

Ukrainian Review

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CONTENTS

<i>E. Glowinskyj</i> , Agriculture in the Ukraine	5
<i>O. Arkhymovych</i> , Grain Crops in the Ukraine	21
<i>N. Voronchuk</i> , The Food Situation in the USSR	35
<i>M. Vasylyiv</i> , The Soviet Economic and Social Order	45
<i>V. Plushch</i> , Medical Services in the USSR Today	58
<i>P. Kotovich</i> , Contemporary Drama in the Ukrainian SSR	70
<i>P. Lutarewytch</i> , A Resistance Group of the Ukrainian Underground 1920—1926	84
Reviews :	92
Ukrainian Publications of the Institute	105

Agriculture in the Ukraine

E. GLOWINSKYJ

The pre-revolutionary period

Agriculture in the Ukraine¹ in the pre-revolutionary period was determined by two factors: The export of grain to European markets and the agrarian reform of 1861 which is known in history as the liberation of the peasants from serfdom.

The export of Ukrainian grain to western Europe via Poland and Danzig dates approximately from the beginning of the XVII century. The incorporation of the Ukraine into Russia put a stop to this trade. However, the colonization of the Ukrainian steppe lands and the Black Sea coasts opened the way for the export of grain by a cheap sea route. The construction of the railroad network which began in the 1860's, helped the grain trade from the ports of Odessa, Nikolayev and Maryupol.² In addition, part of the Ukrainian grain was exported across the former land frontiers of Russia and part was sold on the internal markets.

The total Ukrainian grain harvest at that period was on an average, 200 million centners³ annually; the table below, shows that approximately one third was exported. The total agricultural production of the Ukraine was even larger as the amount sold on the internal Ukrainian market for the needs of the non-agricultural population should be added to the above figure.

Average Annual Grain Export from the Ukraine (1909—1911)⁴

Product	Thousands of Tons	
	To countries outside Russia	To Russia
Wheat	2265	58
Wheat flour	75	1160
Rye	366	51
Oats	205	—
Barley	2225	—
Bran	254	44
Total	5390	1313

¹ This review is devoted to the agricultural structure of the Ukrainian SSR. Consequently when speaking of the pre-revolutionary Ukraine, the author has in mind the Ukrainian lands which were part of the Russian empire, namely the nine Ukrainian governorships.

² The first railroad was built in 1865 between Odessa and Balta.

³ The total grain harvest in the Ukraine in 1913 was 204.8 million centners and from 1911—1915 it totaled on an average 178.9 million centners. Cf. *Ocherki razvitia narodnogo khozyaistva UkSSR* (Outline of the Development of the National Economy of Ukrainian SSR), Moscow, 1954, p. 56.

⁴ H. Kryvchenko, *Zbyrnik statistichnikh vydomostei po Narodnomy Gospodarstvu Ukrainy* (A Statistical Handbook on the National Economy of the Ukraine), Kiev, 1919; Karlo Koberskyj, "The Ukraine in the World Economy," Prague, 1933, p. 16.

The agrarian reform of 1861 left about 46.6% of the land in the hands of the big landowners.⁵ As a result the land left to the peasants was considerably reduced: 30.8% of the land, formerly cultivated by the serfs was now handed over to the landowners. Thus two types of farms emerged; large estates with freely hired labor whose production was for export, and small farms of the predominantly consumer type. Consequently the intensification of Ukrainian farming was made difficult; the large farms working for export and producing mostly wheat and barley were not interested in coordinating and in creating output and the small farms were too weak. Additional difficulties were caused by the general technical backwardness of Russia, and the underdeveloped state of industry.

Among technical crops, an important part was played by sugar beet, thanks to the particularly favorable soil and climatic conditions of the Ukraine. The system of the sown areas in the Ukraine before the revolution (within the boundaries of the present eastern oblasts), is characterized by the predominance of grain crops as illustrated in the following table.⁶

The Structure of Sown Areas in the Ukraine in 1913

(In thousand of hectares)

Total sown area	22,893,6
including	
Grain crops	20,710,3
Technical crops	809,5
Vegetables, melons and potatoes	826,6
Fodder crops	471,2

Among the technical crops, two thirds of the areas were sown with sugar beet. In this way, on the eve of the 1917 revolution, Ukrainian agriculture was predominantly grain, or more precisely wheat-barley producing. However the presence of large areas of sugar beet added a certain industrial character.

The revolution of 1917 and the NEP period

The revolution of 1917 and the ensuing years brought about, primarily, the disappearance of the large estates. While in 1916 the sown area of peasant farms was 17 million ha., in 1925, out of the total sown area of the Ukrainian SSR which amounted to 23,1 million ha., the peasant farms occupied 22.5 million ha. Naturally the sown area was considerably reduced as a result of the revolution and civil war. Whereas in 1916, the sown area in the Ukraine was 21 million ha., it had shrunk to 15.7 million ha. by 1922.⁷

⁵ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva* (Ukrainian Encyclopedia), Volume I (3), Munich-New York, 1949, p. 1041.

⁶ *Ocherki razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva UkSSR*, p. 55.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

Lastly, as a result of war and revolution, Ukrainian trade connections with western European countries were interrupted and therefore the export of grain was substantially curtailed.⁸

Changes in the agricultural usage of the land and reductions in grain exports led to changes in the structure of sown areas. Some of these changes may be considered positive as they helped to intensify the development of Ukrainian agriculture. These included the extension of the sown areas with technical crops. In the first place, the area of the principle technical crop, sugar beet, reverted to its pre-war size. It should be pointed out that although before the 1917 revolution, 82.5% of sugar beet plantations belonged to the landowners, since then, almost all sugar beet cultivation has been carried out by the peasants.

At the same time the areas in which sunflowers were cultivated increased from 73,000 ha., in 1913 to 853,900 ha., in 1925; those of corn from 542,000 ha., to 1,610,000 ha., and those of hemp from 105,200 ha., to 174,300 ha.⁹

The harvest of all grain crops in 1925 was equal to 95.5% of the average harvest of the 1909—1913 period, and that of fodder grain crops was even smaller and in fact equaled only half the ordinary pre-war harvest.¹⁰

This process of structural change in the agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR continued after 1925. As regards the rate of increase in the sown areas of technical crops, the first place belongs to the sunflower, of which plantations in 1929 reached 1,200,600 ha. However, already in 1929 the increase in technical crops and potatoes ceased. The following table presents the distribution of sown areas in the Ukrainian SSR during 1926—1929.¹¹

Sown areas in the Ukrainian SSR (1926—1929)

(In thousands of hectares)

Year	Total area sown	Grain crops	Technical crops	Melon plots, fruit orchards, vegetables	Potatoes	Fodder crops	Others
1926	24,112.8	20,564.7	1,353.8	634.8	1,104.3	419.1	36.1
1927	25,264.8	21,078.4	1,615.3	634.5	1,231.7	466.8	225.7
1928	24,929.3	19,658.3	2,213.9	734.4	1,351.0	681.7	290.0
1929	25,543.8	20,186.7	2,142.1	646.0	1,264.7	986.8	297.5

The period before World War II

The total collectivization in the early 1930's meant, first of all, a considerable increase in the size of agricultural enterprises in the Ukraine. Instead of the 5,173,800 individual farms which existed in 1928, 28,000 kolkhozes covering an

⁸ Dr. Karlo Koberskyj. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁹ *Ocherki razvitia narodnogo khozyaistva UkSSR*, p. 229.

¹⁰ *Zbyrnik statistichno-ekonomychnikh vydomosti pro sylske gospodarstvo Ukrainy* (Handbook of Statistical-Economic Information on the Agriculture of the Ukraine), Khar'kov, 1929, p. 207.

¹¹ *Narodne Gospodarstvo UkSSR* (National Economy of the SSR), Kiev 1925, pp. 222—223.

average area of 1,000 ha., each were established.¹² Small peasant husbandry practically disappeared.¹³ In addition, agriculture was included in the system of central economic planning.¹⁴ While hitherto the planning of agricultural production was carried out indirectly, from 1933 onward compulsory deliveries of farm produce were introduced on January 19, 1933, by a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The state now began to plan deliveries in a centralized way, and at the same time a definite agricultural production program was established. Both the creation of large agricultural enterprises and the direct planning of agricultural output by state planning organs, left their mark on the further development of agriculture. Thus any further intensification of Ukrainian agriculture was temporarily blocked. This was because the development of agro-technical science was such at that time, that intensive husbandry could be carried out only by individual farms.

Prof. K. Matsievych, one of the most eminent experts on Ukrainian agricultural economy, when evaluating the production program of the Soviet government at the beginning of collectivization, emphasized that one of its main characteristics was the complete neglect of problems concerned with the intensification of Ukrainian agriculture. Professor Matsievych stated:

This neglect of intensification is reflected by the whole artificially-created collectivization movement, leading to a complete decline in the peasant's livestock breeding which is a primary base of intensive husbandry and also to a disturbance of the regular development of individual farms, which represent the center of the all-important branches of intensive husbandry; livestock breeding, dairy farming, market gardening, fruit and poultry farming.¹⁵

In this way, the creation of large agricultural enterprises in the form of kolkhozes ensured, to a certain extent development of wheat and sugar beet in Ukrainian agriculture. On the other hand the inclusion of agricultural production in the system of the centrally planned state economy led to the subordination of Ukrainian agriculture to the requirements of the Soviet national economy as a whole and the Ukraine was transformed into an economic region, deprived even of the minimum of autonomy.

Prior to World War II, a new technical crop; cotton, was introduced in the Ukraine. In 1934 the cotton sown area reached as much as 156,300 ha., and in 1940, 236,000 ha. Naturally, in comparison with 1913 the importance of technical crops had considerably increased. But this growth applied only to the beginning of collectivization. In the 1930's a certain stability may be noticed in the increase of technical crops and this also applies to vegetables, melons and

¹² *Zbyrnik statistichno-ekonomychnikh vedomosti pro sylske gospodarstvo Ukrainy*, p. 73.

¹³ In 1938, individual farms in the Ukrainian SSR covered 1% of the land (*Finansovaya gazeta*, August 24, 1938: A report by M. A. Chumbalatov, delegate, at a meeting of the Council of Nationalities).

¹⁴ See the article by S. S. Kabysch & A. I. Lebed: "Innovations in the planning of agriculture in the USSR," *Ezhenedelny Obzor Vazhnykh Sobytiy v SSSR*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1955, No. 47.

¹⁵ Prof. K. Matsievych, "The Agricultural Crisis," Volume 3, Warsaw, 1932, p. 79.

potatoes. The following table shows the distribution of sown areas in the Ukrainian SSR prior to World War II.¹⁶

	1932	1934	1938	1940
	Millions of hectares			
Grain crops	18.1	20.2	17.8	16.9
Technical crops	3.3	2.3	2.4	2.4
Vegetables, melons and potatoes	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.1
Fodder crops	2.9	1.6	3.3	4.0
Total area sown	26.4	26.0	25.6	25.4

It is also apparent that the role of fodder crops is rapidly increasing. This has been occurring mostly at the expense of grain crops. Considerably later, in the 1950's, this disproportional increase in areas sown with fodder crops, mainly perennial grasses, provoked alarm among top level Soviet leaders and resulted in wide persecution of agricultural planners in the Ukraine.

The evolution in the sown areas of the separate technical crops from 1913 to 1940 is presented below.¹⁷

The Sown Areas of Technical Crops

	1913	1928	1940
	(Millions of hectares)		
Sugar beet	533.6	647.1	788.5
Sunflowers	73.0	1269.1	678.7
Cotton	nil	nil	236.0
Flax	76.5	66.2	168.7
Makhorka (a coarse tobacco)	16.1	23.2	173.1
Oleaginous plants	0.7	nil	23.0
Tobacco	3.2	0.9	38.4
Medicinal herbs	nil	nil	13.9
Kok-Sagyz (Russian dandelion)	nil	nil	10.8

From this table it can be seen that the sown areas under sunflowers decreased nearly twice. However, other crops appear, such as cotton, *kok-sagyz* and various medicinal herbs. The areas under sugar beet, flax and *makhorka* were increased. The above table does not include the areas sown with hemp, but according to other data¹⁸ it was planted over with 180 thousand ha. in 1940.

The distribution of grain crops also underwent certain changes. First of all, compared with 1913 and the NEP period, the total area decreased from

¹⁶ *Ocherki razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva UkSSR*, p. 406.

¹⁷ *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia (BSE)*, 1947, Vol. 55, p. 812.

¹⁸ *Entsiklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, Vol. I (3), p. 1062.

20.7 million ha. in 1913, to 16.8 million ha. in 1940. Certain changes took place in the distribution of particular crops and this is illustrated below.¹⁹

Percentage distribution of grain crops in the Ukraine

	1913	1940
	(Millions of hectares)	
Winter Rye	17.8	16.0
Winter Wheat	10.7	30.6
Spring Wheat	27.0	4.8
Barley	24.6	19.3
Oats	10.3	10.0
Others	9.6	19.3

This table indicates notably changes in the role played by winter and spring wheat. Increases in the sown areas of winter wheat should be considered as positive for Ukrainian grain husbandry because it is known that under Ukrainian conditions, winter wheat gives larger yields than spring wheat.

Although the cultivation of the main grain crops—rye, wheat, barley and oats has diminished, the importance of the other grain crops has developed and their sowing areas increased from 1.98 million ha. to 2.24 million ha. It is difficult to say how this area is divided among the other grain crops (corn, millet, buck-wheat and pulses). According to one source,²⁰ the area under corn increased from 542,000 ha. in 1915 to 1,610,000 ha. in 1925; according to another source,²¹ the area under corn within the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR reached in 1940, 1,400,000 ha., that of millet 700,000 ha., buck-wheat 600,000 ha., and pulses 500,000 ha.

The area under vegetables, melons and potatoes in the 1930's was stabilized at the level of approximately 2 million ha. (in 1913, the figure was 826 million ha.).²²

The increase in the sown areas of this category of agricultural crops is connected with the growth in the urban population of the Ukraine between 1929 and 1940. The Party drew special attention to supplying the towns with produce from these crops and the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party issued a special directive:

To create near large towns and industrial centers, potato-vegetable and livestock raising bases; and to secure in full the supply of these centers with vegetables, potatoes and, to a considerable degree, with milk and meat.²³

¹⁹ BSE, 1947, Vol. 55, p. 811.

²⁰ *Ocherki razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva UkSSR*, p. 229.

²¹ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, p. 1058.

²² Table composed from data in BSE, 1947, Vol. 55, p. 816.

²³ *KPSS v Rezolyutsiakh i Resheniakh* (The Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party). Part II, VII edition, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1953, p. 893.

Post-World War II changes in Ukrainian agriculture

The incorporation of the western Ukrainian lands into the Ukrainian SSR increased its territory by 123,700 square kilometres.

We have only precise data on the size of the sown areas in the Zakarpatska oblast—239,000 ha.²⁴ The Ukrainian lands in Poland had a sown area of 3.5 million ha. Thus it can be assumed that the total sown area of the Ukrainian SSR within its present boundaries (but without the Crimean oblast), has increased from 25.6 to 30 million ha.

The first post-war Five Year Plan gave Ukrainian agriculture the task of establishing by 1950, sown areas of 30.5 million ha.

As regards the distribution of sown areas between agricultural crops the following tables show the situation in Ukrainian territory in Poland and in the Zakarpatska oblast.²⁵

The 1939 distribution of sown areas

Ukrainian oblasts in Poland		The Zakarpatska Oblast	
Crop	(Thousand of hectares)	Crop	(Thousands of hectares)
Rye	1170	Wheat	31.0
Wheat	900	Oats	31.0
Oats	675	Rye	26.0
Barley	450	Corn	47.8
Potatoes	650—900	Potatoes	47.8

World War II caused a considerable decrease in the sown areas. The following table illustrates the size of the total sowing area and the sowing for 1940 and 1946.²⁶

Sowing area of the Ukrainian SSR

	1940	1946
	(Thousands of hectares)	
Total sowing area of the Ukr. SSSR (without the Zakarpatska oblast)	30,257	24,339
Grain crops	20,522	17,317
Technical crops	2,625	1,858
including		
Sugar Beet	820	653
Fodder crops	4,302	1,839
Vegetables		
Melons		
Others	2,808	3,325

²⁴ BSE, 1947, Vol. 58, p. 830.

²⁵ These tables are based on data from BSE, 1947, Vol. 55, pp. 824 and 830. The figures are only approximate.

²⁶ KPSS v Rezolyutsiakh i Resheniakh. Part II, p. 1045.

There are certain discrepancies between this information and that on the distribution of the sowing area in six Ukrainian oblasts in Poland. For instance, these lands had, in 1939, between 650,000—900,000 ha. under potatoes. The increase in grain crops (3,600,000 ha. instead of 3,195,000 ha.), technical and fodder crops can be explained by the fact that the sown areas of Chernovtsy and Izmail are included.

Lastly, in order to complete the survey of incorporated territories, the sowing areas of the Crimean oblast are given below.

	(Thousand hectares)
Total sowing area	1300
Grain Crops	925
including	
Winter wheat	621
Technical crops	85
Vegetables, and melon fields	43
Fodder crops	240

The tasks of the Fourth Five Year Plan

As has been noted, the total sowing area of the Ukrainian SSR had decreased by 20% as a result of World War II. The sowing of technical crops diminished by 30% and of sugar beet even more. Fodder crop cultivation fell especially sharply by 57%. Only those areas under vegetables, melons and potatoes increased by 17.9%, a phenomenon completely natural in war time when, because of the lack of machinery and livestock, the main attention of agricultural production is concentrated on crops which can be cultivated manually.

The following shows the tasks allotted to Ukrainian agriculture by the first post-war Five Year Plan.

The Fourth Five Year Plan compared with the period 1940—1946

	1940	1946	Task of Fourth Kolkhoz Five Year Plan participation in Fourth Five Year Plan	
			Millions of hectares	
Total sowing area	30.2	24.3	30.5	21.3
Grain crops	20.5	17.3	19.6	14.1
Technical crops	2.6	1.6	2.6	2.2
including				
Sugar beet	?	0.543	0.830	?
Sunflowers	?	?	0.801	?
Vegetables, melons and potatoes	2.8	3.3	2.8	1.0
Fodder crops	4.3	1.8	5.4	4.0

We see that in the first post-war Five Year Plan the main emphasis was laid on cultivating more fodder crops and restoring the sowing areas of technical crops, vegetables, potatoes and melons to their pre-war size. In the meantime the area under fodder crops has been increased by one million ha. at the expense of grain crops.

The intensification of mainly grass sowings was approved as early as 1947 by the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the decree: "On measures for raising agricultural production in the post-war period. Thanks to increased grass sowing and grain production, a solid fodder base has been created for the development of livestock breeding."²⁷

It should be remembered that research into structural, post-war changes of the sowing areas throughout the Ukraine is very complicated by the fact that Communist sources very seldom give absolute figures, limiting themselves rather to percentage indices.

For 1946, we have only summary data for the total sowing area and for all grain crops without any break-down into individual crops. The last available data of this kind in the Ukrainian SSR is for 1940. Nevertheless, on the basis of data at our disposal, it can be said that the post-war restoration of sowing areas in the Ukrainian SSR was very difficult to accomplish. Accordingly, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party resolved in February 1947: To increase in 1947 the production of winter wheat in the Ukrainian SSR to 4.4 million ha., and in 1948 to 4.8 million ha.²⁸ However, we can deduce that during 1940 in only the pre-World War II boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR, winter wheat was sown over 5.14 million ha., and spring wheat only over 800,000 ha. The decree of the February plenum of the All-Union Communist Party, resolved that in 1947 this spring wheat should be sown over 750,000 ha. The decree emphasizes that it is necessary:

To note the serious delay in the production of spring wheat in the Ukrainian SSR. It is intolerable that such a valuable food crop as spring wheat is neglected from year to year in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses of the Ukrainian SSR, and that fertile black soils are used to cultivate less valuable fodder crops, for example barley.²⁹

Similarly the sowing of sugar beet in 1947 still lagged behind that of 1940 when 788 500 ha., were sown, that is two thirds of the whole area under sugar beet in the USSR.³⁰ The plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party stated that in 1947, sugar beet cultivation should be increased, "throughout the whole USSR to 1,058,000 ha., and in 1948 to 1,312,000 ha."³¹ The results of the first post war Five Year Plan concerning the increase of the sown areas were given in the reports of the Central Statistical Administration of the Ukrainian SSR.³² The actual fulfillment of the plan in 1950 in comparison with the planned tasks established by the Five Year Plan is given below:

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1051.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ A. T. Dubrova, "The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic," Moscow, 1954, p. 27.

³⁰ KPSS v Rezolyutsiakh i Resheniakh. Part II, p. 1053.

³¹ *Radyanska Ukraina*, January 30, 1955.

³² *Ibid.*, February 9, 1954.

	1946	1950 Plan	Fulfillment of 1950 plan
	Millions of hectares		
Grain crops	17.3	19.6	19.03
Technical crops	1.6	2.6	2.6
including			
Sugar*beet	0.543	0.830	1.03

We see that the plan to increase the sown areas under grain crops was accomplished and sugar beet was cultivated over an area beyond the plan's estimates.

The Fifth Five Year Plan

During the Fifth Five Year Plan when the problem of agricultural production became the special object of attention by Soviet leaders, no absolute figures are to be found in Soviet publications concerning the sown areas of separate crops: there is not even a percentage index concerning such increases. The report of the Central Statistical Administration of the Ukrainian SSR on the fulfillment of the state plan for developing the national economy of the Ukrainian SSR in 1952 stated:

The sown area of the republic increased in 1952 by 277,000 ha. The sown areas under winter wheat, buck-wheat, cotton, sugar beet and other technical crops was augmented. The areas under cultivation of perennial grasses, fodder root crops and silage crops was also increased considerably.³³

The report of the same department for 1953 stated:

The sown area of the most valuable grain crop, wheat, increased in 1953 throughout the Ukrainian SSR by 745,000 ha., compared with 1952. The areas under sugar beet, potatoes, millet, barley, sunflowers, pulses, flax fibre, purging flax and fodder crops were augmented.³⁴

Lastly in the report for 1954 we read:

Compared with 1953, the sown areas in the Ukrainian SSR by the harvest of 1954, had increased by 587,000 ha. The sowing of grain fodder crops rose by 1,354,000 ha. More groats were sown than in 1953. The sowing of pulses, sugar beet, flax fibre, potatoes, vegetables and silage crops increased but potatoes were not fulfilled.³⁵

The size of the sowing areas

Throughout the Ukrainian SSR in 1940, the sown area totaled, 30.2 million ha., without the Crimean oblast. According to the Fourth Five Year Plan the sown area was to reach 30.5 million ha.

³³ *Ibid.*, January 26, 1955.

³⁴ *Sotsialisticheskoe Selskokhozyaistvo*, 1955 No. 4, p. 62.

³⁵ *BSE*, II edition, Volume 23, 1953, pp. 547—555.

It is not known whether this increase was achieved or not. In any case the fact is that the Statistical Administration of the Ukrainian SSR in its published report on the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan, on the separate crops in percentage relation to the size of the sown areas in 1946, does not mention the total sum of the areas under cultivation and it may be assumed that the plan was not fulfilled. In the meantime the increase of the sown area in 1952 by 277,000 ha., and in 1954 by 1,354,000 ha., probably applies to the recultivation of those lands, neglected as the result of the war. According to the testimony of I. Zorin, Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR³⁶ there are no uncultivated lands in the Ukraine and therefore any increase in sown areas of certain individual crops can be made only at the expense of others.

From this it can be concluded that the total sowing area of the Ukrainian SSR before 1954 was no more than 30.4 million ha. The incorporation of the Crimean oblast increased the area by 26,000 sq. kilometers (2,600,000 ha.), of which about half is pasture land.³⁷ It may therefore be stated justifiably that in 1955 the total sown area of the Ukrainian SSR was 31.8 million ha.

Grain Crops

Grain crops throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR (without the Zakarpatska and Crimean oblasts), covered 20.5 million ha., and it has already been noted that in 1950, this area covered 19.03 million ha., that is 1.47 million ha. less than in 1940. The report of the Statistical Administration for 1952 does not mention an increase of the area under grain crops. In 1954 N. S. Khrushchev, at the February plenum of Central Committee of the Communist Party stated that: "In the Ukrainian SSR the sowing of grain crops was reduced [compared with 1940] by 1.1 million ha."

On the basis of this data the size of the sown areas under grain crops were approximately 20.5 million ha. (1940); 17.3 million ha. (1946); 19.03 million ha. (1950); 19.4 million ha. (1953) and 20.3 million ha. (1954). The latter figure includes the Crimean oblast.

It is difficult to say how this area is divided among individual grain crops. On the strength of available data we have, unfortunately a far from complete picture of the extent of the sowing areas under wheat in the post-war period. It may be concluded that the sowing of winter wheat, which did not reach its pre-war level, was primarily affected by the decrease in grain crops, which Khrushchev mentioned. True, Khrushchev in his report delivered to the February plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party said:

Beginning in 1949, this situation in the Ukraine considerably improved through the increased sowing of winter wheat; however, greater cultivation of winter crops sown was made chiefly at the expense of a decrease in grain fodder crops and not perennial grasses which give poor yields in the South.

As far as other grain crops are concerned (rye, spring wheat, oats, barley, millet and buck-wheat), there are no direct data which would enable us to

³⁶ *Pravda*, March 21, 1954.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

establish the size of their sown areas. The last information is for the Ukrainian SSR during 1940, that is in its pre-war boundaries. The incorporated western Ukrainian territories increased the areas under these grain crops by approximately 2 million ha., the Crimean oblast by 300,000 ha. However, the decrease in the cultivation of grain crops in general according to Krushchev, was made mainly at the expense of grain fodder crops (barley and oats).

Finally we should examine the cultivation of yet another grain crop which in recent times has become the center of attention throughout the USSR—corn.

Approximately 1.4 million ha. of this crop were sown in the Ukrainian SSR in 1940.³⁸ In 1953, corn was sown over 2,243,000 ha.,³⁹ and in 1954 over 2.5 million ha.⁴⁰ By May 20, 1955, 4,270,000 ha., had been sown by kolkhozes alone,⁴¹ the ultimate goal, according to O. Kyrychenko being 5,250,000 ha.⁴²

This sharp increase in corn cultivation is connected with the January resolution (1955) of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on measures to be taken for a further increase in livestock production which stated: "The sowing of corn, must be increased in each kolkhoz so that by 1955 the sowing of this crop will exceed 5 million ha."⁴³

It is intended to increase the sowing area under corn to 6,600,000 ha., by 1960.⁴⁴ Such a rapid increase which in 1955 reached 2,750,000 ha. and in the next four years will be increased by a further 1,350,000 ha., can only be achieved at the expense of other crops. O. I. Kyrychenko secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party commented recently:

At the expense of which areas can the kolkhozes and sovhozes increase the area under corn? First of all, at the expense of low yielding spring grain crops (spring wheat, oats, barley and others), and partly at the expense of winter wheat which is sown after previously poor crops and also gives low yields.⁴⁵

I. Zorin in an article published in the *Sotsialisticheskoe Selskokhozyaistvo*, expresses himself even more categorically about reductions in the sowing of winter crops:

The sown areas under winter crops will be reduced to a certain extent.

This can be explained by the fact that the winter crops which did not have good crops previously give poor yields in many areas. Also a considerable proportion of winter crops perish for various reasons, mostly because of unsuitable weather conditions.⁴⁶

Zorin is equally outspoken about the recommendation of the All-Union Research Institute of Botany concerning an increase in the Ukraine of oats and barley as the most valuable fodders. Zorin stated: "The kolkhozes in the Ukraine will considerably increase the sowing of corn at the expense of other crops in

³⁸ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, Vol. I (3), Munich-New York, p. 1058.

³⁹ The report of O. I. Kyrychenko, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 22, 1955.

⁴⁰ *Ocherki razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva UkSSR*, p. 527.

⁴¹ Radio Kiev, May 23, 1955.

⁴² *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 22, 1955.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Sotsialisticheskoe Selskokhozyaistvo*, 1955, No. 4, p. 64.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

order to increase the total grain yields.”⁴⁷ By the following table, Zorin illustrated at the expense of which crops, corn is to be increased, and how this raises the total grain harvest.⁴⁸ Instead of those crops indicated below it was planned to sow 2,190,000 ha., giving an estimated yield of 22.4 centners per ha., and a total harvest of 4,905.000 tons.

Crops	Planned decrease in sowing areas (in 1.000 of ha.)	Planned yields (in centners, per ha.)	Planned total harvest (in thousands of tons.)
Autumn crops	900	14.0	1260
Spring grain crops	785	12.0	942
Spring wheat	402	9.0	362
Millet	53	11.0	58
Other crops	51	7.5	38

It should be pointed out that these calculations and the expectations of Soviet leaders do not correspond exactly with the real facts.

Zorin said that the total harvest of corn in 1953 was 82 million poods (1 pood = 36 lbs) and in 1955/56 it is planned to increase it to 552 million poods. If we assume that one hectare of corn yields according to Zorin, 22.4 centners, then the total corn harvest in 1953 should be not 82 million poods but 240 million poods gathered from 1,761,000 ha. sown in 1953, according to Kyrychenko's report. Such a considerable increase in the sowing of corn substantially changes the structure of grain crop cultivation in the Ukrainian SSR. Until recently, corn occupied 8⁰/₀—9⁰/₀ of the total sown area under grain crops; now it occupies 25⁰/₀ of the total sown area and is second in size only to winter wheat.

Technical crops

The total area under technical crops reached its pre-World War II level of 2.6 million ha., in 1950. There are no data whatsoever concerning the distribution of this area among individual crops such as existed for the Ukrainian SSR in its pre-war boundaries. Information is available only on the sowing of sugar beet for certain years and on the planned tasks for 1955. For instance N. Bubnovskyj, secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party wrote: “In the present year, 187 centners of sugar beet are to be gathered from one hectare in the whole sown area, and the total harvest should produce 206 million centners.”⁴⁹ Consequently the sown area under sugar beet totals 1,102,000 hectares. By comparing all previously given data, it may be established that sugar beet cultivation developed from 188,500 hectares in 1940 to 1,030,000 hectares in 1950. The 1955 planned output of sugar beet was 1,102,000 hectares.

On the strength of this data it may be concluded that while the sown areas under other crops did not decrease and the increase in sugar beet cultivation was not made at the expense of other technical crops, the whole area under technical

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 64

⁴⁸ *Izvestia*, April 28, 1955.

⁴⁹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, May 18, 1955.

crops would in 1955 be somewhat larger and instead of 2.6 million hectares should be 3.3/3.5 million hectares.

According to *Pravda Ukrainy* for example, kolkhozes in the Ukraine fulfilled the 1955 plan for the sowing of cotton over an area larger than one hundred thousand hectares.⁵⁰ In 1940 the whole area under cotton was 236,000 ha.

Potatoes, Vegetables and Melons

As already noted in this article, the areas under potatoes, vegetables and melons increased considerably during World War II so that the task of the first post-war Five Year Plan was to reduce them to the state of 1940. The propitious conditions in sown areas which were caused by the war, the high prices of potatoes and vegetables on kolkhoz markets and also by decline in the mechanization of agriculture could not last for ever.

