REBELLUMQ. COSACCORUM ET PLEBIS UKRAYNEŃ
DUX.

Guilhelmi Hondius Haga Batavus S R M^o Chalcographus sculpsit. Cum privi^o S R M^o Godani An^o c^o d^o c^o l^o i

Bohdan Khmelnytsky

PEREIASLAV 1654:

A Historiographical Study

by

John Basarab

**The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
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A Note From The Publisher

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Pereiaslav: History and Myth

An Introduction
by Ivan L. Rudnytsky

When Pieter Geyl, the eminent Dutch historian, was prevented from pursuing archival research during the Second World War, he embarked on a project on the basis of secondary sources. This was the origin of *Napoleon, For and Against*, a brilliant study of the emperor's changing image in French historical literature.

Western students of Ukrainian history face a similar situation to that of Geyl, namely a lack of access to primary sources. Foreign scholars rarely have the opportunity of working in the archives and libraries of the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, when Dr. John Basarab, author of the present work, resolved to re-examine the Khmelnytsky era in seventeenth-century Ukraine, and its crucial episode, the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654, he chose the historiographical approach as the most practicable.

Historiographical studies may offer a double scholarly benefit. First, they provide a better insight into and understanding of the subject, by looking at it from the various standpoints, taken by previous researchers. Second, they serve as contributions to intellectual history inasmuch as they illustrate the evolution of historical thought and social ideologies.

The Khmelnytsky era, including the Pereiaslav agreement, lends itself well to a historiographical treatment. It gave rise not only to lively, often passionate, scholarly controversies, but also to certain ideological constructs which have played, and continue to play, a significant role in the life of Ukraine and Russia. Therefore, in approaching the subject, a historian will have to differentiate between problems on two distinct, though connected, levels: on the one hand, the seventeenth-century events themselves, which,

obviously, must be studied within the context of their own time; and, on the other hand, the latter-day ideological outcroppings, which reflect contemporaneous social conditions and political interests. To elucidate this essential distinction one can refer to the example of the Magna Carta, which also presents itself under a double aspect, as an episode in the early-thirteenth-century struggle between King John and the barons, and as an issue in English constitutional conflicts of a later age.

The Khmelnytsky era and the Pereiaslav agreement have preoccupied a number of Ukrainian, Russian and, to a lesser extent, also Polish historians, but so far they have hardly attracted the attention of Western specialists. It is hoped that Dr. Basarab's critical discussion of relevant literature will bring this important topic within the purview of Western scholarship. The purpose of the following remarks is to provide an introduction to the two levels of the Pereiaslav problem, considered as History and as Myth.

* * *

Sixteen forty-eight is memorable in European history. It was the year of the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War in Germany and gave international recognition to the independence of Switzerland and the United Netherlands; the year of the Second Civil War in England and the Fronde in France. In the eastern half of the continent, it saw the beginning of the Ukrainian Cossack uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. A protracted Polish-Ukrainian conflict ensued, and six years later, by the so-called Pereiaslav agreement (named after a town east of the Dnieper river), Ukraine accepted the overlordship of the Muscovite tsar.

There exists a consensus among historians that the *Khmelnychchyna* (Khmelnytsky era) gave a new shape to Eastern Europe and constituted a turning point in the history of three nations; Poland, Russia and Ukraine. This crisis inflicted irreparable damage to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, deprived it permanently of the position of a great power, and began the irreversible decline which culminated, more than a century later, in the Partitions. And Poland's loss was Russia's gain. Before the Cossack revolution, Poland-Lithuania had the upper hand militarily over Muscovy. The breakthrough to the Baltic Sea, attempted by Tsar Ivan IV in the Livonian War (1557-82) was repulsed by the commonwealth. In the early years of the seventeenth century, during Russia's Time of Troubles, Moscow even found itself temporarily under Polish occupation, with a Polish prince about to ascend the tsar's throne. Russia suffered another setback in the Smolensk War of 1632-4. Ukrainian Cossack forces played

a prominent role in these commonwealth victories. A radical shift in the balance of power occurred when Hetman Khmelnytsky placed Ukraine “under the high hand” of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, the second ruler of the Romanov dynasty. Moscow’s control of Ukraine, it is true, remained tenuous for decades, and it was effective in the eastern half of the country only, the so-called Left Bank. Still, this provided the tsarist state with a base for future expansion into the Black Sea, Balkan and Central European areas. Thus, Pereiaslav was the crucial step in the rise of the landlocked tsardom of Muscovy to the position of a European great power. This applies also to the internal transformation of semi-Asiatic Muscovy into the modern Russian empire. Ukraine became Russia’s first “window to the West”; Ukrainian cultural influences helped to prepare the ground for Peter I’s modernizing reforms.

But what place does *Khmelnychchyna* occupy in the history of the nation most directly affected, Ukraine? One major consequence of the mid-seventeenth-century upheaval is obvious: it transferred Ukraine from the Polish to the Russian orbit. Pereiaslav was the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian association which, for better or worse, still endures today. This, however, does not exhaust the significance of the Cossack revolution in Ukrainian history. In the course of the struggle against Poland, the Zaporozhian Army was transformed into a body politic, which exercised control over a considerable territory, established a system of administration and created a government. Thus there emerged a Ukrainian Cossack state, which for some years enjoyed *de facto* independence. Pereiaslav did not terminate the existence of that state: the agreement contained assurances of Ukraine’s extensive autonomy. In practice, Hetman Khmelnytsky continued to act as an independent ruler after 1654.

There is room for legitimate disagreement concerning the juridical nature of the link established between Ukraine and Muscovy in 1654. This question has been much debated, and John Basarab’s monograph provides a lucid survey of the spectrum of scholarly opinions. One thing, however, may be considered as reasonably certain: Pereiaslav did not amount to a “re-unification” of Ukraine with Russia, a submersion of Ukraine into the Russian state. The point needs to be stressed, because this highly implausible interpretation has been elevated in the Soviet Union to the level of an official dogma. This, however, belongs to the domain of the Pereiaslav myth, about which more will be said below.

To comprehend what Pereiaslav actually meant in the setting of its time, one has to compare it with the Zaporozhian Army’s similar treaties with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman empire, both before and after 1654. The Pereiaslav agreement did not differ from them in substance. Like them, it was a response to a specific situation, and

motivated not by the Ukrainian people's imaginary yearning for union with their Russian brethren, but by the Cossack elite's understanding of their country's current political self-interest. It was only natural that Ukraine's partners, in this case Moscow, also pursued their own objectives and tried to secure for themselves the maximum advantages, usually at Ukraine's expense.

This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of Hetman Khmelnytsky's complex policies. It may suffice to say that he had an acute sense of Ukraine's vulnerable geopolitical position and that, like Bismarck, he was haunted by *le cauchemar des coalitions*. Khmelnytsky's chief concern seems to have been to prevent a situation in which Ukraine would have to fight a war on two fronts simultaneously. In order to achieve this objective, Khmelnytsky was willing to pay a high price. For instance, he clung for a number of years to the Crimean alliance, despite the Tatars' depredations and notorious unreliability, and the unpopularity of this policy with the Ukrainian people. But as long as the contest with Poland was still undecided, Khmelnytsky preferred to keep the Tatars as fickle allies, lest he would have to deal with them as overt enemies in the rear. Similar considerations induced Khmelnytsky to align his country with Moscow in 1654. He wished to check the imminent danger of Ukraine's encirclement, resulting from a rapprochement between Poland and the Crimean khanate. Furthermore, he hoped to break with Russian aid the military deadlock in the war against Poland and to bring under the Zaporozhian Army's control the western Ukrainian and southern Belorussian territories, still held by the commonwealth. The price for this was the acceptance of the tsar's suzerainty or protectorate. There is plenty of evidence to show that Khmelnytsky did not think that the Pereiaslav agreement limited his freedom of political movement in any essential way.

Soon after Pereiaslav, frictions and frustrations erupted in the relations between the Zaporozhian Army and its nominal overlord in Moscow. In response to this, Khmelnytsky embarked on a new foreign policy course. While avoiding a premature break with the tsar, his plan was now to ally Ukraine with the bloc of Protestant powers, consisting of Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia, Transylvania and the Calvinist, anti-commonwealth party in Lithuania. Simultaneously, he renewed his former ties with the Porte and its vassals, Moldavia and Wallachia. The international system, envisaged by Khmelnytsky, was directed primarily against Poland, but potentially also against Russian ambitions. The great hetman's early death, in 1657, prevented the realization of his bold design. Still, Khmelnytsky's alliance with Charles X Gustavus of Sweden served as a precedent for that of Hetman Ivan Mazepa with Charles XII against Peter I in 1708.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky has been both praised and blamed as the reputed architect of Ukraine's union with Russia. Thus, the tsarist government, during the most reactionary reign of Alexander III, erected a monument to Khmelnytsky in Kiev, and, for the same reason, he is now being highly honoured in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the bard of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national renaissance, Taras Shevchenko, cursed Khmelnytsky as the man responsible for his people's enslavement by Russian despotism. In fact, however, both praise and blame are unfounded. They do not express the historical reality of the *Khmelnychchyna*, but reflect rather the Pereiaslav myth. The latter arose in a later era out of the shipwreck of Ukrainian Cossack statehood. This imparted *ex post facto* a new meaning to the 1654 agreement, a meaning not intended and not foreseen by Khmelnytsky and his contemporaries.

* * *

After the turmoil of the second half of the seventeenth century, the so-called *Ruina* (Time of Ruin), and especially after the defeat of Charles XII and Mazepa at Poltava in 1709, Ukraine found itself permanently incorporated into the Russian imperial system. The bid for independence had failed, and the pro-Russian orientation had prevailed over the pro-Polish and pro-Turkish alternatives. The Ukrainian Cossack body politic, officially named Little Russia and popularly known as the Hetmanate (*Hetmanshchyna*), was now territorially reduced to the regions east of the Dnieper, the Left Bank, and lowered in status to the position of a subordinate entity within the framework of the Russian empire. Still, Little Russia remained for several decades administratively distinct from Russia proper, it retained its own laws and customs, and local government was in the hands of the Cossack officers' stratum, the *starshyna*. The makeshift, *ad hoc* Pereiaslav agreement assumed retrospectively the character of a constitutional charter, defining Left-Bank Ukraine's position in the Russian empire. Although periodically revised in an ever more restrictive manner, it was considered as legally binding in principle. This constellation gave birth to the Pereiaslav myth, which served the political needs of both the imperial government and of those segments of Ukrainian society, which, making a virtue out of necessity, wished to co-operate with the imperial system.

From St. Petersburg's point of view, the Pereiaslav myth legitimized the annexation of Ukraine by the Russian empire. This was the obvious and most important reason why "The Articles of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky" were later included in the *Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire* and remained on the statute books until the 1917 Revolution.

But the Pereiaslav myth was also adaptable to the needs of the Hetmanate's *starshyna*, who were searching for a political concept capable of combining loyalty to the Russian monarchy with the defence of the autonomy of their country and their own social privileges. To reconcile these two goals entailed rejecting, as inconsequential instances of individual "treason," the compromising memories of those hetmans—Vyhovsky, Doroshenko and Mazepa—who had overtly risen against Moscow. The positive counterpart of this renunciation of separatism was the transformation of the Pereiaslav event into a juridical and political concept, legitimizing Cossack Ukraine's traditional "rights and liberties." This elevation into mythology is easily traceable in eighteenth-century Cossack chronicles. But perhaps its clearest formulation can be found in the versified historical-political tract, "A Conversation between Great Russia and Little Russia," written in 1762 by Semen Divovych, a clerk in the Hetmanate's military chancery. Little Russia addresses Great Russia, both personified as ladies:

Khmelnysky took cognizance of [the wishes of] his Army and, feeling encouraged, approached the Russian monarch (*gosudar*) and submitted to him the [Zaporozhian] Army together with all Ukraine. To that effect, he took at Pereiaslav an oath of eternal allegiance in the presence of the Russian boyar Buturlin. Aleksei Mikhailovich, the ruling autocrat (*samoderzhets*), seeing this manifest sign of my [Little Russia's] voluntary submission, granted a royal charter of liberties, wherein he confirmed and restored all former articles I have subjected myself not to you [Great Russia], but only to your monarch Don't think that you yourself are my mistress; the monarch is your and my common ruler.¹

Divovych stresses the parity of Little Russia with Great Russia, united in loyal service to the common monarch; at the same time, Little Russia enjoys self-government, as guaranteed by the "royal charter of liberties," i.e., the terms of the Pereiaslav agreement. It is to be noted that at this stage of the myth's evolution, about one century after the event, what in fact had been a bilateral, negotiated settlement, a treaty, had assumed the character of a unilateral, and therefore revocable, act of tsarist munificence.

The myth did not lose its relevance after the suppression of Left-Bank Ukraine's autonomy, which occurred in several stages from the 1760s to the 1780s. It allowed the descendants of the Cossack *starshyna*,

transformed into Russian *dvoriane*, to regard themselves not as a subjugated people, but as a part of the imperial elite. The fiction of their ancestors' "voluntary oath of allegiance" enabled Little Russian nobles to serve the monarch and the empire honourably, without loss of self-respect. Such conformism did not preclude the survival of a sense of Ukrainian ethnic identity and regional patriotism. The latter inspired, during the first half of the nineteenth century, historical and folkloristic research and literary works, some of which were written in Russian, but some in the Ukrainian vernacular. In this manner the beginnings of the Ukrainian cultural revival were rooted in the tradition of the Cossack era.

Dreams about the restoration of an autonomous Hetmanate lingered on until approximately the middle of the century, and the thinking of Left-Bank aristocratic circles still focused on the Pereiaslav concept. A well-informed contemporary observer recorded that during the post-Crimean War "thaw" rumours were abroad in Ukraine that mentioned specific personalities as candidates to the hetmancy and other traditional Cossack offices.² This situation was not to last, however. The tsarist government showed no inclination of making concessions to Ukrainian autonomism, even of a conservative and loyalist type, but rather persisted in its policy of centralization and Russification. Left-Bank nobles became increasingly assimilated to the imperial establishment, with a concomitant weakening of their Ukrainian attachments. As to the Ukrainian national movement, it assumed from the 1860s on a decidedly populist character. Ukrainian populism stressed service to the peasantry and the idea of ethnic nationality; it had no interest in historical legitimism and state rights, which appeared archaic and tainted with aristocratic privilege. These developments undermined the Pereiaslav myth as a relevant political concept.

One might have assumed that the Pereiaslav myth would have been finally laid to rest by the 1917 Revolution. The myth was strongly tinged with traditional monarchism, an idea for which, obviously, neither the new Bolshevik rulers of Russia, nor the leftist founding fathers of the Ukrainian People's Republic had any use. We know only of two instances, from the First World War and revolutionary era, when Ukrainian leaders referred to Pereiaslav in official pronouncements. The manifesto issued upon the outbreak of war, on 3 August 1914, by the Supreme Ukrainian Council, the political representation of the Galician Ukrainians, proclaimed that "the Russian tsars violated the Treaty of Pereiaslav by which they undertook the obligation to respect the independence of Ukraine"; the manifesto called for support of the Central Powers' war effort and expressed the hope that the coming defeat of Russia would bring liberation to Ukraine.³ The second reference is in a speech of Hetman Pavlo

Skoropadsky, addressed on 21 June 1918 to a delegation of school teachers. Skoropadsky stated that Ukraine united with Muscovy at Pereiaslav “as an equal with an equal” (a formulation reminiscent of Divovych), but that the union resulted in a “250 year-long heavy national bondage for the Ukrainian people.”⁴ The two mentioned cases were exceptional. Neither the Galician leaders, raised in the atmosphere of Austrian constitutionalism, nor Skoropadsky, the conservative scion of the Left-Bank aristocracy, were typical of the populist and socialist mainstream of the Ukrainian Revolution. It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian People’s Republic’s declaration of independence on 22 January 1918 contained no reference to historical rights and the breach of the Pereiaslav agreement by Russia; the act was based exclusively on the democratic principle of national self-determination. After the Soviet regime became firmly established in Ukraine in 1920–1, any reasonable observer would have predicted that Pereiaslav had forever lost all practical significance and that henceforth it would preoccupy solely professional historians.

The above prognosis was belied by post-Second World War developments. The tercentenary of the Pereiaslav agreement in 1954 was celebrated throughout the Soviet Union with unprecedented pomp. On that occasion, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union issued a lengthy doctrinal statement outlining the official interpretation of the 1654 event and of Russian-Ukrainian relations, past and present. The 1954 “Theses” retain their binding force in the USSR to this day. The anniversary of Pereiaslav was again solemnly commemorated in 1979, though on a more modest scale than twenty-five years earlier.

What is the meaning of this surprising resurrection of an old-regime myth under Communist auspices? Soviet Russia, like its tsarist predecessor, is faced with the problem of legitimizing Russian domination over Ukraine. The decisive factor in the establishment of Soviet rule in Ukraine was the armed intervention of the Russian Red Army; local Communists, the overwhelming majority of whom were ethnically non-Ukrainian, played only an auxiliary role. The fact of military conquest, however, was politically camouflaged as the fraternal aid of Russian workers and peasants to their Ukrainian brethren. The ideology of revolutionary Marxism and proletarian internationalism provided the legitimizing function. The facade of a technically independent Ukrainian republic was maintained for some years after the Soviet victory. When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed in 1923, this step was rationalized by the necessity of a closer alliance of free and independent socialist states, threatened by capitalist encirclement. The Union was

deliberately given a supra-national name, to avoid the impression that it was a continuation of the tsarist empire. It was even assumed at the time that in the event of successful Communist revolutions in other countries, outside former Russian imperial boundaries, they, too, would join the USSR. The constituent republics retained, on paper, the right of secession from the federation, and hence nominal sovereignty. Furthermore, genuine concessions were made to the non-Russian nationalities in the linguistic and cultural sphere.

Lenin's brilliant nationality policy, which combined centralized political control with flexibility in matters of administrative structure and language, was a key factor in the restoration of a unified Russian imperial state in new forms. It permitted Ukrainian and other non-Russian Communists to serve the regime in good faith, without the sense of being traitors to their own nations. (Ukrainian Bolsheviks were few in number, but they were politically important if Soviet rule in Ukraine was to be given a local colour.) This policy also had a confusing and divisive effect on the forces of the Ukrainian national resistance. Lenin's apparent broad-mindedness compared favourably with the rigid chauvinism of the Russian "Whites" and the non-recognition of Ukraine by the Western powers. In such circumstances, many sincere patriots, who originally supported the independent Ukrainian People's Republic, were inclined to accept the "Soviet platform," if not as an ideal, at least as a tolerable solution. The essential point in the context of the present discussion is the fact that in all these political dealings of the post-1917 revolutionary era there cannot be found the slightest hint of reference to the Pereiaslav tradition. Why then, we may ask, was this obsolete concept revived with great fanfare in 1954?

The answer to the question is that, after the Second World War, the old Leninist ideological devices no longer sufficed to legitimize the subordinate status of Ukraine within the Russian-dominated Soviet Union. The argument of the so-called capitalist encirclement lost its plausibility. Owing to the extension of Soviet control over East Central Europe, the Ukrainian SSR no longer bordered on any capitalist country. Its western neighbours—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania—had all become members of the Socialist Bloc. There was nothing in the theoretical tenets of Marxism-Leninism that could justify the inferior position of Ukraine in comparison with the socialist countries outside the USSR. Two solutions would have been logical on Marxist-Leninist premises: the incorporation of the states of East Central Europe into the Soviet federation, or the dissolution of the Soviet Union in its present form and the creation of a new alliance system of technically independent socialist nations. For obvious reasons, neither alternative appealed to the Kremlin.

Furthermore, a gradual and unacknowledged but undeniable erosion of Marxist-Leninist ideology had taken place in the Soviet Union. The utopian faith in an imminent world revolution, international solidarity of the proletariat, and the future socialist paradise on earth, which during the early post-1917 years exercised a genuine fascination, and which, by a quasi-religious fervour, bound together Russian and non-Russian Communists, lost much of its actual motivating power. The decline of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism was paralleled by a resurgence of Russian nationalism. Beginning in the 1930s, and particularly during the war years, Stalin made a deliberate appeal to Russian national emotions and state traditions. The Russification of the Soviet system entailed an undesirable and dangerous side effect: it was bound to provoke a nationalist reaction among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. In the case of the smaller nationalities, their disaffection could be held in check by the sheer physical preponderance of the Russian massifs. Because of the size of its population, its economic resources, and its strategic geographical location, Ukraine presented a special and most sensitive problem. The resuscitation of the Pereiaslav myth is to be understood as an attempt to find a solution to this predicament.

The official revival of the Pereiaslav concept in the Soviet Union occurred in the 1950s. There exists, however, a pre-Second World War precedent that is worthy of attention, inasmuch as it provides a link between the tsarist and the Soviet versions of the myth. In 1938 there appeared in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, a pamphlet by Vasilii Vitalevich Shulgin, entitled *The Anschluss and We*.⁵ Before discussing its content, a few words should be said about the author. Shulgin used to play a fairly prominent political role during the last decade of imperial Russia, as editor of the Kievan daily, *Kievlianin*, as a gifted and prolific publicist, and as a leading spokesman of the right-wing Nationalist party in the Duma. A native of Ukraine, Shulgin was a dedicated advocate of "one-and-indivisible" Russia, and he specialized in combating the Ukrainian movement. (A second cousin of Vasilii Vitalevich, Oleksander Mykolaiovych Shulhyn—the Ukrainian form of the name—was to serve as minister of foreign affairs in the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and later became a noted émigré Ukrainian scholar. Such divisions within one family were not uncommon.) In his 1938 pamphlet, Shulgin compared Hitler's recent *Anschluss* of Austria to Germany with the Pereiaslav event, as examples of a voluntary unification of two, previously separated branches of one people in a single state. What matters is not Shulgin's misinterpretation of the historical Pereiaslav agreement, nor his questionable reading of the *Anschluss*, but the underlying political thesis. He argued that the decisive factor in the relations between North

and South Russia (i.e., Russia and Ukraine) was national consciousness. Provided that the South or Little Russians possess a pan-Russian awareness, they would be drawn irresistably toward a merger with the North, as the Austrian Germans were drawn toward a union with the Reich. In that case, a temporary political separation of the Russian South from the North—resulting, for instance, from a foreign occupation—would have no lasting effect. If, on the other hand, “the southern Russians were to become Ukrainians, the cause of Oleksander Shulhyn would win, the wheel of history would be turned back, and northern Russia would become again what it was before Bohdan Khmelnytsky, that is, Russia would be reduced to the level of Muscovy.”

Shulgin's subsequent personal fate is of symptomatic interest. Apprehended by Soviet security organs in Yugoslavia at the end of the war, he was taken to Moscow, and tried for counter-revolutionary activities. Upon his release in 1956, Shulgin addressed several open letters to the Russian émigrés, advising them to accept the regime which had brought greatness to the Motherland. Thus the former admirer of Stolypin and ideologue of Denikin's Volunteer Army ended his long career as an apologist for Soviet Communism. One can only wonder to what extent this conversion was facilitated by Shulgin's life-long commitment to Russian nationalism and virulent anti-Ukrainianism.

There is no telling whether Shulgin's ideas actually influenced the shaping of Soviet policy regarding Ukraine, but the similarity is unmistakable. The gist of the 1954 “Theses” is the concept of a preordained unity of fate of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, rooted in the common tradition of Kievan Rus' and extending through all historical epochs, with the Pereiaslav agreement as the pivotal, symbolic event. The Ukrainian people are to be educated in the spirit of a complete, unconditional solidarity with the Russians, sharing with the latter a common political consciousness and “high” culture. Assuming the existence of a total Russian-Ukrainian solidarity, the question of specific Ukrainian values and interests, which per chance may not coincide with the Russian, is prevented from arising: the Ukrainians are not to be concerned with the status of their nation, but rather are to glorify in Russia's achievements as their own. It is true that the Soviet regime recognizes in principle a distinct Ukrainian nationality, which tsarist Russia denied, and a Ukrainian SSR continues to exist as an administrative entity, which even retains some ornamental paraphernalia of statehood. But the difference is perhaps more apparent than real, inasmuch as the Soviet regime is careful to drain Ukrainian national identity of all independent, vital substance and denies to the Ukrainian republic any sphere of meaningful self-government. A Ukrainian nation, whose entire destiny is to play

forever the role of a younger brother and accomplice of Russia, differs little from pre-revolutionary Little Russia—a tribal branch of a single Russian nation.

The effectiveness of the Pereiaslav myth requires eradication of the incompatible features of the Ukrainian historical tradition, those contradicting the dogma of a perennial Russian-Ukrainian harmony. The historical memory of the Ukrainian people is to be pressed into a prefabricated mould: a large part of the record is to be expunged, while other parts undergo various more or less subtle manipulations. National consciousness always possesses a historical dimension. This is the reason for the Soviet regime's extraordinary watchfulness in all matters pertaining to Ukrainian historical studies and writing, both academic and popular, including historical fiction.

Under Soviet conditions, it is impossible to challenge overtly official doctrines. This does not mean, however, that Ukrainian society, and especially the intellectual circles, have accepted the Pereiaslav myth and all that it implies. In this connection, it is worth quoting a long passage from a recent statement by a Soviet Ukrainian dissident, Iurii Badzo:

The falsification of Ukrainian history in contemporary Soviet historiography is not limited to an individual period, but encompasses the entire history of the Ukrainian people. It negates our historical development as an autonomous process and subordinates interpretation to the political interests of the Russian state. The concept of the "Old Russian nationality," which is merely an ideological twin of the theory of "the one Soviet people," completely suppresses the early feudal period in Ukraine's history [For the period] before the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the reader will find nothing Ukrainian in Soviet literature: no territory, no language, no culture, not even an ethnos. The scientifically and historically absurd idea is being asserted that, from the ninth to the thirteenth century, the Eastern Slavs constituted one people, one ethnos, which, of course, was Russian; the Ukrainians and Belorussians [allegedly] appeared only in the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries. They appeared for no other purpose than to "dream" about "re-unification" with Russia. All peoples of the world aspired, and still aspire, toward national independence. Only the Ukrainians and the Belorussians are an exception: their dream was to "re-unify" with Russia. We have reached the point where the Soviet press and literature write about Ukraine's wish to re-unify with Russia "in one state." This is a gross distortion of historical truth even from a formal point of view. Documents testify that the Ukrainian government headed by B. Khmelnytsky, in negotiating an agreement with the Russian state's representatives, reserved for itself substantial political autonomy. The conception of "re-unification" implies the idea of one people, and in essence it denies to the Ukrainian

people the right to a separate, independent state The falsification of Ukrainian history by Russian great-power nationalism is a most important factor in the national oppression of the Ukrainian people.⁶

Only the future will tell whether these insidious efforts to manipulate the historical consciousness of the Ukrainian people will succeed or fail. One prognosis can be ventured, however: the Pereiaslav agreement is a topic which, besides its scholarly historical interest, is likely to retain for a long time also a political dimension. This situation enhances the relevance of John Basarab's work, in which the author has candidly and competently undertaken to set straight the historiographical record of the Pereiaslav problem.

Notes

1. S. Divovych, "Razhovor Velykorossii s Malorossieiu," in O. I. Biletsky, ed., *Khrestomatiia davnoi ukrainskoi literatury*, 3d ed. (Kiev, 1967), 474. In my translation I somewhat simplified the Baroque wording of the original.
2. Ukrainofil, "Eshche ob ukrainofilstve," *Russkoe bogatstvo*, part 2, no. 2 (1882): 11.
3. K. Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukrainsiv 1848–1914* (Lviv, 1926), 720.
4. D. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917–1923*, vol. 2, *Ukrainska Hetmanska Dèrzhava 1918 roku* (Uzhhorod, 1930), 83.
5. V. V. Shulgin, *Anshlus i my* (Belgrade, 1938). Summary and quotations are derived from W. Bączkowski's review article, "Perspektywy anshlusu rosyjsko-ukraińskiego," *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński* 7, no. 35 (Warsaw, 18 September 1938): 377–8.
6. Iu. Badzo, *Vidkrytyi lyst do Verkhovnoi Rady Soiuzu RSR ta Tsentralnoho Komitetu KPRS* (New York, 1980), 17–18.

Preface

Variously called “The Deluge,” “The Great Cossack War,” “The Khmelnytsky Rebellion,” “The Struggle of National Liberation of the Ukrainian People” and “The Reunification of Ukraine with Russia,” the Ukrainian Cossack revolution that started in 1648 and culminated in the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement is a watershed in the history of Eastern Europe. Over a three-hundred-year period, there have been many interpretations of Pereiaslav and even the descriptions of the accord have varied. By focusing on the views of selected historians, this study shows how the understanding of this crucial event has developed in Ukrainian, Polish and Russian historiography.

The 1648–54 Cossack rebellion that led to the Pereiaslav accord marked the failure of efforts to reform the structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into a federation of three peoples: the Poles, the Lithuanians and the Ruthenians or Ukrainians. The ensuing collapse of the commonwealth, in turn, paved the way for the expansion of the tsardom of Moscow, which had taken the rebellious Ukrainians “under the tsar’s high hand” in 1654. Thus, the Pereiaslav accord is an integral part of the growth of the Russian empire, an important episode in what is often termed “the gathering of Russian lands.”

Many historians have, of course, treated this era—often termed “the Khmelnytsky era” after the Cossack leader Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the principal architect of the Pereiaslav accord—in terms of their own ideologies. In the nineteenth century, their analyses often reflected democratic, nationalist and socialist ideas. The most striking example of an

ideological interpretation, however, occurred in the Soviet Union after the Second World War. The Soviet leadership sought to consolidate its power by emphasizing the common bonds between the Russians and Ukrainians and in 1954 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union issued its "Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia." Historians were directed to treat the Pereiaslav agreement and Bohdan Khmelnytsky as the embodiment of Russian-Ukrainian unity. The mythical Soviet interpretation of Pereiaslav has been vigorously employed to sustain political loyalties in Eastern Europe.

However, it is truth and not myth that is the real concern of historians. Even so, there are a number of difficulties in assessing the events of Pereiaslav and what the accord involved. There are few primary sources and none are Ukrainian. Such inaccurate writings as the Cossack Chronicles are as likely to confuse as to clarify. Moreover, archival material in Russia was tampered with by tsarist officials. Considerable confusion is also caused by inconsistent terminology: in Eastern Europe linguistic peculiarities and differing political sensibilities have given rise to a multiplicity of terms for identical phenomena.¹ For the sake of clarity and simplicity, this study uses the terms "Russia," "Great Russia" and "Muscovy" interchangeably; the same is true for "Ukraine," "Ruthenia" and "Little Russia."² In the study such terms carry no pejorative connotation.

Modern terminology is used in reference to three nations that now comprise the Eastern Slavs—the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. In reference to the seventeenth century, the term "Ruthenians" refers to the Eastern Slavs within the confines of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth only, while the terms "Russians" and "Muscovites" refer to the Eastern Slavs with their state organization in Moscow. Although in its precise meaning the term Ruthenians embraces the ancestors of both Ukrainians and Belorussians, the term as used here refers primarily to the Ukrainians.

It should also be remembered that ethnic nationalism arose in Eastern Europe only after the seventeenth century. Thus, many sources refer to those loyal to the commonwealth as Poles, when, in fact, this category also included Lithuanians and Ruthenians. Some, such as Adam Kysil, were Ruthenian patriots who saw no conflict between loyalty to the commonwealth and their specific ethnic or religious affinities. Others voluntarily embraced Polish cultural values and preferred to be known as Poles. Accordingly, it is a convenient simplification to refer to pro-commonwealth forces in the seventeenth century as Poles.

Aside from the difficulties surrounding documentation and terminology, another major problem is the precise juridical status of the Cossack state

in 1654. Specialists in international law have described the agreement as a temporary alliance, a permanent alliance or union of equal partners, a personal union, vassalage for the Ukrainians, a protectorate status for Ukraine, an autonomous status for Ukraine and the outright incorporation of Ukraine into Russia. Recent Soviet use of the word “reunion” (*vossoedinenie*) in all references to Pereiaslav, canonized by the official decree of 1954, has only complicated the issue further.

In recording precise dates, difficulty arises over the ten-day difference between the Old Style (Julian) and the New Style (Gregorian) calendar introduced by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582. The commonwealth accepted the new calendar in 1583, but King Stefan Batory permitted its Orthodox population to retain the Julian calendar. Russia, like most eastern Christian lands, did not accept the New Style calendar. In this study, important events are dated in both the New and the Old Styles. The Pereiaslav *rada*, for example, took place on 18 (8) January 1654—with the date in parentheses referring to the Old Style. All dates after the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, however, follow the New Style.

Notes

1. For a discussion of this problem, see S. M. Horak, “Periodization and Terminology of the History of the Eastern Slavs; Observations and Analyses,” in *Slavic Review* 31, no. 4 (December 1972): 853–62.
2. Despite conflicting terminology, most historians stress the different historical vicissitudes of the ancestors of the modern Russians and Ukrainians. Sergei Solovev, for example, in *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen* points out the differences in the historical development of “North-East Rus” (*Severno-Vostochnaia Rus'*) and “South-West Rus” (*Iugo-Zapadnaia Rus'*), a dichotomy which he also called “Northern Rus’ ” and “Southern Rus’” (*Iuzhnaia Rus'*). Synonyms used by Solovev for these two entities include: for Russia, *Velikaia Rossiia* (Great Russia), *Severnaia Rus'* (Northern Rus') and *Severno-Vostochnaia Rus'* (Northeastern Rus'); for Ukraine, *Kievskaiia Rus'* (Kievan Rus'), *Drevniaia Rus'* (Ancient Rus'), *drevniaia sobstvennaia Rus'* (ancient Rus' proper), *Rus' v samom tesnom smysle* (Rus' in its most precise meaning), *Iugo-Zapadnaia Rus'* (Southwest Rus') and *Iuzhnaia Staraiia Rus'* (southern ancient Rus'). Among the troublesome terms in Russian sources one also finds *Rus'*, *Rossiia*, *russkii*, *rossiiskii*, *Malaia Rus'*, *Iuzhnaia Rus'*, *Belaia Rus'* and *Moskovskoe gosudarstvo*. Most Polish and Ukrainian sources, on the other hand, use distinct words to differentiate between the Eastern Slavs in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and those

in Russia (Muscovy). Polish forms requiring consistent translation into English include *Rosja*, *Ruś*, *rosyjski*, *Rusin*, *ruski* and *rusiński*. Ukrainian parallels, with the name *Ukraina* itself with its derivatives, also require unambiguous renderings in English.

Chapter One

Historical Review

To comprehend the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement, it is necessary to examine related events, particularly those during the reigns of King Władysław IV (1632–48) and King Jan Kazimierz (1648–68), who were faced with the problem of transforming Poland-Lithuania into a tripartite (Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian) federation. Their failure to accomplish this in the wake of the Cossack revolution, led to the breakdown of the commonwealth and the ascendancy of the Muscovite state.¹

Before the Deluge (1596–1648)

In the sixteenth century the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was a large and unique state with a diffuse structure and a tradition of cultural pluralism. Because the Poles and Lithuanians were the most dominant nationalities, such terms as “The Commonwealth of Two Nations” (*Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów*) arose. None the less, it was a federation of four ethnic groups. In addition to the Catholic Poles and Lithuanians, the commonwealth embraced the Lutheran Prussians, joined formally in 1525 when the first duke of Prussia became a vassal of the Polish king, and the Orthodox Ruthenians, the world of *Ruś prawosławna*, a large East Slavic area with cultural traditions rooted in the ancient Kievan state and the Byzantine empire. These Ruthenians (*Rusini, rusyni*), subjected briefly to the Tatars, experienced pagan Lithuanian and then joint Lithuanian–Polish Catholic overlordship; they did not, however,

undergo the autocratic and centralizing processes that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries produced the Muscovite state.

The Ruthenians' vast lands and their vigorous aristocracy contributed greatly to the commonwealth's ascendancy in Eastern Europe. Most investigators agree that the Ruthenians were the most numerous element in Lithuania before and after the Union of Horodlo with Poland in 1413. Non-Polish aristocratic families, frequently descended from the Kievan House of Riurik and the Lithuanian House of Gedymin, enriched the history of the commonwealth.

In the commonwealth Polish-Ukrainian relations, in particular, were more intricate than most nationalist histories suggest. There was a common federation and a cosmopolitan landed nobility, but many Polish peasants migrated late in the sixteenth century to Ukrainian areas, where they assimilated rapidly. At the same time the influence of the Renaissance, Reformation and Counter Reformation in the commonwealth attracted many Ruthenian aristocrats who voluntarily embraced the Poles' European culture.²

Two factors, however, contributed to a breakdown in Polish-Ruthenian relations and the eventual outbreak of a bloody revolt in 1648. The first was the religious and cultural differences between the Roman Catholic Poles and the Orthodox Ruthenians. This cleavage was deepened with the triumph of the Catholic Counter Reformation and the establishment in 1596 of the Union of Churches at the Council of Brest.³ The second factor was the generally deplorable social and economic status of the peasantry throughout the commonwealth. The more desperate malcontents moved to the uninhabited regions of the lower-Dnieper basin (near the border with Turkey and its tributary state, the khanate of Crimea) and established a robust military society free from control of the central government in Warsaw. To protect themselves against the Tatars and Turks and to mount marauding expeditions of their own, the settlers, who became known as Cossacks, built fortresses (*sichi*) at strategic points. The most famous was the Zaporozhian Sich or "Fortress beyond the Rapids" on the island of Khortytsia in the lower-Dnieper area. It was built in the mid-sixteenth century by Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, a Ukrainian noble who espoused the Cossack way of life.⁴

In the early seventeenth century, tension in the commonwealth mounted. Attempts to control the Cossack settlements produced strong opposition to the king and the authorities in Warsaw. The situation became explosive, however, when the Cossack leaders linked their opposition to the defence of the Orthodox faith.⁵ During the 1632-4 Smolensk war, when Russia sought to wrest disputed Belorussian areas from Polish control, the Ukrainian Cossacks raided Muscovite territory.

The 1634 Treaty of Polianovka, which ended the Smolensk war, required Poland to exercise effective control over the Cossacks in the lower-Dnieper region.⁶

In 1636 disorder increased in the Ukrainian areas of the commonwealth. Adam Kysil, an Orthodox supporter of the commonwealth, became the chief negotiator on behalf of the new king's policy of reconciliation with the Cossacks. Władysław IV (son of Zygmunt III Vasa, who died in 1632) attempted to gain Cossack support for the commonwealth and to make peace between the Orthodox and the Uniate Ruthenians. His policy—to establish separate Uniate and Orthodox metropolitan sees in Kiev—was supported by Petro Mohyla, an Orthodox clergyman of Moldavian origin, who emerged as one of the most enlightened churchmen of his age.⁷

Social antagonisms among the Cossacks also contributed to the turmoil in the Ukrainian areas of the commonwealth. Conflict between the rank-and-file *chern* (dark masses) and the *starshyna* (officer corps) forced frequent changes in Cossack leadership. For example, in 1637 the aged leader of the “registered” Cossacks, Hetman Vasyl Tomylenko, was deposed by Pavlo Pavliuk, leader of the disaffected elements within the *chern*. He in turn was voted out of office by a Cossack assembly (*rada*), which named Sava Kononovych as the hetman recognized by the crown.

The Cossack Revolt and Early Russian Attitudes (1648–52)

In 1648 revolution broke out in the Ukrainian areas of the commonwealth, with Bohdan Khmelnytsky emerging as the champion of the Cossack cause. In neighbouring Muscovy, Aleksei Mikhailovich, a Romanov, became tsar in 1645; Patriarch Nikon acted as the young tsar's chief adviser when the issue of expansion into Ukraine became an important state concern. In Warsaw, Władysław IV was planning a new campaign against Turkey. When in 1646 Khmelnytsky complained to the king that he had suffered personal wrongs at the hands of government officials, Władysław, anxious for Cossack support, advised his subject to use military means in defence of his rights. Khmelnytsky fled to the Zaporozhian Sich, where he organized his forces, and in March 1648, obtained support from the Crimean khan in his struggle against the Poles.

The war began auspiciously for the Cossacks, who with their Tatar allies defeated the Poles at Zhovti Vody on 16 (6) May 1648 and at Korsun ten days later. From Bila Tserkva, Khmelnytsky issued an appeal for a general Ukrainian revolt, but at this point Władysław IV died. When Khmelnytsky's delegation arrived in Warsaw for negotiations, Adam Kysil,

head of the new group of commonwealth negotiators, asked for an end to the revolt. Khmelnytsky advocated acceptance of Kysil's proposals, but his moderate policy was rejected by extremists on both sides. Hostilities were renewed; Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, with a strong gentry faction, carried out harsh reprisals on the Cossacks who, in turn, often in open defiance of Khmelnytsky, perpetrated similar excesses.

After victories at Pyliavtsi and Zbarazh, Khmelnytsky learned that Jan Kazimierz, younger brother of the deceased Władysław, had become king. Earlier Kazimierz had written Khmelnytsky that should he become king he would restore the Cossacks' former freedoms and put an end to the conflict. However, the new king's attempt to follow a policy of moderation was unsuccessful. Khmelnytsky had become intransigent and now vowed to liberate the entire Ruthenian nation and drive the Poles back to the Vistula. Both sides used the brief armistice during the negotiations to prepare for renewed fighting. Khmelnytsky, expecting aid from the Tatars and Turks, dispatched Colonel Veshniak from Chyhyryn to solicit support from the tsar, but the latter refused to break the "eternal" Polianovka pact with Poland.

Early in July 1649 a combined force of Ukrainian Cossacks, Turks, Tatars and Don Cossacks besieged a commonwealth army at Zbarazh. When Khmelnytsky learned that Jan Kazimierz himself headed the main Polish army camped at Zboriv, he shifted his forces from Zbarazh and attacked Zboriv on 15 (5) August 1649. However, Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński persuaded the Tatar troops to defect, forcing the deserted Cossack leader to negotiate with the Poles and to sign a peace agreement.

Concluded on 18 (8) August 1649, the Zboriv treaty allowed for forty thousand registered Cossacks. (Registered Cossacks were granted official status by the commonwealth and were regarded as a kind of frontier defence unit. Because they were difficult to control, Warsaw attempted to limit their number. The Cossacks resisted this policy, especially as discontented peasants flocked to their ranks; thus the peasantry became increasingly allied with the Ukrainian political cause. Efforts to reduce the number of registered Cossacks were continued by Muscovy after the 1654 agreement brought the Ukrainian Cossacks under tsarist rule.) The agreement was a diplomatic victory for the Cossacks, but its terms were never carried out. Although it was ratified by the Diet in Warsaw, the Catholic clergy rejected the provision that admitted the Kiev metropolitan into the Senate. From the Ukrainian side, Khmelnytsky was unable to reduce the number of Cossacks or force insurgent peasants to return to the jurisdiction of their landlords. Zboriv had more than a passing significance, however; many historians believe that Khmelnytsky used the agreement as a model for his articles of petition presented to the Russians at Pereiaslav in 1654.

During the early phase of the rebellion, which evoked the sympathy of Orthodox Muscovy, the Russian government recognized that to aid the Ukrainians would be to risk war with the commonwealth. Conflicting reports of the Zboriv treaty and of Khmelnytsky's intentions compelled Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich to prohibit contact between his officers in the frontier fortress of Putivl and the Cossack leader. In October 1649 the tsarist envoy, Grigorii Neronov, refused Khmelnytsky's suggestion that Muscovy protect both the Cossacks and their Tatar allies because of the khan's vassalage to the Turkish sultan. Khmelnytsky then informed him of the khan's dissatisfaction with the Turks.

Fearing closer relations between the Poles and Ukrainians after Zboriv, Moscow tried to exploit their differences. In January 1650 the envoys Grigorii Pushkin, Stepan Pushkin and Gavriła Leontev were sent to Warsaw not only to demand punishment for the Poles responsible for improperly recording the tsar's title in official documents, but also to complain that certain books published in the commonwealth attacked the Romanov tsars Mikhail and Aleksei. They threatened war unless Warsaw returned the cities taken by Władysław IV and punished those who had insulted the tsar. Commonwealth leaders, in turn, tried to generate discord between Moscow and Khmelnytsky; in late 1650 they sent Albrycht Prazmowski to warn Moscow that Khmelnytsky was planning hostilities against the Russians.

After the failure of the Zboriv treaty, Khmelnytsky's hostility toward the Poles increased. War broke out and in June 1651 the Polish army defeated the Cossack forces at Berestechko, a small town in Volhynia. Further reprisals against the Ukrainians followed: Jeremi Wiśniowiecki with a force of thirty thousand men ravaged Volhynia; the Lithuanian hetman, Janusz Radziwiłł, occupied Kiev and desecrated Orthodox places of worship in retaliation for Khmelnytsky's excesses.⁸

Abandoned by the Crimean khan and without aid from Muscovy, Khmelnytsky was obliged to meet with the Crown Hetman Mikolaj Potocki on 28 (18) September 1651 at Bila Tserkva, where a new agreement was drafted. It reduced the number of registered Cossacks to twenty thousand and restricted their location to royal estates and the Kiev palatinate; forbade the stationing of Crown troops in the Kiev district where the Cossacks were located; and forced the Cossack leader to terminate his relationship with foreign powers, including the Crimean Tatars, who were to be expelled from Ukraine.

In 1651 the Russians clearly were unprepared to risk war with the commonwealth by giving military support to the Ukrainian revolt, and the Poles, in turn, intensified diplomatic efforts to deflect Russian attention.

Russian spokesmen continued to complain, however, that the tsar was being deliberately dishonoured in official commonwealth correspondence. Negotiations between the two sides in 1651–2 again resulted in heated quarrels.

Pereiaslav and Moscow (1653–4)

After the Bila Tserkva settlement, Khmelnytsky intensified his contacts with tsarist officials. Since a permanent settlement between Warsaw and the Ukrainians seemed unlikely, the tsar's advisers, fearing that the Crimean state might expand in the direction of Russian territory, began a policy of cautious rapprochement with Khmelnytsky as early as March 1652. The hetman's position was becoming increasingly precarious as the rank-and-file Cossacks protested his uncertain attitude toward the Poles. Moldavia, a Turkish vassalage, became an ally of Khmelnytsky after the latter forced a marriage between Tymish, his eldest son, and Rozanda, the daughter of Basil Lupul, the *hospodar* (ruler) of Moldavia.

In December 1652 Khmelnytsky sent a delegation headed by Samiilo Zarudny to Moscow to ask the tsar to take the Zaporozhian state "under his high hand" (under his protection). In early 1653 a Polish force under Colonel Stefan Czarniecki made a devastating raid into Ukrainian territory at a time when the Cossack leader was helping Lupul put down a revolt in Moldavia. Thus, in April 1653 a shaken Khmelnytsky dispatched two additional envoys, Kindrat Burliai and Siluan Muzhylovsky, to Moscow, with urgent appeals to Metropolitan Nikon and other Russian officials, to pressure the tsar to aid the commonwealth's Orthodox population. In fact the Moscow *Boiarskaia Duma* (Boyar's Council) had already decided, during a session on 4 March (22 February) 1653, to recommend that the tsar receive the Cossacks' petition favourably.

To mislead the Poles the tsar sent another delegation to the commonwealth on 4 May (24 April) 1653, led by Prince Boris Repnin-Obolensky, Bogdan Khitrovo and Almaz Ivanov. The Russians demanded immediate punishment of those who had insulted the tsar, informed the Poles that Khmelnytsky had accused them of breaking the Bila Tserkva agreement, and complained that the Orthodox Christians in the commonwealth were treated so badly that they preferred Moslem rule. A return to the Zboriv agreement was suggested, but the Poles refused. Khmelnytsky tried to influence the proceedings by threatening to negotiate with the Turks. Thus, in a note dated 2 July (22 June) 1653, the tsarist envoy Efim Ladyzhensky assured him that the Russians would protect the Cossacks and provide troops for their defence.

In August 1653 Ivan Fomin was sent from Moscow to assure Khmelnytsky that the tsar's intentions were serious and in the following month two more envoys, Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin, promised full-fledged support if the Repnin-Obolensky mission failed. As the unsuccessful Repnin-Obolensky mission returned to Moscow, the Streshnev–Bredikhin party was intercepted en route to Ukraine on 20 September by a courier who informed them that the tsar had agreed to accept the Cossack petition.

On 11 (1) October 1653 the *Zemskii Sobor* (Assembly of the Land) was convened in Moscow and with regard to the persecution of the Orthodox under Polish rule, decided to intervene in commonwealth affairs. (This was the last convocation of the *Zemskii Sobor*; by the mid-seventeenth century it had ceased to function.)

With fresh assurances from Streshnev and Bredikhin that Khmelnytsky seriously desired his protection, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich sent another delegation to Chyhyryn to establish the new relationship, headed by Vasilii Buturlin,⁹ Ivan Alferov and Larion Lopukhin. On 23 (13) December 1653 an advance party of six hundred Cossacks under Teteria met the Buturlin mission outside Pereiaslav and escorted it into the city, where the Russians were greeted in gala fashion. On 16 (6) January 1654 Khmelnytsky arrived in Pereiaslav and Ivan Vyhovsky, the Zaporozhian secretary-general (chancellor), arrived a day later. On 18 January Vyhovsky informed Buturlin that a high-level conference of Cossack colonels had agreed to accept tsarist protection and that an open *rada* would be held that day to allow the rank and file to confirm the officers' decision.

At this historic *rada* Khmelnytsky described the persecution of the commonwealth's Orthodox population and lamented the previous six years of war and destruction. He explained that the people were assembled to choose a sovereign—either the Turkish sultan, the Crimean khan, the Polish king or the Orthodox tsar of Great Russia. On Khmelnytsky's urging, the assembly accepted the tsar's offer of protection.

The hetman and his officers then conferred with Buturlin, who repeated the tsar's intention to protect the Zaporozhian Host and to provide military aid. The Cossack leaders and the Buturlin group entered the Pereiaslav cathedral, where the clergy gave an oath of allegiance to the tsar. Khmelnytsky asked Buturlin to swear—on the tsar's behalf—that the tsar would not betray the Cossacks to the Polish king, would not tamper with traditional Cossack freedoms and would provide documents verifying the Cossack officers' property. Buturlin refused to take an oath, stating that custom prevented him from doing so. Instead, he scolded Khmelnytsky and advised him to swear loyalty to the tsar, whereupon the latter left the

cathedral, accompanied by his advisers. On his instructions, two colonels, Teteria and Sakhnovych, returned and once again asked Buturlin to give the oath. When Buturlin stubbornly refused, the colonels explained that the Polish kings had also been required to give the oath. Buturlin replied that the behaviour of Polish kings was not a fit example to follow, for, in contrast to the tsars, they were neither trustworthy nor autocrats.¹⁰

When Teteria and Sakhnovych reported to Khmelnytsky, they returned to the cathedral, where all took the oath to the tsar. In return Buturlin presented Khmelnytsky with the symbols of the hetman's office and high-ranking Cossack officers were given expensive gifts. The next day, 19 (9) January 1654, the lower-ranked officers swore loyalty to the tsar. Several days later a group of high-ranking Cossack officers, including Vyhovsky and Teteria, asked Buturlin to provide, in place of the tsar's oath, formal documents confirming the traditional freedoms and property rights of the Cossacks. Buturlin refused, chided the Cossacks for making such a request, and disclosed that the Russians intended to force the inhabitants of various Ukrainian cities and towns to swear allegiance to the tsar.

On 26 (16) January 1654 the Buturlin mission arrived in Kiev, where they were met by Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv. The Russian authorities, ecclesiastical and governmental, were suspicious of Kosiv and compared him unfavourably with one of his predecessors, Iov Boretsky. (Moscow's animosity toward Kosiv has been attributed to his aristocratic background, but more significant was his strong personality; he resisted both Polish and Russian pressures and preferred ecclesiastical subordination to the weak and distant patriarch of Constantinople.) During their first meeting in Kiev, Kosiv and Buturlin were mutually distrustful. Although the population of Kiev, excepting the clergy and gentry, swore an oath of loyalty to the tsar on 27 (17) January, the metropolitan initially refused because many of his bishops and priests remained under Polish and Lithuanian rule and taking the oath would put them in jeopardy. Several days later, however, he relented and he and his entourage took the oath.

Thus, in 1654 the tsar of Moscow became directly concerned with the Ukrainian Cossacks and, as a result, Russian relations with the commonwealth deteriorated. In *Kurs russkoi istorii* (Course in Russian history), Vasili Kliuchevsky writes that Moscow deliberately protracted negotiations in the hope that the Cossacks would be weakened by their conflict with the Poles and thus more amenable to the tsar's will.

As for the Poles, the 1648 revolt instigated a conflict with the Russians that lasted until the Andrusovo armistice of 1667. During these two decades the Poles also faced a Swedish invasion; pressures from a resurgent Turkey and from the khanate of Crimea; and the ambitions of

Brandenburg-Prussia, as well as the diplomatic interference of Austria and France. The triple threat of Ukrainian revolt, Russian intervention and Swedish invasion severely weakened the commonwealth, destroyed Polish hegemony in Eastern Europe, and inaugurated Russian expansion westward. In response to the 1654 Russian-Ukrainian agreement, the Poles tried to retain Ukrainian territories by force and to induce the Cossacks to break their alliances with Moscow and the Crimea. In 1655 the Poles successfully forged an alliance with the Crimeans against Muscovy that lasted until 1666.

Relations between Poland's northern and western neighbours, however, remained troublesome. Despite the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the French continued their efforts with the Poles to form an anti-Habsburg coalition. In turn, Austria sought Poland as an ally against France and Sweden. The major foreign-policy objective of Frederick William, the elector of Brandenburg, was to end his vassalage, as duke of Prussia, to the Polish king. Moreover, at a time when the power of the Polish king was deteriorating, Russia was centralizing its bureaucracy and modernizing its forces. It was seeking ports on the Baltic and expanding to the Black Sea at the expense of the Crimea and Turkey. Most important, in pursuit of Ivan Kalita's (1328–40) goal—the “gathering of Russian lands”—Russia was moving into areas formerly under Lithuanian and Polish rule.

What is loosely referred to as the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement does not refer to a written treaty; nor does it refer to a specific document or to precise bilateral terms. Instead, it embraces three related sets of events: first, the preliminary negotiations during the now-historic *rada* at Pereiaslav in January 1654; second, Khmelnytsky's twenty-three points or articles—usually referred to as the “Articles of Petition” (*prositelnye stati*) which were brought to Moscow by Zarudny and Teteria in March 1654; and third, the document presented by the Russians in response to Khmelnytsky's proposals. This document—the so-called March Articles—appeared on 27 March (6 April) when the tsar gave official approval to the decisions governing the new relationship between Muscovy and the Cossack state.

The “Articles of Petition,” which were, for the most part, accepted by the tsar and his advisers, requested that only Ukrainians be allowed to hold office in the Cossack state, collect taxes and turn over revenue to the tsar. Moscow, however, insisted that Russian inspectors observe the procedures. Promising to inform the tsar of any anti-Russian manoeuvres by a foreign power, the mission also requested the right to receive foreign envoys. The tsar agreed, although with the qualification that the hetman could have relations with the Turkish sultan or the Polish king only with the tsar's permission. The maximum number of registered Cossacks was

set at sixty thousand; they were granted the right to elect Khmelnytsky's successor, and the tsar promised to respect the rights and privileges granted them by their former Polish-Lithuanian rulers. Negotiations were held up because Metropolitan Kosiv had refused to permit the Russian commander to build a fortress on church property in Kiev. Although he eventually yielded to Russian pressure, Kosiv sent the monk Innokentii Gizel to Moscow to plead for respect of the rights of the Ukrainian church and clergy; he also asked that the Kievan metropolitan see remain under the jurisdiction of Constantinople and that no Russians be named to Ukrainian ecclesiastical positions.

An Incompatible Arrangement (1654–8)

In May 1654, after the Pereiaslav negotiations, Prince Aleksei Trubetskoï led tsarist troops into Ukraine while the tsar himself took an army into Belorussia. Vasiliï Sheremetev was sent to defend the southern Russian frontier against the Tatars. The Belorussian campaign was successful from the outset; Smolensk was captured and it has remained in Russian hands ever since. The Russian army was aided by a Cossack detachment of twenty thousand men led by Ivan Zolotareno. The tsar's victory was facilitated by the support of many Lithuanian magnates in the commonwealth who opposed the Polish king.

Russian victories in Belorussia were offset, however, by difficulties with the Ukrainians. Khmelnytsky was reluctant to fight the Poles since this could disrupt his alliance with the Crimean khan. The hetman's association with Russia had upset Crimean policy and pushed the Tatars into an alliance with the Poles.¹¹ However, early in 1655 numerous towns and villages in Belorussia rebelled against atrocities perpetrated by Muscovite troops. Angered by what he thought to be Tatar treachery, Khmelnytsky finally moved against the Poles and Tatars in January 1655 with the aid of Russian troops. In July 1655 a Ukrainian-Russian army marched into Galicia, defeated a Polish army at Horodok and threatened Lviv, before Khmelnytsky accepted a ransom of sixty thousand zloty and withdrew from the city.

In September 1655, encouraged by his initial victories in Belorussia, the tsar changed his title to reflect Russian control of Lithuania, Belorussia, Volhynia and Podillia. At this time the hard-pressed Poles found themselves at war with the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Swedes. Janusz Radziwiłł, the leading Lithuanian Protestant magnate, tried to put Lithuania under Swedish protectorate. Another Protestant magnate, Hieronim Radziejowski, went into exile in Sweden, where he agitated for

war against Poland and later accompanied the Swedish troops that invaded the commonwealth in 1656. King Jan Kazimierz fled the country and the Swedes captured Warsaw and Cracow, but the Poles rallied and gained a great victory against Sweden at Czesochowa. The Polish success was aided by a religious and patriotic revival that firmly identified the Polish cause with Catholicism.

The Swedish invasion of the commonwealth had encountered little resistance from the Poles after their defeat in Belorussia in 1654–5. Sweden thus emerged as a strong rival of the victors and its increased power prevented Russian expansion in the Baltic region. Moreover, the Swedes actively supported commonwealth magnates hostile to the Russians and tried to enlist Khmelnytsky, as an ally against both Russia and Poland. These events created a common cause between the two Slavic countries who temporarily ceased military operations against each other; fighting between Russia and Sweden broke out in 1656.

The Polish-Russian rapprochement, set in motion by mutual hostility toward Sweden and Brandenburg, culminated in the 1656 Treaty of Vilna. However, the treaty avoided the Ukrainian problem and with this matter unsettled, lasting friendship between the two countries was impossible. The tsar sent Larion Lopukhin to assure Khmelnytsky that the Vilna accord did not betray the interests of the Zaporozhian state. None the less, Khmelnytsky objected to the peace talks at Vilna, and warned the tsar in a note dated December 1656, that the Poles would not honour their commitments. As the Vilna talks continued, Khmelnytsky called a council of his closest advisers, and they decided to seek new sources of support, eventually signing agreements with Sweden and Transylvania without consulting the tsar. By this time each partner in the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement felt that the other had violated the intent of the understanding.

The Russians were dissatisfied with Khmelnytsky on several counts. First, military co-ordination with the Ukrainians had fared badly. In the summer of 1655 allied troops had failed to take Lviv because Khmelnytsky opposed the Russian plan to have the city swear allegiance to the tsar. Second, there was friction over which ally would control the parts of Belorussia taken from the Poles, since many local nobles and towns preferred incorporation into the Cossack state rather than into Muscovy. Third, the Cossacks under the command of the hetman's son-in-law Ivan Nechai had carried out excesses in Belorussia. Finally, Khmelnytsky was accused of violating the 1654 agreement by naming his son Iurii as his successor, also without consulting the tsar.

In turn, Khmelnytsky and his aides informed the Russian official Fedor Buturlin that confiscation of property in Ukraine for use by Russian soldiers was a violation of the rights and privileges of the Cossacks and

had evoked strong popular protest. They reminded Buturlin that the Poles' violation of Khmelnytsky's property rights in Subotiv had resulted in bloodshed and protested the Russian military presence in Kiev. Relations between the Russians and the Cossacks had reached an impasse when Khmelnytsky died on 6 August (27 July) 1657. At the time of his death, a delegation headed by Teteria was in Moscow trying to settle misunderstandings arising from the Pereiaslav agreement.

Andrei Buturlin, the Russian military commander in Kiev, reported considerable confusion among the Cossacks after Khmelnytsky's death. Some Cossack officers were opposed to Iurii's designation as the new hetman, and the naming of Metropolitan Kosiv's successor also produced disagreement. Buturlin urged Lazar Baranovych and Innokentii Gizel to subordinate the Kievan church to the Moscow patriarch and to follow the tsar's instructions. Many Cossack officers had disapproved of relations with Moscow, and after Khmelnytsky's death, sought a return to the commonwealth. Ivan Vyhovsky was confirmed as the new acting hetman in August 1657¹² but two months later resigned in protest against Russian interference. However, the officers rejected his gesture, and Vyhovsky returned to his post after pointing out that he had not sworn obedience to the tsar as had his predecessor.

Upon learning of Vyhovsky's reinstatement, the tsar dispatched a new envoy, Dmitrii Rogozin, to deal with the Ukrainians. Rogozin noted the anti-Russian sentiment and the activities of the pro-Russian factions centred in the Zaporozhian Sich. The latter included Iakiv Barabash, the Zaporozhian otaman, Martyn Pushkar, the Poltava colonel, and Maksym Fylymonovych (Filimonov), an Orthodox clergyman from Nizhyn. Rogozin also reported a growing rift between the *chern* and the officer class, which the Russians sought to exploit.

The Russians insisted that the decision to make Vyhovsky the acting hetman was invalid because Cossacks from the Zaporozhian Sich had not been given a proper hearing at the Korsun *rada*. A new *rada* was therefore convened in Pereiaslav, at which Khitrovo put forward the tsar's new "points" including the names of specific cities where Russian troops were to be posted, details of the collection of taxes, orders for the restriction of Cossack activity in Belorussia and plans for a new operation against Poland in the spring. In documents addressed to the tsar, Vyhovsky was asked to sign himself merely as "subject"—not as "free subject" as had formerly been his practice. The tsar also pressed for the election of the rebel Martyn Pushkar as hetman, although the latter was threatened with excommunication by the new metropolitan of Kiev, Dionysii Balaban.

Although at the 1657 Pereiaslav *rada* he had promised to travel to Moscow "to behold the illustrious eyes of the tsar," Vyhovsky now pleaded

pressing domestic problems and failed to make the journey. Instead, he sent a subordinate, Hryhorii Lesnytsky, to Moscow to meet two Cossacks Ivashka Donets (representing Barabash) and Ivan Iskra (representing Pushkar). The Lesnytsky delegation (which included Ivan Bohun) subsequently asked the Russians to end the intrigues of Pushkar and others. In June 1658 Vyhovsky marched against the rebels near Poltava, and in the ensuing battle Pushkar was killed, the Russian envoy Kikin barely escaped with his life and Barabash withdrew. After this victory Vyhovsky made greater efforts to stop Russian interference in internal Cossack affairs, which had become quite blatant. (The Russians had, for instance, demanded the dismissal of the “Lutheran” and “Jew” Iurii Nemyrych.) He sent a note to the tsar asking for the removal of Romodanovsky’s troops and protesting Vasiliï Sheremetev’s arbitrary behaviour in Kiev. The tsar tried to placate Vyhovsky by sending a new envoy, Iakov Portomoin, to assure the new hetman of the tsar’s high regard.

From Hadiach to Andrusovo (1658–67)

By 1658, the Russian-Ukrainian disagreements had rendered the 1654 Pereiaslav arrangement meaningless. Several events contributed to the breakdown in relations: the Vilna accord, Khmelnytsky’s foreign connections, rival claims to Belorussian areas, differing views on the status of the Ukrainian church, failure to agree on several articles in the 1654 accord and Russia’s tendency toward centralization. Vyhovsky decided to break with Russia and in a declaration intended for foreign rulers, accused the tsar of breaking the 1654 Pereiaslav accord and fomenting civil war among Ukrainians by initially refusing him as the new legitimate hetman and by supporting the Barabash and Pushkar factions. Vyhovsky’s diplomatic efforts produced the Hadiach agreement with the commonwealth signed on 26 (16) September 1658 establishing Ukraine as a co-equal “Ruthenian Principality.” However, the Hadiach formula was rejected in Warsaw, primarily because conservative Polish circles opposed it. Vyhovsky, nevertheless, had severed relations with Moscow, and thus continued his anti-Russian and anti-Polish policies until he was shot by the Poles in 1664.¹³

After Hadiach, Russia increased its support of pro-Russian Ukrainians and, in November 1658, sponsored the election of Ivan Bezpaly as the new hetman. At the same time, the breach between Poland and Russia widened, due to the declining influence of those in the commonwealth who favoured a Romanov successor to the throne of Jan Kazimierz. Vyhovsky’s

military victories prompted the tsar to send into Ukraine a new army under Prince Trubetskoi and fighting broke out after the latter's diplomatic efforts to win Vyhovsky to the Russian side failed. On 29 (19) April 1659 the Russians suffered a major setback at Konotop, where they were lured into a trap by Vyhovsky, and the Russian cavalry elite and five thousand prisoners were slaughtered. Upon learning of the catastrophe, the tsar went into mourning.

The Russians began a new political offensive after this military disaster and convened the so-called "Second Pereiaslav Rada" in October 1659. Iurii Khmelnytsky replaced Bezpaly as the Russian-sponsored hetman of both sides of the Dnieper on the basis of both the Old Articles of 1654 and the supplementary "New Articles" designed to reduce Ukrainian autonomy.

At this time Vyhovsky was having difficulties in Right-Bank Ukraine. He had suspended the Cossack assembly at Hermanivka for rejecting the Hadiach agreement. However, a new gathering, convened at Bila Tserkva, deposed him and chose Iurii Khmelnytsky as his successor. When Trubetskoi learned of the new appointment, he invited young Khmelnytsky to Pereiaslav and promised him that the tsar's representatives would invest him in his new office according to the pageantry and policies followed by his father. Iurii agreed to negotiate and advanced proposals drawn up by his followers in Zherdova Dolyna. These proposals, known as the "Zherdiv Articles," and designed to ensure maximum freedom for the Cossack state, were presented to the forthcoming *rada* in Pereiaslav.

At the *rada*, which opened on 25 (15) October 1659, Trubetskoi proposed an association based on the "Articles of Petition of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" (Old Articles) of 1654 (but differing from the original in several respects) plus the New Articles recently drawn up in the tsar's name. The latter called for the assignment of Russian troops in four cities in Siveria (Moscow believed that it had a rightful claim to that area). The Cossacks felt that both sets of articles, as well as the Zherdiv Articles, required discussion. However, confronted by the Russian show of power at Pereiaslav, they were obliged to accept both Trubetskoi's version of the 1654 agreement and his New Articles (with eighteen points), while the Zherdiv Articles were rejected. On 27 (17) October 1659 Iurii Khmelnytsky was confirmed as the new hetman in deference to Trubetskoi's demand. The hetman and his officers then took an oath of loyalty to the Russian tsar.

The 1659 Pereiaslav *rada* failed to stabilize Russian-Ukrainian relations. Further demands put forward by Iurii Khmelnytsky in December 1659 were rejected on the grounds that they violated the 1654 agreement. Moreover, the Russians frequently and openly disparaged Khmelnytsky;

Sheremetev called him “a petty would-be hetman [*getmanishka*] who should tend geese, not play the hetman.” Thus, Khmelnytsky was forced to take an anti-Russian position. His disaffection benefited the Poles, who defeated a Russian-Ukrainian army under Sheremetev during a two-day battle in September 1660 at Liubar in Volhynia and instead of aiding the fleeing Russians, Iurii and his troops joined the Poles in early October. According to Samiilo Velychko, Iurii Khmelnytsky’s change of allegiance was due not only to Sheremetov’s insult, but also to the change in certain provisions of his father’s Pereiaslav articles, such as the removal of Cossack garrisons from Belorussia, particularly Stary Bykhau: this led the colonels and officers constantly to criticize and reproach the younger Khmelnytsky.

On 27 (17) July 1660 Khmelnytsky and the Poles signed the Chudniv agreement which nullified the Russian-Ukrainian agreement of 1659 and again placed most of Left-Bank Ukraine in Polish territory. Iakym Somko and Vasyl Zolotarenko became the Cossack leaders in the small area of Left-Bank Ukraine that remained under Russian control. At a *rada* in Korsun on 20 (10) November 1660 young Khmelnytsky was officially invested as the new hetman under the protection of the Polish king, and Pavlo Teteria was named the general-secretary of the Cossack state. In early January 1663, however, Iurii retired from the turbulence of politics to a monastic life, and Teteria took control over the state.

In 1660 Ukrainians in the Russian-controlled areas of the Left Bank gathered in Pereiaslav to reaffirm their loyalty to the tsar. Vasyl Zolotarenko was named acting hetman in place of Iurii Khmelnytsky. His rivals for power were Somko, and Ivan Briukhovetsky, a young Zaporozhian officer who had made a favourable impression on the Russians.

In June 1663 Bishop Metodii (Maksym Fylymonovych) and two new envoys, the *stolnik* Ladyzhensky and the military commander Daniil Veliky-Gagin, convoked a new *rada* at Nizhyn on the tsar’s behalf, which, after much dissension, appointed Briukhovetsky leader of the Russian-sponsored hetmanate. (This was the famed *Chorna Rada* [Black Council] that served as the theme for Panteleimon Kulish’s celebrated historical novel of the same name.) Despite their previous co-operation with Moscow, Somko and Zolotarenko were tried as traitors and executed along with six of their supporters. In August 1663 Briukhovetsky was informed that the tsar would take the new hetman “under his high hand” in accordance with the 1659 version of the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement and the New Articles of 1659. The official ceremony took place in Baturyn and the document drawn up became known as the “Baturyn Articles.”

In September 1665 Briukhovetsky and an entourage of over three hundred persons were well received in Moscow. The hetman was made a boyar and married to a daughter of Prince Dolgoruky, whereas his accompanying officers were enrolled into the Russian *dvorianstvo*. The agreement reached, known as the "1665 Moscow Articles," consists of ten placatory proposals from the hetman and his officers, each with the tsar's official confirmation. Ukrainian rights were further restricted and, as a result, anti-Russian sentiment increased in areas under Briukhovetsky's jurisdiction. The terms of the 1665 articles were not carried out by the Russians because Muscovite policy began to favour rapprochement with Poland. As for the Ukrainians, Briukhovetsky's pro-Russian position became thoroughly untenable after the Polish-Russian agreement in 1667 at Andrusovo. At a *rada* held on 11 (1) January 1668, the Cossacks decided to break completely with Moscow. Cossack units attacked Russian garrisons, and a mob killed Briukhovetsky at another *rada* near Opishnia in the presence of his rival, the hetman Doroshenko. This second *rada* then named Doroshenko hetman on both banks of the Dnieper.

External and internal pressures now forced the Russians and Poles to begin peace negotiations. Sixteen sixty-five was a difficult year for the Poles: Jerzy Lubomirski, a powerful magnate, revolted openly against King Jan Kazimierz, Ukrainians in the commonwealth became increasingly hostile and Petro Doroshenko strove to put all Ukraine under the protection of the Tatars and Turks, who, in turn, stepped up plans to make Ukraine a Turkish protectorate. In Russia inflation was rampant, there was a peasant uprising and the Ukrainians continued to resist Moscow's centralization programmes.

Consequently, the peace negotiations, broken off at Durovichi in May 1664, were resumed in May 1666 in the Belorussian village of Andrusovo, with new men in key positions. The Andrusovo treaty, signed on 30 (20) January 1667, provided for a thirteen-year armistice between the two countries. In the interim they were to continue efforts to reach a "permanent peace." Poland gave up its claims to large areas in Belorussia, the Smolensk and Siveria regions, the entire Chernihiv district and Left-Bank Ukraine. Kiev was to remain under temporary Russian occupation until 15 (5) April 1669 when it would be returned to the Poles. The Zaporozhian Sich became a condominium controlled by both Poland and Russia, and its Cossacks were obligated to defend the tsar and the king against Turkish aggression.

In substance the Andrusovo agreement partitioned Ukraine. It supplanted the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement, which, from 1667 onward, served merely to pacify Ukrainians dissatisfied with Russian rule. Moreover, the the Pereiaslav agreement and Andrusovo treaty were the

key events that ended the great-power status of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and signalled the failure of its Eastern policy.¹⁴

Integration of Left-Bank Ukraine into the Empire

During the 1660s, after Briukhovetsky's fall (the period known as "a time of heavy weeping"), the pro-Turkish Petro Doroshenko and the pro-Russian Colonel Demian Mnohohrishny vied for leadership in Ukraine. A traditional Cossack *rada* convoked by the pro-Russian faction at Hlukhiv in March 1669 elected Demian Mnohohrishny as the new hetman, and adopted the "Hlukhiv agreement," a juridical document that attempted to define Russian-Ukrainian relations. The agreement of 1669 supplanted the 1665 Moscow Articles and was based on the modified 1659 version of the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement. Mnohohrishny, however, fell into disfavour with the Russians because he opposed their concessions to the Poles. In March 1672 he was arrested and sent to Moscow where he was tried for treason.

Mnohohrishny was succeeded in June 1672 by Ivan Samoilovych who drew up the so-called "Konotop Articles." The new articles were based on the Hlukhiv accord but contained a supplement of ten points that further restricted Ukrainian autonomy. While Samoilovych was hetman (1672–87), a coalition against the Ottoman empire arose, with Russia as an active participant. Samoilovych opposed Tsarina Sophia's military campaign against the Crimea in the spring of 1687, and rumours spread that this campaign, led by Vasili Golitsyn, failed because Samoilovych had set fire to the steppe. Samoilovych's enemies among the Cossacks denounced the hetman to the ruling tsars in July 1687, with the result that he and his son Iakiv were arrested and banished to Siberia.

Samoilovych's rival, Ivan Mazepa, hetman from 1687 to 1709, was installed at a general *rada* held on 4 August (25 July) 1687, at a site along the Kolomak river. From this meeting were issued the "Kolomak Articles," a bilateral agreement between the Russian rulers (Ivan, Peter and Sophia) and the Cossacks (the hetman and his *starshyna*). In the spirit of Pereiaslav, the Russians accepted a Ukrainian petition for protection and promised to respect the rights and privileges of the Cossacks. The Kolomak Articles, however, further restricted Ukrainian liberties, confirmed previous decisions denying the hetman a role in foreign affairs and required the Ukrainian leaders to inform Moscow about internal developments.

In the early period of his hetmanate, Mazepa zealously carried out the desires of Peter I. Yet he is usually remembered as a "traitor" to Russia

who allied with Charles XII in the Great Northern War. Most explanations of his “change” stem from a misunderstanding of events in Russian-ruled Ukraine after the signing of the Kolomak Articles.

Ukrainian military service for war was emphasized in every agreement signed after 1654. Ukrainians were used, without payment, for military ventures against the Crimea, Turkey and Sweden. In addition, Ukrainians had to pay the salaries of both the Cossacks fighting for the tsar outside Ukraine and the Russian troops posted throughout Ukraine. Mazepa frequently protested to the tsar about these military impositions and the behaviour of Russian troops. By 1701 Peter I had decided to curb Mazepa’s recalcitrance. Engaged in war against Sweden, Peter formed an alliance with King Augustus II of Poland (formally ratified in August 1704) and promised to recognize Polish suzerainty over Right-Bank Ukraine. Mazepa was requested by the tsar to cede certain areas of the Right Bank to the Poles, and after discussions with his colonels, decided to resist. He then crossed the Dnieper to the Right Bank and, from Liubar, formally rejected the tsar’s request to give up territory.

By 1706 Peter had made plans to convert the separate Cossack armed forces into regular tsarist military units, presaging the end of the office of hetman and of the special privileges of the Cossack officer class. In fact, total abolition of Ukrainian military and political structures was envisioned. Thus Peter’s plans for centralization finally impelled Mazepa to form an alliance with Charles XII, but the combined Swedish-Cossack forces were defeated by the Russians at Poltava on 8 July (27 June) 1709. The victorious tsar, however, preoccupied with other matters, did not turn seriously to Ukrainian administrative reforms until 1722.

Prior to his victory Peter had announced, in October 1708, the defection of Mazepa and ordered the election of a new hetman. In July the Russian choice, Ivan Skoropadsky, presented a petition of fourteen points to the tsar, requesting his respect for traditional Ukrainian privileges, and specifically, increased local rule. The petition was accepted, but Peter’s edict, worded as a binding decree from a higher authority, demanded the gradual reduction of the powers of the Office of Little Russia (*Prikaz Malyia Rossii*). Since 1663 this agency had functioned as the tsar’s special bureau dealing with Ukrainian affairs, but during Peter’s reign it was eventually abolished.

In 1710 Andrei Izmailov, the tsar’s representative at Skoropadsky’s residence, was succeeded by Fedor Protasev, who reorganized Skoropadsky’s administrative apparatus in accordance with Peter’s policy. In 1722 the dissatisfied Peter created the Little Russian College (*Malorossiiskaia Kolegiia*) and dispatched Stepan Veliaminov to Hlukhiv to oversee the hetman’s activities and establish Russian law in Ukraine.

Peter justified his actions on the basis of the 1654 agreement with Bohdan Khmelnytsky. An edict of 29 April put Ukrainian affairs under the jurisdiction of the Senate, a body established by Peter to handle exclusively internal affairs.¹⁵

After Skoropadsky's death on 14 (3) July 1722, Pavlo Polubotok became acting hetman, but real power resided with the Little Russian College, which managed Ukrainian affairs without Peter's direct supervision. Friction soon developed between the College and local leaders. In 1723 Peter issued three decrees that drastically curtailed what little power remained with the acting hetman. Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn became commander of the Cossack forces in place of Polubotok, who, together with his closest advisers, was summoned to St. Petersburg and imprisoned in the Fortress of Sts. Peter and Paul, where he died in 1724.

Peter died without appointing a full-fledged successor to Skoropadsky, and was succeeded by his widow, Catherine I (1725–7). In February 1726 the Privy Council (*Verkhovnyi Tainyi Sovet*) called for the naming of a new hetman and concessions "in order to placate and attract" the Ukrainians for Russia's impending war with Turkey. But these proposals were not put into effect because of a disagreement between Count Petr Tolstoi and Catherine's chief adviser, Prince Aleksandr Menshikov. Thus, during Catherine I's brief reign, the Little Russian College directly ruled the Ukrainians.

In 1727 the new tsar, Peter II, abolished the Little Russian College and Ukrainian matters were again transferred to the College of Foreign Affairs. In June 1727 Fedor Naumov was dispatched to Ukraine to represent the tsar during the selection of a new hetman. The young tsar's concessions seemed to reflect the interests of Prince Menshikov, one of his advisers who had large landholdings in Ukraine. Menshikov sponsored Danylo Apostol (1654–1734), colonel of the Myrhorod regiment, for the hetmanate.

Apostol's candidacy was ratified at a general *rada* in October 1727 in Hlukhiv, and approved by the tsar a few months later. In early 1728 Apostol went to Moscow to attend the coronation ceremonies of Peter II. On this occasion the hetman transmitted a written petition requesting the renewal of the Kievan metropolitan see, the recreation of an independent judiciary and the removal of Russian military garrisons.¹⁶ The tsar's reply on 2 September (22 August) 1728 contained twenty "definitive points" or decisions, some of which made concessions to the Ukrainians.

Empress Anne (1730–40) made minor changes in the status of Ukrainian areas under her rule. After Apostol's death in January 1734 the imperial government delayed the selection of his successor and established a temporary council of three Ukrainians and three Russians to administer

Ukrainian territory. After the death in 1745 of General Ivan Bibikov, who was both executive officer (*pravitel*) of the interim council and Russian-appointed overseer of the hetmanate's administrative apparatus, the Russian-Ukrainian council administered Ukrainian affairs without supervision.

During the reign of Empress Elizabeth (1741–62), the Ukrainians were granted a new form of self-rule—largely through the influence of Oleksii Rozumovsky, the elder brother of Kyrylo and a favourite of the tsarina. On 15 (4) May 1747 Elizabeth recreated the hetmanate and in 1750 confirmed the appointment of Kyrylo Rozumovsky at the general *rada* in Hlukhiv. Although Ukrainian matters were again transferred to the College of Foreign Affairs, Rozumovsky revived Ukraine's administrative system and made new appointments to the officer ranks and to the judiciary.

The changes, however, were short-lived. On 26 (15) July 1754 the Senate abolished the border between Russia and Ukraine, closed the customs stations along the former frontier and made Ukrainian areas subject to the Russian tariff system. Sergei Solovev characterizes these changes as “a strong counteraction against the re-establishment of the hetmanate.” In 1756 responsibility for Ukraine was again returned to the Senate. In 1764 the Ukrainian gentry submitted a petition to Elizabeth's successor Catherine II. Generally known as “The Petition of the Little Russian Gentry,” this document contained twenty-two points and was submitted in the name of “Hetman Rozumovsky, the Cossack officers, and the Little Russian army, gentry and people.” It called for a separate Ukrainian parliament, or *rada*, and requested that universities be established in Kiev and Baturyn.

“The Petition of the Little Russian Gentry” aroused the ire of Catherine, who had little patience with Ukrainian particularism. She was especially furious about a clause proposing the selection of one of Kyrylo Rozumovsky's sons as the new hetman. Rozumovsky was summoned to St. Petersburg and forced to resign. The hetmanate was then abolished. By two decrees, dated 21 (10) May and 28 (17) May 1764, Catherine reorganized the Ukrainian administrative structure. A new office, the “Little Russian governor-general,” was created to oversee Ukrainian affairs, together with a newly-constituted Little Russian College, which consisted of four Russians and four Ukrainians. The governor-general was to serve as both military commander of the area and presiding officer of the Little Russian College. General P. A. Rumiantsev (1726–96) was appointed to the post, with a warning from Catherine about the Ukrainians' “incongruous mixing of military and civilian administration” and their “innate hatred of things Great Russian.”

Catherine's administrative reforms affected the entire empire. In 1767 she established a commission to elaborate a new Russian code of laws (*novoe ulozhenie*). A Ukrainian deputation presented this commission with recommendations asking for a return to those rights and freedoms "according to which Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the entire Little Russian nation in a body entered into the Great Russian state." In addition, through Marshal Aleksandr Bibikov, the Ukrainians presented to Catherine II a separate petition reminding Catherine that the Ukrainians had united voluntarily with the Russians and accusing the tsarist rulers of breaking solemn agreements. The petitioners also noted the restoration of autonomy under Empress Elizabeth. Catherine II, however, was unsympathetic, and referred to the Cossacks as "political rabble." In 1775 the Zaporozhian Sich—in Catherine's view, another bizarre Ukrainian institution—was dissolved.

In 1781 the *guberniia* system of imperial provincial administration was extended into Ukraine, and the Little Russian College was abolished. All Ukrainian symbols of government were forbidden and typical Russian provincial bodies were established. On 14 (3) May 1783 serfdom was officially introduced in Ukraine, and formerly free peasants were legally bound to the land. In the same year the separate Cossack military units were converted into ten regular infantry regiments. Two years later the Ukrainian gentry was placed on the same level as its Russian counterpart, the *dvorianstvo*, and Ukrainian military ranks were converted to the Russian system. Finally, two decrees of 21 (10) April 1786 secularized the property of Ukrainian monasteries, and transferred their maintenance to the state.

Thus, during the eventful reign of Catherine II, there took place the final administrative changes that incorporated Left-Bank Ukrainian territories into a consolidated Russian empire. It was also during her reign that the three partitions of Poland occurred, an expansionist programme that brought Right-Bank Ukraine under tsarist rule. Henceforth, all Ukrainian areas under tsarist rule were subject to the same processes of centralization.

Notes

1. See, for example, P. Jasienica, *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów* 1, 9–12. For additional information, see also S. M. Solovev, "Ocherki istorii Malorossii do podchineniia eia tsariu Alekseiu Mikhailovichu" and V. O. Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century*, 98–9.

