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CONTENTS

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|---|-----|
| <i>V. Holubnychyj</i> , The Views of M. Volobuyev and V. Dobrohaiyev and Party Criticism | 5 |
| <i>V. Plushch</i> , The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine | 13 |
| <i>I. Krylov</i> , Educational and Pedagogical Aims of the Union for the Liber- ation of the Ukraine | 31 |
| <i>B. Krupnytsky</i> , Mazepa and Soviet Historiography | 49 |
| <i>A. Poplujko</i> , The Economy of the Ukraine Today | 54 |
| <i>A. Hirsh</i> , Conditioned Reflexes and Despotism | 88 |
| <i>A. Kravchenko</i> , A Case of "Voluntary" Resettlement | 98 |
| Notes and Reviews | 122 |

The Views of M. Volobuyev and V. Dobrohaiyev and Party Criticism

V. HOLUBNYCHYJ.

This article aims at elucidating the role of Volobuyev in Ukrainian economic affairs in the 1920's. It is hoped also to make the contemporary phenomenon of Ukrainian national Communism clearer to the reader.

Mykhailo Volobuyev entered contemporary Ukrainian history through writing only two articles called, "On the problem of the Ukrainian economy" which were printed in the central theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, Nos. 2 and 3, 1928.

Those who knew Mykhailo Volobuyev personally maintain that he was not an economist but merely a pedagogue.¹ This statement is supported to a certain extent by my own observation of Ukrainian and Russian economic publications of the 1920's where Volobuyev's name is never mentioned. Moreover, before Volobuyev wrote his articles, he was unknown to the readers of the principle Party newspapers and journals including *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*. His name cannot be found among the more important Party members in the Ukraine at that time. However, as his articles were carried by such an influential journal, it can be assumed that he was either a teacher in a Party school, that he had strong supporters in the Central Committee or among the editors of *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, or lastly that the ideas which he put forward were similar to those of the Central Committee at that time.

Volobuyev's economic conception is not new. His historical merit lies only in the fact that he successfully generalized and combined a number of facts into one system and voiced it at a most expedient moment. This was the period of *Shumskyism* and *Khvylovism* in the Communist Party of the Ukraine, a national Communist philosophic, artistic and political doctrine of Ukrainian Soviet independence. This doctrine needed an economic basis and it was provided by Volobuyev.

In his articles Volobuyev gives facts, ideas and theses already known from the works of historians of the Ukrainian economy such as Professors M. Slabchenko and O. Ohloblyn and in the writings of his contemporaries — Viktor Dobrohaiyev and Hryhoryz Hrynko which he united into a new doctrine. Volobuyev borrowed the principle arguments concerning the Ukra-

¹ P. Radchenko and K. Batyu. *Nasha Borotba* (Our Struggle), Regensburg, No. 3, 1946, p. 58.

inian economic situation within the USSR from Viktor Dobrohaiyev, who should really be considered the inspirer of *Volobuyevism*.

Viktor Dobrohaiyev was a young and able economist who wrote on the budget in the Kharkov journal *Khozaistvo Ukrainy*, taught economics and also worked in the *Narkomfin* (People's Commissariat of Finance) of the Ukrainian SSR. During the revolution he was a member of the so-called national group of *Kobelaky* Communists, but did not join the Communist Party. He died of tuberculosis in the early 1930's.²

Mykhailo Volobuyev's work was divided into two main parts: the economic situation of the Ukraine in tsarist Russia and its situation in the USSR. In the first part which was based on factual material from Professors Slabchenko and Ohloblyn and on the Lenin-Marxist doctrine on imperialism, Volobuyev defined the colonial situation of the Ukraine within the economy of the Russian empire and at the same time develops a new thesis on the meaning of the colony.

While formulating his own theoretical theses, Volobuyev starts by discussing the teaching of the Russian Marxist historian, M. Pokrovsky who maintained that the Russian empire itself was a colony of the West European imperialists, but at the same time had its own colonies in the conquered borderlands. However, Pokrovsky includes only the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus as Russian colonies and does not mention the Ukraine, Belorussia, Poland or Finland. This is not by chance, for according to Pokrovsky's definition, a colony is a country which is less civilized than the metropolis but which supplies the metropolis with its raw materials and serves for the export of capital.

Volobuyev pointed out that Pokrovsky's definition is too general and, "unsuitable for determining the place of the Ukraine, Poland and other countries in the economy of the empire because these countries were not and are not on a lower cultural level than Russia" and in addition, he commented: "The economic rôle of these countries can be described as a market for raw materials. All of them had their own processing industries. But this does not mean that they were not colonies of Russia."³

Volobuyev, therefore, defined colony differently. He declared that a colony is not necessarily more backward economically than its metropolis. In order to prove this thesis, he introduced new meanings and divided the term colony into "European" and "Asiatic" types. In the Asiatic type, the backward economic formations are exploited by the advanced capitalistic economy of the metropolis. The European type is capitalist and developed, but politically dependent. The Ukraine belongs to the European type of colony. Volobuyev quotes statistical indices on the exploitation of the Ukraine by tsarist Russia. According to this data, from 1893 until 1910, Russia had 32,896 million rubles of revenue from the Ukraine, but plowed back only 25,052 million rubles.

In the second part of his work, Volobuyev hinted that the economic situation of the Ukraine in the USSR had not changed, compared with pre-revolutionary times. Here he referred to articles by Dobrohaiyev in *Khozyaistvo Ukrainy* in which the latter showed on the strength of budget data from the *Narkomfin* of

² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

³ *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, Kharkov, 1928, No. 2, p. 12.

the Ukrainian SSR, that Moscow withheld 20% of the state revenue of the Ukraine during 1925—1927.

At the same time, Volobuyev sharply criticized the “remnants” and the “heritage” of colonialism which still existed in the USSR. He said:

One of the most glaring manifestations of the old heritage is the fact that a considerable number of Soviet officials at the center and on the spot regard the Soviet Union not as a union of equal units whose aim is the free development of national republics, but as a step toward the liquidation of those republics and as a beginning of the so-called “sole and indivisible” state.

Volobuyev also criticized in detail the Gosplan of the USSR for its project to divide the Ukraine economically into two parts. Basing this argument on Hrynko's article, he wrote that: “The All-Union organs should approach the Ukraine as a national, economic entity.” Quoting the well-known discussion between Stalin and Trotsky concerning the question of socialism in one country, Volobuyev though supporting Stalin, went even further. He asserted that it was possible to build socialism in the USSR because the USSR was not one country!

In addition, Volobuyev demanded that the Gosplan of the USSR should: “Accelerate the rate of increase of Ukrainian industry”, especially the metallurgical, textile and consumer goods industries. He attacked Gosplan for transferring the center of the sugar industry from the Ukraine⁴ and ridiculed the fact that the Institute of the Sugar Industry was built in Moscow and not in the Ukraine.⁵

Lastly, referring to the first half of his work, Volobuyev argued his general thesis on the necessity of the economic independence of the Ukraine as follows. As the Ukraine was (and he hints remains), a European type of colony, that is to say, advanced and civilized compared with the metropolis, it must join the future world socialist economy as an independent economic unit and not as a part of the USSR. Only the Asiatic type of colony could become part of the world socialist economy via the economic system of their former metropolises which under socialism must help to develop the backward colonies. Volobuyev says: “The European type of colony, after the abrogation of its economic dependence (through the socialist revolution), would have to join the universal economic complex as an equal member. In this way it would not depend upon the separate sectors of the world economy, but upon the whole world economy

⁴ This argument aided Skrypnyk when he accused Volobuyev of selfish nationalism. In his speech to the III Congress of the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine he said that it is only the nationalists who want to monopolize production in their country disregarding the fact that sugar, for instance, can be grown economically in Russia and Siberia. (See M. Skrypnyk, “Articles and Speeches,” Kharkov, Vol. II, part. 2, 1931, pp. 106—107).

⁵ Only 26 years later this truth was mentioned by Khrushchev himself. In *Pravda* of March 21, 1954, he stated: “Sugar beet, as we know, is grown mainly in the Ukraine and in the southern regions of the Central Black Soil Belt. The Scientific Research Institute of Sugar Plantations in the Leningrad region near Moscow. Is it necessary for the Institute to be near Moscow? Hardly. Obviously it is there because certain employees are not guided by the interests of science.” Nevertheless Volobuyev was executed for an identical criticism of bureaucratic centralism.

as one unit." In view of this perspective of the future, Volobuyev demands that even today the central economic organs must direct the Ukrainian economy toward such a "course of building which to a certain extent would take into account the inevitability that the national organisms which compose the USSR would be included into the universal socialist economy."

The publication in the central Party organ of this conception of Volobuyev's at a time when similar conceptions were being put forward by O. Shumskyj and M. Khvylovyj in other sectors, provoked a great deal of discussion. Volobuyev as well as Dobrohaiyev had two kinds of opponents: those who denied their ideas outright (E. Hirschak and M. Skrypnyk), and those who criticized them but who had no adequate counter solution themselves, (A. Richytckyj). Hirschak, with whom Skrypnyk⁶ officially agreed, published a critical article called *Volobuyevism*⁷ in the *Bilshovyk Ukrainy* No. 6 in 1928, which was a formal attack by the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party on Volobuyev's ideas. In this article Hirschak described and condemned *Volobuyevism* as follows:

In Mykhailo Volobuyev's article we find a whole system of political statements and ideas. The most important of them are these:

1. Contrasting of the present-day Soviet Ukraine with the old days when she was a colony of the former Russian empire. This contrast is presented in a way which demonstrates that the colonial Ukraine was the better off of the two.
2. Casting of doubt upon the indisputable fact that the October socialist revolution had realized its slogans regarding the national liberation of oppressed nations and primarily the Ukraine.
3. Support of the theory of the necessity and inevitability of the Soviet Ukraine leaving the Union of Soviet Republics.
4. Alienation of the Soviet Ukraine from the other republics of the Union and primarily the RSFSR.
5. Support of the theory of the struggle between the two economies — the Ukrainian and the Russian.
6. Lack of understanding of the essence of the Union of Soviet Republics.
7. Negation of the existence of the Ukrainian proletarian state and the economic, political, and cultural consolidation of the Soviet Ukraine.
8. The accusation that the All-Union Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Ukraine deviate in matters concerning national policy in favor of Great Russian chauvinism.
9. Fomenting national hatred between the working people of Russia and the Ukraine.
10. The error of Trotskyism concerning the building of socialism in one country.

⁶ M. Skrypnyk. "Articles and Speeches," Kharkov, Vol. II, part. 1, 1931, p. 38.

⁷ E. F. Hirschak, *Na da fronta v borbe s nacionalizmom*, (On two fronts in the struggle against nationalism), Moscow—Leningrad 1930, pp. 110—121.

11. The error of Trotskyism concerning the threat of "national limitation."

All the ideas and assertions contained in this article represent the essence of *Volobuyevism*, the foundation of the economic platform of *Shymskyism* and *Khvylovysm*..

Most of the accusations which Hirschak put forward against Volobuyev were indirect or even tendentious deductions from his article. Volobuyev himself never used such extreme formulations and this was admitted by his other opponent A. Richyckyj in his "repentance" which was published as a letter in *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*.

The attitude of E. Hirschak and M. Skrypnyk at the time of their attacks on Volobuyev (as in the previous case of O. Shumskyj and M. Khvylovyyj), is the same as that of the Ukrainian Communists of that time. Objectively speaking, in retrospect they were the tools used by Moscow for attacking the Ukrainian National Communists, but subjectively under prevailing conditions and circumstances both Hirschak and Skrypnyk believed that they were acting for the good of the Ukraine. Both of them stood for the truth, both believed in the purity of Leninism regarding the national problem and its consistency and logic; both were convinced that Stalin and his Party would never allow Russian chauvinism to disfigure the revolution; both stood on the platform of the XII Congress of the All-Union Party of Communists, a single platform for a struggle on two fronts as far as the national question was concerned, both against Ukrainian and Russian chauvinism, because they believed that these antagonisms were harmful to the solution of the national question and to the cause of the liberation of the proletariat. Today this attitude is clearly wrong. It is also clear that M. Volobuyev, O. Shumskyj and M. Khvylovyyj saw further than either E. Hirschak or M. Skrypnyk, but at that time and under those conditions, these were only two differing trends among Ukrainian Communists.

Hirschak had little criticism of Volobuyev from the economic point of view. His criticism was purely political and is contained in the eleven points leveled against Volobuyev. Hirschak sincerely and convincingly stated that revolution has, despite everything, solved the national question, that the Ukrainian SSR is an independent state, that Russia does not exploit the Ukraine, that everything is going well but that Volobuyev has confused the issue and so on.

Andryj Richkzyj⁸ the former leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party, took a slightly different attitude in this polemic, between that of Volobuyev, Hirschak and Skrypnyk. He attacked Volobuyev for deviation from the Party line, he also thought that this deviation "led to nationalism and Fascism," but at the same time he tried more deeply and seriously to analyze Volobuyev's opinions and the economic conceptions of Volobuyev and Dobrohaiyev.

A. Richyckyj's attitude is well conceived and one feels that he understands his opponent very well but is undecided whether or not he is right. For instance Richyckyj says:

⁸ A. Richyckyj. *Do problemy likvidatsii perezhitkiv kolonialnosti ta natsionalizmu. Vidpovid M. Volobuevu*, (On the liquidation of survivals of colonialism and nationalism). Answer to Mykhailo Volobuyev. Kharkov, 1928, p. 99.

The USSR is either the only possible form of dictatorship of the proletariat, of building socialism and brotherly coexistence between the nations liberated from the yoke of imperialism, a form of organization of the proletarian state during the transitory period of correlation of nations toward their unification, with certain practical shortcomings caused by bureaucratic distortions; or the USSR is such a state system which does not solve the national question and all such distortions unavoidably derive from it, that is to say that in its foundation, it is neither socialist or internationalist. M. Volobuyev maintains the second view on the system of the USSR as far as economic building is concerned.⁹

Ostensibly therefore, A. Richykyj supported the first view of the Soviet system. Unlike Hirschak, he at least admitted the existence, of "partial shortcoming" and "bureaucratic distortions" in the USSR but did not even consider that the system itself was responsible. Richykyj approached the analysis of Volobuyev's purely economic theses from the same viewpoint. He accused Volobuyev and Dobrohaiyev of taking the statistical material for their articles from works which were written on the occasion of the First Five Year Plan. He maintains that conditions were not so bad at that time because the plan had not been approved or even worked out. Richkyj thinks Volobuyev's data on the exploitation of the Ukraine by tsarist Russia is grossly underestimated. He takes the source which Volobuyev quotes to prove his thesis and states that it does not say anything of the kind, but that the data on the pre-revolutionary period given by Volobuyev is underestimated and that for the post-revolutionary period, overestimated.

A. Richykyj supplies his own data on pre-revolutionary conditions which he takes from the works of M. Porsh and Maltsev, and for post-revolutionary conditions, from official data from *Ukrderzhplan* (Ukrainian State Plan). From this information, Richykyj deduced that between 1898 and 1913 tsarist Russia took 44%—45% of its income from the Ukraine and not 21% as Volobuyev claimed, and between 1925 and 1928 not 20%, as according to Volobuyev, but only 8% to 14%.¹⁰ In conclusion Richkyj says that though the Ukraine was losing from 8% to 14% of its state income to the Union, compared with the past the situation was not really so bad. (According to Volobuyev and Dobrohaiyev however, nothing had changed on the economic level in the Ukraine since tsarist days). Apart from this, Richykyj believed that "the state plan expects to decrease this percentage ultimately to zero during the Five Year Plan."

The instability of A. Richkykyj's attitude is caused essentially by the fact that Volobuyev's move was not made at the right time. He says, for instance, that Volobuyev should not make such assertions at a time of greatest national upsurge in the Ukraine, at a time of Ukrainization when a separate center for Ukrainian Trade Unions was being formed, when separate Ukrainian units of the Red Army were being set up and work carried out for the unification within the Ukrainian SSR of all adjoining territories with a Ukrainian population and when Hrynko had kept the Ukraine as an economic unit planned within the Gosplan of the USSR.¹¹

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63, ff.

Such an attitude shows that he was deeply convinced that everything was going well; Ukrainian matters were under control and such deviationists as Mykhailo Volobuyev were simply making a mistake. Richyckyj also believed in the Party and that despite "bureaucratic distortions" it would not tolerate economic exploitation of the Ukraine. For this illusion A. Richyckyj as well as M. Skrypnyk and E. Hirschak paid later with their lives.

It is peculiar that no Moscow economist or participant in Gosplan participated in the polemics against Volobuyev. The Russian chauvinists were not omnipotent and hid behind the screen of Party internationalism and acted surreptitiously, proposing to the Party various Great Russian projects disguised in socialist phraseology such as the project of the economic division of the Ukraine, the author of which was V. H. Aleksandrov¹² against whom Volobuyev fought.

Mykhailo Volobuyev's move coincided in time and theme with similar moves abroad in the emigration and in Tryzub.¹³ E. Glowinskyj made a similar analysis of the budgets of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR and concluded that "from one fourth to one fifth of the state income of the Ukraine is given away outside her frontiers." Similarly Vlasenko in *Nova Ukraina*¹⁴ when quoting the articles by Viktor Dobrohaiyev came to identical conclusions.

Such voices abroad among the "nationalist reaction" and also a very favorable review of Volobuyev's article in the Lvov newspaper *Dilo*¹⁵ naturally strengthened Volobuyev's opponents' faith in their own righteousness (E. Hirschak, M. Skrypnyk and A. Richyckyj), and also revealed to Volobuyev who his real friends and allies were. It is possible that the young Communist was not particularly pleased with the welcome given him by the nationalist emigration and this might be one of the reasons why he decided to repent and yield to his critics rather than escape abroad.¹⁶ His repentance took the form of a letter to the editor of *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*¹⁷ and also later, two new articles entitled "Against the platform of nationalism" which were published in issues 5 and 6 of the same organ in 1930.¹⁸ In his letter of repentance Volobuyev said that the facts upon which he based his theory were true but his mistake was that he accepted these facts not as an exception but as a rule; on the whole the situation of the Ukraine within the USSR was quite good and the Ukraine was not a Russian colony. Thus, in his letter Volobuyev accepted the attitude of Richyckyj but did not completely yield to Hirschak.

¹² V. H. Aleksandrov proposed uniting the industrial eastern flank of the Ukraine into one unit with Rostov, the Northern Caucasus and Kerch and planning the agricultural western areas as an independent economic unit. Aleksandrov was also the author of the *Dneproges*. He was never punished for his Russian nationalism and as late as 1950 he was working as an engineer in Melitopol. (*Izvestia*, October, 7, 1950).

¹³ *Tryzub*, Paris, Nos. 13/14/15. April 1928.

¹⁴ *Nova Ukraina*, Prague, No. 12, 1927.

¹⁵ *Dilo*, Lvov, February 21, 1928, cited by Hirschak.

¹⁶ At that time Volobuyev could have escaped abroad just as Khvylovyj could have remained abroad when he visited Vienna in 1928.

¹⁷ Letter cited by E. Hirschak op. cit., pp. 215—216.

¹⁸ The author was unable to find this particular article; however, it is clear even from the title that it is, at least, self-critical.

The final victory of Russian bureaucracy in the All-Union Communist Party which took place in the early 1930's did not, as far as is known, pardon Mykhailo Volobuyev or his opponents. It appears that Volobuyev was sent to a concentration camp at about that time.¹⁹ According to another source he was shot in 1938.²⁰

¹⁹ P. Radchenko and K. Batyr. op. cit., p. 59.

²⁰ *Istoria revolyutsiinoi borotby v Naddniprianskii Ukraini*, (The history of the revolutionary struggle in the Dnieper Ukraine) (A reprint from underground materials abroad). Munich, 1949, p. 25.

The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine

V. PLUSHCH

Introduction.

The trial of the leaders of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU) and its branch organization the Union of Ukrainian Youth (SUM), testified to the all-national and anti-Communist movement of the Ukrainian people in the Ukrainian SSR from 1924—1930.¹ The study of its history, development, activities, organization and primarily of its ideological trends, is of great importance in the history of the anti-Bolshevik resistance in the Ukraine.

The history of the SVU-SUM and the part they played in the history of the Ukrainian liberation movement has not been hitherto adequately presented.² Until it is possible to carry out research work under free conditions in the Ukraine and the archives of the NKVD—MVD become available, we are forced to read between the lines of distorted Soviet material, principally the shorthand notes of the trial³ or from the statements of those who took part in the movement and material which has been published abroad. The shortcomings of such sources in evaluating objectively the SVU movement, must be taken into account.

The Ideological Principles of the Movement and its Program

The anti-Communist movement known as "The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" which fought for the free development of Ukrainian culture and for the liberation of the Ukrainian state from Communist occupation was a non-party and all-national movement.⁴ The SVU did not deal with problems

¹ Resistance to Bolshevism in the Ukraine did not end with the retreat abroad of the legitimate Government of the Ukrainian National Republic.

In 1929—21 the whole Ukraine was covered by a widespread insurgent movement against Communism. Some of the insurgent committees were discovered by the Bolsheviks and destroyed. Centers of mass resistance such as the All-Ukrainian *Povstankom* (summer 1921) and the Cossack Council of the Ukraine, West of the Dnieper (spring 1922) were discovered and at approximately this time the First, Sixth and Eighth Insurgent Regions were discovered.

² See selected bibliography at end of article.

³ Shorthand report of the SVU trial. Kharkov, 1931.

⁴ In this it differs from other Ukrainian revolutionary party actions of that time as for instance the National Communists.

of a philosophical nature, but most of its leading members adhered to the principles of Christian idealism. As will be seen, the SVU was closely connected with the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church and supported it in every way.

The attitude of SVU members toward Communism as a philosophic and socio-economic system was sharply negative. Academician Sergi Efremov stated for instance: "The Ukrainian intelligentsia could not avoid clashing with those who stood for the October revolution and had established the proletarian state." Mykola Kovalevsky who studied the SVU movement stated: "The ideology of the SVU was based on the principles of national liberation and rejected the principles of Communist internationalism."⁵

It was clear to the SVU leaders that Communism would strive to establish a world dictatorship. They considered all concessions by the Bolsheviks as concerns the economic, cultural or political development of the Ukraine no more than the tactical maneuvers of Communism and a temporary phenomenon. From their experience in the recent past, the SVU leaders realized that the subjugation of the Ukraine which was carried out under slogans of liberation led to its being transformed into a colony of the RSFSR and to the liquidation not only of economic independence, but also of nationality and culture.

The first principle of SVU may be briefly formulated as follows: The basic principle of the existence of the Ukrainian nation, as of every other nation, is the supremacy of national existence before all other political, economic and social problems. National existence and the full development of the nation are only possible within its own sovereign state. Political, economic and social reforms are possible and effective only when an independent, national organism exists.

During 1917—1921 [The civil war period] many people did not understand this presupposition and in Ukrainian political circles, the correlation of various forms of social and national liberation was understood in various ways.

The second principle thesis of the SVU movement was a complete negation of a compromise with any alien imposed régime, no matter what concessions were offered by it in national matters or what social benefits were promised. Such compromises were considered fatal to the nation. In 1917 the independent Ukrainian state was in fact established. Therefore, the social development of life in an occupied state was considered to be a camouflaged method of continued enslavement which did not open any possibility for further political expansion to the nation.

These ideological principles were vividly reflected at the trial of the SVU-SUM. When the Chairman of the Court,⁶ Anton Prykhodko, said: "What was the aim of the SUM"? Pavlushkov replied, "The same as that of the older generation — the creation of an independent Ukrainian state." Answering a question put by the Public Prosecutor, Panas Lubchenko: "You established your organization in order to struggle for the Ukraine's independence"? Pavlushkov replied: "Yes. We considered the present-day Ukraine as a colony of Russia!"⁷

⁵ M. Kovalevsky: "The Ukraine Under the Red Yoke," *Skhid*, Warsaw—Lvov 1936.

⁶ Quoted from the shorthand report of the SVU trial, Kharkov, 1931.

⁷ *Ibid.*

The leaders of the SVU—SUM, as well as the rank and file members, considered the Soviet régime as an occupying force. Answering Lubchenko's question: "Who are the occupiers"? Pavlushko unhesitatingly answered: "The Soviet authorities," and he then explained that these occupation authorities had been established by "Soviet Russia".

During the trial, the Soviet representatives in the Ukraine did their utmost to prove that the SVU—SUM wanted to separate the Ukraine from the USSR in order to hand it over to another country. All these efforts by the prosecution and the Communist régime as a whole were in vain. Despite the tortures applied to the accused, all of them firmly supported the principles of the movement and rejected the accusation concerning the interventionist intentions of the SVU or links between the SVU and any other state.

For instance, to the prosecutor's question: "Is it true that the SVU was in the service of the bourgeoisie?". Academician Sergei Efremov answered, "No. The SVU fought for a democratic republic and not for the bourgeoisie. I, personally, believe in the strength of the Ukrainian masses and not in foreign intervention." In answer to a further question from the prosecutor: "Does Efremov admit that Simon Petlura and his followers did not fight for an independent Ukraine, but for its subjugation to Poland"? Efremov replied that Petlura fought for a free, independent and sovereign Ukraine.

L. Starytska-Chernyakhivska, one of the accused, when asked by the prosecutor: "What did you fight for?" answered, "The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine fought not only for an independent, but also for a united Ukraine." This statement best illustrates the baseless accusation of connections between the SVU and Poland because it is well known that Poland was hostile to a united Ukraine.

The next fundamental thesis in the conception of the SVU—SUM was the establishing of the state on the basis of respect for the individual and respect for the will of the people. For example, Sergei Efremov stated in his evidence that the SVU was against the Soviet system because it did not guarantee the civic rights of the individual. This was confirmed also by Pavlushkov and Ivchenko.

A sharply anti-Russian orientation was revealed in the SVU. For example, A. Zalisky said at the trial that in his opinion, "High mountains should be built on the northern frontiers of the Ukraine in order to defend it from the political and cultural influence of Moscow."

When the Public Prosecutor asked Pavlushkov: "Against which foreign forces were you defending the Ukraine,?" he answered clearly, "Against the North." In his concluding speech to the court, Pavlushkov said: "We considered the Ukraine as an enslaved and oppressed colony of Moscow imperialism."

As the trial revealed, the movement had no detailed and concrete social and economic program for the future Ukrainian state.

Typical principles which the SVU leaders supported, included: democracy, broad liberalism and support of western cultural trends. For instance, H. Kholodny stated that the SVU members were all enemies of the Communist régime and the totalitarian system. From the words of the SVU leaders publications issued by the SVU—SUM and also from evidence given at the trial, it is clear

the social and economic structure and the form of government of the future Ukrainian state were to be left to the will of the nation, to be expressed by the usual democratic methods. Most members and adherents of the movement were rather inclined toward a republican form of government.⁸ But there were also monarchists and even those among SVU—SUM members who thought that for the initial period a form of dictatorship would be the most suitable type of government for the Ukraine. M. Pavlushkov stated at the trial: "We often thought of realizing our ideal — the Ukrainian National Republic," and later: "I, personally, considered a strong dictatorship under an elected monarchy necessary, but the rest of the comrades were more to the left and stood for a republican dictatorship."

This tolerance and even lack of clarity in matters concerning the form of government in the SVU program is typical. Unlike the various parties during the period 1917—1921, the question of the form the government would take in the future Ukraine was of secondary importance to the SVU. Those who took part in this movement fought, not for the Ukrainian monarchy, socialism or liberalism, but for a free, independent and united Ukrainian state which would take the form desired by the people.

This thesis undoubtedly emerged as a result of the Soviet occupation. The defendants realized that the form of state structure was of little importance compared with the postulate of a sole national form of existence. As far as the social and economic problems were concerned, the SVU had a program outlined in general terms.

I have no documents relating to the program principles of the SVU—SUM and therefore the general outline of the social and economic program is based on the strength of evidence given at the trial and statements by former members of both organizations.

It can be assumed that the statements reflected the real, basic views of the members of the SVU—SUM on social and economic matters because concerning the latter, the whole movement was very close to so-called social liberalism.

The principle prerequisite to solving the agrarian question was the admission of the private ownership of land. The land was to belong only to those who worked it and large estates were not foreseen; the land handed over to the peasants was to remain in their possession. Industry and trade were to return to private ownership, but all large enterprises, all communications and natural wealth were to remain in the possession of the state. Private economic initiative was to be encouraged. The co-operative movement was to play an important part in economic life.

As far as religious matters were concerned, Sergei Efremov felt that religion was an entirely personal matter for everyone, but that the SVU considered it expedient for the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church to be given the dominant position.

⁸ See evidence given by Nikovsky, Efremov, Ivchenko, Zalisky and others.

The emergence of the SVU—SUM and its organizational system.

Under conditions of the totalitarian Communist system no legal anti-Communist activities were possible. The wide-spread Soviet secret police apparatus of secret collaborators (*Seksots*) excluded any possibility of a definite form of underground organization. Therefore the SVU—SUM was predominantly an ideological movement.

Its beginning is connected with the so-called Brotherhood of Ukrainian Loyalists. (BUD). Sergei Efremov stated in court that in 1929 because of the uncertain situation of the Ukrainian state, the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Loyalists was organized in Kiev. The Brotherhood had its followers in almost all Ukrainian towns and was connected with various insurgent detachments which were active in the first years of the Soviet régime. In connection with the new economic policy and certain concessions made by the Soviet régime in national matters, the activities of the BUD decreased. From Efremov's statements, it appears that the need then became apparent for a wide scale ideological movement in another form. "When the armed struggle between the government of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Soviet régime ended and the BUD ceased to exist, my comrades and I faced the question of whether we had to surrender completely or continue the struggle for an independent Ukraine."

According to the shorthand notes of the trial, during 1924—1925 the preparatory work for the creation of a new liberation movement was carried out. It can be assumed that during that period, Efremov and others who stood for a total struggle against Communism and rejected any compromise with the Soviet authorities, were exchanging opinions on the basic principles and forms for the future resistance movement. This is reflected in the memoirs of Ukrainian public figures and political leaders abroad such as V. Dolenko, and in the court evidence of a number of former SVU members.⁹ It is certain that individuals and groups of people very close to the ideology of the future SVU were to be found in such centers as Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, Odessa, Zhitomir, Vinnitsia, Dnepropetrovsk and Nikolaiev.

In June 1935, the inaugural meeting of the SVU took place in Kiev in which the following people participated: S. Efremov, V. Chekhievsky, V. Durdukievski, J. Hermeize, A. Nikovsky, O. Hrebenetsky and L. Starytska-Chernyakhivska. At this meeting the officers elected were: S. Efremov (Chairman), V. Chekhivski (Deputy Chairman) and V. Durdukivsky (Treasurer).

J. Hermeize and later O. Chernyakhivsky, H. Ivanytsya, H. Kholodny, V. Udovenko and A. Bolozyvych were instructed to work among the students and organize SVU groups in higher educational establishments. S. Efremov, with the aid of members of the All Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, was to create a network of SVU cells in the Academy and other scientific bodies. V. Durdukievsky and later M. Pavlushkov, B. Matushevsky, D. Kokhta and Yu. Yynohradov were assigned to work among school children. A. Nikovsky

⁹ Dmytro Solovei, in his work "Golgotha of the Ukraine," mentions that the leader of the so called "Peasant Party" Mr. Ortodoks revealed that in April 1926 there was a conference in Kharkov between Ortodoks, Shcherbanenko and Efremov at which they discussed the creation of the center of SVU.

and L. Starytska-Chernyakhivska and later M. Ivchenko and K. Shylo worked among writers and artists and set up a SVU network in Soviet publishing houses. V. Shekhievsky was instructed to maintain contact with the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church.

The form of organization during the first period of SVU activities was that of the strictly secret "fives". These were established in a number of organizations and higher educational establishments and in Ukrainian towns and villages. The members of each "five" had no contact with one another and were acquainted only with their leader. The leader of the "five" only knew the member of the other "five" who had recruited him into the organization and maintained contact with him alone. However, it was not possible to maintain such a strictly secret system in practice. In a short time certain "fives" became organizational centers which gathered information from other "fives" as well as their own. In 1927 the SVU was gradually transformed into a group system and provincial and district cells were organized.

This organizational change was disclosed at the trial by M. Pavlushkov.

Prosecutor: Was the SUM a part of the SVU?

Pavlushkov: The SUM had the same structure as the SVU and BUD, namely that of "fives". In the autumn of 1927 a general reform was introduced and these organizations accepted the group system. This applied to the SUM as well.

The transfer to the group organizational form, as became apparent, was a mistake on the part of SVU—SUM leadership. Under Soviet conditions this was a dangerous procedure. The organizational reform also provoked opposition in the ranks of SVU—SUM and certain members broke away from the leadership because they did not agree with the secrecy element. This break was not brought about by ideological differences but by organizational ones.

In order to attract young people, work was carried out in a number of Soviet secondary schools, in higher educational establishments, among writers, peasants and workers. Professor Kholodny, the principal of the Mykhailo Kotsyubynsky school in Chernigov, stated in court that his school was only outwardly Soviet but that the children were brought up in a patriotic and national spirit. In the literary circles of the Kiev Medical Institute, national propaganda was carried out overtly by members of the SVU, although no formal cell existed. A former pupil of a Kiev school described to the author how cleverly national propaganda was disseminated in her school by a number of the teachers during 1929—1930.

Hundreds of secondary schools in the Ukraine and dozens of higher educational establishments were covered by these and other means of propagating the SVU's ideals. This was done by individual effort or by "fives" and groups. According to the trial evidence and material gathered by the author, SVU and SUM groups were created in the Medical, Agricultural, Polytechnic, Veterinary, Co-operative Institutes and Institutes of People's Education in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Nizhen, in the Ukrainian Agricultural School at the village of Poltavskaya in the Kuban, in Bereznikhovetskaya Agricultural School, in the Ukrainian Industrial Training College in Kherson and in many other educational establishments. In other secondary schools and higher educational centers there were groups who studied the history and literature of the Ukraine as well as dramatic groups

whose activities were directed by SVU members. The majority of those who belonged to such groups did not even know that the SVU existed and that the ideals disseminated among members were SVU ideals.

This ideological work was carried out very successfully amongst scientists and in educational, literary and artistic circles. Scholastic institution in the Ukraine and particularly the All Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, was influenced by SVU members and sympathizers. This was so obvious that Akhmatov, Deputy Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR in his speech at the trial, said that the SVU had transformed the Academy of Sciences into the center of nationalist activities. For the education of young scholars in the national spirit, a semi-legal society called "The Young Society" was set up. The older scholars gathered in "The Old Society."¹⁰

Great attention was paid by the SVU to publishing activities. Their primary task was to influence the publication of text books for primary, secondary and higher schools. Despite Soviet censorship, in those years dozens of books which accurately presented the Ukrainian past and stressed the historical essence of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation were published. These books influenced the young people accordingly. After the defeat of the SVU all these publications were confiscated and destroyed.

Special attention was also paid to the dissemination of SVU ideals through the fine arts. It managed to infiltrate into the largest publishing houses in the Ukraine such as *Khyhospilka*, *Slovo*, *Rukh* and *Ciaivo*. A considerable influence was also exerted in the State Publishing House of the Ukraine.

The ideals disseminated by the SVU were as follows:

- a) To stress the importance of the national problem;
- b) To criticize and expose the true essence of "socialist construction" in the Ukraine;
- c) To emphasize the demoralization and decomposition of civic and family life under Communism;
- d) To ridicule Soviet reality;
- e) To stress the insignificance of the proletariat in political, socialist and economic life and the importance of the individual and his free spiritual development;
- f) To expose the ineffectiveness of the Soviet system and its colonial character.

The ideals of the SVU found fertile ground since 'the attitude of most Ukrainian writers to the Soviet régime and particularly to so-called "proletarian Soviet culture" was most negative. M. Ivchenko the writer, stated at the trial that in his opinion: "The Soviet régime and the whole Communist system is a wild force which ruins culture and produces impossible conditions for free creation." Yu. Yanovsky in his novel "The Master of the Ship" writes:

I have only one bride, a bride for whom I have lived my whole life, to whom I have devoted my steel rapier and exposed my heavy shield; she is called the culture of the nation.

¹⁰ This was mentioned in a lecture by Professor N. D. Polonska-Vasylenko in the Historical Section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

In his other work "The Four Sorts" he depicts insurgents who fight, not only for "land and freedom," but also for the honor of their country.

The hostility of the Ukrainian nation to Bolshevism and particularly to Russian imperialism, can be seen in a number of other works by Ukrainian writers, who were influenced by the SVU's ideals such as Hr. Kosynka, M. M. Drai-Khmara, V. Pidmohyl'ny and others. Naturally the spreading of the SVU's ideals could not be carried out openly. Examples of such activities are given in the novel "Death" by P. Antonenko-Davydovych in which the author presents Horbenko, a nationally degenerated type and a traitor, or the work by Valarian Pidmohyl'ny, "Town" which describes the socialist town as the center of peasant exploitation, as something alien and hostile to the Ukrainian people.

Great importance should be attached to the SVU's activities in popularizing among Ukrainian readers the best examples of European and world literature as well as the Ukrainian classics. Under the influence of SVU members a number publishing houses issued Ukrainian translations of the works of such writers as Shakespeare, Schiller, Goethe, Byron, Balzac, Zola, Hauptmann and Ibsen. Complete or nearly complete editions were also published of such authors as I. Kotlarevsky, Hulak-Artemovsky, Storozhenko, Strytsky, Yu. Fedkovych, I. Franko, Lesya Ukraina, M. Kotsyubynsky, V. Vynnychenko, B. Hrinchenko, Ya. Shchoholiv and M. Kropyvnytsky. In addition, the works of certain authors were reprinted several times. Through the SVU pedagogical group an energetic struggle was undertaken to ukrainianize higher educational establishments and considerable success was achieved in this direction: For instance, in 1929 in 28.9% of learned institutions, 36.5% of the technical colleges, 60.4% of the worker's factory schools and 59.1% of professional schools, Ukrainian was the teaching language.

If these figures are compared with the position in 1939 when out of 30 Kharkov high schools, Ukrainian was partly used in only four, the achievements mentioned above can be fully understood.

An important part in liberating the national church was played by SVU members who worked within the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church.¹¹

The SVU leaders fully understood the great importance of the Ukrainian church in the struggle against the demoralizing influence of Communist propaganda.

Church communities became the centers of the struggle against atheism and for maintaining respect for the individual. The persecution of the Church began in 1924 when in August, the OGPU forbade the Metropolitan to leave Kiev as well as the Congress of the All-Ukrainian Church Council; in the second half of 1925 the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky was arrested.

¹¹ The Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church was in fact established in 1921 (nominally in 1919), as a result of the religious uplift of the Ukrainian nation. At the first All-Ukrainian Orthodox Congress, the Metropolitan of Kiev and of the whole Ukraine, Canon Vasyl Lypkivsky was elected and consecrated.

The expansion of the church started after the congress of 1921. Two years later there were 26 Bishops, 2,500 Priests and Deacons and nearly 2,000 parishes. The church movement was actively joined by numerous groups of the intelligentsia. A priest was among those sentenced at the SVU trial.

Even at the beginning of the SVU's activities a strong church group was set up, led by V. Chekhivsky, a well-known Ukrainian political, civic and church leader. This group played an important part in strengthening the church movement. A special commission was set up in Kiev in which members of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences participated, to translate religious books into Ukrainian.¹² With the aid of the church network, national work was carried out in the villages.

An important part in disseminating the SVU's ideals and promoting national education of the peasant masses was played by the cooperative movement in the countryside which, during the NEP period was widespread and even enjoyed a certain amount of freedom.

In 1928 the *Vukospilka* comprised 40 district unions with 9,636 cooperatives and 2,333,000 members. *Silski Hospodar* comprised 22,116 cooperatives with 2,947,000 members and the *Ukrainbank* had 17 unions and 5,800 cooperatives. The Communist influence in the cooperative movement was insignificant at that time, in contrast to the SVU, which enjoyed a high reputation. The village cooperatives were in close contact with the peasants and thus their employees could spread the SVU ideals throughout the countryside. The cooperative movement also supported the development of individual farming and created the preconditions for the economic, political, national and social advancement of the Ukrainian peasantry.

Another channel through which SVU ideals permeated the countryside was the school. It must be said that at that time the school network grew considerably. In 1926 there were 17,488 four-year primary schools and 2,545 seven-year schools in the Ukraine. In the villages, all schools were Ukrainian and employed 50,000 teachers. At the same time, efforts were made to encourage a nationally conscious and anti-Communist peasant youth. The SVU and SUM through the cooperative movement helped the young peasants to study at higher educational establishments. This action was most successful. Already during 1924—1927, the higher educational establishments were swamped with young peasants and Ukrainian became the language of instruction.

It was more difficult to influence the workers because they were russified and at that time most of them sympathized with the Bolsheviks.

The organization of the SVU was still more complicated in the armed forces. The mood of the forces was strictly controlled by the Communist Party. Thus special attention was paid to Communist propaganda in the armed forces. The Soviet authorities did their utmost to ensure that in the units stationed in the Ukraine, there was a sufficiently high percentage of non-Ukrainians. According to the data of the Central Statistical Administration, in 1925 in the Ukrainian Territorial Units only 42.5% of troops were Ukrainians.

Despite the complications and dangers of working in the armed forces, the SVU managed to set up a number of centers in different units. For example there were SVU and SUM members in the Red Officers School in Kharkov, in the Kiev garrison Vinnitsa, Poltava, Chernigov and even at the Officers' School of the All-Union Executive Committee in the Kremlin.

¹² The author took part in the development of church life in Chernigov where the Ukrainian national church movement found support among the intelligentsia and in the masses of peasants and workers.

The Union of Ukrainian Youth (SUM).

The Union of Ukrainian Youth was a component of the SVU but as the SUM's methods were somewhat different, it will be as well to analyze certain principles and activities peculiar to that organization.

The SUM was formed earlier than the SVU. According to Ya. Deremenda:¹³

The SUM was created on the initiative of the Chairman of the BUD S. Efremov as well as of V. Durdukivsky and M. Pavlushkov. As a result of their discussions it was decided that a youth organization should be established which would unite all those elements of patriotic Ukrainian youth, who possessed firm political convictions.

The first members of the SUM were: Ya. Deremenda, Mykola Pavlushkov, Borys Matushevsky, Diodor Bobyr, Yurko Durdukivsky, Leonid Denusenko, Vasyl Matushevsky and Danylo Kokhta. They were soon joined by many students of the Kiev Institute of Peoples' Education and also of the Medical, Polytechnic and various Cooperative Institutes.

From the names which were published in the press we know of nine leading members of the SUM: Dubrovsky, Solodovsky, Nechitaylo, Dymnych, Kokot, Kuryunny, Zerov, Shemet and Sakidon. If it is remembered that every member of the SUM's leadership had his own "five," the extent of the organization is obvious.

S. Pidhainy writes:¹⁴

Pavlushkov carefully selected his adherents choosing them particularly from among the peasant youth. The SUM's ideal of an organization which was to unite all the anti-Bolshevik youth as a counter-balance to the Komsomol, represented for this category of Ukrainian youth the best way to struggle for an independent Ukraine.

The ideological postulates of the SUM were the same as those of the SVU. The first paragraph of the statute says that the SUM is a free society of Ukrainian youth which believes in and approves the program of the SVU and agrees to work for the organization. New members were accepted only on the recommendation of two other members and after previous observation.

In the first period of its existence the SUM worked according to the method of "fives". The central "fives" were the leaders of the organization. In principle the leaders were to be elected. "However, temporarily, as we were at the front, no adequate elections could be permitted," stated Pavlushkov at the trial, "Therefore it was decided that the initial center would, until a change took place in the general situation, carry on as the central bureau."

The SUM obtained its funds in a 10% subscription from the wages of every member. These funds were used for the publication of literature and other organizational needs.

The fundamental task of the SUM was the preparation of cadres for abolishing Soviet authority and organizing a new national authority. Both the SVU and SUM also carried out instructive national work. Even in the first years of its existence, the SUM concentrated on wide scale public mani-

¹³ Ya. Daremenda: "From TEZ to SUM," 'Avant-garde,' Munich, 1954.

¹⁴ S. Pidhainy: "The Ukrainian intelligentsia in the Solovtsy islands," Toronto 1947,

festations, military training, and even terror activities against the Soviet authorities.

As stated in court by M. Pavlushkov and B. Matushevsky, many leaflets were distributed and two cases of such distribution were given at the trial: one was in the St. Sophia Cathedral during the secret requiem for Simon Petlura and the second was in the Kiev Institute for National Education. For example, V. Ost writes:¹⁵

One summer morning in 1927, leaflets were found by people in many neighboring villages. They were found at the militia, the village council and in the school. The peasants who found them gathered groups of people together and read the leaflets aloud. This is what was written. "Ukrainian people! You were fooled! Our fathers, brothers and sisters fought for the land and freedom of the Ukrainian nation but in fact we didn't get it. Rise in arms! Let us chase the Bolsheviks from our land." In Berekhovetskaia Agricultural School, a SUM cell was discovered. The school was closed, the students and lecturers arrested.

Information is given by other former SUM members who are at present abroad, about disseminating proclamations and clandestine literature.¹⁶ In court this activity was confirmed by M. Pavlushkov and B. Matushevsky.

Prosecutor Mykhailyk: And do you remember your evidence that in 1926, Matushevsky gave you a leaflet signed by the SVU, which was earmarked for distribution to the peasants?

Pavlushkov, Yes indeed, but I don't think that was a mass phenomenon. On the whole we published a great deal of literature.

Mykhailyk, Which was reprinted and distributed?

Pavlushkov, Yes.

When Mykhailyk asked Matushevsky exactly what kind of literature was distributed, the latter stated; "Various poems and an article by D. Dontsov from the Literary Scientific Review."

The attitude of the SVU—SUM toward terrorism is less clear. As stated at the trial by Pavlushkov and Matushevsky, SUM members had no doubts about the need for terror activities against the more important figures of Soviet administration. Answering a question of the prosecutor, Pavlushkov said without hesitation "We welcomed every act of terror against the Soviet régime."

When answering a similar question by prosecutor Mykhailyk: "There is no doubt that you approved of terror methods"? B. Matushevsky answered: "No doubt at all."

But conversely S. Evremov, according to M. Pavlushkov, was in principle against terror methods and this is probably the reason why SVU and SUM members did not apply such methods at the beginning. (Only after the ruthless and cruel liquidation by the Soviets of certain SVU—SUM members, after thousands of Ukrainians had been shot without a trial and collectivization introduced, did the SVU and SUM begin themselves to apply terror, against the Soviets tactics, but this came later. Military training was carried out in

¹⁵ V. Ost: "Repatriation," Germany, 1945—1946.