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in its decree dated September 7, 1953, "On measures for the further development of the agriculture of the USSR," admitted that: "The serious delay in production of potatoes and vegetables which makes it difficult to improve supplies of this produce to the population of towns and industrial centers, is a gross shortcoming. The delay in the production of potatoes hinders further development in livestock breeding."⁵¹

In the "Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR," we read:

The reasons why production of potatoes throughout the country as well as in the Ukrainian SSR is delayed, are the lack of personal interest of kolkhozes in the production of this crop; the low level of labor mechanization; the uneven distribution of the sown areas of potatoes in numerous kolkhozes and sovkhozes; the inadequate application of manure and fertilizers and the unsatisfactory dissemination of the latest experience and achievements of Soviet science.

The development of vegetable production was halted for the same reasons as for potatoes.⁵²

The most important reason for this delay is the lack of personal interest of kolkhozniks in cultivating these labor-consuming crops. The resolutions of the September (1953) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party which reduced the size of compulsory deliveries of potatoes and vegetables and raised delivery and purchasing prices, were aimed at stimulating the personal interest of the kolkhoz peasantry. The following table throws a certain amount of light on the cultivation of potatoes and vegetables in 1954. For comparison the figures for 1940 are given; the latter also include the cultivation of those crops on sovkhozes. It should be recalled, that the information for 1940 applies to the Ukrainian SSR in its pre-war boundaries.⁵³

⁵⁰ *KPSS v Rezolyutsiakh i Resheniakh*. Part II, p. 1155.

⁵¹ *Ocherki Razvitiia Narodnogo Khoziaistva UkSSR*, pp. 530, 531.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 531.

⁵³ *Pravda*, March 21, 1954.

Potato and Vegetable Cultivation

	1940	1954
	(In thousands of hectares)	
Potatoes	1409.0	860.0
Vegetables	418.0	280.0

Fodder Crops

The cultivation of fodder crops suffered most during the war. Their sown area was reduced to 42% of the pre-World War II area. Naturally, in the post-war years the situation improved radically. No figures are available, but an improvement is indicated by the campaign against perennial grasses in the southern Ukraine which was begun by Khrushchev in his speech at the February-March plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and which was afterwards widely discussed in the Soviet central press. Khrushchev stated that the area under perennial grasses increased in the whole USSR by 4.5 million ha. during 1940—1953.⁵⁴ In this connection the plenum passed a resolution in which it ordered the appropriate Soviet organs to:

Undertake measures to eradicate errors made through introducing grass crop rotation. Improvements can be carried out in the structure of the sown areas, provided that, from 1954 onward, the sowing of grain and especially groats, pulses and grain fodder crops are considerably increased at the expense of the cultivation of low-yielding perennial grasses.⁵⁵

Conclusions

Concluding this review of the structure of agriculture in the Ukrainian SSR, it seems that despite various changes in the size of the sown areas under separate crops which have taken place during the post-war years, the percentage correlation between the main categories of agricultural crops remains approximately the same as in 1940, with the exception of fodder crops, the cultivation of which was limited in favor of grain and, to a certain extent of technical crops. However, these changes do not testify to the healthy and normal development of Ukrainian agriculture. The disproportionate increase in the sowing of perennial grasses condemned at the beginning of 1950, by the Bolsheviks, began as far back as the 1930's and came about as a result of collectivization and the creation of large agricultural enterprises in the form of kolkhozes. Similarly the decline in market gardening and in the cultivation of melons and potatoes is connected with large-scale Ukrainian agricultural enterprises.

On the other hand the planned principle, introduced into agricultural production at the beginning of the Five Year Plans has not justified itself. The planning of sown areas by directives was precisely the reason for all the shortcomings in agriculture which have been so sharply criticized at plenums of the Central Committee. The critical attitude toward these planning methods was

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, March 6, 1954.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

crystallized in the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 2, 1954:

Taking into account the serious shortcomings in the existing system of agricultural planning, the exaggerated centralization of which, is shackling the initiative of the kolkhozes, MTS and sovkhozes in the development of agricultural production, it is recommended that the *Gosplan* of the USSR, the Ministry of Sovkhozes of the USSR in agreement with the union republics, work out in two months time and present for approval by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a proposal on changes in the planning method of agricultural husbandry, leaving more initiative to the people on the spot in such planning.⁵⁶

Obviously this admission of serious defects in the centralized system of agricultural planning after twenty-five years of practice, is in itself very indicative. It seems doubtful, however if the new way of planning introduced by the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on March 9, 1955,⁵⁷ will bring about something more positive in Ukrainian agricultural production. This method introduces a new principle for the distribution of land for cultivation, which lies in the volume of goods produced. However, the plans of kolkhozes, established with the aid of local leaders who are allowed a good deal of initiative in this matter, have ultimately to ensure the necessary output of goods in accordance with centralized requirements.⁵⁸ Therefore, centralism in planning remains and the only change is that the state has transferred the whole responsibility for rational planning to the local organs. Where formerly the managements of kolkhozes and sovkhozes received directives telling them which crop and how much of it they had to sow, now they have directives telling them how many centners of this or that product must be delivered to the state. The situation has not changed basically.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, March 11, 1955.

⁵⁷ *Ezhenedelny obzor vazhnykh sobytii v SSSR*. Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1955, No. 47.

⁵⁸ *KPSS v Rezolyutsiakh i Resheniakh*. Part II, p. 1053.

Grain Crops in the Ukraine

O. ARKHYMOVYCH

It is widely recognized that the Ukraine used to produce and still produces more agricultural products than it requires to feed its own population.* It is therefore no wonder that avaricious neighbors both near and far have always turned their eyes toward it with the aim of appropriating its fertile lands and enslaving its people.

From 1654 the Ukraine, slowly but gradually, became involved in Russia's economic system so that all surplus agricultural products were used either for the internal market of the Russian empire or made up a considerable part of Russia's exports.

Since the beginning of the Soviet régime this situation has deteriorated even more not only because surplus agricultural production has been taken from the Ukraine, but in certain years (1932—1933) all grain was removed causing large scale famine.

Before World War II, the territory of the Ukrainian SSR constituted a little more than 2⁰/₁₀₀ of the whole area of the USSR¹ but the sowing area was 20⁰/₁₀₀ of the whole sowing area of the USSR. The reason for this lies in the fact that only 6⁰/₁₀₀ of the total area of the USSR is suitable for agricultural purposes,² but at the same time this percentage is very high in the Ukraine—68⁰/₁₀₀.³

The sown area in hectares under all grain crops was in 1913—20,710,300; 1934—20,200,200; 1938—17,766,600.⁴

As may be seen, the area under grain crops in the Ukraine constitutes from 19⁰/₁₀₀ to 20⁰/₁₀₀ of the area under grain crops in the whole of the USSR.

The total production of grain in the Ukrainian SSR between 1928 and 1934 in thousand of centners was as follows:

* An article by O. Arkhymovych entitled "Grain Crops in the Ukraine after World War II" supplementing the above article, will appear in one of the next issues of the "Ukrainian Review".

¹ V. Timoshenko, "Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem," Stanford University, California, 1932.

² *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR* (The agriculture of the USSR), Moscow, 1936.

³ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva* (The Ukrainian Encyclopedia), Vol. I, 1949, Munich-New York, pp. 1056—1061.

⁴ *Posevnye ploshchadi SSSR v 1938* (The sown areas of the USSR in 1938), Moscow-Leningrad, 1939.

Year	According to official data ⁵	According to N. Jasny's calculations ⁶	Percentage of the total harvest of the USSR
1928	138,854.5		18.9
1929	187,017.0	N. Jasny's calculations agree here with official data.	26.1
1930	227,258.0		27.2
1931	183,460.5		25.4
1932	146,560.6		21.0
1933	222,965.0	169,453.4	24.9
1934	123,349.0	102,379.7	13.7

N. Jasny⁷ showed that as from 1933 the yields in the USSR have been exaggerated. He considers that in order to obtain the real figures, official Soviet data for 1933 should be reduced by 24% and for 1934 by 17%.

Therefore the Ukraine's part in grain production in the USSR ranged from 13.7% in 1934—a bad year, to 27.2%; on an average it was 22.6%. For comparison it should be added that the general grain production in the Ukraine in 1913 was 204.8 million centners⁸ which was 24% more than the average production during 1928—1934.

From 1913—1940 considerable changes in the correlation and geographical distribution of various crops took place in the Ukraine. The main trend was the replacement of grain crops by technical and fodder crops and to a certain extent by potatoes. In particular, spring wheat, some winter rye and spring barley were replaced by winter wheat. In addition, winter wheat sowing moved southward into the steppe. Soviet economists consider that this was the result of "solicitude" shown by the Soviet authorities toward the industrialization of the country. In fact it was due to the colonial policy of the central Soviet government toward the outlying national republics. This policy was aimed at developing the main resources of the separate republics to the greatest possible extent. A striking example of this policy can be found in the Central Asian republics, mainly in Uzbekistan, where the main crop is cotton; another example is the Ukraine which mainly produces sugar beet and winter wheat. The dynamics of these processes in the Ukraine are illustrated by the two following tables:

Percentage of area in the Ukraine under various types of crops⁹

Crop	Years		
	1913	1928	1940
Grain crops	90.5	78.9	66.4
Technical crops	3.5	8.9	9.6
Vegetables	0.9	3.0	2.6
Potatoes	2.7	5.4	5.6
Fodder crops	2.2	2.7	15.6
Others	0.2	1.1	0.2

⁵ *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR* (The agriculture of the USSR), Moscow, 1936.

⁶ N. Jasny, "The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR," Stanford University Press, 1949.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia* (BSE), Vol. II, 1947, pp. 807—818.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Simultaneously with the reduction of the area under grain crops there was an increase in technical crops and potatoes. A similar tendency in the whole agriculture of the USSR is admitted by Malyshev.¹⁰ Fodder crops cannot be included in this comparison as before the revolution the peasants had sufficient meadows and pasture lands, which however gradually decreased in the post-revolutionary period.

The percentage of Ukrainian territory under main grain crops¹¹

Crop	Year	
	1913	1940
Winter wheat	10.7	30.6
Spring wheat*	27.0	4.8
Winter rye	17.8	16.0
Barley	24.6	19.3
Oats	10.3	10.0

* After World War II the correlation between the area under spring and winter wheat showed a bias in favor of spring wheat. The resolution passed on February 9, 1955, "On changes in the practice of agricultural planning" (*Pravda*, March 11, 1955), points out that: "The southern regions of the country and especially the Ukraine, undertook the sowing of spring wheat, but experience based on many years of practice showed that the sowing of winter wheat is more suitable."

Before World War I. the main crop in the Ukraine was spring wheat with winter wheat as a secondary one. There was also considerable difference in the regions where these two crops were sown. Spring wheat was sown mostly in the forest and steppe zone, east of the Dnieper and in the steppe, and winter wheat in the forest and steppe zone west of the Dnieper and partly on the eastern bank, around Sumy, and in the north-western region near the Sea of Azov.

Before World War II, winter wheat had almost completely ousted spring wheat and had attained first place among all the other grain crops; it was also more widely sown east of the Dnieper and in the steppe. Considerable areas under spring wheat were to be found only in the south-east of the Ukraine. Spring wheat gave smaller and less stable yields than winter wheat and therefore under the planning for the whole USSR the main areas under this crop were transferred to the Volga, the Ural region, Kazakhstan, Siberia and part of the Northern Caucasus. The following table gives the areas under the main grain crops in 1913, 1928, 1934 and 1938.¹²

¹⁰ *Planovoe khozyaistvo* (Planned Economy), Moscow, 1951, No. 3.

¹¹ *BSE.*, Vol. 55, 1947, pp. 770—984.

¹² *Posevnye ploshchadi SSSR v 1938*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939.

Area under grain crops in the Ukraine

Crop	1913	1928	1934	1938
	Thousands of hectares			
Winter rye	3,694,7	3,564,5	3,746,0	3,118,4
Winter wheat	2,224,3	1,601,3*	5,020,9	6,440,9
Spring wheat	5,590,2	3,134,4	1,479,1	1,006,1
Spring barley	5,100,9	3,712,0	3,186,5	2,801,2
Oats	2,124,0	2,239,0	1,912,1	1,616,6
Corn	542,1	2,378,5	1,359,4	1,015,2
Millet	491,9	1,591,5	1,873,9	418,4
Buckwheat	590,7	997,5	635,9	667,5
Rice	—	—	0,1	1,5
Pulses	317,7	233,8	518,9	459,5
Others	33,8	305,8	467,4	221,3
Total:	20,710,3	19,658,3	20,200,2	17,766,6


* Large areas of winter wheat perished during the winter of 1927—1928.

The biggest changes were in those areas under winter and spring wheat, barley and corn. The area under winter wheat increased nearly threefold and under corn twice. On the other hand the area under spring wheat decreased nearly five times and that under spring barley 1.8 times. A crop new to the Ukraine—rice—appeared, and its sowing was started in drainage areas of the Dnieper. The area percentage in the Ukraine under the crops mentioned below, of similar crops throughout the USSR is as follows:

Percentage area under separate grain crops in the Ukraine

Winter rye	14.8	14.8	15.8	14.7
Winter wheat	30.3	25.9	46.6	44.2
Spring wheat	22.9	14.5	6.0	3.7
Spring barley	47.1	53.8	39.4	32.9
Oats	12.6	13.0	10.6	9.0
Corn	42.6	53.0	36.9	38.9
Millet	13.8	28.0	22.8	10.6
Buckwheat	29.9	34.1	30.2	32.2
Rice	—	—	0.07	0.9
Pulses	25.5	24.2	18.8	17.8

It should be noticed that the area percentage under winter wheat constantly increased while that under spring wheat decreased.



AGRICULTURAL REGIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR

From: Ekonomicheskaya Geografia SSSR (Economic Geography of the USSR), Moscow, 1954.

The geographical distribution of grain crops in the Ukraine

The distribution of grain crops according to Prof. Kubijowych¹³ may be described as follows:

Polesie. Mostly rye and some oats, barley, winter wheat and in the eastern areas there is buckwheat. Millet and spring wheat are only sown in small quantities but more millet is sown in eastern areas than in western; corn is not cultivated at all.

Galicia-Volyn Ridge. Rye and winter wheat also oats and barley and a little buckwheat. Small quantities of spring wheat, corn and millet.

The Forest and Steppe West of the Dnieper. Winter wheat is primarily cultivated, closely followed by winter rye. Then come oats, barley, corn, millet and buckwheat. Very little spring wheat is sown.

The Forest and Steppe East of the Dnieper. The chief crop is spring wheat followed by winter rye and winter wheat and also oats, millet and barley. There are small sowings of corn and buckwheat.

Steppe Zone. Winter wheat leads, followed by barley and winter rye, spring wheat and corn and a certain amount of oats and millet. Buckwheat is not cultivated.

The Carpathian Region. Oats lead and then winter rye and winter wheat, corn and barley. Millet, buckwheat and spring wheat are not sown.

The table below gives the areas sown with grain crops in percentages of the total sown area of each natural region according to Prof. Kubijowych.¹⁴ The data is the average for 1931—1935.¹⁵

Crops	Western Polesie	Eastern Polesie	Galicia-Volyn Ridge	East of Dnieper	Steppe Zone	Carpathian Region
Winter wheat	8	6	24	11	35	15
Spring wheat	1	2	4	37	13	—
Rye	58	46	31	17	15	26
Barley	8	9	13	8	16	9
Oats	18	15	17	10	6	36
Corn	—	—	3	4	10	14
Buckwheat	5	16	7	3	—	—
Millet	2	6	1	10	5	—

The figures in this table indicate that the area percentage under various grain crops is subject to the fact that sowings of winter wheat, barley, corn and millet increase from North to South and those of winter rye, oats and buckwheat decrease in the same direction. The sowings of spring wheat and millet increase from West to East. The following table gives the areas under grain crops for the oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR according to the administrative division of 1934 in percentages of the total area under a given crop in the same years. The data is taken from Soviet official sources.¹⁶

¹³ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, Vol. 1, 1949, Munich-New York, pp. 1056—1061.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1936.

Oblasts

Crops	Kiev	Chernigov	Vinnitsa	Kharkov	Dnepro-Petrovsk	Odessa	Donets
Winter rye	19.9	17.8	12.6	22.7	10.1	5.0	11.9
Winter wheat	12.2	1.8	11.7	10.8	26.5	31.0	6.0
Spring wheat	1.2	3.0	0.4	31.3	22.7	10.7	31.1
Barley	10.9	3.9	11.9	13.5	23.8	23.0	13.0
Oats	24.1	13.8	18.4	15.5	10.6	9.5	8.1
Corn	2.6	—	10.6	11.3	35.0	22.4	18.1
Millet	12.4	6.8	6.2	21.6	20.6	16.9	15.5
Buckwheat	28.3	32.9	20.4	16.6	0.4	1.0	0.4

The figures in this table confirm in principle the data of the previous table and by combining the data from both tables it can be stated that:

Winter rye is most widespread in the forest belt of the forest and steppe and is not much cultivated in the steppe zone; it is also widely sown in the mountain regions. Therefore the saturation of the grain area under winter rye increases from South to North.

Winter wheat is sown very little in the forest belt or in the mountains but is cultivated in the forest and steppe zone (mostly West of the Dnieper) and chiefly, in the steppe zone. The area percentage under winter wheat increases southward and decreases eastward.

Spring wheat too is sown very little in the forest belt. Contrary to winter wheat, spring wheat is sown in larger quantities East of the Dnieper than in the forest and steppe zone to the West of the Dnieper. In the steppe it gives way to winter wheat. From the West to the East the percentage under spring wheat increases.

Barley is sown throughout the Ukraine but the sowing increases toward the South because barley tolerates better the high summer temperatures. As a result of the short vegetation period, barley is sown in considerable quantities in the mountains where it is used as a cereal. In the steppe barley replaces oats as the fodder crop. In the western Ukraine barley is used as raw material by the brewing industry and also for making groats.

Oats, unlike barley, is most widespread in the forest belt and the forest and steppe zones especially West of the Dnieper. The area percentage under oats decreases toward the South and East because oats are susceptible to drought and high summer temperatures. Oats cover a large percentage of the mountainous areas where it is used as a cereal.

Corn. The area under corn increases from North to South. *Millet*. The areas under millet increase from North to South and from West to East. *Buckwheat*, on the other hand, decreases from North to South and from West to East.

Rice is a new crop in the south of the steppe zone of the Ukraine. It is cultivated mostly in the drainage areas of the valleys of the Dnieper, Bug and Kuban rivers. In 1938 1,500 hectares of rice were sown in the Ukraine. Prof.

Makhiv¹⁷ considered the cultivation of rice had enormous possibilities in the southern Ukraine. He proposed to use the drainage areas of the Dnieper, Kuban, Don and Dniester rivers for the cultivation of rice.¹⁸

Less common crops cultivated in the Ukraine

Spring rye, in 1913¹⁹ 50.3 thousand hectares were sown with spring rye in the Ukraine. By 1933 this area had decreased to 0.5 thousand hectares²⁰ and in 1935 to 0.1 thousand hectares.²¹

Winter barley. 37 thousand hectares were sown with this crop in the Ukraine in 1922.²² In 1928²³ this area decreased to 0.6 thousand hectares and during 1932—1935 winter barley was not mentioned in statistical data.

Spelt (Triticum Spelta), was sown in small quantities in the Ukraine before the revolution. During 1905—1910 4.3 thousands hectares of spelt were sown.²⁴ After the revolution, spelt was no longer cultivated.

Sorghum is encountered in small quantities in the arid regions of the Ukrainian Steppe. In 1935²⁵ 42.8 thousand hectares of sorghum were sown but there is no mention in later statistical data of its cultivation.

Research and seed-breeding stations in the Ukraine and the main strains of grain crops

Experimental stations were set up in the Ukraine earlier than in Russia. The first permanent research establishment was the Poltava research station which opened in 1884.

Still earlier, in 1881, the Ivanov experimental unit, Kharkov province was established and in 1888 the Kherson and Derebchyn experimental centers were inaugurated. Certain organizations established their own research networks all of which worked according to a common program. The first of these was the Kharkov Agricultural Society, composed of 8 experimental fields, worked from 1881—1885. Also well-known was the "All-Russian Society of Sugar Producers" with 32 permanent research fields of which 24 were in the Ukraine. The program

¹⁷ H. Makhiv, *Perspektyvy ryzhosiannia v Ukraini* (The future of rice growing in the Ukraine), 1930, Kiev.

¹⁸ *Byuleten Ukrainskoho Tekhnichno-Hospodarskoho Instytutu* (Bulletin of the Ukrainian Technical Agricultural Institute), Kiev, Nos. XV—XVII, 1950, pp. 1—4.

¹⁹ *Ezhegodniki Glavnogo Upravlenia Zemleustroistva i Zemledenia po Departamentu Zemledenia* (Annals of the main administration for land exploitation and agriculture of the Department of Agriculture), Moscow, 1913.

²⁰ *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1936.

²¹ *Posevnye ploshchadi SSSR* (The Sowing areas of the USSR), Moscow, 1936.

²² *Ezhegodniki Glavnogo Upravlenia Zemleustroistva i Zemledenia po Departamentu Zemledenia*, Moscow, 1913.

²³ *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1936.

²⁴ N. Oganovsky, *Selskoe Khozyaistvo Rossii v XX veke*, Moscow, 1923.

²⁵ *Posevnye ploshchadi SSSR*, Moscow, 1936.

of this network included experiments with sugar beet, potatoes and grain crops.²⁶ Apart from this the provincial agricultural societies organized their own networks of experimental fields. Among them the best known were those of the Kiev and Podolia Provincial Agricultural Societies. Before World War I there were many research stations in the Ukraine including: Poltava, Kherson, Odessa, Sumy, Kharkov, Ivanov (in Khakov province), Nosiv and Novozybkov (Chernigov province), Nemerchanka and Plotyanka (Podolia province), Uman, Smela and Myronovka (Kiev province) and Novochartorysk (Volyn).²⁷

Later it became necessary to open stations having a wider scope of research possibilities. In 1913 three regional stations were opened namely one in Kiev province covering the Kiev, Volyn, Podolia and Chernigov provinces; one in Kharkov province covering the Kharkov, Poltava, Voronezh and Sursk provinces and one in Ekaterynosla (now Dnepropetrovsk) province covering the Ekaterynoslav, Kherson, Tavrya and southern parts of Kharkov and Poltava provinces.

Research on Ukrainian grain crops started long before World War I and was carried out by the research stations belonging to local government bodies where selection departments were set up, and on the private selection stations which belonged in the main to the owners of sugar concerns and large estates in the areas where sugar beet was grown.

At such stations, in addition to sugar beet, the selection of other plants which belonged to sugar beet crop rotation was carried out. Considerable work on the selection of both winter and spring wheat, winter rye, barley, oats, corn and millet was done before the revolution by those selection and research stations already mentioned.

In the western Ukraine there was also a large number of private research stations which mostly belonged to Polish landowners and where selection work on wheat was carried out. During the revolution most of the research and selection stations were closed and only after 1921 did their activities begin to expand slowly. In this respect, an important part was played by the Seed Selection Administration of the Sugar Trust.

From 1920 through 1934, considerable reorganization took place in research and selection in the Ukraine. A system of research establishments was worked out in 1934 and is still in operation. A research station is found in every oblast but its activities depend upon the oblast network of subsidiary establishments and experimental fields. (Full information on the research and selection stations and the types of grain developed, may be found in the *Ukrainsky Zbirnik*, Munich, No. 4, 1955.)

The natural climatic conditions of the regions in which crop selections are made, condition their properties. For instance, in the Kharkov province, in the eastern Ukraine where the winter is colder than in the West, cold resisting strains are selected. On the other hand the strain *Ukrainka*, which comes from the Kiev province, is far behind the first two in respect of its resistance to cold, but exceeds them in yield. Southern strains such as *Novokrymka* and *Kooperatorka* are more resistant to drought than to cold.

²⁶ *Trudy seti osvjetnemykh polei Vserossiiskogo Obshchestva Sakharozavodchikov* (Works of the network of trial fields of the All-Russian Society of Sugar Growers), Report XXXIII, Kiev, 1915.

²⁷ *Yuvileynna knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soyuzu z nahody 60-richchia 1894—1954* (The anniversary book of the Ukrainian National Union), Kiev, 1955, pp. 315—322.

These selection stations have cultivated quite a number of different strains of grain crops which are of great importance not only to the Ukraine, but also to contiguous regions and even foreign countries. For example Ukrainian settlers in the U. S. A. and Canada have reproduced Ukrainian strains which were acknowledged by the local population and used over a wide area. An interesting picture of the spread of Ukrainian wheat in the U. S. A. and Canada is given by H. Hordijenko. Ukrainian wheat served as a valuable basis for Canadian and American selectors such as C. Saunders and L. Waldron, who cultivated a number of excellent strains some of which are also being cultivated now in the Ukraine and many other areas of the USSR,

The percentage of assorted sowings in the Ukraine has gradually increased and is replacing local strains. For instance in 1933 and 1938 the percentage sowings of various crops in the Ukraine was as follows:^{28/29}

Crop:	1933	1938
Winter rye	4.3	38.7
Winter wheat	60.5	91.1
Spring wheat	34.0	92.7
Spring barley	14.7	87.1
Oats	9.4	89.5

While the area percentage under assorted sowings increased, non-assorted sowings of local seeds proportionately decreased. Nevertheless the local seeds are valuable basic material for selection because among local plants there are a large number of types well adapted to unfavorable meteorological conditions such as low temperatures, drought and so on of the various localities.

The attention of many research establishments was directed to the botanical study of cultivated flora. This study was carried out in two directions, toward the utilization of their research in cultivating new strains, or toward the botanical study of local plants.

Among the published works which apply to the Ukrainian SSR, the works of N. Kuleshev³⁰ and S. Vorobev³¹ should be noted. G. Dibold³² describes the geographical location of botanical varieties of wheat in the Ukraine and A. Ternychenko has studied the botanical composition of eared cereals, but limited his research to the Kiev oblast.³³ O. Arkhymovych, with the aid of the local Museum of Regional Studies, carried out work on the Belaya Tserkov region of Kiev province.³⁴ Even more restricted tasks were undertaken by D. Lytovkyn³⁵ and

²⁸ *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1936.

²⁹ *Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (Statistical Reference), Moscow-Leningrad, 1939.

³⁰ *Trudy po prykladnoi botanike i seleksii* (Works on applied botany and selection), Kiev, 1925, Vol. XVI, No. 1.

³¹ S. Vorobev, *Sorta glavneishikh polevykh rastenii na Ukraine* (Strains of main field plants in the Ukraine), Kharkov, 1923.

³² G. Dibold, *Ozimye pshenitsy Ukrainy* (Winter wheat in the Ukraine), Kharkov, 1925.

³³ A. Ternychenko, *Polovi kultury Kyivshchyny* (Field crops in the Kiev province), Kiev, 1926.

³⁴ *Trudy Bilotserkivskoho Krayeznavchoho tovarystva* (Works of Belaya Tserkov Society of Regional Studies), Vol. 4, 1928, pp. 101—112.

³⁵ *Trudy silskohospodarskoi botaniky* (Works on agricultural botany), Kiev, 1926, Vol. I, pp. 22—37.

A. Fejtsarenko, who studied the botanical and strain composition of local wheat in the Shevchenko region. These works are interesting because they note the correlations of the botanical norms of eared cereals which existed at that time in the Ukraine.

The selection of seed for the Ukrainian grain crops was carried out by two organizations, the Seed Sorting Office of the Sugar Trust in Kiev and the All-Ukrainian Society of Seed Growers with headquarters in Kharkov. The difference between these two organizations was that the former was state owned and the latter was a co-operative society. Moreover, the former in addition to seed work, carried out selection at its network of stations. The All-Ukrainian Society of Seed Growers did intensive work in the sphere of seed research and selection. Unfortunately most of those who did so much research on seeds in the Ukraine, perished in concentration camps. Among the many victims were H. Dibold, Director of the Society and Batyrenko organizer of the network for the comparative selection of grain and other crops.

The All-Ukrainian Society of Seed Growers in Kharkov organized two-year courses for the study of selection to which agriculturists were admitted after the completion of higher studies. Altogether three two-year courses were held. During these courses many specialists distinguished themselves by work in genetics and in the selection of agricultural plants.

The fertility of grain crops in the Ukraine

Winter wheat

During the period 1892—1915 the average yields in the Ukraine were distributed as follows:³⁶

Province	Centners per hectare	Province	Centners per hectare
Kiev	11.5	Kharkov	8.4
Volyn	9.7	Ekaterynoslav	6.1
Podolia	9.4	Tavrya	6.1
Poltava	9.3	Kherson	5.0
Chernigov	9.2		

Spring wheat

According to the average yield for the period 1895—1915 V. Talanova³⁷ divides the USSR in five zones. The forest and steppe, West of the Dnieper belong to the first zone (average yield—7-8 centners per hectare) and the semi-arid northern part of the steppe to the second zone (average yield—6-7 centners per hectare). According to the administrative division which existed until 1933 the following regions belonged to the second zone: Kryvoi Rog, Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk, Zinoviev, the northern part of Mariupol, Odessa, Mykholaev

³⁶ *Zbirnyk 10 (18), Sortovnycho-nasinnoi Upravy Soyuz tsukru* (Review 10 [18], of the Seed Sorting Bureau of the Union Sugar Organization), Kiev, 1930.

³⁷ *Rastenievodstvo SSSR* (Plant cultivation in the USSR), Vol. I, Moscow, 1933.

and Melitopol okrugs, the southern part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic, the eastern part of the Kremenchug region, the south-eastern part of the Poltava region and the hilly parts of the Donbas (Artemovsk, Stalino and Lugansk). To the third zone (average yield—5-8 centners per hectare) belong the eastern part of the Ukrainian steppe (Kupyansk and Starobilsk). The fourth zone (average yield—4-5 centners per hectare) includes the Ukrainian regions situated in the southern black soil belt, that is, the southern parts of Mariupol, Odessa and Mykholaev regions and most of the Melitopol and Kherson regions. The fifth zone (average yield—2¹/₂-4 centners per hectare) is situated outside the boundaries of the Ukraine.

Winter rye

According to the average yields, Antropov and Kuzmin³⁸ divide the USSR into seven groups.

Included in the first group (yields of 120% and more) are a number of regions of the Kiev province (Kiev, Berdichev, Belaya Tserkov, Uman, Shevchenko); Podolia province (Proskurev, Vinnitsa, Kamyanets, Mogilev and Tulchyn) and Poltava province (Romen, Pryluka, Lubni, Poltava and Kremenchug) and also the northern parts of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic.

In the second group (yields from 110% to 120%) are such regions of Kharkov province as Sumy, Kharkov, Kupyansk, Izyum and Starobilsk.

In the third group (yields of from 100% to 110%) are certain regions in the Volyn province; Korosten, Shepetivka and Volyn.

The fourth group (yields of from 90% to 100%) is in areas outside the boundaries of the Ukraine.