2. Several thoughtful Polish writers have proposed that this process of Polonization was a tragedy, for it made impossible any further evolution of the commonwealth into a viable federation of three nations. The failure to establish a tripartite federation, or “Rzeczpospolita Trojga Narodów,” is constantly lamented in modern studies of the commonwealth. In addition to Jasienica, see Z. Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza*.
3. The union with Rome, supported by a group of Orthodox bishops, was vehemently opposed by the majority of the Orthodox lower clergy, monks and laymen. For a detailed account of the establishment of the Church Union in the commonwealth, based on an analysis of Vatican archives, see O. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest (1439–1596)*.
4. For the origins of the Zaporozhian Sich, see M. Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, 156–65. For a detailed account of its history, see V. A. Golubtsky, *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo*.
5. According to Ivan Krypiakievych, in 1610 Hetman Hryhorii Tyskynevych, a leader of the Zaporozhian Sich, made the first Cossack public declaration in defence of Orthodoxy. See I. Krypiakievych (Kholmsky), *Istoriia Ukrainy*, 168–9. Most historians who have specialized in this field maintain that the defence of Orthodoxy intensified Cossack opposition to the commonwealth. This explanation is shared by both Jasienica and Wójcik. Sergei Solovev writes that the defence of Orthodoxy and the attempts of the Polish government to control the Cossacks produced the great Cossack revolt in “West Russia”; see S. M. Solovev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen* 5, 388–410, 421.
6. For a pro-Russian account of the Smolensk war, see O. L. Vainshtein, *Rossii i tridsatiletniaia voina, 1618–1648 gg.*
7. The standard work on Mohyla is S. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki*, 2 vols. For a detailed account of the relationship between the Kievan clergy and the Russian government in the seventeenth century, see V. Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v. Snosheniia malorossiiskago dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitelstvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*.
8. For a contemporary account of the atrocities suffered by Jews in the 1648–9 revolution, see N. Hanover, *Abbyss of Despair*.
9. Three members of the renowned Muscovite aristocratic Buturlin family served Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich during the Khmelnytsky period. Vasilii Vasilevich played a leading role in the 1654 Pereiaslav–Moscow negotiations. Andrei Vasilevich commanded tsarist troops and in 1656 was *voevoda* in Kiev. Fedor Vasilevich was on a special mission to Chyhyryn as Bohdan Khmelnytsky was dying. Vasilii Vasilevich, the tsar’s chief negotiator at Pereiaslav in 1654, committed suicide by drinking poison in December 1655 upon learning that the tsar had

ordered his decapitation because of alleged treason. The tsar had received reports that Buturlin accepted bribes from some cities and destroyed others, and after defeat by the Tatars, Buturlin agreed to peace terms with the khan. See M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* 9, 1162.

10. Solovev's account of the Pereiaslav proceedings agrees in its details with that of a later investigator, A. Iakovliv; see A. Iakovliv, *Ukrainsko-moskovski dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikakh*, 11–16.
11. In terms of the balance of power in the seventeenth century, some historians—among them Solovev, Kostomarov and Hrushevsky—see the establishment of Khmelnytsky's state as the creation of another buffer between the Ottoman empire and its rivals in Europe, particularly the commonwealth and Muscovy. From this point of view, the Cossack state as well as Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia and the Crimea became a kind of neutral zone in the classic struggle for control of the steppe. The interests of the Zaporozhian state and of the Crimean khanate coincided; the two powers became allies because they opposed any central control. Pereiaslav destroyed the balance of power and forced the great powers to realign their priorities. Among the shifts that resulted was the new Polish-Tatar alliance. For a discussion of Ukrainian-Crimean relations at that time, including a review of pertinent literature, see V. Dubrovsky, *Ukraina i Krym v istorychnykh vziemynakh*, 11–12.
12. The Vyhovsky family was of ancient origin, with roots in the old Kievan state and associations with the Hlynsky (Glinsky) clan, which had a strong Tatar strain. The family had large estates in Volhynia, but in the sixteenth century obtained holdings in the Kiev region at Vyhov—hence the name Vyhovsky. Ivan Vyhovsky, a graduate of the Kievan Academy, had three brothers and a sister who became the wife of Pavlo Teteria. After service in the commonwealth army, Ivan became Khmelnytsky's chief adviser, with the title of secretary-general of the Zaporozhian state. His execution by the Poles had personal and political overtones and resulted from denunciations by Teteria and Mikolaj Prazmowski. Ivan's brother Danylo was also a prominent supporter of the Khmelnytsky revolt. Danylo, married to Khmelnytsky's daughter Olena [Helen], was arrested by the Russians in 1659 and died while being taken to Moscow. Hetman Iurii Khmelnytsky interceded on behalf of his brother-in-law, who died before the tsar could act. According to Seniutovych-Berezhny, some historians, including Hrushevsky and Iakovliv, mistakenly believe that Danylo married Khmelnytsky's eldest daughter Kateryna. After Danylo's death, Olena married Teteria, whose first wife was a sister of the Vyhovsky brothers. A personal and political rift arose between Ivan Vyhovsky and his brother-in-law Teteria, who became strongly pro-Polish in his politics. Olena Khmelnytsky-Vyhovsky Teteria had

two sons by her first husband; after Danylo's death, Ivan Vyhovsky became her guardian. When Olena married Teteria, he took her property, which Ivan Vyhovsky felt belonged rightly to the two sons. In the ensuing struggle, Teteria allegedly denounced Vyhovsky to the Poles. See V. Seniutovych-Berezhny, "Rid i rodyna Vyhovskyykh."

13. The fate of Iurii Nemyrych was equally tragic. This Protestant aristocrat (at one time so bitterly opposed to the commonwealth that he supported the Swedish invasion) evolved a vision of a regenerated commonwealth based on the religious tolerance and cultural pluralism that he had observed in Holland and Switzerland. Nemyrych converted to Orthodoxy in order to spread his ideas more effectively among the Ukrainians and became a close adviser to both Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky. He was killed in battle in 1659 during the Russian-sponsored revolt of Sirko, Tsetsura and Vasyl Zolotarenko against Vyhovsky. For one aspect of Nemyrych's activities, see S. Kot, *Georges Niemiryecz et la lutte contre l'intolérance au 17-e siècle*.
14. For a review of the major events in this process, see C. Bickford O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667*.
15. For the full text of these decrees see *Polnoe sobranie Zakonov rossiiskoi imperii s 1649 goda*, Collection I, vol. 6, *ukazy* nos. 3988, 3989, 3990. On the functions of the Senate during Peter's reign, see B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, 11-13.
16. For a discussion of Hetman Apostol's endeavours, see B. Krupnytsky, *Hetman Danylo Apostol i ioho doba*,

Chapter Two

The Documents Controversy and Juridical Definitions

The Documents Controversy

Students of the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement have encountered difficulty not only in locating authentic documentary evidence but also in identifying archival materials. Only a few primary documents dealing specifically with the 1654 negotiations have been preserved: the extensive reports of Vasiliï Buturlin, chief Russian participant in the Pereiaslav events, the preliminary or draft copies of Russian positions and the Russian translations of Ukrainian documents, of which the final or binding versions have not been located. The lack of Ukrainian sources has further complicated the work of historians.

The extant documents have been the subject of conflicting interpretations and emphases as a result of incomplete reporting, misrepresentations and fabrications within them. Vasyl Herasymchuk (1880–1944), a specialist on seventeenth century Eastern Europe, has summarized the problem:

An instrument of such enormous significance as that which documents the union of two states, a document which laid the basis for new activities in Eastern Europe, was almost unknown to the public of that time. For some

reason it was not immediately made public, for some reason it was hidden, and in like manner for the future it has remained an obscure and unclarified matter.¹

The nineteenth century historian Sergei Solovev was one of the first to point out the factual inaccuracies in *Istoriia Rusov*. His investigation of seventeenth-century documents in the Moscow archives produced detailed data on Russian policy. It was primarily Mykola Kostomarov, however, who provided material on and generated great interest in the Khmelnytsky period. His scholarly contribution was twofold. First, in 1857 he published a serialized study of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the journal *Otechestvennyia zapiski* [Notes of the Fatherland]. Second, he published a series of documents from the archives of the former *Malorossiiskii Prikaz* entitled *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* [Documents pertaining to the history of South and West Russia].

Gennadii F. Karpov (1839–1900)

Solovev's pupil, Gennadii F. Karpov, examined archival materials concerned with the 1654 agreement and analysed the negotiations. His views on Ukrainian-Russian relations in the seventeenth century, expressed in several polemical articles, are crucial to the controversy over the 1654 documents. Karpov evaluated documentary sources from the ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of justice, the two principal tsarist government agencies with uncollated files on the Khmelnytsky period. The files had been transferred from the various offices previously concerned with Ukrainian matters, such as the *Posolskii Prikaz* (foreign affairs), the *Riazradnyi Prikaz* (military affairs), the *Tainyi Prikaz*, (Privy Council) and the *Prikaz Malyia Rossii* (Little Russian affairs). Karpov found that these archives did not contain the official versions of the 1654 negotiations. For example, the documents on the Khmelnytsky period, printed in the *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, were based on working, or preliminary, drafts from Russian files. Karpov also discovered different variations of the same document, a factor overlooked by previous writers.

The official text of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, upon which all subsequent agreements between the tsars and the Cossacks were based, has never been located. Karpov, however, did find an incomplete file of original or official documents on the Teteria–Zarudny mission, including a Russian-language copy of Khmelnytsky's Articles of Petition translated from a "Belorussian" original. He notes, however, that the version of the

petition presented to the *Posolskii Prikaz* could have been edited several times. Neither the final version of the petition nor the tsar's edicts in response to it have been found.

Karpov informs us that the information in *Posolskii Prikaz* was recorded either in copy-books (*knigi-kopii*) or on cylindrical scrolls (*stolbtsa*). Files on Ukrainian affairs consisted mainly of the latter, with each segment of the parchment glued to the one before and after it. The glued areas (*skleika*) showed signs of tampering; in some the pages were reversed or out of order and others contained extraneous material. In the ministry of justice, papers were arranged according to subject matter (important events, reports of military commanders and so on). There were files containing reports (*otpuski*) from various officials in Ukraine to the tsar or to each other and translations (*spiski*) into Russian from what the Russian officials labelled Belorussian.

Examination of the files enabled Karpov to correct the errors in works such as *Istoriia Rusov*. His sharpest criticism, however, was directed against his contemporary, Mykola Kostomarov, for his excessive reliance on Polish sources and usage of such terms as *Moskovskoe gosudarstvo* and *velikorossy*. In his pamphlet *G. Kostomarov kak istorik Malorossii* [Kostomarov as a Historian of Little Russia], Karpov also refutes Kostomarov's claim that at the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada* Buturlin gave an oath on behalf of the tsar. Karpov charged that Kostomarov, like Samiilo Velychko, was influenced by supposed traitors such as Vyhovsky, Teteria, Doroshenko and Mazepa.

Karpov points out that Kostomarov ignored materials on the Khmelnytsky period discovered by Solovev. Instead he relied on *Istoriia Rusov* and *Hrabiianka* and repeated their errors. Worse, Kostomarov adopted the *Istoriia Rusov* statements that the Russians and Ukrainians negotiated a formal treaty at Pereiaslav, and that Khmelnytsky died of remorse from having united Ukraine with Great Russia. Karpov doubts that *Istoriia Rusov* was written by an Orthodox prelate, as was alleged, because of its anti-Russian bias and its praise of the Moslem Turks.

With respect to the decision to extend the tsar's rule over the Ukrainians, Karpov writes that the *Zemskii Sobor*, which met in Moscow on 11 (1) October 1653, accepted Khmelnytsky's petition for protection in order to protect the Orthodox church and to prevent the takeover of the Zaporozhian state by Turkey.² The Buturlin mission arrived in Pereiaslav on 10 January 1654 (31 December 1653), and the famous *rada* took place there on 18 (8) January 1654. Karpov stresses the significance of Buturlin's refusal to take an oath on behalf of the tsar. He further notes that whereas the Ukrainians felt that the negotiations gave birth to a "treaty" (*dogovor*), the Russians regarded the arrangement as the

extension of tsarist authority to Little Russia. On 18 (8) and 19 (9) January, the Cossack officers took oaths of allegiance to the tsar, and on 19 (9) and 20 (10) January talks continued concerning the rights and privileges of the Cossacks and the grant of property to Khmelnytsky and his chief advisers. On 23 (13) January Khmelnytsky left Pereiaslav for Chyhyryn; the following day, the tsarist envoys departed to other Ukrainian cities to preside over the taking of oaths to the tsar. Karpov's reconstruction of these events was based on Buturlin's report (*stateiny spisok*) to the tsar.³

Karpov next outlines the activities in Moscow of the Teteria–Zarudny mission. This group arrived in Putivl on 7 March (25 February) 1654 and was received by the tsar in Moscow on 23 (13) March. The main Russian negotiators were Aleksei Trubetskoi, Vasiliï Buturlin, Petr Golovin and Almaz Ivanov. The talks, which were intensive, continued until 29 (19) March. On 24 (14) March the Ukrainians presented the Russians with Khmelnytsky's written articles of petition.⁴ A week later the Ukrainians gave the Russians a re-edited version (unofficial or private) of the document presented on 24 (14) March, clarifying the salary payments the Russians were to give to the registered Cossacks. According to Karpov, two versions of the document were preserved. One was published in a collection from the Rumiantsev archives (Document no. 168, vol. 3),⁵ and the other appears in Mykola Markevych's *Istoriia Malorossii* [History of Little Russia]. The publishers of the Rumiantsev collection, Karpov writes, placed the date 22 (12) March 1654 on the document—an obvious error since the talks themselves only began on 23 (13) March. The version in the Markevych history carries the correct date and was found in the archives of the Rozumovsky family.

In general, Karpov presents a solid chronology of the negotiations between the Teteria–Zarudny mission and the tsar's representatives. Several investigators, however, have disagreed with his conclusions. The main controversy concerns the version of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky that the Ukrainian mission brought from Moscow. According to Karpov, (and this would be questioned by other historians), this document contained fourteen points or articles. In addition the Ukrainians also brought back a number of tsarist documentary grants or writs (*zhalovanye gramoty*).⁶ Finally, Karpov believes Khmelnytsky to have been a great leader because under his guidance the Little Russians united with the Great Russians. He maintains that subsequent problems resulted primarily from the Cossacks' desire to retain the privileges they had enjoyed under Poland.

Petr Butsinsky (1853–1916)

In his biography of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, *O Bogdane Khmelnitskom* [On Bohdan Khmelnytsky], published in 1882, Petr Butsinsky disagrees with some of Karpov's chronological reconstructions, but accepts the view that the final version of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, as approved by the tsar, contained fourteen points. According to Butsinsky, the Teteria–Zarudny mission arrived in Moscow on 20 (10) March 1654, and talks with the Russians began on 22 (12) March. The Ukrainians brought a petition from Khmelnytsky containing twenty-three proposals or points. Two proposals—on foreign relations and on the payment of salaries to the Cossacks—caused difficulty during the negotiations. The final business session took place on 29 (19) March, when the Ukrainians received some documents from the Russians, but the exchange of documents officially approved by the tsar took place on 6 April (27 March). One document dealing with foreign relations, received by the Ukrainians on 29 (19) March, differed from the final version received on 6 April (27 March). This discrepancy, Butsinsky concludes, arose because the tsar had not made a final decision by 29 (19) March, the date when the envoys made additional requests, and more than a week passed before the tsar's decisions were finally drafted and presented.

Butsinsky points out that the *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, Bantysh-Kamensky, Markevych, Kostomarov and Solovev all have differing views on the number of articles involved in the talks and their content. Since the original Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky were lost in the seventeenth century, Bantysh-Kamensky's claim that he found the official version in the Moscow archives is unfounded. None the less, Butsinsky feels that it is possible to reconstruct the document on the basis of the writs granted by the tsar, the *Hrabanika Chronicle*, Trubetskoi's report on the second Pereiaslav *rada* of October 1659, and the working notes in Moscow files on the talks with Teteria and Zarudny. Butsinsky concludes that, without doubt, the final, official version of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky contained fourteen points. For example, Trubetskoi's report stated that Doroshenko gave the Russians a document with fourteen articles; this document came from Iurii Khmelnytsky, who claimed that his father's association with the tsar in 1654 was based on it. The Muscovite boyars noted that the document presented in 1659 differed in some respects from the 1654 version, but also stated that both versions contained fourteen points.⁷

Butsinsky also claims that the Russian representatives at the Pereiaslav *rada* refused to take an oath on behalf of the tsar or even to sign a document respecting traditional Cossack freedoms. He bases this assertion on

Buturlin's report to the tsar and disagrees with Velychko's view that a formal treaty had been drawn up between Ukraine and the Muscovite state. Butsinsky holds that only the proposals for such a treaty had been drafted at Chyhyryn on Khmelnytsky's orders. Buturlin did not sign any documents at Pereiaslav, although he did make a verbal commitment, in the tsar's name, to respect the Cossacks' demands.

P. A. Shafranov (1859–??)

In the 1880s, interest in the Khmelnytsky period continued to grow among scholars and politically-minded groups in the Russian empire. Among the contributions was P. A. Shafranov's essay "O statiakh Bogdana Khmelnitskogo" [On the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky]. Shafranov concludes that the 1654 negotiations showed that the Ukrainian upper classes distrusted the Muscovite state and insisted on the preservation of their privileges, and that the Muscovite authorities were extremely cautious in their dealings with the Ukrainians. He perceives a class conflict between the Cossack officers and clergy on the one hand and the lower classes, the peasantry and the burghers, on the other. His main objective, however, is to clarify the Articles controversy.

Shafranov points out that when Karpov and Butsinsky wrote that the final, official version contained fourteen points, the original version of Khmelnytsky's articles no longer existed; thus the conclusions of both researchers were based on copies of later reports on the negotiations. He also notes that subsequent reports refer to documents of 1654 with eleven, twenty and twenty-three points.

Shafranov analyzed materials published in Kostomarov's *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* (vols. 2–4, 10) and concludes that the Teteria–Zarudny mission arrived in Moscow on 23 (13) March 1654, not on 20 (10) March as Butsinsky believed. On 20 (10) March the mission was in Kaluga, some three hundred *verst*s from Moscow, a distance that could not be travelled in one day. Shafranov does agree with Butsinsky that on 23 (13) March the Ukrainian envoys were received by the tsar and first negotiated with the Russians. He maintains, however, that the Ukrainians did not at this time present a document with twenty points (as Butsinsky had asserted), but rather recounted the substance of their petition orally. Russian clerks then recorded the requests in twenty articles. The following day, upon request, the Ukrainians presented to the Russians a written petition containing twenty-three points or articles.

Shafranov finds that although the substance of both versions was identical, the number and the sequence of points differed. The tsar confirmed eleven of the points in the 24 (14) March document unconditionally, and three with slight changes in language. The fourteenth point—on foreign policy—was revised considerably, four points were put in abeyance pending clarification (a note “to question further” [*doprosit*] was written in the margins), and one point was rejected.⁸

On 29 (19) March 1654 the envoys were still awaiting a written reply from the tsar. The Russian negotiators requested further information on the points that had not received the tsar’s complete acceptance (annotated by the tsar “to question” or “to dissuade”). Also, the Russians for the first time discussed the posting of military commanders in Kiev and Chernihiv and salary payments to registered Cossacks. The Russian representatives said they would try to modify the tsar’s refusal to pay salaries and would recommend sending a special envoy to Ukraine to deal with this matter. Thus the tsar had made no final decisions by 29 (19) March, Shafranov repeats, and no document had been passed to the Ukrainian negotiators.

On 31 (21) March the Ukrainians presented the Russians with a note containing eleven articles, as an official reply to the points discussed orally two days earlier. Shortly, the tsar’s decision, or *ukaz*, was added to each unresolved point. On 6 April (27 March) the Ukrainian envoys left Moscow. Karpov had written that their departure was held up by a lengthy dispute over the salary issue, but Shafranov feels that it was the observance of Holy Week which caused the delay. Shafranov also disagrees with Karpov about the documents given to the Teteria–Zarudny mission upon leaving Moscow. Karpov had written that the Ukrainians may have received a copy of the articles of 31 (21) March (containing eleven points) as well as the final version of the articles dated 6 April (27 March) (containing fourteen points). He admitted, nevertheless, that he had been unable to find the original or official versions of these documents in Russian archives and that a document he had believed to be the original was issued in 1666, during the hetmanate of Ivan Briukhovetsky. Shafranov convincingly shows that Karpov’s documents of 31 (21) March and 6 April (27 March) contradict each other, and reveals that the document allegedly dating from 1666 actually originated seven years earlier.

In October 1659, a *rada* held in Pereiaslav elected Iurii Khmelnytsky as the new hetman. Colonel Petro Doroshenko, Iurii’s spokesman at the *rada*, brought the tsarist representative, Prince Trubetskoi, a note with fourteen points. (Iurii was in Right-Bank Ukraine, then under Polish suzerainty.) Trubetskoi felt that this note, alleged to be the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, asked more from the tsar than the original articles of 1654 had granted. In comparing this note with the twenty-three-point

24 (14) March articles, Shafranov finds that the former omits points 19, 20, 22 and 23 because they pertained to matters not relevant in 1659: military aid in the campaign to take Smolensk, defence of Russian borders against the Crimeans, and defence of the Kodak fortress. Since Trubetskoi printed large numbers of his 1659 edition, it was popularly accepted as the true version. Khmelnytsky's policy of keeping the original 1654 version secret added to the confusion. The original disappeared after Vyhovsky announced it publicly in 1657, whereas the 1659 Trubetskoi version circulated widely as the Previous Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

Shafranov concludes that the authentic and final version of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky contained eleven points, was drawn up in Moscow on 31 (21) March 1654 and officially tendered to the Teteria–Zarudny mission on 6 April (27 March).⁹ It was intended as a supplement to the *gramoty* defining the rights and privileges of the Cossacks, and these were the main documents produced by the Moscow negotiations in 1654.

Many historians have agreed with Shafranov's conclusions. Vitalii Eingorn, a specialist on seventeenth-century ecclesiastical history, concurs that the Trubetskoi version was a misrepresentation. He feels, however, that the 1659 version resembled the preliminary articles given to the Russians when the talks began on 24 (14) March 1654, except for the omission of certain articles that were "superfluous" by 1659. Eingorn comments that even the "final version" of 31 (21) March could have been modified during subsequent negotiations.

Boris E. Nolde, an authority on the tsarist legal system, thinks that the final, approved version of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky consisted of eleven articles and was given to the Russians on 31 (21) March 1654, who in turn tendered an official copy to the Ukrainians on 6 April (27 March). Ilko Borshchak (Elie Borschak), the author of several books on eighteenth-century Ukrainian history, writes that after two weeks of negotiations in Moscow in March 1654 the Ukrainian proposals, re-edited into a final version of eleven articles, were approved by the tsar. Borshchak recognized that a document of fourteen articles originating in 1659 had long been accepted as the true Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Shafranov shows that this document was fabricated by the Muscovite government to reduce Ukrainian autonomy.¹⁰

Mykhailo S. Hrushevsky (1866–1934)

Of all the historians concerned with the Khmelnytsky era, Mykhailo Hrushevsky has made the most detailed study. In his *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* [History of Ukraine-Rus'], Hrushevsky states that the

hetman's petition to the tsar, as preserved in a poorly-constructed Russian redaction dated 24 (14) March 1654, contained twenty-three points. The petition ultimately made the Zaporozhian army hired mercenaries of the tsar and according to Hrushevsky reflected the confused thinking of the Cossack officers, rather than the inaccuracies of tsarist bureaucrats.

Hrushevsky states that the Teteria–Zarudny mission arrived in Moscow on 21 (11) March 1654, and had its first audience with the tsar on 23 (13) March. Russian archives contain two separate memoranda of the meeting—one first published by Karpov, containing twenty points, and another, shorter version of sixteen points. Hrushevsky believes that both versions fail to preserve the sequence and style of the Cossack petition, although they do convey the essence of the demands. On 24 (14) March the Ukrainians presented their petition in written form. During the next few days the petition was discussed by the *Tsarskaia Duma*, whose decisions were appended as the tsar's *ukazy* after each point in the petition. On 29 (19) March the Ukrainians had a farewell audience with the tsar, after which Almaz Ivanov presented them with the tsar's *gramota* and conveyed orally additional tsarist decisions on such matters as restrictions on the hetman's foreign relations, complaints regarding the Kiev metropolitan, the posting of commanders in Kiev and Chernihiv, the return of Russian refugees in Ukraine, and the dispatch of Cossack units to Belorussia.

This reconstruction, Hrushevsky notes, represents the Muscovite version of Khmelnytsky's articles, but none the less served as the constitution, or charter, for Ukraine for more than a century. The documents express inconsistent political views and appear to have been hastily drafted. Important aspects of the 1654 agreement—to be covered in separate tsarist patents (*gramoty*)—were omitted. The patents and the different versions of the petition must, therefore, be considered the essential documents on the 1654 agreement.

Hrushevsky maintains there is yet another document, drawn up by Russian officials, containing eleven points and dated (according to Karpov) 22 (12) March 1654. This date is obviously wrong, he writes, since it preceded the time of official negotiations. Karpov had evidently realized the error and changed the date to 31 (21) March to conform with the date of another copy of the eleven-point version found in the archives of the Rozumovsky family. In Hrushevsky's opinion, this Russian version of eleven points was prepared by Almaz Ivanov as part of the process of drafting the tsarist *gramoty*.

To complicate matters further, a version of the Articles of Petition, dated 1659 and containing fourteen points, also circulated in Russia and Ukraine. Hrushevsky agrees with scholars such as Shafranov, Eingorn, Nolde and Rozenfeld, who believe that Karpov mistakenly considered this

1659 document to be the final version of the 1654 agreement. Shafranov had conclusively proved to Hrushevsky that the fourteen-point version had been falsified by Prince Trubetskoi in 1659.

Andrii Iakovliv (1872–1955)

In the 1930s the controversy over the documents of the 1654 agreement was thoroughly reconsidered by Andrii Iakovliv in *Ukrainsko-moskovski dohovory v XVII-XVIII vikakh* [Ukrainian-Muscovite agreements in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries]. Iakovliv notes that in the nineteenth century scholars discovered commentaries, working drafts and some duplicate copies of documents on the 1654 negotiations in Russian archives, but no original versions. Moreover, some of the copies had been freely translated into Russian. The extant translations (*spiski*) of Ukrainian-language documents into Russian cannot be checked against the originals since these perished during wholesale destruction in the Dnieper area. Most of the extant documents are correspondence between Moscow and its envoys dealing with the Ukrainians. Some of the Russian reports inevitably contain one-sided interpretations of the negotiations. Iakovliv found a pertinent statement by Grigorii Kotoshikhin, a clerk in the Russian foreign office who settled in Sweden and wrote a critical appraisal of Russian seventeenth-century society. Concerning the written reports of Russian envoys, Kotoshikhin says that although these officials do not contradict the actual statements, they none the less “exercise their capability to deceive.” They do so “to obtain from the tsar honour and large rewards,” and “there is no one who is able to expose them for such activity.”¹¹ Iakovliv expresses grave doubts about the accuracy of the only existing version of the twenty-three proposals brought by Teteria and Zarudny to Moscow. He believes that the Russian-language copy in the Moscow archives—reportedly translated from the “Belorussian”—was re-edited in order to misrepresent Khmelnytsky’s intentions.

According to Iakovliv, the Teteria–Zarudny mission and a smaller group representing the city of Pereiaslav, arrived in Moscow on 21 (11) March 1654. On 23 (13) March, the same day as their first audience with the tsar, the Ukrainians began negotiations with tsarist representatives and gave an oral exposition of the terms by which the Zaporozhian state would accept the tsar’s protection. There exist two Russian protocols on this exposition: a short one containing sixteen points and a longer report containing twenty-seven points. (The long version was published by Karpov in *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*; the short version was printed in Hrushevsky’s *Istoriia*

Ukrainy-Rusy.) Hrushevsky analysed both versions and concludes that the longer one was the official report submitted to the *Boiarskaia Duma*. This report showed that the tsar's negotiators were especially interested in Khmelnytsky's contacts with the Crimean khanate, Austria, Poland and other foreign powers.

The next day the Ukrainians submitted twenty-three proposals. Negotiations continued until 29 (19) March, when the *Boiarskaia Duma* met to consider this question. On that date Tsar Aleksei granted the Ukrainians a final audience and confirmed their former rights and privileges. The delegates left Moscow on 6 April (27 March) when the formal documents, bearing the tsar's approval, were received. In addition, the Russian negotiators presented modifications of the tsar's decisions orally. The restriction on dealing with the Poles and Turks was tightened so that such contacts were forbidden outright. Russian military governors were to be assigned to the cities of Kiev and Chernihiv. A warning was issued regarding the "inappropriate" activities of the metropolitan of Kiev. The Russians requested the return of all Muscovite refugees who had fled to the Cossack state. Finally, the tsar asked Khmelnytsky to assign two regiments and their commanding officers to the planned campaign against the Poles in Belorussia.

A summation of Iakovliv's evidence suggests that the Teteria-Zarudny mission brought to Khmelnytsky one set of written decisions from the tsar, dated 6 April (27 March) 1654, which contained the tsar's reply to the twenty-three Ukrainian articles of 24 (14) March and a further eleven points containing his additional decisions. In subsequent consultations, the tsarist administrators and Ukrainian spokesmen referred frequently to the 1654 negotiations, but they referred to and quoted from that document only. From 1654 until the Pereiaslav *rada* in 1659, no reference was made to an additional document dated 31 (21) March, as posited by Karpov. Moreover, the document described by Karpov as "the finally edited and confirmed Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" appeared only in October 1659, when Iurii Khmelnytsky was chosen as the Russian-sponsored hetman at Pereiaslav. Therefore, Iakovliv concludes, the Teteria-Zarudny mission on 6 April (27 March) 1654 received only the following documents: Khmelnytsky's articles of petition and the tsar's official decisions (*ukazy*), eleven additional tsarist instructions or articles, and special grants from the tsar, some general and others more specific. All the documents were dated 6 April (27 March) 1654.

Oleksander Ohloblyn (1899–)

In his survey of the 1654 negotiations, *Ukrainsko-moskovsky uhoda, 1654* [Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement, 1654], Oleksander Ohloblyn differs somewhat from Iakovliv. Ohloblyn bases his findings on the knowledge that no original documents on the events in Pereiaslav in 1654 were preserved and that a copy of a report by the Buturlin mission is the only available documentary evidence. He questions, however, the accuracy of Buturlin's reporting and suggests that Buturlin did not fully describe the negotiations.

The original documents that the Teteria–Zarudny mission brought to Moscow have also been lost. The principal extant written evidence, a free Russian translation of a Ukrainian-language document, is identified by Ohloblyn as the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 27 (17) February 1654. This document contains the same twenty-three points the Teteria–Zarudny mission reportedly presented to the Russians on 24 (14) March. Ohloblyn found the date of 27 (17) February on the cover letter (signed by Khmelnytsky in Chyhyryn) to the petition brought by the mission. He maintains that this petition was tendered to the Russians in Moscow on 25 (15) March 1654. This Russian-language document, Ohloblyn claims, was not intended as a draft of a proposed agreement. Despite stylistic incongruities (references to the tsar are sometimes rendered in the third person and at others in the second person, and Russian ignorance of the Ukrainian language created ambiguities), it contains all the major issues discussed by the Russians and Ukrainians in Moscow in March 1654.¹²

Two documents from the Russian side summarize the first confrontation with the Teteria–Zarudny mission on 23 (13) March 1654. According to Ohloblyn, these two documents reflect the basic issues outlined in the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 27 (17) February. They also show that the strongest obstacle to agreement was the mission's rejection of the Russian request to post military commanders in specific Ukrainian cities. Ohloblyn writes that Iakovliv erred in maintaining that among the documents given to the Ukrainians on 6 April (27 March) 1654 was a copy of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 27 (17) February. In Ohloblyn's view, the document under discussion was a copy of the one used when the *Boiarskaia Duma* considered the Ukrainian issue, and was not given to the mission.

Ohloblyn argues further that the 27 (17) February copy of Khmelnytsky's proposals should not be considered an integral part of the Pereiaslav agreement, since it was merely a record or protocol of a meeting of the *Boiarskaia Duma*. As such, it was intended for internal use only by

the Russian government. Thus, on 6 April (27 March) 1654, the Teteria–Zarudny mission received a tsarist writ with eleven articles, intended as the tsar's reply to Khmelnytsky's petition of twenty-three points. The Pereiaslav–Moscow negotiations and the ensuing agreement consisted of only two documents: the Ukrainian petition of 27 (17) February and the tsar's reply of 6 April (27 March). Finally, Ohloblyn agrees with the opinion that a falsified version of the 1654 agreement was used during the 1659 Pereiaslav *rada*.

The 1659 Pereiaslav *Rada*

In *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, Hrushevsky argues convincingly that in 1659 Trubetskoi and his associates deliberately falsified documents. It was Iakovliv, however, who compared Trubetskoi's Old Articles of 1654, presented at the 1659 Pereiaslav *rada*, with the only known rendering of the original petition of 1654—a Russian draft. He draws the logical conclusion that in preparing the 1659 version, experts in Moscow used the Russian-language copy in the files of the *Polskii Prikaz*. They rearranged the order of the points in the 1654 document, paraphrased its contents and made some stylistic changes.

More serious were amendments designed to diminish the rights granted to the Ukrainians in 1654. Article 6 of the 1654 version—dealing with the election of a new hetman—and the corresponding tsar's writ of 6 April (27 March) became Article 4 in the 1659 version. This 1659 article requires the hetman to go to Moscow for formal investiture by the tsar. Regarding the election of a new hetman, the tsar's writ states that if “by God's judgment death overtake the Hetman, then We, the Great Sovereign, are to allow the Zaporozhian Army, in accordance with their ancient custom, to select a Hetman from among themselves. And whomsoever they might choose is to be reported to Us, the Great Sovereign.” Article 6 of the 1654 version refers in general terms to a possible visit of a new hetman to Moscow, but Trubetskoi's 1659 rendition was more explicit:

Furthermore, after his selection, the Hetman is to travel to the Great Sovereign, the Tsar and Great Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great and Little and White Russia, in order to see His Sovereign's illustrious eyes. Then the Great Sovereign, His Illustrious Majesty, will present the Hetman with the mace and banner of his office and will order the issuance to him of His Sovereign's official charter for the hetmanate. (p. 68)

The Trubetskoi version also referred to the tsar as the autocrat of Great, Little and White Russia. Little Russia was first added to the tsar's title on 6 April (27 March) 1654, when Aleksei Mikhailovich ordered the manufacture of new state seals. Scholars dispute the precise date at which White Russia was affixed but concur that it had not been in use before 6 April (27 March) 1654.

Although Article 13 of Khmelnytsky's 1654 draft makes no mention of the metropolitan of Kiev, the corresponding article in the 1659 Trubetskoi version, Article 8, states that the "Metropolitan of Kiev and other clergy of Little Russia are to be under the jurisdiction of the Holy Patriarch of Moscow and of all Great, Little and White Russia, while the Holy Patriarch is not to interfere with their spiritual rights." Eingorn theorizes that the transfer of the Kievan church to Moscow's jurisdiction might have been discussed in 1654 and left unrecorded because there was some disagreement. A letter from Bohdan Khmelnytsky to the tsar dated 5 June (25 May) 1654, which referred to the "metropolitan of Kiev, Galicia and all Little Russia, exarch of the Holy See of Constantinople," reveals that no agreement was reached in 1654.

The transfer of the Ukrainian church to the jurisdiction of Moscow was broached by Russian diplomats only after Khmelnytsky's death. The proposal seems to have been generated by the death of Kosiv, the Kiev metropolitan. After Khmelnytsky's death Vyhovsky requested that Patriarch Nikon visit Kiev to participate in the investiture of Iurii Khmelnytsky as the new hetman and to aid in the installation of a new metropolitan. The tsar responded by instructing Andrei Buturlin, the Kiev military commander, to persuade the local clergy to accept the authority of the Moscow patriarch. The Kievan clergy was divided over the issue, but Vyhovsky forbade the clergy from negotiating with Nikon and instructed Lazar Baranovych to prepare the selection of a new metropolitan. In December 1659 the Kievan clergy selected Dionysii Balaban as the new metropolitan without consulting Moscow. The Zherdiv Articles, the Cossacks' proposal for a new agreement with the Russians (rejected at the 1659 Pereiaslav *rada*), stipulated that the Kievan church would continue to remain under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople. Trubetskoi rejected this idea; as a result, Article 8 of the 1659 document made the subordination of the Ukrainian church to Moscow appear as a decision made in 1654. Iurii Khmelnytsky felt that the change proposed by the Russians was invalid, and he insisted that the church remain under Constantinople's control. In turn, the tsar pointed out that the Kievan clergy had accepted Andrei Buturlin's proposals, and did not deny that the

subordination of the Ukrainian clergy to Moscow was not in the 1654 agreement, referring only to "today's Pereiaslav agreement," that is, the 1659 version.

Trubetskoi's 1659 version of the Old Articles of 1654 also revised the stipulations on foreign relations. Article 9 of the later version forbids the hetman and the Zaporozhian state from engaging in foreign relations without the tsar's permission. However, the documents of 1654 had only restricted the hetman from maintaining foreign relations with Poland and Turkey. Karpov noted that sometime before 1659, the tsar must have added restrictions to the hetman's powers. Article 22 of Khmelnytsky's articles requests that in the event of a Crimean attack upon the Ukrainians, the tsar would wage war against the Tatars in Kazan and Astrakhan, with the aid of the Don Cossacks. Article 10 of the tsar's reply agrees to that request. However, Article 10 of Trubetskoi's version forbids the hetman to wage war against the khan. Finally, the 1659 Trubetskoi version also omits those articles in the 1654 version—Articles 19, 20 and 23—concerning the dispatch of Cossack troops to Smolensk, the defence of Ukrainian borders and the reference to the Kodak fortress.

Iakovliv points out that the Moscow archives contained a copy of the 1659 Trubetskoi version, but not the 1654 document on which it was allegedly based. The Trubetskoi document was published in volume four of *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, whose editors noted that some pertinent materials were missing from the archives. Iakovliv maintains that those papers concerned with the Trubetskoi version of the 1654 agreement were removed in order to conceal tampering on the part of the Russians. The 1659 Pereiaslav *rada* discussed eighteen or nineteen new proposals, all but one of which were put forward by the tsar. In 1654, by contrast, the proposals originated with the Ukrainians and were accepted or modified by the Russians. This new, dominant Russian role also prevailed during the process of selecting a new hetman.

These new articles, apparently drafted by Trubetskoi and his secretaries in Ukraine according to broad directives from Moscow, further curtailed the freedom of the Ukrainian leaders. The first three articles forbid the Ukrainians from waging war without the tsar's permission. Article 5 calls for the unprecedented stationing of Russian garrisons in Pereiaslav, Nizhyn, Chernihiv, Bratslav and Uman. Article 6 requires the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Belorussia. Article 15 requires the removal of Ukrainian troops from Sary Bykhau in Belorussia, presumably because the area had formerly been under the direct jurisdiction of the commonwealth rather than that of the Zaporozhian state. Moreover, the Zaporozhian Cossack leader, Colonel Nechai, was accused of anti-Russian activities. Finally, Article 16 demands that refugees be speedily returned to

the Russians, and Article 18 orders the death penalty for all Cossacks, officers and burghers who refuse to take an oath of loyalty to the tsar.

The articles of 1659 tightened Russian control in Ukraine and reflected the tsar's increased political power in Eastern Europe. The Cossack leaders, among them the colonels Ivan Bohun, Mykhailo Khanenko and Ostap Hohol, immediately sent a new delegation to Moscow in an effort to modify some of the more painful provisions. Yet the tsar refused to grant any of its requests and thus in 1660 Iurii Khmelnytsky abandoned his pro-Russian position and sought closer relations with the Poles.

A Recapitulation

The "Pereiaslav agreement" is actually several related events: the discussions between the Buturlin mission and the Ukrainians at Pereiaslav in January 1654; the drafting of a written petition with twenty-three points in Chyhyryn; the presentation of this petition with Khmelnytsky's signature to the tsar by the Teteria-Zarudny mission; and the tsar's official acceptance and modification of this petition. The negotiations in Moscow produced the so-called March Articles, which defined more precisely the arrangement initiated at Pereiaslav and modified (in an attempt to reduce Ukraine's autonomy) the original petition presented to the tsar in the name of the Zaporozhian state. The Pereiaslav agreement also includes the special grants (*gramoty*) that the tsar presented to the Teteria-Zarudny mission. These grants recognized the special status of the Zaporozhian Sich and gave certain privileges to the Orthodox gentry in the hetmanate and to the citizens of Pereiaslav. By one such grant Khmelnytsky was given the entire district of Chyhyryn and property in the Hadiach area, including an estate at Subotiv.

The Pereiaslav-Moscow deliberations embraced other facets of Russian-Ukrainian relations; for example, the metropolitan of Kiev was required to travel to Moscow to report any difficulties with the city's Russian military commander. In broad terms, the negotiations gave the Ukrainians considerable home rule. The tsar agreed to honour the ancient rights and freedoms of the Cossacks; the number of registered Cossacks could reach a maximum of sixty thousand; and the selection of a new hetman was declared a local matter, to be decided by the Cossacks themselves. To reiterate: the official documents involved, including the Ukrainian petition of 24 (14) March and the tsar's reply of 6 April (27 March), have never been found. In 1709 Peter I ordered his subordinates to produce Khmelnytsky's original petition, but this could not be located. Scholars have found, however, an imperfect translation—from

the original Ukrainian into Russian—in the archives of the *Posolskii Prikaz*.

Scholars agree that tsarist officials, in their zeal to reduce Ukrainian autonomy, manipulated existing documents for their own purposes. As Zbigniew Wójcik states in *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* [The 1667 Andrusovo Treaty and its genesis], Iurii Khmelnytsky was elected hetman in October 1659 on the basis of the Old Articles of 1654 that had been supplemented surreptitiously in order to destroy Ukrainian autonomy. Another scholar, Hedwig Fleischhacker, writes that in 1659 Trubetskoi revised the 1654 arrangement by reducing the powers of the Cossack state: “That which Trubetskoi put forward on 17 September 1659 at the Pereiaslav *Rada*, no longer corresponded with the essential points of the articles that had been given on 28 March 1654 to the envoys Bogdanov (Zarudny) and Teteria.” Fleischhacker notes that the changes primarily concerned foreign policy, for the tsar had become convinced that if Little Russia were allowed to conduct its own foreign affairs, its ties with Russia would end. He therefore embarked on a deliberate policy to liquidate the Cossack state’s international prerogatives.¹³

The Juridical Aspect

Autonomy for Ukraine

The Russian empire was essentially a “unitary” state that had absorbed disparate areas, cultures and peoples, some of which—Poland, Finland and the Baltic provinces, for example, were accorded special status within it. The relationship with Ukraine established by the Pereiaslav agreement gave the Russians their first experience with problems of regional autonomy.

Boris E. Nolde, an expert on the tsarist administrative system, argues that in 1654, in spite of unresolved issues, a genuine treaty relationship had been instituted between Ukraine and the Russian state.¹⁴ Pereiaslav resulted in the promulgation of a treaty (*dogovor*) consisting of two documents—the written Articles of Petition of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the *gramota* from the tsar to the hetman and the Zaporozhian state. Nolde believes that since Ukraine had not been annexed forcibly to the Russian empire, its inclusion within the latter body must have resulted from some sort of agreement or treaty. In theory, Pereiaslav embraces two, somewhat antagonistic elements: first, the grant of a sovereign’s favour (*milost*) in

response to a petition and second, a contractual arrangement between the sovereign and his new subjects. Thus the Russians subsequently referred to the Pereiaslav agreement as a "treaty" (*traktat*), yet simultaneously it was considered by Russian officials to be the legal foundation for future relations with Ukraine.

Nolde takes issue with those scholars who deny that such a treaty existed. For example, Panteleimon Kulish held that Ukrainians "subordinated themselves unconditionally" to Russia and that the autocratic nature of the Muscovite government precluded a treaty relationship. Nolde maintains that this position is untenable in the light of subsequent Russian-Ukrainian relations. Furthermore, he argues, even if Ukrainian subordination to the tsar had been unconditional—which it was not—a treaty relationship was juridically possible. Nolde also rejects Kostomarov's assertion that the Russian mission at Pereiaslav in 1654 gave a formal oath on behalf of the tsar. He claims that Buturlin's report shows that, at most, the tsar's envoys gave some kind of commitment, which was later included in Khmelnytsky's petition.

Nolde stresses that the vague nature of the 1654 agreement was due mostly to the nature of Ukrainian society, which made little distinction between military and civilian functions. Even under the tsars, Ukrainian cities continued to enjoy the privileges of Magdeburg Law, the result of centuries of existence within Western-oriented Lithuania and Poland. The 1654 negotiations failed to define the precise relationship of the tsar and the hetman. At first the tsar's power in Ukraine was limited to a role in foreign affairs and to the use of Ukrainian troops for Russian military objectives. Eventually, however, the tsar took full control over Ukrainian foreign policy. Later in 1654, the tsar also emphasized the need to post troops in Ukrainian cities, although the original agreement had made no mention of this issue. A provision to garrison troops in Ukrainian cities was written into revised versions of the 1654 agreement, but not until 1659 were six cities designated for the posting of tsarist military commanders. Nevertheless, Nolde writes, the 1654 agreement preserved Ukrainian institutions and privileges, including the right to select the new hetman.

Despite continued friction in Pereiaslav and Moscow over finance and taxation, a treaty relationship was created. After 1654, the selection of each new hetman was frequently accompanied by modifications and supplements which further reduced Ukrainian autonomy. Nevertheless, the investiture of each hetman up to and including Ivan Mazepa, was a bilateral procedure that preserved the contractual essence of the 1654 agreement. After Mazepa's "treason," however, fundamental juridical changes were instituted. Unilateral tsarist fiat supplanted the former bilateral relationship: one side issued orders and the other made suppliant

requests. Since no real treaty relationship existed, Mazepa's attempt to end the contractual relationship with the Russians only served to decrease Ukraine's autonomy.

Ivan Skoropadsky, hetman from 1708 to 1722, failed to preserve Ukraine's autonomy; it was further curtailed in April 1722 when Peter I created the first Russian-sponsored administrative body, the Little Russian College, located in Hlukhiv and headed by Veliaminov. Ukrainian affairs at the highest imperial level were transferred to the jurisdiction of the newly-created Senate, a body concerned with internal administrative matters. After Skoropadsky's death, Peter I intensified his programme to increase Russian control of Ukraine. In 1722–3, following a disagreement with the acting hetman Pavlo Polubotok, he abolished the office of hetman and branded as traitors all hetmans succeeding Bohdan Khmelnytsky. When Peter II reinstated the office on 3 July (22 June) 1727, the legal situation was completely different, according to Nolde. The tsar had selected Apostol as the new hetman without consulting the Ukrainians.

In the reign of Catherine II, Ukrainian autonomy was completely terminated. The creation of a new Little Russian College, headed by Count Rumiantsev, in 1764 was a major step in that direction. By 1781 the hetmanate was no longer an administrative entity, and its territory was divided into three tsarist provinces (Kiev, Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siversky). In 1783 empire tax policies were extended to areas formerly belonging to the hetmanate. By the late eighteenth century, Ukraine ceased to exist as an autonomous entity within the Russian empire.¹⁵

Personal Union

Nolde's characterization of the 1654 arrangement as a bilateral treaty granting the Ukrainian state a high degree of autonomy contrasts with the opinions of other experts on Russian law. In *Lektsii i izsledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkago prava* [Lectures and studies on the ancient history of Russian law], Vasilii Sergeevich (1832–1910) stresses that the 1654 agreement created a personal union between the Muscovite state and Little Russia. In contrast to Tver and Riazan, which the Muscovite state annexed and integrated as provinces, by the 1654 "union of states," Ukraine became a partner in a personal union, in which both parties accepted the same sovereign but retained separate governmental institutions. Sergeevich claims that Little Russia joined this union in reaction to Polish religious policy. Little Russia continued to exist as a separate state, with its own administration, army, judicial and legislative

organs and had the right to conduct foreign relations.

Both parties to the 1654 negotiations interpreted the agreement from their own experiences and perceptions, Sergeevich notes. The Ukrainians wanted the tsar to reciprocate by taking an oath, but the Russians refused to allow this. In turn, the Ukrainian clergy and the Zaporozhian Sich refused to recognize the tsar. Furthermore, it appears that the Muscovite authorities did not understand the bilateral nature of the agreement—or, as Sergeevich says, “perhaps they did not desire to understand.”

Whatever the case, friction soon emerged. The 1654 agreement brought Russia into the war with Poland, but two years later the Russians signed a separate peace with the Poles at Vilna, in the hope of mounting a joint campaign against Sweden. The Russian-Polish treaty flagrantly disregarded the wishes of the Ukrainians; Khmelnytsky refused to make peace with the Poles, continued friendly relations with Sweden and turned against Moscow. In retaliation the Russians supported the rank-and-file Cossacks in their disagreements with the officer class. Khmelnytsky died during the troubles and his successor, Ivan Vyhovsky, severed relations with the Russians.

A major improvement in Russian-Ukrainian relations occurred, according to Sergeevich, during Briukhovetsky's tenure as hetman, when Russian power in Left-Bank Ukraine was legitimized. Russian interference in local Ukrainian affairs, however, provoked a wave of revolts, which in turn contributed to the Russian decision to sign the 1667 Treaty of Andrusovo with the Poles, dividing Ukraine between the two signatory powers. Modifications in the original intent of the 1654 agreement continued—particularly after the “treason” of Ivan Mazepa—and culminated in Ukraine's incorporation into the Russian state.

Annexation and Personal Union

In *Uchebnik istorii russkago prava* [Textbook on the history of Russian law], A. N. Filippov discusses the juridical nature of the 1654 agreement and draws conclusions similar to those of Sergeevich. Filippov notes that territorial expansion was a marked characteristic of the early Muscovite state. Between 1450 and 1600 Muscovy's territory expanded thirty-fold. Early expansion was accomplished through various means—purchase, conquest, capitulation and through petitions offered to the tsar. Filippov says that a new phase in Muscovite expansion—the gradual absorption of Little Russia—began with the historic session of the *Zemskii Sobor* on 11 (1) October 1653.

The Ukrainian decision in 1654 brought about the voluntary annexation (*prisoedinenie*; literally, “adhesion”) of Little Russia to the Muscovite state, Filippov writes. This annexation changed the juridical character of the tsarist state from “simple” to “complex.” Filippov defines a simple state as one in which new territorial components are absorbed by or incorporated into the dominant power structure; an area loses its independence after incorporation. In a complex state, the component parts continue to enjoy local privileges recognized or granted by the dominant or expanding state. Juridically, such privileges are derived from and granted by the annexing state. Prior to 1654, Filippov notes, the Russian state absorbed territory either through outright incorporation at the time of union or through temporary vassalage that later became incorporation. In 1654 the act of union (*soedinenie*) involved two states and transformed Muscovy into a complex state. Both states forming the union (*uniia*) accepted a common monarch.

Filippov maintains that a union (*uniia*) may be either “personal” or “real.” In a personal union, one monarch occupies both thrones, but the government structures of each state remain separate and distinct. A real union posits common governmental institutions and a common law of succession according to which the monarch of one state *eo ipso* becomes the ruler of the other. The 1654 arrangement produced a personal rather than a real union, Filippov concludes, because there was no common law of succession automatically making the tsar of Muscovy the monarch of Little Russia. After 1654 Ukraine remained a distinct state with separate institutions, with an army of its own, and with the right to conduct foreign relations. The personal union lasted until the eighteenth century, when Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian empire.

Real Union

Nikolai Diakonov (1856–1919), a specialist in the history of Russian law, maintains that a “real union” emerged from the 1654 agreement. In *Ocherki obshchestvennago i gosudarstvennago stroia drevnei Rusi* [Outlines of the social and state structure of ancient Rus’], Diakonov points out that a “personal union” involves a fortuitous and temporary arrangement, whereas in 1654 the Ukrainians obligated themselves to serve the tsar “forever” and accepted “perpetual subjection” regardless of who ruled in Moscow.

Diakonov argues that incompatibilities between Russia and Ukraine prevented the achievement of the projected “perpetual” union. Moscow negotiated a unilateral peace agreement with Poland while the

Polish-Ukrainian war continued. After Khmelnytsky's death, Right-Bank Ukraine became pro-Polish, while Russia dominated the Left Bank. In consequence, there were two hetmanates. In 1665 Briukhovetsky made extensive concessions to the Russians in Left-Bank Ukraine for which he was lavishly rewarded; these, however, aroused strong dissatisfaction in his area of jurisdiction. The 1667 Andrusovo treaty had partitioned Ukraine between Poland and Russia, and in 1674 Hetman Samoilovych made additional concessions to the Russian sovereign, including the forfeiture of Ukraine's right to conduct foreign policy. Moscow's policy of gradual liquidation of local practices and institutions in Ukraine culminated in 1781, when, with the imposition of the imperial *guberniia* system, its control of Ukraine was complete.

According to Diakonov, the Muscovite rulers annexed Ukraine by exploiting the 1648–54 revolt against the Poles, the Pereiaslav–Moscow negotiations and the conflict over the Ukrainian demand for a reciprocal oath from the tsar. Although the taking of oaths was eventually unilateral, Diakonov points out that the Ukrainians took the oaths without enthusiasm and against their convictions, and in some areas they stubbornly refused altogether.

Finally, Diakonov rejects the assertion that Ukraine's relationship with Moscow was one of vassalage. He defines the latter as the lack of a direct tie between the supreme sovereign and the population of a vassal state; the ruler of the vassal state (in Ukraine's case, the hetman) occupies an intervening position. The population of the vassal state is subordinate to its ruler or lord, who in turn gives an oath of loyalty to the sovereign. In 1654, however, the Ukrainian population gave an oath of loyalty directly to the tsar, not to the hetman. In taking this position, Diakonov parts with such specialists as Nikolai Korkunov, who claims that the 1654 agreement made the Cossack state a vassal of the Russian empire.

Vassalage

The concept of vassalage set forth by Nikolai Korkunov in *Russkoe gosudarstvennoe pravo* [Russian state law] subsumed for the Ukrainians a status of semi-independence analogous to Bulgaria and Egypt's relationship with the Ottoman empire in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Bulgaria and Egypt were not "in union" with Turkey, Korkunov writes, because they had distinct rulers. The essence of personal union resides "first of all and unconditionally" in a single person functioning as the sole ruler in all areas of a union, but this condition did not arise from the Pereiaslav agreement. Little Russia still had its own hetman, who even

retained the right to conduct foreign relations. The resultant association, however, was based on the hetman ruling Little Russia as the tsar's subordinate. Korkunov stresses that this political arrangement was vassalage and not true personal union.

Andrii Iakovliv maintains that the agreement temporarily made Khmelnytsky a vassal of the tsar. To be sure, the agreement was not a single document signed by the contracting parties; it was a written petition from Khmelnytsky approved by the tsar in a sovereign's grant (*zhalovanie*, or *milost*). As has been noted, some scholars (for example, Karpov and Kulish) feel that these documents cannot be regarded as a treaty in the juridical sense; furthermore, the Ukrainians submitted unconditionally to the tsar, who, as an absolute monarch, permitted them some of the privileges they had enjoyed under Polish rule. This interpretation also emphasizes that Khmelnytsky is termed tsar's subject (*poddanyi*), "under Our, His Majesty's, high hand in accordance with previous rights and privileges," and that "in all matters [the hetman] is to be forever under Our sovereign will and obedience."

In rejecting this interpretation, Iakovliv points out that the 1654 agreement gave the tsar power only over certain aspects of the Cossack state. For example, the tsar was to receive, as tribute, monies formerly given to the Polish king, Catholic monasteries and some of the magnates of the commonwealth. The Teteria-Zarudny mission, Iakovliv argues, received instructions to negotiate a relationship with Muscovy similar to that between Turkey and its tributary states (such as Moldavia and Wallachia), that is, nominal vassalage with the payment of tribute by the vassal. (Instead, the tsar's spokesmen proposed that Russian officials would obtain the money from local collectors in Ukraine, revealing the tsar's distrust of local officials and his fear that the Russian treasury would not receive adequate revenue.)

A major dispute arising from the 1654 agreement centred on the posting of Russian military commanders (*voevody*) in Ukrainian cities. In 1657 Fedor Buturlin was sent to Ukraine to inquire why only Kiev had a Russian commander, since the 1654 agreement called for commanders in three other cities (Chernihiv, Pereiaslav and Nizhyn). In reply, Khmelnytsky stated that the Teteria-Zarudny mission had agreed to the stationing of Russian troops in Kiev alone. Iakovliv points out that the latter concession stemmed from a proposal originally made in 1653 by Lavryn Kapusta, Khmelnytsky's special envoy in Moscow, who had asked the tsar for three thousand soldiers to help defend Kiev.

Iakovliv concludes that the 1654 agreement limited the tsar's power over the Zaporozhian state to the receipt of taxes intended as tribute and to the control of certain aspects of the hetman's foreign relations. All other

state functions were retained by the Ukrainians. For example, the Ukrainian courts maintained the same functions and authority as before the agreement with Muscovy, and the hetman retained his powers as chief executive of a separate government and was allowed to hold office for life. The Cossacks could choose his successor, but they were obligated to inform the tsar of their choice. The documents associated with the 1654 negotiations refer variously to the hetman as "sovereign," "supreme ruler and sovereign of our country," and "highest ruler."

The objectives of the two parties were to some degree incompatible, Iakovliv writes. The Ukrainians wanted both to improve the international position of the Zaporozhian state and to obtain Russian military assistance. In fact, Russia did provide military aid for a joint campaign against the commonwealth. However, Khmelnytsky objected to the Vilna talks and considered them a violation of the 1654 agreement (he feared the negotiations would restore Polish rule in Ukraine). Iakovliv points out that Khmelnytsky conducted foreign relations without consulting the tsar. In 1657 the hetman's capital, Chyhyryn, was a centre of intense diplomacy. The various sovereigns were represented by numerous diplomats—the Habsburg envoy Peter Freiherr von Parchevich, two Swedish envoys, a diplomat from Turkey, two princes from Hungary, an envoy from the Crimean Tatars, several delegations from Moldavia and Wallachia, a delegation from Russia, and separate delegations from the Polish and Lithuanian parts of the commonwealth.

Iakovliv believes that Khmelnytsky ignored the foreign-policy provisions of the Pereiaslav agreement because he felt that the March Articles had violated the understanding reached in January 1654. The hetman did not even bother to inform the Cossack officers about the modifications brought from Moscow by the Teteria-Zarudny mission. Khmelnytsky felt, even before the return of his envoys, that the change in the international situation had rendered the Pereiaslav plans obsolete. In exchange for a Russian garrison at Kiev, the payment of a tribute and some restriction on his foreign relations, Khmelnytsky had expected to form a military alliance with the tsar against the Poles. In the hetman's view, this alliance was to be a joint venture against a common foe and did not require severing relations with other states.

Additional clues about Khmelnytsky's interpretation of the Pereiaslav agreement can be gleaned from his efforts to annex to the Zaporozhian state parts of Belorussia and the Ukrainian regions of Volhynia and Polissia. Together with the Russians, he sent Ivan Zolotarenko and Ivan Nechai with troops to Mogilev (Mohilau) and Gomel (Homel). Khmelnytsky also assumed control over the Slutsk principality and claimed the patrimony of Janusz Radziwill's widow, to whom he was related by

marriage. (Tymish Khmelnytsky, his eldest son, had been married to Janusz's sister-in-law Rozanda.) The hetman's efforts to incorporate parts of Belorussia into the Cossack state created more friction with Moscow.

Iakovliv points out that the ceremony for the hetman's investiture exemplifies the Russian interpretation of Pereiaslav. (The ceremony was similar to the manner in which the Tatars and Turks installed a vassal as the head of a tributary state.) The vassal was given a cape, or *kaftan*, and other symbols of his office—a banner (*prapor*) and mace (*bulava*). Buturlin's remarks during this ceremonial recalled the former investiture of Muscovite princes as vassals of the Tatar rulers. These practices, Iakovliv observes, indicate that in 1654 the Russians interpreted the tsar's role as "protector" of the hetman.

Iakovliv adds that this interpretation is credible since after the 1654 arrangement Russia continued to conduct its relations with the Zaporozhian state through its foreign office, the *Posolskii Prikaz*. Discussions took place through the exchange of temporary missions, the standard manner of conducting diplomacy in Europe before the installation of permanent diplomatic missions (an Italian practice) became widespread. Formal boundaries still separated Ukraine from Russia and customs stations operated at border-crossing points.

The Russian attitude toward the 1654 arrangement was also expansionist in that the Muscovite state felt obligated to "unite all Russian lands" under its rule. Vasilii Buturlin, for example, thought that Kiev should be placed under the rule of the tsar because the city was "a primogenital heritage that had been torn away." After Pereiaslav the tsar's title became Autocrat of Great, Little and White Russia, of Lithuania, Volhynia and Podillia. This legitimized the view that the Ukrainians and Russians had united under one sovereign, and enabled the Russians to deem treasonable any Ukrainian opposition to this union. In fact, Cossacks who opposed the diminution of their privileges and power were frequently accused of treason.

By studying neighbouring states' responses to the 1654 arrangement, Iakovliv further reconstructs the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian agreement. The leaders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were opposed to Khmelnytsky's efforts to establish a separate state, which would reduce their territory, wealth and power. Therefore, they tried to quell the Cossack rebellion by force and to dissuade foreign powers from supporting the Cossack cause. For example, in 1656 a Polish envoy to the Crimean Tatars was instructed to inform the khan that the proposed Cossack state would be a dangerous neighbour. In their dealings with Transylvania, the Poles again stressed the dangers that a strong Cossack military state would pose. Bieniowski, a commonwealth diplomat in frequent contact with

Khmelnysky and his successors, tried to keep the Ukrainians within the commonwealth by stressing the disadvantage of “shifting from one protection to another.”

Contemporaries removed from the Ukrainian problem had different perspectives on Pereiaslav. Charles X Gustavus of Sweden, in a note to Khmelnytsky dated 15 July 1656, appraised the Pereiaslav agreement as a “specific treaty” formed “between the Grand Duke of Muscovy and the Zaporozhian people of such a nature as to retain inviolate and complete the freedom of that people.” He requested the opening of diplomatic relations: “Taking under advisement this free situation of yours, we wanted openly and fully, with the knowledge also of the Grand Duke of Moscow, to enter into correspondence with Your Highness.” Archbishop Parchevich, in Chyhyryn in March 1657 as a special envoy of Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III, accorded Khmelnytsky the courtesies of a traditional monarch and called the Cossack state “a glorious and militant republic.”

Alliance and Protectorate

In *Ukrainsko-moskovska uhoda, 1654* [Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement, 1654], Oleksander Ohloblyn points out that the conflicting juridical interpretations of the agreement are due partly to the political consequences: at stake is the definition of the political relations of two peoples over the past three hundred years.

As early as 1648 Khmelnytsky had wanted to form an alliance with Russia in order to prevent the destruction of his new state by the Poles. At a session of the *Zemskii Sobor* on 11 (1) October 1653, the Russians decided to aid the Ukrainians for several reasons: to acquire an ally with three hundred thousand seasoned soldiers; to advance the political claim to the ancient Kievan state; to gain ports on the Black Sea; and from the fear that the social unrest in Ukraine might spread into Russia. Finally, the Russians showed genuine concern for the fate of the Ukrainians because of their cultural and educational achievements.

Ohloblyn’s interpretation is sceptical of the accuracy of Buturlin’s report on the Pereiaslav proceedings, the only extant document on the January 1654 negotiations. The latter took place in an atmosphere of hostility and mutual distrust: there were no social amenities, no private or official receptions of any kind. Most Russian historians accept Buturlin’s statement that he stoutly refused to accede to the Cossacks’ demand. As Ohloblyn points out, however, Ukrainian tradition maintains that an oath was indeed given by Buturlin.

Contemporary accounts differ on this issue. A report by Makarii Krynytsky, a Kievan monk who represented Metropolitan Kosiv at the Pereiaslav negotiations, states that both sides had taken oaths; the Zherdiv articles of 1659 make the same claim. The Cossack chronicler, Samiilo Velychko, also writes that the Russian envoys had taken the oath. In a manifesto to European rulers, dated 4 April 1712, Pylyp Orlyk, the exiled successor of Ivan Mazepa, writes that Khmelnytsky “voluntarily and without force by anyone subordinated the Ruthenian people and the Cossack nation to the Muscovite tsar in a solemn pact Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich affirmed by oath that he would preserve under his protection forever the Cossack nation and the Ruthenian people.” According to *Istoriia Rusov*, the points comprising the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement were drafted and approved by Khmelnytsky and shown to the Russian envoys. The envoys then “agreed to everything they contained and confirmed by their oath in the name of the tsar and the Muscovite tsardom the eternal and inviolable preservation of the accepted agreements.”

Ohloblyn takes the position of Mykola Kostomarov, the first scholar to suspect that Buturlin’s report might be inaccurate. Hrushevsky also believed that Buturlin promised the Ukrainians more than was revealed in his report. Iakovliv was more cautious in his treatment of Buturlin, but he admitted that the Ukrainians might have interpreted as an oath the Russian envoy’s declaration that the tsar’s word was inviolable.

Unnatural Personal Union

In the opinion of Rostyslav Lashchenko, the 1654 agreement produced an “unnatural,” “atypical” and “relative” personal union between two dissimilar but juridically equal states—autocratic Russia and independence-minded Ukraine. In “Pereiaslavskyyi dohovir 1654 r. mizh Ukrainoiu i tsarem moskovskym” [The Pereiaslav agreement of 1654 between Ukraine and the Muscovite tsar], Lashchenko analyses the juridical nature of this agreement. He discusses the provisions for statehood granted to the Ukrainians by the agreement: specific territorial limits, a separate government with a chief executive and legislative machinery, a traditional judicial system and the right to select government officials according to Ukrainian custom.

By his writ the tsar accepted Ukraine under his “high hand” and promised to honour Cossack rights and privileges derived from the Lithuanian princes and Polish kings. In return, Khmelnytsky was obligated to serve faithfully the tsar and his successors. These stipulations, Lashchenko argues, preclude the possibility that the 1654 agreement was

either a “union” or even an “incomplete incorporation” of Ukraine and Russia, since the process of incorporation transforms the absorbed territory into a province of the annexing state. By definition, incorporation excludes sovereignty or political independence; as Korkunov has emphasized, it requires the unconditional subordination of one partner to the other. Of course, the incorporated territory might be granted some degree of autonomy, but such an arrangement is unilateral and completely dependent on the will of the incorporating state. (On this point Lashchenko concurs with the Russian jurist, A. N. Filippov.)

Throughout history incorporation has been achieved most frequently by military ventures. The ancient Persian empire, ancient Rome and tsarist Russia are classical examples of expansion through the incorporation of conquered territory. Ukraine presents a different case. It was not conquered by Russia, and the relationship initiated at Pereiaslav was a treaty arrangement—a free agreement—that by definition excludes incorporation. The rights of statehood possessed by Ukraine after 1654 were not bestowed by Russia; they were conditions already in existence, which the tsar agreed to respect.

Through similar reasoning Lashchenko denies that Ukraine preserved its autonomy, since the basic laws of a province are decreed by the absorbing state. Modifications or exceptions to these laws are of no juridical significance. In support of this argument, Lashchenko cites Korkunov who, in his book on Russian state law, maintains:

Regardless of how broad the autonomy of communities or provinces might be, these exercise the power of government not because of their own law but at the sufferance of the state that transmits to them a portion of its own power, not *quo ad jus* but only *quo ad exercitium*, thus retaining for itself the substance of law completely. (p. 56)

Thus Lashchenko rejects the view of those, like Nolde, who conclude that the 1654 agreement granted Ukraine autonomous status within the Russian empire. He points out that after Pereiaslav, Ukraine retained all the essential attributes of statehood.

Further, the relationship cannot be defined juridically as a form of federation or confederation. A federation consists of a central government with jurisdiction over its component parts, but separate from and independent of the local administration. The Pereiaslav agreement neither produced such a system for lands under tsarist rule, nor provided for a looser confederation.

Lashchenko opposes Korkunov's theory of vassalage for Ukraine, and maintains that the essence of vassalage is dependence or subordination, rather than equality between the contracting parties. In Korkunov's view, the Ukrainian hetman's relationship to his sovereign was similar to that of a feudal lord. Lashchenko admits that although the autocratic tone of the tsar's writ of March 1654 suggests the status of vassalage, such language was typical and even used in exchanges with other established sovereigns. But the substance of the Ukrainian petition dispels all notions of vassalage, for the talks in both Pereiaslav and Moscow were bilateral and were conducted by negotiators representing juridically equal states. The language of Khmelnytsky's petition expressed an attitude of equality, not of a vassal pleading before his sovereign.

Lashchenko rejects the notion that Khmelnytsky's oath of loyalty to the tsar is proof of vassalage. The controversy over oath-taking suggests that the Ukrainians considered themselves equal partners (and it underlines a fundamental difference between Russian and Ukrainian legal approaches), since a vassal would not request his sovereign to take an oath. Although it is not clear whether the Russians gave an oath, the Ukrainians believed that they had done so. Lashchenko also disagrees with scholars who hold that the 1654 arrangement may be deemed either a real or personal union (as defined by Filippov).

Diakonov argued that the 1654 agreement produced a perpetual union between Russia and Ukraine, union which endured even after the end of the present tsar's rule. Lashchenko contends that Diakonov misinterpreted such terms in the tsar's writ as "in perpetuity" and "eternal subjection." It is essential, Lashchenko argues, to establish juridically not only whether the negotiators in 1654 elaborated a law of succession applicable to both parts of one state—Russia and Ukraine—but also whether the monarch of one entity (Russia) was to become automatically the monarch of the other (Ukraine). As no such law was elaborated, no "real union" was formed. Indeed, no common governmental bodies were established at that time.

Viacheslav Lypynsky maintained that the 1654 agreement was essentially a military alliance against Poland, buttressed by the tsar's readiness to make Ukraine his "protectorate." Lashchenko denounces this notion of a protectorate status for Ukraine as counter to the status of equality granted to both parties to the 1654 agreement. The protecting state above all assumes control over certain aspects of the other party's functions, such as foreign policy. The status of a protectorate also limits the sovereignty of the protected partner, as happened in 1783 when Catherine II agreed to assume protection over Georgia.

Some scholars (for example, Sergeevich and Filippov) supported the concept of a personal union because the tsar's writ of March 1654 stated

that he took Little Russia “under his high hand,” and the Ukrainians in turn promised to serve the tsar and his successors. Sergeevich writes in *Lektsii i izsledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkago prava* that “Ukraine did not unite with the Russian state but merely recognized as its ruler the ruler who reigned in Moscow, as well as his successors.” From this Sergeevich concludes that the Pereiaslav agreement was “a case of personal union based on choice. Because the chosen one was the Russian ruler and his family, the union was to continue as long as the family of Aleksei Mikhailovich survived.” Other scholars, such as Korkunov, reject this view because the 1654 agreement did not establish a common monarch for both partners—Ukraine continued to have a separate ruler, the hetman.

Lashchenko believes that Sergeevich’s term “personal union” was a fairly accurate description of the juridical essence of the 1654 agreement. He feels, however, that this was an atypical personal union, as the tsar’s moral authority over Ukraine was limited to a political and military alliance with the hetman. The tsar’s only juridical right over Ukraine was a tribute in return for military assistance. The Ukrainian petition clearly shows that Ukraine remained an independent state with a separate government, army, legislature and the right to conduct foreign relations. But can a personal union exist when two states still retain separate governments?

Lashchenko admits that in theory such a situation seems unlikely, although it occurred, for example, in Poland–Lithuania in 1401. He speculates that Khmelnytsky could have recognized the moral authority of his ally, the Russian tsar, and still remained the sovereign ruler of Ukraine. The resulting merger might not meet all the requirements of a genuine personal union, but would approximate it. Such an arrangement comes closer to what actually occurred; Khmelnytsky rejected tsarist interference in Ukrainian internal affairs; it is improbable that a vassal or ruler of a protectorate would have acted so independently. In addition, the right to conduct foreign relations (albeit on a restricted basis) is possible in a personal union.

The personal union between the Cossack republic and the Russian autocracy was “unnatural,” Lashchenko continues, in that as a rule, a personal union involves monarchies. Because the social traditions of Russia and Ukraine were dissimilar, the 1654 agreement was a “relative” rather than a pure or “authentic” personal union. Khmelnytsky understood this anomaly and he therefore recognized the moral authority of the tsar, and accepted him as a military and political ally, but gave no juridical sanction for interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. Although the tsar restricted the hetman’s foreign contacts, this did not violate Ukrainian sovereignty,

since the hetman retained the juridical right to conduct independent foreign relations.

Thus Lashchenko feels that the misunderstandings at Pereiaslav and Moscow arose from antagonistic Russian and Ukrainian political traditions. The use of such terms as "eternal subject," "perpetual obedience" and tsarist "patrimony" (*otchina*) in the tsar's documents reflects the Muscovite autocratic tradition and contrasts with the Ukrainian emphasis on "rights and freedoms." V. O. Kliuchevsky remarked on the Russian tendency to consider Ukraine merely another of the many Muscovite *otchiny*: the Muscovites regarded the "annexation of Little Rus' from the traditional point of view, as a continuation of Moscow's territorial ingathering of the Russian land." Kliuchevsky maintained that it was a matter of Russia "wresting a large slice of Rus' from her enemy, Poland, in order to add to the *otchina* of the Muscovite Tsars."¹⁶

To arrive at an accurate juridical description of the 1654 agreement, Lashchenko warns, one must grasp the ideological differences between the main documents—the tsar's writ and the hetman's petition—and approach the situation from a seventeenth-century point of view. It then becomes clear that both signatories desired an ally against a mutual foe, Poland. Yet, the style of the tsar's writ suggests that the transactions were the results of unilateral tsarist gestures. In other words, the traditional Russian ideological superstructure obscured the true relationship existing between the two partners in 1654. The tsar, beset by hostile neighbours, was in desperate need of a military alliance with the Ukrainians, and it would be unrealistic to suppose that Khmelnytsky rejected subservience to the Polish king simply to submit to the Russian tsar.

The Ukrainians' belief in an equal partnership is best seen in their refusal to take an oath of loyalty to the tsar unless the Russian envoys reciprocated, Lashchenko points out. Even after heated debate and despite the critical situation, some Cossack leaders (among them Ivan Bohun) and the Kievan clergy refused to take the oath. The rank-and-file Cossacks also balked at this requirement and two regiments were forced to submit to the oath.

Mindful of contemporary events, Lashchenko notes that after 1654, Russia gradually reduced Ukrainian rights and freedoms. It was not fortuitous, he says, that Ukrainian autonomy was finally eradicated in 1781, after the first partition of Poland in 1772 and after the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji in 1774, which increased Russia's power at Turkey's expense. These two events mark significant improvements in Russia's international position; they also mark the end of a serious threat of Polish or Turkish intervention in Ukrainian affairs.

Alliance and Vassalage

In *Lektsii z istorii ukrainskoho prava. Pravo derzhavne. Doba stanovoho suspilstva* [Lectures on the history of Ukrainian law: The law of the state in the period of estate society], written in 1954, Lev Okinshevych, a specialist on the juridical question, concludes that an independent Cossack state, in existence since the 1648 revolt, formed an alliance or union (*spilka*) in 1654 with Muscovy. During the initial negotiations in Pereiaslav, no written agreement was signed, and Buturlin tried to put the Ukrainians in a subordinate position by refusing to take a reciprocal oath. The written agreement came in March 1654 and was preserved in two variants, one with eleven articles and another with twenty-three. There were further complications in 1659 when the Russians presented a version of the 1654 accord containing fourteen points. Despite the peculiar exchange—a petition submitted by the Cossacks was then confirmed by the tsar—a treaty relationship was established that provided first, an international alliance and second, a constitutional charter for one of the signatory states. As suggested by Korkunov, Hrushevsky and Iakovliv, the Ukrainian state, officially termed the Zaporozhian Army (*Zaporizke Viisko*), became a vassal of the tsar; its status was akin to a latter-day protectorate. Such arrangements were common in the seventeenth century, Okinshevych points out, particularly in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Okinshevych feels that much of the confusion about the juridical problems of seventeenth-century Eastern Europe arose because populist and socialist historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries based their interpretations on ideologies more relevant to their own age. Thus they depicted the 1648–54 events as a social revolution in which the Cossacks liquidated the existing order or established a democratic republic. In 1648 a new state typical of seventeenth-century European society—that is, based on the estates system (*stanova derzhava*)—was created. These estates included the ruling elite (kings and nobility), the landowning gentry, enserfed peasantry and self-governing burghers with their guilds. The social order of the commonwealth was structured according to this pattern: it had an elective monarchy, gentry (*szlachta*), enserfed peasantry and burghers with their Magdeburg Law. Similarly, the Muscovite state was comprised of a tsar, princes and boyars, gentry and peasantry.

In the Ukrainian parts of the commonwealth, the Cossacks formed a new fourth estate. Originating in the steppe as self-defence units against the Nogay and Crimean Tatars, in competition with the *szlachta*, they evolved into the creators of a new state. Initially, registered Cossacks formed a transitional estate between the peasantry and the gentry, free of the *corvée* but obliged to perform military service; they owned land but not

serfs (as did the true gentry). In 1648 this privileged group created the Zaporozhian state and became the ruling elite in a stratified Ukrainian society.

Notes

1. V. Herasymchuk, "Do pytannia pro statti B. Khmelnytskoho," 212.
2. G. F. Karpov, "Peregovory ob usloviakh," 2.
3. See Appendix 5 for excerpts from Buturlin's report in English translation.
4. See Appendix 1 for an English-language version of this document.
5. Count Petr Rumiantsev (1725–96), one of Catherine II's leading officials, distinguished himself in the war against Turkey and served as governor-general of Little Russia after the resignation of Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovsky in 1765. To promote the integration of Little Russia into the empire, Rumiantsev ordered a "general census," an undertaking which took two years and produced much statistical and descriptive data. The core of this material is known to historians as *The General Description of Little Russia* ("Generalnaia opis Malorossii") or as *The Rumiantsev Description*.
6. See Appendix 2 for an English-language version of the main tsarist *gramota*.
7. See Appendix 4 for an English translation of the 1659 version of the 1654 agreement.
8. This computation contains an obvious mathematical error. Shafranov refers to the version of 24 (14) March, not 23 (13) March, and yet the total number of points listed is only twenty. Several points required further clarification, for example, point 23. It can only be concluded that Shafranov confused the two documents (13 March and 14 March) when he investigated the tsar's reaction to each individual point.
9. See Appendix 3 for an English translation of this document.
10. V. Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v. Snosheniia malorossiiskago dukhoventstva s moskovskim pravitelstvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, 66–9. B. E. Nolde, *Ocherki russkago gosudarstvennago prava*, 209; and É. Borschak, *La légende historique de l'Ukraine: "Istorija Rusov,"* 138.
11. For details on Kotoshikhin and his usefulness as a source, see V. O. Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century*, 262–3.
12. According to Ohloblyn, a basic weakness in the Russian version of this document, and in other Russian documents, derived from the practice of rendering the Ukrainian adjective *ruskyi* [Ruthenian] as *rossiiskii* [Russian]. Ohloblyn points out that this practice blurs the distinction

between the Eastern Slavs in the commonwealth and those in Muscovy and has served to promote the political concept of a Russia “one and indivisible.” This ambiguity was also deplored by Hrushevsky, who felt that references in Russian-language documents to the Ukrainians in the seventeenth century in such terms as *narod pravoslavnyi rossiiskii* [Orthodox Russian people] were inadmissible. To this author it seems that observations such as Hrushevsky’s are important, but that they overlook other aspects of the problem. There is evidence, for example, that the term *rossiiskii* was also applied to the Ruthenians in the commonwealth as an ornate “baroque” term, usually in an ecclesiastical frame of reference. The difference between the Ruthenians and the Muscovites was felt clearly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but a clear-cut differentiation in national nomenclatures was not achieved before the universal acceptance of the term Ukraine in the twentieth century. These remarks, however, should not be construed as approval of tendencies—deplored by Ohloblyn and Hrushevsky—to exploit linguistic ambiguities for political purposes. For a discussion of this controversy, see L. Tsehelsky, *Rus'-Ukraina ta Moskovshchyna-Rossia*. The first edition of this essay appeared in Austria-Hungary before the First World War. The second edition was published in Istanbul in 1916 by the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy*).

13. H. Fleishchhacker, *Die staats- und völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der moskauischen Aussenpolitik (14.–17. Jahrhundert)*, 197.
14. B. E. Nolde, *Ocherki russkago gosudarstvennago prava*, 288–9. During the First World War a section of this study dealing with Ukraine was translated into French and published separately in Paris. See B. E. Nolde, *L'Ukraine sous la protectorat russe*. It should be noted that his later study on the development of the Russian state, *La Formation de l'Empire russe: études, notes et documents*, does not deal with the incorporation of Ukraine into the tsarist empire; this work was left unfinished by the author and published posthumously in its incomplete form.
15. The process of erosion of Little Russia’s juridical status as an autonomous component of the Russian empire is traced by one of Nolde’s students. See I. B. Rozenfeld, *Prisoedinenie Malorossii k Rossii 1654–1793 gg.*
16. This English translation is by C. J. Hogarth, from V. O. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia* 3, 122.

Chapter Three

The Cossack Chronicles and the Early Historians

The Cossack Chronicles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries comprise a historical literary genre little known in the Western world. Weaving fact, legend and popular interpretation, the Chronicles deal mainly with the period 1648–54 and its aftermath. They provide continuity to Ukrainian history and connect the period of the ancient Kievan state with the national awakening of modern times. Moreover, they directly influenced the first attempts to write a scholarly history of the Ukrainians in the nineteenth century.¹

The authors of the Chronicles included graduates of the prestigious Kiev Academy. All were educated laymen, steeped in Cossack tradition and their outlook was shaped by the Baroque and, subsequently, by the influences of the early Enlightenment. As a group, they represented, in the words of Hrushevsky, the Cossack “stratum of military clerks.”² The Soviet historian, Volodymyr Holobutsky (Vladimir Golubutsky) claims, in his book *Diplomaticheskaia istoriia osvoboditelnoi ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* [Diplomatic history of the war of liberation of the Ukrainian people 1648–54], that the authors expressed the class views of the Cossack *starshyna* and the Ukrainian gentry. They considered religious persecution, rather than the social oppression of the peasantry, to be the prime cause of the Cossack revolt against the commonwealth; they asserted that Khmelnytsky’s uprising was secretly encouraged by Wladislaw IV because of the king’s and the Cossacks’ common opposition to the

overbearing magnates; and frequently they misrepresented the nature of the bond established between Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and Khmelnytsky in 1654. Regardless of conflicting evaluations, the Cossack Chronicles are important documents containing not only some historical facts but also “the presentation of events as remembered,” that is, as a near-contemporary interpretation of the turbulent Khmelnytsky era.

Because the 1648–54 revolt and the subsequent arrangement with Russia are the central themes in this literature, it is pertinent to outline the ideas these chronicles express. The ideology expressed in the Chronicles (defence of local interests, defined in both national and class terms, and idealization of the Khmelnytsky era) also made a considerable impact on historians of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The Kievan Sinopsis

The first printed history of the Eastern Slavs, the Kievan *Sinopsis*, is believed to have been published in 1674. Surviving versions do not mention the events of 1648–54 or the Cossack movement, although the *Sinopsis* concentrates on the history of the Kievan area from its origins until the second half of the seventeenth century.³ It deals in detail with the period prior to the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols in 1240, the battle of Kulikovo in 1380 and the Kievan area’s association with the Lithuanian state. Two sources are used extensively by its author: Maciej Strykowski’s *Kronika polska, litewska, żmudska i wszystkiej Rusi* [Chronicle of Poland, Lithuania, Samogitia, Lithuania and All Rus] and the *Hustynskyi litopys* [The Hustyn Chronicle], which was completed in 1670 and deals with the history of Ukraine to the year 1597.

An account of Ukraine’s history and its ties to Russia, the *Sinopsis* emphasizes the unity and common origins of northern, southern and western Rus’—modern Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia—based primarily on dynastic continuity and ethnic and cultural kinship. Muscovite autocracy and its claim to Ukraine originate in medieval Kiev as an “ancient hereditary patrimony.” As can be deduced from its complete title,⁴ the *Sinopsis* draws a direct line of succession from Volodymyr (Vladimir) the Great to Aleksei Mikhailovich. It regards the Romanov dynasty as the legitimate successor to the Riurikids of ancient Kiev. The author, however, commits some factual errors and relies excessively on legend. In his account of the origin of the Slavs, for example, he writes that they are the descendants of Mosokh, a grandson of Noah. He derives the name *Moskva* from Mosokh, and the word *Rossy* (Russians) from *rosseianie* (scattering), in the belief that it referred to people who had

been scattered or dispersed. The genealogy of the tsars is traced back to Augustus Caesar.

Thus, the *Sinopsis* is a progenitor of traditional Russian statist historiography. As such it deserves scholarly rescue from the oblivion in which it has languished since it was supplanted by Mikhail Lomonosov's *Drevniaia rossiiskaia istoriia* [History of ancient Russia], published in 1776. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, it served as the most popular textbook on the history of the Eastern Slavs in both Muscovy and Ukraine. It was translated into Greek and a Latin edition was prepared by order of Peter I. The *Sinopsis* had a profound influence on the Cossack chroniclers Hryhorii Hrabianka and Samiilo Velychko, and the Russian historians Vasil Tatishchev (1686–1750) and Lomonosov (1711–65). In 1974 scholars in the Soviet Union marked the three-hundredth anniversary of the first known publication of the *Sinopsis*.

