

The UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



Vol. XIV. — No. 2

June, 1958

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Picture on the Cover: SIMON PETLURA, Head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Army in 1919. He was assassinated by a communist agent on May 25, 1926 on a street in Paris. The Ukrainians in the free world are commemorating this tragic anniversary, while the Russian Communists continue to vilify his name as a symbol of Ukrainian freedom and independence.

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\$1.25 A COPY

Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

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Checks payable to: UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Editorial and Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY
302-304 West 13th Street, New York 14, N. Y.

Tel.: WAtkins 4-5618

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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE WORLD'S ANTI-COMMUNIST EFFORT

Editorial

The latest French political turmoil and the revolutionary unrest and agitations, coupled with anti-American feelings and outbursts, which are sweeping the four continents—South America, Asia, Europe and Africa—all are the symptoms of a very dangerous disease afflicting the free world today. These symptoms carry all the markings of a protracted, peril-pregnant malady. Confronting us is no ephemeral and wind-blown political crisis which can be patched up by mustering up a new government in one country or another, or by the signing of a mutual agreement of friendship or a commercial treaty between two or more nations of the free world.

The possibly fatal sickness of the free world does not derive from the stresses and strains of the Western nations and its perennial disunity and erratic behavior in front of a ruthless and determined enemy. Rather, responsible is the inability of the free world to assess properly the weaknesses and vulnerable spots of the enemy and to capitalize upon them.

Meanwhile, retaining the initiative, the Communists, directed by the Russian subversive staff in Moscow, have supplied fuel and ammunition for the large-scale fighting, unrest and agitation in South America, the Middle East, Algeria and Indonesia.

LATIN AMERICAN STRATEGY

The outrageous treatment of the Vice President of the United States and Mrs. Nixon by agitated mobs in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Argentina are part and parcel of the great Soviet Russian anti-American strategy in Latin America, despite vigorous denials by both the U.S. Government and the various Latin American governments.

There is no secret that Moscow picked Latin America as the softest, most vulnerable spot in the allegedly-impregnable Western Hemispheric "fortress." For over a decade Latin America has in-

creasingly become a hub of Russian communist spies and agitators. The Soviet Embassies in Buenos Aires and Montevideo are actual centers of Russian espionage and infiltration. Together with the Mexican "clearance house" of communist propaganda and subversion in the Western Hemisphere, they comprise menacing strategical and political bridgeheads extending to our very threshold.

It is to be recalled that from 1955-57 some 4,000 to 6,000 political refugees and escapees in Latin America returned to the Soviet Union and the satellite countries as a result of the Russian redefection instigation. There was not the slightest attempt on the part of the Western nations, especially the United States, to interfere with this successful Russian action. But the psychological impact upon the Latin American peoples who witnessed the mass exodus of emigrants returning to the Soviet Promised Land was a weighty one. They watched, and so did the Western psychological warfare strategists, who failed at first to realize the effect of these Russian totalitarian moves in Latin America, and then did nothing to counteract what became a major victory in the cold war.

The United States policy in Latin America, admittedly based on technical assistance programs, is largely misunderstood by the Latin American peoples not only because of the adverse publicity it receives from the continental Russian-inspired anti-American campaign, but also because the United States somehow cannot interpret this policy in any other terms than in shoveling out material assistance to the "underdeveloped" countries (a term which wounds the pride and nationalist feelings of many Latin American countries). Here is an instance of the regrettable American inability to grasp the realities and to champion the dynamic causes which are moving millions of peoples in the world to emancipation and national and economic sovereignty.

And yet Communist Russia, the master of enslavement, deceit and subversion, is not only off-setting American influence in our own backyard, so to speak, but is assuming a dominant position. This is possible if only because so many Americans are still unconvinced that there is a communist menace. The degradation, the stone-throwing and spitting upon the Vice President of the United States in various Latin American countries may have awakened some of these. Here are some of the realities of the cold war. For the Russians the fight is on in earnest, despite the smiles of their leaders and their parroting about "peaceful coexistence." *The Worker* of May 18, 1958, crowed over the "sensational flop of Vice President Richard Nixon's lightning trip to the eight Latin American

countries." The article hammered away at the "traditional hatred of *Yanqui imperialismo*," and applauded the physical violence and riots against the Vice President which compelled him to curtail his trip. Here was another Soviet victory.

[It is interesting to note that not so long ago *The New Times* of Moscow (March 1958 issue, No. 13) outlined several arguments and ways to hamper and compromise "American simpletons abroad."]

The Geneva meeting of 1955 and the terrific loss in prestige for the West owing to its inaction in the Hungarian crisis—its actual abandonment of the Hungarian people in their struggle against the Russian invaders—all these products of the Western *malaise* are beginning to bear fruit in Latin America, the Middle East and other communist-infected areas of the world. The Latin American people understandably become confused when the great Western powers, which had been calling upon the rest of the world to join an anti-communist "crusade" since the end of the last war, suddenly become interested in Communist Russia's "peaceful" intentions and start negotiating with them. The Russian bluffs and blusters and the atomic saber-rattling of Khrushchev have succeeded in reducing the Western world to a "do-nothing" attitude with respect to the Russian tyrants. Soviet Russia, actually extremely vulnerable, looms ever larger and more formidable in the world.

"CULTURAL EXCHANGES"

Furthermore, the free world is even completely unaware that the so-called "cultural exchange" program with the Soviet Union is just one of the forms of Russian communist infiltration in the West. The Russians are hereby provided with unlimited opportunities to propagate their views, such as the appearances of Nikita S. Khrushchev and Ambassador M. A. Menshikov on American television. The members of the Russian "cultural" and dance ensembles are either Party members or, at the least, privileged personages of the regime. Benefiting hugely by it, they support it ardently. Briefly seeing the American democracy at work, these Russian "cultural emissaries" do not become converts from Communism; but they do impress a great number of Americans and create doubt as to whether Communism is such an evil after all. It produces such superb actors, performers and scientists! Regrettably, the millions of corpses—upon which the Soviet achievements are based—are not put on exhibition here.

The extent to which this cultural exchange can damage American prestige home and abroad is best attested to by the shameless, naïve behavior of some American groups vis-a-vis the Russian Ambassador to the United States, Mikhail A. Menshikov. He has been wine and dined by American women's clubs and entertained by Cyrus S. Eaton, rich Cleveland industrialist, who went on record recently as comparing the FBI to the Nazi Gestapo and stating that there is no communist danger in America. Khrushchev has praised Mr. Eaton for his "realistic views." Indeed, "Hero of the Soviet Union" awards have been given for less.

A few weeks ago Ambassador Menshikov abused his status as an accredited diplomat by using Soviet Embassy stationery in Washington for a propaganda hand-out sent to every member of the U.S. Congress, urging them to help prevent the rearming of the free and democratic German Federal Republic. In this instance he violated protocol and a long-standing diplomatic rule in going over the heads of the President of the United States and our Secretary of State. Menshikov's direct appeal to Congress in a matter which is of great importance to the security of the United States prompted Congressman Michael A. Feighan of Ohio (cf. *The Congressional Record*, May 19, 1958) to ask President Eisenhower to declare Ambassador Menshikov *persona non grata* in order that he be removed from the American scene. (This ought be duly noted by the Executive Club of Chicago and *The Chicago Daily News*, both of which recently gave sumptuous banquets in honor of Ambassador Menshikov.)

OUR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MURMUR

Some months ago Earl H. Voss, staff writer for *The Sunday Star* of Washington, wrote an article in the January 19, 1958, issue of that newspaper on the possibility of USIA cutting its propaganda broadcasts to "less critical areas" of the world. The article, which smacked of "insider" influence, suggested elimination of the less important language broadcasts to the Soviet Union for reasons of "economy" and also to secure thereby a better concentration of quality broadcasts for the remaining areas. American broadcasting to the Soviet Union today is in Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Uzbek, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian. There are also broadcasts in English, French and German. Mr. Voss' article suggested that the broadcast in the Uzbek language be dropped, inasmuch as it requires all of eight people to turn out a quarter-hour program in the language.

Now, perhaps not many Americans realize the importance of the Uzbek language broadcasts by the free world. And yet the importance of Uzbekistan is so great that we cannot understand how this area could possibly be classified as "less critical" by a U.S. branch of the government. It is precisely in Tashkent, the capital of the Uzbek SSR and the largest city of Central Asia, that the Russians have concentrated lately their extremely powerful propaganda activities. From that Moslem area they are sending out broadcasts in some 90 languages and dialects to the millions of Moslems in Asia and Africa. The Russians, able global strategists, do not consider the Uzbek language as unimportant, nor the Republic of the Uzbeks as a "less critical area" of the world. To delete our Uzbek broadcasts is to let the Russians win again, this time by outright default.

For this is one of the many examples attesting to our blindness and shortcomings in dealing with the communist threat on a global scale. The Russians have been extremely active among the Moslems outside the USSR. Every year Moscow sends hundreds of its Moslem Quislings on the pilgrimage to Mecca, who dutifully spread Russian communist propaganda and the communist gospel of "liberation" of the colonial peoples from Western imperialism. For years the Russians have been operating through the so-called "Soviet Solidarity Committee of Asian Countries," which has proved to be highly successful in the spreading of Russian imperialism and communism throughout Asia and Africa. The absence of any intelligent, hard-hitting American propaganda in those areas is mainly responsible for the success of the Russian propaganda. The local population can thus hardly be expected to understand the aims and objectives of U.S. policy, nor can they appreciate the validity and importance of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Whatever notions they possess about America are provided and shaped by Russian sources, which can always be counted upon to be rabidly anti-American.

NEW SET-UP OF LIAISON

That this vast global movement on the part of Moscow to infiltrate all the areas of the free world is directed and controlled by the Russian center is nobody's secret. On February 27, 1958, after 33 years of existence, the "All-Union Society of Cultural Liaison with Foreign Countries" (VOKS) was dissolved. The agenda of this agency, the Kremlin communique stated, has been taken over by the various national Republics of the USSR through their respective national societies, such as the Russian Society, the Ukrainian society,

the Byelorussian Society, the Uzbek Society, etc. Each of these communist-controlled societies is supposed to be independent and to maintain "cultural relations" individually with foreign countries. But in reality such is not the case.

Izvestia of February 19, 1958, reported that an all-Union conference of "the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Liaison with Foreign Countries" took place in Moscow, at which a new central body was organized. The individual societies from the various national Republics are the usual Russian window-dressing decorations for export; their purpose is to convince the world that the nationality problem has been solved in the same manner as was their political "independence." But in reality VOKS had been replaced by a more subtle body, which has already begun operations by organizing a "Soviet-British Society" (April 8, 1958), a "Soviet-Arab Society" (April 22, 1958) and a "Soviet-Israel Society" (April 19, 1958). These front-cover organizations of the Communist Party of the USSR would certainly be taken in some countries of the West for a *bona fide* expression of a desire to maintain genuine contact with the West. Such, unfortunately, is not the case. What is done is initiated and controlled by Moscow, and this, in most cases, is against the interests of the peoples of the various Soviet Republics.

PROPOSED ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS

Against this backdrop of the varied activities of Moscow for the purpose of subverting and infiltrating the free world, we welcome the idea of calling a world anti-communist congress for freedom and liberation, which has been outlined by the representatives of 65 nations (non-governmental organizations from 65 nations) at the Preparatory Conference, which was held on March 20-25, 1958, in Mexico City, (c.f. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, March 1958). The Congress should convene in October of this year in some country of Europe or the Middle East on the second anniversary of the Hungarian revolution.

We know what Moscow is doing to infiltrate the free world: it has a centrally-organized general staff, unlimited financial, political and diplomatic resources and, above all, a favorable climate created by the West's disunity, apathy and political myopia. While we are rolling out red carpets for such Red butchers as Menshikov and his like, the Mexican Consul of New York, for instance, refused to grant a Mexican visa for Mr. Inmanulah Khan, head of the "World Union of Moslems" in Karachi, Pakistan, when he tried to attend the

Preparatory Conference for the World Anti-Communist Congress for Freedom and Liberation in Mexico City last March.

COURAGE AND PERSISTENCE

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, writing in the Democratic Party platform pamphlet, warned that "we, the American people, are at the beginning of a long line of disillusion, frustration, deep humiliation and alarm. To get through it will take all our courage—but, more than this, all our ingenuity."

And yet, we had been warned long ago by the nature of the enemy we face. Did we not know of the East German uprising in June of 1953? The mass strikes and uprisings of Ukrainian political prisoners in 1954 and 1955 in Vorkuta, Karaganda, Kingir, Mordovia and Taishet? The Polish "bread and freedom" uprisings in Poznan in June of 1956, and finally the bloody Hungarian revolution in October, 1956?

What about the enslaved nations held captive in the Russian communist empire from Berlin to the 38th parallel in Korea? Do they not experience a "frustration and deep humiliation," when they see that their jailers are being invited as honored and civilized leaders to the councils of freedom-loving nations of the West? What must they think of our naïvete, if not our duplicity?

The time is rapidly approaching when Western diplomacy must change from soft murmurs to stern words so that the people of the world—both on our side and behind the Iron Curtain—know that there is a limit beyond which the Russians cannot push in sapping the strength of the West. The free world cannot for long leave the Russians unchallenged and unpunished—else it will atrophy away into oblivion.

Yet, ironically, it is the Russians who have most to fear. Their dynamicism springs not from a conviction they have something to offer. They are forever doomed to leave a bloody trail as they press forward, propagating an unworkable, visionary system as they hide from their prospective victims the enormous vacuity of their system, their way of life, the preposterous fiction that is the Soviet Union. The enslaved peoples, suppressed and smoldering, form the Achilles' heel of this unnatural Colossus. These peoples are our potential allies. Capitalized upon, they would provide the means whereby the world would finally be made safe—whereby the free world would recover from its enervating *malaise*.

THE GOLDEN ERA OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

By EDWARD MARK O'CONNOR

The year 1958 marks the 40th anniversary of two historic events, one of which now threatens the existence of all civilization, while the other holds out good hope for a just and lasting peace for this generation and many generations to come.

All thinking men are aware that 1958 marks the 40th anniversary of the seizure of power in Russia by the Communists. The leaders in the Kremlin have attempted to make certain that their version of this 40th anniversary shall be the only one indelibly marked in the memory of mankind. With the aid of their vast propaganda machine the Russian Communists have flooded the sound waves and occupied many columns of print in the free press with their rewrite of history surrounding the collapse of the Russian Czarist Empire. This carefully prepared propaganda program was launched last October amid grandiose surroundings in Moscow, enjoyed by the new Russian aristocracy and their non-Russian pawns in the dangerous game of power politics.

Leaders of the Communist movement from almost every country of the world gathered in Moscow last October to pay homage and tribute to this new Russian aristocracy. The Russians in turn demonstrated their unusual talents at stage setting for an extravaganza calculated to attract a lot of customers and cause the free world to await developments indicating that, after 40 years, the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat had mellowed and matured to the point of abandoning its goal of world conquest. For this occasion the Russian pro-consuls from Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere journeyed to Moscow, there to be met with pomp and acclaim similar to that accorded the returning victorious Roman legions. After many rounds of feast and festivity the Russian leaders served up a manifesto of solidarity, all neatly prepared and ready for the endorsing signatures of the feted pro-consuls.

But the new Russian aristocracy had not taken into reasonable account the powerful stirrings of nationalism both within and without their present-day empire. The manifesto of solidarity which

they had prepared well in advance of the Moscow festive gathering carried many themes of the superiority of the Russians in the movement of the "world proletariat." This was a theme carried over from the pre-1917-1918 era, when the socialist leaders of Europe would meet and then invariably break up in disagreement over the application of the principle of national self-determination. The Russian Socialists would argue that self-determination was nothing more than a slogan to bedevil the capitalistic states, and in any case could not be applied to any part of the Russian empire. In turn, the non-Russian Socialists generally held that self-determination was the right of all people, that the empires of the world were the root of social injustice, that subjugated nations had the right to self-government and that the people of the subjugated nations would follow the course of socialism only if their national yearnings were respected. During the intervening 40 years, since 1917-1918, some of the non-Russian collaborators in the conspiracy of Communism had wearied of the constant supremacy of the Russians in the affairs of International Communism. Still others objected because they were aware of the handicap this central theme of world Communism had placed upon their activities in the countries of their birth. This state of affairs became evident at the Moscow "homecoming" and caused grave concern to the Kremlin. However, in the end, the manifesto of solidarity which was issued from Moscow carried a softer message of Russian superiority in the conspiracy of communism as well as the rededication of all its adherents to the goal of world conquest.

RE-WRITING OF HISTORY

The latest propaganda initiative taken by the Russians seeks to rewrite the history of events which took place with the collapse of the Russian Czarist Empire. The objective is to erase from history the many inspiring chapters of national independence which occurred during the 1917-1918 era. This task will require a herculean effort but the Kremlin is aware that so long as these chapters remain on the books, even in a dormant form, its drive for the growing political and economic domination of Asia and Africa is seriously threatened. It is in these areas of the world that communist propaganda paints the Russian leaders as "liberators from colonialism and imperialism" and "defenders of the rights of nations to national independence and self-government." It is also in these strategic areas of the world where Russian Communism now engages the cause of human freedom in a life and death struggle,

the outcome of which will likely give either side the necessary balance of power to hold the dominant voice in world affairs. In playing for these high stakes, the Kremlin is compelled to make whatever efforts necessary to prevent the exposure of historical events which would brand Soviet Russia as a colonial power, exploiter of nations and predator upon newly independent nations.

It is against this background that the 40th anniversary of the national independence of Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, North Caucasus, Turkestan, Idel-Ural and Cossackia take on added importance for the leaders of the free world. This year celebrations are taking place in several countries of the free world to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the national independence of these nations. All of these nations have four things in common. All of them regained their national independence with the collapse of the Russian Czarist Empire; all of them in one degree or another incorporated political principles from our Declaration of Independence and Constitution into their own Declaration of Independence or Constitution; all of them suffered the loss of their national independence through subversion and armed aggression by the Russian Communists, and all of them today are held by force within the façade of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the main the various celebrations commemorating the 40th Anniversary of Independence will stress the Russian treachery and aggression which caused them to lose their national independence. This is a timely service to the cause of justice and freedom. It should also serve as a warning to any nation, large or small, whose leaders believe some sort of *modus vivendi* with the Russian Communists is now possible.

However, from the political and information point of view the leaders of the free world are doing little or nothing to exploit this golden opportunity. The information media of the free countries are, with a few exceptions, taking no official notice of these commemorative ceremonies. A curtain of official silence has been thrown up which smothers truth, the most powerful political and psychological weapon in the arsenal of democracy. This curtain of silence may result from ignorance of the facts, or from a misguided belief that the free world in and of itself can reduce world tensions. It may even result from a determination on the part of some opportunists in strategic positions to make a deal with the Russians for another "peace in our times," no matter what the cost may be. In any case, the latest Russian propaganda effort on the 40th anniversary is the only version of history covering the period available to millions of people in all parts of the world. This state of affairs

deprives the politically awakened people of Asia and Africa, where legitimate national independence movements are a prime target of Russian imperialism, of historic truths which they must have if they are going to succeed in winning and consolidating genuine national independence.

U.S. OFFICIAL ARCHIVES REVEAL TRUTH

Ignorance is no excuse for this curtain of silence, at least so far as the United States is concerned. The official archives of our government covering the period 1917-1918 contain all the information necessary to expose the current Russian effort at rewriting history as a colossal fraud. Most of this information has been made public and is readily available to all interested. Of special interest in this connection are three volumes published by the Department of State in 1921 covering the key years of the revolution in the Czarist Russian Empire. These volumes contain dispatches and reports from the American Ambassador to St. Petersburg, and his aides, to the Department in Washington and from the Secretary of State to the Mission. Also included are important documents originating with President Wilson as well as others of British and French origin. The struggles of the non-Russian nations for their national independence are thoroughly recognized though at times misunderstood by the observers who reported on them.

The national independence era which rose up from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Czarist Empire and the Ottoman Empire was ushered in during the closing year of World War I. These empires already weakened by the demand of the subjugated nations for independence could not withstand the internal and external stresses of armed conflict. The signs of collapse began to appear in the early months of 1917. Diplomatic dispatches from Petrograd, seat of the Czarist dynasty, warned of the coming crisis as the long reign of Russian despotism was in its death throes. The American Ambassador in Russia, David R. Francis, in a telegram to Secretary of State Lansing dated March 18, 1917, reported the following:

The six days between last Sunday and this have witnessed the most amazing revolution. A nation of two hundred million people who have lived under absolute monarchy for more than one thousand years and who are now engaged in the greatest war ever waged have forced their Emperor to abdicate for himself and his heir and have induced his brother to whom he transferred the Imperial authority to accept it on condition that a constituent

assembly of the people so request and when so requested to exercise its functions under authority of the government framed by that assembly.¹

A provisional government was then formed which promptly issued an eight point manifesto, the third point of which was abolition of all class, religious and national limitations which had been imposed upon the people by the Czars.

On April 6, 1917, the Congress and the President declared a state of war to exist between the United States and the Imperial German Government. From that date on the United States made every effort to keep the Russian Empire in the war against Germany. In the early stages these efforts were directed at bringing stability to the Provisional Government. This proved to be a hopeless task, as later events proved, because the non-Russian nations of the Empire did not want to maintain the old order of despotism and thus refused active support to the Provisional Government. This task was further compounded by the activities of the Bolsheviks who were set upon a course to destroy all semblance of order at the seat of Imperial power in Petrograd. In the face of these trends the Russian aristocracy and their supporting bureaucracy were impotent because their overriding objective was to preserve the existing order of the Empire. The political sterility of this objective was accurately reported by our Consul General at Moscow, Mr. Summers, in a report to the Secretary of State, as follows:

The state of chaos is complicated by the lack of national patriotism. A Pole cares nothing for Russia. He is before all a Pole and in defense of Poland may and doubtless will do heroic deeds. The same is true with the Finns, the Lithuanians, the Bessarabians, the small (little) Russians, Baltic Province Germans, Jews, Tatars, etc., etc. They are continually pulling against the National Government and fomenting class interests. The same is true to a great degree with the Russians proper. The workmen are not striving to build up a country. They are, first of all, caring for their own interests and in doing so are willing to sacrifice country, honor and all. The same is true with the peasant and other social classes. Russia, as a nation, seems to occupy but little their thoughts.²

The reference to small (little) Russians is a Czarist term for Ukrainians which has fallen into disrepute during the past thirty years with the advance of knowledge concerning the rich and distinctive history, culture, language and national aspirations of the Ukrainian nation.