The fifth group (yields of from 80% to 90%) includes the regions of the Chernigov province (Chernigov, Nizhyn, Konotop and Glukhiv) and certain south-eastern regions: Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Artemovsk, Lugansk, Stalino, Pavlograd and Mariupol.

Lastly, to the sixth group (yields of from 70% to 80%) belong certain regions of the Ekaterynoslav and Kherson provinces: Melitopol, part of Zaporozhe, Kherson, Odessa, Pershotravneve, Mykholaev, Kryvoi Rog, Zinoviev and the southern part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic.

Oats

The average yield of oats in the period 1895—1915 for the whole of the Ukraine was 8.3 centners per hectare.³⁹

Buckwheat

The average yield of buckwheat in the Ukraine during the period 1895—1915 was 5 centners per hectare. There were particularly high yields in the Kiev province (6.7 centners per hectare) and in Poltava province (6.1 centners per hectare).⁴⁰

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

The average yield for the period 1905—1914 in centners per hectare was:⁴¹

Region	Yield
Polesie	7.8
Forest and Steppe West of the Dnieper . . .	11.6
Forest and Steppe East of the Dnieper . . .	13.6
Steppe Zone	10.0

Such details on average yields in the separate oblasts and raions of the Ukraine do not exist under the Soviet régime. Official Soviet sources only give average data for the whole Ukrainian SSR and then only for certain years.

For example, there are data for certain crops⁴² beginning with the period 1925—1930, and for all grain crops in the book "The agriculture of the USSR"⁴³ for the period from 1928 to 1934. If these data are compared with N. Jasny's amendments for 1933 and 1934,⁴⁴ the following table of yields in centners per hectares may be compiled:

Year	Winter rye	Winter wheat	Spring wheat	Barley	Oats	Corn	Millet	Buckwheat
1925	—	—	—	8.7	9.7	—	9.4	7.2
1926	—	—	—	6.8	8.3	—	8.7	5.8
1927	—	11.0	6.9	7.1	9.2	—	10.9	7.1
1928	8.0	8.7	6.2	6.9	9.7	5.2	4.5	5.7
1929	9.3	10.2	8.1	10.2	10.7	8.6	8.4	6.7
1930	11.8	12.2	7.6	11.0	11.9	8.0	7.5	7.5
1931	8.7	9.8	5.2	8.2	7.5	13.6	9.0	6.1
1932	8.0	8.5	5.7	8.3	7.6	9.1	8.1	5.9
1933	7.8	10.0	7.8	10.3	8.4	9.2	4.6	3.6
1934	5.5	5.1	4.7	5.4	6.1	5.5	3.5	3.7
Average	8.4	9.4	6.5	8.3	8.9	8.5	7.5	5.9

The yields from grain crops differ considerably during a given period. For example, 1934 was a poor year for all grain crops with the exception of corn. Conversely, 1929, 1930 and 1931 gave high yields. The Ukrainian SSR has higher yields of grain crops than the other Soviet republics. For comparison the following table gives the average yields in centners per hectare for the separate grain crops in 1928—1934 in the Ukraine and the USSR.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1936.

⁴⁴ N. Jasny, "The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR," Stanford University Press, 1949.

Crop	Average yield UkSSR	Average yield USSR	Republic with highest yield	Size of highest average yield
	(centners per hectare)			(centners per hectare)
Winter rye	8.4	8.0	Ukr. SSR	8.4
Winter wheat	9.3	8.5	Ukr. SSR	9.3
Spring wheat	6.5	6.1	Turkmen	9.4
Barley	8.3	7.9	Turkmen	9.4
Oats	8.9	8.3	Kirghiz	9.7
Corn	8.5	9.0	Turkmen	18.3
Millet	7.5	5.6	Kirghiz	9.0
Buck-wheat	5.9	5.2	Ukr. SSR	5.9

It is apparent from the table that the average yields of all grain crops except corn, are higher in the Ukraine than in the rest of the USSR.

The total grain harvest in the Ukrainian SSR

The total grain harvest in individual crops is given in the following table for the period 1928—1934.⁴⁵

Crop	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
Winter rye	28647.3	40522.9	64487.0	43913.3	30936.7	35742.0	20414.7
Winter wheat	13934.9	15668.0	47094.0	52313.9	49089.8	54356.7	25751.6
Spring wheat	19487.4	25771.2	24621.0	12263.2	6597.0	9564.6	6998.6
Spring barley	25497.6	40820.6	35475.0	24591.8	20765.4	26075.2	17160.7
Oats	21712.2	27162.3	36953.7	14127.3	11869.0	15152.1	11534.5
Corn	12311.9	13637.0	13374.0	22890.0	12602.9	14357.9	7501.5
Millet	7108.6	12572.1	4169.5	4188.0	6972.0	5688.6	6564.5
Buckwheat	5727.5	6441.9	4525.1	3838.1	1995.1	2382.6	2342.9

It should be remembered that during the years 1927/1928 and 1928/1929, winter wheat in the Ukraine was destroyed by extreme frost.

Total grain harvest in the Ukraine 1928—1934

as percentage of the total harvest in the USSR

Year	Winter rye	Winter wheat	Spring wheat	Spring barley	Oats	Corn	Millet	Buck-wheat
1928	15.2	29.1	11.3	47.8	13.2	37.4	23.5	35.2
1929	20.3	30.2	18.8	59.5	17.3	45.2	40.4	42.6
1930	27.7	47.0	14.5	55.3	16.2	50.2	13.1	35.2
1931	20.3	51.0	12.0	50.9	12.9	48.3	13.8	40.4
1932	14.2	56.0	5.7	43.3	10.5	36.8	16.1	21.6
1933	18.9	61.0	7.8	46.3	12.9	39.4	15.5	28.1
1934	12.4	36.2	3.9	32.0	7.4	23.5	19.0	25.2

⁴⁵ *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1936.

This table shows that the Ukrainian SSR until 1939 was producing on an average about 45% of winter wheat in relation to the USSR and in certain years up to 60%; it produced 40% of the corn and in some years 50%. The amount of buckwheat produced was at certain periods up to 4%. The production of winter rye and millet (18.4% and 20.2% respectively), is proportionately distributed over the sown areas of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR. The Ukrainian SSR produces considerably less oats and spring wheat because the southern Ukraine is not a suitable region for the cultivation of oats, and the center of spring wheat cultivation has been transferred since the revolution to the eastern regions of the USSR.

The Food Situation in the USSR

N. VORONCHUK

It is difficult to evaluate accurately, how the Soviet population is fed owing to the fact that Soviet statistics always take great pains to conceal the true state of affairs. Apart from personal observation, this article utilizes data relating to the production of foodstuffs, published by official Soviet sources, studies made by students of Soviet affairs in the free world on the production of these foodstuffs and reports published in the Soviet press as well as the selective questioning of Soviet emigrés on their food budgets.

Deliveries of foodstuffs to the population are conditioned partly by varying supplies and partly by the fact that food consumption differs among different groups of the population in various localities. Deliveries to the municipal population are very different from those to the rural areas and, paradoxically, the rural population is fed a great deal worse. The state takes from the peasant practically all he cultivates, leaving him with the minimum amount of food. It suffices to study the Soviet press for a number of years to see that these "norms" of food which are left by the state to the kolkhoznik in the form of payment for a working day, are lower than his bare requirements. As a rule for a working day in an ordinary kolkhoz the peasant is paid at the rate of 100 to 1,000 grams of grain and only in leading kolkhozes is the remuneration for a working day from 3 to 5 kilograms.¹ If it is remembered that only certain members of a kolkhoz family work and receive payment, it becomes clear that most peasant families suffer a permanent shortage of grain.

The position with regard to supplies of meat, fats and sugar to the rural population is even worse and these products are inaccessible to the ordinary kolkhoznik for long periods. The diet of a kolkhoz family is usually supplemented by potatoes and vegetables. Insufficient food and periodic hunger lead to decreased resistance of the organism, a considerably increased infantile mortality rate and low labor efficiency.²

Party officials and technical personnel among the rural population are better supplied with food. They receive their wages, not in kind, but in cash, and have priority of food supplies.

The municipal population is also categorized as regards food distribution. Such large cities as Moscow and Leningrad and industrial centers are especially

¹ *Vestnik*, Munich, 1952, Institute for the Study of the USSR, No. 2, p. 55.

² *Ibid.*

privileged. For instance, in Moscow there are almost no irregularities in the supply of bread, meat sugar and fats. The provincial towns, especially in the national republics, have always suffered from irregular supplies of sugar, meat and quite often of bread, flour and groats. Deliveries in these localities depend on artificially established restrictions on a political basis for separate categories of the population. Some of these restrictions include the introduction of the ration card system and rationing by registering limited categories of persons with certain supply sources which thus excludes the possibility of unrestricted sale of bread to other groups, including of course, peasants. Even industrial centers of equivalent importance have different food supplies. In Kiev in the 1930's and after World War II, bread could only be obtained in limited quantities after waiting for a long time in queues; meat, sugar and fats appeared only sporadically in the stores. In Chernigov, Poltava, Zhitomir and other oblast centers these products were obtainable only by those registered with the stores and even then supplies were infrequent. Deliveries to the population in smaller Ukrainian towns were even worse and have improved very little in recent years, although it should be noted that in general, sanatoria, hospitals and childrens' establishments are well supplied. For instance, A. Mikoyan, Minister of Trade of the USSR, said at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1954: "In the stores and in communal feeding establishments of certain towns there are queues and the population is justly complaining."³ One of the delegates to the conference of the consumers' co-operative of the Lithuanian SSR made an even more interesting and pointed remark: "We receive more circulars on the distribution of goods than the goods themselves."⁴

As a result, the population of towns and villages in the Ukraine go beyond the boundaries of their country to buy food. Owing to the absurd centralized state purchases and unequal distribution of foodstuffs, it is possible to see a permanent absence of this or that food in towns throughout the USSR. These two factors are also responsible for large amounts of goods such as vegetables, fish and so on, deteriorating or perishing completely.

In most countries the consumer can buy whatever type of food he requires. In the USSR it has always been easier to buy the more expensive foods such as caviare, chocolates and expensive varieties of salami rather than meat, bread, sugar and fats. Although the wages of laborers or minor civil servants have it seems, continually increased, the purchasing power of the population has persistently decreased. For example, while in 1913 the food budget was 10,01 roubles, in 1938 it was 245,28 roubles,⁵ while nominal wages increased only ten times during that period. Real wages in 1951, if expressed in terms of the value of the principle foodstuffs, decreased by 22% compared with 1938. It is interesting that food prices in the USSR were always very high compared with those in pre-revolutionary Russia and have risen constantly ever since. For instance, in 1951 the average earnings of manual and office workers increased by 49% compared with 1938, but the price of sugar increased by 222%, of bread by 100%, buck-wheat by 110% and of salt by 860%.⁶

³ *Pravda*, April 27, 1954.

⁴ *Sovetskaya Litva* (Soviet Lithuania), Vilna, May 26, 1954.

⁵ I. Majstrenko, *Srizovy Protsezi v Sovetskij Ekonomtyisy* (Crucial periods in the Soviet economy), Munich, 1955, Institute for the Study of the USSR, p. 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 28—29.

The Soviet population devotes a large proportion of its earnings to purchasing food, because of its high cost.⁷ The percentage of the individual budget allotted to food purchases increases from year to year.⁸ N. Orekhovych points out that in the Soviet goods turnover in 1928, foodstuffs composed 46,4% and in 1938, 59,3%.⁹ I. Korzhenevskij notes that in 1953 the sale of foodstuffs within the turnover of the state and co-operative trade of the Ukrainian SSR, totaled 49%.¹⁰ It may therefore be asserted that first, the prices of foodstuffs continually increased, and second, that even according to Soviet data, about 50% of all spending by the population went on the buying of food. It should be remembered that a considerable quantity of food is purchased on the kolkhoz markets as well as on the black market. For example V. Sokolov and R. Nazarov report that in 1950 the turnover of the kolkhoz market trade amounted to 12% of the whole retail turnover including that of the state and cooperative trade.¹¹ That a much larger percentage of the individual budget is spent on food is shown by the fact that the average manual or office worker allots 70%—80% of his budget for this purpose.¹² During the period 1913—1953 the grain harvest in the USSR may be indicated as follows:

Year	Grain Harvest (Million centners)	Year	Grain Harvest (Million centners)
1913	= 801	1938	= 759
1921	= 422,9	1940	= 951.4
1924	= 514	1945	= 536
1926	= 783.4	1948	= 920
1928	= 733.2	1951	= 970
1930	= 835.4	1952	= 1000 ¹³
1935	= 771		

During that time the population increased until by 1953 it had reached approximately 215 millions. Thus only after 1930 did the total grain harvest occasionally surpass the 1913 level. By 1930 the Soviet population had increased from 137,402,000 to 157,151,000.¹⁴ In other words the net grain harvest per capita of the Soviet population has continued to decrease since 1913. This continual decrease has been noted by other authors. According to the calculations of Professors S. Prokopovych and V. Mertsalov, the net grain harvest per capita

⁷ According to data compiled by V. Sokolov and R. Nazarov ("Post-War Soviet Trade," Moscow, 1954), the share of food in state and cooperative business was only 59%. M. Makarov ("Soviet Trade and Public Maintenance," Moscow, 1945) states, that in 1953 the share of food was 54.7% of the turnover, excluding the kolkhoz trade.

⁸ Naum Jasny, "The Soviet Economy during the Plan Era," Stanford U. P., Stanford, Calif., 1951.

⁹ *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Problems of Economics), No. 8, 1953.

¹⁰ *Sovetskaya Torgovlia* (Soviet Trade), Moscow, No. 5, 1954.

¹¹ V. Sokolov and R. Nazarov, *Sovetskaya Torgovlia v Poslevoenny Period* (Post-war Soviet trade), Moscow, 1954.

¹² According to calculations based on information obtained from different categories of emigrés who had formerly been Soviet manual or office workers.

¹³ Prof. A. Arkhymovych, *Zernovye Kultury SSSR* (Cultivation of grain in the USSR), Munich, 1954, Institute for the Study of the USSR, p. 84.

¹⁴ *Vestnik*, Munich, No. 1 (14), 1955, p. 19.

in 1913 was 4.9 centners, in 1928—4.0 centners, in 1931—3.4 centners, in 1940—4.0 centners, in 1950—4.3 centners, in 1953—4.0 centners and in 1954—3.9 centners.^{15/16/17}

The position was even worse, as regards the supply of cattle, sheep, goats and pigs. In 1916 there were 58.4 million head of cattle in the whole country; of these there were 28.8 million cows: In 1928 there were 66.8 million cattle (33.2 million cows): In 1941—54.5 million cattle (27.8 million cows) and in 1953—56.2 million cattle (24.3 million cows). The number of sheep and goats in 1916 was 96.3 million, in 1928—114.6 million, in 1941—91.6 million, in 1950—99 million, and in 1953—109.9 million. The number of pigs in 1916 was 23 million, in 1928—27.7 million and in 1950—24.1 million.¹⁸ The resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in September 1953 stated that in 1952 alone: "The general number of cattle in the whole country was reduced by 2.2 million head."¹⁹ Due to limitations in the amount of grain per capita, the number of cattle, sheep, goats and pigs decreased as well as supplies of bread, meat, milk, milk products and fats.²⁰ Even more interesting data can be obtained if reports are analyzed on the production of foodstuffs in the USSR.

A. Poplyuko and V. Marchenko, on the basis of data from the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR, give the following information on the production of foodstuffs during the period 1940—1953: Production of meat in kilograms in 1940—1,170 millions, in 1950—1,253 millions, in 1951—1,400 millions, in 1952—1,620 millions, in 1953—1,800 millions, and in 1954—1,990 millions. Cured meats in kilograms are as follows: In 1940—373 millions, in 1950—483 millions, in 1951—565 millions, in 1953—655 millions, in 1954—730 millions.

Details of other foodstuffs in kilograms are: Fish: In 1940—1,400 millions, in 1950—1,750 millions, in 1951—2,130 millions, in 1953—2,200 millions, in 1954—2,500 millions. Animal fats: In 1940—207,200,000, in 1950—319 millions, in 1951—338 millions, in 1952—350 millions, in 1953—364 millions, in 1954—370 millions. Vegetable fats: In 1940—724 millions, in 1950—780 millions, in 1951—875 millions, in 1952—940 millions, in 1953—1,040 millions, in 1954—1,220 millions. Sugar: In 1940—2,120 millions, in 1950—2,530 millions, in 1951—2,980 millions, in 1952—3,030 millions, in 1953—3,440 millions, in 1954—3,440 millions. Dairy products: In 1950—1,150 millions, in 1951—1,650 millions, in 1952—1,790 millions, in 1953—1,900 millions, in 1954—2,140 millions.²¹

¹⁵ Prof. A. Arkhymovych, *Zernovye Kultury SSSR*, Munich, 1954, p. 84.

¹⁶ S. N. Prokopovych, *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR* (The national economy of the USSR), New York, 1952.

¹⁷ V. Mertsalov, *Politika Krutoyo Podema i Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR* (The Policy of the steep rise and Soviet agriculture), Munich, 1955, p. 29.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁹ N. S. Khrushchev, *O Merakh Dalneishego Razvitiia Selskogo Khozyaistva SSSR* (Measures Leading to a Further Development of Agriculture in the USSR), Address delivered at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Party on September 3, 1953.

²⁰ *Vestnik*, Munich, No. 1 (14), 1955, p. 19.

²¹ A. Poplyuko, "The realization of the plan for a 'Steep Rise' in consumer goods." Address delivered at the V. Conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1955, p. 187.

Average supplies of staple foodstuffs per capita in the USSR²²

Product	1940	1950	1953	1954
	In kilograms			
Flour	102.0*	99.0	93.3	93.2
Potatoes	147.0**	—	96.0	135.0
Meat	6.3	6.2	8.6	9.4
Cured meats	2.0	2.4	3.1	3.5
Fish	7.2	8.6	10.0	11.2
Animal fats	1.1	1.6	1.7	1.75
Vegetable fats	3.9	3.9	5.0	5.7
Sugar	11.0	12.5	16.0	16.0
Dairy products	—	5.7	9.1	10.1

* Calculations concerning supplies of flour in 1940, 1953 and 1954 were made on the assumption that in those years the same percentage of flour from the total grain harvest was released for consumption as in 1950.

** Calculations on supplies of potatoes were made on the basis of data on the total potato harvest in 1940 and 1952 as given by S. Kabysh,²³ and for 1954 according to data supplied by A. Popluyko. In all cases it was accepted that 30% of the harvested potatoes were used to feed the population.

Popluyko also gives approximately the same annual norms of consumption per capita of the population.²⁴ He says, on the basis of his calculations, that these were in 1954: White and brown bread—118 kg, potatoes and vegetables—256 kg, meat and meat products—22 kg, fish and fish products—22 kg, milk and milk products—105 kg, 67 eggs, sugar—17 kg, and fats—7 kg.²⁵

For the average worker the daily food requirement is about 3,500 calories. For the manual worker it is 4,500 calories, but for a person who is relatively inactive the number of calories can be reduced to 2,000—2,500 calories. Fats contain the highest number of calories and fruit and vegetables the lowest. The following table is supplied for general reference:

²² Table illustrating data, given by A. Popluyko (footnote 21) and V. Marchenko in *Vestnik*, Munich, No. 1 (14), 1955, p. 19.

²³ S. Kabysh, *Kartofel i ogorodnichestvo* (Potatoes and market gardening), Address delivered at the V. Conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1955, p. 91.

²⁴ A. Popluyko, "The realization of the plan for a 'Steep Rise' in consumer goods." Address delivered at the V Conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1955, p. 197.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

The calorific value of the most important food products²⁶

Product	Protein	Fat	1 kg contains		
			Carbo- hydrates	Calories	Vitamins
		grams			
Meat	199	78	4.0	1560	B
Sausage	100	100	200	2200	B
Eggs	6.3	4.9	0.3	72	ABDE
Fish	164	18	4	840	B
Vegetables	25	2.0	59	360	ABCE
Flour	110	19	731	3190	B
Animal fat	0	810	4	7160	A
Vegetable fat	0	994	0.2	9250	AC
Sugar	0	0	960	3840	0
Potatoes	20	1	195	850	ABC
Milk	33.9	48	49.4	690	ABCDE

Note: Calorific values are calculated according to: *Wissenschaftliche Tabellen*, J. R. Geigy, Zürich, 1953.

On the strength of previous calculations on average consumption in the USSR, the calorific value and quality of a typical Soviet citizen's food ration may be shown as follows:

Product	Annual Norm (in kg)	Calories (per kg)
Flour	100	3190
Potatoes	135	850
Fruit	50	590
Vegetables	150	360
Cured meats	3.5	2200
Meat	10	1560
Fish	11	840
Sugar	16	3840
Animal fats	1.75	7160
Vegetable fats	5.7	9250
Milk	100	690
Eggs	67	72

Together this amounts to 750,309 calories per annum or 2056 calories per day.

Note: Everywhere average indices have been taken of the varieties of meat, fish, vegetables and fruit used in the USSR. All indices are for good quality products and not for perished or semi-deteriorated goods such as are sometimes supplied in the USSR.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

Annual food consumption per capita in the main countries of the world²⁷

Kilograms

	Flour	Potatoes	Sugar	Meat	Milk	Fats	Calorific value of daily ration
USSR	100	135	16	10	100	7.5	2056
Australia . . .	99	45	55	110	190	16	3280
Argentina . . .	124	87	35	114	165	16	3190
England	100	110	34	49	219	22	3100
Holland	101	141	36	32	205	26	3090
Denmark	98	150	38	56	204	21	3130
Italy	151	33	12	15	96	11	2400
Canada	78	115	48	70	237	20	3240
Germany	101	187	27	37	155	21	2810
USA	77	45	42	75	253	20	3210
France	118	125	27	56	156	13	2790
Sweden	92	116	46	51	315	21	3240
Switzerland . .	118	84	38	46	323	15	3250

First, it should be noted that the basic annual norm of 750,309 calories, accepted by A. Popluyko (2,056 calories daily, per capita), is not only far from the norm for men engaged in heavy physical work, but even from that necessary for a person undertaking light work.

Another factor in the annual food ration of the typical Soviet citizen is the preponderance of low calory food products with an enormous amount of waste, that is, vegetables, fruit, potatoes, plus a very small proportion of fat, meat, eggs, and other high value foods. Meat, fish, cured meats, sugar, fats, eggs and milk compose only 233,059 calories, that is about 35% of the whole calorific value of the ration.



It is clear that the calorific value of the daily ration of the Soviet citizen is behind that of the other countries indicated in the previous table; the ration of fats is more than three times smaller than in Argentina, Denmark, Holland, Sweden and Germany; it is also considerably smaller than in Canada, the USA, Australia and Switzerland. The meat ration is five times less than in England, Sweden, Denmark and France and eleven times smaller than in Australia and Argentina. The sugar ration is between two and three times smaller than the normal consumption.

Thus, in respect of food products with the highest calorific value, the USSR is not only last among other countries, but in addition, the supply of basic food-stuffs in the USSR is lower than the lowest norms.

These particular foods have been dealt with in detail first, because they are of great importance in feeding the population, and second, because while supplies of bread, potatoes, milk, vegetables and fruit are available in the USSR outside

²⁷ Data on the consumption of foodstuffs in the principle countries of the world except the USSR are quoted from "Statistical Yearbook," 1952, United Nations, New York. Data on the USSR are based on the author's own calculations.

the official system, the illegal purchasing of sugar, meat and fats is extremely difficult.

It is easy to establish that on an average a person in the USSR, even in normal years, receives, according to the planned order of distribution, about 270 grams of flour or groats, 370 grams of potatoes, 45 of sugar, 27 grams of meat and 20 grams of fats daily. However as was pointed out earlier, the planned supplies of food in the USSR vary according to the socially differentiated groups of the population.²⁸

The rural population has practically never received any planned supplies except those products given as payment for working days. In the village shops there is almost never any sugar, flour, groats or cardy, not to mention meat or meat products. The town population is always very irregularly supplied with the exception of capital cities. Normal supplies are limited to Moscow or Leningrad and other large cities.

Naturally these latter groups receive under the plan, not an average, but a much higher daily ration. For instance, in sanatoria, and rest homes for the privileged strata of the population on the southern shores of the Crimea and the Caucasus, the daily ration reaches 5,000 calories; this is two and a half times higher than the average. Party functionaries, NKVD officials, workers in the trade network (the latter are in a position to help themselves), technical workers, scientists, doctors and so on also receive a much higher than average ration.

For example, the average daily ration of a technical worker in normal years in Kiev is composed of white and brown bread, groats and bakery products to the value of 400 grams, potatoes—500 grams, fruit—200 grams, vegetables—500 grams, fats—from 50 to 60 grams, sugar and sugar products—150 grams, meat, fish, meat and fish products—from 150 to 200 grams, milk—500 grams and two eggs, in all an average of about 4,000 calories per day and therefore twice above the average norm.²⁹

Industrial workers, rank and file officials and the intelligentsia receive smaller amounts of food but their ration is, generally, about 3,000 calories. The provincial town population is far worse supplied than that of the capital cities and industrial centers, but even so they are better off than the rural population. Incidentally, the supply norms to the armed forces are rather high.

These supplies come from the deliberate under-supplying of other categories of the population carried out in order to increase deliveries to millions of Party members, high officials and other privileged persons.

Taking into account the fact that the number of officials and industrial workers in the USSR has reached 48 millions in recent years and that their norm is 3,000 calories a day, it can be assumed that the rest of the population receives, not 2,000 calories, but only 1,500 to 1,700 a day; thus their food ration is probably lower than any acceptable norm.³⁰

A person cannot live satisfactorily on 1,500—1,700 calories a day. Such chronic undernourishment of millions of the rural and underprivileged town population would certainly lead to their complete extinction. Fortunately, apart

²⁸ See table on "Average supplies of staple foodstuffs per capita in the USSR."

²⁹ On the basis of information obtained from former Soviet manual and office workers who escaped to the West.

³⁰ *Pravda*, January 30, 1956.

from the planned allocation of food, there is in the USSR an unofficial supply system which, from the point of view of the Soviet government, is illegal. There is a continuous struggle between the Soviet government and the population for these unofficial supplies. Heavy punishments are imposed for wrongly established harvest norms by kolkhoz commissions;³¹ there is much petty stealing of food from booths as well as systematic and organized stealing from stores, of which there are unceasing reports in the Soviet press. Everything indicates a permanent struggle for basic foodstuffs between the population and the state with its specific legal system,³² not simply for unofficial consumption, but in fact, for existence.

The methods of obtaining this unofficial supply of food are varied. Among them are methods which are tolerated by the Soviet authorities such as supplies from the individual gardens of kolkhozniks or from the allotments of the workers and officials in the towns.

There are methods which are severely persecuted by the Soviet authorities such as the systematic concealing of the true amount of harvest by the main kolkhoz administration, the unlawful allocation of food products to separate groups of kolkhozniks, the illegal exchange of goods between the kolkhoz administration and industrial enterprises, illegal gratuities for individual workers and kolkhozniks in the form of food, increased payment for a working day and the false inclusion of working days.

To achieve a more or less normal amount of food, most of the Soviet population depends to a great extent on the effectiveness of these methods.

During the acute struggle between authorities to stop the unlawful supplies of food, and attempts by private individuals to obtain them, there have been cases of partial, or even mass famine. For example this occurred in the period of war Communism, during the process of collectivization and when private allotments were forbidden or when methods of combating illegal supplies were intensified.

When a heightened struggle against private initiative, the introduction of stricter methods in the socialist economy and especially in socialist purchases of foodstuffs, brought about famine, the authorities were forced to relax pressure on the population. They permitted the peasant to have an individual garden and a cow; they increased the payment for a working day, allowed supplies of hay and straw and introduced free trade in foodstuffs in one form or another. In addition to this the authorities allowed the so-called kolkhoz markets to function. The punishments for making illegal supplies to the towns were lightened and thus, to a certain extent, the administration recognized its inability to supply the population with food according to plan. It is not possible to evaluate the size of this unofficial supply. There is no doubt that the amount of foodstuffs received by the Soviet population in this way is quite considerable.

Top-level Party circles have been discussing the need for a decisive improvement in the food supply from the very first years of the regime. The pro-

³¹ Special kolkhoz committees make rough estimates of yields to be expected, judging by the appearance of the green corn. This method leads to systematic exploitation of the village: the estimates are kept very high, and the result is increased quotas for deliveries to the state and higher MTS payments.

³² For instance, the well-known law of August 7, 1932.

mise to give bread to the people was one of the measures which greatly strengthened the Bolsheviks in 1917. Lenin spoke of the struggle for bread in the years of war Communism. In order to relax feeding problems, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced. Stalin introduced collectivization by promising to solve the food problem. The terrible results of collectivization at one time forced the Soviet leaders to slacken its rate. In the 1930's Stalin inaugurated the task of gathering a harvest of seven billion poods (one pood = 36 lbs) of grain, apparently thinking that such a harvest would solve the food problem in the USSR.

Malenkov, at the V session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in August 1953, stated for the first time, that the amount of food supplied to the population was unsatisfactory and that the state of production and supply was catastrophic. He stated: "The urgent task is to increase supplies to the population of food and industrial goods during the next two to three years." (*Izvestia*, August 9, 1953).

Khrushchev at the September plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1953 said: "The retarded expansion of a number of the most important branches of agriculture is delaying the further development of the light and food industries."³³ At the same plenum, he declared: "The task to be imposed is the achievement of a level of consumption of consumer goods³⁴ which is necessary for the all-round and harmonious development of a healthy man."

It has already been stated that such a norm scientifically proved would be about 3,500 calories a day. Therefore in order to supply the population of the USSR with the scientifically required norms of feeding, the production of food would have to be increased nearly twofold. It was seen, however, from the second table in this article that during the period 1940—1954 the supply of flour even tended to decrease, that the supplies of potatoes vary from year to year and have a tendency to decrease, that supplies of meat have decreased by 50% in 14 years and that supplies of fats and sugar have increased only slightly. Because such a high rate of increase in planned supplies would be necessitated the problem of the scientifically defined feeding of the Soviet population will probably never be solved.

³³ *Pravda*, No. 15, September 1953.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

The Soviet Economic and Social Order

M. VASYLYIV

I Origins

The Soviets often present the Russian October revolution as an unavoidable result of the development of capitalism. It is necessary for them to do so in order to evoke among the population a conviction that the revolution occurred in accordance with the established laws of historic processes and also in order to strengthen in the eyes of the world the authority of Marx, the spiritual father of present day Communism. Marx's authority was badly shaken at the end of the last century by the critical blows of the revisionists (Bernstein¹ and others) who showed that the schemes of social development described by Marx did not correspond to reality and that modern nations developed differently.

