

# The UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



Vol. XIII. — No. 3.

September, 1957.

**BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY**

ON THE 300-TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH 1657-1957

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*Picture on the Cover:* BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY, Hetman of Ukraine (1648-1657).  
From the contemporary engraving by V. Hondius.


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# THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

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VOL. XIII. — NUMBER 3.



 Ukrainian ethnographic territory

 Boundaries of Soviet republics and satellites

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SEPTEMBER 1957

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*Published by* UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

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*Checks payable to:* UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

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302-304 West 13th Street, New York 14, N. Y.  
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*Notice:* Mr. Nicholas D. Chubaty published letter of his in the June 1957 issue of The Ukrainian Quarterly, p. 138 entitled: "*In Defense of the Religious Freedom in Ukraine; A Letter to Nikita Khrushchev*" without knowledge of the Editorial Board.

The signed members of the Editorial Board emphatically reject the political concept of the kind of appeal as the letter of Mr. N. D. Chubaty to responsible leaders of the bolshevik regime generally and to the person responsible for crimes in Ukraine in particular.

*Antin Dragan, Walter Dushnyck, Dmytro Halychyn,  
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## CONTENTS

	PAGE
Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ruler of Ukraine <i>Nicholas Chubaty</i> .....	197
Soviet Architecture in Ukraine <i>Dmytro Andrievsky</i> .....	205
Decentralization of Management of the Economy of the USSR <i>Mykhaylo Pavlyuk</i> .....	213
The Triumph of Khrushchev <i>Clarence A. Manning</i> .....	220
Thoughts on Solution of the East European Problem <i>Mykola Kapustyansky</i> .....	228
Fate of Sociology in the Soviet Union <i>Joseph S. Roucek</i> .....	234
Annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR <i>Vincent Shandor</i> .....	243
Ukrainian Poet Dray Khmara on the Ukrainian Literary Life Under the Soviets <i>Oksana Asher</i> .....	255
Quarterly Chronicle of Ukrainian Life .....	265

### BOOK REVIEWS:

Hetman of Ukraine, Ivan Mazeppa, by Clarence A. Manning, New York 1957. <i>Alexander Ohloblyn</i> .....	272
The Soviet Partisan Movement, by Edgar M. Howell. Dept. of the Army, Washington 1956. <i>Dr. Myroslav Prokop</i> .....	273
Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934-1945, by Roman Illytzyk, München 1956. <i>S. Y. Prociuk</i> .....	276
The Church of Silence in Slovakia, by Rev. Dr. T. Zubek, Passaic 1956. <i>Nicholas D. Chubaty</i> .....	278
The Red Army. The Red Army 1918-1945. The Soviet Army 1946 to the Present. Ed. by B. H. Liddell Hart. New York 1956. <i>Lew Shankovsky</i> .....	280
Christianity, Democracy and Technology, by Zoltan Shtankay. New York 1957. <i>Joseph S. Roucek</i> .....	284
Ucrainica in American and Foreign Periodicals .....	285

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## BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY, RULER OF UKRAINE

(*On the 300th Anniversary of His Death 1657-1957*)

by NICHOLAS CHUBATY

July 27, 1957 marked the three hundredth anniversary of the death of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the liberator of Ukraine from Polish domination and the first ruler of the Second Ukrainian historical State which was created by the dynamic national revolution of 1648. Bohdan Khmelnytsky was without doubt one of the greatest individuals in Ukrainian history; he was and still is honored as the liberator of Ukraine, as *pater patriae*, although his one political mistake, the Treaty of Pereyaslav which created close ties between Ukraine and the Muscovite Tsar in 1654, became the beginning of a new and still continuing subjugation of Ukraine to a foreign power. That treaty between Ukraine and Moscow changed the political balance in eastern Europe. It benefited the rapidly expanding Russian Empire and it started Poland definitely on the path that led to its ruin.

Khmelnytsky endeavored to correct the mistake of Pereyaslav by a Swedish-Ukrainian alliance (1657) and he died at a time when there was a complete break between Ukraine and Russia. Nevertheless Russian official historiography (both white and red) pictures him as the builder of Ukrainian-Russian political unity. The Tsarist government erected a monument in Kiev in his honor and Stalin created a special military decoration, the Order of Khmelnytsky, on the occasion of the annexation of Western Ukraine to the Soviet Union.

In spite of the tragic consequences of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Khmelnytsky was the real liberator of the Ukrainian people; more than that he was the savior of the Ukrainian people because he insured their national existence as a political and cultural entity.

When Khmelnytsky started his career in 1648, it had been already three hundred years since the Western Ukrainian (Galician-Volynian) Kingdom had disappeared from the map of Europe as an independent state. This had been the last remnant of the Kievan Rus-Ukrainian Empire which had flourished for 400 years. Kievan Rus, situated in a strategic position near the Ural-Caspian gate, was forced to take over



the duty of defending Europe from the continuous invasion of the barbarians from Asia and fully exhausted, it had fallen before the powerful blows of the Mongol invasion (1240). The Western Ukrainian Kingdom survived Kievan Rus on part of its territory for more than a century.

Meanwhile on the western ethnic non-Ukrainian territories that had been included in the Rus Empire, two other states, the Duchy of Muscovy and the Lithuanian State, had developed in the safe forest belt. In the West behind the Ukrainian wall the Polish Kingdom with its different Latin Catholic culture had been able to strengthen itself.

The vast western territories of the disintegrated Kievan Rus Empire became the booty of Poland and of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian State and these two new entities seized all the territories of the Ukrainian people, the former masters of the old empire. Poland commenced a bitter struggle not only to eliminate all traces of the political entity of the Ukrainian people but also to root out that Rus-Ukrainian culture which had been dominant in Eastern Europe for five hundred years.

Yet though no longer independent but in Poland and the Lithuanian State (and after 1569 exclusively in Poland), the Ukrainian people were still compelled to continue their former fighting against the Asiatic invaders, for Poland was too weak to undertake the task by itself. During the life of the independent Ukrainian state, the attacks had been delivered from the east. Now when they were under Poland, these attacks came from the south. The incursions of the Tatars from the Crimea and of the Turks from the Balkan peninsula destroyed the physical substance of the Ukrainian nation to such an extent that the Ukrainian population was almost completely forced back out of the steppe belt into the tiny northern forest and to the western sections of Ukraine. Without any help from their overlords, the Polish government, they were forced to defend themselves and so for this purpose the Ukrainian Kozaks came into being.

The foreign invaders ruined the Ukrainian people materially but the internal invaders, the ruling Poles, tried to destroy the people spiritually by implanting on their territories the Polish culture and Latin Polish Catholicism which they used to effect a full Polonization of the Ukrainian people.

This Polish cultural invasion at first had no success because the old Kievan Rus-Ukrainian culture with its rich Byzantine source was much stronger than the Polish Latin culture of the 14th and 15th centuries.

The Kievan Rus culture although constantly drawing from its Byzantine source never blindly followed the imperial city; even after the religious break between Constantinople and Rome (1054) the Ukrainian



Church had maintained an independent position. The Western Ukrainian Kingdom even maintained close relations with the Catholic world and from the Christianization of Ukraine to the end of the Western Ukrainian Kingdom, the people considered themselves a part of the medieval European *Communitas Christiana* (Christian Community).

It was only after the occupation of the Ukrainian territories by Poland that the anti-Catholic sentiment in Ukraine began to grow rapidly. Eastern Orthodoxy became the Ukrainian national faith and the Kievan-Old Slavonic literary language became accepted as the language of Ukrainian enlightenment.

Later the cultural superiority of the Ukrainians and their self-confidence began to fade because of the change in the cultural balance in the Mediterranean basin. The rich Byzantine source dried up with the loss of Constantinople to the Turks. The Byzantine Greek classic heritage became the seed of a new and rapidly growing culture in the west, the culture of the Renaissance. Latin Polish Catholicism armed now with this new cultural weapon became superior to the Ukrainian Slavonic Orthodox culture. Education in Ukraine lagged more and more with each generation until in the 16th century a wave of ignorance had engulfed nearly all the Ukrainians, clergy and laity alike.

With this the Ukrainian cultural self-confidence disappeared, the Ukrainian upper classes began to desert their people and in large masses gave up their Ukrainian culture and accepted Latin Catholicism or the newly developed Protestantism. In either case they fell before the movement for Polonization. The Jesuit colleges reaped a rich harvest among the younger Ukrainians. The unenlightened Ukrainian Orthodoxy became almost the only sign of the continued Ukrainian nationality which had lost all political aspirations. The Ukrainian nation was threatened as it never had been before.

The few enlightened Ukrainian patriots tried to find some way to prevent this disappearance of the nation. What way could they find? Establish schools? But what kind of schools would be effective? Could the outdated Old Slavonic and Greek schools answer, when the whole enlightened Christian world (except Orthodox Muscovy) was developing along the lines of the Latin Renaissance culture? How was it possible to stop the Polonizing and proselyting work of the Jesuit colleges among the Ukrainian youth? The only way was to find an immediate access to the western Renaissance culture, and to bypass Poland through a direct connection with Rome and a church union.

Rome was not interested in Polonization but in Catholicizing the Ukrainians and was willing to allow the eastern Ukrainian church to

remain intact. Rome had always been greatly concerned over the problem of bringing the Eastern Orthodox Christians into unity with the Holy See.

So we can see the motives for the Church Union in Brest in 1595-6. It was approved by the entire hierarchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, for they expected that the church union would almost automatically stop the activity of the Jesuits in converting the Ukrainian youth to the Latin rite and the Polish nationality.

Although all of the Ukrainian bishops supported the idea of the union, this was misunderstood by conservative Ukrainian Orthodox masses who were accustomed to see in Orthodoxy the safest defence of the Ukrainian nationality against Polonization. They suspected that the church union was a fraudulent device which had been cunningly prepared by the Poles for the final destruction of the Ukrainian nation. It was only the progressive Ukrainians who realized that the Poles wanted the Ukrainian people to be kept in ignorance and so offer no resistance to Latinization and Polonization and that the only protection against this was the help which could be given by the Holy See directly.

Meanwhile the government in Moscow had been stabilized after the Troublous Times and the Patriarch in Moscow was also deeply interested in supporting Orthodoxy in Ukraine in the hope of acquiring the area in the future. Patriarch Filaret, the father of Tsar Michael, used all his influence to support Orthodoxy in Poland. All these political currents split the Ukrainian people into the two camps of adherents and opponents of the church union and these two camps fought one another with words and with arms.

The desertion of the Ukrainian upper classes from the Ukrainian nationality in the latter part of the 16th century developed social differences between the Poles and Ukrainians in the 17th century. After the higher nobles withdrew from the Ukrainian community, the latter consisted almost entirely of the peasant masses, the lower nobility and the poorer towns-people. To these there was added a new military class, the Kozaks.

In the darkest times of the incursions of the Crimean Tatars and the Turks, these volunteers undertook the national defence. They were audacious and adventurous men who were attracted by the free life in the deserted but extremely rich Ukrainian steppes. In the middle of the 16th century, they formed themselves into regular military detachments and built on the island of Khortytsya in the Dnieper River below the cataracts (Porohy) a stronghold called the Zaporozhian Sich (Beyond the Rapids).

This free life of the Kozaks attracted mostly fugitive peasants who were unwilling to fulfill their obligations as serfs for the Polish nobility.

By the end of the 16th century this new military class which had received the name of Kozaks developed into an important factor in the national life of Ukraine. They became a strong democratic force dangerous not only to the Tatars and Turks but to the Polish nobility in Ukraine, for these undertook a new colonization of the area and used the peasants as serfs, since the Kozaks had made the area on both sides of the Dnieper safe for settlement. A struggle between the Poles and the Kozaks naturally resulted. Indeed the first half of the 17th century was filled with continuous Kozak revolts which were bloodily put down by the stronger Polish forces.

In the acute struggle over the church union, the Kozak host was closer to the masses and took the side of Orthodoxy. This again increased the social and religious tension in Ukraine until in the middle of the 17th century it culminated in a great national revolution headed by the Hetman (Leader) of the Zaporozhian Kozaks (1648). This was the first successful revolt and in it Poland was totally defeated and the Ukrainian national state was reborn on the Ukrainian territories on both sides of the Dnieper. After three hundred years of foreign oppression the existence of the Ukrainian nation was assured.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky was born in 1595, the year of the church union in Ukraine which started the internal religious struggle but which fortunately brought about a development of the Ukrainian cultural life in both religious camps. He was a member of the lower stratum of the Ukrainian Orthodox nobility and the son of a Kozak captain. He was educated in a Jesuit college (probably) in Lviv and followed his father's career. In 1620 he was with a Kozak force operating with the Poles against the Turks. His father fell in battle at Cecora (Tsetsora) and young Bohdan was captured by the Turks. During two years of imprisonment in Constantinople he learned to speak both Turkish and Tatar. Then he was ransomed and returned to Kiev where the younger scholars who had been educated in local and foreign schools were developing an atmosphere of national enlightenment under the protection of the Kozak Hetman Petro Sahaydachny, who died from wounds received in a battle against the Turks at Khotyn (1621).

The rising tide of national life showed itself in the rebirth of the Ukrainian national tradition and this linked the glorious past of Kiev with the present and future of Ukraine. In a memorandum written to the Polish Diet (Sejm) and printed under the title *Protestatsia* (Protestation) the Kiev Ukrainian intelligentsia demanded from the Polish Diet a respect for the aspirations of the Ukrainian people who now possessed their own army and were the legitimate successors of the Kievan Rus rulers. They phrased it definitely in their remarks on the Kozak Host:

"This generation is the descendants of the glorious Rus nation, of the seed of Japhet, who battled the Greek Empire on the Black Sea and on the land. This is the army which has succeeded to that of past generations when the Rus monarch Oleh crossed the sea on his ships, rode on the land and stormed Constantinople. At the time of the Sainted Rus monarch, Volodymyr the Great, they attacked Greece, Macedonia and Illyria. Other peoples achieve fame through words and discussions; the Kozaks win successes by their deeds."

It was this national tradition that inspired the national revolution led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In a series of battles he smashed the Polish forces in the steppes of Ukraine and forced them to the west to the ethnographical boundaries of the Polish people. He planned to liberate the entire territory of the Ukrainian people and as he said to the Polish peace delegation: "I want to liberate the Ruthenian nation up to the Vistula River."

Except for the one unfortunate battle at Berestechko (1651), Khmelnytsky was uniformly successful on the battlefield and can therefore be included among the great generals of European history. His revolt shattered the power of the Polish-Lithuanian state which never again recovered its former strength.

In spite of his military victories, Khmelnytsky realized that the new Ukrainian state was too weak to stand alone. It had been weakened by the series of wars and by the internal religious struggles and he had to limit it to the national territory on both sides of the Dnieper. He felt that he had to secure a strong ally to enable him to face Poland and so he developed a very active diplomatic policy to find such an ally. The choice was one of his neighbors, the Ottoman Empire or the Moscow Tsardom.

Logically the Ottoman Empire was the better choice. The Sultan allowed relatively wide autonomy to the smaller political organisms as the Khanate of the Crimean Tatars and the principalities (hospodarstvos) of Moldavia and Wallachia. This might have shown him that the Sultan would respect the political independence of Ukraine in the future, if he had the Sultan's protection.

On the contrary the old dreams of Moscow to assemble under its leadership all the lands of the former Kievan Rus Empire and to weld them into an indissoluble whole under the iron despotism of Moscow should have shown him the risk that Moscow offered to the future independence of the new state.

However the anti-Turkish sentiment of the masses and their bitter attachment to Orthodoxy led them to prefer the more dangerous ally, Orthodox Moscow. Khmelnytsky yielded to the blind sentiment of the masses. This was his weakest political act. He did not have the talent

of a Richelieu to direct and swing the feelings of the masses to the interest of the nation and with misgivings he signed the Treaty of Pereyaslav.

What might have been expected in the future happened without delay. The Treaty of Pereyaslav was signed in 1654 and the common war of Moscow and Ukraine against Poland showed that the new ally was pursuing only his own selfish ends and broke the clauses of the Treaty almost before the ink was dry on the Tsarist scrap of paper.

By 1656 Khmelnytsky was already negotiating with Protestant Sweden which was at the time an enemy of Poland, so as to substitute Sweden as an ally for the perfidious Tsar of Moscow. At the critical moment after he had broken with Moscow and was completing the negotiations with Sweden, Khmelnytsky suddenly died and he left Ukraine in a critical international situation (1657).

With Khmelnytsky gone, Moscow had its chance. It was a master in rousing the Orthodox and anti-Turkish sentiments of the masses with the sole purpose of securing a stranglehold on Ukraine from within and the turbulent situation which this produced was well called in Ukrainian history "The Ruin." Then came the full enslavement of the Ukrainian State and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church but not without the most stubborn resistance by the Ukrainians.

This struggle on behalf of the nation was carried on by the masterful democratic organization which Khmelnytsky in the course of a few years had built for the Second Ukrainian State and by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which had undergone in the same years a magnificent development and had guided the revival of the national culture.

Here again, Khmelnytsky, known as a military strategist, showed himself a nation builder for he had created almost out of nothing a new state administration. This was rooted in the regimental military organization developed by the Kozaks and preserved their traditional elements of democracy and human equality. The peasants were set free and were able to join the military and honorable Kozak class. Khmelnytsky received in a friendly manner the Ukrainian nobility and used them in the administrative and diplomatic services of the new state. His own position was that of a president for life of the republic. The other officers were basically elective. Contemporaries in the West compared him and his work to that of Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector of England, although Khmelnytsky never used those bloody methods that led Cromwell to power.

The Ukrainian people are greeting the 300th anniversary of his death, exactly as his contemporaries welcomed him in Kiev in 1649 after his entrance into that city as the liberator of Ukraine, the builder of the Second Ukrainian State and the strengthener and savior of the Ukrainian

nation after 300 years of enslavement. His one great mistake, the Treaty of Pereyaslav, they have to attribute to the unfavorable internal and external position of the newly liberated Ukraine. Ivan Mazeppa, his great successor in the post of Hetman, tried fifty years later to erase this mistake through his alliance with another Swedish King, Charles XII, and his uprising against Moscow, but that attempt failed at Poltava (1709).

The Ukrainians for two centuries have struggled to annul that treaty and to disentangle Ukraine from the grasp of Moscow. We hope that they will finally succeed now in this period when all colonial empires are being destroyed from within and without and we hope that the present generation of Ukrainians will be able to reassert their right to freedom, democracy and independence and as a self-governing state, play its part in the modern world.

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## SOVIET ARCHITECTURE IN UKRAINE

by DMYTRO ANDRIEVSKY

In the light of the basic principles of the esthetics of architecture which are valid for all periods and all countries, let us try to analyze what is being done today in Ukraine in the field of building. For this purpose, we will use publications which can be secured outside of Ukraine. The most rewarding from our point of view is *Arkhitektura Sovitskoi Ukrainy* ("The Architecture of Soviet Ukraine"), published by Gosizdat, Moscow, 1955 in Russian with illustrations and short explanations of them. It features 38 buildings built in 1951-2 which it considers the most successful and the most characteristic. We can supplement this with the albums published also in 1954, *Kiev* with a Ukrainian text and Russian text of a general character. We will use also a large album with a German text *Dreizig Jahre Sovietischer Architektur* ("Thirty Years of Soviet Architecture"), published in Moscow and Leipzig in 1950 and also the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyklopedia* ("Large Soviet Encyclopaedia"). We will draw some details also from the journal *Stroitelstvo Ukrainy* ("Construction in Ukraine"), the organ of the Academy of Architecture of the UkSSR published in Russian in Kiev for 1957.

This survey of the buildings of Soviet Ukraine allows us to draw a few conclusions about the general features of construction in Ukraine under the Soviets.

First we are struck, as compared with the practice in the West, by the relatively small application of the new building materials, concrete, iron, and glass and also the spread of tile for the covering of the walls. Among the 38 buildings in the *Collection* we find only one example, the movie theatre Kiev, of the application of modern technique used in the West where the framework of a larger building is made in iron concrete and the walls are of brick or blocks which fill the space between the uprights. Almost the only innovation in Soviet construction is the use of 1 m. or 1.20 m. concrete or brick blocks without a framework, which seems to be used in apartment houses. This technique calls for mechanical means of moving the blocks and it is really modern but not widespread.



The outer part of the walls is usually either tinted or more rarely faced with terra cotta or stone. In contrast to the better traditions, where the decorative effect is produced by the building materials, Soviet construction seeks the same effect by artificial means. This destroys the organic character of the architecture and gives it a false note. Also the houses made of huge blocks, if their walls are not coated, can have a monumental character. This is the one decorative effect which the Soviet architects have tried to develop from the new material.

Except for this one example, we cannot find in Soviet architecture in Ukraine constructivism where the organic structure of the building is reflected in its external appearance. This does not mean that there have been no attempts to direct construction along these lines, an example of which is the many storied skyscraper the House of State Industry in Kharkiv built in 1929 by the architects Kravts, Serafimovych and Feldher. In its plan it corresponds to the form of the plot on which it stands and its concrete frame shows on the walls of the building. But such attempts did not secure the approval of the officials and tendencies toward constructivism were condemned for "their schematic forms." Of this the *Large Encyclopedia* writes: "Beginning with 1932 a noticeable change was made in the architecture of Ukraine; in the cities and villages they began to build more comfortable and beautiful houses. In the problems of external appearance the architects gave up asceticism and used the achievement of classical architecture. (See *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. 44, p. 149). From this we note that the year of the change is definitely stated and we can imagine some order of the administrative authorities who forbade the architects to employ constructivism.

From the same *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, we learn, that Soviet builders are ordered to follow the official style of "Socialist Realism" in architecture exactly as in literature, painting and sculpture. Thus we read: "The Party has aided Soviet architects to triumph over the formalistic survivals of the past and to direct architectural creation on the path of socialist realism, which lies in the understanding of a deep ideology and truth of the architectural form with the most complete correspondence of the building to its correct popular significance... In their efforts to reveal this deep ideological content in the realistic forms of life, the Soviet architects rely upon the great legacy of the past of the world and especially on their own architecture, the better and progressive tendencies of which the Soviet architects are developing and working out." (See Vol. III, p. 217).

Is it necessary to emphasize how far this "socialist realism" in the Soviet interpretation departs from the demands of life and the spirit of our time? On the basis of this survey, it is possible to assert that the

apartment houses are far from corresponding to the new scientific facts of hygiene, their windows are small and the inhabitants do not have sufficient illumination. In such new types of building as the Univermahy, which need special construction adapted to their functions of the mass sale of wares of general consumption, we do not see any innovations. The appearance of the so-called "houses of rest" arouses rather uneasiness and irritation. The choice of the building materials and the manner of their use has nothing to do with realism. This has to do with realism from the point of view of technique.

In glancing through the collections which we have mentioned, we have found not a single example except in the House of State Industry in Kharkiv of any attempt to find new architectural forms and no solutions of esthetic problems. The exteriors of the apartment houses are usually banal, without any reflection of the interior contents of the house which lie in utility, adequacy and comfort. The administrative buildings aside from their official and cold character are not marked by any other features suitable for this type of structure. The houses of professional organizations as the "House of Techniques" or the "House of Models" have no character just as the workers' clubs lack it. The theatres and movies are marked by a pretentious architecture and a superfluity of decorations. The railroad stations do not differ from the old type of such buildings in Russia. Except for the five-pointed star among Greek acanthi we cannot find any new decorative motifs employed on the buildings of Soviet architecture in Ukraine.

It would be an error to assert that this architecture has nothing worth while. Wherever the official prescriptions have unbound the hands of the builders, they have at times achieved a certain value. We can mention such buildings worthy of consideration as the building of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR, built in 1936-39 by the architect Zabolotny. Here the forms of the classical columns and cornices are deliberately simplified, and decorative motifs on the theme of the hammer and sickle are used discreetly. The whole of the building breathes repose and comfort. The building of the Central Committee of the Party in Kiev is more pretentious. The central part of the facade is formed by a colonnade five stories high of the Corinthian order, which carries a high entablature with a design and banners and rests on a massive base reaching the first story. The side portions of the building are divided by pilasters with windows in the recesses, added to the central portion. The building of the Council of Ministers and the building of the regional organizations of the Kiev district are more complicated. Here there is no restraint, but the architectural forms are carried by long colonnades. Yet it does not lack taste and harmony.

But if some buildings of Soviet Ukraine are not deprived of esthetic qualities, they are almost free of the esthetic sense in the aspect of the historical time and the national soil, on which they have arisen. They are all marked by the old historical styles of ancient Greece, old Rome, or the Renaissance. Neither by their constructive content or by their esthetic expression do they correspond to the spirit of our time and are true anachronisms. Their appearance can be explained by official pressure since the creative ability of the builders and artists under the Soviets is subordinated to the primitivism of the political and administrative satraps. So we do not believe that it is possible to write of Ukrainian architecture, only Soviet architecture in contemporary Ukraine.

If the Soviet censorship is crippling the esthetics of construction in Ukraine, it is much more intolerant of national tendencies in architecture. Such tendencies have appeared and a proof of them is the Forestry Institute in Holosiyivka near Kiev built in the twenties on the plans of architect D. Dyachenko, who sought inspiration in the Kozak Baroque of the time of Mazepa. The building reminds us of the Metropolitan House in the court of St. Sofia Cathedral with its central pediment and side wings, but the architectural forms are greatly simplified so as to adapt them to modern taste. This was sufficient for the architect to repent of his "nationalism." The architect of the theatre in Nova Kakhivka, Zenkevych was no less daring, for he used the ornamental motifs of the Ukrainian Baroque with a pot, vine branches and sheaves. To be sure he placed in a proper position the phrase in Ukrainian "The building of Communism is an all-national cause" so as to avoid the charge of being a counter-revolutionary.