The Provisional Government headed by Prince Lvov was able to do little more than hold meetings of the cabinet and issue proc-

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia*, Vol. I-II, U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 72

lamations. Crisis after crisis followed which exposed the complete absence of popular support for the restoration of the Monarchy in any form. Finally, the Russian Cadet Party, extremist supporters of a Russian empire, resigned from the Cabinet of the Provisional Government as a consequence of a small degree of recognition being extended to the Ukrainian national liberation movement. American Ambassador Francis reported the following to the Secretary of State on July 16, 1917:

— cause (of the resignation of the Cadet Ministers) attributed is that Minister of War, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs who returned yesterday from Ukraine had granted that province concessions with which Cadet Party unable to agree — ³

The government of Prince Lvov resigned and Alexander Kerensky, a Socialist, assumed the office of Premier on July 20, 1917. The reformed Cabinet of Kerensky was another hodgepodge which lacked popular support of any substantial elements of the tottering Russian empire. There then followed disputes within the reformed Cabinet between the Socialists and non-Socialists over land reform, protection of private property and steps necessary to restore discipline in the imperial army. Within two months a demand was made by Prince Lvov that Kerensky resign as Premier to be replaced by General Kornilov who would then become a military dictator. Kerensky promptly relieved General Kornilov of all authority. In turn Kornilov refused to recognize the removal order and after setting himself up as a military dictator, ordered four divisions of cavalry to capture Petrograd and to arrest the members of the Kerensky Provisional Government as agents of the German General Staff.⁴

The Kornilov effort failed, and Kerensky's Provisional Government changed its name, by the simple but overworked act of proclamation, to that of a Republic. Kerensky designated himself as President and Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks were consolidating their control over the Petrograd Council of Workmen-Soldiers, with the establishment of Leon Trotsky as President. There then followed a brief scuffle of words between the Council of the Republic and the Petrograd Soviet, with neither side enjoying any real popular support and being dependent upon small factions at the seat of imperial power. On November 7, 1917, this battle of words was brought to an end at a special meeting of the Petrograd Soviet. Trotsky then made a declaration that the "Provisional Government no longer exists."⁵

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 648

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 187

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 225

After some fightings in the streets the Bolsheviks took possession of the Winter Palace, arresting all of the Ministers of the Provisional Government except Kerensky who had fled the scene of battle. From that date onward the Bolsheviks moved step by step to consolidate their hold upon the seat of the former Imperial Government and the entire Russian nation.

RISE OF THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS

This was not the case, however, in the non-Russian nations of the broken empire. There were other political movements taking place in these nations as the people were throwing off the chains of Russian colonialism and establishing their national independence. The American Ambassador to Great Britain, Walter H. Page as early as December 12, 1917, reported to the Secretary of State as follows:

Mr. Balfour informs me that his government will not recognize the Lenin so-called government, certainly not until it can show some sort of authority from the people. There are, moreover, at present other difficulties in the way of recognition; the Ukraine, the Cossacks and other people in different parts of the Russian Empire, may possibly show opposition to Lenin and his program dealing with Germany. If these should remain anti-German they would deserve help if it could be given to them.⁶

This opinion was supported by a summary report sent to the Secretary of State on December 15, 1917, by the Consul General at Moscow Maddin Summers. In this dispatch Summers gave extensive coverage to the struggle of the Cossacks against the Bolsheviks and in reporting the Cossacks were gaining the upper hand added the following:

The Maximalists (Bolsheviks) are, however, drawing reinforcements from Moscow, Kharkov and elsewhere. They are trying to get support from Odessa but the Ukrainians do not seem disposed to permit the passage of troops through territory they control.⁷

At another point in this same dispatch Summers reported these two significant developments:

1. The Ukrainists, according to this Rostov information, are bent on independence and are more disposed to lean upon Austria-Hungary than any Russian party.⁸

2. Events have also been ripening at Kiev recently. All the Maximalist (Bolshevik) military formations there were disarmed on December 12. The aviation park offered resistance and there was some bloodshed. The pontoon

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 299

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 310

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 312

battalion, the reserve mountain battery and the heavy artillery, parked across the Dnieper, offered no resistance.. The Ukrainists captured quantities of guns and ammunition. The Ukrainists also arrested eight Maximalist leaders, who were trying to organize an attack on the Ukrainian Government. From last accounts the Ukrainists seem to have liquidated the Maximalist organization in their capitol.⁹

The Bolsheviks became concerned at an early stage with the opposition to their schemes posed by the national independence movements, particularly that in Ukraine. On December 16th Trotsky made a complaint to the French Ambassador to Petrograd concerning the presence of French officers with the Ukrainian Army. Trotsky construed this as "openly supporting counter-revolutionary machinations of Kaledin and disorganizing Russia."¹⁰ This puts the Bolsheviks on record at an early date during the revolution as sharing a common objective with the Russian Monarchists, that of holding the empire intact at all costs and intractable enemies of all national independence movements. The French Ambassador in his reply took the position that the presence of French officers with the Ukrainian national army "is explained by the invitation frequently expressed by various Russian governments to supervise the formation of the national Ukrainian army."¹¹

Events on the international political and diplomatic fronts then moved swiftly. On January 7, 1918, the French Ambassador to Washington, Mr. Jusserand, notified the Secretary of State as follows:

In informing me that it is maintaining with the secretary of the *Rada* of the Ukraine *de facto* relations further accentuated by the recent appointment of General Tabouis as Commissioner of the French Republic to that country, my government adds that the turn of events in Russia and the reports it has received about Austro-Hungarian activities at Kiev led it to the conclusion that it could not defer any longer taking a more clearly defined attitude toward the Ukraine.

General Tabouis is therefore to be instructed to notify the Ukrainian government that the French government is glad actually to recognize it as an independent government.

I have been directed and hereby have the honor to communicate the foregoing to Your Excellency and to inquire whether the United States government would be inclined to take a similar step with the Ukrainian government.¹²

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 312

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 652

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 653

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 655

U.S. PONDERING RECOGNITION OF UKRAINE

American Ambassador Francis reported to the Secretary of State from Petrograd the following on January 9, 1918:

Beginning to think separate peace improbable perhaps impossible and inclined to recommend simultaneous recognition of Finland, Ukraine, Siberia, perhaps Don Cossack Province and Soviet *de facto* government of Petrograd, Moscow and vicinity. Understand another government organizing at Archangel and compromising territory equal to England, France and Germany combined.¹³

On January 11, acting Secretary of State Polk answered the diplomatic note presented by French Ambassador Jusserand as follows:

In reply I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that this government is giving careful consideration to the whole situation, but as yet has reached no determination as to acknowledging separate governments in Russia.¹⁴

The American Consul General at Moscow, Mr. Summers, again reported extensively on developments in Ukraine to Ambassador Francis in Petrograd on January 14, pointing out that the Ukrainian nationalists were desperately attempting to form an army to fight off the Bolsheviks and that there were already 35,000 regularly organized Ukrainian volunteers in Kiev. In his report he concluded that "The soldiers of Ukraine origin probably have more discipline and better fighting qualities than the average of the Russian armies taken as a whole."¹⁵

The Bolsheviks had in the meantime entered into secret negotiations with the Central Powers. Trotsky, as the leader of this move, had given strong indication in public speeches that the Bolsheviks would seek a separate peace with Germany. This was a hard blow to the war time strategy of the United States since our primary objective on the Eastern front had been to keep Russia an active participant in the war against Germany. During this period reports emanating from Petrograd and Moscow, many attributed to supporters of the Russian Empire, began to picture the national independence movement in Ukraine as a creation of German-Austrian intrigue. This followed the pattern already established by Russian misinformation of branding all movements which did not support a Russian Empire as tools of the Central Powers. This together with the general chaos which prevailed, the difficulties of travel and lack of communications, created a serious shortage of knowledge concerning the true nature of the aspirations of the non-

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 336

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 655

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 347

Russian nations of the empire. In the end these circumstances proved to be a fatal blow to the efforts of the Ukrainians and other subjugated people who were fighting for their national independence.

UKRAINIANS STRIVE FOR RECOGNITION BY THE *Entente*

The Ukrainian leaders attempted to establish direct contact with and recognition by the nations associated in the *Entente*. One example of this activity is demonstrated by the visit of Mr. Halip, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic who called on our Ambassador to France in Paris on January 22, 1918. In this conference Halip espoused the cause of an independent Ukrainian nation and proposed the following:

1. Recognition of the independence of Ukraine by the great powers of the *Entente* and the nomination of the Allied diplomatic representatives in Kiev.
2. Financial support to the Ukrainian government.
3. Facilities on the part of the *Entente* for supplying the Ukraine with manufacturing products.¹⁶

In turn American Ambassador Sharp stated that Ukraine must not be party to a separate peace with Germany or enter into any degrading relations with the Central Powers. He also called for the Ukrainians to organize an army with the assistance of an Allied Military Mission to keep order in the country and to resist attack from outside; that Ukraine enter into relations with other autonomous states in Russia so as to present a solid front to the Central Powers. Halip pointed out that Ukraine was busy recruiting volunteers to maintain order in the country "as well as for fighting against the Bolsheviks and incidentally for guaranteeing independence of the country against foreigners."¹⁷ As to continuing the war against Germany Halip warned "That having no army she (Ukraine) is unable to continue the war and that as regards the Brest Litovsk conference, the desire for peace is so widespread among the Ukrainian population that the Government of the *Rada* would be unable to withstand this current, especially if the Bolsheviks manage to conclude peace with the Austro-Germans."¹⁸

On January 26, the Ukrainian delegation at Paris informed American Ambassador Sharp of the following events:

The Ukrainian delegates at Brest Litovsk have received full powers to negotiate peace with the Central Powers. The latter are insisting especially on the resumption of economic relations. They ask to exchange their manufactured

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 661

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 661

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 660

products against provisions from the Ukraine. The government of Kiev not disposing of an army, and being obliged to employ its feeble police forces against the Maximalists (Bolsheviks), cannot resist the pressure of the Germanic powers. According to Mr. Galip the Ukraine, even after conclusion of peace, will endeavor to safeguard its future, to maintain good relations with the Allied powers, to organize itself with their help and to limit to the inevitable minimum the amount of provisions sent to our enemies."¹⁹

The sincerity of these pledges is attested to by events which followed. Consul General Summers at Moscow reported to the Secretary of State on May 1, 1918, the following:

In Ukraine Central Powers experiencing greatest difficulty forcing peasants to sell grain, and serious uprisings reported many places.²⁰

While the Bolsheviks were organizing an army and establishing their regime in Petrograd and Moscow they were also carrying on secret negotiations with the Germans. Meanwhile the Allies, particularly the United States, were continuing their effort at keeping the Russian Empire in the war against the Central Powers. Extreme efforts were made to keep open a supply line on the Trans-Siberian Railway from Vladivostok to Central Russia. The appeals for support of the non-Russians who were fighting for their national independence thus fell upon preoccupied and unsympathetic ears. Any movement which did not conform to the preconceived notion of preserving the Russian Empire was forthwith branded as a tool of the Austro-German intrigue.

DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE

In this connection, an interesting series of events took place in Ukraine which point up the basic weakness in the strategy of the United States. The Russian Bolsheviks invaded Ukraine during January 1918 with the purpose of destroying the independent government of Ukraine. This occurred at a time, according to our plans, when the Russians were supposed to be fighting the Germans on the approaches to Petrograd and Moscow. With the main forces of the regrouped Russian Imperial Army at their command the Bolsheviks captured Kiev, the capital city of Ukraine, and forthwith launched a campaign of mass terror. In Kiev atrocities were widespread as reported by Mr. Jenkins, American Consul General at Kiev on March 1, 1918:

For the first two days of Bolshevik occupation there were hundreds of executions, or more properly speaking, murders. It is estimated that 300 or

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 663

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 515

400 officers were shot down on the streets or taken to a park near the former residence of the governor, where they were killed.²¹

The Ukrainian volunteers then regrouped their forces and attempted to liberate their homeland from the Russian Bolsheviks. Failing recognition and assistance from the Allies they then turned to the Austro-Germans for military cooperation in this task. This point is verified in a dispatch from Ambassador Francis to the Secretary of State on May 20, 1918, which is as follows:

At the same time I learn from reliable sources that Mirbach is courting Kadets and anti-Bolsheviks and proposing course similar to that followed in Ukraine when anti-Bolshevik government was established by German force although composed of patriotic Russians who preferred Allied assistance to German but despairing of former they embraced the latter.²²

Here again the Ukrainian nationalists are described as "patriotic Russians," an indication of our ignorance of the contending forces at work within the broken Russian empire. The Ukrainian volunteers were joined by small elements of the Austro-German Army as they drove the Bolsheviks off Ukrainian territory. American Ambassador to France, Mr. Sharp, reported on April 4, 1918:

Except at Kherson, where a German detachment is said to have been massacred, the Austro-Germans are welcomed as deliverers in all towns. In the country districts where they seize all the food supplies they meet with some difficulties as the peasants who are disbanded soldiers are massacring with their arms isolated parties. Nevertheless the Austro-Germans are continuing to obtain immense results with practically no effort, their troops being far from numerous and composed of elements of the most inferior order.²³

This was followed by a report from Ambassador Sharp on April 16, 1918:

... there is a rumor that the Austro-Germans intend to dissolve the *Rada* at Kiev and install a German government.²⁴

Gen. Eichhorn, German Commander-in-chief in Ukraine, issued an order the effect of which would prevent the distribution of landed estates among the peasants although guaranteeing to the peasants a fair return for their labors. The Ukrainian Agricultural Minister regarded this decree as intolerable and resigned. The *Rada* then adopted a resolution which read in part as follows:

... German troops were called by Ukrainian troops for purpose of helping them in restoring order within such limits and in such direction only as decided by the Ukrainian People's Republic, that no arbitrary interference on part of

²¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 675

²² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 536

²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 678

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 679

German and Austro-Hungarian military commanders (in) social-political life of Ukraine will be tolerated . . .²⁵

The *Rada* government fell and Pavlo Skoropadsky became *Hetman* of Ukraine, a historic title of chief of state. General Eichhorn then took steps to prevent the German military from interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine, and the United States Minister to the Netherlands, Mr. Garrett, reported on May 5, 1918:

After that the new government was called into existence by Ukrainians themselves and will not recognize Communistic theories of property.²⁵

However the opinion still existed among American diplomats stationed in Russia that the Ukrainian independence movement was nothing more than a creation of German propaganda. An American Consul at Moscow, Mr. Poole, commenting on the formation of the new government had this to report:

First, it suggests that the Germans, having made use so far of the fiction of a Ukrainian nationality, may henceforth support a movement for the reconstruction of Russia through amalgamation of Great Russia with the Ukraine under government similar to that now seated at Kiev, which is strictly non-socialist and subservient to Germany.²⁶

The new Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. P. Vasilenko, in a speech reported by Mr. Poole on May 22, 1918, exposed this estimate as false in these words:

In the Ukraine we see a healthy national feeling and the strength of the Ukraine is in this. We know that the entire Slavonic revival was built upon the national principle . . . The facts upon which I base my stand, for the good of the Ukraine, the establishment of its strength and power, the development of its capacity for defense in the future, for these I intend giving all my strength.²⁷

Vasilenko based his program for the future of an independent Ukraine on close contact with the German military. In this he received some opposition from those Ukrainians who were not convinced that Germany would permit an independent Ukraine. However, no other course was open to the leaders of the Ukrainian independence movement because they were threatened by another Russian Bolshevik invasion and the Allies failed to respond to Ukrainian appeals for assistance.

UKRAINIANS APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON

The general situation on the Eastern front went from bad to worse. The so-called White Russians under General Denikin while

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 680

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 682

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 687

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 689

being opposed to the Bolsheviks were bent upon reconstructing the Russian Empire. The German armies in turn were desperately in need of food which they attempted to extract from Ukraine. When the Ukrainian peasants refused to cooperate with the Germans this resulted in a substantial increase of German troops in Ukraine. The American Charge' in Sweden, Mr. Whitehouse, reported an interesting piece of intelligence on the situation which he recieved from a Rumanian engineer who had recently arrived from Kharkiv:

Germans will not succeed in securing food or in organizing Ukrainians into divisions for fighting in West.²⁸

On October 15, 1918 the Ukrainian National Council sent the following message to President Wilson through the American Minister in Switzerland, Mr. Stovall:

Ukrainian National Council just founded in Switzerland of representatives of almost all political parties of Ukraine for the defense of Ukrainian national and democratic cause abroad formulates its best wishes to you, Mr. President. It places itself entirely on the basis of your program in which it sees the best guarantee for the continued free existence of the independnt Ukrainian state. We are sure that the entire Ukrainian people is at one with us in placing its entire confidence in your defense of our independence before our enemies. Ukraine does not wish to encroach upon the rights of other people. Her only wish is that all the territories populated by our race, including Eastern Galicia and Bukovina now oppressed by the Austrians, be reunited under a free and independent government entering as a member into the society of nations.²⁹

Hetman Skoropadsky issued a proclamation on November 23, 1918, calling for all Ukrainians to unite for the reconstitution of Russia upon a federal basis.³⁰ Soon thereafter his government fell because it acted contrary to the wishes of the Ukrainian people. On December 16, 1918, the American Minister to Sweden, Mr. Morris, reported the following:

Reports from Berlin: Kiev besieged by troops of Ukrainian National League which captured all Ukraine. Political situation very favorable to this league.³¹

Simon Petlura, the field leader of this movement, was at first depicted by our intelligence sources as the leader of the Bolsheviks. This misinformation was corrected on December 21, 1918, in a report from the American Minister in Rumania, Mr. Vopicka, as follows:

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 697

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 697

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 700

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 703

. . . this morning a committee of Ukrainians, representing public organizations which are most influential, called on me and stated that Petlura does not lead the Bolshevik army as is reported, but the republican army, which is fighting for the independence of Ukraine against *Hetman* Skoropadsky, who favors the federation system for Russia.³²

ALLIED CONFUSION HELPED BOLSHEVISM

The general confusion which prevailed together with the basic Allied objective of keeping the Russian Empire together proved to be circumstances of great benefit to the Bolsheviks. The extent to which some of the Allied powers were prepared to go in support of this objective is underscored by the following report from Ambassador Francis on October 20, 1918; reporting on a conference with Russian Minister of Finance, Tereshchenko, he added:

He gives me first information about the formation in London of a Russo-British organization with a capital of 300,000,000 (pounds) for exploitation of Northern Russia, especially Pechora district, and colonizing same with Irish. Buchanan, former British Ambassador, Russia, vice chairman. Tereshchenko objects to scheme as I do.³³

It will be recalled that at this same period in history the Irish people were fighting for their national independence from the British Empire.

It would appear from this that some elements in the British government were prepared to save their own empire and that of the Russians at the expense of the Irish patriots who, most likely would be the "colonizers" sent to Northern Russia.

The events which followed in rapid succession witnessed the collapse of the war on the Eastern front. The national independence movements in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, the North Caucasus, Turkestan and Cossackia were eventually destroyed by the Russian Bolsheviks. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were destroyed. The reconstituted Russian Empire rose up in the form of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since then the British Empire, the French Empire and the Dutch Empire have passed into oblivion. Only the Russian Empire remains, vastly expanded and still pursuing the age-long dream of world conquest. This unhappy state of affairs should bring into sharp focus the political sterility which attaches to any national policy towards the Russians which fails to support the age-long struggles of the non-Russian nations of the Russian Empire for freedom and national

³² *Ibid.*, p. 705

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 561

independence. It should also serve as an object lesson to the newly independent nations of the world and to the leaders of the national independence movements in the colonial and dependent areas of the free world, who have taken a position of neutralism in the world political arena or who look to the Kremlin as a disinterested benefactor. There remains an urgent need to dramatize for all the people of the world the golden era of national independence during and following World War I and the role of the Russian imperialists in putting out the lamp of freedom and independence in all the many countries they now occupy. This is the only logical response we can make, in our own self-interest, to the latest propaganda effort of the Russians to rewrite history.

THE INESCAPABLE LIBERATION POLICY

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

In this decade the American people have been exposed to a rapid succession of concepts dealing with our foreign affairs. The verbal parade has included "containment," "liberation," "peaceful liberation," "massive retaliation," "peaceful coexistence," "the Geneva spirit," "competitive coexistence," "deterrence," "evolution," and "disengagement." What the morrow will bring in verbal novelty is anyone's guess. Similar to the annual dress fashion shows, old ideas seem to require new terms. Perhaps the title of this article should be in terms of a new policy of "expansive freedom" or something of like nature. But whatever the verbal dress, the structure of ideas would be the same. This holds true for the other so-called new concepts.

We Americans generally do not go in for rigorous conceptual analyses. The reasons for this condition are many. However, this very succession of conceptual constructs indicates that there is much confusion of thought and an inability to draw logically proper distinctions. Beyond containment and liberation the other concepts are essentially reducible to the one or the other. Careful reflection will show that the issue still is fundamentally between the continuance of containment or the projection of liberation. Yet it is amazing how few understand this. The apparent reason for this is that too many individuals don't seem to grasp the basic meaning of liberation and what it entails. To this writer the liberation policy is logical, sensible, and—assuming that we have the will to survive as an independent nation—inescapable. It is really the only alternative to either co-destruction or peaceful surrender. Call it what you will, the ideas incorporated in it are nevertheless distinguishing.

Let us begin with the concrete question: "What are the prospects of liberation for the captive countries not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Communist empire as a whole?" My answer to this question is in the affirmative: that the opportunities, the prospects are bright; that there are many opportunities for us if we have the knowledge, the understanding, the will, the courage,

and the determination to plan for them and to seize them. Cast in the simplest possible terms, this article will attempt to conclusively justify this answer. One section will deal with the logic and reason of the liberation policy. The second section will briefly develop the history of liberation thought. And the third section will consider some concrete measures of implementation.

THE LOGIC AND REASON OF LIBERATION

Let us look first at the logic and reason of liberation. One may formulate it into some sort of syllogism. The first proposition is this: We are in a cold war with a Messianic enemy—a Messianic, dedicated, determined Russian Communist enemy. The second proposition is that war, whether cold or hot, is a situation which poses the question of victory or defeat. Then the third proposition is that as a nation, it is necessary for us, in fact we cannot but logically seek, to defeat the enemy, which also means political defeat, the political and decisive defeat of the Russian Communist enemy.

Just consider the first proposition. It really requires little elaboration. We read of it in the papers and hear it over the radio, time and time again. Individuals talk about the cold war and winning this cold war. So there is at least verbally a recognition of the fact that we are in a cold war. To support this particular proposition, it is obviously unnecessary to provide all the overwhelming evidence that easily substantiates it.