According to Marx,² the socialist revolution should come about as a result of the immanent laws of the capitalist methods of production. These lie in the fact that due to the creation of additional values by the workers and the appropriation of these values by the capitalists, the social power of the upper classes increases, while that of the workers deteriorates. As a result of the process of accumulating capital, the whole economic and political power is concentrated increasingly in the hands of a small group of financial oligarchs who govern the entire national wealth and keep the workers in extreme poverty. When the development of the productive forces of the community reaches a higher level a larger proportion of the population will be reduced to a proletariat state and will, when united against the capitalist methods of production, refuse to accept this humiliation any longer. Then, according to Marx, the final hour of the capitalist system will be at hand. The socialist revolution will destroy the capitalist régime and a new epoch of socialism will arise.³

Thus the socialist revolution in Marx's view, should take place first of all in the countries where capitalism is most rabid and where the economic way of life of the old régime will create prerequisites for the new social order. It is quite clear that such a conception of the socialist revolution can hardly explain the fact that it took place in Russia; nor can it be presented as an example of Marx's deep and unsurpassed understanding of the laws of social development.

¹ E. Bernstein, *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*, Berlin, 1899; *Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Sozialismus*, Berlin, 1901.

² K. Marx, *Das Manifest der Kommunisten*, London, 1848; *Das Kapital*, London, 1867.

³ *Ibid.*, The last chapter of *Das Kapital*, Vol. I.

It was precisely Russia whose economic development lagged behind that of other more advanced European nations. Tsarist Russia with its semi-feudal attitude to agricultural husbandry, with a comparatively small industry, underdeveloped railways (as a result of which large territories were left economically, undeveloped) and with its semi-literate population, could not be the "experimental area of the socialist revolution" proclaimed by Marx and Engels as early as 1848 in "The Communist Manifesto" for which Marx tried in *Das Kapital* to give theoretical and logical foundations.

This contradiction between the theoretical principles of scientific socialism and Russian historical reality was so striking that Soviet theoreticians were compelled to find some kind of explanation for it. This is why Lenin's thesis on the "break-through of the Imperialist front in the weakest sector" was elaborated in great detail. According to this thesis it was not necessary for the socialist revolution to begin in countries where capitalism was most developed. On the contrary, it could happen where the social organization of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, was weak because of the poor development of production forces and where therefore the working class could seize power and establish its own dictatorship.

Naturally such an understanding of the potentiality of the socialist revolution was quite different from Marx's theory "on the origin, development and destruction of the capitalist system" and was a clumsy attempt to reconcile the usurpation of political power by the Bolsheviks in October 1917 with the fundamental principles of Marxism.

In fact the October revolution in Russia had two determinants: First, the historical development of Russia in general, and second the specific conditions brought about by World War I.

Semi-feudal agrarian conditions, the lack of economic and social privileges such as the West European working classes had enjoyed for a long time, the backward and archaic tsarist régime with its whole arsenal of political and national oppression, the Maximalist frame of mind of the Russian intelligentsia—these were the conditions which drove Russia inevitably toward political upheaval. The defeats suffered by the tsarist army, the unsuccessful war, the lack of the barest necessities—these were the secondary causes which led to the revolution.

The leaders of the new Russia were not capable of understanding these events or of taking the necessary steps to deal with the situation. The Bolsheviks took advantage of this; using the most radical slogans and playing on the lowest instincts of the masses they brought about the complete collapse of authority, of the administration and the army and in October 1917, assumed control with an armed *coup d'état*.⁴

The Bolsheviks, when they had taken over, were confronted by millions of peasants to whom they had given the land, the heavy industry disorganized by war (which occupied incidentally a comparatively insignificant place in the national economy) and a large number of small industrial enterprises. This picture was entirely different from that painted by the socialist theoreticians. The Bolsheviks realized this but did not dare, in the period following the

⁴ P. Miljukov, *History of the Second Russian Revolution*, Moscow, 1921—1923: *Russian's Catastrophe*, Moscow, 1922.

revolution, undertake a fundamental change of conditions in the country. However, gradually they managed to build up a considerable force designed for the suppression of all possible resistance and in the late 1920's started to lay the foundation of the socialist economy. However the material and social conditions which already existed in the country could on no account serve as the basis of the socialist order which, according to Marx and other writers, still had to ripen in the capitalist economy and could only be completed during the period of dictatorship by the proletariat.

Thus when the Bolsheviks had to solve the dilemma of supplying the proclaimed socialist order with something concrete, they had to disrupt those conditions which existed after the revolution which took the form of a small scale economy, and start building the socialist economy (in the first place heavy industry), and the socialist community "from above" with the aid of the state and administrative machinery.

The fact that the new conditions established on the territory of the former Russian empire were a result of coercion by the state administration, is one of the most important factors in evaluating the nature of the Soviet economy and also those events which took place in the 1930's and 1940's such as collectivization, industrialization, purges in the Party and administration etc.

The compulsory introduction of the socialist order especially disrupted the agricultural system which had been fixed throughout the ages and which even later, despite the revolution and the nationalization of the land, continued to be based on the principle of the private ownership of land and also helped to ruin the prosperity of the masses. Naturally the masses resisted and this led to constant friction between the Bolshevik administration and the population and resulted in the death of many persons, particularly during collectivization.

Formally, from the viewpoint of socialist ideologists the socialist order exists in Soviet Russia because private property has ceased to exist and the means of production and the land have been handed over to the community personified by the state; the economy is developed and all economic processes are being realized through planning (this is used very cleverly by the Bolsheviks for propagating the idea of Communism), but at the same time in no country are the real conditions of the people based on such oppression as in Soviet Russia.

This state of affairs is explained by a basic factor in the Soviet economy, namely that it did not emerge as a result of organic growth, but as a result of artificial coercion. The impact of this can be seen in the whole national economy of the Soviet Union and in its separate branches.

II Socialist Accumulation

The clarification of the term socialist accumulation, explaining the origins and nature of the Soviet economy, demonstrates also the whole Bolshevik system.

After the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), because a great deal of private initiative was allowed and especially because of the free development of peasant farming, the Bolsheviks managed quite speedily to restore the economy ruined by the revolution and civil and national wars and to return, basically, to the pre-war level of the country's economy. They decided in the

late 1920's to start building a pure socialist economy and primarily to intensify the industrialization of the USSR. It is quite clear that right from the beginning they were faced with the problem of financing large construction programs which were considered to be most important in the realization of their plans.

The sources of revenue for financing such a program were to be found:

1. By acquiring the necessary capital from abroad in loans and concessions. This was made very difficult for the Bolsheviks, as after they refused to pay tsarist loans far-reaching guarantees for new loans were required, which would have meant a break with the principles of the Communist Party which the Bolsheviks could not accept. The concessions, as shown in practice, were connected with insoluble contradictions between the interests of those granting concessions on the one hand, and the general, economic and legal norms of the Soviet Union on the other.

2. By building the economy on a compromise between the nationalized industry, transport and the credit system (the so-called "command heights"⁵) which remained completely in the hands of the state and the system of peasant farming with a more or less free exchange (Bukharin's plan). The Bolsheviks (or more precisely, Stalin's group) did not dare to take this path which constituted the basis of the New Economic Policy in view of the theoretical consideration that a small-scale economy invariably produces capitalist elements, and because they were afraid that the creation in the country of a strong class of small farmers with the clearly defined interests of private ownership would inevitably lead to a conflict with the fundamental directives of the Party and would endanger the very existence of the Soviet régime.

3. By building the new economic system exclusively at the expense of the country's industrial resources with the complete liquidation of private enterprise in all branches of the national economy. This last method was the most conducive to the theoretical considerations of Stalin's group, but at the same time it meant the ruthless exploitation of the people. The Bolsheviks assumed they could deal with all possible resistance from the population because by that time they had established an huge terror apparatus.

The discussions which took place when it was necessary finally to choose a way for the Soviet economy, led to the defeat of adherents of the first two methods indicated above (particularly Bukharin's plan) and from 1929, Soviet economy took the path of "building socialism in one country." From this moment on the term "socialist accumulation" becomes the most important aspect of the Soviet economy because it becomes the only source for the accumulation of capital and the reservoir into which the income from all sectors of the economy is poured and which has to finance further projects.

The category of "socialist accumulation" is the most general formular for a gigantic system of economic exploitation, all the resources of which are based on the ruthless appropriation by the state of the production of almost the whole population excluding only those who benefit from this socialist accumulation; this reduces living standards to the very lowest.

The methods of appropriation take unusually thorough and varied forms. In agriculture this exploitation was based on the liquidation of the peasantry

⁵ "Command heights" implies the key posts in all sectors of the national economy.

as a separate social class and its transformation into a proletarian element. By forcible collectivization the Bolsheviks achieved four principle aims:

1. Finding it impossible to obtain from the peasants the necessary foodstuffs to feed the municipal population or to obtain the necessary raw materials for industry through the exchange of industrial goods for agricultural produce, the state appropriated without payment all the country's natural resources in the same way it did with other branches of the economy (industry, transport and the credit system) by nationalization at the beginning of the October revolution.

2. Collectivization transformed the independent peasants into hired laborers who received wages from the state in the form of payment units for a working day. Therefore the state had at its disposal an enormous labor force which could be utilized in any desirable direction.

3. Collectivization aimed at the gradual removal of the agricultural population's sense of property and hence the destruction of that base upon which tendencies, dangerous to the socialist state, could grow.

4. All agricultural economy was planned and included in the general plan for the building of the national economy.

The first two aims were of particular importance for socialist accumulation. By transforming the peasants into proletarians, seizing their land and paying them low wages for their work, the Soviet state made agriculture one of the largest sources of accumulation of funds. Therefore the building of socialism in one country was based in the first place on the pauperizing of the agricultural population.

Through forcible collectivization the Bolsheviks unexpectedly acquired another source of labor. Because collectivization ruined the material well-being of the population and a system developed throughout the centuries, the people naturally responded by a stubborn resistance, which the Bolsheviks suppressed. As a result of the liquidation of the *kulaks*, millions of peasants were arrested and sent to concentration camps where they, together with those from other strata of the population became the slaves of the socialist state and were forced to undertake the heaviest of work such as the building of canals, the felling of trees and so on. There are many millions still in concentration and labor camps.⁶

This second and cheapest possible source of socialist accumulation is continually maintained through further arrests which are made on the strength of provocative and baseless accusations from which even the most loyal of Soviet citizens are not secure.

Though the sources of socialist accumulation in agriculture have an openly forced labor character, the exploitation of the population in other branches of the national economy is better camouflaged. Here, the forms of exploitation assume a more thorough form and are mainly realized through the system of market conditions. Its essence is manifested in the establishing of the real wages of industrial workers and employees at a very low level. This is done through the turnover tax which, after the deduction of expenses and a certain percentage

⁶ B. Jakovlev, *Kontsentratsionnye Lageri SSSR* (Concentration camps in USSR), Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1955.

of income, composes the difference between the cost of production and the selling price of essential consumer goods. This percentage of the turnover sometimes attains enormous proportions and can greatly exceed production costs.⁷ Therefore, when buying necessities, the population return most of their wages to the state. The comparison between the wages of an average worker in pre-revolutionary times and those of the Soviet worker expressed in terms of prices of essential consumer goods, shows that the true wages of the latter are from 5 to 10 times smaller. This is why in the Soviet Union all members of a family have to work because the income earned by the head of the family is inadequate to support the rest.

As well as the system of appropriating labor through the turnover tax, the Soviet state tries constantly to increase labor efficiency by intensifying various so-called "forms of socialist labor," the socialist "shock system," labor competitions and so on. The masses have to fulfill many additional tasks to increase production but without additional payment.

Because this fulfillment of additional tasks has not produced any noticeable results, the Soviet state organized the Stakhanovite movement, the aim of which was to raise efficiency to the highest degree and which became one of the most important forms of additional exploitation. As it was bound to worsen considerably the lot of the people, the Stakhanovite movement was organized as an all-national movement which was apparently emerging "voluntarily" from among the Soviet community. By a curious omission of censorship, Stakhanov himself admitted in his autobiography⁸ that the establishing of his record was made on direct instructions from the Communist Party.

After Stakhanov had set up, with the aid of every facility, a new record for the mining of coal which exceeded the average norms several times, the Party ordered, as a spontaneous "demand of the working people," the so-called branch conferences of all sectors of the national economy to review and increase the average norms of production which henceforth became compulsory for everyone.

Consequently the Stakhanovite movement became an additional form of intensifying the production of workers and employees and a further source of socialist accumulation.

The last source of socialist accumulation is a considerable and widespread system of deductions from the wages of the population which begins with the annual deduction of a month's income for the state loan (this takes the form of a "voluntary" subscription but is in fact compulsory), and ends with the payment of membership fees for the innumerable "voluntary" organizations which serve to strengthen the military readiness of the country and pay for the upkeep of fifth columns abroad. Therefore, using Marxist terminology, the base of socialist accumulation despite its involved and complicated form, is an enormous appropriation of additional values by the socialist state.

During the first three Five Year Plans the Bolsheviks strived continuously to accelerate the rate of accumulation, that is to increase exploitation by trans-

⁷ A. Suchkhov, *Gosudarstvennye Dokhody SSSR* (State Revenue of the USSR), Moscow, 1945.

⁸ A. Stakhanov, *Rasskaz o moei zhizni* (My Life), Moscow, 1937.

forming the peasants into hired laborers, using free labor in the concentration camps, maintaining wages at the lowest possible level, continually increasing the norms of production and by taking back most of the wages through the turnover tax. This increased exploitation was supported by the whole judicial system and was particularly striking in the years just prior to World War II.

III The External Manifestations of Exploitation

During its entire existence the Soviet state has managed to achieve considerable success in developing its productive forces. A large number of new enterprises have been built, new branches of production set up, new regions which in the tsarist empire were unknown on the economic map have become active.

This has not been achieved through the organic growth of the country's fulfilling the basic principle of every national economy, to satisfy the needs of the population, but on the contrary as already noted, by ruthless exploitation.

Without dwelling on the enormous apparatus of direct violence with the aid of which the Bolsheviks hold their population in obedience and which better than anything else characterizes the true conditions in the Soviet Union, we shall deal here with the socio-economic effects of exploitation in Soviet husbandry.

Due to the low living standards and constant psychological pressure, substandard health predominates among the population of the Soviet Union and malnutrition may often be observed in the Soviet Union today. It has already been said that to secure a minimum living standard all members of the family have to work. The population is not able to satisfy its most urgent needs in any considerable measure. Foreign observers have noticed more than once the unusually poor appearance of Soviet town dwellers who, by European standards are very badly clothed. The problem of housing is even worse. For most of the population the formula applied is: "One family—one room."⁹ Such a state leads to very low hygienic conditions and to moral degeneration especially among youth. The people cannot improve their lot, because every manifestation which under normal conditions would entail a process of improvement, is suppressed by the removal of those who dare criticize.

Because of the eradication of private property and the loss of incentive, the population has no internal stimulus to work and there is a continuous hidden struggle in the Soviet economy between the people and the state.

In agriculture this is manifested by the fact that the Communists despite all their underakings, have not been able to achieve any considerable increase in production. In agriculture where physical labor as a factor is comparatively more important than in industry, this discrepancy between attempts by the state to obtain the maximum for a minimum given in exchange is particularly noticeable. The large agricultural enterprises—sovkhozes—are built on bureaucratic

⁹ T. Sosnovny, "The housing problem in the Soviet Union," Research Programm on the USSR, New York, 1954.

centralized management and in view of the losses which result from a lack of interest by the employees, have been called "the factories of waste."

The problem of cultivating kolkhoz lands is even more serious. The population, which receive poor wages for a working day, try to reduce to a minimum the number of days worked and exert as little effort as possible knowing that they will not receive an appropriate equivalent in return. This together with other causes such as soil erosion, explains the low yields of Soviet farms which normally have excellent land and under proper conditions could produce a great deal more. In the Ukraine, which at one time was the granary of Europe, numerous peasants visit large towns two or three months before the harvest to buy bread, as the bread received for a working day does not suffice. The Communists attribute the unwillingness to work to counter-revolutionary attitudes and every year before World War II uprooted millions of peasants in order to fill the concentration camps with free labor which was an additional reason for the worsening agricultural situation.

The struggle for efficiency in industry takes a different form. If industrial workers constitute that part of the population on which the Communists feel they can rely and which is materially much better situated than the peasants, then it should be remembered that their work is much easier to control. For this purpose an enormous apparatus of state trade unions has been set up. Thus the workers have less opportunity to decrease their efficiency. Nevertheless there is a constant drive to find new jobs in other enterprises. At one time the transfers assumed such proportions that the state found it necessary to put stop this and issued decrees¹⁰ forbidding a change of employment and so chained the whole population to their place of work. The introduction of difficult Stakhanovite norms apart from the decree forbidding a change of work, imprisonment for being late or for not going to work, finally closed the circle of exploitation around the Soviet worker.

A particularly striking aspect of the Soviet socio-economic structure is the emergence of new classes among the population and the grandiose bureaucracy. The destruction of class structure and the creation of a classless society are proclaimed by the Bolsheviks as the ultimate aim of the Soviet system because apparently only under such conditions can the exploitation of man by man be eliminated. By the whole economic system the soviet state succeeded within fifteen years in destroying the former class and professional structure of the tsarist state. However, almost unnoticeably during the last twenty years new groups have emerged within the Soviet community.

True, the relationship between these privileged groups and the rest of the community is not based on their place in the socio-economic process which determines the class structure of the capitalist system. However their material level is above that of the ordinary Soviet citizen and by their position in the community on the one hand and the attitude to them of the Soviet government on the other they differ sharply from the rest of the population. These upper strata include: The security police; the top level of the armed forces; Party leaders; the trade union bureaucracy; the heads of the various higher economic organizations and enterprises and certain groups of the intelligensia such as Stalin prize win-

¹⁰ Decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR, June 6, 1940.

ners (eminent artists, writers and scientists). Although formerly anyone could be incorporated into these groups, they have now become strictly defined and restricted and integration into them takes place under close Party supervision; These strata of Soviet society are remunerated for their special duties with high salaries, supplies from exclusive shops, the privilege of spending holidays at the best spa's and so on.

As the result of this process of differentiation the social structure of the Soviet State is not an aggregate of equal citizens, but is like a pyramid built on the shoulders of the masses each group of which exploits those below. Declaring itself a convinced enemy of class division, the Soviet system has created new class groups which are fully supported by the state and without which it would not be able to carry on its policy of exploitation. The birth of this new Soviet class structure is also an important by-product of the policy of exploitation in the Soviet economy.

Bureaucracy is another peculiarity of the Soviet economy. This is a matter of a much wider order because all aspects of state and social life are built on the state bureaucratic principle. The whole administration in the Soviet Union is in the hands of the civil servants and in no country and at no time have the people as members of a social organization been in the grip of such a bureaucratic machine as in the Soviet Union. The particularly negative influence of this bureaucracy is reflected on the country's economic life. Soviet economic bureaucracy did not emerge only after the suppression of private initiative and its replacement by state management; to a great extent its roots lie in the lack of confidence of the state in the working people and in the desire to submit everything to a strict and unwavering control. This has transformed the Soviet economic organism into a particularly cumbersome mechanism. A complete absence of initiative among the rank and file workers and the extremely low qualifications of the managers of enterprises who are always Party members and who quite often occupy their posts simply because of this, paralyze all genuine work in economic life. Apart from this, the economic apparatus has grown disproportionately large in comparison with the growth of the economy itself.

All this leads to considerably increased costs of production and complicates enormously the decisions and implementing of the simplest tasks. Because of the fear of responsibility in this or that undertaking, everyone tries to shift obligations to someone else and thus the most elementary decision which in a free economy would be quickly solved, must pass through any number of higher authorities before it can be sanctioned. Such organization paralyzes the smooth working of the economic organism and so from time to time under the guise of various campaigns, the Soviet government attempts to bring about some improvement. The bureaucracy of the Soviet economy, as with all other branches of Soviet life, is not a temporary phenomenon but is maintained by the essence of the system itself. The Soviet economic machine is headed by that part of the Soviet aristocracy known as the "business executive" (*gospodarnyky*) upon which the state relies for implementing all economic tasks. A number of other examples could be given which would illustrate the exploiting nature of the Soviet economy but those already given suffice to describe the social and economic atmosphere in which the "classless Communist community" lives and works.

IV The Theoretical Nature of the Soviet Economy and the Social Order

The theoretical evaluation of the economic and social system of the Soviet Union as a whole is defined by the Soviets as a system of consistent socialism, and by the West as a system of state capitalism.

According to the Communists, the main points which determine the socialist character of their system are:

1. The nationalization of all the means of production.
2. The total planning of the whole national economy.
3. The liquidation of class structure and of man's exploitation by man.
4. The creation of a new psychology and a new approach to work.
5. The improvement of the material level of the workers compared with that in the capitalist countries.

Whatever attitude is taken to the nationalization of the means of production and the planning system of the state, there is no doubt that in principle these are new forms of economic life, that they have been introduced in the Soviet Union and that the economy does operate on those two principles. Private ownership which is the basis of the capitalist community is insignificant in the Soviet Union and is limited in fact to household goods. Socialist property signifies state ownership and co-operative kolkhoz ownership, though the latter is fully directed and exploited by the state. On the other hand the whole Soviet economy is planned and all economic life develops through state directives and instructions.

As regards the last three points which should be the essence of the new social system, it can be stated that these points are not only unattained, but that the capitalist communities in this respect have achieved a great deal more than their "socialist" counterpart in the Soviet Union. It cannot be said that socialism in the Soviet Union is a system of higher moral and social relations. The assertion that a consistent socialist system has been established in the Soviet Union is merely propaganda. On the other hand one must also reject the second definition of the Soviet system as state capitalism. The adherents of this second view argue their case with two points: 1. The full appropriation of all means of production and the transformation of the state into a kind of all-powerful capitalist; 2. The tremendous exploitation of the population—noticeable to every observer—which does its best to oppose this capitalist. From the logical and methodological point of view, the definition of the Soviet system as one of state capitalism cannot survive criticism.

In the Soviet economy, of course, the peculiarities which determine the capitalist system are not apparent. All the specific features of healthy, private enterprise are absent from Soviet economic life: the private ownership of land and means of production have been removed and now belong to the state, becoming only in principle the property of the whole population. The fact that authority rests in the hands of one party does not change the essence of this. because in every given socio-economic formation which continues for any length of time, the authority at this or that stage might belong to widely differing social groups. The spontaneous character of the capitalist economy is replaced

by the planning system which takes into account all material resources and manpower and the payment for work; it derives from the sole principles established by the state and by the absence of a market mechanism for regulating the movement of social capital. According to Sombart¹¹ the definition of such a complicated economic system as capitalism cannot be expressed in general terms but separately for the technical, economic, social and psychological aspects. Therefore if this approach is applied to the Soviet economy it can be asserted that in the economic, social and psychological sense, the Soviet economy is entirely different from the capitalist economy, the only similarity being the technical facets, which are part of the existence of a large industrialized technology.

The fact of mass exploitation cannot be a methodological, constitutive factor in the definition of the Soviet economic system, first because exploitation can be found in many socio-economic formations and therefore cannot serve as a determining element for any of them; second, the capitalist system itself, as a result of its evolution which came about during the XIX and XX centuries, is not at present defined by economists as a system of exploitation.

The term "state ownership" largely contradicts the definition of the state economy which was always understood as a barter economy with the absence of a single regulating factor and which is more peculiar to the nature of the socialist system because the regulating of all economic processes under that system can only be carried out by the state. Thus the definition of the Soviet system as state capitalism is most inaccurate.

In recent times the Soviet order has been defined as state socialism. This is a definition coined by Titoist theoreticians in Yugoslavia¹² and which, in this author's opinion, is also incorrect. Under the economic system which exists in Yugoslavia where separate enterprises are given a certain amount of autonomy, there is some similarity to the principles of French syndicalism. From the viewpoint of Titoist theoreticians, the Soviet system represents state socialism because the enterprises do not enjoy such autonomy in the Soviet Union. Naturally the Yugoslav state does not shirk from controlling those enterprises which have been given that degree of autonomy.

A proper definition of the Soviet system can only be made when a line is drawn between economic and social conditions. From the viewpoint of the economy there is in the Soviet Union a consistent social order but it should be emphasized once more that this concerns only purely economic matters. The statement that there is a social order in the Soviet Union may at first glance appear strange. It is accepted by some that the term socialist is connected with something higher, not only in relation to the economic essence of the present capitalist economy, but also in relation to all manifestations of human life. It is very difficult to reconcile this idealistic concept of socialism with the stark reality of the Soviet Union where life and the relation between the state and the population recall the conditions of the ancient despotic East. However after closer examination it appears that economic relations built on purely socialist principles at the foundation of which lies the complete elimination of private ownership, can be realized under various conditions.

¹¹ W. Sombart, *Der Moderne Kapitalismus*, Berlin, 1902.

¹² *Borba* (The Struggle), Belgrad, for 1955.

When the famous principles of the French revolution had been declared and after the industrial revolution in England which increased considerably labor productivity, social observers at the beginning of the last century had to face the fact, that at the same time English workers had become poorer and tried to explain this phenomenon. Research was made in two directions, by an objective explanation of the real conditions of life (Ricardo),¹³ or through a search for a solution to this problem. Some researchers (Sismondi)¹⁴ called for a return to the medieval Guild Organizations and others wished to combat these phenomena with new theories (Saint-Simon,¹⁵ Fourier,¹⁶ Owen¹⁷). So the creators of the socialist ideal (basically this was Saint-Simon), saw the way toward the elimination of all the negative aspects of capitalism in the transference to the state of all means of production and in the organization of a planned economy. They thought that the fulfillment of these two preconditions would return to the working people those means of production of which they were deprived by the liquidation of the mediaval Trade Guilds as a consequence of historical evolution. They thought that a planned economy and the handing over to the state of the means of production would automatically lead to new socialist conditions. This school of thought was accepted later by Marx and is found at the end of the first volume of *Das Kapital* when he writes of the "expropriation of the expropriators." Despite this, the conviction that social conditions under the socialist order are higher than any other was a logical but purely rationalist extrapolation by the creators of the socialist ideal.

Theoretical deliberations on the obvious superiority of social conditions when the means of production are nationalized and such a state of affairs in practice are poles apart. The structure of the Soviet economy is a totality of new categories, namely those which answer the trend in socialism known as "collectivism". Of course the nature of that social order which is being formed, is not determined by our wishful thinking, but by the way it is realized and by the level of social development on which its realization is taking place.

It is clear that the creation of the socialist order in its proper form and at the present state of development of mankind (particularly in such a backward country as the former tsarist Russia), cannot lead to any forms other than those which are at present found in the Soviet Union.

As has already been pointed out in the first part of this article, the socialist order was proclaimed by the Communist Party immediately after it assumed power but at that time the country had no foundations on which to build. The desire to build it at any price led to the establishment of a new economic system of a socialist type but this was at the expense of the interests of several generations and the conditions built on these socio-economic foundations were not of peace, harmony and grandeur as was the ideal of the creators of socialist theories. Therefore it may be asserted that in the Soviet Union there exists

¹³ D. Ricardo, *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, Paris, 1817.

¹⁴ J. Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique*, Paris, 1819.

¹⁵ C. Saint-Simon, *Lettres d'un habitant de Genève du système industriel*, Paris, 1821. *Le nouveau christianisme*, Paris, 1825.

¹⁶ F. Fourier, *Théorie de quatre mouvements*, Lyons, 1808.

¹⁷ R. Owen, "A New View of Society or Essays on the Principles of the Formation of the Human Character," London, 1813.

a socialist economic order but no appropriate social relations. Such a new order could be appropriately termed, pseudo-socialism.

In discussions with representatives of various schools of thought on the nature of the Soviet economy, the author sometimes heard especially from the adherents of socialist doctrines, a denial of the above thesis which in brief is as follows: The epithet "socialist" added to the Soviet order in no matter what sense it is used, appears on the one hand to be a certain justification for Soviet economic conditions, but on the other hand it discredits socialism itself. If it is admitted that there are certain socialist elements in the Soviet system it implies that socialism deserves a negative attitude. This author thinks that both these statements are groundless. In this case the expected and automatic emergence of socialist conditions as a consequence of handing over of all the means of production to the state and the organization of the planned economy, have not been achieved.

The opinion, that the economic system should be determined by the extent to which the additional value is appropriated, is probably a new approach to this problem but it is certainly not the viewpoint of the creators of the socialist ideal such as Kautsky,¹⁸ who wrote a theory of the relative poverty of the proletariat and advanced it against the criticism by revisionists of certain of Marx's view. This theory differed entirely from Marx's theory of absolute poverty.

¹⁸ K. Kautsky, *Bernstein und das sozialistische Programm*, Berlin, 1855: *Der Weg zur Macht*, Berlin, 1909.

Medical Services in the USSR Today

V. PLUSHCH

(With particular reference to the Ukraine)

Medical services in the Ukrainian SSR have been unsatisfactory throughout the whole period of its existence. Although the network of hospitals, polyclinics, dispensaries and the number of physicians and nursing staff have increased considerably since 1920, the standard of their services to the population is still lower than that in West European countries as well as in the USSR as a whole.

Thus, for instance, according to official Soviet sources, in the Ukraine in 1939 there were 2.5 beds per 1000 inhabitants; at the same time the corresponding figure in the USSR showed 3.5 beds per 1000 inhabitants. In that year there were 30,462 hospital beds in the Ukraine,¹ and 603,823 in the USSR.² Also during 1938—1939, there were 1,195,026 beds in USA³ (8 beds per 1000 inhabitants), in Australia 62,690⁴ (9 beds per 1000 inhabitants), in Norway 25,959⁵ (9 beds per 1000 inhabitants) and in Finland 25,738⁶ (7 beds per 1000 inhabitants).

Per 10,000 of the population there were about five physicians in the Ukraine during this period. (In 1940, after the occupation of Western Ukraine, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine, there were 21,323 physicians in the Ukraine which had a population of approximately 40,000,000.)⁷

A typical feature of the Ukrainian SSR is the unequal distribution of the hospital network between towns and rural districts and the quite inadequate number of country doctors. For example there are only 1.4 hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants⁸ and only 20 T. B. clinics and posts⁹ out of a total number of 297,¹⁰ in rural localities. Only 4,000¹¹ doctors out of 20,000¹² are working in country districts.

¹ From the author's material based on unpublished statistical data of the People's Commissariat of Health of the Ukrainian SSR. Similar figures for the year 1937 are also given in the Large Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE.), Vol. 55, Chapter VI, 1947.

² BSE., 1947, Vol. USSR, p. 1163.

³ Statistical Yearbook 1949—1950. United Nations, New York, 1950, p. 482.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ BSE., 1947, Vol. 55, Chapter VI.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.* From the author's material based on unpublished statistical data of the People's Commissariat of Health of the Ukrainian SSR.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

Compared with Western Europe the technical side of medical establishments, particularly in the country, is particularly bad. In the majority of rural areas there are no specialists and few infirmaries which are very poorly equipped. In a number of raions in the Ukraine there are no X-ray machines. According to official Soviet sources, the well-supplied municipal hospitals which are staffed with specialists, are having to care for patients from the country districts: In Kiev 9.2⁰/₀,¹³ in the municipal hospitals of the Odessa oblast 18⁰/₀¹⁴ and in Dnepropetrovsk oblast 19.6⁰/₀.¹⁵ of all patients were from rural districts.

