

Ukrainian Review



Institute for the Study of the USSR

diasporiana.org.ua

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

Munich, Germany, Augustenstrasse 46

Dear Sir or Madam,

After you have examined this first English-language issue of the UKRAINIAN REVIEW, the editorial staff would be most grateful grateful if you could answer the following questions:

1 Do you find the UKRAINIAN REVIEW useful? Yes No

2 In what way might it be improved?

(If more space is needed kindly use the other side)

3 What additional themes should appear in it?

4 Do you wish to receive the UKRAINIAN REVIEW regularly?

Yes No

It would be appreciated if you would send this information at your earliest convenience to the Editor, UKRAINIAN REVIEW Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, Augustenstrasse, 46. Any ideas and suggestions you may offer will receive the closest attention.

We thank you for your interest in our work.

Yours sincerely,

Editor

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

Ukrainian Review

1

**MUNICH
1935**

The views expressed in the Review
are those of their authors.
They are not bound by any single political philosophy
nor are they to be construed
as representing the point of view
of the INSTITUTE.

★

Material contained herein may be reproduced,
provided reference is made to this publication

★

All comments and inquiries are most welcome and should
be addressed to:
Institute for the Study of the USSR
Editor, The Ukrainian Review
Augustenstrasse 46
Munich, Germany

★

Verantwortlich für den Inhalt:
Publishing Board of the Institute
and
Prof. Petro Kurinny (Editor)

Herausgeber und Verlag: Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, e. V.,
München 37, Augustenstrasse 46, Telefon 5 81 27. Printed in Germany
by Buchdruckerei Dr. Peter Belej, München 13, Schleißheimer Straße 71

FOREWORD

The 36 years' existence of the Soviet state has given rise to a special branch of scholarly research called Soviet studies. It has been given much attention in almost all countries of the free world. Although contemporary scientific literary works devoted to the USSR and its social and national experiments on the subjected nations are many and varied, there are still some important omissions.

The greatest mistake is that official Soviet sources are largely used when studying the Soviet way of life. These give a distorted view, and are to be considered as pure propaganda. Secondly, in many publications on the USSR printed at various times and in various places, there are features which reduce their value. Many works, for example, regard the Soviet Union as an indivisible whole, when, in fact, it is an artificial conglomeration of races, nations and national groups bound together by terror and subject to one dictator. Scholars of the Soviet way of life often neglect the national element when studying individual problems. They do not devote sufficient attention to those features which have given rise to a national history and culture among those peoples which have been able to preserve their individuality and withstand all attempts at denationalization, in spite of Soviet pressure.

Thirdly, almost all works on the Soviet Union make use of memoirs which, although possessing factual documentation, require a critical analysis.

Finally, many scholars, particularly foreign, are too speculative, theoretical and abstract. Not being sufficiently informed on Soviet reality, they do not always fully understand or present the fundamental processes of life under the Soviets.

The Editors do not pretend that the *Ukrainian Review* will be entirely free from these shortcomings, which are the result of conditions brought about by the Soviets (the iron curtain, the lack of freedom of speech and research in the USSR, the well-known falseness of official Soviet statistics, and so on); they are the product of the Soviet system as a whole.

However, we will attempt to approach nearer to the truth in our studies of the various aspects of the Soviet Union, particularly those which are glossed over by Soviet sources—the questions of religious freedom, national enslavement or the furthering of Communist aggression under the slogan of “national freedom” or “peace throughout the world.”

Finally, the Editors wish to provide foreign students of the USSR as a whole or of subjugated peoples in particular with material to help them to understand the important and many-sided problems presented by the Ukraine both now and in the past.

Publishing Board of the Institute

CONTENTS

<i>O. Jurczenko</i> , The Bolshevik conquest of the Ukraine	5
The current Soviet approach	
<i>S. Yu. Prociuk</i> , Planned economy in the Ukraine	29
<i>E. Glowinskyj</i> , The Ukrainian SSR within the centralized Soviet financial system	38
<i>D. Cizevsky</i> , The Soviet history of Ukrainian literature	53
<i>B. Krupnycky</i> , Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Soviet historiography	65
<i>M. Semchysbyn</i> , The educational system in the Soviet Ukraine	76
<i>Y. Vakulenko</i> , The cultivation of virgin and fallow lands in the USSR	90
<i>E. Glowinskyj</i> , Professor V. P. Tymoshenko	102
<i>I. Mirchuk</i> , The brotherhood of the Slavic peoples and Bolshevik reality	104
Contributors to the issue	111
Ukrainian Publications of the Institute	112

The Bolshevik Conquest of the Ukraine

The Current Soviet Approach

O. JURCZENKO

I

N. Suprunenko, author of a work on the early stages of the sovietization of the Ukraine, considers that one of the primary factors hindering the establishment of Bolshevik power in the Ukraine at the moment of the 1917 revolution was the creation of a Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist counter revolutionary center, headed by the Central Rada.¹ The existence of this separate political and governmental entity in the Ukraine, by the admission of the Soviet author himself, strengthened resistance to the newly created Red dictatorship in this former Russian "province". Soviet sources avoid the substantiated facts about the political nature and social basis of the Central Rada. Thus, nowhere in works on the Ukraine covering the period from 1917 to 1922 is information given, for example, on the political and social structure of the Central Rada. The above-mentioned author limits himself to the assertion that "the Central Rada was dependent on the landowners, urban bourgeoisie, kulaks and petty bourgeois-nationalist intelligentsia."² However, according to a Ukrainian historian and active participant in events in the Ukraine during 1917—1918, primary sources indicate that the Central Rada consisted of 212 members of the All-Ukrainian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, 158 of the All-Ukrainian Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, 100 of the All-Ukrainian Soviet of Workers' Deputies, 50 delegates of the so-called General Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, 20 representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist Party, 40 representatives of the Russian Socialist Party, 35 representatives of the Jewish Socialist Party, 15 representatives of the Polish political party, 84 representatives elected at provincial sessions of peasants', workers' and soldiers' deputies and 108 representatives of professional, communal and other organizations.³ As this break-down shows, such dubious groups as landowners and the urban bourgeoisie were not represented in the Central Rada as separate classes. Rather, the greater majority represented those social strata that Bolshevik political and government theory feels to be the foundation of the Soviet regime—the peasants and workers. This fact gave the Central Rada the right to consider itself the provisional

¹ *Voprosy istorii* (Problems of History), Moscow, No. 2, 1954, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dmitro Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy 1917—1925 gg.* (History of the Ukraine from 1917 to 1923), Uzhgorod, 1939, I, p. 123.

representation until the "convening of a Ukrainian constituent assembly of the whole population of our country,"⁴ and the Provisional Government was forced to recognize this organ's political and legal position.⁵ The Central Rada's situation was strengthened in that its government, the General Secretariat, depended for support upon local administrative organs, the zemstvos and local dumas elected in the summer and fall of 1917. This fact, which the Soviets try to ignore, was admitted by none other than Joseph Stalin. In his speech before the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets on December 27, 1917, he characterized the position and foundation of the Central Rada thus: "The Rada opposes the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets'... with its slogan 'All Power to Urban and Rural Self-Government!'" Stalin considered the negative aspect of the Ukrainian provisional parliament to be the fact that, "in the Rada, which is a coalition of all classes, so dear to the hearts of the conciliators, that they see the prototype of a constituent assembly."⁶

In addition, Suprunenko was compelled to admit the presence of a "comparatively broad base of the Ukrainian nationalistic counterrevolution"⁷ whose representative was the Central Rada. The author likewise had to admit that the "conditions for the victory of a socialist revolution in the Ukraine were not as favorable as in Central Russia... the bourgeois-landowner counterrevolution under a nation-wide banner was much stronger there than in the center." Nor could he ignore the fact that in the elections to the Supreme Constituent Assembly held at the end of November 1917, "77% of the votes were cast for the Russian SR's (Social Revolutionaries)."⁸ According to M. Lyubinsky, a member of the Ukrainian delegation at the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, in the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, the candidates of the Central Rada received 75% of the votes.⁹ The elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly held at the beginning of January, 1918 and which, because of the Soviet offensive, were held on only about two thirds of Ukrainian territory, produced about the same results.¹⁰ Suprunenko likewise asserts that the duration and stubbornness of the Ukrainian national liberation resistance to the socialist revolution have their origins in the existence of this comparatively broad social base.¹¹

All current Soviet sources recognize the impossibility of the sovietization of the Ukraine at that time and the renewal of her state ties (in a Soviet form) with the former metropolis. Suprunenko, for example, states, "however, to be victorious over the Central Rada, the workers of the Ukraine needed help. They received this help from the Russian workers and peasants."¹² To the problem of this aid, V. Kuritsyn devoted an entire article, in which he stated that "the government of Soviet Russia gave... much assistance against the bourgeois Central Rada... The All-Russian Soviet government sent to the Ukraine... units of the Red Guards from Moscow and Petrograd, Baltic soldiers, and

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁶ J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (collected works), Moscow, IV, pp. 5, 33.

⁷ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1954, p. 22.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁹ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, p. 6.

¹¹ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1954, p. 22.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

others.”¹³ Likholat, author of the most extensive work on the Bolshevik seizure of the Ukraine, asserts that “only with the disinterested aid of the Russian people, the untiring care and attention of the Communist Party, did the Ukrainian people crush their internal and external foes.”¹⁴

In the summer of 1917, the political and social cadres which controlled the Ukraine and upon whom the Bolshevik center could rely, consisted, according to Soviet sources, of 33,000 Party members, of whom 67% were representatives of Party organizations from the Donets and Krivoi-Rog basins . . .”¹⁵ In other words, over the greater part of Ukrainian territory, including the military centers in the southwest and the Romanian front, there were some 11,000 Bolshevik Party members, the majority of whom were industrial workers from the Donets and Krivoi-Rog basins.

According to Likholat, “on the eve of the October revolution there were about 800,000 workers in the major industries of the Ukraine.”¹⁶ If we assume that total manpower in the Ukraine did not exceed 8% of the adult population, it is clear that Bolshevism represented a small minority of the population. The national make-up of the Ukrainian proletariat is particularly interesting. The industrial development of the Ukraine before World War I and the revolution was accompanied by the moving of a large number of workers from Russia to work in the Ukrainian industrial enterprises. Thus, data furnished by Suprunenko show that the number of aliens, in 1902, in the provinces concerned varied from 20% to 82.8%. The highest percentage of aliens was found in Ekaterinoslav, the most highly industrialized province. In Tavria, another industrial district, 60.1% of the workers were not Ukrainians.¹⁷

Consequently, the industrial working class of the Ukraine, a minority group in the population was to a considerable extent a national minority as well. A certain sector of the workers, which had fallen under Bolshevik influence, was opposed to the Ukrainian Central Rada and to the majority of the Ukrainian people, not only out of motives suggested by Bolshevik national demagogy, but also because the slogans of Ukrainian national regeneration were alien to them and at times inimical. Because of their high proportion of alien workers, “the industrial regions, particularly the Donbas, Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav became the base of the socialist revolution in the Ukraine.”¹⁸

A second area in which the Bolshevik slogans were able to find more or less suitable soil was formed by the masses of soldiers dispersed during the course of the conflict. As the Ukraine was front-line territory, it was overrun by the forces of both sides. Taking into account that the majority of combatants were not Ukrainians and the fact that the revolution had made way for political activity among military personnel, the bolshevization of units on the southwest and Romanian fronts gave the Soviet leaders a good chance to extend to the Ukraine, the control they had just established in the center of Russia.

¹³ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 5, 1954, p. 19.

¹⁴ A. V. Likholat, *Razгром natsionalisticheskoi kontrrevolyutsii na Ukraine, 1917—1922* (The Defeat of the Nationalistic counterrevolution in the Ukraine, 1917—1922), Moscow, 1954, p. 26.

¹⁵ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1954, p. 24.

¹⁶ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁷ *Ocherki razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR* (Sketches on the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), Moscow, 1954, p. 103—104.

¹⁸ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1955, p. 24.