¹⁶ See the archives of the main office of SVU, Munich.

preparation for the insurrection. There were three basic variants of the SUM's participation in the insurrection. The first was that SUM members at an appropriate moment would be formed into companies and battalions. The second stipulated that SUM members would join regular military units as their leaders. The third was that the SUM would create "battle detachments" in the higher educational establishments where they were studying.

The SUM spread its influence throughout dozens of higher and hundreds of secondary schools and teacher training colleges in the Ukraine.

The betrayal of the SVU—SUM and the trial.

The expansion of SVU—SUM activities throughout almost the entire Ukraine, attracted the attention of the Soviet authorities. Already in 1928, there were signs that these activities were being watched by the OGPU. and the Communist Party began to use all available means to infiltrate their agents into the SVU. This was not an easy task for the OGPU as long as the SVU and SUM were based on the principles of "fives" and were of a more ideological than political character. With the transfer to the group system and an increase in membership, infiltration by OGPU agents became easier.

It is difficult to say how far the SVU—SUM movement was penetrated by Bolshevik agents. M. Prykhodko writes:¹⁷

In 1929 Dmytro Borziak was arrested; he was apparently the manager of the press department of the SVU. He spent many months in prison and by torture, they [the Soviets] tried to extract from him false accusations against Academician Sergei Efremov whom Borziak had visited a number of times and also against other representatives of the Ukrainian élite.

In the writings of D. Solovei there can be found a description of how H. Makarovych in the summer of 1931 was recruited to the SVU. According to Solovei this was provocation by the OGPU.¹⁸

Vasyl Mykhalchuk from Volynia who escaped from Poland to the Ukrainian SSR and then back again to Czechoslovakia, said in his public statement that the OGPU had forced him to distribute publications, ostensibly printed by the SVU, among Ukrainian students.¹⁹

In the spring of 1929 mass arrests took place in the whole of the Ukraine. Throughout that year investigations concerning the SVU and SUM took place. In 1930 from March 9 until April 19 the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR dealt with the cases of 45 members of the SVU. The trial took place in the Grand Hall of the State Opera in Kharkov. The Soviet authorities organized the trial for political propaganda purposes.

The Communist intended the trial to compromise the Ukrainian liberation movement and expose its members as the restorers of the landowner —

¹⁷ M. Prykhodko: "In the condemned cell," *Svoboda*, New Jersey, No. 133, June 9, 1951.

¹⁸ "Golgotha of the Ukraine," published by "Ukrainian Voice," Winnipeg, 1953.

¹⁹ Yaroslav Kutko: "The time bomb in Rotterdam," *Narodna Vola*, No. 39, October 2, 1952.

capitalist system as foreign agents and spies. They also wanted to compromise the Ukrainian National Government of 1917—1921.

The court room was filled with the representatives of Communist centers and activists from the factories and other organizations. Special permission was issued to attend the trial and the Opera House was guarded by detachments of the OGPU. The trial was transmitted by radio. In the foyer and corridors of the theater there was an exhibition of various documents compromising to the Ukrainian liberation struggle.

The members of the court were carefully selected by the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and were chosen on the recommendation of the People's Commissar of Justice, Poraiko, approved by a special resolution of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. The Chairman of the court was a former member of the Ukrainian social revolutionary party, a Communist named Anton Anton Prykhodko; the members of the court were — Havrylo Odinets a former member of the Ukrainian social revolutionary party; a former member of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic; Korobenko, a member of the Central Committee of the "smallholders" party; a worker from the Kiev Arsenal which was the center of the Communist movement in Kiev even at the time of the Ukrainian National Republic; Professor Sokolansky, a Communist; a delegate from the scientific, technical section of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions (VURPS); Professor Vovk; Moukha, a worker; and a peasant woman named Korzhenkova. The State and Public Prosecutors were equally carefully selected. They were: Pavlo Mykhaikyk, the Deputy People's Commissar of Justice and First Deputy to the General Prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR, (a Communist from Galicia); Akhmatov, the Deputy Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, (a Communist, his real name was Amkhanatsky); Yakymshyn, the Prosecutor of the People's Commissariat of Justice, (an émigré from Galicia); the Prosecutor of the Provincial Court in Kiev, Bystrukov, a Russian. As Public Prosecutors there were; Panas Lubchenko a former socialist revolutionary and later a Communist, from the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions; Professor Sokolovsky of the Agricultural Institute and on behalf of the Organization of Soviet Writers in the Ukraine, O. Slisarenko. A full member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Professor of Mathematics Kravchuk was selected as a Prosecutor but he reported that he was very ill and did not take part in the trial.²⁰

The Defence Counsel in the trial were; Ratner, Vynohradsky, Vilkomirsky, Idelevych, Obukhivsky, Rivlin, Urovytsky, Shatz, Voznycenska, Poukhtynsky, Grodzinsky, Kovalevska and Potapov. None of them was Ukrainian.

The accused were:*

1, Academician Sergei Efremov, aged 53, eminent Ukrainian scholar, prominent politician, former editor of the daily newspaper *Rada*, theoretician

²⁰ His refusal ruined his career as he was candidate for the post of permanent secretary to the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and was later persecuted.

* The following abbreviations are used in the text: USDRP = Ukr. Social Democratic Workers Party; UPSF = Ukr. Socialist Federalists Party; TEZ = The Society of Unity & Accord; UPSR = Ukr. Socialist Revolutionary Party; UPSS = Ukr. Independent Socialist Party; INO = Institute of National Education.

of the UPSF, the head of its Central Committee. S. Efremov was also one of the organizers of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, its Vice-President and the Chairman of the BUD and SVU.

2, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, aged 54, Professor of the Kiev Theological Academy, a member of the Central Committee of the USDRP, former Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Republic and a well-known church leader.

3, Volodymyr Durdukivsky, aged 55, a well-known Ukrainian educationalist, the Director of the first Ukrainian Secondary School named after Shevchenko in Kiev, a former member of the UPSF.

4, Yosyp Hermeize, aged 37, Professor of the Kiev Institute of National Education, a former eminent leader of the USDRP, director of the study of Marxism at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

5, Andrij Nikovsky, aged 44, eminent Ukrainian journalist and writer, a former member of the Central Committee of the UPSF, former Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian National Republic.

6, Ludmylla Starytska-Chernyakhivska, aged 60, a well-known writer and translator, a political leader of prerevolutionary times and former member of the UPSF.

7, Oleksander Chernyakhivsky, aged 60, Professor of Histology of the Kiev Medical Institute, eminent scientist and politician, member of the UPSF.

8, Mykola Pvylyshkov, aged 26, a student of the Kiev Institute of National Education, one of the organizers of TEZ and SUM and Chairman of SUM.

9, Borys Matushevsky, aged 22, a student of the Kiev Institute of National Education, one of the organizers and leaders of SUM.

10, Volodymyr Udovenko, aged 49, Professor of Hygiene of the Kiev Medical Institute, eminent scientist and politician, an Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

11, Mykhailo Slabchenko, aged 47, Academician, Professor of the Odessa Institute of National Education, eminent Ukrainian scientist, a former member of the USDRP.

12, Oleksander Hrebenetsky, aged 55, a well-known educationalist, a former member of the USPF.

13, Vsevolod Hantsov, aged 37, a well known Ukrainian Philologist, Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a former member of the USDRP.

14, Vasyl Doha, aged 44, Professor of the Kiev Institute of National Education, Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a former member of the USDRP.

15, Hryhory Ivanytsya, aged 38, a well-known philologist, Professor of the Kiev Institute of Peoples' Education, Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the author of several text books, a former member of the USDRP.

16, Hryhory Holoskevych, aged 45, a well-known linguist, the editor of the Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language, Learned Associate of the All-

Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a former member of Tsentralna Rada, (Central Council), a former member of the UPSF.

17, Konstantyn Shylo, aged 53, Director of the Editorial Office of the Derzhvydav Publishing House, Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, former member of the USDRP.

18, Hryhory Kholodny, aged 44, Director of the Institute of the Ukrainian Language, (IUNM), Professor of Kiev Institute of National Education, former member of the UPSF.

19, Mykhailo Ivchenko, aged 47, eminent writer, leader of the literary group of the SVU, former member of the UPSR.

20, Volodymyr Pidhayetsky, aged 41, Professor of the Kiev Medical Institute, Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, former member of the Tsentralna Rada, former member of the USDRP.

21, Volodymyr Shchepotaev, aged 50, Professor of the Poltava Institute of National Education, a former member of the UPSF.

22, Valentyn Otamanivsky, aged 37, prominent Ukrainian political leader, director of the Vinnitsa Branch of the National Library of the Ukraine, a former member of the UPSS.

23, Mykola Kudrutsky, aged 46, Senior Assistant of the Kiev Medical Institute, Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a former member of the USDRP.

24, Arkady Barbar, a well-known specialist in therapeutics, lecturer of the Kiev Medical Institute, a former member of the USDRP.

25, Yuriy Trezvynsky, aged 49, teacher, a former member of the UPSF.

26, Nina Tokarivska, aged 41, school teacher, a former member of the USDRP.

27, Andriy Zalisky, aged 44, school teacher, a former member of the UPSF,

28, Mykola Bily, aged 32, school teacher. .

29, Lubov Bidnova, aged 48, school teacher.

30, Mykola Kryvenyuk, aged 59, a well-known biologist, Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the editor of IUNM, a former member of the USDRP.

31, Volodymyr Strashkevych, aged 54, Associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a former member of the USDRP.

32, Badym Sharko, aged 47, Professor of Mathematics, the editor of IUNM.

33, Konstantyn Turkalo, aged 37, Chemical Engineer, the editor of IUNM, a former member of Tsentralna Rada, a former member of the UPSF.

34, Avksenty Bolozovych, aged 43, a well-known worker for the Co-operative Movement, the Rector of the Kiev Institute of the Co-operative Movement, a former member of the UPSR.

35, Maksym Botvynovsky, aged 50, a well-known worker in the Co-operative Movement, a former member of the UPSR.

36, Zynovij Margulis, aged 50, a Barrister, Learned Associate of the All Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a former member of the UPSF.

37, Konstantyn Tovkach, aged 47, a Barrister, from Poltava, a former member of the UPSF.

38, Petro Blyznyuk, aged 49, a worker in the Cooperative Movement.

39, Petro Efremov, aged 46, Professor of the Dnepropetrovsk Institute of National Education, a former member of UPSF.

40, Mykola Lahuta, aged 34, Professor of the Nikolaiev Institute of National Education, a former member of the UPSR.

41, Yosyp Karpovich, aged 43, school teacher from Chernigov, a former member of the UPSF.

42, Taras Slabchenko, aged 25, school teacher from Odessa.

43, Kyrylo Panchenko-Chalenko, aged 42, an educationalist from Odessa.

44, Viktor Dubrovsky, aged 50, the editor of IUNM, director of the publishing department of the Sugar Trust.

45, Mykola Chekhivsky, aged 53, a Priest of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, a former Colonel in the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic, a former member of the USDRP.

According to occupation, the accused were divided approximately as follows: —

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|-----|
| Professors (including 2 Academicians) | = | 21. |
| Priest & Church workers | = | 2. |
| Educationalists & Teachers | = | 7. |
| Writers & Journalists | = | 4. |
| Students | = | 2. |
| Doctors | = | 2. |
| Engineers | = | 1. |
| Workers in the Co-operative Movement | = | 5. |
| Barristers | = | 2. |

According to political party there were: —

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|-----|
| Former members of the UPSF | = | 17. |
| " " " " USDRP | = | 13. |
| " " " " UPSR | = | 4. |
| " " " " UPSS | = | 1. |
| Non-Party | = | 10. |
| Total | | 45. |

On April 17, the proceedings in court came to an end. The court went into private session to decide the fate of the accused. The whole. Ukraine speculated on the sentences which were finally announced on April 19. Thirteen of the accused, S. Efremov, V. Chekhivsky, V. Durdukivsky, Yo. Hermeize, A. Nikovsky, L. Starytska-Chernyakhivska, O. Hrebenetsky, O. Chernyakiivsky, V. Hantsov, M. Pavlushkov, A. Barbar, V. Udovenko and V. Pidhayetsky were sentenced to death but the court modified this to sentences of imprisonment of from 8 to 10 years.

The rest of the accused were sentenced to imprisonment for from 2 to 5 years and 9 of them were given conditional sentences. All the accused were deprived of their civic rights and lost their positions. Only one of the defendants is still alive and residing at present in the United States.

But the public trial of March 9—April 19 was only part of the destruction of the SVU—SUM movement. The prisons in all Ukrainian towns were full of the intelligentsia, peasants and workers and particularly the youth who were suspected of belonging to the SVU or SUM. The wave of arrests lasted for a long time after the trial; the majority were arrested without legal proceedings, sentenced by the OGPU and given long sentences in the camps in the north of the European part of the RSFSR and Siberia.

The wiping out of the SVU—SUM in 1929—1930 and particularly the trial of some of the leaders of this movement only served to popularize its ideals. In spite of the mass arrests which covered not only the members of the SVU and SUM but also thousands of people who had no organizational connection whatsoever with either body, the Bolsheviks did not succeed in destroying the national ideal of the movement itself.

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Educational and Pedagogical Aims of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine

I. KRYLOV

The year 1917 is unforgettable in the history of the Ukraine: the fight of the Ukrainian people for an independent national existence which had lasted for almost 300 years, yielded, it would have appeared, positive results.

Ivan Steshenko, General Secretary for National Education in the Ukraine, declared: "The sun of freedom is shining again in the Ukraine, and a kinder fate will guide our people." This was a rather over-optimistic statement in view of ensuing events. However, resistance to the Communist seizure of the Ukraine continued most actively during the 1920's.

One facet of resistance to the Soviet government was in the sphere of education and pedagogics. It was here that the activities of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (*Spilka Vyzvolennya Ukrainy*, SVU), were concentrated.

The SVU was not composed merely of those given show trials by the Communist Party, nor those hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian intellectuals, peasants and workers who, in connection with the disclosure and trial of the SVU executive, were shot or banished to Siberia, Kolyma and other labor camps. The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine was an organized manifestation of the ideology of the Ukrainian people, who refused to carry the yoke of occupation and strove toward the sovereignty and independence of their own state.

Leading members of the SVU made the following comments on their aims:

The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine is the organization of the vast Ukrainian masses for the purpose of abolishing Soviet rule.¹

The reasons which produced the organization of the SVU are to be found in Ukrainian deep-rooted individualism, in the private property nature of the economy, in its hostility toward any violation of private property, as leading to dictatorship. All these characteristics evoked expected hatred of the Communist government.

¹ From the letter *To Ukrainians Abroad* by the General Secretariat of the Ukraine, Secretariat of Educational Affairs, Kiev, on October 14, 1917, (File No. 1360) signed by I. Steshenko, General Secretary of National Education.

^{1a} The "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine," shorthand report on the trial, Vol. I., Kharkov 1931, p. 435.

The leader S. O. Yefremov characterized the Communist government in 1924 as one that differed from the tsarist period only by the fact that the place of the tsars had been taken by Lenin and the Red Arakcheyev regime.² This Red Arakcheyev regime was not accepted by the Ukrainian peasantry, by the nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia, or by the workers.

The leader of the SVU, voicing the ideas of the Ukrainian people, felt that the interests of the nation go before class interests and those of a sovereign state go before party interests.

The large majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who were already leading the Ukrainian fight before the revolution, did not accept the October revolution with all its conclusions.³

I am of the opinion that the state comes before the party and the nation before class.⁴

We did not agree to the Soviet government, the dictatorship of the proletariat, because our principle was: "The nation before the class and the state before the parties."⁵

The SVU was born to protect these ideas of the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukrainska Narodna Respublika — UNR) which had been defeated by war. These ideas were again stressed at the SVU trial by Academician Yefremov:

(President:) No. You explain it differently in your testimonials. You say: "We do not consider the fight to be finished yet, but have moved to another phase, with other ways and methods of resisting. Sooner or later, however, this fight will be started again."

(Yefremov) Of course, the defeat was inflicted on us by war. We therefore considered that besides war there are also purely cultural ways of fighting. I felt that the time for such fighting was opportune.⁶

The truth that the fight of the Ukrainian people against Bolshevism was far from being over, that it must be continued under the new circumstances of Soviet reality, was a torch for the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine in its work to realize the invincible aspiration of the Ukrainian people: "To build an independent Ukrainian state."⁷

The instrument of SVU educational and pedagogical activity on a national scale, was the school. *It is not by chance that, among others, the SVU* also chose the school for its work. The members of the SVU pedagogical group unconditionally stuck to the principle of 1918, declaring that the national Ukrainian school must become one of the pillars of state construction. V. Durdukivskyi wrote about this:

² *Ibid.*, p. 242.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 245.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

^{6a} *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

That people is lost which by a treacherous fate has been deprived of its strong historical roots, has lost contact with its historical past, has not built its national foundation.⁸

We, a cultured society, together with our primary schools must return to our people their historical inheritance; we must reestablish the contact of our people with its glorious past, must renew the historical traditions which were destroyed in adverse times, must build firm national foundations for our state. This is, above all other things, the great and honorable task of our young, national school. All teaching in our schools ought to be done so that it may help to achieve this great and urgent task as soon and as well as possible.⁹

V. Durdukiivskiy wrote this during the period of the independent Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian national-democratic intelligentsia never forgot the idea of developing the Ukrainian school and attained it partly by means of the SVU, although the conditions for the development of a national school became increasingly difficult in the years of Communist hegemony in the Ukraine:

There was little that was hopeful or inspiring in the life of the school, but quietly, despite the very difficult circumstances (Communist dictatorship in all spheres of Ukrainian life), the school did its work, developed, gained acknowledgement from friend and foe, and defended honorably the idea of the national school.¹⁰

V. Durdukiivskiy appealed to the teachers to achieve in the schools the sort of education of the younger generation which would enable it to fight for and establish a free way of life in the Ukraine on "the basis of great world-wide ideals." The latter he explained as follows:

Our school set itself the task of educating a harmoniously developed person, to encourage as far as possible all powers and talents of the child (physical, mental, social, esthetic). Of course, we do not dream we shall realize this task fully; we must realize it in parts, step by step, as far as possible by our ability and the existing circumstances. We want to create a school which is new in its spirit, contents and methods of work, to bring it nearer to reality, calling for the utmost activity and creative spirit among the children.¹¹

The children are the foundation, the hope and the blossom of the nation, for the education of youth is the only real way of changing, improving and reforming the national life, and the great ideal of educating the child harmoniously is our only hope for restoring the health of our national life.¹²

This struggle must be led by the nationality-conscious and energetic new generation of Ukrainian college graduates because it:

⁸ *Vilna Ukrainska Shkola* (The Free Ukrainian School) No. 7, 1918, pp. 145—146.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹⁰ *Z praktyky trudovoi shkoly* (From the Practice of the Workers' School), No. 1, Kiev, 1923, p. 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Demands firm, energetic, alert and socially well-educated citizens inspired by the spirit of solidarity and unity, fighters for the right of the people, creators of a new life on the basis of great, world-wide ideals.¹³

The activities of the SVU in school life did not necessarily exclude its active participation in the general process of national regeneration. It will suffice to mention the work done by SVU members and sympathizers in the literary, artistic, theatrical, cooperative and economic organizations which later were dissolved by the Soviet government in its fight against the so-called Ukrainian counter-revolution and to paralyze the national hopes of the Ukrainian people.

The educational work of the SVU corresponded ideologically with that of the period of Ukrainian sovereignty (1917—1920). It was the continuation of the pedagogical activities of the Ministry of National Education of the UNR. There were certain slight differences, but they existed only in the methods and the possibility of their realization under Soviet school conditions. The testimony of K. Shyla during his trial, included the following:

We did not entirely reject the general principles of the Soviet pedagogical system, the methods of teaching, or even important aspects of it, but we included in them our own ideological content of the UNR-line. (Vol. 8, Art. 85)¹⁴

This content corresponded to the basic regulations issued by the Ministry of National Education of the UNR:

1. The right to education ought to be equal for all citizens.
2. The school should be national.
3. The school should be secular.
4. The school's ideals should coincide with those of the state. The main characteristic of national education is that the school should serve all citizens: children from different classes should attend it without regard for the social status of their parents; thus not only will class-antagonisms be leveled, but it will be possible to utilize the best talents of the nation, no matter from which class they originate and to build a monolithic state.

The ideas of a national, democratic school were disseminated by the members of the SVU pedagogical group through personal contacts with Ukrainian teachers and parents, and by the publication of school text-books and periodical pedagogical literature. On this subject we find the following explanations by a number of the accused during the SVU trial:

(Mykhailiyk): In your testimonials on page 230 you mentioned the actual task of the religious institutions, namely: "The task of the religious courses is to bring up fighters for the freedom and independence of the Ukraine, to train them and to send them for national and political work into the villages." Is that right?

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁴ The "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine," shorthand report, p. 110.

^{14a} "Review of the Pedagogical Professional Congress," Kiev, August 14, 1917, Nos. 3—5.

(Durdukivskyi): Yes.⁵

(Hrebenetskyi): Our SVU school section set itself the following tasks: 1. To spread the ideas of the SVU as widely as possible and to recruit as many members as possible among the teaching staffs of Kiev; 2. To utilize cautiously the legal forms of the Soviet school for applying SVU ideological principles to the education of the children. (Vol. 13, Art. 74).¹⁶

(Tokarivska): Our group set itself the task of organizing this in the school section as follows: To educate nationally conscious children and to protect the national schools from internationalistic influences." (Vol. 10, Art. 8)¹⁷

(Hrebenetskyi): They [the teachers] worked on establishing the national type of school. I realized that this was the type of school which had returned after a lapse of almost three centuries.¹⁸

(Trezvynskyi): I never was of the opinion that I applied nationalistic education. I did apply national education.^{18a} I honestly and sincerely admit to all of you that I was educating in a revolutionary way, not in a chauvinistic one. I was educating in the national way.¹⁹

(Yefremov): The activities of the school groups were closely linked with the general pedagogical work for spreading the ideas of the SVU by teachers and the schools. For this purpose a special pedagogical organization was created, as I already mentioned, which united the best teaching talents of Kiev, those who enjoyed popularity among the citizens and the pupils. The work of this pedagogical group emerged in the education of and the influence on students of the teachers' training colleges, in the influence on the broad masses of teachers in Kiev and in the outlying districts (Vol. 1, Arts. 257/258).²⁰

Taking advantage of the legal conditions of work in the Soviet schools for Ukrainian national-democratic education, the members of the SVU pedagogical group at the same time fought all Communist attempts to paralyze this kind of education in theory and practice, and opposed the educational instructions of the Soviet government. Actively opposing every step hostile to the idea of a society based on good will and the freedom of the individual, the members of the SVU realized the danger with which the Soviet government threatened the Ukrainian people by subjecting Ukrainian youth to a purely Communist educational system. Consequently, the members of the SVU combated all new pedagogic methods introduced by the Soviets into the schools, which aimed at inculcating youth with Communist ideals. As the Communists applied, and still are applying many and varying methods in order to achieve their educational aims, this article will deal only with the most important ones which were resisted by the SVU pedagogical group.

¹⁵ "Project for a Uniform School of the Ukraine," Vol. I., The Elementary School, Kamenets-Podolsk, 1919, p. 5.

^{15a} The "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine," shorthand report, p. 607.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

^{18a} In every sphere of practical life, and also at the SVU trial, the Communists regularly replaced the word "national" by "nationalistic" in order to present the national endeavors and the fight of the Ukrainian people in a negative light.

¹⁹ The "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine," shorthand report, p. 682—683.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

I. The SVU strove to minimize the effect of the Komsomol on their pupils.

The defendant Durdukivskiy testified:

The SVU categorically rejects the aim of the present Soviet school which is to bring up children with inclinations toward Communism. Similarly, the SVU is also negatively inclined toward the Communist school children's movement.

Of course, the SVU opposes the Komsomol not only because of purely pedagogical motives, but also because it opposes Communism in general, does not believe in it, and fights against it. (Vol. 2, Art. 198).²¹

Durdukivskiy further declared:

We must accept the Komsomol as an inevitable evil, and at the same time apply every means to prevent it from harming the children and the school as a whole. For this purpose it is necessary to influence the children very carefully through their parents, to prevent them from joining the Young Pioneers' organization. It is therefore necessary to control the Komsomol or pioneer leaders from the very first day: The school principal and all the teachers should show the Komsomol or pioneer leader that he is a poorly educated and pedagogically absolutely inexperienced person, and should submit him to pedagogic influence. One of the more influential teachers of the school ought, therefore, to work with the Komsomol or pioneer leader, to know each step of his work and to make close relations between him and the children impossible. In doing so it will be necessary to avoid separating the Young Pioneers' activities from general school activities, i.e. to apply means for paralyzing the Communist children's movement and its special aims in the general life and work of the school. For this purpose, our teachers of sociology ought to stay in constant close contact with the Komsomol or pioneer leaders, in order to have full information on and control over their school-work. The class organizers, the class principals and all teachers in general ought to observe thoroughly those children who have already joined the Young Pioneers, and to keep them under constant observation. It necessary to neutralize very tactfully the influence exerted on school life and work by the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol leaders. In brief, the work of the Young Pioneers is to be considered a purely formal one, the entire Communist children's movement is to be reduced to nought, so that it only formally exists. I advised all those teachers who visited me and complained of the Komsomol pioneer leaders, to fight the Communist children's movement in this way. (Vol. 2, Art. 379)²²

Tokarivska asserted: "The Young Pioneers' squad existed officially and we carried out some work there: However, it had no influence on the general life of the school."²³

II. The SVU fought against class prejudice in education, against the segregation of children and youth in the schools according to social classes, and against the consideration of class-origin in admitting pupils to schools.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 659.

Durdukivskyi also stated:

The SVU strictly opposes the consideration of class origin in admitting pupils to schools and students to universities. We are of the opinion that class origin or social categories ought not to be considered in this case, but only certain talents and sufficient knowledge of the subjects, involved. (Vol. 2, Art. 196)²⁴ I'd prefer that every child, regardless of its social origin, be granted the right and the possibility of attending any school. I was therefore of the opinion that now — when the masses are striving for education, when this education is needed more than ever, when everything must be done to make things more pleasant for the masses — everyone must be granted the chance to study.²⁵

III. SVU members fought the Communist monopoly in educational affairs.

The SVU believes that education demands the existence not only of state schools, but also of private schools, that private persons, should also be given the right to establish schools of various types. (Vol. 2, art. 197)²⁶

(V. Durdukivskyi): The history of education proves that the state school very often acts as a conservative factor and hinders the broad development of individual activities and initiative in the field of pedagogics. To prevent the state school from collapse, the existence of private schools must be admitted. Only tremendous social efforts and the vast movement of private initiative in national education can help in this matter.^{26a}

This SVU was diametrically opposed to the educational policy of the Communist Party, which considered the principle of private school development to be a criminal one and fought it rigorously, calling it Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.²⁷

In his fight for the school he [V. Durdukivskyi] only defended the "Ukrainian school" as a principle, leaving its class-structure outside his considerations. The school did not become an instrument for annihilating the social order, which it ought to become according to the program of the Communist Party.²⁸

This is what a Communist critic said of SVU educational work, because it disregarded class prejudice in the problem of education.

IV. The SVU considered religion to be a deeply personal affair and as such preferred to leave it up to the family circle, while combating atheist instruction in the school and rejecting it as having a disintegrating influence

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 692.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

^{26a} A. Prykhodko: "The SVU on the School Front," *Shlakh Osvity* (The Way of Education) Nos. 5—6, Kharkov, 1930, p. 85.

²⁷ Works by the Scientific Pedagogical Board of the Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, "Review of the Historical and Philological Faculty," No. 97, Kiev 1929, p. 42.

²⁸ O. Kulnych: "The Pedagogy of Ukrainian Fascism." *Komunistychna Osvita* (Communist Education), Nos. 5—6, Kharkov, 1931, p. 34—35.

on the child's mind. The SVU fought the efforts of the Communist Party to fill the child's mind with Communist ideas.²⁹

The emphasis put by Durdukivskyi on non-religious education to which the members of the SVU adhered in their school work, is not to be misunderstood as denying the basic principles on which education was actually being carried out by them, i. e. Christian principles. This is proved by the fact that the position of a religious teacher in the school was held by the supreme Hierarchy of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, Metropolitan V. Lypkivskyi. With the Party and the government gradually gaining control over the schools it became absolutely impossible to teach the principles of Christianity, and even to mention that education ought to be based on Christianity was considered a crime against Communist instructions. In order to prevent anti-religious education from taking hold of the schools, the members of the SVU pedagogical group had to emphasize the thesis of non-religious education, thus preserving the chance of applying Christian principles to practical work in the schools.

V. SVU members supported national-democratic education. Categorically rejecting the "task of the present Soviet school to educate Communist children,"³⁰ the SVU made all possible efforts under Soviet conditions to replace the Communist educational system by the national-democratic one, based on the principle: "The nation stands above the class, the state above the party."³¹

Durdukivskyi again testified:

How did the school group [SVU] influence the children? Well, first by interpreting the teaching materials so that they corresponded to the views of the group, by presenting these materials in a certain ideological light as far as this was possible under the Soviet school system with its strict demands. Important in influencing the children was the organization of reading-hours and the recommendation of books corresponding to our views. (Vol. 2, Art. 361)³²

I frankly admit that almost all of my visitors left the schools with at least doubt as to the basic principles of Communist education, and intent on applying in their work not the fundamentals of Soviet internationalistic education, but the SVU way of purely national education. (Vol. 2, Art. 376).³³

The court was especially interested in the ideas which were spread by means of school activities. These ideas appear in the answers given by the accused. For example:

Sokolanskyi: Which was the main factor that gave such brilliant results in your school?

Durdurkivskyi: It seems to me that this factor was the consolidation of an association based on the ideas of national, or, as it is put now, nationalistic education of youth.

²⁹ The "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine," shorthand report, p. 112.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 659.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 621.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 115—116.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 116—117.

Sokolanskyi: An association of pedagogues?

Durdurkivskyi: They were not the pedagogues who are here now. Zaliskyi, for instance, did not belong to us, nor Tokarivska, nor Trezvynskyi, as far as I remember. The enthusiasm for building our own national school was so extraordinary that it is hard to find anything similar in history.³⁴ Speaking before the parents I criticized the programs from pedagogical viewpoints and withheld nothing. I did not deny that these programs were incomplete. Anyone will affirm this.³⁵

The prosecutor was largely interested in these comments. Here are some of his questions and the answers to them:

Akhmatov: We shall talk about the school later. I am asking now about the purely pedagogical work.

S. Yefremov: It was primarily work among the students. The ideas of the SVU were propagated during lectures, discussions and so on.

Akhmatov: Do you mean that you influenced the students through the pedagogical group?

S. Yefremov: Yes.

Akhmatov: What kind of students did you want to educate?

S. Yefremov: The SVU wanted to educate Ukrainian students.

Akhmatov: Didn't we, too, educate such students?

S. Yefremov: Our opinions differ on this subject.

Akhmatov: What is your opinion in this case?

S. Yefremov: This can be seen from the principles of our organization.

Akhmatov: Give a more precise explanation of the term Ukrainian students. It is a rather general term.

S. Yefremov: It means supporters of an independent Ukraine.

Akhmatov: What was the attitude of these students toward the Soviet government to be?

S. Yefremov: A negative attitude, of course.

Akhmatov: I daresay you wanted to educate students who were hostile to the present state system and to the Soviet government in general. Is that so?

S. Yefremov: Yes, it is.

Akhmatov: And what about the schools?

S. Yefremov: Among the children in the schools such political work could not be carried out, because children of this age could not be the object of this kind of political activity. Of course, much preparatory work was done.

Akhmatov: Do you entirely reject political education of school children?

S. Yefremov: I think that politics can hardly be applied to school work, for the children would not understand it.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 695.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 693.

Akhmatov: How, then, did you want to educate nationally conscious Ukrainian children in the schools? Probably by introducing national elements into the educational methods. Is that right?

S. Yefremov: By introducing national elements, by the school spirit, by the teaching methods and by using the native language in teaching.

Akhmatov: The manuals given to the children, had they a political character?

S. Yefremov: They had a certain political tendency.

Akhmatov: Thus the education of the children also followed a certain tendency. Do you mean that?

S. Yefremov: It did follow a certain tendency.

Akhmatov: What tendency did you want to impart to the education of school children?

S. Yefremov: First of all it was necessary to bring up Ukrainian children to appreciate their country.³⁶

Yakymyshyn: What were the tasks of the cooperative institute?

S. Yefremov: The education of students in the spirit of SVU ideas.³⁷

The public prosecutor's assistant, Yakymyshyn then asked: "Which was the slogan under which your cooperation was to work?" Durdukivskyi replied: "Cooperation — the road to the independence of the Ukraine."³⁸

V. Durdukivskyi further testified:

Politically the teachers of our school were highly conscious Ukrainian nationalists. Almost all of them were prominent Ukrainian national or political figures or members of the Ukrainian revolutionary parties — the Social Democrats, Social-Revolutionaries, TUP or the BUD, later the SVU. Many active and prominent public figures of the UNR, colleagues and adherents of Petlura, worked with our school, for instance, P. Kholodnyi, V. Prokopovych, L. Chykalenko, Kh. Slusarenko, L. Biletskyi and others who all currently live abroad. The leader of the autocephalic church movement, the former All-Ukrainian Metropolitan V. Lypkivskyi also worked with our school as a religious teacher. Because of certain contacts with the District Inspectorate and my personal authority there, I succeeded to the last moment in keeping the teaching staff of our school free from Communist Party elements.^{38a} (Vol. 2, Art. 469, 470).

The Communists called this practice of national-democratic education, counter-revolutionary and pointed out all those consequences for the organizers of the SVU and their adherents which are inevitable under Soviet conditions:

All their practice was nothing but organized counter-revolutionary fighting against the Soviet government, against our principles of proletarian class-education of the younger generation, against Communist education.³⁹

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 629.

^{38a} *Ibid.*, p. 81.

³⁹ O. Kulinykh, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

VI. The SVU pedagogical group was well aware of the influence and effect which the bitter class-struggle could have on the unformed minds of children.

However painful it is to admit, the fact remains that our school still has plenty of enemies. Being unable to defeat us in the only field possible — that of pedagogy, the enemies of our school ideals transferred the struggle from the pedagogical to the political level. They introduced politics into the problems of national education, although these problems have nothing in common with politics. They forgot entirely that not so long ago they themselves pretended to protect the school from being politicized by the old regime and to fight for schools entirely free and independent from any kind of politics. Thus politics were introduced into purely academic matters, the scientific and objective approach was dropped and a great deal of distortion is being applied now. The children are mixed up in this struggle, they are being incited against everything that is Ukrainian.⁴⁰

VII. The SVU pedagogical group considered the children's self-administration to be an objective and instructive aspect of the educational system:

Sokolanskyi: If I understand you correctly, the main factor of your work, of your school, was this self-administration.

Durdukivskyi: No, I would not say that. Our school was enthusiastic about self-administration until 1923, i.e. until the latter developed away from us, that is until it was no longer of value to us.⁴¹

It is known that after 1923, the Communist Party took over the system of self-administration and made it a factor of Communist education in Soviet schools by turning it over to the Komsomol and Pioneer organizations. This is why self-administration, being a means of Communist education, lost all educational importance in the schools dominated by the SVU members and teaching staff. It performed merely administrative work, diminishing thus its influence as a factor in Communist education. Considering self-administration as a pedagogical means of instruction, the members of the SVU pedagogical group felt that its work should be supervised by a teacher, and not by a Pioneer, Komsomol or Party member.

The SVU teaching staff preferred the following type of self-administration

It must unite all pupils of the school and give them equal rights. It must bring children and teachers together and make them a close family, a friendship society; it ought to interest the children in social affairs and accustom them to a liberal social life; it should give the children a chance to demonstrate their self-activity and ability in the social sphere. It must give the children social education and create an intimate atmosphere in the school, as this is the most advantageous and necessary factor for any successful teaching activity.⁴²

The children's self-administration should be supervised by a teacher who:

Ought to keep the children under his permanent supervision without restricting their freedom, to know their every step without interfering

⁴⁰ *Vilna Ukrainska Shkola*, Nos. 5—6, Kiev 1918, p. 43.

⁴¹ The "Union for the Liberton of the Ukraine," shorthand report, p. 695.

⁴² *Z praktyky trudovoi shkoly*, No. 1, Kiev, 1923, pp. 17—18.

too much and thus destroying their confidence in his abilities, so that he is able help them at any moment. The teacher must see without looking, hear without listening, know without having learned, be with the children without being there, help the children without helping them.⁴³

Communist criticism did not fail to attack SVU theory and practice, concerning children's self-administration:

The principles of these theories on self-administration are evidently bourgeois ideas by which they want to secure education in the spirit of bourgeois morale, in the spirit of farm and kulak ideas and the family circle. Their views on self-administration neglect the principles of Communist education. They borrowed these views from bourgeois American pedagogues.⁴⁴

II.

Another aspect of the educational work of SVU was the appearance of material in 1918 in the pedagogical journal *Vilna Ukrainska Shkola* (The Free Ukrainian School). The ideas of this journal were the foundation on which SVU members continued their educational work in the schools.

During their activity in Soviet schools the SVU pedagogical group did not publish much, but what they published is an important documentation of free Ukrainian national-democratic education. These publication included:

1. "From the Practice of the Workers' School", Nos. 1 and 2.
2. Works by the Scientific Pedagogical Commission of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.
3. Textbooks published by SVU members.

From 1920 through 1929 the SVU members kept a firm control on the publication of school-manuals:

The Kiev authors of textbooks published 20 out of 39 manuals for the younger age group, i.e. more than 50%, and 32 out of 76 manuals for the older age group, i.e. 42%. 12 of the 39 manuals for the first age group, i.e. 30%, were also composed by these authors. If we consider their circulation, we find that they were designed and published in editions of some hundreds of thousands, representing 90% of all manuals being used in the country schools of our republic. (From the decision of Skrypnyk, the People's Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, January 10, 1929).⁴⁵

Of course, most of the material published in these text-books did not correspond to the instructions of the Party and Soviet government, concerning Communist education, class-segregation, the class-struggle and collectivization.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴⁴ O. Kulnych, op. cit., p. 37.

⁴⁵ From "The Decisions of the People's Commissar of Education of the Ukr. SSR." M. Skrypnyk, of January 10, 1929, "Bulletin of the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR," No. 2, 1929.

In almost all of these manuals, every effort is made to educate the children in the spirit of Ukrainian unity and community. Such a community, according to the authors, ought to be based on the principle: "One for all, and all for one."

The authors of these textbooks made all efforts to neutralize the Communist forms of coercion exerted by kolkhoz, Party and administrative totalitarianism. This is why all attempts to build among Ukrainians any association by applying coercive principles found no response in the Ukraine.

As a counterpart to the watchword of Communist collectivist education, Doga gave the classless slogan: "Society is an immense man; there one must stand up for all and all for one." The SVU tried to instill society and community feeling into the children, instead of class-categories, i.e. qualitative categories.⁴⁶

The authors of the manuals did not educate the children in the spirit of Communist ideology and morals, did not praise the Party and its leaders, did not attempt to make the children participate in the so-called political and social work, and did not agitate for Communist dictatorship. They acted in this way for pedagogical and ideological reasons; the SVU pedagogical group stood for free Ukrainian education of the children, and for building the Independent Ukrainian State on the principles of democracy and the firm foundation of the Ukrainian family.

The Communist critic of the above-mentioned works naturally approached them from a purely Party standpoint.

After having learned to read, the children find in the reader *To the Light*, the stories *The Commune*, *The October Holiday* and *The Leninists*. But what strange stories they are! The kolkhoz shown without machinery does not convince anyone of the preponderance of the collective system over the individual forms of economy. *The October Holiday* is no more the holiday of all working people, of the workers and the needy peasants. To the country children it is now not "our holiday," but "their holiday."⁴⁷

The story *Two Friends* is blind, unjustified, bourgeois morale. Instead of presenting a situation where the clash between the personal and the common or between the individual and the collective is demonstrated, where this clash culminates in the class-motivation of behavior, Doga develops a mystic tale of two friends and a bear.⁴⁸

In the old-fashioned version of this tale, one friend flees at the approach of the bear and the other is caught, the moral being, of course, do not leave your friend in the lurch.

The Communists would have preferred to see that, if two friends, one being the son of rich, the other of poor parents, meet a bear, and the bear attacks the rich one, the poor man's son should not come to the rescue of the rich friend because of class-consciousness. They would have liked the "clash" to be solved in such a manner that the Communist slogan could be deduced from it: You must not help your class-enemy.

⁴⁶ S. Chavdarov: "The Production of Textbooks by the SVU." *Komunistychna Osvita* (Communist Education) Nos. 7—8, Kharkov, 1931, p. 75.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

The Soviets also failed to appreciate the non-Communist application of children's self-administration:

The trend toward individual education is also reflected in the forms of organization of the children's self-administration proposed by these parasites.⁴⁹

According to Communist pedagogics, the leader should not be chosen from among the economical, industrious and skillful ones, but from among such pupils who are members of Communist youth organizations, who actively assist the Communist Party in realizing its measures, and take an active part in the class-struggle.^{49a}

The Communist critic S. Chavdorov castigated moreover the authors of educational works for ignoring the proletarianization of the leading institutions of the children's self-administration and for organizing the children's self-administration according to the family pattern which, the Communists feel ought to be liquidated instead of propagated.

Children's self-administration in Soviet schools is supposed to help the Party mobilize the children for social and political work and for the class-struggle, to make them devoted followers of the Party and its tasks, even to make them renounce their parents if the Party demands it:

We condemn those parents who sabotage the Five-Year Plan. They are no longer parents to us. The authors of educational books do not want to organize the children and lead them to help actively the Party, Komsomol, Soviet, professional, cooperative and social organizations. Refusing to present material which would depict the current class-struggle they also refuse to illustrate the steadily growing class-antagonisms and the class-struggle in capitalist countries.⁵⁰

The critic was, moreover, annoyed that these works contained no praise of the Party.

It cannot be overlooked that the authors make every effort to avoid mentioning the Communist Party. They consciously and diligently avoid emphasizing the role of the Communist Party in the revolution and the fight to liberate the workers. These parasites have nothing to say about the brain of the proletariat, about its iron Party. They do not want the children to know the teachings of Lenin about the Party, to know that without the Communist Party it would be difficult for the proletariat to fight, and impossible to win. In the same way, the leading role of the Communist Party in the fight for a world revolution is not emphasized. And to ignore completely Stalin, Skrypnyk and all the other Party leaders in general, isn't this a demonstration against the Communist Party?⁵¹

VIII. The SVU members did not condemn the Central Rada, the Hetman regime or the Directorium, when speaking of the period of fighting for the

⁴⁹ Chavdarov: *op. cit.*, p. 42.

^{49a} M. Zhydkoblinov: "The School in the Struggle for the Industrial Financial Plan." *Komunistychna Osvita* (Communist Education), No. 1, 1931, p. 75.

⁵⁰ S. Chavdarov: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 51—52.

Independent All-Ukrainian State. They did not stigmatize the Petlura or the Hetman movements and all the other participants in these historical events, as the Communists invariably do.

By illustrating these events, the SVU wanted to instill into the minds of the children an objective evaluation of and sympathy for the things the Ukrainian people had fought for.

The SVU program included the following:

1. The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine has the task of liberating the Ukrainian people in all parts of its ethnographical territory, to build a free and independent People's Republic.

2. The regime of the Ukrainian Republic is to be based on democratic principles; it will be ruled by an elected president, the executive power will be delegated to a cabinet of people's ministers who will be responsible to a Council of People's Representatives.

3. All citizens of the Ukrainian Republic, will be ensured all civil rights; the franchise on the basis of all-national equal, direct and secret voting; freedom of speech and press; inviolability of personal liberty; freedom of religion and so on.

4. The economy will be based on private property. (Vol. I, Art. 76)^{51a}

The Communist Party and its representatives could not, of course, agree to such a program.

The bourgeois Central Rada, the Directorium, the Hetman and the Petlura movements, these bloody periods of the proletariat struggle and the peasantry of the Ukraine are not elucidated in the textbooks for children issued by the SVU. Ivanytsya writes in his work, "The Soviet Government in the Ukraine", (*Life and Word*, Ed. 4, Part. I): "The Ukrainian political parties and social organizations built the Central Rada in Kiev which was to be the government of the Ukraine. The Central Rada was opposed to the provisional government and demanded more rights for the Ukraine." He conceals that the Central Rada was built by bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties. He emphasizes that the Central Rada was opposed to the provisional government, evidently to present the Central Rada to the children as a fighter for the freedom of the Ukraine. Mentioning that the Central Rada made agreements with the Germans and invited them to the Ukraine, Ivanytsya omits to emphasize the shameful role of the bourgeois Central Rada with respect to the workers and peasants of the whole of pre-revolutionary Russia, a role well illustrated by the so-called Brest peace treaty.

There is no criticism, not a single word against Petlura and his followers. He dares to say something against Denikin and his adherents, but you will hear nothing against the Central Rada.⁵²

The SVU did not apply anti-religious education in its work, did not support the Communist struggle against religion, and did not publish anti-religious material in their manuals.

Faithful to their agreement with the Autocephalic Church, the SVU consistently avoid mention of the antireligious education of children,

^{51a} The "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine", shorthand report, p. 52.

⁵² S. Shavdarov: *op. cit.*, pp. 50—51.

even when the topics involved urgently demand such discussion. These counter-revolutionaries consistently ignore the class-nature of religion.

The agents of bourgeois Fascist pedagogy introduced into the Soviet school the slogan of "An education without God," thus at best, directing the teachers toward atheist education.

The bourgeois, counter-revolutionary line followed by Ivanytsya, Doga and others in the matter of antireligious education cannot be denied.⁵³

This was an evaluation of SVU work by a Communist teacher, Prof. S. Chavdarov. Skrypnyk the People's Commissar for Education of the Ukrainian SSR, confirmed this evaluation as follows:

Indeed, the case of the SVU revealed a large picture of organized work by counter-revolutionaries and nationalists who were active in the branch of text-book-publishing and skillfully followed their own line as to the contents and the character of the text-books so that they became an instrument in the hands of our enemies, by which means they could poison the brains and souls of the young generation with hostile, counter-revolutionary and nationalistic ideas. (*M. O. Skrypnyk in his speech to the XII All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets*).⁵⁴

III.