Let us take the second and third propositions. The second is that war, whether hot or cold, is something that poses victory or defeat. Being primarily concerned here with the cold war, there should be no question that victory is possible and achievable. And the third is that for survival as a nation we must logically seek victory or be ready to surrender even in a state of ignoble compromise to the enemy.

Now this third proposition certainly cannot be supported by present empirical evidence as such. Its support rests, instead, in common sense, in the ideals of freedom, and in our dedication to these ideals. Unfortunately, here in the United States we have to some extent lost that sense of patriotism. To be sure, it is explicable on numerous grounds. One need only recall that during the 30's many a professor referred to the flag as a colorful symbolic rag. This kind of negativism still manifests itself in the writings and addresses of many different individuals. Nevertheless, this dedication is one of the very springs of our American democracy, going back

to the Declaration of Independence and to our Constitution. It takes these documents seriously and inspires us to uphold the ideals of freedom. Still, much of this has been sapped and, as a consequence, we have anything within the range of the irrational excesses of a Kennan over to the insular Fortress America concept.

Knowing that this is war, albeit a cold war, if we are not dedicated to the defeat of the enemy, then it obviously follows that we are ready to compromise morally and politically. It is a compromise in the sense that we are willing to accept the *status quo* of slavery in a substantial part of the world. And as we develop that predication position, we shall continue to compromise more and more. In the process we cannot but expose ourselves to perhaps ultimate defeat.

With our present position, really one that has been maintained since World War II, it seems that time clearly favors Moscow. In completing this logic of the liberation concept, let me point out that there are five factors which should be soberly considered. They constitute, in a sense, certain irreducible general abstracts.

The first factor is adequacy of arms. It can be firmly argued that it isn't necessary for Moscow to have a clear-cut superiority in all arms. For its purposes in the future, a sufficient adequacy of arms to achieve its ends is enough. At the beginning of this decade we hid behind the fact that we had a distinct superiority in arms. We spoke effusively of physical deterrence, the great deterrence against the Russian Communist wave of the future. It plainly was a fact that we had overwhelming material and physical superiority. Now, however, since the *sputniks*, since the ICBM, etc., we have begun to doubt this. As a consequence, one could maintain that there is a relative decline in this power of physical deterrence. This also means that there will inevitably be, in the continuing arms race, Russian Communist superiority in many lines.

Take now the second factor in this calculus, also an asset in Moscow's position. By maintaining our present position we, in effect, guarantee to the Russians the steady consolidation of their empire. In other words, by maintaining the narrow policy of containment we in effect say, "let history do it," "don't make any delicate decisions." "Let us see pragmatically—day by day, expediently—how things will work out and let's shift accordingly: by all means, no long-range plans, no fixed and set objectives." "We mustn't appear inflexible!" In that case, then, we have unmistakably declared ourself. We will do nothing, nothing of serious import to disturb the consolidating processes within this vast Russian Communist

empire. As a result, we guarantee to them the consolidation of their empire so that they may become stronger and stronger.

A third point is the international conspiracy. We mustn't overlook this fact despite the political offensive fanning the pretensions of peace on the part of Moscow. The undercurrent of international conspiracy continues. Moscow persistently plans for sabotage when the appropriate time arrives. Without hazard one can postulate the thought that they far surpass us in this conspiratorial preparation. Widening of the network of subversion, conspiracy, and sabotage, which is a third asset, is a Russian stock in trade either in times of so-called peace or in times of war.

Now a fourth asset is the highly concentrated and very persistent political propaganda waged by Moscow. Historically, this has always been, and always will be so long as we have this kind of institutional set-up in the Soviet Union. In this atypical case it is a faucet-like propaganda which many oftentimes overlook. Only two years ago there was a great political offensive for peace. Immediately thereafter Moscow prostituted everything that was said and done at Geneva. Now we are plunged again in another phase of summit fever. The same Moscow initiative is seen in the changing of directions. As under the Czars, sometimes it is political concentration in the East, other times in the West, then in the South. Without question, they will continue to use these traditional techniques. And again, as a result, Moscow will continue to breed confusion and debate and to sow the seeds of disunity in the United States and the Free World.

A recent example of Russian propaganda flexibility even within their own empire deserves mention. This is about a truly *Krokodil* position in Ukraine. Issued in November right after *sputnik*, this *Krokodil* number aims to impress upon the people of Ukraine the world-wide superiority of Moscow. The periodical tries to persuade the captive Ukrainian people that they are really associated with the leaders of the future.

The fifth factor is the real advantage of the first shot which we also guarantee to Moscow. For various reasons we can't contemplate any sufficient action in terms of a preventive war. As a result, they are in a position to develop their arms and also to seize the real possibility of firing the first shot. The power of blackmail looms large here. Thus, when one considers these five factors, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that there are two real frightening possibilities. One, it is patently within the realm of real possibility for the United States to suffer military defeat, given a peculiar complex of events and situations. But in my estimation the more important

is the second. There is also the real possibility of the United States becoming in time psychologically isolated, and this, too, would mean disastrous defeat.

Obviously, no rational person would hold that a football team could possibly realize victory by constantly playing on its own side of the fifty-yard line. This is precisely what the United States and Free World are doing. We are playing on this side of the fifty-yard line. Indeed, here is the crucial differentiating point between a policy of containment and a policy of liberation. Under the former, all the tensions are on this side of the Iron Curtain fence. In Africa, in Asia, in Europe and here tensions are being created or aggravated, and we are led to disperse ourselves, tending to this tension today, that one tomorrow, and so on. In the meantime, as a functional correlate to our second factor above, we also guarantee that there will be no creation of disturbances or tensions within the Communist empire.

A BACKGROUND OF LIBERATION THOUGHT

Setting this crucial political distinction aside from certain moral and psychological distinctions that could also be drawn upon, we ought now to look at the background of liberation thought. In doing so, keep in mind that its main differentiating aspect is that it prepares us to carry the political offensive to the terrain of the enemy. Remember, too, that this is a cold war; that we are dedicated to freedom; and that, as a consequence, we wish to realize victory decisively by defeating the enemy.

Indeed, there is a background of thought on the liberation policy. No one can say—as do some editorial writers and people on TV and radio—that there is little, if anything, we can do about our relations to the Communist Empire. On the contrary, there is a great deal of literature showing what can be done. What can be done is essentially determined by our awareness of the opportunities existing within the Russian Communist Empire. Actually, such questions of skepticism and doubt usually reflect one's unfamiliarity with or ignorance of the facts, more than being the result of any painstaking absorption in the outstanding literature. Again, is there any accessible body of literature on this whole liberation matter? First, let me cite the passage of the Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act in August of 1951. This was the first concrete measure designed to produce our political offensive about seven years ago—or five years before Hungary!

Briefly, what is the Kersten Amendment? It means simply three things. Remember, it was during this time that many escapees were coming through the Iron Curtain. There was a great opportunity to have many more. Thus the first provision of the Kersten Amendment was and is to attract escapees from behind the Iron Curtain. The second is to quickly rehabilitate these escapees and to form them into military units. In the Amendment, the aim is to have, for example, several thousand Poles from behind the Iron Curtain, even those in England, Germany, Italy, Lebanon and elsewhere, forming military national battalions with their own commanders, their own insignia, own flag; in other words, constituting in Western Europe, or Turkey, or elsewhere, the brilliant symbol of Polish freedom and liberty. The same is to be applied to Russian, Ukrainian, Slovak, and numerous other national units.

Not only are there to be these national military units, but the Amendment's third provision also calls for the support of the existing undergrounds. There were and are a number of them. In Slovakia, Ukraine, Poland and elsewhere political undergrounds have existed. The Amendment seeks to employ them as the means of conveying our political offensive.

In many quarters the Kersten Amendment received very serious consideration. Significantly, when the United Nations Assembly convened in Paris in December 1951, right down to the end of that Assembly at the end of January, about three-quarters of the sessions was devoted to the Kersten Amendment. By this Amendment Mr. Kersten himself was able to strike a highly sensitive note in Moscow. They were extremely sensitive to it. Mr. Vishinsky attacked it incessantly in Paris. And Mr. Truman found it necessary at the time to send Congressman Mansfield in order to explain that we had no intention of really interfering, mind you, in these captive nations.

There were some official and private criticisms of the Amendment, to be sure. However, none of them stood up to the logical test and the general consensus was clearly in favor of the Amendment's implementation. Why it has not been implemented is still a deep mystery. The Kersten idea continued, and there is much more to it. It was significant that at the beginning of 1957, immediately after the Hungarian crisis, Senator Russell revived the idea and thought that the Armed Services Committee would sponsor it.

Now a second item in this background emerged before the Dulles liberation article appeared in *Life Magazine* in May 1952. In the Republican National Committee, as early as 1951, preparations were being made to advance the whole concept and idea of national liberation. During the Republican convention and the subsequent

campaign this whole idea was presented to the country. One significant incident should be cited. It took place at the beginning of October in New York when Mr. Harriman met with Mr. Dulles on a TV show. Probably well primed by the Democratic National Committee, Harriman challenged Dulles or any Republican to show where or when Mr. Acheson or Mr. Truman ever used the term "containment." This meant that by that time even the Democratic Party was disowning the very thought, or at least the wording of the policy of containment.

In 1956 the same thing was repeated. Witness this statement by President Eisenhower, "the peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, and will continue to be a goal of United States foreign policy." And again much material and several hundreds of thousands of pamphlets were circulated throughout the country. In a more formal way Professor James Burnham systematically gave expression to this policy of liberation in his work on *Containment or Liberation?* In a sense you can say his work is the liberationist's "Bible." In May 1955 General Sarnoff felt that it was necessary to convince many in this country of the urgency of the Russian threat and presented a memorandum to President Eisenhower in which he likewise gives detailed expression to the liberation policy. In 1956 Senator Douglas of Illinois took steps in the Senate to propose a Freedom Administration on the basis of a two-level concept. Moscow operates on two levels, the Communist Party with its subversive network and the conventional diplomatic level. Why can't we have a Freedom Administration, subverting, if you will, for freedom, with the other parts of Government remaining on the conventional level? This constitutes, in brief, the background of liberationist thought.

The logic of liberation teaches that the best way to prevent a hot war is to win a cold war. We hear of peaceful coexistence; we hear of Allen Dulles' naive notion of evolution. These are verbal variants of containment. Let it be emphasized that the liberation policy does not theoretically reject the concept of containment. On the contrary, it is necessarily founded on containment. Certainly we have to contain the forces of Russian expansion, but we also have to go beyond this in creating pressures and tensions behind the Iron Curtain and throughout the Russian Communist Empire. Our situation is as simple as this.

FLEXIBLE LINES OF IMPLEMENTATION

If we can indicate the flexible lines of implementation of the liberation policy, briefly show what could be done, perhaps the

perennial question as to our ability to do something will in some degree be answered. First, by all means we should appreciate the nature of the enemy confronting us. This timely picture more than justifies the old, patriotic Chinese proverb that one picture is worth ten thousand words. In the middle you have a typically squat five by five Russian master, characteristically gripping his holster. This was taken in a street in Hungary during the '56 revolution. It vividly typifies the enemy before us. What can we do? This question has been raised time and time again. In itself it indicates that we have not been acquainted with the growing literature on liberation to see what could possibly be done. Certain concrete measures of action have been advocated for years.



"... one picture is worth ten thousand words ..."

The first thing necessary is a general, comprehensive national policy. What do we want? What are our objectives? They have to be clearly stated and realistically well founded. Many have submitted that liberation, independence, and federation is the policy formula. A universalized Declaration of Independence would strongly reflect the general objectives of the United States in consonance with its institutions and its long-run national security interests.

The second urgent step is the creation of a Freedom Administration. This is what Senator Douglas has proposed, an Administra-

tion that would exemplify the two-level concept. As you will note on the appending chart, the Administration would not be affiliated with any existing power of the government. However, it would be directly under the supervision and direction of the President. It could use counterpart funds, the \$100 million appropriated in the Kersten Amendment, and other sources. National freedom committees here and abroad would be in its network.

Furthermore, we must have guideposts of action. If we take the cold war seriously, the first of these is a moral commitment to all of the captive nations. Such a commitment means the certainty of liberation for all captive nations, including those in the USSR. Fundamentally crucial to all of our present issues and problems is Eastern Europe. This is so because there is the very basis of the strength and power of the enemy. Instead of neglecting this basic area by being absorbed in what goes on in the fringe areas of Indonesia and parts of Asia and Africa, we should begin to concentrate on the enemy, find his weak spots, and begin to magnify and deepen these weak spots. As shown on this map, this can only mean the liberation and independence of all the captive non-Russian nations, both within and outside the USSR.

Our problem is in a real sense their problem for the basic reason that they have already been conquered. They are submerged as nations. This is, after all, our primary concern. We naturally fear



being submerged as a nation. To prevent this tragedy, surely, should be the overriding passion of every American.

With regard to the Russian masses, for them it is not a matter of conserving and preserving their national unity. There hasn't been on record any genocide against the Russian nation. It hasn't been, as a national unit, submerged. Moscow is the capital of Russia, and the problem there is, and has for a long time been, one of liberation in terms of civil and personal political freedoms. We have to keep alive throughout the Communist empire the spirit of resistance, the hope of freedom, and the fiery spirit of nationalism. Also, we should have no qualms whatsoever about hailing Freedom as the wave of the future, instead of permitting colonial and imperialist Russian Communism to assume this role. In pursuing all this, we would have to sharpen by every device Moscow's fear of its own captives. This is another salient point in the policy of liberation. One of the greatest deterrents against a hot war is Moscow's own fear of its captive millions. And this is what we should support, broaden and magnify.

Let us view now some examples of specific operations. For reasons of space the list has to be restricted at least alphabetically, going from "A" to "Z". The first was already mentioned—a full implementation of the Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act. Second, moral and material aid to opposition and resistance groups behind the Iron Curtain. We talk a great deal about giving them time to develop. Yet when Kersten presented a rough draft of what could be done in carrying on a political offensive, his opponents cried out, "Ah, but you can't do it." They preclude the possibility of a *guided* evolution in the unfolding of our liberation policy. If you will note the various other operations which can be effected. Passive resistance, for instance, has been found to be very effective in many areas, especially in several closed non-Russian areas within the USSR. Progressive infiltration of the armed forces of the USSR, particularly into its 43 per cent non-Russian composition, has always borne great potentiality. One of the most glaring misconceptions is to equate the nature of these forces with that of the United States or any other true national entity.

During the Hungarian Revolution, it was quite significant that several hundreds of officers and men deserted the USSR Army. Testifying before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, one of the first Hungarian revolutionaries to appear in this country took pains to point out that these deserters were not Russians. They were Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and other non-Russians who deserted and joined the Hungarian freedom-fighters.

With regard to mass communication, mobile broadcasting facilities about the Communist empire and special messages to respective nations and people will have to take prudent account of each targeted area. Aiding in this endeavor would be a Voice of America for Liberation, Independence and Justice. Mass production achievements of various sorts, light-weight receivers, hand-operated photographic devices, literally millions of such instruments can be funneled into the empire.

Then there is the use of the facilities of friendly countries. One can be certain that not one of them would hesitate to aid us in this type of political offensive. Impressed by positive American leadership, the free Chinese, Koreans, Pakistani, Turks and others would collaborate. This would have to be a sustained day-to-day offensive; not a thing to be won one day and then forgotten about until a week or a month later, but rather a persistent campaign against the enemy. And it can be used in vast, multiple ways.

Now, certainly, at this given time it would be unfeasible to embark upon one or two of these proposals. In the present climate it would be better to concentrate on a diplomatic political offensive and on economic warfare. With a change in climate new activity would be initiated with adequate preparation for follow-ups, such as the dislodgement of Albania from the empire. With changes in climate and organized, dedicated effort, there are many things that could be done, and with maximum flexibility and initiative. The main thing to bear in mind is that by just sitting and maintaining a policy of mere containment, we are allowing the enemy to build himself up militarily, psychologically, politically. It has been truly said that we can freeze to death as well as burn to death.

WHAT COULD BE DONE

1. *General comprehensive policy*: Liberation, Independence, Federation.
 - a) a universalized Declaration of Independence.
2. *A Freedom Administration*: unify political warfare conduct, overcome piecemeal efforts.
 - a) not affiliated with any existing part of Government.
 - b) under general direction and supervision of President.
 - c) funds: counterpart, MSA \$100 million; appropriations.
 - d) national freedom committees here and abroad.
3. *Guideposts of Action*:
 - a) moral commitment: certainty of liberation of all nations, including those in USSR.

- 1) liberation, independence for all captive non-Russian nations in the entire Moscow-centered Communist Empire.
- 2) civil and political freedoms for the unvested Russian masses.
- 3) keep alive throughout Communist Empire spirit of resistance and hope of freedom and national independence.
 - a) break awful sense of isolation in which internal enemies of Moscow live.
- 4) support spirit of nationalism inside and outside USSR.
- b) shatter "wave of future" aura of Russian Communism.
 - 1) instead, certain defeat of Moscow and complete victory of freedom.
- c) inspire millions in free countries with feeling of moral dedication to enlargement of area of freedom.
- d) sharpen by every device Moscow's fear of own captives.

4. *Examples of Operations:*

- a) full implementation of Kersten Amendment to MSA.
 - 1) attraction of escapees; rehabilitation; national battalions; underground support.
- b) moral and material aid, including trained leadership, to oppositions, resistance groups.
- c) broadening of organized resistance—eventual cacophony of protests, riots, and then a symphony of revolts.
- d) encouragement of passive resistance in every sphere of society.
- e) infiltrations into chief areas—armed forces of USSR, national republic administrations, "satellite" administrations etc.
 - 1) no means of communication overlooked: spoken and written word, radio and TV, films, balloons, missiles to distribute leaflets, secret printing and mimeographing presses on enemy terrain, wall scrawls, etc.
- g) fixed and mobile broadcasting facilities about Communist Empire. From each area:
 - 1) *Far East*: special messages to Siberyaks, non-Russians.
 - 2) *Middle East*: special messages to Turkestani, Caucasians, Ukrainians.
 - 2) *Western Europe*: special messages to Russians, Balts, Ukrainians, Poles, Slovaks, etc.
- h) Voice of America: For Liberation, Independence, Justice.
 - 1) appeal to universal emotions—love of family, country, God, humanity.

- i) mass production of cheap and light-weight receivers.
- j) production of hand-operated phonograph devices for millions in Empire.
- k) use of facilities of friendly countries—South Korea, Nationalist China, Philippines, Pakistan, Turkey, Italy, Spain.
 - 1) training of Chinese, Koreans, etc. in political warfare.
- l) make maximum use of fugitives from Empire.
- m) offset redefection operations of Moscow.
- n) publicize names of former democratic leaders now in Communist jails etc.—for world to know their fate.
- o) expand existing programs of correspondence—Liberation stamps, etc.
- p) indictment and condemnation in absentia persons guilty of Communist crimes—broadcast.
- q) systematic execution of sabotage, assassination, confidence and bribery programs.
- r) proposals, demands, exposes, publication of official documents carefully calculated to show true motives of Kremlin.
- s) day-to-day and sustained publicity on Russian Communist genocide, slave labor, Hungary etc. in U.N. and elsewhere.
- t) utilization of labor unions, Churches, veteran groups, universities, etc.
- u) cultural exchanges with political objective attunement.
- v) diplomatic political offensive eg. American ambassadors to non-Russian countries in USSR; withdrawal of all, etc.
- w) selected projects—reunify Korea, reunify Germany, etc.
- x) economic warfare in Empire—eg. offers of surpluses to people via neutral channels.
- y) U.N. activity—continuous pressure on USSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia, “satellites.”
- z) with adequate preparation for follow-ups, dislodge Albania from Empire.

These are only the guidelines. Each operation suggests a program in itself, providing endless opportunities for imagination, innovation and cunning. Above all, they once and for all answer the question, “What could be done?”

LIQUIDATION OF M.T.S— A RISKY MANEUVER

By KOST KONONENKO

The new agricultural reform in the Soviet Union, which the recent liquidation of the machine and tractor stations (MTS) represents, is considered by some observers of Soviet affairs to be as important as was total collectivization. This comparison, of course, is exaggerated inasmuch as the liquidation of the MTS does not change *per se* the basic system as was the case with collectivization. But we have to admit that this event is the most important development that ever occurred in the existing system and one containing the germs of possibility of its total change.

HISTORY OF THE M.T.S.

The concept of the machine and tractor stations developed in Ukraine long before the Bolshevik collectivization, and their purpose was to strengthen the individual homesteads of the farmers. It became clear at the very beginning that the distribution of land would not solve the agrarian problem. The liquidation of great land ownerships, though it provided the landless and small-holder peasants with land, at the same time deprived them of markets of working for hire with the impossibility of full employment on newly-received lands because of the lack of necessary farm machinery. Therefore, much effort was exerted in order to assure the peasantry of low-rate credits and supplies of farm machinery. As far back as 1922, a special organization, *Selo-Tekhnika* (Village-Technique) was formed, which purchased 60 tractors in the United States for common use by the farmers. These were subdivided into two tractor columns. Later on, in 1925, the Agricultural Bank of Odessa organized three tractor columns which were maintained by the credit cooperatives in the villages of Vizirka, Sychivka and Konstantynivka. Similar tractor columns were created in the district of Mykolaiv. In 1927 the Shevchenko State Farm in the *oblast* of Odessa also organized such a tractor column, which it called a "machine and tractor station" (MTS), and which differed from the previous ones in that while the others were the property of cooperatives, this was a state

property. But the establishment of these first MTS stations had no decisive part in the system. Everything was concentrated toward a principal goal: to solve the problem of output in agriculture in the most economic and cheapest way. Therefore, in *The Machine and Tractor Stations*, the book of Markevych, organizer of the first MTS, all attention is given to the very same problem:

"The principal and decisive importance," he wrote, "should derive from the profitability . . . If statistical accounts show the profitability of this form of production for the peasantry, it should deserve strong support, since otherwise one can hardly count on its longevity . . ." (p. 214).

He supplied some statistics regarding the profitability of the MTS: the cost of working 1 hectare of land by the MTS was only 14.13 *karbovantsi* (*rubles*) as against 20.58 by ordinary horse power; one centner of bread from the MTS-run land cost only 1.86 *karbovantsi* as against 5.36 by the other method.

At the beginning, naturally, this effort met with the greatest enthusiasm on the part of the peasantry, which led to the creation of 15 cooperative MTS stations in one year alone.