The authorship of the *Sinopsis* has been attributed to Innokentii Gizel, an erudite Orthodox clergyman who in 1656 became the archimandrite of the *Pecherska Lavra* in Kiev. He had studied in Western Europe and for a time headed the printing establishment at *Pecherska Lavra*. Gizel refused to take the oath of allegiance to the tsar in 1654 and sided with the Kiev metropolitans Mohyla, Kosiv and Tukalsky in opposing the subordination of the Kievan church to Moscow.⁵ Most scholars doubt that Gizel authored the pro-Russian *Sinopsis*, however, since he was not a member of the influential group in the Kievan clerical community which, after the 1654 arrangement with Moscow, produced some of the greatest champions of Russian-Ukrainian unity. It is, none the less, possible that he might have aided in its publication.⁶

In *Ukrainska istoriografiiia* [Ukrainian historiography], M. I. Marchenko advances an explanation for certain gaps in the *Sinopsis*. Since the Kievan metropolitanate was not subordinated to the Moscow patriarch until 1686, the *Sinopsis* was written when the Kievan church still adhered to Byzantine and commonwealth traditions. Monks at the *Pecherska Lavra* were divided over the question of subordination to Moscow, thus the author of the *Sinopsis* (to deflect attacks from both the pro-Polish and pro-Russian camps) chose to pass over the 1648–54 events in silence. Gizel in like fashion played “a double game,” torn as he was between rejection of Russian ecclesiastical control and the need for Russian military aid in the face of imminent Turkish invasion. In the 1670s Gizel tried to persuade Doroshenko to break with the Turks and to ally with the tsar. Given this predicament, he approved the publication of the *Sinopsis* by the *Lavra* printing house with the appropriate omissions. However, Marchenko concludes, the manuscript was the work of an unknown monk who approved of the 1654 association with the Russians.

Other scholars have different explanations for the omissions in the *Sinopsis*. In his examination of eighteenth-century Ukrainian historiography, Hrushevsky explains that the omissions regarding the Cossacks and the Khmelnytsky era testify to the chasm between Kievan scholastic circles and the Cossack *starshyna*. The Soviet scholar S. L. Pestich advances a more convincing explanation of why the *Sinopsis* made no mention of the 1648–54 war of national liberation. In “Sinopsis’ kak istoricheskoe proizvedenie” [The *Sinopsis* as a historical work], Pestich reveals that the 1674 work was actually a censored version of an earlier edition. The Russians were engaged in delicate negotiations with the Poles and therefore ordered the deletion of the anti-Polish passages. Resorting to Aesopian language, Pestich notes that the 1674 edition was published “with the approval of the Russian government” and “could not be printed without the agreement of the Russian government.” He theorizes that a previous edition appeared in 1671 or earlier. A copy of the *Sinopsis* was sent to Artamon Matveev, the tsarist functionary engaged in talks with the Poles, to prepare him for his mission. Pestich notes that the “first” or 1674 edition and subsequent editions based on it contain no anti-Polish passages. Although Pestich’s construction seems plausible, it is noteworthy that, after the fashion of its two main sources (Strykowski and the Hustyn Chronicle), the *Sinopsis* strongly praises Adam Kysil, the pro-commonwealth Ruthenian *voevoda* of Kiev in 1651–3.

Whatever the reasons for the omissions, Russian historians increasingly lost respect for the *Sinopsis*. As Mykola Sumtsov points out in “Innokentii Gizel. K istorii iuzhno-russkoi literatury XVII veka” [Inokentii Gizel: On the history of South Russian literature of the seventeenth century], the *Sinopsis* relegates the history of Muscovy to a secondary position. It does not even mention the reigns of Ivan III (1462–1505) and Ivan IV (1533–84), the annexation of Novgorod, and the revision of liturgical books during the times of Patriarch Nikon. Events in Muscovy are presented as peripheral or used as additional explanations for Ukrainian questions. Sumtsov concludes that the author of the *Sinopsis* “loved” the Ukrainians but only “respected” the Russians. This “one-sidedness” contributed to the decline of the work’s popularity in official Russian circles and its disparagement by modern Russian historians (such as Pavel Miliukov).

The Eyewitness Chronicle

One of the best accounts of seventeenth-century Ukraine is known as *Litopys samovydtzia* [The Eyewitness Chronicle], which covers the period

1648–1702. Its content and style suggest that the manuscript was composed in two phases. The first part of the work, covering 1648–72, is a continuous narrative based on intermittent contemporary notes. The second part, covering 1672–1702, is a chronological account written on an annual basis. The work circulated originally in manuscript form and its author is unknown; but in the 1850s Panteleimon Kulish, impressed by the author's closeness to the events described, assigned to it the name by which it has been identified ever since.⁷ By textual analysis Orest Levytsky has shown that in 1652–9, the author of the *Eyewitness Chronicle* observed many of the events described.⁸

It is safe to assume that the *Eyewitness Chronicle* was written by Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky (1622–1703), a Cossack official who lived his last years as an Orthodox clergyman in the cities of Bratslav in Right-Bank and Starodub in Left-Bank Ukraine. Among the scholars subscribing to this view are Mykola Petrovsky, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Vadym Modzalevsky, Viktor Romanovsky, Oleksander Ohloblyn and Iaroslav Dzyra. This is the official view in the Soviet Union today and Rakushka-Romanovsky is mentioned specifically in the *Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia*.

Although the Khmelnytsky era emerges as the main theme of his chronicle, Rakushka-Romanovsky assigns no special merit to Bohdan Khmelnytsky himself. The hetman is both praised and criticized without, however, any strong emotional involvement on the part of the author. The chronicler recounts that Khmelnytsky instigated the rebellion to avenge himself of the personal wrongs suffered at the hands of the Polish nobleman Czapliński. He criticizes Khmelnytsky for his collaboration with the Moslems and his toleration of Tatar destruction of Ukrainian territory; his death merits but a brief account.

Despite a few minor factual errors detected by modern scholars, the *Eyewitness Chronicle* is remarkable for its high degree of historical accuracy. It is rated by scholars such as Orest Levytsky as second only to primary historical documents of the period and as superior to all other Cossack chronicles. Its virtue is its simplicity of style, for it contains no historical reconstructions, no rhetorical conceits typical of contemporary Polish and Latin models, and none of the imaginary speeches or scenes typical of later Cossack chronicles. In general the *Eyewitness Chronicle* presents an objective description of events in a language close to that of contemporary Ukrainian folk speech. It served as a basic source for two additional Cossack chronicles—those of Hryhorii Hrabianka and of Samiilo Velychko—and it strongly influenced the unknown author of *Istoriia Rusov*.

A reading of the *Eyewitness Chronicle* shows clearly that the author's views are those of the Orthodox gentry in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a commonwealth subject, Rakushka-Romanovsky originally favours its survival. He grieves at the death of Wladyslaw IV and praises his reign; he criticizes Khmelnytsky's failure to reach an accord with the new Polish king in 1649. The Poles, the chronicler explains, sent delegates to the hetman to make peace, but Khmelnytsky, arrogant because he was courted by several monarchs, rejected the offer of the Polish king, his own *pan* (lord). Instead, the hetman formed an alliance with the Crimeans and did not check their excesses. Rakushka-Romanovsky shows great respect for Adam Kysil, but is consistently hostile toward the large land-holding magnates as a group. He condemns the magnates as absentee landowners who abandoned their estates in Ukraine to overseers who exploited the local people. The Zboriv agreement, however, he regards positively. In discussing the battle of Berestechko in June 1651, he writes that the alliance between the Cossacks and Tatars was like a wolf—the Moslems—with a sheep. Rakushka-Romanovsky frequently criticizes the excesses of commonwealth soldiers, deplors their plundering, and decries measures taken against Ukrainian schools and Orthodox churches. On the whole, although the chronicler opposes certain aspects of commonwealth society, he does not reject all its political and social structures.

In Rakushka-Romanovsky's account of the early phases of the 1648–54 revolt, the Russians received scant attention. Until the year 1653 the account does not praise the tsarist regime or Russia. The only mention of Russia is a note that a Cossack mission went to Moscow in 1649 because the Polish king tried to draw the Tatars away from their alliance with Khmelnytsky. (A Soviet scholar concludes that the chronicler was simply unaware of the many contacts between the Cossacks and the Russians prior to 1653.) Rakushka-Romanovsky does, however, mourn the death in 1682 of Tsar Fedor Alekseevich because his brief reign was marked by great kindness toward the Ukrainians. The chronicler also sympathizes with Patriarch Nikon, who was deposed for various "crimes" in 1667 and under whose leadership Ukrainian liturgical practices were introduced into Russian churches. Peter I, on the other hand, is seen as an evil ruler who brought destruction to Ukraine. Rakushka-Romanovsky also strongly opposes Russian policy in Ukraine during Briukhovetsky's ascendancy and laments the excesses of the tsar's *voevody*.

With respect to relations in an earlier period, Rakushka-Romanovsky writes that the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada* "was supported throughout Ukraine" and brought "great joy among the people." He reports that Khmelnytsky and the entire *starshyna* gave an oath of fealty to the tsar and that in

return they received expensive gifts. "In all Ukraine the entire people took the oath with enthusiasm," he reports. Finally, it should be noted that there is no suggestion in the *Eyewitness Chronicle* of the significance that was attached to the Pereiaslav negotiations by writers and diplomats in the years to come. The negotiations at Pereiaslav are merely touched upon.

Hrabianka and the Brief Description of Little Russia

An important account of the turmoil in seventeenth-century Eastern Europe is known, after the name of its author, as *Litopys Hrabianky* [The Hrabianka Chronicle]. Hryhorii Hrabianka was a native of Hadiach; in 1686 he joined the Cossack army, and in 1717 became the chief judicial officer of the Hadiach regiment. In 1723 he signed a petition to Peter I in defence of Ukrainian autonomy and privileges for the gentry and *starshyna*, for which he was imprisoned (1723–5). After the death of Peter I and the renewal of the hetmanate under Danylo Apostol, Hrabianka was released and made colonel of the Hadiach regiment. He died in 1737 or 1738 during a campaign against the Tatars in the Russian-Turkish war of 1735–9.

The *Hrabianka Chronicle* was completed in 1710 and enjoyed wide popularity with the Ukrainian gentry, among whom it circulated in manuscript form. The most authentic version of the *Chronicle* was published in Kiev in 1854 by the state-supported Temporary Commission for the Study of Ancient Documents.⁹ This Kiev edition was prepared for publication by Ivan Samchevsky, who wrote an introduction to it.¹⁰ Six variants of the chronicle were available to Samchevsky, but he published the one in the possession of Mykhailo O. Sudiienko, a landowner interested in Ukrainian antiquities, who served as president of the Kiev Commission for the Study of Ancient Documents. Sudiienko had obtained the manuscript from the descendants of Hryhorii Poletyka (1725–84), a Ukrainian civic leader of Cossack gentry background with varied political and literary interests. Some scholars (for example, Dmytro Doroshenko and Oleksander Ohloblyn) believe him to be the author of *Istoriia Rusov*.

Hrabianka's chronicle attempts to summarize the history of Ukraine from its beginnings to the accession of Ivan Skoropadsky as hetman in 1708. Major emphasis, however, is placed on the Khmelnytsky era—the period which inspired the chronicle. Hrabianka begins with a brief survey of developments preceding the 1648–54 revolt and presents a mixture of fact, fantasy and Biblical lore. The great revolt, he says, originated with the Council of Brest in 1596 and the Ukrainian opposition to the Union of Churches.

Hrabianka describes the early career of Khmelnytsky in a heroic mode and praises the Cossacks as great defenders of Christianity against the Turks and Tatars. The religious issue caused the Cossacks to gradually deflect their military attention from their Moslem neighbours to the Poles. Khmelnytsky's difficulties with Czaplinski and the tragedy at Subotiv are advanced as the catalysts that made Khmelnytsky leader of the revolt. After the Zboriv agreement, Hrabianka writes, Khmelnytsky was greeted by many as "the liberator of Ukraine from Polish slavery." The fragile peace, however, was broken by the Poles, who were pressured by the Tatars—*anxious for spoils of war*—into an alliance against Moscow. The Cossacks were to be a third element in this anti-Russian coalition. Khmelnytsky rejected this scheme and, faithful to the Orthodox faith, secretly dispatched envoys to Moscow to inform the tsar of Polish and Tatar intentions.

Hrabianka next deals with Khmelnytsky's Balkan policies. The attempt to marry his son Tymish to the daughter of Basil Lupul of Moldavia led to renewed fighting with the Poles. Moreover, the Zboriv truce was unpopular with many Cossacks, who resented the restrictions on their numbers. Faced with internal opposition, Khmelnytsky sought support from Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and the Turkish sultan.

In the new outbreak of fighting against the Poles, the Berestechko battle was decisive. Basing his statistics on the inflated totals of Twardowski and Pufendorf,¹¹ Hrabianka writes that half a million men took part in the battle. The treason of Khmelnytsky's Tatar allies made possible the great Polish victory and about fifty thousand Cossacks perished. Hrabianka notes that some Cossacks believed the hetman had deliberately lost the battle because he resented the Cossacks' opposition to his policy of *détente* with the Poles.

The Polish victory at Berestechko was followed by a military stalemate and the abortive Bila Tserkva agreement. Ukrainians began to migrate en masse to uninhabited Eastern parts of the Cossack state, as well as "beyond the border into Great Russia." At this time Khmelnytsky's troops defeated the Moldavian forces and their Polish allies at Batih, thereby forcing Lupul to marry his daughter to the hetman's son Tymish. A further complication was an intrigue involving Wallachia and the defeat of the Cossack-Moldavian coalition at Suchava, where the young Khmelnytsky was mortally wounded. Although the elder Khmelnytsky won a subsequent victory at Zhvanets over the Poles and their Balkan allies—a victory described by Hrabianka as revenge for the defeat at Berestechko—a military stalemate persisted. Khmelnytsky then turned to Moscow for aid.

Earlier, Hrabianka reports, Khmelnytsky's overtures to the tsar had received sympathetic attention. Aleksei Mikhailovich, encouraged by the hetman's requests and information, sent the Trubetskoi-Pushkin mission to the Poles with demands that commonwealth officials who had insulted the tsar be punished. The Tatars' attempts to entice the Cossacks into war against Muscovy infuriated Khmelnytsky, who interpreted such efforts as a Polish-Tatar plot to destroy Ukraine. The hetman decided instead to collaborate with the tsar, and Buturlin was sent to the hetman in 1653, a move that culminated with the Pereiaslav *rada* and the Zaporozhian army's submission to the Orthodox sovereign. Hrabianka says that Khmelnytsky and all his troops took an oath of loyalty to the tsar: "On both sides of the Dnieper in all Ukraine every soul did so with eagerness, and there was great rejoicing among all the people." He makes no mention, however, of a reciprocal oath by the tsar's envoys at Pereiaslav. Hrabianka also reports on the Teteria-Zarudny mission to Moscow and includes the text of Khmelnytsky's petition carried to the tsar. He also summarizes the fourteen-point petition approved by the tsar.

In the spring of 1655 the Muscovites and Cossacks campaigned against the Poles and Tatars in Galicia. Hrabianka describes an alleged conversation in the field of Ozerna between Khmelnytsky and Mengli Giray. Scholars believe that Hrabianka fabricated the incident, and it has placed the reliability of the entire chronicle in doubt. According to Hrabianka, the khan supposedly scolded the hetman for subordinating himself to Moscow. Khmelnytsky, in turn, accused the Tatars of failure to supply sufficient aid and of treachery.

Hrabianka then describes Khmelnytsky's last days and includes a speech allegedly made by the ailing hetman to his assembled officers. The following is drawn from Khmelnytsky's supposed speech and gives an idea of Hrabianka's style:

If I desired to relate our affairs to someone who knows nothing about them, there would be need of a more detailed exposition, of more time, and of better health than I now possess. Since, however, I desire to deliberate with you, I consider it unnecessary to expatiate on these affairs, for you know them as well as I myself. You know, and you know well, the repressions, persecution, ruin and daily tortures our fatherland suffered for so long a time; and more, the evil that was visited upon our mother, the Eastern Orthodox church, which deprived of all her attributes, suffered under the oppression of the Roman heresy and remained silent until God bestowed upon her the grace of his beneficence and gave her the hand of assistance as He did to Israel in Egypt, in order that she might return to pristine Orthodoxy. You also know how much toil, tribulation, evil, and how many

necessary deaths had to be endured for the liberation of both the Orthodox church and of our fatherland from the Polish yoke. All this was achieved through your militant courage under my leadership as ordained by God. Since now it is the will of my Creator that I, in the infirmities of my body, approach death, being unable to sustain the arduous labour of government, I thank you, gentlemen and friends, for your loyal obedience to me in battle, for your unswerving fidelity, and finally, for aiding in the administration of my hetmanate.

God knows whose misfortune it is that the Lord did not permit me to end this war as it should have been ended and to assure you independence for all ages. For my son Iuras, because of his tender years, is unable to carry such a heavy burden, and as I observe, many among you do not desire to recognize him as hetman. Thus today I want to discover whom after I shall have died you desire to choose as hetman and to whom I should pass on the banner of his tsarist majesty, the hetman's mace, insignia and seal, and the artillery with all its ordnance. (pp. 150–1)

In the eighteenth century the *Hrabianka Chronicle* enjoyed wide popularity and influence as a historical document. *Istoriia Rusov* borrowed heavily from it and included the description of the meeting between Khmelnytsky and Mengli Giray. Many passages from the chronicle were also incorporated directly into Aleksandr Rigelman's *History of Little Russia*. The *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii* [Brief description of Little Russia] is also based to a large degree on Hrabianka. Such scholars as Marchenko, Levytsky, Doroshenko and Ohloblyn agree that the *Brief Description* is essentially an epitome of Hrabianka's work.

The first published version of the *Brief Description* appeared in 1777 in St. Petersburg as part of a work by Vasyl Ruban (1742–95) entitled *Kratkaia letopis Malyia Rossii* [Brief chronicle of Little Russia]. As Orest Levytsky points out in "Opyt issledovaniia o Letopisi Samovidtsa," Ruban's chronicle as a "literal copy" of the *Brief Description*, circulated in manuscript among the Ukrainian gentry, was often confused with the *Eyewitness Chronicle* and sometimes considered part of it. Bodiatsky knew that the *Brief Description* was a completely separate compilation, but he, nevertheless, published it as an appendix to his 1846 Moscow edition of *The Eyewitness Chronicle* as did Orest Levytsky in his 1878 Kiev edition. The *Brief Description* directly influenced Mykola Markevych, who used it as a basic source for *Istoriia Malorossii* [History of Little Russia] published in 1842–3. Markevych says that his copy of the manuscript was found in the personal library of Prince Vasiliï Repnin, son of Prince Nikolai Repnin, the military governor of Little Russia from 1816 to 1835.

Another copy of the manuscript was given to the Imperial Academy of Sciences by Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovsky. The *Brief Description of Little Russia* also served as the main source of J. B. Scherer's *Annales de la Petite Russie*, published in Paris in 1788. (It seems that Iaroslav Dzyra erred when he wrote in the introduction to his 1971 edition of *Litopys Samovydtzia* that the latter was "organically woven into" the *Brief Description of Little Russia* and that the *Eyewitness Chronicle* influenced "the German historian Scherer" indirectly through the *Brief Description*.)

The *Brief Description of Little Russia* thus warrants attention as an influential eighteenth-century work based on the *Hrabianka Chronicle*. Although divided into sections according to year, the *Brief Description* attempts to be an interpretative history rather than a mere chronological account. It covers the history of the Ukrainians until 1734 and concentrates on the Cossack period. Its unknown author writes that his objective is to show how, after the Kiev state crumbled, Little Russia fared under Polish rule and how, through the leadership of Khmelnytsky, it came under the protection of the tsar. Ideologically, the study is strongly anti-Polish. The style is simple and unadorned; the language is eighteenth-century literary Ukrainian with Church-Slavonic, Polish and Russian accretions. However, the work contains many factual and chronological errors.

Soviet scholars have accorded Hrabianka an important place in eighteenth-century Ukrainian historiography. He has been portrayed as a spokesman of the Cossack officer class because he wanted the *starshyna* to preserve its privileged status and advocated autonomy for Ukraine, albeit within the empire. His positive attitude toward the inclusion of Ukraine in the Russian state is stressed in recent Soviet writings, such as the third volume of *Ukrainska radianska entsyklopediia* [Ukrainian Soviet encyclopedia]. Soviet sources also note that Hrabianka condemned tsarist military officers who restricted Ukrainian autonomy and that the chronicler opposed such "traitors" as Vyhovsky and Mazepa. On the other hand, Hrabianka has been criticized for his attitude toward the masses, whom he allegedly dismissed as the *chern* (rabble), and for his sharp criticism of "anti-feudal movements." In the view of the Soviet historian Marchenko, Hrabianka consistently defends Ukrainian autonomy and the old Cossack order. The chronicler's basic objective was to portray the Ukrainian people as a distinct nation through the history of its heroic age—the 1648–54 war of national liberation.

The Velychko Chronicle

The most controversial of the Cossack Chronicles is commonly called, after the name of its compiler, the *Velychko Chronicle*. The work's original title is often abbreviated to *Skazanie o voine kozatskoi z poliakami chrez Zynovii Bogdana Khmelnytskogo* [Narration of the Cossack war of Zynovii Bohdan Khmelnytsky against the Poles]. (The Rare Book Collection of the Library of Congress in Washington, D. C., catalogues the *Velychko Chronicle* under that title. The four-volume edition of 1848–64 is also known as the *Letopis sobytii v Iugozapadnoi Rossii v XVII-m veke* [A chronicle of events in Southwest Russia in the seventeenth century].)

Described in the first volume of *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva* [Encyclopedia of Ukrainian studies] as “the first systematic exposition of the history of the Ukrainian Cossack state,” the *Velychko Chronicle* covers the period 1620–1700. It was first published in Kiev during 1848–64 by the Temporary Commission for the Study of Ancient Documents. The manuscript had formerly been in the possession of the historian Mikhail Pogodin. Another copy of the manuscript—almost identical to the Pogodin manuscript—had belonged to the Poletyka family and was later found in the library of Mykhailo Sudiienko, an official of the Kiev publishing group. The Poletyka–Sudiienko copy, as edited by Mykola Rigelman and Ivan Samchevsky, was also consulted by the Kiev scholars.¹²

The *Velychko Chronicle*, apparently finished in 1720, is a collection of documents, reports, contemporary writings and Velychko's own observations. The first volume (1620–60), is mainly a free translation into Ukrainian of Samuel Twardowski's history in verse, *Wojna domowa*. The other volumes continue the historical narrative and contain a large number of seventeenth-century documents. The first volume was reissued in Kiev in 1926, entitled *Skazanie o voine kozatskoi z poliakami* [Narration of the Cossack war against the Poles]. The editors stated in the preface that the manuscript on which the 1848 edition was based had been made to conform to literary Russian standards, with the result that “its original colouration was lost.” The *Velychko Chronicle*, in its entirety embraces Velychko's own narration as well as excerpts from other writers and documents: Twardowski, Pufendorf and Zorka; the diary of Okolski, a Pole who witnessed the 1638 revolt of Iakiv Ostrianyn; speeches delivered in the *Sejm* of the commonwealth; and many documents and speeches associated with Khmelnytsky. The 1848–64 volumes also contain a supplementary chronology covering the years 1700–23.

Samiilo Velychko was born about 1670 and died sometime after 1728. As a youth he attended the Kiev Academy and later worked as

confidential secretary to Vasyl Kochubei, the general-secretary of the Left-Bank hetmanate. In 1704 he obtained a secretarial post in the main administrative office of the Cossack state. While he was a Cossack official, Velychko took part in the Great Northern War and fought with Peter I's armies on behalf of King Augustus II of Poland. In 1708 he was dismissed from his position in the Cossack administration. (Doroshenko claims in *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography* that Velychko fell out of favour with Mazepa because of his closeness to Kochubei, denounced by Mazepa as a traitor to Peter I; in contrast, in his book on Ukrainian historiography, Marchenko proposes that Velychko fell into disfavour because of his co-operation with Mazepa.) Whatever the reasons for his dismissal, Velychko moved to Dykanka in the Poltava region.

While serving with the military in Polish and Right-Bank Ukrainian areas, Velychko was affected deeply by the desolation and destruction. He explains his decision to write a history of the Cossack wars in the introduction to his chronicle:

However, in the years when the mighty Swedish army was in Poland and Saxony, together with auxiliary Little Russian troops dispatched by the Poles against the Swedes on the command of the Illustrious Tsarist Majesty, I traversed Little Russian Ukraine from Korsun and Bila Tserkva to Volhynia and into the Ruthenian principality [Galicia] as far as Lviv, Zamostia [Zamość] and Brody and I saw many towns and castles empty and deserted, and the walls, once constructed by men to resemble hills, now serving as the homes and refuge for wild beasts. The city walls, such as I saw then in Cholhansk, Konstantyniv, Berdychiv, Zbarazh and Sokal, as we passed them on our way, were but little populated, some of them completely abandoned, ruined, levelled to the ground and overgrown with weeds, housing only snakes, reptiles and worms.

Having looked once more, I saw the wide Ukrainian fields and valleys, forests and orchards, the oak groves, and the ponds and lakes overgrown with moss and wild bush. Not in vain, however, did the Poles, regretting the loss of Ukraine, call this country a paradise, because before the war of Khmelnytsky, it was like another promised land, flowing with milk and honey.

There I saw in various places many human bones, dry and bare under the naked sky and I asked myself: Whose bones are these? After viewing all the dead and wasted, my heart and spirit were oppressed, since our beautiful country and fatherland—Little Russian Ukraine, which before was so full of the blessings of the world—has now been turned by God's will into a desert, and our own glorious forefathers have been forgotten. I have asked many old people why this has happened, for what reasons and by whom has this land of ours been turned into ruin, but their replies were different and

contradictory. Therefore, I found it impossible to learn from these various explanations the true reason for the downfall and destruction of that [Right-Bank] side of our country.¹³

Velychko collected all available writings on the Khmelnytsky epoch and incorporated them into his chronicle. He also used the original versions of documents available to him when he was associated with Kochubei and Mazepa. Because he also included other information based on his recollections, historians question Velychko's reliability. The controversy has been called "the case of the four Samuels"—Twardowski, Pufendorf, Zorka and Velychko himself. Twardowski and Pufendorf are not doubted, but the existence of Samiilo Zorka, allegedly the private secretary of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and Velychko's honesty as a historian are suspect. Velychko states that he used Zorka's diary as a basic source for his chronicle; however, the diary has never been found. No contemporary documents mention Zorka, and although Velychko maintains that Zorka delivered a eulogy at Khmelnytsky's funeral, his name does not appear in any of the lists of Cossack officials in power during the Khmelnytsky era.

None the less, despite probable inventions and flights of fancy, Velychko's chronicle is an important testimony of the outlook and ideology of the early eighteenth-century Ukrainian gentry. How this group regarded the 1648–54 war and Khmelnytsky personally is evident in this excerpt from Zorka's funeral oration:

Our kind leader has died, leaving behind him immortal glory, a man because of whose wisdom not only we, his associates, but also the entire Little Russian Commonwealth hoped for long years of happy life and prosperity. He has died, to whom the right hand of the Almighty at all times gave immediate aid, when this man together with Your Graces, Honourable Lords, righteously struggled for our freedoms and ancient rights against our brethren but at the same time our enemies, the Polish Sarmatians. He has died, whose thunderbolts of artillery and small arms shook not only the Sarmatia of the ancient Vandals and the shores of the stormy Black Sea with their fortresses and castles (particularly during the war of 1621 between the Polish Crown and the Ottoman Osmanlis, which endured for a long time but ended successfully at Khotyn with the aid of the Cossacks, our brethren); indeed, even the very walls of Constantinople trembled as they were enveloped by the smoke of Cossack arms! There has died, finally, the one through whose efforts there can be revived forever the ancient Ukrainian rights and freedoms! (1, pp. 289–94)

Velychko's work remains, in spite of its shortcomings, an example of patriotic eighteenth-century Ukrainian historical writing. In the introduction to his chronicle the author describes himself as a "true son of Little Russia." The chronicle portrays the Ukrainian people as a full-fledged national entity with a stratified society of Cossacks, gentry and peasantry. The idea of a Ukrainian national identity emerges more clearly in Velychko than in any other Cossack chronicle, and the word *Ukraina* occurs with much greater frequency than the official name *Malaia Rossiia*. The Cossacks are portrayed as true defenders of Ukrainian freedom, and Khmelnytsky is revered as a new Moses.

Velychko's statement that at the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada* the tsar's envoys gave a reciprocal oath on behalf of their sovereign deserves examination. After reporting that Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich earnestly desired an alliance with "the entire Ukrainian-Little Russian people" (but hesitated to violate the pact of eternal peace that then existed with the Poles), Velychko describes the negotiations and the subsequent *rada*:

At the cathedral of St. John the Baptist, on 7 January [the correct date was 8 January, Old Style], before the Divine Liturgy, at a full and legitimate assembly of the entire Zaporozhian army, Khmelnytsky himself gave a lengthy discourse to the envoys of His Illustrious Tsarist Majesty, as well as to the entire Cossack army, in which he explained the causes of the war against the Poles and the rejection by the Poles of Khmelnytsky's frequent requests for agreement that would confirm the previously existing rights and freedoms of the Zaporozhian army and of all Little Russia. He also explained why he rejected brotherhood and friendship with the Tatars and why he desired, with all Little Russia and the Zaporozhian army, to be in alliance with and under the protection of the Most Illustrious Sovereign Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Russia, the Orthodox Monarch strong in God. After this discourse by Khmelnytsky, there were read at the same assembly the terms of agreement that had been previously agreed upon and prepared. After these terms had been read, Khmelnytsky, and the entire *starshyna* and Cossack fellowship [*tovarystvo*], gave an oath of fidelity to their new sovereign. After this had been done, the Tsar's banner and mace were given to Khmelnytsky by the aforementioned plenipotentiary envoy, the boyar Buturlin. Other significant gifts from the person of the monarch were given to Khmelnytsky himself as well as to all of the *starshyna* and rank-and-file Cossacks [*chern*] that were present; along with the monarch's word under oath and assurance that he, the Most Illustrious Russian Monarch, is to hold Little Russia, with the entire Zaporozhian army, in his protection with the inviolable preservation of its ancient rights and freedoms and that he will

defend and aid her against all enemies and attacks with his troops and resources. And after this oath at Pereiaslav, there were sent out to all Little Russian cities by the same plenipotentiary envoy, the boyar Buturlin, distinguished Great Russian persons to hear the oath of loyalty to the Great Sovereign by the military and civilian Little Russians, which oath thereupon was executed by all. (1, pp. 172–3)

For the most part contemporary Soviet historians tend glibly to regard Velychko as a typical representative of the Cossack *starshyna* class. In 1971, however, Iaroslav Dzyra provided a more profound assessment of Velychko's place in history in an article entitled "Samiilo Velychko i ioho litopys" [Samiilo Velychko and his chronicle]. Dzyra states that Velychko frequently criticized the Cossack upper class and at times showed sympathy for the aspirations of the *chern*. Velychko considers the Ukrainian nation to be "an independent political category" and regrets the partition of the country under the terms of the Andrusovo treaty. Velychko's work stresses the separate identity of the Ukrainian people, advocates their political unification, champions Ukrainian culture, defends the Cossacks as a political movement, criticizes sharply the egoistic and power-seeking proclivities of some members of the *starshyna*, and exposes the negative aspects of the ruling classes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. All this, concludes Dzyra, shows there is no basis for the view that Velychko simply reflected the interests of the Cossack officer class; rather, he was a representative of "the progressive Ukrainian intelligentsia" of his day and a patriot.

Aleksandr Rigelman (1720–89)

Aleksandr Rigelman made a career in the tsarist army as a military engineer. Partly because of his assignments in Ukraine and his marriage into a leading family of the local gentry, Rigelman was able to compile the most complete eighteenth-century chronicle of Ukrainian history. Although the work he produced, known by its abbreviated title as the *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii* [A narrative chronicle of Little Russia], was completed in 1788, it was first published in Moscow only in 1847.¹⁴ The editor, Osyp Bodiansky, retained the Russian language of the original manuscript.

With the intent of producing "a true history of Little Russia," Rigelman compiled a massive work with illustrations and maps. The book begins with the origins of the Slavs and ends in the year 1786 with praise for

Catherine II and Petr Rumiantsev-Zadunaisky. The supplementary materials include a description of Catherine's sojourn in Ukraine in 1787, an essay on the life of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, an account of the customs of the Little Russians and a list of Ukrainian hetmans. The first two books deal with the origins of the Little Russians and the early history of the Cossacks. Book III deals with Khmelnytsky era; Book IV, with the hetmanates of Vyhovsky, Briukhovetsky, Mnohohrshny and Samoilovych; Book V, with the hetmanates of Mazepa, Skoropadsky and Apostol; and Book VI, with the interregnum after Apostol, the tenure of Rozumovsky and the reign of Catherine II.

Rigelman uses a broad variety of sources: diaries, chronicles, treatises, documents and translations from general works.¹⁵ His history of the eighteenth century is particularly rich, for he witnessed many of the events described and talked with participants. Not all his sources are documented properly; some passages from other writers are incorporated directly into the narrative without attribution. Among those acknowledged is the eighteenth-century work of Prince Semen Mishetsky, a tsarist officer who, on the basis of service in southern Ukraine, produced an early work on the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Mishetsky's work, *Istoriia o kozakakh zaporozhskikh* [History of the Zaporozhian Cossacks], was published in 1847 by Bodiatsky.

Book II includes a Russian translation of a work by Pierre Chevalier, a French officer in Polish service who negotiated with the Cossacks. His manuscript, which concentrates on military events from 1648 to the Bila Tserkva agreement, was first published in Paris in 1653;¹⁶ in Chevalier's account Khmelnytsky is heroically portrayed. Book III is largely a rendering into Russian of a Ukrainian chronicle that Rigelman failed to identify but which reads essentially as the *Eyewitness Chronicle*. Key passages in both versions praise the Polish kings, mourn the death of Władysław IV, exalt Ukrainian patriotism, describe the battle of Berestechko, explain Khmelnytsky's motives for negotiating with the tsar, and describe the death and burial of Ivan Zolotarenko.¹⁷

Given the variety of sources and opinions in Rigelman's *Narrative Chronicle of Little Russia* and his service on behalf of the Romanov empire, it is useful to establish the compiler's own views of history. It is clear that he was a loyal supporter of the empire who favoured its acquisition of Ukrainian territories, and saw no conflict between Ukrainian values and the interests of the empire. He accepts the view that the three Eastern Slavic peoples have a common origin, history and destiny in a united all-Russian state. As stated in his brief introduction to the reader, Rigelman maintains that Little Russia, once a part of the Kievan state, "was torn away from the Russian state because of the Tatar invasion."

Rigelman accepts the legitimacy of Romanov rule over all the Eastern Slavs (as does the Kievan *Sinopsis*), but he disapproves of the curtailment of Ukrainian autonomy after the 1654 agreement.

Concerning the causes of the 1648–54 revolt and the pro-Russian orientation of the Cossacks, Rigelman joins the earlier Cossack chroniclers in condemning Polish persecution and in welcoming the Pereiaslav agreement. His account of the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada* recapitulates the versions in the *Eyewitness Chronicle* and the *Hrabianka Chronicle*; Rigelman too, makes no mention of a reciprocal oath by the Russians. He includes in his volume some of the basic documents pertaining to the 1654 negotiations: Khmelnytsky's petition to the tsar dated 17 February 1654; a second petition of the same date from the citizens of Pereiaslav; an eleven-point version of the articles of petition carried to Moscow by the Teteria–Zarudny mission; and a revised petition of twenty points given to the Russians after the Ukrainians had stated verbally their objectives. This work also includes the Russian versions of the basic documents the Ukrainian envoys brought back from Moscow: a copy of Khmelnytsky's petition of twenty-three points dated 14 March 1654, with the tsar's decree appended to each point, and three *gramoty* from the tsar—one for Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian army dated 6 April (27 March) 1654, another of the same date for the gentry and clergy, and a third granting Chyhyryn to Khmelnytsky.

Istoriia Rusov

The opinions and interpretations articulated in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century chronicles received the fullest expression in *Istoriia Rusov*.¹⁸ It is recognized as the apogee among histories espousing the ideals of autonomy and patriotism of the Ukrainian gentry of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; moreover, *Istoriia Rusov* is the best example of the transition in Ukrainian historical writing from the earlier chronicles to nineteenth-century romantic nationalism, a trend characteristic of the so-called non-historical nations in Europe at that time.

Authorities agree that *Istoriia Rusov* was written sometime between 1775 and 1825. (According to Ohloblyn, it was written during the years 1802–95; Borshchak, however, believes that *Istoriia Rusov* was written between 1816 and 1825.) In the 1820s it was popular among Ukrainians and Russian intellectuals and particularly the gentry in the Novhorod–Siversky region.

First published in Moscow in 1846 as *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii* [History of the Ruthenians or of Little Russia], this work was based on a

copy of the manuscript found in 1828 on the estate of the Lobanov-Rostovsky family in the Chernihiv region. Copies of this manuscript reached Mykhailo Maksymovych, a Kievan scholar, and Osyp Bodiansky in Moscow. Bodiansky had it published as part of the series *Chteniia Obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* [Readings of the Society of Russian History and Antiquities]. The manuscript states that the work was written by Heorhii (Iurii) Konysky (1717–95), a Ukrainian cleric who became archbishop of Belorussia, and that it was written at the request of Konysky's former student Hryhorii Poletyka. Despite this, however, Konysky's authorship was questioned as soon as the first copies of the manuscript were circulated.¹⁹

The Kharkiv publication *Ukrainskyi zhurnal* [Ukrainian journal], an early supporter of the Ukrainian national movement, printed an excerpt from *Istoriia Rusov* in 1825, the first known printing of a part of the manuscript. Pushkin wrote an article on *Istoriia Rusov* for the journal *Sovremennik* and also published two excerpts from it in his journal, one on the introduction of the Union of Churches and another on the death of the Cossack hero Iakiv Ostrianyn. Pushkin was one of the first to doubt that Konysky was the author.

Perhaps influenced by Pushkin, Maksymovych was the first professional historian to question whether Konysky had written *Istoriia Rusov*. Maksymovych felt that a man as erudite as Konysky—he had once been the rector of the Kiev Academy—would not have made so many errors. Most nineteenth-century historians concluded that it was written by Hryhorii Poletyka (1725–84) or his son Vasyl (1765–1845), or by both. Some believed the author to be Oleksander Bezborodko (1747–99), chancellor of the Russian empire under Catherine II and Paul I. This view is supported by the fact that the Lobanov-Rostovsky estate—where a copy of the *Istoriia Rusov* manuscript was found—belonged formerly to Bezborodko. Others believed to be the author are Prince Nikolai G. Repnin, Vasyl Lukashevych (1783–1866), a romantic nationalist and Mason active in the Poltava region, and Opanas Lobysevych (1732–1805), a writer from a prominent gentry family of the Chernihiv region. Through textual analysis, Ohloblyn traces the author to a native of the Novhorod–Siversky region, one of the first areas of Ukrainian national ferment, with a strong Cossack tradition.

Istoriia Rusov was written in literary Russian, at this time the customary language of Ukrainian intellectuals. Terms describing ethnic groups are drawn from official Russian literature. *Malaia Rossiia* and the variant *Malorossiia* refer to modern Ukraine; the author tends to avoid the word *Ukraina*, which he thought was of Polish or Lithuanian origin. He believes that *Malorossiia*, which also embraces Belorussia, is the direct

successor to ancient Rus'. The inhabitants of *Malorossiiia* he calls *rusy* or *rusnaky*. He notes that these Ruthenians were also called *cherkasy* by the Great Russians, after a city of that name on the Dnieper, in the same way that the people living in the environs of the city of Moscow were called Muscovites (*moskali*).²⁰ *Istoriia Rusov* regards the Ukrainians as the direct inheritors of the patrimony of the Kievan state: whereas the ancestors of the modern Russians shared only peripherally in the Kievan experience. After the Tatar invasion the separate history of the Ukrainians begins: the author makes a clear distinction between the *rusy* and the *moskovtsy*, or the *narod malorossiiskii* and the *narod moskovskii*.

The author of *Istoriia Rusov* believes strongly in the concepts of justice and morality propounded by Enlightenment doctrine and in the democratic idea that nations have a right to determine their destinies. These beliefs are the basis for his opposition to Polish and Russian encroachment. Thus, the author considers the 1648–54 revolt to be the central event in the long struggle of the Ukrainian people against foreign rule. He believes that the relationship of Ukraine with Russia after 1654 was one between equal partners. Marchenko characterizes this view as typical of the gentry and Cossack officers advocating autonomy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: "The entire history of Ukraine from Peter I on is portrayed as a struggle for the preservation of the hetmanate order."

Istoriia Rusov begins with a survey of Ukrainian history prior to the Tatar invasion—a period shared with the modern Russians—that contains much conjecture and frequently presents early legends as fact. The Kievan state is seen as the forerunner of Little Russia, and the formation of the tsardom of Muscovy is treated as a separate historical process giving rise to a distinct entity, Great Russia. After the destruction of Kiev by the Tatars in 1240, the history of modern Ukraine takes a separate direction. The Kievan area was liberated by Lithuanian princes, under whom the Ruthenians flourished politically and culturally. The union between the Poles and the Lithuanians in 1385 created a new polity consisting of three nations in which the local rulers, gentry and religions were equals. This triple partnership continued to prosper in spite of the common struggle against the Turks and Tatars; this latter danger also led to the rise of the Cossacks, who distinguished themselves in defending the commonwealth. The kings of the period were great and benevolent rulers, and the Ruthenian and Roman churches co-existed peacefully.

The establishment of the Church Union, however, ended the idyllic partnership, bringing disaster to both Poles and Ruthenians. The Ruthenian gentry became Polonized through embracing first the Church Union and then Latin Catholicism. Religious oppression finally pushed the Ruthenians into supporting Muscovy. (The Polish kings, however, were not

responsible for the trouble that befell the commonwealth. Władysław IV, according to the author, was a “known Ruthenian patriot” who advised the Cossacks to defend their rights. Khmelnytsky allegedly wept when he received word of the king’s death, and ordered requiems to be sung in all Ruthenian churches.) Religious persecution also led to the 1648–54 revolt, the main topic of *Istoriia Rusov*.

As the central figure of the revolt Khmelnytsky dominates *Istoriia Rusov*. He is portrayed as an early champion of Russian-Ukrainian co-operation, later becoming highly disappointed with the results of his efforts. In fact, Khmelnytsky’s negotiations with the tsar became “his bitterest pill” and even hastened his death. The hetman’s campaigns are described in detail; unfortunately, however, there are also a number of dubious historical reconstructions. Several manifestos allegedly issued by Khmelnytsky—such as one dated 7 June (28 May) 1648—are considered by most authorities to be the author’s inventions. He also attributes to Khmelnytsky a long speech made during a Cossack *Rada* at Chyhyryn in 1650 in which he rejects all offers of friendship from neighbouring sovereigns except that of the Russians. Marchenko cites this particular speech as a prime example of historical falsification.

Moreover, in *Istoriia Rusov* Ivan Bohun disagrees with Khmelnytsky over co-operation with Russia; as spokesman for the younger Cossack officers, Bohun allegedly attacked the Russians because:

Among the Muscovite people there holds sway to the highest degree the most abject degradation and slavery. They possess nothing and can have nothing beyond the Divine and what is the tsars’. In their way of thinking people are alleged to have been created in order to possess nothing and merely to work as slaves. The Muscovite aristocrats and boyars usually in their titles call themselves slaves of the tsar and in their petitions they always write that they bow their foreheads before him. As for the commoners, all are considered serfs who are alleged to stem not from one people but from captives and slaves. (pp. 134–5)

The author of *Istoriia Rusov* recapitulates the Velychko story about a debate between the Crimean khan and Khmelnytsky regarding the association with Muscovy. The khan warned the hetman that union with Muscovy would end in the ruin of his country and claimed that the tsar was trying to create a new Roman or Greek empire. The khan pointed out that the Romanovs had appropriated the double-headed eagle as their symbol and the legacy of Prince Volodymyr of Kiev, although the latter

was a Ruthenian ruler. “You Ruthenians [*rusaki*],” the khan warned, “will grovel among the Muscovites like sheep among wolves.” Khmelnytsky, however, was determined to uphold an alliance with a people of the same faith and ethnic background as his own.

Istoriia Rusov states that the tsarist emissaries did take an oath at Pereiaslav. After an eloquent speech that swayed the Cossack assembly to accept his alliance with the tsardom of Moscow, Khmelnytsky

directed the justice Samiilo Bohdanovych and the Pereiaslav colonel Pavlo Teteria to draft treaty articles with the Muscovite tsar and to present them for review to him and to the entire Little Russian *Rada*. They were written out and, after their approval by the hetman and the *Rada*, announced to the Muscovite envoys, who, having agreed to the contents, confirmed with their oath in the name of the tsar and of the Muscovite tsardom eternal and inviolable adherence to the accepted agreements. (p. 163)

Few people dispute the importance and influence of *Istoriia Rusov*, but there are many reservations about its historical accuracy. Most specialists stress that the work is not so much scientific history as it is a political tract. As Pushkin points out, the author’s patriotism makes the work tendentious. Authorities agree that *Istoriia Rusov* is replete with mistakes—dates are confused, first and last names mismatched, manifestos and speeches invented, losses in battle exaggerated, and the strengths of armies miscalculated.

Soviet scholars complain that the ideology of *Istoriia Rusov* reflects the outlook of the Ukrainian upper classes. In *Formuvannia istorychnykh pohliadiv M. I. Kostomarov* [The formation of the historical views of M. I. Kostomarov], L. K. Polukhin also accuses the work of presenting an heroic image of the Ukrainian people and the Cossacks and of holding the tsar’s emissaries responsible for Ukraine’s “tragic fate.” This is a false picture, Polukhin argues, for it romanticizes the Ukrainian past, emphasizes the preservation of old Cossack freedoms, and places excessive blame on the tsarist government. In Polukhin’s view, the historical approach of the Ukrainian gentry clashed with tsarist historiography, which did not grant the Ukrainian people a separate existence. Thus, it is in works such as *Istoriia Rusov*, Polukhin contends, that Ukrainian “nationalist historiography” begins.

In his “Vstupna stattia” [Introductory essay], Ohloblyn concurs in part with Polukhin and adds that *Istoriia Rusov* is the most important

historical work responsible for the Ukrainian national revival, and second only to the inspirational poetry of Taras Shevchenko.²¹ Panteleimon Kulish calls *Istoriia Rusov* the work of “the Ukrainian Livy.” Orest Levytsky, in his article “Opyt issledovaniia o Letopisi Samovidtsa,” calls the book “a brilliant political pamphlet” that misled many historians. None the less, *Istoriia Rusov* was a major influence on Taras Shevchenko, and Gogol’s *Taras Bulba* reflects its romantic depiction of Cossack life. Among historians who used *Istoriia Rusov* as a major source in their work are Markevych, Kostomarov and Kulish. It inspired the Decembrist Kondratii Ryleev, whose poems celebrate the Cossack hero Severyn Nalyvaiko and the Ukrainian émigré follower of Mazepa, Andrii Voinarovsky. Above all, *Istoriia Rusov* is an eloquent effort to interpret the history of the Eastern Slavs that assigns to the Ukrainians a separate political existence dating from Kievan times and rejects Russian claims to the heritage of Kievan Rus’.²²

Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamensky (1788–1850)

The influence of the Cossack Chronicles can be seen in Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamensky’s major work, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* [History of Little Russia].²³ One of the major sources for the second, revised edition published in 1830 was *Istoriia Rusov*. Bantysh-Kamensky’s history is an early modern attempt at writing an interpretative history of Ukrainians based on the collation of known documents, chronicles and secondary sources.

Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamensky was the son of Mykola Bantysh-Kamensky (1738–1814), an archivist with the College of Foreign Affairs in Moscow who wrote historical works on Polish-Russian relations and put together a compilation of state documents of the Romanov empire. Born in Nizhyn, Ukraine, where his father settled after his arrival from Jassy in Moldavia at the invitation of Prince Dmitrii K. Kantemir (1674–1723), Mykola Bantysh-Kamensky was educated at Kiev Academy and at the University of Moscow where he later obtained a post as a governmental archivist. His son Dmitrii was born in Moscow and educated in a Russian milieu.

In 1816, through the connections of his late father, Dmitrii became secretary to the military governor of Little Russia, Prince Nikolai Repnin, for the next five years. It was at Repnin’s suggestion that Bantysh-Kamensky wrote *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* [History of Little Russia]. The prince was disturbed because Nikolai Karamzin’s history of the empire, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, ignored Ukraine. (Repin also helped Bantysh-Kamensky write parts of the history.) Bantysh-Kamensky

wrote several scholarly essays—including a study of Mazepa—prepared a compilation of documents on Ukrainian history, and published a collection of essays on illustrious figures in Russian history. His career as a tsarist official was marred in the late 1820s and early 1830s, when he was under investigation. To prove his loyalty to the empire he revised *History of Little Russia*; the second and subsequent editions were dedicated to Tsar Nicholas I.

In his *History*, Bantysh-Kamensky weaves personal views with a wide variety of sources, including the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the records of the former Little Russian College, and materials from the library of Prince Repnin. He borrows liberally from *Istoriia Rusov*, the *Cossack Chronicles* and Aleksandr Rigelman. In the book's margins he records the major sources for his interpretations. He was the first historian of Ukraine to use documents from the College of Foreign Affairs and the works of foreign authors. Some of the seventeenth-century foreign sources were Joachim Pastorius, Wespazjan Kochowski, Guillaume de Beauplan and Pierre Chevalier; he also draws liberally from such writers as Johann Christian Engel, J. B. Scherer, Andriian Chepa and Nikolai Karamzin.

Bantysh-Kamensky's history consists of three parts and an appendix. Part I begins with the origins of the Eastern Slavs and ends with the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada*. Part II covers the years 1654 to 1687, that is, to the end of the hetmanate of Ivan Samoilovych. Part III covers the period 1687–1764—from the hetmanate of Mazepa to the end of the tenure of Kyrylo Rozumovsky and the abolition of the hetmanate. The appendix (part IV in the first edition) contains twenty documents from the Khmelnytsky era, including a Russian version of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 1654, containing twenty-three points.

Regarding terminology, Bantysh-Kamensky usually refers to Ukraine as *Malorossiiia* or *Malaia Rossiia*. He notes, however, that the area west of the Dnieper was also called *Ukraina* as early as the fourteenth century. Another term that he uses for Ukraine is *Iuzhnaia Rossiia* (southern Russia). The Russians he generally calls *rossiane*, and the Ukrainians, *malorossiane*, or at times *ukraintsy*.

Bantysh-Kamensky did not aspire to write a patriotic Ukrainian history. As he indicates at the end of his work, he feels he has performed a useful service on behalf of his father's birthplace:

Here I end the *History of Little Russia*. I am happy that I have paid a debt of gratitude to the motherland of my father! Someone else with more artistic ability will describe more appropriately the deeds of the Ukrainians. Such

fame will not be my portion. I am also content because I have saved from the hands of all-consuming time several documents hitherto unknown and have composed an entity from scattered remnants. My work of many years will vanish and succumb to oblivion. However, the deeds of illustrious men will be preserved for distant generations, and the ruins themselves will speak about them. (p. 492)

This is the only expression of his personal feelings for the land whose history he set out to record.

While working with Prince Repnin, Bantysh-Kamensky absorbed some of the autonomist ideas of the Ukrainian gentry and his history originally reflected their aspirations. However, after he obtained a comfortable niche in the imperial bureaucracy, Bantysh-Kamensky disavowed the autonomist notions of his Ukrainian friends. He tried to show that respect for the Romanov monarchy flourished among the Ukrainians who, during their historical vicissitudes, supported faithfully both dynasty and empire. Although he was not an official court historian like Karamzin, Bantysh-Kamensky acted unofficially as such; his aim was to integrate Ukrainian history into the general history of the Russian empire.

For Bantysh-Kamensky, the ancient Kievan state represents the common patrimony of all the Eastern Slavs. Despite the Tatar invasions, the Lithuanians' ascendancy over the ancestors of the modern Ukrainians and Belorussians resulted from conquest rather than peaceful union. The Pereiaslav agreement meant the return of Ukrainian areas—formerly a part of a common ancient Russian state—to their legitimate rulers. Although he considers the 1648–54 revolution a national-religious war, Bantysh-Kamensky is not strongly anti-Polish. He feels that the 1648 revolt was supported by the king of the commonwealth, and he praises magnates such as Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, Janusz Radziwiłł and Adam Kysil.

Bantysh-Kamensky maintains that the moving forces of the Cossack revolution were Khmelnytsky, the Orthodox gentry and the *starshyna*. He has scant use for the rank-and-file Cossacks, whom he considers the dregs of Ukrainian society. He also shows no hostility toward the institution of serfdom; according to Volodymyr Holobutsky, Bantysh-Kamensky idealized the registered Cossacks, the *starshyna* and the Orthodox gentry. Khmelnytsky is portrayed as vacillating between Polish, Turco-Tatar and Russian allegiances, finally choosing association with Moscow when the Cossack military position became hopeless. Bantysh-Kamensky notes that in 1649 the tsar refused to accept the Cossacks under his protection because of the Polianovka agreement which ended the Smolensk war of 1632–4. Aleksei Mikhailovich informed Khmelnytsky that he would accept

his petitions only if the Polish king recognized the independence of the Cossacks. The historian writes that Khmelnytsky made two mistakes at Berestechko—he refused the assistance of the Turkish sultan and neglected to deploy his troops with his Tatar ally. The 1651 Bila Tserkva agreement brought travail for Khmelnytsky; his people became unmanageable and opposed the return of the gentry to Ukrainian areas. The returning gentry abused the peasantry, many of whom fled to the open steppe where the tsar granted them shelter. These difficulties caused the hetman to intensify negotiations with the tsar and to dispatch several missions to Moscow. The Muscovite court, anxious to preserve peace with the Poles, assuaged the Cossack envoys with gifts and promises.

In April 1653 the Russians showed serious interest in the Cossacks' overtures. The tsar had decided to make a final effort to mediate between the Poles and the Cossacks; he dispatched to Warsaw a mission headed by Prince Boris Reprin-Obolensky. This mission, however, failed to reach a satisfactory accommodation with the Poles. In the meantime Khmelnytsky's Moldavian venture in 1653 backfired, producing a Polish-Tatar alliance at Zhvanets, designed to create a Polish-Tatar-Cossack campaign against the Muscovites and to force the return of Astrakhan to Tatar rule. As diplomatic efforts with the Poles failed and the threat of a grand coalition emerged, the tsar dispatched the Buturlin mission to the Cossacks.

Bantysh-Kamensky provides a broad account of the 1654 Pereiaslav negotiations based on archival material from the Little Russian College. Concerning the Cossacks' demand that the tsarist envoys take an oath on behalf of the tsar, he writes that "this unexpected request dumbfounded the envoys." The ensuing disagreements are discussed, and he reports that the Cossacks finally took the oath of loyalty. The tension between Buturlin and Metropolitan Kosiv, the Teteria-Zarudny mission to Moscow and the chief points in the articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky are also described. The Pereiaslav and Moscow negotiations in 1654, he notes, were extremely advantageous for the Russians. "In this manner, without the shedding of blood, there was returned to the Russian state a country embracing 166 cities and towns, and there was gained a valiant army of sixty thousand men, without the slightest expense to the tsar." This event (which ends the first part of Bantysh-Kamensky's history) resulted in a Polish-Tatar war against Muscovy and Ukraine. Poland, however, was determined to regain Little Russia.

Military manoeuvres, from 1654 to Khmelnytsky's death in 1657, are also exhaustively described. Basing his data on the Tumansky version of the *Hrabianka Chronicle*, Bantysh-Kamensky reiterates the alleged confrontation at Ozerna in 1655 between Khmelnytsky and the Tatar

khan. He supports the tsar's policy in 1656 of accommodation with Poland as a necessary defence against the Swedes. Bantysh-Kamensky also stresses that the tsar was displeased with Khmelnytsky's negotiations with Sweden. The tsar ordered him to aid the Poles, but Khmelnytsky procrastinated, loathe to help his traditional and principal foe. In the meantime, Jan Kazimierz repulsed the invading Swedes and Transylvanians and informed the Russians of Khmelnytsky's intention to form a coalition with Transylvania and Sweden for an attack on Russia. The tsar dispatched Vasilii Kikin to Chyhyryn to substantiate this information.

Kikin and Khmelnytsky disagreed over the Vilna accord, Bantysh-Kamensky reports. The hetman stressed that the accord was poor reward for the Cossacks' refusal to return to the commonwealth. He informed Kikin that the Poles would never implement the Vilna accord, that is, the tsar would never rule the commonwealth. Although Khmelnytsky overtly upheld his oath to the tsar, he secretly violated the Pereiaslav agreement. In negotiating with Austrian and Polish diplomats, Khmelnytsky had acted as an independent ruler, not as a subject of the tsar. Moreover, these negotiations with the tsar's enemies were carried on without the tsar's knowledge. Fearing that the tsar would return Ukraine to the Poles, Khmelnytsky in 1657 formed an alliance with Rakoczy of Transylvania, the Moldavian and Wallachian rulers, and the Crimean khan. Khmelnytsky stated, however, in response to a Polish invitation to openly break with Moscow, that in his old age he would not violate the oath he had given.

The tsar's irritation over Khmelnytsky's negotiations with Sweden and Transylvania was justified, Bantysh-Kamensky writes. A mission led by Fedor Buturlin and Vasilii Mikhailov was sent to demand that Khmelnytsky explain his irregular conduct. The envoys arrived in Chyhyryn in early June 1657, as Khmelnytsky was near death. During the heated exchanges Khmelnytsky's condition worsened and the talks were suspended. The dying hetman called his advisers and asked them to choose from among their numbers a successor instead of his young son Iurii. As Ukrainians mourned the passing of their great leader, the Poles justly denounced him.

Mykola Markevych (1804–60)

Another early nineteenth-century historian deserving of attention is Mykola Markevych. His *Istoriia Malorossii* (History of Little Russia) shows the influence of the Cossack Chronicles and, in particular, of *Istoriia Rusov*.²⁴ Born in the Hlukhiv region into a prominent Left-Bank

gentry family,²⁵ Markevych was educated in St. Petersburg and Moscow where he associated with liberal intellectuals, befriended Kondratii Ryleev and Aleksandr Pushkin, and gained some prominence as a man of letters, scholar and supporter of dissident trends.²⁶

In 1830 Markevych settled on the family estate in the Pryluky region of Poltava province. There in 1838 he completed the five-volume *History of Little Russia*, published in Moscow in 1842–3. The first two volumes give a narrative history; the final three volumes contain supplements, documents, source descriptions and explanatory notes. Documents reproduced include portions of Vasiliï Buturlin's report to the tsar on the 1654 negotiations, descriptions of the *rada* at Pereiaslav, a letter from Khmelnytsky thanking the tsar for accepting the Cossacks under his high hand, and a version of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky containing twenty points. In addition to *Istoriia Rusov* and the Cossack Chronicles, Markevych consulted the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, records in Chernihiv and the writings of Bantysh-Kamensky.

In his historical approach, Markevych treats *Malorossiiia* as a separate country (*strana*) with its own borders. He divides its history into six periods. The first deals with Kievan Rus' to the Tatar invasions, including the history of the *severnnye russy* (northern Russians), whom Markevych calls the "younger brothers" of the Ukrainians. With the coming of the Tatars, the southern *russy* were subjected to Lithuanian and then Lithuanian-Polish rule, a process that the northerners did not experience. The second period treats the sixteenth century (1500–92) as an epoch of heroic Cossack exploits against Crimea and Turkey. The third period covers the troubled times of the Union of Churches and the growing religious struggle. Highlighted in the fourth period is the Cossack revolution and the conditional voluntary union with the northern *rossiane* ("the younger brother"). The fifth period describes the hetmans' attempts to withdraw from the association with Russia; during this period integration into the empire began. The last period deals with the complete absorption of Little Russia into the Russian state: "*Malorossiiia* disappeared without a struggle."

During the first period, Markevych writes, the Kievan state retained the name Rus' although Suzdal, Vladimir, Moscow and Tver emerged to the north. The people in the Kiev area never considered these new northern centres to be part of Rus'; this honour was only for the lands of Oleg and Sviatoslav. Kiev clung to the traditions of Rus' even after it ceased to be the central throne city and after it had been plundered by Andrei Bogoliubsky. With the coming of the Mongols, a new order—that of the Cossacks—arose in the heartland of ancient Rus'.

The second period saw the rule of strong hetmans in commonwealth areas, the founding of the Zaporozhian Sich and constant conflict with the Crimean Tatars and Turkey. In this period Dmytro Vyshnevetsky "traitorously" subordinated himself to Ivan IV during a joint operation against the Crimean Tatars. It was also a time of fruitful participation by the *malorossiane* in the affairs of the commonwealth. The third period saw religious conflict destroy the co-operation among the Little Russians, Lithuanians and Poles. Clement VIII and the Orthodox hierarchy that embraced the Church Union are held responsible for this. The heroes were Cossack leaders such as Severyn Nalyvaiko and Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny. (In the discussion of this period Markevych frequently uses the terms *Ukraina* and *ukrainskii*.) The fourth period is dominated by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Markevych outlines Khmelnytsky's efforts to obtain Russian aid, beginning as early as 1648. In October of that year Khmelnytsky dispatched Hryhorii Hulianytsky to Moscow to urge the Russians to join the war against the Poles and to redeem Smolensk. The tsar's reply, that his country was too exhausted to challenge the Poles, was a "bitter pill" for Khmelnytsky.

After the Zboriv agreement, when Khmelnytsky's fortunes were high and he was courted by strong neighbouring monarchs, he grew angry at the Russians' lack of interest and threatened to become "Moscow's enemy." In one exchange he turned to a picture of Christ and vowed to "go against Moscow and devastate her worse than Lithuania." Khmelnytsky also complained that "I appeal to him [the tsar] with all my heart, but he laughs in my face."

After the Berestechko defeat and the Bila Tserkva accord, the tsar showed greater willingness to aid the Little Russians, Markevych writes. In turn, Khmelnytsky, faced with a deteriorating military situation, sent several missions to Moscow, led by Semen Savych, Ivan Iskra and Samiilo Zarudny. Although they asked for the tsar's protection, the only real gain was to obtain permission for fleeing Cossacks to settle in unpopulated areas of the empire. "The inactivity of the tsar with respect to our struggle against the Poles," says Markevych, "his reluctance to add Ukraine to tsarist domains, finally forced the hetman to seek the protection of the sultan." Markevych also notes that the tsar could have been planning to let the Cossacks exhaust themselves in war against the Poles so that Khmelnytsky might be more co-operative with the Russian envoys.

In April 1653 Khmelnytsky again tried to reach an agreement with Moscow. His envoys, Kindrat Burliai and Siluan Muzhylovsky asked the tsar to accept the Zaporozhian Host "under his high hand." At the same time the tsar sent Repnin-Obolensky to Warsaw to protest the maltreatment of the Orthodox in the commonwealth. The Poles denied any

religious persecution, and the Muscovite boyars concluded that their efforts at mediation had failed. The *Zemskii Sobor* was convened in Moscow and a decision was made to annex Little Russia to the empire. At an assembly in Chyhyryn the Cossack leaders discussed their choices: although almost all the younger officers favoured an association with Turkey, Khmelnytsky persuaded the assembly to accept unanimously an association with Muscovy.

Markevych also discusses the Buturlin mission and the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada*. Orthodox clergymen were reluctant to take the oath of allegiance to the tsar chiefly because they feared repercussions against the Orthodox in the commonwealth, Markevych notes. The Teteria–Zarudny mission was sent to Moscow for formal approval of the Pereiaslav decisions. The tsar was elated over the results of the negotiations; Buturlin was promoted and given gifts and money. The tsar became the “ruler of two Russias” and revised his title to reflect his new status.

The commonwealth, however, set out to destroy the union of Ukraine and Muscovy. War broke out, and the armies of the “two Russias” marched against the Poles. Tsarist troops were successful in Lithuanian and Belorussian areas and captured Vilna. The troubles of the Poles multiplied as Sweden invaded the commonwealth from the north. Subsequently, the Crimeans tried to get Khmelnytsky to break with Moscow, the Austrians mediated between Khmelnytsky and Warsaw, and Khmelnytsky attempted an alliance with Sweden and Turkey. Although unsuccessful in achieving a Ukrainian-Polish rapprochement, the Austrian emperor did bring about a temporary truce between Warsaw and Moscow through the Vilna agreement. The tsar came to terms with the Poles partly because Khmelnytsky had negotiated with Sweden without his permission; the Poles then informed the Russians that Khmelnytsky and the Swedes planned to attack them. The tsar thereupon sent Vasilii Kikin to Chyhyryn to get more precise information.

Kikin reported that Khmelnytsky was behaving like an independent ruler, conducting his own negotiations with the sultan, the Holy Roman emperor and the king of Sweden. Fearing that the tsar was about to return Ukraine to the Poles, Khmelnytsky formed an alliance with George II Rakoczy of Transylvania, the Crimean khan and the *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia. Khmelnytsky also strongly protested to Kikin about the Vilna accord.

A new Russian mission headed by Fedor Buturlin was dispatched to Chyhyryn to advise the Cossacks to obey tsarist policy. Fedor Buturlin found Khmelnytsky on his deathbed, “ready to leave Little Russia forever,” and castigated the hetman for his foreign contacts, particularly with Sweden, an enemy of Russia. However, Khmelnytsky refused to abandon

the Swedish sovereign, his ally of six years and criticized the Vilna accord and the Russians' military support for the Poles. Buturlin assured the hetman that the tsar never intended to return Little Russia to the Poles and that the hetman was regarded highly by the tsar, but insisted that the Russian war against Sweden was justified. Khmelnytsky asked for time to consider matters and the negotiations were interrupted. In the interim Khmelnytsky died.

Markevych's patriotic history has had a strong influence on his countrymen. His tendency to interpret historical events from the Ukrainian point of view has made Russian nationalists disparage his scholarship. Gennadii Karpov chides him for "Little Russian patriotism." Russian and Soviet historians who generally accept centralist historiographical views object to Markevych's reconstructions because they are at odds with traditional Russian views of the relationship among the Eastern Slavs. The Soviet Ukrainian historian Holobutsky claims that Markevych accepted uncritically many of the errors of *Istoriia Rusov*, including the assertion that the Russian envoys gave an oath on behalf of the tsar in 1654. Leonid Polukhin describes Markevych as an historian "burdened with the ideology of his gentry background" who twisted historical facts and produced a tendentious work. Marchenko places Markevych's history somewhere between the old gentry-landowners' historiography of the eighteenth century and the later nineteenth-century Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist histories.

The celebrated Russian critic Vissarion Belinsky dismisses Markevych as dry, boring and lacking in historical insight. Belinsky's review of Markevych's history shows the classical pan-Russian attitude toward Ukrainians (although the review was published in 1843, it still reflects twentieth-century Russian views.)²⁷ The major portion of the essay presents Belinsky's philosophy of history. The spirit of the times was marked by strivings for unity and universality, a process flourishing in Western Europe, and one which all Russians should emulate. Belinsky maintains that the task of the historian is to recognize and celebrate such aspirations for unity, which in Eastern Europe are manifested by the transformation of Rus' into *Rossia*, a great empire. Despite different experiences with the Tatars, the Russians and Little Russians are actually two streams that form one river; Belinsky argues that anyone failing to grasp these essentials cannot call himself a historian.

The remainder of the essay is devoted to a discussion of Markevych and Ukrainian particularism. Belinsky complains that *Istoriia Malorossii* has no interpretative scheme or ideology; that Markevych strung facts together haphazardly and tended to exaggerate Polish cruelty and Cossack heroism. Markevych deserves praise for his industriousness and for discovery of new data, but he did not produce a history that illuminates the past; his work

cannot be considered either history or literature. Of Ukrainian history, Belinsky writes:

Little Russia was never a state and consequently never had a history in the strict meaning of the word. The history of Little Russia is no more than an episode in the reign of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. Carrying his narrative to the clash of the interests of Russia with the interests of Little Russia, the Russian historian should explain in an episodal manner, by interrupting for a time the thread of his narrative, the fate of Little Russia with the objective of returning later to his story. The history of Little Russia is a side stream that flows into the larger river of Russian history. The Little Russians were always a tribe [*plemia*], never a nation [*narod*], and still less a state [*gosudarstvo*]. They knew how to fight valiantly and how to die magnanimously for their country. It was not unusual for them to defeat with meagre resources a strong enemy, but they were never able to make use of the fruits of their victories. They tore their enemies to pieces, they demonstrated miracles of courage and heroism—then returned to their homes to drink their whiskey [*horilka*]. (pp. 60–1)

The Cossacks are depicted as a band of destructive savages; wild, untamed, apolitical children of the steppe. “Both the so-called hetman state and Zaporizhzhia were neither republics, nor states, but some sort of strange society of the Asiatic type.” Like the Tatars, they plundered and robbed, without political motivation. They waged war wantonly, with total disregard for European customs of chivalry. Belinsky describes Bohdan Khmelnytsky as the one great man of Little Russia, who well understood the destructive nature of the Cossack movement:

Bohdan Khmelnytsky was a hero and a great man in the full meaning of the term. There were in the history of Little Russia many strong and powerful figures, but only Bohdan Khmelnytsky was, in addition, a statesman. In education he stood immeasurably higher than his valiant, carousing and simple-minded people. He was a great warrior and a great politician. And for this very reason he understood that Little Russia could not exist as an independent and separate state. This awareness embittered the heart of this noble son of Little Russia and he went to his grave in remorse. The impossibility of an independent political existence for Little Russia he attributed to the geographical position of his country, bereft on all sides of natural boundaries. But there was also another reason, which he did not understand. This is the patriarchal, simple-minded nature of the Little Russians, which made them unfit for intellectual movement and

development. This people was smelted and tempered into a rigid cast-iron mould that was totally incapable of accepting any civilization within the range of gunshot, and even then only in order to flail it with the spear and the knout. (p. 63)

According to Belinsky, this should be the view of any historian who writes about Little Russia. But union with Russia need not be the cause for sorrow, he writes: "Having united forever with consanguineous Russia, Little Russia opened to herself the door of civilization, education, art and science, hitherto barred by the invincible wall of its half-savage way of life. Together with Russia a great future now awaits her."

Notes

1. For a thorough discussion of the Cossack Chronicles in their proper historical setting and an exhaustive list of sources up to the nineteenth century, see V. S. Ikonnikov, *Opyt russkoi istoriografii*, 2: 1560–1674. Dmytro Bahalii has given a more recent analysis of the major Chronicles. See *Narys ukrainskoi istoriografii* 2.
2. M. Hrushevsky, "Some Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the XVIIIth Century," in the *Eyewitness Chronicle* 1, 10. This article was first published in 1934 and was translated into English by Zenon Kohut.
3. For an early study of the *Sinopsis*, see M. Maksimovich (Maksymovych), "O Kievskom sinopsise i nekotorykh urochishchakh drevniago Kieva, upomenaemykh v opisaniu Kieva Zakrevskago" in *Sobranie sochinenii M. A. Maksimovicha* 2, 84–8.
4. This study uses the 1823 edition of the *Sinopsis*, which is available in the New York Public Library: *Kievskii sinopsis ili kratkoe sobranie ot ratzlichnykh letopistsov o nachale slavenorossiiskago naroda i pervonachalnykh kniazekh bogospasaemago grada Kieva*. The edition contains 164 pages of text and 105 pages of supplements that list the princes of Kiev, Vladimir and Moscow; the Polish kings; Orthodox church dignitaries; Little Russian hetmans; Kievan *voevody*; and the Mongol khans.
5. I. P. Ieriomin, "Do istorii suspilnoi dumky na Ukraini druhoi polovyny XVII st." Ieriomin's article exaggerates Gizel's yearning for "reunion" with Russia and omits mention of Gizel's opposition to the 1654 negotiations in Pereiaslav.
6. See D. Doroshenko and O. Ohloblyn, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, 43; M. I. Marchenko, *Ukrainska istoriografiia*, 58;

Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva 2, 475; and S. L. Pestich, “Sinopsis’ kak istoricheskoe proizvedenie.”

7. In recent years two reproductions of this work, with commentaries, have been published; one was published in the Soviet Union and the other in the West. See I. I. Dzyra, ed., *Litopys Samovydtzia* (sponsored by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, this book is part of a series entitled *Sources from the History of Ukraine* planned by the Academy’s Institute of History) and the *Eyewitness Chronicle, Part I*, edited by O. Pritsak (sponsored by the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, this is a reprint of the Orest Levytsky edition, Kiev 1878, with the addition of an editor’s preface and an essay by M. Hrushevsky). Omeljan Pritsak has written a devastating critique of the scholarly deficiencies in the Dzyra edition of the *Eyewitness Chronicle* and of the sponsoring Archaeographical Commission of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR; see O. Pritsak, “Ja. I. Dzyra, *Litopys Samovydcja*.” For a detailed review of the scholarly assessments, content and significance of the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, see D. Bahalii, *Narys ukrainskoi istoriohrafii* 2, 1–29.
8. O. Levytsky, “Opyt issledovaniia o Letopisi Samovidtsa” in the *Eyewitness Chronicle, Part I*, 1–76. This article appeared originally in the 1878 Kiev edition.
9. This 1854 publication was used as the basic source in this study. Its full title is: *Deistviia prezelnoi i ot nachala poliakov krivavshoi nebyvaloi brani Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo, getmana zaporozhskogo, s poliaki, za naiiasneishikh korolei polskikh Vladislava, potom i Kazimira, v roku 1648, otpravovatisia nachatoi i za let desiat po smerti Khmel'nitskogo neokonchennoi, z roznikh letopistsov i iz diariusha, na toi voine pisannogo, v grade Gadiachu, trudom Grigoriia Gribianki, sobrannaia i samobitnikh starozhilov sveditelstvi utverzhdenaia*. Some experts on Slavonic linguistic practices doubt whether it is correct to transliterate seventeenth-century “Slavonic Ruthenian” after the Russian fashion, as has been done in this note with respect to the *Hrabianka Chronicle*. For the sake of consistency, however, and in accord with the entries in most university libraries in the United States, this study follows traditional style for seventeenth-century titles. It should be noted that an earlier abridged edition of the *Hrabianka Chronicle* appeared in Moscow in serial form in the journal *Rossiiski magazin* (nos. 2 and 3) in 1793. This was due to the efforts of its Ukrainian publisher, Fedir Tumansky (1758–1810), a member of the Academy of Sciences.
10. Samchevsky’s introduction constitutes pages iv–xxix of the volume cited above. Samchevsky also included as an appendix to this volume a separate manuscript entitled *Otryvki iz letopisi Leontii Bobolinskago*, i–xx and 273–334. This manuscript, preserved in the archives of the

ecclesiastical authorities in the city of Chernihiv, was completed in 1699 by Leontii Bobolynsky, a monk associated with the ancient Vydubsky Monastery of St. Michael in Kiev, where he recorded some of the turbulent events of his day. Writing in a language close to the popular Ukrainian speech of the seventeenth century, Bobolynsky begins his chronicle with the creation of the world and highlights such matters as the fall of Constantinople to the Turks, the history of Kievan Rus', the Polish-Lithuanian ascendancy and the 1648–54 war in defence of Orthodoxy. His supplements include the Hadiach agreement, a letter from the Kiev Metropolitan, Isaiia Kopynsky, lamenting the conversion of the Ruthenian Vyshnevetsky clan into the Polish Wiśniowiecki family and a description of two Tatar-Turkish efforts to capture Chyhyryn (in 1677 and 1678). Toward the end of his life Bobolynsky moved from Kiev to the Monastery of St. Illia in Chernihiv.

11. Samuel Twardowski (1600–60), a Polish writer who took part in the commonwealth's military campaigns, wrote a long poem entitled *Wojna domowa z Kozaki i Tatary, Moskwa, potym Szwedami i z Wegry*, which was first published in Kalisz in 1681. Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94), an outstanding German jurist, served as royal historiographer for the Swedish king in Stockholm and for the elector of Brandenburg–Prussia in Berlin. His Latin-language works on Swedish history, first published in Utrecht in 1686 and Nuremberg in 1696, contain valuable references to the Khmelnytsky period.
12. O. Ohloblyn, *Liudy staroi Ukrainy*, 218. For a detailed study of the *Velychko Chronicle*, with emphasis on the varied editions, the author's biography, language and world view, and a discussion of the work's significance as evaluated by various scholars, see Bahalii, *Narys ukrainskoi istoriohrafii* 2, 51–92.
13. This translation is taken from Doroshenko and Ohloblyn, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, 49, slightly amended; the original version appears in vol. 1, 4–7, of the 1848 Kiev edition.
14. The complete title is *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii, eia narode i kozakakh voobshche; otkol i iz kakovo naroda onye proiskhozhdenie svoe imeiut, i po kakim sluchaiam oni nyini pri svoikh mestakh obitaiut, kak to: cherkaskie ili malorossiiskie i zaporozhskie, a ot nikh uzhe donskie, a ot sikh iaitskie, chto nyini ural'skie, grebenskie, sibirskie, volgskie, terskie, nekrasovskie, i prochie kozaki, kak rovno i slobodskie polki*.
15. For a study of compilation as a history-writing technique in general and by Rigelman in particular, see I. I. Dzyra, "Dzherelna osnova pratsi O. Rihelmana z istorii Ukrainy."
16. An excellent discussion of Chevalier's work as a historical document, with a translation into modern Ukrainian, is contained in P. Chevalier [Shevalie], *Istoriia viiny kozakiv proty Polshchi*. The historiographical

essay was written by A. Z. Baraboi.

17. Rigelman, *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii eia narode i kozakakh voobshche*, Book 3, 101–219 (these pages, in addition to repeating the essential message of *The Eyewitness Chronicle*, contain the major documents of the 1654 Pereiaslav negotiations as supplements).
18. The usefulness of rendering the word *Rusy* as Ruthenians in English is evinced by the practice of the author of *Istoriia Rusov* of using the word *Rus'* when referring to the land of the modern Ukrainians and Belorussians, the Ruthenians of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In this context *Rus'* embraced Muscovy in a peripheral fashion only.
19. See M. Horban, "Kilka uvah do pytannia pro avtora 'Istorii Russov'" in *Chervonyi shliakh*, no. 6–7 (1923): 146–50; and A. Iershov, "Do pytannia pro chas napsyannia 'Istorii Russov', a po chasty i avtora iei" in *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Hrushevskoho* 1, 286–91.
20. O. Ohloblyn, "Vstupna stattia," *Istoriia Rusiv*, vii. Additional references to *Istoriia Rusov* refer to the translation of the work into modern Ukrainian by Viacheslav Davydenko. Evidence of the terminological usages cited in this paragraph is found on pages 9–10 and page 31 of this publication.
21. See L. Koshova, "Shevchenko ta 'Istoriia Russov'" in *Shevchenko, Zbirnyk* 1, 155–74.
22. It was this position, rather than factual errors, which caused Gennadii Karpov, among others, to denigrate *Istoriia Rusov*. Karpov wrote that its author was "a man without talent, utterly unprogressive but very opinionated." See G. Karpov, *Kriticheskii obzor razrabotki glavnykh russkikh istorichnikov do istorii Malorossii otnosiashchikhsia za vremia 8-e genvaria 1654–30-e maia 1672 goda*, 45.
23. The following is the first edition's complete title: D. N. Bantysh-Kamensky, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii, so vremen prisoedineniia k rossiiskomu gosudarstvu, pri tsare Aleksee Mikhailoviche, s kratkim obozreniem pervobytnogo sostoianii sego kraia*. The first and second editions came out in four volumes, while the third edition appeared in three volumes. The fourth edition appeared in a one-volume edition in three parts. This fourth edition was used as the source for this study: D. N. Bantysh-Kamensky, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii ot vodvoreniia slavian v sei strane do unichtozheniia getmansva*; this fourth edition was passed by the censor in 1902.
24. Brokgaus and Efron, *Entsiklopedicheski slovar* 36, 649. See also the entry under the Russian form of Markevych's name: Markevich, Nikolai Andreevich.
25. The Markevych family name was originally spelled Markovych. Its paterfamilias was a Jewish merchant from Pryluky, Mark Abramovych, whose daughter married Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky.

Prior to Mykola Markevych, three members of this clan produced important historical and ethnographic writings. Iakiv Markovych (1696–1770) was a favourite student of Teofan Prokopovych and wrote an important diary covering the years 1717–67 which was first published in Moscow in 1859 under the title *Dnevnyia zapiski generalnogo podskarbiia Iakova Andreevicha Markova*. Iakiv Markovych (1776–1804) wrote a study entitled *Zapiski o Malorossii, eia zhitelikh i proizvedeniakh*, published in St. Petersburg in 1798. His brother, Oleksander Markovych (1790–1865), published a popular description of Little Russia in the 1820s and wrote articles on Ukrainian ethnography, the gentry and serfdom. In 1852 he proposed to emancipate the serfs on his estates but the authorities rejected his proposal. For an uneven discussion of Iakiv and Oleksander Markovych as historians, see M. I. Marchenko, *Ukrainska istoriografii*, 127–38.

26. For an excellent discussion of Markevych and his intellectual milieu, see G. S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Sevchenko*, 23–5.
27. Belinsky, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* 7, 44–65.

Chapter Four

Selected Modern Historians

Introductory Remarks

From 1850 to the mid-twenties, historians provided numerous interpretations of the Khmelnytsky era. (Soviet interpretations are discussed in the next chapter.) Those historians who produced original work or contributed substantially to our understanding of this period are examined in this chapter. The main intellectual influences on these historians were the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and, after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, Romanticism. These currents stimulated the rise of modern nationalism among the peoples of Eastern Europe and saw the masses become a significant political force.

Mykhailo Maksymovych, a professor of literature at Kiev University is generally considered the founder of modern Ukrainian historiography. He was deeply concerned with the Pereiaslav controversy and Khmelnytsky's place in history. A contemporary of Maksymovych was Mykola Kostomarov, an exponent of the federalist approach to the history of the Eastern Slavs, who clashed vigorously with the centralist view of traditional Russian historians. The latter are discussed in connection with the differences between Kostomarov and Gennadii Karpov, who, like his mentor Sergei Solovov, adhered to a nineteenth-century pan-Russian position.

Volodymyr Antonovych, a Kievan professor of history, also specialized in the Khmelnytsky era and in particular, on Polish-Ukrainian relations in the lands west of the Dnieper. A man of Polish cultural antecedents, but a Ukrainian populist who rejected the civilizing role of "historical Poland," Antonovych's views contrast with those of Ludwik Kubala, a nineteenth-century Polish historiographer, who deals with mid-seventeenth-century Ukraine in the context of the commonwealth's internal and external problems. Kubala's views, in turn, are compared with those of his contemporary, Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, also a specialist on the Cossack problem.

In 1882 an obscure Russian historian, Petr Butsinsky, published a scathing attack on Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Butsinsky's views are stimulating not only because they divert from traditional Russian historiography, but also because they use a social approach to historical interpretation. In this Butsinsky shows some affinity with Venedikt Miakotin's more highly developed socio-economic interpretation; Miakotin, however, stresses socio-economic factors without detracting from Khmelnytsky's role and without rejecting traditional Russian statist views. He presents the most competent pre-Soviet class or socio-economic approach to the 1648–54 Cossack revolt. His study of the peasantry in Left-Bank Ukraine remains unsurpassed. Although Miakotin's history is almost entirely devoted to class motives, it nevertheless provides data essential to the understanding of East European history. Some historians have used class concepts to arrive at interpretations diametrically opposed to those of Miakotin and other populist and socialist historians. For contrast, this study includes the views of an outstanding contemporary representative of that trend, Lev Okinshevych.

Two Ukrainian patriots, Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Viacheslav Lypynsky, took opposing views on the 1648–54 Cossack revolution. Lypynsky adopted an inverted class approach, exalting Khmelnytsky as the deliberate creator of a stratified society of the European type, guided by a landed aristocracy and buttressed by a strong, property-minded peasantry. Under the impact of the same historical processes, but steeped in democratic and populist tradition, Hrushevsky saw the 1648–54 events as an expression of popular will, which was hindered by Khmelnytsky's mistakes. Hrushevsky has been an enormously influential historian, and his work continues to command the respect of scholars and the attention of politicians. Two of his students specializing in the Khmelnytsky era, Stepan Tomashivsky and Myron Korduba, produced outstanding works of scholarship that are discussed in this chapter. (The work of another of Hrushevsky's disciples, Ivan Krypiakievych, is examined in the following chapter on Soviet interpretations of Pereiaslav.)