The October revolution was to have been Russian in nature and was also to have been approved by the all-Russian representative body, the Second Congress of Soviets of Workers' Soldiers' Deputies, in which there were also "workers and revolutionary soldiers of the Ukraine." According to Soviet sources, at this session 83 delegates from 40 Ukrainian soviets took part.¹⁹ The second volume of the *History of the Civil War* contains specific details illustrating certain features of the representation of the "Ukrainian soviets" at the Petrograd Congress. For example, it states that the Kiev organizations (town, okrug and oblast soviets) sent 13 delegates.²⁰

It should be recalled that the Congress represented only a minority of the population, for it spoke for that portion of workers, soldiers and others which was organized into soviets, or some 15 million persons, that is, approximately 20—25% of the adult population. It is characteristic that the most numerous class, the peasantry (except for those in uniform), had no representation at all. Likholat's assertion that the Congress was attended by delegates "from the soviets of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies of the Ukraine"²¹ is not supported. On the other hand, it is generally known that the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies was held a month later, in December 1917, with no Ukrainian representation. The set-up of Ukrainian delegates to the Petrograd Congress in November 1917, assumes an even more peculiar character if it is recalled that the soldiers' representatives from the two southern fronts appeared as an expression of the will of the "revolutionary soldiers of the Ukraine."

It is interesting to note that even this prepared representation of the Ukraine did not give the Bolsheviks a very decisive victory; of 83 delegates, 40 were members of the Bolshevik Party, and of the remaining 43, "a significant portion . . . belonged to Ukrainian petty bourgeois parties."²²

It is clear that under such circumstances, in the Ukraine the Soviet dictatorship could rely for support only on the urban (mostly Russian) workers and soldiers (predominantly Russians from the southern fronts and the garrisons behind the fronts). As a result, some of the local Bolshevik leaders, upon receiving news of the Petrograd revolution decided not to try to seize power immediately in the center of the Ukraine. The Bolsheviks Yu. Pyatakov, V. Zaton-sky and Kreizberg were even compelled to enter the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution in the Ukraine, which was formed by the Central Rada on November 8, whose task it was to prevent the spreading of the civil war that broke out in the Ukraine as the result of the October revolution. In this committee the Bolsheviks remained an insignificant minority; of the remaining 17 members, 13 were spokesmen of Ukrainian political parties which formed the basis of the Central Rada, 3 belonged to the Jewish socialist parties, and one was a Russian social-revolutionary.²³ True, on the very day after a resolution declared it "inadmissible to permit power falling into the hands of the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies, which were only a part of democracy" and expressed the determination "to combat energetically all attempts

¹⁹ *Istoriya grazhdanskoi voyny* (History of the Civil War), Moscow, 1943, II, 127.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

²² *Istoriya grazhdanskoi voyny*, II, 127.

²³ D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy 1917—1923 gg.* (History of the Ukraine from 1917 to 1923), Uzhgorod, 1934, I, p. 160—161.

to support revolt in the Ukraine,"²⁴ the Bolshevik representatives left the Committee of Defense and the Central Rada. Subsequently they attempted to organize in Kiev their own center in the form of the Local Revolutionary Committee, which began to work against the local Russian authority represented by the Kiev Military District. When the latter became completely subordinate to the General Secretariat of the Central Rada on November 11, 1917, the Kiev Bolsheviks decided not to combat it.

At that time the Bolsheviks had in the Ukrainian capital regular military units (about 4,500 men with seven batteries and eight armored cars) as well as armed units of the Red Guard totaling about 1,500 men.²⁵ The majority of these military personnel were not Ukrainians and after their subsequent disarmament by Ukrainian units they were withdrawn to Russia. In the Red Guard the most important factor was the arsenal detachment (80 men) among whose personnel were "many . . . persons from Moscow and Petersburg."²⁶ Opposing the Bolsheviks in Kiev after the bulk of Russian troops had left was the Ukrainian garrison, several thousand strong.

After the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Russia, the Kiev Bolshevik center decided to take decisive action against the Central Rada, in order to facilitate the seizure of the Ukraine from the outside. Early in December 1917 the Bolshevik *Revkom* (Revolutionary Committee) began to prepare the military units located in Kiev, that were attached to it, for action in conjunction with the Red Guard. This move was discovered and frustrated.

Several hours before the intended attack during the night of December 12/13, units of the Ukrainian Serdyutsk Division suddenly disarmed the Bolshevik garrison. Resistance was met at one point only, and as a result one Ukrainian soldier was killed and four wounded.²⁷ Thus, the first blood was shed in the struggle between the forces of the Ukrainian national revolution and Bolshevism. Soviet sources, as usual, attempt to depict the Ukrainian authorities as the aggressors. Likholat, for example, writes, "The Central Rada put forth every effort to liquidate the Soviets in the Ukraine, attacking them and disarming the Soviet forces."²⁸ As proof the author refers to a purely propagandistic document, "An answer to the Ukrainian Comrades in the Rear and at the Front," written by Stalin. Meanwhile, Soviet sources of the twenties do not conceal that the Bolsheviks planned to attack Kiev, hoping for support from the Second Guards Corps located around Zhmerka and Vinnitsa. (See I. Puke *The Kiev Military-Revolutionary Committee and the October Revolution*, Kiev, 1925). These facts are not concealed in the works of contemporary Soviet authors. In this sketch *Tempered in Battle*, the author speaks thus of the Bolsheviks' activity in Kiev: "Strengthening the workers' detachments of the Red Guards and organizing new ones, carrying out active work among the troops, . . . the Bolsheviks, headed by the Military-Revolutionary Committee, were preparing the proletarian masses for a new revolution."²⁹

The December attack on Kiev was to be the first overt Bolshevik blow against the Ukrainian national camp. A further step was represented by the

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

²⁵ *1917 god nad Kievshchine* (Kiev in 1917), Kiev, 1928, p. 335.

²⁶ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

²⁷ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, I, p. 200—201.

²⁸ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

²⁹ Vasil Kozachenko, *V boyakh hartovana* (Tempered in Battle), Kiev, 1954.

decisions of the Oblast Congress of the RSDRP held December 16—18, 1917. The Congress initiated the struggle by calling an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which would wrest power from the Central Rada. As all other Bolshevik acts in the Ukraine, this was prepared in Petrograd. As early as "November 1917 (old style)," writes N. Suprenenko, "J. V. Stalin, in the name of the Central Committee in conversations over direct wire with the representative of the Kiev Oblast Committee, proposed that the Committee lead the struggle for the convening of an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets."³⁰

The Central Rada and its government did not hinder the Bolsheviks in their attempts to call a congress, but did their best to give it some air of authority and an appearance of representativeness.

On December 17, 1917, there arrived in Kiev 130 delegates from soviets that were under the influence of the Bolshevik organizations. No Soviet source indicates on what basis delegates were elected to this Congress. However, it is not difficult to imagine its composition if it is considered that the basis of Soviet power was the "dictatorship of the proletariat." At the same time over two thousand delegates of peasants' soviets arrived in Kiev and appeared unexpectedly at the Congress. They gave the Congress a new composition which represented the real relationship between the social strata and made it impossible for the organizers to implement their plans. The resolution, passed by an overwhelming majority, asserted that, "The Central Ukrainian Rada... is composed of the All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants', Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies elected at All-Ukrainian congresses, and of democratic representatives of the national minorities; therefore it is the provisional competent legislative organ of the revolutionary democracy of the Ukraine." The resolution consequently considered "the reelection of the Central Rada inopportune and unnecessary," and required that the Rada convene "at the proper time a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, which alone can express the true will of the whole of Ukrainian democracy."³¹

A second attempt to take over power in the Ukraine by external action also ended in failure. One hundred and twenty-five Bolshevik and fellow-traveling delegates to the Congress decided to go ahead and carry out their original intention to take Kharkov by force. On December 24—25, the First All-Ukrainian Council of Soviets was transferred to that city. It was composed of the remnants of the Kiev Congress and the full assembly of the III Oblast Congress of Soviets of the Donets and Krivoi Rog basins, which was being held at that time.³²

If it is assumed that all, or the majority of the Bolshevik delegates and their allies attended at the Kiev Congress, it becomes clear that the Krivoi Rog and Donets basins, with 37% of the delegates, had a larger representation than the rest of the Ukraine. The meager data furnished by the "Notice of the Central and Executive Committee of Soviets of the Ukraine" of December 12 (25), 1917, tells of the rate of representation of the other social strata, particular the peasantry. According to this document, there was held in Kharkov "a session of the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies with the participation

³⁰ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1954, p. 30.

³¹ Quoted from V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennya Natssii* (The Rebirth of a Nation), Vienna, 1921, p. 164.

³² Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

of the peasants' deputies." This was based on the fact that authority must be vested "only in the competent organizations—the soviets" for "the General Secretariat of the Central Rada does not express the will of the revolutionary strata of the people—the proletariat and the poorest peasantry." In the re-organized, 40-member Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine, 20 seats were reserved for possible representatives of the Congress of Peasants' Deputies.³³ Thus, it can be stated without exaggeration, that even in such a developed Soviet center in the Ukraine, the peasantry, representing more than 70% of the population (excluding peasants in the armed forces), was given no more than 40% of seats in the center.

The Kharkov Congress organized by the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of the Ukraine and the People's Secretariat (the government) laid the foundations of a Soviet political center of the Ukraine. This first workers' and peasants' government of the Ukrainian republic began its activity under the protection of the bayonets of the 3,500-strong Red Guard of Kharkov and, more important, the local Russian garrison, which included two infantry and one engineer regiment, an artillery division, and others, all aided in November by "an armored train and detachments of rear-echelon workers and sailors . . . sent by the government of Soviet Russia."³⁴

II

The abortive attempts organized in Russia in November 1917 by the Bolsheviks to extend their power to the Ukraine by seizing the majority of Ukrainian centers, using the forces they had at their disposal there, obliged them to begin a systematic and prolonged struggle against the Ukrainian national camp. Two basic tactical methods were applied. One was the direct use of the organized forces of Soviet Russia in an aggressive attack and intervention, aided by internal sabotage by local Bolsheviks. The second was the application of numerous methods designed to weaken and demoralize Ukrainian social and political life.

The former was to draw the attention of the broad Ukrainian masses away from national-political problems and to direct their own use.

The "dictatorship of the proletariat" proclaimed by Lenin in November 1917 was a means of covering up the rule of a majority by a minority. Its foundation, according to its champions, was to be the local proletariat supported by the poor peasantry. The backbone of the peasantry the so-called middle peasantry—had no illusions about the ideology of the proletarian dictatorship, and therefore it became necessary to apply to the peasantry the policy of "neutralization," that is, to eliminate it from political activity. True, official Leninist theory spoke of the neutralization of the middle peasantry to be applied only during the preparatory period of the socialist revolution and the early stages of its development. However it was soon transformed into an instrument of social and political oppression, whose culmination was the complete expropriation of the peasantry at the time of the collectivization of agriculture.

³³ *Peremoga Radyanskoi Vlady na Ukraini* (The Victory of Soviet Power in the Ukraine), Kiev, 1947, p. 85—86.

³⁴ *Likholat, op. cit.*, p. 48.

The first step in the process of neutralization was the attempt to introduce disorganization and revolt into the solution of one of the most pressing of the Ukraine's social problems—the land question. Agrarian reform, for whose realization, the democratic forces considered the convening of a more authoritative organ—the Constituent Assembly, was inaugurated by the Central Rada as soon as it had fully established its authority. As early as November 1917 the abolition of the large landowners', monasteries' and churches' right to own land was declared as well as the transfer of their lands to the peasants without compensation.³⁵

The new Soviet center organized in Kharkov, extending the validity of the Petrograd land decree to the Ukraine, called for the immediate seizure of the large landowners' land "in a revolutionary manner," that is, by creating in practice an agrarian anarchy and by detracting the peasantry's attention from the political problems of the country; sowing confusion among the ranks of the Ukrainian forces.

It is characteristic that the Bolshevik declarations and slogans aided little in carrying out their policies, so initiative had to come from the outside. "In the liquidation of the landowners' landed property," writes Likholat, "great initiative was displayed by the soldiers who came back from the front and also the Bolshevik agitators sent to the villages by the Party committees of Kharkov, Lugansk and other cities."³⁶ During the short period of the first Bolshevik campaign in the Ukraine (December 1917—April 1918) the Soviet authorities did not implement any agrarian policy. Rather, they utilized the land question, as mentioned above, to promote agrarian disintegration. Likholat cites several instances which illustrate the peasant movement in the Ukraine in the summer of 1918. However, he says nothing about the role of the Bolshevik organizations in this movement. There is no doubt that a Soviet historian would not have missed the opportunity to mention the Bolsheviks' role if they had played one. In Soviet publications of the 1920's there are many indications that attempts to provoke or lead the peasant movement in the Ukraine in the summer and fall of 1918 by Bolshevik slogans were unsuccessful. It is worthy of note that Likholat, author of the most extensive, current work on the sovietization of the Ukraine, speaks only briefly of the first and second sessions of the Communist Party of the Ukraine held in Moscow, at which the problem of peasant action and unsuccessful attempts by the Party to gain control of them were discussed. In four lines—and these not in the text but given as footnotes—the author notes the "grave damage" caused to the Party's work by the premature action in August 1918 of partisan units provoked by "left Communists."³⁷ Finally, the insurrection against the hetman regime (November-December 1918), called by the historian Popov—who was later liquidated by the Communists—the greatest peasant revolt on the territory of the former Russian Empire during the period 1917—1921, was carried out under the leadership of the Ukrainian national forces headed by the Directory of the National Rada.