But, regrettably, this Ukrainian initiative took an entire different course when the Kremlin realized what great perspectives the MTS represented for Moscow in its plans to subdue the village under the Bolshevik system. The matter of state ownership of the means of production, as well as the matter of wages in kind, acquired an importance of the first order. One may state without fear of exaggeration that the experiment with the MTS in Ukraine enabled the planning and realization of the total collectivization. By depriving the peasantry of their own means of production and relegating these under the control of state-owned MTS, the Bolshevik regime succeeded in subordinating the entire process of agricultural production to its own caprices.

In addition, the MTS contributed in great measure to the successful collectivization of the village, inasmuch as they became the instrument of the state control not only in the attainment of agricultural goals, but also in liquidating private and individual land ownerships. At a conference of agricultural specialists, held on July 3, 1933, Molotov declared:

The MTS have become the principal state organizations in the village, made into a lever by the Soviet government for the elevation of the collective farm system.¹

¹ *Vazhneisheya resheniya po selskomu khozyaistvu*, 1934, p. 431. (*More Important Decisions on Agriculture.*)

Simultaneously, the MTS stations were also allowed to create the so-called "political sections," which played such an ignominious role in the process of the so-called *de-kurkulization* (*de-kulakization* in Russian) of the village.

The political sections of the MTS and State Farms should therefore insure the transformation of the MTS and State Farms, which now are above all agricultural and technical centers, into centers of agricultural and technical as well as political leadership.²

On the role of the MTS in the process of taking away bread from the peasants one can write sagas of misery and suffering. Suffice it to mention that on the eve of World War II the Soviet state took from Ukrainian peasants 27-28 per cent of collective crops on the average, plus another 17-18 per cent in kind to the MTS. Thus over 40 per cent of all the crops was mandatorily given to the state.³ After the war, as a result of increased mechanization this percentage went up, a fact which was even confirmed by Khrushchev himself who stated in his address on the liquidation of the MTS that this percentage reached fifty.

We cannot afford to omit still another "merit" of the MTS: the mechanization of means of production immediately augmented the surplus of the agrarian population, especially in Ukraine, which previously had already suffered from a surplus of the agrarian population. In order to get rid of this population surplus and "idle bread-eaters," and so to release more bread to the state, the Soviet Russian government organized a monstrous famine in Ukraine in the years 1932-1933, which claimed the lives of 6,000,000 Ukrainians. Subsequently, the MTS system enabled the Soviet government to dispose of hundreds of thousands of peasants every year not only as a labor force in industrial centers, but also as slaves in innumerable slave labor camps.

All these possibilities that could be provided by the MTS were well assessed by Moscow in advance and the growth of the MTS system progressed rapidly. In 1933 in Ukraine there already were 657 MTS stations, and in the first year of the German-Soviet war a total of 1,140 MTS stations with 96,000 tractors. In 1955 their number approached 2,000 with a total of 1,260,000 tractors.⁴

² *Ibid.* From the address of L. M. Kaganovich about the establishment of "political sections," p. 167.

³ *Kolkhosy USSR na 1 sichnya 1939*, Kiev, 1940, p. 54 (*Collective Farms of the Ukrainian SSR on January 1, 1939.*)

⁴ Cf. *Ocherki razvytia narodnoho khozaistva Ukrainy*, Moscow, 1954, p. 526 (*Outlines of Development of National Agriculture of Ukraine*).

With the course of time the role of the MTS in the direction of the collective farms not only had not decreased, but steadily grew in importance. A sham agreement between the MTS and the collective farm administration turned into a one-sided affair, on the basis of which the Soviet government imposed upon the MTS a series of new obligations and tasks which heretofore were not in the sphere of activities of the MTS. The last act, which enhanced considerably the authority of the MTS, was the liquidation in 1954 of the so-called "land sections" of the *raion* executive committees, whose prerogatives and functions were shifted to the MTS. The direction of the MTS stations themselves were actually in the hands of the *raion* party committees and their policies were implemented through the so-called "zonal instructors."

LIQUIDATION OF THE MTS AND COMMUNIST DOCTRINE

It is evident, on the basis of what has been said, that the present reform is not limited to a change of ownership of the means of production. Its change is far more important, because with the liquidation of the MTS disappears the most essential link in the chain of the entire system of the direction of agriculture. The importance of this change is attested to by the fact that during the "all-national discussion" of this reform some 500,000 various meetings took place, in which over 50 million people participated. From the press reports, which were abundant, it would appear that these meetings were more than just typical Soviet window-dressing affairs. They discussed questions with an unusual daring and in such scope that they went beyond the limits of the problem itself. Not less important is the fact that the reform generated a discussion of a basic theoretic character in the highest echelons of the Communist Party itself. Naturally, we are deprived of the possibility of acquainting ourselves with the arguments of the opposition, since such is not aired in the press, but from what the defenders of the reform have said against the opponents (and among the defenders was Nikita S. Khrushchev himself), one can easily grasp what is going on.

The very fact that the new reform aims at the strengthening of the cooperative group ownership at the expense of weakening the general national ownership, is a deviation from the road of communism. In their arguments against the reform the opposition referred back to the founding fathers of Marxism and, among other things, to quotes from F. Engels' letter to Bebel:

With the transition to the communist economy we would have to apply cooperative production in large measure and as a trial attempt, and in this

neither Marx nor I have any doubt. But the matter should be so arranged that society, that is the state for the first time, should retain the ownership of the means of production and thus the private interests of the cooperatives would not supersede the interests of society as a whole.⁵

Thus the oppositionists declare:

The state ownership will lose its leading significance in agriculture, and with it the material basis of the state control over collective farms will disappear as well; the collective farms will detach themselves from the state which will impede our movement on the road to communism.⁶

We are not interested as to what side of the argument possesses a more orthodox approach and servility to Marxism. Far more important is what developed in the course of this discussion.

Although Khrushchev mobilized on his side outstanding academic forces, not one from among his experts could find anything in the prophets of Marxism-Leninism which could crush the opposition theoretically. Therefore, used was every possible argument which tended to prove that there was no retreat from or was there a betrayal of Marxism, but rather a tactical maneuver which would only accelerate, much less impede, the process of total communism. There is no danger, they said, in transforming the state ownership into a cooperative ownership for a short time, when the perspective embraces a plan to transform the cooperative ownership into state ownership anyhow. In his address, as reported by *Pravda Ukrainy* of March 1, 1958, Khrushchev stated:

The general national ownership is a higher degree of socialization than collective farms. The matter is to gradually elevate the level of socialization of collective ownership to general national ownership.

This intentionally-veiled thought in a rather unclear formulation,—“to elevate the level of socialization”—does not prevent us from seeing what actually is going on, inasmuch as it is clear that “elevation” is nothing else but nationalization. What it means in practical terms is the transformation of collective farms into state farms and the consequent disappearance of the peasantry as a class and its substitution by the proletariat, and the fundamental change of the principle of distribution of products, and so forth. Thus the present reform aims at the transformation of the entire system, and as such is extremely important, warranting all the attention and study that we can possibly muster.

There is no doubt that future development will proceed in exactly the same direction, especially when one judges what is said

⁵ F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. XXVII, p. 524.

⁶ From the article of Academician P. Pershin in *Radyanska Ukraina* of March 18, 1958.

in the "lower" echelons of the party workers. For instance, A. Iralsky, in the March 21, 1958 issue of *Radyanska Ukraina* of Kiev, commenting that in 1956 and 1957 a number of collective farms in the Kazakh SSR and in the Russian SFSR were transformed into state farms, writes:

Basing themselves on these isolated cases some workers explain, in an elementary manner, the question of elevation of collective ownership to the level of the general national. They depict the matter in such a way that in forthcoming years all collective farms will be transformed into state farms.

Expressing the opposite view, he continued:

In the cattle raising branches the level of socialization is insufficient. In 1956, on the land organized into collective farms, there were about 56,400,000 heads of cattle. Of that number, 31,400,000 heads, or 55.6 per cent, belonged to the community, while 25,100,000, or 44.4 per cent, of the cattle were the personal property of collective farmers. A substantial part of the collective farmers' working time is being devoted to cultivating personal, private plots. Tendencies to place personal ownership over and above collective ownership are still in existence . . . At present we do not have the material in our hands which would enable us to characterize exactly the organizational forms of the transition of collective ownership to general national ownership.

Therefore, it is not denied that the elevation of the collective ownership to the general national will take place under the guise of the transformation of collective farms into state farms, and that this process will be preceded by the liquidation of the private personal plots of the collective farmers, which will make work in the state farms the only means of existence for the peasant-slave. Khrushchev himself referred to this point in his address in Minsk, where he revealed the plan of the liquidation of the MTS stations. He expressed a desire that collective farmers should surrender their privately-owned cattle to the collectives. And the party chairman of the Melitopol, Prymorsky and Polohivsky *raions* of the Zaporozhe area, accepted this hint as an order to be executed and forcefully began to take away the cattle of the collective farmers in their districts (cf. *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 13, 1958). The decision of the Central Committee which condemned this practice speaks only of the "prematurity and insufficient preparation" of this process.

The prematurity of the final and ultimate decision of the transformation of collective farms into state farms had also been raised by Academician P. Pershin, who advanced still another and the most essential point:

On the basis of an increase in collective production and with the creation of material welfare, the character of the distribution of collective production will be strengthened, approaching the method of distribution in this sector of national economy which is based on general national ownership.⁷

⁷ *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 18, 1958.

In other words, the transformation of peasants into workers of state farms would require a hard and guaranteed remuneration for their work, which under present conditions would entail a decrease of that part of production which the state takes for itself. Therefore, Moscow deems premature a commitment that in the future the peasants would be better remunerated.

There is another reason why the transformation of collective farms into state farms is being considered premature at this time. This reason is being suppressed, but it undoubtedly will play an important part in this process.

In liquidating the MTS Moscow is planning to collect 18—20,000,000,000 *rubles* for machines taken from the MTS and sold to the peasants. About 5 billions of *rubles* of that sum will fall upon the Ukrainian peasantry. Eventually, these tractors and machines will again become "the property of the state," but meanwhile Moscow will be able to extort a great amount of money from the penurious peasantry. The same will happen as what has happened with the peasant ownership of land, which was first taken by Moscow and disposed of in any way it suited Moscow: forty years after the "abolition" of slavery Ukrainian peasants bought out the land, and when everything was paid for, Moscow declared the land to be state property.

PROCESSES ENGENDERED BY NEW REFORM

It would be an error to think that the new reform is the result of the planning of Moscow alone, although it fully corresponds to the known views of Khrushchev, especially his pet-projects of *agro-cities* (*agro-gorod*) and the liquidation of personal plots. There is no doubt that a not insignificant role in the liquidation of the MTS was played by the pressure of the peasantry themselves, even in the form of defending the interest of the collective farms on the part of their more authoritative organs of administration. This is corroborated systematically by the official policy line that from now on there will be only one and not two managers on the fields. Also eloquent is the fact that the liquidation of the MTS was met by general enthusiasm on the part of the peasantry, who believe it to be their victory, as is to be seen at the numerous meetings and conferences.

We might venture to state that this liquidation might truly become a victory for the peasants. The liquidation of the MTS, with the ulterior purpose of transforming collective farms into state farms, generates two processes, which will form the backbone of the agricultural policy:

1. Elevating collective farmers to a higher degree of remuneration for their work;

2. General assault on the personal plots of collective farmers with the purpose of liquidating them.

Inasmuch as the second point is concerned, the logic of reality would lead us to the conclusion that at the present time this is quite impossible. It is to be attained only through sheer force or by the voluntary agreement of the peasants themselves, if they could be enticed by the prospect of economic advantages. It seems that there is no need to stress the undesirability of what happened when the total collectivization was forcefully implemented in the years 1930-32. This the Soviet Russian government cannot afford to repeat because of the general international situation as well as the delicate and precarious disposition of forces in the USSR itself. This, of course, does not mean that there will be no isolated attempts at coercion, but we doubt very much whether Moscow can attempt force as a general policy. In his address regarding the liquidation of the MTS, Khrushchev, encouraging the peasants to surrender their cows to the collectives, said in Minsk:

To do this now I do not advise you. If this is enthusiastically undertaken by the secretaries of *raion* and *oblast* committees and the heads of the collective farms, one can lose track of what was done voluntarily and what under pressure. We cannot allow this . . .”⁸

And, really, Moscow cannot achieve this by using force, as this would result in a total collapse of the agricultural policy, from which the peasants would certainly emerge the victors.

Therefore, there remains only the one course of the voluntary agreement of the peasantry, which can become a reality only at the expense of further concessions and which in essence may result in the change of the nature itself of the existing collective farm system. It is self-understood that a voluntary renunciation of personal plots on the part of the peasants would come only after they are given more substantial economic benefits.

The personal plot serves essentially two purposes: it assures the peasant of potato and other vegetable crops and it is the principal source of his financial income. Before the war, as indicated by statistics taken from three *oblasts* of Ukraine,⁹ 82 per cent of all potato crops and 83 per cent of all vegetable crops came from the personal plots of the collective farmers, while only 18 and 17 per cent of these crops, respectively, were received from the collective

⁸ *Pravda*, January 25, 1958.

⁹ *Budzety kolhospnykiv*, Kiev 1937 (*The Budgets of Collective Farmers*).

farms as remuneration for their working days. This situation has not changed, and according to the press, there are even tendencies toward decreasing payment in kind by the collective farms. It is quite easy to understand these tendencies, if one takes into consideration the fact that the high prices paid for these products encourage the farmers in a more intensive cultivation of the same on their own plots. Moreover, these products are sold on the so-called collective farm market (free market) at prices 3-4 times higher than in the state-controlled stores.

Thus, the peasants cannot voluntarily renounce the cultivation of these crops on their personal plots, which occupy such a vital place in their economies. To do so they would have to receive a special guarantee that they would receive the same products in larger quantities from the collective farms, which is hardly possible. They also cannot deprive themselves of the financial income which they receive by selling these products on the free market. According to our conservative estimates, the productivity of 1 hour's work spent on cultivation of the personal plots is 9 to 11 times more profitable than the same amount of work and time expended on the collective farms. It is evident that this difference can never be supplemented by the Soviet state. What remains is the elimination of the free market, which is an impossibility; during the past forty years the Soviet government has constantly tried to eliminate "black markets" from the Soviet economy, but to no avail.

What is important is not only the fact that foodstuffs are too scarce to meet the demand, but also because of the free market the collective farms themselves receive a substantial part of their monetary income. To dominate all the products and thus to remove them from the free market it would be essential to change the entire policy of price control, which is also hardly feasible.

That this chaotic condition creates considerable headaches for the Soviet government is evident from the recurring alarming reports in the Soviet press, especially during the months of February and March, 1958:

Some of the directors of the collective farms are sometimes following an irregular, and sometimes even an anti-state course: they are selling milk on the free market without fulfilling their assigned norms to the state. In the M. Gorky Collective Farm in the Kremenchuk *raion*, on February 20 out of the total of 48 tons of milk produced by 358 cows, only 9.4 tons were surrendered to the state.¹⁰

Such reports are quite frequent in the press. For instance, in the collective farm, "Star of Communism," in the same *raion* out

¹⁰ *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 26, 1958.

of 448 centners of milk the collective farm gave to the state but 8, while the G. Petrovsky Collective Farm in the Odessa *oblast* surrendered only 3 per cent of its entire milk output.

Suppose we grant that the collective farms would succeed in overcoming these difficulties and would create conditions favorable for the renunciation of personal plots. Suppose they follow the example of the collective farm in Khrushchev's native village of Kalinovka, about which he spoke at the meeting in Minsk. There, according to him, the collective farm obligated itself, after the peasants had surrendered their cows to the state, to provide each member of the collective farm family a half liter of milk daily in the fall-winter season, and a full liter of milk in the spring-summer season. Suppose that similar obligations would be undertaken by the collective farms also in the matter of vegetables. Would that solve the problem as a whole? This would alter the basic nature of collective farms themselves. It would mean that the collective farm would have to surrender a certain portion of its products to the farmer, which would establish the latter's right to the collective farm products. Such a development would change the definition of a "working day" (*trudoden*), the most important basis of the collective farm system. Such an arrangement would in essence bring the collective farm to a real cooperative system, rather than to a state farm system, which is uppermost in the minds of the Kremlin leadership.

Clearly, one can talk about it as a supposition, but it is more than certain that the Kremlin in its attempt to liquidate the personal plots of peasants and in its endeavor to transform collective farms into state farms, would of necessity have to take certain steps toward achieving this objective.

Not the least important consequences should also be those deriving from the process of placing collective farmers on a basis of hard financial remuneration for their work, especially with the new situation compelling the collective farms to buy tractors and machines from the MTS. The need of financial expenditures for these two requirements has increased rapidly. It is true that there is a new source of revenue—the remuneration in kind which heretofore had been paid to the MTS. But, in the first place, it is too early to speak of the extent to which this new source could insure further purchases of tractors, inasmuch as Khrushchev even now speaks about the necessity of raising the prices of these tractors; secondly, this source could be considered profitable only in the future and it cannot fill the gap created by the payment of 4—5 billion *rubles* for the machines of the MTS.

There is much talk about the necessity of raising the contribution to the indivisible funds. In Ukraine, for instance, about 20 per cent of all financial revenues were going to these funds. Now this percentage will increase considerably not only for the purchase of machines, but in order to meet the requirements for other necessities, which will also increase. We do not even mention such emergency needs as building of garages, maintenance of machine repair shops, as well as shelters for cattle, construction of drainage systems and other technical installations necessary for the processing of raw materials, and the like.

But this is not all that requires the increase of financial concessions for the collective farms. Not less acute is the problem of creating their own revolving funds. Heretofore, neither statute nor practice required such funds. With the existing practice of financial payment to the farmers for their working days only at the end of the year, the farmers' salaries were at the disposal of the collective farms during the entire year. With these funds the collective farms could cover everyday expenditures, such as the cost of fertilizing, eradication of destructive insects, and so forth. Now the collective farm is confronted with new expenditures: cost of maintenance of tractors and machines, and of fuel, which consumes a great deal of money. At the same time the financial instalments due for the MTS machines every month are sapping the present source of revenue. This creates the unavoidable necessity not only to increase the contribution to the indivisible funds, but through additional contributions to create a new revolving fund.

Both these contributions should be made from the general amount of revenue; therefore, it will be directed towards decreasing the income which will remain to cover the remuneration for the work of the collective farmers. The purpose of transforming collective farms into state farms and the whole situation in the collective farms requires a considerable increase of this residue.

All this convincingly shows that the attempt to increase by all means the financial contributions will grow in intensity and determination. It will not be limited by the rebuilding of the structure of production in the direction of expansion of more profitable cultivation of production at the expense of less productive wheat cultivation, which enables the existing order to plan further, but it will touch on the system of final accounting with the principal consumer of production—the state. The very clear symptoms of this phenomenon of great importance are already in existence. For instance, Director of the Nemiriv MTS, Demkivsky (the *raion* of Vynnytsia), writes in the March 20, 1958, issue of *Radyanska Ukraina*:

Certain comrades in their reports raised the important question of differentiating in assigning the extent of wheat quotas for the collective farms. This question disturbs many and it must be solved once and for all. The assignment principle based on 1 hectare . . . has one shortcoming: this principle does not take into account the peculiarities of the lands . . .

Such expressions are numerous and by no means isolated, which Khrushchev confirmed in his address to the Supreme Soviet; but this matter along with others mentioned above has not found an adequate solution in a special decree on the liquidation of the MTS. It is still on the daily agenda of the Soviet government. And this matter, as much as the law approving a certain portion of the products for the farmers, generates a fundamental change in the nature itself of the collective farm system. The matter is not in the economic effect that this differentiation between the norms of wheat quotas assigned per 1 hectare and a unified price can produce. The existing system of wheat quotas is nothing else but an absolute land rent, that is, the payment for their right of using the land, as a capital. And the change which is demanded would have to transform the rent into a tax, i. e. a surrender of part of the income. This would entail of necessity also the ascertaining of the income itself, the value of the products, the comparison of the selling prices with the value of the products—in one word, the transformation of the existing system of collective farms into a normally-conducted economic enterprise.

This could not be by-passed in silence by Academician Pershin himself. In the article quoted above, he said:

Heretofore the economic factors connected with the law of value had no appropriate application in the activities of the MTS and collective farms alike. Collective farms could not ascertain the exact value of products . . . Now . . . it is necessary to strengthen the economic accounting in collective farms . . .

In summing up, we believe that all these complications enumerated above suffice to show that the new reform is far from limiting itself to the matter of organizing energetics in agriculture only. It is generating new processes, each of which will develop into two antagonistic directions: one in the direction of further nationalization of collective farms, and the other in a direction approaching the cooperative system and the rebirth of the normal laws of the markets. There is being created a situation of deep conflict in the collective farm system, which cannot but produce painful results and which will earmark the fate of the collective farm system, and in the final analysis, that of the entire economic system of Marxism.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE COLD WAR

By VANO J. NANWASHVILI

At the present stage of the cold war, the center of interest is the Middle East. This does not mean that the goal of the cold war is limited to this area. Not at all! The cold war is going on everywhere in the world, and its goal, which never changes, is the domination of the world. However, the most important action at the present time is taking place in the Middle East.


At the very beginning of the transfer of action to the Middle East, it had become evident that the strongest pressure was to be put on Syria—specifically, the geographical area of Syria. Why? In order to visualize what the geographical area of Syria means today to Russia, it is necessary to analyze its role in World War I.

The cardinal reason for the Russian-German clash in international policy was that at the end of the 19th century Germany embarked upon her economic and political aggression in the area of the Middle East, from Berlin to Baghdad. Czarist Russia could not tolerate the entrance of Germany into this area. Therefore, in order to oust Germany, she decided to compromise even with her old and traditional enemy, England.

Incidentally, the fact should be emphasized that at that time not a single drop of oil was being produced in the whole Middle East. The Suez Canal itself did not figure in Russia's calculations, but the entire Middle East was the ultimate goal of Russia's strategy. Control of this area would furnish a strategic position and make economic expansion possible. A broader political perspective and its realization did not yet exist as the direct goal.

At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution (March 11-15, 1917)—in other words, the breakdown of all Czarist Russian activity—the military situation of the Allies in the Middle East was as shown on the accompanying map. On the Turkish line, the Russian Army occupied Trabzon, Erzincan, Mus, and extended as far south as Mosul. In addition, Russia occupied all of Northern Persia.

In the southern part, formerly a part of the Turkish Empire and which today is the Kingdom of Iraq (called the Mesopotamian



front during World War I) the English Army, after several failures, at last gained the upper hand over the Turkish Army and started to force it back toward the north.