While in 1940 there were 5194¹⁶ beds in municipal maternity homes, there were only 496¹⁷ beds in rural maternity homes.

Spa treatment is almost inaccessible to the rural population. The health resorts in the Ukraine are mainly used for the treatment and rest of top-level Party and Soviet bureaucrats and most of the best spas are directly subordinated to Moscow's requirements.

The political tendencies of Soviet medicine have made the work of the ordinary physician very difficult. Contrary to custom in the free world, Soviet medicine requires the physician primarily to help the administration raise the labor productivity of all workers and to ensure that they do not shirk their duties. In the opinion of the Party, all workers try to evade work. Consequently, the physician in the USSR is restricted in the number of so-called medical slips and similar documents he can give which release employees from work on grounds of illness.

World War II which raged for so long in the Ukraine, destroyed to a great extent not only the industry and national economy of the country but also inflicted great losses on its network of medical establishments. Stalin's well-known scorched earth policy resulted in the destruction of those hospitals, clinics and other medical establishments which had not been evacuated to the East. The German occupation authorities in the Ukraine did not pay much attention to organizing the health service and during their retreat ruined the hospital and clinical network which had been rebuilt by the Ukrainians during the occupation with the aid of devoted Ukrainian medical personnel.

The losses which were inflicted on the Ukrainian health service by World War II can be seen from the information provided by official Soviet sources. Thus, during World War II. 5977¹⁸ hospitals and out-patient clinics, 838¹⁹ childrens' medical establishments and nurseries and 36²⁰ medical schools were completely destroyed; 9369²¹ hospitals and out-patient clinics, 1211²² childrens' medical establishments and nurseries and 64 medical schools were damaged.²³



¹³ BSE., 1947, Vol. 55, Chapter VI.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ BSE., 1952, Vol. 16, p. 602.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

After the Soviets had reestablished themselves in the Ukraine, they directed their attention first to rebuilding the agricultural and industrial potential. The problem of a medical service was a secondary task. Only the menacing increase in disease and the mortality rate, the lowering of labor efficiency and a catastrophic fall in the labor productivity of the Ukrainian people, forced the Party authorities to undertake the rehabilitation of the medical service network and improve the quality of medical aid.

On the present state of the health system in the Ukraine there is unfortunately, no reliable and detailed information because as from 1940 neither the Soviet press nor other official sources provide systematic data on the subject. It is interesting that even in Soviet encyclopedias published since World War II, detailed information on the medical network in the Ukraine ends at 1940—1941.

From data which is to be found in the professional and general press such as *Meditsinskii Rabotnik* (Medical Worker) since 1953 it can be deduced that in the 10 years since the end of World War II, the health services in the Ukraine have returned, approximately, to the level of 1940.

Therefore in the Ukraine today there should be about 1,800 hospitals with a total of 120,000 beds most of which are situated in the towns. According to the "Large Soviet Encyclopedia," the total number of hospital beds in the USSR has apparently increased by 30%²⁴ and in the Ukraine by 23.6%²⁵ compared with the pre-war figures. It appears that of 4926²⁶ out-patient clinics and polyclinics, 2856²⁷ are in rural areas and of the 5289²⁸ surgeries staffed mainly by hospital assistants and midwives, most are in the countryside. The large number of out-patient establishments, especially in rural areas, staffed by underqualified persons is striking compared with the low number of similar centers staffed by qualified doctors.

A closer examination of these clinics and out-patient establishments shows that only 656²⁹ of them are adequately equipped and staffed by qualified physicians. These are the so-called "single dispensaries", "polyclinics" and "specialized out-patient clinics." The remainder constitute units of the out-patient type with very primitive equipment and no specialized staff. The most efficient medical services in the USSR are offered by the maternity and pediatric establishments. In the Ukraine there are about 1,000 maternity and pediatric clinics, some 3,000 permanent and about 30,000 seasonal nurseries.³⁰

It should be pointed out that the qualified pediatric establishments are also mostly situated in the towns and that the rural population has to be satisfied with substitutes such as seasonal nurseries, primitively equipped childrens' surgeries and kolkhoz maternity homes. How pitiful these nurseries in the country districts are, is best illustrated by the testimony of the head of the main administration of the Medical and prophylactic Maternity and Pediatric Services of the Ministry of Health of the USSR, which is given later in this article.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 603.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1947., Vol. 55, p. 851.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

After the war the spa network in the Ukraine considerably increased as a result of the acquisition of the Western Ukrainian spas (Vorokhta, Yaremche, Truskavets and others) and also the Crimean spas, but this improvement does not benefit the Ukrainian population as the spas mostly serve tourists from the USSR and Ukrainian Soviet and Party bureaucrats and are almost inaccessible to the majority of the population of the Ukraine.

After World War II the number of medical schools increased. There are in the Ukraine 1 medical, 2 stomatological and 3 pharmaceutical institutes and the number of physicians qualifying from them each year has increased. But a large percentage of newly qualified doctors do not strengthen the medical services in the country areas of the Ukraine, but are sent to other republics of the USSR, usually distant places like Kazakhstan, Northern Russia, and the Far Eastern areas of the USSR.

The number of physicians in the Ukraine at present does not exceed 20,000³¹ and therefore the index of qualified medical aid to the population is still very low—about 5 doctors per 10,000 of the population. This is lower than in the USSR as a whole (10 : 10,000) and much lower than in most western countries (Western Germany, 14.2,³² USA, 15.5 and Great Britain, 13.1 doctors per 10,000 of the population).³³

It should be remembered that there are no private, medical establishments in the USSR. In the first years of Soviet rule all medical establishments, without exception, were expropriated and nationalized. No one can obtain medical aid without applying to the medical center. The centralization of the management of public health institutions, including hospitals, polyclinics and certain other medical institutions in the USSR is widespread. For example, no hospital or clinic is permitted to change its staff even by one person; its budget cannot be changed; no repairs can be made without the permission of Ministry of Public Health. A great number of hospitals, sanatoriums and polyclinics may be attended only by certain designated groups of the population, as for example, Party or Soviet top leaders, MVD employees and so on.

Soviet medicine built on Marxist-Leninist "ideology" has restricted the whole health system in the Ukraine, and imposed upon the higher and lower medical cadres as their first task to ensure an increase in the labor efficiency of the proletariat and peasant population instead of protecting and improving its health.

Extracts from various Soviet sources, mainly professional medical journals, are given below which strikingly illustrate the state of medical facilities supplied to the Soviet population and the aims of the Soviet health system. This material is particularly interesting because it is provided by leaders of the Soviet medical services, scientists and practitioners who must, in accordance with custom in the USSR, embellish the real state of affairs.

It is also interesting that this information was published in the Soviet press despite a strict censorship. This indicates that the phenomena noted by the

³¹ Official data indicates there are at present over 20,000 physicians in the Ukraine.

³² *Arztliche Mitteilungen* (Medical Information), Cologne January 21, 1956, p. 75.

³³ The author has made these calculations on the basis of data concerning the number of physicians in those countries and on the basis of population figures for 1953.

authors of the articles are so widespread that it was impossible to conceal them from the medical profession. Naturally the remarks are very cautiously phrased and the responsibility for these shortcomings is attributed to the physicians themselves, as those who point out the defects can hardly be expected to say openly where the heart of the trouble lies.

The lamentable state of the health service and hygiene in the towns and villages of the USSR is described by Professor I. I. Elkin of Moscow:³⁴ "The supply of water per capita in many town is not high." Later hinting that the effort to put communal husbandry in order is intended only for its propaganda effect, Professor Elkin says:

The State allocates large financial means for the improvement of towns but they are not always used for the most essential needs. Naturally, the building of fountains and parks in towns is a very important undertaking, but primarily the main water and sanitation systems should be developed and the collection and disposal of garbage and refuse should be properly planned and carried out.

Professor Elkin obviously cannot say that it is the government and Party who are responsible in the first place for the building of fountains, monuments, luxury Metros, villas and so on instead of main water and drainage systems or hospitals.

This is what an expert, Dr. Shultz, writes on matters of sanitation and hygiene and the per capita supply of water:

The supply of water to the towns is unusually bad. At present in the Soviet Union there are 375 municipal main water systems as against the 215 which existed in tsarist Russia. This means that the majority of towns have no main water supply at all. The average per capita supply provided by the water mains for the municipal population is 71 liters per day. How insignificant this norm is, can be seen from the fact that the majority of West European and American towns achieved a long time ago an average per capita supply of from 200 to 300 liters per day. If it is remembered that most of the water from the norm of 71 liters is used by industry, it becomes obvious why in the towns throughout the Soviet Union the population in summer is only supplied with water at night and why most of the municipal baths are unable to function.³⁵

The position as far as drainage is concerned is far worse: "Drainage in the USSR is even worse because only 68 towns are provided with a drainage system."³⁶ Dr. Shultz continues: "The cleaning of towns and other populated localities in the Soviet Union is catastrophic. While in West European and American towns municipal cleaning, that is the planned collection and disposal of garbage and refuse, became an every day practice long ago, in the USSR it is only properly done in Moscow."³⁷

³⁴ *Sovetskaya meditsina* (Soviet Medicine), Moscow, No. 7, 1954, p. 7.

³⁵ Dr. G. Schulz, *Sanitarnaya i protivoepidemicheskaya robota v SSSR* (Sanitary and anti-epidemic work in the USSR), Munich, 1951, p. 35.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

This is what we read about such matters in the resolutions of the XII All-Union Conference of Hygienists, Micro-Biologists and Specialists in Infectious Diseases in Moscow:

The increased indices of acute intestinal infections in the large towns and villages require, first of all, speedy and detailed plans for the drainage of these towns and villages and priority of material funds and means for that purpose.

In the previously quoted article by Prof. Elkin, it is also stated that during the five years since the above-mentioned conference, the sanitary and epidemic service and state inspection have done very little to fulfill these tasks. According to Prof. Elkin, the responsibility for the short-comings in communal building is not due to government policy but rests with the physicians concerned. It is however difficult for them to do anything constructive when even in the towns there is no main water or drainage, when the "cleaning of the towns and other populated localities in the USSR is catastrophic," when "the bathrooms in most flats are not used as such, but as living quarters" and the "populated localities are infested with rats, mice, bed-bugs and cock-roaches" and when "in the medium sized and small towns, garbage and refuse is left to be absorbed by the ground or mineralized on the primitive rubbish dumps, thus causing unbelievable pollution."³⁸

In recent years the soviet medical press has paid much attention to combating the increasing incidence of infectious diseases especially dysentery and acute intestinal infections.

Prof. A. L. Libov at the II. Plenum of the All-Union Society of Pediatricians which took place on April 1, 1954, said that while in Leningrad in 1952 the number of cases of dysentery decreased, by 1953 it had considerably increased again. Prof. H. N. Speransky said: "Although as early as 1934 pediatricians were mobilized to combat dysentery, no noticeable effect has been achieved over the past 20 years."

It is obvious that as long as the current state of foodstuffs continues in the USSR and the present wretched condition of water supply, drainage and the cleaning of towns remains, attempts to combat disease will be a waste of time.

Not only scientists testify that the treatment of dysentery and intestinal infections is bad. The Chairman of the main sanitary and anti-epidemic office of the Ministry of Health of the USSR, Prof. V. M. Zhdanov writes: "An analysis of measures undertaken in recent years concerning the prevention of dysentery reveals that the organs of the health service have not achieved any considerable decrease in cases of dysentery."³⁹ This does not only concern Leningrad. Dysentery is a relatively widespread disease in the USSR as is clear from this statement by a high authority of the Soviet Ministry of Health.

Naturally Prof. Zhdanov accuses the physicians for the widespread incidence of dysentery: "The reason is due primarily to serious shortcomings in the work of the medical establishments such as sanitary and anti-epidemic stations, polyclinics and childrens' surgeries."

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Sovetskaya meditsina*, 1954, No. 6, p. 35.

After enumerating all these shortcomings and admitting inaccurate diagnoses of those who have contracted the disease and poor hospitalization, Prof. Zhdanov recommends the tightening up of medical supervision.

Prof. Elkin also noted in his previously quoted article that: "In the post-war period the number of cases of dysentery has increased." He mentioned in addition other infections of the intestinal tract and explains these increases by "insufficient sanitation in the towns." According to him: "In many towns dysentery accounts for 50⁰/₀—60⁰/₀ of all acute diseases of the intestinal tract." Stressing that "not all diagnosed patients receive hospital treatment," he asks: "Is it possible to admit all patients with dysentery to hospital?" and answers: "In the majority of towns it is quite impossible."

The intestinal infections are not the only black spot. The head of the Main Office of Therapeutic Aid to mothers and children L. V. Grechishnikova, writes:

The heads of local organs of the health protection service are still . . . not taking appropriate measures to wipe out childrens' infectious diseases; because of this, the number of cases of measles, scarlet fever., whooping cough and dysentery in several oblasts and raions is still very large, especially in the Uzbek, Armenian, Georgian and Moldavian SSR's.⁴⁰

The increase in infectious diseases forced the Ministry of Health to issue in February 1954, a special edict dated February 17, 1954, "On the Decrease in Infectious Diseases," in which the Ministry of Health, among other things, stresses the ineffectiveness of vaccination against infectious illnesses and the insufficient period of hospitalization.

L. V. Grechishnikova writes: "Observation on the spot shows that physicians in many childrens' surgeries are continuing to work unsatisfactorily; they admit gross violation of elementary requirements, especially concerning the prevention of acute infectious diseases of children."

The responsibility, however, lies not, of course, with the physicians but with specific social conditions brought about by the Soviet system and its social policy. On this subject Dr. Shultz comments:

The general causes of infection in the Soviet Union have a purely social origin. These causes are the unusually low living standards and exceptional lack of hygiene in the majority of populated localities of the USSR. Indeed, how can typhus for example, disappear in a country where the people, especially in the country districts, lack clothes, and sometimes have to do without bed and personal linen, without soap, hot water, baths and so on? How can typhus disappear when in a flat designed for one family, four or five families have to live? How can such illnesses as typhoid fever, dysentery and infantile gastro-enteritis disappear when only the large towns are provided with main water and drainage and the majority of capitals, not to mention the smaller centers, have no municipal cleaning system or when communal restaurants are the most insanitary places in towns and villages? How can infectious diseases disappear in a country where the population is at least grossly underfed?"⁴¹

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 1954, No. 8, p. 4.

⁴¹ Dr. G. Schulz, *Sanitarnaya i protivoepidemicheskaya robota v SSSR*, Munich, 1951, p. 5.

The case of other infectious illnesses is similar. As a result of effective new methods of treatment the number of cases of syphilis and gonorrhoea have decreased but chronic infectious skin diseases continue to be widespread and their diagnosis and treatment is inadequate according to Prof. A. M. Arievykh of the Central Research Institute of Venereal and Skin Diseases of the Ministry of Health of the USSR.⁴² Prof. V. M. Zhdanov emphasizes that: "The rate of decrease in the number of cases of Brucellosis among human beings is still unsatisfactory because the health service and medical workers do not take advantage of all the possibilities to prevent this illness in humans."⁴³

Special attention should be paid to traumatism and its cure. The intensified utilization of manpower with the high tempo of work, Stakhanovite and shock methods, the unusually long working day resulting from bad transport and excessive overtime and other forms of labor exploitation known only in the USSR, together with unsatisfactory safety measures have led to a hitherto unknown increase in traumatism, especially in rural areas. This has been widely commented upon in the Soviet medical press.

The chief surgeon of the Ministry of Health of the USSR, Prof. V. I. Struchkov, in an article called "Questions of surgical aid to the population and the tasks of chief surgeons" says, naturally understating, that: "One should not forget that one third of surgical beds are occupied by traumatic patients and that two fifths of all surgical cases in the polyclinics are traumatic."⁴⁴

From this article it appears that only one third of traumatic patients are admitted to specialized hospitals dealing with injuries under the care of specialists: "In the raions and most of oblasts all of the traumatic patients are admitted to the general wards where many of the surgeons are unacquainted with the treatment of traumatological patients": further: "Surgical wards are poorly provided with equipment for the treatment of trauma cases."

He does not however explain the reasons for traumatism, but from time to time one can find an explanation in the press. For instance, A. G. Braun and V. N. Emelyanov of the Yaroslavl Medical Institute write: "The basic causes of traumatism are the disregarding of safety rules, lack of personal caution and shortcomings in the construction of equipment."⁴⁵

Even more interesting are the facts described by N. E. Kluyeva at the Eye Clinic of the Kursk Medical Institute. She carried out research into the conditions of work in one inter-raion workshop for major repairs to tractors. Her observations are as follows: The lighting in the workshops is insufficient; in 17 workshops the light was less than 20 lucas while "for work which necessitates the distinguishing of objects and details of from 10 to 100 mm. the minimum light should be 20 lucas; general safety measures (ventilator covers, metal shaving removers, protective screens and so on) were absent in all workshops and not a single worker was equipped with a pair of

⁴² *Sovetskaya meditsina*, No. 7, 1954, pp. 15—19.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, No. 8, 1954, p. 8.

⁴⁴ *Sovetskoe zdravookhranenie* (Soviet Care of Public Health), Moscow, No. 4, 1953, pp. 3—9.

⁴⁵ *Sovetskaya meditsina*, No. 8, 1954, p. 3.

goggles! Among 407 of the workers examined there were 226 cases of eye injury and the writer notes that: "These figures are much lower than the true ones." These workers do not undergo eye selection tests before starting their work and consequently 15 workers have become practically blind in one eye and two of them have clarity of vision of 0.1 in their remaining eye.⁴⁶

A number of writers affirm that traumatism is particularly high in agriculture. T. Kistosdurian of the Oktemberyan raion hospital in the Armenian SSR reports that during the past three years traumatism accounted for 34⁰/₀ of all surgical patients and 36.6⁰/₀ of those treated in the out-patient department. The causes of traumatism were short-comings in the organization of work, unsuitable clothing, faulty setting of machines and inadequate instruction of the workers.⁴⁷

K. R. Yatsenko of the Kuzdeyev raion hospital, Komerovska oblast reports that from 1942—1953 agricultural traumas accounted for 4.7⁰/₀ of all cases connected with disability. The reason for this was the ignoring of safety rules and the lack of safety measures. It is interesting that 81⁰/₀ of all those injured are kolkhozniks and only 4⁰/₀ are directorate personnel. More interesting still is the great delay in taking the injured to the raion hospital; 17.4⁰/₀ arrived more than 24 hours after their accident, 23.8⁰/₀ between 12 and 24 hours later and 25.5⁰/₀ from 6 to 12 hours later. The reason for this was lack of transport, bad roads and long distances. In all cases the injured were sent to hospital by horse transport.⁴⁸

A. Abramov of the Institute for the Organization of Health Protection and for the History of Medicine, named N. A. Semashko, gives a very striking picture of the reasons for an increase in the number of illnesses in the Novo-Tulsky Metallurgical Works.

First of all he states that:

The number of illnesses increased considerably in the Novo-Tulsky Metallurgical Works in 1952 as against 1951 both in the number of cases and in the number of days. Most illnesses in 1951—1952 belonged to six nosological diseases, influenza tonsillitis, skin diseases, vocational and ordinary traumatism and acute illnesses of the digestive tract. In 1953 these six nosological aberrations accounted for 51.5⁰/₀ of all illnesses. In 1952, acute illnesses of the digestive tract were increased by 14.3⁰/₀; this was connected with certain shortcomings in the water supply.

Abramov then comments: "Serious shortcomings in the hygienic and technical conditions of the Novo-Tulsky Works are caused by the poor living quarters and the fact that the cleaning and storage of protective clothing is badly organized. Those working in hot work shops have to change in cold rooms and when they come to work, change into damp clothes."⁴⁹

It is not necessary to comment upon these reports which have permeated through the Soviet censorship and which testify to the poor state of safety measures prevailing in industry and particularly in agriculture.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 5, 1954, pp. 29—31.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 7, 1954, p. 42.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 7, 1954, p. 44.

⁴⁹ *Sovetskoe Zdravookhranenie*, No. 5, 1953, pp. 19—20.

It is emphasized in many Soviet reports that the population is provided with surgical care even in the rural raions. However in reality this is still absent in many areas. V. I. Struchkov, Chief Surgeon of the Ministry of Health of the USSR, stated that: "The Belorussian and Lithuanian SSR's, certain oblasts of the RSFSR and all the Central Asian republics are poorly provided with surgeons. Apart from those few republics which provide surgical aid in every raion, there is a number of backward ones which do very little to provide it. These include certain oblasts of the RSFSR and also Kirghiz, Tadjik, Turkmen, Kazakh, the Lithuanian and Estonian SSR's. Even in the Azerbaidzhan SSR which has a good reputation in the field of surgical service, there is no surgical aid whatever in 7 raions out of a total of 72."

In a number of republics including the Ukraine, there are raions with no surgical aid whatsoever and as it appears from Prof. Struchkov's report, these predominate in the non-Russian republics of the USSR.

Even in the raions, supplied with surgeons, there is a lack of surgical beds, X-ray departments and laboratories. Struchkov writes:

In the Belorussian and Moldavian SSR's surgical aid is developing rapidly but the lack of beds is a hindrance: it creates overcrowding of patients which may lead to an increase of complications. The hospitals lack X-ray departments and clinical laboratories. One cannot put up with the situation which exists for example in the Vitebsk oblast of the Belorussian SSR where in 4 raions there is no X-ray apparatus whatsoever.

X-ray apparatus is also lacking in a number of Ukrainian areas, for instance, the Odessa, Chernigov and Proskuriv oblasts.

Even in those raions where there are official resident surgeons there is, in fact, no full scale surgical aid. Not so long ago the Soviet Ministry of Health checked the qualifications of all surgeons. They were divided into five categories depending on which type of operations they could perform and on whether they could carry them out independently. Those surgeons able to operate independently were included into categories I, II and III; those who are only able to assist at operations or give simple surgical aid (dressing wounds, minor surgical treatment and so on), were in categories IV and V. Struchkov asserts: "The result revealed that 39% belonged to the first three categories and 61% to the other two. The check carried out in 1950 in the Belorussian SSR revealed that only 17.6%⁵⁰ of all surgeons could operate independently."

Consequently the qualifications of other surgeons (that is the majority), equals or is even lower than those of the ordinary practitioner in the West who, in most cases, can give his patients minor surgical attention and knows how to operate for appendicitis or hernia in an emergency.

What is the state of the specialized medical aid? I. M. Tymko, assistant professor with the Organization for Health Protection of the Central Institute for the Improvement of Qualifications of Physicians in Moscow writes:

It is known that the population lacks urological aid more than any other specialist service. In a number of oblasts (Sverdlovsk, Orel, Yaro-

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1953, p. 3—9.

slavl, Archangel), the work of qualified urologists is limited to out-patient departments and patients needing operations are sent to another town.⁵¹

It is doubtful if they are sent to other towns because these suffer a permanent lack of beds for their own patients.

The position as regards oncological (tumors) aid is according to Professor Struchkov as follows:

Despite the widespread network of oncological establishments there is little early diagnosis. For instance, cancer of the stomach is usually recognized so late that the relatively radical operation—resection of the stomach—can be carried out on only 30⁰/₀—40⁰/₀ of patients; in the remaining cases the disease is diagnosed at a time when no radical operation is possible. The diagnosis of tumors of the chest organs and abdomen and the bone system continues to be delayed and the application of the only radical method—surgery—is often impossible.

The state of otolaryngological and oculist care in the USSR is given in the reports of V. A. Vorobev (deputy head of the Leningrad oblast Department of Health) and the above-cited Prof. I. M. Tymko.

The former writes: "In 1953 the oblast ear and eye specialists must train raion specialists because so far there are no ear or eye specialists in eleven raions of the oblast."⁵²

Professor Tymko writes:

The great need of otolaryngologists is recognized, but even so the qualified specialists (in Samarkand, Maikop, Bezhitska, Akmolynsk) only perform out-patient surgery; because of the lack of beds for patients suffering from otolaryngological diseases the patients are sent to other oblasts.

Similar reports come from eye specialists in the Kuibyshev and Tambov oblasts. They are not able to operate or to carry out adequate observation of their patients and lack therefore the most necessary conditions for improving their qualifications.

On the quality of therapeutic aid and the diagnosis of internal diseases, N. A. Zakharov of the Sasov raion hospital, Ryazan oblast says: "In 1947, 45⁰/₀ of all patients with a diagnosis of 'fever' and 'heart trouble' were admitted to hospital. In 1949 38.8⁰/₀ of patients from the raion center were admitted to hospital on the first day of their illness and 61.2⁰/₀ on the second day." "In 1947, 137 X-ray photographs were taken."⁵³

This is all that was done during one year by a hospital of 160 beds and an out-patient department which is attended by 100,000 persons a year.

On the general state of efficiency, the Minister of Health of the USSR, M. D. Kovrygina simply says: "The state of efficiency is completely unsatisfactory."⁵⁴

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, No. 2, 1953, p. 23.

⁵² *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1953, p. 19.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, No. 5, 1953, pp. 44—45.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 5, 1953, p. 17.

The success in combating tuberculosis can be learned from the current medical press. L. H. Savchenko, the raion physiotherapist of Vasytkov, Dnepropetrovsk oblast writes:

We try not to put tubercular patients to work in the fields where they would have to toil in the sun; rain and wind, but to work which is not connected with strenuous physical exertion and long periods of exposure to sun. We also see that patients with active tuberculosis are not allowed to work in childrens' establishments, dairy farms and so on.⁵⁵

I. D. Zaslavsky, of the Moscow Municipal Tuberculosis Research Institute states that even in Moscow in 1949, only 5.2% of patients with active tuberculosis became negative; during 1950—1952 the number was 4.4% to 4.0% and in 1953 only 3.4%.⁵⁶ As we can see the effectiveness of treatment is not great and it is difficult to improve it when an active T.B. patient is underfed and forced by the existing system to work hard to fulfill impossible norms.

Even in the industrial regions of the USSR medical aid to the population is at a very low level. This was stated at the VIII plenum of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Medical Workers, by the Minister of Health of the USSR, M. D. Kovrygina:

In certain industrial regions the aid in the out-patient departments and surgeries has deteriorated, the visiting of patients at home by their doctors has been reduced, the physicians in the surgeries are overworked and this has led to the superficial examination of patients and errors in diagnosis.

The state of medical aid to children and their care in general is described by the head of the main Office of Medical Aid to Mothers and Children, L. V. Grechishnikova: "One cannot put up with the lack of beds and mattresses in nurseries, inferior feeding and unsuitable accommodation. Better conditions should be created for children."⁵⁷

In the article the Minister of Health, M. D. Kovrygina, in *Sovetskaya Meditsina* that: "The number of health establishments in industrial enterprises in 1952 was reduced by 443 because the planned increase in the number of beds was fulfilled by only 32.8%."

Only a relatively few excerpts from the official Soviet press have been given in this article but they are sufficient to show the unsatisfactory level of medical aid to the population of the USSR.

⁵⁵ *Problemy Tuberkuloza* (Problems of Tuberculosis), Moscow, No. 6, 1954, p. 14.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵⁷ *Sovetskaya Meditsina*, No. 8, 1954, p. 7.

Contemporary Drama in the Ukrainian SSR

P. KOTOVICH

Among contemporary Ukrainian Soviet playwrights the most important is Oleksander Kornijchuk (born 1905), who has written a great deal and whose plays are very successful throughout the USSR. His first works which achieved fame were "The Destruction of a Squadron" (1933) and "Platon Krechet" (1934). An equal success was enjoyed by the opera "Bohdan Khmelnytskyj" for which Kornijchuk and his wife V. Vasilevska wrote the libretto to K. Dankevych's music.¹ Later Kornijchuk wrote several plays every year. A few of these are: "Truth" (1933) a play with a revolutionary theme; a propaganda play "Front"; a comedy "In the steppes of the Ukraine" (1941); "Makar Dibrova" (1948) and a comedy "The Grove of Guelder Roses" (1950).

Of the older generation of Ukrainian dramatists, I. Kocherha (1881—1954) wrote quite a number of plays such as the historical drama "Svichka's Wedding" or the comedy "The Watch-maker and the Hen." His dramatic poem "Yaroslav the Wise" (1947) is in fact highly interesting, but nowadays is not considered by the Party to "answer the requirements of recent historical research."² Another playwright, the late Yury Yanovskyj wrote "The Camp of Paradise" and "The Young Will" which will be dealt with in some detail in this article.

Among the younger contemporary Ukrainian dramatists are: Lubomyr Dmyterko ("General Vatutin," "Always Together"); Vadym Sobko ("Behind the Second Front," "Life Begins Anew," "Captain Korshun"); Mykola Zarudnyj ("The Spring"); E. Kravchenko ("The Komsomol Line"); Z. Prokopenko ("The Spring Brook") and A. Khyzhnyak ("Toward the Great Land"). Much attention was attracted by such plays as Yury Yanovskyj's drama "The Public Prosecutor's Daughter" and Kornijchuk's "Wings." On the other hand the latest dramatic poem by Lubomyr Dmyterko "Fires on the Dnieper" remained unnoticed and was not even staged although it was translated into Russian.

Apart from this list of original Ukrainian works,³ many plays are translated into Ukrainian from other languages and Ukrainian plays are mostly translated into Russian. (The author read most of the above-mentioned in Russian because Ukrainian texts are very scarce abroad.)⁴

¹ *Teatr*, No. 1, Moscow, 1945.

² *Ukrainskaya Sovetskaya Dramaturgia* (Ukrainian Soviet Drama), Moscow, 1951, p. 10.

³ In 1953 alone, 24 plays by contemporary Ukrainian Soviet playwrights were published. See *Teatr*, No. 4, 1954, p. 151.

⁴ *Teatr*, No. 5, 1954, p. 80.

At the same time one should note the expansion of Ukrainian drama into the theaters throughout the USSR. In 1953 twenty three plays by Ukrainian dramatists and twenty six works from Ukrainian classicists were staged in the theaters of the union republics. Some of them enjoyed particular success. For instance "Platon Krechet" was put on simultaneously in 20 theaters of the RSFSR in 1953; "Under the Golden Eagle" by Ya. Halan was staged 607 times during the first six months of the same year and also in 1953, "100,000,000" by V. Sobko and Balaban was staged 1025 times. Again in 1953 the comedy "Not mentioning the name" by V. Minko appeared 1134 times in 10 months.⁵ On the whole these plays are weak, inartistic and basically very anti-American. That is why, against such a mediocre background, Kornijchuk's plays tend to stand out. His work although flavored with socialist realism, has dramatic tension and well written scenes.

The Bolsheviks of course force Ukrainian poets, novelists and playwrights to falsify the Ukrainian historical past in general and the ideological attitude of well-known personalities in particular, including such great literary figures as Taras Shevchenko (1814—1861), Lesya Ukrainka (1871—1913), Ivan Franko (1856—1916), or the composer Mykola Lysenko (1842—1912).

Taking as an example the two greatest Ukrainian poets—Taras Shevchenko and Lesya Ukrainka—it will be shown how this falsification of the past is carried out. In Kornijchuk's play "Wings," this article will also demonstrate how the present is being distorted and will show with what ideas contemporary Ukrainian Soviet drama is fed.