The pedagogical work of the SVU was not merely confined to the publication of textbooks. The roots of its activities were to be found in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences:

Some years earlier, the Academy of Sciences had become a strong fortress into which the diligent ideological control by Soviet authorities did not enter.⁵⁵

The results of the election of a majority of Communist or pro-Communist academy-members will be rather disappointing to the Academy: it will lose its national countenance and its national and political significance. Communist ideology and pro-Communist tendencies will take a firm hold of it. (Vol. 2, Art. 410 — Testimonial of V. Durduktivskyi)^{55a}

The center of SVU work within the Academy of Sciences was the Scientific Pedagogical Association which was established to foster the cultural and educational ideals of the UNR and combat the Communist government in the field of education.

Durduktivskyi declared:

The re-established Scientific Pedagogical Association was supposed to carry on the tradition of the similar Association which existed before the Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was founded and was attached to the Scientific Association of Kiev. It was supposed to continue organ-

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 48—49.

⁵⁴ M. Skrypnyk: Speech to the XII All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, Kharkov.

⁵⁵ The "Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine," shorthand report, p. 93.

^{55a} *Ibid.*, p. 97.

izing those teachers who were dispersed by the revolution and had lost touch with their national organizations, the Association for School Education and the Union of Ukrainian Teachers of Kiev. The Scientific Pedagogical Association was further designed to realize the educational program of the BUD, (the original organization of the SVU), to unite the Ukrainian teachers under the aegis of the Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, to support the teachers in their nationalistic attitude toward the Soviet government in general and the anti-national, school policy in particular. The Association had to work constantly on consolidating the anti-Soviet front in the field of education. (Vol. II, Art. 424)⁵⁶

Yefremov testified on the same subject as follows:

Attached to the Academy of Sciences was the Pedagogical Association which united in its ranks all the more prominent teachers in Kiev and amounted to about a hundred members. This fact already made the Pedagogical Association a very convenient forum for SVU work, particularly as Durdukivskyi was deputy chairman of this Association and thus able to take advantage of his contacts and influence. The Pedagogical Association had a good reputation among the teachers of Kiev, it organized lectures and had its own offices and we decided to utilize this apparatus for our organization by establishing a board of five prominent teachers, members of the Pedagogical Association. We arranged it so that they, at the same time, were members of the teachers' training college, as we considered the control over this institution to be of the utmost importance. Thus we obtained firm control over both present and potential teachers. (Vol. I, Art. 90)^{56a}

The Scientific Pedagogical Association set itself the task of uniting all Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian teachers in the fight against the Communist system of education and against the Communist Party.

Doga testified:

As a member of the organization, I helped in the fight in the pedagogic field. By my work I helped in: 1. Preventing younger teachers from participating directly in Soviet activities; 2. Developing anti-Soviet activities; 3. Developing anti-Soviet sentiments and nationalistic aspirations among the older generation of teachers; 4. The unification of the older pedagogical generation in the case of a governmental change. (Vol. 24, Arts. 95, 102, 111)⁵⁷

K. Shylo stated:

Because of the veneration its leaders [of the Association] were enjoying, it was able to select Ukrainian as well as non-Ukrainian teachers, to separate them from the general mass of Soviet teachers and to destroy the respect of the lower teaching ranks for the People's Commissariat of Education by applying ideological influences hostile to the Soviet government. (Vol. 8, Art. 40).⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

^{56a} *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 107—109.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

The members of the Scientific Pedagogical Association planned their work not only for the purpose of coping with current problems. By their work they prepared teaching staffs for the future, when the Communist government would be abolished.

K. Shylo testified:

In case of a change in the regime the Scientific Pedagogical Association could be used as a methodological center within the democratic structure of the future Ukrainian National Republic. In the future democratic republic the Association would supply highly qualified teaching personnel. (Vol. 8, Art. 38, 40).⁵⁹

Finally, under the Soviet government which was hostile to the national-democratic endeavors of the Ukrainian people, the work of the SVU within the Scientific Pedagogical Association could not be merely pedagogical, because the members of the Scientific Association opposed the Soviet government in the educational field.

Durdukivskyi testified:

The Scientific Pedagogical Association, concealing itself behind the official program and protected by the authority of the Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, intended to perform not only mere pedagogical work, but also national, political work. (Vol. 2, Art. 25)⁶⁰

This is a brief description of the educational ideals, endeavors and practical activity of the SVU. It continued to work for its aims under very difficult conditions, after the defeat of the armed forces of the UNR, during the first years of the Soviet government, until the Soviets assumed complete control of the educational system.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Mazepa and Soviet Historiography

B. KRUPNYTSKY

The revolution of 1917 brought with it many popular publications on the history of the Ukraine. Under the new Ukrainian state system there was a great need of instructive historical mass literature. This explains why in 1917 many biographies and descriptions of Ukrainian hetmans and statesmen of the Ukrainian historical past were published. Special consideration was given to Hetman Mazepa, as he best represented the idea of independence and separation from Russia.¹

This situation quickly changed after the Ukrainian democratic state system was abolished by the Bolsheviks. In the twenties, Ukrainian historians worked intensively on the treatment of archival materials. Much consideration was given to the history of the hetman era in the XVII and XVIII centuries, the more so because under the tsarist regime only the history of the Ukraine under Polish hegemony, especially the history of the so-called right-bank Ukraine (situated on the right bank of the Dnieper) could be studied. The study of the political features of the hetman era nevertheless was a rather dangerous undertaking under Soviet conditions, and it demanded much caution on the part of the researcher, especially as regards the individual statesmen of that era. Therefore the historical synthesis was of rather small scope. Only a few very specific problems could be dealt with, but no general and true picture of the era and the people living in it could be given.² M. Petrovsky, for instance, wrote about various prominent statesmen of the Khmelnytsky era, M. Vasylenko did research on the problem of Polubotok, and O. Ohloblyn dealt especially with Petryk, the rival of Mazepa and enemy of Moscow. Nothing, however, was written about Mazepa alone.³

¹ See "Bibliografia istorii Ukrainy, Rosii ta ukrainskoho prava, kraeznavstva i etnologii" (Bibliography of the History of the Ukraine, Russia and Ukrainian Law, Geography and Ethnology), *Bibliografichnij Zbirnyk*, Kharkov, 1930, pp. 40—50; A. Kozachenko, "Nauka i storiya Ukrainy ta Rossi za rr. 1919—1927. v. USSR," (The History of the Ukraine and Russia 1919—1927 in the Ukr. SSR), *Bibliografichnij Zbirnyk*, Kharkov, 1930, pp. 13—14; B. Krupnytskyj, "Die ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921—1941", *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1941, No. 2/4, p. 125.

² Except M. Hrushevsky and his colossal *History of Ukraine-Rus*. See also: B. Krupnytskyj, *Ibid.*, p. 133.

³ L. O., "Doslidnyk Samovydtsa (Pamyaty M. N. Petrovskoho)" (Research of an Eye-Witness, In Memory M. N. Petrovsky), *Ukraina*, Paris, 1952, No. 7, p. 536; a number of works on Petryk, of which the most recent is O. Ohloblyn, *Novi materiiali do istorii povstannya Petra Ivanenka (Petryka)* (New Materials on the History of the Uprising of Petro Ivanenko (Petryk), Augsburg 1949, pp. 1—4; B. Krupnytskyj, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

The twenties were a period of cultural renaissance in the Ukraine; of course, a renaissance within specific, limited forms. Nevertheless, Ukrainian historical science made a considerable advance in development.

A sudden change came in 1929. The USSR abandoned the attitude it had hitherto, i. e. during the NEP era, held toward the Ukraine. The forced collectivization and industrialization policy of the Soviet government was above all an attack on the Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia. The flourishing of Ukrainian culture, a culture which is self-dependent, was regarded as dangerous by Moscow, and therefore persecution of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Ukrainian academic youth was started as early as the beginning of the thirties, and anything that was tainted with the Ukrainian national spirit was liquidated.

Research work on Mazepa therefore, had to fall off in this period, because the Kremlin masters put forward the thesis that the "great Russian people" was "the leader of the revolution," and consequently such Russian promoters of unification as Alexander Nevsky, Minin and Pozharsky, Peter I, Suvorov and Kutuzov were rehabilitated and praised.⁴

At that time those features of Ukrainian history were stressed which demonstrated tendencies toward unification with Russia, while in the twenties the entire work of Soviet Ukrainian historiography had been concentrated on the problem of separatism. The "separatism" of the twenties was replaced by the preaching of integration in the thirties and forties. The policy of separating the Ukraine from the Russian postrevolutionary mass as an individual entity was abandoned and measures were taken to integrate the Ukraine into the new Soviet Bolshevik empire.

After the faculty of history and philology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was abolished, history disappeared from the list of subjects on which research was made. In the thirties only, an Institute for the Ukraine was established within the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. At first it was the Historical and Archeographical Institute. In 1937 S. Bilousov became its director. The main task of this institute was to publish suitable manuals of the history of the Ukraine for use in schools and higher educational institutions, because after the liquidation of M. Yavorsky, the only Communist historian of the Soviet Ukraine his courses on history previously used in all Ukrainian Soviet schools as obligatory manuals, were outlawed. There were literally no manuals at all that could be given to the students by the Soviet government.

Among the new publications were *Essays on the History of the Ukraine*, published in Kiev in 1939—40 and containing monographs on Kievan Rus, the Ukraine under Lithuanian hegemony, the Khmel'nitsky era, and the Ukraine in the first half of the twentieth century. A separate book under the title *The Battle of Poltava* (Kiev, 1940) demonstrated fully the new tendencies.⁵

⁴ Cf. S. Narizhnyj, "M. P. Vasylenko i yeho naukova diyalnist" (M. P. Vasylenko and his Scientific Activities), Lemberg 1936, (reprint from *Nasha kultura*), pp. 33—34, 39; B. Krupnytskyj, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁵ See, for instance *Kyivska Rus fevdalni knyazivstva XII—XIII st.* (Kievan Rus and the Feudal Principalities of the XII and XIII Centuries), Kiev, 1939, 1st edition (S. Bilousov: ed.); K. Huslysty, *Ukraina pid Lytovskym panuvannyam i zakhoplennya il Polshcheyu z XIV st. po 1569 r.* (The Ukraine under Lithuanian Rule and Her conquest by Poland, XIV Century to 1569), Kiev 1940, 2nd edition; M. Petrovsky, *Vyzvolna vijna*

While in the twenties the attitude toward Mazepa was neutral, in the thirties Moscow returned to the old traditional positions of Russian historiography. The brilliant propaganda campaign of Peter I against Mazepa, which left a distinct trace in the ukazes of the tsar, and other official documents and correspondence and built the basis for the opinion of the majority of historical researchers, from Karamazin and Solovyev down to the present historians, became the basis for the Soviet historians and enabled them to renew their exorcism of the "traitor and separatist" Mazepa.⁶

Among the most prominent figures of Ukrainian history only Bohdan Khmelnytsky found favor in the eyes of the Muscovite historians and Marxists as well as nationalists, because the unification of the Ukraine with Russia could be attributed to him, but not to Mazepa. The elaborate celebrations of the 300th anniversary of this alleged unification through the Pereyaslav-Moscow treaty of 1654 were of vast significance, as they entirely corresponded to the Russian tendency of integrating and swallowing the conquered countries, including the Ukraine, in the Soviet empire. These were in reality celebrations of the victory of Great Russia over the province of the Ukraine, although actually Bohdan Khmelnytsky never was the obedient servant whom the Soviet historiographers wished to depict. In works on Khmelnytsky and materials collected for research on his era, consideration was given only to the period from 1648 to 1654, when Khmelnytsky's tendency to establish closer contacts with Moscow was still distinctly recognizable. The events of 1654—57, when the great hetman took an independent line of policy and disregarded Muscovite policy by cooperating with Sweden against Poland, while Moscow undertook to support Poland and declared war on Sweden, were passed over.

Mazepa, of course, could not be made use of for promotion of the new line in Soviet policy, which explains the negative attitude toward him. As early as the symposium on *The Battle of Poltava*, Mazepa was called a traitor for having betrayed the common interests of the Ukrainian as well as the Russian people. According to the Ukrainian historians who were made to write history conforming to orders from Moscow, Mazepa was an abnormal phenomenon against the background of the common struggle of Russia and the Ukraine against the Swedish "invasion." Allegedly the Ukrainian people was faithful to the Russian people and together with the latter defeated the Swedish enemy, while Mazepa (whom Moscow always hated most) was only an insignificant episode.

Beginning with the thirties Ukrainian historical science in general suffered a period of grave decline. The young and talented disciples of Hrushevsky, such historians as Bahaliy or Slabchenko, disappeared, either shot or exiled.

ukrainskoho narodu proti hnitu shlyakhetskoi Polshchi i priednannya Ukrainy do Rosii 1648—1654 (The Liberation War of the Ukrainian People Against Oppression by the Polish Gentry and the Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, 1648—1654), Kiev, 1940, 4th edition; F. Yastrebov, *Ukraina v pershii polovyni XIX st.* (The Ukraine in the First Half of XIX Century), Kiev, 1939, 8th edition; *Poltavska bytva* (The Battle of Poltava), Kiev, 1940, a symposium.

⁶ See D. Doroshenko, *Mazepa v istorychnij literaturi i v zhytti* (Mazepa in Historical Literature and in Life), *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Institutu*, Warsaw 1938 (Zbirnyk vol. I) vol 46, pp. 5,8. Ukrainian historiography of the XIX century was able to support this view; it was generally unfavorable toward the "aristocrat" Mazepa. cf. Doroshenko, p. 8.

The removal of these men was a kind of crusade against the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Later new names appeared which were unknown before, names of obedient servants of the regime who were trained in specifically Marxist ideas, and especially in the spirit of brotherly agreement with the "elder brother," the Great Russian people. Emphasis had to be laid on the tribal consanguinity of the Ukraine with Moscow, i. e. on all features which united these two peoples instead of separating them from each other. Historical research was closely checked by the central authorities, the leading role being played by the Russian Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the Board for the Coordination of the Activities of the Academies of Sciences of the Republics of the Union.⁷

The war period of 1941—45 brought about some alleviation in the centralized regime of russification which already had taken firm hold of the intellectual life of the Soviet Ukraine. As early as 1945, however, Ukrainian historical science again had to repeat what it was told by Moscow. There was no other choice.

As far as Mazepa is concerned, the attitude toward him not only did not change, but rather achieved certain canonized forms. There is one basic publication of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR which merits considerable attention, *The Letters and Papers of Emperor Peter the Great*. Publication of this series was resumed in Moscow in 1946 (vols. VII, VIII, and IX, 1946—52). They contain a wealth of material for the study of the Mazepa era. The Soviet Ukrainian historians, however, engaged not so much in the study of Mazepa himself as in the study of the local problems of the Great Northern War. Thus V. Koroluk dealt with the problem of early negotiations for a Polish-Muscovite treaty, and it becomes clear what immense significance Peter I attributed to Mazepa's views on Polish affairs.⁸

C. Shutoy dealt especially with the structure of Ukrainian society before the battle of Poltava⁹ and also wrote about *The People's War in the Ukraine against the Swedish Invaders in 1708—1709*.¹⁰ Petro Herbulsky gave a popular description of *Peter I in the Western Ukraine* (Lemberg 1948, p. 95), which is by no means free of significant errors.¹¹ Attention should be drawn also to

⁷ A few names will be mentioned later. An important role was played by the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, the director of which was Candidate of Historical Science A. Kasymenko. See also: H. Shevchuk, "Nauchno-issledovatel'skaya rabota Instituta istorii Ukrainy Akad. Nauk USSR za 1950 g." (Scientific Research Work of the Institute of History of the Ukraine, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, for 1950, *Voprosy istorii*, vol. 2, pp. 156—58.

⁸ *Voprosy istorii*, 1948, No. 4, pp. 43—67.

⁹ *Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Sektsiya istorii i filosofii*, 1949, pp. 313—22.

¹⁰ *Voprosy istorii*, 1949, No. 7, pp. 9—27.

¹¹ One cannot agree with the assertion that Peter I waged his war against Sweden in union with Poland; he waged this war in union with the Elector of Saxony who was also King of Poland. Also, little consideration is given to Mazepa's role in Russian-Polish relations of the time, and thus it remains unclear why the tsar refused to turn over to the Poles the fortress of Belaya Tserkov. Cf.: *Revue des Études Slaves*, Paris 1951, p. 229.

a lecture by V. Dyadychenko¹² on *The Common Fight of the Ukrainian and Russian Armies against the Swedes in the First Years of the Northern War (1700—1702)*, where the common interests of Russia and the Ukraine in conquering the Black Sea coast as well as the Baltic Sea coast is especially stressed, and where there is no lack of violent expressions applied to "bourgeois-nationalist" historiography.

An article typical of the new presentation of the Mazepa era was V. Shutoy's *The Treason of Mazepa*, published in *Istoricheskie Zapiski* (1950, No. 31, pp. 154—190), a Russian publication on this theme. This was a subversive piece of writing by a very young researcher. The risk involved in dealing with this type of subject forced the author to adopt the only approach possible.

The entire article approached the problem in the old spirit of tsarist times. The author declared: "The name of Mazepa became a historical symbol of treason. Mazepa betrayed the Ukraine, the Ukrainian people, and the brotherly Russian people." (p. 154). "During the twenty years of his hetmanate, Mazepa was engaged in strongly anti-national policies, policies of intrigues and provocations in the Ukraine and in the Zaporozhe, often trying to provoke clashes between the Russian government on the one hand and the Ukrainian people and Zaporozhe Cossacks on the other, a policy aimed at separating the left-bank Ukraine from Russia and turning it over to the Polish gentry." (p. 159).

Later the author described Mazepa as an extremely jealous person who could not endure the popularity of Paliy (p. 168.) "Mazepa directed all his efforts toward disuniting the Ukraine and Russia, toward inciting the Ukrainian people against the Russian government" (p. 161): "All of Mazepa's assertions about the tsar's intention to deprive the Ukraine of her freedom were but ancient fables." (p. 187). Simultaneously the author dealt with the problem of the "Mazepyntsi" (followers of Mazepa) before and after Mazepa's time. He described the Hadiatsk treaty as the work of Vyhovsky, an agent of the Polish gentry in the Ukraine (page 168), and the Mazepyntsi themselves as "enemies of the people, agents and spies of foreign conquerors" (p. 154).

As can be seen, this was not a study based on research, but an attempt to state certain theses, especially that the union between the Ukraine and Moscow was sacred and that anyone who opposed this idea was a traitor.

There was nothing really new in this article, unless it was the violent attack upon historians who do not agree with the present line of Soviet Ukrainian historiography (i. e. the preaching of Muscovite-Ukrainian unity in the past, the present and the future), beginning with M. Hrushevsky (including even N. Kostomarov, V. Antonovych, and M. Drahomanov, i. e. all the most prominent historians) down to the exile historians D. Doroshenko, B. Krupnytsky, and O. Ohlobyn, the so-called spokesmen for "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" (p. 185) and "falsifiers" of history (p. 165). Of great value, however, were the attached reports and dispatches of the tsar's resident agent in Constantinople, which throw light on the energetic activities of Mazepa in Turkey in 1708—09.

¹² "Naukova sesiya Kyivskoho Derzhavnoho Universitetu 17—23 hrudnya 1948 r." (Session of the Kiev State University, December 17—23, 1948), *Voprosy istorii*, 1949, No. 4, pp. 154—58.

The Economy of the Ukraine Today

A. POPLUJKO

FOREWORD

The considerable number of publications devoted to the tercentenary of the union of the Ukraine with Russia which was recently celebrated, cover many subjects. Even the economic problems of the Ukrainian SSR which, previously, were on the whole presented rather meagerly and one-sidedly, are comparatively well represented among the new publications. Much of the material which was published in recent works on the economic policy of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine is to some extent new to the researcher. This particularly applies to statistical data on the development of the Republic's economy during the last pre-war years. The most important data concerning the economic life of the Ukrainian SSR ceased to be generally available in 1937.¹ In 1940 some information was available concerning the development of particular branches of the economy, but only in certain cases.

One of the most important works on the economy of the Ukraine is entitled *An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR*,² published by the Institute of Economy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. The Russian edition of this review was considerably changed and supplemented and it can therefore be looked upon as a separate edition.³ The works of authors such as A. T. Dubrova,⁴ D. F. Vitnyk⁵ and N. V. Lohvynenko⁶ are mentioned in the bibliography. Except for the last work, which is devoted to the geology of the coal resources of the Ukraine, the later books referred to give no new information compared with what is to be found in the first publication.

¹ See the tables in *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo SSSR (1933—1938)* (Socialist Construction in the USSR, Moscow, 1939).

² *Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva ukrainskoi RSR*. (An outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), Kiev, 1949.

³ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, (An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow 1954.

⁴ A. T. Dubrova. *USSR* (The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), Geografiz, Moscow, 1954.

⁵ D. F. Virnyk. *Ukrainskaya SSR*, (The Ukrainian SSR), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1954.

⁶ N. V. Lohvynenko. *Iskopaemye ugli Ukrainy*, (Coal Mining in the Ukraine), Kharkov, 1953.

It is the general purpose of this article to establish how the Ukraine developed under the Soviet régime, which claims to have transformed it into the "leading industrial and kolkhoz socialist republic" while in fact it has become a country of sharp contrast between the high level of the national economy and the very low standard of living, a republic with a great disproportion in the development of particular branches of agriculture and industry, with an unbalanced production and consumption of separate types of agricultural and industrial goods within its territorial frontiers.

The most important aim of this study is to acquaint the reader with the most essential and characteristic trends in the present-day development of the national economy of the Ukraine and to help him to understand the complicated problems of the economic policy of the Soviet régime in the republic.

I. Territory and Population

The Ukrainian Republic is one of the largest states in Europe both from the point of view of territory and of population (see Table 1).

Since the annexation of the Crimea, the territory of the Ukrainian SSR covers 602.6 thousand square kilometers⁷ and its population, according to the latest official data, is over 42 million.⁸ The density of population is over 70 persons per square kilometer⁹ and in this respect the Ukrainian SSR takes second place in the USSR.¹⁰

Ukrainians constitute the main mass of the population of the republic — 80%, the rest is composed of Russians, Jews, Poles, Moldavians and others.¹¹

There are 280 cities and 470 urban settlements in the republic.¹² The urban population in 1939 made up 36.3% of the entire population of the Ukrainian SSR, and the percentage of urban population in the Crimea is even higher.¹³ No data on the increase in the urban population of the republic since the war have been published, but it may be assumed that all industrial centers in the Ukrainian SSR have reached their pre-war population and that further development of the principal cities is taking place. The growth of the Western Ukrainian cities is particularly noticeable.¹⁴ This is explained by the development of industry and the movement of the peasants from villages to cities.

⁷ Ozhevsky P. G. *Osnovnye cherty geografii s-va USSR* (Fundamentals of Agricultural Geography of the Ukr. SSR), Moscow 1954, No. 3, p. 6.

⁸ A. T. Dubrova. *USSR*, Geografiz, Moscow, 1954, p. 21; according to Ozhevsky — 41 millions.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, Dubrova.

¹⁰ *Länderlexikon*, Weltarchiv, Hamburg, 1953—1955.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Dubrova, p. 22.

¹² *Op. cit.*, Ozhevsky.

¹³ *Izvestia*. January 17, 1954.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, Dubrova, p. 22.

Table 1

*The Place of the Ukraine in Europe (With the exception of the RSFSR)**

| State | Territory in thousands of sq. kilometers | Place | | Population in millions | Place |
|-------------|--|-------|--------|---------------------------|-------|
| Ukraine | 602.6 | 1 | Over | 42.0 (54) | 5 |
| France | 551.0 | 2 | Approx | 43.0 (53) | 4 |
| Spain | 503.5 | 3 | | 28.6 (53) | 6 |
| Italy | 301.0 | 4 | | 48.0 (54) | 3 |
| Germany | 245.3 | 5 | Over | 50.0 (53) | 2 |
| Gt. Britain | 241.9 | 6 | | 50.3 (51) | 1 |

* Source: see footnote 10.

Dubrova writes of the particularly high increase in the population of the republic during the post-war years. "In 1950—1952 alone it increased by 2.6 million and after the inclusion of the Crimean Oblast it was further increased by 1 million."¹⁵

These data permit us to assume that in 1949 the population of the republic was about 38.5 million. The annual increase is over 830 thousand or 2⁰/₀—2.2⁰/₀. Before the war the average annual increase in the USSR was 1.23⁰/₀.¹⁶ Because of collectivization and famine the increase of the population in the Ukraine almost ceased, at one time reaching only 0.44⁰/₀ per annum. The steep rise in recent years in the index of the annual increase of population in the Ukrainian SSR cannot only be explained by the higher natural increase in births and the morality decrease. Moreover, for the USSR as a whole this index does not exceed 1.4⁰/₀—1.6⁰/₀ per annum (3—3.5 million persons per annum for 210 million of population).

In the post-war years the natural increase in the population was higher, not only in the USSR but even more so in the countries of Western Europe. Even in France a sharp increase in births was observed. But as well as this cause common to the post-war world, other factors caused an increase in the population of the Ukraine. The return of persons who had been evacuated to the eastern oblasts of the USSR from the Ukraine during the war began after 1949. In addition to this, armed forces to be sent to the countries of the Eastern Bloc and other regions of the Soviet Union are concentrated in the Ukraine. It is possible that a certain part is also played by the prisoners in the concentration camps employed in strategic and industrial building within the republic, such as at the Kakhovka hydroelectric station and in the accelerated building of the Dashava—Moscow and Shebelanka—Moscow gas pipe lines.

The movement of the population in the Ukraine presents a varied and very complicated picture. Considerable numbers of the Ukrainian population are being moved farther inside the USSR. Tens of thousands of the working population of the Ukrainian SSR have been sent to the virgin lands. During the last two years an intensive recruiting of Ukrainian and also Belorus-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

sians to work in the kolkhozes of eastern Siberia and the Far East has taken place. Probably not less than 20,000 or 30,000 young people of both sexes were sent from the republic to the labor reserve schools situated in the East. However, some persons are leaving the Ukraine voluntarily as well. This applies especially to the miners of the Donbas and Krivoi Rog. It is known that at present young people are being recruited for work in the Donbas, which suffers from a lack of labor. A similar lack of labor is also found in the Krivoi Rog basin and the Nikopol manganese basin. The displacement of considerable manpower to and from the Ukraine probably also has a political meaning and appears to be measure of repression against the disobedience of the population of the republic. But this only an assumption. The final conclusions cannot be drawn without a special analysis and the presence of documented data. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the national composition of the population of the Ukraine and the slow disappearance of ethnic frontiers is taking place.

According to our calculations the number of persons over 18 years of age in the entire USSR is 57%, in the Ukraine with 25.2 million electors, it is 60% and in the RSFSR, 62%.

II. *The Natural Wealth of the Ukraine*

The post-war years have brought few changes in our knowledge of the underground wealth of the Ukraine. The most important wealth of the republic is its coal and iron ore mines. After the amalgamation with the Western Ukraine, the reserves of oil and natural gas were considerably increased.

In the Donbas the largest and best equipped coal mines are found, but its eastern region is outside the frontiers of the Ukrainian republic. In recent times new deposits of coal were discovered in the region of the so-called greater Donbas territory, which measures about 23 thousand square kilometers.¹⁷ According to the latest data, the coal deposits stretch westward from the Donbas through the Pavlovgrad region to the Dnieper river.¹⁸ The coal is of good chemical composition in respect to ash and sulphur content, but contains a great many gaseous substances. The coal from the western region is not fit for coking but that from other regions is suitable.^{18a}

Because of the lack of new information we must content ourselves with pre-war data on the size of the geological deposits. According to VGF (The All-Union Geological Fund), on January 1, 1938, the total geological reserves of categories A+B+C were 88,872 million tons of coal or 6% of the All-Union reserves at that time. In respect to the industrial reserves of categories A+B, that is 5,278 million tons, the Donbas was second in the USSR.¹⁹ Part of the Donbas reserves are in the RSFSR, but most of them are in the Ukrainian SSR.

The importance of the Donbas is increased by the high percentage of coking coal. Coal of the coking, oven and coking-oven types constitutes 22.6% of the Donbas reserves, or about 20 billion tons.

¹⁷ A. I. Gozulov. *Ekonomicheskaya Statistika* (Economic Statistics), Moscow, 1953.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, Lohvynenko, p. 10.

^{18a} *Radyanska Ukraina*, September 7, 1955.

¹⁹ W. Leimbach. *Die Sowjetunion*, 1950, p. 298.

Coal is also found in the Galicia-Volynia depression²⁰ and in the Rovno regions.²¹ A survey carried out in recent years revealed that lignite is found everywhere in the Ukraine. The most important deposits of brown coal are situated near the Dnieper (Aleksandrovsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kremenchug and Nikopol deposits). In Lohvynenko's work, devoted to the coal mines of the Ukraine there are no data on the amount of brown coal.²² According to information from VGF for January 1, 1938, the total deposits of brown coal in the Ukrainian SSR were 518 million tons, which included 241 million tons of the A+B category.²³

We must also be content with pre-war data concerning iron ore deposits. The geological reserves of iron ore in the Ukraine and the Crimea on January 4, 1938, were 4,213.6 million tons or 38.8% of all iron ore reserves in the USSR. The industrial reserves of the A+B category were 2,306 million tons. The reserves of other deposits are of no practical importance. The main mass of iron ore deposits is concentrated in the Krivoi Rog basin and the Kerch peninsula. The deposits of ores in the Krivoi Rog basin are estimated at 1,491.1 million tons, which include 668.4 million tons of the A + B category, 75% containing over 56% of iron.

The Kerch deposits were considered the largest iron ore deposits in the Soviet Union (excluding deposits of quartzite), before the Sokolovo—Sarbaykoe deposits were discovered. The Kerch reserves of ore were estimated at 2,722.4 million tons, of which 1,638.2 million tons belonged to the A+B category.

In addition to rich iron ores, the Ukraine has considerable reserves of ferric quartzite in the Krivoi Rog basin. The general reserves of quartzite with an iron content of from 35% to 45% are estimated at 51,344 million tons, of which 10,672 million tons belong to the A+B category. The exploitation of quartzite in the Krivoi Rog basin began recently.

The Nikopol deposits of manganite ore are still of great importance in the Soviet Union in spite of the fact that a few deposits have been found in the East. The Nikopol deposits are among the largest in the world, their potential reserves valued at 521 million tons and the geological reserves at 643 million tons, of which 11 million tons are of the A+B category.

The reserves of oil and natural gases in the republic are concentrated mainly in the Western Ukraine at Boryslav. The oil deposits near Romny, Poltava district, are of geological rather than industrial interest. Recently, new oil deposits were discovered near Myrhorod (Rakinkivske deposits) and their exploitation has already begun. The exploitation of natural gas in the Azov Sea area has not begun despite the fact that intensive drilling took place before the war. On the other hand the exploitation of natural gas at Shebelanka is energetically being carried out.

The metallurgical centers situated near the Dnieper and in the Donbas are supplied with metallurgical limestone by the Olenivsky and Karakubsky quarries which are located in the southeastern Donbas. These quarries possess large reserves of carboniferous limestone.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, Lovhynenko, pp. 9—69.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

In only two of the surveyed areas, namely Pivnichny and Mandrykynsky of the Olenivsky basin, reserves of the A+B categories are estimated at 179 million tons. In addition to this there are also reserves amounting to 32 million tons of non-metallurgical limestone. The geological reserves of limestone in the Karakubsky basin were estimated in 1939 at 278 million tons, of which 195 million tons were of industrial importance. Next in size and importance are the Balaklava deposits in the Crimea, where reserves of the A+B categories are estimated at 51 million tons. There are a number of deposits of industrial importance near Zaporozhe, Krivoi Rog and Mezheva (Dnepropetrovsk Oblast). Before the war the deposits at Bohuriavske and Krasno-shchokivske, both in the Donbas, were exploited.

Clays are the real treasure of the Ukraine, and they are found in all regions. The largest deposits of heat resistant clays are in Chasovo—Yarsk, from which material is supplied to a number of factories which produce heat-resisting goods. Quartzite from the Donbas and especially that from Ovruch is used for the production of "Dynasova" bricks. Dolomite is mainly quarried near Mykytivska in the Donbas. The kaolin deposits near Hlukhiv are very valuable. Among other raw materials the enormously large deposits of rock salt at Artemovsk and Solotvyn should be mentioned and also the salt obtained by evaporation at Slovyansk. Salt reserves in the Crimea and Transcarpathia are also of industrial importance. Near Kalush and Stebnyk in the Western Ukraine rich deposits of potassium salts are mined. Deposits of Ozocerite are found in Sub-Carpathia.

The Ukrainian national economy is provided with reserves of the most varied forms of building raw materials such as gypsum, chalk, marble, granite, labradorite and marl.

The most difficult position is in respect to non-ferrous metals. Polymetallic deposits in the Naholny belt in the Donbas were known a comparatively long time ago and although they evoked great interest in the early 1930's they did not fulfill expectations. In the Donbas near the Mykytivka railroad station the exploitation of mercury ore was halted before the revolution, but these deposits are mentioned in contemporary literature and it can therefore be assumed that mining is still carried on.²⁴

III. The Industries of the Ukraine

A. Heavy Industry in the Economic System of the USSR General Industrial Production

Even before the World War I the Ukraine was industrially the most developed part of the former Russian Empire, with a well balanced and well developed agriculture and industry which were making rapid progress. The Ukraine played a particularly important part in the mining and metallurgical industries.

The general turnover of production in the great industry of the Ukraine in 1913 was 2,159,000 rubles out of the 16.2 million rubles of production for the whole of Russia (13.4%). By the end of the First Five Year Plan, when the

²⁴ *Radyanska Ukraina*, September 3, 1955.

Ukrainian metallurgic and fuel industries had speeded up the industrialization of the whole Soviet Union, the share of Ukrainian industry in the total industry of the USSR increased to 16% and in terms of value to 6.9 billion rubles.

At the beginning of the Third Five Year Plan the center of gravity began to move toward the eastern regions of the Soviet Union. In 1940 the total production of Ukrainian industries reached 22.4 billion rubles but this was only 16.3% of the All-Union production. By the end of the first post-war Five Year Plan the total production of Ukrainian industry composed 27.8 billion rubles or 11.6% of the total industrial production of the USSR (see Table 2).

Table 2

*Total Production of the Industries of the USSR and
the Ukrainian SSR**

| | (1913—50) | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| | (billions of rubles) | | | | |
| | 1913 | 1932 | 1937 | 1940 | 1950 |
| USSR | 16.200 | 43.300 | 95.600 | 137.00 | 240.000 |
| Ukr. SSR | 2.159 | 6.927 | 16.152 | 22.360 | 27.800 |
| Ukr. SSR in % of USSR | 13.4 | 16.0 | 17.0 | 16.3 | 11.6 |

* Note: The data on the total production of the Ukrainian SSR in 1913—40 is taken from *An Outline...*²⁵; for 1950 it was calculated by the author; the general production of the USSR is given according to the official data except for 1950, for which year it was taken from E. Steinhaus.²⁶ The percentages were calculated by the author.

During the present Five-Year Plan, Ukrainian industry is developing at the average rate in the Soviet Union; thus, as is illustrated by Table 3, the importance of Ukrainian industry has hardly changed. Table 3 gives absolute figures for the total production of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Table 3

*Total Production of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR in 1951—54.**

| | (billions of rubles) | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 | 1954 |
| USSR | 278.0 | 310.0 | 348.0 | 395.0 |
| Ukr. SSR | 30.2 | 36.6 | 40.5 | 47.2 |
| Ukr. SSR in % of USSR | 10.8 | 11.8 | 11.6 | 12.0 |

* Note: The data for the USSR are calculated from the percentages published annually in the reports of the Central Statistical Bureau; the approximate data for 1953

²⁵ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khozaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow, 1954, pp. 484—485.

²⁶ *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (Problems of Economics), 1955, No. 8, p. 27.

are given by Steihaus (350 billion rubles);²⁷ the total production of the Ukrainian SSR is calculated according to *An Outline...*²⁸ and on the basis of a report that in 1951 the industry of the Ukraine produced 35.2% more than in 1940²⁹; in 1952 the general production of the Ukrainian SSR was 17 times greater than before the revolution;³⁰ in 1953 the industry of the Ukraine can be assessed at 145% if the industry of 1950 is taken as 100%;³¹ in 1954 as 170% as compared with 1950.³²

The comparatively high level of industrial development in the pre-revolutionary Ukraine, which was simultaneously the granary of Russia, is proved by the considerably greater importance of industry in the general production of the national economy rather than in Russia as a whole. Thus, industry contributed 48.2% of the total production of the Ukraine's national economy³³ while for Russia as a whole the figure was 42.1%.³⁴ In 1929 the contribution of category 'A' industry (the production of the means of production), in the total industry of the Ukraine was 11% higher than in the industry of the Union as a whole.³⁵ This clearly shows the part which was played by the Ukraine in the industrialization of the USSR. It should be pointed out that even before the revolution, the production of the means of production constituted more than one half of all production of Ukrainian industry, namely 53.5%.³⁶

The years of the Bolshevik revolution and the national war paralyzed for a considerable time the development of the Ukrainian economy. According to official data, in 1926 the pre-revolutionary level was surpassed.³⁷ These data should be taken critically because in the 1925—26 economic year the production of heavy industry did not reach the level of 1913.³⁸ It was only because of the increased evaluation of the production of light industry in terms of permanent prices that Soviet statistics could claim that the production of Ukrainian industry was higher in 1926 than in 1913.

The contribution of industrial production to the national economy of the Ukrainian SSR was high even in pre-revolutionary times, when it was above the average for the whole of Russia. In 1913 it was 48.2%, while for

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ocherk razvitia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow 1954, pp. 484—485.

²⁹ XVIII Syezd KP(b)U. (XVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine), Kiev 1953, p. 38.

³⁰ *Pravda Ukrainy*, January 17, 1954.

³¹ *Ocherk razvitia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow, 1954, p. 484.

³² *Pravda Ukrainy*, April 1, 1955.

³³ *Kontrolnye tsifry narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR na 1926/27* (Control Figures of the National Economy of the USSR for 1926/27), Gosplan USSR, Moscow, 1926, p. 226.

³⁴ *Ocherk razvitia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow 1954 p. 372.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

³⁶ *Kontrolnye tsifry narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR na 1926/27*, Moscow 1926, p. 226.

³⁷ *Ocherk razvitia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow, 1954 p. 217.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

the whole of Russia it was 42.1%. After the revolutionary period, data for the Ukrainian Republic are available only up to end of the Second Five-Year Plan, when the contribution of Ukrainian industrial production was 72.4% of the whole production of the national economy,³⁹ while that of the Soviet Union was higher, 76.8%. Later, because of the fact that agriculture in the USSR suffered a decline greater than that in the Ukraine, the importance of industry grew faster for the whole USSR than for the Ukrainian Republic. It is impossible to establish the change in industrial contribution for the Ukraine and therefore it is also impossible to arrive at or compare percentage relations. According to calculations, in 1952 the total industrial production of the USSR composed 91.9% of the total production of the national economy of Soviet Union,⁴⁰ The total production of the industry of the Ukrainian SSR probably composed four fifths of the entire production of the national economy.

Soviet statistics, or rather the data published so far, do not permit us to compare with sufficient exactness the role of the production of the means of production of the Ukrainian and All-Union industries. Until 1940 the place of the means of production in the Ukraine was higher than the average in the USSR, as is shown by Table 4.

In spite of the fact that in the Ukraine, group 'A' production is ahead of industry as a whole, it is doubtful whether the Ukraine still leads in this sector of production. It is true that after 1950, the share of machine building in the whole production of Ukrainian industry again became higher than in the USSR as a whole (see Table 4).

The structure of the national economy of the Ukraine proves that it is a country of highly developed industry in which the most important place is taken by heavy industry, and particularly by electric power and metallurgy. Apart from this the Ukrainian SSR is still the leading agricultural republic in the Soviet Union and provides a considerable quantity of the food of the USSR, often at the expense of its own national economy, resulting in a chronic crisis in the agriculture of the republic itself.

Because of the low evaluation of agricultural raw materials and the products of the mining and metallurgical industry, the total production of the national economy of the Ukraine constitutes less than 20% of All-Union production. Therefore the total per capita production of the Ukrainian SSR is less than that of the RSFSR and is lower than the average for the USSR although it is second only to the RSFSR. This is caused by the fact that the most important branches of production and the most complicated machine building are concentrated in the RSFSR.

It is assumed that calculations of general production in actual volume, expressed in prices of the world market, would show that the economy of the Ukrainian SSR is not smaller than that of the RSFSR as far as the amount of production per capita is concerned and is at a higher level than shown by the average figures for the Soviet Union as a whole.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

⁴⁰ A. Poplujko. The Conference of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR", (Munich, April 25—27, 1955). Lectures and Discussions, p. 171.

Table 4

*Percentage of Industrial Production of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR
Devoted to Machine Building
(1913—55)*

| Year | Ukrainian SSR (In Billion Rubles) | Ukrainian SSR (In Percentages of Total Production) | USSR (In Percentages of Total Production) |
|------|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| 1913 | 0.128 | — | 8.9 |
| 1932 | 1.533 | 23.0 | 21.7 |
| 1937 | 3.869 | 30.3* | — |
| 1940 | 8.110 | 36.4 (plan) | 35.5 |
| 1950 | 12.200 (plan) | 22.7 (plan) | 48.0 |
| 1955 | 37.500 (plan) | 56.0 (plan) | 50.0 |

* In 1938; the plan figures are calculated by the author.

Fuel and Power Industry

The Donbas occupies a special position in the Ukraine and its coal is the most important source of fuel in the republic. Despite the damage suffered during the last war, the Donbas, most of which lies in Stalino and Voroshilovgrad district, has become once again the most important coal base in the USSR. The importance of the Donbas in the national economy of the Ukraine is determined not only by the total amount of coal mined there, but also by the amount of metallurgical coal fit for coking.

In the entire USSR out of all coal mined in 1952, only 17% was fit for coking, and 28.3% of this amount came from the Donbas.⁴¹ Because approximately half of all pig iron is smelted on Donbas coke, the supply of coal for metallurgical purposes is at the same level: half of the USSR's coke and the chemical industry is supplied with coal from the Donbas.

Apart from the mining of coal, a certain amount of attention is paid to the production of local types of fuel such as brown coal, peat and bitumen. Before the war the local fuel industry was not very highly developed. For instance, in 1932 only 80.6 thousand tons of brown coal were produced in the Ukraine and in 1937, 283 thousand tons, mainly from the Aleksandrovsk region in Kirovograd district. The cutting of peat in Polesie amounted to just over 3 million tons per annum.⁴² In general, locally produced fuel amounted to not more than 4% of the total mined fuel in the republic. In view of the wartime and post-war difficulties in supplying local industries in the Ukraine with fuel, particularly industries situated west of the Dnieper, more attention was paid to the development of the fuel industry in the western regions of the Ukraine. The mining of brown coal from the deposits at Aleksandrovsk, Korostyshev and Zolotchiv was increased. Research work was carried out on this coal at

⁴¹ *Ugol, (Coal)*, Moscow, 1954, No. 9, pp. 10—15.

⁴² *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow 1954, p. 396.

power stations⁴³ and also on the making of briquettes and various methods of thermal processing.⁴⁴ At present, a great deal of attention is paid to the western Ukrainian deposits of ordinary and brown coal. New coal mines are being opened in the Velykomostovsky and Sokal regions of Lvov district. In Volynia and Lvov district, considerable deposits of coal were discovered. The first mines were commissioned in August 1955.⁴⁵ It is assumed that by 1960 the Lvov—Volynia basin will produce an amount of coal equal to that produced by pre-revolutionary Russia,⁴⁶ that is, over 14.4 million tons.

New brown coal mines were put into operation last year in the suburbs of Uzhgorod.⁴⁷ The production of combustible bitumen has begun in Transcarpathia⁴⁸ but there are no data on the amount produced.

At the present time it is impossible to determine the role of locally produced fuel in the total production of the republic. It is quite possible that with the considerable increase in the absolute amount of production of local fuel, its place in general production has changed very little compared with pre-war times. It seems that the contribution of local fuel has not increased to more than 5% or 6% of the total amount of mineral fuel produced in the republic.

The total amount of coal produced in 1951, not in 1950 as the authors of *An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR* maintain, surpassed pre-war production. During the interval the Ukrainian coal mining industry considerably decreased its contribution to the All-Union production of coal. Before the revolution the Donbas was producing 78% of all coal produced in the former Russian empire, in 1940 a little over half and at present slightly more than one third as is shown by Table 5.

The data given in Table 5 are not very accurate since its principle source, *An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR* is grossly inaccurate. For example, Table 50 in that work shows that in 1950 the Ukrainian coal-mining industry produced 93.3 million tons of coal.⁴⁹ Table 79 gives the increase in coal production for 1948—53 in percentages of 1940.⁵⁰ The authors themselves state that in 1948 some 69% (57.8 million tons) of the prewar amount of coal was produced. Only in 1951 was the pre-war level surpassed by 2%. This means that in that year 85.5 million tons of coal were produced. But the authors of *An Outline of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR* assure us that the 1950 plan for 86.1 million tons of coal was overfulfilled.⁵¹ At the same time they state that in 1951 the increase was 10%.⁵² Thus the pre-war level could not possibly have been overfulfilled in 1950. This is clearly a case of either a serious mistake in calculations or falsification of results. The authors's calculations

⁴³ *Energetik*, 1955, Moscow, No. 6, pp. 1—3.

⁴⁴ *Pravda Ukrainy*, December 2, 1954.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, June 15, 1955.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, December 11, 1954.

⁴⁸ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow 1954, p. 499.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 395.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 495.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 496.

completely agree with the percentage increase in production compared with 1940 or with the previous year reported in the Soviet press. In Table 6 we compare data on the increase in coal production according to various sources and supplement the data for particular years by calculations.