This chapter concludes with an examination of the views of the American specialist, George Vernadsky, who appears to have been the first scholar in the English-speaking world to integrate Ukraine with the overall history of Eastern Europe. Vernadsky emphasizes Ukraine's importance to the history of the tsarist empire, and his monumental history of Russia devotes considerable attention to the Ukrainian Cossack movements.

Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804–73)

In the early nineteenth century, the western areas of the tsarist empire were still influenced by the heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and by the pro-Polish policies of Tsar Alexander I (1801–25). Following the Polish revolt of 1830–1, however, Nicholas I adopted restrictive measures, including the closing of the Polish-dominated university at Vilna and 245 schools in “Southwest Russia,” most of them operated by Catholic religious orders (of both Latin and Byzantine rite). As part of the design to eliminate centrifugal traditions, the University of St. Vladimir was established in Kiev in 1834. Its first rector was Mykhailo Maksymovych, who resigned the post after a year, ostensibly through ill health and distaste for the official policy of Russification.¹

Born of Cossack *starshyna* stock in what is now the Cherkasy *oblast* of the Ukrainian SSR, Maksymovych was a botanist at the University of Moscow from 1821 to 1834, but pursued his interest in Ukrainian ethnography and history. In 1827 Maksymovych published his first collection of Ukrainian folk songs under the title *Malorossiiskii pesni* [Little Russian songs]. This was followed in 1834 by a collection entitled *Ukrainskii narodnia pesni* [Ukrainian folk songs] and in 1849 by *Sbornik ukrainskikh pesen* [Collection of Ukrainian songs]. Throughout his life Maksymovych wrote profusely on ethnographic themes. After leaving the university, he entered his most productive phase, as a historian, archeologist, ethnographer and philologist. In 1843 he participated in the establishment of the Kiev-based *Vremennaia kommissiia dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* [Temporary Commission for the Study of Ancient Documents]. Maksymovych's friends included the writers Aleksandr Pushkin, Nikolai Gogol and Adam Mickiewicz, as well as contemporary leaders in the Ukrainian national revival, among them Taras Shevchenko, Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Ievhen Hrebinka and Mykola Kostomarov.

Frequently called the patriarch of modern Ukrainian historiography, Maksymovych laid the foundations for a critical and scientific approach to the history of the Ukrainian people and exerted great influence on scholars such as Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), Panteleimon Kulish

(1819–97) and Oleksander Lazarevsky (1834–1902). Although he often corrected unsubstantiated views of other scholars, he never produced a complete history. His historical writings comprise articles, reviews and letters written largely in reaction to the work of others. Most were published between 1837 and 1874, in periodicals such as *Russkaia beseda*, *Moskvitianin*, *Kievlianin*, *Osnova*, *Sankt-peterburgskiiia vedomosti* and *Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennykh del*. After his death Maksymovych's writings were published from 1876–80 in a three-volume collection entitled *Sobranie sochinenii M. A. Maksimovicha* [Collected Works of M. O. Maksymovych], sponsored by the Southwestern Section of the Imperial Geographical Society.²

In the writings of Maksymovych an overall historiographical perspective emerges: rejection of the Normanist theory of the origins of ancient Rus'; defence of the unity of the Eastern Slavs; intense Ukrainian patriotism (evident in his frequent polemics with the Russian, Polish and compatriot historians); the belief that Orthodoxy is the only legitimate faith of the Eastern Slavs; and exaltation of the 1654 Pereiaslav events as a milestone in the restoration of East Slavic unity.

In January 1857, in an article entitled “Vospominanie o Bogdane Khmel'nitskom” [Commemoration of Bohdan Khmelnytsky], Maksymovych noted that the two-hundredth anniversary of Khmelnytsky's death would fall in August of that year. He writes that in 1812, statues of Kuzma Minin and Dmitrii Pozharsky who had liberated the Great Russians from the Poles during the Time of Troubles, had been unveiled in Moscow, but that a similar gesture had not been made on behalf of the Little Russians. Ancient Pereiaslav, where Little Russia's annexation to the Russian state had been initiated was forgotten and in ruins.³ Maksymovych demands more attention to the war of 1648–54, which above all was fought to bring the Ukrainians within the Russian state, to which they rightly belonged both culturally and politically.

In 1859–60 he wrote a series of eighteen “letters” on the Khmelnytsky era: “Pisma o Bogdane Khmel'nitskom” [Letters on Bohdan Khmelnytsky], five of which were addressed to Pogodin and thirteen to Kostomarov. In those to the latter, Maksymovych calls upon Great and Little Russians alike to pay due honour to Khmelnytsky on the occasion of the appearance of the second edition of Kostomarov's biography of the great hetman. In the five letters to Pogodin, Maksymovych praises Kostomarov's biography but corrects dates, places and the identification of Cossack figures.⁴ In one letter he accuses Kostomarov of portraying Khmelnytsky as both a sincere Ukrainian patriot and as a pupil of the Jesuits who emulated their duplicities. Maksymovych also disagrees with Kostomarov on other issues: whether Khmelnytsky took part in anti-Polish uprisings prior to 1648; the

precise date and place of a banquet at which Khmelnytsky stole Polish documents from the pro-Polish Cossack leader Barabash; the length of time Khmelnytsky had been a prisoner of the Turks in his youth; the reliability of the Cossack Chronicles; and facts about the career of Khmelnytsky prior to the outbreak of the 1648 revolt.

Maksymovych stresses that Khmelnytsky was a great national hero and that the years 1648–54 were a period of glory for Ukrainians. The Poles and the Catholic church, particularly after the Union of Churches, had placed unbearable pressures on the commonwealth Ukrainians; in such conditions Bohdan Khmelnytsky, “our bright falcon,” came to power. “Aroused by its hetman Bohdan,” Maksymovych claims, “Ukraine liberated itself from Polish religious persecution, and breathing an independent life, in 1654 voluntarily joined the collective structure of the Russian state.”⁵

This assessment should be related to Maksymovych’s overall view of the history of the Eastern Slavs, conveyed most succinctly in an 1837 lecture at the University of Kiev. Entitled “Ob uchasti i znachenii Kieva v obshchei zhizni Rossii” [On the participation and significance of Kiev in the general life of Russia], the lecture characterizes Kiev as one of three great centres of Russian history, along with Moscow and St. Petersburg. Kiev, associated immortally with the deeds of St. Vladimir, was “the mother of Rus’ cities,” and the heart and symbol of the civilization of the Eastern Slavs during the periods of Kievan Rus’ and appanage Russia. Despite the break-up of ancient Rus’ into seventy principalities and despite the Tatar–Mongol invasions, Kiev remained the symbol of religious unity for all Rus’, although new political centres arose to the north in Suzdal and to the southwest in Galicia. Eventually, Rus’ was divided up between the new Russian state and the Lithuanian principality, subsequently united with Poland. Catholic influences gained supremacy in Poland–Lithuania so that by 1569—with the Union of Lublin—the Orthodox were deprived of their natural rights, a tragedy as great as the devastation by the Mongols.

At this time, Maksymovych continues, the Cossacks became the defenders of Ukraine and Orthodoxy. Through their exploits and the aid of heroic Polish kings such as Stefan Batory, the Ukrainian nationality, that is, the individuality of southern Rus’, was restored. In the struggle against the Catholic Counter Reformation, and in Ukraine’s rebirth, there emerged many great men⁶ but the greatest of all was Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who earned the acclamation of his people as “God-given” (*Boh-dan*).

In the year 1654 the great Bohdan united Little Russia with Great Russia,

whose tsar, having previously already taken the title of ruler of all northern countries, their inheritor and possessor, also united Belorussia with Moscow. Thus there came to pass the first merger into a single state structure and entity of the three sundered parts of Rus' and the Muscovite tsar became the tsar of Great, Little and White Russia. (p. 20)

Maksymovych sees the Cossacks as the significant historical force giving the Ukrainians an individuality distinct from other Eastern Slavs. In his view the heroism of the Cossacks centred on their anti-Polish exploits rather than on Tatar-Turkish concerns.⁷ In response to Michał Grabowski's view that the Poles had expelled the Tatars from Ukraine and settled the unpopulated steppe (a Polish variant of Pogodin's thesis), Maksymovych notes that the Tatars occupied central Ukraine for only eighty years (1240–1320), whereas Lithuanian rule lasted 249 years (1320–1569). As the Ukrainian areas were united with the Polish crown only with the Union of Lublin, real Polish rule therefore lasted only eighty-five years—from 1569 to the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada*. Nor were Ukrainian areas colonized by the Poles prior to 1569, since Ukraine was not uninhabited. Lithuanian rule was beneficial for the Ukrainians, Maksymovych stresses, and the indigenous population prospered culturally and materially.

Polish rule over the Ukrainians, however, was neither just nor beneficial. The Union of Lublin was planned as a voluntary association based on equal rights and freedoms for both Ukrainians and Poles. The Poles, however, violated this pact and precipitated Khmelnytsky's revolt. If Polish rule had been tolerant, the Union of Lublin would have endured, and the Ukrainians would not have sought union with the Russians. Further, Khmelnytsky had been personally wronged: having fought loyally on behalf of the Polish king against the Tatars until 1647, he was maltreated by the Poles and received no redress. In addition, Maksymovych takes exception to the position of both Grabowski and Kulish, who regarded the 1648–54 revolt as hostile to the gentry. He argues that patriots among the Ukrainian gentry identified with the people (*narod*) and participated in the revolution, as is evident in the articles of petition that Khmelnytsky presented to the tsar in 1654. Khmelnytsky was himself an educated member of the gentry, as were many of his closest confederates: Vyhovsky, Teteria, Zarudny and the clerics Sylvester Kosiv and Lazar Baranovych.

Although Maksymovych warmly supports the 1654 agreement and dismisses as traitors those Ukrainian leaders subsequently opposed to Russian rule (Vyhovsky, Iurii Khmelnytsky and Mazepa, for example), he

also deplores what he considers the unilateral and unjustified curtailment of the rights of the Ukrainians as set forth in the agreement.

His position is made clear in an exchange with Panteleimon Kulish over the land-grant aspects of the Pereiaslav agreement. Kulish had praised a report of Grigorii Teplov (1720–70) (a one-time favourite of Kyrylo Rozumovsky, the head of the revived hetmanate [1750–64] during the reign of Empress Elizabeth [1741–62]). Entitled “O neporiadkakh v Malorossii” [On the disorders in Little Russia], and written sometime after 1757, the report accused the Little Russian gentry of acquiring landholdings in contravention of the 1654 Pereiaslav accord and recommended the abolition of the revived hetmanate. Kulish had claimed that Teplov loved Little Russia more than the Little Russians themselves did.

In “O Grigore Nikolaeviche Teplove i ego zapiske ‘O neporiadkakh v Malorossii’” [On Grigorii Nikolaevich Teplov and his report “On the disorders in Little Russia”], Maksymovych argues that Teplov was no friend of Little Russia. On the contrary, he did all he could to destroy Elizabeth’s good will toward it; for example, inventing abuses by the landowning Little Russian gentry. Also, Teplov had falsified the number of registered Ukrainian Cossacks, stating that there were 20,000, not the expected 150,000. To Teplov’s charge that the Little Russian gentry bought and sold land illegally, Maksymovych replies that Little Russian customary law allowed such transactions and that they were subsequently honoured by the Lithuanian Statute and Polish kings and had been reconfirmed by the tsar in 1654. Temporarily abrogated in 1739, this right had been restored by Empress Elizabeth in 1741.

The Ukrainian practice of land transfer had a long legal history, beginning with the Lithuanian Statute of 1576, later confirmed in Polish law and included in the articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 1654. Teplov had charged that the hetmans and the Little Russian gentry appropriated villages and estates without either the tsar’s *ukaz* or the hetman’s *universal*. Analysis of the Pereiaslav documents, Maksymovych counters, proves Teplov wrong. Maksymovych personally examined more than one thousand documents on land sales and hundreds of *universals* and *ukazy*. Theoretically, all required the seal or signature of a Cossack colonel or centurion; some, however, were not signed by any official. Yet all such transactions were legal. The Pereiaslav agreement allowed such traditions to continue, Maksymovych maintains. Thus the Lithuanian Statute was fully valid both after the 1569 Union of Lublin and after 1654 when the Muscovite tsar took over the legal obligations of the Polish king. Kulish and Teplov’s view that such land transactions were deceitful is unfounded.

The hetman's position allowed for the ownership and disposal of property as he saw fit, and after 1654 all agreements with the tsars allowed for such powers until the hetmanate was abandoned.

Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85)

Although ignored by twentieth century historians in the West and disfavoured in the Soviet Union, Mykola Kostomarov played a prominent role in the controversies over the 1654 Pereiaslav–Moscow negotiations.⁸ Born in the province of Voronezh in an area of mixed Russian and Ukrainian settlements, Kostomarov was the son of a Russian landowner and a Ukrainian peasant woman. In 1837 he graduated from the University of Kharkiv and in the early 1840s taught in gymnasiums in two Ukrainian towns. In 1846 he became a professor at the University of Kiev, but the next year was arrested and banished to Saratov because he belonged to the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius, a group espousing romantic Ukrainian nationalism, Christian messianism and Slavophile federalist ideas. In 1857, upon the accession of Alexander II, Kostomarov was granted amnesty and obtained permission to live in St. Petersburg, where in 1862 he was associated with the university. In the early 1860s he became involved with the Ukrainian literary and political journal *Osnova*, published in St. Petersburg.⁹ After personal differences with the university authorities, he stopped teaching and concentrated on historical and archeological research. A prolific scholar, he produced over three hundred articles and books dealing with history, literature and politics. Both his polemics against Russian opponents and his historical writings stress democratic federalism as the redeeming feature of the early history of the Eastern Slavs.¹⁰

Anatole G. Mazour has said that to Kostomarov:

The purpose of history was not a matter of chronologically stringing events and facts together; that was the function of archaeology and ethnography. The historian's mission was the elucidation of the spirit of the people he deals with, embracing all the ramifications and multitudinousness of their daily lives.¹¹

The characterization is an apt one; for Kostomarov, history was more than a compilation of facts, and documents alone would not provide the entire truth.

In his major work on the Khmelnytsky era, the three-volume *Bogdan Khmelnytsky*, Kostomarov writes that this era was important because it resolved the age-old struggle between Poland and Rus' in favour of the Eastern Slavs. Although the title of Kostomarov's work uses the name of the Cossack leader, it is actually a chronological narrative concerned primarily with the history of the Ukrainians, a separate nationality variously referred to as *malorosy*, *ukraintsy*, *cherkasy*, *khokhly*, *rusiny* and *russkie*. The first volume covers events up to 1648; the second volume ends with the Bila Tserkva agreement of 1651; and the third volume concludes in 1657 with the death of Khmelnytsky.

Kostomarov discusses in detail the Pereiaslav *rada* of January 1654, and agrees with Velychko that the tsar's envoys gave an oath on his behalf. Included is a draft of Khmelnytsky's articles of petition with twenty-three points, a copy of the Moscow redaction of that petition with eleven points and a draft of the tsar's *gramota* to Khmelnytsky. Kostomarov stresses the hetman's dissatisfaction after Pereiaslav and emphasizes the Ukrainians' strong opposition to the Vilna agreement, which caused the hetman to renew contracts with the Turkish sultan. "Moscow," says Kostomarov, "turned a deaf ear" to Khmelnytsky's violent objections. The tension was heightened by the failing health of the hetman.

In June 1657, when Khmelnytsky was near death, a Russian delegation headed by the *okolnichii* Fedor Buturlin arrived in Chyhyryn to complain of his relations with Sweden and Transylvania. Buturlin also met with Vyhovsky, who insisted that the Cossacks' foreign contacts were necessary for self-defence and were not directed against the tsar. The envoys, however, pressured Vyhovsky to allow the posting of Russian troops in Chernihiv, Pereiaslav and Nizhyn, claiming that the Teteria-Zarudny mission had agreed to this at Moscow in March 1654.

On 19 (9) June 1657 Buturlin denounced Khmelnytsky's ties with Sweden as a violation of the oath taken at Pereiaslav. Friendship with "Calvinist heretics" would not be tolerated, he warned. Khmelnytsky refused to desert his old ally and in turn complained about the Russian accord with Poland. Khmelnytsky did not believe that Zarudny and Teteria had agreed to the additional posting of tsarist troops, since he had instructed them to allow the military only in Kiev. The ensuing harsh exchange, Kostomarov notes, marked an open rift between the Russians and Ukrainians. The two halves of Rus' had been separated for centuries and now could not understand one another. "And most important," Kostomarov continues, "Moscow was unable to understand that it was possible to be authentically *russkii* and at the same time a free human being, to be a faithful subject of the sovereign and at the same time to tell the plain truth."

At the hetman's death the Ukrainians were still in revolt, according to Kostomarov, and split into two antagonistic factions—the *starshyna* and the *chern*. The first group was led by Khmelnytsky's closest advisers, the second by the Zaporozhian Sich. The Cossack officers led by Vyhovsky clashed frequently with the Russians, who contributed to the increasing animosity by ridiculing Ukrainian customs and by political action in line with the Vilna accord.¹² Vyhovsky became the head of a "federalist party" advocating a new agreement with Poland; its position was congenial to many prominent Ukrainians, including Iurii Nemyrych. The Ukrainian clergy also opposed Khmelnytsky's association with Moscow. The opposition party of the rank-and-file *chern*, however, tended to be pro-Russian.

In his original assessment, Kostomarov praises Khmelnytsky as the chief promoter of the union of the two major branches of Rus'. Yet new sources showed that after the 1654 agreement Khmelnytsky not only had contacts with the Turks but in fact became a vassal of the sultan.¹³ Disturbed by this revelation, in 1878 Kostomarov wrote a special article entitled "Bogdan Khmelnytsky, dannik Ottomanskoi Partii" [Bohdan Khmelnytsky, vassal of the Ottoman porte], in which he argues that the new data shows that the hetman was neither "a true servant of the Muscovite throne" nor "a true supporter of the unification of all Russian lands." Khmelnytsky was exposed as a deceiver and perjurer, the forerunner of a long list of Cossacks seeking the protection of other states.

The historical significance of the personality of Bohdan should be presented in a different light. His heirs—Briukhovetsky, Doroshenko, Orlyk and others of lesser importance—in implementing the ideas of the independence of Ukraine under the supreme power of the Ottoman porte—merely endeavoured in a consequential manner to follow the crooked path that he had shown them. Thus Iurii Khmelnytsky, to whom the sultan had bestowed the title of Prince of Little Russian Ukraine, was not "the unworthy son of his illustrious father" but was completely akin to him. Bohdan left to Little Russia a son worthy of himself. (p. 817)

In an article entitled "V zashchitu B. Khmelnytskago" [In defence of B. Khmelnytsky], Gennadii Karpov objects to several of Kostomarov's claims. Kostomarov believed that Khmelnytsky's relations with Turkey after 1654 amounted to treason to the tsar; Karpov, however, argues that not only did the hetman diligently keep Moscow informed about his contacts with the Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan but the tsarist

government even approved of the contacts. If Khmelnytsky was a traitor, Karpov adds, a better case could be made from his dealings with Sweden after Pereiaslav. Karpov also points out that the “new” evidence—showing that ties were intensified between the sultan and Khmelnytsky in September 1655—was at best supplementary or explanatory and did not substantially alter the understanding of the inter-relationship among the Cossacks, Muscovy and Turkey. Moreover, Karpov states, these documents are not reliable, since they came from Polish archives.

For the most part, Karpov continues, Ukrainian historians tended to portray Khmelnytsky as a rebel rather than as a constructive agent unifying Little and Great Russia. In fact, the contemporary Ukrainian position suggested that Khmelnytsky betrayed the tsar. Within this context, Karpov interprets Kostomarov’s disillusionment with Khmelnytsky as an expression of Ukrainian nationalism, as part of an effort to prevent a statue of Khmelnytsky from being erected in Kiev and as an attempt to destroy the hetman’s position as a symbol of unity between Great and Little Russia.¹⁴ The Ukrainians intended to show that even from the Russian point of view, Khmelnytsky did not deserve a monument in Kiev. The hetman was thus portrayed as a traitor by nature and habit, who had betrayed the Polish king, the Crimean khan, the Turkish sultan and the Muscovite tsar.

Like Kulish, Kostomarov had consulted *Istoriia Rusov*, which in Karpov’s view was “a political pasquinade.” Karpov vigorously criticizes Kostomarov’s claim, based on alleged errors in *Istoriia Rusov*, that the Pereiaslav agreement was a treaty between equals. Moreover, Kulish, also, was mistaken in perceiving Khmelnytsky as Muscovy’s vassal, for the hetman in fact became the subject (*poddanyi*) of the autocratic tsar in a manner analogous to the case of Novgorod. (The Novgorodians had been defeated militarily while the Little Russians had voluntarily subordinated themselves to the tsar, but in both instances the Muscovites adhered to established “historical tradition” and annexed territory). Karpov counters Kostomarov’s and Kulish’s criticism of Khmelnytsky:

Bohdan Khmelnytsky, William of Orange, George Washington, and others like them were true representatives of their peoples, fighters for freedom and for convictions against despotism, retrogression and aggression. In this regard all of these personalities were identical. All were identical heroes. They strove toward and attained the same objectives, using identical means. All merit identical glorification. A people capable of producing a Bohdan Khmelnytsky, capable for several centuries under the most unfavourable conditions of upholding the pledge that had once been given—“May God confirm it! Strengthen it, O Lord, in order that for ever and ever we might

be one"—such a people deserves fullest sympathy and respect. (p. 104)

It must be remembered, of course, that Karpov was interpreting Kostomarov's opinion of Khmelnytsky as an expression of Ukrainian nationalism. But what were Kostomarov's abiding views regarding the Russians and Ukrainians? He set forth his position in "Dve russkie narodnosti" [Two Russian nationalities]. It is clear that for Kostomarov the adjective *russkii* embraced a qualification rendered best in English as "Eastern Slavic." He maintains that the essential differences between the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians can be traced to differences among the early Slavic tribes.

Kostomarov's view is that the Ukrainian Cossacks continued the federalist tradition of southern Rus', a tradition which did not take root in the north. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Vladimir was the centre of what would become *Velikaia Rus'*, a role later assumed by Moscow. Like Vladimir, Moscow was a new city and both became centres of power because of the Orthodox church. Naturally, in Great Russia the church developed differently from its counterpart in Ukraine. In the north there was close co-operation between church and state; spiritual and temporal power were united—the clergy supported the princes in their drive for autocratic authority. In Great Russia this led to an emphasis on external forms and to the growth of sectarianism, tendencies traditionally strong among the Russians and weak among the Ukrainians. Among the Ukrainians and Belorussians, the only significant deviation from Orthodoxy was the Church Union, a movement based on content, not form. A schism resulting from disagreement over form would have been unthinkable among the Little Russians, Kostomarov writes.

Given Kostomarov's defence of the union of Ukraine and Russia and his friendliness toward the Russian people, one might suppose that Soviet historians would approve of his work. Until the middle of the 1960s, however, he was condemned as a "bourgeois nationalist" imbued with "idealistic" views and "romantic nationalism." He has also been reproached for advocating class reconciliation based on Christian ideals of brotherhood. Despite Kostomarov's clear references to class conflict involving the officers and the rank-and-file Cossacks (and his preferences for the policies of the *chern*), he has been described as a proponent of the theory of the "classlessness" and "bourgeoislessness" of the Ukrainian nation. Although he supposedly accepted the "reunion" (*vossoedinenie*—a term Kostomarov did not use) of Ukraine with Russia as a positive historical development, Soviet sources criticize Kostomarov's inconsistent

evaluation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. He is accused of portraying revolutionary movements—including the 1670–1 peasant rebellion of Stenka Razin—as destructive phenomena.

The Soviet scholar Leonid K. Polukhin was a harsh critic of Kostomarov as both a historian and a public figure. In 1959, in line with the ideological positions of the twenty-first congress of the Communist party, Polukhin published *Formuvannia istorychnykh pohliadiv M. I. Kostomarova. Do krytyky burzhuazno-pomishchyskoi istoriohrafii na Ukraini* [The formation of the historical views of M. I. Kostomarov: A contribution to the critique of bourgeois-landowner historiography in Ukraine]. Concerned with exposing “the bourgeois-nationalist falsification of the history of the Ukrainian people” and determined to provide a “Marxist-Leninist evaluation” of Kostomarov, Polukhin gives a list of scholars who disputed Kostomarov’s views: Sergei Solovev, Gennadii Karpov, Aleksandr Shchapov, Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Mykhailo Maksymovych and Mikhail Pokrovsky.

Moreover, Polukhin attacks not only Kostomarov’s scholarship but also his character, referring to him as “the founder of Ukrainian bourgeois-landowner historiography,” that is, the school of thought that regards the Ukrainian people as historically “classless,” having developed according to the “single stream” theory. Kostomarov, Polukhin points out, came from the Ukrainophile environment of the Kharkiv area, where in the nineteenth century a new capitalist, bourgeois class arose, heir to eighteenth-century aristocratic-landlord traditions of the East Ukrainian gentry. In this eastern part of Ukraine—where the views of Johann Gottfried Herder were enthusiastically propagated—there began the first stirrings of Ukrainian nationalism. Kostomarov’s nationalism, based on his enthusiasm for Herder’s ideas, was coloured by a “cosmopolitan humanism.”

Romantic nationalism and religiosity were natural manifestations of Kostomarov’s orientation, Polukhin claims. The interpretations of the 1648–54 war of liberation as a struggle on behalf of Orthodoxy, in which all the Orthodox who fought against Catholicism are depicted as national heroes, illustrates his approach to history. Polukhin complains that Kostomarov portrayed the hetman as proud, despotic and of no special merit. Still, in Polukhin’s opinion, some aspects of Kostomarov’s work are acceptable to Soviet scholars; for example, Kostomarov’s opposition to official tsarist statist historiography, his discovery and use of new sources and his compilation of valuable ethnographic materials. None the less, these virtues, Polukhin warns, are not sufficient to include Kostomarov in the select company of revolutionary democrats of his time.

In recent years, however, Soviet historians have disapproved of this harsh assessment. On the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Kostomarov's birth, a series of articles softened the official Soviet attitude toward him. Although Kostomarov has not as yet been fully rehabilitated, an edition of his non-historical works (poetry, drama, fiction and literary criticism), *Tvory* [Works], appeared in 1967. It was prefaced by a positive evaluation written by Ievhen Shabliovsky. In a 1971 article entitled "Dozhovtneva iadianska istoriografiiia pro M. I. Kostomarova, iak istoryka" [Pre-October and Soviet historiography on M. I. Kostomarov as a historian], Iu. A. Pinchuk concludes that Soviet historians have yet to make a correct and definitive analysis of Kostomarov. Pinchuk lauds Kostomarov as a "democratic historian" whose "progressive" virtues outweigh his errors and deficiencies. He points out that Marx and Engels praised Kostomarov, as did such Russian "progressives" as Belinsky, Chernyshevsky and Herzen. In their treatment of Kostomarov, Pinchuk maintains, the Soviet encyclopedias were too laconic and passed over too many matters in silence, and Polukhin's evaluation lacked "a historicist approach and scientific objectivity."

Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908)

A meticulous scholar who emphasized documentary evidence, Volodymyr Antonovych was probably the most influential Ukrainian historian of the nineteenth century. The founder of the so-called "Kievan school" of Ukrainian historiography, he was the teacher of Dmytro Bahalii, Petro Holubovsky, Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky, Ivan Lynnychenko and Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Antonovych produced works in archeology, archeography, ethnography and the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Cossack movement in Ukraine. He was the chief editor of *Vremennaia kommissia dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* [Temporary Commission for the Study of Ancient Documents], established in 1843 by the tsarist government, and he founded the Kiev-based *Istoricheskoe obshchestvo Nestora-letopistsa* [The Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler].¹⁵

Born in Makhnivtsi, Kiev province, the natural son of a Hungarian emigrant, Janos Dzidai, and a Polish mother, Antonovych was raised among the Right-Bank Polish gentry and retained the name and connections of his legal father, Bonifacy Antonowicz. From his natural father he received an early indoctrination in the ideas of the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution.¹⁶ Although he originally studied medicine, Antonovych returned to Kiev University to specialize in history. Kiev was still a centre of Polish culture, and the university students were

noted for their anti-establishment activities. A prominent manifestation of this was the so-called *balahuly* movement; it sympathized with the peasantry and demonstratively rejected the manners and cultural values of the Polish gentry society.¹⁷ Antonovych, however, became a leader of a “purist” student faction that advocated progressive ideas without the incidental accretions of the *balahuly* movement.

Influenced by European liberalism and adherents of the “Ukrainian School” in Polish literature, in the 1860s Antonovych broke with his Polish environment and organized a group of “peasant lovers” (*khlopomany*) that included Tadei Rylsky, Fedir Panchenko, Borys Poznansky and Konstiantyn Mykhalchuk. The outbreak of the 1863 Polish revolt finally drove Antonovych from the Polish patriotic camp, for he thought the insurgents to be elitist, gentry-oriented and neglectful of the rights and national character of the oppressed Ukrainian peasantry. Contemporary political events thus contributed to Antonovych’s renunciation of “historical Poland.” Another important factor in Antonovych’s rejection of his Polish background was the realization, based on historical study, that many of the leading gentry of “historical Poland” were originally Orthodox Ukrainians. He wrote a valuable article entitled “O proiskhozhdenii shliakhetskikh rodov v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii” [On the origins of gentry families in Southwest Russia], based on the study of 140 former Ruthenian gentry families who had converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries.¹⁸

Antonovych’s personal political manifesto, “Moia ispoved” [My confession], first printed in the St. Petersburg journal *Osnova*, underscored his break with Polish gentry traditions and explained his defence of the Ukrainian peasantry.¹⁹ This credo contains the essence of his political beliefs as expressed in a reply to the Polish publicist Zenon Fisz (1820–70), who under the *nom de plume* Tadeusz Padalica had accused Antonovych of betraying his Polish cultural heritage. In “My confession” Antonovych rejects the cultural and political heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth because it led to the social and political oppression of the Ukrainian people.

As a Ukrainian populist, Antonovych helped form the group *Hromada* [Community] among university students determined to make Kiev a centre of Ukrainian cultural life. In this capacity he worked closely with *Osnova*, founded in 1861. As political life became radicalized in tsarist Russia in the 1860s and 1870s, a socialist group led by Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), a professor of European history at the University of Kiev, was formed within the *Hromada*. Antonovych and Drahomanov together had compiled a collection of folk songs of the Khmelnytsky era—*Istorieskiia pesni maloruskogo naroda* [Historical songs of the Little Russian people].

Antonovych, however, rejected the younger group's emphasis on political action and became the leader of the *Stara Hromada* [Old Community], which restricted its activities to culture and education.

In the 1880s Antonovych concentrated on aiding the Ukrainians in the Habsburg empire in the hope of transforming the Austrian crown land of Galicia into a "Ukrainian Piedmont" in the wake of repression against the Ukrainian movement in Russia. He encouraged Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement, opposed the Russophile movement in Galicia, wrote articles for the Lviv *Pravda* (Truth), and helped make the Shevchenko Society a respectable scholarly institution. He was offered the chair of Ukrainian history at Lviv University but instead recommended one of his students, Hrushevsky, for the post, which the latter duly assumed in 1894.

After completing his studies at the historical-philological faculty in Kiev, Antonovych taught Latin in a local gymnasium and worked for the Kiev Archeographical Commission. He became editor of its major publication, *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* [Archives of Southwest Russia], a post he held until 1880. Under Antonovych's editorship, *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* became a forum for Ukrainian scholarly research. In 1878 he received his doctoral degree in Russian history. His dissertation, *Istoriia Velikago kniazhestva litovskago do smerti v. kn. Olgerda* [History of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the death of Grand Duke Olgerd] was first published in Kiev in 1885 and later translated into Ukrainian. He was subsequently appointed professor of Russian history at Kiev University and held this post until his retirement in 1901.

Antonovych was most interested in and published valuable documentary material on Right-Bank Ukraine.²⁰ The Temporary Commission for the Study of Ancient Documents, created in order to promote the view that the Right Bank of the Dnieper was "primordially Russian" (*iskoni russkaia*), was soon dominated by Ukrainian scholars, including Mykola Ivanyshiv (Nikolai Ivanishev), Antonovych's teacher at Kiev University and at one time the university's rector. Besides Ivanyshiv, Antonovych was influenced by Maksymovych and Kostomarov, whose ideas helped shape his views on populism and the relationship between the Russians, Poles and Ukrainians.

Antonovych's views on Ukrainian history in general and on the Khmelnytsky era in particular were expressed in a series of private lectures delivered in Ukrainian in Kiev in 1895–6. These lectures were first published in Habsburg-ruled Chernivtsi (Czernowitz) in 1897 under the title *Besidy pro kozatski chasy na Ukraini* [Lectures on Cossack times in Ukraine], edited by Vasyl Simovych. A second edition, with the new title *Kоротка istoriia kozachchyny* [A brief history of the Cossack movement],

was published in 1912 in the Galician city of Kolomyia, with commentaries by Myron Korduba. For Antonovych, the Cossack movement imparted a special leitmotif to Ukrainian history that contrasted with the Russians' absolutism and the Poles' limited "democratic aristocracy": it was a form of democracy based on equal rights for all members of society, embodied most spectacularly in the Zaporozhian Sich. Noting that the democratic ideal is difficult to achieve, Antonovych ascribes the failure of the Cossacks during the Khmelnytsky era—a most propitious time for realizing the Ukrainian historical ideal—to the low educational level, lack of clear-cut goals, and instability of the Ukrainian masses, along with the selfish interests of the Cossack *starshyna*, who placed their own interests above the public good. Ukrainian society lacked the discipline, the consensus and the juridical norms necessary for a successful social and political revolution, Antonovych concludes.

He believes that the 1648 rebellion resulted from the basic contradiction between the Polish gentry's desire to preserve class privileges and the Ukrainian masses' demands for equality. Khmelnytsky's desire for personal revenge did not cause the revolt, he maintains; one man cannot generate an all-consuming revolution. The Cossacks were initially successful because Khmelnytsky was a talented organizer and military commander, but their cause ultimately failed because of Khmelnytsky's mistakes and the immaturity of the Ukrainian people. In 1648, for example, Khmelnytsky besieged Lviv but neglected to capture it; instead he accepted a ransom and moved his army to attack Zamość. After negotiating with the *Sejm* for the selection of Jan Kazimierz as the new Polish king, Khmelnytsky returned to Kiev. Such actions suggest that Khmelnytsky lacked a refined sense of politics: he vacillated at the height of success and negotiated simultaneously with several foreign powers instead of concentrating on priorities. The blame for the hetman's confusion, Antonovych adds, rests primarily with the Ukrainian people, who were unprepared for political life and unaware of their own potential. A good leader knows what his people want, but Khmelnytsky did not have that awareness because his followers themselves had no clear goals.

Antonovych considers the 1649 Zboriv treaty another of Khmelnytsky's errors. When the hetman was in a position to dictate terms and could have captured the Polish king and his entire army, he inexplicably agreed to peace at the request of the Tatars and even apologized to the king for having incited revolt. Zboriv brought great injury to the Ukrainian people, which was not ameliorated by the Bila Tserkva agreement of 1651 which followed the Berestechko battle. (Later, however, Antonovych softened his criticism of Khmelnytsky and emphasized the hetman's accomplishments in an article entitled "Kharakteristika deiatelnosti Bogdana

Khmelnitskago" [Characterization of the activity of Bohdan Khmelnytsky], based on a speech delivered in Kiev on 14 January 1898, on the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the 1648 rebellion.)

There were several conflicting currents in Ukrainian society at the time of the anti-Polish revolt, Antonovych notes. The *starshyna* identified with Polish culture and wanted to destroy the Polish gentry in order to appropriate their privileges; it advocated federalism with the Poles and opposed equality for the Ukrainian peasants. The masses were instinctively hostile to the upper classes but could not articulate a positive political programme of their own. Khmelnytsky's policy envisioned a federation with the small neighbouring states of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia. When this plan failed and agreements with the Poles proved futile, Khmelnytsky turned toward federation with Muscovy.

The 1654 agreement with Muscovy followed Khmelnytsky's persistent efforts to interest the tsar in Ukrainian problems. Antonovych feels that the terms of the agreement were imprecise, to Russia's advantage: "One might suppose that this situation was arranged deliberately by one side, for we can say that in the seventeenth century such was the policy of the Muscovite tsars—to take advantage from the ambiguity of an agreement, to interpret the unclear in one's own way and with coercion to deprive the other side of its rights." The Ukrainians, Antonovych writes, hastily drafted their proposals; the hetman's powers to conduct foreign policy were not defined clearly, nor was the controversial issue of the posting of Muscovite troops in Ukrainian cities resolved. The Russians, however, carefully composed their position. Their diplomats were highly experienced and resorted to "bureaucratic chicanery" (*kantseliarske kruchkotvorstvo*), avoided making precise decisions, and proffered generalities open to various interpretations. Antonovych remarks that Khmelnytsky soon realized he had failed to guarantee Ukrainian rights but could do nothing. Here again we have an example of the hetman's "political ineptness," his lack of moral force and of a clear objective.

The Pereiaslav agreement and Khmelnytsky's death were followed by the period of "Ruin"; the Cossack leaders had conflicting political preferences: some wanted to adopt Polish institutions and links while others sought Russian ties and transformation into a Little Russian gentry. The masses remained politically inactive. Ukrainians showed no awareness of or respect for any political principles, and each faction fought for its own interests. The Russians skilfully exploited the situation and gradually abrogated the Pereiaslav agreement, eventually destroying Ukraine's autonomy.

Petr Butsinsky (1853–1916)

O Bogdane Khmelnytskom [On Bohdan Khmelnytsky] is a severely critical Master's thesis by Petr Butsinsky, a history professor at Kharkiv University. Butsinsky's biography of the hetman, based in part on materials from Polish archives discovered by Kostomarov, is a rare condemnation of Russian-Ukrainian rapprochement by a Russian. Butsinsky sees Khmelnytsky as a consistently anti-Russian, deceitful and unreliable ruler who stumbled into an agreement with Moscow while actually trying to frustrate a Polish-Russian alliance directed against the Tatars.

According to Butsinsky, Khmelnytsky expected no special favours from the tsar when the 1654 agreement was negotiated. Khmelnytsky started negotiations with the Russians in order to prevent the Russians and Poles from moving against his Tatar allies. Butsinsky recalls that in January 1648, Adam Kysil had asked Moscow to help defend the commonwealth against the Tatars, but intervention by the Turkish sultan ended the threat of war and stopped the planned Tatar invasion of Poland. In May 1648 Kysil again tried to encourage a Polish-Russian alliance to fight the Tatars, but Polish defeats at Zhovti Vody and Korsun made the Russians behave cautiously. Cossacks intercepting Russian couriers en route to the Poles found evidence that the Russians seriously intended to honour their commitments to the Poles, and Khmelnytsky therefore was mainly concerned with frustrating active Russian-Polish co-operation. In correspondence with the tsar in July 1648, however, he tried to deceive the Russians by emphasizing that the Cossacks' struggle against Poland was in defence of Orthodoxy.

These early efforts to obtain the tsar's support were unsuccessful. Butsinsky reports that Khmelnytsky received the tsarist envoy Vasiliï Unkovsky with great honour and sent his own envoy, the Chyhyryn colonel Veshniak, to Russia with a request for protection and military aid against the Poles. The tsar refused the Ukrainian proposals in deference to the "eternal peace" between Moscow and Warsaw. Upon hearing this, Khmelnytsky, confident because of the concessions he had extracted from the Poles at Zboriv, insulted the Russian envoys Vasiliï Putivlets and Mark Antonov, refusing to see them and calling them spies who should be executed. Khmelnytsky's units began to raid Muscovite border towns, seize property and sell Russian captives to the Tatars. Khmelnytsky also refused to turn over to the tsar the pretender Timoshka Akundinov.

This hostile behaviour gave Moscow reason to doubt Khmelnytsky's sincerity, Butsinsky claims. The Cossacks' alliance with the Tatars was anti-Russian, and Khmelnytsky gave military aid to Crimean forces

campaigning against the Russian-ruled Don Cossacks. By 1650 Khmelnytsky had accepted the Turkish sultan's protection, which cost him considerable popularity. Constantly searching for security, Khmelnytsky continued his negotiations with the Russians, again in order to prevent Polish-Russian military co-operation. After the defeat at Berestechko in June 1651, Khmelnytsky's position deteriorated, and he began a search for new allies. In March 1652 he sent Ivan Iskra to Moscow with a new request for the tsar's protection; in December 1652 Samiilo Zarudny was sent on a similar mission. Both returned from Moscow empty-handed.

Rebuffed by the Russians, Khmelnytsky became involved in a Moldavian intrigue to extend Lupul's rule to Wallachia, a mistaken gamble in Butsinsky's view because it dissipated Cossack forces and angered the Turks. The Poles refused to negotiate with Khmelnytsky and sent Colonel Stefan Czarniecki to raid Ukrainian areas in March 1653. As Khmelnytsky's position became more desperate, Moscow tried to mediate between the Poles and the Ukrainians and suggested a peace agreement similar to the Zboriv treaty. The Poles, however, pressed for a complete surrender by Khmelnytsky, who now realized that a favourable settlement with Warsaw was impossible. In 1653 the Poles established friendly relations with Rakoczy of Transylvania and with the *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia. The final blow to Khmelnytsky came with the defection of his Tatar allies. Bereft of foreign support and unpopular at home, in desperation Khmelnytsky decided, according to Butsinsky, to make more serious overtures to the Muscovite state.

On 11 (1) October 1653 the *Zemskii Sobor* met in Moscow and accepted the *Boiarskaia Duma's* recommendation that the tsar grant the Zaporozhian state's petition for protection. At the same time the *Sobor* declared war on Poland, and the tsar then dispatched the Streshnev-Bredikhin and Buturlin missions to negotiate with Khmelnytsky. Khmelnytsky also obtained the support of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, with whom the alliance with the Tatars had not been popular. In fact, they had continued to conduct forays into Crimean and Turkish territories despite that alliance. The Zaporozhian Sich, always somewhat independent of the hetman, agreed to the Russian association on condition that the hetman's priority be the advancement of Cossack interests. But the hard-pressed hetman had no time to bargain; he accepted Russian conditions without protest. The assembly of Cossack officers convened by Khmelnytsky decided to accept Moscow's protection, since the Russians and Cossacks had a common religion. The association was opposed, however, by those who objected to the continuance of serfdom in Russia.

The next phase in Ukrainian-Russian relations centred on the negotiations in Pereiaslav and Moscow. Khmelnytsky was dissatisfied with

the results of the Teteria–Zarudny mission, for the Russians required the Ukrainians to pay taxes—something the Turks had not demanded—and restricted the hetman’s foreign contacts. Nevertheless, Khmelnytsky was given title to much property (more than Jan Kazimierz, king of Poland, possessed). The tsar also agreed to permit a new Ukrainian gentry among the ranks of the Cossack officers. Only the “people” received nothing from Khmelnytsky’s agreement with Moscow, Butsinsky muses: Polish masters were replaced by fellow countrymen. Khmelnytsky withheld knowledge from the people about the special tsarist grants, since this would have led to a popular revolt that would have caused the tsarist regime to shift its support from the *starshyna* to “the people.” Butsinsky believes that had the tsar realized the true situation in Ukraine, the Russians would have been spared all the intrigues, revolts and acts of treason with which they had to contend after 1654.

Butsinsky also notes that the Ukrainian high clergy, led by Metropolitan Kosiv, opposed Muscovite protection, while the lower clergy, a special target of the Polish government, sympathized with the Cossack revolt and approved of the association with Moscow. The 1654 agreement gave special privileges to the Ukrainian gentry and burghers, who therefore had no reason to oppose Russian protection. Many rank-and-file Cossacks were opposed to the Pereiaslav agreement, as were some of the officers (among them, Ivan Sirko and Ivan Bohun) who refused to give an oath of allegiance to the tsar. The Zaporozhian Sich also refused to take the oath and many Ukrainians opposed subordination to Moscow. In turn, the scandalous behaviour of Russian troops in Ukraine fanned anti-Russian sentiment. The tsar’s new subjects were frequently assaulted and robbed; peasants and children were kidnapped and taken to Muscovy. As a result, Colonel Ivan Zolotareno, head of a Cossack regiment adjacent to the Russian border, ordered the arrest of Russian kidnapers. The Russian army in Ukraine behaved like a typical army of occupation, according to Butsinsky, and bitter hostility between the *khokhol* and the *moskal* had its true origin in Russian excesses after 1654.

Butsinsky maintains that after Pereiaslav, Khmelnytsky personally headed the anti-Russian faction in Ukraine. He describes the hetman as a master of deception, who tried to conceal his Russian alliance from neighbouring rulers. The Crimean khan only learned of the Pereiaslav accord from the Poles. With the death of Islam Giray in June 1654, the hostile Mehmed Giray became the new Crimean ruler and at once followed a policy of friendship with the Poles. The latter had little difficulty in convincing both the Turkish sultan and the new khan that the hetman’s association with Muscovy violated long-standing pledges to the Moslem rulers. In December 1654 a Polish-Crimean military alliance was signed.

Butsinsky concludes that Khmelnytsky felt himself indebted to neither the tsar nor the sultan. From the Russian viewpoint, the hetman's behaviour after 1654 was provocative and treasonous. The hetman sought a way out of his submission to the tsar: "Moscow is too crude, to live with her is impossible." As a product of Polish culture, Khmelnytsky envisioned a society based on Polish traditions. Further, in the summer of 1654, while the Russian troops captured two hundred towns in Belorussia and Lithuania, Khmelnytsky refrained from aiding the tsarist troops and was, in fact, making overtures to the Poles through the *hospodar* of Wallachia.

Khmelnytsky also completely ignored the 1654 restrictions on his foreign contacts, Butsinsky observes. Despite prohibitions, he continued to negotiate with Turkey. At a time when Russia and Sweden were at war, he formed an alliance with Charles X and offered to provide the Swedish king with ten thousand soldiers. The hetman helped to organize an anti-Polish coalition, which included Sweden, Transylvania, Brandenburg-Prussia and Lithuania, although this venture failed through lack of Russian support. Butsinsky feels that by these actions, Khmelnytsky forced the Russians into the Vilna agreement with Poland.

Khmelnytsky's death came as a welcome relief to the Ukrainians, Butsinsky continues, for the hetman had brought to the people only turmoil and internal strife. Khmelnytsky left Ukraine politically and economically ruined, a place of discord and a focal point of war; the "land of milk and honey" became a desert. The popular image of Khmelnytsky, as portrayed for example in Ukrainian folk songs, was that of an evil man. Of course, popular tradition also praises Khmelnytsky, Butsinsky admits, but this is for his career prior to 1654. The treason of Ivan Vyhovsky was merely a fulfillment of Khmelnytsky's political testament. In fact, the entire educated Cossack officer group closest to Khmelnytsky (Ivan Nechai, Pavlo Teteria, Antin Zhdanovych, Iurii Nemyrych and Samiilo Zarudny) shared Khmelnytsky's anti-Russian conviction. Only illiterate colonels remained on Iurii Khmelnytsky's side after Vyhovsky's break with Moscow.

Butsinsky's harsh condemnation of Khmelnytsky evoked criticism from Volodymyr Antonovych, who commented on Butsinsky's biography in a two-part article in the Kiev scholarly journal *Kievskaiia starina* (January–February 1883). Antonovych recognized the positive merits of Butsinsky's book, among them the use of new Polish sources, the use of documentary evidence in the reconstruction of the 1654 agreement and the attention given to Khmelnytsky's diplomatic activities. Antonovych complains, however, that the book is too one-sided; it fails to use other important Polish sources (such as Jakub Michałowski),²¹ the memoirs of

Khmelnysky's Ruthenian contemporaries and the recent works of Kubala. Butsinsky, Antonovych charges, relied excessively on new archival materials and gives too much credence to works such as *Istoriia Rusov*, which Antonovych regards as a political tract rather than a serious work of scholarship. Moreover, Butsinsky was at times careless in his choice of words; for example, he used the term *haidamak* to describe rebels in the seventeenth century, although it was first used only in the early eighteenth century.

In particular, Antonovych rejects Butsinsky's portrait of Khmelnytsky as a deceitful Polish noble who exploited the serfs. For Antonovych, it was an exaggeration to suggest that the hetman's property holdings and economic status made his political goals congruent with those of the Polish gentry. The family estate at Subotiv was small and the Khmelnytsky family neither possessed complete legal title to it, nor had serfs there. Butsinsky charged Khmelnytsky with cowardly behaviour at Berestechko, assuming that the hetman voluntarily fled the battle, but according to Antonovych, Khmelnytsky was captured by the retreating Tatars. The hetman, moreover, fought with great personal valour in other military engagements. As to the hetman's alleged duplicity in foreign relations, in Antonovych's view, the examples cited by Butsinsky proved the reverse to be true. To take one instance, Khmelnytsky's refusal to turn over the pretender Timoshka Akundinov to the Russians was not a deceitful act but a clear manifestation of Khmelnytsky's understanding of and adherence to international law.

Ludwik Kubala (1838–1918)

Ludwik Kubala was a Polish historian who spent most of his professional life as a teacher of history in a gymnasium in Lviv. Kubala's work on the 1648–60 period consists of two series of writings. The first publication, entitled *Jerzy Ossoliński* after the leading Polish statesman of the Khmelnytsky era, is a study of the early years of the Cossack troubles. This was followed by six volumes of historical sketches, *Szkice historyczne*, dealing with the commonwealth's critical years through 1660 and the Treaty of Oliva.

Although he was a patriot and intended to write a history of the Polish nation in the seventeenth century (in 1863 he helped plan an uprising in Galicia to coincide with the Polish revolt in Russia), Kubala harshly criticizes the policies of the commonwealth leaders in the period of crisis. His conclusions and views as a historian are balanced and objective; his knowledge and use of sources are catholic and professional. Kubala excels

in describing personalities and military engagements.

Kubala devotes considerable attention to the career of Jerzy Ossoliński, the outstanding Polish diplomat during the reigns of Władysław IV and Jan Kazimierz and, from 1640–50, chancellor of the realm. Ossoliński wanted to reintegrate the Ukrainians into the commonwealth and supported Władysław IV's attempts to make the Cossacks and the Orthodox loyal to the crown. In 1647 Ossoliński negotiated with the Cossacks to settle religious issues and to obtain Cossack aid for a projected campaign against the Turks. The negotiations were terminated by the outbreak of the Cossack revolt in the following year and Władysław IV died during the revolt. In the interregnum Khmelnytsky supported the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz.

The new king continued to search for a peaceful solution to the Cossack problem, and under Ossoliński's direction an agreement was reached, which envisioned a Polish-Ukrainian campaign against Turkey. Those opposed to the king, chiefly in the Diet, resisted the planned campaign, and fighting between commonwealth and Cossack forces resumed. According to Kubala, the 1649 Zboriv agreement ending the hostilities was engineered by Ossoliński and marked the high point in his diplomatic career. The peace he sought with the Cossacks was opposed by some of the most powerful families in the realm (such as the Wiśniowiecki clan), and by the pope, who condemned the proposed dissolution of the Union of Churches. Consequently, Ossoliński stepped up his plans against the Turks in the hope that enthusiasm for the grand alliance would weaken internal opposition to the king. He was about to depart for Rome to obtain papal support when he died.

Ossoliński's diplomacy was unsuccessful because of the opposition of his countrymen; according to Kubala, they considered Ossoliński a great diplomat but he was handicapped by a strong cosmopolitanism and a poor knowledge of Poland's internal affairs. Ossoliński protected the king and the commonwealth army through the Zboriv agreement, but his internal policies were ineffective. Educated abroad and unfamiliar with the psychology or motives of the gentry, Ossoliński thought in broad European terms and attempted to strengthen royal power in the face of opposition he did not understand. His abilities and programmes failed to reform or save the commonwealth.

In *Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–1655* [The Muscovite war, 1654–5], Kubala writes that Khmelnytsky dominated the Eastern European political scene in the mid-seventeenth century much as did Oliver Cromwell in Western Europe. Both men were hostile toward the dominant church, led popular revolutions, achieved spectacular military successes and, through sheer force of personality, maintained power until their deaths.

Khmelnysky, however, had more difficulty in achieving his objectives, according to Kubala, because his lands were more exposed to attack and because, unlike Cromwell, he had no intellectuals to assist him. Khmelnysky also lacked other resources enjoyed by an established state; the hetman literally had to create a state and its army, an administrative apparatus, a tax structure and a foreign policy. Yet he was able to feed his people, supply logistical support to his troops, and build an intelligence service.

In Kubala's view, Khmelnysky was a man of extraordinary ability, a born ruler. He was resolute, thorough and manifested firm self-control in crisis. Danger and uncertainty about the future rendered Khmelnysky foresighted and prudent. He was slow and deliberate in making official appointments and was greatly vexed when he encountered incompetence or treason among his subordinates. He explored all possibilities for security: a compact with the Tatars, a subsequent plan to establish a separate Cossack state and a second alliance with the Tatars and Turks. Amidst his vacillations he had one firm objective—to end forever Ukraine's relationship with the Poles. To achieve this goal, he subordinated himself to neighbouring states, who in turn tried to exploit Ukraine, Kubala writes. In retaliation the hetman pitted the competing states against each other.

Khmelnysky devoted a large part of his time to training the Cossacks and maintaining strong government. Much energy was spent in pacifying the *chern* and achieving consensus through innumerable assemblies (*rady*). The rank and file tended to take credit for Cossack victories and blame Khmelnysky for failures. There were many provocateurs and foreign agents among the Cossacks, ready to kill the hetman and demoralize his followers. After Berestechko, during the Moldavian campaign, after the alliances with Turkey, Russia and Transylvania—at every critical turn—Khmelnysky had to suppress violent opposition from within his own ranks.

The hetman possessed a charismatic personality, and he repeatedly persuaded the masses to accept his decisions. In appearance, the hetman made no marked impression and was indistinguishable from other members of the Cossack officer class, Kubala writes. But when Khmelnysky rose to speak he was charged with vitality and vigour, captivating his audience. No one dared interrupt him as he threatened and pleaded, shouted and cried out against the wrongs inflicted upon his people. His democratic behaviour and humble way of life prevented any jealousy among his subordinates. Khmelnysky lived simply at the family home in Subotiv, forbade the Cossack officers to requisition captured estates and refrained from imposing excessive taxes. He refused to use the spoils of victory for his own aggrandizement.

Kubala finds it difficult to assess Khmelnytsky's military abilities because his actions were frequently circumscribed by the Tatars, who made the ultimate decisions. Khmelnytsky did have, however, a keen appreciation of the art of subversion. He established a special staff headed by Colonel Stashenko, who at one time controlled two thousand agents harassing both the officials and the populace of the commonwealth. They organized uprisings behind the lines, burned manor houses and towns and killed members of the gentry. Springs and ponds were poisoned, itinerants and beggars were made to spread rumours and the cities were subjected to psychological warfare.²²

In foreign-policy matters, Khmelnytsky displayed tireless activity. Almost daily he received foreign envoys or dispatched his own, Kubala says, and he personally wrote and edited most of the important state messages. He was an expert in diplomatic intrigue; a consummate actor, who was able for the benefit of foreign guests to improvise bathetic scenes in which he seemed to bare the deepest secrets of his soul. He was lavish in his promises to the rulers and ambassadors courting him. His ability to deceive friend and foe alike was uncanny. For a time Jan Kazimierz was convinced that he owed his throne to Khmelnytsky alone and that with the hetman's co-operation he would be able to pacify Ukraine and be successful in war against Turkey. The Cossacks' success in foreign policy was due largely to the hetman's personal involvement.

Kubala's *Wojna moskiewska* deals mainly with the Pereiaslav agreement and the ensuing military ventures. The author discusses the negotiations in Pereiaslav—including Khmelnytsky's speech to the assembly, the Cossacks' demand for a reciprocal oath and Buturlin's refusal. When Khmelnytsky finally took the oath of loyalty to the tsar, a high Polish official reports, he behaved "indecently" (*nieprzyzwoicie*). Kubala notes that at Pereiaslav only 284 persons took the oath, and only two of these were colonels, whereas Buturlin's report claimed that a total of 4,793 persons had taken the oath in the Pereiaslav, Kiev, Nizhyn and Chernihiv districts. Other Russian representatives gathered an additional 122,545 oath-takers, making the overall total 127,338.

Kubala's assessment of Khmelnytsky differs from traditional Polish writing, and for contrast it is useful to explore the more orthodox views of Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński (1846–1930), a contemporary of Kubala, who enjoyed considerable popular acclaim during his lifetime. Rawita-Gawroński wrote a series of works on the Cossack movement, including two books on the Khmelnytsky era—*Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcyi Jana Kazimierza* [Bohdan Khmelnytsky before the election of Jan Kazimierz] and *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana Kazimierza do śmierci* [Bohdan Khmelnytsky from the election of Jan Kazimierz to his

death]. Rawita-Gawroński feels that a fatal symbiosis bound the Polish people to the Cossack movement and to the territory of ancient Rus'. In the first volume he writes that this connection with Rus' was the most important aspect of Polish history because it had caused the demise of the commonwealth and the loss of Polish statehood. Rawita-Gawroński responds to the theory that the Poles brought about their own misfortune by committing injustices against the Ruthenians (*Rusini*) in the commonwealth. Misfortune and guilt are not the same, he argues in an effort to exculpate the commonwealth's elite and the Polish nation.

Rawita-Gawroński believes the 1648–54 uprising to be an example of East Slavic anarchy, the expression of blind passion by the Cossacks who lacked a political basis for their activity. The Khmelnytsky uprising was inimical to culture, had no national colouration, and destroyed Ruthenian values and the Ruthenian people as much as it did others. It was similar to that of Razin in Muscovy; both Razin and Khmelnytsky led savage, anarchical revolts. Because of his association with the commonwealth, however, Khmelnytsky had a greater appreciation of the state as an institution than the Cossacks of the Don or the Volga. He was more successful than Razin because he had the Tatars as allies and because the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was less centralized and disciplined than the Muscovite state. Furthermore, Razin was unable to agitate against the state in the name of religion, a ploy Khmelnytsky used skilfully.

Given such anarchical fury, Rawita-Gawroński maintains, it is patently wrong to praise the Cossacks and Khmelnytsky, like Karol Szajnocha (1818–68), who specialized in the Khmelnytsky period and wrote *Dwa lata dziejów naszych, 1646 i 1648* [Two years in our history, 1646 and 1648]. Szajnocha, Rawita-Gawroński complains, portrayed the 1648 revolt as a reprisal against Polish misdeeds. Szajnocha saw the Cossacks as champions of freedom who hurled thunderbolts at Polish society and threw off the Polish "yoke." In Rawita-Gawroński's view, he mistakenly identified the Cossacks with "the people" and "political freedom" with anarchy. Rawita-Gawroński writes that the efforts of the commonwealth to bring the Ruthenians closer to Western civilization should not be regarded as oppression.

Rawita-Gawroński is even more harsh with Volodymyr Antonovych. Antonovych's opinion that Khmelnytsky endeavoured to build a separate state might have some validity, Rawita-Gawroński writes, but the hetman did not undertake this task out of patriotism; rather he wanted to increase his own power and authority. Khmelnytsky, however, was unable to build a state with the same people and traditions that had enabled the Riurikovichi to create the ancient Kievan state, despite having the support of the *starshyna* and the *chern*. In fact, Rawita-Gawroński maintains,

there was no trace of any effort to obtain true political autonomy in Khmelnytsky's negotiations with the Poles and the Russians. There was no direct reference to political autonomy in the 1654 Pereiaslav negotiations; the Cossack spokesmen limited their demands to recognition of traditional Cossack privileges and customs. They spoke not of the political rights of Ruthenian society but of *Cossack* rights and privileges. Further, the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, brought to Moscow, did not mention political autonomy, requesting only the retention of "former freedoms" and the Cossacks' right to choose their own officers.

How then, does Rawita-Gawroński conceive Khmelnytsky's role in history? European society in the seventeenth century was divided into two groups—the ruling elite and the working masses. The societies of Rus', Muscovy and Poland proper were no exceptions. Given the masses' desperate social and economic condition, it was a relatively simple matter to incite rebellion. Khmelnytsky was successful (to a degree) because he was a skilful demagogue who knew how to identify with and manipulate the masses. In *Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcyi Jana Kazimierza*, Rawita-Gawroński says:

Khmelnytsky exploited popular dissatisfaction for his own ends, not precisely because this in our case was greater than anywhere else or because he was more capable than other chieftains, but rather because he came to understand the popular mood, which gave hope of revenge, of the enjoyment of unbridled freedom, of release of physical forces, of galvanization of dormant energy. Khmelnytsky knew that he used false slogans, but he was not in the least concerned with truthfulness, merely with attracting the rabble [*chern*] to his side. He therefore appealed to the rabble, interchangeably arousing fear and offering encouragement, presenting himself as their only defender. "If the Poles defeat you," he cried, "they will murder your wives and children, they will root out our faith, and throttle you in everlasting slavery. It is better therefore to perish with weapons in your hands." In spreading fear he employed all means, and he gave encouragement with statements such as "This war with the Poles is not without the knowledge and permission of the king" and that he fought "not against the king but only against the arrogant Poles who appeal to the Supreme Lord that He destroy all Ukraine with fire and sword." (pp. 2-4)

Venedikt Miakotin (1867–1937)

Venedikt Miakotin's major work, *Ocherki sotsiálnoi istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII v.* [Outlines of the social history of Ukraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries], is an analysis of social conditions in Left-Bank Ukraine from the 1648 revolt until the final destruction of Ukrainian autonomy in 1783. Miakotin began studying Ukrainian agrarian problems in the 1890s, drawing heavily on the research of two Ukrainian historians: Oleksander Lazarevsky (1834–1902), an expert on the hetmanate in Left-Bank Ukraine, and Ivan Luchytsky (1845–1918), a Kiev University professor who specialized in the social history of Left-Bank Ukraine. His initial interest in the peasantry soon broadened to all social groups in Left-Bank Ukraine and culminated in an account of changes in the social structure of that area. (Right-Bank Ukraine underwent a different historical and social development and remained outside the scope of Miakotin's study.)

Much of Miakotin's work describes the legal and social processes that led to the reimposition of serfdom in Left-Bank Ukraine less than 150 years after the 1654 Pereiaslav arrangement with the Russians. For Miakotin, the 1648–54 uprising in the commonwealth was caused essentially by an aroused peasantry (the *liudi pospolitye* or *chern*), although the violations of Cossack rights was also a factor. Bohdan Khmelnytsky put himself at the head of the insurgents, but his outlook and social programme differed from that of the peasantry. Even during Khmelnytsky's lifetime the Cossack state began to favour and form a new landowning class at the expense of the peasants' freedom. Economic and social concessions, granted to the Orthodox clergy and some Orthodox gentry after the revolt, were detrimental to the peasants. Furthermore, the Cossack officer class, which possessed military and administrative control over the new state, rapidly became a new privileged group in place of the dispossessed *pany* of the commonwealth.

Khmelnytsky had no understanding of the deep social grievances of the peasantry, according to Miakotin. In the early years of the revolt—for example, when the 1649 Zboriv treaty was concluded—the demands of the peasantry were completely ignored. The treaty provided for an increased number of registered Cossacks and strengthened their privileges, but otherwise social standing was unchanged. The treaty, therefore, was rejected by the peasantry.

The nature of the relationship between Muscovy and the Cossack state has been a matter of great dispute, Miakotin points out. Kostomarov had argued that a treaty (*dogovor*) between the Cossack and Muscovite states had been formalized in 1654, whereas Karpov believed that Pereiaslav

involved essentially two documents: a petition from the hetman and a grant (*pozhalovanie*) from the tsar. Miakotin writes that from a purely formal point of view, Karpov was correct, for no treaty was actually signed at Pereiaslav. He maintains, however, that the 1654 arrangement was exceedingly complex. It gave the tsar all the former holdings of the Polish king, gentry and Catholic monasteries; taxes on behalf of the tsar were to be collected by local officials; and the tsar could station troops in Ukraine. The Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky brought to Moscow by the Teteria–Zarudny mission in March 1654 suggest that the hetman thought of Ukraine as a vassal of Muscovy, much as Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia were vassals of Turkey. This meant that the vassal paid tribute and occasionally supplied troops to the suzerain, but in return was allowed full freedom in internal affairs and considerable freedom in foreign policy. In his negotiations with the Muscovite state, Khmelnytsky emphasized the rights and privileges of the Cossacks, local self-government, retention of an independent judiciary, and protection of Cossack property and other economic advantages. The tsar acceded to all these basic demands, and the exchanges show that the Cossacks were considered to be a separate, privileged stratum in Ukraine with Khmelnytsky as their spokesman and representative.

The 1654 agreement put the number of Cossacks at sixty thousand and stipulated that their salaries would be paid by the tsar. The tsar at first refused to accept that obligation, but eventually he agreed to do so in accordance with the amount of taxes his treasury received from the hetman's officials. The issue of salary payments was complicated primarily because the actual number of Cossacks was much closer to one hundred thousand. To avoid subjecting the remainder to financial discrimination, Khmelnytsky parried Russian attempts to conduct an accurate registration, and as long as he lived no list of registered Cossacks was turned over to the Russians. Also, during Khmelnytsky's lifetime no taxes were turned over from the hetman's state to the treasury. (Later, the Hlukhiv Articles during the tenure of hetman Mnohohrishny set the number of Cossacks in Left-Bank Ukraine at thirty thousand—the Right Bank was then under Polish rule—but that provision also remained unimplemented because of the same registration difficulties.)

The 1654 agreement, Miakotin concludes, can be considered a kind of dynastic union of Little Russia with the Muscovite state. As a vassal state, Ukraine's chief official was an elected hetman who held office for life. The agreement did not require the Muscovite tsar to confirm the selection of a new hetman; instead, it merely stipulated that the tsar be informed about the selection and that the new hetman take an oath of loyalty to the tsar. The hetman could engage in foreign relations, with restrictions on contacts

with Turkey and Poland. The Ukrainians were to turn over some taxes to the Muscovite treasury, and some of their troops were to serve on behalf of the tsar. In return, they retained broad autonomy and a distinct social system. In the latter sphere, the only changes resulting from the 1654 arrangement were an increase in the number of registered Cossacks and a strengthening of their privileges.

During the 1648–54 revolt, most Ukrainian peasants had been liberated from serfdom. The gentry, the upper class of the commonwealth that included the powerful magnates, had been destroyed. The peasantry had achieved social mobility; they could become Cossacks by joining the *tovarystvo* (military companionship) or members of the new stratum of free individuals known as the *pospilstvo* (commoners), composed of former serfs and burghers. Many of the *pospilstvo* took land from the absent gentry and became full-fledged landowners. Thus, in the early years of the Cossack revolt, old social and class barriers were erased; burghers, Cossacks, and peasants could choose their stratum and way of life. Later, however, most of the landed estates in Ukraine reverted to the state and were administered by the local Cossack government. In addition, Orthodox monasteries and gentry continued to maintain their landholdings. Cossacks and burghers who owned land prior to the revolt received full title to the plots they had formerly worked on behalf of the absent gentry. Only those lands abandoned by the Polish gentry and commonwealth governmental representatives were taken over by the Cossack state.²³

Concerning the return of serfdom to Left-Bank Ukraine, Miakotin notes that in 1654 the tsar assumed the right of the Polish kings to grant property, and Khmelnytsky was the first to profit from this practice when he received the entire district of Hadiach. The tsar issued a *zhalovannaia gramota* (charter) to petitioners, and the Cossack officers were quick to benefit from this practice. In addition, the hetman also had the right to grant property, while subordinate colonels and centurions made similar grants in their areas of jurisdiction by promulgating a *universal* with a specific land grant. Land grants were thus made by the tsar, the hetman, and colonels and centurions, usually as a reward for “meritorious service” to the Cossack state. Originally, such grants were arranged as a temporary land grant to an officer, valid for the duration of his rank, but in time those so favoured succeeded in converting this conditional title into perpetual ownership. The recipients of these land grants evolved into a landowning gentry, and the old class of “Polish *pany*” was succeeded by a new class of “meritorious and illustrious Little Russian persons.”

Cossack officials (*uriadnyky*) formed the bulk of the new landowning gentry and eventually became known collectively in history as the group of “Little Russian *shliakhetstvo* (nobility).” In a matter of decades, all Little

Russia was parcelled out to this new gentry, whose wealth and power derived from the estates, villages, towns, mills and dams they owned. Basically Ukrainian in ethnic composition, the new "Little Russian gentry" was eventually merged with the Russian *dvorianstvo* (nobility of service). In 1775 the Ukrainian *shliakhetstvo*, manipulated by Catherine's viceroy, Petr Rumiantsev, as president of the Little Russian College and governor-general of Little Russia, petitioned the tsarina for absorption into the *dvorianstvo*. Their request was implemented over the next few years. Former hetmanate *uriadnyky* were assigned imperial rank (*chin*), Cossack military formations were converted into imperial army units, and Cossack officers were given imperial military and civilian ranks.

Miakotin points out that the reinstatement of serfdom in Left-Bank Ukraine was accomplished by such measures as the prohibition of social mobility between the Cossacks and the *pospilstvo*, and the subjection of both groups to the emerging landholding class. The free flow of the peasantry to the Cossacks was firmly opposed by the hetman's officials, landowners and church dignitaries. Thus the peasantry had no alternative but to subject themselves once more to a landowner (at a time when both tsar and hetman intensified the grant of estates). For the peasantry, this process undid the gains achieved by the 1648–54 revolt. It continued during the tenures of all hetmans from Khmelnytsky to Rozumovsky, and reached its height during the reign of Catherine II. Her decree of 1783, which partly compensated for the destruction of Ukrainian autonomy, fulfilled the dream of the local gentry by declaring the peasants to be serfs and by again forbidding the movement of the *pospilstvo* or peasantry into the category of rank-and-file Cossacks. Left-Bank Ukraine now had, in fact and law, a full-fledged system of serfdom.

Miakotin's emphasis on the democratic and social essence of the 1648–54 revolt was shared by the populist and social-minded scholars of his time. This approach, however, was criticized by Lev Okinshevych in a work entitled *Lektsii z istorii ukrainskoho prava. Pravo derzhavne. Doba stanovoho suspilstva* [Lectures on the history of Ukrainian law: The law of the state in the period of estate society].²⁴ Okinshevych considers it anachronistic to ascribe a democratic social structure to a seventeenth-century political formation in Eastern Europe. The Cossack state, as both Viacheslav Lypynsky and Okinshevych emphasize, was a "society of estates" (*Ständestaat*), like the rest of Europe at this time (although in comparison with its neighbours, particularly Poland and Muscovy, its commoners possessed greater personal freedom). As the Cossack ruling elite strengthened its position, Okinshevych explains, differences among the estates in Ukrainian society widened. Russian imperial power, however, imposed absolutism and heightened social antagonisms.

The theory that the 1648–54 revolt produced a democratic classless republic is a historical legend, Okinshevych claims. The 1654 arrangement with Moscow, favouring privileges for the Cossack *starshyna*, legitimized the power of the Ukrainian military and social elite. The natural process of social stratification that began during the revolt produced an elite, the “illustrious military society” (*znatne viiskove tovarystvo*), which ran the administration of the Cossack state. From this group the *starshyna* posts and officers were filled. The other strata of this society were: the rank-and-file Cossacks (*riadove kozatstvo*), some of whom were returned to serfdom; the peasantry, or *pospilstvo*, which was also re-enslaved by the tsarist regime; and the clergy and burghers, although at times the burghers merged with the peasantry.

The new state that arose was created by the Cossack army, whose officers took over the administrative functions. There was no separation of powers, and state agencies frequently competed with each other for power. There were both monarchical and republican tendencies in the new state. Strong hetmans like Khmelnytsky and Samoilovych held themselves to be above the “Council of Elders” (*Starshynska Rada*), while others, such as Vyhovsky and Petro Doroshenko, considered themselves servants of that body. The “General Council” (*generalna rada*) was a model of direct democracy similar to the ancient Roman *comitia* and the election of the king by the assembled nobility in the commonwealth. It selected the new hetman and made important national and foreign-policy decisions; its members formed the core of the famous 1654 Pereiaslav *rada*. The *Starshynska Rada* acted as the parliament for the ruling elite.

Using the same data, Miakotin and Okinshevych reached diametrically opposed interpretations of the nature of the Cossack state. An interesting intermediate position was taken by Borys Krupnytsky in *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy* [Basic problems of Ukrainian history]. Krupnytsky rejects the view that the 1648 Cossack revolt produced a state based on estates since this ignores the fact that both a national and social revolution took place in 1648. He also believes that Okinshevych exaggerated the monarchical aspects of the Khmelnytsky period, for the hetmanate was not a true monarchy, despite Khmelnytsky’s efforts to make his post hereditary. The Cossack state was a republic: the office of hetman resembled that of a president, and although the hetman had some monarchical powers, he could be removed by the *starshyna*.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934)

The writings of Mykhailo Hrushevsky represent the most thoughtful and thorough interpretation of the Khmelnytsky era. Of the ten volumes that constitute Hrushevsky's major work, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* [History of Ukraine-Rus'], which covers Ukrainian history to the Vyhovsky hetmanate and the Hadiach agreement of 1658, five volumes deal with the origins and outcome of the Cossack revolution. Hrushevsky exhibits erudition, professional craftsmanship and a rare familiarity with pertinent sources. However, political conditions in Eastern Europe prevented Hrushevsky from completing his history.

Unfortunately, scholars in the English-speaking world have not given his writings the attention they deserve. There are two explanations for this: first, a kind of "great-power provincialism" prevents the airing of testimony from representatives of small or unfamiliar nations; this is a psychological and methodological weakness exploited by Russian and Soviet accusations of "bourgeois nationalism."²⁵ Second, Hrushevsky is the most maligned historian in the Russian-speaking world. His bias toward the ideas of the Enlightenment and populist democracy, and his assessment of Khmelnytsky run counter to the stridently nationalistic view that the Soviets have adopted since the Second World War.

In his discussion of the juridical nature of the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement, Hrushevsky concludes that the Russian officials considered the hetman and his entourage as the representatives of the entire Ukrainian people. The Russian rationalization for this treaty was based, Hrushevsky notes, on adherence to a common religion, although oddly enough the Ukrainian clergy took no official part in the negotiations (a circumstance that caused Buturlin considerable anxiety). Hrushevsky agrees with Nolde and Rozenfeld that in 1654, a treaty was arranged between two equal partners. "Cossack Ukraine," Hrushevsky writes, "at the moment of the shift to the protection of the tsar was in fact an independent state, with its own special government."

Concerning the oaths taken at Pereiaslav, Hrushevsky accepts the traditional view that Buturlin refused to reciprocate. However, he reports Kostomarov's doubts as to the truth of Buturlin's statement of refusal, and also indicates the traditional Ukrainian writings on which Kostomarov based his conclusion. The traditional Ukrainian approach stemmed, according to Hrushevsky, from experience in the commonwealth, where Polish leaders frequently took an oath to respect Ukrainian freedoms. Hrushevsky believes that the issue was not as simple as some Russian writers suggest and points out that even Russian sources indicate that the Ukrainians took the oath in 1654 under certain specified conditions. He

also feels that Buturlin promised more than his report to the tsar revealed. If Buturlin did not actually give an oath, he in all probability gave his "word of honour" on behalf of the tsar, Hrushevsky concludes.

In Hrushevsky's view, the Ukrainian historical tradition that considered the hetman to be "the father of freedom," a hero who liberated his people from Polish oppression and initiated them into a new and "free life" under the protection of the Russian tsar, was erroneous. This old tradition, emphasizing the struggle for Orthodoxy, reflected the views of the Orthodox gentry and failed to consider the class or economic antagonisms within Ukrainian society. Hrushevsky takes a middle position between these traditional views and those of the nineteenth-century populist historians who interpreted the activities of the *starshyna* in terms of their selfish class interests only. He claims that in addition to furthering their class objectives, the *starshyna* also functioned as state-builders; they acted out of patriotism and a desire to preserve cultural traditions.

Hrushevsky concludes that the revolutionary movement in mid-seventeenth-century Eastern Europe gave birth to the Ukrainian nation. In this historical process, the role of the masses, rather than that of individuals, was paramount. The creativity of the common people was best expressed, Hrushevsky feels, by Mikołaj Potocki, a staunch opponent of the Cossack revolt, who in a report to the Polish king, asked: "Is this Khmelnytsky the only one they have? Such are to be counted by the thousands. One is executed today, and in his place there comes another, one even more capable and courageous."

Khmelnytsky was a man of great capacity, Hrushevsky points out, but was surrounded by men of equal, or superior, ability—Vyhovsky, Bohun, Ivan Zolotarenko, the Nechai brothers and Krychevsky. When Danylo Nechai was killed in battle in 1651, the Poles considered this a great triumph. In defining Khmelnytsky's place in history, Hrushevsky writes that he was neither the embodiment of political wisdom nor a constructive statesman. Khmelnytsky achieved personal power at the cost of terrible suffering by the Ukrainian masses: he destroyed half the Ukrainian population and most of the country's economy. His methods, Hrushevsky says, resembled those of the chieftains of the Scythian hordes, rather than the rulers of seventeenth-century Europe.

Hrushevsky thus rejects Viacheslav Lypynsky's idealization of Khmelnytsky as a gifted state-builder with the persistent objective of creating a strong Ukrainian state. Khmelnytsky's policies, according to Hrushevsky, were erratic, uneven, contradictory and shifted unpredictably. He was consistent only in preserving his personal power. Defence of Orthodoxy was not one of his primary aims, and at times, he was even pro-Moslem. One of the aggrieved commonwealth gentry, Khmelnytsky

was educated in a Jesuit school and adhered to Polish gentry traditions. He originally rebelled because of personal grievances—his early years as a Cossack leader had no connection with the national and religious currents centred in Kiev. As Khmelnytsky himself said: “At first I fought because of wrongs and evil inflicted upon me, but now I am going to fight for our Orthodox faith.” This change in his thinking came after Ukrainian church leaders in Kiev welcomed Khmelnytsky and compared him to Moses, the Maccabees and Constantine the Great.

There was neither plan nor continuity in the process that brought Khmelnytsky to the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement, nor did the hetman grasp its “fatal significance,” Hrushevsky notes. The hetman sought a useful military alliance; to obtain it, he made indiscriminate promises to the tsar. Subsequent events showed that not only were the military benefits of the alliance minimal, but also it gave rise to grave misunderstandings. The alliance with Russia had hardly been sealed when Khmelnytsky, after the defeat of Poland by Sweden in 1655, embarked upon a new and constructive phase in his political activity—the creation of a Ukrainian state based on co-operation among the Cossacks, the gentry and the cities of Ukraine. This programme, which entailed a break with Russia, was continued by his successor, Ivan Vyhovsky, who defined and determined Cossack political objectives during the last phase of the hetman’s life.

Khmelnytsky’s mistakes were many, according to Hrushevsky. His interference in Moldavian-Wallachian affairs after his son Tymish became the factual co-ruler in Moldavia merely served to provoke Rakoczy into a Polish-Danubian alliance against the Ukrainians. This put an end to the dream of a Cossack alignment with a group of Protestant-oriented states, which was to include Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania and Lithuania under Janusz Radziwill.

Another critical mistake was that the 1654 alliance, spurred by Khmelnytsky’s impulsive promises to the tsar, had no fixed long-term objectives. It was nonsensical for the Cossack government to permit Ukrainian deputations from class groups and from cities (such as Pereiaslav) to present petitions to the tsar for a grant of privileges at the same time that Ukrainian statesmen were negotiating as equals with the Russians. Furthermore, despite the opposition from church authorities, Khmelnytsky was prepared to subject the Ukrainian church to Moscow.

In all, Khmelnytsky’s Russian policy was inept. Without breaking his alliance with Moscow he supported Rakoczy’s anti-Polish designs and entered into an alliance with Sweden, then the tsar’s main enemy. Khmelnytsky felt, Hrushevsky points out, that the Russians had already broken the 1654 agreement by signing the Vilna accord with the Poles. But the hetman should have been resolute enough to demand that the

Russians adhere to the agreement or face the consequences of its destruction. Instead, Khmelnytsky continued to protest his faithfulness to the tsar, while his actions bespoke the contrary. Having found Khmelnytsky in this equivocal situation, the Russians used it as a convenient pretext to interfere in internal Ukrainian affairs by appealing to the Ukrainian masses and by exposing the duplicity of the Cossack *starshyna*.

Khmelnytsky's most shameful mistakes, however, derived from excessive trust in the Crimean Tatars. Until the hour of his death, the hetman considered the Crimeans his Praetorian guard, a kind of court army. For years he bought their allegiance at the price of blood and plunder. Betrayed by the Tatars many times (at Zboriv, Berestechko and Zhvanets, for example), Khmelnytsky nevertheless showed a curious inability to gauge their true intentions. He could have driven them from the Crimea and the steppe area forever, a feat that would have made him a hero in the eyes of the Christian world and in the heart of the sorely-tried Turkish sultan.

Such examples, Hrushevsky continues, make it difficult to praise Khmelnytsky's statecraft. He and his advisers were "former men of the Commonwealth" incapable of creative innovation; consciously or unconsciously, they strove to create a Cossack replica of the commonwealth. The poverty of their ideas was abysmal in an era of violent social change and with a revolutionized people. The peasants were given no guarantee that the Cossack state would not allow a return to serfdom; this uncertainty caused many Ukrainians to flee to Russian territory. Moreover, the burghers in Ukrainian cities supported the Cossack revolt, but Khmelnytsky behaved unparadonably toward them, so that for their own protection these cities hastened to plead for special protection from the tsar.

The most positive aspect of Khmelnytsky's activities was his restitution of Ukrainian national and religious rights, Hrushevsky writes. This was a natural consequence of the Cossack revolt, however, consonant with the defence of old traditions; it required no constructive initiative by Khmelnytsky and his advisers. Yet Khmelnytsky could have forestalled excesses such as the destruction of Catholic and Jewish places of worship, the expulsion of their clergy and restrictions on the return of Catholic priests, monks and Jews, and the liquidation of the Uniate church, a "traditional postulate" maintained blindly and stubbornly despite its injuriousness to Ukrainian interests and its creation of additional friction within the country.

Thus Hrushevsky's catalogue of complaints against Khmelnytsky far outweighs his praise. There were no new schools, no cultural revival, no new literature or art to mark his rule. About the only cultural activity was



Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich



Ivan Vyhovsky



Wladyslaw IV



IOANNES CASIMIRUS DEI GRATIA REX POLONÆ, MAG: DUX
LITHUANIÆ, RUSSIÆ, PRUSSIÆ, MASOVIÆ, SAMOGITIÆ, LIVONIÆ,
SMOLENSIÆ, SEVERIÆ, CZERNIHOVIÆQUE: NEC NON SUECORUM,
GOTHORUM, VANDALORUMQUE HÆREDITARIUS REX.

Daniel Schütz pinxit

Wilhelmus Hondius sculpsit Golan Anno Domini 1649.

Cum privilegio S. R. Maj. ¹⁶⁴⁹

Jan Kazimierz

the building of churches and the return of property to Orthodox monasteries. Western Ukrainian areas were neglected and tacitly set aside as an arena for Tatar raids. Peasant dissatisfaction with the policies of the Cossack *starshyna* was strong, and Khmelnytsky died of an apoplectic stroke when he obtained news of a peasant revolt against his son Iurii, a revolt abetted by the tsarist government. Khmelnytsky's death, Hrushevsky concludes, occurred opportunely, for the burden of his mistakes fell upon his successors. His death preserved his reputation.

Despite this harsh criticism, Hrushevsky feels that Khmelnytsky remains the greatest figure in the mid-seventeenth-century Ukrainian revolution. Although he dissipated the energies and resources of his people, he had a formidable array of objective obstacles to overcome: the exposed topography of Ukraine, the flaws in its social structure and its cultural isolation. None the less, he lacked the ability to solve the basic problems of his era.