The same situation developed in Palestine. In 1917, the English Army, gaining the ascendancy, slowly started to push the Turkish Army northward.

The final action of the Czarist Russian Army was an offensive against Diyarbakir. What meaning did this action have?

At the rear of the Turkish Army, which was desperately defending itself in Iraq and Palestine, Russia—with the aid of the English—hoped to reach the nearest ports on the Mediterranean (Alexandria and Latakia) in the geographical area of Syria. The time, however, was not ripe; the Turkish Army stopped the Russian offensive with comparative ease, but the political aim of Russia was very clearly perceived. Each further success of the English Army in Iraq and Palestine was always to Russia's advantage. She would have been able to close the way to the English Army and, with her bare hands, start the liquidation of the Central Coalition from the south, turning to her own profit all the successes of the Western powers. Through these successes, Russia would have been able to occupy Syria at the rear of the Turkish Army after its defeat by the English in Palestine and Iraq.

The old Czarist Russia understood her opportunity perfectly. She realized the importance of the geographical area of Syria and was ready and waiting to use this situation. She wanted an open passage from the south to Central Europe, just as is now the case with Red Russia forty-one years later. Therefore, Czarist Russia was against the action of the Allies in the Dardanelles, regardless of the fact that only by that action could Russia be saved from devastating and inevitable defeat on her Western front. For the same reason, during World War II, Stalin was against any Allied action in the Balkan Peninsula. Today, forty-one years after the death agony of Czarist Russia, Red Russia is carrying out the same action by means of a systematic cold war, and with much more success.

In order to achieve such successes, which would have radically changed the fate of World War I, Czarist Russia needed a few weeks' time to sustain herself. But it was in March of 1917, three weeks after the collapse of Czarist rule in Russia that the English Army definitely defeated the Turkish Army in Mesopotamia and occupied Baghdad. Later, in December of 1917, it occupied Jerusalem on the Palestinian front. At that moment, Czarist Russia would have had the opportunity to occupy the northern coast of the Mediterranean on the geographical territory of Syria, without any effort.

IMPORTANCE OF SYRIA

What can Syria, as the center of successive phases of the cold war, secure for Russia? The strategic importance of Syria is such that today's events in the Arab world will not produce any change in Russia's general scheme of action. The ports on the Mediterranean nearest to Russia are in Syria. No army can stop the march of Russia's armed forces from the Caucasus to these ports.

Of course, as a consequence of successive general wars, it will be possible to liberate every country occupied by Russia, but in the present circumstances it will not be possible to defend the territory of Syria at the beginning of a conventional war. The armed forces of Iran and Iraq are not large enough to make them worth taking into account in such an action .

Turkey has two fronts—in Thrace and in the Caucasus. Her armed forces will be contained on these fronts. All Russia's action will be conducted beyond the territory of Turkey; therefore, the military strengthening of the territory of Turkey is not important in today's situation. Turkey would not be able to carry on the struggle in the Middle East for the length of time necessary to allow

enough armed forces of the free world to bring about a general solution of the situation.

Connection of Syria with Russia through the latter's railways, which reach the Lake of Urmia in Iran, is not difficult. Advance Russian military units in Syria would be able to sustain themselves until Russia's armed forces from the Caucasus reached Syria. If Russia were to occupy Egypt even today, she would enjoy no such advantages as those to be gained by the occupation of Syria. Russian units in Egypt could not last there long. The closing of the Suez Canal is possible even without any occupation by Russia, as was demonstrated in 1956. For Russia, occupation of Syria from Egypt is not possible, but the occupation of Egypt from Syria is possible.

RUSSIA'S CURRENT TARGET

Now, what is Russia's next direct target in her cold war? The Middle East, where the current pitched battle of the cold war is taking place, is of itself not the goal it was in World War I. Today the Middle East serves only as a temporary medium. The current battle of the cold war is being fought for the Eastern Hemisphere, the fate of which must be decided by this battle.

Today, for the first time in the history of Europe, there does not exist in Western Europe a conventional military power able to stop the Russian conventional armed forces. This situation will continue to exist until the Western countries (the free world), after a declaration of war, can concentrate enough armed forces on the soil of Europe to match Russia's. Such forces can be mustered in the western part of Africa only after a period of some eighteen to twenty months, but Russia will want to occupy this area before she is compelled to wage a general war.

This is the prime purpose of all the political agitation in the world today. To realize her goal, Russia needs peace—peace at any price—the kind of peace she is enjoying right now. What is now called "cold war" by the Western nations was the dream of Lenin in 1918, which he called, "Not war and not peace." It is only in such a time of "peace" that Russia is able to carry on a cold war and to obtain such astounding results—results which she could never achieve by a conventional war. To produce an uneasy state of mind suitable for propaganda purposes, Russia may produce a mirage of peace in the style of the "Geneva spirit."

War as understood by the free world is for Russia a disturbance and an inconvenience. It forces the cold war to stop, and this is not

to Russia's liking. Her strongest weapons are operative in time of "peace." During a shooting war she is obliged to put the fate of her policy temporarily into the hands of her armed forces, of which she has never been sure, in which she has never had any confidence. If "peaceful conquest and occupation" is not possible, if Russia is compelled to carry on military action, she wants such to be only local military action, without an official declaration of war, and conducted in conjunction with some foreign power, such as China or Arabia, with good support from Russian advisers.

In the end, after exhausting to the fullest extent all the advantages of cold war, Russia may risk a conventional war. If this takes place, it is because there are conditions which give her exceptional advantages, namely:

(1) For the first time in her history, Russia is able to proceed with mobilization and concentration of armed forces several months earlier than her opponents can.

(2) For the first time Russia's propositions for limiting nuclear war and for partial or general disarmament, which would reinforce her advantages, are causing great agitation and disorganization of forces among the Western countries. (We shall return to a detailed analysis of these questions.)

Finally, what chance does Russia have to attain her goal? Why is she so stubborn? As a matter of fact, she has only one chance: *the fatal and chronic political mistakes of the Western powers*. The reasons for these mistakes are:

(1) The Western world does not know the doctrine of cold war.

(2) The free world does not understand the ideology of the Russian nation.

(3) The West does not know the political structure of the Russian Empire.

COLD WAR

The idea of "cold war" appeared in the Western World for the first time after World War II. After 1945 the Western countries were confronted with a strange kind of political aggression on the part of Russia. It seemed to have some connection with war, but was unprecedented. The West named this phenomenon "cold war," but up to the present time they have yet entirely to understand its nature or methods. Hence the Western nations never have known where each successive blow of the cold war would fall or what its immediate goal could be. They merely understood that the final goal was the domination of the world.

It is not within the scope of this article to treat fully of the theory, tactics, and strategy of cold war. Only its most salient characteristics will be presented.

In Russia's history the cold war actually has a tradition of over 400 years. Scientifically, its theory and principles are very precisely and clearly crystallized, and are no secret today to any one who wants to study them. Russian political leaders do not need to act in an impromptu manner; their background and training enable them to handle questions in the political arena in ways which, in the minds of the free world, belong only on the level of tactical action by armed forces.

The whole action of cold war must be restricted to local isolated areas as a series of successive steps in one general direction. Care must be taken that this aggression does not cause an open war, especially today, a general war with the free world.

In the minds of the free world the present cold war has been going on since 1945, but it really started prior to World War II. During the period 1935-36 Russia had control over the march of events. This early phase of the cold war tended to prevent the putting of conditions in Western Europe in order, and thus to bring about the outbreak of war. These objectives were at that time entirely within Russia's reach, and were fully attained.

If we analyze current events in the Middle East from the above-mentioned point of view, we see an entirely different development of world policy. But how does the free world view the same events through the glasses of conventional policy? With the first effects of the cold war action in the Middle East, the entire press of the West started to write about "oil fields," "oil pipelines," and the "Suez Canal" as the "jugular vein" of Western Europe, etc. One of the most authoritative political magazines of the United States, in answering the question why Russia directed her general blow on Syria, dealt only with the internal conditions of Syria: economic difficulties, internal political crises, etc. It failed to view anything from the standpoint of the general international situation; it saw no connection with the general line and goal of the active aggressor in world policy.

Of course, the economic elements of the Middle East situation are very important, but Russia today has no time to wait for economic repercussions. The development of political events has gone very far. Today the entire Middle East constitutes one advance among many made in the general direction. Today we are witnessing a direct fight for the fate of the entire Eastern Hemisphere. In

this general situation, the question of what Syria itself wants, of what Egypt's goal is, or what that of the entire Arab world is, is not important. What is important is the question of what Russia wants and what she is going to do. A similar situation existed in Ukraine in the 17th century and in Georgia in the 19th century. These countries sought Russia's support only to strengthen their independence, but Russia wanted to exploit these territories for different goals.

For a full understanding of Russia—her goal and her policy—the free world must study the principles of cold war carefully, in the same way it is customary to study the strategy, tactics, and history of conventional warfare. In this way it will encounter some big surprises. For instance, the component parts of the Russian Empire—the Kingdom of Kazan, Ukraine, Poland, and South Caucasus—were gained by Russia only through cold war.

When a comparison is made of the policy of the Western countries and that of Russia, a very strange phenomenon is disclosed. The aims of the Russians are being accomplished by political means, after which the armed forces simply assume formal possession of what has already been gained by political action. In the case of the Western countries, just the opposite is true: the political aims of the Western powers are secured by long and bloody wars, only to be lost by their subsequent policies.

There exists one very authoritative source for understanding the political structure of Russia. In the past, when the founders of Red Russia were not sure of their future and were fighting for power in the years 1917-20, they were in the habit of speaking and writing quite openly and candidly. During those years they crystallized their policies, which have since governed their actions and which today are being scrupulously followed. These speeches and writings should be studied. Lenin and Stalin in 1917-20, desperately pointing out the weak places in the Russian Empire, are to be believed. The same holds true for the principles they laid down for the defeat of the Western powers.

One oft-repeated fact emphasizes very painfully how widely the people of the Western countries have been disoriented up to now with regard to the general political situation. At the end of each phase of the cold war, the entire press asks the so-called "specialists" on Russia where Russia will strike next. Instead of addressing these specialists, they should ask their own military experts what area Russia needs next for progressive control of the Western Hemisphere.

Ever since the early 1930's, the USSR has been carrying on a cold war on a worldwide basis, and each successive action in the cold war has developed on this level and has followed the same pattern. Each event must be analyzed by the Western countries on the same world level, and the remedy must be sought in global terms. Any analysis of each successive blow of the cold war made in the framework of local conditions and local goals leads inevitably to fatal mistakes. It is no wonder that on such erroneous grounds the Western countries should arrive at wholly erroneous conclusions.

We ought see that Russia's aggression today is not solely an action of the Communist Party. Fundamentally, it is *Russian national* aggression. Today all the Western countries sincerely desire to stop the so-called Communist aggression without a third world war. But after a third world war, ending with the defeat of Communism, Russia will continue the same aggression with the same methods, thereby necessitating a World War IV. Or let us suppose that:

(1) In a conventional war, Red Russia reaches the east coast of the Atlantic, and one of the victorious generals liquidates the Communist government in Moscow. What relaxation might the Western countries expect from such a coup?

(2) After a long and bitter struggle, the Red Army is rejected in Central Russia and half her territory becomes free, but that in ethnographical Russia the Communists remain strong, without any possibility of their being defeated.

What would the Western powers do in this situation? It is not possible to divide the territory of the Red Empire into two parts, as in Korea, and establish a Communist and a non-communist Russia. All this territory belongs ethnographically to entirely different nations, and these nations do not wish to be occupied either by Russian Communists or non-communist Russians. Any mistake on this question will bring on a new (IV) war on the first day after the demobilization of the armed forces of the Western nations.

What practical results are to be gained by a study of Russia's political history? One concrete fact will illustrate this very clearly. These questions were studied by the military circles in the subjugated nations in 1947 and 1948, and that research made it abundantly clear that Russia would attack Syria and further showed the manner in which she would do it. There exist documents which show that some Western countries were acquainted with this study. Now, ten years later, Russia is realizing her aims with great precision through her cold war. Why has this come to the Western World as a bolt from the blue?

THE AMERICAN NEGLECT OF NATIONALISM

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Perhaps in no field of the cold war can there be seen a greater difference than between the American and the Soviet attitudes toward the growing nationalism of the undeveloped peoples of Asia and Africa. With utter ruthlessness and lack of regard for either the truth or consistency Moscow is fostering nationalism on every side. It makes little difference to the Russians whether they are encouraging Nehru in India or are supporting the other peoples of India to oppose Nehru, and they are carrying on the two policies simultaneously simply to weaken any government, neutralist or pro-Western, which is not in their orbit. On the other hand the American policy, while legalistically correct, neglects almost every effort to develop the new nationalism in any part of the world and above all among the oppressed nations within the Soviet Union. It is a policy or a lack of one which will ultimately cost the United States dearly as one country after another falls under the siren spell of Moscow.

Yet that policy is deeply rooted in the American way of thinking. At the end of World War I, there was a very good illustration of it. The last Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States was never allowed to present his credentials because of the imminent entrance of the United States into the war. When the war was over, Mr. Frank Polk, then Undersecretary of State, went to Paris, and almost his first visitor was the former Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Tarnow von Tarnowski. At the moment there were supposed to be in Paris no representatives of the defeated Central Powers. When he raised the question to his guest, he received the unexpected answer that the gentleman was not in Paris as a representative of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy but as the representative of the new Poland. This surprising answer almost stumped the American Undersecretary of State. Yet it was symptomatic of the condition in Europe in 1918 and later and now of the conditions elsewhere.

Even though President Wilson through his Fourteen Points set out in clear words the American attitude toward self-determination,

neither he nor his staff carried it through consistently. It is often forgotten that in the original form of the Fourteen Points, there was a call for the autonomy of the peoples in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires but not a call for their complete independence, and the article dealing with Russia speaks only of the obligations of the world to the Russian people at the very moment the Russian Empire had already broken up into a series of national states which had declared their full independence and were struggling desperately to free themselves from the Russian yoke, whether White or Red.

How can this seeming contradiction be explained? It is obviously too simple to say that it is the result of ignorance or of propaganda from abroad. It is not a purely legalistic argument like the French insistence that Algeria is an integral part of metropolitan France, even though the folly of that position is today more than evident with the Algerian revolt.

THE ROOTS

The answer must be found in the way in which the United States developed from its beginning. At the time of the American Revolution, the thirteen English colonies, separately governed for a century and a half, came together in the Continental Congress and for purposes of the Revolution, entered into a loose federation under the Articles of Confederation. It was the confident belief of nearly all the men of 1776 that the French in Canada would hasten to join them in their revolt against Great Britain. It was only a little over ten years that they had been under British rule but the American invasions of Canada in the Revolution and again in the War of 1812 proved disastrous and resulted only in the expenditure of lives and money. For good or ill Canada remained at the time under British sovereignty and developed to nationhood on a different path.

When the Spanish speaking peoples of South and Central America revolted against Spain, the United States was one of the first countries to recognize their independence and took a firm stand against any efforts of Spain to reconquer them on the ground that there should be no European control in the New World. The United States accepted their boundaries as they defined them and confined itself to efforts to stabilize the governments and to seek an end to the continuous revolutions that harassed the new states for the greater part of a century. It made little or no effort to analyze further the forces that were operating on the continent. In fact when President Theodore Roosevelt recognized the last of these states, the Republic of Panama, there was considerable feeling that

he had done so only to facilitate the building of the Panama Canal and little discussion of the motives of the Panamanian leaders.

We find the same indifference of the government and the people as a whole toward revolutionary movements in Europe during the nineteenth century. There was a small but active group of Hellenophiles largely in Boston who welcomed the Greek securing of independence but their influence went little further. In the same way the American people welcomed the arrival of Garibaldi and of Louis Kossuth, but these men were welcomed as heroes of a struggle for liberty rather than as examples of their own people who were struggling to be free.

So marked was this that the great American educational institutions set up in the Ottoman Empire, Roberts College in Constantinople and the American University in Beirut, opened their doors to all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire to train them in modern thinking but the institutions as such took no attitude toward the efforts of these peoples to secure their freedom. There were of course individual Americans both in and out of the diplomatic corps who protested against the Bulgarian massacres of 1876 but it cannot be said that their efforts produced any appreciable effect upon American public opinion except that the Americans welcomed the downfall of any despotic government without thinking what form of regime would be set up in its place.

In the meanwhile the great mass immigration of the poor and the downtrodden of Europe to the United States commenced—first the Irish, then the Germans after 1848 and the various later waves until World War I. Yet this was an immigration of honest and hard-working people, who came and were treated as individuals. The number of political leaders among them was relatively small, for the political emigres of the time preferred to find shelter in the Western European countries where they could be nearer to their homelands and hope to affect the course of events. The United States accepted the immigrants and naturalized them as American citizens without making any effort to conclude treaties as to citizenship with any of the lands from which they came. Where any country refused to allow emigration without the fulfilling of certain restrictions, as the performance of military service, the United States paid no attention and if the immigrant once arrived on American shores, he was guaranteed the protection of American laws despite the interference of any foreign diplomat.

The American policy was made easier to work because the ocean communications during the nineteenth century when it was being

elaborated were difficult and the crossing of the ocean was so slow that very few of the immigrants who landed in the United States ever thought seriously of returning home even for a visit. Once a man and his family had landed on these shores, he gave up the thought of returning to his homeland. He threw his lot in with the United States for better or for worse and it made little difference to him what regulations were applied in Europe as regards the movement of the population. He heard from his relatives by letter and that was all.

In fact, in the nineteenth century the only considerable group that remained concerned with the political status of their homeland were the Irish, who maintained a steady propaganda against Great Britain. They made several half-hearted attempts to punish their hated enemy by invasions of Canada but even these had rather the character of an *opera bouffe* than of serious movements. They were usually checked by the local police along the border and did not disturb the general American-Canadian relations. At the same time, although there was a fondness for twisting the lion's tail in Fourth of July orations, the American government realized that it was to a certain extent dependent upon the British Navy for the securing of the freedom of the seas and so it never made any move to break the British sea power or to challenge it after the War of 1812.

It was thus only during World War I that the full extent of the European national problem was understood or made any impression upon the mass of the American citizens. They had been previously content to take Europe more or less for granted and to accept the boundaries as they were in 1914 as final, fixed and unchangeable. Here and there voices were raised for the restoration of Poland, but this was merely the work of some of the more active Polish leaders and aroused little or no echo in the population, even though the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian diplomats formally protested when a monument was erected in Washington to General Kosciuszko during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.

The complete absorption with the problems of internal American expansion and development first began to break during the Spanish-American War, when the United States found itself involved in the Philippine Islands and the West Indies. The movement was somewhat aided by the Russian-Japanese War but even so it did not reach any overwhelming flood until World War I, when the representatives of the peoples of Austria-Hungary began to form themselves into groups and strive to impress upon the United States that as an outcome of the war, the peoples like the Czechs

and the Poles should receive again their own sovereign states. Yet the success of these movements was in a way a by-product for American thought; even men like President Wilson at first laid all stress upon the Western front and treated the East as a *terra incognita*. That was the situation when the Russian Revolution broke out in the spring of 1917.

America welcomed the overthrow of the Czar without understanding all that was involved. There were few Americans who had any first-hand knowledge of the situation in Russia and the general mood of the public was that another absolute monarch had been deposed and that under a free government, the Russian war machine would function even more smoothly and thus speed up the ending of the war. As signs of the disintegration developed, lack of comprehension increased and the Americans, including the majority of the American diplomats, preferred to believe that these signs of disintegration were all inspired by German propaganda. Very few knew or cared to know that the old Empire had been in a true sense a prison of nations.

EXPLOSIVE FREEDOM

When the armistice in the West was signed on November 11, 1918, all believed that peace had been achieved and that it would be a simple task to make a new Europe of republican states entirely on the Western pattern. Very few realized the call for self-determination expressed by President Wilson would meet with a thundering response and that peoples who were scarcely known by name in the United States would send representatives to the Peace Conference and call for independence.

The American diplomats were unprepared for this, and even the committee of scholars set up by Colonel House to consider the problems of the peace could scarcely find in the American libraries the information that they needed to make intelligent decisions. A period of confusion came about and in the middle of it a new wave of isolationism spread over the United States and for a decade after the ending of World War I, the United States remained stubbornly aloof from all the political developments in Europe.

Yet it was during these very same years that American relief activity reached a new high. The American Relief Commission under Herbert Hoover delivered food to the starving people in Ukraine and other Soviet-held territories, but it never bothered itself with an analysis of the reasons for the famine or with political action that might be required to remedy those conditions. In the same way

the educational institutions operated first under the American Board of Foreign Missions and then of the Near East Foundation recognized that the new Turkey was making it more or less impossible for students from outside of Turkey to study in them; so it created new colleges in Sofia and under a somewhat different scheme in Athens to continue a work which had been successful for almost a century. The American tradition in the Far East that had served to give large numbers of Chinese a Western education did not take into account the changes brought about by the deposition of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China and made only the barest and most simple changes made necessary by the growing nationalism of Japan.

Thus between the two World Wars the American people and the American government had not associated themselves with the efforts of the peoples of Eastern Europe or of Eastern Asia to secure political independence and the development of their native cultures. They had been content to follow the changes of national boundaries and to channel the help which they were willing to give through whatever regime was set up in a given area. They did not ask whether that assistance was directly adapted to the improvement of some particular national group. They asked no questions but were only too willing to pour out financial and human aid to the area without seeking any return even in the political or cultural sense.

In accepting this position, the best representatives of American philanthropy and interest abroad performed real miracles in the fields of health and education but it never dawned upon them that many of these peoples sought something more—a recognition of their own individuality and of their right to exist and breathe freely on their own land and in their own countries. The worse representatives fell all too easily under the influence of the dominant political rulers and cooperated with them in the cementing of new bonds to hold their subject peoples in virtual slavery.

Insufficient preparation and training of men and women who were to work abroad strengthened these features. The American colleges and universities paid little attention to the new languages which were rising to world prominence during these years or to the rich cultures that the foreign representatives were going to meet when they went abroad. It resulted in the growth of the Russia-firsters, largely non-Communist Americans who had studied Russian history through the eyes of the old histories written under Czarist control plus a smattering of the Russian official history of

the Russian Revolution. It resulted in the creation of a picture of China and the other Asiatic countries which was again a synthetic product of personal experience and established texts. It resulted in the complete ignoring of the new movements stirring in Africa and the Middle East and the viewing of these movements through the eyes of men who pioneered there a hundred years before.