A contemporary Soviet historian has attempted to create the impression that this uprising was the result of Bolshevik activity in the rear and beyond the borders of the Ukraine. Likholat asserts that "as regards the rapid liberation

³⁵ I. Mazepa, *Ukraina v ogni i buri revolyutsii* (The Ukraine in the Fire and Tempest of Revolution), p. 155—156.

³⁶ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, to p. 117.

of occupied territory . . . an important role was played by the historical Manifesto of the Ukrainian Soviet government published at the end of November" and further states that the manifesto "and news of the offensive against Kiev and Kharkov by Soviet units aroused the Ukrainian people. Throughout the Ukraine there was a mighty wave of uprisings against the occupiers and their hetman hirelings."³⁸

In fact, however, the revolt began with an attack on Beleya Tserkov on November 16, and November 21, 1918, that is, before the above-mentioned manifesto was issued, the so-called Kiev settlers' Corps of the insurgent forces, headed by Colonel E. Konovaltsy, had already surrounded the Ukrainian capital. The proclamations and declarations of the Ukrainian Soviet government were in fact a belated reaction to the real state of affairs.

The characteristic Communist agrarian and peasant policy in the Ukraine began when Ukrainian territory was occupied by the Soviets (spring-summer 1919). The Soviet authorities sought to carry out long and short term policies. For the former they worked toward the complete subjugation of the peasantry as a class to the dictatorship of the proletariat; for the latter they arranged for the rapid and complete seizure of all food supplies and their removal to Russia.

If the Bolsheviks, a year earlier, had considered their chief goal to ferment confusion and rebellion among the peasantry, directing their energies toward the immediate expropriation of the landowners, they now counted on decay of the peasantry from within, on arousing the rural proletariat and peasants who owned little land. The "kulak" was proclaimed the chief enemy. The process of liquidating the middle peasantry—the majority of the small peasants—and subjugating it to Russia, "was practically accomplished . . . half a year after the victory of the October socialist revolution."³⁹ The next step was to differentiate and subjugate the country by creating independent organizations of poor peasants. According to the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 11, 1918, "Committees of the Poor" (*Kombeds*) were formed which had practically full control of the rural areas. These organs fulfilled their duties in Russia in a very short time and were liquidated on December 2, 1918, as the dictatorship considered it could get along without their further services.

The situation in the Ukrainian countryside was different. Here the *Kombed's*, organized on January 13, 1919, by decree on the grounds of the "temporary situation" and their successors, the "Committees of Poor Peasants," existed for a long time—up to the accomplishment of the "socialist reconstruction of agriculture." They were finally abolished in February 1933.

By the spring of 1919 the *Kombeds* in the Ukraine had become the strong points of the proletarian dictatorship distributed throughout the Ukraine. According to Likholat, they "until the election of the soviets of peasants' deputies . . . exercised the function of state authority;"⁴⁰ but, in fact, they retained this position even later, for it was subsequently announced, on May 14, 1919, that it was the "duty of the 'Committees of the Poor' to carry out all decrees of the Soviet regime concerning the rural areas . . ."⁴¹

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 126—127.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

Formally, the Committees were to merge hired farm labor with the small peasantry (having less than 5 desyatinas* of land). This would have made the majority of the Ukrainian rural population eligible to participate.

Through the Committees, the Communist regime sought to take over the country's food supplies and snuff out its resistance. Thus, on May 25, 1919, the Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, in a telegram to the executive and Party committees, emphasized that "the organization of 'Committees of the Poor' is the urgent and chief task of the moment in connection with the acute food crisis and the elimination of the kulak bandits."⁴²

But these attempts met at once with bitter resistance. Thus, on June 1, 1919, the greatest number of *Kombeds* was in the Kiev area with 243; Kharkov, on the other hand, had only 28.⁴³ No data is given at all for the steppe regions. However, even these Communist organs were frequently not the most effective tools. One Soviet historian complained that "very frequent were the cases in which kulaks succeeded in taking over the *Kombeds* and directing them into channels suitable to them [the kulaks]... The *Kombeds* that fell under the influence of the kulaks opposed the food policy of the Soviet regime and did not carry out their duties."⁴⁴ Further, the author mentioned the mass organizations of *Kombeds* in the summer of 1919, but does not give any concrete data. Finally he was compelled to admit that the "stratification of the Ukrainian village was not the result of an organic process inherent to the village, but rather the result of a general process of Ukrainian social development." "An important role," we read in Likholat, "in the organization of the *Kombeds* was played by workers' food detachments sent to the Ukraine from Moscow, Petrograd and other industrial centers of Soviet Russia."⁴⁵

All these features emphasized that the Bolsheviks, at the time of their second campaign in the Ukraine, did not succeed in establishing themselves in the Ukrainian countryside. This compelled them, in their third attempt, to resort again to the measures interrupted by the retreat of the Soviets in the summer of 1919. The IV Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, held in March 1920, in a resolution, "For the Stratification of the Countryside," considered it the "Party's most important task to create a militant class organization that will unite all the proletarian elements of the country."⁴⁶

The Committee of Poor Peasants (KNS) became the successors to the *Kombeds*. These organizations were founded on a broader social base than their predecessors. This is pointed out by Likholat, who asserts that the "concept of poor peasant does not mean literally 'poor peasant', it means the peasant of little means."⁴⁷ On the other hand, according to the spirit of the resolution of the IV Party Congress and, particularly, the Instructions of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs of May 1920, the social base of the KNS was to be narrower than that of the *Kombeds*. The former was to include peasants having no more

* desyatina = 2,70 acres.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 304—305.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

⁴⁶ *KP(b)U v rezolyutsiyakh ee sezdov y konferentsy* (The Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine in the Resolution of its Congresses and Conferences), Kharkov, 1927, p. 66.

⁴⁷ Likholat, *op. cit.*, note on p. 440.

than three desyatinas of land.⁴⁸ How restrictive it was, can be seen from the following figures: At the time of the First Congress of the KNS (October 20, 1920), that is, after the Soviet conquest of the major part of Ukrainian territory, there were 13,000 KNS with a membership of 790,812.⁴⁹ In the fall of 1921, that is, when the Soviet occupation of the Ukraine had been firmly established, the KNS counted 1,557,838 members. However, this number appeared excessive to the authorities. In the spring of 1921 and winter of 1922 a purge was conducted (the so-called re-registration of the KNS) after which 757,507 members remained,⁵⁰ fewer than there were in October 1920. Thus, at the beginning of the so-called period of reconstruction, the number of persons united in the KNS did not comprise a tenth of the total adult rural population. At the same time, these elements remained the only (although not always reliable, as the purges of 1921—1922 illustrated) mainstay of the Soviet regime in the Ukrainian village. For example, the re-elections to the rural soviets, held as a formality, were carried out by the Communist Party under the special slogan, "Committees of Poor Peasants, to the Soviets." And in some localities this insignificant minority of the rural population received up to 50% of the seats on rural soviets.⁵¹

No less interesting is the Bolshevik tactic concerning the Ukraine in the national-political sector. According to Stalin, the problem of relations between the former Russian metropolis and the national provinces was in fact a problem of relations "between the proletariat of the former state and the previously oppressed nations."⁵² Referring to Lenin, Likholat asserts, "The peasantry is the foundation of the army of the national movement; without the peasantry the army is not and cannot be a powerful national movement."⁵³ Thus, the measures applied by Lenin to weaken national activity in the Ukraine was quite similar to the methods employed in Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Ukrainian village as a social force.

In the rural question also, the method of "neutralizing" the national-state tendencies, particularly among the politically least active elements, was basic to Bolshevik policy. It consisted of adopting many of the slogans and principles of the Ukrainian national movements, sometimes even in their most radical form, as, for instance, Lenin's proclamation of the independence of nations including the right of secession. In this manner they sought to shake and break the spiritual strength of resistance in the national movements. The Bolshevik incursions were carried out not as an aggressive attack from without, but as a social revolutionary action. However, the very ideological nature of Bolshevism on the one hand and the double-edged nature of its radical national slogans led and continue to lead the so-called Leninist-Stalinist national policy into a vicious circle of unsolved contradictions. If, on the one hand, the basic principle of Leninism—the dictatorship of the proletariat—does not permit any sharing of political power and ideological leadership with another class, on the other hand, the slogan of national self-determination binds the proletarian leader to a political and ideological trend that makes its advocate not the proletariat but

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 470.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 572—573.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 574.

⁵² Stalin, *op. cit.*, V, p. 237.

⁵³ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

another social class. The tactical moves of the Bolsheviks in their policy toward the former non-state nationalities are more in the order of a reflex action having no basis in Lenin's ideology of "revolutionary Marxism." The champions of the latter frequently admit that they are called on to fulfill tasks that (at least outwardly) are strange to them. Contradictory, for example, are on the one hand Lenin's assertion that "as long as and to the extent that different nations form a unified state, the Marxists will not preach the federal principle of decentralization,"⁵⁴ and, on the other, the assertion put into all present theses on Russian-Ukrainian relations of the attaining by the Ukrainian people "of their age-old dream—the creation of their own... sovereign national state."⁵⁵ If it is remembered that, according to statements by Soviet authors, the Ukrainian political parties, did not reflect the aspirations of the people because they "employ all means to weaken the revolutionary movement"⁵⁶ and that instead they (the aspirations) are reflected by the Communist Party which, "united in its ranks the leading representatives of the workers of all nations and nationalities of former Russia,"⁵⁷ and which, "came out against federation as a form of state structure for Russia,"⁵⁸ then the question as to who, actually, fostered among the Ukrainians their "sacred dream" of a national state remains unanswered in contemporary Soviet literature.

Present-day Soviet sources try to avoid mentioning the rise of Ukrainian state consciousness in 1917 in order to hide its anti-Soviet and, thus, its anti-Bolshevik origin. Likholat, author of a monograph on the revolution in the Ukraine from 1917 to 1920, was unable to conceal the fact of the proclamation by the Central Rada of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, but tried to dispose of this great historical event in two lines namely, "In the Third Universal, the Central Rada proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (UNR)."⁵⁹ Other, less voluminous publications also attempt to escape mention of how the Ukrainian state came into being. Suprunenko, for instance, in his account of the Third Universal does not say a word about the proclamation of the UNR;⁶⁰ instead, speaking of the resolution of the Kharkov Soviet Congress of December 25, 1917, he mentions the "historical decision by which the Ukraine was proclaimed a Soviet republic."⁶¹ The phrase is so constructed that the unwary reader might read it as the Ukrainian "republic," that is, an individual state, was first proclaimed by the Kharkov Soviet Congress. A similar formulation is used by Chistyakov.⁶² Still another author, Kuritsyn, writing that the Kharkov Congress "recognized the Ukrainian Republic as a federated part of the Russian Republic,"⁶³ makes no mention about the origin of the former.

⁵⁴ Lenin, *Kriticheskie zametki po natsionalnomy voprosy* (Critical Notes on the National Problem), in Korablev, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁵⁵ O. Chistyakov, *Razvitie federativnykh otnoshenii mezhdru UkSSR i RSFSR* (The Development of Federal Relations between the UkSSR and the RSFSR), p. 14.