Table 5

*The Production of Coal in the Ukrainian SSR and its Share in the Coal Production of the USSR**

| | Millions of Tons | Percentage |
|--------------------|------------------|------------|
| 1913 | 22.76 | 78.0 |
| 1927—28 | 24.8 | — |
| 1932 | 39.2 | 61.0 |
| 1937 | 69.1 | 54.0 |
| 1940 | 93.8 | 50.5 |
| 1945 | 30.5 | — |
| 1946 | 39.5 | — |
| 1947 | 47.2 | — |
| 1948 | 57.8 | — |
| 1949 | 68.8 | — |
| 1950 | 78.5 | 30.0 |
| 1951 | 86.4 | 30.6 |
| 1952 | 94.2 | 30.4 |
| 1953 | 101.0 | 31.4 |
| 1954 | 110.0 | 31.8 |
| 1955 (approximate) | 123.0 | 31.6 |

* Data for 1945—55 were calculated by the author.

Table 6

*Increase in Coal Mining in the Ukrainian SSR.**

| | In percentages of 1940 | In percentages of preceding year |
|------|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1940 | 100 | — |
| 1945 | (37) | — |
| 1946 | (47) | 129 |
| 1947 | (56.5) | 120 |
| 1948 | 69 | 122 |
| 1949 | (82) | 119 |
| 1950 | (93) | 114 |
| 1951 | 102 | 110 |
| 1952 | 111.2 | 109 |
| 1953 | 120 | (108) |
| 1954 | (132) | (109) |
| 1955 | (147) | (112) |

** Figures in brackets are correlations calculated by the author; other data are from official reports.^{53/54}

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 498.

The report that during 1951—53 the increase in coal production in the Donbas was about 7 million tons per annum⁵⁵ agrees with the author's calculations. Virnyk's statement that: "The annual increase in coal production in the Donbas during the last years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan comprised on an average 24 million tons" is absurd. Additional proof for our calculations is the report that since the war the share of the Donbas in the All-Union production of coal has increased to 20%.⁵⁷

In spite of the decreased importance of the Ukrainian coal mining industry it still maintains its leading position. Thus, in the Ukraine in 1955 2,930 kg. of coal were produced per capita and in the USSR 1,830 kg.

Not only does Ukrainian industry and transport work on supplies of Donbas coal; the Ukrainian coke and chemical industries supply coke to the metallurgical and smelting industries in the south and central parts of the Soviet Union. A large part of the coal produced is still sent out of the republic. Two thirds of the industry in the Northwest and in the Leningrad district are supplied with Donbas coal. Its export to the eastern regions of the USSR has been decreased but in relative and absolute figures, export was increased to the Northern Caucasus and particularly to the Volga region, where it forms 15.5% of the supply of coal.⁵⁸ The consumption of Donbas coal has increased slightly in Central Asia and Transcarpathia.⁵⁹

It may be assumed that during the current five-year plan the absolute figures for the export of Ukrainian coal will not be reduced, but the place of export in the total consumption will be decreased at the expense of the internal consumption of the republic and of an increase in the production of local fuel in the regions where Ukrainian fuel is used today.

The gas industry emerged in the Ukraine shortly before the last war when exploitation of the Subcarpathian deposits of natural gas was begun. The Melitopol deposits have not so far achieved industrial importance.

The first main gas pipe for supplying natural gas was built from Dashava to Lvov in 1940—41. Its length is 69 km and it has a diameter of 30 cm.⁶⁰ The main gas pipe for Dashava—Kiev was built in 1948—50. Its length is 513 km. and it is so far the largest.⁶¹ This pipe supplies gas to 75,000 apartments and 800 communal enterprises in Kiev.⁶² Natural gas is also supplied to other localities which lie on the path of the pipe. It is also planned to supply Zytomir and Khmelnytsky with natural gas.⁶³ In 1953, 29 towns and regional centers in the republic were provided with fuel gas.⁶⁴ In 1954 there were already 54 towns provided with fuel gas but these included those towns which were supplied, with industrial coke gas. In that year 8,000 apartments were provided

⁵⁵ *Ugol*, 1954, No. 11, pp. 5—14.

⁵⁶ D. F. Virnyk. *Ukrainskaya SSR*, Moscow, 1954, p. 118.

⁵⁷ *Ugol*, 1954, pp. 10—15.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ G. Vedensky. *Ezhenedelny obzor* (Weekly Review), Munich. 1955, No. 6-, p. 10.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Dnepr* (Dnieper), Moscow, 1954, pp. 106—108.

⁶³ *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 17, 1954.

⁶⁴ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow, 1954, p. 495.

with gas.⁶⁵ These figures are very modest if the number of apartments without gas in towns which are supplied with gas and the number of towns with no gas at all are taken into consideration.

In 1955 the Dashava—Kiev gas pipe was extended from the capital of the Ukraine to Moscow.^{66/67} The diameter of the new pipe is 500 mm and its total length 1,300 km. This pipe is to supply gas to Moscow and other towns in the RSFSR such as Briansk, Byezhitsa and Kaluga.

A newly discovered deposit of gas 60 km south of Kharkov near the village of Shebelanky is reported to be especially promising and it is thought that this is the largest deposit of gas in the USSR.⁶⁸ In 1956 gas will be supplied to Kharkov. It is planned that the Kharkov pipe will be extended later northward to Moscow via Kursk, Orel and Briansk

There is no information on the amount of natural gas found in the Ukraine. On the strength of reports that natural gas in the republic is supplied to hundreds of thousands of apartments and thousands of communal and industrial enterprises, hospitals and so on and that the Dashava (Ukr. SSR) deposits are larger than those of Saratov (RSFSR), out of 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas consumed in the USSR in 1954,⁶⁹ the Ukraine's contribution of between 4—4.5 billion cubic meters was not more than 40%—45% of that figure. This is only approximate.

In addition to natural gas, Ukrainian towns are supplied with coke gas. In spite of the fact that only small quantities of gas are used for non-industrial purposes, possibly between 5% and 10%; it plays a considerable part in the total amount of gas used. At present 54 towns in the Ukraine are supplied with natural and coke gas. Coke gas is supplied to the following towns: Stalino, Dnepropetrovsk, Enakievo and Makievka⁷⁰ and preparatory work has been done in Dnepropedzerzhinsk, Horlovka, Krivoi Rog and other towns of the Ukrainian SSR.⁷¹

Oil

Before the annexation of the Western Ukraine to the republic the production of oil was more symbolic than actual. After the annexation of the Western Ukrainian lands, the Boryslaw oil industry became the base of this branch of Ukrainian industry. However, the quantity of oil is clearly insufficient for the needs of the republic. In "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR" the problem of Ukrainian oil was given exactly one line: "In the Subcarpathian region the oil industry is developing successfully."⁷² There is very little information available from other sources. According to the plan for 1941, the Ukrainian SSR was to produce 353 thousand tons of oil and the Crimean ASSR 2 thousand tons, or a total

⁶⁵ *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 17, 1954.

⁶⁶ *Vechernyaya Moskva* (Moscow Evening News), August 22, 1955.

⁶⁷ *Ogonek*, 1955, No. 17, p. 12.

⁶⁸ *Radianska Ukraina*, July 19, 1955.

⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, Vedensky.

⁷⁰ *Pravda Ukrainy*, December 17, 1954.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ocherk razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow, 1954, p. 497.

of 355 thousand tons.⁷³ The decree on the 1946—50 Five-Year Plan provided for the production of oil in the Ukraine at the level of 325 thousand tons in 1950.⁷⁴ Under the Polish State the production of oil diminished steadily after the record year of 1909 when the Western Ukraine was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, when 2 million tons of oil were produced. In 1939 Boryslav produced 370 thousand tons.⁷⁵

The Ukrainian oil industry occupies a very modest place in Union production. According to the plan for 1950 the production of oil in the Ukraine was to become 1% of All-Union production. It is still not more than 1%. If it can be assumed that the first post-war five-year plan was fulfilled and that during the present five-year plan the annual increase is not more than 20% (in 1953 it was 18% and in 1954, 24%), it can be expected that at present from 700 to 800 thousand tons of oil are produced yearly in the Ukraine. This assumption is confirmed by the reports of the Central Statistical Bureau which state that in the post-war years the production of oil in the Ukraine increased by from 2 to 2½ times.⁷⁶

Peat Production

There are no reliable data on the development of the Ukrainian peat industry since the war. In pre-war 1940, in Polesie and other territories of the republic, 997 thousand tons of peat were cut.⁷⁷ In the reports of the Statistical Bureau of the Ukrainian SSR the increase in the production of peat is given in percentages. Using the same method as that applied in the case of oil, and assuming that the production of peat was increased in 1953 by 9% and in 1954 by 11%, we can establish that the cutting of peat has increased approximately 1.5 times since before the war. Therefore, at present about 4.5—5.0 million tons of peat are produced annually.

Combustible bitumen is mined in Transcarpathia, but no data are available.

Electric Power

The Ukraine is a country of comparatively powerful thermal and hydraulic power installations. By the end of 1934 the Dneprostoi, Shteriv and Zuyev power stations made up 44.6% of the total power of all stations in the Ukrainian SSR. Ten other stations of 25—100 thousand kw made up 24.1% of the total power.⁷⁸ Therefore 13 large stations were producing over two thirds of the current in the republic. Also in 1934 the regional power stations produced 1,159,000 kw or 70% of the total power in the Ukrainian SSR (1,656,000 kw).⁷⁹ Before the war there were only 268 small village power stations.⁸⁰

⁷³ *Gosplan na 1991* (Gosplan for 1941), Moscow, p. 654.

⁷⁴ *Gosplan na 1946—1950* (Gosplan for 1946—1950), Moscow, 1946, p. 47.

⁷⁵ *Op. cit.*, Leimbach. p. 339.

⁷⁶ *Radio Ukraina*, September, 1955.

⁷⁷ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow, 1954, p. 396.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 336—7.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 498.

The increase in power generated by the stations and the production of electric energy before the war are illustrated in Table 7. The power stations of the republic produced nearly one quarter of the power in the USSR or 25% of the All-Union production of electricity per capita.

Table 7

Power Stations and Output in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR

| | 1913 | 1927—28 | 1932 | 1937 | 1940 |
|---------------------------------------|---------|---------|----------|----------|--------|
| Capacity of Power stations in USSR | | | | | |
| (Thousands of kw.) | 1,100.0 | — | 4,700.0 | 8,200.0 | — |
| Same in Ukrainian SSR. | 200.0 | 464 | 1,400.0 | 1,980.0 | 2,496 |
| Ukr. SSR in %'s of USSR. | 18.3 | — | 29.8 | 24.2 | — |
| Production of Current in USSR | | | | | |
| (Thousands of kw.) | 1,900.0 | — | 13,500.0 | 36,400.0 | — |
| Same in Ukrainian SSR. | 500.0 | 1,244 | 3,158.0 | 9,343.0 | 11,938 |
| Ukr. SSR in %'s of USSR. | 26.3 | — | 23.4 | 25.6 | — |

In 1945 the Ukrainian power stations furnished one fifth of their pre-war production. Only in 1950 did the production surpass pre-war output by 19%. During the last five-year plan the production of power in the Ukraine was doubled (see Table 8). In the post-war years the government of the USSR paid more attention to the development of electricity-producing enterprises in the eastern areas and therefore a disproportion between the current needed and its production was created in the Ukraine. The percentage of electric power per capita is lower at present in the Ukraine than the average for the USSR despite the fact that the production of current per capita in absolute figures was increased to 619 kwh. per annum.

At present relatively more village, collective farm and inter-collective farm stations are being built on rivers of local importance. By the end of 1950 there were four times as many such stations as before the war, namely 1,165.⁸¹

Table 8

*The Output of Current in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, 1945—55**
(Output in Millions of Kwh)

| | USSR | Ukrainian SSR | Percentage |
|------|---------|---------------|------------|
| 1945 | — | 2,460 | — |
| 1948 | — | 8,850 | — |
| 1950 | 90,300 | 14,200 | 15.7 |
| 1951 | — | 16,700 | — |
| 1952 | — | 18,700 | — |
| 1953 | 133,000 | 20,800 | 15.6 |
| 1954 | — | 23,100 | — |
| 1955 | 166,000 | 26,000 | 15.7 |

* Data for the USSR are official; for the Ukrainian SSR they are calculated by the author from correlation of percentages.

⁸¹ *Op. cit.*, Dubrova.

The power of the regional stations in the Ukrainian SSR increased during the first post-war five-year plan (1946—50) by 1.5 times and the production of current by 89%. Two Ukrainian power systems, *Donbasenergo* and *Dneprostroi*, produce more than twice the output of all power stations in pre-revolutionary Russia.⁸² It can be assumed that it reaches nearly 2.5 million kw.

The great Ukrainian hydroelectric station at Kakhovka, built after the war, is one of the "great structures of Communism." The station was to provide industrial current by the end of 1955. Its nominal power was set at 250 thousand kw.⁸³ According to other reports its actual power is said to be 236 thousand kw.⁸⁴

It is known that the Kakhovka hydroelectric station was built mainly in order to create a large reservoir and an irrigation network to provide increased yields in the semi-arid southern districts of the Ukraine and the northern regions of the Crimea.

The Metallurgical Industry

Before the revolution the metallurgical plants of the Ukraine were producing more than one half of the metal produced in the former Russian empire. The Ukrainian works were more powerful than those in the Urals and were staffed with better technologists. In 1929—30 when the production of metal in the Soviet Union surpassed the pre-revolutionary level, the Ukraine produced 3.4 million tons of pig iron, or 69% of the All-Union production; 3.2 million tons of steel or 55%; and 2.6 million tons of rolled metal or 63%.⁸⁵

In the late 1920's local specialists with the aid of American and German advisers worked out an extensive plan for the reconstruction of the Yugostral works, located near the middle Dnieper, and the Donbas. The works most drastically reconstructed at that time were Makievka and Dneprodzerzhinsk. In the 1930's the building of new metallurgical establishments in the Ukraine began. These were works encompassing the full metallurgical cycle (pig iron — steel — rolled metal), with their own coke and chemical works in Zaporozhe, in Mariupol (Azovstal) and in Krivoi Rog, with a capacity of over 1 million tons of pig iron each per year. A tube rolling works was also built in Nikopol and new tube rolling departments were built at Mariupol (at the Kuibyshev works), in Taganrog (at the Andreev works) and in Dnepropetrovsk (at the Liebknecht works). In addition to the extended production of plate at the Comintern works at Dnepropetrovsk, a new plate works was built at Novomoskovsk. But at that time only two works were built in the east, the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk combines. The building of the Novo-Tahilsk and Chelyabinsk works came later. In Central Russia, the Novo-Tulsk works were built. Thus the building of ferrous metallurgical enterprises in the Ukraine during the first two pre-war five-year plans was on a larger scale than in other parts of the USSR. Thanks to this, before the war the Ukraine preserved its leading position in All-Union metallurgical production, as is illustrated in Table 9.

⁸² *Radyanska Ukraina*, May 16, 1955.

⁸³ *Ibidi.*, September 21, 1955.

⁸⁴ *Bloknot Agitatora*, 1955, No. 26, p. 7.

⁸⁵ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow, 1954.

In 1940, out of a total of 96 blast furnaces in the USSR there were 49 blast furnaces in the Ukraine, or slightly more than half. Because of the capacity of Ukrainian blast furnaces the difference was even more in favor of Ukrainian metallurgy. A considerable number of the blast furnaces built in the Ukraine were of 600 cubic meters capacity, including 16 with a capacity of more than 600 cubic meters; there were also four super blast furnaces with a capacity of 1,300 cubic meters each.⁸⁶ It should be noted that the practice of building super-large blast furnaces was begun in the Ukraine, in 1938. Later, drawing on the experience gained in the Ukraine, similar blast furnaces were built for the metallurgical works in the East.

During the five-year plans standard stationary open hearth furnaces for working with liquid pig iron with a capacity of 110—125 tons were built (the area of the hearth being 52 square meters). Such furnaces were built at the Dneprodzerzhinsk and Makievsk work at Zaporozhstal. At the Azovstal works, which produce phosphorite pig iron, labial and not stationary 250-ton blast furnaces of the Krupp type were built. In all, during the Second Five Year Plan, 23 large open hearth furnaces were built in the Ukraine.⁸⁷

According to a report of January 1, 1953, there were 337 open hearth furnaces with a total hearth area of 8,613 square meters in the USSR; 214 of these, with a total hearth area of 5,098 square meters or 59.2% of the total area of all furnaces, were in the RSFSR and 117 open blast furnaces with a total hearth area of 3,444 square meters or 40.0% were in the Ukraine.⁸⁸

After the war, Ukrainian metallurgy was not only rebuilt, but was also extended. The extension of the Zaporozhstal, Azovstal, Krivoi Rog and Nikopol works continued. However, the leading position which had been lost in the years of war ruin was not regained. Although the Ukrainian SSR continues to be an important metallurgical base in the system of Soviet republics it is certain that the importance of Ukrainian metallurgy will decrease in the future. Apparently no new metallurgical works are to be built in the republic. In spite of this, per capita production of ferrous metals in the Ukraine will preserve its leading position in future. The ferrous metallurgy of the republic will continue for years to supply other districts and republics of the USSR.

The production of pig iron in the post-war years was maintained at the level of approximately one half of All-Union production.

⁸⁶ *Narodne gospodarstvo Rad. Ukrainy*, (The National Economy of the Soviet Ukraine), Kiev, 1945, p. 7.

⁸⁷ See the tables in *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo SSR (1933—1938)* (Socialist Construction in the USSR, 1933—1938), Moscow, 1939.

⁸⁸ *Trud v SSSR* (Labor in the USSR), Moscow, 1935, p. 107.

Table 9

*Production of Pig Iron in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR,
(Millions of Tons (1913—55))*

| | USSR | Ukrainian SSR | Percentage |
|---------|-------|---------------|------------|
| 1913 | 4.63 | 2.88 | 62.0 |
| 1929—30 | 4.90 | 3.40 | 69.0 |
| 1932 | 6.20 | 3.90 | 63.0 |
| 1933 | 7.10 | 4.30 | 60.5 |
| 1934 | 10.50 | 6.30 | 60.0 |
| 1935 | 12.50 | — | — |
| 1936 | 14.40 | — | — |
| 1937 | 14.50 | 8.80 | 60.5 |
| 1938 | 14.60 | — | — |
| 1939 | — | — | — |
| 1940 | 15.00 | 9.20 | 61.2 |
| 1945 | 8.95 | 1.70 | 19.0 |
| 1946 | 10.00 | 2.90 | 29.0 |
| 1947 | 11.40 | 3.80 | 33.3 |
| 1948 | 13.90 | 5.30 | 38.0 |
| 1949 | 16.50 | 7.10 | 43.0 |
| 1950 | 19.30 | 9.20 | 47.5 |
| 1951 | 22.10 | 10.80 | 48.7 |
| 1952 | 25.20 | 12.90 | 51.5 |
| 1953 | 27.70 | 13.70 | 49.5 |
| 1954 | 30.20 | 14.80 | 49.0 |
| 1955 | 33.00 | 16.30 | 49.5 |

A similar position in All-Union production is noticeable in the production of steel and rolled metal (Tables 10 and 11). Today the Ukraine produces 35%—37% of the All-Union production of steel and rolled metal, that is, 10% less than in pre-war times.

The production of steel per capita in the USSR as a whole and in the Ukrainian SSR in particular is such that the Ukrainian republic today produces 1.9 times more steel per capita than the USSR (see Table 12).

The official Soviet press gives no absolute figures concerning the production of steel and rolled metal in the post-war years. But the percentage increase of production of the ferrous metallurgical works which are given in

"An Outline of the Development of the Economy of the Ukrainian SSR,"⁸⁹ which states that in 1953 Ukrainian works produced 59% more pig iron than in 1940, 59% more steel and 64% more rolled metal, allows us to establish with sufficient exactness for our purpose the absolute figures for the production of metal in the republic.

Table 10

*Production of Steel in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR
(Millions of Tons (1913—55))*

| | USSR | Ukrainian SSR | Percentage |
|---------|------|---------------|------------|
| 1913 | 4.9 | 2.44 | 49.8 |
| 1929—30 | 5.8 | 3.20 | 55.0 |
| 1932 | 5.9 | 3.10 | 52.5 |
| 1933 | 6.8 | 3.40 | 50.0 |
| 1934 | 9.6 | 4.60 | 48.0 |
| 1935 | 12.4 | — | — |
| 1936 | 16.2 | — | — |
| 1937 | 17.5 | 8.50 | 48.5 |
| 1938 | 18.0 | — | — |
| 1939 | — | — | — |
| 1940 | 18.3 | 8.60 | 47.1 |
| 1945 | 12.4 | 1.40 | 11.3 |
| 1946 | 13.5 | 2.40 | 17.8 |
| 1947 | 14.7 | 2.60 | 17.7 |
| 1948 | 18.7 | 4.50 | 24.0 |
| 1949 | 23.4 | 6.50 | 27.8 |
| 1950 | 27.3 | 8.40 | 30.8 |
| 1951 | 29.2 | 10.20 | 35.0 |
| 1952 | 35.0 | 11.80 | 33.7 |
| 1953 | 38.0 | 13.70 | 35.8 |
| 1954 | 41.4 | 15.20 | 36.7 |
| 1955 | 45.0 | 16.70 | 37.0 |

⁸⁹ *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 3, 1954.

Table 11

*Production of Rolled Metal in the USSR and Ukrainian SSR
(Millions of Tons (1913—55))*

| | USSR | Ukrainian SSR | Percentage |
|---------|------|---------------|------------|
| 1913 | 4.04 | 2.06 | 51.0 |
| 1929—30 | 4.1 | 2.60 | 63.0 |
| 1932 | 4.3 | 2.40 | 56.8 |
| 1933 | 4.9 | 2.60 | 53.0 |
| 1934 | 6.7 | 3.60 | 53.7 |
| 1935 | 9.4 | — | — |
| 1936 | 12.4 | — | — |
| 1937 | 13.0 | 6.20 | 47.7 |
| 1938 | 13.2 | — | — |
| 1939 | — | — | — |
| 1940 | 13.1 | 6.25 | 48.0 |
| 1945 | 7.5 | 1.10 | 14.7 |
| 1946 | 9.6 | 1.70 | 17.7 |
| 1947 | 11.1 | 2.20 | 19.8 |
| 1948 | 14.2 | 3.70 | 26.0 |
| 1949 | 18.0 | 5.60 | 31.1 |
| 1950 | 20.8 | 6.80 | 32.7 |
| 1951 | 23.9 | 8.20 | 33.3 |
| 1952 | 26.8 | 9.50 | 34.8 |
| 1953 | 29.7 | 10.30 | 35.6 |
| 1954 | 31.5 | 11.70 | 37.1 |
| 1955 | 34.1 | 12.60 | 37.0 |

According to the first post-war five-year plan (1946—50), the Ukrainian metallurgical industry was to produce 9.7 million tons of pig iron and 8.8 million tons of steel per annum. The actual production of steel and pig iron as determined by our calculations shows that this goal was under-fulfilled by 5% in respect to pig iron and by 2.5% in respect to steel. The authors of "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR" state, however, that: "The metallurgical industry of the Ukraine, which speedily rose from ruin and ashes, produced even in 1949 more metal than in pre-war 1940."⁹⁰ If this statement were true it would mean that the Ukrainian metallurgical industry had considerably over-fulfilled the plans of the fourth Five-Year Plan, but in fact the Ukrainian SSR did not fulfill the plan for ferrous metals. Also the data on the increase in the production of ferrous metals given by the authors in percentage relation show that the author's calculations are more accurate.⁹¹ The same report states that in 1954 the Ukrainian metallurgical industry was to produce the same amount of pig iron as that produced by the whole metallurgical industry of the USSR in 1940.⁹² In "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR" only the planned production of pig iron, which was to be increased by 10%, is discussed, but

⁹⁰ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, Moscow 1954.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, table 7, p. 484.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 492.

in fact its production has increased by only 8⁰/₀; thus instead of the 15 million tons expected, the Ukrainian metallurgical industry produced 14.8 million tons, which tallies with the author's own calculations. As a matter of fact, Virnyk states that by the end of 1950 the Ukraine produced more metal than before the war.⁹³

Table 12

*Per Capita Steel Production in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR
(in Kilograms)**

| | USSR | Ukrainian SSR | Percentage |
|------|------|---------------|------------|
| 1940 | 96 | 278 | 290 |
| 1950 | 136 | 207 | 152 |
| 1955 | 208 | 398 | 192 |

* The population of the USSR in 1940 was 193 million and in the Ukrainian SSR 31 million, in 1950 in the USSR 200 million, and in the Ukrainian SSR 40.5 million, in 1955 in the USSR 216 million, and in the Ukrainian SSR 42 million.

Before the revolution and World War II, the Ukrainian metallurgical industry supplied all the necessary types of rolled metal and steel needed by the Ukraine, with some small exceptions. The specialization in the production of rolled metal in the mid-1930's brought about the necessity of transporting metal to the Ukraine from the distant Urals, and vice versa. Since the war the utilization of steel and rolled metal by the machine-building industry and other branches of the national economy of the Ukrainian SSR has increased to such an extent that only pig iron is exported from the Ukraine and from the USSR itself in considerable quantities.

There is no possibility of analyzing here the reasons which made it necessary to transport metal on a large scale. It is not our task to dwell upon this economic irrationality. From the example of the metallurgical industry it is not difficult to establish that what is involved is a deliberate effort on the part of the Soviet state and the Communist Party to tie the separate republics economically into a single national economic system. But even in the machine-building industry, upon which we shall dwell later, the peculiarities of the economic policy of the régime are sufficiently clear to establish the fact that it often sacrifices the profitability and expediency of economic ties in order to prevent the independent and balanced economic development of the separate republics. The economic and geographical partitioning of the Soviet empire runs contrary to the national and administrative division of the Soviet Union.

The Ukrainian metallurgical industry owes its development to the fortunate combination of iron and manganite deposits with the presence of coking coal and with sufficient reserves of flux and water resistant materials. Krivoi Rog iron ore is not only used on the spot, but is also exported to the metallurgical enterprises of Russia and outside the USSR. Before the war, Germany was the main consumer of Krivoi Rog ore but her place has now been taken by the countries of the eastern bloc. Kerch ore is used only by the Azovstal works although the production is calculated to supply two metallurgical works. Its main disadvantage is the amount of arsenic content, which it has so far not been possible to remove effectively. For this reason the pig iron produced from Kerch ore is used for making only a few kinds

⁹³ *Op. cit.*, Virnyk.

of steel and a similarly limited assortment of rolled metals. The production of iron ores is shown in Table 13.

At the present time the production of iron ore is 5.5 times greater than before the revolution and is 95% larger than before the war. With the increase in the mining of iron ore in the Krivoi Rog basin a question emerged concerning the utilization of quartzites and iron ores which contain less than 46% of iron. At present about 3 million tons annually of such ore remain behind in the mines.⁹⁴ The status of quartzites containing less than 37% of iron has been even worse. The amount of such ores in the Krivoi Rog basin is ten times greater than of those which are rich in iron ore. In order to improve the status an ore-concentrating mill has been put into operation designed to enrich ores which contain only 38% of iron.⁹⁵

Table 13

*Iron Ore Production in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR (1913—55)**
(Millions of tons)

| | USSR | Ukrainian SSR | Percentage |
|---------|--------|---------------|------------|
| 1913 | 9.2 | 6.4 | 68.5 |
| 1929—30 | — | — | — |
| 1932 | — | — | — |
| 1933 | — | — | — |
| 1934 | — | 13.3 | — |
| 1935 | 26.8 | 16.5 | 59.3 |
| 1936 | — | — | — |
| 1937 | 27.7 | 16.4 | 59.3 |
| 1938 | — | — | — |
| 1939 | — | — | — |
| 1940 | 29.8 | 18.9 | 68.5 |
| 1945 | — | 3.5 | — |
| 1946 | 18.3 | 5.8 | 31.8 |
| 1947 | — | 8.7 | — |
| 1948 | — | 11.6 | — |
| 1949 | — | 14.8 | — |
| 1950 | (40.0) | 20.0 | 50.0 |
| 1951 | — | 23.8 | — |
| 1952 | — | 27.8 | — |
| 1953 | — | 30.6 | — |
| 1954 | — | 32.1 | — |
| 1955 | — | 35.0 | — |

* The amount of ore mined in 1940 and 1946 is calculated from data taken from A. Zvorykin;⁹⁶ data concerning ores in the Ukrainian SSR before the war are taken from "An Outline the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSS." Data on the situation after the war are calculated by the author on the basis of percentages of growth. Data for 1935 are taken from the manual "Labor in the USSR."⁹⁷ Data for iron ore in the USSR in 1955 are taken from the report of the Five-Year Plan.

⁹⁴ *Stroitel'naya Gazeta*, Moscow, July 29, 1955.

⁹⁵ *Ogonek*, 1955, No. 22, p. 14.

⁹⁶ A. Zvorykin. *Ocherki po istorii sovetskoi gornoi tekhniki* (Outline of the History of the Soviet Mining Industry), Moscow, 1950, pp. 41—48.

⁹⁷ *Trud v SSR*, Moscow, 1935, p. 107.

Nikopol manganese ore is used by the industries of the Ukraine and Russia and is probably also exported, as was the case before the war. The mining of manganese ore before the war in the Ukraine is illustrated by the following figures: in 1913, 276 thousand tons of manganese ore were mined; in 1932, 443 thousand tons; in 1935, 1,037 thousand tons; in 1937, 957 thousand tons; and in 1940, 893 thousand tons. The Ukrainian manganese ore industry made up the following percentages of total USSR production in 1913, 22.5%; in 1937, 33.8%; and in 1940, 35%.^{97a}

There are no available data concerning the post-war period to enable us to calculate the production of manganese ore in the Ukraine. In "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR." there are the following figures concerning the production of manganese ore in percentages of the previous year (from reports of the Central Statistical Bureau of the Ukrainian SSR): in 1947, 124%; in 1948, 119%; in 1949, 152%; in 1950, 127%; in 1951, 129%; and in 1952, 105% other sources provide the following figures for later years: in 1953, 111%; in 1954, 104%; and in 1955, 117%.⁹⁸ As compared with 1946 the production of manganese ore had increased by 1950 2.85 times and by 1955 about 5.25 times. There is no doubt that the pre-war level of the manganese industry has been surpassed.

There are some additional data on coke production in the Ukrainian works, but here we have to do with calculated data and not official indices. Table 14 gives figures illustrating the production of coke in the post-war years based on the assumption that in 1950 the planned task of the Ukrainian coke and chemical enterprises was underfulfilled by 0.3 million tons.

It may be assumed that at present the production of coke in the Ukraine constitutes over one half of the total production of coke in the USSR. The coke is not only used by Ukrainian industry but is also exported to the central regions of the RSFSR, mainly to foundries. The per capita production of coke in the Ukrainian republic is about 570 kilograms per annum and is 2.7 times higher than the average for the USSR.

^{97a} *Bloknot Agitatora*, 1953, No. 6, pp. 18—32.

⁹⁸ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo Khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, table 81, p. 481, table 82, p. 491.

Table 14

*The Production of Coke in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, (1913—55)**
(Millions of Tons)

| | USSR | Ukrainian SSR | Percentage |
|---------|--------|---------------|------------|
| 1913 | 4.5 | 4.44 | 98.5 |
| 1929—30 | — | — | — |
| 1932 | 8.4 | 6.87 | 81.8 |
| 1933 | 10.2 | — | — |
| 1934 | 14.2 | 10.5 | 74.0 |
| 1935 | 16.7 | — | — |
| 1936 | — | — | — |
| 1937 | 19.8 | — | — |
| 1938 | 19.9 | — | — |
| 1939 | — | — | — |
| 1940 | 20.0 | 15.1 | 75.5 |
| 1945 | 14.4 | 3.2 | 22.4 |
| 1946 | 16.0 | 5.1 | 32.0 |
| 1947 | 18.3 | 6.9 | 37.7 |
| 1948 | — | 9.3 | — |
| 1949 | — | 12.2 | — |
| 1950 | (28.5) | 15.2 | 53.5 |
| 1951 | — | 16.7 | — |
| 1952 | — | 18.1 | — |
| 1953 | — | 19.9 | — |
| 1954 | — | 22.0 | — |
| 1955 | — | 24.0 | — |

* The production of coke in pre-war days is taken from an unpublished work by the author on *Coke-Firing Chemistry*; the post war production of coke is calculated from reports of the Central Statistical Bureau.

Machine Building and Metal Processing

In the Ukraine before the revolution, only part of the metal produced there was used for making machinery. At the beginning of the twentieth century, machine building was in the initial stage of a large development and its great prospects attracted considerable foreign capital to the Ukraine. Already on the eve of World War I, there were 540 machine-building and metal-processing enterprises employing about 57,000 workers in the Ukraine.⁹⁹ The total production of this branch of industry in 1913 constituted in value 239 million rubles or 20.2% of the total value of the All-Russian metal industry.¹⁰⁰ In other words, its importance was about equal to that of the Ukrainian population in the Russian Empire. The Ukraine also occupied a leading position in other branches of the All-Russian machine-building industry. Before World War I, the Ukraine produced 51.1% of all agricultural

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

machines in Russia and 43.3% of all railway engines.¹⁰¹ A prominent part in All-Russian production was played by the Ukraine in the building of rolling stock and ships and the production of equipment for separate branches of industry, mainly mining and metallurgy.

After the Soviet authorities had switched to rapid industrialization, Ukrainian machine building began to develop so fast that it surpassed the increases in the metallurgic and coal-mining industries. At the end of the First, Five-Year Plan, the value of the total machine building production was estimated at 1.533 million rubles or 5 times more than in 1927—28 and 12 times more than in 1913.¹⁰² At the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, the Ukraine produced one third of all tractors in the USSR and nearly 60% of all harvesting combines (see Table 15). The railroad locomotive building works in the Ukraine made up 52.1% of the total production of the USSR.

Before World War II, among the products of the machine-building industry of the Ukraine there were many which had not been produced before the revolution or, if so, only in small quantities. These included metal-cutting machines, turbines, harvesting combines, road building machines, various kinds of mining and metallurgic equipment for the chemical and food industries.¹⁰³ Airplane engines, bridge girders, metal masts for high voltage transmission lines and other types of construction, and wire cables were also produced.

Because of mechanization and its need for large machines, the Ukrainian machine-building industry considerably increased its production in terms of value; compared with the prerevolutionary period, the value of production increased 18.2 times, reaching over 570 million rubles.

The basic funds of the machine-building industry of the Ukrainian SSR increased in the 10 years prior to 1938 more than ten times.¹⁰⁴ Although this figure is relative, it is impossible not to admit to a considerable development in this branch of the national economy. Many old enterprises were reconstructed, modernized and considerably extended. New enterprises were built in all districts of the republic, but in principle the new works were built mostly in the large cities which already had highly-developed industries, such as Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa and in old industrial regions such as the Dnieper area and the Donbas, which were developed at the end of the last century.

Table 15

The Production of Machines in the Ukrainian SSR

| | 1913 | 1927—28 | 1932 | 1937 | 1940 | 1950 | 1955 |
|--------------------------------|------|---------|--------|------|------|------|------|
| Large railroad locomotives | — | 231 | 431 | 880 | — | 1253 | — |
| Tractors | — | — | 16,333 | — | — | — | — |
| Harvesting Combines | — | — | 5,953 | — | — | — | — |
| Agricultural | | | | | | | |
| Machines, (Millions of Rubles) | 32 | — | — | — | 572 | — | — |

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 329.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 398.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

Before the last war, machine construction constituted more than one third of the entire production of the heavy industry of the USSR (see Table 16). From the fourth place in prerevolutionary times, machine building rose to the first place in 1940 by furnishing more goods than all other industries together, except the light industry and the food industry, in all 36.4% as against 25.0%, as is seen from Table 16.

Again after the war, machine building was developed as rapidly as possible so that by 1950 it constituted 44% of the entire production of heavy industry, and in 1955, according to the plan, was to provide over one half (56%).

Because it is impossible to calculate absolute figures for production we can supply only general data which can be found in various publications. By the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 2.7 times more metallurgical equipment was built in the Ukraine than before the war, twice as many tractors, 2.5 times more electrical motors, 2.1 times more railway freight cars and 9.3 times more excavators.¹⁰⁵

In order to give a picture of production in absolute figures, it is as well to recall the goal of the first post-war five-year plan which called for production in 1950 on a slightly higher level than in 1940, with certain exceptions for separate types of production. It was planned to produce in 1950, 5,950 metal cutting machines or 8% of the All-Union production; 25,000 automobiles or 5%; 1,000 railroad engines or over 45%; 55,500 railway freight cars or 38%; 25,000 tractors (less than before the war because in 1934 40.4 thousand were made) or over 22%; and 35,000 tons of metallurgical equipment, or 34% of All-Union production. With the exception of automobiles and machine tools, in all other branches of production mentioned the contribution of the Ukrainian SSR in the metallurgical industry is considerably higher than the average for the USSR.

The rebuilt factories were supplied with much new equipment; it was only possible to use part of the pre-war equipment, as a great deal of what was evacuated to the east was lost in transport. The machines which were brought from the west as "trophies" or which were received as reparations were very useful in re-equipping the rebuilt factories. Certain enterprises were removed from western and central Europe complete with equipment and some even with personnel, and these became the basis for new works in the Ukrainian SSR. Through the lack of concrete data it is possible only to assume the role of this equipment in the building of the new post-war industries of the republic. However, it should be assumed that in the creation of new branches of the machine-building industry they have played a large part. Among the newly built enterprises, we must mention a ball-bearing factory in Kharkov, a motorcycle factory in Kiev, a dump-truck factory in Lvov and a motor-car assembling works in Dnepropetrovsk.

The largest machine-building enterprise of the USSR in Europe in the Novo-Kramatorsk heavy machine-building plant in the Donbas. Here mixers, clinker carts, rolling presses, metal cutters,¹⁰⁶ electric caterpillar excavators with a capacity of 15 cubic meters, self-propelling excavators, metal presses

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 500.

¹⁰⁶ *Radyanska Ukraina*, September 9, 1955.

and cranes are built.¹⁰⁷ During the years of the Fifth Five-Year Plan this plant increased its production by 2.7 times.¹⁰⁸ Part of its production is exported to the satellite countries and China.

The Staro-Kramatorsk plant produces equipment for cold metal pressing and various kinds of equipment for heavy industry.

Kharkov is a great machine building center, not only of the Ukraine, but also of the entire Soviet Union. In addition to its tractor plant there are many factories for the building of heavy and transport machines and electrical equipment. The Molotov machine-tool plant at present produces large grinding machine tools.¹⁰⁹ The Turbo works produce 58,500 kwh turbines for the Kharkov, Irkutsk and other power stations.¹¹⁰ The transport machine-building factory produces powerful steam locomotives of 4,000 HP.¹¹¹ In Kharkov bicycles, printing equipment, electric engineering appliances and many other kinds of machines are produced.

In Kiev machine-building and ship-building enterprises construct trawlers, excavators and equipment for the food and polygraphic industries.¹¹² Here also there are factories making equipment and apparatus for the chemical industry and precision instruments, as well as a factory for automatic machine tools.

Odessa has ship-building enterprises, a factory of radial machine tools, motor-car assembly works which produce dump trucks,¹¹³ a factory for refrigerators, a factory making scales, and a number of other enterprises which produce equipment for various branches of the national economy, but mainly for the light industry. Works producing machine tools are also found in Kramatorsk and Melitopol¹¹⁴ and ¹¹⁵ and a new machine-building plant was recently put into operation in Dnepropetrovsk.¹¹⁶

Railroad car building was concentrated in two plants, the Pravda plant in Dneprodzerzhinsk and the Krukovsk plant near Kremenchuk.

Chemical machine building is represented by many enterprises, among which the best known are the *Bilshovik* plant in Kiev, the Artem plant in Dnepropetrovsk and the Frunze plant in Sumy.

Ship-building is concentrated in Kherson, Nikolayev, Odessa and Kiev. The Nikolayev yards mainly serve the Black Sea Navy. There is also a comparatively large Dormachina enterprise which produces excavators in Niko-

¹⁰⁷ *Izvestia*, February 9, 1955.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, November 28, 1955.

¹⁰⁹ *Pravda*, December 9, 1954.

¹¹⁰ *Radyanska Ukraina*, May 13, 1955.

¹¹¹ *Pravda*, March 12, 1955.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, March 31, 1955.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, November 3, 1954.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, August 22, 1955.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, August 11, 1955.

¹¹⁶ *Leninskaya Pravda*, September 17, 1955.

Table 16

*Industry in the Ukraine in 1913, 1940, 1950, and 1955**

| Type of Industry | P e r c e n t a g e s | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| | 1913 | | 1940 | | 1950 | | 1955 | |
| | (Millions of rubles) | | | | | | | |
| Coal mining. | 244 | 11.3 | 1.00 | 4.5 | — | — | — | — |
| Metallurgy. | 419 | 19.4 | 2.28 | 10.3 | — | — | — | — |
| Machine building. | 239 | 11.3 | 8.13 | 36.4 | 12.2 | 22.7 | 37.5 | 56.0 |
| Chemical. | 67 | 3.1 | 1.23 | 5.5 | — | — | — | — |
| Electrical Power. | 9 | 0.4 | 0.65 | 2.9 | — | — | — | — |
| Building. | 35 | 1.6 | 0.40 | 1.8 | — | — | — | — |
| Light. | 56 | 2.6 | 2.23 | 9.7 | — | — | — | — |
| Food, (inc. Sugar Refineries). | 940 | 43.5 | 3.92 | 17.6 | — | — | — | — |
| Others. | 150 | 6.8 | 2.52 | 11.3 | — | — | — | — |
| Total | 2,159.9 | 100.0 | 22.36 | 100.0 | 53.7 | 100.0 | 67.0 | 100.0 |

* Data for 1913 and 1940 are given in percentages in "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR."¹¹⁷ The absolute figures are calculated by the author.

layev,¹¹⁸ and in Kherson there are locomotive works which produce steam engines.¹¹⁹

The largest specialized enterprise in the USSR is the Molotov Bridge-Building plant which makes complete bridges and parts for bridges. This plant produces metal masts, metallurgical equipment, cranes and metal framework for high buildings. The DZMO metallurgical equipment plant in Dnepropetrovsk also makes subway casings. At present this factory works for Communist China.¹²⁰

In Lvov, in addition to the dump truck factory, there are a number of machine-building enterprises including a factory for agricultural machinery. There is a factory in Poltava which produces equipment for the meat industry,¹²¹ and in Osipenko agricultural and construction machines are produced.

There are a considerable number of factories which produce mining equipment in the Ukraine. Most them are in the Donbas, in Gorlivka, Druzhkivka, Stalino, Ruchenkovo, Voroshilovgrad and other localities; but there are even more enterprises which produce agricultural machinery.¹²² Such factories are

¹¹⁷ *Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR*, Kiev, 1949, p. 439 and 393.

¹¹⁸ *Pravda*, January 30, 1955.

¹¹⁹ *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 22, 1955.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, June 28, 1955.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, December 22, 1954.

¹²² *Gudok*, August 24, 1955.

found in practically all the industrial centers of the republic, such as Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Kiev, Kirovograd, Pervomaïsk, Zaporozhe, Melitopol, Veliky Tokmak and so on.

Considerably less attention is paid to the production of precision instruments, control and measurement equipment, and radio-engineering apparatus. Such works are situated in Kiev and Kharkov; in Kiev, for instance, there are radio and camera factories.

In spite of the comparatively wide range of production in the machine-building industry of the Ukraine, it cannot fully satisfy the needs of the national economy of the republic and many goods have to be imported from other parts of the USSR. The lack of precision instruments, control and measurement apparatus, and automatic equipment are particularly noticeable. Simultaneously, considerable quantities of machines and equipment made in the Ukraine are sent to other countries of the USSR and many necessary goods are imported. This can be partly explained by the specialization of the Ukrainian enterprises and also the fondness of the Soviet régime for gigantic enterprises which produce goods considerably surpassing the requirements of the particular region. In certain cases one can clearly see a quite conscious desire on the part of the Communist authorities to prevent the self-balancing of separate national organisms. The compulsory binding of separate economic regions to each other by the exchange of complete or semi-finished goods leads to waste in transportation.

Many Ukrainian machine-building enterprises produce parts which are assembled in other areas of the USSR. For example, the Yaroslav brake works supply steel ingots and stamps.¹²³ In 1948 the Donbas was supplying works in the Gorky oblast with steel ingots.¹²⁴ Electrical cables are sent from Moscow to Kharkov for use in the tractor equipment factory.¹²⁵ In "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR" examples are given of the "close co-operation" of machine-tool building works in Kiev and Kharkov with works in Moscow and Leningrad engaged in the production of complicated machine tools and automatic machine-tool lines.¹²⁶ Co-operation between enterprises separated by from 800 to 1,500 kilometers can hardly be close or economically sound.

The Chemical Industry

Data on the post-war development of the Ukrainian chemical industry are very scarce. It suffices to say that such an important work as "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR," in either its Ukrainian or Russian edition, does not mention this industry at all. The book only supplies material concerning pre-revolutionary and pre-war times. The authors state that: "During the first Five-Year Plan chemical production considerably increased; general production was increased from 107.7 million rubles in 1927—28 to 456.6 million rubles in 1932, an increase of 4.2

¹²³ L. Ya. Barry. *Spetsializatsia i kooperatsia v promyshlennosti SSSR*, (Specialization and Co-operation in the Industry of the USSR), Gospolitizdat, 1954, p. 334.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

¹²⁶ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, p. 301.

times.¹²⁷ Another part of the book states that the chemical industry of the Ukrainian SSR was developed on the basis of the utilization of the byproducts of coking and salt deposits.¹²⁸

An important branch of the Ukrainian chemical industry is the coking chemical industry situated mostly in the Donbas, along the Dnieper and near metallurgical works. In addition an important part is played by the production of caustic and calcinated soda, synthetic ammonia, nitrogen fertilizers (Horlovka), superphosphates, (Odessa and Vinnitsa) and aniline dyes (the Donbas). The increase in production is illustrated by the facts that by 1940 the chemical production of the Ukraine had increased 6.2 times compared with 1913 and the production of sulphuric acids had increased 12 times and of superphosphates 15.6 times.¹²⁹

According to calculations based on price indices in 1940, the Ukrainian chemical industry produced goods worth 1,230 million rubles as against only 67 million rubles in 1913, on an increase of 18.4 times, which is much more than shown by the figures given above. It is difficult to explain such a considerable difference especially when it is remembered that the basic material for these calculations was taken from "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR" by taking the amount of total production in 1913 and 1940, and the percentage breakdown of the separate branches of industry.¹³⁰ If in 1940 the total production of large-scale industry amounted to 6% of production in 1913 and in addition to this the importance of the chemical industry for the same period increased from 3.1% to 5.5%, the true increase is 18.4 times and not 6.2 times as is stated in "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR". It is possible that the authors took the increase in production of the chemical industry from one source and prepared the table from other material which did not include the chemical industry based on coking.