Except for these two examples we find no endeavor to express the Ukrainian national traditions in the contemporary architecture of Ukraine. Also we notice at times inscriptions in Ukrainian on buildings as on the store in Kiev Red Army St. No. 16 but even on the railroad station in Lviv the inscriptions are in Russian. If to the above we add the decorative panel in the station in Kharkiv, it would be all of which Soviet liberalism can boast in its attitude to the Ukrainian tendencies in the architecture of present day Ukraine.

As we see, the Soviet censorship does not sin by toleration of the national character of the architectural style of Ukraine. Although the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* wrote "being a part of the culture of the many nations of the Soviet state, Soviet architecture is developing the progressive traditions of the national architecture of the Soviet people" but it adds "the greatest role in the creative efforts of Soviet architecture is being played by the study and reworking of the realistic traditions of the Great Russian architecture" (Vol. III, p. 219). From this remark we

can see what miserable rights are given to Ukrainian and generally to non-Russian architects in the implanting of national features in their works. This corresponds to the fact that the Soviet regime is striving to form out of the various nations a single "Soviet people." It is seeking to develop a single Soviet culture and so a Soviet architecture. It is doing this by edicts and punishments, and by imposing on the builders "socialist realism." Even if the banal novels and propaganda in verse do correspond to this title, as we see, Soviet construction is very far from realism. At every time it seems that the classics or the Renaissance of Italy or Germany correspond more closely to this title and the efforts and taste of the Ukrainian proletariat than the Kozak Baroque, created by the Ukrainian people at the time of the social and national movements of the broad masses of Ukraine in the time of Khmelnytsky and Mazepa.

When we follow the indications given by the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* and turn to "the Great Russian architecture" from which the unfortunate Ukrainian builders should draw inspiration for their creative work, we notice one remarkable phenomenon. As we showed earlier by examples, we do not see in Ukraine many efforts to approach the contemporary architecture to the needs of our time either in the way of construction or from the point of view of esthetics. Here "Traditionalism" must dominate and that rests not on the Ukrainian past but on other patterns. So in looking over the German album *Thirty Years of Soviet Architecture* in the Russian SFSR we see quite a number of buildings in the modern style and worthy of attention.

We are struck first by the building of the newspaper *Pravda* in Moscow built by the architect P. Golosov in 1935 and so after constructivism was condemned in Ukraine, stylizing and eclecticism were imposed. The central portion of the building is marked by broad windows the height of one story, the entrance is emphasized by a majestic balcony on the second floor, in a side wing the stories are marked by long strips of wall under the windows which are divided not by piers but by columns. Here the horizontal line dominates and it sets off the mass of the building, regulating the combination of the different parts. The whole gives an impression of certainty, decisiveness and harmony. Also in the building of the State Library built by architect V. Shchuko in 1939, the vertical line dominates and gives a wholeness of movement upwards. It divides the facade by piers which run up the whole building and are capped by carved statues on a low parapet, which serves as a pedestal. The style of this building is completely modern and not lacking in nobility.

Such examples are not exceptions. In the same album we find a whole series of buildings of different architects. So the House of the

Ministry on Sadovy St. in Moscow by the architect A. Shchusev has also a totally modern character. The eye is struck by a huge glass rotunda and the large openings of the windows which give a great deal of light. In the same style there was built in 1937 the Molotov Academy by the architect D. Razov. In a somewhat different but still quite modern style was conceived the Frunze Military Academy built by the architect L. Rudnev in 1937 and also an apartment house on the Moscow Boulevard, the work of the architect T. Kuzmin in 1938 or the movie theatre Moscow, the work of the architect L. Khidekel in 1937. Completely modern in appearance is the Botkin Hospital, the work of the architects A. Knyazev and D. Kvitchevsky in Leningrad in 1928 or the Workers' Technical School of architect L. Galpern in 1936 or the House of Industry by architect V. Zuyev in Kuybyshev or the administrative building in Sverdlovsk, the work of the architect A. Antonov in 1938 or the House of the Central Committee of the CP in Novosibirsk by architect A. Kroichkov in 1933-36, etc.

In comparing the state of affairs in Ukraine with the information given by this album on the RSFSR, we will come to the conclusion that the Russian architects have rights and power to seek new solutions in construction of which the Ukrainian architects are totally deprived. It is not strange when in such conditions the Ukrainian architects prefer to work outside of their own country. This does not mean that in Moscow foolishness is not done for "socialist realism" dominates there but it is obviously interpreted in architecture somewhat more liberally. As an example of the devastation which official orders produce in Russian architecture, we may mention the famous Metropolitan of Moscow. Yielding to the will of Stalin, the architects tried to impress the spectator with the splendor of the marble with which the walls and floor of some stations are covered, the elegant candelabra, the decorative panels, the fairylike character of the illumination and the exotic decorative motifs, the fantastic play of lines and masses (the stations of Sokol, Mayakovsky Square, the Aeroport etc.). From this there arose an architectural paradox.

On the whole the condition of Soviet architecture, especially from the point of view of esthetics, poses a problem which we must consider.

The fact is that in the Soviet Union a new social class has found its voice. This is composed of the proletariat and the peasants; of course it is bound in the ranks by the Party. It would seem that this fact would be marked by a certain breakdown in the field of architecture and in culture generally. From history we know that in the Middle Ages when the cities awoke to communal life and the burghers acquired influence, city halls were built which were the response to the palaces and fort-

resses of the feudal lords. Since this was the period of the development of Gothic, the city halls took over the architectural forms worked out for the building of cathedrals and the burghers laid great store in the artistic heritage of their time but did not create their own style. When in the beginning of the XIXth century after the French Revolution came the period of the capitalistic bourgeoisie, the situation was somewhat different. The Renaissance style was passing through the Rococo into its last phase. The bourgeoisie accomplished nothing but the transformation of the old historical styles in the eclectic "Empire" style. It found in that the satisfaction of its ambitions and tried to rival, if not in pomp and beauty, the monarchs which it sent to the scaffold. What happened with the "socialist society" under the Soviets?

In looking at Soviet architecture and especially the Moscow Metropolitan, built by order of Stalin who wanted to perpetuate himself in its construction as the Pharaohs did with the pyramids we want to compare the actions of the Soviets to the actions of a psychological type which is called the "nouveau riche." A characteristic feature of the worker who has recently become rich is the effort to show to everybody his wealth, to follow the luxury of the former lords and also the involuntary display to them of his lack of culture, his lack of nobility, sense of measure, taste and tact. All these features are noticeable in the architecture of the Soviet Union and especially in Ukraine. When you look at the sculptured groups of workers and women from the kolhosps, against a background of Renaissance buildings or marble foyers, you think that you are a peasant woman in run down shoes in the boudoir of Mme. Pompadour. Soviet art is as strange in its surroundings and unconnected in its parts. It is not at home but has been hauled in by the hair. The new government of political workers with the Communist Party has ordered the forcible transformation of architectural forms and decorations created in other social conditions to the taste of the aristocracy or the bourgeoisie into the social and cultural conditions of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the edition of the Moscow Bolsheviks. This has produced a logical and esthetic paradox. We must recognize that especially in architecture of all the spheres of culture, the situation is the most paradoxical.

In finishing our survey of construction in Soviet Ukraine, we must assert that there as in the other spheres of life under the Soviet regime, all is filled with falsity and cruelty. The despotic Soviet government does not allow the genius of the people to develop freely, not speaking about politics. As a result of the pressure from above the Soviet Union including Ukraine in the field of architecture and art in general is at least 50 years behind Western Europe. In any case those attempts at

innovation in architecture which were made in Ukraine during the NEP, were not continued. Ukrainian construction since 1932 had to return to the old paths and to chew on the old mouthful of the classical orders. At the same time in Russia, the architects, as we have seen, had more freedom in solving esthetic problems. And as in other fields of culture the Moscow censor has tried to hold Ukraine to the level of ethnographism, so in the field of architecture he has seen to it that it does not get outside the frame of provincialism.

So the sphere of architecture certifies to the colonial status of Ukraine. Those timid attempts to attach themselves to the Ukrainian architectural tradition, had no results. Neither will the intentions expressed in the organ of the Academy of Architecture of the UkSSR, *Construction in Ukraine*—in Russian—by the President of the Academy A. Komar: "On the basis of the study of the progressive national features the Ukrainian architects will develop creative principles and make use of their inheritance in the present practice of architecture." They will not, so long as the Soviet regime rules in Ukraine and a foreign power is the lawgiver in Kiev. But it is a fact that the Ukrainian architects are nurturing those ideas of which Komar speaks and we can well believe that under normal conditions there are forces which will move Ukrainian architecture along the path of an organic and creative evolution.

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## DECENTRALIZATION OF MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE USSR

*by* MYKHAYLO PAVLYUK

The Soviet economic system which has existed for almost forty years, has passed through two periods in the character of the control of its economy. Almost forty years ago, when the Communists seized the power in Russia, they put out the slogan "Local Control." Actually this meant the control by the local workers' soviets and by the peasant soviets in the villages. It was a condition of full decentralization both economic and administrative. This period was not of long duration. After the civil war and the taking over of the control of the non-Russian republics, and especially after the liquidation of the NEP the process of centralization by rapid strides brought the USSR to such a centralization of the administration of the economy as was previously unknown in history. After the death of Stalin a third period emerged in the administration of the Soviet economy. But its decisive beginning must be dated not so much from the XX Congress or the meeting of the Plenum of the Presidium of the Party in December, 1956 as from the laws for the decentralization of the economic administration adopted by the Supreme Soviet in May, 1957. The basic principles of these laws are: 1. the right was given to the republics to issue laws on court procedure in criminal and civil cases; 2. the right of control of judicial processes; 3. the republics were given the right of state control; 4. there was a limitation of the rights of the Supreme Court of the USSR to control the republics; 5. the economic planning was transferred from the centre to the separate republics with a further decentralization to separate economic regions by the formation of such regions and the assignment of the obligations for planning to a special organ of a "Soviet of People's Economy." This again brought up the plan of dividing the entire USSR into regions of special economic features without respecting in such regions the borders of any national republic (this system of economic regionalization had been started in the time of Lenin). This last broad regionalization has not yet secured legal sanction but it is in a preparatory stage; 6. for the decentralized industry the control of the local Party committees

has been widened, while under Stalin, industry directly subordinated to Moscow, legally and actually was not under the control of the local Party committees. Now the Party bureaucracy has been placed above the industrial bureaucracy.<sup>1</sup>

The actual decentralization of the economic administration began immediately after the death of Stalin and the dynamics in the percentage relationship of the number of enterprises subordinate to the centre and to the republics and the autonomous districts quickly began to swing in favor of decentralization as is shown by the following tables:<sup>2</sup>

*Control of Industry in Percentages*

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957
All-Union	67	68	70	69	57	53	—	45
Republic control	33	32	30	31	43	47	—	55

These tables show how even during the last years of the life of Stalin the percentage of industries of the centralized administration kept increasing and how after Stalin's death the reverse process began of an increase in the percentage of enterprises controlled by the republics and the autonomous districts.

Parallel to this was the constant reduction of the number of ministries with economic functions included among the ministries of the central government of the USSR. After numerous reductions there are now in the central administration of the USSR only six economic ministries, i.e. the aviation industry, defense industry, radio industry, middle machine construction industry, shipbuilding and the ministry of electric power stations. The rest of the ministries of the central administration, more than two dozen, have been eliminated by the transfer of their functions to the approximately corresponding ministries of the separate republics.<sup>3</sup> This is the actual status of the economic decentralization, which Soviet propaganda calls "the introduction of democratic centralism." This material which characterizes the third period of the economic leadership of the USSR, reveals large scale transfers.

In considering the causes which forced the necessity for such an extensive reform in the management of the economy of the USSR, we

<sup>1</sup> See *Pravda*, February 6, 1957.

<sup>2</sup> See "Economy of the USSR," *Statistical Collection of the USSR*, Moscow, 1956, p. 41; *Pravda*, February 6, 1957.

<sup>3</sup> See *Pravda*, May 8, 1957, *Izvestia*, May 11, 1957 and the *Industrial and Economic Journal* May 1/1, 1957.

notice a certain interest in motivating the need for the reform which has been given by the "collective leadership," although usually they have not given the real motives. We do not have the texts of the addresses of Khrushchev and Bulganin at the Plenum in December, 1956 and February 1957, but from the Soviet press we can find the motives which it has been permitted to publicize.

The essence of these motives is to be found in the following:

1. The appearance of very great errors in the management of industry under Stalin. The negative results of the narrow ministerial handling of the most important economic problems. The absence of normal working relations between enterprises of different sorts built up in a single locality, which rendered impossible the solution of economic problems in a practical and speedy manner.

2. The ministerial frontiers injured the intensification of the specialization of industries and the cooperation of the economic efforts of the republics, regions and districts.

3. The actual control organs of the central ministries were scattered over the whole country and created parallelisms in work.

4. The incredible concentration in the centre of various kinds of economic personnel created a very serious hampering of the economic initiative of the local party organizations and the professional organizations.<sup>4</sup>

After this summary of the material passed by the Soviet censorship for the information of its subjects and the free world, we must mention that the beginning of the reorganization did not go on smoothly and harmoniously even in party circles and the Politbureau itself. The opposition, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, were accused chiefly of sabotaging the steps for the decentralization of the economic administration of the USSR. In addition there are certain signs that the decentralization on such a large scale of such a centralized economy as had been produced under Stalin, created a certain confusion and chaos which was not entirely caused by the opposition of the Party but by the opposition of the machine politicians of the centre both in and outside of the Party, with which Moscow was filled.

The triumph of Khrushchev over the leaders of the opposition, without doubt, in time will give him the power to carry through, in his terminology, "the Lenin principle of democratic centralism." We believe that Khrushchev and his supporters will also have to reckon with the new nationalism of the Muscovites and this new nationalism of the Muscovites certainly will not be glad to accept the carrying out of de-

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<sup>4</sup> See *Soviet Russia*, February 16, 1957.

centralization on such a large scale. To win over to the side of decentralization this new nationalism of the Muscovites will take more than the economic motivation of the necessity for reorganization given in the Soviet press.

It is still too early to say how this tremendous reorganization of the administration of the economy of the USSR is going to work out. Observers of the Soviet economy in the free world are confused as to what factors really caused the introduction of the reform and what effect it will have for the future development of relations between Moscow and the "independent republics" which compose the USSR. We will submit later our own estimation of the reasons that compelled the reform and also the approximate range of the decentralization which it can have, and also the results on the social and national relations in the USSR.

We must note that the "collective leadership" which has been constantly under the leadership of Khrushchev, began its activity by typical examples of Stalinist centralism in the administration of the economy. Khrushchev was responsible for opening the half-desolate regions of Kazakhstan. He was glorified as the initiator of the plan and the leader of the campaign for spreading the cultivation of corn and the sowing of potatoes "in a four-sided nest." He carried out these agricultural innovations by the application of judicial responsibility even for slight variations from the orders of Moscow.<sup>5</sup>

Of these three agricultural campaigns with which Khrushchev steadily occupied himself for three years, two without doubt have been dictated by considerations of a military nature. The increase of the yield of potatoes makes it possible to increase the production of artificial rubber, an important military material, for the manufacture of which potatoes are used. The cultivation of the half-desolate areas of Kazakhstan also is essentially a military measure for it develops an additional strategically remote centre for the production of grain, even if it is of slight value. It is possible that the increase in the area devoted to corn may also have a military importance. Thus until the Plenum of December, Khrushchev by Stalinist methods of the centralization of the administration of industry strengthened the "defence" of the USSR.

The unexpected decisions at the December and February Plenums for a far-reaching decentralization of the administration of the economy and at a rapid tempo, were doubtless a continuation of the policy of Khrushchev to prepare for possible military complications. The direct

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<sup>5</sup> Recently the Soviet press announced that for the non-fulfillment of the order to plant potatoes "in a four sided nest," the disobedient had been sentenced to two years of imprisonment.

impulse for this might have been given by the revolutionary anti-Moscow and anti-Communist movements and revolutions in the satellites. A further extension of these might have led to the outbreak of a major war sooner than the Kremlin wished.

We think that the international complications in the Middle East which led to the war with Egypt had no decisive significance in hastening the decentralization of the administration of industry in the USSR, for in this conflict the Kremlin held the initiative in its own hands and had the power to quench it at any moment. But the 100 million population of the satellites clearly showed the Kremlin that they were trying to seize the initiative for their own liberation. But not only the satellites of Moscow but the peoples of the Soviet "independent" republics were disturbing the Moscow leaders. We know that the Hungarian revolutionists were joined by not a few Ukrainians from the Soviet divisions stationed in Hungary at the beginning of the revolution.

All this together created two basic factors which forced the Kremlin to commence a cardinal reform of the administration of industry and of the whole economy. The first object of the reform was the formation of dozens of centers of economic planning and control which in a general war, in case of necessity could independently carry on their work and have the machinery and a certain experience for it. For modern warfare the Stalinist system of the centralization of the administration in Moscow was very dangerous, for it might at once be put out of commission. On the other hand, the creation of dozens of centres of the administration of the economy would offer a certain stability of administration, even in the case of a major war.

The second goal of the Kremlin was to make it possible for its propaganda to spread the conception that the USSR had definitely adopted a policy of a far-reaching decentralization so as to inspire hope in the peoples oppressed by the Kremlin of a speedy change to their advantage. Moscow relied upon a special success here in the external forum. It is certain that in the external forum this propaganda has given Moscow a continuing success and has aided it within the USSR.

To be able to estimate how far this decentralization of the administration of industry will actually go in the USSR after the completion of the reform, we must take into account the special feature of the centralization under Stalin. As we know, the Kremlin very easily has created and is creating "independent republics" and "autonomous districts" but even under Stalin the Kremlin did not and still does not allow the party "leadership" of these "republics" and districts and even the party leadership in the satellites of Moscow to have any party line other than that which Moscow has at the given moment. The centralism of Stalin effected

this through the party bureaucracy and not through legislation. Since the last purge in the Party showed that Khrushchev and his partisans were resolutely fighting against all party deviations, there can be no question that the party leadership in the "republics," "autonomous districts" and in the soviets of people's economy of the new economic regions cannot carry on any other economic policy than that which Moscow orders. So the Khrushchev "democratic centralization" in practice will be *decentralization in form and centralization in essence*. There can be a true decentralization of the administration of the economy of the USSR only after a decentralization of the party leadership in the USSR since there are no signs of a decentralization of the party administration, and instead there has been stressed the full subordination of the Communists interested in the economy to the party machinery (the secretaries of the raykoms, obkoms, and secretaries of the republic committees of the Communist Party). Moscow also has the centralized machinery of the MVD, a centralized bank credit system and a centralized budget. This is enough to justify our conclusion. The constitution of the USSR proclaims itself a state with a widely decentralized administration but in fact it has had and has a most highly centralized administration. The Kremlin has boasted that its success in socialist construction has been the result of its complete centralization of economic planning and administration. Now we see how the Kremlin has been compelled in planning and administering the economy to accept *decentralization in form and centralization in essence*.

Even with this, such a wide decentralization merely in the form of the administration and not in essence, will arouse the centrifugal forces in the lands of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. As we have mentioned, Moscow has drawn from the archives the plan of forming great economic regions which are not to be created without the calculation of the belonging of their territory to one or another "independent republic." This plan has quite a long history. During tsarism, when the Revolution of 1905 showed the strenuous efforts of many peoples enslaved by tsarism to secure independence or federation, or national autonomy (Finland, Poland, the Baltic Lands, Ukraine),<sup>6</sup> the then most influential Russian party, the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), so as to weaken the national unity of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, drew up a plan for dividing Russia into autonomous districts not along the national (ethnic) borders, but on the economic relationships of certain areas.

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<sup>6</sup> See the brochure of Mykola Mikhnovsky, *Independent Ukraine* which was printed in 1900. A second edition was published in 1948 by the house, "Ukrainian Patriot."

Thus the lands of the then Ukrainian gubernias of Kherson and Tavrida were to be placed in the industrial region of the "South of Russia" which would also include the non-Ukrainian lands of the Don area. The plan of the Russian liberals (Cadets) remained only a party program with no attempt at its realization.

Under Lenin the idea was revived of autonomy not for the economically related lands of the USSR but for 13 economic regions which were also to divide economically the already existing "independent" republics and autonomous districts. But this imitation of the Cadet plan did not go far. The Stalin system of open economic centralization led to the forgetting of this plan of the time of Lenin. Now there has been a legalization of the creation of economic regions within the limits of all national "republics" except Ukraine and the largest Russian Republic. Economically Ukraine has been divided into 11 independent districts with the clear plan not to allow the formation of great economic regions which can carve up the territory of the whole of Ukraine and revive the genuine Ukrainian economy autonomous from Moscow interference (Kobluiv doctrine condemned by the Party). Therefore through fragmentation it will be prevented. It is only thus that we can understand the withdrawal from the archives of the tsarist imperialism of the Cadet idea for autonomous districts created to weaken the centrifugal Ukrainian national movement for independence of the nations enslaved by Moscow. Yet in the USSR the centrifugal national movements are so strong that they will in time burst all the artificial barriers with which Moscow is constantly surrounding them.

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## THE TRIUMPH OF KHRUSHCHEV

*by* CLARENCE A. MANNING

The unexpected announcement of the expulsion from the Presidium of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Central Committee of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov for "anti-party" activity and their removal from posts in the Soviet government has been generally taken to mean that Nikita Khrushchev has definitely triumphed in his bid to assume the place left vacant by the death of Stalin. There does not seem to be now in the Kremlin any possible rival, unless it be Marshal Zhukov who apparently threw the weight of the Red Army in the scales against the opponents of Khrushchev and hence may be assumed to be a potential rival.

The death of Stalin was followed by the same sort of struggle for power that went on after the death of Lenin and it has been decided in the same way. At that time the Soviets set up a triumvirate to govern the country, Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev. Stalin was merely the First Secretary of the Communist Party but that was enough, for it gave him the practical control of appointments down to the lowest level. As a result he disposed first of Trotsky and then he took advantage of the mistakes of Zinovyev and Kamenev to remove them from their posts and later to try and execute them on various charges of breaking Communist discipline.

With Stalin's death it was generally recognized that Beria, the Chief of the MVD, Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Khrushchev were the leading figures. The first of the group to make a bid for supreme power was Beria but his hopes of success by means of the MVD were thwarted in some way and he was arrested and executed as a Western spy. Next it was Malenkov's turn. He was made Prime Minister, while he still held the post of Secretary of the Party. He was forced to resign the latter post and then the former, although he still remained a Deputy Premier. Khrushchev took his post as Secretary of the Party and this time he used his office successfully and eliminated in some way his principal rivals.

There is the story which may well be true that he was on the verge of expulsion himself when a sudden meeting of the Presidium

was called but that he succeeded in delaying this, perhaps with the aid of Zhukov, and threw the question into the hands of the full Central Committee of the Communist Party which was heavily packed with his own men who sustained him almost unanimously and removed his opponents. Apparently even Bulganin wavered in his loyalty to Khrushchev, for since the expulsion of the anti-Party group, his influence seems to have waned. Khrushchev has taken precedence over him in public appearances and apparently he was not asked to make the visit to East Germany but Mikoyan, one of Khrushchev's supporters in the anti-Stalinist campaign, went along in his place to represent the government of the USSR. Whether the details of Khrushchev's seizure of power are correct is of course still doubtful and may never be revealed fully, but the fact of his triumph is evident and it will be his conception of his post that will almost certainly dominate the Soviet Union during the next years.

Yet there is one significant difference in the present situation from that prevailing after the death of Lenin—the age of the rivals for power. Lenin was under fifty when he seized the control of Russia. Stalin was in the neighborhood of forty when he and his opponents fought out the question of control. Since then over thirty years have passed and the same figures have remained in the Soviet hierarchy. Molotov after a long period as Foreign Minister is now sixty seven and Kaganovich is but a trifle younger. Malenkov was in fact the only man who can be said to belong to a younger generation. Khrushchev himself is sixty four. From the point of age he is the same generation as the men whom he overthrew. He is younger in his seniority in the Party for it was only in 1938 that he was sent to Ukraine by Stalin to quash the last struggles of the Ukrainian national spirit. It was in the thirties that his name began to figure in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and it was really not until he left Ukraine and was called back to Moscow that he began to loom as one of the coming stars in the Soviet firmament. He cannot look forward to as long a tenure as did his predecessor and he must accomplish in a few years the work of a lifetime, if he is to be seated firmly and be able to throw off his burdens with the advancing years, secure in his post.

Yet the circumstances of the rise of Khrushchev bring out again the strange dualism that exists within the Soviet Union. For decades the technical head of the Soviet Union was Kalinin. He performed all those functions that we associate with the head of a state and when he died at a ripe old age, he was succeeded by Marshal Voroshilov who is the present incumbent. Voroshilov is, it is true, a member of the Presidium of the Party but he has always played a sub-

ordinate role and no one has considered him an aspirant for the control of the country.