The distortion of Taras Shevchenko

In the journal *Vitchyzna*, No. 3, 1955, a historical drama by Yury Yanovskyj, "The Young Will," was published. This drama is devoted to the tercentenary of the union of the Ukraine with Russia. In the editorial foreword we read that Yury Yanovskyj intended to write a tetralogy which "would cover the most important periods of the life and creative activities of T. H. Shevchenko." "But," says the author of the foreword, "the writer was in no hurry to write the next part of the tetralogy." This may be because Yury Yanovskyj is a writer of great patriotic emotions a writer who did not take kindly to the weight of subjugation and insult suffered by all creative forces in the Ukraine after the bloody liquidation of the cultural renaissance of the 1920's.

Every Ukrainian writer however was compelled to write something to celebrate the "union." Yanovskyj took for his theme an episode, which he invented, from the last three years of the life of the Ukrainian poet before his arrest in 1847. We know that Taras Shevchenko lived in the Ukraine at this time and that his main occupation then was painting ancient Ukrainian architectural monuments, and landscapes, for his intended almanac, "The Pictorial Ukraine." We also know that he was writing poetry and was a member of the Cyril and Methody Brotherhood. In his search for examples of Ukrainian architecture and so on, he traveled a great deal all over the country and stayed

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 3, 1954, p. 147.

with the landowners whom he knew, who understood his work as a painter and poet and helped him.

The playwright without any need of drifting too far from the historical truth could have found in those three years many sufficiently tense situations to serve him for his drama. But Yury Yanovskij wanted to write, not a historical play as such, but a "jubilee" drama with a compulsory tribute to Russia—the "elder brother;" he wanted to show Shevchenko not as he was, but as the Bolsheviks would like him to have been.

The plot of Yanovskij's play, in which the action takes place in Kiev province and Kiev in the autumn of 1846, is as follows:

In a certain village which belongs to the landowner Chukhnenko, a wedding is taking place. Yarema, a Cossack, is marrying a serf girl, Oksana. The wedding party is attended by Taras Shevchenko and Yarema asks him to be the "wedding father." Chukhnenko's bailiff comes to the party and wants to take the bride to "pay tribute to the squire" and warns her that if she does not go of her own accord she will be dragged to him by the hair. Shevchenko intervenes, the bailiff recognizes him and tries to turn the whole thing into a joke.

After a time Chukhnenko appears in Ukrainian Cossack dress, having discovered from the bailiff that Shevchenko is at the wedding. Chukhnenko invites the poet to visit him but Shevchenko refuses. An exchange of words between Shevchenko and Chukhnenko culminates in Yarema turning Chukhnenko out of the house. The insulted squire orders his men to set fire to the village. They do so and Yarema is killed. A rebellion follows. The squire sends the bailiff to fetch the Dragoons but he is intercepted and killed. The village is surrounded by soldiers.

The insurgents are joined by a soldier called Ivanov. Shevchenko, who is in command of the rebels, embraces Ivanov and hands over the command of the rebellion to him. Chukhnenko escapes but is later caught and on Ivanov's orders, hanged. At night the rebels, avoiding the sentries, escape through the forest to the Kuban and the Caucasus.

The last (fourth) act takes place on the banks of the Dnieper near Kiev. This is a meeting of a revolutionary group in which students of various nationalities from Kiev University, Yarema's widow Oksana, an official, a worker from the Arsenal, a worker from Mezhirya and an officer take part. The meeting is highly secret: (there is a spy and other "revolutionary" paraphernalia). There play ends with Shevchenko reciting his own 'Testament'.

Already from this short summary it can be seen that the whole play is artificially constructed. Its historical inaccuracy is particularly striking in the scene in the first act when the bailiff arrives to take the bride away. His reason for doing so was the so-called *lex primae noctis*, although in fact this right was never practiced in the Ukraine. It seems odd that Yanovskij introduces this *droit de Seigneur* from feudal Western Europe into the Ukraine, particularly in the case of Oksana who is described by Shvashka, one of the other characters, in the following manner:

When she was taken as a tiny little thing to be maid to the squire's daughter, she grew up on the squire's food. Now she plays music and babbles in the master's language. Her hands are white and little, and her

face is not the weatherbeaten face of a peasant; she won't even cross the courtyard barefooted.⁶

As we can see, the squire had plenty of opportunities to woo Oksana earlier. It is also very strange that Shevchenko was asked to be the "wedding father." What had happened to the original "wedding father" who was there before Shevchenko arrived, without whom there could be no wedding? Yarema could not change the "wedding father" who was originally invited for another in the middle of the ceremony, especially for one whom he did not know at all.

But as it is we are more interested in the "jubilee" aspect of the drama. Here the writer should give at least a minimum of what is required of him. The following dialogue takes place at the wedding party and reveals the author's basic aim:

Chukhnenko (addressing Shevchenko). As you have risen above your slave status, you should aspire to higher society! Perhaps it was a mistake to let you improve yourself! Perhaps you became a free man too soon.

Shevchenko, It was not you Chukhnenko, who freed me! Indeed it was not you. My compatriots are not enlightened. From them I would not get my freedom! They would ride rough-shod over me until I died . . . Don't hurry to be my benefactor, not you Sir!

Chukhnenko, Certainly it was not through the Holy Spirit!

Shevchenko, Quite right, Chukhnenko! Freedom cannot be achieved by one's own efforts. I acquired my freedom through the services of the blessed Russian people! They warmed my soul, opened their hearts and told me to live!⁷

The Ukrainian rebel peasants are joined by a Russian soldier Ivanov. He is an ordinary soldier but Yanovskyj in accordance with Party requirements, makes Shevchenko not only embrace him but also calls him by his christian name and patronmic "Yefrem Ivanovich"—a very friendly mode of address although Ukrainian characters, and even those who are not serfs, but Cossacks, are simply called by their Christian names—an inferior form of address. Even more, Shevchenko hands over the command of the rebellion to him.

This, for example, is how Shevchenko and the Russian serf-soldier become acquainted:

Shevchenko, "Its nice to meet you, Yefrem Ivanovich."

Soldier, Same to you, Taras Grigorovich . . . I would like to ask you something . . .⁸

Such familiarity, of course, is rather startling. It seems that Yanovskyj felt such a close social link between Shevchenko and Ivanov—the Russian soldier that he wished to call the next part of his tetralogy "Private Shevchenko." (In 1842 Shevchenko was exiled to Orienburg as a private soldier.)

As has already been said, Shevchenko found himself in the center of the peasants' rebellion and became their commander; but this was only until Yefrem

⁶ *Vitchyzna* (Homeland), Kiev, No. 3, 1955, p. 104.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

Ivanovich appeared on the scene. Here is a typical Party theme with its social innuendoes:

Shevchenko (takes a rifle and hands it to the soldier), Put on your coat, Yefrem Ivanovich. Go and inspect the men with Okhrim, inspect the arms and divide the men into battalions. I personally do not know how to do it. And after they have left, *Shevchenko* then states that the Ukrainian and Russian peasant representing their peoples will arrive at the truth by means of an insurrection. He says this with the alleged purpose of opposing the Ukrainian historian Kostomarov who was trying to place all Slavs on an equal footing by means of the Cyril and Methody Brotherhood. Yuriy Yanovskyj despite the historical truth, makes *Shevchenko* (who was also a member of this society) champion the idea of Russian supremacy and not of the equal rights of all Slavic peoples, even in the course of the revolutionary struggle.⁹

It seems, according to Yanovskyj, that *Shevchenko*, apart from belonging this Brotherhood, was organizing or at least participating in some other and more "revolutionary" brotherhood or at any rate in some separate conspiracy. In fact this was not the case.

The whole of the fourth act is nothing more than a meeting of that other "brotherhood." It was written especially to prove the revolutionary (in the Communist sense), convictions of *Shevchenko*, and to show the difference between him and the members of the Cyril and Methody Brotherhood and precisely what made him, apparently, a "forebear" of Bolshevism. Here are a few quotations from this act.

Vano, The Caucasus is populated by 50 nations! Does that mean that we need 50 revolutionary organizations? We shall have one organization for the whole of Russia! Isn't that true, *amkhanabebo*?¹⁰

Shevchenko, It is true, my friend. We have one Tsar and therefore we shall abolish him together!¹¹
And a few lines later:

Posyada, What use to me is the free "Little Russia" of Kostomarov while the ordinary people do not enjoy the light of freedom, do not leave the darkness, do not embrace the free world with free hands!

Andruzkyj, I am telling you once more that I stand for the Republic, but against the Khmelnytskyj and Hajdamaky type of State.

Posyada, That is because you do not understand why Khmelnytskyj is famous! He freed the people from the landlords' oppression, he united his people with Russia in a fraternal way! Thus he did not let his nation be destroyed, he saved it! That is why I'm grateful to him!¹²

This is supposed to be the central point of the whole play. If it were produced on the stage, this is the moment when applause would become an

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

¹⁰ The Georgian for "friends."

¹¹ *Vitchyzna*, No. 3, 1955, p. 139.

¹² *Ibid.*

ovation. But, strangely enough, Yanovskyj's play has not been staged in any of the theaters of the Soviet Ukraine.

Yanovskyj, without doubt, a master of word and picture, was not able to give real dramatical tension to his work in that suffocating atmosphere of Party censorship. Even the excellent Ukrainian language cannot save an artificial situation created particularly for Party requirements.

Lesya Ukrainka

The Bolsheviks attempt to turn many other authors as well as Shevchenko into "revolutionaries" in their understanding of the word, and into "forebears" of Communism. The main factor for the success of such an adaptation is that these Ukrainian poets and novelists lived before the Bolshevik revolution and therefore had no opportunity of making their attitude toward Communism known by the time it had established itself and showed that in practice it was an anti-democratic and immoral force. It does not matter that the writers whom the Bolsheviks wish to "adapt" have revealed themselves to be true democrats and humanists and therefore anti-Bolshevik. As during their life time there was no Soviet régime and thus they could not possibly express opinions on, say, Stalinism, the Bolsheviks exploit their silence and make a number of great men their "sympathizers" or even their spiritual "fathers."

Leonid Smilanskyj, well-known Soviet Ukrainian writer, was given the task of making Lesya Ukrainka an ideological predecessor of Communism. The writer has overfulfilled his task. Seizing the opportunity, he makes Bolsheviks out of Mykola Lysenko the composer, M. Kotsyubinskyj, O. Kobylanska and Ivan Franko, outstanding Ukrainian classical authors.¹³ All this is achieved in one and the same play—his drama "The Red Rose."¹⁴

At the very beginning of the play we learn that Lesya Ukrainka speaks with a young man only about Marx and revolution and that she "does not detach herself . . . from Das Kapital." There is no doubt, and everyone knows it, that Lesya Ukrainka was a revolutionary and lived with the pathos of the revolution; the creation of her great poems and dramas was permeated with that pathos. Her allegories, however, and excursions into the ancient history of mankind testify to an entirely different direction in her intellectual interests.

Smilanskyj's play is an anachronism and a bigger one than any of the recent series of false silhouettes of great Ukrainian personalities. There is no need to summarize this play, it is so obvious in its intentions that it can be understood from the quotations given.

One of the characters in the play reproaches Lesya that she, as it were, trusts social democrats, that some of her best friends are to be found among them, but the social democrats do not trust her. So, as in the present day practice in the USSR, poor Lesya confesses as though she were about to be purged.

¹³ In 1944 Leonid Smilanskyj wrote a play about Ivan Franko called "The Peasant Deputy."

¹⁴ Leonid Smilanskyj "The Red Rose," a drama in 5 acts, *Dnipro*, Kiev; No. 1, 1955.

It is true that I was born into another class, not the one to which some of my friends belong. But I went over to the other class just as Marx and Engels and many of my friends did at one time. They were an example to me and I took my moral principles from the Parisian communards.¹⁵

All this is phantasy. Her biography nowhere indicates that Lesya Ukrainka posed and solved this problem so clearly. In addition to this, even if she subscribed to such an attitude, she would have been a member of the Social Democratic Party, but as we know, this was not the case. Apparently even in 1904, Lesya Ukrainka could foresee the general line of the Party in 1954 and was faithful to it! For instance:

Lesya, How could one forget? You made the first effort to unite the social democratic forces of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev and the separate nations of Russia into one All-Russian movement and to create a single party in order to overthrow autocracy and strive toward your object—socialism.¹⁶

The Bolsheviks and Mensheviks (these two factions split in 1903), in those pre-revolutionary years, were not striving toward socialism: they fought rather only for the liberal democratic “bourgeois” revolution.

Here is an argument between two Ukrainian socialists, Yury and Gennady, who discuss some of Lesya Ukrainka’s articles directed, apparently, against moderate Ukrainian socialists. The discussion is also attended by Lysenko, well-known Ukrainian composer.

Yury, Are we indeed criminals?

Gennady, Of course not. You declare yourself to be a socialist party, but in fact—and Lesya proves it—your program comforts the bourgeoisie, although it’s true that it’s our own Ukrainian bourgeoisie and not a foreign one.¹⁷

Yury, She is confused . . . How do you like those lines she wrote about Bohdan Khmelnytskyj and read to us herself, but so far hasn’t published? “And the right arm of Khmelnytskyj was raised high . . . And brother recognized brother and were united.” This means presumably “We want to be under the orthodox Muscovite tsar.” Can you make any other sense of it . . . ?

Lysenko, We, my friend, are not united with the tsars, but with the nation . . .¹⁸

Smilanskyj by letting Lysenko appear, has a chance to propagate the latest Bolshevik idea that the Pereyaslav treaty was not a treaty with the tsar, but the union of two peoples—the Ukrainian and Russian.

It is obvious then that the aim is to prove first, that Lesya Ukrainka stood for a single centralized party; second that even then there were Ukrainian

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

socialist-traitors whom she opposed and third, that she was an adherent of Khmelnytskyj simply because he united the Ukraine with Russia.

The author also takes this opportunity of showing us that Lysenko apparently agreed with everything that Lesya said and was therefore also a Bolshevik "forebear."

Moreover the author puts into Lesya's mouth such "principles" as this:

Lesya, In a day or two they intend to ask Symyrenko for money to publish books and newspapers . . . I have tried more than once to convince my mother that help from this Ukrainian millionaire only compromises every public action.¹⁹

It is interesting that out of all the characters in Smilanskyj's play, the Governor General M. Dragomirov (1830—1905), understand Lesya's rôle best. It is not quite clear why the author makes the Governor General sum Lesya up so accurately.

Dragomirov, By the way, do you know who wrote this poem? A certain poetess. Almost a hothouse creature. Her friends say she is weak . . . (he shouts). But she is not too weak to shake the foundations of the empire!²⁰

Lesya Ukrainka indeed shook the foundations of the Russian empire, not as a "forebear" of Bolshevism, but as a Ukrainian poetess. However neither Smilanskyj, nor his character the Governor General, dares to say so. The Governor Generals of that time and the present day Soviet leaders saved and are striving to save the same totalitarian empire, the base of which was shaken by Lesya Ukrainka; Smilanskyj, fulfilling the orders of his present leaders makes Lesya join the "saviors" of this empire.

Incidentally, the author paints an interesting human picture of M. Dragomirov. The Governor General issues his orders:

. . . I forbid you to make any concessions to the workers. Call the Cossacks! . . . Shoot without warning!
And then:

Dragomirov, (his hand trembles as he takes a glass and the contents are spilled) . . . (he drinks, hesitates for a moment, walks to the icon and then, dropping slowly on one knee he crosses himself with great feeling from the forehead to the heart and from the right shoulder to the left . . .)²¹

The Governor is tormented by his conscience. If the audience compares this image with that of the present day leaders, Dragomirov emerges at least the more humane.

Lesya then continues along the Party line:

Lesya (looking at certain books with Taras), Herzen, Shevchenko, Chernyshevsky . . . and here is Ulyanov (Lenin) . . . Our teachers.²²

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

²² *Ibid.*

Apart from Shevchenko who occupies the first place in the hearts of all Ukrainians, their teachers were possibly Herzen or Chernyshevsky, but no one that time read Lenin; Plekhanov not Lenin was studied by socialists.

Lysenko (in Smilanskyj's play), calls Lesya Ukrainka "the stormy petrel of the revolution," paying an appropriate tribute on this occasion, to Maxim Gorky. This is what Lesya says about Lysenko.

Lesya, As far as Mykola Vitalyevych is concerned, he is a great, great composer and indeed a great man. Was he thinking about himself when he recently set Franko's "Eternal Revolutionary" to music? That was for the people . . .²³

Claudia, Wasn't it Franko himself who classed you next to Shevchenko as a poet?

Lesya, You don't know what you are talking about. Shevchenko was a great friend of Brulov, Chernyshevsky and Nekrasov. The flaming hearts of the Russian revolutionaries inspired Shevchenko's genius.²⁴

Thus according to Smilanskyj, Shevchenko was great only because he was the friend of Nekrasov and Chernyshevsky. This is not an accidental statement: it is a most important thesis in present Soviet propaganda. It is a clear indication of the type of ideology under which a writer in the Ukraine lives. Even in Yanovskyj's "The Young Will" with which we have already dealt, there was nothing similar to it.

Apparently Lesya Ukrainka disliked V. Vynnychenko and was critical of his works. However, according to Smilanskyj, it was not because of any artistic short-comings he might have had, but only that she was "against the Ukrainian Social Democrats who want to act separately from the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDRP)." "She denies them the right to exist separately from the Russians, independently . . ."²⁵ Vynnychenko is contrasted by Lesya to Kotsyubynskyj who "... even in his dreams saw the revolution and lauded it in almost his every word."²⁶

It is noticeable that Smilanskyj consistently pursues the idea of a permanent and close co-operation between the Ukrainians and the Russians. The Ukrainian writers, political leaders and so on are always mentioned in company with the Russians whether this is justified or not. Even if a Russian is to be attacked, his Ukrainian compatriot is also criticized. For instance, a faithful friend and follower of Lesya's, Claudia, says: "Let the Vynnychenko's and Artsybashev's spit in our faces, we shall not retrace our steps."²⁷

Despite everthing, Smilanskyj's "Red Rose" is more successful histrionically than Yanovskyj's "The Young Freedom." In Yanovskyj' play everything is

²³ A special play by Yu. Mokriev "Creator of Songs" was devoted to Lysenko. This play was staged by the Lvov Theater named M. Zankovetska. It is fitting to recall that M. Lysenko not only set "Eternal Revolutionary" to music but also a prayer "O, Almighty God, Save the Ukraine" with which every service in Ukrainian churches ends.

²⁴ *Dnipro*, No. 1, 1955, p. 40.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

wrong; the background of the action, the events and the way they are presented, everything is false and anti-historical and this applies especially to the characterization of Shevchenko. However only occasionally, does Smilanskyj present Lesya Ukrainka as the person we know her to have been.

The falsifying role of Kornijchuk

Oleksander Kornijchuk, compared with the playwrights already mentioned, made an even worse mess of his task. He also wrote his "Wings," a play of four acts, to order, something he is very accustomed to. One has the impression that there are two writers in the USSR who are most easily adapted to the "general line," they are Ilya Ehrenburg and Oleksander Kornijchuk. They were specially commissioned after Stalin's death to produce literary works which would suggest the faint promise of freedom. What are these "wings" of which Kornijchuk speaks? The answer is given by Romodan, former colonel in the Soviet army and recently appointed a local Party secretary:

Romodan, Our plenum disclosed such truths of life, such strength, that now we have become winged. More than once I have felt as though I was flying over the whole of our land.²⁸

This, of course, is about the September plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1953.

The fourth act of the play begins with a long quotation from the resolution of this plenum, by Samosad a former kolkhoznik.

Samosad (he is reading), Among the causes there is in the first place the violation in agriculture of the principle of the material interest of the workers in the development of production, in increasing its profitability—one of the fundamental principles of socialist husbandry.

That's right too. (He turns over a page and continues to read) . . . Every kolkhoz household is given the right to own an auxiliary private small-holding to satisfy consumer requirements at a time when these requirements cannot be satisfied in full by the socialist economy. The violation of this principle, the increased delivery norms of produce from private small-holdings, shortcomings in the tax policy in respect of the private small-holdings of kolkhozniks led not only to a decrease in the number of cows, pigs, and sheep in private possession of kolkhozniks, but also to a distortion of the concept of the artel form of kolkhozes . . . You know, all this is expressed here with great authority²⁹ (he underlines the passage).

A few lines later Samosad address Dremluha, Chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee:

²⁸ The full text of Kornijchuk's play "Wings" is published in Russian translation in the magazine *Novy Mir* No. 11, 1954. I quote everywhere from this translation but nearly all passages quoted have been checked with the substantial excerpts from the play which appeared in the article by O. Zinkvych carried by *Smoloskyp*, Kiev, No. 2 (50), February, 1955.

²⁹ *Novy Mir*, No. 11, 1954, pp. 40—41.

Samosad, The spring is here again and I'm still hanging about . . .
Dremluha, What spring? Where do you see it?

Samosad (showing him a small book), Here it is. There is so much sun in it that our land will bloom like the embroidered flowers on the towels in a bride's trousseau.³⁰

As we see, it is the ordinary, officially phrased resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU which inspires "wings," contains so much "sun," causes souls to bloom.

There is little difference between the style of the plenum's decisions and that of V. Mayakovsky (1893—1930). The only thing which distinguishes this play from the ordinary propaganda leaflet is a certain poetic licence used by Kornijchuk with the permission of the authorities, such as utterances about various inconsistencies of the Bolsheviks. A great many people were taken in by these "freedoms" and were inclined to evaluate the play very highly.

In fact the dramatic quality of this play is very poor. For example, Varvara, the sister of the secretary of the Oblast Party Committee and a colonel, herself a Communist decorated with the Orders of Lenin and of the Red Banner of Labor, works as an ordinary laborer carrying bricks at the building site. This Soviet "activist" dreams only of returning to her kolkhoz as a team leader in order to cultivate corn! Or another example: Romodan is visited by his old school mistress, Horytsvit.

She removes her scarf; on her breast are seen the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner of Labor and a medal.³¹

She is eighty five years old and is looking after the local museum! In short, the author depicts good, hardworking people. It is only the old bureaucrats who have detached themselves from the people who are in the way. It does not matter, however, the author consols his audience, the bureaucrats will retire and nothing will prevent the country from blooming like the "embroidered flowers on the towels in a bride's trousseau." In the foreground of the play are naturally the new Soviet rulers—the petty bourgeoisie who most clumsily play the part of the "masters."

Kornijchuk's play also sets out to prove that not all those who lived under the German occupation or who were sent to Germany to work were traitors to the nation. This notion is only at the beginning of its propagation because there are still "responsible workers" who think differently. Even this modest effort to rehabilitate the former enslaved *Ostarbeiter* was pleasing to many.

An example of the "audacity" with which the ordinary women workers speak to the head of the Oblast Executive Committee, Comrade Dremluha himself, is as follows:

Dremluha, How long are you going to wander about here?

Varvara, You may be wandering about, we're working.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Pylyp, What?

Varvara, You heard.

Hala, You should give us a truck because we have to carry the bricks all the way from the barge.

Drumluha, If you haven't finished the garage in two days time, I'll turn you out of here. Do you hear me?

Varvara, You look old but you bellow like an bullock.

Pylyp, Do you know whom you're speaking to? This is Comrade Dremluha, the Chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee.

Varvara, So what?³²

True, *Varvara's* "audacity" is not so great when we remember that she is an "activist," the holder of two orders and ... the sister of *Dremluha's* direct superior, the new Secretary of the Oblast Party Committee, *Romodan*.

There are even more audacious expressions spoken by even more authoritative persons, mostly by *Romodan* and his wife. For instance:

Romodan, How much evil, pain and tears were brought upon the people through the suspicion, masquerading as watchfulness that that gang [Beriaists] was sowing. They blinded us but we believed. And how we believed!

Anna, (quietly) They wounded the great and the small ... (from the bottom of her heart surge bright and simple words), Thank you! Great thanks to the Central Committee! That frightful nightmare will never return!

Romodan, Never!³³

In another place *Romodan* says:

The war was over and after it we all had to live through so many tears and joys and sorrows.³⁴

How could the audience fail to be enchanted by the fact that these matters were publically discussed on the stage.

This same *Romodan* (who, by the way, can easily sweep all obstacles from his path), when addressing *Dremluha*, says:

Your soul is corroded by a lust for power; only contempt for the people, their needs and requirements remains. For you the Party is your own ego and not the conscience and honor of the people.³⁵

A kolkhoz meeting is in progress. The Chairman, instead of ringing the bell, bangs a rail with a hammer and calls the meeting to order.

A voice, Put that hammer down! Don't smother democracy!

Voices, That's right! Don't smother it!³⁶

³² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

These and similar utterances were a good advertisement for the play; a large number of people were surprised that the Bolsheviks allowed the publication of such an apparent "anti-Soviet" work. However there is nothing "anti-Soviet" in it at all. On the contrary, all the positive characters in the play are Communists and naturally "real" Communists and not "bureaucrats" or "Beria-Bandits."

It is interesting that these positive characters always appear wearing their orders and medals pinned to their chests whereas the negative characters do not wear them although they possess them. The object of this play seems to be well summed up in the following quotation.

Varvara, These are great, sunny decisions... but even the sun can cloud over when one forgets the people, as that secretary did. If you caress people they will turn mountains upside down for you!³⁷

What in fact the people needed was food and clothing: in the USSR the provision of such necessities indeed means "the turning of mountains upside down." In other words it was necessary to force the kolkhozniks and workers to work harder. At a given stage (the September Plenum 1953), it was decided to "caress" the Soviet worker in order to accomplish this task. Kornijchuk, through the mouth of that super-positive character Varvara, reveals this. He does not complicate his task, he simply paints in black and white. This was not noticed by one of his critics:

In Kornijchuk's play "Wings," a bureaucrat Dremluha, ostentatiously exhibits his dirty aims, speaks and acts with imprudent frankness.³⁸

Every audience or reader will immediately notice who is a negative and who a positive character. Kornijchuk tries to direct his audiences' sympathies toward the positive hero—Romodan—Dremluha's adversary, but the artificiality of all this emerges very clearly.

The audience applauds Romodan, and therefore the author, not for artistic qualities but for those "freedoms," for stressing openly the negative sides of Soviet bureaucracy which the audience, quite clearly, will associate with the whole Soviet system. This was not exactly Kornijchuk's task and this is why he has continuously altered his play.

Plays are often rewritten or partially revised in the Soviet Union to conform with Party requirements, often without the author's permission. For example, the Soviet Ukrainian writer, V. Sobko, complains:

I wrote a play "The Happiness of Trokhym Korchak." I took it to the theater and they started work on it. They altered everything until they had completely changed its appearance. In its 11th or 12th variant it emerged in such a state that it was only worthy of abuse, and it got it.³⁹

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³⁸ *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, March 1, 1955.

³⁹ *Teatr*, Moscow, No. 1, 1954, p. 129.

5. Conclusions

Soviet playwrights falsify at will and pay not the slightest attention to historical truth or to the probability of their scenes and situations. Quite often they allow very crude anachronisms in their work in order to satisfy the provisional "general line" of the Party.

An example of this changeability of the "general line" is the attitude of Soviet historiography to Bohdan Khmelnytskyj. Earlier one might have read:

The parleys with Moscow dragged on for three years, and were eventually concluded in 1654 by the well-known Pereyaslav Treaty which determined the union of the Ukrainian feudalists with the Russians and in essence judicially defined the beginning of the colonial rule of Russia over the Ukraine.⁴⁰

It would be idle to look for something similar today in any Soviet writing. In contemporary Soviet Ukrainian drama Bohdan Khmelnytskyj is described in an entirely different way. Even the composer M. Lysenko, who was hardly a politician but an artist, is forced to talk about the union "not with the tsars, but with the people."

The propaganda section attached to the Central Committee of the Party which allocates poets, novelists and playwrights their "socialist tasks" would naturally like to have works of artistic value or at least works which approach it. This is why the poets and novelists are supported by various means: materially these artists are a privileged caste in the USSR; they live as Soviet dignitaries, not in a common, but in a golden cage.

The Bolsheviks have to be satisfied by such works produced by dependent artists because where there is no really free creative activity a forced insincere product replaces a genuine one. The falsification of history and of the spiritual essence of outstanding Ukrainian personalities in contemporary literature is bound to have a considerable negative influence on the Soviet Ukrainian reader. This factor should be taken into consideration when studying the Soviet distortion of national cultures.

⁴⁰ *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia*, Vol. 59, 1935, p. 818.

A Resistance Group of the Ukrainian Underground 1920—1926

P. LUTAREWYTCH

Editor's Foreword

With the passage of time it is too easily forgotten that the Bolsheviks came into power by force and expanded their control by force, overthrowing national republics which had been created upon the collapse of the Empire. Resistance was stubborn and deep-seated. In the Ukraine every village and district had its local resistance group which at times succeeded in paralyzing the local Soviet administration. In some cases these groups continued their activity long after the civil war had come to an end and war Communism had been succeeded by the New Economic Policy.

The anti-Bolshevik struggle passed through four fairly well defined stages. In the first, Bolshevized units of deserters from the southwestern front were opposed by units made up of Ukrainian soldiers from the tsarist army, troops of the Ukrainian National Republic, local self-government organs, and revolutionary militia in cities and villages. In the second phase, partisan bands supported by parts of the local population were opposed by local Ukrainian administrative organs and local self-defense organizations each responsible for the defense of a specific street, a section of a city, a rural district, or similar area. With the arrival of large-scale forces, the Bolshevik occupation with its food requisitioning detachments and revolutionary committees was opposed by the army of the Ukrainian National Republic and its allies, partisan units under the control of the army, and local self-defense combat groups. The final phase of resistance was carried on under great difficulties after the Bolshevik occupation had become established in force. In this phase, the struggle against military punitive detachments of the Cheka and OGPU, the Soviet administrative apparatus, and the Bolshevik militia was carried on by peasant insurgents, mobile partisan combat groups and groups of the Ukrainian underground movement.

Few documents have been published relating to the anti-Bolshevik resistance movement in its last phases, important though such documents are for an understanding of the resistance, organized and spontaneous, offered by the Ukrainian people to the Bolshevik invaders. Equally important are such documents as background for an understanding of the situation in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic today.

The following eye-witness account describes the activities of a typical Ukrainian resistance group during the years 1921—1926. Originally published in full in the Ukrainian-language *Ukrainsky Zbirnik* of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, it has been somewhat condensed by the omission of details of names and places, and is presented as a useful document for the study of the Ukrainian resistance movement. Further details by the same author may be found in the Institute's *Ukrainsky Zbirnik* (Vol. 3, 1955) and in the newspaper *Ukrainskyj Prometey* (Detroit, April 1923, Nos. 14—16).

The original leader of the resistance group whose activities form the subject of this sketch was a young Ukrainian by the name of Hres.

Serhij Vasylovych Hres was born in Chornukhy, a small town in the Lohvytsya district of Poltava province. His father, Vasyl Muiovych Hres, and his mother Klavdia owned 24 acres of land in Chornukhy. Their family consisted of five sons and two daughters.