American business abroad was conducted along the same lines. Many well-known and progressive firms continued to send their representatives abroad and to use the same channels of communication and distribution that they had used before World War I, even though those channels were obviously outmoded and were in some cases almost completely blocked by the new national boundaries. This was true in Europe and it was even more true as the wave of nationalistic development surged up in other continents.

RISE OF RUSSIAN MENACE

Then came World War II and the complete change in the basic political situation in large areas of the world. The Americans were thrilled by the possibility of a world organization. They were profoundly eager to eliminate all possible chances of armed clashes and American policy reflected this in the first post-war years. They could not imagine despite all the evidence that could be submitted that Joseph Stalin was working for world domination and paying only lip service to the ideals that animated the West during the War—the desire to spread freedom throughout the world and to grant all peoples those inalienable human rights that they enjoyed themselves. They still sought to extend those rights through the already existing governments on the ground that these had been set up by some duly constituted authority without questioning what that authority was or how it was functioning.

It never occurred to them that Moscow in the meantime had been training large staffs of men and women drawn from various quarters of the world or from the Soviet Union itself to carry on seditious and disruptive propaganda in various areas, that these men and women were trained for particular regions, and that Moscow would support them secretly and openly in their nefarious work. They still wanted to believe that Moscow was as eager as Washington, London and Paris for the same kind of peace, a peace with justice and freedom for all.

With the expansion of American interests and the broadening of American political horizons from purely domestic problems to a

world wide scale, elaborate programs have been set up and richly supported in various colleges and universities to train men and women in the economic geography and the political institutions of various parts of the world. Yet all these that deal with the troubled and confused areas are still too largely oriented on the already existing regimes and the dominant languages. It is probably true that in the old British colonial service there were more men trained to handle the natives of some remote area where they were called upon to serve than there are being turned out by the elaborate educational foundations which exist to prepare persons to cooperate in the building of the new, better and more peaceful world.

The results as compared with the policies of Soviet Russian Moscow are beginning to be obvious. In one part of the world after another there is a rising tide of anti-Americanism. Now it appears in Indonesia, now it crops out in South America, now it is reflected in the Middle East. It is disturbing not only to the general public but still more to the responsible officials who cannot understand why this should be so. The United States has recognized all the countries that have won or been given their independence and yet it is receiving no credit for this but merely renewed complaints, for far too many high officials and leaders of public opinion are still blindly committed to the idea that all the governments of Europe, Asia, and Africa, when once set up and admitted to the United Nations, represent the feelings and the interests of their entire population. Moscow knows better and it is choosing its own course without regard to international law or international morality. Again and again on a purely legalistic and formal basis the United States is supporting peoples and regimes, even though they know in their hearts that those regimes are not friendly but are distinctly hostile both to large elements of their own people and to the United States.

The habits of past thinking are hard to eradicate. The United States has covered a long road from the days when it welcomed millions of individual immigrants from Europe and gave them a taste of a new and better life. It has travelled a long way since its representatives at Versailles rubbed their eyes in amazement at the problems offered by the different national groups that called for self-determination and asked to be admitted to the family of the free world. But it has still much further to go.

It is the task now of the United States to go through an "agonizing reappraisal" of all the reasons why that American assistance which has been so richly poured out on the undeveloped

portions of the world has not brought sufficient recognition and why the far smaller donations of the Soviet Union given as a cloak to infiltration have brought rich fruits. The basic attitude of the United States has changed but it has still not changed enough to train men and women to give relief and help not only in the material and medical fields but in the spiritual and the cultural rebirth of peoples that are only now awakening to a consciousness of their own national identity. The United States must find a way to strengthen these sentiments and to show that the basic problems of a previously oppressed people do concern the great and rich United States and that this help can be given not only by the expenditure of billions of dollars but by a sympathetic understanding. The United States must learn that it can only secure firm friends, if it will take a firm stand not only against the old conventional type of colonialism which is now frankly outmoded but against the new type as exemplified by the Russian Communists, who replace the essence of freedom with a lie and ruthlessly dominate and oppress all who come within their clutches.

It is not enough to talk of liberation of the satellite states or to urge some new method of cooperation with newly liberated organizations. It must go to the heart of the matter and bring home to the world its profound conviction that the tyranny of the Soviet Union and its hold over the non-Russian peoples in the USSR must be broken and that new empires shall not be allowed to arise on the ruins of the old colonialism, however plausible and peace-loving the new rulers appear to be.

This is the pressing task of the future and it will require the formation and training of a new type of representative abroad who will be able to see and report accurately on the trends of public opinion and to recommend appropriate action by the highest officials of the United States government and its allied free nations. The United States in the cold war cannot rest upon its oars and glow with satisfaction at what it has already achieved. It must set new tasks before itself and work strenuously to achieve them, so that the ideals which have been so brilliantly expressed again and again by American statesmen can be reflected in American action and the world can move into a new realm of freedom, prosperity and co-operation.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST UKRAINIANS IN THE USSR IN NATIONAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS

By NESTOR KOROL

The national and political discrimination against the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union by Russian Communists began in 1918 with the arrival of Russian Communist troops under the command of Col. M. Muraviev, former officer of the Czarist *gendarmarie*, and V. Antonov, who took the alias of Ovsienko and has since been known as Antonov-Ovsienko.

It is to be recalled that the war between Communist Russia and the Ukrainian National Republic which began on December 28, 1917, broke out *after* the recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Bolshevik government of Lenin.

When the Russian Bolshevik troops occupied Kiev they initiated a barbarous massacre of the Ukrainian population and plundered Kiev and the Ukrainian territory which fell under their power. It was enough for any Russian Communist to overhear the Ukrainian language spoken on the streets of Kiev. He arrested the innocent passersby and executed them on the spot without trial or investigation as "enemies of the revolution." Any documents or papers written in the Ukrainian language found in a dwelling of Ukrainians were sufficient grounds for the execution of the owner without trial.

Even their own fellow members of the Communist Party, if they happened to be Ukrainian or spoke Ukrainian, were shot on the spot. Thus a number of Ukrainian Communists were executed in Kiev by the troops of Muraviev for the sole reason that they carried some Ukrainian documents or identity cards in their pockets. Among those who were thus disposed of were Zarudny and Mykhalchenko, two outstanding members of the Communist Party and leaders of the Communist faction in the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. Their only crime was possession of the admission card, written in Ukrainian, to the building of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, which they had to have, as members of the *Rada*, to gain entrance. These cards were found in their pockets together with membership cards of the Communist Party. The fact that they formed a communist Fifth Column in the *Rada* could not have saved them from

execution, simply because Russian Communist hatred of everything and anything Ukrainian was so strong. Later on, the Communists expressed "official regrets" for the outrages of their troops, and eventually erected memorial plaques on the street where the two outstanding Ukrainian Communists were "erroneously" executed.

After the peace treaty of 1921, by which the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920 was terminated (in which war Ukrainian military units participated on the side of Poland), Ukrainian intellectuals, having lost hope for a speedy liberation, changed their tactics against the Communist occupants. As a result of this change of tactics, an unusual development took place, embracing Ukrainian education, arts, literature, science in all its branches, and economy, especially in the various forms of co-operative organization. For instance, the Union of Agricultural Co-operatives possessed 39 beet sugar refineries and the largest plant producing farm machinery, while the "Ukrainobank" owned large shipping enterprises, and built wheat elevators.

In 1925, however, the Russians finally completed the liquidation of Ukrainian independent statehood. First of all, they abolished the separate Ukrainian citizenship, replacing it with Soviet (All-Union) citizenship. In 1923 they established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, into which they incorporated by force the heretofore sovereign Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Ukraine and that of Turkestan. At the same time the Russians began the "unification" of the administrative divisions of these Republics on the pattern of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. They abolished the rich network of Ukrainian cooperatives and crippled the educational system by transforming universities, polytechnical and technological institutes into separate institutes of narrow specialization on the pattern of Russian institutes. All Ukrainian institutions of learning, including the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, were transformed into Russian-type institutions, with the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences becoming a branch of the Russian Academy, which was known as the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

All Ukrainian scientists and learned specialists who could not be liquidated on suspicion of being "nationalists" and "Petlurites," were lured into migrating to the Russian Republic. In order to stimulate such migration of technical personnel to Russia proper, the entire Soviet Union was divided into five "zones" with respect to salaries. The first zone, embracing the central part of the Russian Republic with Leningrad, Moscow, the Urals and Siberia, was the highest-salaried zone, while Ukraine constituted the fifth zone, lowest in point of view of salary. The areas which were populated by the Ukrainians but were not part of Ukraine, belonging to the Russian Republic (parts of the provinces

of Kursk, Voronizh, Rostov and North Caucasus), constituted the fourth zone.

The difference in salaries between the first and the fifth zones was enormous. For instance, while working in Moscow I received 1,800 *rubles* a month; if transferred to Kiev, for the same employment I would receive only 1,050 *rubles* a month, although food, electricity, gas, rent and heating were much cheaper in Moscow than in Kiev. For example, a few years before World War II, one kilogram of rye bread in Moscow cost 70 *kopeks*; in Kiev it cost 1 *ruble* and 10 *kopeks*. White bread in Moscow was 90 *kopeks*, in Kiev 1 *ruble* and 40 *kopeks*; 1 kilogram of sugar in Moscow cost 4 *rubles* 20 *kopeks*, while in Kiev the same cost 5 *rubles* and 90 *kopeks*.

From the viewpoint of political relations, life in the Russian Republic was more serene than in Ukraine, inasmuch as in Russia there was no persecution for Russian nationalism. In Ukraine, sympathy for Ukrainian nationalism was considered a major crime punishable by at least ten years at hard labor under the Soviet penal code. On the contrary, Russian nationalism, and even Russian chauvinism, enjoyed the official protection of the government and the Communist Party. This in part accounts for the mass flight of Ukrainian intellectuals and patriots from Ukraine to other parts of the Soviet Union. As a rule, their places were taken by hordes of Russian specialists, professors of universities and institutes, teachers, doctors, engineers, administration and party officials and, last but not least, security police and the Soviet army.

In Ukraine these Russian "career" officials received salaries not in accordance with the "zone scale," but on the basis of individual contractual arrangements. These individual contracts assured them of much higher salaries than they could hope to receive in Moscow, plus special privileges regarding food, rent and clothing, to which, as "foreign specialists" in Ukraine, they were entitled.

[The Ukrainians in the Russian Republic, despite their high special qualifications, were not considered "foreign specialists"; their salaries were regulated according to the "zone" specifications.] These Russian "foreign specialists" in Ukraine enjoyed other privileges as well: they could receive scientific degrees without formal presentation of theses or doctorates, inasmuch as their scientific achievements were credited by their "previous academic" work in Russia.

These "specialists," who as a rule did not know the Ukrainian language, were the enforcers of Russification, inasmuch as they lectured in Russian to Ukrainian students. When the students demanded the use of the Ukrainian language, as prescribed by the university authorities, they were accused of being "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" and in

many instances were arrested and sent to concentration camps. When this measure proved inadequate, Moscow introduced special universities and institutes in Ukraine whose direction was not in the hands of the Ukrainian Soviet government but in those of the Soviet Union. In these institutions the Russian language became the official language. By such devices and ruses the Ukrainian language has gradually been reduced to an inferior level, usually restricted to provincial and small town schools, while Russian is the dominant language in all institutions of higher learning in Ukraine.

This "equality of Ukraine within the USSR" resulted in a mass exodus of Ukrainian scientists and scholars to other parts of the Soviet Union. Those Ukrainian intellectuals who refused to be enticed by the prospect of better living conditions somewhere outside Ukraine were arrested as "enemies of the people," among them, to give but a few great names in Ukrainian science: Academician A. Y. Krymsky, V. M. Peretz and M. S. Hrushevsky.

Others, like V. I. Vernadsky, president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and Academician A. Y. Karpinsky, and hundreds of more or less prominent Ukrainian intellectuals, were dispersed throughout the Soviet Union where they were put to work for the various branches of the Soviet Russian government.

Another aspect of persecution of the Ukrainians in their own country by the Russians is the discrimination against the Ukrainian language. From the very inception of the Communist regime in Ukraine the Russians imposed the so-called "official Ukrainian orthography and syntax," which for all practical purposes differed little from the Russian. In the Ukrainian lexicon appeared a great number of Russian words, phrases, expressions and new creations, and the grammatical rules of the Russian sentences were imposed upon those of the Ukrainian. Subsequently, a falsification of Ukrainian folklore and the history of Ukraine began. From the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences disappeared such important divisions as the history of Ukraine, the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian philology. The most flagrant example of the falsification of Ukrainian history by the Russians was the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, whereby they came up with an entirely new interpretation and meaning of that treaty, one which benefits the Russian state and damages the Ukrainians, to say nothing of the damage inflicted upon historical truth.

All party and Comsomol purges in Ukraine were invariably directed against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists." Even Ukrainian Communists could not tolerate this systematic discrimination and the colonial status accorded Ukraine within the USSR. Many found themselves in op-

position to the Russian Communists. These soon were sent to concentration camps or were executed outright. At least three ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet government were forced to commit suicide: Skrypnyk, Shumsky and Lubchenko.

In addition to placement of Russians in Ukrainian universities and institutes, and industrial and agricultural institutions, the discrimination against Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language is being pursued through other channels as well. The price of the Ukrainian book is much higher than that of the Russian book; likewise, the remuneration of authors of Ukrainian books is much lower than of Russian authors. This policy is a double-edged one. It seeks to force Ukrainian authors to write in Russian for higher remuneration, and to discourage the Ukrainian readers from buying Ukrainian books because of the prohibitive prices. Ukrainian authors, especially those in the scientific and technological field, are told to write in Russian, since "the Ukrainian language is not known abroad" and because Ukrainian books are "not likely to attract readers in the Soviet Union."

My own experience in this respect may serve to substantiate my assertion. In 1930 I wrote a major treatise on the soy bean, its cultivation and its practical use. It was the first book in the USSR on the subject and it was published in Moscow in the Russian language. For one printed ream (16 pages) I received 800 *rubles*. As a Ukrainian I wanted to have the book published in Ukrainian as well. After translating it into Ukrainian, I proceeded to Kharkiv to the Ukrainian State Printing House. There they accepted my manuscript and offered me the honorarium of but 350 *rubles* per printed ream. In Ukraine, I discovered, this was the highest remuneration. However, they subtracted 125 *rubles* for the "translator," although the manuscript was in a good Ukrainian literary form. The "Ukrainian" publishing house apparently wanted to spoil the pure Ukrainian language by mixing in Russian words, which was always the policy of the Russian Communists. The price of my Russian-language book was 1 *ruble* and 10 *kopeks*, but the Ukrainian-language version cost 5 *rubles* and 80 *kopeks*, although the number of pages was the same.

The same treatment is applied to translations of old works of Ukrainian costs 31 *rubles* and 20 *kopeks*; the same volume in Russian and American authors. An exception is made in the case of contemporary Soviet Russian authors; their works in Ukrainian are cheaper than in the original Russian. The full volume of T. H. Shevchenko's works in Ukrainian costs 31 *rubles* and 20 *kopeks*; the same volume in Russian costs only 21 *rubles* and 60 *kopeks*. On the other hand, the full collection of works of Mayakovsky costs 30 *rubles* and 25 *kopeks* in Russian, and but 21 *rubles* and 60 *kopeks* in Ukrainian. Sholokhov's *And*

Quiet Flows the Don cost 40 rubles in Russian, and only 28 rubles in Ukrainian. The translation of Jules Verne's *The Secret Island* costs, in Russian, 11 rubles 95 kopeks, and 19 rubles and 50 kopeks in the Ukrainian language. Mark Twain's *Huckleberry Finn* costs 3 rubles and 40 kopeks in Russian; in Ukrainian its price is 6 rubles and 60 kopeks. His *The Prince and the Pauper* Russian edition costs 3 rubles, while the Ukrainian edition is 5 rubles and 80 kopeks. To be sure, the list of such examples is endless.

The Ukrainian authors, especially the scientific ones, are persuaded to write in Russian because very "few peoples abroad know the Ukrainian language." "The farmers on collective farms who speak Ukrainian do not need your scientific dissertations. The Ukrainian language is good for the expression of simple things by common people, while the Russian language is a world language."

Thus the Russians are using their language policy as an instrument of expansion and Russification, not only in Ukraine, but in all other non-Russian republics of the USSR, especially in Asia.

IN DEFENSE OF THE ENSLAVED NATIONS

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The following memorandum on the dangers of a new "Summit" Meeting was prepared jointly by the Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent (CACEED) and the American Conference for the Liberation of the Non-Russian Nations of the USSR. Addressed to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the memorandum was presented on April 29, 1958, to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles by a delegation of U.S. legislators: Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D) Ill., Sen. H. Alexander Smith (R) N.J., Rep. Walter H. Judd (R) Minn. and Rep. Michael A. Feighan (D) Ohio.*

It appears that another meeting of the heads of state of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is imminent. The pressure for such a meeting, generated by the vast propaganda machine of the Russian imperialists, has sought to stampede the leaders of free and representative governments into a sudden and ill-prepared gathering to consider an agenda developed at the recently concluded meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the International Communist Movement. That meeting was called ostensibly to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik take-over of the Russian Federalist Soviet Socialist Republic, but in reality to prepare the final assault against the still-free nations of the world. The manifesto released to the information media of the world upon the conclusion of that meeting provides ample evidence that the leaders of the Kremlin have openly rededicated themselves to the fundamental Communist goal of total world conquest. The propaganda for another Summit Meeting which now emanates from Moscow is only an effort of the leaders of world Communism to implement their recent manifesto.

It is against the political reality of this background that the refusal of the Government of the United States to be stampeded into such a Russian trap has the overwhelming support of the American people.

The importance which the Russians attach to an early meeting at the Summit with the leaders of the free world is underscored by the following:

a. The open threats made by the Russian leader Khrushchev against all the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should they continue to take steps to preserve their national integrity and individual independence. In effect, the Kremlin has sought to frighten our allies into peaceful submission with the spectre of atomic warfare if they refuse to do so;

b. The Russian tactical campaign of threats and intimidation is accompanied by a carefully planned and activated drive which offers "peaceful coexistence" as the only alternative to further Russian aggression through atomic warfare. The Russian leaders are candid in admitting that their offer

of "peaceful coexistence" is only a maneuver to weaken the defenses of the still-free nations so as to make in due time peaceful surrender a necessity.

This world-wide Russian propaganda campaign has been capped by the demand of the Russian leader Khrushchev that the free world accept the *status quo*, as it now exists in the world. Thus, we, as a nation, are now being invited to extend *de facto*, if not *de jure*, recognition to the Russian occupation of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. It is patently evident the leaders of the Kremlin are seeking a meeting at the Summit to force such recognition from the statesmen of the free world.

Here, in the United States a number of activities have been and are being launched in order to prepare the climate for a Summit Meeting which cause us, the undersigned, grave concern. We wish respectfully to call your attention to these activities and their certain consequences in the spirit of good Americans seeking to aid the leaders of our country meet this latest Russian threat to world peace and justice.

1. The argument is advanced that we must not speak about the long record of black deeds perpetrated by the Russian Communists against the people of many nations now held against their will within the present-day Russian Empire. Fear is expressed that by so doing we will provoke the Kremlin into taking unfriendly action against us. Meanwhile, the world-wide Communist propaganda machine is inciting hatred and hostility against the people of the United States in every country of the world.

2. Another argument is advanced that if we take a firm and critical attitude toward the Russian Communists in our various language broadcasts beamed to the Soviet Union and Central Europe, we will incite the people therein to premature revolt. This argument disregards the fact that the despotism of Russian Communist occupation carries with it a powerful stimulus for freedom revolutions, aside from what we may think or do, and that our long-range security interests are best protected when we clearly express our political allegiance with the oppressed nations.

3. A tempting but unfounded prospect of unlimited markets for American consumer goods among the people behind the Russian Iron Curtain is now being cleverly portrayed by the Kremlin. This is the empty reward being offered big business in the United States in exchange for its participation in the game of "peaceful coexistence." This tactical economic operation of the Kremlin is skillfully timed to capitalize on present economic trends in the United States. The recent arrival of the new Russian Ambassador Menshikov, who is a trade expert protege of Commissar Mikoyan, is therefore significant.

4. The press recently reported that the "Voice of America," in the interest of economy, was giving thought to reducing the number of language broadcasts to the Soviet Union, holding out the possibility that since the ruling class spoke Russian the "Voice of America" might follow the example of the British Broadcasting Corporation and thus limit such broadcasts to the Russian language. Such thinking may unintentionally lead to the serious weakening and likely to dissolution of the vital role intended for the "Voice of America." A weak "Voice of America," subject to continuing public attack and suspicion, is unquestionably a primary objective of the Russian Communists. If economy in this vital work is a pressing need and our psychological warfare is to be

regulated by the ceiling of budgetary expenditures, then priority attention should be given to reducing the already overweighted broadcasts in the Russian language so as to make needed provision for more non-Russian language broadcasts to Central and Eastern Europe and Asia.

We believe, Mr. President, that before any meeting at the Summit is entered into, additional steps should be taken by our government to prepare a constructive and fresh climate of world opinion. We respectfully recommend that careful consideration be accorded the following recommendations which we believe serve that purpose:

1. That the United States reaffirm its support for the guarantees set forth in the Atlantic Charter, at the same time noting the many violations of these solemn promises by the Russian Communists;

3. That the United States reaffirm its support for the political principle of national self-determination for all people while declaring our intention to create a world atmosphere in which this basic human right may be exercised;

3. That the United States place the blame for world tensions where it properly belongs by announcing our refusal to accept the *status quo* as created by Russian aggression and deceit and in violation of the solemn pledges given that the governments of the liberated nations would be representative of the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned;

4. That the "Voice of America" be strengthened by increasing the number of non-Russian language programs beamed to the Soviet Union and that the program content be governed by the overriding need to present to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain the unvarnished truth about world affairs and above all, about national and cultural traditions and aspirations of the enslaved nations which are being subjected to communization and Russification. The same policy of a strengthened American psychological warfare effort should be equally applied by American private organizations which are engaged in political broadcasting programs directed to the enslaved nations under Communist domination, such as "Radio Free Europe" and "Radio Liberation." Money should not be a consideration to dictate the urgency and quality of our broadcast programming, inasmuch as we are spending billions for national defense, and consequently we should not hesitate to provide for the most powerful weapon which we possess—the ideals of freedom and human values;

5. That the United States take the lead in advocating support for free, regional federations of independent nations, in which the principle of equal among equals prevails, as a positive and eventual goal for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and Asia.