⁵⁶ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁵⁸ Zlatopolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁵⁹ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁶⁰ Suprunenko, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁶² Chistyakov, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁶³ Kuritsyn, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

We find the same in Sofronenko's work.⁶⁴ Attempting to impress upon the reader the idea of the historical and ideological necessity of the indivisible state bonds uniting the Ukraine with Russia, Soviet authors, when they are unable to explain any question—including that of the creation of the Ukrainian state—so as to make it acceptable as Soviet reality, tend to push its origins far into the past, hence the compulsory thesis of Lenin and Stalin as the “creators of the Ukrainian national state,”⁶⁵ and on the possibility of its creation only “with the brotherly aid of the Great Russian people.” In their desire to provide a foundation for the current obligatory line concerning the sovietization of the Ukraine, Soviet historians are obliged now and then to give extracts from Bolshevik documents of that time, which all point in the opposite direction. Thus, even today Soviet authors cannot avoid quoting certain passages of the ultimatum of the Council of People's Commissars to the Central Rada of December 17, 1917, when the former declared that it “recognizes the Democratic Ukrainian Republic, its right to separate from Russia or to conclude treaties with the Russian Republic.”⁶⁶ The existence at that time (that is, before the Kharkov Soviet Congress) of a Ukrainian state is consequently confirmed. Similarly, in the collection of documents, *The Creation of the USSR*, in the resolution of the First Oblast Congress of the RSDRP in Kiev are the lines, “The proclamation of the Ukrainian Republic by the Central Rada . . . was met sympathetically by the workers'-peasants' government (the Petrograd Council of People's Commissars).”⁶⁷ It is interesting that in Likholat's rather extensive work these lines do not appear. Nor is there anywhere in current Soviet publications comment on the fact that the Soviet regime in the Ukraine, until its removal in April 1918, officially assumed the designation “Ukrainian Democratic Republic” given by the Third Universal of the Central Rada to the Ukrainian State. Instead, in several works it is designated by the name it received a year later, the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, Suprunenko, for example, in an article on that period of the Soviet occupation of the Ukraine, calls his work “The Formation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.” Another author writes that “on January 8, 1918, the representatives of the Ukrainian SSR were received by Lenin and Stalin.”⁶⁸

A third asserts that the “First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.”⁶⁹

The Bolshevik Party was thus compelled to adopt the principles of Ukrainian statehood, hitherto alien and inimical, as a final form of the “neutralization” of the Ukrainian national movement. The problem of how far the Bolshevik dictatorship felt itself compelled to make concessions in this direction, was always resolved without regard for the concrete circumstances. Repeating Lenin's views on the subject, Likholat indicated that “the Communist Party always linked the solution of the national problem with that of the basic tasks

⁶⁴ Sofronenko, *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei* (The Union of the Ukraine and Russia), p. 55.

⁶⁵ S. M. Belousov, *I. V. Stalin—tvorets Ukrainskoi Radyanskoi Sotsyialistychnoi Derzhavy* (J. V. Stalin, The Creator of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist State), *Visnyk Akademii Nauk Ukrainskoi Radyanskoi Sotsyialistychnoi Respubliky*, Kiev, 1953, No. 3.

⁶⁶ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1954, p. 29.

⁶⁷ *Obrazovanie SSSR*, p. 66.

⁶⁸ Kuritsyn, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁶⁹ Sofronenko, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

of the revolution.”⁷⁰ It should be added that there, tasks had to take into account such factors as the strength of the national anti-Bolshevik resistance and allied social elements. Thus, the rise of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic obliged Lenin to accept the necessity of preserving the principle of Ukrainian statehood while gathering strength to eliminate it. In March 1918 the Second Congress of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Ekaterinoslav, facing the conclusion by Soviet Russia of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with its recognition of Ukrainian independence, declared emphatically, “in essence the relations of the Soviet republics remain as they were” and that “in the near future this formal federative bond must be renewed.”⁷¹ The events in the summer of 1918 led to the rank and file of the Communist Party assuming that the idea of Ukrainian statehood had been compromised among the masses because of the German occupation of the country and public reaction against the hetman regime. As a result, the First (constituent) Congress of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communist Party accepted the formula “for the revolutionary uniting of the Ukraine with Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the borders of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republics.”⁷² The question of preserving Ukrainian state integrity within the borders of Soviet Russia remained open. Instead, the circumstances that arose several months later led the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to create a separate Provisional Worker-Peasant Government of the Ukraine, treated as independent despite the fact that the international situation that had compelled this recognition of independence seven months previously (the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) no longer existed. The uniting of the Ukraine with Russia took place during the period 1918—1922 with emphasis on the Ukraine’s independent” character. The actual transfer of the main military and state functions to Moscow in the summer of 1919 took place at first on the basis of “independent” decisions of the UkSSR for example (the notorious decree of the VUTsVK of May 18, 1919). Diplomatic relations between the Ukraine and the RSFSR were based on a bilateral international agreement, the so-called Union Worker-Peasant Treaty of December, 28, 1922.

Political relations between Soviet Russia and the Ukraine during this period were conducted for the most part, not on the basis of past historical links, but for the sake of expediency and, most of all, the internationalist principles of Communism. The resolution of the Second Congress of Soviets in Ekaterinoslav was founded on the principle that soon “all Soviet republics will be united in a world socialist federation.”⁷³ Union with Soviet Russia is first and foremost an expression of solidarity with the ‘cradle of world-revolution’⁷⁴ and the USSR, created in 1922 is the prototype of the world union of socialist republics.”

Characteristic of current Soviet treatment of political and ideological relations between Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine is the great stress on the “historical” attraction of the thousand-years’ common heriage of the two nations and particularly the development of Russia’s leading role. Without any foundation for his statement, Stalin spoke of the historical unifying role of the

⁷⁰ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁷¹ Mazepa, *op. cit.*, I, p. 51.

⁷² Khrystyuk, *Ukrainska revolyutsiya* (The Ukrainian Revolution), Vienna, 1921, II, p. 153—154.

⁷³ Mazepa, *op. cit.*, I, p. 51.

⁷⁴ From a declaration of the Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of the Ukraine of January 26, 1919, quoted from Pankratova, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

"Great Russians" who were led by organized bourgeois military bureaucracy.⁷⁵ This Russian mission to unite all the nations of the present USSR (particularly the Ukrainians and the Belorussians) had another peculiarity: "The friendship of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples goes back into the depths of the ages; its origin is to be sought in the initial period of the formation of these peoples." Regardless of the social and political conditions of both countries, the "Ukrainian people has always aspired to a union with the Great Russian People."⁷⁶ In this "friendship" lies the particular role of the Russian peoples; "from time immemorial it has been the leader and the true comrade of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples."⁷⁷

As a rule, Soviet writers do not deal with certain features that might clarify some stages of the relations between the two nations, but rather limit themselves to simple description. Some facts, if they are at variance with the current ideological course, are simply eliminated. It is interesting to note that the treaty of union concluded between the RSFSR and the UkSSR on December 28, 1920, with its emphasis on the equality of both parties, is not considered in either its political or its legal aspects. In Likholat's extensive work just two concessions are made (on page 579). All the stress is placed on the "articles of union." Moreover no Soviet source states that part of the treaty dealing with the absence of any Ukrainian obligations arising out of her previously belonging to Russia.⁷⁸

Omitted, naturally, is mention of the internal Party differences in this struggle, still possible at that time, when the Party, although a centralized organ, had not yet achieved the monolithic form of the Stalin era. Generally, Soviet writers during the period of "socialist construction" avoid speaking frankly about the general "great-power" orientation of the Party unless it is in connection with the so-called enemies of the people, ultimately liquidated by Stalin. The reader is not presented with such facts as, for example, the censure by the Kiev Oblast Committee of a certain group of its members who proposed to establish a special Party organization for the Ukraine, which was termed as "anti-Party" and "antidisciplinary." In no work covering the Ukraine during the years 1917—1919 is there mention of the bitter disputes that took place during the first two Moscow congresses of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communist Party, which were closely concerned with past and future policy toward the Ukraine. It is characteristic that Suprunenko only hints at an anti-Ukrainian act of the Donbas Bolsheviks, who at that time constituted the majority of Ukrainian Bolsheviks. Not even a page is devoted to such an important issue as the attempt to separate the Donets and Krivoi Rog basins from the Ukraine by founding a separate "Donets-Krivoi-Rog Republic," existing from the end of January to April 1918. Criticizing certain workers' lack of understanding "of the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy and the necessity of strengthening the Ukrainian Soviet state,"⁷⁹ the author ignores Artes, who died before he had time to compromise himself with the Stalinist leadership.

⁷⁵ Stalin, *op. cit.*, II, p. 303—304.

⁷⁶ *Torzhestvo ideologii druzhby narodiv na Ukraini* (The Triumph of the Ideology of the Friendship of Peoples in the Ukraine), Kiev, 1953, p. 4.

⁷⁷ Pankratova, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁷⁸ The treaty of December 28, 1920.

⁷⁹ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1954, p. 39—40.

No less curious is the fact that Likholat in a work that appeared in the same year as Suprunenko's article, speaks of the creation of an "Autonomous Soviet Republic of the Donets and Krivoi Rog Basins" whose positive feature was that it transformed the region into an "important strong-point in the struggle against the occupiers."⁸⁰ The attempt to detach these basins from the Ukraine as early as the First Congress of Soviets at Kharkov is shown in the formulations: "In a resolution on the Donets and Krivoi Rog basins, the Congress vigorously protested against attempts by the White Guardists and the nationalists to take control of these regions."⁸¹

III

The social demagogy of Bolshevism and its propagandistic acknowledgement of certain principles advanced and practiced by the Ukrainian national movement, produced real success only during the first stage of Bolshevism's struggle for the Ukraine (January 1918—April 1919) that is, until the broad strata of the Ukrainian population had a chance to become acquainted not only with the propaganda, but also with the actual practices of Communist dictatorship. As the results of all elections having any degree of freedom show, the Bolsheviks were always in the minority. However, the energy of the Bolsheviks and the groups activated by them at first glance gives the impression of a great, mass Bolshevik movement. Concurrently, the tactics of "neutralization" and of social rather than national-political coloring produced results that were clever in that elements generally not in sympathy with Bolshevism lost, for a period of time, the impetus to fight against what was for them a relatively unknown movement. All these features seriously weakened the Ukraine's organized resistance to Bolshevik aggression at the time of the first and second Soviet campaigns.

However, the Communist occupation of the greater part of the Ukraine (April 1919) and the drastic measures taken by the Soviet authorities led to active Ukrainian resistance against Bolshevism. The resistance of organized Ukrainian national forces and the masses of the people could not be ignored by Soviet literature. "In the Ukraine," writes Likholat, "as the result of several historical facts, external conditions and the specific development of the countryside . . . the struggle against the bourgeois nationalists was exceptionally bitter, protracted and obstinate."⁸² This assertion is repeated several times by the author.

Of special interest are the features displayed by the Ukrainian population's resistance to the occupation. A Soviet historian, characterizing the situation in May 1919, quotes Lenin saying that "now in the Ukraine every group chooses a name, each freer than the next, one more democratic than the next; and there's a group in every district."⁸³ The author states that in April 1919 alone, that is, at the beginning of the mass uprisings, on Ukrainian territory occupied by the Soviets there were (93) kulak uprisings.⁸⁴ He was obliged to mention

⁸⁰ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 332—333.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

that the rebel group of the ataman Zeleny held several districts around Kiev in its power, and "in June 1919 in the region of Tripol beat up and tortured several hundred members of the Kiev Komsomol organization which had sent out its detachments to fight the group."⁸⁵ Likholat admitted further that former "soviet" tendencies of certain sectors of the Ukrainian population were far from being in agreement with Communist principles, Discussing the famous rebel leader, Grigoriev, who in May 1919 had shaken the entire Soviet regime in the Ukraine, the author tries to pass off the ataman's previous three months' soviet "orientation" as a sort of disguise.

The insurgent movement and its culmination—Grigoriev's exit with forces some 20,000 strong—threatened the Kremlin's long-range plans, in which the Ukraine was to be a military stronghold. Likholat does not mention this but rather limits himself to the assertion that "Grigoriev's revolt was a great danger to the Soviet authorities, for it took place in the immediate rear of the Red Army, which was fighting the White Guard Forces of General Denikin and had repulsed an attempt of the Petlyura band to break into the Ukraine from the West."—Further, he includes an excerpt from the appeal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in which it said: "At the time the Ukrainian Red Army is preparing to clean up Bessarabia and Bukovina of the Romanian landowners and extend its assistance to Red Hungary, the 'left' SR's and independents are again raising their arms against the Soviet authorities."⁸⁶

The defeat of Grigoriev did not bring a halt to insurgent activity, and in the latter half of July 1919 an organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communist Party declared, "The rebellious rural kulaks, like marsh bubbles, regularly rise up and burst, only to appear anew . . . the kulak element in a considerable number of places is still the lord of the village."⁸⁷ Communist attempts to mobilize men for the Red Army failed. According to Lenin, the situation of the Soviet regime in the Ukraine was such in midsummer 1919 that "the number of deserters reached many thousands."⁸⁸ And in many military units in the Ukraine, as before, "the partisan spirit reigned, frequently cases of refusal to carry out military orders were observed, absence without leave, etc."⁸⁹

At the beginning of August 1919, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communist Party declared that "the wave of kulak uprisings . . . is completely disorganizing the foundations of the Soviet structure" and is "the chief reason for the present situation in the Ukraine."⁹⁰ This mass action of the Ukrainian population—chiefly peasants—was in 1919 successfully opposing the spread of Communist power over the Ukraine. Likholat admits that, "The anti-Soviet insurgent kulaks and the hostile activity of the Petlyura bands . . . eased the path of the Denikin hordes and the newly-recruited army of the nationalistic "Directory."⁹¹

The new, third Soviet occupation of the Ukraine in the winter of 1919—1920 did not halt the resistance, and the march of Polish-Ukrainian forces on Kiev

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 340—341.