During the Third Five-Year Plan (1938—40), 80% of the total Union production of soda came from the Ukraine.¹³¹ Under the first post-war plan Ukrainian works were to produce 448 thousand tons of calcinated soda out of 800 thousand tons for the entire USSR, or 56% of the total production. This proves that after the war the Ukraine played the most important part in the production of soda in the USSR. The production of superphosphate, was planned at 865 thousand tons; in the plan for the USSR this production was included in the general figure for mineral fertilizers, and for this reason these figure indices are not comparable.

There are also no data on the amount of production and processing of potassium salts in the Stanislav and Drogobuch oblasts. Concerning aniline dyes, it is reported that in 1940, 9 times more were produced than in 1913.

Considerably more cooking salt is produced in the republic than is needed for home consumption. For instance, in 1950 it was planned to produce 2.2 million tons in the RSFSR, 1.93 million tons in the Ukrainian SSR and 160 thousand tons in the Turkmenian SSR; other republics are mentioned in the

¹²⁷ *Narodne gospodarstvo Rad. Ukrainy*, p. 7.

¹²⁸ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, p. 399.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 392—393, table 59.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

plan. Out of the All-Union output of 4,290 thousand tons of cooking salt, the Ukraine produces 45%.¹³²

Building Materials

Unlike the chemical industry, about which only prewar data are reported in "An Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR", the building materials industry is discussed only in respect to facts concerning the post-war period of development. On the strength of reports on the fulfillment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan for 1946—50, it is stated that the production of cement in the Ukraine had increased 1.7 times by 1950 as compared with 1940, glass 1.6 times, gypsum 1.3 times and tiles 1.9 times.¹³³ The book does not provide comparable data for the years of the first post-war five-year plan. There is only an indication that in 1954 as compared with 1950 the production of bricks increased 1.9 times.¹³⁴

These data do not permit us to arrive at the absolute figures for building materials or give any indication of the existence of a disproportion between production and needs, but that there is an enormous shortage of building materials is proved by a special resolution passed by the XVIII Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party on the necessity of speedy production of building materials.¹³⁵

It is necessary to point out that the Ukraine plays an important part in the production of heat-resistant materials for the metallurgical, glass and other industries using large furnaces. The Ukrainian heat resistant materials industry produces fire bricks, kaolin heat resistant material, chronite and chrono-magnesite bricks. For the production of magnesite goods raw material from the Urals is used. The production of magnesite from sea salt is at present considered a problem of the future, despite the fact that a number of enterprises of this kind are already working in the United States.

Factories for heat-resistant goods are concentrated in the Donbas. A number of works use raw materials from the Chasov-Yarsky deposits, one of the largest in the USSR. Over 6,000 workers were employed by seven factories in 1933. Considerable amounts of heat-resistant kaolin are mined in the Ukraine and deposits are widespread. The main deposit worked at present is the one at Hlukhov which in 1928—29 produced up to 50% of all kaolin in the USSR. The main raw materials base for the heat-resistant materials industry is the Donbas deposit of quartzites, which supplies a number of factories. In recent times quartzite from the Ovruch and Piatykhvatka deposits has been used for the production of heat-resistant bricks. The ore concentrating combine which was put into operation recently in Krivoi Rog is producing quartzite from the waste material from the production of heat-resistant materials.

Works which produce goods from dolomite are concentrated in the Donbas; the most important of these are the Mykytivsky and Yamsky combines

¹³² *Gosplan na 1946—50*, Moscow, 1946.

¹³³ *Ocherk razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Ukrainskoi SSR*, p. 502.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

Because the main consumers of heat-resistant materials are metallurgical enterprises, all of them, especially the larger ones, are as a rule equipped with refractory furnaces. They produce between 35% and 40% of all heat-resistant products in the Ukraine.

The total amount of production of heat-resistant materials in the USSR and Ukrainian SSR can only be approximately established. In 1937, 2.6 million tons of heat-resistant materials were produced in the USSR; according to the plan for 1942, 3.65 million tons were to be produced and for 1950, 4 million tons. These figures allow us to assume that the present production of heat-resistant materials reaches about 6 million tons. The Ukrainian industry is sufficiently large to satisfy its own needs in this respect. While part of the production is exported (fire bricks), the Ukrainian industry receives a number of special heat resistant materials (magnesite, chromite and forsterite) from the RSFSR. It we are to assume that the export and import of heat resistant materials is balanced, which appears to be true, the Ukraine produces about 37%—40% of the Union production.¹³⁶

The Ukrainian glass works are well developed and satisfy the needs of the national economy. The glass works in Konstantinivka are the largest enterprise of this kind in the Soviet Union. The works produce bottle glass, preserve jars, window panes and technical glass goods for industry.

Conclusion

As a rule the building industry is connected with other branches of heavy industry and it would be quite natural to analyze its development together with that of other branches of Ukrainian heavy industry, but we are forced to analyze it independently. In order to take into account the peculiarities of the development of the building industry in the republic, especially since the war when a considerable part has been preoccupied with the reconstruction of the national economy, we should dwell upon the many questions which apply simultaneously to all spheres of the national economy of the Ukrainian SSR.

The heavy industry of the Ukraine, as has been shown, holds not only the key position in the industry of the republic, but also plays an important part in the industrialization of the entire Soviet Union. It is not for nothing that the Donbas and the Dnieper area are called the primary coal and metallurgical base of the USSR. Precisely this base played a decisive part in the industrialization of the USSR and enabled the Soviet régime to produce goods inside the Soviet Union and to do away to some extent with the import of industrial equipment from abroad. So far, this first base has preserved its importance, to be sure not at the level of the first two five-year plans, but still at a level which satisfies not only the needs of its own republic but also the needs of other Soviet republics. The Ukrainian enterprises trade more and more with the satellite countries. Ukrainian iron and manganese ores are supplied to metallurgical works in central and eastern Europe. Metallurgical works which are being built in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland receive a considerable part of their equipment from Ukrainian machine-building enter-

¹³⁶ Data on heat resisting material industry is taken an unpublished work by the author.

prises. The oil industries of Rumania and Austria are supplied with pipes from Nikopol, Mariupol and Dnepropetrovsk. Ukrainian heavy industry supplies machines and equipment to India and Communist China.

As has been said, Ukrainian heavy industry occupies an important place in the production of the USSR. The Ukraine's part in All-Union production, calculated in per capita production, is particularly high.

In respect to industry, the Ukraine is the most highly developed republic of the Union with the exception of the European portion of the RSFSR.

Irrespective of the comparatively high level of development of Ukrainian heavy industry, there are also considerable disproportions which remain a permanent factor and are caused by extra-economic reasons. The disproportions in the production of pig iron and steel remain today. At a time when in the USSR as a whole as well as in a number of its industrialized republics, the production of steel was catching up with that of pig iron, in the Ukraine the production of steel is lagging behind that of pig iron, which is sent in considerable quantities to the central regions of the USSR. There are also artificial disproportions in machine building. Specialization and cooperation which are natural in this branch of industry take distorted forms in the USSR as a whole and in the Ukraine in particular. The specialization and cooperation which often take place, but not because of the needs of a given economic region, bind together enterprises so distant from one another that there can be no talk of economic expediency.

However, it should be stressed that Ukrainian heavy industry, which even at the present stage of its development, with an appropriate redistribution program and a thorough-going specialization of enterprises, is fully capable of satisfying the internal needs of the republic in regard to many products of heavy industry, is forced today to import and export much more machinery and equipment than would be necessary in a properly balanced national economy. Long-distance transportation causes the national economy to be dependent on imports from other republics of the USSR and from distant parts of the Ukraine itself.

It is difficult to say exactly to what extent economic expediency requires that the heavy industry of the Ukraine should be self-sufficient. But there is no doubt that it could be much more self-sufficient than it now is, in order to achieve a better balance in the national economy of the republic, based on the republic's internal resources for heavy industry. Long-term steps could be taken in this direction in order to achieve the most efficient exploitation of the country's productive powers, without running the risk of falling into the kind of complete autarchy which, as is well known, is characteristic of the economy of the Soviet Union as a whole.

Conditioned Reflexes and Despotism

A. HIRSH

An important problem which hitherto has not received the consideration which it deserves from western scientists and sociologists, concerns the adaptation of the theories of the famous Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov to the governmental practices of the USSR, and the application of conditioned reflexes to the political training of human beings.

Pavlov's Views on Conditioned Reflexes

A reflex is the reaction of an organism to impulse from without. It is the reply of the organism. The purpose of the reflex (if such natural phenomena may be said to have a purpose) is either self-defense or adaptation to the outside factor.

Before Pavlov and his research, scientists had located the active center of the reflexes in the lower nervous system. Pavlov, however, believed that this center was located in the higher nervous system, and considered reflexes to be the reaction of an organism to stimulation from outside.

Pavlov distinguished two types of reflexes: the permanent (unconditioned or innate) reflexes which are peculiar to all animals, and conditioned reflexes, i. e. reflexes which are caused by factors from outside. The latter are not permanent, but transient.

Such interference, or excitation, from outside can be of various kinds and origins; it can act on the sight, the hearing, the touch, and so on.

As one of the famous experiments which he demonstrated to his students, Pavlov showed them three puppies (from the same litter), each of which had been accustomed to a reflex of a different kind and origin. One of them was fed only when an electric lamp was placed before it, the second got its food at the sound of a bell, and the third had a bright red object placed before it prior to feeding. Thus one of the puppies was taught to associate the process of being fed with a certain occurrence in the environment, different for each of them. The first puppy associated salivation and stimulation of the gastric juices with the appearance of light, the second with the sound of a bell and the third with the appearance of a certain color.¹

This procedure was repeated once or several times a day, for a certain period of time. Pavlov then stopped feeding the puppies, but still employed

¹ L. P. Pavlov, *Lektsii po fiziologii* (Lectures on Physiology), Moscow, 1952, p. 435.

the usual stimulations: the lamp, the bell and the bright red object. He found out that when the lamp was placed before the first puppy this action caused salivation, although no food was given to the puppy; the same happened with the second puppy at the sound of a bell, and with the third when the object with the well-known and striking color was placed before it.

This salivation, i. e. the stimulation of the salivary gland by a factor which has absolutely nothing to do with taking food, is a typical example of the physiological phenomenon which Pavlov called the *conditioned reflex*. Pavlov stated:

"The conditioned reflexes are called so, because they are created during life-time, and because they change with changing conditions. This, however, does not mean that we must not take them into consideration; on the contrary, we must study them thoroughly and consider all circumstances which cause them."²

The Application of Pavlov's Theory to the Animal-Training of Human Beings

Soviet authorities cultivate special veneration for Pavlov. *The Bolshaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopedia* (Large Medical Encyclopedia), for instance, stated: "In spite of his conservative political convictions and the distrust he often expressed about socialist construction, the Soviet government always treated I. Pavlov with a maximum of consideration and care."³ The official Soviet press even calls him a "Soviet" scientist. This definition, however, is quite inexact, for I. Pavlov began his scientific activities long before Communist despotism was established, and made his main discoveries under the old regime. He never was a Communist, made all efforts to keep out of Communism, and never showed any sympathy for the Soviet regime.

His convictions did not prevent the Soviet authorities and scientists from considering Pavlov's theory one of the most important contributions to dialectical materialism. However, the high esteem bestowed on Professor Pavlov by official circles of the Kremlin is of less interest than the practical application of his theory to the purposes of Soviet dictatorship, or, to put it more bluntly, to their use of his theory for the "animal-training" of humans.

The adaptation of the theory of conditioned reflexes by the administrative machine of a dictatorship is, of course, a much more complicated and delicate matter than ordinary research on animals.

The human differs from the animal in having not only a primary signalizing system which corresponds to the reflexes caused by excitation from outside, but also a secondary signalizing system. This secondary system is also to be found in some higher species of animals. In these animals, however, the system is in a primary stage of development, while in the human being it is well developed and plays a highly significant role. Pavlov localized this secondary signalizing system in the cortex and the centers situated in the brain and stated that it belonged to the higher neural system.

² *Ibid.*, p. 436.

³ *Bolshaya meditsinskaya entsiklopedia* (Large Medical Encyclopedia), Moscow, 1932, p. 525.

The role of the secondary signalizing system is of such great significance because it can act in a direction opposite to that of the primary signalizing system. The primary signalizing system produces a positive conditioned reflex to excitation by a factor from outside, a positive answer, so to speak. The secondary signalizing system, however, can produce a negative conditioned reflex, a "refusal". This is a form of self-defense of the human organism.

It is actually a system of blocking and braking, as had been learned before Pavlov by two famous Russian physiologists, Sechenov and Vvedensky, who discovered that the nervous system of human beings is characterized by two procedures in opposition to each other. These procedures, although they follow mutually opposed actions are: excitation and braking.

Pavlov perfected the study of this important problem. He proved that the brain is the object of numerous and highly varied excitations from outside. We correct the influence of these arrows which attack us continuously, and our braking centers prevent us from accomplishing undesirable actions.

According to Pavlov there are defense impulses in the braking system which protect the nerve system from exhaustion and annihilation. The braking center provides rest and peace for the human. A human being whose energy is not exhausted, remains strong and cannot be easily subdued by pressure from outside.

It is also necessary to give proper consideration to the fact that the cells of the two hemispheres of the brain react sensitively to excitations from outside, and the overstrain which is thus caused can lead to organic atrophy of the cells.

Finally, it must not be overlooked that intellect and instinct are qualities both of animals and human beings, the instinct in animals being much stronger than the intellect, while the situation is reversed in human beings, whose intellect is perhaps stronger than instinct. Nevertheless, in animals as well as in human beings, the intellect and the instinct are closely connected and their actions become so entangled that it is often impossible to distinguish which action is caused by the intellect and which by the instinct.

Still, there is no doubt that the conditioned reflexes stimulate the actions of the instinct, thus reducing the actions of the intellect. This can be observed especially in respect to the self-defense reflex which subordinates the human to the instinct of self-preservation. Saltikov-Shchedrin was not mistaken in saying: "He who submits entirely to the instinct of self-preservation must do all he can to get rid of even the slightest trace of rebellious spirit."

What has been said thus far is necessary as a background for an objective study of the important problem of the training of human beings by the government of a totalitarian state, the aims of which by far exceed anything having to do with the existence, freedom and dignity of human beings.

When Pavlov did his famous research into conditioned reflexes of animals, the room where these experiments were made was thoroughly isolated from any factor which might influence the normal reaction of the animals to the applied stimulus.

Under normal laboratory conditions, when the entire surrounding world can be shaped by the researcher, any research will produce very

⁴ I. P. Pavlov, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

precise results. A special building will now be constructed as a part of the Institute of Experimental Medicine which will be especially adapted to research work on conditioned reflexes, a laboratory different from any already existing. There will be no outside sounds, noises or shocks in the room, no cries of cabmen or railroad whistles will be heard. The entire environment will be determined by the researcher and people will be admitted to the dog on which the experiments are to be made only with the consent or desire of the researcher. Under such circumstances it will be possible to study exactly all deviations and all conditions of the reflexes.⁴

A dictatorial government which wishes to subject the population to these conditioned reflexes which it deems necessary, must first of all isolate the people from all outside influences, as this could endanger the results of the experiment. Adolf Hitler isolated the Germans morally by inculcating the idea that they were a special nation, a nation of masters, a *Herrenvolk* which ought not to fraternize with other nations, with the *Untermenschen*.

The Communist dictatorship of the USSR has achieved this isolation of the population even more resolutely, not only in the spiritual, but also in the material sphere, by means of the Iron Curtain. This is quite natural, for the experiment which this dictatorship exercises on the population to create on a mass scale these conditioned reflexes which it needs, can produce positive results only in an isolated world, where no outside influence can excite the negative reflex of braking or even resistance, thus neutralizing these positive reflexes which the dictatorship needs. Such an outside interference might stimulate the actions of the secret "center of freedom and criticism" and be of great danger to the dictatorship itself. It is, therefore, necessary to interrupt all connections between the center of freedom and criticism and the outside world, to cut off all those invisible antennae which can supply the center with impressions and ideas originating from beyond the walls of the Soviet laboratory. Only then, and under such conditions, is it possible to expect any success in the experiment which is intended, by means of certain stimulations, to produce the conditioned reflexes desired by the totalitarian dictatorship.

What are the reflexes desired? These are the reflexes of fear, and of submission. The first of these is produced not by terror alone. Of course, terror plays a role in causing the necessary psycho-physiological reactions. Those who have lived under Hitler or in the Soviet Union know well the moral effect of nocturnal visits which caused people to suddenly fall ill with a sickness known to psychiatrists as *noctophobia*. The symptoms of this sickness appear at the sound of any automobile, as it could belong to the secret police, which might be coming to make a search or arrest someone. Another factor is the permanent dependence of the citizens on the state, the sole employer and distributor of work and material goods, an employer who is in charge of everything necessary for the existence of the human being and has a free hand in disposing of all these things. The power of a totalitarian state and the dictatorial government which represents this state in the eyes of the inhabitants of the country induces among the latter a complex of fear and humiliation which in turn causes psychic trauma often resulting in somatic symptoms.

Fear and permanent alarm provoke inner conflicts within the nervous system and thus cause the spread of various diseases. If a person is subject

to permanent nerve strain, the normal secretion of gastric juices is disturbed and the digestive organs do not work properly. The result is nervousness of the stomach and later chronic disturbance of the digestive system; this in turn can result in an ulcer of the stomach or of the duodenum. Such emotional conflicts may also cause heart sickness and arterial diseases which are a conglomerate of physical reactions to psychic traumatism.

The center of will and criticism, the reflexes of braking and resistance which are connected with the human brain and the cortex, of course, attempt to react in turn to the rise of the fear reflex. Such attempts can provoke dramatic conflicts within individual psyches as well as between the psyches of two or more different individuals.

A tragic example of such a conflict is the famous incident of Pavlyk Morozov, a Soviet Young Pioneer who denounced his own father and accused him of theft of state property (his father had hidden a small part of the harvest in order to stretch the insufficient food ration of his family). When the father was arrested the grandfather of the Young Pioneer was overcome by an invincible resistance reflex and took vengeance for his son by strangling with his own hands the grandson who had been "animal—trained" by the Soviet government.

Here we are already approaching the problem of education, which is an essential part of the training of people by a dictatorial regime.

In the crèche, and later in the kindergarten, children are taught to smile and rejoice when they are shown pictures of the "leaders." This is continued, in less primitive ways, of course, in the elementary and secondary schools, in the higher educational institutions, the army and so on, where the children and youth are trained to love the regime and submit absolutely to its representatives.

A former Soviet scientist who is now an emigré told the author that the Ministry of Education distributed a secret circular which showed the advantages of applying Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflexes to the education of youth. It should also be borne in mind that the penal code of the USSR is the only one in the world providing the death penalty for minors.

Training for further development of the reflexes of fear and submission is continued after the citizen completes his school education. The totalitarian state is able to keep the population under the permanent influence of stimulations which cause the desired reflexes. The land, the factories, the offices, stores, hospitals, rest homes and so on, all belong to the state and all inhabitants depend entirely and absolutely on the state, i. e., on the general line of the party in power, and on the administrative machinery by which this party executes its power.

There is no personal life for the individual in a totalitarian state, at least not as this is understood outside its boundaries. In a totalitarian state, all inhabitants, workers and intelligentsia, civilians and soldiers are in the state service, they are its officers, and the state demands from them through the Party and the government that they fulfil not only officially assigned work, but also many additional "obligations" which deprive them of the hours of "personal freedom" after work. Participation in meetings, preelection rallies and various demonstrations is obligatory, and the person is thus kept under the permanent influence of the state machine and slowly turned into

an automaton which reacts to all stimuli in the manner foreseen by the government.

The psychic reflex of submission is demonstrated in many curious petty reflexes which gradually become a kind of habit; when the name of the leader is mentioned at a meeting, all people present leap to their feet as if forced to do so by an invisible power. All press organs continuously repeat the same phrases and all inhabitants get accustomed to them to such a degree that even in intimate discussions they use the same phrases when speaking about public affairs, so that it seems that their centers of freedom and criticism in the cortex have been replaced by an automatic mechanism.

Pavlov showed his students a dog which had been given strong electric shocks during feedings. If only this form of excitation, which caused grave pain, had been applied the dog would certainly have defended itself, but if it was hungry and being fed and at the same time was stimulated, the defensive reaction would gradually disappear. When this experiment of feeding and simultaneous application of electric shocks was frequently repeated, it finally led to the complete paralysis of the self-defense reflex. Pavlov wrote: "If these experiments were repeated often enough they would lead to the complete disappearance of the defensive reaction and the electric shock would cause salivation, i. e. a replacement of stimuli would take place." A link was established between the center of defense and the center of nourishment. Pavlov continued: "When the dog now is given this stimulus causing grave pain it happily wags its tail and its mouth waters." And further: "You may now apply high temperature to the dog, 100 degrees centigrade or more, and burn its fur, but you will get only the same reaction as if it were being fed. You can twist the skin of the dog with large pincers, and it will only dribble. It is the same with fanatics and individuals of strong will who suffer great pain without moving a muscle."⁵

Conditioned Reflexes and "Voluntary Confessions."

The above facts make it possible to explain the secret of "voluntary confessions" which are an essential feature of the court trials so frequently staged in Moscow, Prague, Bucharest or Sophia.

Voluntary confessions by the accused in these trials arouse wonder in the civilized Western world. The historians, however, have no reason to wonder. They should remind the public of the fact that in the period of the Inquisition, the women who were accused of witchcraft confessed that they really were witches.

Still, there is one essential difference between the trials of the Middle Ages and those staged in a contemporary totalitarian state. Our ancestors who were less "scientifically" educated, had only the brutal and disgusting means of physical torture at their disposal if they wished to obtain "voluntary" confessions. We, on the contrary, in our more progressive age, have at our disposal all the achievements of science and do not need to turn to primitive brutality. Pavlov's theory is a suitable weapon to make anyone who has

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 457.

fallen into the hands of an investigator confess anything the investigator may desire.

The reader might object and ask to have explained the astonishing fact that even people who belong to the highest circles of the regime sometimes voluntarily confess crimes and even accuse themselves of having accomplished these crimes, although they are completely innocent of them.

First of all the reader should remember the general atmosphere in which the population of a totalitarian state lives. The centers of freedom and criticism of the psycho-physiological system are paralyzed, or at least semi-paralyzed, so that people can think only with the brain of the government, or else stop thinking at all. This, in turn, creates a special complex: faith in the infallibility of the Party and its executive organ, the government. The infallibility of a totalitarian state dictatorship is absolute, and anything proclaimed by this dictatorship must be accepted without even the slightest objections. Thus, anyone falling into discord with this infallible government simultaneously commits a mortal sin, a rebellion against the authority and the truth which this authority represents at any time in respect to any problem. Anybody disagreeing with the dictatorial government becomes a fallen angel. He finds himself spiritually, morally and politically isolated, because in a totalitarian state, doctrine and policy are inseparably joined by the general line of the party; the infallible representatives of this line are those who are in power at the time.

This individual isolation is the more complete because it takes place in an environment already isolated from the outside world, an environment that is already psychically homogenous and knows only the reflexes of fear and submission.

Any person under such double isolation is deprived of any chance of appealing to anyone. He cannot appeal to public opinion, for there is no public opinion, and these can never exist in a country where all inhabitants are subject to collective fear and submission. He also cannot appeal to the public opinion of the free world, for there are no connections between the free world and the gigantic laboratory of political and moral experiments.

It must also not be forgotten that the technical apparatus of the contemporary totalitarian state (the police and the courts) possesses methods, highly perfected and at the same time very simple, to influence the individual and destroy his reflexes of braking and resistance.

This can be done by applying pharmaceutical means, for instance. But we shall rather deal with such a simple function of the organism as sleep. Sleep is rest, and therefore one of the most important functions of the organism of animals and even of plants. The regular sequence of sleeping and waking provides normal functioning of the organism, its nervous system, and the psyche.

Normal sleep has many variations. It can be monoperiodical or poliperiodical, i. e. it can take place either once a day or several times a day. Animals also know hibernation and summersleep (in tropical countries). On the average one third of life is devoted to sleep.

If a person is deprived of sleep, or if sleep is deliberately interrupted, the result is a disturbance of the functions of the organism, which often causes serious trauma and sometimes even death. Half a century ago the physician

Manasyeina made experiments on this problem: Puppies deprived of sleep died within four or five days, grown dogs within sixteen or seventeen days.

Some diseases can be treated and cured by extended sleep, but it is also possible to disturb the psychic balance of a person by depriving him of sleep. Deprivation of sleep results in a drop in arterial pressure and shock to the nerve system, in the weakening or even annihilation of the self-defense reflexes.

Police techniques often take advantage of the possibility of getting "confession" by interrogating a person for several days and nights in succession without interruption. The police and court authorities of the totalitarian state have improved upon this system: the prisoner who is to be forced to confess is sometimes placed in a cell where the temperature can be varied from freezing to 115° Fahrenheit. The prisoner is thus subjected to rapid changes from winter sleep to summer sleep. Finally the sleep is brutally interrupted and the prisoner interrogated.

There is a slang term among political prisoners which describes those who have confessed "voluntarily". No one says: "They have confessed," but merely "they have been split." This vivid term well describes the psychological change within the individual. A new personality develops deprived of all reflexes of braking and resistance, whose brain is "filled" with the type of mental material desired by the dictatorial government.

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It should be pointed out that according to Pavlov's theory, the conditioned reflexes which are caused by outside stimuli are not permanent, as are the unconditioned, innate reflexes. A person who goes over to the free non-totalitarian world quickly regains his previous spiritual personality and a normally functioning center of freedom and criticism. The brain substance soon reacts normally again to stimuli unfavorable to the personality, by the reflexes of braking, resistance and regeneration.

This article would be incomplete if it failed to mention the fact that the problem to which it is dedicated has been studied by a number of foreign specialists.

Among these special mention should be made of the Dutch scientist A. M. Meerloo, professor of psychology at Columbia University and former director of the Psychological Division of the Dutch armed forces. As early as 1950 he wrote articles on this problem, in which he dealt with "this extremely dangerous outrage on the freedom of spirit" which he called *menticide*, or "mind-killing." In May 1954 he published an interesting article in *The American Journal of Psychiatry* in which he examined, among others matters, material on the psychic preassure to which captured soldiers and officers of the United Nations forces were subject in Korea. In this article he discussed the problem of application of the theory of Pavlov to experiments on humans performed by the Bolsheviks and their disciples, the Chinese and Korean Communists. "Pavlov showed us," said Meerloo, "that it is possible to influence the brain of dogs. A special teaching system makes it possible to change their instinctive reflexes and to influence the mechanism of their behavior" he further stated:

New types of reflexes can be created in the brain of a dog by gradual repetition of such stimulation, which causes the desired reaction of the nerve system. The works by I. Pavlov are well known in psychiatry and have helped greatly to explain more precisely the behavior of animals and men. Still, it is less well known that Soviet psychiatry is based exclusively on interpretations given by Soviet scientists, and that these scientists are engaged in permanent research on the problem of adapting these principles in the totalitarian system in the best way possible.

"Soviet theorists," Professor Meerloo continued, "are of the opinion that people can be trained like animals. The representatives of totalitarianism wish to train people in such a way as to turn them into a kind of society of anthropoid insects, whose activities are planned and determined beforehand." This results in brainwashing and mind-killing. Meerloo further explained: "This should not lead us to condemn I. Pavlov's doctrines from a purely scientific viewpoint, for every scientific discovery can be used for inhuman purposes."

An example of the adaptation of the Pavlov doctrines to the governmental techniques of the Soviet totalitarian system is, according to Meerloo, the work done by one of the most famous Soviet psychologists, C. M. Dobrogaev, author of a research study on *The Reflexes of Language*, which deals with the problem of the practical application of language to propaganda.

Meerloo recommends to his readers a work on *Pavlov and Propaganda* by the American specialist on Soviet affairs, A. M. Little who comments:

The essential problem the leaders of totalitarianism have to solve is rather simple: Can the human being resist a state which wishes to determine the behavior of the human being? What can be done by the individual against this animal-training? How can the last traces of psychic resistance be erased?

Observations made on captured members of the armed forces of the United Nations in Korea give us plenty of material for the study and a better understanding of the system and the methods of political education by which the Communist "pedagogues" and "psychologists" secured such confessions as suited Communist propaganda purposes. It must be mentioned that in France the basic work on the application of the Pavlov theory to political propaganda was described by one Pavlov's disciples, Professor Chakhotin. During the civil war in Russia, Chakhotin was a member of the propaganda staff of Denikin's government and then, for some time, a "white emigre"; later he accepted a Soviet passport and became a Soviet citizen. His work on the subject was published in French under the title *Le Viol de Foule* (The Violation of the Crowd), a title which, in fact, fully corresponds to the true facts.

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A Case of "Voluntary" Resettlement

A. KRAVCHENKO

Foreword

The author of this article worked in 1930 for the West Siberian Regional Administration of Livestock Raising as senior animal husbandry expert. In connection with his work he was detailed to the Narym district. On the day he arrived in Tomsk, from which the Narym district can be reached only by freight train, a transport of Ukrainian prisoners from a Trans-Ural concentration camp arrived at the Tomsk railroad station. The author left Tomsk on the day the first column of prisoners left for Narym; as far as Kolpashovo, he proceeded on the same road as this column. He had to stay overnight in the same villages as the transport of prisoners and was thus able to observe closely the life of these prisoners. In Kolpashovo, the capital of Narym district, he was told by the office of the Administration of Livestock Raising in Novosibirsk that his further progress into the taiga would depend on when the prisoner transport would depart from Kolpashovo. Several days later he received a permit signed by the chairman of the Regional Land Administration and the chief of the West Siberian OGPU Administration to proceed on his way. The permit provided that he was to go to his destination with the transport of prisoners and stay there pending special assignments. Also, it required the OGPU district detachment of Narym and the transport leader to assist him during the journey as well as on his arrival in the camp. Special orders which accompanied the permit specified the author's rights and duties during the journey as well as after his arrival in the camp. Essentially, the latter were as follows:

1. To find the shortest and most convenient route for the transportation of pure-bred cattle from Kolpashovo to wherever the prisoners would finally halt, somewhere in the taiga;
2. To study the topography and flora of the neighborhood where the transport would halt;
3. To study the quality of the pastures and meadows;
4. To study the conditions of water supply and watering of cattle.

The author traveled fourteen days together with the prisoner transport and witnessed the hardships and misery which the prisoners suffered en route. During 1932 he supervised the selection of pure-bred cattle, and their transportation to where the concentration camp was established, distributed the cattle among the settlers, and subsequently organized cattle breeding activities on their land. He was therefore a living witness of the sufferings and hardships which the Ukrainian prisoners had to endure after their arrival as well.

I.

It was early January, 1930. The place was the Tomsk station on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Chekists* were running about in the station and on the station square, clearing everyone from the platform and the vicinity of the station buildings, with shouts and curses. There was a blizzard and the frost was so severe that one's eyelids stuck together and breathing was painful.

At about 9 o'clock in the evening several hundred Chekists appeared on the platform of the railway station. Every second one was leading a German police dog. The Chekists were dressed in warm half-length sheepskin coats, on their feet were new felt boots; their superiors wore fur-lined boots. Their heads were protected by sheepskin caps with ear-flaps. The entire detachment was armed with automatic rifles and hand grenades.

Within a few minutes the station, from the rails to the barracks, was surrounded by Chekists standing in a double row, a few meters apart.

The snow-storm grew worse, the frost more severe. Here and there railroad ties crackled and even the piles of rock emitted peculiar sounds.

Emerging from the darkness of the night, trains of freight cars came rolling slowly along, one after the other. The engines and cars were completely covered with snow and looked as if wrapped in cotton. At the middle of every train was an open platform carrying two machine guns each, so placed as to cover both sides of the railroad tracks. Each machine gun was manned by two sentries.

As soon as the four trains came to a halt, they were surrounded by Chekist detachments which had been waiting for them. In the darkness one could hear the locks of the freight car doors snap open. A command cut the air: "Unload within twenty minutes!"

The station was not lighted, nor were the cars. Clouds of steam welled up from the open car doors, accompanied by a frenzied human hubbub: children crying, women weeping, old people groaning. People popped out from the cars like corks from bottles, followed by bags, bundles, wooden crates with rattling kettles, pots and pails tied to them.

A new command: "Stay near the cars!"

From one of the groups came the timid question: "Citizen chief, what about those who have frozen, shall we take them out or leave them? The reply was: "Leave them in the cars!" And, as if directed by an invisible conductor, the wailing of the women and children whose parents, children, relatives and friends had fallen victim to the fierce cold, surged up again.

"Column of fours!"

Weeping, the women took the little children in their arms; the bigger ones, holding fast to their mothers' skirts, had to walk. The men were loaded down with their precious possessions. In fours, the column moved forward between two rows of Chekists, at whose feet the leashed watch-dogs wriggled nervously.

* The Cheka existed till 1922; from 1922 through 1934 it was replaced by the OGPU, which in turn was replaced in 1934 by the NKVD. The name of Cheka continued in popular usage.

Who were these people? From where had they been taken? For what offenses and crimes? They were peaceful, industrious Ukrainian peasants who, during the all-out collectivization of their farms, had been proclaimed "enemies of the people" by the Soviet regime. Their only guilt was that, before the collectivization, they had been prosperous peasant farmers, or kulaks, as these hard-working people were called in Soviet jargon. They had come from the regions of Zaporizhye, Chernihiv, Kiev, Zhytomir, Poltava, and Kharkov. This transport had been made up somewhere in the Urals and moved to Tomsk by railroad.

The column of prisoners, numbering 4,000 at least, was led to barracks surrounded on all sides by Chekists. A check-up began.

At dawn, the snow-storm abated, but the temperature was still around —58° Fahrenheit. Children were wrapped up in indescribable rags by solicitous mothers. Here and there one began to cry: the bitter cold was becoming unbearable.

Did the prisoners in the convoy know their destination? Of course not. It was kept a close secret, and even the rank-and-file Chekists did not know where the transport of "enemies of the people" was headed.

The check-up was finished. The prisoners were now divided into four columns, each under the command of an NKVD officer with the rank of captain of state security. At his disposal were about 30 Chekist guards, each two with a watchdog.

The check-up lasted until late in the afternoon of the next day, yet no one even thought of bothering to feed the prisoners. It was terribly cold in the unheated barracks; there were no panes in the windows and an icy draft blew through the rooms.

At last, six three-ton trucks approached the depots, and rations were issued. Each group of ten was given a loaf of bread and each person 100 grams of dried ground *komsa*, small Black Sea fish. It was impossible to slice the hard-frozen bread; the prisoners broke it apart with hands shaking with cold. The grown-ups ate the crumbs, leaving the larger pieces to the children and invalids.

For physical necessities people were led out in groups guarded by Chekists.

The next morning, January 6, 20 one-horse carts and eight *narty* halted before the barracks. (A *narta* is an Ostyak dog-sled, ten feet long, very light, and well adapted for use in deep snow.) Each sled was pulled by nine dogs. The carts were loaded with the Chekists' belongings, provisions, and spare weapons. The *narty* were occupied by the Chekist machine-gunners. The drivers were Ostyaks. No Ostyaks lived in the vicinity of Tomsk, and dog transportation was a rare phenomenon there. In order to provide the Chekists with transportation adapted to the conditions of deep winter in the far North, the Ostyaks and their dog-sleds had been brought to Tomsk from Narym, a distance of 700 kilometers.

The prisoners themselves would have to cover the entire distance to their final destination on foot. No means of transportation had been provided.

The district of Narym, to which these peasants from the fertile Ukraine were being deported, covers a territory as large as Belgium. It is a country of impassable swamps and vast expanses overgrown with pines, Siberian firs,

cedars, and alders. Climatic conditions are severe: by mid-October it is usually winter, with the thermometer falling as low as — 85° Fahrenheit. The taiga is covered with a layer of snow between a meter and a meter and a half thick. Through the Narym district flows the Ob river, which has its source in the Altai Mountains and runs into the Arctic Ocean. The natural wealth of the Narym district consists of cedar nuts, fur animals, elk, bears, wolves, foxes, squirrels, all kinds of mushrooms; of fruits there are bogberries, red bilberries, and rock cherries. The native population, consisting only of Ostyaks, is very sparse. The local Ostyaks lead a settled way of life, making their living by fishing in summer and hunting fur-bearing animals in winter.

Before the revolution, the Ostyaks did not know how to sow crops or to plant fruit trees. They kept almost no draft animals and raised cattle and sheep only to meet their own requirements for milk and meat. For purposes of winter transport, the Ostyaks used dogs and, in the northern part of the district, reindeers. Until 1930, there were neither railroads nor highways in the whole Narym district. In summer it could be reached only via the Ob by steamer from Novosibirsk to Tomsk, in winter the only means of transportation was sleds.

In 1932, air transportation was established between Novosibirsk and Kolpashovo. Kolpashovo had no airfield and in winter the airplanes merely landed on the frozen river. In summer, air transportation was suspended. Needless to say, only important Party members or Chekists could make use of this airline. Valuable furs, sturgeon, and beluga (white sturgeon) were brought from Narym to Novosibirsk, to be traded by the local population for gold and silver articles acquired by the *Torgsin** from the city population in exchange for minimum quantities of such scarce foodstuffs as sugar, butter, and flour.

Such are the main facts of interest to the reader regarding the Narym district to which the first convoy of Ukrainian "enemies of the people" was deported.

The whole convoy was under the command of a Chekist with the rank of a major of state security, a Latvian named Antoni Litkens. He was a big man, blond like most Baltic nationals, with the brutal expression common to Chekists. He was clothed in a short leather coat covered by a *yaga* (a long coat with dog fur inside and out). His feet were thrust into *yunty* (boots of reindeer skin lined with fox fur), and his head was protected by a fur cap with ear-flaps. This costume, suitable for travel in the North was completed by fur gloves, a revolver in the belt, and an automatic rifle on the shoulder.

Before moving on, Litkens called together the chiefs of the columns and gave them the following instructions:

1. I myself shall precede the whole convoy by dog-sled.
2. The first column moves out two hours after my departure.
3. The other columns move out at intervals of five hours.
4. The route is Tomsk-Kolpashovo. Halting places will be determined by me.
5. The main line to follow is the Ob river.

* The government foreign trade monopoly.

6. Transports coming from Narym are not to be delayed on their way.
7. Prisoners who cannot keep pace with the column are to be shot on the spot; the march formation must not be allowed to get out of order.
8. Bury those who die on the way, in the snow, or, if possible, drop them through holes in the ice.

Having given these instructions, Litkens mounted his *narta*, the Ostyak driver cracked his enormously long whip, and shouting something in his native language, set his team in motion. The next moment, the convoy commander was flying along the snow road and soon disappeared in a cloud of snow dust.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the thermometer pointing to -58° Fahrenheit, the first column of 1,000 persons was getting ready to set out. The commander of this column, Janek Radziwinski, a Pole, commanded: "Take up your trash and line up in fours!"

The column was formed with men of 18 to 45 up ahead, followed by teenagers, women with children, and old men and women in the rear. Having formed the column, the Chekists encircled it as guards and unleashed the dogs. Radziwinski repeated aloud the convoy commander's instructions.

The men were loaded down with all kinds of luggage: saddle-bags, sacks, baskets. Some had little sleds on which sat the older children, for whom it was difficult to walk; the babies were carried by their mothers. Even old men and women were loaded. Sticks in their hands, they carried on their backs miserable kitchen utensils: pails, kettles and pots.

Their clothes were pitiful. Most were shod in troddendown shoes tied up with rags and strings, or in felt boots full of holes. Some had shoes on only one foot while the other was wrapped in rags.

Some were clothed in overcoats, some had short fur jackets but everything looked as if it belonged to professional beggars and deserved the name of rags rather than clothing. During the campaign against the kulaks, the village activists had seen to it that these once well-to-do peasants were thoroughly impoverished, and were left for their way north only things of no value whatever.

Following the column was the horse-drawn train of five waggons and several dog-sleds, on one of which a machine-gun was mounted.

Before moving off, Radziwinski once more warned the prisoners, speaking in Russian with a Polish accent: "Do you hear what I say? Anyone who fails to obey a soldier will be shot. Today we go fifty kilometers."

Radziwinsky jumped on his *narta* and ordered the Ostyak driver to start off. Then the first column moved on its way.

II.

The march was one of terrible hardships for the Ukrainian prisoners. For many it was their last.

In winter, the only passable road from Tomsk to Narym is the bed of the Ob river. Along this path, day and night, without interruption, strings of sleds move from Narym to Tomsk, the nearest railroad station of the

district. These strings frequently consist of a thousand sledges on which the goods of the northern regions are being exported: timber, furs, leather, etc.

As Litkens, the chief commander, had ordered, the convoy was obliged to make way for the trains of sledges coming in the opposite direction, by turning off the travelled path into the powdery virgin snow. The first meeting of the column with a sledge train looked somewhat as follows:

Having spotted a train, the Chekists began to shout nervously and to fire in the air with their automatic rifles. The column turned aside while the *narta* with the machine-gun rushed up and down the edge of the road. The people, some of them stuck in snow up to their waists, could hardly move their feet. Some fell down in the snow, head and all. Those behind tried to move on, over their bodies. Despite the bitter cold (nearly —60° Fahrenheit) a cloud of steam hung over the moving column, rising from the sweat-drenched clothes of the prisoners. Sweat dropping from their faces froze to ice in the air. One might think that if the guards still had a spark of humanity, there would have been no need to drive the prisoners to complete exhaustion, by forcing them to proceed in the deep snow, when they might have been allowed to wait at the roadside for the sledge train to pass.

The column left Tomsk at three in the afternoon and spent the whole night on the way, without a single stop to rest. Finally, at dawn of the next day, it came to a little village situated on the bank of the Ob, consisting of scarcely a hundred huts. Its inhabitants were Kirzhaks, members of the sect of Old Believers.

The prisoners were distributed among the huts. Here they were apportioned their daily food rations: one loaf of frozen bread for each ten people and 100 grams of *komsa* per person. The village population regarded them with suspicion. Who were these people, and why was the village surrounded by armed Chekists?

Exhausted, frozen to the marrow, wet from sweat, the prisoners, though hungry from their march, did not even stop to eat, but dropped down to sleep packed closely side by side, hoping that, after the hardships of their march, they would be allowed a rest of 24 hours at least. But after a mere six hours their hopes were shattered by the shouts of the escorts: "Get up: Line up in fours!" Regardless of the night and the snow-storm which had again set in, the column had to line up again and move on its way, because the next column was to arrive at the village in a few hours.

This first stage had already taken toll of its victims: four children and six old people had died. Their bodies were buried in the snow by the guards themselves and their families were not even permitted to take leave of them.

The time the column was faced with over 60 kilometers, even harder than the first. The snow-storm which set in when the column moved off did not stop during the whole march. The people moved forward holding each other by their hands so that no one would be left behind. In the pitch black of the northern night, after having covered a distance of about 20 kilometers, the column came upon a flooded stretch. When the temperature sinks below — 58° Fahrenheit, the ice on the river cracks and water comes to the surface and floods the snow. After a few hours, this water freezes; but until then it turns the snow into impassable slush.

After wading through several hundred meters of water-soaked snow, the column came up to the crack, about two meters wide. The first rows of the

column had scarcely halted before the crack when the Chekists shouted: "Jump!" Jump? How can a child jump over a gap of two meters? Or, for that matter, an adult after a 70-kilometer march with almost no rest?

To spur the hesitating prisoners, one of the guards decided to give an example and, miscalculating the distance, fell into the crack and went under the ice.

In order to overcome the obstacle, the guards selected about three dozen strong men, took them to the river bank, and, giving them axes, ordered them to fell several pines to make a bridge. Several hours were spent on the construction of this primitive bridge: during this time the prisoners had to stand knee-deep in the wet snow. The people crossed the crevice without special incident, but it was worse when it came to the horse-drawn waggons, for the horses refused to set foot on the shaky bridge, had to be unharnessed, tied up, and pulled over the bridge. The two dog-teams had no difficulty in coping with the obstacle, and the sledges were pulled over by the prisoners.

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The condition of those who had spent several hours in their wet clothes and foot-wear waiting for the crossing can well be imagined. Their clothes had frozen stiff and it was almost impossible for anyone to raise an arm or move a leg. After hours of struggle, the column reached its next lodging for the night, the village of Abramtsevo, also situated on the river bank, and consisting of about two hundred houses. After having been distributed among the houses the prisoners could not even undress until their clothes were thawed out.

Before the column reached the village, Radziwinski had ordered the local village council to have all houses well heated and to instruct the peasants to feed the prisoners. The first order was easily obeyed, since the village was surrounded by impassable woods. But the second, the feeding, was an incomparably more difficult problem. Autumn was drawing to a close, and, after the compulsory overfulfillment of the state delivery program, the "surplus" left was hardly enough to keep the village alive to the next harvest.

Nevertheless they shared with the arrivals what little they had: some, bear or reindeer meat; some fish; and boiled potatoes or a thin soup.

From the stories told by the members of the column one could gradually put together a picture of the losses during the second day's march: nine children and fourteen of the older men and women had been left on the way under the snow, and over 120 people had suffered frostbites on their feet or hands.

The column was permitted to stay 24 hours in the village of Abramtsevo, where its members could dry their things, rest, have a good night's sleep, and eat. They tried to get their blood circulating by rubbing their frostbitten hands and feet, but not all were successful, the hands and feet of some were alarmingly swollen. Meanwhile, those who were still alive had to get ready for the next day's march. During the night they sewed themselves soft *chuny* (a kind of foot-wear) from the tails and flaps of their sheepskin coats and cloaks.

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On the next morning the frost was less severe and the snow-storm had abated. Again the people had to file up in fours, and the column moved on its way. This time, the Chekists showed some solicitude for the marchers. The dogs, horses and sledges packed down something like a snow road and it was

somewhat easier for the people to walk on the trodden snow. Luckily, no trains of sledges met the column.

To reach the next halting place, the village of Nikolskoe, it was necessary to cover 60 kilometers. After their 4 hours' rest, they proceeded in better spirits until, about 15 kilometers before Nikolskoe, they were again faced by a crevice. This time, the guards had no intention of getting drenched themselves and dispatched a dog-team to scout out the extent of the flood. Half an hour later, the scouts returned saying that the flood had soaked the road over a stretch of about five kilometers.