For years after he had cemented his position, Stalin held no official position in the Soviet government. He was merely the boss of the Communist Party and it was only under pressure of World War II that he emerged as the official head and chief spokesman for the government, though even before his power was absolute.

This dualism runs through every branch of the Soviet service and it greatly facilitates the Soviet freedom of manoeuvre in the diplomatic and internal fields. It renders it possible to avoid many changes of crookedness, when the government officials say one thing and the Communist bosses another.

The appearances of Khrushchev well illustrate this fact which cannot be overlooked, although it all too often is. At the meeting in Geneva, attended only by the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the other countries, Bulganin was there to speak for the Soviet Union as the Prime Minister but he was always outshone by Khrushchev, who as Secretary of the Party was able to speak for it and hence to have the final say in all the negotiations, even though he was technically no official and there was on paper no reason to invite him even to attend.

In one respect Khrushchev has changed the Stalin policy. Stalin was an older pre-war revolutionist and as such he had the conspiratorial virtues. He rarely appeared in public and he preferred to present a forbidding exterior to the world. He rarely met foreigners, even the diplomats accredited to the Kremlin and he went his own way, ruthlessly sacrificing whoever stood in it. Yet when he met with Churchill and President Roosevelt, he could be charming and that charm seemed so sincere that his companions in the Big Three thought again and again that they could persuade him to do something which was not in his immediate interest but they always failed.

Molotov, associated with him for years, adopted the same stony demeanor. It is said that Lenin once called him the best file clerk in Russia and he lived up to his reputation. He was almost always the same grim unsmiling figure that he presented to the United Nations and to all with whom he came into contact.

Khrushchev is entirely different. From the moment he first became prominent, he has worked to give himself an air of friendship. He has departed from the strict rules of Stalin's day and has gone out of his way to be pleasant and at times, when he has been drinking excessively, he apparently does not object to making a clown of himself. Yet his record in Ukraine and in service under Stalin shows

perfectly that at heart he is a ruthless intriguer with as little regard for human life or human rights as had his predecessor in the post of ruler of the Communist Party and so of the Soviet Union.

It is hard for some of the Asian countries to realize that fact but it is no less hard for the Western diplomats to bring home to their people the real savagery of the personality of Khrushchev, and when in his jovial way he berates and uncrowns Stalin, many people believe that a new period has come in the relations of the Soviet Union with the outside world. Yet has it?

He has become an indefatigable traveller. He has gone to India, to Burma, to Great Britain, to Geneva, to Finland, and to Czechoslovakia and East Germany. On all except his last trip he has been accompanied by Bulganin who has spoken definitely in the name of the Soviet government while Khrushchev has laughed and joked and clowning in an effort to sway the feelings of his hosts. He has talked loudly and vigorously about the peace-loving peoples behind the iron curtain but he has never hesitated in undiplomatic vein to utter impassioned threats against the imperialistic and capitalistic warmongers and he has not hesitated to back his threats with action.

We need to remember that he flew to Poland after the October events and loudly and vociferously threatened a military occupation of Poland by Soviet troops, if the Poles did not yield. During the revolt in Hungary he was in touch with the situation and there is not the slightest doubt that the Russian attacks upon the Hungarian patriots had the approval of Khrushchev, even if he was not the inspirer.

Today he denounces Molotov and Kaganovich as opponents of a peaceful settlement of the world disputes and pleads for peaceful and competitive coexistence. Yet at the same time there can be no doubt that since the fall of Molotov and Kaganovich, the Soviets have continued to foment trouble in the Middle East. They have continued to send arms to Egypt and Syria. They have demonstratively moved warships through the Dardanelles. Now they have turned their attention to Yemen and are pouring arms into that poor, retarded state because of its value as a menace to the British base at Aden, all with the desire to promote hostilities out of which the Soviet Union may hope to secure some prize.

Yet despite his arguments that the Soviet Union against the wishes of Molotov desires to relieve the existing world tension, there has been no sign at the Disarmament Conference in London that Zorin has been instructed to offer any relaxation or seek any compromise in the question of disarmament. He has continued to offer the same peremptory demands for a cessation of all nuclear tests and a ban on

nuclear weapons, and in his television interview Khrushchev did not hesitate to say that the reason for the Soviet attitude was that the territory of the Soviet Union was large enough to carry on testing without observation or detection.

At the same time he has continued to write threatening and often insulting notes to Scandinavia, Germany and other countries, threatening them with what will happen, if they as the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will admit nuclear arms to their countries and do not accept the Soviet promises of friendship and cooperation. All this sounds very strange as coming from the genial Khrushchev, who is bubbling over with words of peace, good will and peaceful coexistence.

Internally there may be some changes in the manner of administering the USSR. Khrushchev has set out on a far reaching plan for the decentralization of industry and a new regionalizing of the Soviet Union. It is hard to tell yet whether all this talk and the new resolutions represent any substantial change in policy. He has liquidated many of the All-Union ministries, particularly in industry. The centralization here had been carried to absurd extents when the directives of Moscow compelled the various regions and individual plants within the regions to communicate with one another through Moscow and when the industries were divided to the lowest level by their assignment to different ministries. He has ordered this changed but it is still not clear how much real autonomy the various plants and regions will enjoy.

This was undoubtedly a device to further his own rise to power. Almost of necessity the cadres of the various ministries in Moscow came to possess a veto power, perhaps even on the Central Committee, and the easiest way for Khrushchev to end this was to decentralize and get many of his prominent opponents out of Moscow. In addition to that, his love for travel allowed him to make local contacts in the various Soviet republics, to place in key positions his own men whom he had trained once in Ukraine and then in Moscow to fill loyally responsible positions.

His ideas on decentralization sharply conflict with his emphasis on agricultural cities and the union of kolhosps, so that they could be controlled by a relatively smaller number of Communists and so kept in line. At the same time he has ardently pushed the opening to agriculture of the lands of Asia and has induced thousands of young people to go "voluntarily" to those remote areas where they can more effectively be russified, even while he is throwing some sops to the individual Soviet republics and harking back to Lenin's apparently softer national policy.

Yet all Ukrainians must remember that it was under that policy that Lenin recognized the Ukrainian National Republic and then on the same day in 1917 presented such outrageous demands upon it that the recognition was accompanied by a Declaration of War upon it and the first invasion of the territory of the Republic by Russian forces, posing as the representatives of a newly set up Communist government of Ukraine.

It is perfectly clear that Khrushchev's policy of decentralization and of regionalization may be intended ultimately to prevent the growth of Ukrainian solidarity and the spirit of independence throughout the Ukrainian SSR. In the name of economic decentralization, dividing the Ukrainian Republic into 11 regions, he may be trying to foster an increased separation of the population of the dynamic anti-Russian Western Ukrainian lands from that of Kiev or Kharkiv, to emphasize a type of local autonomy which will, he hopes, break down the growing solidarity of the people and their conviction that the Ukrainian lands are and should be an integral whole and hence desire an independent state. We do not yet know exactly what this reorganization and the creation of new regional soviets are intended to mean any more than we can evaluate positively Khrushchev's desire for peace on an international scale.

It is difficult to estimate the role of Mikoyan in the entire movement that led to the elevation of Khrushchev. An Armenian by birth, he has had a long and successful career both in the government and the Party and has risen to the post of Deputy Premier and also a member of the Presidium of the Party. At the same time his interests have seemed to be confined to questions of trade, domestic and foreign, and in the past he has avoided any activity that would indicate an ambition to rise still further in the hierarchy. Yet it was he who seconded Khrushchev's attack upon Stalin at the XX Congress of the Communist Party. He has played some role in Khrushchev's attempts to make an arrangement with Marshal Tito and he was in Yugoslavia at the time of the meeting of Tito, Nehru and Nasser, the preliminary to the seizure of the Suez Canal by Egypt and the open Soviet penetration into the Middle East. He seems to have been one of the Presidium that warmly supported Khrushchev through the conflict, whatever form it took, and under Khrushchev he seems to be emerging as an important figure in other fields than commerce. Only the future will show whether at this late date and under the new conditions he has found the opportunity to expand his influence perhaps as a result of some change in the policy of the Party toward the non-Russian population.

It seems clear that Khrushchev secured his approval by the Central Committee because of his knowledge of the problems of the non-Rus-

sians acquired during his 12-years ruling of unquiet Ukraine. Just as Stalin after the defeat of each of his opponents adopted the essential features of their programs of opposition, so has Khrushchev. Apparently Beria, a Georgian, tried to win the non-Russians in his try for victory, and so Khrushchev perhaps more skilfully has known from his experiences in Ukraine how to place his men in the non-Russian republics and to use them effectively.

This does not mean that he is of necessity any more favorable to their ultimate national aspirations. He has worked hard in Ukraine to secure a Ukrainian staff of determined Communists without any Ukrainian sympathies and he has done his best to crush every indication of the Ukrainian patriotic spirit technically called "bourgeois nationalism." His appointment of Ukrainians to high positions does not mean that he has fundamentally changed that policy which he employed so successfully in the thirties to the Ukrainian cost, even though he now lays all the blame for that on the cult of personality fostered by the late Joseph Stalin. Any relaxation may be only a temporary measure to establish himself in power, exactly as Lenin's New Economic Policy and Ukrainization were only intended to restore prosperity to the country and bring those personalities to the surface who might be dangerous to the centralized rule of Moscow so that at a propitious time they might be ruthlessly exterminated. Khrushchev learned his lesson under Kaganovich and Kaganovich has paid his pupil with his own loss of power and disgrace. The immoral and atheistic regime ruthlessly devours its own leaders and only a basic change in the attitude of the Kremlin which would destroy its basic methods of administration will ultimately put an end to the savage struggle for supremacy.

Of course that struggle may not take the bloodthirsty methods that it took during the thirties, when the cunning mind of Stalin, like the warped intellect of Tsar Ivan the Terrible, saw traitors and enemies of the people everywhere even in his own trusted entourage. The new regime at least in the beginning will be careful not to stress terror and executions but those men who have lost in the struggle to Khrushchev are fully aware that they are living on borrowed time and that the axe may fall at any moment, when the new master of the Soviet Union judges it opportune.

Still the world is now in a critical situation. Khrushchev has won but he has to consolidate his victory and eliminate from key positions in the Party and the government the devoted and loyal adherents of the ousted leaders and do it without calling too much attention to what he is doing. That may explain the fury of his attacks on Chancellor Adenauer and the United States even while he preaches sweetness and



light. He has to get into working order the new system by which he gained his power and the easiest way for him to accomplish that end is to stir up more and more trouble abroad; the situation in the Middle East shows that he is trying it.

It is no less critical in the free world. Khrushchev's blaming of Molotov may lead the unthinking in many countries to take his statements at their face value and to believe that some relief of tension is possible and probable. That is the last thing Khrushchev with his fanatical Communistic belief can want or tolerate, for he must show new victories to support his position. Again as so many times before the West has the opportunity to speak for a real policy of liberation and to express in unmistakable terms its belief that the satellites must be honestly liberated from Russian Communism and that the same privilege must be given to the non-Russian Soviet republics which will then be able to play their part in the building of a peaceful world. It is not the time for fond hopes that the new order may improve but it is the time for the West to increase the pressure upon the tyrants in the Kremlin and demand from them real liberation deeds, not just liberation words.

That means that the West must be on the alert and cease to fool itself with the dream that any coexistence between tyranny and freedom is possible. The sooner the free world learns this, the sooner will liberty come to the oppressed peoples behind the iron curtain and that monstrosity called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will cease to exist for the good of all mankind. Khrushchev may rant and smile but despite his newly won power, he is fully aware that his rule and that of his associates is based solely on the sword. The triumph of Khrushchev by the methods which he used betrays the fundamental weakness of Moscow and the free world today has nothing to fear but fear itself.

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## THOUGHTS ON SOLUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN PROBLEM

by GEN. MYKOLA KAPUSTYANSKY

"Russia is a multinational empire, the last and the only one in the world. It would be a miracle, if it emerged unharmed from a possible catastrophe."

[*The New City*, G. D. Fedotov. "The Fate of Empires."]

"The Russian people must now take shape nationally in their own ethnographic boundaries and respect the national aspirations of the peoples of Russia," was the statement of *Boris Savinkov* in 1920 in discussing a treaty of alliance with a spokesman of the Ukrainian National Republic.

History shows that for various reasons and under various conditions, in the Ancient World, the Middle Ages and Modern Times there have been formed, functioned and dominated for a certain time strong empires. For the most part, after they have fulfilled their mission of an organizational and constructive, cultural or even destructive character (the empire of Genghis Khan), they have slowly faded away or completely vanished. This raises the question what chimerical fate is in store for the huge Russian Communist empire of the USSR and the nations, especially in Eastern Europe,<sup>1</sup> that are subjected to it.

The geopolitical situation of Russia on the borders between two worlds, Eurasia, and circumstances have dictated and generously favored it in fulfilling its historical mission during the last centuries—the protection against the yellow peril and the Mohammedan World.<sup>2</sup> Moscow, and then imperial Russia (from the time of Peter I), absorbed Ukraine

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<sup>1</sup> The author includes in the term Eastern Europe the European part of the USSR. This is true of all European science. It is unscientific to extend the conception of Eastern Europe, as is done in political circles in the United States, to include exclusively the satellite states. This is not done in European studies and journals.—EDITOR.

<sup>2</sup> We are not discussing the question on how Russia was able to subjugate and control the nations of its empire and their fate. This question has its own literature, especially as regards Ukraine, and is not part of my subject.

which had previously fulfilled the task of defending Europe against Asia and then slowly came to dominate the huge expanses of Asia, especially the gigantic tracts of the North of Asia, which were unpopulated, and then the Far East to the Pacific Ocean. Russia seized and protected from the dangerous invasion of the colored nations the great reservoir of Asia with all of its resources. The political and strategic power of Russia favored to a certain degree the equilibrium of the forces in Europe. Eurasia became an important partner of the European powers and they at the time in various groupings and combinations solved important problems of an international character. The war with Frederick the Great, the struggle with Napoleon and Turkey, the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, the division of Poland, the joint campaign against Peking, etc. were important evidence of the role of the Moscow Empire. It led to the sacrifice of the fate of the colonial peoples of Russia in World War I; they kept on their fronts almost half of all the armies of the Central Powers and checked Turkey by the successful storming of the threatening fortress of Erzerum and the seizure of Trapezund. Here the empire played a very important role in breaking German imperialism.

We must note that North America was linked with Russia by common interests—the Far East, where America was the rival first of Great Britain and later of Japan. In view of this the Entente powers in 1917-1921 carefully tried to defend the interests of Russia, their political partner and ally. In every way they supported the Russian volunteer armies with their aim of reestablishing “a single, indivisible Russia.” Because of this the Entente ignored the youthful energy of the nations oppressed by Russia and their efforts to secure their independence for they saw in these a threat to the unity of Russia.

These intentions, traditions and the political conservatism of the pre-revolutionary attitudes of the Great Powers and their evaluation of the role of Russia as a necessary strategic factor on the international chess board, unfortunately have remained to the present time. One of the examples of this is the conception of *non-predetermination* embroidered with white threads and spread by its spokesman, the *American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism*.

We consider the doctrines of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and even Eisenhower very dangerous to the psychological preparation of the West to repel the attack of the USSR on the entire world. These statesmen have considered it possible at the price of the oppressed peoples of the USSR and partially of the satellites, to come to an understanding and to share peaceably with the Bolsheviks spheres of influences.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> President Roosevelt called the greatest murderer whom history has known, Stalin, “Good Uncle Joe” and acceded to all his far-reaching demands. For. J. F.

We consider this loyal attitude of the present Great Powers of the West to their former partner Russia a grave mistake, although it was previously intelligible and logical. We are now facing an absolutely different situation in the power and new policies of Moscow.

When the Bolsheviks seized control in 1917, they decidedly changed the preceding policy and introduced the slogan: "Face against the West!"

Lenin, after the pattern of the Mongol leaders, prepared to bring the communized masses of Asia to storm the hated "rotten Europe" and the free world. This sharp and radical change in the policy of the USSR over 180° was actually a denial and rejection of the traditional positions of pre-revolutionary Russia and its historical imperial role, to keep the balance between Asia and Europe and to be a shield against the yellow peril. As a result of this change, the mission of Russia in Eurasia ceased and the USSR became as an empire a dangerous, superfluous and harmful political, strategic and ideological factor for the free nations of Europe.

The oppressed peoples of the USSR, especially the Slavs, Balts, and the Caucasians, are at present far closer to the West than to the East, an integral part of Europe. As independent states they can under certain political conditions become the natural allies of the free states of the West, its advance guard and a controlling factor in the East after the fall of Bolshevism. In addition to the natural unceasing drive of oppressed peoples for independence, this is also one of the chief causes for their efforts to break away at all costs from Eurasia (Russia).

The Bolsheviks on December 3, 1917 issued a proclamation to the Mohammedans of Russia and the Orient, announcing that they were taking over the defense of their interests. From that moment Moscow has kept the same path. The well-known "anti-colonial" propaganda of the Bolsheviks among the colored peoples and the Communist influences among them played a decisive role, (the Korean campaign with Chinese volunteers and the Viet Nam campaign).

Today we know the plan of the Soviets and Red China to kindle a world conflagration, as is told in the secret memorandum of Mao-Tse-tung. In the American Congress, Senator Knowland read the secret plan of Mao-Tse-tung in 1954. The gist of this was: we Chinese are not ready to fight immediately; we have no heavy industry and anti-aircraft artillery but we will slowly pacify the Asian states. In 1960

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Dulles no multinational Soviet Russian Empire exists, only Russia, the Russian people and even the Soviet people, a new Khrushchev invention. In the present USSR, in his opinion, there is only a denial of civil rights to individuals (Press Conference, *The New York Times*, July 12, 1957). Harrison Salisbury in the same way interprets the attacks on the Kremlin (*The New York Times*, July 7, 1957).

we will be ready by furious propaganda to keep America from attacking and in a wave of revolutions we shall sweep all colonists into the sea. In twenty years the revolution and our victory will be accomplished facts.

The Muscovites, as we know, are preparing to carry out this plan and are building in China heavy industry and ways of communication.<sup>4</sup> The "collective leadership" under the control of N. Khrushchev is not even hiding its plans for "liberation."

The logic of the events and stern reality call from the world leaders a new re-evaluation of their political principles: the clearness of their aims and the means of realizing them in combating the imperialism of the USSR and its far reaching intentions of disintegrating the world. So a program for liberating the peoples enslaved by Moscow must be worked out and realized.

#### A VISION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The Communist bloc, put together by the USSR, is an artificial creation. It includes many diverse elements which are ready to fight among themselves, as the revolt in the satellite states and deep processes of a national and social character, which are disintegrating this bloc, show.

The close connection of the USSR with the Asian peoples, especially Red China, is not natural and under certain conditions can lead not only to the fall of the USSR as an empire but also to a possible loss of a great part of its Asian possessions. The USSR can expect an invasion in the future both from its "loyal" friend, Red China, and from its dread opponent Japan, robbed by the Soviet Union of the Kurile Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin. These peoples have nothing more to seek from the West but the great Asian expanses of the USSR are at hand and are alluring them. As we know, in World War II Japan put out the inflammable slogan "Asia for the Asians!" and it aroused a great response among them. By that Japan inflicted in World War II a tremendous blow on Great Britain and North America.

The Japanese General Sato gave far-reaching plans for this: "The future of Japan lies on the Asian mainland—our nearest goals are on the fields of Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia... I look at them as the sacred spots of our ancestors...the place of the future activity of our descendants. By securing control of these areas, Japan will acquire

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<sup>4</sup> Direct railroad communication between Peking and Moscow is now open, 8,000 kilometers in length and the trip takes 10 days. Moscow took a great material part in the building of this railroad.

the first place in the East... In the course of a century Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia must become areas populated by Japanese."

We think that the adjacent Siberian regions are no less tasty to the Chinese (there are 6,000 kilometers of frontiers between Red China and Moscow). Red China is already securing the key positions in Asia and turning them into satellites. Today Red China is offering to Japan to expel the United States from the Pacific Ocean (the islands of Okinawa, Guam and Formosa). And what will happen tomorrow?

Moscow too is threatened by the yellow peril. The Soviets recognize it and are feverishly building up and settling their Asian areas, principally at the expense of the oppressed peoples, the Ukrainians and others.

We think that the East and especially the USSR, although it has enormous military potentialities and the modern destructive atomic and thermo-nuclear arms, A. G. ballistic rockets, etc. yet for various reasons, chiefly of a psychological character, will not be able probably to stand a destructive total war of the continents, even if the West does not turn against itself the enslaved peoples as the Germans did. The "collective leadership" understands this very well and probably it will refuse to start a third World War, although it is blackmailing the West with a threat of it.

An armed clash or the movements in the USSR for liberation and revolution will cause the disappearance of the USSR as an empire. In the confidence of this, the oppressed peoples, and especially Ukraine with its forty million population, will strive for total separation and the renewal of their own states—and they will welcome such a struggle.

The one hundred million Russians in the RSFSR face a dilemma in the development of their political ideas—toward the East or toward the West. We may assume that Moscow will not abandon its imperial aspirations and the great increase in the definite political and strategic power of the Asian peoples and the vast building up of the Asian lands carried on by the Bolsheviks will force the RSFSR to an alliance with the East. It is possible that national Russia will try to renew "the friendship with the Tatars" as was done by the Muscovite princes and the khans to bring about "the gathering of the Russian lands," only now to restore the empire with the aid of the Chinese. But such a position of national Russia, we think is false, ephemeral and dangerous to itself. Isolated from the West, threatened by an eventual invasion of the powerful Asian states and burdened by a developing feud with the newly established states—it will be compelled to abandon its struggle with them for the recovery of hopelessly lost imperial positions.

As a result, national Russia, either with or against its will, may also seek support in the West; first in the newly established sovereign

states, Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Caucasus and the countries of the Baltic, and will work for an understanding with them to strengthen its western and southern rears. Besides there are factors of an economic and industrial nature and the orientation toward the West of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and other nationals who are in the RSFSR (Siberia and the Far East) will dictate to them the need of agreement with the newly established states and satellites, good neighbor relations and a broad co-existence.

It is only on such principles, we think, that Russia will be able without injury to build up its own powerful and rich national state, to raise the well being of its poverty-stricken but enduring and laborious population and to protect the status of its holdings in the Far East. It is hard to predict what real political, strategic and ideological categories and ideas will function in national Russia in the light of coming events. But remembering science and the bitter proof of history and that we may not again be overhasty, let us remain keen and ready for various unexpected developments.

#### CONCLUSION

Will national Russia join the East or the West? It has already lost the sense of its historical mission by the swing of its policy by 180° against the West and its insane mania of grandeur. Against a well planned policy of liberation on the part of the West, as we have said, the USSR cannot hope for world hegemony. The Achilles' heel of its power are the movements for national liberation among the oppressed non-Russian peoples and the deep internal processes which are going on within it.

After the downfall of Bolshevism a number of states will rise in the east to life and creative work. They will find for themselves forms of common existence and common work. In the east there will come no "vacuum," no anarchy with the fall of the Moscow empire, but there will be favorable conditions for the political and economic rehabilitation of these areas, for the revived states without a doubt will be better prepared for independent existence than the new colored states. After surviving the wild years of Bolshevik tyranny, they will be revived by life-giving freedom and inspired by the ideal of having their own states and these young nations will start on creative work as friends successfully and will make themselves the regulating factor in the East of Europe.

This is the moral force which the West must invoke in its plans to solve "the eastern problem" now and in the future.

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## FATE OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION

by JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

There is such a wide gap between the concept of Empiric Sociology (as known in the West and the United States) and Soviet sociology that we can even question whether Soviet Russia can boast of sociology.

More specifically, to us "Sociology is the study of human beings in their group relationships... Like any science, it attempts to describe its subject matter and to point out such uniformities of occurrence as are found to exist."<sup>1</sup> Important here is the effort to "describe," as impartially as possible, these uniformities, and to separate these descriptions from an ideological coloring. All ideologies are "systems of reasoning and beliefs which purport to describe the true nature of man and to derive therefrom the 'right' type of socio-economic structure for his true nature."<sup>2</sup>

In other words, the basic aim of Western sociology is to "describe," as concretely and scientifically as possible, the social phenomena and to slough off the tendency to select and evaluate such phenomena from any ideological viewpoint. But the Soviet "sociologist" insists on using only the ideological approach, as seen from the official pronouncements of such Soviet spokesman as G. F. Aleksandrov:<sup>3</sup>

"... The foremost difference between the Marxist-Leninist science of society and all sorts of idealistic sociological theories is that Marxist-Leninist science was able to discover the objective, systematic relationship of historical phenomena—was able to recognize and discern, among the thousands and thousands of great and petty events, the single advancing, ascending, progressive line of development of society. At the same time, the Marxist science of society has definitely established the fact that progressive evolution of production—that material foundation of the whole life of society—lies at the root of this social advance, accomplished despite

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph S. Roucek & Roland L. Warren, *Sociology: An Introduction* (Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams, 1956), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 155.

<sup>3</sup> G. F. Aleksandrov, *The Pattern of Soviet Democracy* (issued in cooperation with the Russian Translation Program of the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948), trans. by Leo Gruliov, p. 15.



all the obstacles erected by reactionary forces, despite so frequent and at time prolonged delays and even retreats and backward steps."