⁸⁷ *Kommunist*, Kiev, July 18, 1919.

⁸⁸ Lenin, *op. cit.*, XXIX, p. 426.

⁸⁹ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

⁹⁰ *Kommunist*, August 9, 1919.

⁹¹ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

in April and May 1920 only served to strengthen the insurgent movement. As a result, Felix Dzerzhinsky, the head of the All-Russian Cheka, was sent to the Ukraine. He felt that the "most necessary task of the moment is the eradication of the heart of this anti-Soviet activity."⁹²

The bitter struggle outlasted the military operations on the outer fronts, and did not stop even after the UNR regular army and other anti-Bolshevik forces had been compelled to cease their activity. In June 1921 the RNK of the Ukrainian SSR issued a special order on the fight against the partisan forces. Only the stabilization of the Soviet regime and the elimination of the external threat at the end of 1921 together with certain concessions to the population permitted the liquidation of mass anti-Communist partisan activity in 1922.

Considering the various aspects of the Bolshevik conquest of the Ukraine, it becomes clear that it could not have taken place merely by applying the means the Bolsheviks had at their disposal in the Ukraine from 1917 to 1921. The sovietization of the Ukraine (as well as of the majority of the other national regions of the former Empire) and its union with the former metropolis were possible only as the result of political and military action by the Communists. The methods we have examined above for either stirring up certain strata of the Ukrainian population or for weakening its power to resist could only be auxiliary to the basic action—the political and military conquest of the country from beyond her borders.

The state of the relationship between the former metropolis and the national outlying regions was expressed by Stalin in a somewhat hazy manner as follows: "Inner Russia, with her industrial and cultural-political centers... with a homogeneous, predominantly Russian, population in the national sense... was transformed on the basis of a revolution. Outlying Russia, however, ... was transformed on the basis of a counterrevolution."⁹³ From this arose Bolshevism's tasks with respects to the so-called outlying regions. Its political program did not admit the possibility of breaking up the old Empire, as a spacious arena for the struggle for the future "socialist republic,"⁹⁴ and as a unit that "had progressive significance in the struggle against feudal breakup."⁹⁵ The fundamental aim of Russia, led by the dictatorship of the proletariat was to transform the "old, compulsory unity of tsarist Russia into a multinational socialist state."⁹⁶

In the face of such ideological and political premises held by the Bolshevik "revolutionary reformer" of Russia, the slogan "self-determination" put forward by her leaders was nothing but an empty declaration. Still, relying on such slogans, including that of "voluntariness," in order to preserve the unity of the old Empire, Lenin from time to time had to employ considerable elasticity. He began with recognition, or rather semi-recognition, of the new Ukrainian state. It is characteristic that Soviet authors no longer dare analyze in detail the state of Soviet-Ukrainian relations at that initial period in order to avoid damaging the prestige of the dictatorship. To this end and quite contrary to historical fact, the telegram of the Council of People's Commissars to the Central Rada is today shamefully called the "Manifesto to the Ukrainian People with Conditions of Ultimatum to the Central Rada," (Likholat, Suprunenko, and

⁹² *Kommunist*, May 9, 1919.

⁹³ Stalin, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 275—286.

⁹⁴ Lenin, *op. cit.*, VI, 293—294.

⁹⁵ *Obrazovanie SSSR*, p. 5.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

others). This note went into Soviet legislative and governmental records under the rather vague title, "Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the Recognition of the Ukrainian Republic and on Transmitting to the Central Rada an Ultimatum Regarding its Counterrevolutionary Activity."⁹⁷

The Petrograd Council of People's Commissars recognized the "Democratic Ukrainian Republic" as a political (and legal) reality even at the time no Soviet government existed there. In recognizing the republic and presenting an ultimatum to the Council was in fact recognizing the Rada as the actual government of the Ukraine. At the same time, the ultimatum and the threat of war represented intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state that had just been recognized. These facts are not touched upon by Soviet historians.

The above-mentioned intervention was a fact even before the ultimatum of December 17, 1917. Commissar for Nationality Problems, Stalin, in a proposition to the representative of the Kiev Oblast Committee on November 30, 1917, called on him "to head the struggle to convene an All-Ukrainian congress of soviets."⁹⁸ On the next day at the formation of the Kharkov Congress of Soviets inspired by a member of the Petrograd Soviet government, the latter promised the "new government of the fraternal republic complete and close support."⁹⁹

This support was expressed chiefly in that "detachments were sent from Soviet Russia to Kharkov and also to Ekaterinoslav... these detachments occupied all the most important railroad lines," and "with the aid of units of the Red Guard sent from Russia, in the second half of December the Gaidamak units were destroyed... and Soviet authority was established in the regions of Lozova, Pavlograd and Sinelnikovo."¹⁰⁰

To give some notion of the nature of the first Soviet campaign in the Ukraine, the words of a rather popular (although no longer mentioned) order of the Soviet commander Muravev should be mentioned, which was proclaimed on the occasion of the capture of Kiev in February 1918: "We have brought this authority [Soviet] from the far North on the points of our bayonets, and where it has been established we shall maintain it by the force of those bayonets."¹⁰¹

The concluding of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by Soviet Russia in March 1918, the Soviet recognition of Ukrainian independence and the promise to cease hostilities against the Central Rada did not, in fact, bring a halt to military action until the Soviet armies had been forced out of the Ukraine by the Ukrainian and Austro-Hungarian armed forces. Stalin announced that the "patriotic war begun in the Ukraine hoped for support from the whole of Soviet Russia." At the same time, in Kuritsyn's words, "the Kharkov base was supplemented by soldiers and commanders from Moscow and Petrograd."¹⁰²

The second Bolshevik campaign against the Ukraine was likewise carried out by the forces of the RSFSR, but this time by those already located there. According to Kuritsyn, on November 11, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR issued a directive to the Revolutionary Military Council

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹⁸ *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1954, p. 30.

⁹⁹ Kuritsyn, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁰⁰ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹⁰¹ Khrystyuk, *op. cit.*, II, p. 149.

¹⁰² Kuritsyn, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

of the Ukrainian Front, which included "along with units of the First and Second Ukrainian Soviet divisions (formed, armed, for the most part, in the RSFSR and subordinate to the Soviet command) . . . the Moscow Workers' Division, the Third Division, the Second Orlovsk Brigade, the Second Armored Train, units of the Eleventh Frontier District and others."¹⁰³ In general, all Soviet military formations in the Ukraine, even those made up of local personnel, became units of the "All-Russian Red Army," and "were subordinate to the unified command."¹⁰⁴

Thus, the Red campaign against the Ukraine in November-December 1918 was initiated by the forces of the RSFSR, headed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Ukrainian Front appointed by the Moscow Council of People's Commissars.

It is interesting to note that present-day Soviet writers do not discuss the Kiev treaty of June 12, 1918, between the Ukraine and the RSFSR, providing for the cessation of hostilities by both parties during peace negotiations. The negotiations, which the Soviet side dragged out because it had no intention of concluding a peace, were unsuccessful, and, on November 3, 1918, the delegation of the RSFSR, headed by Manuilsky, left Kiev. At the same time Ukrainian consulates withdrew from Soviet Russia. (These were set up in several Soviet Russian cities after the armistice agreement of June 1918.) However, neither side declared that the armistice provisions were no longer in force.

A decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of November 11, 1918, showed Moscow's intention to begin military action in the Ukraine. According to the notes of Antonov-Ovseenko (a Soviet commander later liquidated as a Trotskyite by the Stalin regime), the decree of the Council of People's Commissars ordered the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR "to begin within ten days an offensive with the support of the workers and peasants of the Ukraine who had rebelled against the hetman."¹⁰⁵ The date of the decree (the first day of the German revolution and of the German capitulation to the Allies) shows that the Kremlin had not timed its offensive with a view to supporting the Ukrainian workers and peasants, who, indeed, had not yet rebelled (the uprising headed by the Directory began on November 15), on the expectation that the German armies would withdraw from the Ukraine. However, the offensive of the army on the Ukrainian Front developed considerably later, on December 6, that is, after the Germans had begun to abandon the demarcation line between the Ukraine and the RSFSR.¹⁰⁶ Until then, the activities of the "Group of the Kursk Direction" (at the beginning, it had the veiled designation of the "Ukrainian Front"), begun on November 20,¹⁰⁷ had been local in scope.

True, the December offensive had already developed at the time of the anti-hetman rebellion; however it was directed not against support of the hetman declared on November 11, but on the contrary, it was a blow in the rear of the Directory, which was engaged in a struggle with the hetman government. Likholat's assertion that the Soviet forces at that time were engaged in action

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁴ Chistyakov, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁰⁵ Mazepa, *op. cit.*, I, p. 70.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁰⁷ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

against the Germans and the hetman¹⁰⁸ does not correspond to the facts and is without documentary foundation. The reasons for this offensive are easy to see in the speech of Epshtein-Yakovlev, a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communist Party, before a session of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the RSFSR and representatives of the Central Committee. As Antonov-Ovseenko testifies, Epshtein announced that, "although the workers and many peasants . . . are on our side, nevertheless, without the transfer of a significant part of the Red Army, there, little hope not only for the success of the revolutionary [Bolshevik] movement, but even for its breaking out."¹⁰⁹ Antonov further relates that some Ukrainian Communists¹¹⁰ were even inclined to view the campaign of the Soviet armies as an "occupation of the Ukraine by Great Russian units."¹¹¹ In all further military operations connected with the conquest of the Ukraine, the already-mentioned units of the Ukrainian front formed the basic military force. Some Ukrainian formations that at the beginning had fallen under the influence of Soviet slogans (the units of Zeleny and Grigoriev, etc.) soon turned against the Soviet authorities. As far as reinforcing the Ukrainian front was concerned, according to Kuritsyn, "soldiers came from the Moscow, Orel, Petrograd military regions of the RSFSR."¹¹²

The military organization of the Ukraine was included within the framework of the RSFSR military system, "for the immediate assistance of the all-Russian general staff."¹¹³ According to a decision of May 18, 1919, and a directive of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "On Uniting the Soviet Republics . . . for the Struggle Against World Imperialism," a separate Red Army of the Soviet Ukraine ceased to exist, and Ukrainian contingents were put at the disposal of the unified military organization of the RSFSR. At the time of the third Soviet campaign in the Ukraine, no attempts were made to create a separate Ukrainian Red Army, although it was requested by certain Ukrainian fellow-travelers of the Soviet government.

In accordance with a declaration of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee of January 20, 1920, "On Military Policy in the Ukraine," the Ukraine was to be completely subordinated to the RSFSR in military matters. It stated that "all the territory of the liberated Ukraine . . . is to form two military regions which will be part of the general organizational system of the Federated Republic."¹¹⁴

The relative importance of Russian Soviet forces in the struggle for the Ukraine was defined by the "Manifesto" of the IV All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, issued at the time of the Polish-Ukrainian campaign in the heart of the Ukraine in May 1920, announcing that "Soviet Russia is rushing to our assistance. The crack Soviet regiments that defeated Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin have been transferred to the Ukraine. The Russian workers and peasants are hurrying to our aid."¹¹⁵ It is interesting that at this very Congress, Shumsky

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted from Mazepa, *op. cit.*, I, p. 70.

¹¹⁰ Of the four members of the Revolutionary Military Council, two represented the Ukrainian Bolsheviks (Pyatakov and Zatonsky), the others (and most important) represented the military command of the RSFSR (Ovseenko) and its government (Stalin).

¹¹¹ Mazepa, *op. cit.*, I, p. 71.

¹¹² Kuritsyn, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹¹³ Chistyakov, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹¹⁵ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

characterized Bolshevism's struggle for the Ukraine quite differently, saying that "the Ukraine is that big village, which is fighting proletarian Russia."¹¹⁶

It is quite natural that during the struggle to conquer the Ukraine, the direct participation of the RSFSR was not limited to the sending of armed forces but also consisted of the direct supervision of the country's sovietization and its political and administrative subordination to Moscow.