Hrushevsky's criticism of Khmelnytsky was not meant to imply the total failure of the Ukrainian upheaval. The historian states that his objective is to counter some of the unhealthy adulation showered upon the hetman: the era of Khmelnytsky was no paradise, but it was, nevertheless, a great epoch in the Ukrainian quest for social, political and cultural assertiveness. The true hero of that epoch was the common man, as epitomized in the proud words of a "simple Cossack" addressed to the Polish king:

His Majesty wrote to us to the effect that we, the common people, should not write letters to Commonwealth military commanders. Today, however, by the grace of God, we are not common people, but the knights of the Zaporozhian Host. By the grace of God, as long as His will is holy, there is among us here in the Siveria region neither military commander nor judge nor secretary. And as our ruler Bohdan Khmelnytsky remains healthy among us, as the hetman of the entire Zaporozhian Host, so let a colonel be our military commander, a centurion our governor, and a city otaman our judge. (Vol. 9, p. 1508)

Such was the real significance of the Cossack revolution, Hrushevsky concludes. For a brief span "the common people" reached the summit of social and political emancipation. This "brief, charming moment" inspired and guided future generations. Khmelnytsky's greatness is that he presided, however, poorly, over the creative impulses of the common folk.

Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931)

Viacheslav Lypynsky was an eloquent spokesman of the segment of the Polonized gentry in Right-Bank Ukraine that identified with the Ukrainian awakening during the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Lypynsky advanced many stimulating ideas on the events associated with the 1654 Pereiaslav negotiations. He elaborated a world view based on new sociological concepts, the elitist ideas of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, and the values of traditional European conservatism, and he applied this world view to the problem of Eastern Europe, whose problems he attributed to the twin evils of narrow nationalism and Marxism. Lypynsky's analysis of the mid-seventeenth-century Cossack revolution served as the foundation of his historical and political formulations.

Lypynsky's basic ideas are set forth in three major works. The first to appear was the Polish-language *Z dziejów Ukrainy* [From the history of Ukraine], published in 1912, a compendium of original historical studies designed to show Polonized Ukrainian gentry that their ancestors were important to Khmelnytsky's revolution. Using the Polish variant of his name, Waclaw Lipiński, the author dedicates the volume to those who preceded him in the endeavour to "Ukrainianize" the Right-Bank gentry—the historian Włodzimierz Antonowicz (Volodymyr Antonovych), Paulin Świecicki, Tadeusz Ryłski (the father of the poet Maksym Ryłsky) and the physician Józef Jurkiewicz. This book contains Lypynsky's basic historiosophic ideas, which were refined in a subsequent Ukrainian-language work, *Ukraina na perelomi* [Ukraine at the turning point], published in 1920 in Vienna. His third major work, *Lysty do bratw-khliborobiv* [Letters to my fellow farmers], self-published in Vienna in 1926, is largely a political treatise in support of a Ukrainian monarchism rooted in the traditions of Khmelnytsky's Cossack state.

In *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, Lypynsky marshals considerable historical evidence to show that the Ukrainian gentry (*szlachta*) played a leading role in the 1648–54 revolt. This evidence refutes the popular view of that upheaval, as a horrendous jacquerie and an onslaught of "barbarians" against "culture and civilization." Although Cossacks with social grievances sparked the revolt, equally pressing religious and political issues caused a part of the Ruthenian gentry to make common cause with the class-oriented Cossacks in the Dnieper region. Co-operation between the Cossacks and the gentry produced a national Ukrainian political movement and political cohesion among different social strata led by a group that Lypynsky calls the "Cossackized gentry" (*szlachta kozakujaca*), in which the Orthodox clergy were also strongly represented. It was this stratum of

“Cossackized gentry” that provided the impetus for Khmelnytsky’s movement.

Besides Khmelnytsky himself, many of the gentry helped create the Cossack state: Iezykhiil Bulyha-Kurtsevych (an Orthodox monk), members of the Vyhovsky family, Pavlo Teteria, Stanislav Rechkovsky, Ostap Hohol, Ivan Bohun, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Stanislav Mykhailo Krychevsky.²⁶ Although the “Cossackized gentry” was largely Orthodox, 6 per cent of the gentry registered with the Cossacks in 1649 was Latin Catholic. Iurii Nemyrych, who initially supported the commonwealth (as did his friend Adam Kysil) but later identified with the Khmelnytsky movement, was a prominent Anti-Trinitarian. Some Orthodox Ruthenians remained loyal to the commonwealth throughout, among them Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv and Adam Kysil, who, in Lypynsky’s view, represented old-line attitudes and were incapable of helping to construct an independent Cossack state. This latter object, in Lypynsky’s view, was the reason for the Cossack wars. (Incidentally, Lypynsky sees Adam Kysil as a tragic figure caught between two extremes: Kysil’s loyalty to the commonwealth gave rise to accusations of treason by the insurgent Orthodox while his moderation toward the rebels evoked the harsh denunciation of intransigents like Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, whose followers threatened to murder Kysil.)

Ukraina na perelomi begins with two documents from the Khmelnytsky period that Lypynsky found in the Czartoryski archives in Cracow. The first, dated 30 (20) June 1657, is a petition from the gentry of the Pinsk area of modern southern Belorussia, almost all of them Roman Catholics, who requested inclusion in the Zaporozhian state. The second document, dated 6 July (27 June) 1657, is Khmelnytsky’s acceptance of the petition with the stipulation that Latin Catholics and the Orthodox would enjoy equal rights while the Uniate church and Protestant sects would be proscribed. Lypynsky points out that the recognition of close common bonds between the Catholic gentry and an Orthodox Cossack state runs counter to Russian statist historiography, which sees the Pereiaslav agreement as a Moscow-led anti-Catholic pact to reunite the unjustly separated Russian Orthodox. Traditional Polish views brand the Khmelnytsky revolt uncultured, anti-Polish, anti-Catholic and anti-gentry. Populist Ukrainian interpretations similar to Hrushevsky’s portray the Khmelnytsky period as one of democratic struggle “by the people” for natural social and cultural rights. None of these approaches can abide gracefully with the Pinsk petition, and Lypynsky sets out to provide a meaningful explanation.

According to Lypynsky, the Cossack revolt erupted because of the religious and cultural oppression of the Orthodox Ukrainians and because of class antagonisms between the petty Cossack landowners and gentry, on

the one hand, and the large landholding magnates or “kinglets” on the other. For decades the commonwealth had been in decline, and a portion of the Ruthenians, “the progressive-opportunistic” Uniates, joined with the progressive Polish gentry to restore it. The formation of the Uniate church was a progressive political move, but it was exclusively the work of intellectuals and aroused strong opposition within conservative Orthodox circles—the gentry, clerics and burghers. Khmelnytsky’s ability to exploit simultaneously the class instincts of the peasantry and the grievances of the Orthodox provoked a powerful revolution, which in turn politically regenerated the Ukrainians.

The first true political expression of this regeneration was the Zboriv agreement of 20 (10) August 1649, which attempted to keep the nascent Cossack state within the commonwealth on the basis of political and cultural autonomy. Zboriv failed because the Orthodox pressed for the abolition of the Uniate church, and because the Polish signatory failed to honour the provision that all gentry, Orthodox and Catholic, who had taken part in the Khmelnytsky rebellion be granted complete amnesty. These factors, along with continued discrimination against the Orthodox and the projected return of the “kinglets” to the *latifundia* from which they had been driven away, caused renewed conflict. After Zboriv, however, the struggle was less turbulent, for extremist Cossack leaders like Kryvonis were replaced by more level-headed colonels and diplomats. In the meantime, among commonwealth leaders, Wiśniowiecki’s campaign to “pacify the rebellious peasants” was replaced by a search for solutions through diplomacy and negotiation.

After Zboriv Khmelnytsky vacillated between continued membership in a reformed commonwealth and a complete break with the Poles; this vacillation ended with the 1654 agreement. The Pereiaslav agreement was later embellished, Lypynsky writes, into a “legend” by pro-Russian Ukrainians, who for self-serving political reasons advanced the theory that the Ukrainians had voluntarily united with Muscovy. In political terms, the Little Russian nobility wanted to legitimize their privileged position in the Russian empire. This “legend” had a prototype in the view—expounded by the Polonized Ruthenian aristocracy—that the Lublin Union of 1569 was a voluntary and beneficial event for the Ruthenians. The creators of both legends, Lypynsky argues, were concerned primarily with retroactive justification of their own positions and policies. The “Pereiaslav legend,” in particular, was “pointless scholasticism,” for there is no evidence that Khmelnytsky rebelled in 1648 in order to replace Polish with Russian subordination. The Pereiaslav agreement was a “fortuitous alliance” against Poland, as was Khmelnytsky’s previous alliance with the Crimean Tatars. In the hetman’s view, the tsar played a role similar to that of the

Turkish sultan: he provided protection and military aid in exchange for a monetary tribute.

During and after the 1654 Pereiaslav negotiations, misunderstandings between the Russians and Ukrainians multiplied. Sharp differences arose over such issues as the taking of oaths and the posting of tsarist troops in Ukraine. There also was conflict immediately afterward over developments in Belorussia, where victorious Cossack units introduced Ukrainian administrative patterns, and over Russian efforts to control the Kiev metropolitan see. In Belorussia Khmelnytsky's son-in-law, Colonel Ivan Nechai, clashed with Russian military commanders over the affair of Kost Poklonsky, leader in the Mogilev (Mahilau) area, who wanted to subordinate himself to Khmelnytsky rather than directly to the tsar. During a joint Russian-Cossack military campaign into Galicia, discord developed between the allies because of Khmelnytsky's decision not to storm Lviv and other fortified points. But the heaviest blow to the new Russian-Ukrainian partnership was the September 1656 Vilna accord between the Poles and the Russians, achieved through Austrian intercession.

The Vilna accord set up a temporary Polish-Russian alliance in the wake of a jointly perceived threat from Charles X Gustavus of Sweden. Both the Poles and the Russians refused to allow Ukrainian representatives to attend the talks, which projected the promotion of Tsar Aleksei as the new Polish king. Reaction to the Vilna agreement was bitter among the Ukrainians. In October 1656 Khmelnytsky convened a special council in Chyhyryn, where the assembled Cossack colonels unanimously resolved to sever all ties with foreign rulers. This assembly can be considered as a direct Cossack reply to what they believed to be a Russian violation of the Pereiaslav agreement.

The Vilna accord was followed by the heightened efforts of European sovereigns to court the dissatisfied Cossack leaders. Two Polish missions hovered about Khmelnytsky, who in turn tried to join a new international alliance of anti-Polish and anti-Russian powers, including Sweden, Prussia, Lithuania, Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia and Turkey. In the meantime, Lypynsky notes, Russian-Ukrainian relations deteriorated. Khmelnytsky resented the Russian practice of "buying" his subordinates with expensive gifts. In May 1656 the conflict between Ivan Nechai and the Russian military in Belorussia reached a high point when Nechai was detained by the Russians and was subjected to hostile interrogation, being asked, among other things, what religion he professed—"Catholic or Christian?" According to Lypynsky, this was the first deliberate and public application by the Russians of "religious provocation" to secure political goals. In April 1657 at a meeting of Cossack colonels, the sixteen-year-old son of Khmelnytsky, Iurii, was chosen—without prior consultation with

Moscow—as the hetman's successor. In June of that year the Pinsk delegation arrived in Chyhyryn to express the local gentry's desire to join the Zaporozhian state. Within three years of the Pereiaslav agreement, the Cossack state appeared more attractive to discontented Eastern Slavs in the commonwealth than did the tsardom of Moscow. During that time a process of social consolidation had taken place in Ukraine, joining the Cossacks, the peasantry, the gentry and the burghers in new bonds of political loyalty.

Solidarity among the various Ukrainian social groups lasted until the Russians began to manipulate the *chern* in order to further their political goals. In the early years of the Khmelnytsky revolt, Lypynsky writes, class antagonisms between the rebellious Cossacks and the Orthodox gentry made difficult their political co-operation, and the Polish king hoped to prevent a political merger of these two forces. Khmelnytsky did achieve this merger, but after Pereiaslav, Muscovy used Warsaw's tactics to foment discord between the Cossacks and the gentry.

Thus, in Lypynsky's view, the Cossack revolt evolved from a class-oriented movement within the commonwealth to a national movement to create a separate state. This transformation was supported by the Cossacks' change from a semi-nomadic economy based on hunting and fishing to settled agricultural ways. Khmelnytsky's state, the *Viisko Zaporizke* was no longer the anarchical Sich. Under Khmelnytsky, Cossack thought and action coalesced into an ideology of national and religious solidarity. The goals of the hetman matured from a desire to avenge a personal wrong to a national concept of liberating "the entire Ruthenian people from Polish slavery."

Khmelnytsky's genius, according to Lypynsky, consisted primarily in his ability to overcome "the ruinous power of the steppe" by fostering a European-type agricultural economy. Adherence of the gentry, a landholding class, further consolidated and Europeanized Khmelnytsky's state. Acute rivalry for land between the magnates and the gentry pushed the latter into an alliance with the Cossacks. The privileged position of the Orthodox gentry in the Cossack state, moreover, was augmented by restitution to the church of large landholdings, which were managed by Orthodox gentry. The taming of the marauding Sich is evidenced by the fact that the sixty thousand registered Cossacks controlled by Khmelnytsky were led by officers settled on the land, either Cossack farmers or "Cossackized gentry." From their point of view, a basic provision of the 1654 agreement was the recognition of hereditary landholding rights of the Cossack officers.

After Khmelnytsky's triumphal entry into Kiev in early 1649, the Ruthenian gentry increased its support of the Cossack cause. Its loyalty to

the commonwealth weakened, and Khmelnytsky had to choose between the gentry and the *chern*. Lypynsky provides a list of prominent commonwealth families who became supporters of the new state. (Among the more prominent representatives were Iurii Iarmolovych, Mykhailo Stetskevych, Stanislav Mrozovetsky, Fedir Veshniak, Iurii Nemyrych and Ivan Vyhovsky.) The hetman's policy called for the creation of a stratified society typical of Europe in the seventeenth century: it would have a hereditary monarch, an agricultural economy with a peasantry and landed gentry, clergy and burghers. To implement this policy, Khmelnytsky advocated strong centralized power, for its success required firm control over the Cossack colonels and the unruly *chern*.

Through the Pereiaslav agreement, Khmelnytsky hoped to strengthen Western-type institutions and to "Europeanize" the Cossacks by including in the Cossack state the Western Ukrainian and Belorussian territories still held by the commonwealth. At the same time, however, the "alliance" with Moscow strengthened "anti-European" elements among the Cossacks, and Ukraine continued to be an area of struggle between Eastern and Western influences. Western concepts were expressed in efforts to strengthen the private ownership of land and to create a land-based national elite. Hereditary landownership was unknown in Muscovy, according to Lypynsky, and was also rejected by the *chern* of the lower Dnieper. There was thus a natural sociological sympathy between Russian policy and the *chern*, since both rejected hereditary landownership and a land-based gentry. The Russian attitude toward agrarian arrangements, Lypynsky writes, was based on experience with the Tatars. It stressed the monarch's title to the land and opposed the development of an aristocratic stratum rooted in the soil. Lypynsky cites Pavel Miliukov in support of his thesis: "The Russian service gentry (*dворянство*) never succeeded in assimilating the European sense of military honour, which formed the class spirit of the European gentry."

Thus, for Lypynsky, the *chern*, the dominant element in the lower-Dnieper region, was an anti-European force in Ukrainian history. As such, it was inherently hostile to Khmelnytsky's design to create a land-based stratified society. Khmelnytsky set up a Western-type judicial system, encouraged the application of the Magdeburg Law to the cities of his realm and strengthened the position of the landowning gentry. His chief advisers were European-oriented gentry: Ivan and Danylo Vyhovsky, Ivan Nechai (who married Khmelnytsky's daughter Stepanyda), Stanislav Mykhailo Krychevsky, Ivan Bohun and Ivan and Vasyl Zolotarenko of Nizhyn. Khmelnytsky's diplomats were also Western-oriented.

Another aspect of the Cossack state that receives high praise from Lypynsky is its approach to religious issues. The ancient Kievan state,

drevniaia Rus', was not, as most historians believe, an exclusively Orthodox state. During the era of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it was inhabited by Ruthenians (*rusyny*) of both the Greek and Latin rite, who lived together harmoniously until the Union of Churches. Moreover, Lypynsky claims, the Pinsk gentry's petition for inclusion in the Cossack state, returned to the traditions of ancient Kiev by stipulating that the region house both Latin Catholics and Greek Orthodox. Thus, here is additional evidence of Khmelnytsky's adherence to the traditions of ancient Kiev. The 1648 rebellion, which began as a social and religious protest, became Khmelnytsky's effort to revive the old Kievan state on more modern European aristocratic foundations.

In the course of human events, Lypynsky remarks in *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, there are critical periods when the sword is mightier than the pen or the speeches of parliamentarians. The 1648–54 revolution was such a turning point for the Ukrainians. The blood sacrificed then was not spilled in vain:

For if today we exist as a separate nation, if we are developing our individuality as the Ukrainian nation and enhance it with each passing day, we owe this to the great revolution of 1648. From it there emerged the Left-Bank hetman state, which to our times preserved the idea of a free Ukraine. This state's traditions and slogans supported the entire subsequent almost century-old struggle for the liberation of the Ukrainian people in "Polish" Ukraine, a struggle which ended with the destruction of Polish domination over our areas. Moreover, its spiritual heritage, bequeathed through the Cossack wars, nourished Shevchenko, and this heritage produced our contemporary movement of rebirth, our present-day Ukraine. (p. 147)

Stepan Tomashivsky (1875–1930)

Trained in methodology by Hrushevsky, Stepan Tomashivsky became the outstanding modern historian of Galicia, his birthplace. He specialized in the influence of the 1648–54 Cossack revolt in Galicia.²⁷ In addition to the Khmelnytsky era, he also specialized in medieval Rus' and Carpatho-Ukraine (his *Etnohrafichna karta Uhorskoj Rusy* [Ethnographic map of Hungarian Rus'] remains a major source on that area) and the history of the Ukrainian church. Tomashivsky also wrote on Polish-Hungarian relations; his important study on this topic was "Uhorshchyna i Polshcha na pochatku XVIII v." [Hungary and Poland at

the beginning of the eighteenth century].

Among the primary documents on the Khmelnytsky era that Tomashivsky studied and edited were the reports of two papal nuncios in Warsaw—Giovanni de Torres, who served from 1648 to 1652, and Pietro Vidoni, who served from 1652 to 1657. In the Vatican archives Tomashivsky also found thirty-seven letters from King Jan Kazimierz's private secretary, the Italian cleric Paolo Doni, to nuncio Vidoni. These letters were written during the summer and autumn of 1653, a crucial time when Khmelnytsky made the final decision to associate with the Muscovite tsar; Tomashivsky discusses this in "Do istorii perelomu Khmelnychchyn" [On the history of a turning point in the Khmelnytsky era].

His classic work is "Narodni rukhy v Halytskii Rusy 1648 r." [Popular movements in Galician Rus' in 1648].²⁸ This article investigates the catalytic influence of the Cossack revolt on peasant uprisings in Galicia—especially after Khmelnytsky's victory at Pyliavtsi in September 1648, when the triumphant Cossack armies threatened to overrun Galicia. He notes that although the Galician uprisings differed substantially from the Cossack movement in Dnieper Ukraine, they were inspired by peasant-oriented Cossack leaders such as Kryvonis and Nechai.

The Galician peasant uprisings were motivated not only by social and economic grievances, but also by religious and national concerns. The Galician uprisings failed to emancipate the peasantry, however, primarily because the social reforms of the 1648–54 revolt were short-lived. Leaders of the peasantry were banished while the rank and file were treated more leniently, probably a tactic designed to discourage new outbreaks of violence. Economically the area was ruined; depopulated areas were resettled by Polish colonists. The gentry that had supported the peasantry during the revolt accepted Polonization in the second half of the seventeenth century, while the Orthodox clergy in like spirit embraced the Church Union.

In "Pershyi zazyvnyi lyst Khmelnytskoho" [Khmelnytsky's first letter of appeal], Tomashivsky examines the hetman's first appeal to the Ukrainian masses for support. This appeal stresses personal wrongs, but it also refers to specific Ukrainian social and political complaints shared by most inhabitants of the commonwealth's Ukrainian areas. Written by the Cossack leader prior to the Zhovti Vody battle of May 1648, the appeal was included in Samiilo Velychko's chronicle. Maksymovych and Karpov have questioned the authenticity of this version. Tomashivsky, however, found a summary of Khmelnytsky's first appeal in the manuscript of the Lviv burgher, Samuel Kazimierz Kuszewicz, who wrote a record of the Polish–Cossack conflict in 1648–50. (Tomashivsky wrote a special study of

Kuszewicz entitled "Samuil Kazymyr Kushevykh, l'ivskiy radtsia, i ieho zapysna knyha" [Samuel Kazimierz Kuszewicz, a Lviv councillor, and his record book].) In a comparison of the Kuszewicz and Velychko versions, Tomashivsky concludes that both documents contain the essence of Khmelnytsky's appeal, but the Kuszewicz version is more authentic because Velychko added passages to the original.

Most historians, including Kostomarov and Kubala, attribute the 1649 Zboriv accord to skilful Polish diplomacy that broke the Cossack-Tatar alliance and made the khan an ally of the king. Tomashivsky points out in "Odyn moment pid Zborovom 1649 r." [One moment at Zboriv in 1649] that it was Jan Kazimierz's letter to the hetman which initiated the Zboriv negotiations. The king's decision to send the letter was an admission of the Poles' political defeat. They had been defeated repeatedly on the battlefield, they faced widespread peasant dissatisfaction and they were unable to control the Cossacks despite a reward of twenty thousand zlotys for Khmelnytsky's death. Forced to attempt an accommodation with the Cossack leader, the commonwealth authorities tried to keep the king's initiative a secret, spreading the rumour that Khmelnytsky had initiated the Zboriv negotiations.

Tomashivsky considers the 1654 Cossack agreement with Muscovy a contingency plan that Khmelnytsky was forced to adopt after the failure in 1653 of his efforts to construct a Balkan federation. In the summer of 1653 both the Poles and the Ukrainians were exhausted militarily. Poland was unable to regain her rebellious Ukrainian areas, but was still in a better military position than it had been at any time since 1648. The Polish campaign against the Cossacks in coalition with the Crimean Tatars, however, ended in the disaffection of the khan. Meanwhile, Khmelnytsky's Balkan adventure turned his natural allies into enemies. The campaign of 1653 did not enhance Khmelnytsky's stature as a statesman or soldier, claims Tomashivsky. In 1653 both Jan Kazimierz and Khmelnytsky were obliged to accede to the dictates of the khan. Khmelnytsky had no alternative but to accept the protection of the Muscovite tsar. The result was the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement, which produced "a fundamental change in the political system in Eastern Europe."

In Tomashivsky's view, articulated in his *Istoriia Ukrainy. Starynni i seredni viky* [History of Ukraine: Ancient and medieval periods], Pereiaslav inaugurated a new phase in Ukrainian history characterized by struggle between the north and the south in Eastern Europe, between Muscovy and Ukraine. He sees Ukrainian history as dominated by three decisive forces: the conflict between the forest region and the steppe; the struggle between East and West, manifested most strongly in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and the Orthodox-Catholic dichotomy; and the

(Pereiaslav-initiated) struggle between Muscovy and Ukraine. In the nineteenth century, conflict between the Russians and Ukrainians intensified after the tsarist empire had absorbed most Ukrainian ethnic areas. The struggle centred on efforts to foster a separate Ukrainian identity in the face of a so-called "common-Russian personality." Pereiaslav was the historical turning point that generated this confrontation.

In the examination of this confrontation, Tomashivsky assigns a positive role to the Union of Churches, in marked contrast to the negative assessment of most Russian and Ukrainian historians. He sees Ukraine as a transitional culture containing elements of both East and West, but under the strong Eastern influence of Byzantine Christianity. This factor precluded Ukrainian participation in important historical movements such as the struggles between pope and emperor, the Crusades, the Renaissance and the Reformation. As a result, Ukrainian civilization was stagnant, and when Eastern and Western forces clashed, for example in religious matters, the East generally lost. A sense of cultural inferiority led to the Polonization of the upper classes and to the extreme conservatism of the peasantry. Conflict led to accommodation and the rise of transitional cultural institutions, exemplified in the Union of Churches.

In *Tserkovnyi bik ukrainskoi spravy* [The ecclesiastical aspect of the Ukrainian problem], assessing the Union of Churches, Tomashivsky writes that the Union of Brest came too late. By 1596 there was no possibility that any form of Catholicism could evolve into the national church of the Ruthenians. Efforts to create the Church Union go back to the thirteenth century, Tomashivsky notes. Success then would have ensured that Latin Catholics of Ukrainian background would have remained Catholics and local patriots, and Latin Catholics of foreign origin (mostly Poles and Germans) would have become Ukrainianized. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when efforts to establish the Church Union were intensified, the Latin church was already firmly established in Ukrainian areas, and its adherents and hierarchy were already committed to non-local Polish cultural and political values. The breach between the Eastern and Western churches tended to strengthen the Polish centralists in Ukraine and led to the Polonization of the Ukrainians in the absence of an indigenous Catholic ecclesiastical structure. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks weakened the Orthodox church and contributed to this process of assimilation in Ukrainian areas. The 1654 Pereiaslav agreement was a turning point in the religious sphere also; the Kievan church, at first opposed to Pereiaslav, in time was forced to abandon its opposition and restrict its efforts to the preservation of the rights of the Kievan metropolitan see within the Russian Orthodox Church. After 1654 Russian

suppression of Orthodox Ukrainian religious autonomy hastened the spread of the Union of Churches in those Ukrainian lands not under Russian influence.

Myron Korduba (1876–1947)

Myron Korduba was associated with Warsaw University from 1929 to 1939 and with the University of Lviv from 1944 to his death in 1947. He owed his early interest in the Khmelnytsky era to the influence of Hrushevsky.²⁹ Korduba collated and edited primary sources in *Akty do Khmelnychchyny (1648–1657)* [Documents on the Khmelnytsky era, 1648–57], volume 12 in the series *Zherela do istorii Ukrainy-Rusy. Materiialy do istorii ukrainskoi kozachchyny* [Sources on the history of Ukraine–Rus’: Materials on the history of the Ukrainian Cossack movement] under the general editorship of Hrushevsky. He wrote separate studies on Khmelnytsky’s diplomatic activities and reviewed the writings of other specialists on the period. One of the great twentieth-century historians of Eastern Europe, Korduba also wrote extensively on the general history of the Eastern Slavs, the evolution of the Ukrainian nation and the Galician-Volhynian state.

Korduba investigated the diplomatic aspects of the Cossack revolution in his essays on Alberto Vimina’s mission to the Cossacks in 1650—“Venetske posolstvo do Khmelnytskoho” [A Venetian embassy to Khmelnytsky]—and on Peter von Parchevich’s mission to Khmelnytsky in 1657 on behalf of Ferdinand III, the Holy Roman Emperor: “Proba avstriiskoho poserednytstva mizh Khmelnytskym i Polshcheiu” [An attempt at Austrian mediation between Khmelnytsky and Poland]. He notes that the outbreak of the Cossack revolt in 1648 originally disappointed the Venetians because they hoped to enrol the consolidated commonwealth into a broad anti-Turkish coalition. Vimina was dispatched to Chyhyryn in 1650 to explore the possibilities of a joint Venetian-Cossack campaign against Turkey. Vimina was also to determine the extent of the hostility between the Tatars and the Turks and to encourage Khmelnytsky to collaborate with other Christian powers in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. But Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky informed the envoy that the time was not propitious for the proposed campaign: the Cossacks’ internal problems were not resolved, the Tatars were unreliable, and the Zboriv peace with the Poles was shaky. The Venetians were advised to solicit the Tatar khan’s participation in the anti-Turkish project. At the same time a Cossack mission was negotiating for an alliance with the Turks. Khmelnytsky’s major objective was,

according to Korduba, the prevention of Polish-Tatar rapprochement. He thus encouraged the khan to wage war against the Turks and warned the tsar of a possible Polish-Tatar campaign against Muscovy. The Vimina mission was considered exploratory, and both sides expected additional negotiations. After the failure of Zboriv and the resumption of Polish-Cossack hostilities, however, the Venetians ceased their efforts to enlist Khmelnytsky into their project.

With the 1657 Parchevich mission, Austria tried to extricate the commonwealth from the Swedish invasion and Ukrainian revolt. Vienna felt that the vital interests of the Habsburg realm were threatened by Sweden, France and their allies. The Polish king had made peace with Muscovy in the 1656 Vilna accord, promoted by Ferdinand III. The latter also wanted an accommodation between Khmelnytsky and the Poles. To that end, Vienna planned a mission to Chyhyryn, led by the Catholic archbishop of Martianopol, Peter von Parchevich. Korduba believes that Parchevich, a Bulgarian by birth, was chosen for his anti-Turkish sentiments and his knowledge of "the Cossack language."

Parchevich was received by Khmelnytsky, who spoke politely of his concern for Ferdinand III's efforts but neither recalled the Cossack forces supporting Transylvania's anti-Polish campaign, nor sent Cossack troops to aid the emperor. Parchevich and the Polish envoy Bieniowski, also in Chyhyryn at that time, reported that Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky were procrastinating matters. Bent on subverting the Vilna accord, Khmelnytsky informed the tsarist envoy in Chyhyryn, Vasilii Kikin, that the Parchevich mission was an Austrian and Polish effort to draw the Cossacks away from their agreement with the tsar. At the same time, he told the sultan that the Polish and Austrian plans proposed Cossack attacks on Turkish-held territory. The Austrian-Polish diplomatic effort failed to gain Khmelnytsky's support; Parchevich's mediation brought no immediate results, but a new Polish embassy under Bieniowski eventually led to the 1658 Hadiach agreement with the Cossacks.

Korduba's writings manifest a strong and persistent defence of the personality and goals of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Antonovych criticized Khmelnytsky for supporting Jan Kazimierz in 1648, but Korduba points out that Antonovych, like Kostomarov, ignored documentary evidence that the hetman's original choices for the throne were the Russian tsar and the Transylvanian prince Rakoczy. The hetman supported Jan Kazimierz only when his candidacy seemed assured.³⁰ Khmelnytsky's simultaneous diplomatic negotiations with many envoys was only prudent, Korduba argues, for all rulers followed that practice. He refers also to Kubala's high praise of Khmelnytsky's diplomatic skills.

Korduba also rejects Antonovych's view that Rakoczy would have formed a federation with the Cossack state but for Khmelnytsky's vacillations. Rakoczy's objective was to gain the Polish throne, not to form a federation with Khmelnytsky, Korduba stresses, and the hetman showed great diplomatic skill in his dealings with Rakoczy.

Antonovych criticized Khmelnytsky's agreement to Zboriv, but Korduba feels that the hetman knew he lacked the strength to rout the Polish forces. Moreover, the Tatar khan was the dominant political and military figure at the time Zboriv was negotiated. The Tatars successfully weakened both the Poles and the Ukrainians through a Tatar-Polish agreement. Zboriv was a Tatar victory, and Khmelnytsky had no choice but to agree. To attack Khmelnytsky when he had no alternative moves was harsh and unjust, Korduba concludes.

Antonovych had also taken the view that the 1654 Pereiaslav accord had been hastily and unwisely drawn up by Khmelnytsky, whereas the Russians showed great diplomatic skill. Korduba protests that the decisive factor in international diplomacy is not "bureaucratic chicanery" but power, the ability to take advantage of a given situation. Given the course of events in Eastern Europe, Korduba continues, even the most meticulous and carefully drafted proposals at Pereiaslav would not have improved the Ukrainian predicament. Charges that Khmelnytsky was politically inept are also without foundation, Korduba adds. Khmelnytsky made Ukraine an important factor in European politics. No hetman before or after him played as significant a role in the history of Ukraine and of Europe.

In "Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung," published in 1932 in *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte*, Korduba takes issue with Hrushevsky's treatment of the Khmelnytsky era:

According to Hrushevsky, his [Khmelnytsky's] plans did not go beyond the extraction from the Polish government of certain rather modest concessions for the Cossack class (and for it alone!), after which he would revert to being a loyal subject of the Polish king and state. Only in the winter of 1648-49, under the influence of Kievan burgher and clerical circles, is he said to have experienced a change in heart which made him the champion of Ukrainian independence. In my opinion this view of Khmelnytsky as a leader is difficult to reconcile with the qualities this great commander and statesman is known to have possessed. Least of all can this be inferred from his behaviour after the victories at Zhovti Vody and Korsun. He was then too mature a personality and experienced an officer to do what many hotheads in his entourage, and subsequently many a modern historiographer before Hrushevsky, would have had him do—namely to press on to Warsaw. He had, after all, to take under advisement not only the situation of his enemy

but also his own, which was not particularly advantageous. First and foremost, he was dependent in his operations on the Tatars, who soon after the battle at Korsun betook themselves homeward laden with booty; fresh hordes did not arrive until September during the battle at Pyliavtsi. At Bila Tserkva his army numbered about 30,000, and as Hrushevsky himself admits, it was of mediocre quality since the older, experienced units from the 1630s had been destroyed or dispersed as a result of previous reprisals. Although many volunteers were now pressing to join his army, he was careful about whom he accepted. (p. 54)³¹

Korduba challenges most of Hrushevsky's complaints against the hetman and believes that the latter greatly underestimated Khmelnytsky's place in history. Korduba proposes that, in judging Khmelnytsky, a comparison be made between the status of the Ukrainians in 1647 and in 1657. In 1647 Ukraine was an ordinary province in the commonwealth and the Cossacks were border troops under the command of Polish officers. Ten years later the Cossack state was a power recognized by Sweden, Venice, Turkey, Poland, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Danube principalities. It is hard to believe, says Korduba, that any of Khmelnytsky's associates could have accomplished more.

Korduba also disagrees with Hrushevsky's criticism of Khmelnytsky's foreign policies. Khmelnytsky was forced to seek allies wherever he could find them. A stable system of alliances, according to Korduba, requires many years to mature; time was a luxury Khmelnytsky did not enjoy. Initially, he had no choice but to ally with the Tatars, for no other neighbour showed an interest in the Cossacks' plight. Khmelnytsky was not to blame for the khan's mercurial policies.

Similarly, Hrushevsky's complaint that Khmelnytsky devastated his own land and destroyed his own people is invalid. Korduba notes that he was unable to find one instance during the Khmelnytsky wars when the hetman was able to move operations into hostile territory. For example, the hetman could not move against Warsaw in 1648, because he was besieged by the Tatars and Lithuanians. To compare Khmelnytsky with Scythian rulers, as Hrushevsky did, was unfair, Korduba insists, for Ukrainian areas were devastated not by the Cossacks but by their enemies.

Equally, he denounces Hrushevsky's criticism of the hetman's internal policies:

The allegations that the Cossacks ravaged the cities, that they wanted to keep for themselves everything that the *starosty*, the large landowners and

the Catholic church had once taken away from the latter, that the government of the hetmanate ruthlessly exploited the industry of the towns do not tie in at all with what the author said in a previous passage (IX, 843). In this passage he blames the Cossack leaders for failing to anchor legally the hegemony, patronage and control of the Cossack army over other segments of the Ukrainian population and for tolerating a situation which forced the cities to turn to the tsars for the confirmation of their privileges. The author himself admits that during the Khmelnytsky era the economic situation in the cities improved in many respects (IX, 1563). Although a document quotes an official of Starodub as telling Zhelabuzhky that under the government of the hetman the cities would be reduced to rack and ruin if the tsar did not take them under his wing (a piece of flattery, if it is not an invention on the part of that Muscovite envoy), it must be remembered it was the Ukrainian burghers who persistently tried to escape the oath of allegiance to the tsar, and that from 1655 to 1657 a number of cities in Belorussia drove out their Muscovite occupants and cast their lot with the Cossacks. Finally, Hrushevsky, having spoken of stagnation under Khmelnytsky in the sphere of administration, finance and justice, immediately adds that the state of continuous war was not conducive to reforms and that available information on the state organization in the Cossack territories during the period in question is extremely sparse. (p. 380)

When one compares the chaos that existed in the Polish parts of the commonwealth with the relative order that existed in the Cossack state, Korduba continues, one must conclude that the Cossack state functioned reasonably well. Paul of Aleppo and Ludwik Kubala, for example, testified to the orderliness and calm that existed under Khmelnytsky's leadership.

Korduba finds other weaknesses in Hrushevsky's history. The latter's account of the military events in 1649 disregarded Cossack operations in Lithuania in the summer of that year. Hrushevsky's work has inconsistencies and inaccuracies in dates and place names, but Korduba attributes most of these errors to the printer. More serious, however, were his excessive quotations from sources that led to an accumulation of insignificant, confusing and even contradictory details, which Hrushevsky made no effort to reconcile.

None the less, Hrushevsky was an outstanding historical analyst, Korduba concludes. Thoroughness, logical reconstruction of obscure and controversial issues, and excursions into unresearched areas are the characteristics of Hrushevsky's scholarship. In the volumes on the Khmelnytsky era, however, the historian allowed his thoroughness to lapse; Hrushevsky did not examine personally some of the important sources that he cited. Nevertheless, he carefully separated fact from the many legends

about the Khmelnytsky era.

Hrushevsky investigated many new fields, including data on Khmelnytsky's life, the negotiations between Muscovy and the Cossacks in June and July 1653 recorded in the reports of the tsarist envoys Matveev and Fomin, and relations between Moscow and the Ukrainians in 1654 from documents in the Muscovite *Sibirskii Prikaz*. In all, Korduba concludes, Hrushevsky's contribution to scholarship will endure.

George Vernadsky (1887–1973)

George Vernadsky is one of the most distinguished modern scholars of Russian history.³² Dmitrii Obolensky has written that Vernadsky's works represent "the most important contribution to Russian history in a non-Russian language." Vernadsky's five-volume work, *A History of Russia*, which narrates the history of Russia to 1690, provides the English reader with new insights.³³ Vernadsky's approach reflects that of the "Eurasian school"; that is, Eastern Europe and Asian areas were controlled by Russia as a natural geopolitical entity whose history encompasses the activities and cultures of the Eastern Slavs and all the peoples of the steppe. From this perspective, Russian history includes all the peoples inhabiting that huge expanse. From a broad historical point of view, the institutions and practices of ancient Muscovy, the creator of modern Russia, represent a continuation of the heritage of Mongol rule in Eurasia. Along with this "Eurasian" approach, Vernadsky postulates a theory of rhythms in Russian history based on three factors: the nation's creative energy, its geography and the co-ordinate of time. In unison, these three factors produce a rhythmic periodicity or "pulse of history," a cycle of ascents and depressions, a construction borrowed from P. N. Savitsky, the theorist of the Eurasian School. Within this scheme, the years 1634 to 1654 represent a phase of steady expansion, whereas the period from 1654 to 1672 is one of regression.³⁴

Within the framework of these historiosophical approaches, Vernadsky was the first English-language historian to integrate the history of the Ukrainians with that of the Russians. His emphasis on the Ukrainian aspects of Eurasian history was a revelation to scholars in the English-speaking world who had not consulted original Slavic sources. Although his approach is Russocentric, Vernadsky demonstrates the importance of Ukrainian sources. For example, he feels that the 1648 Ukrainian revolution and the Pereiaslav agreement were turning points in the relations between the Eastern Slavs and Poland and laid the foundations for the transformation of the tsardom of Moscow into the Russian empire.

Vernadsky claims that by the middle of the fifteenth century three definite East Slavic languages had emerged. Also, by that time Muscovy and Lithuania (with a "Russian" population of three million and a Lithuanian population of one million) emerged as the two chief rivals for hegemony over the Eastern Slavs. Muscovy, or Great Russia, unified largely during the reigns of Ivan III (1462–1505) and Vasili III (1505–33), began a protracted conflict with Lithuania and Poland over the Kievan legacy. Until 1648, Poland-Lithuania dominated this confrontation. The Pereiaslav agreement of 1654 and the consequent union of Ukraine with Russia reversed this trend. "The Ukrainian Revolution of 1648 tipped the balance in favour of Moscow," Vernadsky says in *The Tsardom of Moscow (1547–1682)*.

The ten years of peace in the commonwealth that preceded the 1648 outburst was deceptive, Vernadsky writes, for the wellsprings of conflict were concealed. The pretext for a Cossack revolt was supplied in 1646 by Władysław IV, who hoped to gain the aid of the Cossacks for a war against Turkey and to increase his royal power. These plans also coincided with the Czaplński affair when the king suggested to Khmelnytsky that he might resort to the sword. The subsequent revolution produced a new democratic Cossack order, Vernadsky insists. By 1649 the hetman was head of a nation, with its own administration. The new state drew the attention of the entire Orthodox world. Khmelnytsky also sought support from Protestant leaders, among them Rakoczy, the Swedish sovereign and Janusz Radziwiłł. In addition, the Ukrainian revolution had profound social implications. The emancipation of the peasants gave rise to a concomitant and profound internal problem—the adjustment of relations between the Cossacks and the peasants.

Khmelnytsky's main problem, bearing on the internal organization of the Cossack state, was the interrelationship of the Cossacks and the peasants. We have seen that a great number of peasants joined the Cossack movement in 1648 and formed army regiments following the Cossack pattern. The first Cossack victory served as starting signal for the general peasant rebellion against the Poles. That rebellion became the foundation of further Cossack successes. The peasants—whether they joined the Cossack army or acted independently in small bands—became the actual masters of the country. The Polish lords were ousted; the peasants seized the land and became free. Their ideal was a democratic Cossack state similar to that of the Don Cossacks during the Time of Troubles in Muscovy. (Vol. 5, 1, p. 445)

However, Vernadsky notes, the Cossack officer stratum thought differently. Their ideal, outlined by Ivan Vyhovsky and Metropolitan Kosiv, was based on the separation of the Cossacks and the peasantry and preservation of class distinctions and privileges.

To achieve stability, Khmelnytsky negotiated with Moscow and Turkey in 1649. A treaty of friendship with the sultan was signed in February of that year as a first step in the extension of Turkish protection over the Cossack state. Negotiations with the Russians failed as "Moscow was in no position to break with Poland because of the unstable situation in the tsardom's religious and civil life." Of Khmelnytsky's help to the pretender Akundinov, whose surrender to the tsar the hetman refused to facilitate, Vernadsky reasons that "it was characteristic of Khmelnytsky's devious ways in diplomacy that while looking to Moscow for assistance he was simultaneously preparing for action against Muscovy in case no assistance was forthcoming."

Military struggle against the Poles and diplomatic probings with neighbouring states continued until August 1649, when a confrontation at Zboriv was transformed through the diplomatic skill of Ossoliński into a peace arrangement. The Zboriv treaty, in Vernadsky's view, was a "major achievement of the conservative core of the starshina"; it "created an autonomous Cossack state within the framework of the kingdom of Poland." Khmelnytsky tried to abide by the Zboriv agreement, but peasant opposition prevented him. After the treaty he continued to seek aid from the Muscovites and Tatars. Muscovy was a more natural ally, for a variety of reasons, but Vernadsky points out that Ukrainian religious leaders were reluctant to allow Moscow control of their church. The lower Ukrainian clergy, however, along with the rank-and-file Cossacks and the peasantry, "looked to Moscow with hope."

Cossack negotiations with Moscow had been "long and tortuous"; the tsar was cautious because of both internal problems and Khmelnytsky's unpredictability. The Ukrainian problem was first brought to the attention of the *Zemskii Sobor* in February 1651, but no positive action was taken until 1653. Vernadsky remarks that the *starshyna* spokesmen's statement to Buturlin that they trusted the tsar whereas the rank-and-file Cossacks did not, "was of course a hypocritical one," made to save face. He details the stipulations of the Pereiaslav agreement and notes that in general the requests of the *starshyna* reflected a desire to obtain hereditary rights outlined in the Zboriv treaty. Opposition to the Buturlin mission and tsarist protection thus stemmed from the conservative *starshyna* and the high Orthodox clergy.

The Pereiaslav negotiations in 1654 brought Ukraine under the tsar's protection, but clear-cut terms were not drawn up, Vernadsky argues.

Cossack leaders subsequently drafted a petition to the tsar, detailing specific rights and privileges to be guaranteed. The petition evidently caused conflict between the aristocratic view of the *starshyna* and the more liberal attitude of Khmelnytsky. The conservatives wanted to separate the Cossacks from the peasants by limiting the number of registered Cossacks. The finished petition, in Vernadsky's view, reflected the victory of the conservative Polish-oriented wing of the *starshyna*; this victory was revealed when the Teteria–Zarudny mission brought to Moscow documents containing the certified texts of charters granted previously by the Polish kings to the *starshyna*.

Vernadsky stresses that although they constituted the majority of the Ukrainian population, the peasants were completely ignored by the Pereiaslav agreement. The *starshyna* followed the agreement with “a veritable stampede” of requests that the tsar grant them estates. The Cossack spokesmen took it for granted that the tsar would enjoy the same status in Ukraine as the kings of Poland previously held. Although he notes that the juridical nature of the agreement became a matter of dispute, Vernadsky expresses no conclusion of his own other than to underscore that the Pereiaslav–Moscow negotiations constituted an event of paramount importance to both the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples.

The Cossack revolution produced the nascent Ukrainian nation, while Pereiaslav “created the political association known as the Tsardom of all Great and Little Russia,” which Poland, Turkey and Crimea “tried at every opportunity to tear asunder.” The 1654 arrangement was defective in that the rights of the peasants were not considered—a deficiency caused by the conflict between the *starshyna* and the peasants. The peasants wanted the abolition of landlords, while the Cossack officers wanted to replace the expelled Polish gentry. In stressing this dichotomy, Vernadsky adheres closely to the thesis explained most cogently by Miakotin. This is how Vernadsky describes the alleged pro-Polish proclivities of the conservative officers:

The starshina leaders' political ideal was that of an aristocratic society, based on the large landed estates, and supported by a dependable Cossack army consisting of the well-to-do Cossacks and the distinguished fellows. As history had shown that the Cossacks were not strong enough to form an independent state, the starshina made it their objective to secure complete autonomy for the Ukraine under a neighboring state. As a matter of fact, such autonomy had been achieved under the protectorate of the tsar, but the starshina did not trust the tsar and were afraid of the possibility of his interference in Ukrainian affairs in the future. The starshina's attention was therefore directed toward preparing an understanding with Poland. They

hoped to secure for the Ukraine as firm a status in the Polish Commonwealth as that enjoyed by Lithuania.

In the matter of religion, most of the starshina were as staunchly Orthodox as the bulk of the Ukrainian people. They intended to procure from the Polish government full recognition of the equality of the Orthodox church with that of the Roman. Besides, the starshina leaders attributed great importance to the expansion of learning and education in the Ukraine.

As we shall subsequently see, the starshina's attempts to introduce their program was undermined and foundered because the majority of the Ukrainian population wanted self-government and opposed agreement with the Poles and the revival of landlordism. And, in addition, the Poles, who at one moment agreed to the full-fledged status of the Ukraine in the Commonwealth, renounced the agreement at the first opportunity. Some of the starshina then turned to Turkey for protection. Meanwhile Moscow was averse to letting the Ukrainians forfeit the union. Thus, the starshina's scheming with one would-be protector after another involved the Ukraine in a series of civil and foreign wars. The unavoidable result was the utter devastation of the unhappy country and its dismemberment into three parts—Russian, Polish and Turkish. (Vol. 5, 2, 489–90)

Vernadsky considers Tsar Aleksei and Khmelnytsky two of the most outstanding men of their time. He contrasts the quiet and gentle personality of Aleksei with the dynamic and mercurial hetman. The hetman was an expert at drafting proclamations and diplomatic notes, had a knack for diplomacy and was a captivating speaker. "Historically, the Ukraine's union with Moscow was Bogdan's crowning achievement."³⁵

After 1654 Khmelnytsky conducted independent diplomatic relations with Poland and Turkey, breaking the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian union. The hetman also clashed with the tsar when the latter wanted Belorussian areas under his direct rule, whereas the hetman wanted to annex them to the Cossack state. Disagreement between the two leaders continued after the Swedish invasion of Poland. As Swedish successes mounted, the tsar declared war on Charles X and made peace with the Poles at Vilna in 1656. Vernadsky rejects the theory that by signing this treaty the tsar violated the Pereislav accord. None the less, the refusal of the Muscovite troops to fight the Poles "caused confusion in the minds of the Cossacks." Khmelnytsky disregarded the tsar's policies against Sweden and continued to support a Swedish-Transylvanian coalition. At this point in deteriorating Cossack-Muscovite relations, the tsar sent Fedor Buturlin to Chyhyryn to investigate matters, but the hetman had fallen fatally ill.

With Khmelnytsky's death, there was no longer a leader in Ukraine capable of maintaining order. The conflict between the *chern* and the

starshyna escalated as the conservative Vyhovsky took over from Khmelnytsky's ineffective young son. Many of the Cossack colonels, including Ivan Bohun, urged Vyhovsky to break with the tsar, while certain elements of the Sich, headed by Barabash and pro-Russian colonels (such as Pushkar of the Poltava regiment), opposed Vyhovsky and warned the tsar of the new hetman's anti-Russian plans. Vernadsky argues that Moscow tried to act as an arbiter between the hostile Cossack factions and sponsored a new *rada* to reconfirm Vyhovsky's position as hetman. Despite such concessions, Vyhovsky continued to negotiate with the Poles while the tsar tried to prevent a Ukrainian civil war. In September 1658 Vyhovsky engineered the Hadiach agreement, which created a tripartite commonwealth, with the Cossack state—Rus' or Ruthenia (translated as "Russia" by Vernadsky)—as one of its members. Hadiach represented, in Vernadsky's words, "the sociopolitical concept of the aristocratic group of the *starshyna* and its ideologist Iurii Nemirich." Difficulties continued and Vernadsky describes the factionalism among the Ukrainians up to the 1667 Andrusovo armistice, which marked the failure of Tsar Aleksei to unite the three Russias, a task later completed by Catherine II.

Vernadsky's views on the *starshyna* and the Hadiach agreement seem one-sided and typical of many Russocentric interpretations. To describe the attitude of members of the *starshyna* (such as Vyhovsky) as basically pro-Polish is misleading. The attitude of these Ukrainians was characteristic of the gentry of the entire commonwealth and reflected common Western European rather than exclusively Polish influence. Western influences among the Ukrainians were just as legitimate as Byzantine Christianity, Turkish military tactics and terminology, or Tatar or Mongol contributions. Vernadsky's interpretation of Hadiach as an attempt to replace the rule of the Zaporozhian Army in Ukraine by that of the *szlachta* is too confined. The commonwealth architects of Hadiach envisioned a revived commonwealth with a triune structure reflecting its basic ethnic areas. Those of the *starshyna* sharing Vyhovsky's outlook wanted more than selfish *szlachta* privileges. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the tsar's representatives among the Cossacks deliberately fomented civil war in Ukraine in a calculated effort to reduce the power of the hetman; this was undertaken even prior to the Pereiaslav *rada* that elected Iurii Khmelnytsky hetman. Vernadsky himself remarks that in 1662–3 Moscow changed its Ukrainian policy—from support of the Sich and the *chern* to support of the aristocratic *starshyna*. The new policy, which was "in the Polish tradition," granted boyar status to hetman Briukhovetsky and enrolled *starshyna* members into the Russian *dvorianstvo*.

Ultimately, however, the effectiveness of Vernadsky's interpretation of the Eastern Slavs is diminished by inconsistent and ambiguous terminology. For example, the familiar commonwealth slogan *natione Polonus, gente Ruthenus* has *Ruthenus* rendered in English as "Russian." With respect to Zboriv and the *Sejm's* refusal to abolish the Church Union, Vernadsky's text reads that the Polish king "issued a proclamation (universal) to the 'whole Russian people' confirming and enlarging King Władysław IV's enactment of 1632 on the equal status of the Greek Orthodox and Uniate Churches." One might conclude that Jan Kazimierz's appeal was also directed to the subjects of the Muscovite tsar. As already noted, Hadiach allegedly made "Russia" a third member of the commonwealth. In *Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age*, Vernadsky writes that " in M. Hrushevsky's opinion the Polish government consciously used the Magdeburg Law to curb Russian influence in Galicia and prepare the ground for the denationalization of the Russian population." Further, many residents of Lviv–Lwów–Lemberg, including Hrushevsky himself, who is quoted as the source in this instance, would be surprised to know that the historic *ulica Ruska (Ruska vulytsia)* translates as "Russian street."

Notes

1. See Brokgaus and Efron, *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar* [Encyclopedic dictionary], 18, 422.
2. Subsequent references to Maksymovych's writings refer to this edition.
3. The city of Pereiaslav was one of Maksymovych's favourite historical themes. His writings on this topic include: "O drevnei eparkhii pereiaslavskoi" 1, 111–16; "O gorode Pereiaslave v pervonachalnyi vremena" 2, 325–9; "Skazanie o praznike Sv. Borisa pod Pereiaslavom" 2, 330–9.
4. The relationship between Pogodin and Maksymovych is a fascinating topic that lies outside the scope of this study. These two scholars initiated the famous "Quarrel between the Southerners and Northerners" on the origin of the Ukrainian people and language and the heritage of Kievan Rus'. Pogodin advanced the thesis that the Kievan area originally had been populated by Great Russians who were driven away by the invading Mongols and that the area had been repopulated by Little Russians who migrated there from the west. The Normanist Pogodin also held that the Varangians of ancient Rus' were a non-Slavic element from Scandinavia. In the article "O mnimom zapustenii Ukrainy v nashestvie Batyeyo i naselenii eia novoprishlym

narodom," first published in 1857 in *Russkaia beseda* and reprinted in his collected works (1, 131–45), Maksymovych shows that the ancestors of the Ukrainians inhabited the Kievan region prior to the Tatar invasions and that Kievan Rus' should be considered an integral part of Ukrainian history. Maksymovych's major work against the Normanist approach of Pogodin carries the title *Otkuda idet russkaia zemlia, po skazaniiu Nestorovi povesti i po drugim starinnyim pisaniiam russkim?* First published as a separate brochure in Kiev in 1837, this study appears in *Sobranie sochinenii M. A. Maksymovicha* 1, 5–92. Another exchange with Pogodin on this theme is entitled "O proiskhozdenii variago-russov," first published in *Moskvitianin* in 1841 and reprinted in *Sobranie sochinenii M. A. Maksimovicha* 1, 93–104. In his polemics with Pogodin, Maksymovych also produced linguistic evidence to demonstrate the continuity between the modern Ukrainian language and the language of Kievan Rus'. A recent Soviet source commented that Maksymovych erroneously held that the Ukrainian language arose prior to the Russian. See *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia* 13, 976.

5. See "Bubnovskaia sotnia," in *Sobranie sochinenii M. A. Maksimovicha* 1, 748–834. First published in 1848–9 in the *Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennykh del*, this article is one of Maksymovych's best works on the structure and personnel of a typical Cossack military-administrative formation.
6. Konoshevych-Sahaidachny (d. 1622) in Maksymovych's view was, after Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the second greatest Cossack leader. The historian wrote two fine articles on this man: "Izsledovanie o getmane Petre Konasheviche Sagaidachnom," first published in *Moskvitianin* in 1843 and reprinted in *Sobranie sochinenii M. A. Maksimovicha* 1, 336–57; and "Skazanie o getmane Petre Sagaidachnom" [A report on Hetman Petro Sahaidachny], first published in *Kievlianin* in 1850 and reprinted in volume 1, 358–86 of his collected works. Maksymovych held that Sahaidachny, who had marched with the Poles against Muscovy in 1618, should not be considered a traitor, for this war took place when he was a subject of the commonwealth prior to the 1654 union. Vyhovsky and Mazepa, on the other hand, were real traitors because they turned against their lawful sovereigns as solemnly contracted in 1654.
7. M. Maksymovych, "O prichinakh vzaimnago ozhestocheniia poliakov i malorossian, byvszhago v XVII veke," in *Sobranie sochinenii M. A. Maksimovicha* 1, 248–76. This article, first printed in *Russkaia beseda*, no. 4 (1857), was a reply to Michał Grabowski, who tried to assuage Ukrainian-Polish animosities by showing that throughout history the Poles influenced the Ukrainians in many beneficial ways.
8. Within the past few years an increased interest in Kostomarov has been evident. In the Soviet Union the one hundred and fiftieth

anniversary of his birth was observed in a limited way by scholars. In the West, Dennis Papazian wrote "Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov: Russian Historian, Ukrainian Nationalist, Slavic Federalist" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1966). A new study discusses why Kostomarov's dissertation on the Union of Churches was rejected: J. T. Flynn, "The Affair of Kostomarov's Dissertation: A Case Study of Official Nationalism in Practice."

9. For details on *Osnova*, see M. Bernshtein, *Zhurnal Osnova i ukrainskyi literaturnyi protses kintsia 50-60 rokov XIX st.*
10. A careful account of Kostomarov's relationship with the Russians is contained in P. M. Popov, *M. Kostomarov iak folkloryst i etnohraf.* This valuable study, a booklet published in an edition of 1,850 copies, is concerned with biographical and ethnographic aspects of Kostomarov's life and avoids discussion of his work as a historian. The study praises Kostomarov for his opposition to tsarism and serfdom and his idealization of the masses, as well as for his alleged closeness to Russian "revolutionary democrats" (Herzen, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov). Although in later years Kostomarov allegedly tended toward "liberal-bourgeois" and "clerical" positions, nevertheless "the progressive" in his writings overshadowed his "errors."
11. A. G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography*, 153.
12. M. Kostomarov, "Getmanstvo Vygovskago," in Kostomarov, *Istoricheskiia monografii i izsledovaniia* 2, 38-9.
13. After the capture of Warsaw in 1794, Field Marshal Suvorov, on orders from Catherine II, sent some official Polish documents, the so-called *Metryka Koronna*, to St. Petersburg. Some of these materials were later sent to Moscow, where they were investigated and used by both Kostomarov and Butsinsky.
14. One of the most active promoters of the campaign to erect a statue of Khmelnytsky in Kiev was Mikhail Iuzefovich (1802-89), the anti-Ukrainian head of an archeological commission in Kiev. Mikeshin's original model for the statue contained bas-relief figures of a Catholic priest trampled under the hoofs of Khmelnytsky's horse, a Polish *pan* hurled into the abyss, and a Jew with stolen liturgical articles, along with scenes from the battle of Zbarazh, Khmelnytsky's triumphal entry into Kiev, and the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada*. It also carried the inscription "One and indivisible Russia to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky," as well as a quotation from Taras Shevchenko concerning the elimination of the Poles, Jews and the Union of Churches in Ukraine. Responsible Ukrainian leaders, such as the scholar Orest Levytsky, protested these inclusions. Among those protesting was Rev. P. H. Lebedyntsev, the canon of the Cathedral of St. Sophia, who complained that the faithful, when assembled before the cathedral in prayer, would face the *derrière* of Khmelnytsky's

horse. Iuzefovich denounced Lebedyntsev to Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the procurator of the Holy Synod, as an advocate of Ukrainian separatism, adding that the cleric's concern for propriety would not have taken the form of protest "if the monument were erected to the traitors Vyhovsky and Mazepa, the favourites of the Ukrainophiles." For his efforts on behalf of the Khmelnytsky statue, Iuzefovich received a high governmental award, the title "Genuine Privy Councillor" (*deisvitelnyi tainyi sovetnik*).

15. For a listing of the major works by and about Antonovych, see M. Tkachenko, "Bibliografiia prats V. B. Antonovycha ta prats pro ioho," in V. Antonovych, *Tvory* 1, lix–xc. Antonovych wrote a study of the Cossack movement in Right-Bank Ukraine after the 1667 Andrusovo armistice entitled *Poslednie vremena kozachestva na pravom beregu Dnepra po aktam 1679–1716 gg.* This study was first published in *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (Kiev, 1871). It was translated into Ukrainian and reprinted as *Ostanni dni kozachchyny na Pravoberezhi* in O. Barvinsky, ed., *Ruska istorychna biblioteka* 18, 129–274.
16. See D. Doroshenko, *Volodymyr Antonovych* 4, 163.
17. The word *balahula* refers to a covered buggy (or its driver) commonly associated with peasants and Jews in Ukraine. The *balahuly* were early nineteenth-century populists of Polish gentry origin who demonstrated sympathy for the Ukrainian peasantry by eccentric behaviour and adulation of the Ukrainian language and "Cossack" costume and manners.
18. Although Antonovych was reared as a Catholic, he embraced Orthodoxy and considered the Union of Churches to be a prime factor in the hostility between Eastern Slavs and the Poles. His major study of the religious aspects of Polish-Ukrainian relations carries the title *Ob unii i sostoianii pravoslavnoi tserkvi s poloviny XVII do kontsa XVIII v.* This work appeared in *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (Kiev, 1871). It was translated into Ukrainian and reprinted in *Ruska istorychna biblioteka* 8, 81–154, under the title *Narys stanovyshcha pravoslavnoi tserkvy na Ukraini vid polovyny xvii do kintsia xviii st.* Another edition was printed in Canada in 1952: *Shcho pry nesla Ukraini unii. Stan ukrainskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy vid polovyny XVII do kintsia XVIII st.*
19. For the text of this manifesto, see "Moia Ispoved," in V. Antonovych, *Tvory* 1, 100–15.
20. Among the primary sources on the Khmelnytsky era published by Antonovych was the diary of Stanislaw Oświecim. See "Dnevnik Stanislava Osvetsima, 1643–1651," in *Kievskaia starina*, nos. 1–2, 5–6, 9–12 (1882). This work was subsequently printed by Antonovych as a separate book.
21. Jakub Michałowski (1612–62/3) was a commonwealth official who

- took part in the 1651 battle at Berestechko and wrote his recollections during the years 1647–55. Michałowski's memoirs and archival materials were published in 1864 in Cracow by the scholar Antoni Zygmunt Helcel (1808–70).
22. Hrushevsky, on the other hand, rejected what he termed exaggerated accounts in Polish sources of Khmelnytsky's psychological warfare activities. He doubted the very existence of a Colonel Stashenko or Stasenko. See *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* 9, Book 1, 265–6.
23. Before 1648 there were three major forms of land use in Left-Bank Ukraine. Private ownership was widespread, whether by magnates, gentry, Cossacks, peasants or burghers; there existed a species of communal or collective land use; and in Siveria there flourished a special form of co-operative or communal land use known as *siaberstvo*. This type of land ownership by an extended family was dominant in the northern parts of Left-Bank Ukraine at the time of the 1648–54 revolt, but it disappeared by the end of the eighteenth century, giving way either to private ownership or to a communal system similar to that practiced in adjacent Russia. Communal land ownership was dominant in Left-Bank Ukraine after the 1648 revolt, with private land ownership as the second most prevalent form. Collective (or communal) and individual land ownership spread in Left-Bank Ukraine as a consequence of the settlement of the uninhabited steppe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Settlers and refugees, either individually or in groups, took over estates abandoned by the Polish gentry. Most of the settlements, according to Miakotin, were communes or associations (*soiuzy*) in which the land was owned in common and was “free” to all members of the association. If both Cossacks and peasants participated in the new settlement, separate *tovarystvo* (Cossack) and *hromada* (peasant) administrations were established. As a rule, the village church served as the centre of the *hromada*, which frequently provided the parish with land and a priest, who was selected from members of the community. In addition to these spontaneous settlements by refugees from west-Bank areas, *slobody* or “free settlements” were founded in east-Bank Ukraine by monasteries and Cossack officers, who received permission from the hetman to establish communities with conditional ownership of land, mills and dams. The conditional ownership was later converted into hereditary, perpetual ownership. In time, the communal “unions” disintegrated into private ownership as the Cossack officer class, monasteries and clergy manoeuvred to obtain special land grants and as the peasants themselves chose private ownership. By the middle of the eighteenth century this type of communal land use was practically non-existent in Left-Bank Ukraine.
24. An English translation has appeared: *Ukrainian Society and Government 1648–1781*.

25. *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 2d ed., 13, 145–6, describes Hrushevsky as an “ideologist of the Ukrainian counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie” and a “relentless enemy of Soviet power.” He is charged with advocating the separation of Ukraine from Russia and the creation “of a bourgeois-landowners’ Ukrainian monarchy under German protectorate status as a colony of German imperialism.” His writings allegedly exhibit “an anti-scientific framework” formulated “in the spirit of reactionary German historiography.” *Ukrainskaadianska entsyklopediia* 3, 509–10, states that Hrushevsky promoted a “crude falsification” of history with his “bourgeois-nationalist theory” of the “bourgeoislessness” (*bezburzhuaznist*) of the Ukrainian nation and his “single stream” approach to its history (“We never had and do not have a bourgeoisie”). Hrushevsky also allegedly maintained that the Ukrainian nation “has no kinship or community whatsoever” with the Russian. Hrushevsky is attacked because he praised “the evil traitors” of the seventeenth-century Cossack revolution, such as Vyhovsky and Mazepa, and for his comments that Ukraine “was intimately and directly associated with Western Europe—Germany above all.”
26. *Z dziejów Ukrainy* also contains a separate monograph on Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski, the scion of an ancient aristocratic family from Brest who became Khmelnytsky’s “right-hand man” until his death in battle on 24 July (3 August) 1649, at Loiv. This study is an outstanding work of historical scholarship.
27. For biographical details on Tomashivsky and a listing of his major writings, see the obituary “Stepan Tomashivsky,” in *Zapysky NTSh* 151, 225–30.
28. The primary sources on which this article was based were published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the series entitled *Zherela do istorii Ukrainy-Rusy*. The two volumes edited by Tomashivsky, which carry the subtitle *Materiialy do istorii Halychyny*, cover the years 1648–51. Volume 1, *Akty z r. 1648–1649*, contains a separate article by Tomashivsky: “Z zhyttia halytsko-ruskykh soimykyv 1648–1649 rr.” Volume 2, *Akty z r. 1649–1651*, contains an introductory article by Tomashivsky entitled “Pohliad na stan liudnosti lvivskoi zemli v polovyni XVII st.,” i–lii. In this article Tomashivsky concludes that at the time of the Cossack revolt, the Lviv region had a population of about 100,000 which was reduced to 40,000 by the devastation of 1648–9. Tomashivsky also edited a separate volume containing twelve appeals and proclamations of direct interest to Galicia by the Polish kings, hetmans and *wojewody* during the Khmelnytsky revolt. See S. Tomashivsky, ed., *Materiialy do istorii Khmelnychchyny*. This is volume 14 in the *Zapysky* of that society.
29. For details on Korduba’s life, see O. Pritsak, “Editor’s Preface: Myron Korduba and his Work,” in M. Korduba, *La littérature historique*

- soviétique-ukrainienne*, vii–xviii. For a bibliography of Korduba's works, see N. N. and O. Pritsak, "Myron Korduba—Bibliography," in the same work, xix–lvi.
30. Korduba's views on the first part of Jan Kazimierz's reign were made available in an English-language version: M. Korduba, "The Reign of John Casimir: Part I, 1648–1654," in *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (to 1696)*, 502–17.
 31. On the other hand, Korduba took exception to Władysław Tomkiewicz's portrayal of one of Khmelnytsky's most prominent opponents, Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, as a Polish national hero, largely because of the blemishes in the prince's private life, his brutality and unscrupulousness, and political intransigence. See M. Korduba, "Jeremias Wiśniowiecki im. Lichte der neuen Forschung," in *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte* 8, 221–38. This article is a review of Władysław Tomkiewicz, *Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (1612–1651)*.
 32. For a list of Vernadsky's writings, see A. D. Ferguson, "Bibliography of the Works of George Vernadsky," in *Essays in Russian History: A Collection Dedicated to George Vernadsky*. For additional information, see R. T. Fisher, Jr., "George Vernadsky, 1887–1973," in *Slavic Review* 33, no. 1 (March 1974): 206–8.
 33. That study was planned originally as Vernadsky's contribution to a joint enterprise with Michael Karpovich. Published by Yale University Press, Vernadsky's *A History of Russia* embraces the following titles: *Ancient Russia* (1943); *Kievan Russia* (1948); *The Mongols and Russia* (1953); *Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age* (1959); and *The Tsardom of Moscow 1547–1682*, in two parts (1969).
 34. In *The Tsardom of Moscow 1547–1682*, Vernadsky produces a chart of such cycles for the years 1538–1682 on page 752.
 35. Vernadsky's earlier *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* also contains his basic views on the events of 1648–54.

Chapter Five

The Soviet Period

In *Russian Historians and the Soviet State*, Konstantin F. Shteppa, a man who shared the vicissitudes of Soviet historians from the inception of the Communist regime until the outbreak of the Second World War, posited three major periods in Soviet historiography from the October Revolution through the 1950s. The first, from 1917 to 1928, was a period of “peaceful co-existence” between “bourgeois” and Marxist historiography. The second, from 1928 to 1934, witnessed the growth of Marxist orthodoxy and was dominated by the official school and the personality of Mikhail N. Pokrovsky. In the third period, from 1934 onward, the Marxism of the Pokrovsky period was moderated to “great power centralism and universal statism.”

The Soviet approach to the 1648–54 revolution and the Pereiaslav agreement, however, discerned two fundamental periods. In the first, Soviet scholars denied the significance of the 1648–54 events; in the second new significance was attached to the Khmelnytsky era. This re-evaluation reflected changes in emphasis on and definitions of bourgeois nationalism, great-power chauvinism, colonialism, imperialism and the “friendship of peoples.”¹

During the first years of Soviet power—often described as a time of “War Communism” followed by a brief span of ideological retreat under the New Economic Policy—scholars in general and historians in particular were accorded considerable academic freedom. Although Marxist approaches were encouraged, there was a concomitant effort to write the histories of the non-Russians in a spirit of local patriotism and

“anti-imperialist decentralization.” There was a degree of accommodation between the old and the new, particularly among Ukrainian historians. In the 1920s nationally-oriented scholars under the leadership of Mykhailo Hrushevsky overshadowed the doctrinaire Marxist historians, led by Matvii Iavorsky in Ukraine. Lenin, Stalin and other leading Bolsheviks rejected the notion of Russia’s civilizing mission and Russian chauvinism was denounced in 1923 in a resolution of the Twelfth Congress of the Soviet Communist party. During the Sixteenth Congress, held in 1930, the top Soviet Communists promulgated for the last time an official resolution calling for the elimination of Russian chauvinism.

Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868–1932)

The dominant Soviet historian of the 1920s was Mikhail Pokrovsky.² Pokrovsky enjoyed Lenin’s confidence and served as a deputy commissar for education under Anatolii Lunacharsky. In his well-known *Brief History of Russia*, Pokrovsky gives the 1648–54 Cossack revolt a Marxist interpretation. Ruthless serfdom in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, created by the development of trade and investment capital, brought the Ukrainian peasantry to violent revolution. Runaway peasants founded the Zaporozhian Sich, produced their own intellectual stratum and attracted support from the exploited burghers of Ukrainian cities. The rebellion led by Khmelnytsky was successful, but the hetman was unable to consolidate his position. He then obtained an ally in Moscow. “The Muscovite government very cleverly took advantage of this: it extended its protection to Khmelnytsky and in this way the Ukraine (at first only the Left Bank of the Dnieper and the city of Kiev) became a Muscovite possession.” Pokrovsky describes Khmelnytsky as “a member of the upper, fairly well-off section of the Cossacks.”

Pokrovsky maintained that tsarist Russia had a popular revolutionary tradition akin to the *Jacquerie* in France, the Hussite Wars in Bohemia and the Peasant War in sixteenth-century Germany.³ He perceives four major peasant revolts in tsarist domains in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the 1648–54 Ukrainian uprising, which initiated the disintegration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and in Great Russia the Time of Troubles (1604–13), the revolt of Stenka Razin (1670–1) and the Pugachev rebellion (1773–5). Pokrovsky notes that the discontented Cossacks limited the tsar’s role in Ukraine. Moscow, however, gradually increased its power there with the aid of the Cossack upper class, which pacified the rebellious peasantry. This Cossack upper stratum changed its role from “leaders of the uprising into a real landowners’ class

that was even more greedy and oppressive than the landlords of Great Russia.”

Pokrovsky was not alone in his negative assessment of both Khmelnytsky and the Pereiaslav agreement. The first edition of *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* [Large Soviet encyclopedia], published in 1935 and still reflecting the views of the anti-imperial tendency, described Khmelnytsky as “a traitor and rabid enemy of the risen Ukrainian peasantry.” His connections with the Ukrainian feudalists and the Cossack officer class were stressed, along with his record of former loyal service to the Polish king. The *Encyclopedia* portrays Khmelnytsky as a representative of “the oligarchy of Ukrainian feudal-Cossack *starshyna* which was endeavouring to achieve equality with the feudal lords of Poland.” The Ukrainian feudalists had joined the revolt to defend their vital interests against those of the *szlachta*. The struggle of the Ukrainian peasantry was exploited by Khmelnytsky for his own class interests. As the interests of the peasantry and the Ukrainian feudalists were divergent, Khmelnytsky frequently sought an agreement with the Poles. A consequence was the Zboriv agreement of August 1649, which guaranteed traditional feudal rights to the *starshyna* and called for the re-establishment of serfdom. The Bila Tserkva agreement of September 1651 was of the same nature but dealt even more harshly with the peasantry. At the beginning of the revolt, the *Encyclopedia* stresses, Khmelnytsky aspired merely for equality with the Polish gentry. Only later did he strive to create an independent Ukraine.

The *Encyclopedia* charges that there were instances when Khmelnytsky deliberately provoked popular revolts in order to crush the peasants. During the important battle of Berestechko, Khmelnytsky's indecision caused the Tatars to join the Poles; furthermore, Khmelnytsky deliberately lingered in the Tatar camp to facilitate a Polish victory. The consequent defeat for the rebels and the death of several thousand Ukrainian peasants broke the strength of the revolutionary peasantry and enabled the *starshyna* to conclude the Bila Tserkva accord. Also treacherous was Khmelnytsky's direct aid to Polish forces engaged in suppressing the revolts led by Nechai, Bohun and others. After the peasant-Cossack forces had driven Polish troops from Ukraine and invaded Polish areas, Khmelnytsky at once made peace with the Polish feudalists. After the Zboriv and Bila Tserkva accords, Khmelnytsky savagely punished rebellious peasants and destroyed scores of cities and villages.

In his diplomatic activities, too, Khmelnytsky pursued the interests of his class. He skilfully played against one another Poland, the Muscovite state, Turkey, Crimea and the Swedish king. His negotiations with Moscow dragged on for three years and culminated in the Pereiaslav

treaty, which, the *Encyclopedia* claims, “signified the union of Ukrainian with Russian feudalists and in essence juridically defined the beginning of the colonial domination of Russia over Ukraine.” The *Encyclopedia* decries the bourgeois reference to the 1648–54 peasant war as the “Khmelnysky era” and maintains that Khmelnysky was not and could not be the leader of that war. Rather, he betrayed the revolt and expedited Russian colonialism. Moreover, Khmelnysky’s desire for personal power was so strong that he tried to become an autocrat, with his son as his successor. Exaltation of Khmelnysky, according to this 1935 Soviet publication, was a common error of Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist historiography.

Matvii Iavorsky (1885–1933?)

Pokrovsky’s counterpart in the Ukrainian republic was Matvii Iavorsky, author of *Istoriia Ukrainy v styslim narysi* [History of Ukraine in brief outline]. Born in Galicia in 1885 and executed in 1933 or 1934 by Stalin’s subordinates on the pretext of espionage for capitalist powers, Iavorsky was a Marxist who dismissed the Pereiaslav agreement in a few sentences and considered Khmelnysky an enemy of the popular masses.⁴ Iavorsky also regretted the submission of the Ukrainians to a government, with a social system no better than that of the Polish gentry.

In his discussion of the “great Cossack revolution,” Iavorsky portrays the 1648–54 Cossack uprising as an attempt to create a classless society. The revolt concealed the seeds of conflict between the Cossack *chern* and the *starshyna*, and the latter sought to assume the privileges formerly enjoyed by the Polish gentry. This class antagonism was muted in 1648, when both forces co-operated to destroy the Polish gentry; a broad alliance formed between the rank-and-file Cossacks, the members of the Zaporozhian Sich, the Cossack officers, the peasantry and the Ukrainian burghers. The *starshyna*, however, was only impelled to revolt by the Polish gentry’s movement into the Dnieper area. Thus, in Iavorsky’s view, the violent class struggle that broke out in 1648 had within it “objective social contradictions.”

This “all-national revolution of 1648” was provoked by the enserfment of the peasantry and the exploitation of the cities by the Polish gentry, Iavorsky explains. The cities, based on commercial capital and a money economy, were strangled by a feudal economy based on peasant labour and the nobility’s monopoly over foreign trade. The villages, controlled by the landowners and their agents, were isolated economically from the cities, which in turn could form no economic symbiosis with the countryside. This arrangement was challenged by an emerging money economy, dominated

by the rising class of burghers in the cities and by landed Cossack officers who wanted to convert agricultural goods into commercial capital. These two social forces—the exploited peasantry and rising burghers—clashed with the feudal gentry and produced the 1648 revolution. After the elimination of the Polish gentry, the Cossack officers—registered Cossacks, formerly favourites of the Polish kings—became the strongest social group in Ukraine.

The socio-economic revolution of 1648 began, Iavorsky claims, over a trifling incident: personal rivalry between two members of the privileged class, Czaplinski and Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Khmelnytsky, disparaged as a “registered centurion,” obtained the aid of the Sich, the registered Cossacks and the Tatars and issued grandiose appeals for the liberation of the peasants and the defence of the Orthodox church. In the ensuing conflict the Polish ruling class was destroyed. The Cossack officers, however, had no real intention of freeing the peasantry. Intoxicated with success, the *starshyna*, led by Khmelnytsky, reached a compromise with the Polish gentry at Zboriv in 1649. But the masses, led by men such as Kryvonis, Bohun and Nechai, opposed this compromise and forced the Cossack officer class to continue the struggle against Poland.

Faced with Polish counter-measures and an insurgent peasantry, the Cossack officers sought the support of Muscovy with its strong, centralized government and gentry-dominated social structure. “And Moscow from time immemorial had cast covetous eyes upon Ukraine,” wanting to become “the sovereign of all Rus’,” Iavorsky writes. Thus Moscow eagerly agreed to the petitions from the Cossack *starshyna*.

Although social injustices in Russia were as great as in Poland, the Ukrainians were attracted to Muscovy because of common religious bonds. They were unaware that their fate would soon be worse than it had been under Poland, Iavorsky writes. The 1654 Pereiaslav agreement promised the Ukrainians, in return for acceptance of rule by the Muscovite gentry and “the white tsar,” autonomy and the preservation of the social order created by the 1648–54 revolution. The Ukrainian masses gained little from this bargain, Iavorsky continues. None the less, there were some short-lived changes. As the Reformation movements ended feudalism in Western Europe, so the Khmelnytsky revolt destroyed feudalism in Ukraine. In both instances, religion was employed as a political weapon: to destroy the remnants of the old feudal order and to initiate the nation states. For the Ukrainians, the 1648–54 events saw the replacement of Polish gentry rule and the birth of Ukrainian nationhood. This new state was short-lived, however, for it was soon absorbed by the Russian autocratic state, described by Iavorsky as “a foreign system of Russian commercial capital and gentry-serf stratification.”

The 1648–54 revolution eliminated serfdom and removed the Polish ruling class in most of Ukraine. Land was socialized and placed under the administration of the new Cossack state. On the agrarian question, Iavorsky writes, the class instincts of the Cossack *starshyna* were boldly manifested. The Cossack officers wanted to dominate the peasantry and with Russian aid this objective was realized. The new ruling class in Ukraine received temporary use of the socialized land as a reward for military service. For ten years democracy existed in the new Cossack state, but as the *starshyna* consolidated power it evolved into the “Little Russian gentry.” The *starshyna* thus effected the reintroduction of serfdom and its members became minions of the tsar. This process, Iavorsky points out, was chiefly abetted by “the pernicious colonial policy and the insatiability of the Muscovite tsars themselves.” The tsarist regime mercilessly exploited Ukraine and reduced it to a Russian province. The intermediaries in this process were the new Ukrainian gentry, who asked the tsar to end Cossack democracy. This behaviour, motivated by selfish class interests, made it easy for Moscow to accomplish its objectives, merely by agreeing to the gentry’s requests and petitions.

Iavorsky says that the Russian government had three major objectives: the abolition of the Cossack form of social organization, the conversion of the Cossack officer class to gentry status and the enserfment of the peasantry. The tsarist government and the *starshyna* worked together to achieve these objectives. In less than a hundred years, the socialized land was transferred to the new landowning class in Ukraine by the *universaly* of the hetmans and the grants of the tsars. Iavorsky notes that the Russian capitalists and the new Ukrainian gentry disagreed over the question of autonomy. Immediately after the Pereiaslav agreement, there were manifestations of Ukrainian separatism, which came to a head under Vyhovsky’s leadership. Doroshenko and Mazepa also followed the separatist path, but the Russians ended Ukrainian autonomy in 1768 and 1775.

Class conflict was inherent in the 1648 revolution, Iavorsky stresses. Khmelnytsky acted as the representative of a new exploiting class. Peasant outbreaks against the hetman were frequent, and he was often denounced as a hireling of the gentry and as a traitor working on behalf of the Tatars. The peasantry, the rank-and-file Cossacks and the Zaporozhian Sich were in frequent conflict with Khmelnytsky and the *starshyna*. In Iavorsky’s view, the class egoism of both the Cossack officers and the new Ukrainian gentry was the most contemptible aspect of the 1648–54 revolution; the colonial policies of the Russian state were secondary.

Traditional Scholarship

In the 1920s, however, Marxist interpretations were not predominant among historians in the Ukrainian Soviet republic. There were a wealth of innovative historical studies, including many on Eastern Europe in the seventeenth century.⁵ This was Hrushevsky's most fruitful period of scholarship. This renaissance was curtailed by the political turmoil of the early 1930s. Nevertheless, some of the best studies of the social, economic, juridical and cultural aspects of seventeenth-century Ukraine appeared at this time. Among them was Osyp Hermaize's *Ukraina i Din u XVII st.* [Ukraine and the Don in the seventeenth century], a study of the relationship between the Ukrainians and the Don Cossacks during the Khmelnytsky period. In 1922–5 the Odessa academician, Mykhailo Slabchenko, produced his exhaustive history of the Ukrainian economy from the Khmelnytsky era to the First World War: *Organizatsiia khoziaistva Ukrainy ot khmelnichchiny do mirovoi voiny* [The organization of the economy of Ukraine from the Khmelnytsky era to the World War]. It was also at this time that Oleksander Ohloblyn began to publish works on the growth of Ukrainian industry, with special emphasis on the seventeenth century.⁶ Lev Okinshevych established his reputation as an authority on seventeenth-century governmental institutions in Eastern Europe by publishing such studies as "Prikaz Malyie Rossii moskovskoi derzhavy XVII st." [The department of Little Russia of the Muscovite state in the seventeenth century] as well as a series of studies of the Cossack officers' organizations in the 1926, 1928, and 1930 volumes of *Pratsi Komisii dlia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhidno-ruskoho ta ukrainskoho prava* [Works of the Commission for the Study of the History of West Rus' and Ukrainian law]. A collection of essays on cultural and religious currents in seventeenth-century Ukraine and Belorussia entitled *Narysy z istorii kulturnykh rukhiv na Ukraini ta Bilorusy v XVI–XVIII v.* [Sketches from the history of cultural movements in Ukraine and Belorussia from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries] was published in 1929 by A. Savych.

During the 1920s Soviet scholars focused on the documents dealing with the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement. Hrushevsky had surveyed the relevant issues in a study published in 1917, and he continued to do so in successive volumes of his major work. An émigré scholar, Andrii Iakovliv, had some essays published in Soviet Ukraine during that decade; in an article entitled "Statti Bohdana Khmelnytskoho v redaktsii 1659 r." [The articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the 1659 version], Iakovliv concludes that the 1659 version of the 1654 agreement was a falsification. During this controversy, Volodymyr Shcherbyna wrote "Do pytannia pro statti

B. Khmelnytskoho" [On the question of the articles of B. Khmelnytsky]—in which he takes the view that since no true copy of the 1654 pact has survived, historians must rely on the 1659 version. In "Prychynok do pytannia pro statti B. Khmelnytskoho" [Contribution to the question of the articles of B. Khmelnytsky], Mykola Petrovsky also rejects the 1659 version primarily because of the addition of the phrase "of White Russia" to the tsar's official title after July 1654. He concludes that the 1659 edition was a doctored version of the March 1654 agreement.