Furthermore,

"The Marxist-Leninist science of society is distinct from all other theories of society's development in that it is capable of correct estimates of contemporary events, as well as past. It judges events accurately in the periods of society's more or less ordinary development; it evaluates them just as accurately in time of abrupt and rapid break-up of the old—in times of the sharpest and most intense class struggle. It can discern the seeds of the future which the present contains; it has a clear perspective of society's development. Marxist-Leninist science is based on historical experience; it generalizes the phenomena of life and applies the rest of reality to theoretical and political deductions and premises."<sup>4</sup>

In other words, the ideology of Marxo-Leninism accuses the Western sociological accumulation of knowledge of being only "idealistic sociological theories," while elevating itself to the status of "Marxist-Leninist science." Thus, basically, the Soviet scientist assumes that a genuine social science can be developed only by Marxo-Leninism, the only possible "scientific ideology." The handmaid of Marxo-Leninism is philosophy, the chief integrating "ideological science," the aim of which is to: 1. clarify "the Marxist foundations of both social and natural sciences," and 2. to "guide" the other sciences in the ideological crusades of the day. Thus the Soviet scientist cannot theorize, scientifically, but rationalize on events within the Marxian-Leninist framework; he does not inquire but reflects. He views and studies Soviet society not from scientific facts—but only from the illustrative material which supports the ideology of predictable portents of historical materials, for the formally propounded principles of the workings of various components of Soviet society, giving "scholarly" publicity to the Party's official claims. Thus the Soviet social scientist "has ceased to be a scientist in the true meaning of the term. He has ceased to theorize and has shown remarkable reluctance to generalize on any level."<sup>5</sup> Hence "there is no discipline in the Soviet Union resembling a sociology of knowledge, for the Soviet man of learning... studies science ideologically."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2. Adam Ulam, "Stalin and the Theory of Totalitarianism," pp. 157-171, and Waldemar Gurian, "Partiinost' and Knowledge," pp. 298-306, in *Continuity and Change In Russian And Soviet Thought*, Ernest J. Simmons, Ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), are good summaries of the Soviet ideological approach to science.

<sup>5</sup> Alexander Vucinich, *The Soviet Academy Of Sciences* (Stanford University Press, 1956), p. 45.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

## SOVIET "SOCIOLOGY" AND SOCIOLOGY

Historically speaking, the Russian sociologists have made some remarkable and universally known sociological contributions to the development of that discipline<sup>7</sup> and also Ukrainian sociologists at present in the Soviet Union have made important contributions to the sociological science of the world.<sup>8</sup> For instance, the contributions of Pitirim A. Sorokin, Nicholas S. Timasheff and of others are known to every sociologist, not only because of their penetrating observations of the conditions in Russia and Soviet Union, but also because of their contributions to the advancement of sociological theories.<sup>9</sup> But it must be also noted that Russian sociology, as well as Ukrainian sociology, developed historically, as a branch of the philosophy of sociology, closely related to various revolutionary and counter-revolutionary schools, tending to accept only extreme positions—while reflecting the German, English, French and even American sociological theories of the times. In this respect, sociology was one of the main weapons of those who wanted to promote social change in Russia; hence sociology was also politics and "to understand Russian sociology and to appreciate it, one must necessarily study it in the light of the history of that nation's social and political movements."<sup>10</sup> Hence the pre-Soviet sociology be-

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<sup>7</sup> See such surveys as: Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, *Social Thought From Lore To Science* (Washington, D.C.: Harren Press, 2nd ed., 1952), Vol. II, Chapter XXVI, "Russian Sociology," pp. 1029-1059, and bibliographical references, pp. xci-xciv; Harry Elmer Barnes, Ed., *An Introduction To The History Of Sociology* (University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 441-442, 493, 889, and the chapters on Novicow, Kovalevsky and Sorokin; Max M. Laserson, "Russian Sociology," Chapter XXIV, pp. 671-702, in Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore, Eds., *Twentieth Century Sociology* (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945), and bibliography, pp. 701-702; Nicolas Timasheff, "Sociology: Russia, Czarist," pp. 1230-1233.

<sup>8</sup> M. I. Mandryka, "Sociology: Ukraine," pp. 1233-1293, in Joseph S. Roucek, Ed., *Slavonic Encyclopaedia* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949); Yaroslav Chyz and Joseph S. Roucek, "Ukrainian Sociology Before 1914," *Journal Of Central European Affairs*, I, 1 (April, 1941), pp. 74-87; Joseph S. Roucek, "Ukrainian Sociology After the First World War," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, I, 2 (1944), pp. 152-163.

<sup>9</sup> See, for instance: Hans Speier, "The Sociological Ideas of Pitirim Alexandrovitch Sorokin: 'Integralist' Sociology," Chapter XLVI, pp. 884-901, in Harry Elmer Barnes, Ed., *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*; Clement S. Mihainovich, *Social Theories* (Milwaukee, Wis.: The Bruce Publ. Co., 1953), Chapter X, "Pitirim Alexandrovitch Sorokin," pp. 201-215, by Albert S. Foley, and bibliography, pp. 214-215.

<sup>10</sup> Julius F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1934), p. 3.; E. J. Simmons, Ed., *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*

came involved with the Slavophilism of Danilevsky, the Russophilism of Leontiev, Pobedonostsev's theory of Conservative Society, the Neo-Slavophilism of Soloviev, the theocratic theory of Chaadayev, the humanitarianism of Belinsky, Herzen's Westernism, the anarchistic theories of Bakunin, the historicism of Granovsky, the Narodnik theories of Chernishovsky, and even the nihilistic theories of Nechayev—and others. Today, these and others would be evaluated by the modern sociologist as pure ideologists who could be, probably, classified into the camp promoting the cause of Westernism and that of Slavophilism. Probably the ideologists of this type came nearest to sociology when criticizing—and some brilliantly—the theories of Marxism. Some favored Marx, since his ideology helped his followers to work for the abolition of the stranglehold of aristocracy and for the creation of a new social order; especially attractive to them was Marx's idea that changes in the form of production are followed by an inevitable change of social and political institutions.<sup>11</sup>

According to the Soviet claims, Nicholas Bukharin (1888-1938), the author of *Historical Materialism, A System of Sociology* (New York: International Publishers, 1925), is evaluated as the most able recent Soviet sociologist; he proclaimed that historical materialism was not only a method of research but also a general theory of society which guides the laws of social evolution. For him, sociology provides the way of "scientific prediction" in social processes as any natural science can. This proponent of mechanistic materialism also stressed a socio-psychological analysis of society and developed an occupational psychology in the sense that one's occupation tends to influence the nature of personality; the subtler influences of one's environment are not recognized by the individual, but will be recognized if a person takes the place of society and views the operation of environmental forces objectively.<sup>12</sup> Lenin (1870-1924) is today, with Marx, the final authority "on everything" in Soviet Union. Without going into his theories, let us note that he was attracted by the sociological part of Marxism,

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(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), *passim*; Richard Hare, *Pioneers of Russian Social Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), *passim*.

<sup>11</sup> Two factions arose in Tsarist Russia from these Marxian or Objectivist sociologists: the orthodox (headed by the "father" of Russian Marxism, Plekhanov and his pupil Lenin) and the heterodox Neo-Marxists and Revisionists (composed of the Ukrainian Tuhan-Baranovsky and the Russians Struve and Bogdanov); they all might be classified today as Historical Sociologists.

<sup>12</sup> Bukharin was executed with Rykov and Yagoda in March, 1938, on the then commonplace charges of treason and espionage.

especially Marx's analysis of the sociological weaknesses of the bourgeois system. He outlined his method in his writing *What Is To Be Done?* (1902). Later, he picked up J. A. Hobson's liberal critique of imperialism and applied it to a Marxist analysis of the weaknesses of the bourgeois system on the international plane, and propounded that internally and internationally capitalism is creating the forces of self-destruction, not only because of the economic trends (which are the master cause) but directly through the social and cultural tendencies it generates. He also adapted the Marxian ideas to Russia's areas, stressing that reality is "independent of human consciousness" and he believed in a world the laws of which should be studied objectively. The world is an "interpretation of opposite forces" that approach a unity and then pull apart. The law of change is basically evolutionary, interrupted from time to time by "spontaneous, periodic breaks"—"revolutionary outbursts." Lenin also applied the Marxist analysis to the new forms of capitalism which have developed since Marx.<sup>13</sup>

Marxo-Leninism is obviously the core of all thinking which the Soviet ideologists consider "sociology."<sup>14</sup>

#### THE DEATH OF EMPIRIC SOCIOLOGY IN SOVIET RUSSIA AND SOVIET UKRAINE

At the end of the Tsarist regime, Sorokin, with a few of his followers, tried to keep sociology alive. But he soon went into exile

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<sup>13</sup> Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) was, in the author's opinion, a miserable theoretician and only a commentator on the theories of Marx and Lenin. For the controversy focusing mostly around Stalin's concept of mechanism in social thought, see: John Sommeville, *Soviet Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), "Pivotal Controversy," pp. 213-228; the most current debate has been that dethroning Stalin, see: Russian Institute, Columbia University, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).

<sup>14</sup> Teachers of courses in social stratification, industrial sociology, and social theory have difficulties when they want to refer to the writings of Karl Marx. In spite of the numerous collections of Marx's writings, only one has appeared so far assembling the scattered passages which relate directly to sociology: T. H. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, Eds., *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (London: Watts and Co., 1956); the Introduction, pp. 1-28, summarizes Marx's sociology and social philosophy; the remainder is a useful guide to the literature on the influence of Marx's ideology. Another useful collection, often covering sociological thinking, of Marx and his interpreters, is: Sidney Hook, *Marx and the Marxists: The Ambiguous Legacy* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1955), which also covers George Plekhanov, pp. 57-61, Lenin, pp. 75-90, Leo Trotsky, pp. 91-99, Stalin, pp. 107-121, with selected readings.

and eventually ended his career as Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Harvard. His chair of Sociology established in 1919, at Moscow University, with the Department of Social Sciences, was closed in 1924. Ethnography survived in the new Department of Ethnology until 1930, but from 1930 until 1939, when a chair of Ethnography was founded in the Department of History, there was no academic teaching on topics even distantly related to sociology. The chair of Anthropology, in the Department of Biology, represented only Physical Anthropology.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time, all sociological inquiry was removed from the framework of academic life and placed under direct Party supervision. It was subsumed under Marxism-Leninism, which was taught either as Political Economy or Philosophy, or as part of a general education. Here and there various academic institutions carried on investigations of a social character (such as surveys of working-class family budgets) but this ended in 1930, when most of the economic and statistical institutions were purged.

Parallel with the Russian sociological research concentrated in the Russian Academy of Sciences, serious sociological research was developed in Ukraine in two competing centres: Kiev and Kharkiv. The first was organized in the institutions of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences—the other in the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism in Kharkiv, at this time the seat of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. The Kiev sociological institutes followed the western empirical methods of sociological research, whereas the Kharkiv—the Marxian-Communist. The scientific authority of the Kievan sociological researches was so high that the official Marxian researches although richly supported by the Government could not successfully compete with the work of the Academy.

Already in 1918 before the sovietization of Ukraine a chair of the Ukrainian sociology in the Academy was established and offered to the world known Ukrainian scholar, Dr. Bohdan Kystiakivsky. However soon after the first steps of his work he became ill and died. Therefore only separate institutes planned by him started their work, in particular the Ukrainian Demographic Institute headed by Prof. M. Ptukha. With the help of his aides, the Institute published 5 volumes of its researches.<sup>16</sup>

After Prof. Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, a historian of sociological trend and the patriarch of the Ukrainian historiography, took over the leader-

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<sup>15</sup> "The Social Sciences in the U.S.S.R., *Soviet Survey*, No. 10 (November, 1956), pp. 6-7.

<sup>16</sup> M. Ptukha, *The Number and Composition of the Inhabitants of Ukraine...* idem *The Mortality Rate in Russia and Ukraine*, Kharkiv, 1928; J. Korchak-Chepurkivsky, *The Town and Countryside in Ukraine from the Standpoint of Mortality*, M. Trachevsky, *Nativity in Ukraine*, and others.

ship of the historical studies in the Kiev Academy, he included all sociological researches into the Institute of History of Ukraine creating several special cabinets and commissions. The most active was the Cabinet of Primitive Culture headed by his daughter Katherine Hrushevsky. This cabinet studied the problems of genetic sociology.<sup>17</sup>

The Ukrainian Communist-Marxian school of sociology in the twenties, represented by the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism in Kharkiv, was divided into 5 sections and headed by Prof. M. Popov. The Institute published a periodical *Flag of Marxism* with Prof. Semkovsky as its main contributor.

The Marxist sociological school in Ukraine was unable to compete successfully with the sociologists of the Kievan Academy of Sciences, and finally in 1930, an attack was launched on both Ukrainian sociological schools, and in the following years both were liquidated by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; both were blamed for Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism."

Today, the USSR handles sociology as a branch of the Party control. The subject itself is not under academic control but supervised directly by the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Academy of Sciences of the USSR has a section of Social Sciences, composed of the Institutes of Philosophy, Economics, Law, and History, but not sociology. The degree-granting institutions do not include sociology. It is true that the higher degrees in the social sciences offered by these institutions, which include not only various pedagogical and economic ones, but also the Military-Political Academy, the Higher Party Schools, etc. require the acceptance of theses whose subject often border on the sociological areas, but their topics would only bring a smile to a Western sociologist, since they offer such gems as: "Defence of Socialist Society—A Sacred Task and Honorable Duty of the Citizens of the USSR," or "Militarization of the Economy and Deterioration of the Conditions of the Working Class in the U.S.A. in the Post-war Period (1946-54)."<sup>18</sup> The propaganda slogans are often presented as sociological investigations—"Cosmopolitanism—The Ideology of Imperialist Reaction."<sup>19</sup> A minor recent change in the run of the mill of such loaded topics has been evident only in regard to the elimination of Stalin from the much over-worked

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<sup>17</sup> Annual publication: *The Primitive Society*, P. Tutkivsky, *The Causes of the Invasion of Asiatic Barbarians into Europe*, P. Savchenko, *Sociology in the Concepts of New French Democracy*.

<sup>18</sup> *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 5 (1956), p. 115; *Vestnik Vyshey Shkoly*, No. 5 (1956), p. 62.

<sup>19</sup> *Vestnik Vyshey Shkoly*, No. 4 (1956).

list of topics pertaining to "the cult of personality." The recent trend has been to emphasize "Marxo-Leninism on freedom of personality."<sup>20</sup>

What is important is that Soviet Russia has no empirical research. Such sociological field work as social surveys, and other techniques of social investigation of social stratification, industrial relations, or social mobility, are unknown in the USSR—for reasons which are more than obvious.

Probably the only subject in the USSR which is closest to the non-existent empirical sociology is ethnography. But, again, it can hardly be compared to what the western world knows as social anthropology or cultural anthropology. It is mainly limited to "folklorism," the material aspects of the culture of various Soviet peoples, social history, and the investigation of numerous tribes living on Soviet territory. It is mainly "a study of historical cultures," and as such is "largely a hand-maiden of history and archeology."<sup>21</sup> S.P. Tolstov, the first professor of the re-established chair of Ethnography at Moscow University, is carrying on work on the history of Khorezm, based on excavations in Soviet Central Asia.

Publicly, the Soviet ethnographers are unaware that their "Marxo-Leninist methodology" is dominated by the views of Morgan and Tylor.<sup>22</sup> They are enticed by the enumerative concept of culture with the accent on its material aspects, since this supports the Marxian concept of history as the scheduled evolution of humanity from primitive communism to the classless society.

#### AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY UNDER ATTACK

Since the American sociologists do not conceive sociology as being identified with historical materialism and accept Marxism as a sort of substitute for sociology, their work is quite upsetting to the pro-Soviet ideologists. The attacks are not carried on the academic level but according to the standard Soviet formula of abuse, exaggeration and gutter-sniping. American anthropology has been, for instance, evaluated as such:<sup>23</sup>

"It is well known to everybody that some American 'ethnographers' support the bandit-terrorist anti-Negro organization, the Ku-Klux-Klan. Hence on the basis of well-founded evidence it can be said, in the literal and not the metaphorical

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 4 (1956).

<sup>21</sup> "The Social Sciences in the U.S.S.R., *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>22</sup> P. Tolstoy, "Morgan and Soviet Anthropological Thought," *American Anthropologist*, XXXIV (1952), No. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Institute of Ethnography, Academy of Science of the USSR, *Sovietskaya Etnografiya*, No. 1 (1952), p. 212.

sense of the word, that the contemporary reactionary bourgeois ethnographers are hired mercenaries of Wall Street."

It seems that the American sociologists are the real war-mongers: <sup>24</sup>

"American sociologists are not only ideologically but organizationally linked with the most reactionary strata of American finance-capital... (they) are above all the propagandists of a new world war... (they) justify and glorify the zoological punishment of other nations... Following Hitler, who proclaimed in his time the slogan that 'the German should not think'... (they) are leading a crusade against free human thought, against reason and science."

Baskin is especially disgusted with

"Their leader, F. Ogburn, (who) cynically compares their function to that of the managers of war factories... The sociologist Ross tries to show the existence of races with a predominance of 'animal desires' and others with a predominance of 'desires of an emotional and intellectual order.' The latter comprise all 100 per cent Americans, i.e. in the first place financial kings and plutocrats... The sociologist Bogdus, paid by Wall Street, advocates on the basis of racial 'theory'—genocide, the physical extermination of whole nations. He pours out torrents of dirty slander on Negroes, Chinese, Indians, and other nations which are not convenient to Wall Street."

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In totalitarian societies no social science is possible. In free societies, the fact that conflicts are not forcibly repressed allows them to be expressed in social science itself. This is impossible in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, sociology offers a description of objective laws governing social life. But the Communists claim to have discovered them in Marxo-Leninism; this claim, in turn, in Stalinist hands, became an ideological justification for exploitation and tyranny. The resistance of the Stalinists and their apparently anti-Stalinist successors to empirical inquiry is due to their fear of disproof of their claim. Hence true sociology in the Soviet Empire is really something subversive. Hence the promising development of sociology in Tsarist Russia and in the twenties in Ukraine, has ended in a grave, and only a complete reversal of the ideological policies of the Soviet regime can bring sociology of this enslaved sub-continent out of its graveyard.

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<sup>24</sup> M. P. Baskin, *Against the Philosophising Warriors of Anglo-American Imperialism* (Moscow: Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Science of the USSR, 1951), pp. 102-140.



## ANNEXATION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE TO THE UKRAINIAN SSR

*by* VINCENT SHANDOR

The principle of self-determination, which had to a certain degree guided the liberation policy of the Entente toward the end of the World War I, was not applied to the largest of the nations in Central Europe, namely the Ukrainian people. This gross contravention of the principle of self-determination brought about the disruption of the moral equilibrium in Europe and led to the toleration and, to some extent, the legalization of Muscovite and Polish aggression against Ukraine which finally resulted in World War II. The only instance in which the right to self-determination was applied, and then only in a limited degree, was in Carpatho-Ukraine, called in official diplomatic circles in 1919 "Ruthenie Subcarpatique."<sup>1</sup>

In our article we shall concern ourselves with this section, the westernmost part of Ukraine which, like the other Ukrainian lands, was at different times occupied by various foreign countries. Thus, up to 1919 it was under the domination of Hungary, from 1919 to 1939 it belonged to the Czechoslovak Republic, from 1939 until 1944 it was occupied by Hungary, and in 1945 it was annexed to the Ukrainian SSR.

### FOREIGN ASPIRATIONS

There are two emigre groups in the U.S.A. which are interested in re-acquiring the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine for their own countries. Both these groups are members of the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), which takes in nine so-called satellite countries. From what has been said by leading circles and individual members of the ACEN it clearly appears that they have included in their political programs, among other things, also the aim of restoring the 1938 boundaries in Central-Eastern Europe. In view of the fact that the Ukrainian lands in 1938, with the exception of Soviet Ukraine, were

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<sup>1</sup> Carpatho-Ukraine is the area between the rivers Uzh and Tysa, which in the Czechoslovak Constitution was called "Podkarpatska Rus."

divided among three countries, namely Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, and that at present these areas, except a small part of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory, constitute component parts of the Ukrainian SSR, the activities of the ACEN are directed largely toward the division of the territory of the present Ukrainian SSR and the liquidation of its state status after the fall of the Bolshevik regime in Ukraine. In this article, we shall examine the "justification" of the claims of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak groups to Carpatho-Ukraine as well as the legal aspects of the annexation of the area to the Ukrainian SSR.

#### HUNGARIAN CLAIMS

Until the end of 1918 Hungary had included various nationalities, including also Carpatho-Ukrainians (Ruthenians). These peoples were deprived of even the basic national rights, not to speak of political rights and equality. To illustrate, for instance, the electoral practice and "equality" in Hungary of her own citizens of non-Hungarian nationality, it would suffice to cite the following example: "among the Roumanians there is an average of one deputy to over 50—60,000 inhabitants; among the Szekels (Hungarian speaking ethnic group in Transylvania) of East Transylvania, 1 to every 4—5,000."<sup>2</sup>

In the field of culture, here again Hungary did all it could to destroy everything that was non-Hungarian. A striking example of such behavior was the laws passed by the Hungarian Parliament, such as the Lex Apponyi, directed against other nationalities living within the confines of Hungary.

For illustration we shall mention merely the fact that at the time of the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* (1867), when Hungary secured direct jurisdiction over the Ukrainians (Ruthenians), the problem of schools in Carpatho-Ukraine presented itself as follows: there were 479 Ukrainian (Ruthenian) schools in 1868; 571 in 1874; 23 in 1906. But by 1913 there was not a single Ukrainian (Ruthenian) school. Only in 34 schools was the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) language permitted to be used and then only in the subjects of religion and church singing.<sup>3</sup>

Along with the liquidation of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) schools a dreadful terror was unleashed against the population. In certain areas of the lowlands, the population was not allowed to use its native lan-

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<sup>2</sup> R.W. Seton-Watson, *Corruption and Reform in Hungary* (A Study of Electoral Practice), London, 1911, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> C.A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, London-New York-Toronto; 1937; p. 211.

guage in church or in school. School children were forbidden to use it even outside the school grounds. Despite their inability to speak the Hungarian language at all, they were severely punished by the teacher if it was brought to his attention or if he overheard any child speaking its mother tongue. Therefore, the natural and logical consequence of all this was that the peoples then subjugated by Hungary fought against her and seized the first opportunity in 1919 to break away from her. In 1920 the so-called Trianon Peace Treaty was signed between Hungary and the *Entente* and in it Hungary renounced her territory inhabited by non-Hungarians, including Carpatho-Ukraine. As a result of this agreement almost one-third of the population detached itself from Hungary. Thus Carpatho-Ukraine became part of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1919.

In 1939, with Hitler's blessing, Hungary marched her troops into Carpatho-Ukraine and occupied the territory anew. After regaining the country, the Hungarians introduced a terroristic police regime and violence. Innocent people, Ukrainian patriots, peasants, priests, students, and workers, were shot without trial. Throughout the whole of the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine, the prisons were filled with the native population. When the prisons could hold no more prisoners, school buildings were converted into prisons (for instance, the Commercial School in Uzhorod). The following quotation bears witness to this fact:

"Hungarian rule in the mountains of Subcarpathian Ruthenia began with the indiscriminate shooting and hanging of a good many of those who played a part in public life of the Czechoslovak Republic. The number of people thus exterminated amounted to above five thousand. In the small industrial town of Velky Bockov alone 27 teachers and 130 other 'intellectuals' were shot or hanged by the Hungarian military authorities. Several thousand Subcarpathian Ruthenians were dragged into Hungarian concentration camps in Nyiregyhaza and Garany or are still detained in Hungarian military and civil prisons." <sup>4</sup>

In the course of the occupation, from March 1939 until October 1944, Hungary did not venture to hold elections in Carpatho-Ukraine to elect representatives to the Budapest Parliament, although such elections took place in Hungary proper in June 1939. Likewise, she failed to implement a plebiscite which she had constantly demanded in the years between the two world wars. In spite of the occupation of the country,

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<sup>4</sup> *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*, A Document of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Introduction by Jan Masaryk, pp. 170-171, American Council of Public Affairs.

Hungary did not consider Carpatho-Ukraine an integral part of its state territory. She organized Carpatho-Ukraine as a separate administrative unit vested with a temporary statute, which remained in force until the end of the occupation, i.e. until 1944.

On this occasion it would be appropriate to note that former Hungarian statesmen today endeavor in their publications to explain the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine as an anti-Hitlerite act. Former Premier Kallay, for instance, writes:

"It is important to emphasize, however, that Hungary's occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine was done at the urging of Poland, in the face of German disapproval, and only after Czechoslovakia had disintegrated."<sup>5</sup>

The real truth, however, is that on March 13, 1939 Hitler summoned the Hungarian envoy in Berlin, Dome Sztojaj, to present to him his decision concerning Carpatho-Ukraine:

"Hungary may begin to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine; however it must start this action promptly."<sup>6</sup>

That same night Sztojaj, accompanied by a high-ranking official of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, flew to Budapest in order to inform Premier Pal Teleki, Foreign Minister Csaki, and Regent Horthy of Hitler's decision concerning Carpatho-Ukraine. The Hungarian statesmen received the news with great satisfaction; the population with great enthusiasm. The immediate sequel to this exultation was a letter by Horthy to Hitler which read:

"Budapest, March 13, 1939.