Serhij, born in 1890, was the eldest son. His brother Volodymyr, who also played a prominent part in the resistance movement, was the third child. Serhij did not finish high school, but Volodymyr graduated and became a primary school teacher. Both were in the tsarist army from the beginning of World War I; both graduated from the officers training school at the beginning of the 1917 revolution and returned home as lieutenants.

Wearied from three years of service in the front lines, Serhij and Volodymyr did not serve in the Ukrainian armed forces in the years 1917—1920 but devoted themselves to cultural, educational and organizational work among the Ukrainian peasants. Visiting the villages and hamlets around Chornukhy the brothers established youth clubs, produced and sometimes acted in plays, gave lectures, set up branches of the *Prosvita* (Enlightenment) Society and carried on other activities. They also established contact with persons who, at the right moment, could be rallied to defend the freedom of their country against the Communist invaders. Taking advantage of the revolutionary chaos, the brothers collected stores of ammunition and arms and energetically gathered around them former Ukrainian servicemen who were persecuted by the occupation authorities. In 1919—1920 they set up in Chornukhy an underground military organization, which was connected with the nucleus of the Ukrainian underground movement, the Cossack Council in Kiev.

Serhij Hres, who used the pseudonym Halaida, was a natural leader for a resistance movement. He was energetic and strong willed, a good speaker, courageous, calm, and well-balanced. In his cultural and educational work as well as in the underground movement he was prudent but firm. His decisions were well thought out. His closest collaborator, his brother Volodymyr, who called himself Honta, was an ardent patriot whose imagination was captured by Ukrainian political romanticism. He underestimated the aims and strength of the enemy and paid little attention to the opinions or advice of others. He loved to wear a Cossack uniform; he belonged to the type of ambitious leader who strives for power and glory, which often led him to into mistaken actions. He had an inclination for intrigue, sometimes even against his own brother, and suffered from a lack of discipline. Misunderstandings and antagonism between the brothers in their organizational work frequently led to the taking of sides and quarrels between their underground followers, and was detrimental to their struggle against the occupying forces.

The main goal of the underground military organization in Chornukhy was to take limited armed action against the Communist invaders, particularly Party members and Cheka agents, to disrupt the Bolshevik economy and transport system, to kindle among the people a national consciousness and propagate the idea of a Ukrainian sovereign state.

By the beginning of 1921 the underground organization in Chornukhy was ready to undertake armed action. The local districts were almost entirely organized and ready to take part in an uprising. They were awaiting orders from the Kiev center, but these never came. Eventually it became known that the Soviet authorities had discovered and liquidated the center of the Ukrainian underground movement, the Cossack Council in Kiev. Fearing the same fate for the local organization the Hres brothers decided to abandon the underground movement and to undertake open armed action against the enemy. Attempts at a general uprising in the area failed. In their first action the insurgents numbered about 300 persons, of whom about half, under the command of Volodymyr were mounted. The remainder, on foot, were commanded by Serhij. The insurgents were, for the time, well armed. In addition to rifles and revolvers, they possessed a number of light machine guns, a considerable quantity of hand grenades and ammunition, and several Maxim heavy machine guns on carriages. At the beginning of August 1921 they disarmed the local militia, and then took refuge in the forests in expectation of counteraction.

The older brother, Serhij, was particularly desirous of avoiding strong counteraction on the part of the enemy, as he was convinced that there would soon be a general uprising in the Ukraine supported by an incursion by the army of the Ukrainian National Republic from abroad. When and how this was to begin nobody knew; the general guess was for the autumn of 1921. The insurgent staff made its headquarters in the ruins of the ancient Krasnohirsky Monastery near the village of Pisok on the Udai river. A considerable number of the insurgents, anticipating the general uprising, remained at home, where they received such assistance as the local population was able to render.

In order to combat the expected uprising a cavalry detachment of 250 with a number of mounted machine guns arrived in Chornukhy under the command of a Communist named Uglov. The detachment occupied the center of the town and the gardens of two former landowners. Uglov at once reorganized the Communist administration and took steps against the insurgents. He ordered hostages taken from the villages and hamlets, arrested innocent citizens, and directed a campaign of extortion and terrorism against the population. All those arrested were sent to the Cheka prison at Lokhvytsya.

From their forest refuge the insurgents still controlled from 50 to 70 square kilometers of this densely populated area. Learning that the hostages taken by Uglov were in danger of being shot, they determined to secure a counter-hostage by capturing the head of the Lokhvytsya Cheka or the head of the District Executive Committee. They succeeded in capturing the head of the Cheka by watching the house of relatives, and extracted from him a letter to the district authorities in Lokhvytsya ordering the hostages to be set free in return for his own life and that of his wife. The next day the hostages were freed, and the Cheka head and his wife were released.

With the approach of winter, the Communist authorities attempted in vain to requisition foodstuffs in the areas controlled by the insurgents. Requisitioning

detachments sent out by the Communists were liquidated. In November came news that units of the army of the Ukrainian National Republic had crossed the border from Poland and started their second winter campaign in the Ukraine. The time appeared ripe for a large-scale action by the insurgents in the Chornukhy district, who resolved to force Uglov's terrorists out of Chornukhy, and to destroy them. On the night of November 7 insurgents led by Serhij Hres surrounded Chornukhy and began an attack which by daybreak had developed into a pitched battle. Uglov's detachment and the local militia offered no resistance, but retreated toward Lohvytsya. Serhij had left this direction open so that his brother Volodymyr could ambush the retreating detachment. But Volodymyr became delayed by a lengthy argument with his brother and failed to carry out his portion of the plan on time. His insurgents suffered the loss of 5 men killed and 12 wounded.

Uglov lost 46 of his men killed, but succeeded in saving the bulk of his detachment. However, his detachment did not return to Chornukh but remained in Lohvytsya.

Some time later there appeared in the Chornukhy area a detachment belonging to armed bands of the famous anarchist Makhno. This detachment was led by a woman known as Marusya. Marusya suggested that the local insurgents join forces with her detachment and take part in a joint action to capture a nearby sugar refinery guarded by a detachment from the forces of the Bolshevik cavalry officer Budenny. Serhij was strongly opposed to a joint action but his brother insisted and eventually won his point, joined his mounted detachment to Marusya's forces and went into action. An engagement took place near the village of Shramkivska, but it soon became clear that Budenny's force had been expecting an assault and was prepared to meet it. Marusya's detachment was defeated, and the Chornukhy insurgents lost 32 killed and wounded and were compelled to take flight. Volodymyr himself was wounded.

As it was considered certain that the Bolsheviks would undertake a large-scale action against the Chornukhy insurgents, the latter decided to retire into the depths of the forest and to avoid encounters with the enemy. Couriers brought news of the suppression of uprisings and of further Bolshevik terrorism of the population of the entire Ukraine. All contact with the Kiev center of the insurgent movement had ceased. The insurgent staff of the Chornukhy district called an extraordinary meeting of their Council, to decide on means of coping with the situation.

As he analysed the situation, Serhij could see no purpose in continuing the struggle in hopeless isolation and therefore proposed that an amnesty be negotiated with the Bolshevik government of the Ukrainian SSR in Kharkov. Volodymyr on the other hand advised in favor of moving westward and emigrating across the Ukrainian-Polish frontier. One officer proposed that the entire body of insurgents join up with others at Kholodnyj Yar in the neighborhood of Kiev, continue the struggle, and, if it proved useless, leave for Poland in the spring. Another proposed further uncompromising partisan action against the enemy by small isolated bands. The Council failed to agree upon a concrete decision. Each proponent of a separate line of action gathered his supporters about him and began to carry out his own plan independently, to the detriment of the morale and unity of action of the insurgents. Some, chiefly those who had been inactive and were not known to the Cheka, returned to their homes.

Volodymyr Hres continued to gather his adherents. After first agreeing to set out for Kholodnyj Yar, he changed his mind and decided to remain with his brother to await the expected amnesty. Serhij, through local intermediaries, began parleys with the Bolshevik authorities regarding the possibility of capitulation in return for an amnesty. The intermediaries made frequent secret visits to the insurgent staff and negotiations progressed. Meanwhile a detachment of 40, made up chiefly of residents of other areas of the Ukraine, departed in the direction of Kiev. While awaiting conclusion of the amnesty, the Chornukhy insurgents refrained from armed action.

In March 1922 the Soviet government announced an amnesty for all insurgents. The Hres brothers and the 124 men remaining from their original troop made a formal surrender in the market square of Lokhvytsya handing over 60 horses, three heavy and seven light machine guns and more than 100 rifles and revolvers, in addition to handgrenades, ammunition and other supplies. The surrender was attended by the head of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR, H. Petrovskyj, who personally handed a certificate of amnesty to each insurgent as he laid down his arms. The certificate guaranteed freedom, and security from oppression or persecution for past activities. Following the amnesty Serhij withdrew from cultural and educational activity and occupied himself with farming in Chornukhy.

Serhij however, had no faith in the sincerity of the Bolshevik amnesty. He was convinced that sooner or later reprisals would be directed not only against the former insurgents but also against the entire Ukrainian people, and that the Bolshevik concessions under the New Economic Policy were only a tactical measure. Even the Bolshevik policy of Ukrainization aroused his suspicion. He declared, "Either those who took part in the Ukrainian uprising will have won and will have forced the enemy to capitulate or there will be reprisals by Red Moscow for our efforts at self-liberation." He and other former members of the Ukrainian underground movement, like the Ukrainian people as a whole, were not left long in suspense. One group of insurgents led by Captain Evhen Yena, had not accepted the amnesty but continued to take armed action. For this reason Serhij was subjected to persecution. He was several times arrested, imprisoned in Poltava, and questioned regarding Yena's detachment and the hiding places of their arms.

When he was released from prison for the last time, Serhij decided that under such circumstances he could no longer live in the Ukraine and in 1925 left for Siberia with his wife and two small daughters. There he worked as a forester. He was continually under observation and in 1930 was again arrested by the OGPU and sent back to Chornukhy. Tried for his past activities he was sentenced by a special OGPU court sitting in secret and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment in the Solovki concentration camp, where he died at the hands of the OGPU.

Volodymyr Hres worked after the amnesty as a school teacher in the village of Kovali in the Chornukhy raion. The group of insurgents still active under Yena, as well as other members of the underground movement, warned him more than once of danger from the OGPU. In 1927 he was arrested by the OGPU and sentenced for his past activities to ten years' imprisonment in the Svirlag concentration camp. After serving out his term he did not return home.

Captain Yena refused to capitulate, but remained in the underground movement with a small group of faithful friends, determined to continue the armed struggle until the very end. In the course of their activities against the Bolshevik occupation the little group came in contact with a widespread underground terrorist organization in the Lokhvytsya district, and under the resourceful and intelligent leadership of Yena continued to be a thorn in the side of the Communist authorities in Chornukhy, Varva, Pyryatyn, Lokhvytsya, Romen, Sencha and other districts. In April 1922, a month after the amnesty, Yena began to make his presence felt. The chief of the Chornukhy militia, Yosyp Kolomiets, decided to take action against the insurgents. Yena learned of this decision and organized an ambush at the little hamlet of Lytiv. Kolomiets was wounded and one militiaman captured. In May the partisans, supported by underground organizations in Chornukhy and other sympathisers, made a successful night raid on the militia post in Chornukhy. However, a few members of the militia, as well as the local Communists, succeeded in escaping.

Determined to destroy the partisans at all costs the head of the Lokhvytsya Cheka, recruited Oleksij Chervyak, a former member of the resistance group, who had taken advantage of the amnesty and assigned him the task of killing Yena. Chervyak agreed and entered the forest to make contact with the partisans. There he proved his loyalty to the Cheka by murdering the first partisan he met. Having thus acquired the confidence of the Cheka, he was used for increasingly important tasks. He wormed his way into one of the cells of a secret resistance organization in Chornukhy, not that of Yena, and became a member. As a result of his denunciations, the entire group, with one exception, was arrested and its members shot in Lokhvytsya in 1922. Chervyak then became an official agent of the Cheka. Yena's detachment was compelled to cease its armed activities for the time being.

In October 1922 the insurgents halted a passenger train near the village of Hiryavi-Yuskivtsi, shot all Communists aboard, and made off with supplies of winter clothing and arms. They repeated this act a few days later with another passenger train near the village of Yuskivtsi-Senhanski. Thereafter, armored trains were run on this line.

The Cheka increased its acts of terrorism against the defenceless population, including reprisals against those suspected of resistance activity. A special tribunal of the Chornukhy Cheka sentenced to death and shot in the presence of the entire population of the town gathered on a hill near the schoolhouse, nine well-to-do farmers taken as hostages because of the activity of the Ukrainian insurgents in the Chornukhy area. The insurgents at the cost of great effort, and with the aid of the secret resistance organization, captured the Cheka agent Chervyak, condemned him to death, and carried out the sentence.

Ascension Day was, by local custom in Chornukhy, a market day. Peasants gathered from the whole area. On Ascension Day in 1922 a militiaman came to the widow of Mykhailo Holota, one of the recently shot hostages, to requisition a cow, the Cheka sentence having called for requisitioning all the property of those executed. Motrya refused to part with the cow, and was shot by order of the head of the local Committee of Poor Peasants. News of this event enraged the crowd gathered in the market place. Armed with whatever weapons they could lay hands on, the crowd ran to the office of the Committee of Poor Peasants, dragged the offending head outside, and administered a severe beating.

The crowd dispersed only upon the arrival of the head of the local Cheka, armed with a machine gun, which he fired into the air. A few were arrested and sentenced to a year's imprisonment.

In January 1923 the insurgents under Yena surrounded the village of Berbeshtsi in the Lokhvitytsya district, where a representative of the district food commissar and six militiamen were requisitioning food and other supplies from the peasants, and cut down the detachment. In April Yena's band captured and shot the chief of the Lokhvitytsya prison and one of the local Communists. In July 1925 he captured and executed the head of the Bilousivka Executive Committee, a former Red partisan. Among other actions during the years 1923 and 1924, the detachment disarmed the militia in the market town of Varva, seized the funds of the State Trading Organization, and turned over to the peasants the contents of the shops. Similar actions were carried out in other villages, including Bilousivka, Hiltsi, Dashchenky and Ozeryne. Because of the sympathy of the population for Yena's insurgents, the local authorities were helpless to combat them. It became necessary for the district authorities, with their larger and better armed detachments, to take action.

In 1923—1924 the period of war communism and the activities of the Cheka came to an end. The New Economic Policy was introduced and the Cheka was replaced by the OGPU. The name, organization and uniform were changed but the reality remained the same. The OGPU used the period of the NEP to build up an unbelievably complex network of secret agents. These secret agents, disguised as instructors, statisticians, insurance agents, agronomists and so on, worked ceaselessly to create a dense network of secret collaborators known as *Seksots*. The secret district representatives of the OGPU did not directly involve the *Seksots* in subversion. When visiting villages they merely observed, noted and selected candidates as possible agents for the OGPU and notified the authorities. A man who was earmarked as a future *Seksot* or agent was called to the area department of the OGPU. There the chief of the area department had a "talk" with him, while a revolver lay on the table between them, and required him to sign an obligation. From that moment the *Seksot* was in touch with the district agent of the OGPU in the locality where he lived. Numbers varied from place to place depending on the size of the population, but everywhere the number of persons thus recruited constituted a considerable percentage of the population.

The fact that the *Seksots* were not acquainted with each other greatly assisted the activities of the OGPU, especially in their control of the *Seksots* themselves. Soon no one knew who could be trusted and mutual confidence disappeared. Sons denounced fathers and brother denounced brother. This was one of the most frightful measures of terrorism under the Soviet régime.

As far as the Ukrainian underground movement was concerned, the extraordinarily dense network of *Seksots* and secret agents created conditions which paralyzed its activity. The leaders of the Chornukhy underground movement decided to collect information on the *Seksots* and agents of the OGPU in the district. Devoted service was rendered by the young people and by the members of the terrorist group of the underground movement, who worked in the local OGPU with knowledge of the resistance organization. Lists of the *Seksots* in the district were soon in the hands of the underground. The temporarily suspended armed action by the insurgents and the secret organization started anew.

In April 1924 the underground movement executed a number of OGPU agents and Communists and in the spring of 1925 killed another group of Communists, including the secretary of the district Party committee, the chairman of the district land administration and the women's organizer. The group also took action to render harmless members of the underground movement who failed to observe secrecy.

In the late fall of 1925 a mounted punitive detachment of 150 men under the command of Belayev a special plenipotentiary of the Poltava oblast OGPU, arrived in the Chornukhy district with full powers from the Poltava oblast OGPU to combat banditry. Belayev mobilized the local militia and undertook action against the Ukrainian underground movement and particularly against Yena's insurgents. It soon became known that Belayev had discovered that the partisans, in addition to their forest hideouts, often spent the winter in the tiny hamlets of the Chornukhy, Lokhvytsya and Varva districts. He dispatched members of his detachment to search these hamlets for insurgents.

The endless searches of houses, the requisitioning, and the acts of terror filled the population with disgust, both for the Communists and for the insurgents, who were in danger of complete extermination. At the urging of one of the resistance leaders, Yena agreed to halt his activities temporarily and to remain in hiding until spring. The resistance leader in turn agreed to find places of concealment, to store arms and ammunition, and to prepare a stock of food for the insurgents.

Several members of the group were ambushed and killed by the OGPU. To save their own lives the local inhabitants refused further assistance. Further resistance had become hopeless. In the spring of 1926 the four remaining members of the group, including Yena left their homeland forever.

REVIEWS

Charles Bettelheim: *Problèmes théoriques et pratiques de la planification*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951, 384 pages.

An element which is common to certain Western economists and their counterparts on the other side of the Iron Curtain is their almost slavish attachment to the idea of collectivism in general and the Soviet variety in particular. They do not rely on an objective analysis of the possibilities deriving from the collective structure of economy; but on unconditional faith in the superiority of collectivism over liberal economic systems. Such an attitude makes it difficult for them to analyze effectively Soviet theory and practice.

Bettelheim belongs to this category of Western economists. One of his fundamental arguments is this: "In planning, the economy ceases to follow economic laws and submits to the will of the people" (page 8). Thus, according to Bettelheim, all irregularities in the economic process which appear as crises under the capitalists system, disappear if planning is introduced.

Indeed, in a collectivist state of the Soviet type production is planned and directed by the state. This hardly means that the economy "submits to the will of the people." The aim of man's economic activities is to satisfy all his needs with the minimum of effort. Human needs and the capacity of effort are not equal in all men and change continuously. The state is not able to evaluate them or foresee their future development. However the state must plan what, and how much should be produced. Consequently "the will of the people" which Bettelheim mentions and by which he probably means the consumer, is in fact only the will of the group of men who rule the state. The Soviet economic leaders accentuate heavy industry and armements. Clearly this trend in the Soviet economy has nothing to do with the will of the population particularly since it is carried out at the expense of general living standards.

A large part of the book is devoted to such problems of economic planning as, for instance, which needs should have priority of satisfaction or the question of choosing a rational method of production. Although Bettelheim says that this kind of question cannot be included in the technical categories (page 6), further on he proposes an entirely mechanical method of calculating cost, prices and amortizations but does not give any economic foundation for it. Many of Bettelheim's practical solutions are built on abstract ideas and they therefore have no perspective in practice. When discussing the order of priority for the

satisfaction of the population's needs, he proposes that one type of goods should be produced until its price and the demand for it reach zero, that is until a given product is available in such quantity that the consumer would not accept it gratis; he then proposes that the production of another item should be started.

Here there is a complete lack of realism in his analysis of collectivism. It is well-known that human needs continually increase, that it is impossible to determine their limit and also that when developing production it is essential to maintain a balance between its various sectors.

On the whole Bettelheim's book is extremely abstract and neglects important questions. Bettelheim does not take into account the problem of supply in a comparatively developed collectivist economy. The Soviet press in recent years has often mentioned goods which have appeared on the market and which, although not substandard, are not of the quality required by the consumer. The Soviet press blames individuals; it would seem, however, that the difficulties arise from the impossibility of foreseeing the quantitative and qualitative evolution of the required goods over a number of years, although the authors of the Five Year Plans claim they are able to do so.

Here the Soviet system faces difficulties which are disregarded by Bettelheim and which are very similar to those of capitalism. Goods are produced but the consumer either rejects them or, having no choice, buys them. In both cases there is a loss because of the production costs of goods for which there is little demand and the neglect of the production of more essential goods.

When comparing capitalism with collectivism, Bettelheim takes collectivism in its ideal theoretical form and capitalism in its real form and moreover in the outdated Marxist interpretation. Naturally, only capitalism suffers from such a comparison.

Bettelheim's book is a good introduction to the theory of Soviet planning in its official interpretation. He dwells upon a number of important questions which face the state planning authorities. However there is nothing in this book about the factual economic processes in the USSR or the solution of the theoretical questions discussed.

R. Zybenko

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Dr. Romain Yakemtchuk, *L'O. N. U.*, "*La sécurité régionale et le problème du régionalisme*," Paris, Editions Pédôme, 1955, 310 pages.

This book by a young Ukrainian scholar which has also been published under the auspices of Louvain University, deals with the problem of regional international alliances in connection with the charter of the United Nations Organization and the problem of regional security.

The author, who considers that regionalism is one of the stages toward universalism, distinguishes between organic regionalism which is created as the result of spontaneous and natural cooperation between states geographically and culturally similar, and functional regionalism which is a result of conscious aims and tasks. The author's main attention is concentrated on how and in what form the problem of regionalism influenced such a universal organization as the United Nations.

In the first chapter of his book, the author reviews the initial planning of UNO from the viewpoint of regionalism, up to the Dumbarton Oak's conference.

The second chapter deals with the efforts of the great powers to achieve a union of nations and gives the public and official reaction to these efforts. In the third chapter the author shows how the regional agreements influenced the conference in San Francisco and the UNO Charter.

The fourth chapter, probably the most interesting, is devoted to regional agreements such as the Organization of South American States, the Arab League, West European Union and NATO. The fifth chapter of the first part of the book deals with the functioning of the regional principle at UNO; the election of judges to the International Court of Justice; the distribution of personnel in the secretariat at UNO; the election of temporary members of the Security Council and so on. In the second part of this work the author gives examples of functional regionalism existing in the system of UNO. The sixth chapter is devoted to problems of international regional law.

A detailed bibliographical index is given at the end of the book.

E. G.

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Brigadier C. N. Barclay: *"The New Warfare,"* London, 1953.

In this work the author discusses, in detail, one of the most urgent problems of today, i. e., the new methods of warfare as employed so successfully by the USSR. In the introduction, he calls the reader's special attention to the dynamic nature of the constant changes in these methods, pointing to the fact that, to a considerable extent, these changes are caused by the development of the means of warfare. The author calls the present struggle a "limited war." In his opinion, such a war may still last a very long time; yet, he says, one must be prepared for the possibility of its unexpectedly turning into a "normal war." Referring to the irrepressibly dynamic nature of the above-mentioned changes, the author expresses his apprehension that the rapid development of the various technical means of warfare may not be adequately appraised in time, especially by the older generation who, owing to age and experience, is in control. Any undérestimation of the potential power of military means may lead the world to final disaster.

The new warfare consists in political acts by diplomatic agents whose principal task is to create and foster permanent misunderstandings and conflicts between the peoples of the world. This has led frequently even to an imminent danger of war. Soviet diplomats applied these methods of warfare with great skill and, with their help, accomplished a great deal for the USSR. For a considerable length of time, the West regrettably paid no attention to the methods of warfare practiced by the Soviets. Today, circumstances already force the politicians of those peoples still free to adopt the Soviet methods of action in order to divert the danger of losing a future war. The present, so-called "cold" war is being conducted with the following means:

1. Propaganda, which has the purpose of inducing one's own people to believe, in the justness of one's own cause and in the abilities of its leaders, and to call attention to the "insidious" intentions of the enemy. Also, propaganda must shake the adversary's belief in the justness and righteousness of its leaders' acts. The essential objective of propaganda, which operates with a whole scale of criteria from intimidation to bribery, from removing the adversary's alertness to breaking his will to resist, is the complete nervous exhaustion of the adversary. In its activity, propaganda employs various means: theater and film, radio, press and other editions, posters, special exhibitions, festivities, congresses of scholars and industrialists, speeches by statesmen and rank-and-file agitators or agents. Propaganda impresses the individual's mind and affects his feelings as well as his eyes and ears. As most people have no personal convictions and opinions, propaganda's chief task is to impose the official view upon them. This is done very carefully and in a constantly changing form, until the individual exposed to it believes that just this view, and no other, is his own view. Propaganda in the international connotation is intended to demoralize the adversary, to gain the sympathy of peoples or, at least, the neutrality of some countries. The standard of propaganda varies with the intellectual level and temperament of the people concerned. By means of their propaganda, the Soviets try to talk their peoples into believing things, no one in the West would believe. In this respect the Soviets, making use in their propaganda of the idea of Communism which in its nature is supposedly acceptable to man (despite its Utopianism), are superior to the West. By opposing the idea of Communism, the West refers in its propagandistic arguments to the old religions, which constantly fight each other. A propaganda conducted for the purpose of inducing foreign countries to remain neutral is very important in war as well as in peace. NATO propaganda has saved very many countries, especially in Europe, from the pressure of Soviet propaganda, for instance Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Greece and Turkey. The tactics of British propaganda differ from those of the propaganda of other nations in that it relies on the truth; it operates with facts presented to full advantage, avoiding deception. This is a very difficult method, but it has proven effective in convincing intelligent people in a very short time. Our author opines that, in its propaganda, the West should launch an offensive not only against the inaccessible fortress of Communism, but particularly against its weak points, primarily the satellite countries.

2. Underground warfare, acts of sabotage, intimidation by threats of war, and attempts at corruption, all serve the purpose of a *coup d'état*. This action is carried out by means of strikes, sabotage and espionage; the difference between these activities and propaganda is that the former commits acts which stand outside the laws of the country in question. The democratic countries of the West tolerate the Communists, granting their representatives the same

rights that are enjoyed by those of other political parties. Yet it is known that in the East any activities whatever of anti-Communist or neutral parties are prohibited. Underground activities can assume different forms: Illegal propaganda by means of clandestine publications, whispering campaigns, coercion of people by blackmail and threats, espionage consisting in the betrayal of political, military, and economic secrets, acts of sabotage aimed at destroying industrial equipment, military objects, means of communication, etc.; inciting to hostile military activities or open revolt and instigation to overthrow the government.

3. Limited hot war is conducted at little personal risk for the attainment of certain limited goals. In this category belong the wars in Korea and in Indochina. The advantage of such wars lies in the circumstance that they can be conducted by proxy, while the country that is interested in them gives only material or moral aid in a more or less conspicuous way—as did the USSR in Korea and Indochina. Everybody is afraid now of a hot war; that is why nations are united in defensive alliances. In addition, people are scared of the speed and long range military means of destruction which might lead to a complete annihilation of either of the belligerent sides. Therefore, even the great powers do not care to risk a hot war under the present conditions. This circumstance is exploited by the USSR through inciting “limited” hot wars in the world’s most sensitive points. In the future, these wars by proxy should be most seriously taken into account and it should be always kept in mind that the Soviets actually did succeed in inducing China to conduct a war in Korea without the USSR’s participation, a war which was not in the interests of the Chinese. The Soviets have already prepared new “middle-men” for conducting such a war, in particular in Europe. In East Germany the People’s Police (*Vopo*) army was organized, a force of 800,000 men ready to launch an aggression against West Germany. Simultaneously, the Soviets have increased the numerical strength of the armed forces of Hungary (from 70,000, as agreed upon in the peace treaty, to 180,000), Romania (from 138,000, per treaty, to 175,000) Bulgaria (from the 65,000, per treaty, to 175,000), Poland and Czechoslovakia. These military preparations are made merely specifically to provoke and conduct “limited hot wars.”

4. Armed threats as a method are employed in such a way that diplomatic activities are backed by the great might of land, sea and air forces, thereby stressing atomic and hydrogen bombs to scare the adversary. The main objective of employing this method is to intimidate the adversary and force him to make concessions. At the same time, it is applied to isolate or neutralize those peoples who maintain a peaceful outlook. It must be remembered that the Soviets, already have at their disposal armed forces which are quantitatively superior to those of the West. On the other hand, the Western powers are superior to those of the East by the technical quality of their arms and technical standards. The author points to the fact that the present state of armed readiness is not a transient phenomenon; he says that this state of semi-mobilization and armament can last even for decades, and this may lead on either side to exhaustion. The Soviets, in particular by applying this method, plan to exhaust the powers of the West.

5. Misunderstandings and disturbances are applied especially by the Soviets for the purpose of constantly nourishing a distrust and hatred for the West. In order to avoid a “hot” war, the Soviets apply these tactics in a legal form, thereby often engaging the aid of their “middle men.” An example is the

attitude the so-called *Vopos* apply to German citizens in trains and on highways, the detaining of citizens on the eastern and western borders of Germany and the setting up of most elaborately invented obstacles to communication. This method calls for special attention since the Soviets employ it in international politics, in particular by misusing the right of veto in the Security Council of UNO. As is known, Soviet diplomacy is conspicuous for its brutality and ruthlessness; it recognizes no postulates of courtesy to which the diplomacy of the West is accustomed. There exists literally not a single political issue in the whole world, which is not an object of the USSR's interest. This is why the USSR, tries by various means, to create disturbances among the peoples, wishing to keep the western countries from cooperating with each other in any field whatever. So, for example, the USSR advertizes the reestablishment of the sovereignty of West Germany and the creation of a German corps with the European Defence Community, as an instrument which, allegedly, is to become a danger for the countries of Europe, especially for France.

The author draws the following conclusions: Peace is not the only form of human coexistence as the history of wars testifies. Peaceful coexistence between peoples is difficult to attain. Leaving aside the various phases of religious, racial, and class antagonisms, the principal reason for the hatred that divides the world, is the difference between the ideological principles of democracy and Communism. Therefore, today it no longer suffices to fight Communism by dogmas or to hope that it will be possible to allay the existing conflict. It is absolutely necessary to lay firm foundations. It must be kept in mind that, the longer hostile prejudices exist between peoples, the more time it will take to eradicate them. It is not enough to possess high spiritual and moral qualities; they must be supported by substantial force—which is armament. Situations must by no means be permitted to develop into crises; it is necessary to react at once and in the right direction. For example, the West considered the defeat of Germany and Japan as a goal, but the Soviets considered it as a mere transitory phase in the process of spreading Communism. The West demobilized itself hurriedly after World War II, the USSR did not. For many years the Soviets have conducted with impunity a propaganda campaign, hostile to the West, and with no reaction to it by the West. To this day, the Soviets have constantly humiliated the West, which has admitted the right of veto in the Security Council of UNO, inadequately conducted the Korean war where, in addition to big losses (170,000 by the USA alone) and deployment of large forces, it has led to such devastation and destruction of the population that in future no people will wish for such a liberation. The Soviets who really provoked the war in Korea, limited themselves to giving only material assistance, while the UN sent there considerable armed forces and, thus, weakened Europe, the principal terrain of the struggle between East and West.

The recognition of the Red Chinese government without coordinating this issue with the USA and the over vacillation in giving Spain access to the Western defense system have considerably contributed to delaying the organization of Western defense. This is one more link in the unending chain of errors committed by the West.