The role of the Tatars and Turks in the Slavic areas of Europe in the seventeenth century was also investigated during the 1920s. The Orientalist Ahatanhel Krymsky (1871–1941) and his students made Kiev and Kharkiv important centres of research on the Eastern world. In a 1928 article, "Pro vyvchennia vzaiemyn Ukrainy ta Turechchyny v druhii polovyni XVII st." [On the study of the relations of Ukraine and Turkey in the second half of the seventeenth century], Vasyl Dubrovsky reviewed the literature on Turkish-Ukrainian relations in the seventeenth century. In the 1920s the Czech Orientalist Jan Rypka and Hrushevsky exchanged views on a letter sent under the date of 10 August 1650, to Bohdan Khmelnytsky by the Turkish government.⁷

During the 1920s the historical sources of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ukraine were also investigated. The authorship of *Istoriia Rusov* occupied several scholars. Mykola Horban, in an article entitled "Kilka uvah do pytannia pro avtora *Istorii Russov*" [Several observations on the authorship of *Istoriia Rusov*], concludes that V. H. Poletyka could not have been the author, while A. Iershov in his article, "Do pytannia pro chas napysannia *Istorii Russov*, a po chasty i avtora ii" [On the question of the time of the writing of *Istoriia Rusov* and, in part, about its author], argues that *Istoriia Rusov* was written by members of the Poletyka family in 1815–18. In his essay "Shevchenko ta *Istoriia Russov*" [Shevchenko and *Istoriia Rusov*], L. Koshova elaborates on the extensive influence of *Istoriia Rusov* on the poetry of Taras Shevchenko.

Work on the Cossack Chronicles also flourished. V. Modzalevsky maintained that the author of the *Eyewitness Chronicle* was Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky, a view shared by Viktor Romanovsky, Oleksander Ohloblyn and Mykola Petrovsky. The latter, in "Psevdo-Diariush Samiila Zorky" [The pseudo-diary of Samiilo Zorka], produces evidence that the alleged diary of Zorka, which Velychko claimed to have used as a source for his chronicle, never in fact existed.

Stalinist Revisionism

On 16 May 1934, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars defined how history should be taught in Soviet schools. The resolution demanded the study of concrete facts, more attention to great historical figures, strict adherence to chronology, a new system of periodization and greater concern with foreign relations. The decree was followed by two decisions in 1936—one in January and the other in March—on textbooks. The March decree announced a special competition to write a new textbook on the history of the USSR for use in Soviet elementary schools. In January 1937 the Soviet leaders established a special committee, headed by Andrei A. Zhdanov, to supervise and reorganize historical studies in the Soviet Union. In August 1937 Andrei Shestakov, a historian active in the campaign against the Pokrovsky "school,"⁸ was awarded a prize in the textbook competition.

This textbook, published in English in 1938 as *A Short Course in the History of the U.S.S.R.*, is concerned with the personalities of Tsars Ivan IV and Peter I, the peasant rebels Stepan Razin and Emelian Pugachev, and non-Russian heroes like Khmelnytsky and Shamil. Over half the book concerns anti-tsarist revolutionary movements and the new Soviet regime. The book is remarkable for its internationalism and its lack of emphasis on the Russian heritage. Shestakov's textbook marks a transitional stage between the "national nihilism" of Pokrovsky and Stalin's Russian nationalism. Shestakov's account of the Eastern Slavs, for example, avoids a Russocentric bias and there is no hint of the doctrine of the "elder brother." Non-Russians are regarded as victims of tsarist expansionism. Shestakov's textbook remains a quaint relic of the pre-nationalist phase of Soviet historiography.

The 1654 Russian-Ukrainian arrangement produced a fundamental revision in Soviet historiography. A decree of 16 May 1934, which criticized Soviet textbooks, complained that:

Their authors do not see any positive role in the actions of Khmelnytsky in the seventeenth century, in his struggle against the occupation of the Ukraine by the Poland of the pans and the Turkey of the sultans. The fact of Georgia's being placed at the end of the eighteenth century under the protectorate of Russia as well as the fact of the Ukraine's being brought under the power of Russia are viewed by the authors as absolute evils and unconnected with the concrete historical conditions of that time. The authors do not see that Georgia was faced with the alternative of being swallowed up

by the Turkish sultan or of coming under the authority of Russia. They do not see that the second alternative represented the lesser of two evils.⁹

As this quotation suggests, Soviet concern with Ukrainian historiography was not an isolated phenomenon. Soviet leaders, in fact, were engaged in a major reinterpretation of history. Involved were issues, and clichés, like tsarist colonialism, Muscovite centralism, Pokrovsky's "prison of peoples" approach, anti-Russian national-liberation movements, the amalgamation of the non-Russians with the Russians and the role of the Russians as the leading nationality in the Soviet Union. The theory of the "lesser evil," for example, first propounded in 1937 to justify tsarist expansionism, applied not only to the Ukrainians but also, more aptly, to the nationalities of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far North. The history of the various Soviet peoples was re-examined; the case of Shamil, the leader of the anti-Russian resistance in the Caucasus, is an outstanding example.

The clearest indication of this new turn in Soviet historiography was the rejection of Pokrovsky's views and the eradication of his influence. A staunch Marxist, Pokrovsky was the first president of the Society of Marxist Historians in the USSR and the editor of its journal, *Istoriĭk-markсист* [The Marxist historian]. Before he died in 1932, Pokrovsky was declared to be "anti-Marxist" and his works were suppressed. His chief indiscretion, as the Stalinists saw it, was to condemn Great Russian expansionism—he believed that tsarist rule in the non-Russian parts of the empire was colonial. In Pokrovsky's view, Russia's western borderlands, including Ukraine, were more advanced culturally than Russia proper, and tsarist rule there was one of both social and national oppression. As Roman Szporluk, editor of *Russia in World History: Selected Essays by M. N. Pokrovskii*, points out, it was this kind of "national nihilism" that led to the official condemnation of Pokrovsky in 1934. The following is an expression of Pokrovsky's "national nihilism":

The Russian Empire was a prison of peoples. We now know that not only the state of the Romanovs merited this name, but its predecessor also, the patrimony of the descendants of Kalita. The Great Moscow Principality, not only the Moscow kingdom, was a "prison of peoples." Great Russia was built on the bones of non-Russians, and the latter could hardly find great comfort in the fact that eighty percent of the blood in the veins of the Great Russians was theirs. Only the definite overthrow of Great Russian oppression by that force which fought and still fights with all forms of oppression could serve as true compensation for all the sufferings which this oppression has caused them.¹⁰

Pokrovsky's stand on the national question has been an embarrassment to Soviet Russian historians; recently they have glossed over this aspect of Pokrovsky's historiography. Oleg Sokolov's detailed *M. N. Pokrovsky i sovetskaia istoricheskaia nauka* [M. N. Pokrovsky and Soviet historical science], published in 1970, ignored the historian's condemnation of Russian imperialism. In an analysis of Pokrovsky's *Brief History of Russia*, Sokolov examines all aspects of that work except Russian imperialism and Pokrovsky's "prison of peoples" concept. Sokolov chides Pokrovsky for failing to see the "progressive significance of the annexation by Russia of a number of peoples." Pokrovsky overlooks the "significance of the union of the Russian working class and the peasantry with the workers of the national borderlands in a common struggle against exploiters and the imperialist parasites of Europe and Asia." Historians in eclipse because of their opposition to Pokrovsky's views were restored to prominence, among them Evgenii Tarle, Boris Grekov and Dmitrii Petrushevsky. Although partially rehabilitated in the 1960s, Pokrovsky still has not received full Soviet approval because of his views on the national question.

Pokrovsky was also a Normanist, who emphasized the decisive role of the non-Slavic Varangians, or Vikings, in the early history of the Eastern Slavs. This view was rejected by Russian nationalists, who were supported by Stalin. After the 16 May 1934 decree, Soviet scholars were obliged to refute the Normanist approach. After 1934 separate histories of the individual nations of the USSR were treated under the rubric "History of the Peoples of the USSR." On Russian expansionism, the formula of the "lesser evil" replaced Pokrovsky's "prison of peoples" approach.¹¹

The Second World War

The ferment in 1934–7 led to increased Russian nationalism and a peculiar version of a revived "Little Russian patriotism," especially during the Second World War. The reasons behind this historical *volte-face* were political: to mobilize all Soviet nationalities for a common war effort.

Prior to the outbreak of war, Osip Kuperman, writing under the pseudonym K. Osipov, published laudatory biographies, intended primarily for Soviet youth, of traditional tsarist heroes such as Aleksandr Nevsky, Dmitrii Donskoi, Aleksandr Suvorov and Fedor Ushakov. In 1939 to his series, "Lives of Illustrious Persons," was added a biography of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. (Khmelnytsky was the only non-Russian popularized in this series, prior to the Second World War.) Osipov's study portrays the Ukrainian association with the Russians in 1654 as a "lesser evil"

supported by the entire Ukrainian population. Osipov wrote a second article on the same theme for professional historians.

Osipov's biography was part of a campaign to exalt Khmelnytsky. Oleksander Kornichuk wrote a play, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, which also appeared in 1939; a film of the same title, directed by Ihor Savchenko, was released in 1941. During the war, when West Ukrainian areas were annexed by the USSR and later when the Germans invaded Ukraine, there was an upsurge in Ukrainian national feeling. Soviet leaders were constrained to support it either for their own survival or out of genuine identification with popular opinion. The zenith in wartime exaltation of Khmelnytsky came on 10 October 1943, when a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet created a new military award in Khmelnytsky's honour. Another decree, issued ten days later, changed the name of the ancient town of Pereiaslav to Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky.

The Second World War ended with almost all ethnic Ukrainian areas annexed to the Soviet Union. The Soviets accomplished this in the name of national self-determination and their wartime allies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, were required to cede territory. On 1 February 1944 the Soviet constitution was amended to enable Union republics to set up supplementary defence ministries and to engage in foreign relations. The Ukrainian and Belorussian republics were the first to set up their own foreign ministries. These wartime changes, including the reassessment of Khmelnytsky, suggested departures from a strict Marxist or class approach to Russian-Ukrainian relations. All departures were, however, in line with the Stalinist view of Russia's imperial past. Outstanding tsarist figures, condemned during Pokrovsky's ascendancy, had been made national heroes and the former feudal and autocratic tsarist state had become "the state of the Russian people." This ideological turnabout required revision of some of the major tenets of Marxist theory.

Stalin's personal espousal of Russian great-power positions, published in May 1941, came in a critique of Engels' views on tsarist foreign policy—"O state Engelsa 'Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsarisma'" [On Engels' article "The foreign policy of Russian tsarism"]. Stalin's critique was first written in July 1934 as a letter to the Politburo opposing the publication of Engels' article in *Bolshevik*, the party's theoretical journal. Vladimir Adoratsky (1878–1945) had proposed to publish Engels' article in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War. The article, written in 1890, condemned tsarist foreign policy as aggressive, impelled by the class interests of the Russian oligarchy and implemented by Jesuitic, but gifted, foreign adventurers who made Russia into a powerful military state. Stalin argues that aggressiveness was not a monopoly of tsarist Russia and defends Russian

control of Constantinople. Stalin contends that Engels failed to grasp that the struggle for colonies was universally applicable to imperialist powers. Engels referred to Russia as “the *last* bulwark of general European reaction.” Russia, Stalin counters, was indeed a mighty bulwark of reaction, but certainly not the last. For Russia, Stalin continues, the First World War was not an anti-national, imperialistic adventure but a war of liberation “or almost one of liberation.” The errors in Engels’ thinking, he adds, led the German social democrats to vote for war credits in 1914 to defend the bourgeois fatherland against “Russian barbarism.” Engels thought that a German victory over Russia would result in a proletarian revolution. Stalin, who was successful in preventing publication of Engels’ harsh criticism, rehabilitated tsarist foreign policy for political purposes.

Prior to the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities in June 1941, there was a great increase in the number of historical works published concerning the “1648–54 war of liberation of the Ukrainian people.” The purpose of these works was to underscore the “progressive significance” of the 1654 Pereiaslav events for both the Russians and the Ukrainians and to praise Khmelnytsky as the champion of Russian-Ukrainian collaboration. The historians writing in this vein included I. D. Boiko, A. Z. Baraboi and M. E. Podorozhny.¹²

The general tenor of these works can be seen in *Istoriia Ukrainy. Korotkyi kurs* [History of Ukraine: A short course], a survey of Ukrainian history published by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1941. This “short course” contains a chapter (attributed to Oleksander Ohloblyn) on the “annexation” (*pryiednannia*) of Ukraine. This chapter explains that the Ukrainians, suffering from economic exploitation and religious-national oppression, revolted in order to unite with the Russian people. Khmelnytsky continually sought Russian aid, but in 1649 the tsarist regime was preoccupied with internal opposition. The annexation of Ukraine in 1654 was a “lesser evil” in comparison with other possibilities. Although Khmelnytsky did not save the peasants from feudal exploitation, and the Cossack republic he founded became a vassal of Russia, he was none the less a true national hero. For in this period the Ukrainian people evolved from a nationality (*narodnist*) into a nation (*natsiia*).

Essentially the same scheme was presented by other Soviet works appearing in 1941, such as *Istoriia Ukrainy v dokumentakh i materialakh. Vyzvolna borotba ukrainskoho narodu proty hnitu shliakhetskoi Polshchi i pryiednannia Ukrainy do Rosii, 1569–1654 roku* [History of Ukraine in document and materials: The struggle of liberation of the Ukrainian people against oppression by aristocratic Poland and the annexation of Ukraine by Russia, 1569–1654], a collection of documents on the seventeenth-century struggle and Oleksander Ohloblyn’s special survey on the late seventeenth

and early eighteenth centuries, *Narysy z istorii Ukrainy. Ukraina v kintsi XVII—pershii chverti XVIII st.* [Outlines of the history of Ukraine: Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth century and the first quarter of the eighteenth century].

After the Second World War

Immediately after the Second World War, Soviet party leaders retreated from the wartime flirtation with Ukrainian nationalism. In the Ukrainian republic, the retreat was led by Konstantyn Z. Lytvyn, third secretary of the Central Committee in Ukraine and an expert on ideology. In Lytvyn's article "Ob istorii Ukrainskogo naroda" [On the history of the Ukrainian people], published in *Bolshevik* in July 1947, he argues that the Leninist heritage required the Ukrainians to oppose various forms of bourgeois nationalism and to "unmask" the Pokrovsky "school" and its "vulgar materialism." Soviet historiography should be based on the axioms elaborated by Stalin in his famous *Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks* and on the contributions of Stalin's close collaborators, Zhdanov and Kirov.

Wartime books on Ukrainian history were deficient, Lytvyn continues, for they had "not completely overcome" bourgeois approaches. Four books published under the auspices of the republic's Academy of Sciences were singled out for special criticism. These were the *History of Ukraine: A Short Course* (1941); the first volume of a *History of Ukraine* (1943); an outline of the history of Ukrainian literature (1945); and a history of the Ukrainians edited by Mykola Petrovsky (1943). These publications, which followed Hrushevsky's rather than a Marxist system of periodization, failed to emphasize the class struggle and preached the classlessness of the Ukrainian people. They failed to point out that the ancient Kievan state was *drevnorusskaia* (Old Russian) and thus the legitimate parent of all three contemporary Eastern Slavic peoples. They leaned toward the theory of the Normanist origins of Kievan Rus'.

It is necessary, Lytvyn feels, to cleanse Ukrainian history of Hrushevsky's influence; to correct the view that "Ukraine never had anything in common with Russia" and owed more to Western influence; to re-emphasize the closeness and unity of the three East Slavic peoples. Furthermore, Lytvyn condemns Hrushevsky's alleged sympathy with German and Austrian imperialism, his enshrinement of traitors like Vyhovsky and Mazepa as national heroes and his belief in the classlessness of the Ukrainian people. He accuses Hrushevsky of trying to pit the fraternal Ukrainians and Russians against each other. He claims that

during the First World War Hrushevsky worked as an agent of German imperialism and that in 1921 Hrushevsky used Vasyly Kuziv (1887–1955), a Presbyterian minister and an active Protestant leader among Ukrainians in the United States, as his agent in America.

Lytvyn says that the modern Ukrainians, Belorussians and Russians are descended from a common Eastern Slavic stock of the Kievan period. In the ninth and tenth centuries the Kievan state was not a feudal state but rather a “state of the period of the rise of the feudal method of production.” Feudalism arose only in the second half of the tenth century and thus the Normanist theory of the origin of Kievan Rus’ should be rejected. The ethnic unity of Rus’ lasted until the thirteenth-century Tatar invasion. Tatar rule, like Hungarian, Polish and Lithuanian domination, was a negative influence that contributed to the formation of the three fraternal Eastern Slavic peoples. A separate Ukrainian nationality began to form in the fourteenth century, and by the sixteenth century the basic structure of the Ukrainian nation, including language, culture and the Cossack stratum, had been established. The Ukrainian people always desired close association with the Russians as the 1648–54 war revealed. After the annexation (*prisoedinenie*) of Ukraine by Russia, both peoples struggled jointly against the tsar and foreign invaders, until the October Revolution of 1917. Finally, owing to Russian aid, the Ukrainians survived the Second World War and were united in their own sovereign republic.

Lytvyn’s article was followed by a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, dated 29 August 1947. This resolution demanded that the all-Union campaign for ideological purity—initiated in 1946 under the direction of Andrei Zhdanov—be applied to specific Ukrainian conditions. Zhdanov’s strictures, promulgated during a tense period in international diplomacy, attacked “cosmopolitanism,” “fawning” before the West and “bourgeois objectivism,” and praised Russian civilization. In the Ukrainian republic, Lazar Kaganovich replaced Nikita Khrushchev as first secretary of the Ukrainian republic and began to eradicate “bourgeois nationalism.”¹³

During 1946–7, the official interpretation of union of Ukraine with Russia in 1654 changed from “a lesser evil” to an “absolute blessing.” The Tsarist takeover of Ukraine, moreover, was defined not as annexation or territorial acquisition but as a reunification (*vossoedinenie*)—the inevitable result of the history of the two Slavic peoples. These views were soon to be canonized in the official “theses” of 1954. Another Zhdanov line was that all movements against tsarist rule were evil manifestations of nationalism. In 1950, for example, Shamil’s movement was reinterpreted as a reactionary episode inspired by Turkey and England, rather than a genuine national liberation struggle of the North Caucasians. Such an

interpretation was applied to similar movements in Kazakhstan and Turkmenia.

In the campaign for historical reinterpretation, publishing schedules were poorly co-ordinated with ideological directives. For instance, in 1948 a "revised" edition of Osipov's biography of Khmelnytsky portrayed him according to the pre-Zhdanov "lesser evil" formula. After a hurried re-editing of Osipov's text, the revised edition substituted "reunion" (*vossoedinenie*) for "union" (*soedinenie*) on the chapter's title page; in the body of the chapter, however, it is unchanged. Thus, for the most part, the 1654 arrangement with Muscovy is described as a form of union (*soedinenie*), although Osipov maintains that Khmelnytsky always saw Moscow as the first refuge. Of all choices, Khmelnytsky considered the Russian association to be the best and "close union" to be vital. Moscow, however, was slow to respond to the hetman's requests for aid because of the complicated international situation and because of the hostility of the high Ukrainian clergy and the Cossack *starshyna* toward Muscovy.

Osipov's view is that the "union" was "not an absolute blessing" because tsarist Russia was a "prison of peoples" and held back the economic and cultural progress of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the "union" was "historically progressive" even for the peasantry which, despite the reintroduction of serfdom, was freed from national oppression. Russian rule was less oppressive than that of the Poles. In submitting to Moscow, Khmelnytsky followed the formula "defend us against our foreign enemies but don't interfere with our internal affairs." This formula was contradictory, Osipov adds, for Russian military aid entailed the stationing of Russian troops in Ukraine. Russia, moreover, immediately began to violate the 1654 agreement. The Ukrainians naturally were disappointed, especially the high clergy and the Cossack officer class; the peasantry, burghers and lower clergy always supported the union. Osipov also dwells on the quarrel over reciprocal oaths at Pereiaslav, noting that Buturlin's refusal caused "strong confusion." Khmelnytsky desired a bilateral agreement whereas the Russians wanted a subordinate Ukraine.

Khmelnytsky, disappointed with the results of his agreement, sent a note to the tsar in December 1656, in which he predicted correctly that the Poles would not adhere to the Vilna treaty. Khmelnytsky, however, did not intend to break the tsarist connection, as Hrushevsky maintained. Rather, Osipov continues, the hetman tried to establish an anti-Polish coalition that would vindicate his anti-Polish stance and perhaps change tsarist policy.

Osipov states that it is difficult to give a thorough assessment of Khmelnytsky. The hetman was adventurous; he drove himself and his subordinates mercilessly. He had a rare ability to manipulate the masses and was a man of great personal courage. He was also exceedingly

secretive, as evident in his policy of withholding from the public the content of the March articles of 1654. Khmelnytsky rose above both a general anti-Polish nationalism and the restrictions of his own upper-class upbringing: he desired co-operation with the Polish masses and opposed only the *szlachta*. He was also one of the great military leaders of the seventeenth century. Osipov gives an “objective assessment” of Khmelnytsky’s historical significance:

Under the influence of unfolding events, under the influence of the mood of the masses which began to permeate his being, Bohdan evolved beyond himself, as a finished piece of sculpture transcends the original model. The roots of his world-view grew in the ideological soil of his time and of his class. His social program was in essence the programme of the landlord, but it was less exploitative than that of the Polish gentry. However, in moments of creative imagination he stepped out beyond the framework of this landlords’ programme and struggled not only on behalf of the interests of the officer class, but also on behalf of the interests and needs of all the oppressed Ukrainian people. Therefore in the ring of the chains of national oppression broken by Khmelnytsky, chains that fettered the Ukrainian people, there was audible the funeral march of political oppression, as well as of cultural oppression and in part of economic oppression as well. (pp. 461–2)

Hrushevsky was therefore wrong, Osipov insists, in claiming that Khmelnytsky’s economic programme was class-based and ended in failure.

The 1654 union had both negative and positive aspects, Osipov says. Among the former was Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky’s accumulation of personal fortunes. The tsarist grants of property created a new exploiting class of Ukrainian landowners. A positive result of the union was the economic and cultural growth of Ukraine, and Osipov refers to the high praise of Ukrainian cultural achievements recorded by Paul of Aleppo following a visit to Ukraine in 1654. Osipov inverted the truth, however, for Paul of Aleppo had praised Ukrainian achievements as they existed *prior* to the association with the Russians. Finally, on subsequent events, Osipov says that the 1667 Andrusovo agreement was less of a burden for the Left-Bank than for Right-Bank Ukrainians because feudalism under the tsars was less onerous than under the Poles. Osipov thus denies implicitly the importance and viability of the 1654 Pereiaslav arrangement.

The change of formula from “lesser evil” to “absolute good” was initiated by a letter from Militza Nechkina in 1951, printed in *Voprosy istorii* [Problems of history]. In this letter, entitled “O voprose formuly menshogo zla” [On the question of the “lesser evil” formula], she suggests

that tsarist expansion in Central Asia, the Volga area and other regions should be described as a “great blessing” rather than as a lesser evil. The letter notes that since the 1930s the lesser-evil formula has been applied indiscriminately to the annexation of non-Russians to the tsarist empire as an antidote to the Pokrovsky “school.” Nechkina somewhat timidly suggests that inherent in the lesser evil formula is a negative attitude toward Russian expansion. On the whole, Nechkina reasons, Russian expansion was a positive historical phenomenon, even though tsarist Russia was a “prison of peoples.” The non-Russian peoples acquired many cultural and economic benefits and could take part in a common struggle of all revolutionary democrats against the tsarist system, under the leadership of “the elder brother, the great Russian people.” Nechkina says that historians should renounce the lesser evil formula and those in the non-Russian republics should show special interest in the search for new formulations. In this manner, the Communist party’s intensified Russocentric historiography was presented to Soviet historians.

This change of approach was discussed at the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, convened in October 1952. The first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan, Mir-Dzhafar Bagirov, was given the task of extolling the historical role of the Russians as the “elder brother” of all the non-Russians in the Soviet Union. In his speech, Bagirov attacked Soviet historians for their “lesser evil” approach, for their failure to struggle against bourgeois nationalism and for their failure to stress the blessings that annexation by Russia had brought the non-Russians. One result of the Bagirov campaign was the reorganization of the editorial board of *Voprosy istorii*, and the dismissal of its editor, Petr Tretiakov.

The 1954 Theses

Early in 1954 was issued an interpretation of Russian-Ukrainian relations—a document entitled “Theses on the Tercentenary of the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia (1654–1954).”¹⁴ As the title suggests, the 1654 Pereiaslav accord is seen as the keystone of Russian-Ukrainian relations and as a central historical event for the Soviet Union. The twenty-one basic theses stress the success and significance of Soviet nationality policy, particularly with respect to Ukrainians.

According to the theses, the reunification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654 was the natural culmination of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Moreover, the Kievan state was the birthplace and cradle of the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. The Tatar-Mongol invasion destroyed the

original unity of the Eastern Slavs, who had preserved a consciousness of their common origin and destiny. Ukrainian areas were subjected to rapacious neighbours, particularly the Polish feudal lords, while the Russians developed a strong centralized state that acted as a "lodestar" for the oppressed Ukrainians. To defend themselves, the Ukrainians established a society of Cossacks, including the Zaporozhian Sich, which played a "progressive" role in history through its struggle for social and national liberation. The Ukrainians were inspired by the 1606–7 peasant revolt in Russia (led by Ivan Bolotnikov) and by Russian successes against Poland and Sweden during the Time of Troubles.

The theses indicate that the prime objective of the 1648–54 Ukrainian revolt was reunification with the Russian people. For the Ukrainians, reunification removed the threats of Polonization and annexation by Turkey. They were led by an outstanding statesman and soldier, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who understood that "the Ukrainian people's salvation lay only in unity with the great Russian people" and worked "perseveringly to reunify the Ukraine with Russia." Other Ukrainian heroes were Maksym Kryvonis, Ivan Bohun and Danylo Nechai. The Belorussian people and the Moldavian peasants also took part in this struggle which evoked widespread sympathy among the Polish peasantry. Russian support was constant: Don Cossacks and Russian peasants joined the Ukrainian army; the Russian state provided economic, diplomatic and military support. The tsarist government, after several years of indirect aid and in response to repeated Ukrainian requests, decided on 1 October 1653 to admit the Ukrainians into the Russian state and to declare war on Poland.

The proclamation of reunification by the Pereiaslav *rada* was acclaimed by the Ukrainians and marked a turning point in their history. Reunification gave the Ukrainian people a close friend, and furthered their economic and cultural development. By including the Ukrainians, the Russian state strengthened its international position. Together the Russian and Ukrainian people began a successful struggle against serfdom and capitalism, and ultimately toward the October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet state.

The 1954 theses were not merely a historical exercise. The document's purpose was to shape Russian-Ukrainian relations to the advantage of the Soviet state. More than half of it concerns the correctness of Marxist-Leninist nationality policy, the Russian proletariat as the standard-bearer of proletarian internationalism, the co-operation between Russian and Ukrainian workers, the Leninist legacy of equality and friendship of nations, the iniquities of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, and the accomplishments of Soviet Ukraine as a sovereign state within the Soviet framework. It points out the cultural and economic advances made

by the Ukrainians during the Soviet epoch, and lauds the annexation of Ukrainian ethnic territories after the Second World War. The theses repeatedly state that “the Soviet Union is an inspiring example of a country which has solved, for the first time in the history of mankind, the national problem.”

The celebration of the three-hundredth anniversary of Pereiaslav (it began in 1953) was conducted with great fanfare throughout the Soviet Union. A major theme was the exaltation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. On 16 January 1954 a decree of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet gave the city of Proskuriv and the *oblast* in which it is located—Kamianets-Podilsk—the new name of Khmelnytsky.¹⁵ Writers and artists were encouraged to produce works praising Khmelnytsky and the Pereiaslav agreement. In the words of Lowell Tillett: “For the sheer numbers of published items commemorating a single anniversary at one time, it is likely that the history of publishing knows no equal to this event.”¹⁶

The Soviet leaders organized demonstrations, concerts, speeches, art displays and sports events to commemorate the Pereiaslav anniversary. A Moscow subway station was redecorated and renamed in honour of Khmelnytsky. The Crimean peninsula, once an autonomous area for the Tatars, was detached from the Russian federated republic and added to the Ukrainian republic as a gesture of Russian friendship toward the Ukrainians (but in complete disregard for the Crimean Tatars). Three historians—I. Grekov, V. Koroliuk and I. Miller—were assigned the task of producing a popular Russian-language account of Pereiaslav—*Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei v 1654 g.* [Reunification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654]. The ensuing literary output made the wartime efforts of Korniiichuk, Savchenko and others appear insignificant in comparison. The poets Pavlo Tychyna (“At the Pereiaslav *Rada*”) and Maksym Rylsky (“The Pereiaslav *Rada*” and “Three Hundred Years”) wrote poems to honour the events. Mykola Bazhan wrote a book called *Honets* [The courier]. Additional contributions were made by Andrii Malyshko (*The Saga of Danylo the Cossack*), Iakiv Kachura (the novel *Ivan Bohun*), Natan Rybak (the novel *The Pereiaslav Rada*), Ivan Le (the novel *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*), Liubomyr Dmyterko (the play *Together Forever*), and Petro Panch (the novel *Echoing Ukraine*). Among the works published was the *Litopys velykoi druzhby* [Chronicle of the great friendship], edited by Mykola Bazhan, in which contemporary Ukrainian writers praised the Russian people. A similar volume entitled *Bratstvo kultur. Zbirnyk materialiv z istorii rosiisko-ukrainskoho kulturnoho iednannia* [Brotherhood of cultures: A collection of materials from the history of Russian-Ukrainian cultural interaction], edited by O. I. Biletsky,

contains selections by Russian writers from the Decembrist Kondratii Ryleev (1795–1826), to those of the 1917 revolution praising the Ukrainians, and reciprocal items by Ukrainian writers from Taras Shevchenko (1814–61) to the revolution praising the Russians.¹⁷

A Russian-language handbook for teachers of the history of the USSR in secondary schools was prepared: *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei, 1654–1954* [The reunion of Ukraine with Russia, 1654–1954]. The manual is essentially an expanded version of the 1954 theses. It contains no references to the controversy over reciprocal oaths at the 1654 Pereiaslav *rada*: the teachers were evidently expected to ignore the issue. Without direct reference to the Vilna accord, the handbook states that Russia “was forced” to reach an agreement with Poland in 1656. The book takes a traditional Russocentric approach: Ukrainian “bourgeois historians” are frequently attacked; Mazepa, Orlyk and Voinarovsky are condemned as traitors; and the eighteenth century partitions of Poland are praised. The 1654 reunification is regarded as a “profoundly progressive event,” but mainly because it helped to consolidate Russian power.

Historians throughout the Soviet bloc were required to produce books and articles to celebrate the tercentenary. The Poles held a conference and issued a volume of the proceedings: *Sesja naukowa w trzechsetna rocznice zjednoczenia Ukrainy z Rosja, 1654–1954* [Scholarly session on the tercentenary of the union of Ukraine with Russia, 1654–1954]. Soviet historians of Poland were also active. For example, I. S. Miller, in an article entitled “Osvoboditelnaia voina 1648–54 gg. i polskii narod” [The 1648–54 war of liberation and the Polish people], which appeared in *Voprosy istorii*, wrote that the 1648–54 revolt against the commonwealth was a boon to the Polish people. The “bourgeois nationalists” erred in treating that revolt as a movement against all Poles. Ukrainian and Polish workers clashed with Polish and Ukrainian feudalists, Miller argues, and the Cossack cause was supported by the Polish masses. Many Polish peasants joined their Ukrainian brothers in revolt and the lists of registered Cossacks showed several Polish surnames. Miller stresses that Khmelnytsky also encouraged uprisings among the Polish peasantry. In fact, Miller concludes, the Ukrainians’ and Belorussians’ secession from the commonwealth was in the interest of the Polish people. The loss of Ukrainian territories did not in any way impoverish the Polish masses, and affected only the feudal landlords. The multi-national nature of the commonwealth, Miller writes, fatally weakened it. In an article entitled “Klassovaia borba krestian zapadnoukrainskikh zemel v 1638–1648 godakh” [The class struggle of the peasants of the West Ukrainian lands in the years 1638–48], M. W. Horn also shows that the decade preceding the Khmelnytsky revolt was not a time of “Golden Peace” but of acute

conflict, particularly in West Ukrainian areas.

The articles published in *Voprosy istorii* examined a variety of aspects of the Khmelnytsky revolt. In “K kharakteristike mezhdunarodnoi obstanovki osvoboditelnoi voyny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 godov” [Toward a characterization of the international situation during the 1648–54 war of liberation of the Ukrainian people], B. F. Porshnev relates the 1648–54 revolt to other contemporary events; for example, the problems of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are connected with the Thirty Years War and the 1632–4 Smolensk war with Russia. The 1634 Peace of Polianovka determined Russian-Polish relations until 1654. Porshnev agrees with E. Haumant, author of *La guerre du nord et la paix d’Oliva*, published in Paris in 1893, that after the Thirty Years War a new crisis erupted in Europe, the so-called First Northern War, which began with the Khmelnytsky revolt and ended with the Andrusovo agreement of 1667.

Porshnev believes that despite Turkish and Swedish aggression, the greatest danger to Russian interests came from Poland, which was associated with the Holy Roman Empire and Spain. Thus he maintains that the 1654 events enabled Russia to cope with its major foe of that time, Poland. Smirnov’s “Borba russkogo i ukrainskogo narodov protiv agressii sultanskoi Turtsii v XVII veke” [The struggle of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples against aggression by the Turkey of the sultans in the seventeenth century] provides a patriotic account of Russian relations with Turkey in the seventeenth century; it praises those responsible for Russian successes and denounces the pro-Turkish Ukrainians. The 1654 “reunification,” in Smirnov’s view, saved Left-Bank Ukraine from Turkish domination and prepared the way for the liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine in the eighteenth century.

A. E. Kozachenko made a special study of the *Zemskii Sobor* of 11 (1) October 1653. The latter had approved Khmelnytsky’s petitions for aid and recommended the tsar’s acceptance. Kozachenko concludes his 1957 article—“Zemskii sobor 1653 goda” [The *Zemskii Sobor* of 1653]—with a quotation from the 1954 theses to show that the decision of the *Zemskii Sobor* expressed the will of the entire Russian people. In similar fashion, in 1954 Volodymyr Holobutsky, a specialist on seventeenth century Ukrainian history, had written a carefully researched article, “Rossiia i osvoboditelnaia voina ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 godov” [Russia and the 1648–1654 war of liberation of the Ukrainian people], replete with quotations stressing the “fraternal bonds” between the Ukrainians and Russians and demonstrating that “reunification” was the basic *leitmotif* of Ukrainian history.

The 1954 theses, and the historiography that preceded them, influenced a generation of historians. The writings of Holobutsky, in particular, are an excellent example. Holobutsky's popular biography of Khmelnytsky, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky—velykyi syn ukrainskoho naroda* [Bohdan Khmelnytsky—the great son of the Ukrainian people], published in 1953, stresses the economic and national situation of the Ukrainians in the commonwealth prior to the 1648 uprising. The Union of Churches aimed at “the artificial separation of the Ukrainian people from the great Russian people.” During the 1648–54 revolt Russia was the “only force” willing and able to aid the Ukrainians, and reunion with Russia was “the main question dictated by the entire course of the history of Ukraine.”

According to Holobutsky, Bohdan Khmelnytsky was a great soldier, organizer, diplomat and politician; he was also pro-Russian throughout his career. In 1648 after his triumphal entry into Kiev, he sent Muzhylovsky and the patriarch of Jerusalem, Paisii, to Moscow with a petition that the tsar take Ukraine under his wing. In 1653 Muzhylovsky made another journey to Moscow when the Ukrainians were in difficult straits, and this time the Russians responded positively. Further negotiations led to the Pereiaslav *rada* of 18 (8) January 1654, which expressed the will of the entire Ukrainian people.

Holobutsky assesses personalities in Soviet fashion. Adam Kysil, for example, was “sly and eloquent,” but his plans were “unmasked.” No mention, however, is made of some of Khmelnytsky's closest advisers, such as Vyhovsky and Teteria. Holobutsky ends his biography with a quotation from Nikita Khrushchev and with the frequently (but often inaccurately) quoted passage from Vissarion Belinsky: “Having united forever with consanguineous Russia, Little Russia opened up for itself the dream of civilization, education, art and science. Alongside Russia, she is destined for a great future.”

In *Diplomatičeskaia istoriia osvoboditelnoi voiny ukrainskogo naroda* [Diplomatic history of the war of liberation of the Ukrainian people], a study of the international aspects of the 1648–54 events, Holobutsky once again adheres closely to the 1954 theses. He begins with a detailed account of the internal problems of the commonwealth on the eve of the Ukrainian revolt. King Władysław IV and Chancellor Ossoliński wanted a strong centralized state but were opposed by powerful magnates. The policy entailed friendlier relations with France and Russia, at the risk of tension with Turkey and the Crimean khanate. Władysław aimed to use the Ukrainian Cossacks as leverage against both the Turkish-Crimean alliance and his internal foes. But the Polish magnates resented these negotiations and planned to murder Khmelnytsky. Khmelnytsky's collaboration with the Polish king provoked the raid on his Subotiv estate. Holobutsky rejects the

view of most bourgeois and some Soviet historians that this episode was the result of a personal conflict.

Khmelnysky was in close contact with Władysław IV and may have been among the Cossacks sent to France in 1645 to aid the French in their war against Spain. During the interregnum which followed Władysław's death in 1648, Ossoliński led the anti-magnate, pro-Cossack faction, which favoured increased royal power and supported Jan Kazimierz as the new king. The latter promised to grant concessions to the Cossacks in return for their support. The pro-Austrian faction in Poland, however, supported Władysław's half-brother Karol as the candidate for the throne. They were supported by the French who were ready to help suppress the Cossack revolt, to obtain increased support within the commonwealth. The crowning of Jan Kazimierz was, in Holobutsky's view, a great victory for Khmelnytsky; the new king immediately dispatched Adam Kysil to reconvene peace talks with the Cossacks.

The Ukrainian rebellion evoked two kinds of reaction in Moscow: joy over the desire for reunion and fear that the anti-feudal struggle might spill over into Russia. The latter, together with Swedish aggression, caused Russia to reject Khmelnytsky's petition for reunification in 1649. Nevertheless, in that year the tsar sent his first mission to Khmelnytsky; Vasiliï Mikhailov established diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ukraine, signifying "the official recognition of Ukraine by Russia." A second mission, led by Grigorii Unkovsky, arranged for Russia to supply economic aid to the Ukrainians. The Russians assisted the Ukrainians in a number of ways, without direct war with the Poles. Unfortunately, the Poles were so concerned about Russian intervention that in spring 1649 they began new military campaigns against the Ukrainians. Khmelnytsky was informed by the tsar that the Polianovka accord excluded direct Russian military aid and Ukraine's reunification with Russia. Throughout 1649 and 1650 Khmelnytsky's policy had one long-term objective: reunion with Russia.

After the battle of Berestechko and the Bila Tserkva agreement of 1651, Ukrainian leaders accelerated efforts to reunite with Russia. Throughout 1651 Russia was not concerned with the plight of the Ukrainians. In January 1651 Larion Lopukhin went to Ukraine and stated that Russia would go to war against the Poles if those guilty of using the tsar's title incorrectly were not punished. In February 1651 the *Zemskii Sobor* discussed the Ukrainian problem. Vasiliï Stepanov was then sent to Khmelnytsky to obtain documents that would compromise the Polish king. News of a massive Polish military build-up and fear of Swedish intervention, however, prevented direct Russian interference in Ukrainian matters. Moscow decided to wait and see what developed. However, in

October 1651 Vasiliï Unkovsky was sent to Khmelnytsky to reassure him that Russia would break off relations with Poland if the tsar's ultimatum regarding the punishment of those that insulted him was not heeded.

At the battle of Batih in May 1652, the Ukrainians and their Tatar allies defeated the Poles. Khmelnytsky continued to press for Russian aid, sending Samiilo Zarudny to Moscow in December 1652. Holobutsky claims that in 1652, Khmelnytsky "pretended" to want peace with the Poles, but used the negotiations as a cover to gain time for the planned reunification with Russia. In March 1653, as the forces of Stefan Czarniecki marched against the Ukrainians, the hetman decided to seek aid from Sweden as well as from Moscow. But by this time Moscow had decided to aid the Ukrainians. The decision was conveyed by the tsar's emissaries Artamon Matveev and Ivan Fomin, to Khmelnytsky's envoy Burliai. (A similar reply was brought to the hetman by another tsarist emissary, Fedor Ladyzhensky.)

Simultaneously, a Russian mission in Warsaw was negotiating for peace between the Ukrainians and Poles, as outlined in the Zboriv pact. Holobutsky, however, claims that the true aim of this mission, headed by Boris Repnin-Obolensky and Bogdan Khitrovo, was to conceal from the Poles Russian aid to the Ukrainians and preparations for war against the Poles. In September 1652 the tsar sent Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin to Chyhyryn; there they received the news that the Repnin-Khitrovo mission had failed and that the tsar would soon be taking the Ukrainians under his protection. These events led to the convocation of the Pereiaslav *rada* in January 1654.

On 11 (1) October 1653 the *Zemskii Sobor* decided to accept the Ukrainian petition and to declare war on Poland. Vasiliï Buturlin informed the Ukrainians of the Russian decision. Khmelnytsky and his Tatar allies were then at Zhvanets, but the hetman did not inform the Tatars as he feared that they would join the Poles. For the same reason, says Holobutsky, Khmelnytsky refused to receive Streshnev and Bredikhin in Zhvanets. When Jan Kazimierz learned that the Russians proposed to intervene, he immediately informed the Tatar khan, Islam Giray, who was furious at Khmelnytsky's duplicity. In December 1653 the khan signed an agreement with the Poles.

Russian-Ukrainian reunification was made official at the Pereiaslav *rada* on 8 January 1654. Holobutsky writes that Khmelnytsky failed to persuade Buturlin to take a reciprocal oath on behalf of the tsar. In assessing the Pereiaslav events, Holobutsky quotes the official theses of 1954. The Pereiaslav *rada* was supplemented by the March Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, approved by the tsar after they had been examined and corrected. On 27 March 1654 a special tsarist patent, addressed to

Khmelnysky and the Zaporozhian army, containing assurances of respect for Ukrainian "political autonomy," was granted to the Ukrainians.

Ivan Krypiakevych (1886–1967)

During the final years of Stalin's life Soviet concern with Russian-Ukrainian relations led to the rehabilitation of the historian and teacher, Ivan Krypiakevych. An outstanding authority on the Khmelnytsky era, Krypiakevych, as stated in *Ukrainskaadianska entsyklopediia* [Ukrainian-Soviet encyclopedia], "overcame his old erroneous views and published a series of valuable studies, particularly on the 1648–54 period" and moved away from "the anti-popular bourgeois-nationalist conceptions of Hrushevsky."

Born in Lviv and given a European education, Krypiakevych was the son of a distinguished Ukrainian Catholic theologian and studied under Hrushevsky.¹⁸ Prior to 1939 Krypiakevych taught history in secondary schools, except for brief periods at the underground Ukrainian university and the Greek Catholic theological academy, both in Lviv. After the German-Soviet partition of the Polish Republic in 1939, he obtained a position with the Soviet-controlled university in Lviv, but under the second Soviet regime after 1945, came into official disfavour. From 1946 to 1951 he lived as a virtual prisoner in Kiev and Lviv. In 1951, during preparations for the Pereiaslav tercentenary, Krypiakevych was partially rehabilitated and permitted to write new studies of the Khmelnytsky period. These studies, however, were required to conform with the positions later set forth in the 1954 theses. The motives for exploiting Krypiakevych for the tercentenary are unclear, but the changes in the historian's views (as published in the USSR) are a revealing case study of political control over the writing of history.

Before the Soviets annexed Eastern Galicia in 1939, Krypiakevych had been a prolific writer on the Cossack period. He helped to edit an encyclopedic military history of the Ukrainians, *Istoriia ukrainskoho viiska* [History of the Ukrainian army], first published in Lviv in 1936, and wrote the sections on the Khmelnytsky era. His best work on that period, published in installments from 1925–31, was "Studii nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmelnytskoho" [Studies on Bohdan Khmelnytsky's state]. Krypiakevych's articles were highly nationalistic. A general history of Ukraine written during the Second World War was printed in Western Europe in 1949 under the pseudonym of Ivan Kholm'sky (Krypiakevych's father was a Uniate priest in the Chelm (Kholm) area in the 1880s who had fled to Galicia after tsarist persecution of the Eastern-rite Catholic

church). Krypiakevych's views on the Khmelnytsky era in these non-Soviet works contrast with those in his Soviet publications.

In "Studii nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmelnytskoho," Krypiakevych stresses that the 1648 revolt produced a new state in Eastern Europe, unique historically because it was created by a class of free, land-based Cossacks. Through the Zboriv agreement, the state attempted to reach a compromise with the Poles. The Polish gentry, however, doubted Khmelnytsky's loyalty to the commonwealth and many opposed the Zboriv treaty. Hostilities were renewed. The battles of Berestechko and Batih prompted a search for new solutions that eventually resulted in the Ukrainian-Russian alliance of 1654.

In 1649 the Cossack state consisted of three former palatinates (*województwa*) of the commonwealth, to which it still formally belonged: Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv. These were artificial borders, however, and did not encompass the entire Dnieper basin. Khmelnytsky tried to expand the state's borders in all directions. Muscovy opposed his efforts to establish a Belorussian regiment, as this threatened Russian interests. The Ukrainians then abandoned the annexation of northern territory. The movement of the Ukrainians into Slobidska Ukraine to the east was frustrated for similar reasons. Thus the heart of the Cossack state remained the middle-Dnieper region, with Chyhyryn as the capital.

In his pre-Soviet writings, Krypiakevych stresses that the events of 1648–54 transformed the social structure of Ukraine. In the commonwealth 85 per cent of the land belonged to large estates under private, ecclesiastical or crown ownership. After the Cossack revolution the large estates were broken up, serfdom was abolished and a system of rental payments (*chynsh*) replaced the former *corvée* (*panshchyna*). The *szlachta*, the commonwealth gentry, was also uprooted in the Cossack state, although some of the Ukrainian Orthodox upper class identified themselves with the Cossack revolt. Khmelnytsky was careful to keep this upper stratum from dominating the Cossack state, Krypiakevych points out, but later hetmans permitted the consolidation of a new ruling class.¹⁹ After the revolt about half the Ukrainian population became Cossacks, that is, they became free farmers obligated to serve in the army and had first choice of land grants as well as exclusive right to state offices. The other half were burghers (*mishchany*) and free peasants (*pospolyti*). (The urban element was a separate segment of Ukrainian society and in some regions formed as much as 70 per cent of the population; many cities possessed local self-government and enjoyed special exemptions.) Considerable social mobility existed between the Cossacks and the burghers and peasants; the Orthodox clergy was a special privileged group.

The Cossack state under Khmelnytsky was constantly at war and an unusually large part of the population was mobilized. At its height, according to seventeenth-century sources, the Cossack army numbered three hundred thousand; this figure is exaggerated, but it does suggest a tremendous increase over the six thousand registered Cossacks in 1648. Military success was made possible by Khmelnytsky's alliance with the Crimean Tatars, which, although unpopular among the Ukrainians, guaranteed rear guard security as the Cossacks battled the Poles. (This alliance with the Tatars, however, ran counter to the Cossack tradition of easy access to the Black Sea and put Ukraine within the orbit of Oriental influences, Krypiakevych writes in *Istoriia Ukrainy* [History of Ukraine].)

With a predominantly agricultural economy, the Cossack state depended on rye and wheat farming, cattle raising and beekeeping; exports consisted largely of lumber, potash, furs, wax and honey. Krypiakevych estimates that in 1649 the population of the early Cossack state numbered no more than one million people.²⁰ Constant fighting, the emigration of Jews, and Tatar raids resulted in large population losses, which Khmelnytsky tried to offset by encouraging Greek, Wallachian and Serbian immigration.

The main source of revenue for the new state came from the expropriated lands of the commonwealth gentry, the Catholic church and the crown. War also increased the state's property. Taxes were levied on private land, mineral deposits, tobacco, tar, mills and the manufacture of alcoholic beverages. Tariffs were collected on both imports and exports. State officials received no monetary remuneration; instead they were granted state-owned property. Although the military and the mobilized Cossacks were exempt from taxes, both the free, unmobilized Cossacks and the burghers paid them. The system of taxing the mills and specific products consumed domestically created a state monopoly through a practice known as the *arendari*. These middlemen in turn paid taxes to the state for the right to sell to the consumer. The chief financial officer of the hetmanate was known as the general-treasurer (*generalny pidskarbii*).

Cultural and educational activities also thrived during the heyday of the hetmanate. The Kievan Academy, a unique institution of higher learning, reached an enrollment of 2,000 students. Literacy was high throughout Ukraine and many young people studied abroad; science, art and literature flourished. From the intellectual milieu of the Cossack state emerged later the writings of Velychko, Hrabianka and the *Istoriia Rusov*.

The new state created a body politic with an administrative system based on Cossack military forms, Krypiakevych points out. The state had no written constitution, and judicial practices were based on Cossack common law ("where there are three Cossacks, two will judge the third"),

Magdeburg Law and the Lithuanian Statute. Three political concepts struggled for supremacy within the Cossack state, Krypiakievych claims: the anarchy-prone direct democracy of the Zaporozhian Sich (the institution of the *Chorna Rada*), the elitist class-oriented and state-centred approach of the officer stratum, and the monarchical principle advocated by Khmelnytsky, Vyhovsky and Petro Doroshenko. Adherents of all three approaches promoted certain freedoms (*volnosti*) in their own interests and all considered themselves patriots and defenders of their native land, making frequent appeals to the glorious past of Kievan Rus'.

At first, direct democracy was the rule, with frequent convocation of open assemblies (*rady*). Officials were accountable to these assemblies and to the army, as in the Zaporozhian Sich, the prototype of the new governmental apparatus. As the state expanded, however, the general assemblies became unwieldy and the general *rada* met on ceremonial occasions only; actual power—executive and legislative—was given to the hetman (the chief executive) and his advisory body, the *Starshynska Rada* [Officers' Council]. Although the office of the hetman was elective, Khmelnytsky tried to become an absolute ruler and planned to make the office hereditary.

The tradition of direct democracy inherited from the Zaporozhian Sich proved to be impracticable. A representative government, which would have been the best alternative, Krypiakievych argues, failed to develop. No viable legislative body emerged to replace the *Generalna Rada*; the hetman and the *Starshynska Rada* performed all the functions of government. This group became a new elite and used its power to promote its own interests. The result was conflict—much of it violent—between the masses and the rulers.

Social division proved to be the main weakness of the Cossack state and was exacerbated by the inexperience of the ruling class. Although the state possessed an excellent army, strong leadership under Khmelnytsky and some capable administrators, Krypiakievych concludes that it could not survive within the power structures of Eastern Europe. The creator of the Cossack state wanted complete independence, but obtained only a promise of autonomy within the Muscovite state. Nevertheless, as Krypiakievych says in *Istoriia Ukrainy*, the Cossack state was a unique phenomenon in Eastern Europe:

Ukrainian culture attained such strength and originality that it not only countered Polonization, not only countered Russian incursion, but even gained great influence in Muscovy, bringing enlightenment and knowledge to this backward land. The Ukrainian state fell before the advance of Muscovy,

which was better organized militarily and economically. However, all that the Ukrainian people created during that brief span of independent existence was not lost but was bequeathed as a heritage to future generations. Consciousness of national identity, attachment to one's native land, devotion to freedom and individual improvement, respect for civil authority, the spirit of chivalry, deep appreciation of culture—these were the acquisitions with which the Ukrainian community entered the nineteenth century. (p. 300)

Krypiakevych considers Khmelnytsky a great soldier and statesman, whose primary goals were political rather than strategic. The hetman strived for a separate state, and gave the Ukrainian masses a new self-confidence.

The creation of a new state was vitiated, however, by the 1654 arrangement with Moscow. Krypiakevych writes in "Bohdan Khmelnytsky i Moskva" [Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Moscow] that the 1654 accord marked "the beginning of the end of Ukraine." Krypiakevych's position echoes Ukrainian romantic poetry and folklore. His article begins with a quotation from Taras Shevchenko that expresses the sentiments of the Ukrainian people:

Oi Bohdane, Bohdanochku!
Iak by bula znala
U kolystsi b zadushyla,
Pid seretsem pryspala!
 [Oh Bohdan, little Bohdan!
 Had I but known,
 I would have choked you in your cradle,
 Or ended you in the womb!]

Khmelnytsky did not want union with the Russian state, writes Krypiakevych. The hetman's praise for the tsar was mere "diplomatic politeness." Pereiaslav was a temporary agreement, made primarily to obtain aid against external foes. Khmelnytsky had no confidence in the Russian military commanders stationed in Ukraine, and his hostility increased after the tsar's troops destroyed Ukrainian villages. Within a few months Khmelnytsky realized that the Pereiaslav agreement was a mistake; moreover, he believed that the 1656 Vilna accord would destroy

the Cossack state. Ukrainian delegates sent to the talks were not allowed to participate "as dogs are not permitted into a church." Upon their return at an assembly of Cossack officers, the envoys reported that Moscow planned to return Ukraine to Poland, whereupon Khmelnytsky informed the assembled officers that he was prepared to submit to Moslem rule. The *rada* agreed unanimously to an anti-Russian programme and dispatched envoys to Moldavia, Wallachia, Crimea, Transylvania and Sweden in search of new allies. Khmelnytsky's advice to his successors was that they should break away from the tsar.

Krypiakevych thus maintains that in 1654 Khmelnytsky formed an alliance with Russia, which was broken unilaterally by the Russians. In 1648, Moscow refused to aid the Ukrainians because of an accord with Warsaw, which Khmelnytsky opposed. As renewed fighting seemed likely, Khmelnytsky prepared for war against both the Poles and the Russians. There were clashes along the Ukrainian-Russian border; in 1649, in response to Russian protests against Cossack incursions into their territory, Khmelnytsky threatened "to smash Muscovite cities and Moscow itself." Changes in the military balance in Eastern Europe, however, forced the Ukrainians into temporary union with the Russians in 1654.

After Buturlin's refusal to take the oath, the Ukrainians lost confidence in the Russians. Bohun, Hladky, Sirko and Huliannytsky and other colonels refused to take the oath of allegiance to the tsar. Two regiments gave a hostile reception to the Russian envoys, and Ukrainian priests warned that Muscovite rule would impoverish the people. None the less, Krypiakevych adds, Khmelnytsky's realistic assessment of the needs of the Cossack state led him to accept the alliance. The Ukrainians did not regard the agreement as annexation or union, nor did they talk of the return "of a branch severed from the maternal trunk," as tsarist apologists later wrote. The possibility of liberating the Orthodox church did not motivate the Pereiaslav agreement because the Ukrainian clergy was overwhelmingly opposed to Moscow. Even Khmelnytsky was uncomfortable as a subordinate to the tsar, but the agreement provided Russian support for a break with Poland. Above all, Khmelnytsky needed a new military ally.

After Khmelnytsky's death, his closest adviser, Ivan Vyhovsky, continued the hetman's policies. Vyhovsky's main objective was to model the Cossack state on the Netherlands and Switzerland, republics whose existence was guaranteed by the Treaty of Westphalia. In reply to a Russian envoy who said that the Ukrainians had been separated from Great Russia and were now reunited, Vyhovsky said: "Let Great Russia be Great Russia and let Ukraine be Ukraine; we are not a defeated army." Vyhovsky demanded that the Russians cease interference in internal Ukrainian matters and that the tsar's military commanders stop usurping civilian

powers. Vyhovsky also insisted that the tsar's representatives should deal only with the hetman, not with individual members of the *starshyna*, clergy or Zaporozhian Sich.

Prior to Khmelnytsky's death, Moscow had begun to exploit the social conflicts between the rank-and-file Cossacks and the officers. Khmelnytsky had balanced this social struggle by controlling the *starshyna*. Vyhovsky, however, vigorously opposed the *chern*, relied primarily on the *starshyna* for support and helped them become a new privileged class. The masses resented the growth of these "new *pany*," and Moscow took advantage of the growing conflict—the tsar, for example supported the Pushkar and Barabash rebellions.

Vyhovsky, aided by Iurii Nemyrych (among others), signed a new agreement with the commonwealth: the Hadiach accord of September 1658. He claimed that the tsar had failed to provide the promised protection, had made a separate agreement with the Poles and had built a fortress in Kiev. Vyhovsky further complained that the tsar's representative had denigrated the hetman and supported his opponents, channelled false information to Moscow and fomented civil war in Ukraine. War between Vyhovsky and the Russians broke out in August 1658; in July of the following year, the Cossacks defeated the Russian army under Prince Trubetskoi at Konotop.

Krypiakevych states that Vyhovsky was unable to consolidate his military victory because of his "erroneous" social policies. He underestimated the extent of popular discontent and was unable to appease the *chern*. Vyhovsky's adherence to commonwealth social patterns led to conflict with the masses and individual members of the *starshyna*. Russian support for Vyhovsky's opponents produced a new Pereiaslav agreement in 1659 that made Iurii Khmelnytsky head of the anti-Vyhovsky forces.

This 1659 Pereiaslav agreement was catastrophic, Krypiakevych writes. The Russians terrorized Iurii into accepting all their demands. To Krypiakevych, the 1659 agreement "confirmed the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky on the basis of a version that the boyars had arbitrarily altered." The agreement was an attempt to destroy Ukrainian statehood; it provided for the posting of Russian military units in more Ukrainian cities, obliged the hetman to travel to Moscow, denied him a voice in foreign affairs, and made the Kiev metropolitan subordinate to the Moscow patriarch. After the 1659 agreement the Russians negotiated separately with individual Cossack officers, members of the clergy, and cities. Estates were granted unilaterally and the tsarist commanders increased their control over local civilian affairs.

As the Russians trampled over Ukrainian rights, a wave of disorder began to spread, that culminated in the period of "Ruin." Divided into two camps, one oriented toward Russia and the other toward Poland, the

Ukrainians began a civil war. After Vyhovsky's tenure, pro-Polish groups were led by Pavlo Teteria, whereas the Left-Bank factions were led by Iakym Somko (a rich burgher by origin), Vasyl Zolotarenko and Ivan Briukhovetsky. In the turmoil, Vyhovsky was shot by the Poles and Teteria resigned the hetmanate. Briukhovetsky's subservience to the Russians was a "heavy blow to the Ukrainians," Krypiakevych notes, and even caused pro-Russians—such as Bishop Metodii Fylymonovych—to change allegiance. Disorder in Ukraine was a factor behind the 1667 Andrusovo agreement between Poland and Russia, which caused even Briukhovetsky to oppose the Russians.

Andrusovo compromised both pro-Polish and pro-Russian Ukrainian groups, making possible the rise of Petro Doroshenko, who tried to establish a viable political entity based on pro-Tatar and pro-Turkish policies. Doroshenko's plans also failed, and large Ukrainian areas remained under Polish or Turkish hegemony. The autonomous *hetmanshchyna* in Left-Bank Ukraine tried to preserve Cossack rights and privileges; this endeavour ended in Mazepa's revolt against tsarist rule during the Great Northern War. The defeat of the Swedes and Mazepa at Poltava in 1709 ended all possibility of escape from Russian control. For future generations, however, Mazepa remained the symbol of the struggle for independence, Krypiakevych contends, and his programme was pursued in emigration by Pylyp Orlyk. Moreover, Left-Bank traditions resurfaced in the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national revival.

These were the views of the pre-Soviet historian Krypiakevych.²¹ In 1948 he had obtained permission to return to his native Lviv and in 1951 became the head of the city's historical institute. By 1958 he had become a full member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. From 1953 until his death in 1967 Krypiakevych endeavoured to be a free scholar and to train historians in the techniques and values of European scholarship. Political pressures were so strong, however, that he was obliged to publish a renunciation of his former non-Marxist views in *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* [Ukrainian historical journal].

Despite trying conditions, Krypiakevych none the less managed to get his works published. His booklet *Zviazky Zakhidnoi Ukrainy z Rosiieiu do seredyny XVII st.* [Relations of Western Ukraine with Russia to the middle of the seventeenth century] (published in Kiev in 1953) deals with economic and cultural ties between Muscovy and West Ukrainian areas, with special emphasis on the printer, Ivan Fedorov. The introduction and conclusion recapitulate the theses of 1954 and mercilessly attack the views of Hrushevsky, Krypiakevych's mentor. ("These falsifications of Hrushevsky were elaborated and circulated by his 'school,' to which the author of the present work also belonged in the past.") The language and

style of this statement, so uncharacteristic of Krypiakevych, suggests that it was inserted—as in all probability were similar passages—in the text without the author's consent.

In 1954 Krypiakevych's major contribution to the Pereiaslav tercentenary appeared: *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, a biography. In 1956 the historian edited a collection of articles on Lviv entitled *Narysy istorii Lvova* [Outlines of the history of Lviv]; a bleak, non-controversial volume, which barely touched on the Khmelnytsky era. In 1961, under the joint editorship of Krypiakevych and I. Butych, was published *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho* [The documents of Bohdan Khmelnytsky], a collection of letters, declarations and orders written by Khmelnytsky from 1648–57. The following year Krypiakevych edited and published *Dzherela z istorii Halychyny periodu feodalizmu* [Sources on the history of Galicia in the feudal period], a valuable compilation of sources on the history of Galicia up to 1772, with very little commentary or assessment.

The introduction to the 1954 biography of Khmelnytsky cites the “errors” of Krypiakevych's previous writings. Among them were the underestimation of social and economic factors in history, failure to distinguish between the superstructure of society and its basic economic substructure, adherence to the nationalist “single-stream” theory of the history of the Ukrainian people, failure to grasp that the Cossack state had a class basis with a record of suppression of the popular masses, and falsification of history by portraying the Cossack government as an “over-all national institution.” Without directly referring to himself, Krypiakevych castigates “bourgeois nationalists” because they portrayed Khmelnytsky as a man with an aristocratic world view, ignored the hetman's close ties with the masses, and opposed the “reunification” of Ukraine with Russia.

These Soviet criticisms of bourgeois-nationalist historians are unfairly applied to Krypiakevych. His pre-Soviet writings do not underestimate social and economic factors. In fact, these works outline the class antagonisms in the Cossack state as the principal cause of its demise. Nor do his writings show evidence of the “single-stream” approach. These charges, levelled against Krypiakevych in his own work, were clearly authored by anonymous political censors unfamiliar with Krypiakevych's “bourgeois” views. Also, the vituperative language used in the book is typical Soviet propaganda, and alien to Krypiakevych.

Krypiakevych's biography refers to the Ukrainians' “constant and continually expanding contact with Russia.” Reunification was their aspiration, as shown by increasing trade, the missions of the clergy to Moscow, the flight of peasants to Muscovy, the close ties between the Sich and the Don Cossacks and the frequent exchanges between the tsar and

the Ukrainian Cossacks. The style and content of such passages, however, suggest that they were inserted by a censor. They maintain that Khmelnytsky's only reliable ally was Russia and that the Ukrainian army learned a great deal from the Russian, which was superior to those of Western Europe. This biography contains nothing original; it presents well-known facts and adheres to the 1954 theses.

One chapter deals with the socio-economic conditions on the eve of the 1648 revolt. Despite the Marxist terminology, the views expressed are essentially the same as in Krypiakievych's pre-Soviet writings: the commonwealth was a fragmented feudal society in a period when most European states were centralized under absolute monarchs; in the Ukrainian areas magnates dominated the enserfed peasantry; and the rise of the Cossacks highlighted social, national and religious factors. The peasantry became the main force in the revolt. The 1648–54 revolution had an "overall national character," Krypiakievych insists, as well as a social aspect. The "popular masses" struggled against "feudalism and the gentry order," while every specific social stratum fought in its own interests.

The revolution destroyed the power of the magnates; free, small private landholdings became the rule as the land was worked by both peasants and Cossacks. This was a progressive development, Krypiakievych contends, but Khmelnytsky began to return land to Orthodox monasteries and the Cossack *starshyna*. The hetman issued many *universalys* restoring landholdings, and at Pereiaslav the officers insisted on the preservation of their rights and privileges. The March Articles of 1654 also guaranteed the feudal rights of the Ukrainian gentry. (Khmelnytsky's grants of special privileges included control over mills, dams and other enterprises, a policy that was abetted by the tsarist government.) Khmelnytsky wanted to increase the power of the *starshyna*, and thus brought about "the intensification of the class struggle" in Ukraine. (Khmelnytsky himself belonged to the rich oligarchy and was the largest landowner among the *starshyna*.) At the same time, Khmelnytsky knew he could not win the war against the Poles without the aid of the Ukrainian peasantry and consequently protected the latter stratum. He personally favoured feudal landownership but limited for political reasons.

Krypiakievych writes that the state established by Khmelnytsky's Cossack oligarchy had a twofold purpose: to keep the masses subservient and to protect its territory. The administration of state affairs was carried out by two groups within the *starshyna*. On the one hand, there were the Cossack aristocrats descended from the old Ukrainian gentry (such as Vyhovsky and Teteria) hostile to both Russia and the peasantry and who sought agreement with the commonwealth. On the other hand, there were

those who rose to leadership positions from Cossack ranks in the course of the revolt; they were close to the peasantry and favoured friendship with Russia. Thus reads the new Krypiakievych formulation. The hetman's failures in his Moldavian-Wallachian venture and with Rakoczy spurred him to negotiate for reunion with Russia. Khmelnytsky tried to form close ties with Poland's enemy Sweden in 1650 but was thwarted by Russian-Swedish hostility. In 1655–7 Khmelnytsky reopened negotiations with Sweden and also with other European countries (such as Brandenburg, Venice and Austria). None the less, the hetman's principal objective remained reunification with Russia.

The hetman's great merit, the biography continues, was that he fulfilled the age-old strivings of the Ukrainians for "reunion" with Russia. Propaganda aside, the book is a solid account of Khmelnytsky's life and attains a high level of scholarship. The biography is most useful for its details of Khmelnytsky's career. Responsibility for the incident that led to his revolt—Czapliński's raid on Khmelnytsky's Subotiv estate—is attributed to the Koniecpolskis, the most powerful family in the Chyhyryn district, who wanted Khmelnytsky's property and commissioned Czapliński to expropriate it forcibly. Khmelnytsky's second wife, who later married Czapliński, was directly involved in the incident. Of gentry origin, she sympathized with the Poles and was ready to betray Khmelnytsky. In 1651, when the hetman was absent from Subotiv, she was killed on orders of her stepson, Tymish.

What is particularly striking, however, in this discussion of Khmelnytsky's early career is a passage unrelated to the Subotiv affair. It states that Khmelnytsky always tried to bind Ukraine's fate to that of Russia and that this love of Russia was instilled in him by his father. Another section states that Khmelnytsky did not consider himself to be a member of the gentry; rather, he was close to the masses and was a proponent of their centuries-old aspirations for reunification with Russia. Both passages suggest that the text had been tampered with.

Krypiakievych gives a vivid account of the military operations in 1649–53. He declares the Cossack victory at Zboriv in 1649 to be the decisive factor in forcing Jan Kazimierz to negotiate with Khmelnytsky and the Crimean khan. However, Khmelnytsky was pressured by Islam Giray into a compromise agreement that did not correspond with his "true intentions." The hetman signed the treaty reluctantly, for above all he desired military aid from the Russians.

The Zboriv agreement did not prove to be viable. The Poles renewed the fighting, while Khmelnytsky moved against Moldavia, as Lupul had befriended the Poles. Khmelnytsky sought outside aid and turned first to Russia. After the battle of Berestechko in June 1651, when the hetman

was again betrayed by the khan, both sides agreed to the Bila Tserkva accord. Krypiakevych stresses that the battle itself was not a major defeat because Khmelnytsky's army sustained relatively few casualties, but the accord was a great blow to the Ukrainian cause. Khmelnytsky revenged himself in the battle of Batih, after which he had "no longer to hide his plans concerning the reunion of Ukraine with Russia." Again, official propaganda has intruded the work.

In soliciting Russian aid, Krypiakevych continues, Khmelnytsky tried to convince the Russians that the Poles were less strong than they appeared. On the 1648 note in which Khmelnytsky advises the tsar to assume the Polish throne, the biography states that "in this manner there was broached the question of the reunion of Ukraine with Russia in one state." The many diplomatic exchanges between the Ukrainians and Russians prior to the Pereiaslav accord all spoke of reunion.

In 1651 the Russians became more friendly toward the Ukrainians after the *Zemskii Sobor* approved Ukrainian petitions for aid, the biography notes. Moscow's "new course" was initiated in the spring of 1653 when Boris Repnin-Obolensky was sent to Warsaw; at the same time the mission of Artamon Matveev and Ivan Fomin informed Khmelnytsky of the tsar's new hard line toward the Poles. The impatient Khmelnytsky responded that he would turn to Turkey unless the tsar stopped procrastinating. To appease the hetman, in June 1653 the tsar sent out a new mission headed by Fedor Ladyzhensky with a *gramota* outlining the tsar's readiness to accept the Ukrainians "under his high hand." In September the tsar answered the hetman that Russian troops were being organized to help the Cossacks. The "historical act of reunion" followed immediately after the Repnin-Obolensky delegation's return to Moscow. The *Zemskii Sobor*, convened on 11 (1) October 1653, manifested the will of all the Russian people, "not only that of the tsarist government alone," which "in the interest of strengthening the state took into consideration broad public opinion and supported popular aspirations." In December 1653 the Streshnev-Bredikhin mission informed the hetman of the *Zemskii Sobor's* decision. Khmelnytsky immediately called an assembly of Cossack officers, whose activities, Krypiakevych notes, showed that they construed the impending agreement as a bilateral treaty. After the decision of the *Zemskii Sobor*, the tsar sent Vasilii Buturlin to implement the new arrangements. Krypiakevych states that the reasons for Buturlin's refusal to take the oath are not known. He was requested to do so not by Khmelnytsky but by members of the *starshyna* and *szlachta*, such as Teteria, Lisnytsky and Zarudny, who pressured the hetman. "Polish agents," the text continues, spread rumours that some officers, including Ivan Bohun, opposed the taking of the oath. "All this turned out to be

lies"; some officers—Bohun among them—were at the front and thus could not take an oath at Pereiaslav. Only Kosiv and some of the high clergy were opposed.

The only real controversy during the Pereiaslav *rada* concerned the guarantees of Cossack privileges. Eventually the Cossacks agreed to the tsar's terms with the proviso that unsettled points were to be clarified later. In January and February 1654 the twenty-three point March Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky were composed and the Zarudny–Teteria mission took them to Moscow. On the first day of negotiations, 23 (13) March, the Ukrainians reported orally on twenty points. A written report was given to the Russians the next day. Talks continued through 31 (21) March on matters such as the salary of the Cossacks, the posting of tsarist military commanders, the collection of taxes and the hetman's foreign relations. The outcome was a collection of articles containing only eleven points, "perhaps" dated 31 (21) March 1654, Krypiakevych claims. Only an early working draft of these articles exists, however. Other matters were covered by special tsarist writs (*gramoty*), and the articles and writs contain the essence of the deliberations in Moscow. Unfortunately, there is no record of how Khmelnytsky and the Cossack officers greeted the Teteria–Zarudny mission. "Undoubtedly" Khmelnytsky gave written thanks to the tsar, the biography adds, and "undoubtedly" Khmelnytsky was pleased with the results.

After the 1654 "reunion" there followed an era of friendship between the two peoples. Russian armies came to Ukraine to wage war against common enemies. Neither the Russian government nor its military commanders, however, interfered in local Ukrainian affairs. There was some trouble over taxes, but Krypiakevych dismisses this as secondary to winning the war against the Poles. Khmelnytsky failed to take the city of Lviv in the spring of 1655, the book notes, because by then the city had lost its strategic importance. The Poles had been defeated and were no longer an immediate threat; therefore, Khmelnytsky accepted the tribute offered by the inhabitants of Lviv and withdrew.²²

Khmelnytsky's foreign policy after 1654 was conducted with the knowledge and often with the direct approval of the Russian government. The Poles, with the aid of the Crimean khan, failed to subvert Ukrainian-Russian friendship. To strengthen his ties with Russia, Khmelnytsky kept Moscow informed of his Turkish contacts throughout 1655–7. Moreover, Khmelnytsky envisioned a grand alliance against Turkey with Russia, Sweden and other powers. After 1654 Khmelnytsky wanted to retain his ties with Sweden for war against the Poles, but Charles X favoured the Polish magnates and refused to help Khmelnytsky liberate West Ukrainian areas. The projected alliance of Ukraine,

Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia was an attempt at rapprochement with Russia, with Ukraine as intermediary.

Sweden's victories against Poland threatened the interests of the Russian state. With the ascendancy of Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin, who emphasized Baltic priorities, war with Sweden broke out, and the Russians made peace with the Poles at Vilna in 1656. The accord revealed the Russian attitude toward Ukraine:

Its significance lay in the fact that the Russian state had the opportunity for the first time to exhibit its attitude toward Ukraine. Russia stood firmly in defence of Ukraine. The Russian plenipotentiaries firmly proclaimed that Ukraine is bound tightly to Russia and that the Russian state will defend it. They supported the proposals submitted by the hetman and refused any bargaining with respect to Ukraine. (p. 509)

This somewhat specious claim is followed by an admission that the Russians had some "complications" with Khmelnytsky over the Vilna accord. The talks between the Poles and the Russians were secret; only rumours—spread by the Poles—reached Khmelnytsky. The Ukrainians thought that the tsar would betray them, not knowing that at Vilna the Russians had, in fact, been defending their interests. The Russian government tried to assuage Khmelnytsky's fears by sending Avram Lopukhin and Vasilii Kikin to Chyhyryn in early 1657 to provide accurate information on the Vilna accord. Thus, the contents of the agreement only became known to Khmelnytsky two or three months after the talks ended.

Krypiakevych notes that the Russian government disapproved of Khmelnytsky's diplomatic activities, especially the continued warfare against the Poles after the Vilna accord. Fedor Buturlin went to Chyhyryn in June 1657 to voice the tsar's grievances. He protested that Khmelnytsky's support for Rakoczy, the ties with Sweden and the Ukrainian occupation of Belorussian areas violated the oath taken at Pereiaslav. After bitter exchanges, Buturlin realized that Khmelnytsky did not intend a break with Russia, and the talks ended with "complete understanding." But at this time Khmelnytsky was gravely ill and effective power was in the hands of Ivan Vyhovsky. The latter, with the aid of the *starshyna*, prepared to break with Russia and form an alliance with Poland. When Khmelnytsky heard of Vyhovsky's intentions, he chose his son Iurii as his successor to save the association with Russia.

The 1960s

By the mid-1960s Soviet historians had fully integrated the tenets of the 1954 theses into their writings. An example of this is found in *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR* [History of the Ukrainian SSR], a general textbook for non-specialists in higher educational institutions. This book, edited by K. K. Dubyna, devotes one chapter to the Khmelnytsky era. The chapter stresses the economic and national exploitation of the Ukrainians by the *szlachta* as the fundamental cause of the war of liberation. Khmelnytsky longed for reunion with Russia throughout his life, and he strove to achieve that objective in the 1648 uprising. The peasants initiated the revolt, but soon Ukrainian burghers, petty gentry, and the lower clergy joined in. Although asked in 1648 to protect the Ukrainians, Russia was exhausted by war against Poland and Sweden and could not risk a new conflict. By 11 (1) October 1653 Russia had recouped its military strength and the *Zemskii Sobor* unanimously agreed to accept Khmelnytsky's petition. The Pereiaslav *rada* of 18 (8) January 1654 witnessed the agreement, which was fortified by the March Articles of 1654, granting the Ukrainians autonomy and strengthening the privileges of the Ukrainian feudalists. Pereiaslav consummated the Ukrainian struggle for liberation and for "reunion" with Russia.

In 1969 a two-volume *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR* was published by Ukraine's Institute of History. As stated in the introduction, the book stresses the common historical development of the three East Slavic nations, with specific emphasis on Ukrainian efforts to unite with Russia. The section on 1648–54 was written with guidance from the leadership of the Communist party. Thus this study can be considered the most recent and most authoritative expression of Soviet views on the Khmelnytsky era.

The 1648–54 events are described as a struggle "against gentry Poland for the reunion of Ukraine with Russia." Khmelnytsky is regarded as a hero, who is above criticism. His principal virtue was his resolve to reunite the Ukrainians with the Russians. He was a military genius; his victory at Batih was compared by contemporaries to that of Hannibal at Cannae in 216 B.C. Khmelnytsky created a centralized state and held great powers. Ukraine's neighbours, including tsarist Russia, were hostile to this new state.

On the whole, this 1969 version of Ukrainian history provides a balanced treatment of the Khmelnytsky epoch. Motives of the different strata in Ukrainian society at that time are given a traditional Marxist interpretation. For example, one reason why the Ukrainian gentry joined the peasant revolt and accepted association with Russia was the attractiveness of the strong, centralized Russian state in contrast to the

anarchic commonwealth, which failed to provide social stability.

The Ukrainians could escape from Polish oppression only by Russian intervention. The decision to reunite with Russia, promoted by Khmelnytsky, was enthusiastically accepted by all strata of the Ukrainian population except the magnates and the high clergy. The Pereiaslav *rada* was a milestone, the culmination of Ukrainian aspirations for reunion with their Russian brothers. The reunion was “an event of enormous international significance”; it “strengthened the power of the Russian state and moved its borders far to the southwest,” and this “created more favourable conditions for the successful struggle of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples against Polish-Catholic and Turkish-Moslem aggression.” This reunification, however, “did not signify the amalgamation of the Ukrainian people with the Russian nor the liquidation of the Ukrainian nationality.” Rather, it helped the Ukrainians become a full-fledged nation (*natsiia*). After Pereiaslav the tsarist government permitted local self-government in Ukraine; the legal system and the office of hetman were retained, but in matters “of an overall political character” the tsarist government maintained firm jurisdiction.

The study criticizes non-Soviet historians for treating the 1648–54 events as a destructive and reactionary rebellion by anarchical peasants. On the other hand, the Hrushevsky “school” is attacked for portraying the Ukrainian nation as “democratic” and “classless” and for exaggerating the religious factor and thereby deflecting social and class issues.

The Soviet position on Pereiaslav and Ukrainian nationalism had turned full circle, from condemnation of Khmelnytsky to this 1969 judgment:

The essential point of this historical event—the reunion of Ukraine with Russia, which was prepared by the entire course of the historical development of the two peoples—the bourgeois nationalists endeavour by all means to pervert, and they slander the great son of Ukraine, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, by qualifying the reunion as his “political error.” (1, p. 238)

Dissidence among Soviet Historians

To what extent Soviet historians accepted or rejected the 1954 theses is debatable. In a closed society where the authorities enjoy full control over communications media and scholarship, it is difficult to assess opposition to official doctrine. For a brief period after the 1956 Twentieth Congress

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—during which Nikita Khrushchev exposed and denounced Stalin's excesses—party controls over scholars and writers were loosened. In Ukraine in 1957 this “thaw” witnessed the birth of a Ukrainian-language historical journal, *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, which soon reflected the reimposition of ideological control. None the less, there was at this time some dissent among Ukrainian historians. In 1956 at a conference of historians in Kiev, Kost Huslysty objected to the adulation of Khmelnytsky in the 1954 theses and decried the hetman's transformation into “an icon.” Such expressions of independence were, however, exceedingly rare.

In 1972 scholars outside the Soviet Union became aware of a critique of the 1954 theses that had circulated clandestinely in that country since the late 1960s. Entitled *Pryiednannia chy vozziednannia? Krytychni zauvahy z pryvodu odinie kontseptsii* [Annexation or reunion? Critical reflections on a certain conception], this *samvydav*²³ pamphlet was written by Mykhailo Braichevsky, an archeologist and specialist on the Kievan state, author of many articles and several important monographs. Braichevsky's ideas deserve consideration because in all probability they also reflect the views of other Soviet scholars.

Braichevsky notes that de-Stalinization in Soviet Ukraine required the correction of distortions of history that became pronounced in 1947 with Kaganovich's reappearance in Ukraine as Stalin's special emissary. In 1961 Nikolai Podgorny, then the first secretary of the Ukrainian party, told the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that Kaganovich had exaggerated the dangers of bourgeois nationalism. Braichevsky points out, however, that the distorted formulations of 1947–56 were still in effect in the late 1960s. The best example of this distortion, Braichevsky stresses, is the still valid “Theses on the Tercentenary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia,” the errors of which brought moral and political harm to the Soviet system. The theses twisted and concealed facts, made false conclusions and made selective use of information. Braichevsky says that the “theses” elevated the 1654 Pereiaslav events to “almost the most significant revolutionary turn in the history of mankind.”

Moreover, the theses abounded with terminological absurdities. Specialists had protested against the word “reunion,” Braichevsky reveals, but they were forced to acquiesce. The term “reunion,” Braichevsky argues, was nonsensical, for only the separated parts of a whole can reunite, whereas the 1654 agreement concerned two distinct peoples (*narody*), the Russians and the Ukrainians. Ukraine and Russia had not been united prior to 1654, and the Ukrainians could not “reunite” with Russia in 1654 because they had never been part of the Russian state or

Muscovy. Nor can the idea of "reunion" be supported by arguing that the Russian and Ukrainian peoples once belonged to the Kievan state. Once the idea of separate Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups is postulated, "the reunion of Ukraine with Russia is an impossibility."

The idea of the "reunion" was merely one aspect of a broad theory of Russian messianism, Braichevsky notes. It is an expression of the great-power chauvinism condemned by Lenin. The 1954 theses maintain that the annexation of Ukraine was a blessing for the Ukrainian people and was "the natural result of the entire history of the two fraternal Slavic nations." This approach, Braichevsky argues, singles out the Russian people for special treatment and subjects them to different social and historical laws. It makes the Soviet Union the direct descendant of imperial Russia "one and indivisible." Hence criticism of tsarist imperialism becomes impossible and dangerous, because it undermines the "friendship of peoples." It is impossible for Soviet historians, for example, to mention Ivan Vyhovsky's victory over the Russians at Konotop in 1659 or to discuss the stipulations of the Hadiach agreement. Russian nationalism has replaced class struggle as the main force in Ukrainian history, for "reunion" is now the principal *leitmotif*. In fact, the history of all non-Russians has been subjected to Russocentric interpretations.

In recent Soviet historiography, the 1654 Pereiaslav events are assessed from this same viewpoint, Braichevsky complains. Periodization of Ukrainian history no longer follows Marxist criteria but hinges on Pereiaslav. No longer is Ukrainian history a process or struggle for independence—independence has become a great evil—and those in favour of it are "the most bitter enemies of the Ukrainian people." Ukrainians are judged not according to class criteria but from their attitudes toward Russia; anyone doubting the blessings of the "reunion" is a "miserable traitor." There are many such "traitors" involved in the Pereiaslav events: Vyhovsky, Iurii Khmelnytsky, Teteria, Briukhovetsky, Petro Doroshenko, Nemyrych, Mazepa and Orlyk. At the same time feudalists and oppressors who supported Russia are exalted—men like Vasyl Kochubei, who denounced Mazepa to Peter I.

On colonialism and national liberation movements, Soviet historiography has performed a *volte face*. Leaders of national-liberation movements (for example, Shamil) are now considered feudalists. This change is anti-historical, Braichevsky charges, for Russia generally exploited its annexed territories. Moreover, Braichevsky says, local leaders were also "feudal types," and in supporting the tsarist government, they supported local reactionary tendencies. To be consistent, Soviet historiography should consider all liberation movements reactionary, including that of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who was a feudalist. The current Soviet eclecticism is wrong

and a return to Leninism is necessary.

Lenin taught that the bourgeois nationalism in an oppressed nation is generally progressive and should be supported as a response to the chauvinism of an imperialist nation. This is true of all chauvinism, including Russian, Braichevsky stresses. This political lesson has been correctly applied in Soviet support of national liberation movements outside the Soviet bloc. None the less, this Marxist approach must not exempt Russia. If the American struggle against England and that of Greece against Turkey are commendable, then the struggle of the Ukrainians against tsarist Russia cannot be denounced as treason. There is no Marxism in the current tendency to discuss all manifestations of nationalism in Ukraine as "hostile activity," nor should movements be called reactionary because they tried "to separate" Ukraine from Russia.

The current Soviet approach to non-Russians favours their annexation to the Russian state, for allegedly good reasons, Braichevsky notes. For example, annexation brought economic benefits to Russians and non-Russians alike and made possible their common struggle against tsarism; economic bonds facilitated social and economic progress. The benefits of a higher and more progressive Russian culture were bestowed upon the annexed areas that were thus saved from conquest by other nations. Annexation by Russia frustrated the designs of imperialist countries (often hostile toward Russia), and strengthened Russia's international position. Braichevsky rejects all these arguments as typical justifications of imperialism. He then discusses these views in connection with the Pereiaslav events.