"Your Excellency: Heartfelt thanks. I cannot express how happy I am, for this headwater region is, in fact, for Hungary—I dislike using big words—a vital question. Notwithstanding our recruits of but 5 weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust. I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times rely steadfastly on my gratitude. Horthy."<sup>7</sup>

By perpetrating this act of aggression, Hungary grossly violated not only the international accords she had signed after World War I but also the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration of November 2, 1938, of which she herself was a staunch initiator and at which she voluntarily

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<sup>5</sup> Nicholas Kallay, *Hungarian Premier* (A Personal Account of the Nation's Struggle in the Second World War), 1954, p. 61.

<sup>6</sup> Walter Hagen, *Die geheime Front*; Linz-Wien, 1950, p. 184.

<sup>7</sup> *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945* (From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry); Series D (1937-1945), Department of State, p.241.

renounced any further claims to Carpatho-Ukraine. Hungary did not have at the time, nor does she have today, either legal or factual grounds for her demands for Carpatho-Ukraine. All her actions are manifestations of sheer aggression and imperialism aimed at seizing foreign territory. Her aggressive act against Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939 has never been recognized internationally, except by Hitler, and has been denounced by the civilized world at large. By the 1947 Paris Treaty, Hungary again was reduced in size to the territory of 1920.

#### CZECHOSLOVAK CLAIMS

After the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Carpatho-Ukrainians (Ruthenians) made known their wish to belong to the Ukrainian state in the declarations of their national councils of Liubovna, Svaliava, and Khust. However, when this proved impossible to implement and when their brother Ruthenians in the U.S.A. took the initiative, they decided for annexation to the Czechoslovak Republic. This was carried out by an international agreement in Saint Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919, which guaranteed broad autonomous rights to the country. The decisions of this agreement were, to a large extent, incorporated in the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic on February 29, 1920. Thus, Carpatho-Ukraine attained an international and constitutional guarantee of her autonomous rights. By another Constitutional Law concerning the autonomy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, № 328 of November 22, 1938, a three-member government was formed, the members of which were simultaneously members of the central government in Prague. Through this act Czechoslovakia became a federative state of Czechs, Slovaks, and Ukrainians. She remained such until March 14, 1939.

It was not until 1938 that Czechoslovakia fulfilled her obligations to grant the autonomy of the country. Yet we must concede in the name of truth that during these twenty years of the democratic Czechoslovak Republic, Carpatho-Ukraine underwent a strong national and cultural rebirth and that she made certain economic gains. What the Hungarian occupation regime had neglected or destroyed prior to 1918 was revived and speedily developed during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak era.

In the U.S.A. there is active the Council of Free Czechoslovakia which as a member of the Free Europe system also endeavors to include Carpatho-Ukraine in its state representation in exile on the basis of the Saint Germain agreement and the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of 1920. It is true that the Saint Germain agreement and the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of 1920—the latter having been in force, together with the adopted Constitutional amendments

until the day of the proclamation of the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine (March 14, 1939)—were the point of departure not only for the legal relations between the two countries, in particular, but also for the international legal status of Carpatho-Ukraine, in general. As a result of Hitler's creation of a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the declaration of an independent Carpatho-Ukraine, and the restoration of Czechoslovakia—less Carpatho-Ukraine—after World War II new legal conditions and a new international legal situation have arisen. The act of the declaration of independence is of importance also for the reason that it reflects the will of the population which was given expression through constitutionally elected members of the government and Parliament.

#### ANNEXATION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE TO THE UKRAINIAN SSR

During the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic, leading Czechoslovak politicians repeatedly maintained that Carpatho-Ukraine had voluntarily joined Czechoslovakia. It logically follows therefore that Carpatho-Ukraine also has the right to secede voluntarily from Czechoslovakia. If we have in mind pre-Munich Czechoslovakia, which as such was recognized by the Western Allies during World War II, then the "secession" of Carpatho-Ukraine appears to have been actually completed by an agreement between Czechoslovakia and the USSR concluded on June 29, 1945. In this connection, two points should be borne in mind: *a.* Carpatho-Ukraine had never constituted an integral part of Czechoslovakia as had, for instance, the territories of the Sudetenland: *b.* the founders of Czechoslovakia themselves regarded their relationship to Carpatho-Ukraine as merely a "temporary trusteeship" which should be returned to her lawful owner (Ukraine) at an appropriate moment.

The agreement between Czechoslovakia and the USSR contains all the attributes of an international agreement; it was ratified by the Czechoslovak Parliament; its ratification was confirmed by President Benes and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk; the exchange of the ratification documents took place in Prague on January 30, 1946. It is necessary to stress particularly the fact that during the voting on the agreement in the Prague Parliament, not a single opposing vote was cast. Moreover, not a single person abstained from voting. Hence it is obvious that the present leaders of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia had at the time also voted for the agreement. Furthermore, in accordance with the Constitution of Czechoslovakia, only those international accords have legal internal validity which are published in the official gazette. The agreement in question was entered in the official gazette on October

21, 1946 under number 186, *Collection of Laws and Decrees*, and so acquired valid internal-legal force. If we are to attach significance to the declaration of former members of the Czechoslovak government—who today figure as members of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia—to the effect that all decisions and decrees of the Prague government released prior to February 1948 (the date when the Communists seized power) were expressions of the free will of the government and the population, then by the same token this agreement must be also viewed as a free expression of the will of the government and population.

Notwithstanding and despite this factual state of affairs, the Council of Free Czechoslovakia adopted the following decision at its meeting on June 30, 1954: "...we do not recognize, and we condemn the detaching of Subcarpatho-Ruthenia which was carried out under Soviet terror and against the will of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians."<sup>8</sup> This contention is unfounded for several reasons: *a.* During World War II, Dr. Benes and his Government had their permanent seat in London, not in Moscow; *b.* Great Britain recognized the Government of Czechoslovakia in Exile and therefore Benes had no need of seeking another "guardian" for the protection of the state interests of his country; *c.* when Benes returned from the U.S.A. to Britain in the summer of 1943 and informed Secretary Eden of his intention of paying a visit to Moscow to attend the signing of a Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, "Eden declared that the British Government deemed such a trip inappropriate."<sup>9</sup> *d.* Eden showed Benes a protocol and two other documents concluded by him and Molotov to the effect that "Britain and Soviet Russia had agreed not to enter into any agreement with small nations regarding frontiers and other post-war matters until cessation of hostilities."<sup>10</sup> Apparently all this did not stop Benes from going to Moscow, nor did it discourage him from signing an agreement with Moscow.

There is no doubt that Carpatho-Ukraine was for Czechoslovakia a strategically important territory, for it served as a link between the members of the Little *Entente* (Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia). But in view of the Ukrainian character of the country and the new realignment of the forces in Central and Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia considered the time ripe for handing over the "trusteeship" to the Ukrainian owner. As we have already remarked, the fact that the real Ukrainian owner was not a sovereign master but himself under

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<sup>8</sup> M.J. Brouček, *Československá Tragedie*, Germany, 1956, p. 404.

<sup>9</sup> *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. XIII, No. 2; p. 157.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*.

foreign occupation does not diminish the legal or factual validity of this act. The important thing is that Carpatho-Ukraine was joined to the Ukrainian state territory and that Czechoslovak statesmen had themselves acknowledged that the country should be turned over to its rightful Ukrainian owner at a suitable time. It would be appropriate in this connection to refer to an article by Dr. E. Benes in which "Dr. Benes explained that as far back as 1918 both he and President Masaryk regarded Czechoslovakia as a trustee of Ruthenia and were willing to relinquish this trusteeship when the Ukrainian people became nationally united. This occurred when Eastern Galicia was absorbed into the Soviet Ukraine." <sup>11</sup>

Apart from the aforementioned agreement, other valuable statements have been made by prominent Czechoslovak politicians and statesmen in reference to the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR. Thus the prominent leader of the Popular Socialist Party, Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, made the following declaration in the Prague Parliament on December 2, 1946:

"When, after the liberation of our Republic, voices were heard in favor of the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine to Soviet Ukraine, the Government would not be influenced by any so-called reasons of prestige against the merger of our Ukrainian citizens with their brethern of their homeland. It was a decision which history will prove to have been right. A decision which we do not regret and which we surely will not have to regret in the future." <sup>12</sup>

Carpatho-Ukraine had become a recurring subject of discussions among interested statesmen. For instance, when in 1927 the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov visited Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) in Czechoslovakia, he had a confidential talk with Benes, then Czechoslovak Foreign Minister. Litvinov relates the talk thus:

"Benes recalled his dramatic conversation with Mostovenko (Soviet Ambassador in Prague) in the summer of 1920, when our troops were closing in on Warsaw. He (Benes) had then said that as soon as the Red Army reached the Carpathians, Czechoslovakia would cede Ruthenia with the town of Uzhorod to us . . . ." <sup>13</sup>

Such views reflected the innermost cravings of the Kremlin politicians who visualized the great danger that was in store for them and their policies because part of the Ukrainian lands was out of their

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<sup>11</sup> Dr. E. Benes, "Post-War Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24, 1945-1946, pp. 397-398.

<sup>12</sup> M.J. Brouček, *Československá Tragedie*, 1956, Germany, p. 305.

<sup>13</sup> Maxim Litvinov, *Notes for a Journal*, New York, 1955, p. 64.



reach, prospered economically, became nationally conscious, and fostered the idea of Ukrainian statehood in spite of many obstructions. Stalin was well aware of the maxim that ideas know no frontiers. This he had come to realize back in 1938-1939, when the small Carpatho-Ukraine won world-wide publicity and when far-flung, bold political plans were linked with her. From the political point of view it is significant that at the 18th All-Union Party Congress in Moscow on March 10, 1939, Stalin devoted considerable attention to Carpatho-Ukraine even though he endeavored to minimize her importance with irony.

In the light of known documents, there is reason to argue that, to a large extent, it was the Ukrainian problem—connected with Carpatho-Ukraine—that brought Stalin and Hitler together and led to the agreement that they concluded. Litvinov made an interesting remark in his *Notes to the Journal* at the end of 1938, when he cited the attitude of the Politbureau and that of Stalin with regard to the Ukrainian problem in general. Litvinov writes:

"The Instancia is obviously scared. They are particularly afraid of the Ukrainians... It's ridiculous... A small group of... I think Hitler will hand them over to be gobbled up by Horthy... The 'neighbors' are denying... Astakhov has reported that in his last conversation with... He was told that the Ukrainians of Ruthenia will receive no support... It's strange how we fear any sign of Ukrainian irredentism... Joseph Vissarionovich more than anyone else since he... They would rather see the Ruthenians eaten up by the Hungarians... Hitler will not let the Hungarians get Ruthenia before they sign the pact... We shall then be able to break off diplomatic relations with Budapest as a sign of protest... We shall pass off as defenders of the Ukrainians at the same time have no irredentists in Ruthenia... It will possibly happen... But I don't know yet whether Hitler will want to... As to Rosenberg, he will... But his influence is limited..."<sup>14</sup>

As the reader may see, the quoted lines from Litvinov's diary are written in broken phrases from which the reader may have to guess at some words. Litvinov himself furnishes the meaning of some of these: "Instancia"—Politbureau; "neighbors"—NKVD.

There is no doubt but that the Soviet diplomacy did not pass up any international opportunity to acquire the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine; there is also no doubt that the Czechoslovak diplomacy had all the possibilities of putting up a resistance, which it did not do. If Benes did protest at all, he did not do so at the right place and time.

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 288.

Up to the last moment he refused to admit the possibility that Moscow was playing a double game, and heaped all the blame on Ukrainian nationalism...

When Stalin found that the Czechoslovak emigre circles in England were beginning again to discuss loudly the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine, he wrote a personal letter, dated January 23, 1945, to Benes, stating among other things: "The Soviet Government has not forbidden and could not have forbidden the population of Subcarpathian Ukraine to express their national will. And this is even more comprehensible as you yourself have told me in Moscow that you are prepared to cede the Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. As you will certainly remember, at that time I did not give my consent to it."<sup>15</sup> Further, Stalin denied the rumors that the Soviet Government entertained any intentions of abrogating the agreement between the two countries and solving unilaterally the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine.

On January 28, 1945 Benes answered Stalin. In his reply he had the occasion to refute "incorrect" statements by Stalin concerning their conversation with regard to Carpatho-Ukraine. However, he did not mention this. On the contrary, his letter was replete with assertions of devotion to Stalin, and among other things:

"Nevertheless, I assure you most emphatically, Mr. Chairman, that neither I personally nor the Czechoslovak Government has for a moment suspected that the Soviet Government desired to solve the question of Subcarpathian Ukraine unilaterally or had the intention of violating the agreement between our two states. I am thoroughly acquainted with the principles of the policy of the Soviet Union and I know that such action on their part can be definitely excluded. I therefore beg you to believe my words."<sup>16</sup>

#### THE SOVIET ARMY IN CARPATHO-UKRAINE

In October 1944 the Soviet Army entered Carpatho-Ukraine, followed by F. Nemec, delegate of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile. The presence of the army and other organs of the Soviet government in the country undoubtedly exerted considerable influence upon the activities of the delegate as well as upon the expression of the will of the population concerning the question to whom the country should belong. The Soviet Army's westward advance posed a significant question which had a bearing upon the orientation of the population. The

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 173.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 174.

Carpatho-Ukrainians at the time had two possibilities: either to join Soviet Ukraine or Soviet Czechoslovakia. For the reasons given above, they chose the first alternative. However, we must note that regardless of the extent and importance of Soviet influence upon the annexation, the expression of the will of the local population in favor of annexation was not the cause but the result of the pro-Soviet policy of Benes and the Czechoslovak Government abroad and at home. Therefore, the act of annexation should be assessed from the point of view of the general interests of the Ukrainian people, regardless of the existing regime in the Ukrainian state. We hold that it would be closer to the truth if we contended that it is this feeling of national unity of the Ukrainians on both sides of the Carpathian Mountains and the desire to be forever together, as well as aspirations for an independent state, that were predominantly decisive in the matter of annexation. These very same national sentiments of the Ukrainian people were pointed out by Molotov at a meeting with a Czechoslovak delegation in Moscow on December 27, 1944 which had arrived to discuss the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine. Molotov said at the time that "the situation was complicated by the strong Ukrainian nationalism in Ruthenia and in the Soviet Union as well—and the Government in Moscow was simply not able to prevent every exaggerated expression of such feelings." <sup>17</sup>

Benes also wrote in the same vein when he sent a telegram from London to his delegate Nemec in Moscow (December 13, 1944), revealing to him his own observations on the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine:

"My impression is that in this matter both Governments are proceeding with sincerity and in the same direction. It seems to me, however, that the Ukrainian Government and especially also the Ukrainian Communist Party intentionally proceed differently; they want to confront both Moscow and ourselves with accomplished facts and do not respect anybody, but follow recklessly their own aims. I do not think there is a double game of Moscow in this and I have the impression that it is beginning to get out of hand, and against the Central Government. One must not forget that Ukrainian nationalism is and will be dangerous in every respect and that Moscow has to take it into account." <sup>18</sup>

Delegate Nemec, who stayed in Carpatho-Ukraine from October 1944 until January 1945, admitted in this conversation with Molotov

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<sup>17</sup> F. Nemec, *Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia*, Toronto, 1955, pp. 144-145.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 291-292.

that "in his opinion the separatist movement in Ruthenia was spontaneous and very strong and that, generally speaking, he had no complaints concerning the local Soviet authorities."<sup>19</sup>

In the light of the above documents, the statement by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia that "we do not recognize and we denounce the detaching of Subcarpathian Ruthenia which was carried out under Soviet terror and against the will of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians"<sup>20</sup> appears politically naive.

At the time when Carpatho-Ukraine belonged to Czechoslovakia, the present leading members of this Council were at the helm of the state. They failed to promote and create constructive relations with Carpatho-Ukraine. They denied, as they do now, to another people the same rights they demanded for their own people today.

Even in politics, problems are solved ultimately only when they are solved correctly. The Ukrainian problem in Central-Eastern Europe will be correctly and ultimately solved when all Ukrainian ethnographic lands, including Carpatho-Ukraine, will find a permanent place in an independent Ukrainian state. The Ukrainians do not wish to constitute an exception from the general rule of the right to self-determination and thereby to the opportunity to live in their own state without foreign tutors.

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 143.

<sup>20</sup> M.J. Brouček, *Československá Tragedie*, 1956, Germany.

## UKRAINIAN POET DRAY KHMARA ON THE UKRAINIAN LITERARY LIFE UNDER THE SOVIETS

by OKSANA ASHER

From 1924 to 1932, Michael Dray-Khmara kept a diary in which he noted the significant literary events of that turbulent period. Here, too, he inserted many revealing and pungent comments on the various ways in which the literary figures of the time reacted to the growing Soviet pressure. Some, the diary shows, resisted and died; while others conformed and lost their souls. Dray-Khmara did not mince words here, and his own position—and eventual fate—are never in doubt. The following pages contain, in chronological order, the passages from the diary which bear upon the Ukrainian, and therefore Dray-Khmara's, literary life.

Dray-Khmara remarked of the contemporary Ukrainian poet, Pavlo Tychyna, in an entry dated August 16, 1924:

Turning away from his earlier verse of dream worlds, he is now forced to write poems about our prosaic life. Some people relate this to his removal to Kharkiv. Is it possible that he has sold his soul? No. Only terrible fear could have put him into the hands of Ellan (Blakytny) and Koryak<sup>22</sup> who accepted him because of his reputation and exploited him in every conceivable way. Surely it is clear to all that the fanfares of the revolution have now stifled his clarinets.<sup>23</sup>

Literary critics of to-day cannot but agree with Dray-Khmara that the Soviets were successful in silencing the masterful symbolic neo-romanticism of Tychyna.<sup>24</sup> Like Dray-Khmara, Tychyna saw in the Revolution the seeds of a latent Ukrainian national revival. And it is in this perspective that we must consider his glorification of it. His

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<sup>22</sup> Koryak, Ukrainian literary critic, a member of the Communist Party and also a member of *Hart*.

<sup>23</sup> *Sunny Clarinets* was the title of Tychyna's famous volume of collected poems.

<sup>24</sup> For the criticism of Tychyna, see Yuri Sherekh, "Trends in Ukrainian Literature Under the Soviets," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, No. 2 (Spring, 1948), p. 152.

unusual imagery and striking vocabulary made him one of the most original of contemporary Ukrainian poets. In all likelihood, only lack of courage (or shall we call it the presence of a strong instinct for self-preservation) prevented him from taking an active part in the literary debate in 1925, although it is true that he joined *Vaplite* (the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature), founded in that year. He is one of the few poets who survived Stalin's regime and even made a political career after the Second World War, serving for a short period as Minister of Education of Ukraine. For the contemporary Soviet reader, Tychyna is known only as the author of the *Feeling of the United Family*, though, if serious literary merit is our criterion, he must be considered exclusively on the basis of his early poetry.

Three days later (August 19, 1924) we find in Dray-Khmara's diary the following ironical entry about another Ukrainian poet, Ellan Blakytny:

How curious that in all the photographs of Ellan, Tychyna and Khvylovy, Ellan is always in the middle between Tychyna and Khvylovy. Together they constitute the musical trio of the balalaika, flute and cello. But it goes without saying that "the Soviet balalaika" is always in the center.

Both Khvylovy and Tychyna belonged to *Hart*, the literary organization led by Blakytny, though (like many other Ukrainian writers), they were doubtless weary of Ellan's relentlessly political approach to literature. It is obvious that the balalaika is a Russian national instrument; bandura is the Ukrainian.

*Hart* and *Pluh*<sup>25</sup> were rivals in the attempt to promote a literature for the masses. Their struggle reached its climax in 1925, when the members of *Hart* blamed *Pluh* for lowering literary standards by encouraging "cultural provincialism." *Pluh* in turn accused *Hart* of imposing proletarian culture on the peasant masses.<sup>26</sup> As the struggle wore on, writers of both camps deserted their positions for the "enemy,"<sup>27</sup> Dray-Khmara's ironical commentary runs as follows:

The following sequence of events took place: first, there was a quarrel between Pylypenko and Ellan. As a consequence the two "generals" went about stirring up dissatisfaction among the young members of both organizations. And now the upshot of the matter is that like butterflies these youthful writers fly from *Pluh* to *Hart* or from *Hart* to *Pluh*. And this we call searching for a platform.

Several passages of Dray-Khmara's diary deal with his contemporary, the poet Volodymyr Sosyura, a man of proletarian origin who

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<sup>25</sup> A fuller explanation of the role of these organizations will be given in another essay of the author.

<sup>26</sup> "The letter to the editors of *Bolshevik*," *Bilshovyk*, March 20, 1925.

<sup>27</sup> "The letter about abandonment of *Hart*," *Kommunist*, March 18, 1925.

took an active part in the Ukrainian war of liberation. He served in the Ukrainian National Army, led by Petlyura, from the time of its formation (November, 1918) and gave up only in February, 1920, when the army was at last defeated and decimated. Later he served in the Red Army, hoping that the triumph of the Revolution would procure independence for Ukraine.

In an entry in Dray-Khmara's diary dated February 19, 1926, we read the following about Sosyura:

...Yesterday I went to a party in honor of Sosyura. It consisted of two parts—his reminiscences as a Kozak of the Third Regiment, and his poetry. The memories were interesting, though in some places overly objective. Sosyura looked at the events of the past no longer as a Kozak but through the eyes of a communist. This about-face produces a complete upheaval of values: for him Petlyura is now an executioner who resembles Rakovsky<sup>28</sup>—what an irony of fate that he himself served in Petlyura's army from 1918 to 1920, and only abandoned the fight when 'Petlyura' was liquidated ... All that I heard in 'the reminiscences' can be found in Sosyura's poetry, even the 'chumak' and the schoolgirl holding a machine gun between her legs. The only thing he never mentioned in his creative work was his scalplock<sup>29</sup> when he was a Kozak. Sosyura's nature is open and naive, as he himself admits.

And from this probably followed his lack of character, absence of moral convictions, and other defects. Otherwise, how can one explain such endless waverings, the hymns to the party in public, and the 'O, my poor Ukraine' read behind the scenes. This ambivalence caused a division in his poetry between the ideologically correct and the incorrect. The first attitude produces pot-boilers, the second mainly repetitions, for he was never able to go farther than his Ukrainian girls and the life of the Red Army man in the Fourth Company; why not the Third Kozak Regiment where Sosyura spent more time than in the Fourth Company?

One more example, that shows his lack of loyalty to his fellow writers ... somebody asked him his opinion of the current literary debates, and he answered: 'Pylypenko and Khvylovy have had the wrong approach since Pylypenko is oriented towards the Kulak and Khvylovy towards the petit bourgeois; therefore I shall try to attack Khvylovy in writing.' It is clear that Shchupak<sup>30</sup> and Company had already succeeded in cajoling this weak-minded man. During his speech I kept thinking, not about Sosyura himself, but about the events of 1918 to 1920, in which he was immersed, nay, drowned. None the less, we must accept the fact that he is undoubtedly a poet of talent; though I question if we shall get

<sup>28</sup> Christian Rakovsky, the head of the People's Commissariat in Ukraine (1919-1922), protested in his article, "Beznadezhnoye delo," in *Izvestia*, January 3, 1919, against the use of the Ukrainian language in administration.

<sup>29</sup> Scalplock, the special haircut of the Kozaks.

<sup>30</sup> Shchupak, a member of the Communist Party and the editor of the newspaper, *Proletarska Pravda*.

anything of merit from him, for he is completely satisfied with his cheap laurels and no longer seeks to develop himself.

In Sosyura we may distinguish more clearly than in any other Ukrainian poet a striking duality of character: on one hand we see the communist; on the other, the Ukrainian patriot. This ambivalence is evident throughout his poetry, which at the same time leaves no doubt as to where his strong affection lay. For the poems written by Sosyura, the communist, are nothing more than artificially constructed slogans, whereas Sosyura, the Ukrainian patriot, was capable of producing verse of lyrical power. A comparison of two poems, both based on Ukrainian historical themes, illustrates this dichotomy. In one, *Taras Tryasylo*, (published in 1925) the poet deprecates and mocks his previous romantic admiration of the Kozak Ukraine.<sup>31</sup> But in another poem, *Mazepa*, partly published in 1929, Sosyura praises the Ukrainian Hetman Mazepa, thus placing himself in direct opposition to the Puskinian tradition of Russian nationalism in *Poltava*.<sup>32</sup>

In the middle '20's, Sosyura's verse collections, *The Red Winter*, published in 1922, and *Autumn Stars* of 1924, were widely read throughout Ukraine, especially by the Ukrainian youth. It is in *The Heart* that Sosyura, for the last time, revealed his artistic lyrical personality, for the horrible executions and deaths of 1933 proved to be fatal for Sossyura's talent. Although the great purge did not mean, for him, physical extermination as it did for so many of his literary contemporaries, the shock brought about by the news of the liquidation of a large part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia led to his commitment to a mental hospital. Ironically, it was because of this that he managed, physically at least, to survive. However, he continued to write verse after his illness, but none of it possessed sufficient merit to deserve our attention. The sole exception is his *Shchob Sady Shumily* (That the Orchards Rustle), published after the World War II, which contains lyrical poetry redolent in style and quality of his youth.

His widely known poem *Lubit Ukrainu* (Love Ukraine), composed for the Ukrainian Red Army during the war, was banned after the war and now permitted to appear (*The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. VII, p. 253.)