"After the victory of the armed uprising in the decisive regions of the country—Petrograd, Moscow and the central provinces," writes Likholat, "the Central Committee of the Party, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars organized the dispatch, to all the most important cities and district centers of the country, of commissars, instructors, agitators and Red Guard detachments, to aid local Party organizations in establishing Soviet authority. Among the many other places to which representatives were sent... were the Donbas, Kharkov, Chernigov, Poltava and Volynsk provinces..."¹¹⁷

After the Petrograd Council of People's Commissars had received a picture of the situation in the Ukraine and had achieved the creation of a Kharkov Central Executive Committee, it, sent S. Ordzhonikidze to the Ukraine (January 1, 1918).

That he was not merely a representative of his government accredited to the Kharkov center is clear from Likholat's remark on the nature of his activities. Ordzhonikidze "did great work in straightening out the food situation. In a short time under his leadership, food detachments were set up which organized the supplying of the workers in Ekaterinoslav, the Donbas and other industrial centers of the country." Afterward Ordzhonikidze received Lenin's personal thanks and was given the task of continuing the job "with all his might."¹¹⁸ The author does not explain why the business of supplying Ukrainian cities with food was the duty of the Russian representative rather than that of the Ukrainian government.

During this period, the Ukraine was temporarily lost to the Soviet dictatorship (the summer and fall of 1918), the pursuance of political and underground sabotage activity on her territory was concentrated completely in the hands of Moscow. "The aid of the Communist Party and the Soviet government to the Ukraine was expressed above all in the Central Committee of the Communist Party furnishing direct leadership for the activity of Bolshevik organizations in the Ukraine. On orders of the Communist Party, experienced Party workers were sent to the Ukraine from Russia to organize the underground."¹¹⁹

The shortage of reliable local cadres was noted by Lenin during the second campaign. "Cries come from our Ukrainian comrades," he wrote, "that there is no one to organize a Soviet government, there is no apparatus, there is no proletarian center such as Moscow. Kiev is not a proletarian center; the Donets Basin, tormented by hunger, has not been liberated from the Cossacks... the workers of the South have come to us for help!"¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ *Kommunist*, May 20, 1920.

¹¹⁷ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 74—75.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹²⁰ Lenin, *op. cit.*, XXIX, p. 65.

Thus, "at the beginning of 1919, by a decree of the People's Commissariat of Food, about three thousand workers were sent to the Ukraine. Included were labor union workers, and others from the fields of transportation, metallurgy, coal, cooperatives and so on. Thanks to the fraternal assistance of the Russian workers, the constant care of the Central Committee of the Party, the work of creating a new social structure assumed wider proportions with each succeeding day.¹²¹ From the categories of workers sent to the Ukraine it is clear that it was not so much a lack of properly qualified cadres as their unreliability and Moscow's need to gain direct control over specific areas. Indeed, it appears very strange from the standpoint of efficiency to send to the Ukraine, which possessed the greater part of the coal industry of the former empire, miners from the central provinces where there is no coal, as well as cooperative workers to a country, renowned for its progressive cooperative movement.

It is interesting that Moscow didn't even trust local Party forces. In the first Party purge in the Ukraine, in May 1919, "great help in this matter" was afforded by the RSKP, which, "in April 1919 sent more than 100 persons to the Ukraine for Party and soviet work."¹²² During the Soviet government's third return to the Ukraine, the organizational "assistance" of the center was even greater, and "from December 1919 to April 1920 more than 1000 Party workers were sent to the Ukraine from the Army with passes provided by the RSKP."¹²³ Similarly, in the summer of 1920, 500 more Communists were sent from Russia.¹²⁴ One of the Kremlin's special tasks was that of providing the occupied territories with reliable police personnel. The "Group of the Kursk Direction" included two regiments of the All-Russian Cheka. In summer 1920 "by order of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, elite units of the internal defense army were sent from the RSFSR to the Ukraine."¹²⁵

During the period 1917—1921 the conquest of the Ukraine was not merely a distant goal of the Red dictatorship: To a considerable degree it was bound up with the desire to continue the exploitation of the country's resources, chiefly food, raw materials and fuel, lost as a result of the Ukraine's separation from Russia. The first step in this direction was the appointment of Ordzhonikidze as commissar. During the second campaign Lenin particularly emphasized that "in the Ukraine there are great stores of surplus grain," which it is true, "are difficult to remove all at once."¹²⁶ The "Group of the Kursk Direction" included three "food regiments," and in June 1919 the Ukrainian and Russian food commissariats were united in a single organ.¹²⁷

Before the unification, during the first half of 1919, "2,700 workers were sent from Moscow and Petrograd and put at the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Food of the Ukraine." In July of the same year 46 food detachments "from Moscow, Petrograd, Kronstadt, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Smolensk, Bryansk, Chui and other cities of Soviet Russia" were operating and "distinguished themselves by their discipline and their great consciousness of the work of the

¹²¹ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 265—266.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 331.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 414.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 477.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

¹²⁶ Lenin, *op. cit.*, XXIX, p. 291, cf. Likholat, p. 295.

¹²⁷ Yu. Yu. Kondufor, *Robitnychi prodovolchi zagony na Ukraini v 1919 rotsi* (Workers' Food-Collecting Units in the Ukraine in 1919), Kharkov, 1953, p. 33.

revolution." The attempts of the Ukrainian Commissariat to set up its own food detachments were not very successful. "The basic nucleus," at any rate, had to consist of "persons who had had experience in work in Soviet Russia."¹²⁸ The attempt to create a so-called food militia locally was not successful, and a historian refers to its initiators as "Trotskyite nationalist elements."¹²⁹

The bitter war for Ukrainian grain, however, because of the "weakness of the food system in the Ukraine and the bitter resistance of the kulaks did not provide an opportunity to develop the procurement of agricultural products."¹³⁰ By the end of summer 1919 the expeditions of the food army provided the RSFSR with 2,621,622 poods of foodstuffs and 800—900,000 poods of flour for the army.¹³¹ In return "Soviet Russia gave the Ukraine great assistance in the form of cadres of specialists and technical personnel" and provided "the Ukraine with currency to develop trade."¹³²

The course of events during the first eight revolutionary months of 1917 clearly shows that the Ukraine had set out to develop its own political and social life on a democratic basis. At this time the foundation was laid for a new order corresponding to these principles and traditions of its national history. The ideas introduced in November by the October revolution were in their essence strange and inimical to the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian people. The creation of a totalitarian "dictatorship of the proletariat" on the territory of the former metropolis accelerated the process of the Ukraine's political formation and brought Ukrainian organized forces and the majority of the Ukrainian people into a bitter struggle against this dictatorship and its emissaries.

This dictatorship showed itself unable to achieve its ideological goals and realize its political plans without maintaining the old great power complex as a base together with its rule over the Ukraine. To this end the Bolsheviks employed all possible methods and forms of action, from attempts at internal revolution to armed attack from without.

Today's tactics of Soviet ideological influence attempt to inculcate into the reader the idea that the existing political and social structure in the Ukraine—as well as throughout the USSR—is historically good and the only possible result of social progress. Because of its unity with the former metropolis, the Ukraine was permitted to develop along this path alone. "Without the self-sacrificing struggle and heroism of the Russian workers and peasants fighting in the ranks of the Red Army on the fields of the Ukraine and other fronts during the Civil War, the Ukrainian people would not have been able... to create the necessary conditions for the building of socialism,"¹³³ is the summary of the Russian contribution as given by one of the authors most cited in this article.

¹²⁸ Likholat, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 314—315.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 291.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 620.

Planned Economy in the Ukraine

S. YU. PROCIUK

With the exception of the comparatively short period of war Communism and the beginning of NEP, the industry of the Ukraine has always been subordinated to the directives of planned economy. Soviet administration has distorted and disfigured these directives, but nevertheless the principles of planned economy are fundamental for the Ukrainian industry today.

The application of planned economy started even before NEP when, on February 22, 1921, the Soviet government passed the statute of the first State Planning Commission (*Gosplan*). However, the impact and importance of *Gosplan* in 1925—1927 was not very forceful and its activities lay at that time in determining what were designated control figures of the national economy which the administration at that time did not consider as compulsory. In the Ukraine especially, these control indices were of little consequence and the Ukrainian *Narkomats* of that time did not feel them to be binding. The application of the planned principles of economy found a noticeable obstacle during the NEP period because there were simultaneously two sectors of enterprise, socialist and private. Between 1922—1927, even foreign capital in the USSR had certain concessions. At that time 2,211 offers were received from abroad, 782 from Germany, 223 from Great Britain, 205 from America and 174 from France of which 163 were accepted; however the beginning of 1928 only 92 concessions¹ were still in operation.

The development of the socialist and private sectors depended on the relative importance of each sector in the country's economy. Difficulties were caused by the fact that the control figures of the national economy appeared for the first time only in 1925—1926. These figures, as well as those for 1926—1928, were only partly accepted by the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine and by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party as a basis for their plans concerning the national economy. During that initial period *Gosplan* was drawing up rather general theoretical plans, inspired by the administration, but meanwhile the real planning was carried out by the appropriate *Narkomats*, the Economic Council attached to the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR (this was later changed to the Economic Administration of the Ukrainian SSR), the Institute for the Study of the Economic Situation, attached to the *Narkomat* of Finance and the Ukrainian Chamber of Trade which acted more or less independently in the interests of the Ukraine and which was probably less influenced by pressure from Moscow, than by the *Gosplan* of the Ukrainian SSR which was itself only an advisory organ.

¹ B. Butovskij, "Foreign concessions in the national economy of the USSR." Moscow, 1928.

A net-work of statistical offices in the oblasts, raions and towns was organised to aid the *Gosplan* of the Ukraine and this was headed by the Central Statistical Administration attached to the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. During the NEP period this administration worked as a separate body and only in 1931, after it had changed its name and had been re-organized into the Central Office of National Economic Management, did it become, to some extent, part of *Gosplan*; this was on the strength of decrees issued by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on May 9, 1931 and March 10, 1932. The existence of socially diverse sectors of industry and agriculture in the Ukraine, did not permit their general development during the first Five Year Plan and *Gosplan* could only partly influence such development.

The first really binding annual plan for the whole economy of the country was worked out by *Gosplan* as late as 1931, that is in the third year of the first Five Year Plan. But even then, a whole number of sectors of the national economy were still outside the framework of *Gosplan* activities, for instance the military side of industry, wages planning and so on. Only during the second Five Year Plan. But even then, a whole number of sectors of the national various bodies which tended to give *Gosplan* the last word. At that time *Gosplan*'s activities were divided into two principle groups:

1. Co-ordination of planning,
2. Sector planning of the country's economy.

Naturally the Ukrainian *Gosplan* was re-organised; special attention was devoted to that aspect of the plan which reflected the financial side of the changes and of industrial development, investment, costs of production and so on.²

After the second Five Year Plan, the disproportionately large differences in the growth of separate branches of the economy were revealed and this led to yet another re-organization of *Gosplan*, which centralized its activities even more. The fundamental aim of the new reform was to strengthen the control over plan fulfilment. Henceforth, the results of the quarterly plans were published in the press and the importance of *Gosplan* as an independent body began gradually to decrease by the 1938 reform. *Gosplan* for the entire USSR appointed its plenipotentiaries in the republics and oblasts; they were nominated by the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR, who were responsible, not to the Republican Planning Commission, but to *Gosplan* for the whole USSR.³ The Ukrainian *Gosplan* and the Planning Commission attached to the oblasts and municipal executive committees in the Ukraine must follow strictly the instructions of *Gosplan* from Moscow, both in its methods of planning and in its control of plan fulfilment. The time was past when the guiding principles of planned economy in the Ukraine were determined according to the needs of the country by such important figures as Hrynko, who worked out and supported the principle of what was known as horizontal planning, contrary to the principle of vertical planning (centralization) supported by Moscow, Volobuyev who exposed the colonial character of the Ukraine's economy in the economic system of the USSR, and Skrypnyk who just before his suicide, was for a short time Chairman of the Ukraine's *Gosplan*.

² See an article the Chairman of Gosplan, V. Mezhlauk, in *Planovoe khozyaistvo* (Planned Economy), 1935, No. 4.

³ "The bulletin of financial and economic legislation," Moscow, 1938, 1940, No. 3—4.