The author suggests that the following principle be adopted to reach a sensible compromise: "Non-intrusion of Communism into western democratic

affairs and non-intervention of democracy into Communist affairs even if Communism were to employ disreputable methods in its struggle against democracy." The Communists will have to discontinue their missionary activities because the West will never agree to their using any means for converting the whole world to their ideology. The Communists would be allowed to stabilize Communism by various means only within the borders of their own territories, but outside of these, they would have the right to disseminate Communism using only peaceful measures which do not contradict the laws of the countries in question. The free world must put up with religious persecutions and secret police terror, faked courts of justice, mass purges and mass deportations to labor camps—all of which is practiced in sovietized countries. Naturally, the free world cannot approve these means of destruction, but it is not in its power to overcome them. The author adds that adoption of this compromise would mean giving up the idea of saving the minorities behind the iron curtain, particularly the satellite countries, whose peoples are not extensively sovietized. Furthermore, the author holds the view that wronged peoples should not be defended against their will, as this has very frequently led to considerable harm. For the sake of liberation, countries have been turned into ruins—as in Korea. Such a liberation merely adds to the general confusion incited by Communism. Thus, the book obviously renounces the Atlantic Charter.

The author advocates peaceful coexistence, which should be achieved in the following stages:

1. Meeting of top-level representatives of the USA, Great Britain, the USSR, and, possibly, Red China to coordinate the above-mentioned principles. The author considers this stage as the most difficult one.

2. Discussions about, and removal of the various differences beginning from the major ones—such as the Korean war, the relations between East and West Germany, and ending with important problems of local significance. The third phase will arise only after agreement has been reached in all questions raised during the second phase. The third phase will be a period of peace lasting for many years. The fourth phase will mark further approaches, i. e. conferences on the highest levels, which should lead to a limitation of armaments.

From the viewpoint of reality and taking into consideration the goals the USSR has set itself, these reflections and proposals may be qualified as impractical daydreams because the world will never find a common language with Communism and Soviet imperialism. Violence and coercion, which in the USSR is rooted in the totalitarian police system can be destroyed only by force of arms, and never by means of diplomatic acts on the part of Western politicians. This conclusion did not occur to Brigadier Barclay, because he knows little of the systematic extermination by Bolshevism of those peoples who, owing to the West's incorrect policy, came under Soviet control during and after World War II. The author is also apparently indifferent toward the lot of those peoples who, since 1917—1920, have been compelled to endure totalitarian violence and deprivation of rights under the Soviet system.

Toward the end of the book, the author remarks that, in case it were not possible to attain this harmonious cooperation between the East and the West, it would be necessary to master all means of "cold warfare" and apply them

most decisively; and in case of a third world war—endeavor to win it so as to avoid universal chaos and confusion. At the same time, the Western world must be constantly prepared for negotiations for peaceful coexistence. The book makes no mention about the liberation of the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism.

In this book, the author fails to indicate any interest he may have in the fate of the peoples subjugated by Bolshevism. It should be added that, on the basis of the above-mentioned political conceptions, the West would scarcely have a chance to win any future war against the East—today already a powerful bloc.

F. Korduba

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D. Dallin: "American Politics and Russia," *Novy Zhurnal*, New York, Vol. XXXVI, 1954.

The well-known American student of Soviet affairs D. Dallin, a Russian by origin, has published in Vol. XXXVI of *Novy Zhurnal* (probably the most serious and certainly the most ambitious literary and political journal of Russian emigrés) an interesting article in which he attempts to analyze the principles of American policy toward Russia and the USSR in the past and the present. Also, he tries to give a prognosis of future American tactics toward the Soviet Union and the territorial and political complex which will possibly establish itself when Communism has been defeated.

The first impression created by this detailed article is that, its author, displaying in method and form his wish to maintain objectivity and impartiality in his analysis of the issues and political phenomena in question, has nevertheless, intentionally or not, become the mouthpiece of a certain political conception which he submits with considerable precision and eloquence and which he either considers as an already determined historical necessity or else wishes to suggest this line to American public opinion. Quite naturally, this attitude has reflected clearly and decisively on his study, selection, and evaluation of the above-mentioned issues.

Another outstanding feature of Mr. Dallin's article also results from the author's above-mentioned political outlook. He tends to envisage the conception of international politics in the present and even the future as the result of some immutable and finally established laws of international relations and of a certain traditional and inflexible disposition of forces. But, chiefly, he is inclined to interpret the manifestation of international affairs as having no connection with ideological and internal political processes.

Conforming primarily to these fundamental principles, the author analyzes American policy toward Russia as well as toward its historical heir, the

Soviet Union. Thus, according to Dallin: "The USA has consistently kept to the principle that the 'disturbed state' of Russia should not have served as a pretext for annexing parts of Russian territory." It should be asked first: Was this principle of non-separation of a people's national territory (independent of "disturbance" within any national organism or community) peculiar to American policy only as regards the Eurasian empire? As historical experience shows, America either rejected tendencies toward any kind of "annexing," or at least such trends played a very insignificant rôle and were provoked by specific circumstances. In no case have they ever been major factors in American foreign policy. The reason for this is rooted in American ideological and political principles as well as in its international position which is due to its economic and social development and, to some extent, to its geographical situation.

Therefore, the conclusion which might be drawn from Dallin's above-cited statement, that, allegedly, the safeguarding of inviolability of the state boundaries of Russia (and the USSR) has been a consistently followed principle, particularly of Washington's "Russia" policy, is exceedingly ambiguous. For that matter, the author himself felt compelled to modify this statement, which, in fact, almost nullifies his initial conclusion. Dallin continues that: "This principle [of non-division of Russian territory] is not violated by the present recognition of the non-Communist governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which were established and supported by the local population." Thus, under certain conditions, even independently of the situation of the Russian state—the USA actually did recognize the division of certain parts of its territory. If Poland and Finland, neither of which the author mentions are added here, the allegedly fundamental American conception of a "consistent" preservation of the indivisibility of the Russian empire loses much of its categorical nature, for quite understandable reasons. Despite various temporal, transient, or opportunistic motives by leading American circles who at various times have determined the course of America's foreign policy, the latter has always preserved its fundamental principle. This principle is "the will of the local population." Abstracting the factors of a purely ideological and, emotional nature, it could scarcely be denied today that the above-mentioned principle occupies a much more prominent position than is occupied by that of an equilibrium of international forces as advocated (or, maybe, revived) by Dallin, a principle which had its origin, and was developed, under quite different conditions of national and international historical evolution. It may be readily assumed that the USA would hardly use the "disturbed state" of any other geographical and political complex as a pretext for "annexing" from it terrain without the support of the "local population" (except, perhaps, the the case of an acute struggle against a force threatening international peace, as, for example, with Germany).

The author sets off the hitherto traditional American ill-disposition toward the idea of the inviolability of "Russian territory" being infringed, against opposing tendencies and aims of other large and small countries, contiguous with the USSR; Dallin concludes sadly that only countries situated at a considerable distance from Russia are "unselfish" (in the sense of territorial expansion). Thus, according to the author: "England has long advocated a separation of Central Asia and the Caucasus from Russia;" "Germany wishes for the separation of at least a considerable part of the Ukraine and, in this matter, is supported by Poland." The latter, in addition, "claims a large portion of Belorussia." Rumania wants Bessarabia and, if possible, also the area "as

far as Odessa;" Turkey "demands some Caucasian territories," Japan claims all of Sakhalin and the Kuril (Chishima) Islands, and, perhaps, "also a buffer on Russian territory." None of the neighbors of the present Soviet Union: "Even thinks of fighting simply for the cause of overthrowing the Bolsheviks—without gaining any territorial profits;" and the "old formula 'without annexion and contribution' smells of the Manilov era."

The author does not trouble to support his reproaches of neighboring countries of the USSR with arguments demonstrating their correctness as well as their political validity; chiefly, he puts the whole problem of relations between the free (non-American) countries and the Soviet Union exclusively on the level of claims and compensations by the former in case of an armed conflict with the latter; thus, though England "has long been advocating the separation" of Turkestan and the Caucasus, it is nevertheless not clear why, so far, it did so little to promote this matter, having more than once had serious chances to do so. Why, for instance, did the British conservative-liberal government support in 1919 General Denikin, the ardent defender of this very same "single and indivisible Russia?"

In Germany which desires "the separation of at least a considerable part of the Ukraine," why did influential German circles suggest during World War II, "the conception of supporting the Vlassov movement with its program of preserving the state unity of the "peoples of Russia?" On what arguments does the author base his statement about Turkish claims to "some (which, exactly?) Caucasian territories?" So far, on the contrary, a much louder clamor was raised by Moscow's claims to Ardahan and Kars. These claims were formally presented as Georgian and Armenian national aspirations; yet, actually, they are unequivocal pretensions to territories which once were apparently "Russian."

The most important of the political prospects presented by Dallin is the following: He considers all these possibilities only in terms of the individual egotism of the USSR's neighbors to satisfy their own limited local interests, which exclude the possibility of "fighting simply 'for the goal of overthrowing the Bolsheviks'." In other words, Dallin rejects the possibility of the liquidation of Bolshevism arising at all in the free world, if this liquidation is to be based on reasons of universal and individual national security rather than on motives of political ethics alone. He asserts the democracies would not be interested at all in the further fate of the present Soviet set-up, if it were not for the narrowly selfish interests of individual countries who are interested in recreating relations between the peoples of the present Communist empire on the basis of a new national, state, and social order. The author simply starts out from the conviction that the trends of national and state "isolationism" have been to a greater or lesser degree, and will remain, the inflexible pillars of all the free world's international policy, and that the free world's leaders will never be able to traverse the limits of short-sighted aspirations aimed at very limited goals. This point cannot be analyzed here for it is a matter of the author's conviction. It should, however be noted that these conclusions are in obvious contrast to so-called American guiding principles of foreign policy which is the subject treated by Dallin here.

According to Dallin, the "equilibrium of forces" in the international field cannot be "disturbed" without abolishing war. Therefore, "as long as the barbarous manner of solving international conflicts is operative, the 'anti-quoted' equilibrium of forces" will remain. This is not the place to reflect

on a possible abolition of the "barbarous manner of solving international conflicts," i. e., war. In any case, Dallin asserts that he believes in its abolition in the future. Yet, from what he says next, it appears that, in his opinion, even a change of the world's totalitarian regimes into free ones would be no guarantee in this respect. This means that the principles of UNO and of collective security would be threatened even if the totalitarian participants in the international community were to be removed. Incidentally, the author makes no mention of any means for maintaining international peace.

Instead, as far as he is concerned, his "own logic and own rightness" consist, chiefly, in the policy of "alternating alliances." This is a personal viewpoint. Nevertheless it is, at least, one-sided of him to disregard the significance of UNO for the non-Communist world in his analysis of this most important factor in the development of international relations. And indeed, is the organization which was founded within this framework in San Francisco, really so devoid of significance? At any rate, the author, obviously, has no great confidence in it. He rests his greatest hopes in the "alternating alliances" and in the "system of mutually balanced forces."

This system, if we understand the author correctly, is based on the assumption, first, that the USA will withdraw from European-Asiatic affairs and second, that the "old world," will not desire or at any rate will be unable to organize itself and put relations between its peoples on the firm basis of mutual security guaranties. Indeed, Dallin asserts that in Western Europe a power is arising "which will soon replace all other powers—Germany." The author does not believe in a satisfactory solution of one of the cardinal problems in European consolidation and unity, i. e., the problem of Franco-German relations within the framework of a European organization. (As a matter of fact, he expects only little, if any, positive results from the steps being taken toward European unity.) According to Dallin, the chief problem for France, for instance, is to find allies against Germany—"the stronger the better." Germany, on the other hand, will, as the author sees it, become "another, by no means less dangerous aggressor" in the course of the West's struggle against the USSR; an aggressor who will acquire extreme power as a result of the "destruction of Soviet forces and the downfall of Russia." Under these circumstances, the only solution is to preserve Russia as a great-power even if it will be vanquished, because, though this is "far from being an answer to all evils, it would permit relaxation of tension."

Thus, the system of "mutually balanced forces"—the only practicable one according to the author, since "at present there yet exists no third way out of the contradictory situation"—is, essentially, that of dividing the world between extensive and, invariable, imperialistic powers. In Europe, these would be the mutually counterposed powers of Russia and Germany. Other countries, adjusting themselves to these two, might preserve relative freedom and independence. Yet it is quite incomprehensible why the two great-powers should remain only "mutually balanced" and why, one sad day, they might not agree to divide the continent between themselves. The assumption that the tendencies toward great-power and aggression are immanent and decisive forces in politics is not at all unfounded, and there are examples of it. Napoleon's plan to divide power between himself and Alexander I was not so phantastic. Furthermore, Alexander II supported the newly established united Germany instead of counter-balancing France and Austria against it. Finally, the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement is still fresh in everybody's

memory. Thus, our author cannot guarantee that future Germany and what is to replace the present USSR, will be invariably "mutually balancing" themselves and will not divide Europe and unite themselves against the rest of the world under the slogan, for instance, of a struggle against the "domination of the Anglo-saxon race." In this situation, according to Dallin the tactics of "two paths" of American foreign policy, the "German" and the "French" (the latter, actually, being "Russian," because the main partner in the second case would be Russia, not France), is indeed "far from being a cure-all" against the sinister shadows of aggression and oppression hovering over the world. Moreover, there is no ground for the author's conviction that, after the downfall of the gigantic Soviet empire, America will "invariably take the French path."

The author is disturbed at the prospect of a future Middle-European great power with 70 million inhabitants, which in order to check and balance, it will be absolutely necessary to reestablish a great-power numbering almost three times as many people. He does not take into consideration possible European coalition which, including Great Britain and the East European countries (even without Russia in its national ethnographic borders), would number over 250 million people, though in our opinion this would be a much more practicable solution than an "equilibrium" of empires as he proposes. It is rather unlikely that Hitler would have dared to launch a war in 1939 if, instead of a disunited Europe and actual support by the power which, according to our author should have counterbalanced him, he had been faced by coalition of the West and East European countries. The system of the so-called "equilibrium of forces" prevented neither the first nor the second world war catastrophes. On the contrary, it caused them.

Dallin does not develop his pessimistic prognoses concerning the development of relations in Europe in case of war with the USSR—fearing the establishment of new centers of aggression, this time in the West—to the sphere of internal relations within the Communist empire. He is confident that, in time, the "political processes, which are shaking Russian Communism, will cool off and, as a result of the struggle, yield fruits in the form of a new regime, a new program, and a new foreign policy." D. Dallin bases his expectations chiefly on the "effect of time" and the "laws of sociology," which will bring about the above-mentioned changes "without any direct influence from the outside." It is quite understandable that, apart from the considerations which, from the viewpoint of mankind in general, speak for an obviation of war by all possible means, the author is troubled also by a war's possible results, which he fears which would violate the principle of international politics he stands for, i. e., the principle of an "equilibrium of forces" and the postulate of preserving the great-power complex in Eastern Europe necessitated by it.

At the same time, the assumption may be reasonably doubted that the processes which are taking place on Soviet territory will develop uninfluenced by the free world and, vice versa, will not themselves exert any influence on that world. Freedom is indivisible, and, therefore, sooner or later the time will come of its full victory everywhere or, else, of its complete deterioration and universal catastrophe. In order to escape the latter solution of the struggle between the two principal powers of our days, the camps of freedom and of totalitarian oppression, a coexistence of which cannot last for ever, the free world must not weaken its ranks and relax its efforts, lulling itself with hopes

that the Communist danger will become less imminent as a result of a merely possible "transformation of internal Russian relations." On the other hand, this struggle for freedom (not necessarily and not always conducted by belligerent means) should not be limited by considerations which contradict, to any extent, the fundamental principle of liberation: to return to the peoples subjugated by Bolshevism the rights they were deprived of, i. e., to decide their fate freely and without any reservation. Only under these conditions will it be possible to establish a new order in international relations on the firm basis of mutual trust and mutual guaranties rather than on the unstable, and ultimately impracticable and antiquated "system of mutual balances."

O. Yurchenko

UKRAINIAN PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTE

G. SOVA. "A Ukrainian's Twenty-Five Years in the USSR." Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 24, 100 pp. (In Ukrainian).

The author, a participant in the revolution of 1917, has been a Soviet civil servant, a political prisoner of the Soviets and local administrator in the German-occupied Ukraine. The present work draws from his memoirs to present valuable material on the Bolshevik system and, to some degree, on the German occupation of the Ukraine.

Dwelling on the early years of Soviet power in the Ukraine, this work deals particularly with the famine of 1921 and the beginning of the struggle against religion, including the closing and destruction of churches. The New Economic Policy resulted in economic improvements in the region. As a member of the raion administration in Novy Sandzhar, near Poltava, the author became well acquainted with all the aspects of life under the Soviets. He goes into detail on the reasons for and the circumstances surrounding the second great famine in the Ukraine, 1932—1933. He points out the economic and political background of the famine and the true motives of the Kremlin, which was responsible for the tragedy that caused the death of some seven million Ukrainians.

Other chapters describe the Soviet system of justice and the concentration camps, presenting a list of the most important of the latter. It is pointed out that in 1913 in tsarist Russia there were 32,758 prisoners, about 5,000 of whom were confined for political reasons. In the USSR today their numbers run into the millions.

In 1936, suspected of sympathy to the right deviation of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the author was arrested and sentenced to three years imprisonment in the concentration camp in Kolyma. He describes

in detail his experiences in Kolyma and the geography of the surrounding territory, where around two million prisoners, mostly engaged in goldmining operations, were kept.

In 1940 the author returned to the Ukraine, where, after a short period of work as a Soviet civil servant, he was caught up by the German occupation. As a raion administrator he had an opportunity to become acquainted with the German methods of administration and, at the same time, to observe how the Germans exploited the resources of the Ukraine.

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K. KOVALEVSKI. "Opposition Movements in the Ukraine and the National Policy of the USSR." Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 26, 73 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

In examining the national liberation movement of Ukrainians within the confines of the USSR, the author takes as his starting point the chief stages in the Ukrainian revolution of 1917. At that time, when Petrograd and Moscow became the main centers of Bolshevism (colored with internationalism), Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, was the organizing center for the peoples of the former Russian Empire.

In his analysis of the national policy of the Bolsheviks, the author dwells on Lenin's ideas and points out the variance between revolutionary theory and the Bolsheviks' revolutionary practices. A result of this policy was the creation by the Bolsheviks in December 1919 of the Ukrainian SSR, which together with the Belorussian SSR and others, concluded Federation agreements with the RSFSR and renounced their sovereign rights.

The author explains all the Bolsheviks' attempts to liquidate the national differ-

ence in the USSR as primarily the result of the Communist doctrine, which aims at complete centralization. For this, the paradoxical methods of ukrainianization, belorussification and georginization are used under the mask of "the right of the peoples to self-determination." Against the background of these characteristics of the nature of Communism in the national question, the author describes in detail the apposing national and Communist movements in their relation to the All-Union Communist Party Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Communist Party Bolsheviks and their colonial policy in the Ukraine. The opposition's speeches against the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) had a great effect on the rulers in Moscow.

The task of solving the problem of Ukrainian opposition was given to the executive committee of the Comintern, as was the problem of the "nationalist" deviations in the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine and of its leader Maximovich. Apart from considering opposition movements in the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the author throws light on the ideology and history of the national organization "The Soviet for the Liberation of the Ukraine" on the basis of the stenographic report of the trial of 45 members in 1930.

The author also mentions the new forms of opposition and the national policy of the USSR.

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IVAN MAISTRENKO. *"The Crises in the Soviet Economy."* Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 29, 124 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

The author analyzes the Soviet economy and devotes special attention to the crises which in his opinion arise in connection with the collectivization of agriculture and industrialization, or rather the militarization of Soviet industry.

The economic system of Stalinism was bureaucracy, a system of "war communism" first introduced during the Civil War. Stalin returned to this system after the collectivization of agriculture.

During the 25 years of its existence the Stalinist economic system has been unable to establish a healthy economic life which

would both ensure the development of the economy and satisfy the needs of the population. Throughout the period the Soviet Union has been in a permanent economic crisis. Enforced collectivization led to the decline of the peasant's interest in the results of his work. It was therefore essential to establish an enormous bureaucratic machine, both in agriculture and in industry, in order to drive the workers and peasants to work harder. The system of "socialist competition" and "Stakhanovism" which were conceived by the Soviet bureaucrats failed to give positive results.

The weak spot in the Soviet regime is agrarian overpopulation. Collectivization only made this problem more acute and brought it out into the open. Tens of millions of peasants found themselves to be superfluous under the kolkhoz system. This provided the reason for a harsh Bolshevik offensive against Soviet society in the form of resettlement and even the liquidation of millions of persons.

Postwar developments and the emergence of the atomic bomb may make wars impossible. The reflection of these developments in the USSR has been a crisis in the military economy. Stalin's death made this crisis apparent. Consequently the Soviet economy is showing a tendency to transfer gradually and carefully to a peacetime footing. To a certain extent this is taking place in an elemental way, although it is in part being furthered by government measures. However, the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus left behind by Stalin will hardly be able to demilitarize the Soviet economy.

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N. POLONSKA-VASILENKO. *"A History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences."* Part I (1918—1930). Series I (Printed Editions), No. 21, 152 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

The work deals with a period when the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences enjoyed a relative amount of freedom, not yet being totally subordinate to Communist aims.

The second part of the work, which is to appear in 1956, will consider the period after the Communists took over the Academy in 1930.

In order to prove the creative role of Communism in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks assert that the Academy in Kiev was founded by them and that all its achievements are therefore the achievements of Bolshevism.

Professor, Polonska-Vasilenko gives the history of the Academy of Sciences, an institution which was established by the Ukrainian people before the Bolsheviks came to power. She throws light on the fate of more than a thousand scholars whom the Bolsheviks condemn to oblivion.

When the Bolsheviks occupied the Ukraine during the period of war Communism the Soviet authorities completely ignored the Academy. They provided no funds for its maintenance but on the other hand did not interfere with its freedom. During the period of the New Economic Policy material conditions improved considerably and the occupation government supplied the Academy with money, but the ideological offensive on the institution had already begun.

An outstanding event in the life of the Academy was the return from abroad of Academician M. S. Hrushevsky.

After the appointment of M. Skrypnyk as People's Commissar for Education in the USSR, constant interference of the Soviet government in the life and activities of the Academy began. Several political trials were held. In 1930 the trial of members of "The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" (SVU) served the Bolsheviks as a pretext for establishing complete control over the Academy. This trial marked the commencement of the Bolsheviks' hostile attitude toward Ukrainian culture in general and to the Academy in particular.

The work contains ten supplements in the form of documents on the Academy's activities from 1918 to 1930.

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P. FEDENKO. "The Ukraine After Stalin's Death." Series II (Mimeographed Editions), No. 39, 86 pp. (In Ukrainian).

The author has used the most recent Soviet periodicals and newspapers to throw light on a number of questions concerning the role that Stalin and his assistants, particularly Beria and Khrushchev, played in the life of the Ukraine. Much information is provided on the effect the late leader's death had on the Ukraine and a picture of the Kremlin's post-Stalin policy toward the republic is given. The author dwells at length on the significance of the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine, an act which he views as an attempt to throw part of the Soviet Communist Party's guilt for the genocide of the Crimean Tatars on the Ukraine.

The author analyzes the difficulties of agriculture in the republic which are aggravated by the need to provide machines and manpower to carry out Khrushchev's plans for cultivating the virgin and idle lands of Kazakhstan.

After Stalin's death the ruling Kremlin hierarchy changed, to some extent at least, its policy toward the Ukraine, but only in method, not in principle. The policy became more elastic and for the first time in the history of the Ukrainian Communist Party, a Ukrainian was permitted to be elected to the post of first secretary of the Party. There are indications that the Ukraine is to be elevated to the status of a second "elder brother."

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 1 (In Ukrainian)

- P. Kurinny*, Bolshevik Aggression in the Ukraine (1917—1921).
B. Martos, The Bolsheviks' Conquest of the Ukraine.
O. Jurczenko, The Sovietization of the National Republics in the USSR.
H. Waschtschenko, The Bolsheviks' Liberation of the Western Ukraine.
(Documents and Facts)
I. F., Soviet Ushgorod.
H. Kostiuik, M. S. Hrushevsky's Last Days.
S. Prociuk, The Principles of Planned Economy and their Realization in the Ukraine.
S. Nahay, Housing Construction and Housing Conditions in the USSR.
P. Lutarewytsh, The MTS in the Ukraine.

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 2 (In Ukrainian)

- E. Glowinskyj*, Ukrainian Finance as Part of the Soviet Financial System.
B. Krupnycky, Mazeppa and Soviet Historiography.
A. Hirsch, Conditioned Reflexes and Despotism.
A. Lebed, The Problem of Soil Amelioration in the Ukraine and the Crimea.
D. Solovey, The Ukrainian Village from 1931 to 1938.
P. Lutarewytsh, Facts and Figures on the Ukrainian Famine in 1932—1933.
O. Kultschitsky, Puberty and Adolescence as seen by Soviet Educators and Psychologists.

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 3 (In Ukrainian and English)

- O. Jurczenko*, The Bolshevik conquest of the Ukraine.
The current Soviet approach.
D. Cizevsky, The Soviet history of Ukrainian literature.
B. Krupnycky, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Soviet historiography.
M. Semchyshyn, The educational system in the Soviet Ukraine.
Y. Vakulenko, The cultivation of virgin and fallow lands in the USSR.
E. Glowinskyj, Professor V. P. Tymoshenko.
I. Mirchuk, The brotherhood of the Slavic peoples and Bolshevik reality.

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 4 (In Ukrainian)

E. Glowinskyj, The structure of Soviet Ukrainian agriculture.

N. Woronczuk, The feeding of the Soviet population.

P. Kotowicz, Contemporary Ukrainian drama.

N. Wassiliw, The Soviet economy and its social structure.

W. Pluschtsch, Medical services in the Ukraine to-day.

P. Lutarewytsh, The Poltava rebellion 1920—1926.

O. Archimowitsch, Grain cultivation in the Ukraine.

Reviews

R. Zybenko, Charles Bettelheim, «Problèmes théoriques et pratiques de la planification».

E. G., Romain Yakemtschouk, «L'O.N.U. La sécurité régionale et le problème de régionalisme».

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 5 (In Ukrainian)

V. Holubnychy, M. Volobuyev, V. Dobrogaev and their Opponents.

A. Poplujko, The Economy of the Ukraine Today.

V. Plyush, The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.

I. Krylov, On the Question of the Educational Tenets of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.

A. Kravchenk, 'Voluntary' Migrants.

N. Pushkarsky, The Burning of Kiev.

I. Kisil, The Sugar Industry of the Ukraine.

Reviews

F. Korduba, Brigadier C. N. Barclay, "The New Warfare."

New Publications of the Institute

Belorussian Review, No. 2, 1955

This is a mimeographed publication mainly for the Belorussian emigration. The material in this review, with certain changes, has been published in the English-language Belorussian Review.

The Review contains the following articles:

1. *A. Adamovich*: Stages in the Sovietization of Belorussian literature.
2. *M. Kulikovich*: Belorussian National Art under Soviet Control.
3. *Ya. Stankevich*: The Language Policy of the Bolsheviks in the Belorussian SSR.
4. *G. Niamiba*: Education in Belorussia before the Rout of "National Democracy," 1917—1930.
5. *A. Yalovich*: The Forests of the Belorussian SSR.
6. *V. Budzimer*: Problems of Corn Cultivation in the Belorussian SSR.

This Review is devoted particularly to Belorussian culture and Bolshevik policy in the Belorussian SSR. The authors with the help of numerous, detailed documents, show graphically the continuous effort of the Bolsheviks to subordinate to their control every aspect of Belorussian life.

Dergi

At the beginning of 1955 a new journal **Dergi** was published. It is intended as a quarterly and is the first Turkish-language publication issued by the Institute. Three numbers have appeared so far. The aim of **Dergi** is primarily to elucidate problems of the Soviet East which are comparatively little studied in the free world.

Articles in the first issue deal with the following problems:

Soviet Turkmenistan (articles by Prof. Togan on the last stages of Soviet policy in Turkmenistan; A. Uluktuk on the second linguistic congress in Turkmen; A. Akku on transport in Turkmenistan and in the Trans-Ural; Murat

Tadzhmurat on the crisis in livestock raising in Turkmenistan, and S. Kabish on difficulties in the cotton industry in Turkmenistan and in the Caucasus.)

Azerbaidzhan (An article by Mirza Bala on Soviet policy in Southern Azerbaidzhan.)

Mongolia (Prof. Poppe's article on Soviet policy in Mongolia.)

Moslem religion in the Soviet Union. (Dr. E. Kirimal's article on the Moslem religion in the Crimea and a contribution by Prof. Devlechin on the situation of the Moslem religion in the Idel-Ural.)

The Ukraine. (Prof. W. Dubrovsky's article on the decline in Ukrainian oriental studies.)

Military affairs in the USSR. (The article by N. Galay on the influence of Soviet social doctrine on contemporary military science.)

Soviet Pedagogy. (Y. Koval's article on the Soviet school today.)

In addition the first issue of *Dergi* contains reviews on the following new works:

Der nationale Kampf der Krimtürken by Dr. E. Kirimal.

"Memoirs" by Field Marshal Mannerheim.

"Soviet Archeology" by Prof. M. Miller.

"The Normal Curriculum of Moslem Sciences in Bukhara" by A. Bauzani.

The Journal "Azerbaidzhan" issued in Turkey.

The following articles appear in the second number of *Dergi*: Prof. Dr. von Stackelberg writes on "From Baku to Bandung" and analyses Soviet policy in the East from 1917 to the present day: Akhmedjan Omerkhan contributes an article entitled: "The Ideological Differences at the Bandung Conference," giving a general picture of the proceedings and an analysis of the conference: The Azerbaidzhan scholar Mirza Bala writes on "The National Character of Azerbaidzhan Peasant Resistance": There is an article by A. Akku: "Land Exploitation and Irrigation in the Ukraine and Crimea," illustrated with maps, and one by Dr. Miroglu: "The Population of Northern Turkestan (Kazakhstan) and the Cultivation of the Virgin Lands" in which he analyzes the economic and demographic policy of the Bolsheviki in Kazakhstan.

Other contributions are by Suleiman Tekiner: "A General View of Education in Azerbaidzhan and the aims of the Communist Educational System and by V. H. Glazkov: "The Rebirth of the Cossack State in 1917—1921."

There are also three book reviews. One by Dr. Kirimal of General Klemens Rudnicki's book "On the Polish Path" (1939—1947); the second by Eng. I. Malinski of Lebed and Jakovlev's work, "Hydrotechnical Construction in the USSR" and the last by M. Aktai of the first number of the Institute's "Ukrainian Review."

The most recent issue (No. 3) of *Dergi* contains the following articles:

Mirza Bala: "The Colonial Policy of the Soviets in Azerbaidzhan."

Dr. Edige Kirimal: "The Position of the Crimean Turk Woman and Family before and after the 1917 Revolution" (with photographs and documents).

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