In conclusion, Mr. President, we must be wary of why the Russians are so exceedingly anxious and eager to have a Summit Conference at this time. Their drive to maintain a *status quo* now is not motivated primarily by their alleged technological and military superiority, but rather by the general insecurity and unrest caused by the unwavering opposition and restlessness of the non-Russian nations held in captivity by the Kremlin in the vastly over-extended Russian Communist Empire. This very weakness of the Russian Communist state is the principal reason which prevents the Russian Communist leadership from pushing further its aggressions and encroachments against the free nations of the world.

Only a daring and fearless attitude toward the Russian threats and intimidations can justify the hope and expectation of the many millions in the world who still see and respect the United States of America as a great power and leader in these troubled and insecure times in which the world finds itself today.

**CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS
OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN DESCENT:**

Very Rev. Msgr. JOHN BALKUNAS,
President.

M E M B E R S :

Albanian American Literary Society
—*Peter Borzuku*;
American Bulgarian League—*Luben M. Christov*;
Czechoslovak National Council of America—*Andrew J. Valusek*;
Estonian National Committee in U.S.A.
—*Richard Espenbaum*;
Hungarian American Federation: Eastern Division—*Joseph Hattayer*;
American Latvian Association —
Charles Stankevitz;
American Lithuanian Council—*Mary Kizis*;
Polish American Congress—*Dr. Sigmund Sluszcza*;
Romanian American National Committee—*Pamfil A. Riposanu*;
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America—*Dmytro Halychyn*.

**AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR
THE LIBERATION OF THE NON-
RUSSIAN NATIONS OF THE USSR:**

Professor ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI,
President.

M E M B E R S :

American Committee for the Independence of Armenia—*Edward F. Sahagian*;
Azerbaijani Union in the U.S.A. —
Zahid Khan-Khoysky;
Byelorussian Congress Committee of America—*John Kosiak*;
Cossack American National Alliance, Inc.—*George Jeremenko*;
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American Council for Independent Idel-Ural—*Dr. Sahih Faizi*;
Turkestanian Association—*M. Maksud-Bek*;
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America—*Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky*.

BOOK REVIEWS

DAS GOLDENE FELD. Roman aus der Ukraine. Erich Kern. Copyright 1957 bei Schild-Verlag, Muenchen-Lochhausen. Umschlagentwurf: Robert Hoffmann, Muenchen. Druck: Waldheim-Eberle, Wien VII. P. 293.

The German public at large has not yet adequately realized the great tragedy which took place in Ukraine in the years 1941-44 and which had a decisive influence not only upon the fate of the German and the Ukrainian peoples, but on that of the entire world. As in the First World War, so was it true in the Second World War that the erroneous policy of the great powers with respect to Ukraine took a painful revenge upon them and affected a number of other peoples in and outside Europe.

It is true that there do appear a number of publications in the English language which underscore the great political significance of Ukraine in the USSR and in world politics in general. Little, however, is written about the immediate cause of the present world malaise. The German writers especially have tended to by-pass this painful question altogether or have commented on it in distorted mirror fashion.

One of the first to depart from this general rule was German writer Erich Kern, author of a series of novels, such as *The Clock Stopped*, *Dance of Death*, *The White Man — The Dead Man*, *The Great Ecstasy* and *The Hard Life*. Some of his books have been republished in Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Turkey, England, Spain and the United States. Kern's latest, *Das goldene Feld*, deals with the events in Ukraine during World War II. It is not a novel *per se*, but rather a series of reportages knit together by a light fable for the purposes of unity.

This German writer and diligent collector of historical documents provides in his book vivid tableaux of the fate of the German and Ukrainian men during World War II, as emphasized by the publishing company on the book's blue and yellow cover [Ukrainian colors—*Editor*].

"On the golden field of Ukraine was decided the fate in these years not only of our own, German, and that of the noble Ukrainian peasant people, but of the entire world."

The author dramatically and with great skill depicts the events of 1941-44 in Ukraine. The principal characters of the book are a Russian *politruk* (political commissar); the Germans: a captain from Westphalia who later becomes a Major, a young Lieutenant from Lorraine, an old Colonel from Pomerania, a Private First Class from Vienna; and the Ukrainians: a student from Lviv, a soldier from the Ukrainian Division "Galicia," Ukrainian peasants, a young and attractive Ukrainian woman, Daria Stepanivna, with her son Ihor, and, of course, the bands of Russian partisans. The background of the book is the "limitless space of Ukraine."

Author Kern is considered to be a writer of "hot themes;" accordingly, we do not find him mincing his words. The Russian terror in Ukraine and

the unpardonable psychological and political mistakes committed by the German Eastern policy are vigorously threshed out. He is completely permeated by the Ukrainian world; in his book Russia is shown to be a hostile and remote world which has no common bonds with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. This is underscored by the names of localities in Ukraine which are given in the Ukrainian rather than the Russian transliteration.

The author is enchanted with the bountiful nature of Ukraine; the skylark is a "bird of Ukraine." He stresses that the Ukrainian population welcomed the German army enthusiastically, but that this sympathetic attitude changed when the Germans began to treat the prisoners of war cruelly and retained the collective farms. It is hardly strange that this German policy was quickly taken advantage of by Moscow, which sent its partisans to Ukraine. In expressing the viewpoint of all Ukrainians, Daria Stepanivna says (in the book):

"They (the Ukrainians) do not like the Germans, but, even more, they hate the Russians."

When the German occupation authorities began immediately forceful confiscation of wheat and sunflower seeds, the first great popular indignation arose. The German Captain Wagner was compelled to say: "I am disturbed by this uncertainty, I am afraid of this country." He had good reason to be afraid of that country, his friend Daria pointing out to him:

"You, Germans, speak the same language as the Russians . . . Those who wanted to march with you, you starved to death during the first winter."

The German writer catches with great accuracy the mood of the population of Ukraine:

"The Ukrainian peasants, sensing the future developments, looked with panic to the East. Nothing good has ever come for them from that direction. And now there would be even worse. On the crossroads of nations: trodden by the East and exploited by the West, without having found any understanding from it, this is Ukraine."

This impasse is also underscored by the young Ukrainian student whose mission was to recruit youth for the Ukrainian Division: "It is too late now . . ." Daria added: "In the winter of 1941 the Germans pushed too many people into graves. They made no distinction between good and evil."

Author Kern states that such was Ukraine during the long centuries, "on the crossroad of two worlds." Therefore, he describes sympathetically the history of Ukraine, the Kozak wars with the Poles, Turks and Russians. Through the lips of Daria, who conducts a conversation with young German Lieutenant de Flavini, the author says:

"Here steadily invaded the foreign peoples: Poles, Tatars, Turks and Muscovites. They always wanted to take something from us: our women, our honey, our cattle, our labor force. They took all this, our husbands for the army, and finally they took our whole country . . . They even forbade us to call ourselves by our proper name—Ukrainians."

The German Eastern policy must of necessity have led to the terrible retreat of the Germans from Ukraine which began with the fall of Stalingrad. But even this retreat did not change this policy at all. The author reports that the Ukrainian Division, which was to defend a front sector extending over 60 kmls., was placed under the command of an ordinary policeman unqualified for the post of commander. In addition, the German troops that were assigned to defend the other parts of the front, could not sustain their positions and gave up. The Germans had to lose, but the "dream of the Ukrainians about

freedom faded away, and the Red hangmen again occupy the Ukrainian cities and villages . . . There will be again what has always been during the centuries . . ."

We have purposely referred to some outstanding paragraphs of the book to show the great attachment of the German author for Ukraine. Kern spares nothing in condemning the German officers and men for their less than gentlemanly conduct in Ukraine.

Yet for all of his sympathy, we cannot afford not to criticize him for failing to present true Ukrainian characters. The heroine of the book, Daria Stepanivna, is hardly a genuine Ukrainian woman. In general Ukrainian women do not comport themselves as lightly as would appear from the book. Regrettably, the author has given us characters wholly of his own making, possibly to suit the sensational taste of the reading public.

The other important shortcoming of the book is the author's omission of any reference to the Ukrainian nationalist insurgents during 1942-44, although he knows well the history of Ukraine, including the role of Ukrainian Communists, such as Skrypnyk and Shumsky. In these years the UPA was at the peak of its underground power; a picture of Ukraine without the UPA is a false one.

But even with such shortcomings and inadequacies the book as a whole is a welcome novelty on the German publishers' lists.

DR. V. ORELETSKY

FORTY YEARS OF THE SOVIET POWER. Ninth Conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1957. P. 168.

The Scientific Council of the Institute, prefacing the book, states the following:

"The Conference did not attempt to draw conclusions with respect to the situation in all the branches of life in the USSR. The purpose was to cast a light on the most important question of the ideological bases of Bolshevism and their changes, and also to analyze their practical application in the political, national-legalistic, cultural and economic forms of the USSR."

In this spirit of the decision of the Scientific Council of the Institute was the conference conducted. Almost all the speakers kept to the plan of analyzing the problems as outlined by the Scientific Council of the Conference. Regrettably, the Council failed to provide any arguments in favor of such a narrowing of the work of this important conference, rich in pregnant conclusions. Moreover, the book does not include the contents of the dissertations presented by the speakers; instead, the summations of the official opponents at the conference are given. As a result, the opinions expressed in the course of the discussion by the conference participants have remained undisclosed. It is truly regrettable, inasmuch as the reader is deprived of the reaction of the participants to the principal speakers and their official opponents. The Council also failed to give, even in cursory form, the contents of the speeches of other participants and the reason for such a procedure.

The material given in the book demonstrates beyond question that the principal purpose of the conference lay in the elucidation of the ideology and policy of the communist power in one or another branch of life of the USSR. Thus, the theme of the conference—"Forty Years of the Soviet Power"—was treated literally. The emphasis was almost exclusively on power. In presenting

the analyses of such problems, as the ideology of the Bolsheviks and their nationality policy, the *rapporteurs* (Dr. R. Wraga and Professors Frederick C. Barghoorn, Reinhard Murach and Poppe) in their reports limited themselves in the treatment of these problems by interpreting the legislation and policies of the communist government, its views and intentions. Special stress was given to the separation of Bolshevism from "scientific Marxism." The inescapable impression persists that such was the prime purpose of many speakers and of the Scientific Council of the Institute itself.

Thus no one spoke of the popular masses of the USSR. The Scientific Council of the Institute, in summing up the results of the communist power for the past forty years, did not find it fitting to dwell upon such pertinent and cardinal issues as the class problem, the national movements, the attitude of the masses toward the communist power, the social face of the so-called "Socialist man of the USSR," the national mood of the Russians themselves as well as that of the other peoples of the USSR. Without a fundamental elucidation of these sociological problems the work of the conference cannot claim comprehensiveness nor can the Scientific Council of the Institute pretend that its analysis of the problem it deemed important was correct. For the methodology of research of various sociological problems requires a certain conclusiveness of analysis. In our view the analysis of such or other efforts of the Kremlin mandatorily is to be completed by an analysis of the reaction toward these efforts on the part of the popular masses of a certain strata, and also an analysis of the social and national upheavals in the Soviet society. The entire forty-year period of the communist power is an experiment of a sociological order. Therefore, the sociological results of the experiment at the summation of its period of time should rank first in importance and not be deprived of any significance at all.

Thus the work of the conference seemed to be rather narrow and one-sided in scope. This one-sidedness especially is manifest in the reports on the nationality policy in the USSR, inasmuch as no mention in them was made of the national movements of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. It appears that in the opinion of the organizers of the conference these nations enslaved by Moscow do not merit full attention on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of their struggle, which coincides with the fortieth anniversary of the coming to power of Communism, although in the struggle for their liberation against the Russian Bolsheviks they have lost tens of millions of their people, as for example, the Ukrainians, whose population loss under the Soviet Russian tyranny is enormous.

MYKHAILO PAVLIUK

HARVARD SLAVIC STUDIES, Vol. III, edited by Horace G. Lunt, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 327.

This volume consists of eight studies on various Slavic themes by members of American and Canadian universities and by one professor from the University of Belgrade. On the whole they offer a good cross section of American Slavic studies and the wide range that these include.

For the Ukrainian reader, the most interesting is George S. N. Luckyj's study of the *Battle for Literature in the Soviet Ukraine: A Documentary Study of VAPLITE (1925-1928)*. Arkadi Lyubchenko, the only one of the members of the VAPLITE (the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) to escape the great

purges of Ukrainian writers, succeeded in taking his papers to Germany during World War II and though he died there, the papers reached Canada and are now at the St. Nicholas Orthodox Monastery, Grimsby, Ontario. Prof. Luckyj has had the opportunity to study this unique collection and from it he has culled the material for this article, the rise and fall of the VAPLITE and its connection with Khvylovy, undoubtedly the most important Ukrainian writer of the period ideologically. The article well shows that the attack on the budding Ukrainian literature was deliberately conceived by the Communist Party which did not wish Ukrainian literature to emerge from under the Russian shadow as the members of the VAPLITE worked hard to do, yet without throwing off the Communist framework. The story of the interference of the Party in the affairs of the Society is well known and exposes the emptiness of the Russian Soviet claims to cultural superiority. It is a welcome addition to Prof. Luckyj's previous work on Ukrainian literary politics in these years and we can only hope that he will continue and give later a literary evaluation of the period.

Another article of considerable indirect interest is Prof. Serge A. Zenkovsky's *The Ideological World of the Denisov Brothers*. The Muscovite traditional nationalists under the leadership of Avvakum revolted in the days of Czar Alexis against the invitation to the Kievan scholars to come to Moscow in the days of Khmelnytsky. In the next generation the Denisovs were, as leaders of the Old Believers, the center of Russian opposition to the reforms of Peter I or rather his transformation of Moscow into the Russian Empire where only the power of the Czar remained intact. They were intensely loyal but they could not tolerate the antics of the Orthodox Czar and so they shifted the emphasis for Russia from the land of the Orthodox Czar to the land of the truly Christian Russian people and rehabilitated the Third Rome without the Christian Emperor. Prof. Zenkovsky tries to explain this as due to democracy, "from an autocratic Christian state into a concept of a democratic Christian nation." He traces these ideas into the teachings of the Slavophiles and similar groups. We can well believe that the Denisov brothers did play a decisive role in the building of that monstrous complex that we now know as the Soviet Union with Stalin's emphasis on the superiority of the Great Russian people.

The other articles are striking and thought-provoking, especially the Translation and Introduction to Nyegosh's *Ray of the Microcism* by Anica Savić-Rebac of the University of Belgrade. She very definitely underestimates the influence of Milton on this work but she well explains some of its peculiarities of thought and expression, even though she does not seem to know of a peculiar translation of Milton into Russian by a monk which Nyegosh seems to have had in his library.

Vera Sandomirsky's *The Sad Armchair: Notes on Soviet War and Postwar Lyrical Poetry* is a good treatment of the evil results that socialist realism had on Russian poetry, especially in the Zhdanov period, although it shows clearly that the political pressure on the Russians was not so pressing as on the Ukrainian authors of the same period under the Russian Communists.

The other four articles are *Marko Marulić* (1450-1525) by Mirko A. Usmiani of Dalhousie University, a study of the life of the first writer in Croatian; *The Russian Bible Society and the Bulgarians* by James F. Clarke of the University of Pittsburgh, a study of an attempt to translate the New Testament into the still uncoordinated modern Bulgarian; *Prague and the Purple Sage* by Svatava Pírková-Jakobson of Harvard, a study of a weird pro-American youth movement in Prague during the period of the Czechoslovak Republic; and *Recurrent Imagery*

in *Dostoevskij* by Ralph E. Matlaw of Harvard, a study of certain insect symbols found consistently in Dostoyevsky's novels.

It is a competent and a carefully edited work with a good range of material but we can only regret that the transliteration of Cyrillic names was not done into a style that reflects the normal English instead of the German-continental pronunciation. Such names as Kvylyovyj look unusual and apparently Vera Sandomirsky has avoided the dilemma by printing her texts in Russian where they stand out more clearly. Still we can hope that the *Harvard Slavic Studies*, now in their Third Volume, may continue on the same level of scholarly excellence.

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CLARENCE A. MANNING

NIGHTMARE OF THE INNOCENTS. By Otto Larsen. Translated from the Norwegian by Munda and James Whittaker. Philosophical Library, New York, 1957, pp. 240.

In recent years at least two revealing books on the concentration camps in the USSR have appeared. I have in mind *One of the Fifteen Million* by N. Prychodko (Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1952) and *Islands of Death* by S. Pidhainy (Toronto: Burns & MacEachern, 1953).

Both Prychodko and Pidhainy are educated Ukrainians who had been arrested by the Soviet Russian police and deported to the slave labor camps as enemies of the regime. In their accounts, they not only tell of their experiences in prison, but also analyze the Soviet Union in its sociological aspects.

Otto Larsen, author of the new *Nightmare of the Innocents*, did not receive a formal education. A simple Norwegian fisherman sympathizing with Communism, Larsen reproduces what he saw in full detail and writes with candor. The result is an unusually fresh and striking account of a world that Westerners still find hard to accept as real.

Anticipating the German occupation, he fled to Russia in 1940. There he had hoped to find the paradise of which he was constantly told in his poor fishing village. In Murmansk he was imprisoned for some time, and released only after he agreed to work for the Soviet Union's intelligence system. For several years Larsen, along with two other Norwegians, spied upon the German troops in Norway and forwarded information to the Russians. Then, while on Soroya Island, he lost his radio contact with Murmansk and, threatened with German capture, managed to get to Sweden. At the end of World War II he returned to his native village in Norway.

Now Larsen made his second and greater mistake. He decided to go to Russia to pick up his personal belongings and his brother's fishing boat. As soon as he crossed the border of the Paradise, he was arrested and thoroughly searched. It was proposed to him that he renew his espionage work. Larsen hotly refused, seeing "no reason for such activity now." "The war was over and I did not want to be mixed up in espionage any more," he writes of his attitude expressed to the Soviet intelligence officers. But the Russians became very hostile to him and all too soon accused him of espionage directed against the Soviet Union. Thus, for his pains, Larsen was sentenced to ten years at hard labor.

Larsen spent eight years in both prison and concentration camps, being released at the end of 1953. During the whole of this time he lived with the vast mass of prisoners. His powers of endurance were remarkable, as were his

powers of observation. The naked truth of life in concentration camps is graphically revealed here without any exaggeration.

The reader can learn much about the Soviet Union from this engrossing book. Once Larsen was told that there were "40,000,000 prisoners in these camps" (p. 212). Another prisoner, a Tatar, told him that some "48,000 Tatars, young and old, men and women and children, sick and healthy," were uprooted from Crimea in 1944.

"These poor people were given no time to settle their affairs, collect their belongings, or make contact with the rest of their families. They were just all swept up like animals, stuffed into the railway convoys and taken away. Most of them had lost near and dear relatives and friends and had no idea where they were today" (p. 205).

Very moving is the incident of the orphan boy, "about ten or twelve years old" (p. 96), who confesses to Larsen he had been arrested for begging in the streets of Murmansk. Although he was starving in the camp, this boy nonetheless was content with his lot because he had a place to sleep and at least something to eat. While in the streets, he had nothing at all.

Larsen frequently mentions Ukrainians. It is obvious from his book that a host of Ukrainians had been imprisoned.

I warmly recommend this excellent book. It spreads the sad truth about the Soviet Union, the "prison of nations." Thanks to Larsen, the free world now can see more of the bestial life hidden behind the Iron Curtain.

WEINSTOCK DER WIEDERGEBOURT. *Moderne ukrainische Lyrik. Ausgewählt, übertragen und herausgegeben von Elizabeth Kottmeier. Vydannya na hori in Zusammenarbeit mit Kessler Verlag, Mannheim 1957. Pp. 116. \$1.50.*

Ukrainian poetry abroad has found happy years in West Germany. Three anthologies of it have been published within the last nine years.

The first anthology, Volodymyr Derzavyn's *Gelb und Blau*, (*Yellow and Blue*), appeared in 1948 in Augsburg. The translator presented here thirty contemporary poets with some seventy poems. *Die ukrainische Lyrik, 1840-1940 (The Ukrainian Lyric, 1840-1940)* by Hans Koch, included fifty-two poets, starting with Ivan Kotlyarevsky.

Kottmeier's anthology is limited almost exclusively to Ukrainian authors who live abroad. Among the thirty-two poets included in this book are Yuriy Klen, Evhen Malaniuk, Mykhailo Orest, Oksana Laturynska, Oleksa Stefanovych and others who have already established their positions in literature. Also the poets of the younger generation, such as Vira Vovk and Bohdan Rubchak, are represented here by two or three poems each.

The translator has also included in this anthology Mykola Zerov, Volodymyr Svidzinsky, Bohdan Ihor Antonych and Pavlo Tychyna, probably because their poems enrich her selection with predominantly modernistic approaches to poetry.

Most of Kottmeier's translations are authorized by the poets themselves, who once lived in Germany before they emigrated to the American continent. A few of them, namely M. Orest and Ihor Kostetsky, still live in Germany.

As a rule, the translator has preserved the rhythm and the rhyming of each original. She has also succeeded in preserving the stylistic peculiarities of the

poets. We must admire her for her successful renditions into German of such completely different authors as M. Orest and P. Tychyna. Here are two examples:

M. Orest:

День гніву — він настав! Зарокотала,
Важка провісна буря. В небесах
Промчала хмар розбурхана навала
І сутінь розлилася по полях.

Der Tag des Zorns — brach an! Im Brausen nahte
Der wuch'tge Kűnder Sturm. Es wogten wild
Gewitterwolken unterm Himmelsgrate,
Und Dmmerung  berschwemmte das Gefild (p. 35).

P. Tychyna:

Арфами, арфами —
золотими, голосними обізвалися гаї
Самодзвонними:

Йде весна
Запашна,
Квітами — перлами
Закосичена.

Harfen sind, Harfen sind —
holde Antwort wie von Golde alle Wlder worden sind
Die erbebenden:

Bringt der Mai
Die Schalmei,
Bl tenkranz — Perlenband
D fte-Schelmerei (p. 16).

Kottmeier's translations succeed in expressing the meaning of the originals. They show the manifold value of contemporary Ukrainian poetry. The fact that the translator is a noted German poetess assures fluency of the language in her translations. Indeed, this is a worthy contribution to German literature.

Monterey, California

YAR SLAVUTYCH

THE GREAT SIBERIAN MIGRATION. By Donald W. Treadgold, Princeton University Press, 1957, Princeton, N.J., XIII, p. 278, illus. and maps, \$5.00.

Prof. Donald W. Treadgold presents a very interesting and useful book on the migration to Siberia and the Far East. This well-written study will probably serve as a standard for this kind of work.