From 1939—1941 a number of further changes were made in the structure of state planning. The most important of these changes was the complete subordination of all the agencies of the Central Office of National Economic Management to *Gosplan* organs⁴ and the inclusion into the program on planning work of restricted industrial problems such as technical improvements, inventions, rationalization methods and so on.⁵

It is a little known fact that in 1941 the Ukrainian *Gosplan* was given a directive to work out a fifteen year plan for the economic development of the Ukraine, naturally within the regional system of the USSR, but World War II prevented the realization of this project.

The fundamental part in planning procedures is played by the method of material balances. Such balances are composed of two parts, the first concerns resources and the second, the distribution of production.

In the first, all the sources which are used for a given product are determined qualitatively. Recently they have, according to Soviet sources, formed in nearly all sectors of industry, 90%—95% of socialist production; 5%—10% is allocated for imports and the utilization of production surpluses accumulated by the suppliers and consumers. On the other hand, production is divided into output proper and into those parts of production which are used for the needs of enterprise, investment, market funds, export, the supplementing of state reserves and the special needs of the state. The preparation of detailed material balances is compulsory in all sectors of production which belong to the category of production funds. These include output in the most important sectors of the national economy, especially heavy industry, electricity, and some of the principle products of agriculture. At the beginning of 1952, the list of different kinds of production in the Ukraine covered by compulsory control through the system of material balances, included 1,650 items.

Apart from the qualitative determination of sources of a given product, the currency ascertainment of its components is also carried out. This has been caused by the currency and goods turnover in the USSR.

The following guiding principles⁶ bind the employees of *Gosplan* and the supply administration in the distribution of the means of production;⁷ (this applies above all to the All-Union and republic *Gossnab* [state supplies] and *Gosprodsnab* [state production supplies]⁸ which also play an important part in the working out of material balances):

1. To satisfy primarily the needs of investment and only then the needs of current production; this applies first to such goods and materials as rolled metal, timber, cement and so on.

⁴ *Planovoe khozaystvo*, No. 1, p. 23, and No. 11, p. 126.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 12, 1940, pp. 8—9.

⁶ By the law of March 15, 1953, *Gossnab* and *Gosprodsnab* were united with *Gosplan* and H. P. Kosyachenko became its Chairman. (See the decree of the joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, of March 7, 1953).

⁷ Production as a rule is divided into two parts in the Ukrainian SSR; the means of production (products of heavy industry) and the implements of utilization (products of light industry).

⁸ E. Lokshyn, "The distribution of the means of production under socialism," *Bol-shevik*, Moscow, No. 1, 1952.

2. To satisfy the needs of those sectors which produce the means of production (heavy industry) and only in second place the needs of the production of consumer goods (light industry).

3. To satisfy the needs of the purely state enterprise (especially those of All-Union importance) and only then the needs of the kolkhoz and co-operative systems.⁹

The final distribution of material funds is carried out by the Central State Planning and Supply bodies and also the All-Union ministries. The appropriate bodies in the Ukraine (*Gosplan*, The State Supplies of the Ukrainian SSR and the republican ministries) have more an advisory position. Only in the cooperative system, are certain material funds distributed by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. But even here, the distribution of the most important material funds is centralized as much as possible by official Soviet elements in the Ukraine. In 1940 only 11% in the general turnover of goods was distributed independently from Moscow by 40 of the most important republic co-operative unions.¹⁰

Uncritical application of the directives mentioned above and a progressive degeneration of the healthy principles of planned economy, especially in recent years, has led to distinct manifestations of state capitalism in the USSR.

It was probably in 1952, that the Soviet government decided to defend Soviet capitalism by the issue of a number of new theses. The transformation of the guiding principles of planned economy began, in fact, with a change in the guiding principles of Soviet statistics. The conference of the Central Statistical Administration and representatives of republic statistical agencies which was held on February 20—21, 1950, accepted the aims of statistics in the USSR. In April 1952, these were defined more clearly in connection with the project of publishing a new standard manual of statistics for Soviet universities.

The new principles of statistical work were simultaneously introduced in the Ukraine.¹¹ According to these, statistical research in the Ukraine must correspond to the principles of the binding internal and external policy of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine; therefore the state could no longer reveal and explain economic and social or even national phenomena and changes in the Ukraine, but merely "illustrate" them. In other words, the socialist economic directives of the Party and government must form a base for and serve as a guide to statistical research and not viceversa. Statistics, at present, are denied the distinction of being recognised as an exact, pure science; according to the present official formulation, it is only one branch of the social sciences and as such cannot deal with research and the interpretation of natural phenomena, upon the utilisation of which the Soviet planned economy is, apparently, based. In view of this, Ukrainian statisticians are categorically forbidden to use the well-known theory of probability. All these measures were taken in order to decrease the importance and meaning for statistics which, of course, reveal a number of fundamental shortcomings in the Ukraine's economy, such as the unprofitableness of a number of branches of heavy industry, the exploitation by

⁹ "Socialist property" in the Soviet régime has two forms, that of state property and that of the kolkhoz and co-operative systems.

¹⁰ *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 9, 1940, pp. 126—127.

¹¹ *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 1, 1950. The official organ of the Central Statistical Bureau attached to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

the Kremlin of Ukrainian wealth, or show an unusually slow improvement in the living standards of the Ukrainian population which is not in proportion, either to the natural wealth of the country nor to the scale of industrial expansion. Soviet statistics are at present approached by everyone with the utmost caution.¹²

Especially when analyzing planned figures relating to the production of separate branches of industry, it is necessary to distinguish between these figures and the actual ones which sometimes constitute only a certain percentage of the former, sometimes greater, but usually smaller. In order to illustrate how large the changes can be, we shall instance the production of railroad freight trucks throughout the USSR according to the 1947 plan; the Ukraine was to produce 43,500¹³ trucks, but in fact only 29,900 were manufactured.¹⁴ On the whole, the differences are not so extreme. This article clearly indicates planned figures which relate to the industry of the Ukraine.

Only in recent years (1949—1950) *Gosplan* decided under an agreement with the Politbureau to switch over to evaluating production at current prices, but as late as 1953 the new method was not fully established.¹⁵ It seems that the only exception in this respect prior to World War II, was the secret plan for 1941¹⁶ in which prices were fixed as for 1940. The following examples illustrate the differences in evaluation:

Branch of production	Value of production (millions of roubles)	
	In fixed prices.	In actual prices.
	1926—1927	1940
Heavy Machine construction	3,780	4,752
Medium Machine construction	8,850	9,810
General Machine construction	2,730	2,875

These figures reveal a simultaneous process of lowering the value of the rouble. As a result of such differences and financial ambiguity, a tendency has appeared in the West to value the production of countries embraced by the Soviet régime in American dollars;¹⁷ Stalin's on works on the problems of economy, published with a great deal of noise in 1952, represent a new and unequivocal proof of the degeneration of Soviet planned economy.

¹² On the subject of Soviet statistics, good studies have appeared in the western world such as N. Jasny's "International organisations and Soviet statistics," *The Journal of the American Statistical Association*, March, 1950; Stuart & Ricz, "Statistical conceptions in the Soviet Union examined from generally accepted scientific viewpoints," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Harvard, February, 1952.

¹³ The national economic plan for 1937, *Gosplan* of the USSR, Moscow, 1937, pp. 80—81.

¹⁴ The third Five Year Plan in the development of the national economy of the USSR (1918—1942), *Gosplan* of the USSR, Moscow, 1939, p. 207.

¹⁵ A. I. Rothstein: "The problems of industrial statistics of the USSR." Lenin-grad 1936—1947, Vol. 1, pp. 241—252; Vol. 3, p. 60. Y. A. Joffe: "The planning of industrial production," Moscow, 1948, p. 92.

¹⁶ This plan was obtained by western experts as a result of World War II.

¹⁷ See a valuable work by A. Gerschenkron: "A dollar index of Soviet Machinery Output," 1927—1928—1937. Rand Publications, USA, 1951, p. 357.

The new theses of official Soviet economic policy emerged as an answer to discussions, which began in November 1951 and were concerned with the problem of preparing a new manual of political economy.

There are several reasons to assume that this textbook will replace in many respects, the well known "Short Course in the History of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks." The dead-line for the manuscript presentation of the new manual for approval by the Central Committee of the Communist Party was set for February 1, 1953. An answer to the November discussions was also necessary as a number of eminent economists led by Yaroshenko and acting probably in good faith, exposed the present distorted state of economics under the Soviet régime in their works. Moreover they even made it clear that they supported this type of economy. They gave a number of definitions and directives which were either being applied then, or which could be applied in the near future and all qualified the present economic policy of Moscow, especially in the Ukraine, as one of state capitalism, of an exploiting, anti-human and anti-national pattern.¹⁸ The main object of Stalin's newly announced economic theses was to camouflage any manifestation of capitalism, cover the most blatant facts of the exploitation by a number of empty and high sounding phrases. However a careful analysis of them reveals in full the colonial dependence of nations within the economic system of the USSR.

The greater part of the economic theses announced in 1952 were devoted to defending the need for the profitability of production under a socialist economy and to guiding the value of production by currency laws. It is interesting to note the persistent efforts made to persuade the citizens of countries under Soviet occupation that the law of values is not a sign of capitalism or at least, not under all conditions.

The weak side of this argument is the need to defend increased productivity per worker, which conceals behind its very well-known Soviet norms, the *Stakhanovite* movement, shock workers and so on. On the one hand, the theses emphasized that the fundamental principle of a capitalist economy is maximal profit, and on the other hand, it is proposed to introduce this principle, but under another name, rejecting the term "additional work" (*Mehrarbeit* a term coined by Marx), because *de facto* this same principle of maximal profit is being forcibly applied in the economy of the Ukrainian SSR. The term "additional work" is condemned as, apparently, unsuitable under conditions of a socialist planned economy.

In view of the generally prevailing discontent among the masses, as a result of the permanent shortage and poor quality of consumer goods, some economists felt during the discussion of 1951—1952 that it was highly necessary to satisfy the needs of the population.

The economic law of socialism, according to Yaroshenko, states literally that it is a drive toward "increasing a wider and more perfect provision for the

¹⁸ "The economic problems of socialism in the USSR," *Bolshevik* of September 15, 1952, and also the following article, "The answer to Comrade A. I. Notkin" of April 21, 1952, "On the mistakes of Comrade D. D. Yaroshenko" of May 2, 1952, "Answer to Comrades A. P. Sanina and V. H. Venzher" of September 28, 1952.

¹⁹ There is no doubt that the thoughts expressed by Yaroshenko and other economists were brought about by the influence of opinions of the new Soviet professional intelligentsia.

material and cultural living needs of the community." Stalin's new economic theses theoretically proclaimed the same principle but simultaneously supplemented it "with the aid of the growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of the latest technical achievements. Therefore the prerequisite for satisfying the needs of the population is increased production and it is explained that before living standards become higher, the people will have to work harder, with more perseverance and greater productivity. There are clear indications of intensified norms, labor discipline and so on.

The economic theses revised by Stalin clearly defended the priority of heavy industry. This defense does not surprise us because the present Soviet trading system in the Ukraine is simply one of exploiting the Ukrainian population. For example it is known, that prior to World War II, the state paid kolkhozes and kolkhozniks about 10 kopecks for one kilogram of wheat and at the same time sold in the state shops to these very peasants one kilogram of black bread for 90 kopecks and one kilogram of brown bread for 1 rouble 50 kopecks. One kilogram of rye was bought by the state for 6,4 kopecks and one kilogram of rye bread cost 70 kopecks or even more in the shops, depending on the raion.²⁰ It can be seen what profit the régime makes from trade in foodstuffs alone from the fact that as early as 1939 the *Narkomat* of the food industry received 29.7% of all turnover trade, although its part in overall production was only 11.7%.²¹

There are even more graphic examples in the consumer goods trade; for instance, the price of one meter of woolen material in 1949 was approximately 97 roubles 20 kopecks and the turnover tax on it was as much as 54 roubles 25 kopecks, that is 66%; after a certain lowering of prices in 1951 this type of material cost 85 roubles 55 kopecks per meter, of which 52 roubles 50 kopecks was tax, that is still 61%.²² The statement that official Soviet economic policy aims at the securing of maximal satisfaction and continuously increasing the material and cultural needs of the whole population is, in the light of such facts, an empty phrase.

It is indeed so false that it was not even recognised by certain Soviet economists who expressed their anxiety that the new theses would give supremacy to consumption over production. Despite the fact that Stalin's retort to these anxieties is so well camouflaged ("On the mistakes of Comrade L. D. Yaroshenko," *Bolshevik*, September 1952), it is still quite clear that no thought is given to the priority of production and even less to that of consumption. It was simply a matter of increasing the military potential of the USSR as a means of internal and external imperialism, camouflaged by false ideology.²³

By comparing the increase of overall production in the post-war years, Soviet sources make various calculations concerning the growth of the national

²⁰ S. Oleksiyenko: "Gosplan of the USSR," a series of articles in the weekly *Pronin*, Salzburg, Austria, February and March 1949.