The commander of the column decided to detour the area by way of the river bank.

The marchers crawled and clambered up the hard-frozen and snow-covered bank. But their spirits sank as soon as they entered the forest stretching along the bank. The osier and bird-cherry bushes growing among the trees were completely covered with snow, and away from the bank the forest was completely impassable. The snow was a meter deep, and the marchers kept tripping over the bushes and tree stumps hidden beneath the snow. It was several hours before they finished the detour and came back down onto the river ice. It was late at night before they reached the village of Nikolskoe, the first major settlement on the route of the march. In this village, which consisted of about 300 houses; there was a large two-story building, the village club, in which the column was somehow accommodated.

During this lap, the column had lost sixteen children and twelve old people. But the column commander, who always arrived at the halting place before the marchers, had seen to it that the clubhouse was ready to receive the column. The rooms were heated, the floors were covered with straw, and the tanks were filled with drinking water.

Nikolskoe had a big hog farm belonging to the Stalin kolkhoz. Two tons of potatoes had been boiled in the huge kettles used to prepare fodder for the pigs. But the column had arrived at the village almost two hours later than expected; the potatoes were cooked to shreds, were cold and black and could not be peeled. But the Chekist was probably guided by the saying: "Like master, like meat; and like meat, like fork," not doubting that for the deportees who had had no food in 24 hours, even these potatoes would be a genuine treat. No bread was issued, but the marchers got their *komsa* ration. For the children there was a pleasant surprise: the kolkhoz, in a burst of generosity, issued to each child a quarter of a liter of skimmed milk.

During the night, three pregnant women had miscarriages. The still-born infants were buried in a common pit in the club yard. The unfortunate women were unable to continue the march. Radziwinski ordered the chairman of the village council to keep the women at the dispensary, on his personal responsibility, until the arrival at the village of the fourth and last column, which was expected in four or five days. As we learned later, there were kind people at the kolkhoz who, after the departure of the column, took the women into their homes and gave them a good rest.

After spending the night in Nikolskoe, the column moved on its way the next morning. It was a calm and sunny day. The frost kept the thermometer at -58° Fahrenheit. The strings of sledges on the river road had paved the way. During the day the column met only one small train of about a hundred

sledges. There were no crevices and no water flooded the snow. The 30 kilometers to the next halting place, the village of Krivosheino, were negotiated with no special difficulty.

The winter sun had long since fallen below the horizon when the column approached the village, which was wrapped in the veil of a frosty evening mist. Krivosheino was a district center, with the district's seven-grade school.

The column commander announced that the marchers would be given 36 hours of rest, until the arrival of the next column. The school was assigned to them as billets for the night. As in Nikolskoe, the premises were heated and there was enough straw for bedding.

On learning from the guards that the new arrivals were "resettlers," the villagers, with Radziwinski's permission, came crowding to the school carrying bundles and baskets. Each brought what food he could spare and the marchers thus received a substantial supplement to their normal rations. The children were brought milk, though not enough. The old people got plenty of fresh bread.

Outside, the cold became more severe. The mercury fell to the bottom of the thermometer, -75° Fahrenheit. The Chekist guards around the school were relieved every hour. The horse-drawn carts and dog-teams were accommodated at the House of the Kolkhoz Peasant, the Soviet hostel.

Despite the fact that the last day's march had been only half as long as the two before, the deportees had lost eight children and six old people. Nearly fifty persons had frostbites.

On the day the column moved out from Krivosheino, nature itself seemed to take mercy on the marchers: the temperature rose to -20° Fahrenheit, and with it their spirits rose. They coped with the first 30 kilometers without incident and were given twenty minutes' breathing spell on the ice of the river. But as soon as the column was in motion again, the guards began to shout: "Turn off to the right!" In front of the column there appeared the leading sledge of a sledge train. It was one of the longest string of sleds the column met on its whole march, consisting of a least 2,000 carts stretched out over several kilometers.

Without waiting for the long train of sledges to pass, which would have meant a delay of a good one and a half to two hours, the column moved on beside the packed road. The Chekists knew that they faced a march of 80 kilometers, the distance from Krivosheino to the next settlement; and it was not in their interest to tarry on the way. With short stops for rest, the column went forward the whole night and in the morning, just at sunrise, it reached a little Ostyak village buried in snow to the roofs. The column was housed in the huts, each packed like a can of sardines. This time they were issued "increased rations," i. e., double rations of bread and *komsa*. The column stayed in this village until the next morning. Ahead lay an 80-kilometer march to the nearest inhabited place, the town of Kolpashovo, the administrative center of Narym. The Chekists, of course were not concerned with the lot of the marchers, but they themselves needed a rest.

The conditions under which the column had to cover this last march of 80 kilometers to Kolpashovo were incredibly hard. A snow-storm began to blow, the snow drifts grew on the road, and the marchers exhausted their last reserves of strength in trying to get through them. Here and there the shouts of the guards could be heard driving the people on.

The dogs became angry, and barked furiously. Apart from this, there was deathlike silence, amid which the marchers barely dragged their feet, groaning almost inaudibly through clenched teeth.

The children of eight to ten held fast to the clothes of their parents who in low voices tried to encourage them. One little boy toiled along at the side of his mother, whose back was bowed from grief and from the weight of the bundle which she was carrying. The little boy's ragged cap was pulled down over his eyes and hid his face. To judge from his height, he was ten or twelve years old. Every minute he lifted imploring eyes to his mother, while weakening hands clung to her skirts. A mother should help her child, but how could this woman, who had walked distances which the horses used to local conditions could hardly manage, find the strength to give help?

In one of the snow drifts the exhausted child sank down and remained unable to get up. The mother stood by helplessly. Her parched lips whispered: "Oh Lord, give peace to Thy servant's soul..." Hundreds of feet trod over the body of the innocent child. The mother moved on without a last farewell. The Chekists at the end of the column dragged the child's corpse away from the road and covered it with snow.

By this time, the nerves of the marchers had sunk into such torpor that personal grief and misery had lost all meaning. Struggling for bare life, overcoming inhuman hardships, the deportees proceeded on their way toward an unknown destination.

About 40 kilometers before reaching Kolpashovo, the Ob narrows to a width of not more than 100 meters. Both river banks are very steep and form something like a corridor. This part of the route was especially hard for the marchers. Trying to protect their heads behind the backs of those ahead of them, they scarcely moved, while the guards at the rear drove them on.

It was not until nightfall of the next day that the column approached the city of Kolpashovo. Twenty-eight children and thirty-three grown-ups had remained under the snow on the river Ob.

The concentration camp barracks were located three kilometers from the city. They had been built during the time of the Ramzin trial and the trial of the Trotskyst-Bukharinist Center, and had never lacked inmates. Many of the inmates, worn out by the exorbitant timber-cutting norms and the local climate, had gradually moved from the concentration camp to the cemetery. The barracks of the Kolpashovo camp were built with ample reserve space for an increase in population. As careful mothers have their children's clothes made with "room to grow," so Stalin's constructors of socialism had built the barracks of the Kolpashovo concentration camp with "room to grow"; thus, when the first column of Ukrainians arrived, thirteen barracks were uninhabited.

The marchers had covered on foot approximately 350 kilometers from Tomsk to Kolpashovo; this march had taken a toll of 165 human sacrifices. A large proportion of the people had suffered frostbites. Their faces, which had turned black and had already begun to rot, were terrible to see. Of their old clothes only rags remained, their footwear had finally fallen to pieces.

At the camp, the column was met by the commander of the whole convoy, Major Litkens himself. The marchers were turned over to the camp OGPU administration and accommodated in the barracks, which were fairly warm

and dry. An hour after their arrival, the deportees were issued their first hot meal, consisting of soup made from uncleaned frozen potatoes, unspiced and without a trace of fat.

Within five days, one after the other, the other four columns arrived. All had suffered the same horrors as the first column. The fourth column arrived two days behind time and, as became obvious later, had suffered fewer losses than the others. Its commander was Captain of State Security Halushchenko, a Ukrainian by nationality, and it is possible that on account of a common nationality he had taken pity on his fellow-countrymen and had allowed them more time for rest.

After the arrival of the last column, the casualties of the whole convoy could be counted: 706 persons had remained in the snow, 337 children and 369 adults.

In the spring, the Ob would overflow, the ice would move north to the sea, and nature would hide all traces of another of Stalin's horrible crimes.

After all the horrors experienced by the resettlers during their march, life in the concentration camp seemed like the Garden of Eden. There was room for all in the bunks. Families grouped together, and the single people formed groups according to ages. Though the barbed-wire fence around the camp reminded them of their lack freedom, they settled down somehow under the protecting roofs.

Several days after their arrival in camp, they were issued clothing and shoes. To be sure, the things had been worn, but they were still in fairly good condition. Men as well as women were given warm cotton-lined trousers, quilted vests, gloves and newly soled felt boots. Those who were sick or had suffered frostbites were given medical treatment.

The daily food ration of a camp inmate consisted of 300 grams of bread, and soup three times a day. The children also got gruel and stewed fruit. There was a pleasant surprise for the smokers, an eighth of a Russian pound of *makhorka* (crude tobacco) to each four men daily.

It was a real holiday for the deportees when they could take a hot bath at the camp bath-house and wash their underwear.

Except for a few women who were assigned in turns to work in the kitchen, where they usually had to chop the frozen cabbages with axes to cook the soup, no one was sent out to work.

The Ukrainian deportees were kept at the Kolpashovo camp until the beginning of February. By that time the sick and frostbitten were more or less restored to health, the marchers were rested and they had more or less acquiesced in their fate, in the belief that their sufferings had come to an end at last. But under the Bolsheviks, things do not go the way people are led to expect.

III.

For several days, secret preparations had been under way in the camp. Sledges were put in repair, horses and dogs fed better than usual, special skis for use in the taiga made ready. None of the "resettlers" even guessed what was awaiting him until these preparations made it obvious that there was to be another march.

The preparatory work was at last completed: a hundred pairs of skis, thirty solid sledges, and twenty dog-sleds were selected. The sledges were loaded with shovels, axes, cross-cut saws, crowbars, tin sheeting, nails, several crates of window glass, kitchen boilers, pails, and other kitchen implements. Food, too, was loaded: bread, barrels of salted cabbage, *komsa*, salt, and so on. The dog-sleds were packed with warm folding tents, field dispensaries, kerosene and kerosene cans, crates containing cartridges and bands of ammunition. On four of the dog-sleds machine-guns were mounted. The sledges and dog-sleds were covered with tarpaulin, and the whole train, now ready for departure, was put under the supervision of the camp *Vokhr* ("free hired" armed guards recruited from among released prisoners).

In the evening, representatives of the camp administration appeared at the resettlers' barracks. The guard who accompanied these superiors shouted: "Attention!" There was silence. Looking over the resettlers, the commander said: "You are not yet at the end of your march. Here you have been allowed to stay only to rest and to nurse the sick. Tomorrow morning you will proceed on the route laid out for you, again on foot. If any of your clothing or footwear needs repair, you have the whole night ahead; time enough to put everything in order."

One can easily imagine the resettlers' thoughts as they heard that this was not the end of their suffering. They crowded about the Chekists, to learn where they were to be driven. But they got only the sarcastic reply: "The march commander knows where."

The barracks seethed in pre-march turmoil: the poor possessions were packed in bundles, bags, and sacks, and the lucky owners of sleds were getting them ready to use. Women and children were weeping.

On the next morning, the Chekists drove the resettlers out of the barracks. The guards, each provided with skis, were already up. The sledges and dog-sleds stood ready. The convoy was put in marching order and, surrounded by guards, was again divided into four columns. The column commanders and the whole guard were new. Only one old acquaintance remained, the convoy commander, Major Litkens. The convoy was accompanied by a physician and two nurses, who carried on their backs bags with medical equipment.

The forming of the columns was completed, the Chekists strapped on their skis, and each column was enclosed by a close circle of guards. The commander of the march, Litkens, had departed long in advance.

The columns followed each other at intervals of not more than one kilometer. Between the columns were the dog-sleds carrying the machine-guns. The rear of the columns was made up by the string of horse-drawn and dog-drawn carts and sleds.

The weather was clear and sunny; the temperature about -40° Fahrenheit. After a progress of several kilometers, the convoy entered the zone of the Narym taiga with its virgin forest, consisting mostly of conifers: firs, pines,

Siberian pines, and cedars. Some of the trees were over twenty meters high. The tops of the trees formed an unbroken ceiling through which only now and then one could glimpse the sky. All around there was semi-darkness and silence.

The convoy proceeded along the tracks left in the snow by the commander's sledges. In the forest the snow was deep and, in order to divide the hardships equally, the columns had to change places in the convoy every other hour; the column in the lead waiting for the other to pass and then falling in behind.

The guards flanking the columns on skis did not treat the deportees badly. There was no cursing or shouting.

The convoy moved through the taiga until late in the night before it was halted for a night's rest. The deportees were given shovels with which they dug deep pits in the snow. Others chopped off branches. Soon after, camp-fires were burning in all pits. They boiled melted snow in kettles hung on tripods made of sticks. The sanitation dog-team passed along columns, which had settled down for the night, the physicians asking if any had fallen ill or suffered frosbites. Fortunately, nobody had.

The guards and medical personnel spent the night in tents put up for them by the marchers.

Having swallowed the prescribed grams of frozen bread and *komsa*, the deportees, wrapped as well as possible in whatever they had, made ready to sleep near the camp fires which threw out a cheerful warmth. The marchers took turns in watching and keeping up the camp fires.

At the first glimpse of dawn the guards shouted: "Get up.!" They issued 200 grams of bread and *komsa* per person with the warning that this was to keep them through the day. It was not yet full daylight when the convoy moved on its way, following the tracks of the commander's sleds.

As they progressed further into the depth of the taiga, obstructions on the way became increasingly frequent. Enormous trees uprooted by taiga storms blocked the expanses of the taiga everywhere. It was almost impassable even for fit and well-trained hunters and trappers. What could be expected of the worn-out deportees? The gleaming of the automatic rifles in the hands of the Chekists reminded these martyrs that it was not in their power to change any part of their lot.

One might well ask and what about the Chekist guards? Did not they, too, have to endure all the hardships of the march through the taiga? No; the conditions under which the Chekists traveled could not even be compared with those to which deportees were exposed. In the first place, all were well dressed in warm clothing. They were relieved of guard duty every two hours. In their off-duty hours, they made themselves comfortable on the sledges and dog-sleds and even traveled in some luxury. Also, it was quite easy to convoy the columns on skis.

The Chekists were well provided with food: large quantities of biscuits and scones, cold roasted reindeer or bear meat, and the polar ration of 200 grams of undiluted alcohol. Under such conditions the trip was for them rather a matter of sport and recreation.

Before sunfall, the column came upon a lair of bears. The animals awoke and began to come out from their lair. Alarm broke out in the ranks of

the column; women and children were badly frightened. But the Chekists ran up and killed three bears with bursts from their automatic rifles. The booty was considerable: bear skins for the Chekists, and for the column bear meat for supper.

When the prey had been distributed, the convoy got ready for the night. Six children and three grown-ups had found their eternal rest in the taiga. About fifteen persons had suffered frostbites and were given first aid by the physicians.

I shall not continue to describe the deportees' march through the taiga because until their arrival at their destination, their days resembled each other like kopeks.

For a whole fortnight the resettlers were driven through the impassable taiga. Not once did they meet a human soul, a human settlement. Only game and animals of prey — deer, wild goats, and sometimes even wolves — eyed the unbidden guests wonderingly.

At the last halting place, the convoy settled down for the night as it had become accustomed to during the long journey. It was not until morning that they learned that the commander, guarded by the Ostyak guides, had camped down for the night in his tent not far from the deportees' resting-place. He summoned the column commanders and told them that the convoy had arrived at its destination. For the resettlers, this was to be their "halting-place for ever."

This news, imparted to the marchers by the column commanders, was received even with some gratification. Everyone heaved a sigh of relief: "Well, at last an end has come to the hardships of this forced march through the taiga."

But on looking around, their spirit again fell: the impassable taiga was everywhere with deep snow, and only animal tracks to show that living creatures existed in the taiga. Nobody knew, of course, that the nearest inhabited place, Vasyugan, was 150 kilometers north of this spot, and the nearest railroad station 950 kilometers.

The march of almost 600 kilometers over pathless territory, through the wild taiga, had taken a high toll of victims. Six hundred and seventy persons — children, young people and adults — were missing; 800 had suffered frostbites. Of the 4,000 persons who had departed from Tomsk, only a few more than 2,500 had arrived at their destination. Discounting those who had become invalids from frostbites, there were left scarcely 1,000 persons wholly fit for work.

*

At noon the column commanders instructed the resettlers that each head of a family was to appear at once at the resting-place of the third column. There they were met by Litkens himself.

The gist of his address to the gathering was as follows: "Surely you and your families have become worn out on the way and you probably believed that this march would never end. I can cheer you up, we have arrived at the place of your new settlement. I believe that you have realized by now

that it would have been better for you to respect Soviet authority rather than to leave your long-occupied places to wander in the solitude of the North. For the time being, each column will occupy the site on which it has stopped. Today, you will be issued from our supplies the tools you will need for the start, and tomorrow morning you will go about building mud huts for shelter. As you can see for yourselves, there is enough timber wherever you look. Fell trees, saw them, and build living quarters for yourselves. I believe that you will not even think of running away, if I tell you that it is several hundred kilometers from here to the nearest inhabited point. But if, nevertheless, any of you should make the attempt and get caught, the sentence is already pronounced: shooting on the spot. I shall stay here with you and I believe that we shall find a common language and come to an understanding on all questions that might arise. I hope all of you have understood me well?

The crowd confirmed silently that everything had been understood, after which they were allowed to break up.

On the next day, the resettlers were given the tools needed for construction — shovels, saws, axes, and other implements — and work was soon in full swing.

They learned that the most difficult part of their work was to dig out the foundations for the mud huts. The taiga of Narym is situated in the zone of eternal frost which reaches down to a depth of one and a half meters. The soil was harder than iron, and fires had to be laid on the surface prior to digging it up. Everyone hurried to complete building his quarters as soon as possible and by the end of the second day some had finished their construction.

The mud huts were erected, yet people had no materials to build stoves or glass for windows. But a Ukrainian proverb says: "Want will teach people to eat even pancakes with poppy-seed and jam with cottage cheese."

They had to make roof holes and heat their quarters in the ancestral way, with black smoke: a fire is made on the floor of the mud hut, and the smoke goes out through the roof hole. The open fire burning day and night illuminates the hut, though only fitfully. Without waiting for completion of building, the families moved from the snow pits into their new quarters.

When the "housing construction" was finished, all persons fit for work were recruited on Litkens' orders for the construction of the administrative barracks: the medical dispensary, the barracks for the guards, the bathhouse, the kitchen, and the warehouses. The barracks were solidly built of hewn logs. For the floors and ceilings, the resettlers manufactured boards. The roofs were covered with shingles; all rooms were furnished with tin stoves and the stove-pipes were led out through the windows.

This "special construction" was completed within a week. During that time the resettlers dug three wells in which, fortunately, good drinking water showed up at a depth of only three meters.

The bath-house, the construction of which had been completed meanwhile, immediately began to operate full swing and without a break: two and a half thousand people had to pass through it as soon as possible and rid themselves of the filth and lice of a month's march. Also, they had to be given a chance to wash their linen and dirty clothes. One can hardly imagine the pleasure they derived from being able to splash in hot water, wash themselves clean

with green soap, and, having done this, to wash their patched underwear which sweat had turned into coarse canvas.

The kitchen, which by then was also completed, began to issue hot food to the resettlers. At first, this food was no different from the prison food: soup from frozen salted cabbage, with no fat, of course, and even without potatoes. The bread ration was fixed at 300 grams per head, grown-ups and children alike.

The sentry duty of the guards was soon considerably reduced. Tired of their constrained inactivity, most of them occupied themselves with hunting wild goats, deer and hares. The meat of the killed game was delivered to the common kitchen and the food instantly became better. The women who were free from duty collected bogberries from under the snow; these berries are rich in vitamins and were good for the children.

The horse-drawn train and the dog-teams which had come along with the convoy went back to Kolpashovo a few days later. Two dog-teams were left behind at the camp for the requirements of the commander and the administrative personnel. But even they were hardly of any use because there was no place to go: for a radius of hundreds of kilometers there was absolute solitude.

Not a single attempt at escape was recorded for the time being; and quite understandably, too, if we take into consideration that there were no persons without family ties among the resettlers, and that one could not escape far from the Chekists with their skis. Thus, the people gradually became accustomed to the idea that they would have to build solid foundations for a new life there.

What was the objective of the Kremlin government in choosing the desolate northern Narym district as the place to which these people were to be deported?

It was another of the regime's experiments with human material. The wealth of the Narym territory was truly inexhaustible: fur animals, timber, fish, and, of course, mineral resources. All that remained to be done was to make sure if the human organism was able to adapt to the exceedingly hard conditions of the Narym district. And the best way to make sure was to use the so-called "class and national enemies" for this purpose: if they should die, no harm would have been done; but if they should prove to survive and to adapt themselves to the new conditions, the cultivation of this land would be practicable.

IV.

Soon more substantial equipment began to arrive from Vasyugan for the camp: a saw-mill frame, tools for logging, and even a wood-burning engine for the saw-mill.

The camp administration organized systematic forest exploitation work.

The logging place was a distance of three kilometers from the camp, and the saw-mill frame and the engine were set up for operation. Only high quality timber fit for export was being produced.

At aslow rate, but more noticeably day by day, supplies for the use of the inmates of the camp also began coming in. From Vasyugan there were

brought to the camp warehouses such articles as flour, salt, makhorka, matches, soap, salted frozen cabbage, dried potatoes, dried pressed onions (an excellent remedy for scurvy), sugar, and coffee substitute. The clothing warehouse received footwear, warm jackets, women's and children's clothing. Also building materials were brought: window glass, nails, corrugated iron and sheet tin, kerosene, all kinds of cooking pans and pots, and other articles. All these goods were brought in great haste from Vasyugan by sledges pulled by horses, reindeer, or dogs. Everything had to be finished before the spring thaw made the terrain impassable.

All work in the camp, i. e., in the kitchen, the warehouses and administrative barracks, was assigned to persons of advanced age who could not be used for forest exploitation. Only the disabled, and children under sixteen, were freed from labor duty.

The spring arrived imperceptibly. The northern nights grew shorter, the sun was shining more and more often, here and there rivulets began to murmur, thawed spots appeared in the taiga, and long lines of migrating birds which had spent the winter somewhere in the south, crossed the sky.

In early May, Litkens convoked a general meeting. No one doubted that the supreme supervisor wished to tell them something important and urgent, because as a rule all instructions concerning work were announced in camp orders.

The very first word with which Litkens addressed the meeting caused general surprise. "Citizens," he addressed the camp inmates, beginning his speech with an almost benevolent intonation.

Neither Litkens himself nor any of the Chekists under his command had ever addressed the camp people with this word, common enough under normal conditions.

"According to the resolution of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government," Litkens continued, "I can announce here before you that the crimes you have committed against the workers' and peasants' government have been forgiven you and that, by way of amnesty, you have been freed from punishment and will not serve time in OGPU corrective labor camps."

There was a perceptible commotion among the people. They exchanged glances as if failing to understand.

"From this time on," Litkens continued, "you are considered free citizens and are restored all the rights of citizens. The Soviet authorities consider you now as *free resettlers*, and from this day all guarding of the camp has been liquidated. This place has been chosen for your permanent residence and you may go about establishing a normal future life for yourselves. Begin your construction work and gradually build up your properties. The state will assist you in everything. For the construction of houses and farm buildings the state gives you the required timber free of charge. Start clearing the woods and turn it into arable land. Everyone may take as large a plot as he can work with his family. The state will supply you with seed. In conformity with the regulations concerning free resettlers, you are exempted for the next two years from paying any agricultural taxes and from state deliveries. The Party and government entrust you with a task of great importance to the state and they trust that you will justify their confidence. You are pioneers

in the realization of a project conceived by the Party and government: the exploitation of the natural wealth of this country and cultivation of its virgin land. Your experience in, and knowledge of, agricultural work together with your innate industriousness are sufficient guaranty that you will be able to cope with the task you are charged with. Today, the camp administration is being liquidated and you will have to elect, at once, at this very meeting, a communal authority, i. e., a village council. I myself shall stay here for some time to advise the council you will have elected, in legal problems during the initial period. After this meeting, the heads of the families will have to appear at the camp administration and sign statements confirming that you are settling down here *under conditions of voluntary planned resettlement*. After that, the village council can begin its work. This is all I have to tell you today. Are there any questions?" With this question, Litkens closed his address.

The assembly stood in dismal silence. Surely not everything Litkens said had reached the consciousness of these "voluntary" resettlers. But one thing was clear in their minds: none would be allowed ever to return to their native Ukraine. This thought obscured everything else, and the Chekist's question was answered with the silence of the tomb.

Such was the birth of *Nova Ukraina*, a settlement of Ukrainian peasant farmers in the desolate taiga of Narym.

During the election of the village council no one consented to be candidate for chairman. And so, with no objection raised, the assembly supported the only candidate submitted, the Chekist Litkens. Thus, the henchman whose actions during the convoy had exacted thousands of victims, began to embody the Soviet authority and assumed the function of protecting the interests of his recent serfs.

Soon after, a provisionary commercial base of the *Sibtor* (Siberian Trading Company) was established at the settlement. From now on people were paid in cash for logging work, according to the general labor tariff. The *Sibtor* base gradually developed a trade in various goods and food articles and opened a purchasing section which paid for everything in cash. The women, children, and aged at first took to collecting cedar cones dried in the sun, they husked the cedar nuts out with their fingers. For one centner (100 kg) the base paid 30 rubles. This side-income by family members was a considerable help, because those who were fit for work could not give much attention to logging, since it was time to begin building their houses.

When the local authority was finally organized, it began to apportion plots of land. The streets of the future village were laid out on the site foreseen for it, leaving a little square in its center. And now construction work began full swing. The short northern summer spurred everyone, because all wished to complete construction in order to be able to meet the winter in new, warm houses.

V.

Clay was found in the vicinity of the settlement and the women and girls began to manufacture air-dried bricks.

As a matter of course, everyone, without agreeing on this matter, tried to give his house the look of a Ukrainian peasant cottage. Inside, the walls and ceilings of the houses were coated with clay. Special care was devoted to the erection of Ukrainian stoves with stove-benches, so closely connected with the Ukrainian peasants' mode of life.

Among the builders there were, of course, carpenters too, who manufactured the doors and window-frames, nor was it any problem to make the primitive peasants' rustic furniture. Everyone made his own tables and benches. The more experienced manufactured stools and even cupboards or wardrobes.

Until *Pokrova* (the feast of the Intercession of the Holy Virgin) and the first frosts, the site of the settlement conveyed the impression of a human anthep: the people worked until late in the night and erected over 600 houses. There was no time to build farm buildings, i e., barns, stalls or sties. In any case, these were as yet unnecessary since the people possessed no livestock. Also, there was no point in preparing fuel for the winter, for there was plenty of fuel everywhere.

Even before the first snowfall, many families moved into their new quarters and the horrors of last year's wintering were a reminiscence only.

The *Sibtor* now changed its mode of accounting with its suppliers and customers. Each resettler who signed a contract with the base obliging himself to supply it with nuts, bogberries, and red huckleberries could get a credit against which he could buy whatever he needed. Eighty per cent of the credit was to be taken by the resettler in goods, and the remainder in cash; but the latter was to be paid to the resettler only after he had kept his part of the contract. This system of mutual accounting was called bartering in Soviet terminology, but the people got used to calling it swindling, because they had to take at the base what the base had in store, and not what they needed.

Before the autumn had passed, some of the resettlers went in for fur hunting. Pelts were greatly welcomed at the *Sibtor* base. Since nobody possessed firearms, the hunters used all kinds of traps and snares. With the traps and snares set up for the night they caught hares, goats, wild goats, and sometimes even a fox.

The meat from these animals was smoked, salted, and dried, and there was enough for all families. The pelts were delivered to the base for credit.

The resettlers spent the second winter in their new home country with no great hardships or want. The most important fact was that every family had its own warm place to live.

VI.

The spring of 1932 arrived. As soon as the days grew springlike and warm, the resettlers went about putting the village in good order. The first task was to grub out the trees and stumps which were still standing in the middle of the streets.

The whole community engaged in this work and thus the streets of the settlement soon assumed a neat look. Gradually every resettler also put his own yard and farmstead into order. The houses were given fences with wickets and gateways, skillfully made in the Ukrainian style.

The chairman of the village council, the Chekist Litkens, walked the streets of the village with considerable satisfaction, quite naturally ascribing the lion's share of the resettlers' achievements to his own merits. By May, every owner of a homestead had put into good order his private plot of land and had ploughed as large a plot as possible for a garden. Toward the end of May when the Ob became navigable, the people brought garden seeds and seed potatoes, and everything was sown and planted in time.

It must be pointed out that, despite the severe climatic conditions of the Narym country, the vegetables and potatoes, if planted in time, manage to ripen within the period of vegetation. There is a sufficient amount of precipitation, and the gardens do not need to be watered.

Before Ukrainians were resettled in the region, the local population had not the least idea about the growing of vegetables. The main occupation of the local Ostyaks was hunting and fishing, and their private recreation consisted in drinking vodka, smoking their pipes, remembering to beat their dogs and, on occasion, also their wives. Just why "on occasion" calls for explanation. According to the Ostyak mode of life, when someone gets ready to go hunting, he must invariably give his wife a thrashing; otherwise the hunt will not be successful and it would not be even worthwhile to start out hunting. Now, since hunting feeds the Ostyak, beating the wife is in the order of the day. The wife, for her part, does not remain long in his debt. When, on his return from a successful hunt, the Ostyak gets drunk with vodka, his wife gives him all the blows she has received. If this does not happen, the Ostyak feels cheated, the inference being that he has not enjoyed himself as was due after a job well done.

VII.

In the statute of the Soviet government concerning voluntary resettlers, it is laid down that the peasant-farmers who have settled in distant regions of the USSR are exempted for two years from paying agricultural taxes. Although the Chekist chairman of the village council, Litkens, had confirmed in public meeting that this regulation also applied to the "voluntary" Ukrainian resettlers; nevertheless under the Soviet system "a law is like the shaft of a cart, whichever way you turn it, it goes."

After the harvest, the peasant resettlers were, despite everything, forced to pay the agricultural tax. It was not even taken into consideration that this was the first harvest after terribly hard work and that everyone had to have some reserve for the winter.

In the early autumn of 1932 the new settlers were pleasantly surprised when the news reached them that a drove of pure-bred livestock and a flock of poultry were soon to arrive. The cattle and poultry were transported from the Novosibirsk region to Kolpashovo by river, and from there by light boats to Vasyugan. From Vasyugan the poultry were brought to the village of *Nova Ukraina* on carts, while the cattle were driven. Depending upon the numbers,

each family received one or two cows, as many horses, and several sows and sheep. The poultry, too, were divided proportionately: turkeys, geese, ducks, and chickens. Each household received up to ten fowl.

The cattle brought in were pure-bred stock of not more than second generation. There were horses from the state horse-breeding point at Voronezh, Dutch cows from the republic of the Volga Germans, Yorkshire pigs from the Askania Nova sovkhoz in the Ukraine, and "Siberian merino" sheep from the state stock farm at Rubtsovsk. A little later there followed a drove of young animals, not over one year old: foals, calves, and so on, 80 per cent females.

The cattle and the poultry were given to the individual farmsteads on credit, to be paid within three years.

How can one explain this "generosity" on the part of the Soviet regime toward the former "enemies of the people," especially since, during the whole period of existence of the Soviet regime, with the exception of the short NEP period, livestock raising had always been in a catastrophic situation?

The reason was that, despite the severity of the winters, natural conditions were favorable for livestock raising. There are vast meadows on the banks of the little tributaries of the Ob river. The woods of the taiga are abundantly provided with edible roots, well suited for pig forage. The local population are poor cattle breeders, and the local cattle are of a small species, live weight being only 100 to 120 kilograms. A local cow will not yield more than 300 liters of milk a year, containing at most 3% to 4% of butterfat.

Since the Soviet government had set itself the task of developing livestock raising in the Naryn country, it is quite understandable that it could rely only on resettlers of Ukrainian nationality, who had been experienced farmers on their own lands from ancient times, and whose industriousness has been well-known just as long.

The author of these lines was responsible for the development of livestock raising in the settlement there and is therefore in a position to describe further developments.

Having received cattle and poultry, each farmer saw to it that they got warm stalls before the winter arrived and that fodder was provided. Through the *Siborg*, which had procured a sufficient quantity of wheels and axles, every farmstead possessed carts; and it was an easy matter to manufacture sleds for the winter. Thus, every farmer had his own means of transport at his disposal.

In the spring of 1933, all the resettlers rushed out to till their plots of virgin soil and by the end of May large expanses of the land were sown with rye and oats.

In the meantime, the resettlers were constantly busy developing their village, *Nova Ukraina*. As a communal enterprise they erected a school building, a house for the village council, and a clubhouse with a library.

The milk surplus was delivered to the *Masloprom* (butter industry) base, which had established a dairy. In the late summer, the regional society of the flour-milling industry, the *Soyuzmuka* (Union Flour), built a steam-mill whose dynamo soon began to supply the village with electric power for lighting purposes.

The area grew at a truly miraculous pace and soon turned into a model village.

When one day the author met a fellow countryman from the Kiev region, the latter said: "Well, friend, if our father would stop robbing us, he would not recognize us in a mere five years." And he was right. By 1934 this person had three working horses, four milk cows, about ten well-fed pigs, fifteen sheep, and approximately a hundred fowl.

The animal husbandry and veterinary personnel were maintained at the village at the expense of the state. Within a short time, the village of *Nova Ukraina* developed automatically into a pure-bred stock center for the entire Narym country. Being a village which really could boast model farms, *Nova Ukraina* was soon receiving visits from representatives of various regional organizations and research institutes, among them agronomists, zootechnicians, veterinary experts, research workers and professors of agricultural institutes. These tourists were interested in many things there, and the farmers received many practical hints concerning livestock raising, land-working, and the procuring of forage for their cattle.

The Ukrainian resettlers had hardly had time to forget the convoy march and all the hardships they had endured, when a new adversity visited them. Whereas from 1932 to 1934 only taxes on vegetables and harvests were exacted, on January 1, 1935, taxes on livestock products were imposed on them too. Orders were given to deliver 300 liters of milk annually for each cow, independent of her milk flow; for each head of horned cattle, 60 kilograms of meat, and for each pig, 20 kilograms; for each sheep, 10 kilograms of meat and 3 kilograms of wool; for each hen, 160 eggs. For these articles, which the people had to deliver like taxes, they were paid the official prices: 1 liter of milk, 15 kopeks; 1 kg of pork, 85 kopeks; 1 kg of mutton, 65 kopeks; 1 kg of wool, 1.20 rubles.

It might appear that this was not too bad, that the lion's share still belonged to the individual farmers. But then the state purchasers appeared on the scene. A strong campaign for "voluntary delivery" of agricultural products in overfulfillment of plans was opened and the technique of systematic robbing of the peasant population, on which the whole Soviet state system actually relies, was introduced and developed.

Everyone who refused to make these voluntary deliveries to the state incurred the normal punishment for "saboteurs," i. e., imprisonment in a concentration camp for not only the offender himself, but for his whole family. Any failure to carry out the plan of additional voluntary deliveries deprived the peasant farmer of the right to buy clothes, shoes, or any utensils of any kind at the local village cooperative store. Whether they wanted to or not, the people had to turn over all their "surplus" agricultural products to the state.

This, too, would not in itself be so terrible for the resettler: if there exists in a country only state trade, the peasant can trade only with the state. Yet if we take a look at the official prices of agricultural products and industrial goods delivered to the peasants by the state, it becomes obvious that these were not commercial dealings, but overt robbery.

The state established the following prices to be paid the peasants for their agricultural products:

| | | |
|--------|---|----------------------------------|
| Beef | — | 50 rubles for 1 centner (100 kg) |
| Pork | — | 75 „ „ „ |
| Mutton | — | 60 „ „ „ |
| Rye | — | 10 „ „ „ |
| Wool | — | 3 „ 1 kilogram |
| Eggs | — | 0.50 „ 10 eggs |
| Milk | — | 0.75 „ 1 liter |

Yet the prices of industrial articles on sale at the village cooperative stores on which the peasant was wholly dependent, were as follows:

| Item | Price |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| A cotton suit — | 100 to 150 rubles |
| A pair of ordinary felt boots | 80 „ |
| A pair of shoes — | 40 to 50 „ |
| A sheepskin coat — | 100 „ |
| 1 liter of kerosene | 1 „ |
| 1 kg of sugar — | 1.75 „ |

The annual income of a medium farmstead did not exceed 2,000 rubles. But from this sum all sorts of taxes (cultural taxes, insurance, etc.) had to be paid, one tenth of the income had to be subscribed for the state loan, and fees had to be paid for membership in the village cooperative society and the *Okhotrybaksoyuz* (Hunters' and Fishers' Union). In the end, half of the income went straight into the pocket of the state.

The peasant resettlers' side income also went the same way: only members of the *Okhotrybasoyuz*, which exacted 100 rubles as membership fee, had the right to hunt for fur-bearing animals. All pelts had to be delivered to the state at very low fixed prices. In addition, each hunter was obliged to meet a certain delivery norm in bear skins, squirrels, foxes, etc. While the bear was still sleeping in his lair, his skin was already sold to the state. The same regulation was introduced for fishermen. A more profitable source of side income was the collecting of nuts, berries, and mushrooms, whose delivery at the collection base was voluntary.

VIII.

The chairman of the village council, Litkens, was simultaneously the representative of the OGPU. He conducted a campaign of corruption among the young people and presently established Party and Komsomol organizations in the village. Communist propaganda was enforced in the school. As in the old country, children began denouncing their parents. Here, too, the state authority began to divide the village population into kulaks, sub-kulaks, medium, and poor peasants. When the stratum of Party members grew stronger, an artificial division set in among the peasants who had so far been united by the common task of establishing their life in resettlement.

IX.

The collectivization of the Ostyak homesteads proceeded at a very slow pace.

The settlements were thinly populated and the homesteads were situated at considerable distances from one another, which excluded the possibility of a consolidation of collective farms. The Ostyaks of the Far North were compelled to live a nomadic life, roving all over the vast plains of the North in search of fodder for their reindeer.

To liquidate this "breach" in the collectivization of the North, detachments of propagandists were sent there from the regional and district centers. Partly by means of persuasion and partly by intimidation, collectivization was finally carried out. Even the reindeer-keepers were forced to join the kolkhozes.

Soon, it was the turn of the village of *Nova Ukraina*. Most of the peasants this time, too, stubbornly resisted collectivization, voting against it at their meeting, and again many of them paid with their lives for this resistance, perishing in OGPU prisons and concentration camps. "Liquidation of the kulaks as a class" was the slogan pronounced by Stalin.

The Ukrainian resettlers who somehow survived were once more robbed and herded into the kolkhozes by the Soviet regime, which again turned them into drudges of the state, with no rights of their own. This was the fate of the "voluntary" resettlers.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

The Current Soviet Approach to Ukrainian History

V. DUBROVSKYI

The founders of the historiography of the Ukraine — M. Maksymovych, D. Bahaliy, M. Kostomarov, O. Lazarevskyi, V. Antonovych and M. Hrushevskyi as well as their pupils always strove for complete objectivity in interpreting the processes of Ukrainian historical development in their works. In the attempts of Marxist historians to write a history of the Ukraine, we are faced with quite a different approach toward Ukrainian historical research. The first attempt of this kind was made by M. Yavorskyi in the 1920's. However, he failed in his efforts and his books were destroyed by the Soviets. Yavorskyi wrote of the Ukrainian historical process as an independent issue, but explained it from the viewpoint of the Marxist-Leninist Party doctrine. Yavorskyi's historical conception, i. e. his views on the separateness of the Ukrainian historical process were sharply attacked by the followers of Academician Pokrovky's school (Shpunt and others).

A second attempt was made after the liquidation of Yavorskyi's school, by the All-Ukrainian Association of Art, Literature and Science group of historians under the editorship of Karpenko, a formerly unknown historian. He was assigned by the agitation and propaganda section of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party to fill the gap on the Communist cultural front after the disappearance of Yavorskyi's book. The "artel" method of composing the "History of the Ukraine" under Karpenko's editorship may be explained not only by the "collective mania" widespread under the Soviets, but also by the quite natural step of "insuring" oneself against criticism and self-criticism, both of which are doubtlessly not as dangerous for a collective author as they are for a single one. However, the separate parts of this whole work, compiled under Karpenko's editorship, which were written by different authors — some of them non Party members — were not quite coordinated with each other. Thus, certain discrepancies in the exposition and contradictions among the various authors was noticeable. Karpenko's work was very shortlived and disappeared from the book market along with Karpenko and some of his colleagues during the big purge in the Ukraine in 1933. The History edited by Karpenko recognized the separateness of the Ukrainian historical process, although it endeavored more zealously than did Yavorskyi's work to keep to the directives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and was more intent on conforming to the heritage of Marxism-Leninism by trying to align with Moscow's Marxist historians predominant at that time.

And now, after World War II, a group of researchers of the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR have made a third

attempt at a Marxist travesty of the history of the Ukraine. It is the "History of the Ukrainian SSR," vol. I, Kiev, 1953, 784 pages, published by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR under the editorship of O. K. Kasymenko, V. A. Dyadychenko, F. Y. Leś, F. P. Shevchenko and F. O. Yastrebov. It is pointed out in the foreword that certain parts of this book were written by other persons who did not belong to the above-mentioned editorial board, namely: K. H. Huslysty, I. D. Boyko, K. I. Stetsyuk, M. A. Rubach, I. O. Hurzhiy, O. A. Parasuńko, S. A. Kytarev, O. F. Yermolenko, I. I. Kompaniyets Y. T. Shcherbyna, I. H. Shovkoplyas and V. A. Bohushevych. Thus, apart from the five editors, the book was written by as many as twelve authors. Of the above-named, only K. H. Huslysty and M. A. Rubach (Rubanovych) were known as historians before World War II. All the others belong, probably, to the younger generation of Ukrainian Communist historians reared in the period of the "Stalin constitution," during and after World War II. The almost complete absence in this collective work of historians of the 1920's and 1930's indicates that they have, if still alive, discontinued or were forced to discontinue research in the field of Ukrainian historiography. As can be seen from the preface, the chief editor O. K. Kasymenko has not written a single one of the 15 sections and 100 sub-sections of this book.

The fundamental rules of scholarly, historical investigation have not been adhered to by the authors of the book, although they claim particular impartiality for it: "Prior to the October Socialist Revolution no scholarly history of the Ukrainian people had been written." (p. 6) Or again:

Soviet historians, creatively applying the theory of Marxism-Leninism and armed with a mighty ideological weapon in their struggle for the complete removal of bourgeois-nationalist and cosmopolitan conceptions, directed their efforts to creating a truly scientific history of the Ukrainian people (p. 7).

The whole volume contains no reference to sources, although chronicles, archival documents, testimonies of contemporaries, statistical data, etc., are quoted in it. Not even the appendices contain a bibliographical list of sources.

This enables, for instance, K. I. Stetsyuk to consider the so-called "Letter of the Zaporizhya Cossacks to the Sultan" a historical document (p. 292), though it is actually a literary pamphlet and not even of Ukrainian origin; it gives I. Kompaniytsev the chance to distort Clausewitz's well-known definition of war and to ascribe it to the classics of Marxism-Leninism (p. 754).

Also, this book contains no reference to any specialist literature, neither in footnotes nor separately in the bibliography. Thus, I. Shovkoplyas polemizes with Academician N. Marr without quoting him or referring to his work (p. 24), and I. D. Boyko argues with "Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist historians," also without mentioning any names or referring to any of their works (pp. 270, 279).

Even in the rare cases when a Marxist author argues with a historian whom he mentions by name, he fails to specify the work containing the supposedly erroneous statements contested by the Marxist. This is how K. H. Huslysty treats Academician Hrushevskyi:

This inveterate enemy of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, the bourgeois nationalist M. Hrushevskyi, denied, in contradiction to historical truth, that Kiev Rus was the common cradle of the Great-Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples. (p. 86).

Again he writes, without any reference to specific literature:

The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist historians (V. Antonovych, M. Hrushevskiy, and others) falsified the historical facts, by stating that the Russian and Ukrainian people differ radically in their origin, character, history and culture; and the nationalist linguist S. Smal-Stotskiy tried to prove that the Russian and Ukrainian peoples are not related even linguistically. (p. 142).

I. D. Boyko employs the same method: "Most grossly falsified were the issues concerned with B. Khmelnytskyi's war of liberation."

F. O. Yastrebov, attacking V. Antonovych, claims:

The most inveterate Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists of the Kiev Hromada were headed by the historian V. Antonovych. He maintained monarchical positions and was a bitter enemy of the revolution. Betraying the vital concerns of the Ukrainian people, he considered it necessary to separate the Eastern Ukraine from Russia. (p. 510).

Against Hrushevskiy he writes: "All of this refutes and crushes the mendacious theory of the non-bourgeois nature of the Ukrainian nation, which was put forward by the nationalist M. Hrushevskiy and his 'school' (p. 511)."

This polemical ardor, unsubstantiated by any references, causes the authors to state in the final part of the book that: "the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists of all shades have always been the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people" (p. 683); that V. Vynnychenko and S. V. Petlura were "truculent enemies of the Ukrainian people and political adventurers" (p. 685); that Romanchuk, K. Levytskyi and M. Hrushevskiy are "traitors to the Ukrainian people" (p. 706); and that "Hrushevsky's followers and pupils mentioned before: V. Lypynskiy, S. Tomashivskiy and D. Doroshenko have in their unpleasant writings constantly sung hymns to the evil deeds of foreign imperialist invaders" (724).

The author of these scholarly "comments," O. F. Yermolenko, summing up his evaluation of the works of Ukrainian bourgeois historian — O. Y. Yefimenko, D. I. Bahaliy, D. I. Vavornitskiy, M. Vladymyrskiy-Budaniv and V. Ikonnykiy, states:

The investigations made by the bourgeois historians, were far from genuinely scholarly, because they were based on idealistic foundations and on defective and perverse bourgeois methodology. (p. 723).