In his Foreword the author compares the Siberian migration and the American frontier movement. A big difference, however, exists between them—the migration to Siberia was and is now under the strict control of the government—the Imperial, formerly, and at present, Communist—whereas the American movement was never subject to any control, being motivated wholly by individual or group interests.

At the end he does offer an important explanation of the term, "Russian." "The reader must often interpret the word 'Russian' as used in the study to render—*rossiysky*, inhabitants of the Empire, rather than *russky*, Great Rus-

sian" (p. 8). He referred here to W. Kubyovych's study of the Ukrainian migration to Siberia.

The author also makes the important remark: "However, such tabulations merely beg the question of 'Nationality.' How far had the idea of being a Ukrainian or Byelorussian national, or even the consciousness of speaking a separate language rather than dialect, spread among the immigrants from the provinces in question? These matters are most difficult to study" (p. 9).

Although it is true that study of this question is quite difficult, it can be done. We have enough evidence in the different events and questions after the revolution. Perhaps one of them was the appointment of Ukrainian delegates to the Siberian *Duma* (Parliament) and, another, the assignment of Ukrainian delegates as ministers in the Siberian Government before reactionary Kolchak's forces took over the Siberian government and lost the anti-Bolshevik war. We know well why such an end ensued.

In 1926 the Soviet census confirmed that the Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East kept the definition of their nationality.

On pp. 143-149 the author discusses the movement of migrants to Siberia and concludes: "Thus 90 per cent came from the black-earth and western provinces, where the need for land was felt most sharply: Poltava—329,000; Chernihiv—278,000; Kursk—234,000; Kiev—182,000; Kharkiv—167,000 and others. Ukraine had the highest percentage, 12.8, of migrants for the period 1896-1915.

Interesting and well documented are a few pages relating to the question of the formation of a new people with distinct customs and Siberian dialects. There "nationalism and sectionalism both developed powerfully. The aspiration of the *Sibiriak*, his expression of regional needs and uniqueness, and the growth of ambitions for regional autonomy or even independence, cannot be explored here, though considerable literature on the subject may be consulted."

An interesting work in this field is being prepared for publication by Prof. V. Erlich of the University of Washington.

Prof. Treadgold points out that, inasmuch as the "Soviets did not feel the need for even nominal recognition of Siberian regionalism—since the Siberians did not make up a minority 'nationality'—it is possible that such aspirations may one day be heard again" (p. 243). It is certain that the Kremlin is fearful and that recognition of the Siberian aspirations conflicts with the policy of complete Russification of the USSR.

To this conclusion we can add that the new influx of migrants to the Asiatic part of the USSR and the development of national consciousness among the Moslem peoples of Turkestan and Kazakhstan will produce new political conditions and troubles for the centralist imperialism of Muscovy.

The Great Siberian Migration is a fine book with clarity and imaginative writing, based on the best available sources. The Far East and especially its nationality problems must be carefully studied because therein we can find valuable data on the present policy of Russification. This Soviet policy follows remarkably closely the steps of the reactionary Kolchak and Rosanoff administrations in the civil war period.

Prof. D. Treadgold has written probably the best book in English on the question.

JOHN V. SWEET

GESCHICHTE DER UKRAINISCHEN KULTUR. Ivan Mirtschuk. Veroeffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes Muenchen. Herausgeber Hans Koch. Band XII. Isar Verlag, Muenchen, 1957. P. 284.

History of Ukrainian Culture, which was published recently in the German language by Prof. Ivan Mirtschuk, a well-known Ukrainian scientist, undoubtedly belongs to the priceless achievements of Ukrainian science. The book provides not only a lucid and comprehensive cross-section of Ukrainian culture in its developments throughout the centuries, but—what is the most important characteristic—it is written from the viewpoint of Ukrainian statehood and under this aspect presented to the foreign reader.

In the first pages of his valuable book the author in presenting the geography of Ukraine, singles out his country from among other countries of Eastern Europe, proving that Ukraine geopolitically is tied with both the East and the West, and that Ukraine's geopolitical position is the result of its separate political independence. The question of the political independence of Ukraine thus is not an "accidental problem" of Poland or Russia (pp. 52-53), but is an independent problem in itself of European and world caliber. Throughout the centuries, Ukraine was and still is now the terrain of historical decisions and there is no doubt that it will play an important part in the general international constellation which will be shaped in the future.

Under this aspect of interpretation, Prof. Mirtschuk is endeavoring to provide the foreign reader with the latest possible cross-section of history of Ukrainian culture throughout the centuries, discussing the most vital and important fields of culture, beginning from the language, folklore and the history of the church to literature, arts, schools system and the history of philosophical thought. The author presents this cross-section by the methods of Western European approach to the history of culture, clearly underscoring not only the Western European influence upon the development of Ukrainian culture, but the inclusion of various sections of Ukrainian culture, especially the arts, in the complex of world culture, with which the culture of Ukraine forms a unity. This point is one of the most outstanding characteristics of the newest work of Prof. Mirtschuk.

In the preface the author remarks (p. 5) that some periods, because of the lack of sources, are not fully covered, and that the book contains some gaps. But in the opinion of this reviewer these gaps detract nothing from the value of Prof. Mirtschuk's book, inasmuch as these gaps and inexactnesses could be filled in during the subsequent editions of the book, as for example, the author's statements that Metropolitan Mohyla "was dogmatically an Orthodox" (p. 39), or his hint that a Ukrainian theater existed in the pre-Christian era in Ukraine (p. 181), both of which seem to be open to challenge (cf. the research of Rev. Prof. A. Velyky, OSBM in the matter of the Kiev patriarchate and the "old Ukrainian theater"). But, we repeat, these gaps and inexactnesses in no measure belittle the valuable book of Prof. Mirtschuk.

Some may argue with the author whether it was necessary to include in the history of culture such attainments as museums, libraries and archives. We believe that the author did an excellent scientific feat by providing actual figures, as for instance, in the chapter on the school systems (p. 225), in which he incorporated the statistics on Ukrainian schools under Austria and under the post-Versailles Poland.

Finally, the author must especially be given credit for his rather extensive presentation of philosophical thought in Ukraine. This field (in which Prof. Mirtschuk is a specialist) has been rather neglected, and now almost completely suppressed or transformed into communist and materialistic dialectic by the Russian communist occupants of Ukraine.

In conclusion, by publishing this enlightening *History of Ukrainian Culture* in the German language, Prof. Mirtschuk contributed a great service to Ukrainian science. One would wish only that this valuable volume be published as soon as possible in the English language as well as in the other world languages.

PROF. DR. GREGORY LUZNYCKY

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION," by Alan Moorehead. *Life*, New York, N.Y., January 13, 20, 27 and February 3, 1958.

These four chapters on the Russian Revolution are impressively written and to the largest degree accurately presented. The narrative is absorbing throughout. Assisted by Dr. Stefan Possony of Georgetown University, the author definitely makes a popular contribution in knowledge and understanding of this event. As the title suggests, he is concerned chiefly with the revolution in Russia and only here and there alludes to the non-Russian revolutions of national independence in Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Baltic countries and elsewhere. However, some basic historical inaccuracies do creep into this excellent narrative and thus indicate a short grasp of the total perspective of East European developments since early medieval times.

In chapter one the writer vividly depicts the general situation in the Russian Empire during the early years of World War I. Here, as elsewhere, the term "Russia" is employed indiscriminately; sometimes it refers to the Empire, at other times to its proper object, the ethnographic territory of Russia. The writer himself demonstrates the continuing influence of Czarist Russian censorship, about which he says much, when he speaks of a "Russian monarchy for a thousand years." In fact, no such monarchy existed until Peter the Great, since prior to his time no "Russia" as such was in existence. The vestigial products of Russian historiography are vanishing and certainly in time will be non-existent. Despite all this, the chapter gives a descriptive account of the chaotic conditions prevailing in 1916, the ineptness of Czar Nicholas to rule, the sinister influence of Rasputin upon the Czarina, and the main historical events from the time of Alexander II in the 60's to the first World War. The institutional picture is well portrayed, showing a totalitarian, predatory empire with all its properties of slavish Russian masses, captive non-Russian peoples, censorship, terrorism, and pervasive autocracy. The writer correctly observes that "everybody knew that the *Duma* as an effective parliament was a farce . . . It was a noisy 'talking shop,' and the Czar could and did dismiss it whenever he chose." Czar Nicholas gave cogent expression to the centuries-old tradition of political Russian totalitarianism when he declared, "I shall maintain the principle of autocracy just as firmly and unflinchingly as it was preserved by my unforgettable dead father."

Chapter two of this series traces the early revolutionary outbursts in the Russian Empire. The rebellion led by the Cossack Pugachev is cited and the works of Diderot, Voltaire and others are mentioned. It is in this chapter that account is taken of the nationalistic uprisings in the empire. Voltaire once said that the Ukrainian nation always seeks freedom, a fact which the author also might have mentioned. Nevertheless, despite his neglect of the problem of

the non-Russian nations in the councils of the revolutionary parties, the writer provides much interesting material. He quotes from Marx's letter to Engels that "I do not trust any Russian." Regardless of Marx's attitude toward the Russians, George V. Plekhanov is shown organizing the Russian Social Democratic Party on a Marxist basis. Later this party split into the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The other two chief parties were the Russian Social Revolutionary Party, made up of populists espousing agrarian socialism, and Paul Miliukov's liberal Constitutional Democratic Party, otherwise known as the Cadets. The roles played by Lenin, Trotsky, Father Gapon and others are neatly integrated into the scheme of the narrative.

With the historical background completed, the narrative brings the reader back to the period of World War I. The threat to the revolutionary movements of the reforms pushed by Peter Stolypin more or less came to an end with his assassination in the Kiev opera house in 1911. However, the threat was resumed with the outbreak of the war as the Russian masses rallied behind the Czar. German strategy is correctly shown to have been aimed at promoting the non-Russian independence movements in the empire and undermining the Czarist government through the Russian revolutionaries. The author shows quite strikingly that the latter were not at this time receptive. As he puts it, "Both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks by 1915 believed revolution in Russia to be inevitable. But they wanted to delay the revolt until the end of the war so that they would get control over a united country. A premature revolution, they thought, might lead to the dismembering of Russia." What the writer obviously meant to say here is the dismemberment of the Russian Empire. In terms of Russian imperialism these revolutionaries generally were no more liberal than the Czar. Another telling point made by the author is that "It was the soldiers who really made the revolution." Significantly, in March, 1917 the Petrograd garrison was made up of large numbers of non-Russians, particularly Ukrainians, who joined in the revolution. This is important when we consider the potentiality in this respect of the mixed armed forces of the USSR.

The description of the rival *de facto* governments in Petrograd adequately depicts the chaos that reigned in 1917. The crass ineptitude of Alexander Kerensky, who was more concerned about the breakaway of Ukraine and the Caucasian nations from the empire than the entrenchment of the *Duma*, is clearly shown. However, confirming further our earlier criticism of this exposition, the author in one breath rightly points out that "in the Ukraine an independent government had been established, hostile to Lenin" and then, regarding the Brest-Litovsk treaty, wrongly states that "It was a crushing defeat. Russia lost one-third of her population, one quarter of her territory . . ." and so on. Actually Russia lost nothing that rightfully belonged to her. There is no doubt that such contradiction will in time prove to be the media for a more accurate and acceptable perspective toward these events.

"A FRESH LOOK AT LIBERATION," by the Board. American Committee for Liberation, New York, November, 1957.

The title of this pamphlet, issued by the American Committee for Liberation, is essentially and unfortunately a misnomer. The look, to the greatest degree, is neither fresh nor refreshing. The same half-truths, inaccuracies, and, in a few instances, fabricated notions which persisted earlier in this decade are repeated here. Actually, for one to evaluate this latest product of the committee in this vein and character, a close familiarity with the organization's

background and activities is indispensable. Contrast and comparison could not be attained without it. The case is an unfortunate one because in spite of some constructive activities undertaken by the group, its thought and policies are stagnant, not having substantially advanced these past seven years. They definitely lag behind the developed thought in this field as indicated, for example, by the two instructive articles commented upon above.

For the specialist in the field the very first sentence, posed as a question, sets, the tone of the article: "Will political liberty one day flourish in the countries now under Communist domination?" By all means political liberty should thrive in these countries, but before this can eventuate, the independence and freedom of the nations both within and outside the Soviet Union must first be realized. This article brusquely brushes aside the facts of history, particularly the expansion of Russian imperialism, and tries to set up an objective which falls short of political requirements in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The chief point is that in doing so, it would deprive the United States and the Free World of their most potent ideological weapon against imperialist Russia, namely the liberation, independence and freedom of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. Nowhere is any mention made of Russian Communist imperialism and colonialism, as though these were unmentionable terms or perhaps even invalid. Instead, we encounter such crass nonsense as, for example, "the Soviet Union emerged as a mighty nation" (p. 3). Even Moscow is careful to avoid such usage. The plain fact is that the Soviet Union is no more a nation than the Kuakiutl tribe. But facts are not the guides for this article.

Additional violence to elementary facts is seen almost throughout the entire article. It has "Soviet despotism," rather than Russian Communist imperialism, as the main threat; it poses a mythical "permanent civil war" in the USSR, a "continuing struggle between the Kremlin hierarchy and its subjects" rather than the real struggle between the conquered and dominated nations and imperialist Moscow; with its "Soviet citizens in the aggregate" it seeks to discolor the concrete and widely established fact that Ukrainians and other non-Russians were largely those who "deserted to the German side" in World War II; or, to take just one more twisted version of things, it observes in part correctly that "the detachment of one or another puppet state is possible, but only liberation of Soviet Russia itself can guarantee the larger success," whereas, to be realistic about it, the only *guarantee* of the larger success is the liberation of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. Soviet Russians have not offered a single bit of evidence in massive opposition to the regime since 1917—and this includes the drunken sailors mutiny at Kronstadt!

Each of these concepts and thoughts not only defy established historical facts about Russian imperialism and colonialism but also mislead and confuse the chance American reader of this pamphlet regarding the real nature of the Soviet Union which is that of a colonial empire ruled by Moscow. In brief, nowhere in any Russian Communist text that this commentator is familiar with, is there as much verbal monolithism as one finds in this article. Moscow itself couldn't have done a better job in this respect; and all this is done for the ostensible purpose of not offending imperialist-minded Russian anti-communists who, as a matter of well-documented fact, share with the Russian Communists the mania of "Holy Mother Russia" and its empire. After a careful analysis of this article one really wonders whether this subsidized committee is striving to out-compete Moscow in creating in the Free World the impression that the Soviet Union is truly a monolith and that the territorial integrity of

the Russian Empire, now in supposedly Communist form, must be eternally preserved. It develops its unrealistic theme as though the so-called nationalities question—actually the captive non-Russians issue—never existed. There can be no doubt that the disservice done by this committee to basic U.S. national interests will become clearly evident once the tremendous potentialities of the non-Russian nations in the USSR are generally realized.

"KEEP SEATED, PLEASE," a commentary. *National Review*, New York, N. Y., April 26, 1958.

At the Metropolitan Opera House the Moiseyev Dance Company opened recently the People-to-people's program of the cultural exchange medium agreed upon by the United States and Moscow. The occasion was highlighted by the shameful fact of an American audience rising and standing to the tune of USSR's anthem. What many feared about the cultural exchange agreement is already coming to pass, namely Moscow's full political capitalization of it. This is just the beginning, to be sure.

As the commentator in this widely respected periodical puts it, "An American audience, in America's premier auditorium, on its feet for the playing of the Soviet national anthem! For the anthem that celebrates the victories of the most frightful conspiracy in world history, the planned starvation of four million Ukrainian peasants, the slow murder of forty million slaves in Siberian labor camps . . ." and numerous other atrocities. Although in the interest of complete accuracy the anthem is not "national," this commentary makes its substantial and overwhelming point. It goes to stress that the "Moiseyev organization is conceived as an absolute totalitarian lie—the Hitlerian kind of Big Lie—about what for Moscow is the most crucial problem —'the national question.' The Moiseyev theme is the free and joyous companionship of all the Communist peoples and nations. The native dances of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Byelorussians, Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians, Tajiks, Mongols link happily in the repertory with the steps of the Russians. The footlights metamorphose the grim Soviet prison of nations into the smiling family of orthodox Bolshevik propaganda." Here, too, despite certain inaccuracies (the "question" is not national but an issue of foreign domination by Moscow over the non-Russian nations: Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks are one as Turkestanians: the prison of nations concept applied also under Russian Czarism), the core of Moscow's foremost problem is plainly expressed. This represents additional appreciation of an increasingly important subject. And no one knows this more sensitively than Moscow!

"UKRAINIAN EMIGRES AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE," comments from USSR. *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, Prolog*, New York, April 1958.

One of the richest sources in this country providing research material on developments in Ukraine is this well-edited digest. The digest is prepared by the "Prolog" Research and Publishing Association, Inc. in New York. Material translated from the publication of this captive country in the USSR is presented in raw form either by way of essential excerpts or full reproduction. Every significant and major sphere of life in Ukraine today is adequately covered. This publication is exceedingly valuable for advanced students and close observers of the USSR scene. The service performed by the association is undoubtedly incalculable in value and impact.

In this April issue of the digest a most interesting section is devoted to Ukrainian emigres and the policy of the United States toward Ukraine. Under this caption excerpts are reproduced from two Moscow-controlled Ukrainian publications. As the editor's note indicates, the first article, entitled "Mercenaries Masked and Unmasked," was apparently written by someone residing in the United States. The author's name appears as Yaroslav Zynych and the organ in which the article appears is *Zhovten'*, No. 1, January 1958, pp. 92-106. The writer spends much of it in attacking Ukrainian emigres and the American Committee for Liberation which he construes as being hostile toward Ukrainian national independence. He berates the Ukrainian nationalist emigres for allying themselves in the past with the Germans and now the American imperialists. "Even the nationalist bosses themselves," he writes, "admit that in the so-called American Committee, an unofficial agency of the US Department of State, the first fiddle is played by Russian White-Guard 'non-predeterminists,' who refuse to recognize the existence of the Ukrainian state." The writer goes on and on with half-truths which he twists to serve the purposes of the Russian masters. The piece is a superficial polemic and deserves comment only to the extent of the objects attacked.

The second article, written by an A. Kysil and entitled "Ravings of the Confused," appeared in *Ukraina*, No. 1, January 1958, p. 28. It is of the same vitriolic character as the one above. Here both Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of Labor Mitchell are attacked for their sympathies toward a real independent Ukraine. The writer says that "Mister Dulles sets out to 'liberate' even Ukraine, and even Byelorussia without asking one or the other their opinion." Later he writes, "What one man has in mind, another has on his tongue. Dulles' colleague Mister Mitchell went in directly, without diplomacy and shouted: "—hey, boys, let's march, we are going to 'liberate' Ukraine." It is gratifying to note the concern shown toward growing Western sympathy for genuine Ukrainian independence. This can only encourage us to intensify such sympathy.

"COMMUNIST POLITICAL SUBVERSION," hearings. Committee on Un-American Activities. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., August 16, 1957.

This very interesting report covers the investigation of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born. For a long time it has been known that Moscow has been attempting to subvert American democratic society through foreign-born elements in the United States. Manuilsky tried it overtly in the late 40's with the American Slav Congress and failed miserably. However, covert methods and front organizations have also been resorted to with some minor success in a few small communities. *

A scan of the list of names associated in one way or another with the A.C.P.F.B. shows that a small percentage is even foreign-sounding. Noteworthy, too, is the fewness of organizations affiliated with the A.C.P.F.B. which have an East European background. For example, there are four so-called Ukrainian-American committees, two Polish ones, three Lithuanian ones and so forth. In this country, in each case there are hundreds of truly American organizations of such background. It would not be hazardous to say that well over 95% of these Americans are strongly and actively anti-Communist. Attempted inroads into their ranks by Communist agents have been virtually nil.

"REPORT . . . TO COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS: A REVIEW OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND OPERATIONS," by Senator Ellender. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1958.

In many respects this is an interesting report submitted by Senator Ellender of Louisiana on the basis of his several visits to the Soviet Union. The Senator was there in 1955, 1956, and 1957. For one, the report represents eloquent testimony of the fact that one can travel widely and still fail to understand, in sound and proper perspective, what he sees. Second, it embraces a few good ideas which, however, have more rooted strength in factual premises than the one he provides. And third, the report demonstrates again the Senator's intellectual recklessness in forcefully arriving at conclusions resting largely on visual observations rather than on careful rational analyses backed by years of study in the field.

To justify in some measure these estimates of the report, let us review a few of the Senator's basic fallacies. First, for the Senator the USSR is a "nation" which he also calls "Russia" and which he deems to be made up of only the "Russian people." These misidentifications immediately stamp the report as being ill-based and erroneously slanted. For obviously if the fundamentals are not in order, the higher generalizations are even less so. As more and more Americans are coming to realize, the Soviet Union is an empire of many nations which, except one, is under the imperialist rule of Moscow. This fundamental fact the Senator couldn't see. Second, he seems to show little acumen and great naivete when he stresses that he enjoyed almost maximum freedom of movement and could "take pictures of whatever I desired, with few exceptions. They were railroad bridges, airfields, and, of course, military installations." One need only ask how could the Senator judge when a forbidden area was really a strategic installation or a slave labor camp? Why didn't he insist on going to the camps in Kolyma, about Karaganda and elsewhere to take pictures? Moreover, in his indiscriminating way the Senator jumps from the sight of grains in Siberia to the unjustified conclusion that this area is "actually becoming Russia's breadbasket," this despite soils and figures to the contrary. His abuse of fragmentary facts, which spot visual observations can only provide, is further seen in such statements: "Under no circumstances is an individual able to go into business for himself . . . It (Communism) has provided a better standard of living . . . for an entire nation of people . . . Today Siberia is the granary of Russia" and so on. Here, too, facts of general understanding are to the contrary.

A live-by-live appraisal of this report, covering education, industry, politics, etc., would show many other evidences of these superficial leaps from fragmentary facts to absurd generalizations. The intervening remarks by Senator Morse on power development in the U.S. as compared to the USSR, by Senator Neuberger on education and Senator Fulbright on the arts, in like vein, seem to suggest some political premeditation in the presentation of this grossly misleading report. Senator Ellender's recommendations are equally misleading. Naively, he suggests we conduct our information program "without disparaging the system presently in effect in the Soviet Union or behind the Iron Curtain." One is almost prone to ask "On whose side is the Senator rooting?"

L. E. D.

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

VOLUME XIII

1957

MARCH—JUNE—SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER

Published by THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Subscription: Yearly \$5.00; Single Copy \$1.25'

NEW YORK CITY
1957

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