The Soviets' reference to the Russian and Ukrainian "people" as the prime actors in the Pereiaslav events is erroneous and fails to apply the class approach to the analysis of history. The Cossack *starshyna* and Russian boyars cannot be equated with "the people," Braichevsky insists. In their loose references to the working masses of both nations, the 1954 theses obscure class issues, for in reality the dominant policy-makers in 1654 were feudalists. Lenin wrote that "the cursed history of Russian autocracy" led to the estrangement of the working classes of the various nationalities of Russia. The theses of 1954 have confused this issue and in doing so, have departed from Leninism, Braichevsky maintains. What took place at Pereiaslav was not the reunion of two peoples but the union of two ruling classes against both peoples: the exploiters united to control the masses more effectively. This error in the theses led to another—the tendency to consider the tsarist state the "state of the Russian people," as proclaimed in a passage praising the Russians' fight against Tatar–Mongol domination. The theses make the Russian people, not the Russian feudal class, the creators of tsarist Russia.

For the Ukrainians, the association with Russia in 1654 had both advantages and disadvantages. Economic bonds with Poland and Turkey were severed, but the subjection of Ukraine's economy to the Russian state prevented the development of an all-Ukrainian economy. Russia was behaving like a typical imperialistic country.

The Soviet claim that tsarist Russia enriched its annexed territories culturally also departs from true Leninism, Braichevsky writes. Lenin had attacked tsarism because of the restrictions it imposed on the Ukrainian and Polish languages. Literacy in Ukraine fell drastically after 1654, and Braichevsky finds the references to the beneficent role of Russian culture to be bitterly ironic. In the mid-seventeenth century Russian culture was inferior to Ukrainian and Russian literacy was lower. The Ukrainian *starshyna* was better educated than the Russian boyars. In fact, the only institution of higher learning in the entire empire up to the middle of the eighteenth century was the Kievan Academy. Moreover, there were many Ukrainians prominent in Russian cultural life. Braichevsky names the churchmen Teofan Prokopovych and Stepan Iavorsky, the writer Vasyl Kapnist, the painters Antin Losenko and Volodymyr Borovykovsky, and the composers Dmytro Bortniansky and Maksym Berezovsky.

The view that the Russians saved the Ukrainians from conquest by others is a new variant of the "lesser evil" formula, Briachevsky remarks. In 1654 Ukraine had many alternatives to Russian domination, including an alliance with Sweden. The Hadiach treaty of 1658 gave the Ukrainians more rights than did the Pereiaslav agreement. Also, the Soviet tendency to portray Ivan Mazepa as pro-Polish is false, for he actually sought close co-operation with Sweden. Braichevsky admits that the annexation of Ukraine to the empire strengthened tsarist Russia but maintains that this does not justify Ukraine's impoverishment; the Ukrainians were victims of Russian imperialism.

If the 1954 theses misrepresent the 1654 events, what, then, is the true significance of Pereiaslav? Braichevsky supplies some original answers to this question. For one thing, Ukraine at that time was not a land of peasant serfs. Forty-six per cent of the people were city-dwellers, and of these perhaps half were free Cossacks. Of the remaining 54 per cent of the population, about half were also free Cossacks, rather than serfs. Only 40 per cent of the village population were pauperized or worked on *latifundia* or for rich peasants. In addition, free settlements, or *slobody*, existed in Ukraine. Accordingly, Braichevsky concludes, only one fourth of the Ukrainian population was enserfed in the middle of the seventeenth century. Free Cossacks and private farmers predominated in Ukrainian society.²⁴

Further, during the 1648–54 war large landholdings were abolished; the only *latifundia* remaining were those of the Orthodox church. At the same time social and economic changes encouraged the growth of manufacturing. With these changes emerged a new Ukrainian nation; the Cossack stratum was its chief component and the rising bourgeoisie the antithesis of the old feudal class. Thus the 1648–54 war should be regarded as a struggle between the old feudal class and the new Cossack state, which was potentially bourgeois. Braichevsky adds that the 1648–54 struggle was an attempt to spread the political system of the Zaporozhian Sich to liberated Ukrainian areas. In other words, there was a movement to strengthen a bourgeois republic, which, in essence, the Sich was. Khmelnytsky's misfortune was that he headed a bourgeois movement, but thought in feudal terms.

The position taken in the 1954 theses—that in 1654 two nations “reunited”—is untenable, Braichevsky argues. What took place then was the union of two states—one feudal, the other striving to restore feudalism in defiance of the masses. Neither side represented the interests of the people. In fact, it was through fear of the revolutionary masses that the number of registered Cossacks was limited to sixty thousand in the March Articles of 1654. The Ukrainian gentry wanted to preserve their property holdings; for instance the Zarudny–Teteria mission tried to obtain feudal privileges from Moscow. Thus, in Braichevsky's view, Pereiaslav “constituted a class conspiracy of the Ukrainian *starshyna*, which actively joined into a feudal arrangement with Russian tsarism, [and was] oriented toward the preservation (or more precisely, the restoration) in Ukraine of the feudal order.” Pereiaslav, “in its character and tendency was an anti-popular act”; it was designed “to intimidate the risen masses of the working population” and it did this by “selling out national interests.”

Khmelnytsky, Vyhovsky, Vasyl Zolotarenko and other Ukrainian leaders saw tsarism as a force that would help them control the *chern*. The tsars performed this function willingly, for they feared that the Ukrainian rebels would inspire similar revolts in Russia. (Fifteen years after Pereiaslav Stepan Razin led a peasant revolt and was inspired in part by the Ukrainian example.) Despite their class compatibilities, conflict between the *starshyna* and the tsarist state broke out over the political status of Ukraine after 1654. The Russians reluctantly granted the Ukrainians autonomy, but only as a temporary measure. Though the tsarist government had no intention of honouring the Pereiaslav agreement, it took a century and a half to abolish Ukrainian autonomy altogether.

The Hadiach treaty and the Russian defeat at Konotop were setbacks for the Russian policy makers, but the treaty of Andrusovo (1667) between Russian and Poland completely annulled the Pereiaslav agreement. The

Andrusovo treaty states that Ukrainian areas conquered (*zavoevany*) by the Russians would remain under tsarist rule and makes no mention of the Pereiaslav accord. Andrusovo confirmed that the tsarist annexation of Ukraine was a conquest, and not a response to the wishes of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine was not even considered a juridical partner at Andrusovo; no Ukrainians participated in the negotiations.

Thus the Pereiaslav agreement was valid for only thirteen years. The Andrusovo treaty was a true turning point in Ukrainian history, for it provoked many uprisings, including those of Petro Doroshenko, Ivan Sirko and Briukhovetsky. The opposition forced the Russians to delay the integration of Ukrainian areas, and Andrusovo limited Russian rule to Left-Bank Ukraine, where the feudal order was restored. There the Ukrainian gentry obtained new privileges, and in time their rights were made equal to those of the Russian gentry. Thus the social and economic gains of 1648–54 were nullified.

The nascent Ukrainian bourgeoisie was destroyed by Russian feudalism. Petty bourgeois agriculture was replaced by restored serfdom and large feudal landholdings. Manufacturing declined, as did self-government in the cities. Political autonomy gradually disappeared; the final blow was the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775. Culturally, Ukraine deteriorated; once a land of high literacy, it became one of near total illiteracy. Ukrainian cultural leaders like Mykola Hohol, Mykhailo Hlynka and Illia Ripyn were integrated into the Russian cultural milieu.²⁵ Printing in Ukrainian was proscribed in 1720 by a decree of Peter I. Ukraine, which formerly exported books to Russia, was forbidden to print books in its own language and was compelled to import Russian books. Ukrainian literature suffered a decline, from which it began to recover only in the time of Taras Shevchenko. These were the so-called cultural benefits of the “reunion of two fraternal peoples” begun in 1654.

Where does all this leave Khmelnytsky? Khmelnytsky deserves credit, Braichevsky writes, for leading the struggle against the Poles and for his military victories, but it should not be forgotten that he was a typical representative of the feudal class in a period “when the feudal system had already become a reactionary force in the way of progress.” He therefore cannot be considered progressive, for he tried to preserve the feudal order and betrayed the masses. For this he was denounced by the revolutionary leaders of Ukraine, including Shevchenko, who could never forgive the hetman for accepting tsarism and for enserfing Ukraine for several centuries. In his early career, when collaborating with Władysław IV against the commonwealth magnates, Khmelnytsky did not comprehend the forces he had unleashed and was unable to control them. Later he searched for ways to mitigate the masses’ resentment of the ruling class.

Also, at the start of the uprising Khmelnytsky did not want to take Ukraine out of the commonwealth. He made several agreements with the Poles to preserve the interests of the gentry—his basic aim in negotiations with both the Poles and the Russians. Appeals to the masses for obedience, grants of feudal privileges to the *starshyna*, attempts to return the Cossacks to peasant status and suppression of anti-feudal uprisings were Khmelnytsky's basic policies. He cannot be called a "people's hero" and it is absurd to suggest that he always wanted "reunion" with the Russian people.

Orthodox Soviet historians are unable to explain why Khmelnytsky did not turn to Moscow from the beginning and why he instead sought an alliance with the Crimean khan. The reasons are not difficult to discover, Braichevsky explains, for Russia had then a military alliance with Poland and was prepared to intervene in Ukraine on behalf of the Poles. Internal rebellion in Muscovy, however, ended Russia's plans for intervention—an episode ignored in Soviet historiography. Khmelnytsky made his first contact with the Russians only after the Korsun battle, when victory seemed assured. In June 1648 the Ukrainians intercepted a Russian courier bound for Poland, but Khmelnytsky sent him back to the tsar with a note suggesting that the tsar should be a candidate for the Polish throne since Władysław IV had just died. Soviet publications use this episode as evidence that Khmelnytsky wanted the tsar to be the Ukrainian sovereign, and as early evidence of his aspirations for "reunion." But this interpretation is refuted, Braichevsky argues, by Khmelnytsky's frequent declarations of continued loyalty to the king and commonwealth.

Soviet historians also tend to idealize tsarism, Braichevsky charges. The tsarist regime is credited with protecting the Ukrainians from the invading Tatars, whereas the reverse is closer to the truth—in the seventeenth century, the Zaporozhian Sich defended Muscovy against Turkish-Tatar raids. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Tatar raids reached as far as Moscow but ceased in the seventeenth century because of Ukrainian Cossacks resistance. After 1654 the Russian state treated Ukraine like any other newly-incorporated area and was oblivious to the fact that Ukrainians had revolted against a feudal order.

There were many uprisings against the feudal programme, Braichevsky points out, but Soviet works invariably denounce them as treacherous because they were anti-Russian. Soviet books are replete with long lists of Ukrainian "traitors," "puppets," "agents," "foreign vassals" and "enemies of the people." Ukrainian history has been reduced to a strange process, in which all the significant leaders were "traitors" or "foreign agents." Even Briukhovetsky, a natural lackey, is frowned upon because he was forced to take an anti-Russian position. Why did Vyhovsky turn to the Poles,

although he had the full support of the Russian government? Why did Mazepa ally with the Swedes, when he enjoyed the personal confidence of Peter I? Why did Doroshenko seek Turkish protection, when he had the support of the Russians? Soviet historiography, Braichevsky charges, is unable to answer these questions.

Notes

1. For a detailed account of this preoccupation, see L. Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities*.
2. See O. D. Sokolov, *M. N. Pokrovsky i sovetskaia istoricheskaia nauka*.
3. See "The Revolutionary Movements of the Past," in *Russia in World History: Selected Essays by M. N. Pokrovskii*, ed. R. Szporluk.
4. According to Iwan Majstrenko, who participated in the turbulent politics of the Ukrainian republic in the 1930s, Stalinists produced a picture of Iavorsky in an Austro-Hungarian army officer's uniform during the First World War as proof of his capitalist espionage proclivities. (Personal communication.)
5. The best handbook on the historiography of this period is that of Myron Korduba, first printed in Warsaw in 1938 but destroyed during the Second World War. The book was recently reprinted by the Harvard Committee for Ukrainian Studies; see M. Korduba, *La littérature historique soviétique ukrainienne, Compte-rendu 1917-1931*.
6. For a listing of Ohloblyn's major contributions at this time, see Doroshenko and Ohloblyn, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, 321-2. The Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies recently reprinted Ohloblyn's major economic work of the 1920s: O. Ohloblyn, *A History of Ukrainian Industry*.
7. See M. Hrushevsky, "Z pryvodu lystuvannia B. Khmelnytskoho z Ottomanskoiu Portoiu," *Ukraina*, no. 4 (42) (1930): 3-7.
8. See L. Tillett, *The Great Friendship*, 44.
9. K. F. Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State*, 128. The quotation is Shteppa's translation from a Soviet source containing the entire text of the May 1934 decree. Shteppa identified his source as *Materialy k prepodavaniiu istorii SSSR*.
10. M. N. Pokrovsky, "Vozniknovenie moskovskogo gosudarstva i velikorusskoi narodnosti," *Istoriik-Marksist*, no. 18-19 (1930): 272-3, as quoted in Konstantin F. Shteppa, *Russian Historians*, 103-4.
11. For an account of the major shifts in Soviet historical writings, see C. E. Black, ed., *Rewriting Russian History*.
12. See I. D. Boiko, "Do pytannia pro pryiednannia Ukrainy do Rosii";

A. Z. Baraboi, “K voprosu o prisoedinenii Ukrainy k Rossii v 1654 godu”; and M. Ie. Podorozhny, *Osvoboditelnaia voina ukrainskogo naroda (1648–1654 gg.)*.

13. See M. Braichevsky, *Pryiednannia chy vozziednannia?*, 7.
14. Russian and Ukrainian versions of this document were circulated simultaneously in the Soviet media in 1954. Separate pamphlets were also published, among them the following: *Tezy pro 300-richchia vozziednannia Ukrainy z Rosieiu (1654–1954 rr.)*. An English-language version of this document, as translated by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow, is included as Appendix 8 in this study.
15. The equestrian statue of Khmelnytsky in Kiev again comes to our attention in this connection. An unidentified correspondent of the Moscow *Literaturnaia gazeta* (9 January 1954) printed a report entitled “Istoriia odnogo pamiatnika” containing traces of official Soviet Russian (as distinct from Ukrainian) anti-Semitism. Noting that the statue features “the great son of the Ukrainian people” pointing his mace to the northeast in the direction of “the only correct path, the path of union in eternal friendship with fraternal Russia,” the correspondent recalls that its erection was marked by struggle of the “progressive forces of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples” against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists and great-power chauvinists.” Further, Mikeshin’s original design, preserved in a Chernihiv museum, included the likenesses of “the overthrown enemies of the Ukrainian people—a *pan*, a Catholic priest and a [Jewish] middleman [*arendator*].” Bourgeois nationalists and great-power chauvinists opposed the design and induced the tsarist authorities to make several changes.

A more accurate account of the campaign to erect this statue had appeared in the Moscow journal *Golos minuvshago*, no. 7 (July, 1913): 284–5, with a report from its Kiev correspondent, identified only by the initials M. G., in an article also entitled “Istoriia odnogo pamiatnika.”

16. See also J. J. Reshetar, Jr., “The Significance of the Soviet Tercentenary of the Pereiaslav Treaty.”
17. This catalogue is far from complete. For additional entries, see B. Fedenko, *300-littia pereiaslavskoho dohovoru i sovietska propaganda*, 142.
18. See O. Pritsak, “Ivan Krypiakevych (1886–1967).”
19. In this matter the hetmans were “supported by the Muscovite government, thus bringing Ukraine closer to the Muscovite aristocratic system.” The Cossacks, dominant under Khmelnytsky, were limited to sixty thousand men by the Pereiaslav accord; the Hlukhiv agreement of 1669 reduced their number to thirty thousand. As the tsar whittled down Ukrainian autonomy, the Cossack element lost its privileges.

Peter I sent the Cossacks to wars throughout the empire, while the number of free Cossacks was constantly reduced. In time the majority of the Cossack population was reduced to the status of peasants; by 1735 most of the free peasants had been returned to serfdom. As for the once thriving and self-governing Ukrainian cities, Russian policy destroyed their institutions, system of trade and industry, and prosperity.

20. Olgierd Górka also wrote in "Bohdan Chmielnicki—jego historycy, postać i dzieło" that the Cossack state had a population of around one million. Górka notes, however, that precise demographic data for seventeenth-century Eastern Europe do not exist. Górka estimates that at the same time, the Ottoman empire had a population of twenty million, Muscovy eleven million and the commonwealth between six and seven million.
21. In his non-Soviet writings Krypiakievych takes a positive stance toward the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church as the protector of Ukrainian culture and traditions. Suppressed in Russian-controlled areas, this church survived in Right-Bank Ukraine under Polish rule. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was reorganized in accordance with directives elaborated in Rome rather than Warsaw. The Uniate church ceased to be a vehicle of Polonization and under the direct protection of Rome it could not be manipulated by the Poles in the manner that the Russians were able to manipulate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in areas under tsarist rule. The Uniate church evolved into an institution that protected and preserved Ukrainian culture, even though Latin-rite extremists endeavoured to reduce the Uniates to the status of second-rate Catholics.
22. Specialists have advanced a variety of reasons why the Muscovite and Cossack forces failed to capture Lviv. Dmytro Doroshenko writes that the allied troops failed to take the city because the hetman opposed the Russian intent to have Lviv swear allegiance to the tsar.
23. *Samvydav* is the Ukrainian equivalent of the Russian *samizdat*. For a listing of other clandestine writings in the Ukrainian republic, see M. Browne, *Ferment in Ukraine*.
24. Braichevsky obtained most of his data from O. S. Kompan, *Mista Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVII st.* He obtained additional information from I. D. Boiko, *Selianstvo Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVI-pershii polovyni XVII st.* Braichevsky's analysis of Ukrainian society in the mid-seventeenth century invites comment and further study. The statistic that nearly one half of Ukraine's population was urban was brought about in part by the danger of Tatar raids, which caused the populace to concentrate in fortified towns. Another inducement was that towns possessed at least the rudiments of self-government according to the Magdeburg Law. The inhabitants of private towns paid the landowner a rent, but they were free of the *corvée*

(*panshchyna*). However, most of these “burghers” (*mishchany*) were farmers, not merchants or craftsmen, and Braichevsky’s characterization of these burghers as a nascent bourgeoisie may be incorrect. Finally, it is tempting to speculate what social stratum would have developed from this Ukrainian urban element if serfdom had not been restored by the Russian state after the 1654 Pereiaslav arrangement.

25. Braichevsky refers here to the writer Nikolai Gogol (1809–52), the composer Mikhail Glinka (1803–57) and the painter Ilya Repin (1844–1930).

Chapter Six

The Testimony of Three Hundred Years

Descriptions and interpretations of the events at Pereiaslav in 1654 began directly after the events themselves. In the modern era we have witnessed the Soviet “rediscovery” of the 1654 accord as the most significant event in the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations and as a symbol of permanent Russian-Ukrainian unity. Over the three hundred years there have been a whole galaxy of views ranging from support of Russian imperial absolutism to the championing of a separate state for the Ukrainian people.

The 1648–54 Cossack revolt is the central theme of the Cossack Chronicles. These writings present that revolt as motivated by religious factors and are distinguished by strong territorial patriotism. Moreover, the Cossack Chronicles underscore the unilateral or improper tsarist policies that subverted the true intent of the 1654 arrangement. The *Eyewitness Chronicle* defends Ukrainian privileges and supports the 1654 association with Russia, but opposes tsarist centralization policies. Hrabianka reports great rejoicing among the Ukrainians because of the 1654 Pereiaslav accord and stresses its religious sources, but also defends Cossack autonomy. Velychko’s composition shows patriotic opposition to Russian hegemony, and emphasizes that the Russian envoys at Pereiaslav in 1654 gave a reciprocal oath on behalf of the tsar. The retired tsarist military officer Aleksandr Rigelman, on the other hand, combines loyalty to the empire with sympathy for Ukrainian particularism and champions Russian-Ukrainian unity as elaborated in the Kievan *Sinopsis*.

The Kievan *Sinopsis*, a plea for Russian-Ukrainian unity and the first printed history of the Eastern Slavs, was written by an anonymous cleric

from the Kievan intellectual community. The *Sinopsis*, inexplicably, fails to deal with the events of 1648–54. S. L. Pestich, a Soviet scholar, suggests, however, that all known editions of the *Sinopsis* from 1674 onward represent a censored version of an earlier, as yet undiscovered, original edition. The latter had been purged of its anti-Polish passages in the early 1670s, when the tsarist government was engaged in delicate diplomacy for an alliance with Poland.

This problem aside, the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writings inspired in the early nineteenth century a new generation of nation-centred historians. Among them was the anonymous *Istoriia Rusov*, an influential if somewhat erratic romantic history expressing an ardent patriotism, an opposition to tsarist centralism and outlining Russian violations of the 1654 arrangement. Bantysh-Kamensky, on the other hand, attempts to integrate Ukrainian history into that of the Russian empire by stressing the benign nature of Russian expansionism and the mutual advantages that accrued from the 1654 arrangement. Mykola Markevych turns traditional Russian historiography on its head with his view that the Russians were the “younger brothers” of the Ukrainians and shared in the ancient Kievan traditions in a peripheral manner only. Markevych also maintains that the tsars violated the 1654 arrangement.

Historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries accentuated the social aspects of the 1648–54 revolt. Kostomarov combines populist and ethnographic approaches with a sweeping federalist interpretation of the history of the Eastern Slavs. He portrays the 1654 Pereiaslav arrangement as a crucial event, but criticizes Khmelnytsky and his advisers as opportunistic leaders motivated primarily by class interests. Dissatisfied with tsarist suzerainty after 1654, they unscrupulously tried to subvert Ukraine’s relationship with Muscovy. Butinsky also accents the social aspect of the 1648–54 revolt, condemns Khmelnytsky as intrinsically anti-Russian and sees the 1654 events as a bargain between the self-seeking *starshyna* and the Russian state. The Russian armies’ excesses in Ukraine led to subsequent Russian-Ukrainian animosity.

Maksymovych exhibits a strong anti-Polish bias. He supports the tsarist empire and the political unity of the Eastern Slavs, viewing the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement as the culmination of the historical aspirations of the Russians and Ukrainians. His views thus frequently coincided with traditional Russian statist historiography, and they anticipate the Soviet approach of the 1954 theses. As Marchenko notes, Maksymovych was the first modern Ukrainian historian to stress that Khmelnytsky’s chief objective was to unify Ukraine and Russia. A nationalist before Ukrainian romantic nationalism became anti-Russian, Maksymovych’s sympathies for Ukraine conflicted at times with loyalty to the Russian empire. But

Maksymovych's Ukrainian patriotism was within the confines of a pan-Russian Slavophilism, and it was no accident that he edited the Slavophile journal *Russkaia beseda*. Intimidated by Russian extremists, he rejected the social and national radicalism of the younger Ukrainians of his day, including Taras Shevchenko. His writings, nevertheless, emphasize continuity in Ukrainian history, including the legacy of Kievan Rus', and they nourished a species of nationalism that he did not anticipate. As Serhii Iefremov writes in "Maksymovych v istorii ukrainskoi samosvidomosti" [Maksymovych in the history of Ukrainian self-awareness], Maksymovych, despite obeisance to pan-Russian positions, helped to promote a specific Ukrainian system of values that inspired later generations to reject Russian tutelage.

Volodymyr Antonovych sees the cause of the Cossack revolt in Polish elitism and its conflict with the Ukrainians' proclivity for equality. The Ukrainians failed to create a democratic society because the common people were politically immature and unstable—Ukrainian society lacked discipline, consensus and the juridical norms essential for a successful revolution. This society was based on a fatal social contradiction between the elitist, Polish-oriented *starshyna* and the egalitarian masses. Failure to establish a viable state caused Khmelnytsky to accede to the Pereiaslav agreement, which was hastily negotiated from the Ukrainian side. But the Russians, by deceit, diplomatic manoeuvring and evasiveness forged an agreement that they could subvert easily to destroy Ukraine's autonomy.

A classic social interpretation of the 1648–54 revolt and of the subsequent Ukrainian association with Russia was made by Venedikt Miakotin. He focuses on the liberation of the Ukrainian peasantry from serfdom and the subsequent reimposition of serfdom in Left-Bank Ukraine through close co-operation between the native gentry and the tsarist government. Kubala's examination of the 1648–54 revolt concludes that the commonwealth possessed inner contradictions and perpetrated irremediable errors. He characterizes Khmelnytsky as a great man, who towered above his contemporaries. Hrushevsky, however, judges the Cossack hetman to be an inept and impetuous man who distorted the 1648–54 revolution, which in Hrushevsky's view was a noble attempt by the common people to achieve social and national emancipation. On the other hand, Lypynsky perceives a revolt of the Ukrainian elite to build a separate state based on European models of a stratified society dominated by a landed aristocracy. This elite attempted to transform the semi-nomadic Cossack stratum into a settled agricultural society. Lypynsky also rejects the egalitarian views of Miakotin and Hrushevsky and proposes that Khmelnytsky's importance lay in his efforts to tame the steppe and to create a stratified society similar to contemporary West European models. The state-builders in Lypynsky's

scheme were the gentry who espoused the Cossack revolt, while anarchical elements in the steppe combined with the Russians to destroy the new state.

Stepan Tomashivsky investigated the impact of the 1648 revolt on the peasantry in Galicia. He sees the 1654 Pereiaslav arrangement as a reserve plan implemented by the Ukrainians only as a last resort. None the less, it produced a fundamental shift in the balance of power in Eastern Europe and inaugurated a new phase in Ukrainian history marked by conflict with Russia. Hitherto the Ukrainians had focused on relations with the Poles and the peoples of the steppe to the east. In the nineteenth century there was confrontation as the Ukrainians tried to assert a separate identity, while the Russians demanded a "common-Russian personality." Tomashivsky sees Ukrainian culture as transitional, containing Eastern and Western elements. This synthesis of East and West is evident in the Union of Churches, an accommodation aided indirectly in the western Ukrainian lands by the 1654 agreement.

Myron Korduba published primary source materials and clarified the diplomatic aspects of the Cossack revolution. For example, he writes that Peter von Parchevich's mission to Khmelnytsky in 1657 on behalf of the Habsburg emperor, initiated the Hadiach agreement. Korduba takes strong exception to Hrushevsky's depreciation of Khmelnytsky's place in history. Despite adverse conditions, the hetman accomplished remarkable feats, among which was the Pereiaslav agreement, which served as the Magna Carta for the Ukrainians for a hundred years.

Vernadsky writes that 1654 marked the peak of Muscovite expansion, and was followed by a period of regression, caused, in part, by disorder in the newly-acquired Ukrainian areas. Vernadsky states that the 1648–54 revolution was a turning point in the relations between the Eastern Slavs and Poland because it laid the foundations for the transformation of the tsardom of Moscow into the Russian empire. Pereiaslav decided the centuries-old rivalry for the Kievan legacy between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania in Moscow's favour. The revolt produced a new democratic order and gave birth to the Ukrainian nation. The Pereiaslav agreement was the "crowning achievement" of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, an outstanding man, whose accomplishments included the emancipation of the peasants. The new order, however, was unable to define satisfactorily the relations between the Cossack officer class and the peasantry. Also, after Pereiaslav, Khmelnytsky experienced many difficulties with the tsar over foreign policy. Upon Khmelnytsky's death, disorder mounted in Ukraine; the tsar's efforts to arbitrate failed, and the Russians had no choice but to sign the 1667 Andrusovo armistice, a signal of Muscovy's failure to unite "all three Russias."

The loosely termed “1654 Pereiaslav agreement” involved negotiations in both Pereiaslav and Moscow: the Buturlin mission in January and the Teteria–Zarudny mission in March. Original documentation is lacking. Documents from the Ukrainian side perished completely, while those from the Russian side are free translations from “Belorussian” into Russian, working papers and preliminary drafts by Russian officials, and notations by scribes. The major exception is the report to the tsar by the chief Russian negotiator at Pereiaslav, Buturlin. But the lack of counterbalancing documentation makes it difficult to explore disputed aspects of Buturlin’s report, such as the issue of reciprocal oaths.¹ The precise purposes and dates of the extant drafts and working papers are also in question, and therefore scholars have been concerned with the documents controversy. The pioneering work of Karpov deserves special recognition here although his early theories have been discredited.

The conclusions of Iakovliv and Ohloblyn (although conflicting in some aspects) present the most accurate and acceptable reconstructions of modern scholarship. They believe that the Teteria–Zarudny mission brought back from Moscow a document, dated 6 April (27 March) 1654, containing the tsar’s responses to the Ukrainian petition of twenty-three points dated 24 (14) March 1654. The tsar’s reply also contained eleven additional decisions or points. Ohloblyn’s disagreement with Iakovliv concerning these documents is more procedural than substantive. He writes that Khmelnytsky’s petition of twenty-three points should not be considered an integral part of the Pereiaslav–Moscow documents. The copy found in the Russian files with notes on the tsar’s reaction was intended only for internal use. Ohloblyn therefore concludes that the tsar’s reply of eleven points or articles represents the official Russian response to the articles of petition of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. On the date of the official presentation of the Russian response (6 April or 27 March), the Ukrainians also received additional specific patents or grants (*gramoty*) from the tsar. (Karpov’s supplementary document from the tsar, which he arbitrarily dated 31 (21) March 1654, and which had fourteen points, in fact originated in 1659 and is a revised version of the 1654 document.)

Most historians believe that in 1659 Prince Trubetskoi presented a doctored version of the 1654 agreement, a view substantiated by Viacheslav Prokopovych. In an article entitled “Pechat malorossiiskaia” [The seal of Little Russia], Prokopovych shows that the addendum to the tsar’s title—*i Belyia* [and of White]—in the formulation *vseia Velikiia i Belyia i Malyia Rossii* [of all Great, White and Little Russia] had replaced *vseia Velikiia i Malyia Rossii* [of all Great and Little Russia] no earlier than September 1655—and that Trubetskoi’s version of the 1654 agreement carries the trinitarian version of 1655. This addition to the

tsar's title in 1655 was made after the Russians had captured Vilna and other cities in Lithuania–Belorussia. The annexed territories were hurriedly incorporated into Russian state usage because Sweden also claimed those areas and because Belorussian nobles and burghers preferred association with the Cossack state to direct incorporation into Muscovy. (After the Andrusovo armistice, in which Russia conceded Polish rule over Belorussian areas, new Russian seals were struck; these reverted to the old dual formula and omitted the *i Belyia*.)

Since the 1954 theses were promulgated, Soviet historians have avoided the documents controversy.² The reasons for this silence are not difficult to surmise because the controversy centres on the motives, objectives and trustworthiness of the Russians during and after the 1654 agreement. Any research would require discussion of Russian expansionism, throwing doubt on the beneficial nature of Russia's interest in Ukraine. Soviet historians are required to present Russian-Ukrainian relations during the tsarist period as close and co-operative. Evidence to the contrary is either ignored or attributed to the “anti-popular” and “treasonable” proclivities of Ukrainian class enemies.

The Ukrainian subordination to the tsar began in 1654 under conditions that were defined differently by the contracting parties. The negotiations are a unique example of Russian expansionist policies. Most juridical experts agree that the original association was based on a genuine treaty relationship. Only details and definitions are disputed; what is at stake is whether the association constituted an alliance, a personal or a real union, a status of protection or autonomy for the Ukrainians, a vassal–suzerain relationship, or a combination of these possibilities.

However one defines this relationship, all authorities agree that during the succeeding 150 years, Ukrainian rights and privileges were reduced gradually until Left-Bank Ukraine was absorbed into the administrative and judicial structure of the Russian empire. The diverse views of scholars—that there existed a treaty relationship with a grant of autonomy (propounded by Nolde), a personal union (Sergeevich and Filippov), a real union (Diakonov), a vassal relationship (Korkunov and Iakovliv) and a vassalage-cum-alliance (Okinshevych) all attest to the special status given to the Cossack state by Muscovy in 1654.

Juridical opinions are less important than the intentions of the main actors in the events of 1654. The Ukrainians did not think that their subordination to the tsar impaired the sovereign rights of the Cossack state. Khmelnytsky followed commonwealth and Balkan practices in making the understanding. The Russian boyars and their sovereign also acted from their own experience and ideology, which included aggrandizement of the tsar, acquisition of territory, protection of members

of the Orthodox church and further success in “gathering Russian lands.”

Much of the confusion regarding the juridical nature of the 1654 agreement derives from attempts to apply post-seventeenth-century concepts to an area and time when they were unknown. Again, juridical categories must not take precedence over the subjective perceptions of the Russians and Ukrainians who forged the 1654 agreement. For the Ukrainians of that time, terms such as “subjection,” “protection,” transition “to the high hand of the tsar” and “defence” meant a nominal vassalage. This usage was Polish and was also the custom in neighbouring Balkan areas vassal to the Ottoman empire.

The word “subjects” and its derivatives (*poddanyi*, *poddanstvo*), which frequently appeared in Muscovite documents on the 1654 agreement, did not then have the same meaning that they possess today. This is illustrated in an article written by Viacheslav Prokopovych entitled “The Problem of the Juridical Nature of the Ukraine’s Union with Muscovy.” The native inhabitants of Muscovy were called “slaves (*kholopy*) of the tsar,” or “peoples of all ranks of the Muscovite state.” After 1654 the Ukrainians were termed the tsar’s *poddanye*, not *kholopy*. In Muscovy *poddanye* was applied only to foreigners who served the tsar; these “subjects” were under varying degrees of dependency to the tsar. They included Siberian and Georgian princes and others who were rulers or descendants of rulers of areas associated with the tsar. In 1654 Khmelnytsky joined that select list as the hetman of the Zaporozhian state, and Moscow also asked the Wallachian *hospodar*, a vassal of Turkey, to transfer his vassal status to Muscovy as the tsar’s *poddanyi*. Prokopovych says that Muscovite documents show that the tsar’s “subjects” were nominal vassals who accepted his protection or supremacy under specific conditions. The term “subject” as understood in West European juridical practice was not introduced into tsarist Russia until the reign of Catherine II.

The 1654 agreement was incompatible with practical politics and broke down soon after it was concluded. Most sources support this position, although myths have been created to gain political advantage from the past. The most recent example of this myth-making involves Soviet emphasis on the events at Pereislav. The reasons for the breakdown of the Pereiaslav agreement are clearly evident: the rivalry between Russians and Ukrainians for control over Belorussian areas; the Russians’ dislike of the Cossacks’ Tatar and Ottoman ties; the 1656 Vilna accord between Warsaw and Moscow; the presence and misbehaviour of Russian troops in Ukraine; Russia’s hostility conflicting with Khmelnytsky’s friendliness toward Sweden; different perceptions of the Polish threat; inability to co-ordinate joint Russian-Ukrainian military operations; Ukrainian opposition to ecclesiastical subordination to Moscow; conflicting interpretations of the

content and intent of several articles in the 1654 agreement; and, perhaps most significant of all, the clash between Russian centralization and Ukrainian desires for self-government.

Thus, the 1654 Pereiaslav arrangement did not usher in a period of blissful co-operation between Russia and Ukraine; instead, it led to continual misunderstandings and conflicts. Politically, the accord soon ceased to be meaningful. Moreover, by 1667, when the Andrusovo armistice was signed, Pereiaslav ceased to have any international significance. Ukrainian areas were partitioned by Russia and the commonwealth, the Cossacks were split into several factions, and Russian-Ukrainian relations were burdened by mutual distrust, warfare and numerous cases of "treason against the tsar." Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95) characterizes the post-Pereiaslav period in Ukrainian history as "the lost epoch." The second half of the seventeenth century is known aptly as the period of "Ruin" (*Ruina*) in the Dnieper area.

As Drahomanov emphasizes in *Propashchyi chas. Ukraintsi pid moskovskym tsarstvom, 1654–1876* [The lost epoch: The Ukrainians under the tsardom of Moscow, 1654–1876], after 1654 the tsarist government gradually destroyed all the gains that the Ukrainians had won through their revolt against the Poles and reduced Left-Bank Ukraine to an exploited colony. Local rights were abrogated and local officials dismissed. The agrarian revolution was undone as large Ukrainian areas were parcelled out to foreign and native landowners. The positive aspects of the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 1654 included provisions for the election of local officials, banning foreign intervention and insistence on the due process of law; tsarist policies ended these progressive practices.

Drahomanov portrays Russian rule from 1654 as politically and socially degrading for Ukrainians. The Cossack state, by all criteria more democratic and progressive than the tsardom of Muscovy, was destroyed. The Ukrainians, who used to dispatch teachers and clergy to Muscovy, were transformed into a backward, ignorant people. The self-governing institutions of the Cossacks were superseded by arbitrary decisions from a far-off capital made by ill-informed, cruel tsars and tsarist bureaucrats. Although Cossack political institutions had some faults (the 1654 agreement was gentry-oriented and neglected the peasantry), it was the Russians who reimposed serfdom in Ukraine and introduced an absolutism previously unknown. The Cossack order had more in common with European constitutional governments, with elements of liberty similar to those of the Magna Carta. The growth of liberal institutions was stifled by tsarist oppression, and the flow of enlightened ideas from Western Europe stopped.³

Drahomanov's interpretations were based on solid scholarship and shared by many opponents of the tsarist regime, including Lenin and the Ukrainian Bolshevik, Hryhorii Petrovsky (1878–1958). On 2 June (20 May) 1913 Petrovsky, as leader of the Bolshevik faction in the Fourth Duma, gave a famous speech, which Soviet sources maintain was composed in close consultation with Lenin. Speaking on behalf of his constituents in Katerynoslav province (now the Dnipropetrovske *oblast*), Petrovsky attacked tsarist Russia as a savage oppressor of all non-Russians, including the non-Russian Slavs, who were forbidden to use their native languages in “the great Slavic state.”⁴ He charged that for centuries the tsarist government had kept the Ukrainians illiterate deliberately. In 1910, for example, in seven predominantly Ukrainian provinces, from 20 to 29 per cent of the people were literate. Yet in 1652, Petrovsky noted, when Paul of Aleppo visited Ukraine he observed that almost everyone, including women and children, was able to read.⁵ The censuses of 1740 and 1748 show that in the seven administrative “regiments” of the hetmanate there was one Ukrainian-language school for every 746 inhabitants. In 1804 a decree forbade the use of Ukrainian in schools, and the 1897 census showed that the Ukrainians were the most illiterate nationality in the empire; only thirteen persons out of one hundred were able to read. Economic exploitation accompanied this cultural degradation, Petrovsky claimed, so that the Slavs in the empire were more debased than the Negroes in the United States.

The Ukrainian interpretations of the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement contrast with the state-centred historiography of tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. A traditional focus on Ukrainian particularism shows considerable vitality even today. The roots of this tradition are found in the 1654 events themselves, Khmelnytsky's lifetime, and the actions of the hetman's successors. The tradition begins with Khmelnytsky's successor, Ivan Vyhovsky, in many respects the most capable Cossack leader of the mid-seventeenth century. He was the architect of Khmelnytsky's foreign policy and responsible for its implementation, while acting for two years (1657–9) as Khmelnytsky's successor. Vyhovsky tried to extricate the Cossack state from Moscow's entrapments by negotiating the Hadiach agreement. In a declaration addressed to the rulers of Europe, Vyhovsky accused the Muscovite government of breaking the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement. Moscow, Vyhovsky charged, refused to recognize a legitimate hetman, interfered in internal Cossack affairs by supporting the Barabash and Pushkar factions, and fomented civil war among the Ukrainians. The Zaporozhian state therefore had no choice but to appeal to its neighbours for assistance.⁶ The neighbour Vyhovsky had in mind was the commonwealth, and the result was the Hadiach accord, signed on 16

September 1658. The idea of a co-equal "Ruthenian Principality," supported by Iurii Nemyrych and many Western-oriented members of the *starshyna*, was strongly opposed by those Poles who wanted a return to pre-1648 conditions. In consequence, the Hadiach accord was rejected in Warsaw. Vyhovsky, however, had rejected Moscow and pursued both anti-Russian and anti-Polish policies until he was shot by the Poles in 1664.

Pylyp Orlyk provides a patriotic Ukrainian interpretation of the Pereiaslav agreement. Orlyk succeeded Ivan Mazepa as the leader of émigré Cossacks opposed to Russian domination of Ukraine after the battle of Poltava. A complex personality, Orlyk was influenced strongly by Stepan Iavorsky, his teacher at the Kievan Academy, and rose to a high position in the Russian-controlled Cossack political entity headed by his patron, Mazepa. The constitution drafted by émigré Cossacks at Bender in 1710, when Orlyk was chosen hetman, provided for a republican form of government with a parliament limiting the power of the chief executive.⁷ This constitution rejected the reforms of Peter I in Ukraine and made Ukraine a Swedish protectorate in a manner analogous to the Pereiaslav agreement as it was understood by Mazepa's followers. This approach was elaborated by Orlyk in 1712–13 in a political appeal—*Déduction des droits de l'Ukraine*.⁸ Discovered in France in 1922 by Élie Borschak (Ilko Borshchak), this document holds that Khmelnytsky created an independent state, which in 1654 formed an alliance with Muscovy. The tsarist government, however, violated the Pereiaslav agreement and deprived Ukraine of its sovereignty. The 1654 agreement, Orlyk argues, is incontrovertible proof that the Cossack state was a sovereign principality. But hetman Briukhovetsky renounced the sovereign powers of the Ukrainian state; an action that was illegal because the power to do this was vested in the assembly of high Cossack officers, or *les Etats de l'Ukraine*. Orlyk believes that Poland recognized Khmelnytsky's state as sovereign in the Zboriv treaty of 1649. At Pereiaslav, Muscovy agreed to respect the sovereignty of the Cossack state as Poland had done previously. After 1658, however, the tsars continually subverted the agreement, impelling the patriotic Cossacks to reassert Ukrainian independence.

In 1767 a group of Ukrainian deputies to Catherine II's Legislative Commission, under the leadership of Hryhorii Poletyka, presented a memorandum in which they requested a return to the rights guaranteed by the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement. Their premise was that Little Russia was not a conquered land but a country that had voluntarily accepted Russian rule with the stipulation that its institutions and privileges be respected.

Nineteenth-century Ukrainian literature, particularly the historical poetry of Taras Shevchenko, continues the particularist tradition and is

replete with references to this Ukrainian understanding of Pereiaslav. Further, the modern Ukrainian national revival has held this understanding at the core of its ideology. In 1888, for example, when the monument to Khmelnytsky was unveiled in Kiev, a leaflet in Ukrainian and French was circulated that protested tsarist perversions of the 1654 agreement. In a speech at a celebration in honour of Taras Shevchenko in Poltava on 19 February (Old Style), repeated in Kharkiv on 26 February 1900, Mykola Mikhnovsky (1873–1924), an early militant Ukrainian nationalist, declared:

On the basis of the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654 between Tsar Aleksei and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ukraine united with Muscovy as one equal with another. The Muscovite tsars did not honour this agreement and Ukraine legally also became free of this agreement. We want a unified, indivisible, independent Ukraine from the Carpathian mountains to the Kuban river.⁹

A final example of the Ukrainian interpretation of the 1648–54 revolution is the view of the spokesman of the national liberation movement in the Ukrainian SSR after the Second World War. In 1948, the three-hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the great Cossack revolt, propagandists within the anti-Soviet insurgent movement drew inspiration from the exploits of the Khmelnytsky era and fashioned their own image after that of the Cossacks. An underground pamphlet written by Petro Poltava and circulated in Ukraine in April 1948 claimed a direct line of ideological and historical descent from the 1648–54 events to the anti-Soviet underground movement during and after the Second World War:

Our contemporary revolutionary underground is a modern Cossack movement adapted to contemporary conditions. Our professional underground is the vanguard of the entire revolutionary movement and as such is a modern Sich. Our revolutionary armed insurgent struggle of recent years is preparation of both the vanguard of the revolution and of the broad masses for a new 1648 directed this time against Moscow. This route brought the Ukrainian people to freedom. We believe that we too shall reach freedom by the route we are taking today.¹⁰

The Soviet rediscovery of Pereiaslav in 1954 was a political response to this view. Stalin's attempts to reimpose conformity on the Ukrainians after the Second World War led to a new emphasis on the close historical bonds between the Russians and Ukrainians. This campaign focused on the three-hundredth anniversary of Pereiaslav. The events of 1654 were declared the most significant episode in Ukrainian history because Ukraine was "reunited" irrevocably with Russia. Thus, a new Pereiaslav myth was created to justify Ukraine's connection with the Russians.

The 1954 effort to cement the bonds between the Russians and Ukrainians was not based on Marxist or internationalist positions, but on appeals to Ukrainian and Russian historical traditions. The Soviet objective was to propagate a Russophile version of Ukrainian nationalism, with emphasis on pro-Russian traditions and movements in the history of the Ukrainians and a concomitant suppression or denigration of all Ukrainian opposition to Russian domination. Since all nationalisms need a foreign enemy, the Poles, Tatars and Turks have been replaced by the machinations, real and imaginary, of the victorious Entente powers, Hitler's Germany and American imperialism. The historiographical "surgery" included the excision of all anti-Russian incidents from Ukrainian history, the exaggeration of Russian influence and the denunciation of historical figures who cannot easily be fitted into the placid picture of Russian-Ukrainian unity. The current Soviet approach has much in common with traditional Russian historiography which compiled a long list of Ukrainian traitors. The essential difference, however, is that no effort has been made to revive the old concept of a "Russia one and indivisible." The denial of the existence of the Ukrainian nation has been replaced by "the everlasting friendship of two fraternal peoples."

Whether this new "Pereiaslav legend" will be more successful than earlier tsarist versions is difficult to predict. Dissidence in the Ukrainian republic and the logic of history suggest that the "fraternal bliss" between the Russians and Ukrainians under Soviet rule is fragile. Abiding friendly relationships do not ignore past discords. Anglo-American relations require no reinterpretations of the American Revolution or the suppression of facts, nor do memories of Joan of Arc and the Hundred Years' War threaten Anglo-French friendship today. The Soviet rewrite of Russian-Ukrainian relations suggests tension and an uneasy conscience in the Kremlin. The "mansion" of Ukrainian-Russian friendship is haunted by many "ghosts," among them Khmelnytsky's closest colleagues during the 1648-54 revolution. These ghosts of "traitors," include all the hetmans up to the battle of Poltava; Khmelnytsky alone has been declared an exception, although the historical records reveal the dubious nature of Khmelnytsky's loyalty to Russia.¹¹

Braichevsky's view—the theses of 1954 reflect outmoded Stalinist thinking that must be replaced by a new liberalism—is supported by a quotation from the guidebook of Kostenko on the teaching of the history of the Eastern Slavs, also written in 1954. In describing how the Eastern Slavs were unified under the leadership of the Russians, this volume quotes an article by Stalin printed in *Pravda* on 7 September 1947, on the occasion of the eight-hundredth anniversary of the founding of Moscow:

The merit of Moscow above all abides in the fact that it became the base for the unification of fragmented Rus' as a single state with a single government and a single leadership. No country in the world can think to further its capacity for serious economic and cultural growth if it is unable to liberate itself from feudal fragmentation and from princely disorderliness. Only that country which is unified as one centralized state can entertain the possibility of serious cultural-economic growth and the possibility of consolidating its independence. The historical merit of Moscow abides in the fact that it was and remains the basis and the initiator of the construction of a centralized state in Rus'.¹²

Given this centralist approach and its elaboration in the 1954 theses on Russian-Ukrainian unity, there is reason to believe that the theses are already an anachronism. To be meaningful and effective, liberalization, or de-Stalinization, in the USSR requires a re-examination and revision of the 1954 theses. In the latter half of the twentieth century there may or may not be legitimate reasons for the preservation of the political status quo in Eastern Europe, but they do not justify the distortion of history.

Notes

1. The sheer volume of Russocentric historiography, both imperial and Soviet, prompts most scholars to accept uncritically the view that the tsar's representatives did not give a reciprocal oath at Pereiaslav. This view was not firmly held in the seventeenth century, however, as shown by the testimony of the Russian émigré, Grigorii Kotoshikhin. In his description of the tsarist administrative body concerned with Ukrainian affairs (*Prikaz Malye Rossii*), Kotoshikhin describes an aspect of the 1654 Pereiaslav events as follows: "When the tsar accepted them under his rule in vassalage [*v poddanstvo*], he promised them and made an oath [*on obeshchalsia im i chinil veru*] that they were to be under his

rule in perpetual vassalage [*poddanstvo*] in accordance with the freedoms and privileges that they possessed when they were in the vassalage [*v poddanstvo*] of the Polish king, so that nothing whatsoever would be changed and their freedoms would not be abrogated.” See G. Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, 111.

2. For example, a detailed study of Left-Bank Ukraine from the 1650s through the 1670s discusses the 1659 Pereiaslav *rada* but ignores the problem of the 1659 version of the 1654 agreement. See K. I. Stetsiuk, *Narodni rukhy na Livoberezhnii i Slobodskii Ukraini v 50-70-kh rokakh XVII st.*
3. A more complete account of Drahomanov’s views on Pereiaslav in English translation appears in “The Lost Epoch” in *Mykhailo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings*, a special edition of the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* edited by I. L. Rudnytsky.
4. Petrovsky’s speech is printed in the third edition of Lenin’s works: V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia* 16, 686–92. The fourth and fifth editions of Lenin’s works (the volumes covering 1913, published in 1948 and 1961, respectively) do not contain this speech. Neither does the volume *V. I. Lenin pro Ukrainu*. All these publications, however, carry a footnote stating that Lenin wrote the outline of Petrovsky’s speech but that Lenin’s manuscript has not been found. Soviet reluctance since the early 1930s to reproduce the Lenin–Petrovsky speech derives from the changes in nationality policy instituted by Stalin at that time.
5. In fact, Paul of Aleppo’s account of literacy among the Ukrainians was based on travels he made in 1654.
6. A translation of this document into English appears as Appendix 6 in this study. Written in Latin, apparently by Iurii Nemyrych, a copy of Vyhovsky’s appeal was found in the archives of the Swedish government in Stockholm in 1898 by Nikandr Molchanovsky (1858–1906). A student of Volodymyr Antonovych, Molchanovsky carried out historical research at the behest of the Kiev Archeological Commission. Some of his discoveries, including the Vyhovsky appeal, were published in a special volume in the series *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* part 3, vol. 6. This volume was published in Kiev in 1908 and bears the subtitle *Akty shvedskago gosudarstvonnago arkhiva, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Malorossii (1649–1660 gg.)*.
7. See B. Krupnytsky, *Hetman Pylyp Orlyk*, and M. Vasylenko, “The Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk.” The latter is a translation of a Russian-language article that first appeared in *Uchenye zapiski Instituta istorii RANIION* 4, 153–71.
8. A translation of this document appears as Appendix 7 in this study.
9. I. Kollard, *Spohady iunatskykh dniv, 1897–1906*, 75. This is a reprint of memoirs first published in serial form in 1928–31 in the Lviv

journal *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*. Kollard, a member of an early Ukrainian revolutionary group, reports that in 1903–4 some tsarist supporters in Ukraine celebrated the 250th anniversary of the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement. Youthful nationalists in Kharkiv retaliated by planning to blow up monuments to tsarist heroes. Since Kharkiv had no statue to any tsar, the group decided to blow up the statue of Pushkin located on the university grounds because the poet had celebrated the idea of “Russia one and indivisible.” Similar actions in Kiev and Odessa failed completely.

10. P. Poltava, “Chomu povstannia 1648 r. bulo peremozhne.” An authenticated copy is in the possession of Prolog Associates, New York City. It was published in P. Poltava, *Zbirnyk pidpilnykh pysan*, 175–89.
11. The argument of this and the preceding two paragraphs are based on I. L. Rudnytsky’s “Novyi Pereiaslav,” in *Mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu*; the article originally appeared in *Kultura* (Paris), no. 6 and 7–8 (1956).
12. A. Ia. Kostenko, *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei 1654–1954*, 21.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Translation into English of a Russian Version of the “Articles of Petition of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,” Dated 14 March 1654, Old Style (24 March, New Style), Containing Twenty-Three Articles

A Copy from the Text in the Belorussian Language with Articles Which Was Transmitted by the Zaporozhian Envoys Samiilo Bohdanovych and Pavlo Teteria on 14 March 1654

Before You, Great Sovereign and Great Prince by the Grace of God, Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, and Ruler of many States, before Your Tsarist Majesty we, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, and the entire Zaporozhian Army as well as the entire Ruthenian Christian world, bow our forehead to the face of the earth.

Rejoicing greatly because of the many grants and innumerable favours which Your Tsarist Majesty has willed to be shown to us, we vow fervently to You, Our Sovereign, that we shall forever serve Your Tsarist Majesty sincerely and faithfully with respect to all things and with respect to all Tsarist desires. We now fervently request, as we have petitioned in an official document, that You will bestow upon us Your Tsarist Grace in all matters and that You decree the privileges and Your Tsarist favours that our envoys will beseech of Your Tsarist Majesty on our behalf.

1. In the beginning, grant that Your Tsarist Majesty will confirm our rights and our military freedoms as they have existed for ages in the Zaporozhian Army, which was governed by its own laws and which possessed its own prerogatives in matters of property and of justice; grant that neither a military commander nor a boyar nor court official shall interfere with the courts of the Army and that its members be judged by their own elders in accordance with the rule: when three Cossacks are involved, then two of them are to judge the third.

This article the Tsar decreed and the boyars agreed is to stand in accordance with their petition.

2. That the Zaporozhian Army to the number of sixty thousand men always be at full strength.

The Sovereign decreed and the boyars agreed that it should be sixty thousand, in accordance with their petition.

3. That the gentry that has turned to Russia and taken an oath, in accordance with the immaculate commandment of Christ, to You, Our Great Sovereign, Your Tsarist Majesty, continue to retain the class privileges of their estate. That from among their own elders they continue to select their own judicial officials and to hold possession to their own property and freedoms, as it had been under the Polish kings. So that others, along with the rest of the Christian world, having observed such favours from Your Tsarist Majesty, will also accept Your jurisdiction and come under Your Tsarist Majesty's high and firm hand. District and municipal courts are to be administered, as they were previously, by officials chosen by the local people themselves. Furthermore, the gentry deriving income from their estates which they possess according to charters shall continue to do so now as before; otherwise they either will be compensated or will be permitted to administer such properties.

These articles the Tsar decreed and the boyars agreed are to be in accordance with their petition.

4. That in the cities there be selected from among our own worthy people officials who are to govern or supervise Your Tsarist Majesty's subjects and who are to transmit to Your Tsarist Majesty's treasury the incomes justly belonging to it.

The Tsar decreed and the boyars agreed that it should be in accordance with their petition. That the state officials, village leaders, town mayors, councilmen and assessors are to collect all kinds of taxes, in money and in grain, for the Sovereign and to turn them over for the Sovereign's treasury to those persons whom the Sovereign shall send out for this purpose, to receive for the treasury and to observe that the collectors perform properly.

5. That to the office of hetman there be attached the district of Chyhyryn with all of its appurtenances in order that it might continue to provide income to that entire office.

The Sovereign decreed and the boyars agreed that it be in accordance with their petition.

6. God preserve the Lord Hetman from death, but since every man is mortal and otherwise it cannot be, let it be that the Zaporozhian Army on its own select from within itself a hetman and make him known to His Tsarist Majesty since this is an ancient custom of the Zaporozhian Army.

The Sovereign decreed and the boyars agreed that it be in accordance with their petition.

7. That no one take away Cossack properties. And those that possess land shall continue freely to manage their own properties and to enjoy all the benefits of their lands. Widows surviving departed Cossacks, as well as their children, are to possess the same privileges as their forefathers and parents.

It is to be in accordance with their petition.

8. That to the general secretary of the Zaporozhian Army there be allocated, because of the kindness of His Tsarist Majesty, one thousand gold pieces for the employees of his office and a mill to provide for quartermaster needs, which require large expenditures.

It is to be in accordance with their petition, the funds to come from local taxes.

9. That to each colonel there be assigned a mill because expenditures are great. However, should Your Tsarist Majesty's kindness be greater, then whatever Your Tsarist Majesty may will to grant.

The Sovereign issued a grant in accordance with their petition.

10. Additionally, for justices of the Zaporozhian Army three hundred gold pieces to each, as well as a mill, and for each court recorder, one hundred gold pieces.

The Sovereign issued a grant in accordance with their petition. But with respect to the justices, enquiry should be made as to their number.

11. With respect to the chiefs of staff of the Zaporozhian Army and the regimental chiefs of staff that are on permanent military duty and cannot cultivate the land, we further beseech Your Tsarist Majesty to grant to each a mill.

The Sovereign issued a grant in accordance with their petition.

12. For the manufacture of ordnance equipment and of artillery and for all persons employed with ordnance, we request Your Tsarist Majesty to turn Your Kind Attention to both the problems of winter and of quarters. We also request that the master of ordnance be granted four hundred gold pieces.

The Sovereign ordered this grant, which is to be taken from local taxes.

13. That the rights granted through the centuries by princes and kings to both clerical and lay persons not be violated in any way.

The Sovereign so granted and ordered that it be thus.

14. That envoys from foreign lands coming to the Zaporozhian Army with good intentions be freely received by the Lord Hetman and the Zaporozhian Army, for this will bring no affront to His Tsarist Majesty. However, if there should be something detrimental to His Tsarist Majesty, then we are obligated to so inform His Tsarist Majesty.

The Sovereign decreed and the boyars agreed that envoys with good intentions are to be received and dispatched. Further, the Sovereign is to be informed in writing regarding the purposes for which they came and with what instructions they were released. And with respect to all envoys sent out by whomsoever on matters detrimental to the Sovereign, these are to be detained and the Sovereign is to be informed about them in writing. They are not to be released without an order from the Sovereign. Further, with the Turkish Sultan and the Polish King there are to be no relations without the Sovereign's permission.

15. Inasmuch as in other countries tribute is paid in one sum, we also wish to give in the accepted manner to those persons appointed by Your Tsarist Majesty. In any case, no tsarist military commander should be permitted to participate in such matters, and if need be there can be selected from among local people a commander, a worthy person, who is to turn over all of these taxes to His Tsarist Majesty.

This article, the Sovereign decreed and the boyars agreed, is to remain as written above. The village leaders, town mayors, councilmen and assessors are to do the

collecting and to turn over the taxes for the Sovereign's treasury to those persons whom the Sovereign shall send out. These same persons are to observe the collectors in order that they might perform justly.

16. Our envoys are to seek an agreement to the effect that no visiting commander shall violate our rights and institute procedures causing great displeasure because the people cannot abruptly accustom themselves to the way of others and are unable to tolerate such burdens. And wherever among local people there are qualified persons, these shall see that justice is done with respect to violations of local laws and traditions.

With respect to rights, the Sovereign's decree and the boyars' decision are recorded in connection with other articles

17. In the beginning there was no suppression of our faith or of our freedoms by the Polish kings, and since we enjoyed complete freedom we therefore served faithfully. But today, because of the assault on our freedoms, we are obliged to submit to the firm and high hand of His Tsarist Majesty. And our envoys are to request assiduously that His Tsarist Majesty write down our privileges in charters stamped by seals, one for Cossack freedoms and a second for the freedoms of the gentry, so that these freedoms might be forever. And when we shall receive this, we ourselves are to maintain order among ourselves. He who is a Cossack shall have Cossack freedoms, and he who is a land-working peasant shall give to His Tsarist Majesty the customary obligation, as before. And so it shall be with respect to all manner of people who have become subjects of His Tsarist Majesty with reference to what rights and freedoms they are to have.

The Sovereign decreed and the boyars agreed that it is to be in accordance with their petition.

18. With respect to the Metropolitan there are to be discussions, and concerning this matter we have given oral instructions to our envoys.

The Sovereign decreed and the boyars agreed that the Metropolitan is to be granted an official charter concerning the properties that he now possesses.

19. Additionally, our envoys are to request assiduously that His Tsarist Majesty send troops quickly and directly to Smolensk without delay, so that the enemy might not improve his position and consolidate with others, for his troops are now hard-pressed. Also, no faith should be placed in any of the enemy's blandishments.

The Sovereign decreed and the boyars agreed that an announcement should be made to the envoys about the expedition of troops, among them the Sovereign Himself, *boyars* and many soldiers, which will depart from Moscow. This matter should not be written about to the Hetman.

20. This essential matter should be broached that for any eventuality a contingent of persons, around 3,000 or preferably more, whatever the will of His Tsarist Majesty might be, should be stationed here along the border with the Poles.

Enquiry should be made as to what places along the borders they are to be posted.

21. It has always been the custom for the Zaporozhian Army to be paid a salary. And now it is requested of His Tsarist Majesty that there be paid 100 *efimki* to each colonel, 200 gold pieces to each regimental chief of staff, 400 gold pieces to each chief of staff on the highest staff level, 100 gold pieces to each centurion and 30 gold pieces to each Cossack.

This is to be dissuaded. The Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, desiring to defend the members of the Orthodox Christian faith from persecutors and from those wanting to destroy the Church of God and to uproot the Christian faith, has collected a large army to defend that Church from the Latins and marches against the enemy. For this defence and for the armed forces he has depleted much of His Sovereign's treasury. Furthermore, when the Sovereign's trusted boyars Vasilii Vasilevich Buturlin, the Lord-Lieutenant of Tver, and his colleagues visited Bohdan Khmelnytsky and spoke with the hetman regarding the strength of the Zaporozhian Army, the hetman spoke as follows: even though the strength of the Zaporozhian Army will be great, this will bring no loss to the Sovereign. The Hetman so spoke in their presence, advising his justices and colonels that it is not appropriate for them either to speak of such matters.

22. If the Horde should become aggressive, then it will be necessary to move against them from Astrakhan and Kazan. In such an eventuality the Don Cossacks should also be alerted. However, since there is still peace, time should be permitted to go by and the Tatars should not be provoked.

They should be informed that the following order of the Sovereign has been sent to the Cossacks of the Don: if the Crimeans cause no trouble, do not march against them; however, should they cause trouble, then at that time the Sovereign will issue an order as to what action to take against them.

23. That His Tsarist Majesty will henceforth order the supplying of rations and powder for artillery for the fortress of Kodak, which was constructed at the frontier with Crimea and in which the Lord Hetman at all times posts 400 men and provides them with all kinds of provisions. Also, with respect to those that defend the outpost beyond the rapids, that His Tsarist Majesty will deign to show His grace, for it cannot be left abandoned without men.

To enquire: the amount of rations needed for each of these 400 men, and why has a petition been made on their behalf?

The boyars decided to recommend to the Sovereign: that those of the Sovereign's persons of all ranks that have fled to the Sovereign's Ukrainian cities and towns be sought out and returned.

Source: *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 10, Document 11, 445–52.

Appendix 2

The Tsar's Official Patent to Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Army Transmitted through the Envoys Samiilo Bohdanovych and Pavlo Teteria in Moscow 27 March 1654, Old Style (6 April 1654, New Style)

By the grace of God We, the Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, have issued a patent to the subjects of Our Tsarist Majesty, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, and its secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, as well as to the Justices of the Army, the Colonels, the Chiefs of Staff, Centurions, and the entire Zaporozhian Army, who in the year 1654, in accordance with God's grace placed themselves under Our Sovereign's high hand. This same Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the entire Zaporozhian Army made an oath to Us, the Great Sovereign, and to Our Sovereign's children and Successors, of eternal allegiance. Further, in March the same Hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army sent to Us, the Great Sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, their envoys Samiilo Bohdanovych, the Justice of the Army, and Pavlo Teteria, the Colonel of Pereiaslav. In his letter to Us, the Great Sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, the Hetman wrote and his envoys petitioned that We, the Great Sovereign, bestow a patent to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army.

It was petitioned that We honour their previous rights and the liberties of the Army, as they have existed since long ago from the times of the Great Ruthenian Princes and Polish Kings. That they continue to possess and enjoy their rights with respect to property and the courts, and that no one should interfere with the courts of the Army. That they be judged by their own elders. That We confirm their previous rights conferred to persons of lay and clerical rank by the Great Ruthenian Princes and the Polish Kings. That such rights are not to be violated and that in recognition of these rights there be granted Our Sovereign official patent authenticated by Our Sovereign seal. Additionally, that the strength of the registered Zaporozhian troops be set at sixty thousand, a figure which is to be filled at all times. And should by God's judgment death overtake the Hetman, then

We, the Great Sovereign, are to allow the Zaporozhian Army, in accordance with ancient custom, to select a Hetman from among themselves. And whomsoever they might choose is to be reported to Us, the Great Sovereign. Cossack properties and lands that are used for sustenance are not to be taken away, and in like manner widows and children surviving deceased Cossacks are to retain the privileges of their parents and grandfathers.

Therefore We, the Great Sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, have issued a patent to Our subject Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, and to Our Tsarist Majesty's entire Zaporozhian Army. We have ordered that they be under Our Tsarist Majesty's high hand in accordance with their former rights and privileges as conferred by the Great Lithuanian Princes and the Polish Kings. We have ordered that these rights and liberties shall in no way be violated. We have also decreed that they are to be tried by their own elders in accordance with their own ancient laws. We have decreed that the strength of the Zaporozhian troops shall be put at sixty thousand registered men in accordance with their petition, and that this figure be filled at all times. And should God's judgment bring death to the Hetman, then We, the Great Sovereign, will allow the Zaporozhian Army to choose a Hetman in accordance with their former practices, that is, by themselves from among themselves. And whomsoever they shall select as Hetman they will inform Us, the Great Sovereign, in writing. With respect to this newly chosen Hetman, it is for Us, the Great Sovereign, to arrange for him to take an oath of subjection and loyalty in a manner that We, the Great Sovereign, shall decree. Additionally, we forbid that Cossack properties and lands used for sustenance be taken away from them or from widows and children surviving deceased Cossacks; instead, matters are to remain as they were previously.

And so, in accordance with Our Tsarist Majesty's patent, the subject of Our Tsarist Majesty, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, and Our Tsarist Majesty's entire Zaporozhian Army are to be under Our Tsarist Majesty's high hand in accordance with their former rights and privileges and in accordance with all of the articles previously enumerated. They are to serve Us, the Great Sovereign, and Our son the Sovereign Tsarevich, Prince Aleksei Alekseevich, and Our successors with loyalty and they are to promote all things good. When Our Sovereign's decree so orders, they are to march in battle against Our Sovereign's enemies, and in all things they are to be forever obedient to Our Sovereign's will.

With respect to each and every article that the above-mentioned envoys Samiilo Bohdanovych and Pavlo Teteria presented as a petition in the name of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, to Us, the Great Sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, through Our Tsarist Majesty's most trusted nobles, the boyar and lord-lieutenant of Kazan, Prince Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi, the boyar and lord-lieutenant of Tver, Vasilii Vasilevich Buturlin, the courtier and lord-lieutenant of Kashira, Petr Petrovich Golovin, and the state secretary Almaz Ivanov, We, the Great Sovereign, cordially considered these articles. Each article that received Our Tsarist Majesty's approval We ordered to be confirmed by signature after each appropriate article. We further ordered that these articles with Our Tsarist Majesty's

decrees be transmitted to the same envoys Samiilo Bohdanovych and Pavlo Teteria, for We desire to retain Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army in Our Tsarist Majesty's gracious favour and solicitude and desire that they be loyal to Our Sovereign beneficence.

Source: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii* 1, 325–7.

Appendix 3

Articles Drafted in Moscow with the Envoys of Hetman Khmelnytsky, 27 March 1654, Old Style (6 April 1654, New Style)

A petition to the Great Sovereign, the Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, Sovereign and Ruler of Many States, is presented by His Tsarist Majesty's subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, the entire Zaporozhian Army, and the entire Ruthenian Christian world in order that His Tsarist Majesty might grant those things for which the envoys have petitioned. In turn the petitioner will serve His Tsarist Majesty forever with respect to all of His Sovereign desires. Each article obtaining His Tsarist Majesty's sanction will be so subscribed following each article.

1. That in the cities officials be chosen from among their own worthy people. They are to govern His Tsarist Majesty's subjects and to deliver justly the appropriate taxes to His Tsarist Majesty's treasury. Visiting commanders of His Tsarist Majesty are not to violate their rights so that great dissatisfaction might be avoided. Leading local persons are to render justice with respect to the violation of their own laws.

His Tsarist Majesty granted this article and decreed that it shall be in accordance with their petition. The city officials, village leaders, mayors, councilmen, and assessors are to collect all taxes in money and in grain on behalf of His Tsarist Majesty and to transmit them to His Sovereign's treasury through those persons who shall be sent out by His Tsarist Majesty. These same designated persons to be sent by His Tsarist Majesty to obtain the collected assets shall also supervise the collectors in order that they might perform correctly.

2. The general secretary of the Zaporozhian Army, because of the graciousness of His Tsarist Majesty, shall be given 1,000 Polish gold pieces for the employees of his office. The justices of the Army are each to be given 300 Polish gold pieces,

each court recorder 100 Polish gold pieces, each secretary and standard-bearer on the regimental level 50 gold pieces, the standard-bearer on the century level 30 gold pieces, and the keeper of the hetman's regalia 50 gold pieces.

His Tsarist Majesty so granted and ordered that it be in accordance with their petition, the funds to be obtained from local taxes.

3. That there be assigned to the general secretary of the Zaporozhian Army and two of its justices, to each colonel, and to the chiefs of staff on both Army and regimental levels a mill to provide for rations, for these officials have large expenditures.

His Tsarist Majesty so granted and ordered that it be in accordance with their petition.

4. For the manufacture of artillery for the Zaporozhian Army, for cannoners, and for all persons employed with artillery—that His Tsarist Majesty issue a grant and order that His Tsarist Majesty's solicitude graciously be extended to the problems of winter and quarters. Additionally, that the master of ordnance be given 400 gold pieces and the standard-bearer of the artillery 50 gold pieces.

His Tsarist Majesty so granted and ordered that the funds be obtained from local taxes.

5. Envoys who for an extended period of time have been coming to the Zaporozhian Army from foreign countries and who come with good intentions are to be freely received by the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Army. Only if there is something inimical to His Tsarist Majesty should His Tsarist Majesty be kept informed.

With respect to this article, His Tsarist Majesty decreed that envoys with good intentions are to be received and allowed to depart. As to the nature of the business for which they came and with what they departed, this shall be reported immediately and faithfully to His Tsarist Majesty. With respect to those envoys sent by anyone on matters inimical to His Tsarist Majesty, such envoys and couriers are to be detained by the Zaporozhian Army. His Tsarist Majesty is to be informed in writing immediately about them and instructions are to be requested. Without an order from His Tsarist Majesty they are not to be allowed to return. Further, with the Turkish Sultan and the Polish King there is to be no contact without His Tsarist Majesty's permission.

6. With respect to the Metropolitan of Kiev, the envoys were dispatched with oral instructions, and orally the envoys requested that His Tsarist Majesty grant and order that the Metropolitan be given the Sovereign's official patent of entitlement to his properties.

His Tsarist Majesty so granted to the Metropolitan and to all persons of clerical status with respect to their properties which they now possess and decreed the issuance of His Sovereign's official patent.

7. That his Tsarist Majesty immediately order troops directly to Smolensk, brooking no delay whatsoever, in order that the enemy might not improve his position and consolidate with others. The enemy forces are now hard-pressed and credit should not be given to any blandishments the enemy may see fit to offer.

His Tsarist Majesty has willed that against His enemy the Polish King He Himself shall march. He will dispatch boyars and military commanders with many soldiers after the terrain has dried and when pasturage for horses begins to grow.

8. That for defence against all kinds of threats, people be conscripted along the border with the Poles, to the strength of 3,000 or preferably even more, whatever might be the will of His Tsarist Majesty.

His Tsarist Majesty's forces are always deployed along the frontier for the defence of Ukraine and shall begin to move forward.

9. It has always been the custom for the Zaporozhian Army to receive a salary. So now petition is made to His Tsarist Majesty that for each colonel there be allocated 100 *efimki*; for each regimental chief of staff, 200 gold pieces; and for each chief of staff on Army level, 400 gold pieces; for each centurion, 100 gold pieces and for each rank-and-file Cossack, 30 gold pieces.

In previous years Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army contacted His Tsarist Majesty and petitioned many times that His Tsarist Majesty grant them a charter on behalf of the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God, beseeching the Tsar to intercede on their behalf, to accept them under His Sovereign high hand, and to provide assistance against their enemies. At that time it was not possible for Our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, to accept you under His Sovereign hand, because between His Tsarist Majesty and the Polish Kings and the Great Lithuanian Princes there existed an eternal peace agreement. However, since then from the side of the King there have been committed many outrages and insults: with respect to His Tsarist Majesty's father, the Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Prince Mikhail Fedorovich, of blessed memory, the Autocrat of all Russia, Sovereign and Ruler of many States; with

respect to the Sovereign's grandfather, Filaret Nikitich, of blessed memory, the Great Sovereign and Holy Patriarch of Moscow and of all Russia; as well as with respect to Our Great Sovereign, the Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Russia, His Tsarist Majesty.

In reference to the King's communications, the Diet's resolutions, the drafting of documents and diplomatic agreements, His Tsarist Majesty expected redress. It was further desired to bring peace between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army and the Polish King through the intercession of the Great Sovereign's envoys. It was intended that King Jan Kazimierz would agree to peace arrangements in accordance with the Zboriv Agreement; and that there would be no persecution of the Orthodox Christian faith; and that all Uniates would be suppressed. His Tsarist Majesty desired that those guilty persons who received the death verdict for defaming His Sovereign's honour be turned over for punishment. For these purposes he dispatched to King Jan Kazimierz His Sovereign's great and plenipotentiary envoys, the boyar and lord-lieutenant of Great Perm, Prince Boris Aleksandrovich Repnin-Obolensky, and his colleagues. His Majesty's great and plenipotentiary envoys negotiated with respect to such a peace and with respect to the actions of the King, bringing up all issues before the Senate [*Pany-Rada*]. Neither King Kazimierz nor the Senate agreed to any proposal and thus they brought this great effort to nothing. Thus His Tsarist Majesty's great and plenipotentiary envoys returned without success. Accordingly, Our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, seeing these many errors insults and injustices from the side of the King and desiring to defend the Orthodox Christian faith and all Orthodox Christians from persecutors and from those Latins wanting to ruin the Church of God and to destroy the Christian faith, has accepted you under His Sovereign high hand.

Currently for your defence our Great Sovereign Himself, His Tsarist Majesty, having gathered together many Russian, Tatar and German troops, is marching against the enemies of the Christians and is sending out His boyars and military commanders with large forces. For this military objective, in accordance with the Tsar's decree, the Sovereign's treasury has been greatly depleted. Therefore it is not appropriate for the envoys to talk now about salary payments to the Zaporozhian Army in view of such graciousness on His Tsarist Majesty's part and in view of the efforts now being made in their defence. When the Sovereign's trusted boyar Vasili Vasilevich Buturlin, the lord-lieutenant of Tver, along with his colleagues visited Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, during the negotiations the Hetman talked of putting the strength of the Zaporozhian Army at 60,000 and remarked that even if the figure should be greater that would bring no loss to the Sovereign because they had no intention to request salary payments from the Sovereign. This is known to Samiilo Bohdanovych and Pavlo Teteria and to other persons who at that time were with the Hetman. Further, since it is not known to His Tsarist Majesty what taxes are to come from Little Russia, from the cities and towns, the Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, is dispatching officials to study the tax problem. These officials of His Tsarist Majesty are to describe and arrange all types of taxes, whereupon after review by His Tsarist Majesty there will be

issued a decree regarding salary payments to the Zaporozhian Army. For the present His Tsarist Majesty, having compassion for the Hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army, desires to send some gold pieces, in accordance with the ancient custom of his ancestors, the Great Sovereign, Tsars and Great Princes of Russia, to the Hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army.

10. Should the Crimean Horde spring into action, it will then be necessary to advance against them from Astrakhan and Kazan. Additionally, the Don Cossacks should be alerted in that eventuality. However, since all is still peaceful, it is best to play for time and cause them no provocation.

His Tsarist Majesty's instructions and orders have already been sent to the Cossacks of the Don. If the Crimean people cause no trouble, then it is forbidden to march against them and to cause them any trouble. If the Crimeans cause trouble, then at that time His Tsarist Majesty will issue instructions as to what measures to take against them.

11. That Kodak, a fortress at the frontier with Crimea, in which the Hetman at all times stations 400 men and supplies them with all kinds of provisions, henceforth be supplied with rations and powder for artillery by order of His Tsarist Majesty. Additionally, those that defend the outpost beyond the rapids should be accorded His Tsarist Majesty's graciousness, since it is impossible to abandon that outpost and leave it without men.

With regard to this article, a decree by His Tsarist Majesty will be issued after it has been established how much and what kind of supplies have been sent to those places and the amount of taxes that shall be collected for His Tsarist Majesty.

Furthermore, in your communication it is written that as soon as our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, issues a patent to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army and orders the grant of His Sovereign charters with respect to your freedoms, then you will make a decision among yourselves as to who will be a Cossack and who will be a peasant. Also that the strength of the Zaporozhian Army be set at sixty thousand. The Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, agreed and ordered that the number of registered Cossacks be of that strength, and He further ordered that when you envoys shall have returned to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky that you inform him that he should order the immediate registration of the Cossacks and that this list under his signature should be transmitted to His Tsarist Majesty.

Source: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii* 1, 322–5.

Appendix 4

The 1659 Version of the 1654 Agreement with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky

1. That His Tsarist Majesty issue a grant and order the confirmation of the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Army as they have existed since long ago. That they might be governed by their own laws and might possess their own liberties with respect to property and with respect to the courts. And that these courts shall have their own justices, with no interference from boyars, military commanders or tsarist courtiers, so that members of the community might be tried by their own leaders in accordance with the rule that when three Cossacks are involved, then two of them shall judge the third.

With respect to this article His Tsarist Majesty issued a grant to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army and ordered that it be in accordance with their petition.

2. That in the cities the officials be selected from among their own worthy people and that these officials should govern or exercise control over His Tsarist Majesty's subjects and turn over the appropriate taxes to the treasury of His Majesty.

His Tsarist Majesty accepted this article and ordered that it be in accordance with their petition. The officials of the Zaporozhian Army and the village leaders, city mayors, councilmen, and assessors will collect all kinds of taxes, in money and in grain, on behalf of His Tsarist Majesty and turn them over to His Sovereign's treasury through those persons that His Tsarist Majesty shall send out, persons assigned to this matter to Kiev and Pereiaslav. Persons so assigned by His Tsarist Majesty to receive the collections for the treasury are also to observe the collectors to insure that they function properly.

3. To the office of the Hetman there has been attached the district of Chyhyryn with all of its appurtenances so that there might be sufficient support for all ranks connected with that office. Additionally, the Hetman is to receive a thousand gold ducats.

His Tsarist Majesty accepted this article and ordered that it be in accordance with their petition.

4. If by God's judgment death should befall the Hetman, then His Tsarist Majesty will allow the Zaporozhian Army to select on its own a Hetman from among themselves. Having made a selection, the Zaporozhian Army will inform His Tsarist Majesty, since this is its ancient custom.

His Tsarist Majesty accepted this article and ordered that it be in accordance with their petition. Further, after his selection the Hetman is to travel to the Great Sovereign, the Tsar and Great Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great and Little and White Russia, in order to see His Sovereign's illustrious eyes. Then the Great Sovereign, His Illustrious Tsarist Majesty, will give the Hetman the mace and banner of his office and will order the issuance to him of His Sovereign's official charter for the hetmanate.

5. That no one shall take away properties belonging to Cossacks. Those who possess land and sustain themselves by these lands are to remain unmolested in the retention of such property. Additionally, widows and children surviving departed Cossacks are to possess the same privileges that their forefathers and fathers enjoyed.

His Tsarist Majesty accepted this article and ordered that it be in accordance with their petition.

6. The general secretary and the master of ordnance of the Zaporozhian Army are each to receive 1,000 Polish gold pieces. The justices of the Army are each to receive 300 gold pieces. For each court recorder there is to be allocated 100 gold pieces; for each secretary and standard-bearer on the regimental level, 50 gold pieces; for the standard-bearer on the century level, 30 gold pieces; for the keeper of the Hetman's regalia, 100 Polish gold pieces; for each colonel, 100 *efimki*; for each regimental chief of staff, 200 gold pieces; for each chief of staff of the Zaporozhian Army, 400 gold pieces; for each centurion, 100 gold pieces. Additionally, the master of ordnance, the general secretary, two justices, each colonel, and the chiefs of staff on Army and regimental levels on permanent military duty shall be awarded one mill each. Each registered Cossack is to receive 30 Polish gold pieces. There are to be 60,000 registered Cossacks, who are to

receive salaries from the Sovereign that have been collected from taxes each year by the Zaporozhian Army of Little Russia in the cities.

7. That the artillery of the Zaporozhian Army be posted in Korsun and the entire district be set aside for the support and manufacture of artillery and to take care of the artillery there should be assigned an artillery officer, an administrative officer, a standard-bearer, a secretary, eighteen men as cannoneers, four blacksmiths for artillery, twelve artificers, six herdsman, one hostler, two morticers and two veterinarians.

With respect to this article the boyars agreed it is to be in accordance with their petition.

8. That His Tsarist Majesty issue a patent with respect to the rights granted in times past by Princes and Kings to both clerical and lay persons and that the Sovereign prohibit the violation of these rights in any way.

His Tsarist Majesty issued a decree to the effect that both clerical and lay rights shall not be violated in any way. Also that the Metropolitan of Kiev and other clergy of Little Russia are to be under the jurisdiction of the Holy Patriarch of Moscow and of all Great, Little and White Russia, while the Holy Patriarch is not to interfere with their spiritual rights.

9. The Hetman is not to receive ambassadors, envoys or couriers from neighbouring states, nor from any other states, and in response to missions from neighbouring states, or from any other states, he is not to dispatch envoys or couriers on his own behalf. Because of the monetary cost and other kinds of expenditures by the Zaporozhian Army, His Tsarist Majesty, the Great Sovereign, will determine to what state and on what business the Hetman will be allowed to send envoys. Furthermore, should any envoys, ambassadors and couriers from neighbouring states take the initiative and present themselves to the Hetman, he is to reject them with the advice that, whatever their concerns might be, they should travel to the Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, in Moscow.

10. With the Crimean Khan the Hetman is to have no relationships other than peaceful ones, the peace to be maintained in accordance with the instructions of the Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty. This shall be so in order that the citizens of the Zaporozhian Army might not be attacked in war by the Tatars from Crimea and in order that the Tatars might not ravage them and take them into captivity. Raiding parties from the Crimean and Nogai Tatars are to be discouraged from ravaging the Ukrainians and taking them into captivity.

11. Just as in other lands tribute is paid in a lump sum, in like manner they also desire to convey tribute to those persons beholden to His Tsarist Majesty. If this is impossible, they do not desire that any tsarist military commander whatsoever be charged with arranging such matters. Rather, they desire that a worthy person from among local people, having been selected as their commander, be charged with turning over in a just manner all taxes to His Tsarist Majesty.

With respect to this article His Tsarist Majesty ordered that it be as is written above; that it is for the village leaders, town mayors, councilmen and assessors to collect on behalf of the treasury. They are to transmit that collected to the treasury through those persons designated by His Tsarist Majesty. These same persons shall supervise the collectors in order that they perform properly.

12. Should a tsarist military commander arrive and begin to violate their rights and create difficulties so that great dissatisfaction would ensue, this would be because they are not able to accommodate themselves immediately to the ways of others and are not able to tolerate such innovations. Therefore violations of the laws and regulations of a local nature shall be adjudicated by officials selected from among local people.

With respect to this article His Tsarist Majesty's gracious decree granted that officials from among the Zaporozhian Army shall oversee the rights and liberties of local people.

13. Previously there had been no suppression by the Polish Kings of their faith and freedoms and all ranks possessed their own privileges. Therefore everybody rendered faithful service. Today, however, because of the assault upon their liberties, they have placed themselves under His Tsarist Majesty's high hand and petition that His Tsarist Majesty order the grant of privileges attested to by seals to the effect that these shall be inviolable forever. After these privileges are granted they themselves shall keep order among themselves. He who is a Cossack shall possess Cossack liberties, and he who is a land-working peasant shall render the customary obligation to His Tsarist Majesty, just as it had been heretofore. The same procedures shall apply to all manner of persons that are His Tsarist Majesty's subjects insofar as the rights and liberties they are to possess.

His Tsarist Majesty ordered that this article be validated in accordance with their petition.

14. With respect to the Metropolitan of Kiev, the envoys were given oral instructions and orally the envoys requested that His Tsarist Majesty issue a patent and order the grant of an official charter to the Metropolitan confirming title to his

properties.

His Tsarist Majesty issued a patent to the Metropolitan with respect to his properties as they now exist and ordered the grant of His Sovereign charter.

Source: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii* 1, Document 262, 493–5.

Appendix 5

The Diplomatic Report of Vasilii Buturlin

On 16 (6) January on the feast of the Epiphany the people went to the Trubizh river for the re-enactment of Christ's Baptism with crucifixes, icons, banners and the image of the Saviour that had been presented by the Sovereign and which was carried aloft. Following the tableaux in the procession were the Archimandrite Prokhor of the Monastery of the Transfiguration in Kazan, the canon of the Cathedral of the Nativity Andreian, Father Iona of the Monastery of St. Sava of Storozhevka and the deacons, all of whom in accordance with the Sovereign's decree, had been dispatched along with Vasilii Vasilevich Buturlin and his associates. In the procession also were the Pereiaslav canon Hryhorii and the priests and deacons from the cathedral and parish churches. Buturlin and his associates also followed the images. As the Baptism was re-enacted, the Cossacks fired their muskets and from the square there was firing from artillery.