In spite of the suppression of independent thought in Soviet Ukraine, we find the following entry in Dray-Khmara's diary, dated April 2, 1926, about Hryts'ko Chuprynka, a Ukrainian poet who was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1921. Dray-Khmara opens his remarks with a quotation from Lenin:

<sup>31</sup> *Zasudzhene i Zaboronene*, V. I. Hryshko, New York, 1952, p. 16.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.



The experience of all movements of the enslaved classes teaches us that only the proletariat is able to unify and lead the separated and backward laboring classes of the population.

Then followed this poem of Chuprynka:

*Have You Heard?*

You did not hear? But you must hear  
How the people sing in grief,  
How the people sing in tortures,  
How arise to the sky  
Their tired and ill souls,  
Accompanied by long suffering sounds.

You didn't know? But you must know  
That with tears—the cry of despair,  
Heat and the flame of the fire!  
The heavens will grow red,  
Everywhere from the end to the end.  
The walls will be destroyed, and  
There will be no more frontiers.

Opposing the two quotations, Dray-Khmara concluded:

Lenin speaks about the enslaved classes, about the proletariat which will unify and lead the struggle for a better future. And Chuprynka sings of the people's grief, of the people's tortures, of their tears and their cries of despair. And the result of their misery is the heat and the flame of the fire! Is not this, too, faith in the revolution? And what happened? Lenin had Chuprynka shot.

In an entry dated January 22, 1927, Dray-Khmara commented upon the gradual disappearance of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as follows:

The funeral of Demutsky (a musical ethnographer) took place yesterday, and today I hear the news of Shcherbakivsky's tragic death. (Shcherbakivsky was Director of the Historical Museum in Kiev.) The loss of each man who works in the field of Ukrainian studies is so regrettable! Demutsky was at least an old man and died a natural death, but Shcherbakivsky drowned himself! He could no longer stand the cruel dirt of our life and committed suicide . . . I am curious whether the letter he wrote before his death will appear in the magazine. I doubt it very much.

Often the Russian intelligentsia refused to support Ukrainian writers. Indeed, like Gorky, many bitterly opposed the encouragement of Ukrainian literature.

Although Maxim Gorky, in Lenin's words, "without doubt the greatest representative of proletarian art,"<sup>33</sup> had expressed lofty ideas about social justice in pre-Revolutionary Russia, he nevertheless saw fit to protest against the development of the languages of non-Russian

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<sup>33</sup> V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th ed., XVI, 186.

nationalities under Russian occupation, as he noted in a letter to the Ukrainian poet, Slisarenko. Dray-Khmara was painfully surprised that Gorky, whom he had considered a representative of the liberal Russian intelligentsia before 1917, would accuse Ukrainians of chauvinism. The details of the incident are as follows:

After his second return from abroad (1928), Gorky became a leading figure in Soviet literary life. His articles on Russian literature and social realism were intended to direct the efforts of Soviet writers and literary critics. With the establishment of a single union of all Soviet writers (1932), Gorky became the leader of this organization.

On April 8, 1927, Dray-Khmara wrote:

Today I received a copy of Gorky's letter to Knyhospilka (the principal publishing house in Ukraine). Here are the contents of this interesting document which should prove most instructive to all Ukrainians: 'Dear Aleksey Andreyevich (Slisarenko), I am categorically opposed to any abridgment of the novel *Mother*. It seems to me that the translation of this novel into Ukrainian dialect is superfluous. The fact surprises me that the people who see before their eyes one and the same goal not only fortify the diversity of the dialects—try to transform a dialect into a language—but also they oppress the Great Russians, who form the minority in the territory of the dialect concerned. Under the old regime, I ceaselessly protested against similar situations. Under the new regime, I consider it necessary to avoid anything that could prove to be an obstacle to mutual aid. We are the witnesses of a most curious situation—while some people do their best to create a world language, others seem to seek the very reverse, A. Peshkov.' Such are the words of Gorky, who belonged in the past to the leftist movement and was a representative of the liberal Russian intelligentsia before 1917. What then can we say about the others! Here is an example of real, authentic, unqualified chauvinism, yet at the same time we Ukrainians are accused of chauvinism, only because we are Ukrainians. This story is as the earth and as boring as the speeches at a meeting . . . From a dialect we would like to create a language! What could be more horrible from a representative of the Russian intelligentsia! They are unwilling to let us escape from their paws . . . To obtain his goal he (Gorky) is even capable of lying, spreading the rumor about the 'oppressed' great Russians. According to Gorky, the Ukrainians must build together with the Russians the Tower of Babel (because what is this if not the Tower of Babel, this world language?), must renounce their own language and their own culture, created by a nation of forty millions during a millenium. All this is only to prevent any obstacle to own 'brothers'! No, it is precisely the immortal (Russian) chauvinism of the old regime, which prevents people from reaching mutual understanding and not what the Ukrainians are doing or rather, have already accomplished—transforming the 'dialect' into a language.

Some time after his letter to Slisarenko, Gorky, while visiting Kharkiv, told certain high officials of the regime (Zatonsky and Chubar) that he made a mistake and that Slisarenko (the Alexey Andreyevich of the letter) had reproved him. But after the deportation of Slisarenko to Solovki, a Ukrainian spokesman for the "official line" protested indignantly against the "disgraceful calumnies" concerning a letter "pur-

portedly" written by Gorky, but which in fact "never even existed." This was in 1937. About the same time, the Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Russian Postyshev, said to the Ukrainian writers: "There is one example for you to follow and to imitate, Comrades. I am thinking about Maxim Gorky."

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Since Dray-Khmara sympathized with the position of *Vaplite* on current literary trends, and because the name of this important organization is often mentioned in his diary, we must explain its history and the influence it exercised upon Ukrainian literary thought. The literary freedom prevailing in the Soviet Union of the 1920's<sup>34</sup> made it possible for certain of the able Ukrainian writers to found *Vaplite*, a literary organization headed by Mykola Khvylovy in Kharkiv. In *Thoughts Against the Current*, Khvylovy summarized the platform of *Vaplite*, declaring that the writer's main contribution is the literary product he creates rather than activity in writers' organizations, and that the improvement of purely literary quality is of primary importance. Naturally, such a literary organization aroused the sympathies of the leading Ukrainian writers and intellectuals and found its strongest supporters among the Ukrainian "neo-classicists." Some of the members of *Vaplite* fell under the influence of the "neo-classicists," and Dosvitny (one of the three active members of *Vaplite*) wrote a favorable article about the "neo-classicists."<sup>35</sup> In a series of articles published in 1926, Khvylovy came out in favor of a West European orientation of Ukrainian literature and freedom from Russian influences. Moreover, these ideas found powerful support in the Ukrainian Commissar for Education, Shumsky.<sup>36</sup> But in 1927, Shumsky was condemned and exiled from Ukraine by the Soviet government, and Khvylovy, Dosvitny, and Yalovy, the leaders of *Vaplite*, were accused of ignoring Moscow directives and were expelled from this organization by the order of the party.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, the Communist critics, Koryak and Khvylya, continued their attacks on Khvylovy, who contributed to the *Vaplite* journal even after his expulsion. The publica-

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<sup>34</sup> On June 18, 1925, a Party resolution on literature was approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This decision favored the development of the literatures of national minorities and the encouragement of free competition among various literary groups.

<sup>35</sup> O. Dosvitny, "Do rozvytku pysmennytskykh syl," *Vaplite*, First issue, 1926, pp. 5-17.

<sup>36</sup> See S. Nykolyshyn, *Kul'turna polityka bol'shevykiv i ukrains'ky kul'turny protsesy*, 1947, p. 31.

<sup>37</sup> S. Nykolyshyn, *Natsionalizm u Literaturi na Skhidnikh Ukrains'kykh Zemlyakh*, Na Chuzhyni, 1947, p. 21.

tion of his novel, *The Woodsnipes*,<sup>38</sup> by this magazine, aroused fierce criticism from representatives of the party line. And Khvylyya went so far as to declare that Khvylovy's Ukraine was not a Soviet Ukraine, and that for him the Party was an organization of hypocrites and the national policy of respecting ethnic minorities a sham. He further charged that Khvylovy represented Ukrainians as a hapless people.<sup>39</sup> Such criticism was clearly indicative of the breach between the Party and *Vaplite* which resulted in the final dissolution of *Vaplite* in 1928. As we have seen, the high artistic standards of *Vaplite* had found support beyond the limits of the organization itself.

Of the liquidation of *Vaplite*, Dray-Khmara wrote on January 1, 1928:

I dropped in at Mohylansky's (a Ukrainian writer and scholar) and heard from him that *Vaplite* had been either disbanded or suppressed by the government. O the times! The times! Even the slightest sign of opposition is impossible. No one dares to print a free word, let alone a free thought! Why must we tire our starving brains when they have already established a system of thinking and philosophy for us. You need only open Karl Marx, read, learn as much as you like. There is plenty of nourishment; there is enough for all...

We also discussed the last investigating committee, headed by Ozersky (head of the Council of Political Education in 1927-28, who was responsible for all literary activities in Ukraine at that time). They would probably like to do to the Academy of Sciences what they did to *Vaplite*.

The following ironical entries in the diary relate to the first purges in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, in which scholars of great reputation were often replaced by Communist professors of limited education and scholarship. These purges were usually accompanied by public meetings where the condemned professors were forced to criticize themselves and to admit their mistakes publicly.

The members of the Academy of Sciences refused to listen to Matyiiko (pen name of Yaworsky, historian and member of the Communist Party) and to elect him and Shlikhter (economist and member of the Communist Party) to the Academy—so now you have it! It is the same as if you chased the fly out of the door and it came back in through the window. If you do not like to make this voluntary, you will be forced to do it, whatever 'his highness' desires.

Already their attack has begun on our Academy. Krymsky (the famous Ukrainian philologist) said that Mohylansky (a Ukrainian writer and scholar) was completely confused at the public meeting. He pretended to be feeble-minded, swore his loyalty to the government, and beat himself on his chest, but nobody believed him.

Doroshkevych (a scholar and Director of the Shevchenko Institute in Kiev), discovering the attacks against the Academy, was frightened, and would have liked, at any price, to introduce a Communist into the Shevchenko Institute. How

<sup>38</sup> Khvylovy, "Valdshnepy," *Vaplite*, No. 5, 1927.

<sup>39</sup> A. Khvylyya, *Vid ukhlyu u prirvu*, Kharkiv, 1928, p. 3.

so! In Kharkiv there are Koryak and others, while in Kiev—not one member of the party! It is necessary to bring someone who will at least be an adequate scholar and who will prevent attacks against the Institute. For example, Zaklynsky (the Director of the Kiev Historical Museum and a member of the Communist Party)—a scholar communist. Why wouldn't he be a good collaborator of an Institute which is concerned with the works of Shevchenko? He even wrote a small article about . . . . Franko.

On January 18, 1928, Dray-Khmara wrote:

After the speech of Yefremov (vice-president of the Academy of Science) at the Academy, Rylsky and I went to Fylypovych's for tea. We discussed the literary debates going on in Kharkiv. It seemed to me that these debates had been tactically staged by the Soviet government, for they were finding it necessary to drown out the noise which the foreign press was making over the liquidation of *Vaplite*, *Hart*, etc. Their secondary aim (as revealed in Skrypnyk's<sup>40</sup> speech) was to place all artistic organizations under government control and to change their ideological point of view because pure Ukrainian organizations were too dangerous for the state.

Here follow a few excerpts from Dray-Khmara's conversations with his colleagues, as recorded in his diary. These entries characterize the conditions of his life before his first arrest:

From my conversations with Zerov . . . Most of our conversations were literary and sometimes in the course of our discussion we allowed ourselves to criticize proletarian poetry as ungraceful and crude. When I tried to write revolutionary poems, Zerov wrote parodies of them. After 1929 I spoke with him only once, in the spring of 1932, in the Proletarian Park. I told him about my literary work which had been denied publication.<sup>41</sup> I also told him that I was depressed because of the conditions which surrounded me, that I was tired of my work and that I could see no future for myself. Zerov characterized our era by comparing it with the Time of Troubles.<sup>42</sup>

With Rylsky<sup>43</sup> I also had talks of a literary character. I remember that once, while returning from Mohylansky's, we spoke of the necessity of taking one state or the other because we recognized that our present indecision could bring no positive results. After Rylsky's release from prison I spoke with him several times in my own home where he was working on a dictionary. I was the only one who really spoke because he was silent. He found it was better that way, having already been in prison. I spoke about how difficult it was for me to work; that I had too many lectures, but that I could not earn a bottle of milk for my child; that I had not even a bushel of potatoes in my house and that by 1933 I might be in a very difficult situation.

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<sup>40</sup> Mykola Skrypnyk, the Commissar of Education of the Ukraine from 1927 to 1932.

<sup>41</sup> Translation of Lermontov's *Demon*, of French poets, the second volume of poetry, the article about Kupala, etc.

<sup>42</sup> The so-called "Smutnoye vremya" (1598-1613).

<sup>43</sup> Among the Ukrainian "neo-classicists" Dray-Khmara became particularly fond of Rylsky, considering him his sworn brother, although he was painfully disillusioned on this score after his second arrest.

Another of Dray-Khmara's friends whose conversations with him were recorded in his diary was Olexander Doroshkevych, professor of literature, who participated in the literary debates of the middle twenties and published an article entitled *More About Europe*,<sup>44</sup> in which he advanced the rejection of the old "bourgeois" European cultural heritage for the contemporary European literary values as epitomized by Romain Rolland. For these opinions Doroshkevych was strongly criticized by Zerov.<sup>45</sup> But it is more than likely that he owed his survival to his refusal to embrace the extreme position of the present day Westernizers. In the late twenties, when he still believed in the Ukrainian renaissance, Doroshkevych thought that contemporary Ukrainian poets were intellectual leaders as well. Here he had in mind primarily Dray-Khmara, in whom he had discovered not only a deep thinker but a friend as well.

I began to meet Doroshkevych more often. He came to my apartment once towards the end of January, 1932 ... He spoke about the rations, which had become even scarcer than before. I complained that I could not go on like this much longer, that they were harassing me from all sides, that I was tired and would like to rest. Doroshkevych also complained of the oppressive atmosphere of the Shevchenko Institute and admitted that he dreamed of leaving it.

This is one of the last entries in the diary. Dray-Khmara was arrested shortly thereafter and ceased to reveal himself on the written page. Strangely enough, the police never found this highly incriminating record of Dray-Khmara's defiant spirit. It was hidden by his family and finally brought to the free world.

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<sup>44</sup> *Zhyttya i Revolyutsiya*, No. 607, 1925.

<sup>45</sup> Zerov, M., *Do Dzerel*, Kharkiv-Lviv, 1943, p. 260.

## QUARTERLY CHRONICLE OF UKRAINIAN LIFE

### I. BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

#### AN ANTICOLONIAL CONGRESS IN THE CAPITAL OF A SOVIET COLONY

At the end of August there was held in Kiev the Sixth Congress of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. It was a congress of pro-Soviet organizations from all countries. Moscow chose Kiev this time as the seat of the Congress to demonstrate that Ukraine was an equal partner with Muscovy. At the Congress praise was showered on the Kremlin for its consistent anticolonial attitude, although the Congress was being held in one of the most oppressed colonies in the world, Ukraine.

#### A PURGE IN THE COMSOMOL

The daily *Winnipeg Press* on July 31 reported from Moscow that the administration of the Comsomol of the USSR had recently purged 4,000 members between the ages of 15 and 17, for their practice of religion and church membership. The organ of the Comsomol, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Comsomol Truth) wrote that the Comsomol was permeated with religious members and that after their removal the organization became stronger ideologically. Yet this was an official acknowledgement that Soviet atheism with the aid of an atheist school system was not able fully to implant atheism even in the members of its own Communist organization. What then is to be said of the millions of young people who are outside the Communist youth organization?

#### THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLICS IN LVIV ARE STILL COMPELLED TO ATTEND POLISH CATHOLIC CHURCHES

The Polish journal *Sirena*, which appears in Paris, has been publishing a description of present-day Lviv by a Pole, George Janicki, who was recently in Lviv. He states that in Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, the Communist government has closed all Greek Catholic Churches, to which almost 80% of the population of the country belong, but it has left open in Lviv three Roman Catholic Polish churches, which before the Bolshevik occupation had been attended only by Poles. Now Janicki reports that in the Polish Catholic churches in Lviv, Ukrainian is the language most frequently heard for the Ukrainian Catholics, deprived of their Greek Catholic churches in their own land, are compelled to attend the Latin Polish Catholic churches. And in the conception of the Kremlin, Ukraine is still an independent nation.

#### THE FAMILY OF THE LEADER OF THE UPA AGAIN IN PRISON

The Ukrainian weekly *Shtyakh Peremohy* (Way of Victory) has received news from Lviv that the family of the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

(UPA), General Taras Chuprynka (his real name was Roman Shukhevych) who was killed by the Bolsheviks in 1950, i.e. his wife Natalka and his son Yuriy, who were for many years in Soviet concentration camps in Siberia and were recently released, were again arrested shortly after their return to Lviv.

#### THE DNEPER-KRYVY RIH CANAL

The Kiev *Radyanska Ukraina* (Soviet Ukraine) reported on July 9th the plan of the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to construct two new canals in Ukraine between the Dnieper and Kryvy Rih and between the northern stretches of the Donets River and the Donbas. These canals are to supply the two centres of Ukrainian industry with water for the use of the population and industry. The difficulties in building the canals are caused by the hilly terrain, the low altitude of the rivers and the higher altitude of the industrial regions of Kryvy Rih and the Donbas which are to receive the waters from the rivers.

#### THE PRODUCTION OF THE TRUCK PLANT IN LVIV

The Lviv plant for the production of motortrucks has now commenced production of heavy trucks for sale to the satellite states and the neutral countries of Asia. The factory has introduced special improvements, so that the trucks can be used in the hot, moist climate of tropical countries.

#### THE WELL-KNOWN SOVIET OPPOSITION WRITER DUDINTSEV IS BY BIRTH A UKRAINIAN

The novel *Not by Bread Alone* by Volodymyr (Vladimir) Dmitrovich Dudintsev, although officially criticized, has created a great stir in the world because of its criticism of Soviet methods. Now a reporter of the German journal *Stern* Günther Spekonius states that he had in Moscow an interview with Dudintsev who said that he had been born in Ukraine in 1918 in the city of Kupyansk near Kharkiv. He finished the elementary and intermediate schools in Ukraine.

It is evident that the spirit of freedom-loving Ukraine permeates the entire being of a native of Ukraine, even when he is moved to the territory of Moscow and writes in Russian.

#### THE WRITERS OF SOVIET UKRAINE HAVE SECURED OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK THE TRUTH IN PART

There was held in Kiev in July a meeting of writers and artists of Ukraine, i.e. after the liquidation of the "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Kaganovich and company in Moscow.

The writer Malyshko feelingly described the humiliation of the Ukrainian writers under Kaganovich. Kaganovich was especially severe against the greatest living poet of Ukraine, Maksym Rylsky, and accused him brutally of "bourgeois nationalism" and threatened him with liquidation. Kaganovich also persecuted in 1947, when Stalin sent him as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the women writers Olesya Honcharova, Leonida Novychenko, and others.

#### THE CONDITION OF THE ACADEMIC SCHOOLS IN SOVIET UKRAINE

The statistical publication of the USSR, *Kulturnoye Sroystelstvo* (Cultural Construction), states that there are now in the USSR 33 universities and 723



institutes of academic rank. Of these Ukraine has seven universities in the cities of Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, Odesa, and Uzhorod. There are 23, 134 full time students. Kiev University has the most students (5,754) and Uzhorod the fewest (1,629). The latter is the only university which has a Medical Faculty, for in the other cities the Medical Schools are separate academic institutions. Two universities (Kiev and Lviv) have Faculties of Journalism; the only other such Faculty in the USSR is in Moscow. Most students are in the Science Faculties (about 14,000) and only about 8,000 are studying in the Humanistic and Journalistic Faculties.

#### A MONOGRAPH ON ANCIENT KIEV

M. K. Karger, a scientific worker of the Institute of Material Culture of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, has published a two volume monograph entitled *Ancient Kiev*. It contains articles on the history of the material culture of Kiev prepared on the results of archeological research and years of excavation. According to *Radyanska Ukraina* (Soviet Ukraine) for August 4, the monograph shows a Slavic population from the first centuries of our era and gives an analysis of the various problems in the history of the material culture of the city in the X-XIII centuries, when it was very large.

#### A NEW ETHNOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL

There has just appeared the first number of the journal *Folk Creativeness, Art and Ethnography*, published by the Institute of Art, Folklore and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The journal contains articles on folk creativeness in Ukraine, on the life of the workers and the new customs of the kolhosp village.

#### THE LVIV OPERA IN THE CRIMEA

The Lviv Franko Opera Theatre has recently completed a guest tour in the Crimea. Between June 1 and July 14, it made 47 appearances in Symferopil and Evpatoria. These performances were attended by an audience of about 50,000.

#### A TELEVISION CENTRE IN LVIV, THE CAPITAL OF WESTERN UKRAINE

The newspaper *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word) No. 26, which appears in Ukrainian in Warsaw, reports the Soviet government is now building a giant television centre with the greatest power in all Europe in Lviv on the mountain called the High Castle. This is the highest point in the East European plain between the Carpathians and the Urals. This station will enable the USSR to send television broadcasts to all the satellite states.

#### THE RETURN OF UKRAINIANS WHO WERE MOVED BY POLAND TO THE WEST TO THEIR OWN LANDS IN THE EAST

So as to show in part to the Ukrainians the "readiness" of the Warsaw government to permit them to return to their own lands, the appropriate ministries have arranged for the return of 500 Lemko families to the district of Horlytsi. Most of these will be settled in the villages of Blikhnarka, Volovets, Vysove, Regytyv, Zhdyna, Bortne, and Rozdzhilya. The first two villages are to be purely Ukrainian. There are so far 3,000 applications for inclusion in the 500 families to be moved.

## II. OUTSIDE UKRAINE

## A UKRAINIAN—MICHAEL STARR (STARYTSKY)—FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOR IN CANADA

The new Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, Diefenbaker, has appointed as Minister of Labor Michael Starr (Starytsky), a Canadian of Ukrainian origin and a member of the Parliament of Canada. The journalist Peter Storsberg in the *Toronto Daily Star* says of the new minister: "He has always been an expert in labor questions; his appointment is considered the best which Prime Minister Diefenbaker has made, for Michael Starr is more than a mere Minister of Labor; he is the first Canadian of Ukrainian origin to become a member of the government and he is a symbol of the "New Look" of the Progressive Conservative Party..." It can be said of the new Minister that although he is entering upon his duties without previous experience, he has special sympathies and understanding for the working man, for it was not easy for him to make his own way in the world.

"Michael Starr was born in Copper Cliff, Ontario, November 14, 1910, the son of poor Ukrainian immigrants. He grew up in Oshawa, where he was an excellent student. When he was 15, he left school to help his parents." The author traces his further career as a worker until he became an executive in a metal factory. Starr was first elected to the Federal Parliament as a Conservative in 1952.

## THE MEMORANDUM OF THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE TO THE VATICAN ON THE UKRAINIANS IN POLAND

Prof. Lev Dobriansky, Chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, has sent a request to the Holy Father to take under his protection the Ukrainians in Poland and to use his influence with the Poles for the reconstruction of Ukrainian church life in Poland; also for a true resettlement in their ancient lands of the Ukrainians moved to the West after the War and he has petitioned the Holy Father to aid in the settlement of other burning questions affecting the Ukrainian minority in Poland.

## THE NEW PRESIDUM OF THE CANADIAN UKRAINIAN COMMITTEE

On August 22 there was held a meeting of the Representatives of the Component Organizations of the Committee for the choice of a new Presidium for the year 1957-8. As President there was chosen the Representative of the Ukrainian Catholics, Rev. Dr. Vasyl Kushnir; First Vice President, Rev. Dr. S. Savchuk; General Secretary, I. Syrnyk. The Second Vice President is Mykhaylo Pohoretsky. The Members of the Presidium are Rev. S. Izhyk, Ivakh, V. Martynets, Dr. T. Mykhaylivsky, P. Oliynytsky, etc.

## THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE UKRAINIANS IN ARGENTINA

The IV Congress of the Ukrainians in Argentina was held July 21st. It was called after three years by the Central Representation of the Ukrainians in Argentina. The Congress was opened by the President, Eng. V. Levytsky. Prof. Onatsky gave a report on the three year work of the Central Representation of the Ukrainians in Argentina. Its work chiefly concerned foreign policy in its relation to Ukraine. Internally the Representation worked energetically and suc-

cessfully against the agitation by the Soviets among the Ukrainian local population for return to the Soviets. A new Administration under Prof. Eugene Onatsky was elected for the next three years.

#### THE DEATH OF MYKOLA HLOBENKO, A UKRAINIAN SCHOLAR

At the end of May, 1957, Mykola Hlobenko died in Sarcelles near Paris. He was a Ukrainian scholar, an authority on the history of Ukrainian literature and an assistant editor of the *Ukrainian Encyclopedia*. He came from the eastern borders of Ukraine near Kharkiv. He completed the University in Kharkiv and was lecturing there in 1941 on Ukrainian literature. During the war, when the Germans occupied Kharkiv, he remained at his post but when Ukraine was recovered by the Soviets, he went with the emigration to Germany. Then he moved to France and in Sarcelles at the headquarters of the Shevchenko Scientific Society he carried on an unusually productive scholarly work as assistant editor of the *Ukrainian Encyclopedia*.