Having acquired the habit of not corroborating their statements by facts, the Marxist authors state whatever is convenient for them as, for instance, that: "bourgeois historians have reduced the history of ancient Rus to the deeds of the princes, the activities of individual prominent representatives of the ruling class of feudal lords, neglecting the rôle of the people and the history of the toiling masses" (p. 85; — K. H. Huslysty). The works of Kostomarov, Serhiyevych and Hrushevskiy, are completely ignored. Again: "The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists falsifying the whole historical process in their interpretation of Ukrainian history of the XIV, XV and XVI centuries as well as of other periods, put national relations in the forefront and do not mention at all the class fight of the Ukrainian peasants against the Ukrainian feudal lords." (p. 137). Huslysty has completely ignored the voluminous literature on the situation and struggle of the peasants during the Lithuanian as well as Cossack Hetman period in the Ukraine.

Thus, students and readers in the USSR, who have no access to the works of these "nationalist" and "bourgeois historians (which have been either completely removed from or hidden in the secret sections of the libraries), are deprived of all possibility to verify the statements in this "History of the Ukrainian SSR".

The presence of exact quotations from, and references to Lenin, Stalin and other Soviet leaders proves that the authors are well acquainted with the technique of scholarly writing, and that they know how to employ it. This means that they prefer to ignore it on purpose when dealing with the so-called "bourgeois" historians. There is no doubt that, when writing down the first ten sections of the book, they made wide use of the works of these "bourgeois historians," borrowing especially from Hrushevskiy's "History of the Ukraine-Rus". If, doing so, they had made due reference to the literature which they had utilized the reader would have gained a much more accurate idea of these "bourgeois historians," but this would not be, of course, at all desirable for the authors of the book and for their Party.

The authors' deference to the so-called classics of Marxism-Leninism exceeds the limits of respect of scholarly circles for scholarly leading figures. For Huslysty, Lenin did not simply write, but "showed that feudal oppression existed in Russ already in the IX century" (p. 48). For Shovkopoyas, Stalin — who knew almost nothing about archeology — "gave an exceedingly complete and clear-cut definition" of the primitive community order (*obshchynnyi lad*) (p. 17). Huslysty refers to Karl Marx as if he were an expert on the period of the Grand-Duke Wolodymyr. (p. 57). Maksim Gorki is for him an unquestionable authority in the field of research on the origin of the literature of the grand-ducal era.

Karl Marx is also for Huslysty a great authority on the history of Moldavia in the XIV century (p. 110) just as he is a great expert on the East (p. 146). To prove the leading role of Moscow in matters of progress, Huslysty relies on Marx and Engels (without quotations) and especially on Stalin's speech of September 7, 1947, on the occasion of Moscow's 800th anniversary (p. 149).

Yastrebov goes to extremes in this reverence for Party authorities: His characterization in the "History of the Ukrainian SSR" of the Soviet Ukrainian leaders is absolute adulation (pp. 523—525); so is his approach to Stalin (pp. 526—527) whose only contact with the Ukraine was during its subjugation in 1919. "Leninism is the supreme achievement of Russian and of universal culture" (p. 538): "The highest achievement of Russian and universal culture is Marxism-Leninism" (p. 560), writes Yastrebov. Yermolenko seconds him: "Leninism is the supreme achievement of Russian and universal culture," "Leninism is the apex of human thought; it is a gigantic, powerful force, which enriches and transforms society;" Lenin is the "defender of the national rights and cultural of the Ukrainian people" (p. 720); he is a "great leader in the Russian and the rest of world of learning" (p. 722).

It is quite understandable that, considering this obsequiousness before the Bolsheviks the exposition of the history of the Ukraine relies on utterances established once and for all as infallible and immutable.

Bohusevych states that the slaves of the Roman Empire, "escaped in great numbers and went to Slavic lands where there was no slavery" (p. 39). The Marxist author needed this statement badly to defend the much-quoted thesis of Soviet Marxists that the Ukraine never knew a period of slavery at

any time in its history. But a few pages later, the author of the next section, Huslysty, tells how the Eastern Slavs traded and exported, slaves during the formation of the feudal system (p. 42). Further (p. 46) Huslysty states that, with the Eastern Slavs, slavery did not develop into a slave-holding system. All these statements are, of course, mere empty words employed to support Party doctrine.

Just as vague are this Marxist author's ideas about the Khazars. Huslysty speaks about the "steppe hordes" of the Khazars (pp. 44, 48), but at the same time he writes about their big manufacturing and trading town Itil (p. 44). Huslysty even dares to state that: "Literature originated among the Eastern Slavs along with the formation of classes" (p. 77). Huslysty conceived this idea after chancing in Stalin's "Marxism and the Problem of Linguistics" (p. 25) upon the mundane phrases: "The further development of production, the emergence of classes, the emergence of literature and the origin of the state." Thus, since Stalin wrote "the emergence of literature" after "the emergence of the classes," the latter is interpreted as the cause, the former the effect: Quotations of this kind are innumerable in this work.

Employing such methods, the process of preparing such a work is as follows: 1) a team of authors is established in conformity with the directives of the agitation and propaganda section of the Central Committee. This team works very closely together and takes collective responsibility for opinions expressed, thus protecting itself against "criticism and self-criticism" — inevitably on the basis of Marxism-Leninism; 2) all, suitable quotations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism are used exhaustively, and a plan of the historical process is set up on this basis; 3) the generally known historical facts are fitted into this scheme; 4) the verbal canvas of the work is embroidered with epithets adulating the Soviet leaders and attacking all who have never sympathized with the Bolsheviks.

The text is supported by portraits of the leaders, photostats of certain documents, and a great many "doctored" snapshots, from the lives of the leaders and the Party. There is, for instance, M. Gorki reading Taras Shevchenko's works, or workers reading *Pravda*, or a diagram of the organizations of the RSDRP (Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party). Yet no prominent figures from Ukrainian history or the Ukrainian liberation struggle can be found; there is no mention of Konashevych-Sahaydachnyi, Vyhovskyi, Mazepa, Poletyka, Ryepnin, Hrushevskyi, Yefremov or Antonovych.

The Historical Conception of the "History of the Ukrainian SSR"

This "History of the Ukrainian SSR" was conceived and elaborated according to a scheme, unique in Ukrainian historiography. Its main feature consists not in adapting the history of the Ukraine to the Marxist so-called socio-historical formations — the pristine communal order, slave-holding, feudalism, capitalism or socialism, but in adapting the whole history of the Ukraine to that of Russia. No doubt, this was the "social command" the Party and government issued to this team of Marxist authors.

"The History of the Ukrainian SSR," vol. I, is divided into 15 chapters: 1) primitive communal order and the origins of class society (pp. 9—39); 2) The

emergence and development of feudal relations among the eastern Slavs. The ancient Rus state (pp. 40—87); 3) The period of the feudal division of Rus into smaller parts (XII—XIV centuries) (pp. 88—114); 4) The development of feudal serfdom conditions and the struggle of the masses against national and social oppression in the XV and XVI centuries; the shaping of Ukrainian nationality (pp. 115—177); 5) The strengthening of the serfdom system and of national oppression in the Ukraine in the first half of the XVII century; the peasant-Cossack uprisings in the 1620's and 1630's (pp. 178—209); 6) The liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people (1648—1654). The reunification of the Ukraine with Russia (pp. 210—263); 7) The socio-economic development and political situation of the Ukraine after reunification with Russia (second half of the XVII century) (pp. 264—306); 8) The intensification of feudal serfdom pressure in the Ukraine at the end of the XVII and first half of the XVIII century (pp. 307—342); 9) Feudal serfdom conditions in the second half of the XVIII century and the origins of capitalism in the Ukraine (pp. 343—383); 10) Corruption and crisis of the feudal serfdom system. Development of capitalist conditions in the Ukraine (late XVIII and first half of XIX century) (pp. 384—461); 11) Development of industrial capitalism. Initiation of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in the Ukraine (second half of the XIX century) (pp. 462—565); 12) The revolution of 1905—1907 in the Ukraine (pp. 566—623); 13) The Ukraine during the period of the Stolypin reaction (1908—1912) (pp. 624—651); 14) The Ukraine during the period of a new revolutionary upsurge (1912—1914) (pp. 652—741); 15) The Ukraine during the imperialist world war and the second Russian revolution (pp. 742—780).

This chronological outline makes it obvious that the authors have divided the history of the Ukraine into the following periods: until the VI century A. D. there existed the primitive communal order; feudalism lasted from the VI century until the end of the XVIII century, when capitalism originated in the Ukraine; no slave-owning order existed in the Ukraine according to the authors; Yet the short period of industrial capitalism was during the second half of the XIX century while at the beginning of the XX century, the still shorter "imperialistic stage of the development of capitalism" began. Only 30 pages of the work are devoted to the period of the primary communal order; 345 pages to the feudalistic era, and as many as 397 pages to the period of capitalism.

An important feature of this work, is the process of adapting Ukrainian history to the general history of Russia. In grand-ducal times the "ancient Rus state" existed; chapter II; (pp. 2,7) or "Ancient Rus" (II; 4, 5, 6, III; 1) (the "Ruthenian duchies" (III; 2, 3, 5) and the "Ruthenian people" (III; 3). As to the terms "Ukraine," which was already known in those times, and "Ukrainian people" — they are avoided consistently because the Marxist authors, imitating the scheme M. Pogodin set up in the XIX century, delay the "formation of Ukrainian nationality" (IV; 3) to a period as late as the XV—XVI centuries. The entire era prior to that is treated as an all-Ruthenian period, in which the Ukrainians and Belorussians had not yet separated from the all-Ruthenian family. But from the moment of the "emergence of Ukrainian nationality," the leading position of the Russians with regard to the Ukrainians is confirmed in a different form — from the point of view of the state, a fact which can be seen from the following titles: "Formation of the Russian centralized state and its significance in the history of the Ukrainian people" (IV; 5); the "Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia and its historical significance"

(VI; 5); the "Common struggle of the Ukrainian and the Russian people against feudal serfdom oppression" (VII; 5); "The Battle of Poltava and its historical significance" (VIII; 4); "Reforms in the Russian Empire in the early XVIII century and their significance for the Ukraine" (VIII; 5). Beginning from the sub-chapter "The Dnieper left bank Ukraine and Slobodskaya area of the Ukraine in the Complex of the Russian Empire during the Second Half of the XIX Century" (IX; 1), the task of merging Ukrainian with Russian history becomes an easy matter for Soviet historians because part of the Ukraine was at that time already administratively unified with Russia; after "liberating" the Dnieper left bank of the Ukraine, merely the rest of the Ukraine remained to be "liberated" and united. This is, in fact, described in the chapter "liberation" of the Dnieper Right Bank of the Ukraine from the Rule of the Polish Gentry" (IX; 4), especially since at the same time the "Occupation of the West Ukrainian Lands by Austria" is described (IX; 5). Then comes: "The Liberation of the Black Sea Coast" (IX; 5), followed by: "The Ukrainian Lands under the Yoke of the Austrian Monarchy" (X; 7). Beginning at the end of the XIX century, the history of the Ukraine was turning into a history of the Social-Democratic Party, especially of its Bolshevik faction in the Russian Empire with additional explanatory illustrations from Ukrainian history. There is no further mention about any separateness of the Ukrainian historical process. The political manifestations of the Ukrainian liberation movement are ignored completely; and if they are mentioned, then it is only in an abusive way.

Thus, the thesis of Russo-Ukrainian historical unity is being applied by various means: for the primary period — by the thesis of ethnic unity and the lack of differentiation between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples; for the period of feudalism — by the hypothesis on the Ukrainian people's eternal aspiration toward a reunification with the Russian people and, particularly, with the Russian centralized state; and for the capitalist era — by the Russian Bolsheviks monopolizing the whole process of the revolutionary struggle against the tsarist system, thus trying to create the impression that the Bolsheviks alone had been the leaders of political life in the Ukraine.

The "Tribe-Nationality-Nation" Theory

Delaying the period of formation of the Western Slavic peoples (all three of them simultaneously) to the XIV—XV centuries (p. 137), which was necessary to destroy the idea of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples having existed already before the Russian people — the Marxist theorist Huslystyj uses the concept "nationality", placing it between "tribe" and "nation" and giving it a special Communist connotation, though this term was used by Kostomarov already in the middle of the XIX century.

Huslystyj writes: "Bourgeois historians did not see any essential difference between tribe, nationality, and nation, which are historical categories appertaining to concrete socio-economic formations" (p. 142). In the primitive period there had to be, in his opinion, the tribe; under the feudal system — the nationality; and only under capitalism did the nation emerge i. e., only in the second half of the XIX century. And since the Ukrainian people had manifested itself rather unequivocally and independently already in earlier centuries, the author uses for these manifestations the concept of "nationality".

This Bolshevik conception about the origin of the Ukrainians (chapter IV; 3) includes the follow theses:

"As class society developed, the kindred Eastern Slavic tribes began to fuse into one East-Slavic Ruthenian nationality (i. e. people). The ethnic name of *Rus* is of a very ancient local origin; with its roots it reaches back to the epoch of the pristine communal order. In the course of time, the term "*Rus*" became the common ethnical designation of all eastern Slavs" (p. 41; Huslysty). It follows that the designation *Rus* was not their common name from the beginning. Just whose national name it was, Huslysty ignores.

"The East-Slavic tribes spoke languages and dialects which were closely related to each other; from these languages and dialects developed the sole language of the old-Ruthenian nationality" (p. 41). Elsewhere Huslystyl declares still more positively: "Gradually, the tribes of the Eastern Slavs formed a sole, old-Ruthenian nationality with one sole language, a common culture and common territory. This nationality was the common ancestor of the East-Slavic brother nations of the Russians (i. e. Great Russians) Ukrainians, and Belorussians" (p. 49); "The one and only old-Ruthenian state". (p. 77). "The traditions of ancient *Rus*... constituted an immense contribution to the history of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples, which were formed at a later time" (p. 84). "Kiev *Rus* with its culture was an all-Ruthenian creation; it was the beginning of the all-Ruthenian historical and cultural process, the common cradle of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian brother nations, which were formed later" (p. 86). "Also in the feudal period, approximately in the XIV—XV centuries the East Slavs constituted still essentially one sole old-Ruthenian nationality" (p. 90).

Thus, Huslysty's and indeed this whole book's conception is quite clear: the Ukrainian people did not, and could not, exist earlier than the Russian people. That this conception does not coincide with the truth can be seen from the fact that K. Huslysty himself sometimes errs: "The increase in feudal disintegration in the XI and XII centuries impeded the process of ethnic consolidation of the old-Ruthenian nationality." (p. 87). Does not this mean that some ethnic units already existed which were in the process of consolidation? Were they tribes, or nationalities, or peoples? Huslysty gives no reply to this question. However, it is not the names that matter, but the existence of what K. Huslysty prefers to ignore. He puts his own interpretation on the wars between the Russian North and the Ukrainian South: "The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, in their hostility toward the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, tried to oppose and separate the history of the south-western and the north-eastern Ruthenian lands. Falsifying history, they assert that the conflict between Duke Andrey Bogolyubskiy of Vladimir-Suzkal and the Duke of Kiev, Mstyslav Izyaslavovych revealed divergencies between the Ukrainians and Russians. Actually, this conflict was a feudal war between dukes belonging to the same old Ruthenian nationality" (pp. 91—92).

Closely adhering to the historical time decreed by the Party to be considered the period of the formation of the three brother nationalities from the old-Ruthenian nationality, Huslysty once more reiterates his thesis according to which, "approximately until the XIV—XV century... the old-Ruthenian nationality essentially still existed intact." (p. 115). Thus, Huslysty admits the possibility that, within the same feudal system, one nationality has for some reasons turned into three nationalities. Huslysty tries to

explain this phenomenon by a development which he does not elucidate: "The process of the formation of the East-Slavic nationalities was especially intense around the XIV—XV centuries and was basically caused by the socio-economic development of the Eastern Slavic lands". (p. 116). What "development" was that? A change of the historical system? If so, according to Marxist historians, the feudal formation turned into a capitalist one only in the second half of the XIX century. If in the XIV—XV centuries the same feudal formations still existed why, then, should the single old-Ruthenian nationality split into as many as three separate nationalities? Even here, Huslystyj avoids using the term "people," because Party doctrine forbids him to apply this term to a period earlier than the XIX century.

The only thing, K. Huslystyj established firmly is the main territory of the new Russian nationality: "It was of great importance for the development of Moscow that it be situated within the territory where the process of shaping the Russian nationality was taking place" (p. 117). For Huslystyj this was necessarily so, because Moscow is the center of the RSFSR. The much earlier existence, long before Moscow of a highly developed center of the Russian people, i. e., Novgorod, is completely eliminated by Huslystyj; In the same way he ignores the fact that the Russian Empire only originated under Peter I and had its center in St. Petersburg, and that prior to that, all who lived on Russian territory were simply *Russkie* or "Muscovites".

Expounding the process of the emergence of Ukrainian nationality (IV; 3), K. Huslystyj proposes another thesis: "From the very beginning of the emergence of these nationalities, the strongest of them, i. e., the Russian, began to play the leading historical part among them" (p. 137). This thesis was absolutely necessary for the explanation of further acts of reunification. But how did this "strongest nationality" establish itself as such? K. Huslystyj gives an intentionally obscure explanation:

The Russian nationality came into existence through the fusion of the population of the North-Eastern Ruthenian lands into a compact ethnic unity; the Ukrainian nationality through the fusion of the population of the south-western lands, and the Belorussian through the fusion of the population of the western territories. (pp. 137—138).

In this primitive fashion the author fails to mention the substratum of Great-Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples. To explain the reunification which ultimately came about, K. Huslystyj sets forth yet another thesis: "The formation of the Russian 'nationality' took place more intensely than did the formation of the Ukrainian and the Belorussian nationalities which were being oppressed by alien invaders" (p. 138). Thus, the Tatar yoke which weighed on Muscovy throughout two centuries, is ignored completely as well as the freedom of the Ukrainians and their cultural superiority in the Lithuanian grand-duchy.

This is followed by the third thesis which has frequently appeared recently in the Soviet press: "The Ukrainian nationality has always been supported by the Great Russian people" (p. 138). Note that the author promotes the Russians very soon to the rank of "people," at the same time leaving the Ukrainians still in the lower rank of "nationality." There is no point in requiring Huslystyj to define these two concepts more precisely, his following explanation being a typical example of deliberate Party ambiguity: "A nationality is formed on a certain territory. A nationality, as well as a nation develops only

as the result of durable relations of people living together for generations. A permanent life together is moreover impossible without a common territory" (p. 138). This explanation tends rather to prove that "nationality" and "people" are synonymous rather than to reveal any difference between them, a difference on which K. Huslystyj insists, but which is actually nonexistent.

However K. Huslystyj has to prove that the Ukrainians were not yet a "people". For this purpose, he adduces linguistic arguments for the existence of a Ukrainian language; yet at the same time he reduces their validity adding that this means that "some distinguishing features of the future Ukrainian language were beginning to emerge" (p. 139). Huslystyj made this statement according to Party doctrine which states: if there is a separate language, there is a separate nation. Yet there can be no Ukrainian people before the XIX century. Therefore, in the period of feudalism, only "some aspects of the future Ukrainian language could exist." K. Huslystyj's statements are very consistent, but they do not correspond to the historical facts. And he himself admits that: "Since the XIV century there are documents which, as a whole, already bear a clearly marked Ukrainian (linguistic) character." (p. 139).

Huslystyj tries to remove contradictions between the facts and Party dogma by hazy verbal constructions: first, he speaks about the distinguishing features of the Ukrainians, and then consolidates what he has said by reiterating the iron thesis about the community of the Ukrainians and Russians. For instance, concerning language:

The Ukrainian language developed and perfected itself according to the internal laws of its own development. For a long time — even after it was shaped — it bore the name of Ruthenian, which is one more testimony to the consciousness of the common origin of the Ukrainian language and the Great-Russian and Belorussian languages (p. 140).

As regards culture, Huslystyj comments:

The Ukrainian people has created its own original culture, which bears the stamp of the exceedingly rich cultural inheritance and the traditions of ancient Rus. This culture established itself and developed constantly by close cooperation with the Russian and Belorussian fraternal nationalities (p. 140).

There is even a word about common psychological traits:

Already at that time such character features of the Ukrainian people appeared as industriousness, courage, hatred of all kinds of oppressors, sharp humor, poetical disposition, and love of music. All of these linked the Ukrainian and the Russian people. (p. 140).

Huslystyj concludes that:

It must be stressed that, although certain distinguishing features developed characterizing each of the three nationalities, those traits which connected and linked the Russian, Ukrainians and Belorussians did not disappear. (p. 140).

By purely verbal "dialectics," without adducing any arguments for proof, Huslystyj confronts the reader with the Party thesis, which claims that the Ukrainian nationality, while shaping itself, concurrently alienated itself and drew nearer to the Russians.

The Theory about the Ukraine as a Borderland of Russia.

Since, in Huslysty's opinion, the Ukrainians were not a nation until the second half of the XIX century, this "non-national" nationality was also without a state. In the sub-chapter "Emergence of the Centralized State and Its Significance in the History of the Ukrainian People" (IV; 5), Huslysty categorically rejects the idea of the Ukraine having been a (sovereign) state at the period of the grand-dukes: "The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists with their unscholarly reactionary 'theory' about Kiev Rus having, allegedly, been a Ukrainian state, deny that the Russian centralized state was the heir of Kiev Rus and represent the unifying policy of the Russian centralized state as regards Ukrainian and Belorussian territory as identical to the aggressive policy of other states" (p. 149).

On the basis of ideas expounded by K. Kuslysty, I. Boyko and V. Dyadychenko, Yastrebov reveals himself, in chapter X about the end of the XVIII and first half of the XIX century, and in chapter XI about the second half of the XIX century, as a Ukrainian-hater for whom the Ukraine is only a geographical concept and for whom a Ukrainian people and state "have never existed, do not exist, and cannot exist." F. Yastrebov's frankness, if compared with that of the other authors of the book, is remarkable. He believed that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists "holding Shevchenko in contempt, depicted him as the bearer of Ukrainian all-national interests, which, actually never existed and could not exist — neither in feudal times, nor during the period of capitalism" (p. 455). It is quite natural that for him as well as for Huslysty, the view expressed in *Istoriya Rusiv* according to which "*Kiev Rus is the Ukraine*," is a "nationalist idea" (p. 469). "The Ukrainian, Belorussian, Georgian (!) and other bourgeois nations formed themselves" only in the XIX century and this was carried out "in close connection with the Russian bourgeois nation" (p. 399).

Yastrebov considers the Ukraine a part of Russia (p. 397). F. Loś uses Yastrebov's terminology writing for example about: "To the Ukraine, as well as to other regions of Russia." (p. 616). Also the group of the authors of chapter XIV consider the Ukraine as a part of Russia: "Historically, the economy of the Ukraine established itself as a part of the economy of Russia" (p. 655).

Yastrebov describes the Ukrainian nations as emerging as late as during the era of capitalism. "Simultaneously with the beginning of the rule of capitalism in Russia, the process of the formation of bourgeois nations was completed. As follows from V. Stalin's teaching, the bourgeois nations in Russia appeared after the reform of 1861, in the second half of the XIX century. This was because the abolition of serfdom and the emergence of capitalism took place at the same time in the central regions of Russia as well as in the borderland — the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Georgia, etc., — since, as a whole, in Russia capitalism, and the development of bourgeois nations developed concurrently and through one process. The Ukrainian bourgeois nations within the complex of Russia existed until the great Socialist October Revolution and were liquidated (?) after the latter's victory. In their place emerged new, socialist nations" (p. 505).

In recent times, the Ukraine has been ruled by the Ukrainian proletariats — so the Soviets say. "The labor movement in the Ukraine developed

as an inseparable constituent of the universal-Russian labor movement," F. Yastrebov asserts (p. 512): "The struggle against the tsarist regime and the capitalists tightened the ties of friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian workers still closer," say the authors of chapter XIV more leniently (p. 663). But then they declare finally and categorically: "The Ukrainian socialist culture has been developed by the proletariats of the Ukraine, who were an integral part of the Russian working class" (p. 717).

This makes it evident that the concept of "socialist Ukrainian nation" as understood by Marxist authors means something that does not in the least resemble a nation in the common sense of the word.

The Theory of Aspiration toward "Reunification"

In order to support the thesis of Russia not having "grasped" the territory of the Ukraine as did Poland (pp. 156, 178, 180, 210—213, 373), Turkey (pp. 190, 254, 416, 442) or Austria (p. 365) but only "reunified" them, it was necessary to substantiate it with the argument about the Ukrainian people themselves desiring to be "reunited" with Russia. They had to wish for this "reunification" because "to join Russia was profitable for the progress of the non-Russian peoples. The higher level of the economy and culture of the Russian people exerted a favorable influence on the economy and culture of these peoples" (p. 152 — K. Huslysty). This wish is interpreted as follows: "The utter defeat of the Polish interventionists by the Russian people in 1612 was of immense significance for the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the rule of gentry-dominated Poland. From that time, the Ukrainian people place their hopes in the possibility of overthrowing the yoke of gentry-ruled Poland with the assistance of the fraternal Russian people" (p. 185 — I. Boyko). B. Khmelnytskyi allegedly "yearned to reunite the Ukraine with Russia" even during the uprisings of the 1630's (p. 219 — I. Boyko). Therefore, having initiated an insurrection and won victory in the late spring of 1648, B. Khmelnytskyi: "Used the respite thus achieved in the first place to establish contact with the Russian government and to get military and material aid from it." (p. 225 — I. Boyko). "The only country that took an interest in the liberation of the Ukrainian people was the Russian state whose masses sympathized deeply with the sufferings of their oppressed brothers, the Ukrainians"¹ (p. 225 — I. Boyko). B. Khmelnytskyi's polite phrase in his letter of June 8, 1648, saying: "We should like a lord, an autocratic lord such as Your Tsarist Majesty," is considered by the authors as evidence for Khmelnytskyi's request to include the Ukraine into the complex of the Russian state (pp. 226—227). Wanting to present Khmelnytskyi's Pereyaslav treaty as the realization of the entire people's wish, I. Boyko stressed: "The broad peasant masses of the Ukraine saw in a reunification with Russia a way toward an easing of conditions" etc. (p. 156); "For centuries, the Ukrainian people yearned to be united with the Russian people whom it always considered its elder

¹ The authors ignore the fact that the Ukrainian peasantry was at that time free, while in Muscovy it was completely deprived of any rights. The Cossacks — it must be remembered — fought for the privileges of the gentry. Also, the authors fail to mention that it was the Russian state which initiated the division of the Ukrainian lands between Poland, Austria and Russia.

brothers, reliable protector and faithful ally" (p. 258). This was why Khmelnytskyi was "decisive and insistent in his efforts to obtain the Russian government's agreement for a reunification of the Ukraine with Russia." (p. 244). Boyko quite categorically denies that Khmelnytskyi intended to break with Moscow as well as sign an agreement with Sweden: "Khmelnytskyi who fought all his life to strengthen the bonds between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, never deviated from the planned course" (p. 268). Thus, Khmelnytskyi's subjection to the Turkish sultan — which Kostomarov already knew about — did not at all enter the Marxist historian's field of vision, because it did not in the least fit into his scheme (pp. 236, 242), according to which Khmelnytskyi was always "skilful in conducting diplomatic negotiations."

Since the Marxist authors do not consider the Russian incursion into the Ukraine in the XVII and XVIII centuries as a foreign invasion, it is in keeping with their general line when they comment that: "Belonging within the complex of the Russian state, the territory of the Ukraine was better protected against incessant foreign incursions." (p. 314 V. A. Dyadychenko). Apparently it was not by Peter the Great's orders that the Ukraine's connections with Western Europe were forcibly disrupted and she was tied to Russia. "Having joined the complex of the Russian state, the Ukraine considerably tightened her economic ties with the central regions of Russia," (p. 315). "The increasingly close economic ties between the Ukrainian lands and the central regions of Russia played an important role concerning the progress of Ukrainian economic development." (p. 348). This "progress" is the psychological justification of the unnatural theory about the Ukrainian people wishing to fall into the slavery of "reunification".

This theory of self-enslavement is further expanded to include West Ukrainians; — cautiously at first and via mediation of the Dnieper lands: in the XVII century: "Most of the Ukrainian lands were united within the complex of the Russian state, and to these lands gravitated, in keeping with their historical development, also the Western Ukrainian territories which had remained under foreign domination" (p. 349 — V. A. Dyadychenko). In 1793, "the population of the Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine welcomed the Russian troops joyfully as its liberators and assisted them in every respect" (p. 367).

For Yastrebov there is no doubt as to the "yearning for reunification" of the Galician Ukrainians also: "The broad masses of the Ukrainian population of the Western Ukraine who yearned to make true their age-old dream, i. e., to be reunified with the Ukraine belonging within the complex of Russia, now liberated from tsarist oppression." (p. 537). Quite naturally in 1914: "The Ukrainian working masses of Galicia, Bukovina and the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine were joyfully looking forward to the arrival of the Russian troops and welcomed them warmly in the hope that they would liberate them from Austro-German oppression" (p. 750). The facts refuted this thesis: "The tsarist authorities established in Galicia and Bukovina, which had been occupied during military operations, administrative bodies composed of diehard reactionary elements: Count Bobrynskiy, Yevreinov and others who oppressed the local population just as the tsarist system oppressed the peoples of Russia" (p. 761). It is difficult to understand how this statement can be fitted into the thesis about a "yearning for reunification." On the other hand, neither the mass arrests and executions of workers — to which the Austrian imperialists resorted during the war — nor the undermining activities of the Ukra-

inian bourgeois nationalists and the Uniate Church were able to kill the sympathies of the Ukrainian population of the West Ukrainian lands for the Russian people nor the Ukrainian people's yearning for reunification" (pp. 762—763). This is how the thesis is being defended, even in the face of facts which prove the opposite.

To symbolize the longevity of these imaginary sympathies, a "monument on the burial place of Yuriy Dolgorukiy," who "used the consolidation of the Rostov-Suzdal principality to seize Kiev," was erected after the war in the Savior Church on Berestov in Kiev (p. 75). The book reproduces a photograph of this monument representing a marble tombstone with the following interesting inscription: "Erected in commemoration of the 800th anniversary of the city of Moscow by the workers of Kiev on September 7, 1947." (p. 76).

Marxist historians feel that the Georgians also aspired toward reunification with Russia.

The liberation of the Black Sea coast from Turko-Tartar domination played an important and favorable part in the history of the Georgian people. For centuries, Georgia was in danger of being engulfed by Turkey or Persia. Her voluntary entering into the framework of the mighty Russian state saved Georgia from being subjugated by aggressive countries and, at the same time, considerably promoted the development of economic and cultural relations between the Georgian people and the fraternal Russian people. (pp. 372—373).

Yet not only Georgia, Azerbaidzhan too apparently yearned to join Russia. "At the beginning of the XIX century, Georgia and Azerbaidzhan joined Russia. This was a blow at the grasping policy of Turkey and Persia" (p. 401 — Yastrebov).

The Theory of Russian Superiority

It would seem that not only the Ukrainians but all nations and countries of Europe are, and have been, inferior to the Russians and to Russia: "Owing to the high development of craftsmanship, the towns of old Rus were in better order, better planned and organized than those of Western Europe," writes Huslysty (p. 67), having quite forgotten all about Rome and other cities in Italy and France. Again Huslysty comments: "No European or Asian state played such a big part in international life as did old Rus (p. 85).

Concerning the incorporation of the khanates of Kazań and Astrakhan in Muscovy in the XVI century, Huslysty reflects that:

The unification with Russia was of significance for the progress of the non-Russian peoples. The higher development of the economy and culture of the Russian people exerted a favorable influence on the economy and culture of these peoples. Between the Russian and non-Russian peoples various economic and cultural ties developed which created the prerequisites for a political association in the struggle against the common exploiters, against the tsarist regime, which oppressed all peoples belonging to the complex of the Russian state (p. 152).

In other words: the non-Russian peoples, profited from the circumstance that, having fallen under the domination of the Muscovite tsars, they had to struggle against them!

The superiority of Russian culture in the XIV—XVI centuries is founded by Huslysty on his own statements such as: "As the chronicler testified, the distinguished Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belorussian state" (p. 171). This is a wholly phantastic theory implying that Western Europe borrowed education from Eastern Europe. As evidence, a citation is adduced from Belinsky: "Having fused for all times with her next-of-kin, Russia, Little Russia opened her doors to civilization, education, art and science." (p. 261).

Yastrebov considers that: "Beginning with Pushkin, Russian literature has occupied — owing to its high ideals and artistic qualities — the first place in the world" (p. 449). "Russian literature, the fine arts and sciences can boast of a series of great writers, artists and scholars who by right have occupied the leading position in universal culture" (p. 461). This is, seemingly, refuted by Loś who writes that even at the beginning of the XX century: "Russia remained backward in comparison with Western Europe" (p. 639).

Even Yastrebov made an involuntary slip of tongue about the "backwardness of Russian life" (p. 467), for which he blamed the abstract tsarist system: "Tsarism kowtowed before reactionary West European culture, by all means tried to implant it in Russia, and renounced the universal significance of progressive Russian culture" (p. 538).

The Theory of the Superiority of the Eastern Ukraine over Western Ukraine

If Eastern Europe is superior to Western Europe, then, naturally, the East Ukrainian lands must be more highly developed than the Western ones. This item was, of course, exploited by the Marxist authors. They needed it to combat the viewpoint of Galicia having been the Ukrainian "Piemont" in the XIX and XX centuries. (p. 704). Therefore, they reiterate their statement about the backwardness of the West Ukrainian lands in the XVI—XVII centuries. "The cultural level of these (the Western) parts of the Ukraine was far below that of the Ukrainian territories which belonged to the Russian state" (p. 366), writes V. Dyadychenko about Galicia, Bukovina and Trans-Carpathia of the XVIII century. Even during the early part of the XX century: "Austria-Hungary as a whole and the West Ukrainian lands in particular, lagged far behind Russia as to the pace of the development of industry and the latter's concentration" (p. 694).

Theory of the Superiority of a Centralized State

Important for the theory of the superiority of Russia is the theory of the superiority of a centralized state. A directive by Stalin serves as the foundation of this theory. This is how Huslysty presents this conception: In the XV century, "Centralized states began to form in Western as well as Eastern Europe. Yet there was an essential difference: the former were national, the latter multinational. The process of establishing centralized states in Eastern Europe was accelerated by the necessity to combat the inroad by Mongols, Turks and other Eastern peoples. Explaining the conditions under which multinational states emerged in Eastern Europe, Stalin pointed out:

The development of capitalism had not yet begun in these countries; possibly, it was only germinating then while the need to resist invasions by Turks, Mongols and other Eastern peoples called for an immediate establishment of centralized states able to withold invasions. Since in Eastern Europe the process of establishing centralized states went faster than that of nations, mixed states developed composed of several peoples, which were not yet formed into nations, but were already united in one common state (Stalin, vol. 5, p. 34)) (p. 117).

Of course, this theory of Stalin's in no way corresponds to the facts — the multinational Roman empire, the empires of Charlemagne and Karl V, the Austro-Hungarian empire, all in the West; and on the other hand, the almost mononational khanates of Kazań and Astrakhan in the East, as well as the centralized Muscovite realm up to the XVI century, i. e., up to a time when there was no danger any more of Turks, Mongols and other Eastern peoples invading Moscow.

The Theory of Oppression and Liberation

Contemporary Soviet political theory asserts as a universal dogma that, before the October Revolution of 1917, constant oppression reigned and that afterwards came liberation: economic, social, national and cultural, in other words — total liberation. The leading part in this process is supposed to have been played by the Russian people, especially by the Russian proletariat under the guidance of the Communist Party. This well known Party doctrine is the ideological framework of the entire "History of the Ukrainian SSR."

Although Marxist historians find it hard to merge this theory with the hard facts of medieval history, this leitmotiv appears with ever greater frequency and clarity in their treatment of the Middle Ages. In the time of Grand-Duke Vitold (XIV—XV centuries): "The exploitation and robbing of the masses, i. e., the peasants and poor townspeople, by the grand-ducal government and the feudal lords increased" in Lithuania (p. 118) according to Huslysty. The Genoese colonies on the Black Sea "exploited and robbed the population" in the XIII—XV centuries (p. 126). This exploitation applied to the Muscovite realm, is called "economic progress." "The fundamental reason for the unification of the individual Russian duchies into a single centralized Russian state with Moscow at the head was their economic development" (p. 148). The Turkish empire, however was based on the oppression of the non-Turkish peoples. Its aggressive policy aimed at annexing neighboring lands and at robbing their peoples" (p. 146).

The Cossack peasant uprisings in the XVI and XVII centuries was utilized by Boyko for advertizing the hegemony of the proletariat in revolutions: "The peasantry's antifeudal uprisings at the end of the XVI and first half of the XVII centuries were suppressed. The peasants acted at that time spontaneously and haphazardly: the peasantry could not win without the leadership of the working class" (p. 201). Or still more frankly: "The Ukraine was not able to liberate itself from Polish oppression without assistance from the Russian state" (p. 238). Turkey, on the other hand, "was waiting for a convenient opportunity to annex and subjugate the Ukraine" (p. 254). The uprisings of Pugachev and Razin are explained in a similar manner (p. 534).

The thesis on the singular and exceedingly beneficial role of the working class is climaxed by such remarks as: "In the late XIX century — in Russia, including the Ukraine — the working class began to play a most important part in the class fight and led the peasantry in this fight" (p. 505). Los adds: "The only defenders of the interests and rights of the toilers of the Ukraine were the Bolsheviks" (p. 590). He claims: The peasants fought for national liberation; since the workers were the peasants' leaders, they — the workers — also fought against national oppression. (p. 615).

Quite consistently with this, F. Shevchenko evaluates Austrian and German imperialism in the early XIX century as "predatory" (p. 707), while "the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants of all the peoples of Russia, which was conducted by the Communist Party against autocracy," (p. 712) was a struggle for liberation.

The Theory of Ukrainian Cultural Development as an Integral Part of the Russian Cultural Process.

In accordance with the fundamental doctrine that the development of the Ukrainian people depended on the Russian proletariat and Communist Party, the thesis was forwarded of equal dependence on a historical and cultural level.

Huslysty states that ecclesiastical relations between Kiev and Moscow had existed even before the Middle Ages. This creates the impression that the Kievan state had originated in Muscovy and not vice versa. He writes: "At the beginning of the second half of the XV century, the Orthodox Churches of the Ukraine and Belorussia were separated from Muscovy and established as a separate principality of Kiev. This was in 1458" (p. 146). It must be pointed out here that this author, although he mentions the baptizing of Duchess Olha (p. 55) and Grand-Duke Volodymyr (p. 959) and, by accident, even the Kiev Metropolitan Ilarion of the Church in the Ukraine which took place prior to the "separation" of the Kievan state from Muscovy.

On the culture of the Ukraine in the XIV—XVI centuries, Huslysty states: "The development of pictorial art in the Ukraine reflects the influence exerted on it by the pictorial art of Moscow and Novgorod" (p. 176). He also eliminates the Gothic, Renaissance and Baroque architecture of the Ukraine, and its influence on the North of Eastern Europe.

Boyko discussing the cultural relations of the XVI and XVII centuries in general, comments:

A great influence on the development of Ukrainian and Belorussian cultures was exerted by the Russian people who had a centuries-old cultural inheritance and traditions in common with the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples; this inheritance and these traditions, however, had in Russia more favorable conditions for their development (pp. 202—203).

There is no mention of the great influence of Ukrainian culture in the XVI and XVII centuries exerted on the culture of Muscovy.

V. A. Dyachenko brings even Radishchev, Novikov, Krechetov and Lomonosov into the social movement in the Ukraine. Concerning himself with a later historical period of the Ukraine, F. Yastrebov adheres even more consistently to this doctrine: "Supported by advanced Russian culture, advanced

Ukrainian culture was an achievement not only for the Ukrainian people, but also for the Russians and for other peoples" (p. 445).

The influence was so deep that, according to F. Yastrebov, the Russian workers, for instance, "passed their revolutionary experience on to the workers of the Ukraine and acquainted them with progressive Russian culture, which was of immense importance for the labor movement in the Ukraine" (p. 512). Just how these Russian workers, most of them semi-illiterate, went about acquainting the Ukrainian workers with progressive Russian culture is not illustrated by any examples. In the same manner Yastrebov expounds the leading role of Russian culture in Ukrainian literature and art.

On pp. 712—713, there is even a colored reproduction of K. Trokhymenko's painting, "A. Gorki reads T. H. Shevchenko's works to a peasant audience." It is clear from the picture that these are Ukrainian not Russian peasants. This means that the Ukrainian peasants do not themselves read Shevchenko, but that Gorki is, supposedly, leading them to understand Shevchenko's works. The purpose of reproducing this painting is to reveal 1) the fraternal relations between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and 2) the leading role of Russian literature and culture among the Ukrainian people. Therefore, Gorki is adulated and elevated to the position of a "teacher of the advanced writers of all peoples of Russia" and "father of national literatures" (p. 717).

This extreme Bolshevik propaganda extended over many pages of the book, encourages Yermolenko to invent a "Ukrainian proletarian or socialist culture" by the beginning of the XX century in the Ukraine: "Ukrainian democratic and proletarian culture, emerged and developed under the many-sided influence of advanced Russian culture. The development of advanced Ukrainian culture contributed, in its turn, to the democratic culture of the (Great) Russian people and of all peoples of Russia" (p. 717); "The Russian proletarian culture was the determining force in the formation of elements of Ukrainian socialist culture — a constituent in the universal proletarian culture of the working class of Russia" (p. 717). In order to substantiate this statement about the existence of a "Ukrainian proletarian culture," the author brings in writers such as I. Franko, L. Ukrainka and M. Kotsyubynskyi: "They were friend of the workers and were close to the proletarian movement. This is why in their works the elements of a socialist literature already began to emerge" (p. 718). (Meanwhile, Franko's words were written earlier than Gorki's, and social motives in Ukrainian literature can be traced as far back as the XVII century). Also the workers themselves have not been forgotten: "There was a growth of the spiritual culture of the working class, a development of its revolutionary poetry and its songs, chastushkas and proverbs" (p. 718).

This History claims moreover that: "The advanced Russian scholarship exerted an immense influence on the development of culture and learning in the Ukraine. Its prominent representatives — D. Mendeleyev, I. Mechnikov, K. Timiryazev, I. Pavlov and I. Michurin were the leading figures in Ukrainian learning. Of course, there is no mention about West European achievements, because this would contradict the Party doctrine, which has branded West European culture as "decadent" (p. 741).

This Party catechism is crowned by Yermolenko who comments: "The Bolshevik Party and its leader, V. Lenin, became the protector of the national rights and culture of the Ukrainian people" (p. 720).

Thus the reader is presented with the description of a culture which is Ukrainian in name, but Russian in content.

*The Theory of the System of "Communal Property"
as the Ancient Mode of Life of the Ukrainian Peasants.*

Already on the first pages of this work, the reader encounters the repeated use of the Russian word *obshchina* in connection with the "pristine communal-property system" (pp. 9, 11, 13) to characterize the early stage of society in the Ukraine. This designation excludes the terms "pristine community" or "tribal ethnical order".

The use in this book of the Russian word *obshchina* instead of the Ukrainian *hromada* points not only to a linguistic russification. As can be seen further in the text, this is done to create the impression that the rural *obshchina* in the Russian sense of the word has existed in the Ukraine from time immemorial. Concerning *Russkaya Pravda*, Huslysty, speaks of: "The regularity of the development of the *obshchina*" (p. 70). Yet the XI and XII centuries can no longer be designated as the period of the "pristine communal property order." Thus, though "pristine" disappeared, *obshchina* remained.

Although, according to Huslysty, the Ukrainians passed over at once from the *obshchina* system to feudalism (pp. 34—35, 39), and in dealing with subsequent centuries, the term *obshchina* is not mentioned any more, preference is given to "peasantry," "bondage peasantry" or "village population" (pp. 218, 223, 319, 332, 387, 440—441, 496, 521, 532, 572). Los does take up the term *obshchina* again applying it to as late a period as the beginning of the XX century, and this time quite obviously in the Russian sense: "The communal property form of land-ownership was widely established in the provinces of Kharkov, Kherson, Ekaterinoslav and Tavria, where it embraced 91% to 96% of all farms. In the Chernigov province the *obshchinniki* constituted almost 50%. There were very few of them in the Ukraine on the Dnieper right bank and in the Poltava province" (p. 573).

The author identifies the village community which was forcibly established to pay off "repurchase payments" — which were introduced in the Ukraine after the 1861 reform and lasted until they were cancelled after the 1905 revolution — with the ancient Russian *obshchina*. This identification serves the author as a pretext to treat the Stolypin law (of November 3, 1906 through June 14, 1910) as regards the Ukraine also, as a "law concerning the destruction of the village *obshchina*" (pp. 633—634), and the sporadic demonstrations by the peasants against this law as the defense of the peasants of the *obshchina* system of tilling the land (p. 634).

The approach of these Marxist historians to persons or groups hostile to the Party is, of course, one of pure vituperation.

Stetsyuk calls Hetman I. Vyhovskiy a "henchman of the Ukrainian people" (p. 278), a "vile traitor" (p. 279), and Hetman Yuriy Khmelnytskyi is called the "unworthy son" of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (p. 299). Daydychenko employs a whole arsenal of means to discredit the hetmans of the second half of the XVII century: Ivan Samoylovych was exceedingly grasping" (p. 308), Ivan Mazeppa "hated the Russian as well as the Ukrainian people, but concealed it cleverly" (p. 308). He was a "cruel keeper of serfs and hated by all people" (p. 313); "The people's hatred of hetman Mazeppa..." (on the evidence of the Russian priest Lukyanov) (p. 318); Mazeppa was "hated by the Ukrainian people" (p. 324). Also the Ukrainian Cossack nobility are discredited. "A group of traitors from among the officer aristocracy tried to reestablish on the

Dniéper left bank territory, the rule by Polish gentry, so intensely hated by the people... in their desire to enslave the peasantry still more, these mercenaries betrayed the interests of the Ukrainian people and prepared a reestablishment of the alien rule" (p. 323). "Of the immense riches Mazeppa had pillaged in the Ukraine, he succeeded in taking away with him two barrels of gold coins" (p. 329). For Yastrebov, Hetman Iv. Mazeppa is, of course, also an "insidious and arrogant traitor" who "sold his people to the aliens" (p. 450). Similarly, Petryk (p. 309) is a "traitor and demagogue" (p. 326); the Cossack chief, Hordiyenko a traitor, P. Orlyk, P. Polubotko, P. Kalnyshevskiy, Holovaty, and Hloba are all termed "oppressors of peasants." (p. 369).