On that same date Bohdan Khmelnytsky came to Pereiaslav, arriving an hour before dusk. The secretary Ivan Vyhovsky arrived on 17 (7) January. The colonels and centurions had already arrived in Pereiaslav. On 17 (7) January Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky dispatched the Pereiaslav colonel Pavlo Teteria to Buturlin to arrange for an audience, at which the Sovereign's written decisions were not yet to be transmitted and at which no announcements were to be made. It was then made known to the hetman through the colonel that Buturlin with his associates was pleased to meet with the hetman and as to where they should see each other it was for the hetman to inform them. The hetman revealed that he would visit Buturlin at his residence the same day in the evening. That evening Vyhovsky and Teteria came from the hetman, announcing that the hetman would arrive immediately. Having so spoken, they returned to the hetman. And that same evening Khmelnytsky along with Vyhovsky and Teteria visited Buturlin at his residence.

Vasilii Vasilevich with his associates spoke as follows to the hetman: they were sent by the Great Sovereign Tsar and Great Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, the Autocrat of all Russia and Sovereign Ruler of many States, with the Sovereign's graceful and complete decree on matters pertaining to the petition of the hetman and of the entire Zaporozhian Army; that on the next day, 18 (8) January, he would give to the hetman the Sovereign's patent and announce the Sovereign's graceful decree in the public square; and that after the Sovereign's patent had been

turned over and the Sovereign's graceful decree had been read, that same day they were to enter the church and administer the oath to the hetman, the colonels and other persons, both officials and commoners, to the effect that they were to be under the Sovereign's high hand.

The hetman stated that he and the entire Zaporozhian Army were happy to serve and to be devoted with all their soul to the great Sovereign Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, that they were prepared to lay down their heads for the Sovereign's longeval health, and that they were ready to swear an oath to the Tsar on 18 (8) January and to be at the Sovereign's command in all things; also, that early on the morrow all the colonels would be with him, and that after he had talked with them they would come to the public square; having heard the Sovereign's patent and graceful decree, he would now discuss matters with the colonels, and after the talks with the colonels and administrative leaders, they would go to the cathedral church and give the oath to the Sovereign.

The hetman and Vyhovsky further stated: May God's grace be with all; as in ancient times it was with Prince Vladimir, so be it today that his kinsman, the Great Sovereign Tsar and Great Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, take through his kindness guardianship over the Sovereign's heritage of Kiev and all Little Russia; as the eagle covers his nest, may in like manner the Sovereign deign to accept us under His Tsarist Majesty's high hand so that Kiev and all Little Russia might forever be his; and we shall serve the Great Sovereign in all ways, in all things be devoted to him with our souls, and we shall lay down our heads for his longeval health.

In regard to all of these matters in the early morning of 18 (8) January there was dispatched through Parfenii Tobolin a report to the Sovereign Tsar.

On that same day the secretary Vyhovsky came from Khmelnytsky to relate the following to Vasili Vasilevich and his associates: that the hetman had held a secret meeting with his colonels, judges and chiefs of staff and that these officers had agreed to submit to the Sovereign's high hand; that after the secret meeting, during the morning of the same day, the kettledrums were sounded for an hour so that at an assembly of the entire people at two o'clock of the same day, they might listen to advice regarding the matter that was desired to be realized; accordingly, a large multitude of people of all ranks assembled, forming a spacious circle around the hetman and colonels, whereupon the hetman himself came forth with the regalia of his office, along with the judges, chiefs of staff, secretary Vyhovsky and all the colonels; the hetman took a position in the centre of the circle and one of the chiefs of staff ordered all to be silent.

After all had fallen silent, the hetman began to make a speech to all the people: "Gentlemen Colonels, Chiefs of Staff, Centurions, the entire Zaporozhian Army and all Orthodox Christians, it is known to all of you how God liberated us from our enemies, who persecuted the Church of God and debauched all Eastern Orthodox Christianity; that for six years we have lived without a sovereign in our land in continuous warfare and bloodshed with our oppressors and enemies, who desire to extirpate the Church of God so that even the name Rus' might not be remembered in our land; all this has tried us greatly and we now see that we

cannot live without a ruler; for this purpose we have today convoked an assembly, open to all the people, so that you might with us select a sovereign from among four, whichever one you desire; the first ruler is Turkish, who many times in the past through his envoys invited us to his jurisdiction; the second is the Crimean khan; the third is the Polish king, who is still willing to take us under his favour, as before, should we ourselves want it; the fourth is the Orthodox Sovereign Tsar of Great Russia, the great Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, the Eastern Autocrat of all Russia, whom for six years now we have been beseeching through constant supplication to be ours. Choose here the one you want; the Turkish ruler is a Moslem; you all know our brethren, the Christian Orthodox Greeks, suffer misery and what godless oppressions they endure; the Crimean khan is also a Moslem, although because of necessity we have formed an alliance with him and in so doing we brought upon ourselves intolerable miseries; what taking of captives, what merciless spilling of Christian blood, takes place because of oppression by the Polish gentry—it is not necessary to recount this to any of you; you yourselves know all of this, that they considered a Jew or a dog to be better than one of our Christian brethren; the Orthodox Christian Great Sovereign, the Eastern Tsar, is with us of the same sacred faith of the Greek dispensation, of the same religion, and we are one body with the Orthodox Church of Great Russia, which has Jesus Christ as its head; this great Sovereign Christian Tsar, grieving because of the intolerable persecution of the Orthodox Church in our Little Russia, after listening to our constant supplications over a period of six years, has turned his graceful heart toward us and has decided to send to us his most trusted representatives with a special favour; if we show zealous devotion to him we shall not choose a refuge more favourable than his Tsarist Majesty's high hands; and should someone be in disagreement with us now, the road is free wherever he might wish to go."

All the people cried out with these words: "We desire to be under the hand of the Eastern Orthodox Tsar and to die in our true faith rather than to go to the hater of Christ and the pagan." Thereafter, the Pereiaslav colonel Teteria, going about the circle, asked on all sides: "Do you all desire this?" All the people replied: "Everybody," in once voice. Then the hetman said: "So be it, let our Lord God join us to the Tsar's strong hand." After him, all the people shouted in one voice: "God confirm it, God strengthen it, that we might forever be one." Then Vyhovsky came to the fore and stated that the Cossacks and burghers all submitted themselves to the Sovereign's high hand.

On 18 (8) January Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, along with the commander-in-chief of the artillery, chiefs of staff, centurions and atamans, presented themselves in the public square before Buturlin and his associates. Vasili Vasilevich made a speech to the hetman in which he said: "By the grace of God, the Great Sovereign Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich has presented to you, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and to the entire Zaporozhian Army a patent." At this point the Sovereign's patent was turned over to Khmelnytsky. And as Vasili Vasilevich presented the Sovereign's patent to the hetman, it was accepted by the hetman with great joy. After he took the Sovereign's patent the hetman kissed it, broke its seal, and handed it over to Vyhovsky and ordered him to read it aloud before all

the command elements and rank-and-file of the Zaporozhian Army. Vyhovsky thereupon before all the people read aloud the Sovereign's patent. Having heard it, the hetman, colonels and all ranks of the people rejoiced because of the Tsar's kindness. The hetman affirmed that he with the entire Zaporozhian Army would serve and devote themselves and all their souls to the Great Sovereign Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, and that they were eager to lay down their heads for the Sovereign's long-lived health, to make an oath to the Tsar, and that they were at the disposal of the Tsar with respect to all matters.

Vasilii Vasilevich then said: "By the grace of God, the great Sovereign Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich greets you, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the colonels and the entire Orthodox Christian Zaporozhian Army, and orders that we enquire about your health. And since with respect to the favours that the Tsar has granted and with respect to the enquiries that the Tsar made about their health, the hetman and colonels bowed their foreheads and enquired about the health of the Sovereign Tsar. Vasilii Vasilevich spoke as follows: "When we left the Great Sovereign Tsar, He asked that we transmit His wish that God grant you good health."

After this Buturlin said to the hetman: "By God's grace the Great Sovereign Tsar ordered that you be told the following: In preceding years and in this current year 1654 you, Hetman Khmelnytsky, sent petitions to the Tsar affirming that the Senate and the entire Polish Commonwealth has acted against the Orthodox Christian faith of the Greek dispensation and against God's sacred Eastern churches; that great persecution was visited upon you and that they began to separate you from the true Orthodox Christian faith, in which you have lived from ancient times, and to force you into the Roman faith, while in some places in the lands of the Crown [of Poland] and in Lithuania Orthodox churches were sealed shut and others were converted to the Union so that all kinds of persecutions, desecrations and un-Christian evils were perpetrated; after they made peace with you, first at Zbarazh and later at Bila Tserkva, they did not fulfill their promise, and God's churches, which according to written agreement were to be returned from the Union, were not given back, while those few that had been returned were once more reconverted to the Union; desiring to root out the Orthodox Christian faith and to destroy completely God's sacred churches, they dispatched their armies against you, and many cities and towns along with their sacred churches were defiled, defamed and destroyed; many innocent Orthodox Christians of both clerical and lay status were tormented and all manner of evil insult was inflicted; not wanting to abandon the true Christian faith or to see God's sacred churches in ruins, against your own will you invited the Crimean Khan with his Horde to assist you, and you began to stand up in defence of the Orthodox Christian faith and God's sacred churches, that He take pity on you and that He ordain that you, the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army with its cities and land, be accepted under the Tsar's high hand; also that you desire to serve Our Great Tsarist Majesty and to sustain forever His Sovereign health against all enemies; furthermore, in accordance with our great Sovereign's decree it is made known to you, Hetman Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army, that there exists

between Our Great Sovereign Tsar and Jan Kazimierz, the Polish King and Great Prince of Lithuania, a perpetual agreement, which Our Great Tsarist Majesty and Christian Sovereign cannot violate without cause; with regard to whatever improprieties were committed from the side of the King in violation of this perpetual agreement, Our Great Sovereign expects redresses from the King: if the King and the Senate do not make amends with respect to this treaty, Our Great Sovereign will not suffer such a state of affairs and because of their misdeeds will enter into conflict with them by ordering the implementation of his gracious decree to you, Hetman Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army.

“You, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army, sent a petition to Our Great Sovereign, asking if it were possible for His Tsarist Majesty to accept you under his high hand and declaring that if His Tsarist Majesty should turn away from you and from the Orthodox Christian faith and God’s sacred churches and chose to advocate peace between you and the King and the Senate, then let it be said through the Sovereign’s high envoys that may this peace be propitious for you but that you yourselves do not desire to come to peace terms with the Poles because they do not abide by their word; furthermore, in accordance with Our Great Sovereign’s decree and in accordance with your petition, there was sent to King Jan Kazimierz in Poland the Sovereign’s great and fully accredited envoys, the boyar and lord-lieutenant of Velikii Perm, Prince Boris Aleksandrovich Repnin-Obolensky, together with his entourage; they were instructed to negotiate firmly with the King and Senate regarding this agreement and mediation; these great envoys in talks with the Senate stated that the King and the Senate should assuage all rancours and come to terms with you, that the Orthodox Christian faith of the Greek dispensation should not be persecuted, that God’s churches should not be molested, that no infractions of freedom should be inflicted upon you in any way, and that peace be instituted in accordance with the Zboriv agreement; additionally, those churches that had been converted to the Union should once more be returned to you; should the King and the Senate act accordingly and come to terms with you, and if in truth henceforth no wrong shall be done to you and God’s churches are returned to you as they were before, then Our Great Sovereign will make the following concession to His Royal Majesty: those persons who committed crimes with respect to His Sovereign’s title and who were justly sentenced to death in penalty shall be ordered to have their guilt nullified.”

His Tsarist Majesty’s great envoys continued: “When Jan Kazimierz was chosen King, He swore before people of both clerical and lay status that He would erect no barriers between persons of different Christian faiths, that He would protect all, that there would be enacted no measures oppressing any faith, and that no one would be permitted to engage in such activity; furthermore, should it come to pass that He would not abide by His oath, then He will release His subjects from all fealty and obedience and will require no one to adhere to the stipulations associated with His oath, nor will He entertain requests to that effect; thus Jan Kazimierz was not only to protect and defend the Orthodox Christian faith but also was to assure that there would be no evil persecution of any faith, however heretical it might be; since, however, He violated the oath to which He had sworn, you

Orthodox Christians are released from being His subjects and thus are free of His jurisdiction; in this manner Jan Kazimierz and the Senate have brought all to nothing and have rejected both peace and mediation, for they desire to root out the Orthodox Christian faith and to destroy God's churches; they went against you in war at a time when our great envoys were with them and forced the envoys to return without success; therefore Our Great Sovereign, beholding such improper behaviour, vexations and violations of the perpetual peace from the side of the King, as well as the persecution of the Orthodox Christians and the profanation of the true faith by the Latins, ordered that Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army, now released from their oath of allegiance because of the violations of the King, be accepted under His Tsarist Majesty's high hand; the Tsar further ordered that assistance in the form of the Sovereign's troops be supplied against perjurers and those desiring to destroy the Christian faith; and you, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army, observing His Tsarist Majesty's graciousness and grants on your behalf, should serve Him, wish Him all manner of good and should be grateful for His kindness; and Our Great Sovereign will begin to hold you, the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army, in His Tsarist Majesty's benevolence and protect and defend you from your enemies."

Having heard this discourse, the hetman, officers and the people of all ranks bowed their foreheads before the Sovereign's benevolence. From the public square the hetman rode in a carriage with Vasilii Vasilevich Buturlin to the cathedral Church of the Assumption of the Immaculate Mother of God. Archimandrite Prokhor of the Monastery of the Transfiguration of Kazan, the canon of the Cathedral of the Nativity, Andreian, and the priests and deacons who, in accordance with the Sovereign's decree had been dispatched with Buturlin, had already taken their places in the cathedral church behind the image of the Saviour. As Vasilii Vasilevich and Khmelnytsky approached the cathedral church, the Pereiaslav canon Hryhorii and all the priests and deacons in their liturgical robes greeted them at the steps with crucifixes and incense-burners and chanted: "May the name of God be blessed from today for ever more." And after they entered the church, Archimandrite Prokhor, the canon Andreian, the Pereiaslav canon Hryhorii and all the clergy, vested in their priestly robes, wanted to administer the oath-taking ceremony with the use of the liturgical book which had been given to them by the Sovereign. However, Hetman Khmelnytsky said that Vasilii Vasilevich with his colleagues should make an oath on behalf of the Sovereign Tsar to the effect that the Sovereign would not betray the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army to the Polish King, that He would protect them and would not violate their freedoms; to the effect that he who was a member of the gentry or a Cossack or a burgher would remain as he was and that every person regardless of station and regardless of the properties he possessed would remain as he was before. Furthermore, that the Great Sovereign in drafting a patent should order that such persons be given a tsarist charter with respect to their properties.

Vasilii Vasilevich with his colleagues said to the hetman that in the Muscovite State just as the Sovereign's vassals gave an oath to the previous Great Sovereign Tsar, in like manner the Sovereign's vassals must swear an oath to Aleksei

Mikhailovich to the effect that they will serve Our Great Sovereign, will be devoted to Him in a most loyal fashion and wish Him all manner of good; furthermore, for someone to take an oath on behalf of the Great Sovereign was never practiced in the past and will not be countenanced in the future; it is unworthy of the hetman even to mention this matter, for it is incumbent upon all gradations of vassals to swear an oath to the suzerain; should the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army begin to serve the Great Sovereign in accordance with their petition, they for this purpose should execute an oath to the Great Sovereign and swear to it in accordance with the commandments of the Gospel without any reservations. Then the Great Sovereign will begin to hold them in his gracious beneficence and guardianship and will defend and protect them from their enemies; nor will the sovereign take away their freedoms or properties; whatever one possesses, the Great Sovereign will confirm with a patent and order that matters remain as they were before.

The hetman replied that he would talk with his colonels and all of the people with him about this matter. Departing from the church, he went to the square, to the Pereiaslav colonel Teteria, and discussed the matter with the colonels and all the people for a long time, while the others remained in the church. Then from his quarters there were dispatched to those in the church the colonels Pavlo Teteria of Pereiaslav and Hryhorii Sakhnovych of Myrhorod. Coming before those in the church, the colonels said the same things, that an oath on behalf of the sovereign should be given.

Vasilii Vasilevich with his colleagues thereupon said to the colonels: "To request an oath on behalf of the Sovereign is reprehensible; it has never been practiced that an oath for the Sovereign be given to vassals but rather vassals give oaths to the Sovereign."

The colonels stated that the Polish Kings always swear an oath to their vassals.

Vasilii Vasilevich with his colleagues stated to the colonels that it was reprehensible to refer to the fact that the Polish Kings make an oath to their vassals, for these Polish Kings were untrustworthy and were not autocrats, and furthermore whatever they might swear to they do not in truth honour. With respect to previous Great Tsars and Princes of Russia, and in like manner with respect to Aleksei Mikhailovich, the suggestion that an oath be given on their behalf has never been entertained or implemented. Vasilii Vasilevich and his colleagues, it was stressed, were sent by the Great Sovereign to the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army to implement the Tsar's gracious decision. At the public square Vasilii Vasilevich with his colleagues gave the Sovereign's gracious word to the hetman and others, amidst rejoicing because of the Sovereign's kindness, and all entered the church without broaching such reprehensible matters. In like manner it is now equally reprehensible for the hetman and the colonels to initiate such matters, for the Sovereign's word is inviolable.

The colonels then stated to Vasilii Vasilevich and his colleagues that the hetman and the colonels believe this but that the Cossacks do not believe it and desire that they be given an oath.

Thereupon Vasilii Vasilevich told the colonels that Aleksei Mikhailovich had decided to take them under his high hand in accordance with their petition and in defence of the Orthodox Christian faith and God's sacred churches, that they should remember the Sovereign's kindness, serve Him loyally and wish Him all manner of good, and should require the entire Zaporozhian Army to take the oath. And should uninformed persons engage in reprehensible talk, persons who are unworthy to take part in this great undertaking, then it is necessary for the Cossack officers to demonstrate their loyalty to the Great Sovereign by putting an end to the utterings of such uninformed persons.

With this information the colonels returned to the hetman. Later the hetman, the secretary, the colonels, centurions, the chiefs of staff, the atamans and all the Cossacks returned to the church. Speaking to Vasilii Vasilevich and his colleagues, the hetman, the secretary and the colonels stated that in all matters they submit themselves to the Sovereign's benevolence and that they were ready in unanimous spirit to swear an oath to the Great Tsar in accordance with the commandments of the Gospel, that they will gladly lay down their heads for the Sovereign's longeval health, and that with respect to their special requests the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army will initiate petitions to the Great Sovereign.

And so on that same date, through Divine grace and with the aid of the Immaculate Virgin, through the intercession of the great miracle-workers, Peter, Aleksei, Iona, Philip, and of all the saints of Moscow and all Russia, and of the Great Sovereign Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, Vasilii Vasilevich Buturlin with his colleagues successfully brought the hetman, the secretary, the artillery commander-in-chief, the military judges, the chief of staff, colonels and the entire Zaporozhian Army under the Sovereign's high hand. The hetman, the secretary, the commander-in-chief of the artillery, the military judges, the chiefs of staff and the colonels swore an oath to the Sovereign that they with their lands and cities were to be forever and irrevocably under the Sovereign's high hand. The oath was administered to them by Archimandrite Prokhor with the use of the liturgical book presented by the Tsar. The hetman, the secretary, the colonels and other Cossack officers took the oath with tears. They promised to serve, to be loyal and to wish well to the Great Sovereign Tsar, the devout Sovereign Tsarina and the Great Princess Maria Ilichna, the gentle daughters of the Tsar and whatever children God might give to the Sovereigns in the future. They promised that in all things they will abide in accordance with the Sovereign's will without any reservation, as was written in their oath. Thus as the hetman, secretary and the colonels gave an oath to the Sovereign Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, at the same time at the altar of the cathedral Church of the Annunciation Deacon Aleksei chanted a prayer of longevity for the Sovereign. As the deacon called out for many years for the Sovereign, the multitude of people of both male and female sex that then filled the church wept because of great happiness, for it had pleased the Lord God that they all were to be under the Sovereign's high hand. Having taken the oath, the hetman rode out of the cathedral church with Vasilii Vasilevich and his colleagues in a carriage to the public square, while the colonels and all the other people went there by foot.

Source: *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei, Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh* 3, Document 205, 459–66.

Appendix 6

Ivan Vyhovsky's Manifesto to Foreign Rulers on the Reason for His Break with Moscow

To the most serene, exalted, illustrious, resplendent, lustrous, generous and respectable Lords, Kings, Electors, Princes, Marquises, Republics, Counts, Barons, Nobles, Cities, etc., etc.:

We, the entire Zaporozhian Army, declare and testify before God and the entire world with complete candour that the only cause and the only objective of the war that we undertook against the Poles was the defence of the holy Eastern Church and of our ancestral liberty, which we lovingly cherish in unison with our Hetman of immortal memory, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and Ivan Vyhovsky, our Chancellor. For the glory of God and for the public good we neglected our private concerns. For this cause we in the first instance sought friendship with the Tatars and with the Most Serene Queen of Sweden Christina and subsequently with the Most Serene King of Sweden Charles Gustavus. With respect to all these we maintained constant fidelity. With respect to the Poles as well we never provided any pretext for the violation of agreements; rather we scrupulously observed with complete fidelity all pacts and alliances. For no other motive did we accept the protection of the Grand Prince of Muscovy than to conserve and foster for ourselves and for our posterity this self-same liberty which, with the aid of God, had been vouchsafed with arms and secured at the price of much blood. In this connection our Army was the first to submit Lithuania to the Grand Prince of Muscovy, the work of the colonel of the Nizhyn regiment, Zolotarenko, after the receipt of all kinds of promises and guarantees from the Grand Prince of Muscovy.

We expected that the Grand Prince would be just toward us, benign and merciful because of love of religion, and that in gratitude for our free and spontaneous submission he would comport himself toward us in good faith without prejudice to our liberty, and that on the contrary he would foster it in accordance with his promises. However (O false hope!), the ministers of state and the highest officials of Muscovy induced a Prince so religious, pious and merciful to act as he did that first year when there were negotiations for peace between the Poles and the Muscovites in order to subject and to oppress us in the hope of obtaining dominion over Poland. Thus, the Muscovites warned the Poles that he would violate our agreement with the Swedes and that we would declare war against them at the

behest of the Grand Prince. Their plans anticipated that, as we were preoccupied with war against the Swedes they would be able to dominate and suppress us with greater ease. However, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and our Chancellor not only did not give their consent to the Grand Prince but also with many reasons they advised through Vasiliï Petrovich Kikin against declaring war against the Swedes in Livonia. We had in hand documents on such matters for the Kikin delegation authenticated beyond all doubt. We believed that the complete blame was that of the ministers of state and of the magnates who had flattered their Prince and that the good Prince would never be in accord with such villainy, as also would not be the Most Holy Patriarch. Thus because of the constancy of our faith we were obliged to oppose the manoeuvres of the Muscovites.

War was declared nevertheless against the Most Serene King of Sweden, our friend and ally, without any cause whatsoever, solely because the Most Serene King of Sweden desired to contract friendship with us. The first documented result of this crime was that the King of Sweden, occupied with war, was unable to aid us in our plans. Because our envoy, the estimable Daniel Olevberg de Graecani, had been denied access through transit across Muscovy to the Most Serene King of Sweden, our Hetman felt obliged to send out an army, under the command of Danylo Vyhovsky, to Lublin in order to observe on the spot the duplicities of the Muscovites. Our suspicions were augmented by the establishment of a new fortress in our capital of Kiev and by the garrisoning there of several thousands of Muscovites, a turn which at that time even the Poles did not desire. In this manner with complete equanimity the Muscovites endeavoured to maintain us simultaneously in the position of allies and slaves.

With respect to this policy, we have a very clear affirmation in White Russia, as when almost two hundred families of the gentry who had spontaneously adhered to the side of Muscovy were transported through resort to deceit and force to Muscovy, and when more than twelve thousand citizens of Mogilev and other indigenous inhabitants of White Russia from diverse cities and villages, those that had been placed under the protection and generosity of the Grand Prince, were deported to the deserts of Muscovy, while in their areas there were brought in colonies of Muscovites. Wherever they were not successful in such ways, they resorted to other forms of deceit.

After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of immortal memory, the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, it was thought that our Little and White Russia along with the Zaporozhian Army would soon perish. For this reason our envoys were detained for a long time in Muscovy and treated with disdain and our petitions were met with cold responses. Soon an army of the Muscovites under the command of Grigorii Romodanovsky, which had presented itself under the pretext of bringing aid, penetrated to Pereiaslav and refused to obey the Hetman. When Ivan Vyhovsky was chosen Hetman, a post that had been given to him after he had been the Great Chancellor of the Zaporozhian Army, Romodanovsky at first refused to recognize this title of office. Later the Grand Prince acted in like manner. Later they began to sow discord to the effect that Vyhovsky was a Polish aristocrat more devoted to the Poles than to the Zaporozhian Army.

As is known, it is in the nature of idle soldiers who have experienced many victories to resort to an easy life. In line with this tendency, the ambition to command induced some Cossacks encamped beyond the cataracts of the Dnieper to select in a seditious manner as their hetman a certain Barabash. Resorting to all manner of criminal actions, they denounced the recently elected hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army before the Grand Prince of Muscovy by means of written reports and recommended through their envoys that the principal persons of the Army be deported to Muscovy with all their possessions and that from Muscovy governors should be sent to our cities. The matter was projected in the following plausible manner: When these envoys [of Barabash] were passing through the territory of the Poltava regiment, escorted by thirty men, the colonel of the Poltava regiment, Pushkar, himself a witting participant in the conspiracy, would send out seven of his own men allegedly in order to take these envoys into captivity; instead, the rebel envoys would intercept the seven and take them to the confines of Muscovy, after which they would be released; the envoys of Barabash would announce that Pushkar wanted to capture them but was unable to do so.

Upon learning of all this, from the general *Rada* then being held in Korsun, Hetman Vyhovsky sent envoys to the Grand Prince with letters requesting that no credence be placed in the seditionists in view of the fidelity so often manifested to the Grand Prince by the Army and that the representatives of the rebels be dispatched as captives to the Zaporozhian Army. Thus, matters unfolded that our envoys arrived before those of the rebels. When the latter arrived in Moscow, they were kept in secrecy. Queried by our envoys, the chancellor of Muscovy, Almazov, denied that rebel envoys had arrived until these persons were recognized and pointed out as present in the city, whereupon all was admitted to our envoys. However, this did not serve any useful purpose because of the malice of the Muscovites. Our envoys were dismissed with nothing, and the Patriarch of Moscow did not have the dignity to reply to the letter of the Hetman. On the contrary, the rebels, flattered by presents from the Grand Prince, received patents and privileges prejudicial to the Zaporozhian Army for transmission to Barabash.

It was then that the governor of Putivl, a most reasonable man, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Susin, realized that matters were going badly and that free people were being maliciously treated. He therefore detained the delegates of the rebels and promised to us that he would return them to us if the Grand Prince should give his consent. In the meantime, without consulting with the Hetman, Pushkar almost daily received envoys from Moscow. Summoned by the Hetman by seven letters, Pushkar refused to appear and finally attacked unexpectedly several detachments of the Hetman that were in the vicinity and had no hostile intention whatsoever. Some of their members were killed while others fled.

At almost the same time there arrived an extraordinary plenipotentiary of the Grand Prince, Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo, a general of artillery and a senator of Muscovy. This man dispatched letters of instruction to all chiefs of the regiments without consulting the Hetman, telling them that they should proceed to Pereiaslav for a general *Rada*. This man ordered that Grigorii Romodanovsky come from Muscovy with his army and in the name of the Grand Prince he ordered that the

Hetman appear before the *Rada*. To the Hetman it seemed that the rights and authorities of his office were being infringed along with the liberties of the Zaporozhian Army, but he agreed on behalf of the common good and appeared at the *Rada*. There it was declared to the Hetman that Grigorii Romodanovsky, the commander of the Muscovite army, had met twice with Pushkar in order to discuss mutual problems and that it was in the commander's power to seize the rebel, overpower him and to present him to the *Rada* in session. Awaited over a period of eight days, Pushkar did not appear but instead increased his forces. All of the colonels of the regiments and Bogdan Khitrovo sent envoys to him in order that he might desist from his plans and that he come to the *Rada*, protected by public confidence, in order to present his explanations. Pushkar replied that since he could not come with his army, in his stead he would send some of his centurions, who undertook their return journey after they had been received with full honours by Khitrovo and had been treated with courtesy and given gifts. At the same time, Khitrovo with his associates vowed to the Hetman that he would settle accounts with Pushkar and reduce him to obedience; that if this were impossible by persuasion, then it would be done by force if the Hetman would promise the following two things: to give the oath to the Grand Prince over the Holy Bible, and agree to go within eight days with the main leaders of the Zaporozhian Army to Moscow for negotiations with the Grand Prince.

The Hetman accepted both of these points. Accordingly, the *Rada* was dismissed, and it was ordered that the four detachments that had been sent out to attack Pushkar should return. At almost the same time the envoys of Barabash arrived and came into contact with Pushkar. They exhibited the charter and other privileges granted by the Grand Prince. Barabash, summoned from Zaporizhzhia by the grace of God and the wisdom of the Hetman, confessed his guilt and humbled himself before the Hetman, who mercifully and generously absolved him of all blame and punishment.

Bogdan Khitrovo, who had readied his troops on behalf of the rebels, did not adhere to that which was promised but got Pushkar to swear fealty and promised him immunity. In this manner our fire was inflamed by the winds of the Muscovites with increasing vigour while the rebels slaughtered the innocent, while the Muscovites stood by doing nothing from a distance. Among those slaughtered was the noble Boglevsky, a friend of the Hetman, who was assassinated in his home with his wife and his entire family despite his being innocent and a man of peace. This crime was reported to the Grand Prince but it was kept in silence. Not being content with this, Pushkar, after redeploying his detachments and dispersing the rebellious Cossacks throughout his territory, set out toward the Dnieper in an effort to capture the Hetman and all of the principal leaders of the Zaporozhian Army, for he had promised to hand them over to the Muscovites. The Hetman, who had asked for assistance from the Muscovites, waited in vain. Therefore, he felt obligated to look out for his interests in other ways and called for assistance from the Tatars and their leader Karach-bei. Joined by all the Cossacks that he could muster, the Hetman set out to encounter the rebels and drove them to Poltava, his only desire being to pacify the sedition without the shedding of blood. For this

reason he repeatedly sent envoys to Pushkar, offering amnesty to all and promising forgiveness.

It seemed that Pushkar also desired peace and that both rebel leaders considered their envoys to be hostages. But Pushkar with malicious deceit on the solemn feast-day of the Holy Trinity, in the middle of the night, supposing that our army would be enveloped in sleep and drunkenness and therefore could be more easily defeated, mounted an attack, encouraged by the traitorous Muscovites and by some from within our army, for such were not lacking among us. Penetrating furtively into the centre of our encampment, Pushkar caused great damage. The Hetman with his auxiliaries and with the Tatars resisted, and in the early morning the rebels were repulsed so that all of the followers of Pushkar perished along with their leaders. Only Barabash with a few others succeeded in escaping. Including those that were killed in this battle and those that perished from among the rebels at Lubni and Hadiach, the number of rebels reaches fifty thousand—the fruit of the machinations of the Muscovites.

While all this was going on and while our Russia hoped for peace, within the span of three weeks Grigorii Romodanovsky with the Grand Prince's army entered our territory. Regarding his arrival, he assured the Hetman that he wanted nothing more than to calm the tumult. He was told in reply that all had been calmed and that therefore he should depart with his army and hand over the rebel Barabash to the Hetman. Romodanovsky responded that he was not able to return with his army nor was he able to turn over Barabash to the Hetman without a special order of the Grand Prince. He then called upon the Hetman to attend a parley in the company of but a few persons. In the meantime, Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, one of the Grand Prince's generals, entered Kiev from another direction with six thousand soldiers, and these were supplemented by additional Muscovite troops, whose number then reached fifteen thousand. This man requested in a friendly manner that the Hetman come to him for a conference, everything having been arranged with the objective of seizing the Hetman and his advisers. The Hetman refused to appear, whereupon in open discourse Sheremetev began to proclaim that Pushkar, the best and most faithful servant of the Grand Prince, had perished and that for that reason the Hetman was an enemy of the Muscovites. Some Muscovites who had sought refuge among us confirmed that Sheremetev incited all manner of intrigue against the Hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Army. The same was confirmed by two refugees from the army of Romodanovsky who were aware of the wicked conspiracy. Nor was there lacking any evidence from the side of Romodanovsky: he condemned to the scaffold a number of centurions who were devoted to us, and to Barabash, who had rebelled twice, he awarded the title of Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army with the insignia of the Grand Prince. The colonel of the Pryluky regiment, who was devoted to us, he dismissed from his post and named another in his place. He sent charters to Barabash in order to incite new revolts in various places. He also openly encouraged hostility, and the town of Vepryk and its adjacent areas he depopulated and deported many of our people as captives.

In such manner was perpetrated the deceit and the fraud of those who first through internal civil war and later through open use of arms prepared for us a yoke of slavery without any provocation on our part. In order to deliver us from this yoke, we have given expression to our innocence, and having invoked the aid of God, we are obliged to seek assistance from our neighbours on behalf of our legitimate defence. And we remain as always dedicated to the cause of liberty. The fault is not ours and we are not the cause of the war that now exists. Nor are we the cause that those who were and want to continue to be faithful to the Grand Prince have taken up arms to our regret.

Source: *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, Part Three, 6, Document 127 (Kiev, 1908), 362–9.

Appendix 7

Pylyp Orlyk's Devolution of the Rights of Ukraine

After a long and bloody war the most valiant Hetman Khmelnytsky, of immortal memory, liberated the severely oppressed Cossack nation from the Polish yoke. He thereupon made Ukraine an independent principality and contented himself with the title of Hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. His son succeeded him and the estates of the aforementioned principality continued after his death to select their hetmans without any power pretending to have the right to oppose this. Ukraine was in some manner dependent upon the tsars of Muscovy.

I do not intend to expatiate on the history of Ukraine other than to make clear that she is a free principality and that her estates had the liberty to choose their hetmans in the manner that they desired. It is an established fact and a generally attested truth that the Cossack nation and Ukraine were free. Ukraine with her hetman was considered as such in the treaty of perpetual peace concluded in Moldavia on the river Pruth in which she is considered an ally of the sultan. As such a free partner she negotiated a treaty with the Tatar khan, and as such Hetman Khmelnytsky concluded a treaty with the king of Sweden, Charles X, which one can see in the archives of the Swedish crown.

However, the argument and proof that are the strongest and most invincible with respect to the sovereignty of Ukraine abide in the solemn treaty of alliance between Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and Hetman Khmelnytsky and the estates of Ukraine. This treaty was concluded in 1654 and was signed by plenipotentiaries named for this purpose by both parties.

A treaty so solemn and precise that it was called a perpetual treaty seemingly should suffice to establish forever peace, liberty and tranquillity in Ukraine. It would, in fact, suffice if it were observed by the tsar with the same good faith and fidelity with which the Cossacks confided in it. They turned over fortresses to the Muscovite armies and joined their troops with those of the tsar in order to advance their common cause, but the tsar's generals abused the good faith of the aforementioned nation and seized by subterfuge a large number of other fortresses and then began to behave as the masters of the entire country.

Nevertheless, the shadow of sovereignty was left to the Cossacks, and even after the death of Hetman Khmelnytsky the tsar granted a patent to the Ukrainian estates in the year 1658.

Hetman Briukhovetsky, having made a journey to Moscow under the pretext of promoting the welfare of Ukraine, effected that homage be paid to the tsar as the protector of the Cossacks. This was the foundation for the misfortunes of Ukraine. He was compelled to renounce the rights of sovereignty of the Cossacks. The public still does not know whether Briukhovetsky had been led to this despicable move by threats or by more dulcet means. However, it is certain that this renunciation did not change anything with respect to the rights of Ukraine since the hetman could not give away something that belonged to the estates. The Cossacks complained in vain; troops were sent out, which by force of arms converted them into slaves and made them suffer all the burdens of despotic domination.

That which I have just related demonstrates to all who are without prejudice the incontestable rights of the estates of Ukraine and the crying injustice imposed upon them by the despoilment of their rights and liberties under the pretext of a holy alliance and of a solemn treaty which assured them the enjoyment of such rights. But however great the violations which they have had to suffer might be, such violations do not give the Muscovites any legitimate rights over them. The Cossacks, on the contrary, have on their side international law as well as the law of nature, one of the most important principles of which affirms that the people always possess the right to resist such oppression and to regain the enjoyment of their ancient rights when they find a favourable opportunity.

Such an opportunity has been offered to Ukraine, for the king of Sweden came to the aid of oppressed Ukraine. The Cossacks have regained courage and strive only to take advantage of this conjuncture in order to free themselves from slavery. Hetman Mazepa and the Ukrainian estates in the year 1708 in this manner employed their power in order to regain possession of that which belonged to them. In order to secure their liberty more effectively, they associated themselves with the king of Sweden and compacted not to negotiate with anyone in a separate manner.

The following are some of the provisions contained in this treaty:

1. His Royal Majesty undertakes to defend Ukraine and the parts of the land of the Cossacks that are joined to it and to dispatch to them for this purpose auxiliary troops without delay, as necessity may require and when it is requested by the hetman and the estates. When entering the country, these troops shall be under the command of Swedish generals, but when employed operationally there, His Majesty will place them under the direction of the hetman and his successors, to whom this function shall be reserved as long as there shall be need for such troops, for whom His Royal Majesty shall provide salary payments and to whom the Cossacks shall supply bread and sustenance.

2. All that shall be conquered in the former domains of Muscovy shall belong by right of war to those who have become the masters there, but all such areas that will have been established as having belonged previously to the Ruthenian people shall be returned and secured for the principality of Ukraine.

3. The hetman and the estates of Ukraine shall be retained and maintained in accordance with the rights that they have possessed up to this time through the entire expanse of the principality and of those areas annexed to it.

4. Ivan Mazepa as the legitimate Hetman of Ukraine shall not be molested in any manner with respect to his possession of this principality. After his death, which it is hoped will not come to pass for a long time, all freedoms shall be retained by the estates of Ukraine in accordance with their rights and former laws.

5. Nothing shall be changed with respect to that which has been observed to this day with respect to the coat of arms and the title of Hetman of Ukraine. His Royal Majesty can never arrogate to himself this title or the coat of arms.

6. For the greater security of this treaty, as well as of Ukraine, the hetman and the estates will turn over to His Royal Majesty for the duration of this war and as long as danger endures some of their fortified cities, namely Starodub, Mhlyn, Baturyn, Poltava and Hadiach.

The plenipotentiaries of His Tsarist Majesty respond:

1. That Ukraine has formerly not been independent and that she has been delivered from the yoke of the infidels by the victorious arms of His Tsarist Majesty.

2. That if any change were to be effected with respect to this situation, this would violate the Treaty of Karlowitz.

With respect to the first point, it is of no importance that Ukraine had formerly been a province of Poland, considering that since the year 1649 to our day she has been recognized as a principality by all Europe, including the Emperor himself. On behalf of what principle of religion and piety does the court of Moscow, having liberated the Cossacks from a species of Polish protection, impose upon them a yoke, as experience has made clear, infinitely more onerous than that which the infidels fasten upon conquered peoples?

Finally, assuming, as some might affirm, although such a statement is thoroughly false, that His Tsarist Majesty received from the Poles some kind of right to Ukraine, that would be none other than the right of protection, for the Poles never possessed any other. Accordingly, the Poles were unable to pass on any rights that they did not possess themselves and to which, moreover, they never pretended. It follows that His Tsarist Majesty has no basis whatsoever for depriving Ukraine of her liberties and privileges.

Thus, it can be concluded in full justice and equity that the peace of Karlowitz will not be violated in any way by a declaration to the effect that Ukraine is to be free as she previously had been, with those borders and frontiers that she possessed before she was deceitfully subjugated. I ask to what purpose did the tsar include Ukraine in his instructions concerning the peace which was to be concluded through the mediation of England and the Netherlands if it was not desired that Ukraine participate in the negotiations?

One can reasonably conclude from all this that the Muscovite court should be regarded as the usurper of Ukraine and one can expect that the sense of justice and equity of those who read this paper will persuade them of the incontestable right of the estates of Ukraine to elect Lord Pylyp Orlyk as their hetman, and that this hetman is entitled to claim the possession of this land and to expect restitution in accordance with the equity of the powers of Europe that are in a position to make this possible.

It is in the interest of all the powers of Europe to make possible arrangements so that Ukraine will be turned over to Hetman Orlyk, who has been freely chosen and invested by the estates of Ukraine. Furthermore, I affirm that it is in their own interest not to permit developments to take place that are dangerous to these states themselves and inherent in the usurpations that a dominant power can impose on one that is weaker under the sole pretext of expediency.

International law requires that assistance be given in extreme cases to oppressed subjects; it is even more just and in conformity with the obligations of Christianity and humanity to re-establish principalities oppressed under the premise of an alliance.

Ancient history would lead me far off if I were to cite examples from that in order to prove that the power of those times always took the part of princes and republics that were oppressed. We do not lack modern examples, as can be seen in this century in the peace treaties in the entire Empire, Italy, Lorraine, Pomerania, Sweden and several other places where there were the fully sovereign principalities over which some powers claimed rights on the basis of various titles and at times simply by conquest. Ukraine finds herself more or less in the same predicament. She has the same rights; should not the same be done on her behalf that has been the custom to do for others for so many centuries?

Since the Emperor offered a guarantee to Hetman Khmelnytsky, as did the King of Sweden in his capacity as an ally, the hetman and the estates of Ukraine have reason to be persuaded that the guarantees of the treaty of Oliva (the Cossacks were included in the peace treaty of Oliva in their capacity as allies of the king of Sweden) will assure that Ukraine cannot be deprived of her liberties. And since all the powers of Europe have the intention of adhering to this treaty, which serves as the foundation for tranquillity in Europe, in it they will easily find the motives and means to re-establish Hetman Orlyk in Ukraine and to encompass him in a new treaty.

I have said that a general peace will never be stable as long as the just demands of Hetman Orlyk with respect to Ukraine are not fulfilled and the court of Moscow does not satisfy the just grievances of the confederation of which he is the head.

One should not fear that in case of the re-establishment of this principality the weakening of Muscovy will upset the European balance of power. On the contrary, as the example of the Netherlands testifies, for that country never served the common cause so well prior to the establishment of a strong republic.

However, one can think that this last argument is not convincing enough and that the tsar, after the projected peace agreement, can employ all of his forces to reduce and subjugate Ukraine utterly. I shall not bother to show that the difficulties, the inconveniences and the extremities of such a course could drive this people to throw themselves in desperation into the arms of the Turks. Likewise I shall not dwell upon the ideals of justice and glory which should impel the powers of Europe to return Ukraine to her hetman. All this has been demonstrated and proved. I shall say only that if all the motives advanced do not suffice, then vital interests, to some of which I have already alluded, oblige the European powers to restore Ukraine and thereby restrict a power that might soon be disposed to overthrow the liberty of Europe.

Those that are concerned with the interests of Europe and of individual powers will easily comprehend the danger that the liberty of Europe faces from a power that is so aggressive. They can appreciate this better than I, not only from examples from history but also because of the profound experience and consummate wisdom which they possess on matters pertaining to the welfare of their states and the interests of Europe.

It is to be hoped that they will be convinced that all that is herein written is based on reason and on the experience of the past and that the achievement of a durable peace depends to some degree on the restitution of Ukraine.

Source: *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 6, nos. 3-4 (1958): 1307-12. (1958): 1307-12.

Appendix 8

Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia (1654–1954)

(Approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

Three hundred years ago, by the powerfully expressed will of the Ukrainian people at the Pereyaslav Rada (Council) in January 1654, the reunion of the Ukraine with Russia was proclaimed. This historic act culminated the long struggle of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people against alien enslavers for reunion with the Russian people in a single Russian State. The 300th anniversary of that outstanding historic event is a grand jubilee not only for the Ukrainian and Russian but for all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The reunion was of great importance for the further historic development of the two great peoples, which are “so close in language, in habitation, in character and in history” (*Lenin*).

By linking their destiny forever with the fraternal Russian people, the Ukrainian people freed themselves from foreign subjugation and ensured their national development. On the other hand, the reunion of the Ukraine with Russia helped considerably to strengthen the Russian State and to enhance its international prestige. The friendship between the working people of Russia and the Ukraine grew firmer and stronger in the joint struggle against their common enemies—tsarism, the serf-holding landlords, the capitalists and foreign invaders. In the epoch of imperialism this struggle was headed by the Russian working class, the most revolutionary in the world, guided by its militant vanguard—the Communist Party. The Russian working class led the Russian peoples to an epoch-making victory over the autocracy, and then over the landowners and capitalists.

The great October Socialist Revolution put an end once and for all to the social and national oppression of the peoples of former tsarist Russia, created the conditions for the formation of socialist nations and laid the foundation for their close co-operation in the building of a communist society.

The friendship and fraternal alliance between the Ukrainian, Russian and other peoples of our country were strengthened and steeled in the stern years of civil war and foreign intervention, in the process of socialist construction and in the historic

battles of the Great Patriotic War against the nazi invaders. Unbreakable friendship among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is one of the principal pillars of the multinational Soviet Socialist State and the chief condition for all the achievements of the fraternal Soviet Republics.

The Communist Party is the inspirer of the unbreakable friendship among the free and equal peoples of the U.S.S.R. Leading the struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the victory of communism, it strengthens the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, which is the foundation rock of Soviet society. The Party is constantly concerned for the development of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, wages an implacable fight against manifestations of bourgeois nationalism and educates the Soviet citizens in the spirit of friendship among nations, of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

The whole history of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is graphic evidence of the momentous importance of their friendship with the great Russian people, of the invincible strength of the fraternal alliance and close co-operation among all the peoples of our country, who under the leadership of the Communist Party, have built socialism and are now confidently marching onward, to the triumph of communism.

I

1. The reunion of the Ukraine with Russia in 1654 was the natural corollary of the entire preceding history of the two great kindred Slavic peoples—the Russians and the Ukrainians. It was determined by the long centuries of development of economic, political and cultural relations between the Ukraine and Russia and accorded with the fundamental interests and aspirations of the two peoples.

The Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples sprang from a common stock—the ancient Russian people who set up the ancient Russian State of Kiev Rus.

The social and economic development of Rus in the period of feudalism and the difficult times of the Mongol-Tatar invasion brought about the dispersion in separate parts of the land of the ancient Russian people. From the single ancient Russian people there were gradually formed three kindred peoples, the Russian, the Ukrainian and the Byelorussian, each with their own distinctive features in language, culture and way of life. Notwithstanding all the vicissitudes of history and severe trials, the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples preserved and retained through the centuries the consciousness of their common origin, of the kinship of their languages and cultures, and of their common destiny.

2. With the weakening of the ancient land of Russia, largely owing to the conquests of the Mongol-Tatar Khans, the Ukrainian territories were severed from Northeast Rus and broken up into parts, falling a prey to the Lithuanian, Polish

and Hungarian feudal lords, to the Turkish Sultans and their vassals, the Crimean Khans.

In the 16th century a large portion of the Ukraine was seized by feudal Poland. This was facilitated by the treacherous policy of the Ukrainian feudal serf-owners, who sought, in an alliance with the Polish gentry, to suppress the struggle of the masses against feudalism, to strengthen and extend their feudal, serf-owning class privileges, and to intensify the exploitation of the working people.

The Polish feudal aristocracy and squirearchy (the magnates and the szlachta) established a cruel and inhumanly oppressive system of serfdom in the conquered Ukraine. The whole weight of feudal and national oppression fell upon the peasantry, the urban poor and the Cossack masses. The Polish szlachta looked upon the Ukrainian peasants as animals and grossly trampled upon their dignity. With the help of the Vatican and by measures of brutal coercion, they implanted Catholicism in the Ukraine, strove to establish a Uniate Church, pursued a policy of forcible Polonization of the Ukrainians and defiled the Ukrainian language and culture in an effort to reduce the Ukrainian people to spiritual slavery and to break their ties with the Russian people.

The severe plight of the Ukrainian masses was further aggravated by the feudal anarchy in the Polish State, a manifestation of which was the unbridled tyranny of the magnates and the szlachta in methodically plundering and devastating the Ukrainian territories.

Oppression by the Polish feudal state and the unrestricted tyranny of the Polish gentry were a serious impediment to Ukraine's economic and cultural development. In addition, the Ukrainian population were constantly harried by robber raids of the Turks and the Crimean Khans.

The Russian people, in a long and selfless struggle against the Mongol-Tatar and other alien conquerors, overcame feudal division, upheld their national independence and established a powerful centralized state with Moscow as its capital. Moscow became the basis and initiator of the Russian State, its political, economic and cultural centre.

The centralized Russian State played an immense role in the historical destiny of the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other peoples of our country. From its very inception it was a centre of attraction and bulwark of the fraternal peoples in their struggle against foreign oppression.

3. Threatened with extermination, the Ukrainian people waged an unceasing struggle against foreign oppression, for liberty and independence, and at the same time for reunion with Russia.

The struggle of the Ukrainian masses against feudal-serfdom and national oppression and against the Turkish and Tatar robber raids brought into being an armed force, the Cossacks. In the 16th century the centre of that armed force was the Zaporozhskaya Sech, which played a progressive role in the history of the Ukrainian people. Whereas, at times, a section of the wealthier, upper ranks of the Cossacks made their peace with the Polish szlachta, the rank-and-file Cossacks,

together with the peasants and the urban poor, waged a relentless struggle against feudal-serfdom and national oppression. The Ukraine and Byelorussia were shaken by a continuous succession of peasant and Cossack revolts against the Polish szlachta and local exploiters. The biggest of these popular uprisings in the Ukraine at the close of the 16th and the early half of the 17th centuries were led, among others, by Kossinsky, Nalivaiko and Taras Fyodorovich (Tryasilo).

An inspiring example to the working people of the Ukraine and Byelorussia in their struggle against the alien tyrants and their own oppressors was the peasant revolt in Russia led by Ivan Bolotnikov (1606–07), in which Ukrainian peasants took an active part.

The popular struggle against social oppression by the Polish and Ukrainian feudal landlords was closely interwoven with a struggle for emancipation from national oppression. A powerful spur to the struggle was given by the glorious victory of the Russian people, led by Minin and Pozharsky, in the war against the Polish and Swedish invaders at the beginning of the 17th century.

In fighting for national liberation, the Ukrainian people strove for reunion with the Russian people. Economic and cultural relations between the Ukraine and Russia grew broader and firmer in spite of all obstacles. That helped to bring the two kindred peoples closer together and had a beneficial influence on the development of their cultures.

4. For the Ukrainian people, liberation from the yoke of the Polish szlachta and elimination of the danger of annexation by the Sultans of Turkey, were a historical necessity, a fundamental question of their national existence.

One of the most glorious pages in Ukrainian history was the people's war of liberation of 1648–54. The chief and decisive force in this war was the peasantry which was fighting both social oppression by the Polish and Ukrainian feudal landlords and alien subjugation. The broad masses of the Cossacks and the urban population, as well as the upper ranks of the Cossacks, fought together with the peasants in this war of liberation.

But whereas the peasants and Cossack masses were waging a heroic struggle against social and national oppression, the Ukrainian feudal elements (the upper ranks of the Cossacks and the small landlords) took part in the war of liberation with a view to preserving and strengthening feudal relations and serfdom in the Ukraine.

In the war of liberation of 1648–54, the Ukrainian people fought both for emancipation from the yoke of the Polish gentry and for reunion with the kindred Russian people in a single Russian State.

5. In this war of liberation the Ukrainian people were led by an outstanding statesman and soldier, Bogdan Khmel'nitsky. The historic merit of Bogdan Khmel'nitsky lies in the fact that, while expressing the age-old aspiration and hope of the Ukrainian people—close unity with the Russian people—and while giving

leadership to the process of building Ukrainian statehood, he correctly understood its purposes and prospects, realized that the salvation of the Ukrainian people could be achieved only through unity with the great Russian people, and worked perseveringly for the reunion of the Ukraine with Russia.

In the course of the people's war of liberation led by Bogdan Khmelnytsky, there was built up in the Ukraine a powerful armed force, which scored a series of brilliant victories over the army of the Polish szlachta and liberated a large part of the Ukraine. Beside Bogdan Khmelnytsky, the insurgent Ukrainian people produced from their ranks Krivonos, Nechai, Bogun and other outstanding military leaders and national heroes.

Together with the Ukrainians, the kindred people of Byelorussia waged a struggle against the yoke of the Polish and Lithuanian feudal lords and for reunion with Russia.

The peasants of Moldavia also took an active part in the Ukrainian people's war of liberation.

The struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Polish gentry found broad sympathy and responses among the Polish peasants, who were also suffering heavily from the feudal yoke. Under the influence of the mounting liberation struggle of the Ukrainians, peasant actions took place in several parts of Poland, undermining the strength of the Polish feudal state.

The constant assistance and support of the Russian masses and of the Russian State helped to broaden the scope of the Ukrainian people's war of liberation and contributed to its outstanding victories. Many Don Cossacks and Russian peasants and townspeople fought in the ranks of the Ukrainian army.

In fighting the Polish szlachta and repelling the robber raids of the Crimean Khans, the Ukraine was backed by the continuous economic, diplomatic and military aid of Russia. Transports of grain, arms and ammunition, salt and metal wares were sent from Russia to the Ukraine. Russian diplomats protected the interests of the Ukraine in negotiations with foreign states, and so on. Ukrainian peasants and townspeople whom the incursions of the soldiery of feudal Poland or of the Crimean Khans forced to flee from their homes, found asylum on Russian territory.

The tsarist government, in the interests of strengthening the state, gave its support to the Ukrainian people's desire for reunion with Russia. On October 1 (11), 1653, the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow, responding to the repeated requests made by representatives of the Ukraine, and mindful of the danger offered to the existence of the kindred Ukrainian people by Polish, Lithuanian, Turkish and Tatar invaders, gave its consent to the admission of the Ukraine into the Russian State and to declaration of war on szlachta Poland for the liberation of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. In addition to boyars, nobles, clergy and tsarist officials, the Zemsky Sobor, as the documentary records testify, was attended by representatives of the Russian cities, the merchant class, the peasantry and the streltsi.

This decision of the Zemsky Sobor was an expression of the will and desire of the entire Russian people to aid their Ukrainian brothers in their struggle for liberation from foreign enslavement.

6. The reunion of the Ukraine with Russia was publicly proclaimed on January 8 (18), 1654, at the Rada in Pereyaslav (now Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky, Kiev Region), which was attended by representatives of various social strata of all the Ukrainian territories liberated from the Polish szlachta. Envoys of the Russian Government were also present. Addressing the Rada, Bogdan Khmelnytsky recalled the severe trials and tribulations suffered by the Ukrainian people and their grim struggle against the oppression by the Polish szlachta and the robber raids of the troops of the Turkish Sultans and the Crimean Khans. He urged the Rada to vote for reunion with Russia. The Rada decided unanimously in favour of reunion, "so that we may thus be one forever" ("Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia." Documents and Materials, Vol. III, 1953, p. 461).

The decision taken at Pereyaslav was enthusiastically received by the Ukrainians. "All through the Ukrainian land the people manifested their gladness," wrote a contemporary, the chronicler Samovidets (Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky).

The Pereyaslav Rada's decision crowned the people's struggle for the reunion of the Ukraine with Russia; it realized the age-long hope and aspiration of the Ukrainian people, and marked a turning point in their history.

Though Russia in those days was governed by the tsar and the landlords, the reunion was of immense progressive importance for the political, economic and cultural development of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.

The historic importance of the Pereyaslav Rada's decision for the Ukrainian people lay primarily in the fact that union with Russia within a single state, the Russian State, saved the Ukraine from subjugation to the Polish szlachta and from annexation by the Turkish Sultans.

By the act of reunion, the Ukrainian people sealed their historically evolved, close and intimate tie with the Russian people, thereby acquiring a great ally and a firm friend and defender in their struggle for social and national emancipation.

Reunion with the strong centralized Russian State facilitated Ukraine's economic and cultural development. In the latter half of the 17th century the Ukrainian economy became an integral part of the newly-evolved all-Russian market. The reunion facilitated the expansion of the productive forces both of Russia and of the Ukraine and the mutual cultural enrichment of the two kindred peoples.

The entry of the Ukraine into the Russian State was also of supreme international importance. It was a blow at the aggressive designs of the Turkish Sultans and the Polish szlachta.

II

7. Combinations of the economic resources of Russia and the Ukraine multiplied the strength of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples in their common struggle against foreign invaders.

The Swedish invader was routed at Poltava in 1709 by a Russian army which included Ukrainian units. The Ukrainian people rose unanimously against the

despicable traitor and Jesuit fosterling, Hetman Mazeppa, who tried with the help of the Swedish and Polish invaders to sever the Ukraine from Russia and restore the detested foreign yoke.

As a result of Russia's signal victories over the Sultans of Turkey in the latter half of the 18th century, in which the great Russian soldier, A. V. Suvorov, played an outstanding part, the Crimea and the southern Ukrainian territories were liberated from Turkish rule. That helped substantially to develop the productive forces of the whole country, which had now secured an outlet to a sea that had been closed to it before. Big Ukrainian commercial and cultural centres, such as Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa, sprang up on the Black Sea coast.

The Ukrainian territories west of the Dnieper (the Kiev, Volyn, and Podolia regions) which until then had been under the yoke of the Polish szlachta, were reunited with Russia towards the close of the 18th century.

In the Patriotic War of 1812, the peoples of our country, including the Ukrainians, led by the Russian people, destroyed Napoleon's invading armies.

8. The reunion of the Ukraine with Russia strengthened the unity of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples in their joint struggle against social oppression by the Russian and Ukrainian serf-owning landlords. The anti-feudal rebellions led by Stepan Razin and Yemelyan Pugachov in Russia in the 17th and 18th centuries, in which the peasants of many nationalities took an active part, found a broad response among the oppressed Ukrainian masses. The struggle of the Ukrainian peasantry against feudal-serfdom and national oppression produced such popular leaders as Zaliznyak, Dovbush, Karmelyuk and others.

Despite their spontaneous, unorganized and sporadic character, the anti-feudal movements, in which the peasant masses of various nationalities of Russia were involved, shook the feudal system and united those masses for the struggle against their common enemies.

The heroic struggle against feudal-serfdom oppression and alien invasion cemented the fellowship-in-arms between the working people of Russia and the Ukraine.

9. The bitterest enemy of the Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples of Russia was the tsarist autocracy. Relying on the reactionary upper strata of local landlords and bourgeoisie, tsarism pursued a policy of brutal national and colonial oppression of the non-Russian peoples. In the Ukraine, tsarism abolished local self-government, savagely suppressed the national-liberation movement and frustrated the desire for the establishment of Ukrainian statehood, conducted a policy of forcible Russification, and hampered the development of the Ukrainian language and culture.

10. In the revolutionary struggle for emancipation from tsarism and serfdom which developed in Russia in the 19th century, the great Russian people played the leading role.

The first generation of revolutionary fighters against tsarism were the Decembrists, who carried on the revolutionary tradition of Radishchev, and who in 1825 raised revolts in St. Petersburg and the Ukraine (mutiny of the Chernigov Regiment). Following the Decembrists, the struggle against tsarism and serfdom was taken up by the great Russian revolutionary democrats: Belinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov.

Despite the reactionary tsarist policy of brutal national and colonial oppression, the finest sons of the Russian people recognized the right of the Ukraine to national independence and, together with progressive-minded Ukrainians, rose up against the shameful policy of inciting the peoples of Russia against one another, a policy pursued by the Russian and Ukrainian landlords and bourgeoisie and their servitors, the Russian dominant-nation chauvinists and the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. In recognizing the right of the Ukrainian people to free national development, the revolutionary minds of Russia associated its possibility with the overthrow of tsarism and the emancipation both of the Russian and of the Ukrainian and other peoples of our country.

The great son of the Ukrainian people, the poet and revolutionary democrat T. G. Shevchenko, fought tsarism and serfdom in close union with the Russian revolutionary democrats. Through his writings, with their deep hatred of the oppressors, Shevchenko played an immense part in the development of the national and social consciousness of the Ukrainian people. The high road to the emancipation of the Ukrainian people, as he saw it, was a revolutionary union of all the Slav peoples with the Russian people. Shevchenko was an implacable foe of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and bourgeois liberalism.

The Polish revolutionary democrats joined the Russian and Ukrainian revolutionaries in opposing tsarism. The best elements of the Polish people always sympathized with the struggle for emancipation of the Ukrainian people.

11. The development of capitalism in Russia gave rise to a new class, the proletariat. In the Russian proletariat, the working people of all the nationalities of our country acquired for the first time in history a reliable leader in their struggle for the abolition of social and national oppression.

With the development of industry, a working class grew up rapidly in the Ukraine, from among both the Ukrainian and the Russian population. The working class of the Ukraine was an integral part of the proletariat of Russia. The working-class movement in the Ukraine developed in intimate unity with the general working-class movement of Russia. Already in the 1870's and 1880's, there began to be formed in the Ukraine, as in Russia, revolutionary working-class organizations which made it their object to fight the autocracy and capitalism. The Ukrainian working class was one of the biggest and most militant detachments of the proletariat of Russia.

Towards the close of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries the centre of the world revolutionary movement shifted to Russia. Russia was then a nodal point of all the contradictions of imperialism, where feudal-military, colonial and capitalist oppression were combined. Oppression of the working people by tsarism, the landlords and the bourgeoisie was supplemented by the imperialist plunder of Russia by West-European monopoly capital. At the same time there was in Russia an effective force capable of resolving all these contradictions by revolutionary means. That force was the proletariat of Russia.

The tasks confronting the growing working-class movement in Russia urgently demanded the organization of a revolutionary proletarian party. In the 1880's, the association of the first representatives of Marxism in Russia, the Emancipation of Labour Group headed by G. V. Plekhanov, laid the theoretical foundations for the revolutionary working-class movement in Russia. In the 1890's the great Lenin assumed the leadership of the working class of Russia. The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, founded by V. I. Lenin in St. Petersburg in 1895, was the first rudiment of a revolutionary proletarian party in Russia. Lenin's League of Struggle exerted an immense influence on the revolutionary movement throughout the country. Similar Leagues were founded in Yekaterinoslav, Kiev and other Ukrainian cities. In the Ukraine, as in Russia, the Social-Democratic organizations of the Leninist trend led strikes, passed to agitation among the masses, and thus combined socialism with the working-class movement.

12. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, a Marxist party of a new type was founded, based on the ideological and organizational principles elaborated by V. I. Lenin. In a struggle against the separatist and nationalist elements in the working-class movement, V. I. Lenin upheld the internationalist organizational principle of the Marxist party. The R.S.D.L.P. embraced revolutionary workers of all the nationalities of Russia. It came forward from the very first as the standard-bearer of the ideology of proletarian internationalism and friendship among nations. The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted Lenin's programmatic demand on the national question—the right of nations to self-determination.

The Russian workers were in the van of the struggle against the landlord-bourgeois system. They roused and united the proletariat and all the working people of the border nationalities to fight for social and national emancipation.

Together with the heroic Russian proletariat, the working people of the Ukraine waged a devoted fight against their class enemies in the first bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905–07). Big uprisings took place in this period in a number of Ukrainian cities and gubernias, as well as revolts in the Black Sea Fleet. During these uprisings, the workers of the Ukrainian industrial centres followed the example of Moscow, St. Petersburg and other Russian cities and set up Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the forerunners of Soviet power. The revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian workers and peasants played a prominent part in the general course

of the 1905–07 revolution.

In the period of the Stolypin reaction, of the new revolutionary upsurge, an of the first world war, the workers of the Ukraine, as of all Russia, rallied still more closely around the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in the struggle against the autocracy and the bourgeoisie.

The revolutionary movement in Russia stimulated the struggle of the working people of the West-Ukrainian territories, which were under the yoke of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, for national emancipation and reunion with all the Ukrainian people.

The great Lenin, for the first time in the history of Marxism, elaborated the Party's theoretical programme and policy on the national question. He showed that the national question was a component part of the general revolutionary struggle of the working class for the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was Lenin who inspired the policy of equality and friendship of nations, and it was he that guided the practical implementation of that policy. The precepts of Lenin's programme on the national question were, on the basis of a generalization of the experience of socialist construction, further creatively developed in the works of J. V. Stalin and in decisions of the Party. Upholding the principle of proletarian internationalism, the Party emphatically stressed the necessity for unity of action of the proletarians of all nations and their union around the Russian proletariat.

"Given united action of the Great-Russian and Ukrainian proletarians," V. I. Lenin wrote, "a free Ukraine is *possible*; without such unity she is out of the question" (*Works*, Vol. 20, p. 14).

The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, who were bitter enemies of internationalism and of fraternal alliance between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, endeavoured to infect the working people with the virus of nationalism, to foster in them a spirit of enmity towards the Russian people, to deflect them from the common class struggle against the oppressors, and thus harness them ideologically to the selfish class interests of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and landlords. In order to deceive the masses, the nationalists preached the unscientific reactionary "theory" that the Ukrainian nation had no classes and no bourgeoisie, and the "theory" of the "single stream." In doing so, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists acted as allies of Russian tsarism and the bourgeoisie, and as agents of foreign imperialism.

Leading the revolutionary movement of the working people of all Russia, the Communist Party waged a determined struggle both against Russian dominant-nation chauvinism and against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.

The Communist Party worked for the merging of the national-liberation movement of the oppressed nationalities of Russia with the struggle of the workers against the bourgeois-landlord system and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

13. Unity of the revolutionary struggle for emancipation made for stronger cultural ties between the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples. Russian progressive

culture had a beneficial influence on the development of all branches of Ukrainian culture (literature, drama, painting, music). Ukrainian progressive culture, in its turn, enriched the culture of the Russian people and contributed greatly to the promotion of world culture.

The development of progressive social ideas since the close of the 19th century in the Ukraine, as throughout the country, was influenced by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

The appearance in the historical arena of the proletariat of Russia, the most revolutionary in the world, and of its militant vanguard, the Communist Party, was of decisive significance for the further development of the Russian, Ukrainian and all other peoples of Russia.

III

14. In the Great October Socialist Revolution, the working class of Russia, in alliance with the labouring peasantry and under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the rule of the imperialist bourgeoisie and landlords, and established the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The October Socialist Revolution led to the establishment in our country of the first socialist workers' and peasants' state in the world. This state proclaimed a policy of peace and friendship among nations and of equality and sovereignty of all the peoples of Russia, and welded the peoples of our Motherland into a single fraternal family under the banner of proletarian internationalism.

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the centre of Russia imparted a powerful impetus to the development of the proletarian revolution throughout the country.

The Ukrainian people, who had waged a long revolutionary struggle in common with the great Russian people, were the first, after their Russian brothers, to adopt the path of the October Socialist Revolution, thus ushering in a new and glorious era in their history.

On December 25, 1917, the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the Ukraine a Soviet Socialist Republic. Expressing the unanimous will of the Ukrainian workers and peasants, the congress solemnly proclaimed the need for close union between the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia.

By its devoted struggle for the overthrow of bourgeois and landlord rule and by its fight against nationalist counter-revolution, the Ukrainian working class made a weighty contribution to the victory of the proletarian revolution in our country.

Having emancipated themselves from landlord-bourgeois exploitation and national oppression, the Ukrainian people became the sole masters of their destiny. With the fraternal aid of the Russian people, they realized their age-long dream—the establishment of a genuinely free and sovereign national state which occupies a prominent place in the family of Soviet Republics.

The victory of the socialist revolution in the Ukraine and the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet state were achieved on the basis of Lenin's teachings on the national and colonial question, and represented a major defeat for international imperialism and its bourgeois-nationalist agents.

15. In a grim and costly struggle against external enemies and internal counter-revolution, the peoples of our country, led by the Communist Party, upheld the great conquests of the October Revolution and the liberty and independence of their Motherland. The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists—inveterate enemies of the working people—preached the spurious slogan of Ukrainian “independence” as a camouflage for their attempts to destroy the Soviet power, re-impose the landlord and capitalist yoke, incite the Ukrainian working people against the Russian workers and peasants and foment fratricidal war between them.

Counter-revolutionary nationalist “governments”—the Central Rada, the Directory, etc., headed by paid agents of foreign imperialism, such as Grushevsky, Vinnichenko and Petlyura, who were striving to restore the power of the landlords and capitalists and to strengthen the rule of the kulaks—sold the Ukraine and her people and national resources wholesale and retail to the West-European imperialist vultures. In February 1918, the counter-revolutionary Rada invited Austria and Germany to occupy the Ukraine with the purpose of crushing the Soviet regime.

In answer to the call of the Communist Party, the Ukrainian people rose against the Austro-German invaders and their underlings, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.

Led by the Russian people, the labouring folk of our country defeated and ejected from the Soviet land the British and French interventionists who towards the end of 1918 had occupied the Southern Ukraine and the Crimea, the forces of Denikin, the Polish Whites and Wrangel, the Petlyura and Makhno nationalist bands, and the other hirelings of the U.S. and Entente imperialists.

In that period of the foreign armed intervention and civil war, the Ukrainian people, shoulder to shoulder with the other peoples of Russia, coped with the immense difficulties, with the economic ruin and famine, and displayed supreme heroism and courage in defending the Soviet power they treasured so highly. Thousands upon thousands of workers and peasants of Soviet Russia fought in the Ukraine for the freedom and happiness of the Ukrainian and other peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Many of the Ukraine's sons, in their turn, fought on the numerous fronts of the civil war in Russia, Byelorussia, Central Asia, Transcaucasia, etc.

An outstanding role in mobilizing the forces of the Ukrainian people for the defeat of the forces of foreign intervention and internal counter-revolution was played by the Communist Party of the Ukraine—an integral part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—founded in July 1918.

In the fire and storm of the civil war and foreign armed intervention, the fraternal alliance and friendship of the Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples of the

U.S.S.R. were strengthened and steered. Only thanks to this friendship were the Ukrainian people, as all the other peoples of the U.S.S.R., able to uphold their liberty and independence.

16. With the victorious conclusion of the civil war the Soviet state entered a period of peaceful socialist construction. The building of socialism and the defence of the country demanded closer economic, military and political co-operation among the Soviet peoples, and the unification of the Soviet Republics into a single federal state became an imperative need. The working people of the Soviet Ukraine were among the first sponsors of the Union.

The Communist party headed this movement for union of all the peoples of the Soviet land and directed it along the right path. At the First All-Union Congress of Soviets, in December 1922, the Soviet Republics united voluntarily and as equals to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each of the constituent republics retaining the sovereign rights of an independent state, with its own supreme organs of authority, its own territory and its own constitution and legislation.

The establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a signal victory of the Soviet power and a triumph of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy. It was a victory over the bourgeois nationalists of all brands who had opposed fraternal co-operation of the peoples and who were a serious obstacle to the amalgamation of the Soviet Republics into a single union.

The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics provided all the necessary conditions for the economic, political and cultural progress, on a scale unparalleled in history, of the Soviet land generally and of each Soviet Republic individually, and for the conversion of the formerly backward and oppressed peoples into advanced, socialist nations.

Thanks to its membership in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was able effectively to rehabilitate her national economy, to develop a socialist culture and to make swift progress in the building of socialism.

IV

17. The Communist Party, guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, drew up a programme for the building of socialism in our country. Acting on this programme, the Soviet people, for the first time in history, built a new social system—socialism; they eliminated the exploiting classes once and for all and abolished exploitation of man by man.

By putting an end to its age-long economic and cultural backwardness, our Motherland made a gigantic stride forward and became a powerful state with a highly developed industry, a socialist agriculture and a Soviet culture, the most advanced culture in the world.

The victory of socialism brought about fundamental changes in the economy of the U.S.S.R., in the class structure of Soviet society, and in national relations. The abolition of the exploiting classes, which were the instigators and inciters of inter-national strife; the fact that the power was in the hands of the working class, which is a foe of all subjugation and a steadfast proponent of internationalism; the mutual assistance of the peoples in all spheres of economic and public life; the progress of the cultures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., which are national in form and socialist in content—all these were factors which helped to establish in our country fraternal co-operation among the peoples within the framework of a single federal state, and firmly to implant the Soviet ideology of equality of races and nations, of friendship and brotherhood among the peoples.

With the victory of socialism, the centuries-old friendship of the Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples of our country became a mighty and invincible force and one of the motive forces of the development of Soviet society.

The Communist Party routed the traitors and capitulators—the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists and other enemies of the Soviet people who had tried to deflect the Soviet Union from the Leninist path, to undermine the unity and friendship of the peoples of our socialist Motherland, and to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

Under the Soviet system, the old, bourgeois nations have been transformed into new, socialist nations, which are successfully developing under the banner of proletarian internationalism. These are in fact closely-cemented nations with common interests, for they are exempt from the irreconcilable class antagonisms which corrode the bourgeois nations.

The force which cements and directs the union of these nations is the working class and its Communist Party.

A decisive role in the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. was played by the great Russian people—the leading nation among the equal nations of our multi-national Soviet state.

The Soviet social system set the Ukrainian people on the road of political, economic and cultural development.

It was the Communist Party that unfurled the banner under which the Soviet Ukraine and her people flowered into strength. The Communist Party, its Central Committee, and the Government of the U.S.S.R. have displayed unceasing and unflagging concern for the economic development of the Soviet Ukraine.

18. Carrying out the policy of socialist industrialization, the Soviet people, under the guidance of the Communist Party, built up in a brief historical period a powerful and advanced socialist industry which was the decisive factor in the reconstruction of the entire national economy on socialist lines.

With the extensive fraternal assistance of the Russian people, a highly-developed industry was built up in all the national republics, enabling them to put an end to the century-old economic backwardness. In the Ukraine, non-ferrous metals, machine-building, tractor, chemical and other key industries

were built from the bottom up and equipped with the most advanced modern machinery. They include such industrial giants as the Kharkov Tractor Works, the Kramatorsk Heavy Engineering Works, the Azovstal and Zaporozhstal Steel Works, the Zaporozhye Harvester Combine Works, and the Gorlovka Chemical Works. The Lenin Hydroelectric Station on the Dnieper, the biggest in Europe, was built, and the Donets coal fields and the Krivoy Rog iron fields were thoroughly reconstructed.

In this period, such large industrial centres as Kiev, Kharkov, Stalino and Voroshilovgrad changed and developed beyond recognition.

The socialist industrialization of the Ukraine owed its success to the labour enthusiasm of the working class which launched a socialist emulation movement, and to the assistance of the R.S.F.S.R. and other Soviet Republics.

Success in socialist industrialization paved the way for the reconstruction of agriculture. Thanks to the efforts of the Party and the Government, our country has built up a system of agriculture which for largeness of scale and extent of mechanization is without equal in the world, and which has demonstrated its decisive superiority not only over small-commodity peasant farming, but also over large-scale capitalist farming.

Like other Soviet Republics, the Soviet Ukraine has an advanced socialist agriculture and is one of the major granaries of the Soviet Union.

The Leninist-Stalinist national policy consistently pursued by the Communist Party has brought about a cultural revolution in our country and the rapid progress of the socialist cultures of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government have trained in each of the nationalities a numerous force of new, Soviet intellectuals who come from the people, are linked with the people and devote all their energies to the service of the people, to the service of the great cause of building communism.

Thanks to the Soviet system, the Ukrainian national culture received unprecedented opportunities of development and became a genuinely people's culture, a socialist culture.

19. The growing might and strength of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made it possible to realize the yearning for national reunion which the Ukrainian people had carried through the centuries. The reunion of all the Ukrainian territories was completed thanks to the wise policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. In 1939, the Western Ukraine was reunited with the Soviet Ukraine. Bukovina and the Ismail Region were reunited with the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1940, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1945. With the reunion of all the Ukrainian territories, the Soviet Ukraine became one of the biggest states in Europe. The Ukrainian S.S.R. now has a population of over 40 million.

In a number of major economic aspects, the Soviet Ukraine has far outstripped France, Italy and other big European capitalist countries. The ancient Rus city, Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, is one of the biggest administrative and cultural centres in our country.

In the reunited Ukrainian regions, socialist industry is swiftly developing, collectivization of agriculture has been completed, and the building of cultural institutions is proceeding on a broad scale. One of the most ancient of the Ukrainian cities, Lvov, has entirely changed in the period of Soviet power. It now has large new industrial plants, twelve new higher educational establishments, a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R., a branch of the Lenin Museum, and many other scientific and cultural institutions. The socialist transformation of the western regions has dealt a crushing blow to the remnants of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, bitter enemies of the Ukrainian people who became paid agents of the foreign bourgeoisie.

The completion of the historical process of reunion of the Ukrainian people into a single Ukrainian Soviet State was an outstanding victory for the Leninist-Stalinist national policy of the Communist Party, the policy of brotherhood and co-operation among the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

20. The Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War was a serious test of the virility and strength of the socialist system and the Soviet multi-national state.

All the peoples of the Soviet Union responded to the call of the Party and rose as one man in defence of their Motherland, regarding the Patriotic War against the nazi invaders as the common cause of all the nationalities.

The Ukraine was one of the areas of the Soviet Union which suffered most from the nazi invasion. The damage it caused to the Ukraine's economy ran to upwards of 285,000 million rubles. The nazi fiends endeavoured with the help of brutal terrorism to subjugate the Ukrainian people and turn them into slaves of the "nazi master race." In this they were actively abetted by the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.

Only thanks to the fraternal assistance of the great Russian people and the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. was the Ukraine delivered from the nazi yoke.

In the Patriotic War, the Ukrainian people shared with the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the devoted struggle against the nazi invaders and their hirelings both on the battlefronts and in the enemy-occupied territories, where the masses developed a broad guerrilla movement which produced many a hero. The Party and Komsomol organizations carried on their activities in the difficult and trying conditions of the underground struggle.

In the Patriotic War, the unbreakable friendship uniting the Soviet peoples withstood a severe test and was further steeled and tempered.

The defeat of German fascism and Japanese imperialism in World War II made possible the establishment of people's-democratic states, and the camp of peace, democracy and socialism, headed by the Soviet Union, grew in size and strength. The Ukrainian S.S.R. was one of the founders of the United Nations, where together with the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the representatives of the entire Soviet Union and of the People's Democracies, she strenuously upholds the cause of peace and strives for the promotion of co-operation among all nations. The Soviet Ukraine is constantly strengthening her fraternal ties with the People's

Democracies. With the establishment in Poland of a people's democratic system and the abolition of the rule of the bourgeoisie and the szlachta—who had incited the Polish working people against their Slav brothers, the Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians—relations of genuine friendship arose and are effectively developing between the Polish people and the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Russians and other peoples of the great Soviet Union.

21. After the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War, the peoples of the Soviet Union, inspired and organized by the Communist Party, rehabilitated their devastated national economy at an unprecedented speed and advanced all branches of the Soviet economy and all departments of technology and culture.

The working people of the Soviet Ukraine, guided by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and by the Government of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and with the fraternal assistance of the Russian and other peoples of our country, have completely restored the economy of their Republic, have exceeded many of their pre-war output levels, and are now making a substantial contribution to the building of communism.

In 1952 the large-scale industry of the Ukraine turned out 17 times more products than the industries of pre-revolutionary Ukraine. Power output in that year was over 37 times, output of the metal-working industry nearly 69 times, coal output more than 4 times, iron output 4.5 times, and steel output nearly 5 times as great as before the revolution. The Soviet Ukraine is one of our country's major sources of supply of coal and metal. The Donbas, with its powerful coal, metallurgical, chemical and engineering industries, occupies, together with other Ukrainian industrial centres, an important place in the industry of the entire Soviet Union.

Implementing the decisions of the Party and the Government, and on the basis of the progress already made in heavy industry, the underlying foundation of the socialist economy, the working people of the Ukraine, as of the whole country, are striving for a steep increase in output of articles of popular consumption.

The collective-farm peasantry of the Ukraine have by their devoted efforts secured unprecedented harvests of winter wheat, sugar beet and other major crops. The Ukrainian collective farmers have produced from their midst many an innovator of socialist methods of labour in all branches of agriculture.

It is the constant concern of the Party and the Government to supply socialist agriculture with up-to-date equipment. There are now operating in the fields of the Ukraine 182,000 tractors (in terms of 15 h.p. units), or 69 per cent more than pre-war, 51,000 grain combines, or 65 per cent more than pre-war, and tens of thousands of complex agricultural machines.

With the steady progress of the national economy, the material and cultural standards of the working masses are also rising. The socialist culture of the Ukraine is flourishing. The Ukraine has about 30,000 schools with over 6,500,000 pupils. In 1952/53, there were in the Republic 144 higher educational establishments, with a total of over 177,000 students, which is nearly 8 times more

than in 1914, and more than in any West-European capitalist country. The 591 technical and other specialized secondary schools had a student body of some 234,000. There are tens of thousands of cultural and educational centres, clubs, libraries and Palaces of Culture.

The Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Architecture, and the numerous research institutions founded in the Ukraine in Soviet times embraced a large number of scientific workers who are making a weighty contribution to the advanced science of the Soviet Union.

The Ukrainian people are developing their socialist culture on the granite foundation of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and in intimate creative contact and organic interaction with the cultures of all the fraternal peoples of the U.S.S.R. Particularly beneficial is the influence on the Ukrainian Soviet culture of the socialist culture of the great Russian people.

The historic achievements of the Soviet Union and its component part, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, arouse the deep admiration and recognition of all progressive-minded men and women.

The labouring millions groaning under cruel exploitation in the capitalist countries are following with deep pride and hope the achievements of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., including the Ukrainian people, in their struggle for the building of communism and for world-wide peace.

The progress of communist construction in the U.S.S.R. shows to the peoples of the world that only socialism can ensure a free and happy life, the development and progress of all peoples and nations, and genuine friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance among the nations.

The Soviet Union is an inspiring example of a country which, for the first time in history, has solved the national question.

* * *

All the peoples of the Soviet Union are meeting that noteworthy event, the 300th anniversary of the reunion of the Ukraine with Russia, with new achievements in the building of communism.

Led by the Communist Party, the Soviet people are striving heroically for the fulfilment of the programme of measures for the further advance of our country along the road to communism, outlined by the Nineteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. The Party and the Government are bending every effort to ensure the full satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the working people.

The September Plenary Meeting of the C.C., C.P.S.U., charted a grand programme of measures for the continued development of socialist agriculture and improvement of the people's living standards. The Communist Party has launched a struggle for a steep increase in agricultural output and accelerated expansion of the light and food industries, with a view to abundantly satisfying within the next two or three years our people's rising demand for foodstuffs and the raw material requirements of the light and food industries.

In all their activities, our Party and the Soviet Government are imbued with a deep faith in the people, in the creative energies of the workers and peasants, who produce all material values and who are the real makers of history.

The chief instrument in the building of communism is the Soviet Socialist State. It is the constant concern of the Communist Party to further strengthen the Soviet state, to increase its might and defensive power, to cement the alliance of the working class and the collective-farm peasantry, and friendship and socialist co-operation among the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

It is our sacred duty to continue to strengthen the unity and mutual friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, to strengthen the Soviet multi-national state. Given friendship among the peoples of our country, no enemy, internal or external, can daunt us.

All the perfidious attempts of the Western imperialists to sow strife among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and to undermine the strength of our multi-national socialist state have failed and will always fail. But the Soviet people know that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists, the imperialist states will continue to smuggle spies and saboteurs into our country, will endeavour to utilize the remnants of the demolished hostile groups for anti-Soviet purposes, to activate bourgeois-nationalist elements, to revive nationalist prejudices in individual minds and use them to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Greater vigilance with regard to the machinations of the imperialist vultures and their agents, the bourgeois nationalists of all brands and other traitors, is one of the most important conditions for the success and progress of each of the Soviet Socialist Republics and of the whole of our Great Motherland.

The achievements of communist construction in the U.S.S.R. and the triumph of the ideology of friendship among nations inspire the peoples of the world to fight for emancipation from the capitalist yoke and for friendly and peaceful international relations.

May the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the source of the strength and might of our Great Motherland, continue to flourish!

Under the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and the leadership of the Communist Party, forward to the victory of communism!

Source: *Theses on the 300th Anniversary of The Reunion of The Ukraine with Russia (1654-1954)*. Approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954. [The appendix retains the spelling and the style of the official Soviet translation of the original Russian text.]

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Ukraine
in the mid-seventeenth century

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