The memory of the deceased scholar was honored in Paris by an assembly in the hall of the Geographical Society on Boulevard Saint Germain with several speeches on his services to scholarship.

#### LECTURES ON UKRAINE IN PARIS

The administration of the Central Alliance of Ukrainian Students in Europe arranged a series of academic lectures in Paris September 16-22 on the subject: *The Struggle of Ukraine for a Place in World Culture in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. The lectures were: 1. Prof. I. Mirchuk, "Stages in the Development of Ukrainian Science in the last 100 Years;" 2. Prof. O. Kulchytsky, "The European Origin of the Ukrainian Spirituality;" 3. O. Shulhyn, "Ukrainian Historiography of the 19th and 20th Centuries;" 4. Dr. L. Bilas, "Selected Problems from the Contemporary Ukrainian Historiography;" 5. Prof. L. Rebet, "The Development of Ukrainian Social and Political Thought before the Revolution of 1917;" 6. Prof. O. Yurchenko, "Social and Political Thought in Ukraine after the Revolution;" 7. Prof. P. Zaytsev, "Ukrainian Literature Since Kotlyarevsky;" 8. Ya. Hnizdovsky, "The Condition and Problems of the Contemporary Fine Arts;" 9. Dr. O. Horbach, "The Origin of the Ukrainian Language and its Position among the Other Slavic Peoples."

#### RECOGNITION OF A UKRAINIAN HISTORIAN IN FRANCE

The French National Centre of Scientific Research has assigned 200,000 francs to Prof. Alexander Choulguine, a Ukrainian historian and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian National Republic, for the printing of his historiosophical work, *History and Life*, which will be published by the firm of Marcel Rivière in Paris.

#### PROF. YAROSLAV RUDNYTSKY AT THE LINGUISTIC CONFERENCE IN OSLO

The Eighth International Congress of Linguistics was held in Oslo. Twenty-five countries including the United States and Canada sent representatives. From behind the iron curtain there were representatives of the Red Russians, Estonians, Czecho-Slovaks and Poles. There was no one from Soviet Ukraine but the Ukrainians were represented by Prof. Yaroslav Rudnytsky of the University of

Manitoba in Winnipeg. He read a paper on the subject: "Onomastical Bilingualism in Canada and the United States."

#### THE MUSEUM AND ARCHIVES OF THE BASILIAN FATHERS IN MUNDARE

On July 28th, the Museum and Archives of the Basilian Fathers were opened in Mundare, Alberta, Canada. This is perhaps the most valuable Ukrainian museum on the American continent, for it has such rare treasures as the *Apostol* of Fedorovych (16th cent.), the *Ostrih Bible* (16th cent.) and similar works. The treasures of the Basilian Museum date from the beginnings of the arrival of the Basilians in Canada. The most valuable part was acquired by Fr. Jean during his stay in Europe. The Museum was blessed by the Most Rev. Nil Savaryn, formerly the devoted custodian of the collection of Fr. Jean.

#### THE DEATH OF OLHA KUZELYA

Olha Kuzelya (née Avdykovska), wife of the late head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the well-known Ukrainian scholar and public spirited leader, Zenon Kuzelya, died in a hospital in Montmorency, Sunday, July 26, after she was injured by a motorcycle on July 10. She was 74 years old. She was a typical representative of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Western Ukraine of the end of the 19th and the early 20th century. As most of them she was born in a priestly family.

#### THE CONVENTION OF UKRAINIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN THE USA

On June 15 and 16 the Convention of Ukrainian Students in the American Universities was held in Cleveland. There were more than a thousand present. Among other subjects it was decided to establish in one of the great American Universities studies in Ukrainian Culture.

#### CARDINAL TISSERAND ON THE MISSION OF UKRAINE

On July 13 and 14 there was a solemn gathering in the well-known pilgrimage centre Maria Zell in Austria. The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Figl took part and also a large group of Ukrainians led by Mons. Ivan Buchko, Archbishop of the Ukrainian Catholics in Exile. It was attended also by Cardinal Tisserand, Dean of the College of Cardinals and Secretary of the Congregation for the Eastern Church.

The Cardinal delivered an address on the mission of the Ukrainian people. Turning to the Ukrainian group, he said: "According to the testimony of persons who have been for a long time in the Soviet concentration camps, there are a great number of Ukrainians in them, including many of your brothers from the dioceses of Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Peremyshl. Is it not necessary to consider the fact of the presence of a permanent delegation of the Ukrainian Republic at the Assembly of the United Nations as a manoeuvre which is intended to hide more securely the truth by a seeming recognition of rights which actually are denied? In fact everything possible is being done to weaken this ethnic group which because of its geographical position has received the mission to be a mediator between the East and the West, so as to reduce the existing conflicts of a political and religious character."

#### THE CONGRESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX AUTOCEPHALOUS CHURCH IN ENGLAND

At the end of July, the Fourth Congress of the clergy and representatives of the faithful of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Great Britain was held in Oldham, England. 68 persons took part, 12 clergy and 56 laymen. Also present was a member of the Supreme Council of the Metropolitanate and the head of the Committee for building a church of the UAPC in Paris, P. Plevako.

In its resolutions the Congress affirmed the strengthening of the UAPC in Great Britain, approved the actions of the former General Church Administration and after giving it an honorable dismissal and expressing its thanks, it chose the members for the new body of the General Church Administration and passed a number of important resolutions. Among these the Congress resolved unanimously to organize in England a building committee to construct for the UAPC the Church of St. Symon in Paris, and to place on this committee one representative from every UAPC parish in England, and to ask every Ukrainian to contribute one brick at 5 pounds.

#### THE SYNOD OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN USA

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America, which is headed by Archbishop Bohdan and is under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch Athenagoras I, is preparing to hold on October 4, 5, and 6 a Synod in Allentown, Pennsylvania. At the conclusion of the Synod, the 20th anniversary of the consecration of Archbishop Bohdan will be celebrated. In honor of the Synod and the Jubilee of the Archbishop the Synod will publish a memorial volume with an illustrated history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America and other materials. The parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America are preparing later large celebrations for their Church.

#### MEETING OF UKRAINIAN EVANGELICALS

There was held in Hamilton, Ontario, from August 31 to September 2, 1957 a synod of the Ukrainian Evangelical Union in North America. Two days before the synod, August 28-30, there was held in the same city a pre-synodical meeting of the preachers and members of the Central Administration of the Ukrainian Evangelical Union.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

HETMAN OF UKRAINE, IVAN MAZEPPA. By Clarence A. Manning. Bookman Associates, New York, 1957. P. 234, \$3.50.

Two hundred and fifty years have already passed from the time when the Hetman of Ukraine, Ivan Mazeppa, died, but his name is still a banner and a battle cry of Ukrainian patriots in their struggle for liberation of Ukraine. Simultaneously it provokes bitter hatred on the part of the defenders of the One and Indivisible Russia. Throughout two and a half centuries the Russian Orthodox Church anathemized the dead Mazeppa together with all the other heretics of Russian Orthodoxy. The name "Mazepist" in old Tzarist Russia, as well as in the present USSR, means an implacable enemy of Moscow and the best qualified candidate for Siberia.

In spite of everything, the name of the great Ukrainian Hetman, very well known in 18th century France, attracted the attention of writers and artists who pictured him not as a great statesman, but usually as a romantic and mysterious personage.

Historical research of the 19th and 20th centuries produced many new works about Mazeppa; we are able to mention the works of M. Kostomarov, F. Umanetz, I. Borshchak, B. Krupnyckyj, as well as a non-Ukrainian A. Jensen. And now we have the pleasure to review a book on Mazeppa by Clarence A. Manning of Columbia University, a widely known expert on Ukrainian literature and history.

The new Manning book is composed in the style of popular American historical biographies and is written in an easy style, but on a sound basis of historical material. The author has achieved his purpose in full. It will be surely pleasant reading for a wide circle of readers in the English speaking world.

Professor Manning's book treats the most important events in Mazeppa's life, such as his service at the Polish Royal Court and later as a military figure in the entourage of the Ukrainian Hetman Doroshenko, an enemy of Moscow. Mazeppa became a prisoner of Samiylovych, Hetman of Eastern Ukraine under the Tsar's protection. After the fall of Samiylovych the new elected Hetman Mazeppa appears as a protector of the Ukrainian Church and cultural life; Mazeppa is interested in the unification of Ukraine still under Polish domination. In later years comes his autumn love and his conflict with Kochubey; secret negotiations and an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII; and finally the open break of Mazeppa with Tsar Peter I, bringing the revenge of the Tsar and a war for liberation with the catastrophe at Poltava (1709). The stormy life of the great Hetman ends with his death in exile on Turkish territory,

After reading Manning's book the shadow of a great personage remains before our eyes as expressed by the author's words: "in his lifetime both his friends and foes considered him . . . . an extraordinary person, a man of winning charm, of great learning, and with a real gift for leadership" (p. 224) . . . "gentle-

man of the Renaissance" (p. 225) . . . "an ardent patriot and the great Hetman of Ukraine" (p. 227). But the literary qualities of Manning's book contain a great danger: the author concentrates his attention on the person of his hero, disregarding often the historical background and circumstances, people with whom Mazeppa had to live and cooperate. The whole work is written in the spirit and style of the psychological method, while psychological analysis of human acts is substituted for the iron logic of historical events, which often are in conflict with the written image.

After a thorough study of the history of this period, the author is justified in offering his own understanding of "the work and days" of Mazeppa but the reader has a right to compare them with real historical facts. Without doubt the author's conclusion concerning Mazeppa's attitude toward the Moscow *coup d'état* of 1689 or the dramatic narration of the author about Mazeppa's last night in Baturyn are original.

Nevertheless several small errors found their way into Professor Manning's book, which can be hardly reviewed in our short remarks. All of these errors are controversial matter among historians of Ukraine till the present day, but they do not diminish the value of Professor Manning's book.

The author calls the first twelve years of Mazeppa's hetmanate "the years of calm" although he adds the word "relative" calm. Indeed the last years of the 17th century in Ukraine were a stormy enough period; Ukraine as an ally of Moscow was pressed into a war with Turkey and Crimea. Almost every year the Ukrainian army took part in expeditions headed toward the North shore of Black Sea. Ukraine was ruined by the Tatar incursions and this was one of the main causes of Petryk's Uprising, directed against Hetman Mazeppa as a faithful executor of Moscow's orders exhausting the population of Ukraine. The Great Northern War was no surprise for Hetman Mazeppa; on the contrary we have documentary sources which prove that Mazeppa advised Tsar Peter I to attack Sweden around 1700. The only surprise was the outcome in the first period of the Northern War and the successes of Charles XII.

In spite of some inaccuracies, which in no way diminish the value of Professor Manning's book, the author introduces the real Mazeppa to the Western World and not a fantastic type involved in a romantic affair, bound to a wild horse loose in the steppes of Ukraine, who scarcely avoided death. Professor Manning's book clearly explains to the English reader that Mazeppa's revolution was not the treason traditionally pictured by Russian artists and painters from their imperialistic point of view. In Manning's book Mazeppa appears as a great patriot and statesman, a champion of independent Ukraine against Russian domination, a good administrator and especially a protector of Ukrainian culture. By writing his book, Professor Manning has brought to the American reader a precious and fine literary gift.

DR. ALEXANDER OHLOBLYN

THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT 1941-1944. By Edgar M. Howell. Department of the Army, August 1956, 217 pp.

As indicated in the preface and in the foreword this is an official volume prepared by Maj. E.M. Howell, AUS-Ret., in the Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. It is intended as a reference work on partisan warfare for the Army staff schools and colleges.

The sources for the study of the Soviet partisan movement listed in the book are not complete. The author is right in using German documents captured by the US Army as primary sources. This is true especially of the Rosenberg and Himmler files and the records of various trials of war criminals, following World War II. He gives as secondary sources the memoirs of the German panzer leader Heinz Guderian, Goebbels' diaries, Henry Picker's *Hitler's Tischgespräche im Führers Hauptquartier 1941-42* etc. However no Soviet sources dealing with partisan activities are listed in the Bibliographical Note for the author complains that these sources are unreliable. It cannot be denied that the Soviet documents are highly biased. None the less there are more than a dozen Soviet books which can be of great interest for a student of the Soviet partisan movement, to name but a few memoirs of such Soviet leaders of the partisan movement as S. Kovpak, D. Medvedev, O. Fedorov, V. Vernyhora, T. Strokach, H. Lynkov, and A. Tse-sarsky. They deal comprehensively with the conditions under which the partisan movement was organized, the attitude of the population, and the actions of the anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet national underground forces especially in Ukraine and Byelorussia. There is also in the book no reference to the documents of the anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet activities of the peoples of the Soviet Union during the Second World War which are available in the free world.

The study of the Soviet partisan movement is preceded by general information about the topography, climate, transportation net and the peoples of the Soviet Union, the last topic being handled in a rather confused manner. Referring to the different nations of the Soviet Union, Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, a. o., the author uses the term "Russian." Consequently he speaks of "Russia," "Russian peoples," "Russian peasants," "Russian character," as though all of the Soviet Union was Russia and all of the peoples of the Soviet Union were Russians. While the Soviet writers make every possible attempt to depict the American nation as divided by the internal conflicts of different ethnical groups and play up particularly the alleged persecution of the American Negroes, the Western students of foreign affairs very often help to consolidate the Soviet Russian prison of nations by describing it as a homogeneous community.

Mr. Howell's excursions into history are also debatable. In his opinion Ukrainians "have shown only desultory sort of national consciousness" and no reference is made to Ukrainian independence at the times of Kievan Rus, (9th-13th cent.), or in the 17th and 18th centuries, or from 1917 to 1920. The author asserts that even "at the time of the German invasion in 1941, despite the claims of the separatists as to the national aspirations of the populace, the people sought only a release from the collectivist system and demonstrated only vague and apathetic ideas about the future political configuration of the Ukraine." Such an opinion runs contrary even to what has been told in the German documents used by the author. In a half dozen papers prepared by Alfred Rosenberg and his staff between April 20 and June 28, 1941, the independence of Ukraine was proposed as a policy for Germany in order to win the support of the Ukrainian people. Later during the war many attempts were made by different German political and military personalities to change Hitler's policy of genocide toward the peoples of the Soviet Union. In all the endeavor to win support for the political aspirations of the Ukrainian people was regarded a *conditio sine qua non* for gaining over the Ukrainians (see a memorandum of Dr. Bräutigam of Oct. 25, 1942, mentioned by the author on p. 106). The author himself does not deny that the political circles of the peoples of the Soviet Union demanded "establish-



ment of native provisional authorities" as a price for the changing of the hostile attitude of their peoples toward Germany.

Howell gives a vivid account of the development of the Soviet partisan movement. He states correctly that there was no popular rising following the German attack on June 22, 1941. However he omits the fact that the peoples of the Soviet Union demonstrated their feelings by a mass surrender of the soldiers of the Red Army and by the attempts in Ukraine and in the Baltic countries to set up local national governments without the consent of the Germans.

The first anti-Nazi resistance of the Soviet type was offered by the bypassed Red Army units in the German rear. They were supported by parachutists, and following Stalin's order of July 3, 1941, gradually developed into separate partisan battallions. Until September 1941 these battallions were under the command of Gen. Mechlis; then a special Central Staff of the Partisan Movement was set up, headed by Marshal K. Voroshilov. In August 1942 Voroshilov was replaced by P.K. Ponomarenko, former chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Byelorussian SSR. It is natural that the growth of the Soviet partisan movement was influenced by the events on the front. The first defeats of the German army on the Moscow front in the fall of 1941 and the general difficulties encountered by the Germans, increased the strength of the Soviet partisans. However the most propitious factor for the partisan resistance was the German policy toward it and toward the peoples of the Soviet Union in general. Colonial plans and practices, the abortively handled land problem, the forced labor program, collective responsibility of the whole villages for partisan activities, drove the population into active collaboration with the partisans. When late in 1942 and 1943 the Germans began to make psychological and political efforts to check the growing strength of the partisan movement, they were too little and too late. The author writes: "By the end of the summer of 1942 the Germans had all but squandered their opportunity to establish a workable administration in Russia. And in doing so they had lost their chance to crush the growing partisan movement, for large blocks of the Russian people had turned from them almost to a man. Those natives who in 1941 had been pro-'liberator' had turned apathetic, and those once apathetic had turned back to the Soviets. In Great Russia where communist influence had always been heavy there had never been any serious question of allegiance. Many large areas there had quickly gone under partisan control and the German Army had not the troop strength to contest the loss." Here too the author fails to distinguish clearly between the attitude of Russians and non-Russians toward the returning Soviets. For the former they were dictatorial rulers depriving them of their social freedom and well-being, for the latter they were also foreign enslavers. This was the reason why in Ukraine, in the Baltic countries, and in Byelorussia the underground liberation movement was active for many years after the end of war, a phenomenon not known in Russia proper.

Short accounts are given of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The author acknowledges its effectiveness in late 1943 and in 1944 but regards its activities as limited only to Galicia, and "without visible effect on the tactical situation." The author is not right when he writes that the Ukrainian national insurgents "had their doubts as to efficacy of opposing the highriding Soviets," and that they "had one common goal, the expulsion of all ethnic Poles from the Ukrainian nationalist stronghold in Galicia." It seems proper to point out that: 1. the main bases of the UPA were originally in Volynia and later in Galicia with

wide operational areas in the Western part of central Ukraine, and raiding groups in bordering areas, including Czechoslovakian territory; 2. the UPA continued to be active in the Western part of Ukraine until the early fifties, that is many years after the end of World War II, disregarding the fact that Moscow had won the war and gained a free hand in fighting the Ukrainian underground; 3. the main goal of all Ukrainian anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet fighters was the independence of Ukraine. It is true that some skirmishes took place between the UPA and the Polish extremists in Volynia and Galicia for reasons too broad to be discussed here, but it is also true that during World War II and after there were many instances of collaboration between the Ukrainian and the Polish national liberation forces; 4. the scope of the activities of the UPA and of its abilities to control large areas of Western Ukraine can be judged by the fact that the Soviet partisans attempting to move in those regions, had very often to disguise themselves as Ukrainian nationalists, a fact corroborated by the Communists themselves [see D. Medvedev: *Silnye dukhom* (The Strong in Spirits), Moscow 1951, and P. Vershyhora: *Ludy s chystoyu sovestyu* (People with a Clean Conscience), Moscow 1951].

Summing up his studies, Howell calls the Soviet partisan movement the greatest irregular resistance movement in the history of warfare. Nonetheless, he says, it "neither won the campaign nor prevented the Germans from winning it," and "the Soviets would have swept through German defences even without partisans' blows at the rail lines." The Soviet partisan movement was very helpful to the operation of the Red Army. But its success was definitely limited.

Maj. E. Howell's book also lacks a clear view and complete information on the nationalities situation as well as on the ideological trends dominant in this part of Europe; it is one-sided and therefore it is rather doubtful whether this book can in all aspects be used as a reference book in partisan warfare in the army schools and colleges.

DR. MYROSLAW PROKOP

DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE UKRAINE, 1934-1945. Tatsachen europäischer Ostpolitik. By Roman Ilnytzkyj. Osteuropa-Institut, München, 1956, Vol. 2.

This is the second volume of the work of Roman Ilnytzkyj on Ukrainian-German relations in the years 1934-1945, prepared under the sponsorship of the Osteuropa-Institut directed by Prof. Hans Koch, the well-known expert on East European questions.

Although much has been written on Ukrainian-German relations in the press, most of this has been of a journalistic character and insufficiently documented. This is the first documented study on this subject, although in its construction we can find certain defects. This second volume is part of a more widely conceived work and Prof. Koch deserves the thanks not only of the Ukrainian people but not less of the Germans, because he has urged the young researcher to take up this difficult task.

In three decades (1917-1947) Germany came to grips twice with the most important problem of Eastern Europe, the Ukrainian question, and twice the contacts resulted in catastrophe for both nations and not only for them but also for the whole world of Western civilization. This was due to the ignorance of the German leaders as to the Ukrainian problem and the false calculations of

the Ukrainians. So the work of Ilnytskyj has also an importance for practical politics.

It covers the period from the beginning of World War II to the middle of 1942. In the first section he discusses the German policy day by day in the Ukrainian occupied territories and in the second he discusses the wider political plans of the German government concerning Ukraine.

In the first section, the author deals in satisfactory detail with the questions raised in Western Ukraine; he mentions the proclamation of the Ukrainian government in June, 1941, in Lviv and the work of the Ukrainian National Rada but gives much fewer details on the policy of the Germans in the eastern lands of Ukraine.

In this part the author shows some rather partisan sympathies in describing events which are questioned by other Ukrainian circles. In the second part he considers the wider policy of the Germans for the solution of the Ukrainian question.

In discussing the attitude of the official German circles toward the Ukrainian problem, he does not hide his sympathies for the early conception of Rosenberg. But in truth the conception of Rosenberg should not arouse excessive sentiment, for it was developed only in connection with the execution of the well-known German *Drang nach Osten*. The best proof is the fact which the author mentions on p. 221 when he gives in passing the chapter heading to the appropriate division: "Hitler reveals his Ukrainian plans and appoints Alfred Rosenberg Minister for the Occupied Eastern Regions." So the gap between the conception of Rosenberg and that of Hitler was not too sharp, since no one but Rosenberg guided the Ostministerium until the end. In a totalitarian system no humane or considered plans can be carried out. The men who come to power in a totalitarian system are usually harsh and aggressive personalities and all more reasonable and understanding individuals fight shy of joining in such a government. Also these are able to visualize positive and progressive plans but under the conditions of totalitarianism, they do not have the power and cannot dream of realizing their vision. When we speak definitely of Germany, not only did some workers in the Ostministerium but also many other progressive representatives of the German intelligentsia in all fields have liberal views but they had no influence on the policy of the Third Reich not only toward Ukraine but toward all of Eastern Europe.

The second volume of the work of Roman Ilnytskyj gives the text of many interesting documents and it is unfortunate that most are of German origin. It would be very interesting to quote other original documents dealing with the period 1934-1945 especially on Ukrainian-German relations, for example those of Soviet and Polish origin. The omission of such documents makes the opinions of the author rather one-sided.

The author cites among his other sources the English volume *Hitler's Europe* published by the Royal Institute of International Studies in London under the editorship of A. Toynbee as an example of how to approach such problems. He should have used in this connection also the book of Richard Breyer which discusses the not less difficult but very similar question of German-Polish relations.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Breyer: *Das Deutsche Reich und Polen, 1932-1937*. Herausgegeben bei Marburger Ostforschung im Auftrage des Johannes Gottfried Herder Forschungsrates e. V.; Holzner Verlag, Würzburg, 1955.

In describing the changes of Ukrainian policy on the eve of and during the war the author usually is correct. He is especially so, when he emphasizes that the one organization of the Ukrainian nationalists (the *UVO*—Ukrainian Military Organization and later the *OUN*—Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets) made serious preparations for the event of an outbreak of war. The legal Ukrainian parties under Polish occupation were wholly interested just in the local problems and made *no* efforts to prepare staffs for future state work or to study the actual situation in eastern Ukraine. The author overlooked the very valuable work of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw (sponsored by the circles of the Ukrainian National Republic) and the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute in Berlin under Prof. Kuzelya (sponsored by the Ukrainian Hetman circles). Both gave much material on Ukraine between the two World Wars.

We hope that the monograph prepared by the Ost-Europa Institute in Munich will have the serious consideration of Ukrainian and especially German readers. The work of Ilnytzkyj is planned to appear in four or five volumes and so it will be possible for him to supplement the material overlooked in his first two volumes and to give his own conclusions.

The author now is facing the difficult task of explaining the situation in the eastern Ukrainian lands, as well as of analyzing the causes of the many Ukrainian failures. He must also consider Ukrainian-German relations not as something isolated and self-contained but as a phenomenon organically connected with the problem of German-Russian and German-Polish relations, and in a broad way with the question of the whole international situation. The finished work will be a valuable handbook for those who wish to avoid mistakes in the future. Let us hope that in one of the future volumes of his study the author will express *his own conception* of the proper Ukrainian-German relations for his own ideas are not made clear in these first two volumes.

S. Y. PROCIUK

THE CHURCH OF SILENCE IN SLOVAKIA. By Rev. Dr. Theodoric Zubek, O.F.M. Passaic, New Jersey, 1956, pp. 310.

The book of Fr. Theodoric Zubek gives an unusually detailed account of the situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia, where the majority of the population are of the Latin Rite and the minority are Catholics of the Greek Rite, especially in the region of Pryashiv (Prešov).

By force of circumstances the Catholic Church in Slovakia on the arrival of the Red Army and the establishment of the government of President Benes found itself in a difficult situation. In 1938, when Czechoslovakia fell apart, there was set up an independent Slovak Republic and its President was a Catholic priest, Fr. Tiso, and the leader of the Catholic Nationalist Party of Fr. Hlinka. The government was chiefly composed of Catholics for the opposition of the Slovaks to the Czechs had been closely connected with the Catholic movement. The execution of President Tiso still further embittered the situation.

Taking advantage of this situation, the few Communists in Slovakia immediately after the war formed a Slovak National Council which became the unofficial government of Slovakia. Yet conditions for the Church were still tolerable until the communist coup d'état of 1948.