Yastrebov tries to convince the readers that:

After the 1861 reform, a Ukrainian liberal-bourgeois movement established itself which was inimical to the people. The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist intelligentsia founded groups in Kiev, Kharkov, Poltava, and other towns of the Ukraine — the so-called *hromady*. These *hromady* wanted to separate the Ukrainian workers from the toiling masses of the Russian people, to deflect them from the joint struggle against the oppressors of all nationalities and to subordinate the oppressed masses of the Ukrainian people to the ideological guidance of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and landowners (p. 490).

"The activities of the *hromady* were based on the idea of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" (p. 490). V. Antonovych, Konyshkyi, and other leading Ukrainian figures were for F. Yastrenov "rabid bourgeois nationalists, haters of the Russian people, and traitors to the interests of the Ukrainian people" (p. 536), because he claims: "The actions of the Austrian authorities and of their bourgeois nationalist adherents were calculated to tear the Ukraine away from Russia, to weaken Russia and wreck the expanding revolutionary movement. They were part of the all-German plan of an offensive against the East and subjugation of the Slavic peoples by German imperialism" (p. 536). Thus, from Yastrebov's interpretation it follows that the Ukrainian movement was invented by the Germans. In the same manner, Yastrebov slanders the Ukrainian patriots P. Kulish, O. Konyshkyi and B. Hrichsko (p. 577), as well as Nechuy-Levytskyi, M. Kosmtomarov (pp. 548, 558—559), M. Hrushevskiy, W. Vynnychsko, O. Oleś (p. 648), Smal-Stotskiy, and Barvinskiy (p. 704). The Marxists particularly dislike Hrushevskiy, the most prominent Ukrainian historian and first President of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic.

Yermolenko writes:

The most reactionary views were preached by Hrushevskiy, a typical representative of bourgeois nationalist historiography, who consciously distorted the history of the Ukraine. This reactionary ideologist of the Ukrainian nationalists, falsifying the true history of the Ukraine, preached chauvinism in the "History of the Ukraine-Rus," the "Illustrated History of the Ukraine," and also in a series of articles. He deliberately denied the profound historical ties between the Ukrainian and fraternal Russian peoples on purpose and, bowing before the bourgeois culture of Western Europe in order to have the Ukraine enslaved by an alien imperialism, he propagated a Western, Austro-German orientation. M. Hrushevskiy's writings — the writings of an enemy of the people — have always been extolled and used by all malicious enemies of the people. These writings have become a "theoretical" basis for the Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist

counter-revolution. The representatives of Hrushevskiy's notorious bourgeois-nationalist "school," such as V. Lypynskiy, S. Tomashivskiy, D. Doroshenko, and other faithful menials of foreign imperialism have always manifested themselves as fierce enemies of the workers. Hrushevskiy's partisans and disciples have constantly adulated in their foul writings the bloody misdeeds of alien imperialist invaders. (pp. 723—724).

This slander serves the authors as a means which, under present conditions in the Ukraine, may fully serve their purpose, since the works of all defamed persons have been confiscated. Thus, the readers have been deprived of all possibility of checking this slander on the basis of original sources, i. e., the works by Hrushevskiy and others.

The authors deliberately make no difference between the diverse parties active in the Ukrainian movement. Consequently, the various aspects of Ukrainian history and the Ukrainian liberation movement are completely distorted. The RUP (Revolutionary Ukrainian Party) has been designated by Los as follows: "Under cover of revolutionary phrases, the RUP actually conducted a chauvinist policy which was hostile to the people, thus trying to poison the workers' minds with nationalism" (p. 589). The "Ukrainian People's Party" (*Narodna Ukrainska Partia*), which seceded from the RUP "occupied quite obviously chauvinistic positions," states Los. The Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union is alleged to have, "stood up against proletarian internationalism and been an accessory to the national oppression committed by the Mensheviks" (p. 590). He further identifies them with the nationalists in every detail: "The opportunist Ukrainian social-democrats stood up against the revolutionary struggle of the peasantry, since in their opinion the peasants' movement, which was directed against the land owners, was a reactionary movement. The Ukrainian nationalists, with their loathsome policy, helped the tsarist regime to suppress the revolution" (p. 615). Then, "the revolution of 1905 exposed the treacherous part played by the Ukrainian nationalists and showed that the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, just as its Russian counterpart, was in alliance with the tsar and that it was a counter-revolutionary force" (p. 622). "During the period of reaction, the USDRP (Ukrainian Social-Democratic Revolutionary Party) revealed still more of its bourgeois nature and quite openly began to preach nationalism. The USDRP and the "Union" had no influence whatever on the working classes of the Ukraine" (p. 645).

I. Hurzgiy, S. Kytaryv and O. Parasunko, for instance, write the following about the labor movement in the Ukraine in 1917—1923: "Under the mask of revolutionary phraseology, and calling themselves "Ukrainian social-democrats," the petty-bourgeois nationalists created a bloc together with other representatives in an attempt to place the Ukrainian people in opposition to the Russian people and split the unity of action of the Ukrainian and Russian working masses in their struggle against the tsarist regime and capitalism".

Not merely the Ukrainian "nationalist," but all other individuals or historical events which the Bolsheviks do not approve of, are discredited regardless of whether or not they have any real bearing on the history of the Ukraine. Trotsky, for instance, is called a "despicable traitor of the working classes," and his newspaper — *Pravda* — a "filthy rag" (p. 645 — note that the name of the newspaper is not mentioned). In another place, they call him even "Jude Trotsky" (p. 746 — not *Yudushka* as Lenin wrote); Kautsky, Trotsky, and Bukharin are "enemies of the proletariat (p. 755), and Kamenyev

is a "traitor" (p. 756); Bukharin, Pyatakov, and Radek maintained an attitude which was "hostile to Marxism" (p. 761). Also the Russian Social-Revolutionary Party (p. 630) as well as Jewish Zionism and the Jewish Social-Democratic Party are stigmatized as "reactionary," "nationalist" and "opportunist" (p. 705).

In accordance with the general line in foreign policy pursued by the Bolsheviks at the time this book was written and published, the Western world, its science and scholarship are more than once defamed: "The bourgeois historians and archeologists, in the first place the ideologists of German fascism and Anglo-American imperialism, have strived, and do so to this day, to belittle the immense historical significance of the Slavs by representing them as latecomers to Europe. In order to justify the aggressive policy of their respective governments, they suppress many facts which testify that the Slavs have lived in Europe since time immemorial" (p. 29). "The American way of life" means a life in "misery, want, unemployment, and ruthless exploitation" (p. 701). The USA was "the first to embark on the path of imperialist wars" (p. 743); "America... is controlled by American power-seekers who wanted to penetrate into China and subjugate the Chinese people" (p. 591).

The entire Ukrainian Central Council (*Rada*) was "bourgeois," according to the Marxists. It was composed of representatives of the bourgeois land-owners, of the Ukrainian urban and rural bourgeoisie and of the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia. The leading part in the policy of the Central Rada was played by the bourgeois party of the so-called socialist-federalists and the nationalist petty-bourgeois parties of the Ukrainian social-democrats and social-revolutionaries. The leaders of the Central Rada were inveterate bourgeois nationalists, and the leaders of the nationalist Ukrainian counterrevolution were M. Hrushevskyi, S. Yefremiv, V. Vynnychenko, and S. Petlura" (p. 779).

The Attitude toward Religion

Though, according to the constitution, the Church is considered in the Ukrainian SSR as separated from the state, and religion as everybody's private affair, the authors of the "History of the Ukrainian SSR" have made every effort to fill their "scholarly work" with atheistic propaganda based on historical material.

The authors explain that in the stone age the people had a purely materialistic religion. Quoting Lenin, mention is made about totemism, magic and animism (pp. 15—16). The description of religious conceptions and the cults observed by the Eastern Slavs occupies only ten lines (p. 36). The fact that Grand-Duchess Olha embraced Christianity is merely mentioned (p. 55); and the christening of the whole state and Grand-Duke Volodymyr is explained as having been the result of class-political tendencies. Of course, this book contains no consistent exposition of the history of Christianity in the Ukraine. Instead, we are often faced with invectives against religion and its ministers: against Duke Danylo (p. 105) and the Pope, against Metropolitan P. Mowyla, the Uniates, the Catholic Church (pp. 360, 357), and the Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytskyi.

Boyko (p. 196) underlines the hostility of Metropolitan S. Kosiv and the higher clergy against a unification of the Ukraine and Russia; he does not,

however, explain this by their aspiration for independence, but writes that, "they were interested in the preservation of the Polish landowning regime in the Ukraine" (p. 256).

The authors of the book are hostile to Protestantism too: "The propaganda of mysticism and religious obscurantism was especially enforced after the war of 1812, when the "Bible Society was founded," F. Yastrebov writes and then continues: "This reactionary organization tried during many years to spread the Bible among the general public, which poisoned the people's minds with spiritual drugs, preached humility and meekness before "those in power," and promised the toiling people a "better life" not on earth, but in heaven" (p. 405).

Conclusions

1. This "History of the Ukrainian SSR," at least, the first volume which is dealt with here, cannot be considered in fact as a history of the Ukrainian SSR. Most of this first volume is hopelessly distorted, the aim of this falsification being to present the whole earlier history of the Ukraine in such a manner as if it were inevitable that Bolshevism should arise in the Ukraine.

2. Two-thirds of the book are devoted to describing the history of Russia and the Ukraine as if they were one entity. The last chapters are nothing more than a tendentious exposition almost exclusively of the history of the Bolshevik underground movement (pp. 641, 599, 648, 662—663, etc.). Thus, the history of the Ukraine has been turned here into a political history of the Bolshevik Party.

3. Of all the various ties between the Ukraine and the West, only that with Marx and Engels has been admitted into this work.

Appendix

In connection with this review, it is worth examining what happened to P. Vershyhora's evaluation of the "History of the Ukrainian SSR," which he published in *Oktyabr*, No. 4, 1954, p. 118.

This author, tried to express his own ideas about writing "history without history", Apparently these ideas were published by mistake, P. Vershyhora's ideal gave the editorial board of *Oktyabr* a great deal of trouble, for already in the next issue, No. 5 (May), we read on p. 191 a special resolution passed by the editorial board with regard to Vershyhora. The latter wrote originally:

Thus, for instance, in the "History of the Ukraine" (published by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1953), a worthless attempt has been made to write history without history, i. e., to present the development of a people without showing the most clearcut features of its early existence in which the creativeness of the broad masses of the people was embodied, particularly of the toiling peasants who manifested their patriotism in the partisan Cossacks wars. This book is an eloquent

example of a bureaucratic, self-assured creativeness which lacks the main nucleus of historical research — patriotism.

As a result of these views, the following announcement appeared:

“From the Editors Office. In P. Vershyhora’s article “Brothers-in Arms” published in No. 4 of the journal *Oktyabr*, an erroneous footnote was printed censuring the work of a large group of scholars in the “History of the Ukrainian SSR,” volume 1, issued in Kiev in 1953.

The editorial board of *Oktyabr* having discussed the circumstances of the appearance in print of this note and its nature, feels bound to declare that it tolerated a gross political blunder.

The editorial board apologizes to the team of authors of the “History of the Ukrainian SSR” for being having printed this coarse invective, which debases their whole work.

The editorial board has decided to impose the most severe punishment on the members of the editorial office who are to blame for the publication of these comments.

Dr. B. VYNAR, *"The Development of the Ukrainian Light Industry,"*
Denver, 1955.

Dr. B. Vynar's work must be welcomed as a valuable contribution toward elucidating an important sector of the Ukrainian economy.

Vynar has divided his essay into two parts. The first part deals with the pre-revolutionary, the second illustrates the period under the Soviet regime. Having given a brief outline of the difficulties in the way of a development of the Ukrainian economy, the author shows on the basis of figures collected by him and other well-known researchers — the chaos suffered by the Ukrainian light industry from the moment the Ukraine was occupied. The author is right in quoting — beside M. Slabchenko, M. Volobuyev and O. Ohloblyn — also Russian scholars who have done research into the industrial development of the Ukraine, for instance Aksakov and Karamzin. The testimonies by such Russian economists are similar to those of certain economists who, at present, are trying to whitewash the measures tsarist Russia undertook for the colonial exploitation of the Ukraine. These measures were, by the way, characteristic not only for the XVIII and first half of the XIX centuries, but also for the period of the industrial development of the Ukraine, i. e., from 1870 to 1917. Disregarding even the capital works of the Ukrainian economists of the renaissance in the 1920's and relying on the works of Russian economists of the late XIX and first quarter of the XX centuries alone, it can be very easily demonstrated how harmful the policy of the tsarist regime was to the Ukraine's economy. Furthermore, it is known that in the second half of the so-called Stalin era, studies of Russia's economy, were subject to especially ruthless distortions. At that time Kutuzov, Suvorov, and Nakhimov were made to appear as national Soviet heroes. The autocratic tsars who in the conception of the free world have always been symbols of almost medieval obscurantism were called "progressive". This was when the paradoxical theory of the "lesser evil" was fabricated. According to this theory, it was the lesser evil for many, especially the Asian and Caucasian peoples, to be ruthlessly oppressed by "progressive" tsarist Russia than to live under supposedly feudal conditions in their own "unprogressive" states.¹ Even official works by Lya-shchenko, Feygin, Barandkiy, and Nesterenko clearly reveal the Ukraine's economic slavery in the tsarist Russian empire. Vynar points out quite justly that ultimate economic expansion was not at all due to the tsarist government,

¹ The first to put forward the theory about the "lesser evil" was the historian M. V. Nechkina, who established it in a letter to the editors of *Voprosy Istorii* (No 4, April 1951). The announcement of this theory concides with the attack on Central Asian historians B. H. Gafurov, Kh. T. Zarifov, M. A. Abdikalikov and E. Bekmakhenov for their treatises on the history of the Kazahs, Uzbeks, Kirghizes and Tadzhiks.

but to the efforts of foreign capital to exploit the Ukraine as a convenient raw material base.

Vynar correctly analyzes the shortcomings of the territorial distribution of the Ukraine's light industry in the pre-revolutionary period. This industry was established in districts far remote from those in which the mining and metal industry was developing (Donets Basin and Dnieper regions). Vynar points to the disproportion between the abundance of existing raw materials and the range of the production of the feeble light industry at that time. He also indicates the unprofitable preponderance of lower-quality products, which were not able to secure adequate profits for the appropriate enterprises. So, for instance, as much 80% of leather production consisted of low-priced hard sole leather.

It would have been useful to give a more detailed account of the state of flax, hemp and wool processing in the pre-revolutionary period, because it would show what a heavy blow this industry was dealt by the Soviet regime. The textile factories were, for the most part, small enterprises. But it is well-known that the population of the Ukraine was in those times well supplied, especially with high-quality home produced goods. The hemp-spinning enterprises were centered in the Chernihiv region (not in Odessa, as the author says) if only for the reason that 45% of the area which was planted with hemp (which, in 1913, constituted in the Ukraine 127,000 dessyatins: 1 dessyatin = 2.7 acres) was in the province of Chernihiv. The hemp-spinning enterprises were distributed as follows:

| <i>Province</i> | <i>Enterprises</i> | <i>Workers</i> |
|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Chernihiv | 12 | 929 |
| Kharkov | 3 | 461 |
| Kherson | 4 | 229 |

In Chernihiv, also, a major hemp-scutching factory (695 workers in 1900) was in operation. It should be remembered that the Chernihiv hemp products, which were well-known for their high quality, constituted in 1913, 91.3% of the Ukraine's entire export of hemp products.

The processing of flax was almost entirely a domestic industry; only in Poltava was there a major flax-spinning unit (128 workers in 1900).

The processing of wool was very under-developed. In 1908, the wool-processing enterprises were situated as follows:²

² *Statisticheskie svedenia o fabrikah i zavodakh no nproizvodstom ne oblozhenym aktsizom* "Statistical Data on Factories and Works Concerned with Non-Exicisable Production. (For 1900) Production Group IV, St. Petersburg, pp. 87—92; *Statisticheskie svedenia no obrabatyvayuschei fabrichnozavodskoi promyshlennosti Rossiiski imperii* (Statistical Data on the Manufacturing Industry of the Russian Empire for 1908), edited by V. E. Varzar, St. Petersburg, pp. 47—48.

| <i>Province</i> | <i>Enterprises</i> | <i>Workers</i> |
|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Chernihiv | 8 | 4260 |
| Podole | 26 | 681 |
| Kharkov | 2 | 561 |
| Kiev | 4 | 155 |
| Ekaterynoslav | 1 | 73 |
| Kherson | 3 | 149 |

From these figures it may be seen that the biggest enterprises were in the Chernihiv province while the enterprises in the Podole, Kiev, or Kharkov provinces though numerous, were on a small-scale. No wonder, therefore, that the Ukraine's share in the wool manufacturing industry of the tsarist empire constituted, as Vynar points out, only 3.4% — despite the fact that the Ukraine had enough raw material at her disposal to set up this industry. Even the Soviet economist Nesterenko was compelled to stress in his well-known monograph on the industry of the Ukraine of the late XIX and early XX centuries³ that the Ukraine was, as far as concerns the textile industry, only a source of raw materials for Central Russia, which supplied the Ukrainian market with finished textiles (frequently of an inferior quality). Not even dye-works could develop in the Ukraine where, on the eve of World War I, only two small wool-dye enterprises existed, one in the Chernihiv province (54 workers), the other in Podole (24 workers).

Until 1900, there was even no mention about cotton manufacturing in the Ukraine. After 1900, only three cotton-dye works were established there (two in Kharkov and one in Ekaterynoslav).

In his analysis of the pre-revolutionary period, the author fails to mention the sewing industry of the Ukraine. There is not enough information about the number and size of the sewing enterprises (most of which were small, and distributed among the villages), but we know from the figures of the first census of the population in the Russian empire of 1897 that 123,092 persons of Ukrainian nationality were employed in the sewing industry, while there were 30,855 persons working in the manufacturing of fibrous materials. The above-mentioned figures deal, of course, also with the whole domestic sewing home industry.⁴

Until 1914 there were no really large-scale enterprises of the textile industry in the Ukraine. The author is not quite justified in describing three enterprises in Kharkov, two in Odessa and one in Lugansk, as large. For instance, all three of the above-mentioned Kharkov factories employed in 1900 only 989 workers. Only the jute factory of Odessa with over a thousand workers might have been called a big concern.

*

³ Nestorenko: *Ocherki istorii promyshlennosti i polozhenie proletariata Ukrainy v kontse XIX i nachale XX v.* (Outline of the History of the Industry and Situation of the Proletariat in the Ukraine at the End of the XIX and Beginning of the XX Centuries), State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow 1954, p. 53

⁴ *Obshchii svod po imperii repultatov razrabotki dannykh pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naselenia, proizvedennoi 28 yanvarya, 1897.* General Summary of the Result of the Data of the First General Census Carried out on January 28, 1897, Part II, St. Petersburg 1905, p. 326 [i. e. the industrial population speaking Ukrainian as their mother tongue].

In the second part of his essay, Vynar analyzes the period under Soviet rule. He correctly evaluates the changes which took place during the era of war Communism and subsequently the NEP period, illustrating them with examples taken from the leather industry. Analyzing the light industry during the period of the five-year plans, the author deals with the problem of an increase in the funds assigned to the light industry, and proceeds to examine the significance of the newly constructed enterprises and the reasons for their low productivity and unprofitableness of output. The author explains this by the inadequate exploitation of the technical equipment of new enterprises, the large percentage of women employed there and the low wages paid by these enterprises. He supports his conclusions with statistical data from 1928 to 1936. The author's conclusions are basically correct; yet they would have had greater effect had he also taken into consideration the harmful role of the disproportion between the state of the market and the raw material base of the light industry. It must not be forgotten that organizations such as, for instance, the *Gossnab* (Chief Supply Administration) of the All-Union ministries in Moscow have often hampered production at the Ukrainian enterprises by failing to supply them in time with the necessary raw materials. Moreover, despite the unsatisfactory small scale of textile production in the Ukraine, some considerable part of its output has been exploited in Russia (for instance hosiery), which, of course, has had a detrimental effect on supplying the population of the Ukrainian regions.

The second part of Vynar's essay contains data only from 1925/26 to 1928/29 and in millions of rubles at the so-called "constant value" of 1926/27.

In the last part of his essay, Vynar analyzes the postwar situation, mentioning also the plan to construct new enterprises (basically for the production of textiles). It is a pity that the author does not comment on the productive potential of the new factories, according to international standards, which determine such a potential by the number of spindles in operation. These data are, of course, not easily accessible, yet Soviet sources do sometimes mention them. Some light is thrown upon the matter by figures concerning the production plans for 1954. According to these, the production of cotton fabrics should have amounted in the Ukraine to 17 million meters and the production of cloth to 6.4 million meters. The corresponding production in the whole USSR amounted in the same year (1954) to 5,500 million meters of cotton fabrics and 242 million meters of woolen fabrics. This means that the share of Ukrainian industry in this field of production⁵ amounts to 0.31 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively. Some data concerning new construction for the Ukrainian textile industry can be found in official Soviet publications dealing with the so-called period of "steep rise" announced by Malenkov⁶ in 1953, and also in the critical reviews of this period.⁷ Though the project for this

⁵ Vynar takes into consideration the production scales of only those enterprises which are under the direct supervision of republican authorities. Actually, certain Ukrainian textile factories were still subordinated even in 1954 to All-Union ministries and, therefore, the figures 17 million meters or 6.4 million meters do not include the whole textile industry of the Ukraine.

⁶ *Pravda*, October 28, 1953.

⁷ Papers by A. Popluyko and G. Vvedensky published mainly by the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich.

"steep rise" broke down already in 1954/1955, the construction of some of the projected enterprises is being continued. A large cotton factory is being built in Poltava in addition to the Kherson combine. New clothing factories are being built in Chernihiv and Chernivtsi. In Darnytsya and Bendery (Moldavia) silk weaving factories are nearing completion.⁸

It is not believed, however, that even the putting into operation of the new concerns will improve the relative situation in the Ukraine to any considerable extent. It is known, for instance, that of the fifteen new enterprises in the cotton industry, as many as eleven fall to the RSFSR. Of the 1,861,000 spindles which, according to plan, were to be put into operation in 1954 and 1955 in the textile industry of the USSR, for the Kamykhin combine (in Russia) alone 500,000 spindles were planned.⁹ Thus, the figures referring to 1950/51, according to which the Ukraine produced only about 3 per cent of the All-Union output of woolen products and about 0.9 per cent of cotton products, can also be taken as typical for the present situation.¹⁰ It is regrettable that the author did not present more data on the shoe industry of the Ukraine, which is in a more pitiable state than that of the textile industry. It would also be as well to say something about the scales of production of the sewing and hosiery industry during the Fourth and Fifth Five-Year-Plan periods, Khrushchev's speech should be recalled here, made at the VIII Session of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR on August 28, 1946, dealing with the Fourth Five-Year Plan in the Ukraine. In this speech, he bragged that in 1950 the production of hosiery garments would surpass the pre-war level by 22%, that of knitted top-wear by 15%, and of stockings and socks by 17.4%. Yet it is now known, that from 1940—1950 no increase in the mentioned branches of production has taken place, either in the Ukraine or, even, in the USSR as a whole. On the contrary: the stockings and socks industry, for instance, produced in 1950, 5,000,000 pairs less than before World War II. Saburov's speech delivered on November 6, 1954, revealed that even in 1953/54, garment production plans were systematically underfulfilled.¹¹ A. Kyrychenko wrote in his article "The Ukraine on the Eve of the Election to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, April 25, 1951"¹² that total production of the entire industry of the Ukraine had increased 15% by 1950 as compared with 1940, the largest increase being in the fields of heavy industry and machine construction. Korotchenko repeated Kyrychenko's figures about increases in heavy industry and machine construction at the XIX Congress of the Party in 1952. He asserted that, in 1950, this industry had produced 50% more than the annual production prior to 1939. At the same time, he announced that the production of cotton fabrics increased ten times during the Fourth Five-Year Plan; of woolen — 15 times; of foot-wear — 8 times. The figures submitted by Korotchenko concerning the textile industry

⁸ According to the plan, the production of the factory in Bendery should amount to 8 million meters of fabrics (synthetic fibers) annually. (*Stroitel'naya Gazeta*, February 12, 1954).

⁹ The corresponding figures concerning the RSFSR are: cotton fabrics — 89.2 per cent; woolen fabrics — 80.9%. cf. Galkin: *Vozniknovenie i razvitie sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR*. (The Origin and Development of the Socialist Nations in the USSR), Moscow 1952, p. 66.

¹⁰ *Nauka i Zhizn*, Moscow, No. 4, 1954.

¹¹ *Pravda*, November 7, 1954.

¹² *Ibid.*, January 28, 1951.

of the Ukraine in 1950 do not point to any growth of this industry, but rather to a terrible devastation of the textile industry as a result of the war, and to an extraordinary slowness in rehabilitating this industry.

Though the data adduced by the author are somewhat incomplete, due to inaccessibility of certain sources, he has given in his work a brilliant analysis of the state of affairs in the Ukraine's light industry. The author's arguments are fully satisfactory.

Finally, it should be mentioned that Vynar gave his work the title: "The Development of the Ukrainian Light Industry". In it, he considers some of the aspects of the textile, leather, foot-wear and glass industries. Thus, as a whole, the author keeps to that classification of the branches of light industry, which is officially applied in the USSR. In all other countries, however, it is customary to consider all the enterprises that are not embraced by heavy industry as belonging to the light industry. This means that those branches of production also come under the category of light industry which are segregated in the USSR into a separate group, the so-called local industries. The significance of the local industry enterprises sector of light industry can be seen from the fact that in 1940, it already constituted 50% of the entire production of knitted wear, 35% of the felt-boot production, 15% of the machine-knitted garment production, 33% of all sewing-industry products, and 85% of rubberized fabrics; during 1948—1925 a factory was built in Kiev, which is to produce 1 million meters of rubberized fabric for raincoats annually. Such articles as furniture or carpets are not considered here. These are produced in the USSR mainly by the local industries. Important are also the glass and ceramic industries, especially in the Ukraine where they have first-rate raw material at their disposal (quartz, loams) which cannot be found in other regions of the USSR. Before World War II, the Ukraine produced over 90% of porcelain clay (kaolin), of which 60% was processed in Central Russia and the Urals.¹³ The growth of production in Ukrainian glass factories and their range of products deserve special attention. The more important glass factories are in Lysychanske, Kostyantynivka, Slavuta, Izyum, Artemivski, Kherson, Lvov and Stryj.

If the author wished to discuss the general range of light industry production it would have been desirable to adhere to the nomenclature used in the Western world, i. e., the conception "light industry" should include all branches of production which, according to Soviet standards, come within the category of enterprises producing consumer goods¹⁴ or, at least, belonging to the light and local industries. It is to be hoped that the author of this valuable essay will analyze in a future work those branches of the Ukrainian industry which, according to international standards, also come within the general term of light industry.

S. Y. PROTSYUK

¹³ V. P. Aleksandrov, A. E. Voytsekhovskiy, and W. I. Luchitskiy: "The Kaolin Industry of the USSR" in "The Works of the All-Union Research Institute of Mineral Raw Materials," Moscow 1938, Vol. 126.

¹⁴ Not included here are the chemical, food, paper and cellulose industries and the industry of building materials, which together constitute a separate group.

THE SUGAR INDUSTRY IN THE UKRAINE

I. KYSIL

Grain crops, potatoes and sugar remain the unsolved problems of the food industry of the USSR. This has been true ever since the October revolution of 1917. Only during the NEP period did the inhabitants of the Soviet Union have a temporary opportunity to feed themselves fairly well. The kolkhoz and sovkhoz system brought want and malnutrition to the peasants and inhabitants of labor colonies.

The food problem in the USSR has always been the responsibility of the Ministry of Food Industry. Special scientific institutions and controlling organs were established after World War II for the express purpose of reviving the sugar industry which was ruined during the war. Such institutions were established not only for the Ukrainian sugar industry, but also for sugar mills outside the Ukraine.

The supreme authority in the sugar industry of the USSR is *Glavsakhar* (Supreme Sugar Administration). It is under the direct control of, and follows the instructions of the Ministry of Food Industry of the USSR. *Glavsakhar* is at the head of a system of sugar trusts and groups of research laboratories. These give instructions to, direct and control the work in mills for granulated and refined sugar. Other organizations concerned with the sugar industry are as follows: 1. *Sakhremsnab* (Institute for Sugar Mill Repairs). The Ukrainian sugar industry is supplied by *Ukrsakhremsnab* (Ukrainian Institute for Sugar Mill Repairs);

2. *TsINS*, the Central Institute for Scientific Research, for the sugar industry and the food industry in general (its branch for the Ukraine is located in Kiev);

3. *Ukrsakhkamin*, the Ukrainian producer of limestone for the use of sugar mills; and

4. The Power Installation Administration in Moscow, Kiev, Rostov-on-Don and Tashkent; its task is to supply all sugar mills with electrical and machine equipment.

The following institutes serve the sugar industry:

1. The Moscow Technological Institute for the Food Industry.
2. The Leningrad Technological Institute for the Food Industry.
3. The Central Asiatic Polytechnical Institute.
4. The Prague Scientific Research Institute for the Sugar Industry.

After World War II, the sugar industry was built up in the following areas of the USSR:

Ukrainian SSR; Moldavian SSR; Kazakh SSR; Kirghiz SSR; Georgian SSR; Armenian SSR; Lithuanian SSR; Latvian SSR; Estonian SSR; Belorussian SSR; Krasnodar Krai; Buryat-Mongolia ASSR; Altai Krai; Voronezh Oblast; Kursk Oblast; Tambov Oblast; Penza Oblast.

Though many republics and regions of the USSR produce some sugar, the Ukraine is still by far the chief sugar producer.

The whole management of the sugar industry is centered in fifteen sugar trusts, of which the following are the most important:

1. Kiev Sugar Trust
2. Poltava Sugar Trust
3. Kharkov Sugar Trust
4. Sugar Trust of Kamyanets-Podilskiy (now: Khmelnytskyi)
5. Kirovograd Sugar Trust
6. Vinnytsia Sugar Trust
7. Zhytomir Sugar Trust
8. Sumy Sugar Trust

Each Ukrainian sugar trust has at its disposal five or six group research laboratories. The sugar mills are serviced by the following operative networks:

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| 1. The Stalin | Group Laboratory |
| 2. The Malo-Viskiv | „ „ |
| 3. The Haysyn | „ „ |
| 4. The Shpola | „ „ |
| 5. Pionenkiv | „ „ |
| 6. Smila | „ „ |

Additional group laboratories are being established.

The construction of sugar mills began in the Ukraine as early as the 1920s. The first beet-sugar factory was built in 1825 in the village of Makoshyn, Sosnytsia district, Chernihiv province. Subsequently, from 1828 to 1838, eight sugar factories were built in other localities.¹ At the time the first sugar mills were built in the Ukraine, Russia already had a few scattered mills. Their experience was used in construction of the sugar mills in the Ukraine. Instructors from abroad were engaged for some of the newly erected sugar factories and were assigned to train local employees.² In the course of time sugar refineries were built at Blakleyiv, Smila and Yabluniv. Their machinery and equipment were manufactured at Maltsev's machine-building factory in Moscow. The sugar refiners exchanged experience in the *Zemledelchesky Zhurnal* (Agricultural Journal), which carried articles on the theoretical and technical problems of sugar production.³

¹ *Sakharnoe Proizvodstvo*, Moscow, No. 4, 1954, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

A. I. Korchynsky states that in these early times the executive and technical staffs of the Ukrainian sugar refineries were recruited from among graduates of the Petersburg Practical Institute, now the Lensoviet Technological Institute.⁴ The climatic conditions in the Ukraine were favorable for an extensive development of the sugar industry, which was also assisted by the private property system and the availability of cheap local labor. By the late 1840's, the Ukraine had become the main center of sugar production in the Russian Empire. In 1859, 247 of the Empire's 432 sugar refineries, or 57.4%, were in the Ukraine. Gradually, this proportion continued to shift in favor of the Ukraine, and in 1917 constituted as much as 82.5%.⁵

This concentration of the sugar industry led to a gradual disappearance of the small sugar refineries with their primitive equipment, and their replacement by large enterprises developed by such sugar millionaires as Bobrynsky, Symyrenko, Tereschchenko, Kharytonenko and Brodskyi.

During this period, the processes of sugar production and the technique of sugar extraction by hydraulic press, a widely used method in the 1830's, were greatly improved. Also, a good deal of research and experimental work was done in the field of sugar extraction by continuous presses.⁶ At the Smila sugar refinery, experiments were made in extraction by soaking beet shavings and running them through continuous presses. This method was later adopted by other sugar refineries in the Ukraine. Considerable success was achieved in expanding and improving sugar extraction by the method of diffusions developed by Repnin and Lukonsky in 1844; Brinchynsky in 1881; Abraham and Chapikovsky.

In 1850—51 experiments were carried out at the Balakleyiv sugar refinery with the object of refining the beet juice by saturation with carbonic acid gas. In 1867, Tolpyhin introduced at the Starynsk sugar refinery in the Ukraine a second saturation for the purpose of purifying the beet juice.

In 1898, Abraham developed a new type of filtrating press, which in still in use both in the Ukraine and abroad. In 1910, Ovsyannikov developed the method of continuous saturation at the Myronivka sugar refinery in the Ukraine. Great improvements were made in methods of evaporating the water from the sugar beet juice and in the crystallization of sugar. In 1850, a new type of evaporation machine constructed by the Ukrainian brothers Yakhnenko, was put into operation at the Smila, Yablunivka and other sugar refineries.⁷

In 1852, Fedosiyiv tested and applied at the Balakleyiv sugar refinery in the Ukraine a new method of manufacturing sugar in crystal form instead of the old method of production and thus increased the output. From 1890 onwards the process of sugar manufacture, by adding and making use of the waste from the various types of molasses, was introduced. In 1893, refining apparatus developed by Pyontkovsky and Shchenkovsky was installed at the Kapustyany sugar refinery. This apparatus contained steam pipes for heating, and was installed according to the principle of Archimedes' screw, in constant motion. In 1907, the engineer Ovsyannikov employed at the Myronivka sugar refinery

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 13—14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷ *Ibid.*

the method of continuous crystallization of sugar waste, or a second crystallization (brown sugar). As early as 1854, Tolpyhin had developed and employed at the Balakleyiv and Yablunivka sugar refineries, the method of bleaching brown sugar by means of vaporization, which subsequently also found wide application abroad. This method of bleaching sugar was called the "Russian method," although it was developed in the Ukraine. In 1891, the continuous centrifugal machine constructed by Pyontkivsky and Shchenyovsky for the purpose of bleaching sugar by the vapor method, was put into practice for the first time in the sugar mills of Kapustyanka, Balakleyiv and Novotovolzhany.

The sugar industry of the Ukraine already before this, had needed a scientific institution able to cope with the problems involved in development of sugar production and to direct the course of development. In 1871 the Kiev section of the Russian Technical Society was established to deal with the technical problems of the sugar industry. The leading roles were played by Prof. Alekseyev and Prof. Bunge. The Kiev section published the journal *Zapiski Sakharnoi Promyshlennosti*. It conducted scientific conferences on technical subjects, held congresses and organized exhibitions in order to assist inventors, to whom it communicated the foremost foreign achievements in the field. Kiev scientists played an important part in the organization and training of research workers in the sugar industry of the Ukraine.

The highly-developed Ukrainian sugar industry and technique of production spurred the Russian machine-building plants to devote more attention to the problems of improving the machinery they were producing for the sugar refineries in the Ukraine. Ukrainian scientists, engineers and technicians contributed greatly to the development of the technique of sugar production and the methods of its organization.

Later on, the Institute of the Sugar Industry, was organized in Kiev. At present it belongs to the General Institute of the Food Industry (the Mikoyan Institute of Technology), where it constitutes the sugar industry section. Its function is to train engineers for the sugar refineries.

According to information from the Soviet press, the research institutes of the Ukraine are now concerned with the problem of increasing and improving the quality of sugar beets in order to raise the sugar percentage. Some advances have been made in the field of labor mechanization by employing hydraulic conveyors and hydraulic pump unloaders, thus freeing a large number of workers. Also new loading machines have been partly put into use; after World War II the first universal conveyer truck-loader was built. The diffusion process of the continuous diffusion machines has been improved. Improvements are being made in methods of purifying sugar-beet juice: research in this field is done by the scientists Holovin, Znamensky and Kar-tashov. The time required for evaporation has been shortened. Sugar engineers have recently proposed a number of types of equipment to make possible continuous operation of vacuum evaporators (Zuyev, Kondak and Znamenskyim). Considerable progress has been made in research work concerning processes of sugar crystallization (Holovin and Savinov).

According to Soviet sources, the Ukrainian sugar refineries have considerably increased their productivity. The Korovyntsy sugar refinery for instance, which has existed for 115 years, has increased its sugar output 200 times and

its quantity of beet processing 40 times. The Andrushiv sugar refinery was built 105 years ago; it has increased its quantity of processing 85 times and its sugar production 400 times.⁸

The Ukraine had over 200 sugar refineries, but many of them were destroyed by Bolsheviks during their retreat. After World War II, only a little over a hundred sugar refineries were rebuilt and put into operation. But even these cannot be considered as operating fully and profitably. They still require reconstruction on the basis of recent innovations.

The most efficient sugar mills produce granulated sugar and some are also refineries. (For complete list, see *Ukrainsky Sbirnik*, No. 5, 1956, pp. 185—187).

In 1954, for the entire USSR, the output of granulated sugar was to amount to 4,300,000 tons, and of refined sugar to 1,350,000 tons. Thus, if compared with 1950, the production of granulated sugar was to be increased 170%, and of refined sugar by 193%. In 1956, sugar production was to attain 5,300,000 tons, i. e., 2.1 times as much as in 1950; the output of refined sugar was to amount to 1,800,000 tons, or 2.1 times as much as in 1950.⁹

The plan for 1954 foresaw an increase in productivity of the sugar factories, according to which the quantity of beets processed in 24 hours in the sugar mills would be increased to 17,000,000 centners, and the amount of refined sugar processed in the refineries in one day to 4,000,000 centners. The plan for 1955—56 foresaw a total of 97,000,000 centners of beets to be processed in 24 hours. According to plans, the Soviet *Glavsakhar* (Chief Administration of the Sugar Industry) and the *Sakharotresty* (Sugar Trusts) were to install over 50 steam boilers, 40 turbogenerators, 17 beet pumps, 38 diffusion batteries, and 17 vacuum machines in the sugar mills of the USSR, and to expand the evaporating stations of 67 sugar mills.¹⁰ Efforts were to be made to improve purification of sugar beet juice by the new method of ionization.

A difficult problem has faced *Glavsakhar* and the sugar trusts of the Ukraine: the shortage of professional cadres required for carrying out this extensive plan. For this reason, plans were worked out to organize technical instruction for workers in evening courses.¹¹

The journal *Sakharnaya Promyshlennost*¹² stated in 1954 that from 1954 through 1956 the production season of sugar mills would be prolonged 20 to 25 days. During the period 1954—56, 25 new sugar mills were to be erected in the USSR: of these 11 would be built in the western oblasts of the Ukraine, as follows: Lvov, 2; Stanislaviv, 1; Chernivtsy, 1; and Ternopil, 3; the Moldavian SSR was to have 4 new sugar mills.

The main task in diffusion and filterpressing, is apparently to reduce the loss of sugar, to improve the winter storing of beets and achieve high-quality beet shavings. It was planned to introduce sixteen-part diffusion batteries and to improve the process of crystallization of brown sugar. In 1954, only

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁹ *Sakharnaya Promyshlennost*, Moscow, No. 1, 1954, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1954, pp. 19—22.

¹² *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1954, p. 7.

one third of the sugar mills had modern boilers and power equipment. The remaining two thirds in the USSR and the Ukraine had to use antiquated steam boilers and low-pressure machines.¹³ Plans called for installing over 50 new steam boilers and 40 turbogenerators in 1957. Operation at the boilers were to be reduced and facilitated by installing mechanical sieves, introducing mechanical fueling and using mechanical-hydraulic removal of ashes and slag.

It has been planned to develop research work at the institutes and group laboratories with the objective of improving the working process of continuously operating diffusion apparatus, vacuum apparatus and centrifugal machines. The extraction of sugar juice by ionization and of electropasmolysis is to be improved.

Progress is apparently being made in improvement of automatic controls. Special evening schools are being established, known as ten-grade schools, specializing in the study of the sugar industry. Each sugar trust already has its own courses of instruction in addition to special courses for the training of Stakhanovite groups.

Though Soviet propaganda extolled in its press the achievements of the sugar industry, it had by 1954 not yet attained the prewar level of 1940. Only an average of 81% to 83% of the sugar was being extracted, while the rest was lost in the filter-press and in molasses.¹⁴

The principal defects in sugar production are as follows:

- 1 Late digging and transport of beets
- 2 Incorrect determination of the amount of mud on beets
- 3 Failure to employ improved methods of cleaning beets
- 4 Unsatisfactory organization of work in raw material laboratories and motor transport
- 5 Lack of regular registration of beets received
- 6 Extreme wastage and inadequate storage of beets
- 7 Delay in getting sugar mills into operation
- 8 Delayed repair of machines and equipment; poor labor distribution in repair brigades; violation of control diagrams
- 9 Gross violation of technological and fueling processes.

Though there has been a recent increase in the production of sugar in Ukrainian sugar mills, this increase has not been due to progress in mechanization of production processes. In 1953, the sugar content and quality of the beets themselves increased, as a result of improved climatic conditions in the principal beetgrowing regions of the Ukraine, which increased the percentage of sugar in the beets and thus raised the sugar output.

The journal *Sakharnoe Proizvodstvo*¹⁵ remarked in 1954 that the sugar industry had not yet mastered the fundamental principles of production so as to ensure much less waste of sugar in the treacle and of molasses, which cons-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁵ *Sakharnoe Proizvodstvo*, No. 1, 1954, p. 8.

tituted 1.0% of the weight of the processed beets. The sugar waste should not exceed an average of 0.85% to 0.9% of gross weight of beets. This loss of sugar actually amounted from 1.0% to 1.5%.

Sugar mills were reported as frequently interrupting operations during production, for the following reasons:¹⁶

- 1 Unsatisfactory repair of equipment and machines
- 2 Poor care of machines
- 3 Unnecessary waste of time on previously planned repairs
- 4 Stoppages for other general reasons (e. g. unwillingness to work for the low wages paid).

The following table from *Sakharnoe Proizvodstvo*¹⁷ shows the position of sugar production at the various sugar trusts in the Ukraine. Only one of the trusts included is located in the RSFSR.

Length of Production Seasons
(in Number of Working Days)

| Sugar Trusts | 1940-41 | 1949-50 | 1950-51 | 1951-52 | 1952-53- | 1953-54 |
|--------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| Kiev | 86.6 | 78.6 | 92.2 | 95.2 | 114.9 | 106.8 |
| Kamyansky-Podilsky | 104.6 | 101.2 | 117.6 | 160.9 | 103.2 | 144.8 |
| Kirovograd | 155.8 | 107.3 | 121.2 | 119.1 | 162.0 | 112.1 |
| Lvov | 67.4 | 108.8 | 152.6 | 172.6 | 147.6 | 179.0 |
| Kursk | 98.0 | 70.6 | 100.6 | 122.5 | 88.8 | 91.6 |

As the table indicates, the average working season was increased by only 5.2 days from 1940—41 to 1953—54. The five basic profitable sugar trusts shown are probably exceptional; figures for all trusts of the Ukraine and the USSR would no doubt show that the average working season of the sugar mills had not even attained that of 1940.

The Soviet press itself points out that sugar production is poorly organized. It cites examples¹⁸ of uncleaned lakes and pools supplying sugar mills with dirty water, which damages boilers. In 1953, because of a water shortage, some factories had to stop production too soon or to work with interruptions. A conference of the state industrial sanitation inspectors of the Ukraine, which took place in Kharkov in 1953, adopted a resolution that in constructing new sugar mills, the most careful attention should be paid to the provision of sanitary facilities. Workshops and other places of work were dirty.

Plans for stoking steam engines did not include means of protecting the stokers against draughts, and telephone operators were exposed to dust and steam (the Suilyany sugar factory was given as an example). Machines were installed without regard for norms set up for the width of passage ways, (for instance, at the Bobrovysky sugar factory). No uniform method of operating

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 2, 1954, p. 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1954, p. 6.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 2, 1954, pp. 1—5.

sulphur furnaces, very dangerous for the health of workers, had been established for the sugar factories of the Ukraine. As a whole, no changes had taken place in the method of loading and unloading sugar in sacks at sugar depots. The standard weight of one sack was 100 kg. net, while the weight of one sack of sugar to be handled manually, should not exceed 80 kg.

In 1953, the USSR produced 12% more sugar than in 1952; yet the sugar production plan was not fulfilled because the sugar mills were not prepared for the production season. This was also true of the sugar mills of the Ukraine, such as the Parafiyivka, Shamrayivka, Veselo-Podolyany, Khalturyn, Layiniv, Rybnyky, Bilshovyk and Kuybyshev.

The extraction, loading and crushing of lime-stone is still on a very primitive basis and progress in the mechanization of these operations is unsatisfactory. The enterprises of the Ukrainian *Sakhhkamin* trust extracted in 1953 a mere 1,500,000 tons of lime-stone, while 6,333,000 tons were handled by manual labor. The operations of the Ukrainian trusts are not mechanized, and only 36.55% of the 1953 plan was fulfilled by January 1, 1954. Mechanization of lime-stone extraction was increased by 10.6%. The Ukrainian *Sakhakamin* trust combines seven plants, but only the Rybnytsky, the Rezynsky and Synovsky plants are worth mentioning.

Sakharnoe Proizvodstvo,¹⁹ in an article entitled "Improve the Methods of Management in the Sugar Industry," refers to the bureaucratic attitude of the executive organs of the sugar industry. The leadership of *Glavsakhar* and its whole operating apparatus were said to be drowning in floods of paper. In January and February, 1954, the number of operation orders, letters and circular instructions received from the Ministry of the Food Industry of the USSR alone amounted to 810. From the sugar trust institutions and various enterprises. *Glavsakhar* was receiving up to 800 letters and 100 telegrams daily. *Glavsakhar* itself was by no means backward, and was dispatching approximately 700 letters and 60 telegrams daily.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1954, pp. 3—5.

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