After this there was a radical change, for the new Communist government of a federated Czechoslovakia commenced a planned struggle with the Church. The government demanded from the hierarchy an oath of loyalty to the new Communist regime. When it could not secure this easily, the Communists created their own "Catholic Action" which under this name was to carry on pro-Communist work.

Soon there came the closing of the monasteries and the formation of concentration monasteries where the monks were taught Communism and then distributed among the labor camps of Czechoslovakia.

The heaviest blow was dealt to the Greek Catholic Church which had a diocese in Pryashiv (Prešov). Its members were Ukrainians (or Ruthenians as they were called) and Slovaks. It was at once outlawed, obviously by orders of Moscow in accordance with traditional Russian church policy.

Although there were not more than 20,000 Orthodox in all Czechoslovakia and most of these were emigres from the territory of the old Russian Empire and just a few thousand Ukrainians, Czechs and other nationalities, the Czech Communist government favored the formation of a formal Czech-Russian Orthodox Church of Czechoslovakia under Archbishop Gorazd. This Orthodox Church tried in every way to seize the diocese of Pryashiv by the same use of savage terror as in Western and Carpathian Ukraine. A Moscow bishop Eleuteriy (Eleutherios) soon appeared in Pryashiv and he was followed by the well-known Metropolitan Nikolay as representative of the Moscow Patriarch, *persona grata* to the Kremlin which decorated him twice with the order of the Red Flag.

Soon both bishops of the Pryashiv diocese—Ukrainians—Bishop Pavlo Hoydych and his assistant Vasyl Hopko, were arrested on the charge of aiding Ukrainian partisans. After their arrest the cathedral in Pryashiv was forcibly seized by the Orthodox and the Moscow crew "converted" the clergy and the people, who with few exceptions continued and still continue their Catholic faith of the Eastern Rite. At the same time that Bishop Hoydych was arrested, the Czech government also arrested two patriotic Slovak bishops, Ivan Vojtašek and Mikhail Buzalka.

The government formed a "Society of Patriotic Priests," who were in fact demoralized creatures of the Communist government and tried to seize the chanceries of the dioceses, especially when a bishop died as in Banska Bystrica. Such procedures are known from the persecution of the Catholic Church among the Czechs.

The Theological Faculty in the University of Bratislava was taken over by these creatures and renamed the Cyril and Methodius Theological Faculty with the compulsory teaching of Marxism. There has been some relief in the last years, since the death of Stalin, which is a definite proof that the government of the Czecho-Slovakian satellite is nothing but a blind tool of the Kremlin.

The book of Fr. Zubek is a systematic and well written work with true scientific objectivity, criticism and documentation. Although it was written by a Catholic priest and monk and a Slovak patriot, it is not a piece of propaganda but a truly scientific research which can be a model, when books are appearing on religious persecution behind the iron curtain, of the way such books should be written.

THE RED ARMY. The Red Army 1918-1945. The Soviet Army 1946 to the Present. B.H. Liddell Hart, Ed. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1956. 480 pp. \$6.00.

This is an interesting book and, to a limited extent, a successful experiment in giving the *general* reader a picture of the Soviet military might. Thirty one writers from six nations, under the direction of B.H.L. Hart, have each taken part of this difficult task; every one of the authors selected for this task is a competent writer, but there is no doubt that more competent authors could have been easily found, too. One cannot understand why e.g. the Finnish winter campaign of 1939-1940 has been presented in the volume by a German, and not by a Finnish officer, and why so many Russian emigré contributors of junior grades have been invited to participation while non-Russian experts of senior grades and with invaluable battle experience against the Red Soviet Army were not. There are first-rate experts on the Soviet Army among the latter as e.g. the Pole—Gen. Wladyslaw Anders (Commander of the 2nd Polish Army corps in the last war, author of the book *Hitler's Defeat in the East*), Hungarian—Gen. Ferencz Farkas de Kisbarnak (Commander of the 6th Hungarian Army in the last war), Ukrainian—Gen. Lt. Pavlo Shandruk (Commander of the Ukrainian National Army in the last war, previously on the General Staff of the Ukrainian and Polish Armies), and many others. All these officers have an expert knowledge of the Soviet Army and, therefore, the failure to invite their contributions must be stressed here, particularly in view of the fact that some contributions by Russian emigré authors are the poorest in the entire volume.

Whatever reservations readers of the *Red Army* will have, they are likely to admit that the literary level of the volume is high throughout, which makes the book pleasant reading. The Editor of the volume—B. H. Liddell Hart who himself is well-known as a military historian and one of the top military theoreticians of our times, brilliantly planned the volume and produced the best parts of it (Prologue, The Russo-German Campaign—p. 100 ff.). However, his manner of editing can be regarded as somewhat too loose and not sufficiently precise. He has allowed not only some unnecessary repetitions, but has also overlooked frequent contradictions and even incorrect information. For example, the T/Os given by Capt. N. Galay (p. 320, and endorsed by the Editor as against the information provided by Col. Ely—cf. p. 212) are not correct both as to the actual organization and to existing trend.

The book lacks that correct and up-to-date information which is so greatly needed in the West and which should be an obligatory reading for every officer, diplomat, and politician. For example, some important information is lacking as e.g. data on the organization of artillery divisions and artillery corps, anti-aircraft divisions, etc. Cavalry divisions are confused with cavalry corps (p. 343) as the cavalry arm has not been diminished in the Soviet Army. At present there are 5-6 cavalry corps in the Soviet Army, and not divisions. There is 1 camel division in Soviet Central Asia. All these cavalry divisions including 2 Cossack cavalry corps and Mongol cavalry divisions which could be brought from Outer Mongolia, are expected to play an important role in any possible military operation in the Middle East where the terrain is best suited for the advance of large cavalry masses.

It is a pity, however, to see how some contributors provided their readers with outright fairy-tales as for instance the story by Gen. Student (p. 378). The trouble with Gen. Student and other German authors is that they have

viewed the Red Army through the dark monocles of their own defeats in the East and consistently and totally ignored the *political* side of their ill-fated campaign. Against all our expectations, this has remained to them the dark side of the moon. They are, therefore, unable to explain why at the beginning of the campaign the Red Army was defeated and ran away despite the fact that its forces were by far superior over the German forces.<sup>1</sup> The German authors in their volume have given no true reason for this unprecedented defeat. The initial successes of the German Army were not due to the "superior" strategy of the present contributors, but to the fact that the officers and men of the Red Army were unwilling to fight against the invaders. Instead, they surrendered even without a pretense of opposition, and offered their services to fight Stalin and his regime. It was a large *plebiscite* within the Red Army, and its outcome turned against Stalin and the Soviets: 3,600,000 officers and soldiers of the Red Army surrendered to the Germans during the first 7 and a half months of campaign according to the data presented at the Nuremberg trial. They surrendered not because they were cowards on the battlefield, but because they refused to fight for Stalin's tyranny. The Germans rejected the offered hand. They rejected all *constructive* policy in the East, and dreaming of the total destruction of "inferior" peoples and of transforming the conquered territories into the "Lebensraum" of the German "master-race," entered upon a policy which could hardly have been more detrimental and catastrophic and which condemned them to the punishment of the most drastic failure in history. They had lost their war in the East long before the German generals lost it on the battlefield.

The German authors in the present volume readily discuss all possible strategical blunders save one—the infamous treatment of Soviet war prisoners. It was a mockery of all customs of civilized nations. Many captured Soviet soldiers, and especially the Turkestanians whom the German "superhumans" considered "Mongols" and who were the most astute opponents of the Soviet regime, were shot on the spot. Many others were intentionally starved to death. During the autumn and winter of 1941-42, some 20 per cent of Soviet war prisoners died of starvation, typhus, and cold. Naturally the news of the fate of the Soviet war prisoners reached the lines of the Red Army and quickly spread among the Red army men and the populace. Mass anti-German sentiment grew from day to day. Mass surrendering stopped in 1942 and in 1943, and anti-German partisans appeared in the countryside where the paths of German tanks were strewn with flowers not so long ago. The first partisans in the East were disillusioned Ukrainian nationalists, and not Stalin's or Khrushchev's henchmen.<sup>2</sup> The effect of this German strategical blundering can be measured by the additional number of the Soviet divisions which stopped surrendering in 1942 and in 1943, and by the additional number of German divisions which had to oppose the partisans in the rear.

Our disappointment with the reviewed book increases considerably when we draw near to the end of the volume. We become appalled by seeing how with a monotonous regularity, all the authors have managed to ignore the *nationality problem* of the Red respectively Soviet Army. The treatment that this problem, one of the most important problems of the Soviet Union, has received in the book, is in itself somewhat macabre in nature. While the struggle of the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *The Halder Diaries*, Vol. VI, p. 160.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Peter Kleist, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin*. Bonn, Athenäum Verlag, 1950, p. 190.

non-Russian peoples for freedom and independence was at its most intense stage while this struggle has long been recognized as an "Achilles heel" of the Soviet Union, the response of Liddell Hart's typewriter brigade has been that of ghostly silence. "Cruelest lies are told in silence" (Roberts L. Stevenson) and, accordingly, the readers of the *Red Army* have been instructed that no such problem exists behind the golden gates of "one" and "indivisible" Holy Russia. The acknowledged existence of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement has been a perennial source of trouble for the Kremlin overlords for years; strikes and uprisings in the Soviet concentration camps shook the foundations of the terroristic system; the Berlin and Poznan uprisings and the revolt of Budapest with their unanimous Hungarian nationalistic outcry "Russians Go Home" shook the foundations of the Soviet colonial empire; all this might burst upon the consciousness of the entire world, but not upon that of our writers. One is stricken dumb: decades of Soviet genocidal practices have not succeeded in exterminating the nationality problem in the Soviet Union, but the contributors for *The Red Army* have.

The problem exists and it is the vulnerable spot of the Soviet colonial empire and a fatal weakness of its Army. The centrifugal force of non-Russian explosive nationalisms drives towards the dissolution of the USSR into national states and imperils the very existence of the Soviet colonial empire and the power of the Soviet Army. Like its predecessor, the Imperial Russian Army of 1917, the Soviet Army is a *multinational army* (Vielfölkerarmee) and as such it is susceptible to the laws by which such complex bodies are directed. In the Soviet Army every other soldier is a non-Russian national and as such he is potentially unreliable; in this sense 50 per cent of the Army are unreliable. The disintegration of the Imperial Russian Army in 1917 and the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Army in 1918 present ample evidence that once the soldiers of various non-imperial nationalities are assured of a free and decent life in their liberated homelands, they never fight for the empire, but would rather fight against it. The Czechs—deserters from the Austro-Hungarian Army—formed a whole army corps within the Russian Army and separate legions in France and in Italy. Such examples can be multiplied. We must add that out of 3,600,000 Soviet prisoners of war in 1941, some 2,000,000 were non-Russians and the majority were Ukrainians. In 1941, the Germans attained their most brilliant successes in the South of Ukraine, which was defended by the Southern Army Group of Marshal Budenny. His armies consisted of Ukrainians, Cossacks, North Caucasian Mountaineers, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Turkestanians (Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghizes, Kazakhs). Here the rout of the Soviet Army was complete: the Germans were able to advance 40 miles a day and succeeded in reaching even Rostov (Nov. 21, 1941).

We complete the review of *The Red Army* by listing some historical facts about which there is no mention which trace the history of the Soviet Army from the Tsarist regime to the present time. A reader from whom the information about the struggle of the non-Russians against Moscow has been withheld, will never know that:

1. It was the Ukrainian *Volhynsky Regiment of Guards* (90 per cent Ukrainians among the rank and file) which first passed to the side of the Revolution on March 11, 1917, and immediately was joined by another regiment—the *Izmailovsky Regiment of Guards* (70 per cent Ukrainians) thus decidedly helping to overthrow the Tsarist Empire.

2. The Imperial Russian Army disintegrated in 1917 along national lines. In September 1917 some 34 per cent of the front units of the Army were



reorganized as national units which served under national banners and subordinated themselves to their national leaderships. Among them were 23 Ukrainian divisions. The national troops preserved order and discipline to the very end and even some Russian Commanders regarded national troops as an effective way to counteract the demoralized Russian units of the Army.<sup>3</sup>

3. The Ukrainian War of Independence (1917-1921) was waged by a regular Ukrainian Army under the leadership of a democratic Ukrainian Government. It was a three front war against the White and Red Russians and in the West against the Poles in which the Ukrainian Army succeeded in writing upon its banners some important victories. The Ukrainian Government and its Army were forced to leave Ukraine under the pressure of overwhelming forces of the invaders, but the war was not entirely lost. The invaders had to establish a Ukrainian Soviet Republic with the attributes of a sovereign state instead of a "Little Russian General Government" which was Ukraine under the Tsars. The war by the Ukrainian Regular Army was followed by an anti-Soviet guerilla warfare of the Ukrainian peasantry which lasted to 1926.

4. There existed a Soviet Ukrainian army with Ukrainian as the language of command, its own officer schools, publications, etc. Also, there existed national divisions of Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjani, Byelorussians and other nationalities of the Soviet Union. All these Soviet national formations of the Red Army were liquidated by Marshal Tukhachevsky only in 1934, when Stalin openly entered the paths of Russian nationalism and imperialism.

5. There existed in 1942-1950 a Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which waged war against the Nazi and Soviet occupants of Ukraine during the last war and against the Soviet and Red-Polish occupants of Ukraine after the war.<sup>4</sup> There is not a word written about this Underground Army in a book which deals with the Partisan Forces (p. 153 ff), though it is well-known that a pact for cooperation of the forces of three powers (the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia) was concluded on May 7, 1947, to evict its detachments from the border regions of those powers in the Carpathians.

Taking all this into consideration, one cannot agree with the Editor of the volume that the authors of *The Red Army* have provided "all facts" and "all aspects" of the problem. The promised "reliable account" and "a comprehensive picture" of the Soviet military might is rather missing. While there are some excellent contributions in the volume (The Soviet Army in the Far East by J.M. Mackintosh—p. 172 ff, A General Assessment by Col. Louis B. Ely—p. 197 ff, The Psychology of the Soviet Soldier by Sir David Kelly—p. 213 ff, Geography and Strategy by Lt. Col. F.O. Miksche—p. 242 ff, Soviet Tanks by R.M. Ogorkiewicz—p. 295 ff), the *essential* information has been withheld from the reader and even suppressed by some authors. Among them are the Russian authors who have heavily scored in the field of suppressing all information on the struggle of the non-Russian nationalities against Moscow in the past and present.

Philadelphia, Pa.

LEW SHANKOWSKY

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and Interpretation*. Vol II, p.1408. (New York, Macmillan, 1953).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Ansel Talbert, "What is Behind Khrushchev's Co-existence?" *The New York Herald Tribune*, New York, February 16, 1956.

CHRISTIANITY, DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY. By Zoltan Sztankay. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. Pp. xiii, 182. \$3.75.

As an anguished effort of this Hungarian-born Christian, seeing the crumbling of the contemporary civilization, to offer the world the vision of a coming world, we must appreciate the author's sincerity and eloquence which often reaches the point of distinction. Basically, Sztankay believes that man cannot solve the problem of organized world cooperation nor fight away the temptation of communism, unless helped by spiritual inspiration; only Christianity can help to overcome the impediment of ultra-nationalism which stands in the way of political world community. Since there is a close relationship between Christianity, democracy and technology, with the help of these three, man should be able to build a world of peace, prosperity and freedom. In Sztankay's opinion, materialistic philosophy along with retrograde nationalism and pretendedly international communism is a hindrance to an organized world community.

The theme is well developed and ably handled; from this angle all idealistically minded internationalists, conservative Christians and "one-world" proponents will be thankful to Sztankay. But since this world is also inhabited by more critical "realists," this "voice in the wilderness" is bound to create numerous, if not bitter controversies. The social scientist, for one, is bound to shake his head over such assumptions as: "the racial entity does not stand, at least not at present, in the way of organizing the world for general human purposes" (p.126), or "if men of different civilizations are willing to give up their own values and ways of life, the moment is bound to come when they will be absorbed completely into the body politic of their place of residence" (p. 141). Sztankay's premises certainly evaporate when confronted with the operation and effectiveness of racial ideologies and the utter unwillingness of the dominant culture patterns to give up "their own values and ways of life." And it can be also pointed out, in passing, that the author is pretty weak in his academic presentation since the variations of his theories have been disputed along the same lines by such well-known "spiritualists" as Sorokin, Berdayev, Toynbee and others. Perhaps Sztankay is unacquainted with these various schools, since his book has only one footnote, referring to two American textbooks in political theory, while there are quite a number of textbooks surveying the extensive sociological theories.

In short, Sztankay's contribution is a good theological battle-cry and should be evaluated mainly, if not only, from that standpoint.

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## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"A MINORITY UNDER PRESSURE." *Soviet Survey*, London, August, 1957.

This issue of the instructive London monthly is devoted especially to the miserable life of the Jews in the Soviet Union. The topic is treated from the wider viewpoint of the Soviet Russian policy toward the non-Russian nations. "This is a sense," writes the editor of the paper, "in which Soviet policy toward the Jewish population is merely an aspect of the general nationalities problem in the USSR—a multinational empire whose government has combined Russifying tendencies with autocratic practices in administration." The deterioration in the life of the Jewish population started after 1930; that year was critical also in the life of other non-Russian nations. But the worst years for the Jews was the period after World War II.

In the third part of this Jewish number of the *Soviet Survey* the author deals with the representation of Jewish life in literature and especially in Ukrainian literature after World War II. The Jews lived mostly in the Ukrainian and Belorussian territories. At this time Ukraine was filled with Ukrainian guerillas. The Jewish authors found at this for them critical time relatively the best treatment in Ukraine. His reviews of the works of the Jewish authors Emanuel Kozakevich, Yuri Libedinsky and Natan Rybak show that the Jews were even safer in Ukraine than in Russian territory, where in the fifties several Jewish authors were executed. The Ukrainian writer Alexander Korniychuk even introduced an old Jew into the ranks of the Red partisans.

The author gives credit to the Ukrainian writer M. Bazhan, who in a speech at the Congress of Soviet Writers defended against Russian chauvinism not only the Ukrainians but also the Jews. The whole issue shows that in Soviet Ukraine the Jews are not so much hated by the Ukrainians as Khrushchev in one of his speeches tried to show.

"THE RISE OF SERFDOM IN EASTERN EUROPE." Jerome Blum. *The American Historical Review*, July, 1957.

The author, a professor of Princeton University, discusses the development of serfdom in Southeastern Europe, in Ukraine and the neighboring lands as far as the borders of Germany. In such a large territory it is perhaps scarcely possible to find the same development of the institutions of serfdom. They developed independently in the old Kievan Rus state and were different from those in Poland and her Western and Southern neighbors.

In discussing the colonization of the Volga territories, the cradle of the Russian nation, the author is under the influence of the Russian historians and

accepts their view that these northern territories which developed into the Russian nation, were colonized from Ukraine. There is no historical proof of any mass colonization from Ukraine outside the territory of the present Ukraine.

*ORIENTE EUROPEO*, April-June, 1957, Madrid.

This is a special number of the Spanish journal *Oriente Europeo* dedicated to Ukrainian affairs and contains ten articles written by the most prominent Ukrainian writers.

Prof. A. Choulguine of Paris writes on the "Formation of the Ukrainian Nation" during the eight periods from that of the prehistoric tribes of the Antes to the present.

Rev. Athanasius Velyky, OSBM, touches the problem: "Ukraine and the Problem of Union of the Churches." A younger historian Lew. R. Bilas writes on the Ukrainian State Organization during the thousand years; the ancient Rus of Kiev, the Kozak State of the 17th Century, and the modern Ukrainian National Republic.

Mykola Vasylyv, the Rector of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, analyzes the Economic Potential of Ukraine in agriculture, the metal industry, machine building, the chemical industry and the production of electricity, etc.

Prof. Dmytro Tschizewskyj in the article: "Baroque in Ukrainian Literature" pictures the development of Ukrainian literature in the 17th and 18th centuries.

There are two articles on Ukrainian life under the Soviets. Prof. G. Shevelov writes on the "Literary Life Under the Soviets" and Dr. V. Markus discusses the political life of Soviet Ukraine.

Bohdan Kordiuk handles the "Communication of Ukraine with the Mediterranean Peoples" and D. Andrievskyj, "Ukraine On the Western Borders."

This issue of the *Oriente Europeo* gives brief but accurate information on Ukraine to its Spanish readers.

"THE COLONIAL POWER OF MOSCOW" ("Die Kolonialmacht—Moskau"). Walter Staugaard. *Der Europäische Osten*, July, 1957.

This article gives basic information on Russian imperialism and its source, Moscow's messianic dream of world domination. During the old regime Russian Orthodoxy and in modern times the international idea of Communism have been the tools for colonial expansion. The author believes that the only defence against the Russian danger is the unity of the Free World.

"LE COLONIALISME SOVIETIQUE EN ASIE CENTRALE" ("The Soviet Colonialism in the Central Asia"). Richard E. Pipes. *Le Contrat Social*. Paris, July, 1957.

Richard E. Pipes, a well known American expert on the Soviet rule in Asia here gives a picture of the contemporary Russian progress in Asia. He mentions the mass Russian emigration to the central Asiatic provinces. In Kazakhstan the newcomers have become the majority of the population. The Soviet colonization is destroying all the old local customs and is hostile to Islam. The final aim of Soviet domination in Central Asia is the complete Russification of the native population.

"AGAIN A NEW SOVIET HISTORICAL SCIENCE." *The Twentieth Party Congress and the Soviet Evaluating of Historical Figures*. Dr. G. A. Stackelberg. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, June, 1957.

Before Stalin Soviet historians called Ivan the Terrible and Peter I feudal tyrants and Shamil, the Caucasian hero and fighter for independence a hero. This was the theory of Michael Pokrovsky.

Stalin's Central Committee (1934) condemned Pokrovsky and regarded Ivan the Terrible and Peter I as the glorious builders of the centralized Russian state and in fact the predecessors of Stalin. Anna Pankratova, the Soviet official historian, became the herald of this historical truth.

After the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party this "historical truth" changed again. In accordance with this campaign Pankratova, in a pamphlet entitled *Problems of Teaching Soviet History in the Light of the Discussions of the Twentieth Party Congress*, warned against laying too much emphasis on Peter the Great. She asserts that the successes achieved during his reign were to be viewed primarily as a result of the intensive efforts of the people. History teachers were advised to keep in mind "the class nature of Peter the Great's policy, the cruel suppression of national uprisings .... and the strengthening of a feudal serf state."

Now Ivan the Terrible was again a tyrant and Shamil a progressive man. It is no wonder that a weak woman like Anna Pankratova, a member of the Central Committee, had to die.

"THE HISTORY OF RUS." V. Derzhavyn. *The Ukrainian Review*, No. II. London, 1957.

This is an excellent article on the first history of the Ukrainian people. The work *Istoria Rusiv* was written by an unknown Ukrainian patriot at the end of the 18th century. The author of this history began with the Kievan Rus Realm and already one hundred fifty years ago tried to put on paper the basic differences between Ukrainian and Russian spirituality. He considered Ukraine as a part of European culture.

"EIGHTY YEARS OF RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY OUTSIDE RUSSIA." ("Achtzig Jahre russischer Geschichtsschreibung ausserhalb Russland"). Hans Halm. *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*. Munich, Vol. V, No. 1-2.

This double issue of the German historical journal is devoted to the celebration of the 80th anniversary of Prof. Hans Uebersberger. Dr. Hans Uebersberger played a very important role in the last decade of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy not only as Professor of East European History at the University of Vienna but also as an expert on Russia and adviser to the Austrian Foreign Ministry during World War I. Prof. Uebersberger also trained several Western Ukrainian historians who were studying in the capital of the empire, Vienna.

This article is a very careful review of the historical bibliography of the former Russian Empire from the last decade of the 19th century to the present time. It also includes a review of Ukrainian historical works written outside Ukraine.

"SOVIET KNOWLEDGE AS A TASK." ("Sovietkunde als Aufgabe"). Hans Koch. *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*. Munich, Vol. V, No. 1-2.

Prof. Hans Koch, probably the best living authority on the Soviet Union in Germany and a historian, gives a plan to systematize studies of the Soviet Union. He proposes to divide them into three parts: the Soviet philosophical conception of life (Sowjetismus); Soviet World History (Sowjetik) and the Soviet world picture (Sowjetie). He develops his conception of these three angles of study of the Soviet world and gives an important bibliography of books on Soviets printed in the West. Prof. Koch's systematization should be of great interest to all Western scholars concerned with the Soviets as a phenomenon in world history.

"THE POLISH FOREIGN POLICY 1904-1940" ("La Política Exterior Polaca 1904-1940"). Michal Sokolnicki. *Oriente Europeo*, No. 25, Madrid, 1957.

This issue of the Spanish journal devoted to studies of Poland contains several valuable articles on Poland's role in the modern world. This is especially true of the article by M. Sokolnicki, a veteran of Polish diplomacy and an author. He deals with the Polish orientation before and during World War I, and the rebirth of the Polish Republic. That section which deals with the Polish East European policy is especially interesting, for he touches Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania, Poland's immediate or proximate neighbors on the East. He mentions also the Polish-Ukrainian alliance against Russia made by the leaders of the two countries, Simon Petlyura for the Ukrainians and Joseph Pilsudski for the Poles. Unfortunately this alliance was unsuccessful because Poland signed the Treaty of Riga with the Red Russians and a Communized Ukrainian government, and abandoned the Ukrainian National government as a defeated partner.

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