²¹ A. K. Suchkov: "The incomes of the state budget of the USSR," Moscow, 1945, p. 16.

²² A. K. Suchkov: *op. cit.*, p. 97, and also "Economic Survey of Europe in 1951," UNO-Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 1952.

²³ This problem is explained from the social and political point of view by Prof. E. Glowinskyj (see his article "On imperialism in general and Muscovite imperialism in particular"), *Ukrainski Visti*, Neu-Ulm, Germany, Nos. 101, 102 and 103, December 1952.

income in the USSR and in the Ukraine.²⁴ The growth from 1940—1950 should have been 64⁰%, from 1935—1936, it was as high as 77⁰%. However the national income under Soviet conditions has nothing in common with the prosperity or living standards of the population and this cannot be considered a criterion. Uncoordinated and disunified manipulations in calculating production in currency values and in calculating prices of the trade system do not have any bearing on figures relating to the growth of national income in the Ukraine. Moreover, the changes themselves in the national income are shown in figures which are often inaccurate and untruthful. Nevertheless, although we find in the officially published data, colossal divergencies, it suffices to mention the planned figures.

For example, during the fourth Five Year Plan (1946—1950) the planned turnover of retail trade was at least 30⁰% below the purchasing power of working people in the Ukraine. This proves the existence of a permanent shortage of goods and irregularities in the trading system. It is caused mainly by the low requirements of purchasers who are usually glad to get goods of any quality after waiting so long.

If, according to the report on the implementation of the fourth Five Year Plan, the population in the postwar years received 74⁰% of the Ukrainian national income to satisfy their needs, and the state apparently retained only 26⁰% of that income for its own use, this does not mean that Ukrainian citizens in fact received that 74⁰%. The 74⁰% includes all budget expenditures for producing consumer goods and primarily for producing the means of production. Taking into account the guiding principles of the distribution of production which was discussed earlier, the main part of this expenditure is devoted to strengthening the potential of the USSR and only a certain proportion is indirectly given to the population.

The 26⁰% taken by the state for its exclusive use is earmarked for special tasks, namely new buildings and various secret expenditures.²⁵ Basically, researchers into Soviet economy cannot attach any great importance to these figures—74⁰% and 26⁰%, because they differ too much from previous data, at a time when statistics in the Soviet Union were not so purposely distorted. It is known that in 1927 (the final NEP period), the state took 40⁰% of the national income from the population and that in 1938 it was 38.2⁰%; the percentage continued to increase, the maximum, according to those carrying out this kind of research, was from 1934—1936. As concerns the latest period (1948—1953), most researchers such as Naum Jasny, Abram Bergson, Aleksander Gerschenkron, Gregory Grossmann, Franklin D. Holzman and others, concluded after a detailed

²⁴ In order to determine the national income the following method can be applied; from the sum of the overall production of the Ukrainian economy national, that part which is spent on the replacement of worn-out production tools should be deducted; this part corresponds to the amount of raw materials used, various materials, fuel and amortization of investment capital. The proportion of the overall production which is left, is the net production of the national economy and it gives new material values during a given period of time. This constitutes the national income of the country.

²⁵ See Economic Survey of Europe in 1951; Research and Planning division of UNO, Geneva, 1952, p. 137.

²⁶ However in recent times the economists of the western world have concluded that secret expenditures in the USSR are placed in most diverse positions in the budget, including educational expenditure. See Naum Jasny's, "The Soviet Economy during the plan era," Stanford University Press, 1951, p. 116.

analysis, that during the fourth and fifth Five Year Plans, not less than 50% of the whole national income was spent on military needs (armed forces, war industry, strategical building, war reserves etc.).

The policy of the planned economy itself during the fifth Five Year Plan was the subject of further changes. In addition to changes caused by Stalin's thesis in 1952, at the beginning of the fifth Five Year Plan, there again emerged an enormous disproportion between the plans for expanding the separate kinds of industry and the problem of raw materials.

For instance, the scope of expansion in the building material industry, especially that of brick works, was completely different to the plans for the building of new enterprises. On the other hand when the new brick works were built they were not provided with supplies of the basic raw materials (clay, sand and so on), which clearly slowed down the exploitation of technical equipment and the productive capacity of the brick works. The centralization of planning was officially blamed for this. *Gosplan* was reproached at the XIX Congress of the Communist Party for being too aloof and detached from the immediate needs of the country. Indeed, the importance of republic, oblast and municipal planning commissions declined to such an extent during 1948—1952 that *Gosplan* in Moscow as the central planning body for the USSR did not think it proper to establish contact with them and instead collaborated only with All-Union ministries. That is why as from 1953, it was proposed to raise anew the importance of local planning organs, not only in the sphere of local industry, but also in enterprises administered by All-Union ministries. In addition, for the first time in 20 years the need to plan not only according to particular types of industry (vertical planning) but also for economic regions and oblasts was again expressed. True, the economic regions of the Ukraine, determined according to Soviet partition, did not always answer the country's real economic needs.

However, too short a time has passed since 1953 to enable the results to be ascertained of changes in the methods of the planning agencies. In addition there are serious doubts as to whether these changes will be fully implemented as was officially prescribed. The drive toward the centralization of planning has reached such proportions in the USSR that it will be very difficult to stem or amend it. The projected changes²⁷ apply only to the methods of work of the planning commissions; the binding, guiding principles of planning still remain operative during the fifth Five Year Plan.

²⁷ A somewhat similar project for less decentralization and increasing the rôle of local planning organs was approved as far back as January, 1941, but apparently for war-time reasons it was never put into operation.

The Ukrainian SSR within the Centralized Soviet Financial System

E. GLOWINSKYJ

"The organisation of state administration, on the principle of democratic centralism, means that such administration in the USSR is centralized, for all political, economic and organizational control is directed from one center."¹ The adjective "democratic" should however be eliminated from this quotation which was taken from a recent treatise on the Soviet financial system, as there is nothing democratic about a system where only one party is permitted.

Centralism, in fact, determines the whole political and economic structure of the USSR. It emerges in the political sphere—by the authoritarian régime of one party—through the centrally planned economic system (apart from the existence of the consumer's will and of the kolkhoz market), which almost entirely excludes autonomy for the producer.

In the sphere of finance, this centralism has been introduced consistently and almost completely. Paragraph 14, Section II of the so-called Stalin Constitution of 1936, which deals with the state system determining the competence of the Union as represented by its higher organs of authority and the organs of state administration, includes the following within the scope of these organs as regards financial policy:

1. Approval of a single state budget for the USSR and also the revenue which is to be allocated to the Union, republican and local budgets:

- a) Management of the monetary and credit system;
- b) Organization of state insurance.

Later the budget rights of the Central Union Administration and the union republics will be dealt with in some detail. Here nevertheless, it should be noted that:

1. There is only one monetary system with the Soviet rouble as the currency throughout the whole territory of the USSR. The governments of the union republics have no say in matters connected with this currency system.

2. The centralization of the credit system is reflected in that only All-Union banks with their headquarters in Moscow, exist in the USSR. In the Ukrainian SSR and the other republics there are branches of these banks. These are:

- a) The State Bank of the USSR, The Institute of Short-Term Credit, The Clearing and Treasury Center of the Union and the Emission Bank,
- b) The long-term credit banks such as *Prombank* which is concerned with the financing of investment building, industry, transport and communications; *Selkhozbank* for the financing of socialist agriculture;

¹ A. M. Aleksandrov, "Finances of the USSR," *Gosfinizdat*, Leningrad, 1952.

3. The centralized savings organisation.

The State Savings Banks are subordinated to the Ministry of Finance of the USSR which manages and controls their activities. This system is headed by the main administration of the State Savings Bank and State Credit which is appointed on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance of the USSR, by the Council of Ministers.

4. The system of the organs of state insurance is also subordinated to the Ministry of Finance of the USSR. This is headed by the main administration of state insurance which manages the whole work of insurance bodies, works out projected legislation, issues instructions and organizes specific types of insurance. The main administration has its republic and local organs which are attached to the ministries of finance of the union and autonomous republics, and to oblast, raion and municipal financial divisions.

The ministers of finance of the separate republics, as well as the managers of the financial divisions of the local soviets only have power to control activities of the state insurance organs, concerning the implementation of laws, regulations and instructions on property and personal insurance.

The basic principles of the budgetary law of the USSR

Until 1923 the Ukrainian SSR was nominally an independent state which was united with other similarly independent Soviet states—RSFSR, BSSR, ZSFSR and so on. This was the union of states for the purpose of fulfilling certain military tasks. But the history of the Ukrainian SSR during the period of war Communism reveals that the independence of these states was to a high degree, illusory. In the financial sphere, considering the fact that the financial policies of all republics were based upon the emission of paper currency, the independent republics which formed part of the Union did not have their own budgets. "The beginning of the Ukrainian state budget," said M. Poloz, former Financial Commissar of the Ukrainian SSR, "belongs to 1923—1924. Until then we had no budget but only estimates of expenditure which . . . were covered by grants, mainly from the sources of emission."²

In 1923 a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed. The second session of the first assembly of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR approved its initial constitution which established similar constitutions for the union republics. On October 26, 1924, the Union's Central Executive Committee passed its first law on the budget rights of the union republics, and on the May 25, 1927, this law was replaced by the statute on the budget rights of the Union and union republics and this has continued to operate up to the present time.

The principle of financial supremacy

The principle of financial supremacy in the Soviet Union manifests itself primarily in the fact that the budgetary laws of the union republics, their scope and their limits, are determined by the higher central organs of the USSR.

² *Ukrainsky Komunist*, Kharkov, 25. XII. 1927.

The Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union, now called the Supreme Soviet, can issue decrees, laws and orders which may decrease or increase the budgetary right of the union republics. To do so, no change of constitution is required, nor the agreement of the appropriate organs in the union republics. The All-Union organs have the exclusive right to determine taxation. This applies also to all other levies from the population. Neither the union republics nor the autonomous republics have the right to establish and collect taxes or to use any revenue not provided for in All-Union legislation.

The union republics are restricted in their powers to issue additional executive orders and, within the limits laid down by All-Union laws, to establish detailed tax norms; this applies only to oblasts.

The principle of the unified budget of the USSR

The State budget of the USSR which until 1938 was called the "single" budget, was composed of the general All-Union budget and the budgets of the sixteen other union republics. All republic budgets form an integral part of the USSR's whole budget. The system of a single state budget is a novelty in the financial policy of federal states which normally have a separate general budget as well as individual budgets for the federated areas. In this way the state budget of the USSR is essentially the ordinary budget of a unified state.³

As from 1938 the state budget of the USSR included all local budgets, by their inclusion into the budgets of the separate Soviet republics and into the social insurance budget. There was thus one budget for the whole USSR despite the fact that henceforth for some unknown reason, the adjective "single"⁴ disappeared.

Division of competence between the Union and the union republics

The division of competence between the Central Union Administration and the union republics plays a decisive part in establishing the scope of tasks to be performed by the respective organs and the means necessary for such tasks. The division of competence was determined by the 1923 and 1936 constitutions of the USSR which allow All-Union organs a very wide field of activities. Certain spheres belong entirely within the scope of the Central Union Administration (armed forces, foreign affairs, transport),⁵ in others it plays a leading part (national economy, finance, control), and in some, after the All-Union supreme organs have established guiding principles, the executive aspect is left to the organs of union republics, (judicial, education, health and social insurance). In

³ Gerhard Dobbert, *Der Zentralismus in der Finanzverfassung der UdSSR*, Gustav Fischer, Jena, 1930, p. 56.

⁴ In statistical reports the local budgets were sometimes added to the single state budget of the USSR until 1938; after that date such a budget was termed "unified". This change in the structure of the Soviet state budget and of the budgets of the union republics should be considered when comparing the figures of the pre-1938 budgets with later ones.

⁵ According to the constitution of 1923.

this way the *Narkomats* (People's Commissariats, now termed Ministries) and allied institutions are divided into:

- a) Those at All-Union level.
- b) Those at union republic level which have All-Union and union republic allegiance; for instance the Ministry of Finance of the Ukrainian SSR is subordinated to the Ministry of Finance of the USSR and to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.
- c) Institutions at union republic level only, having no counterpart at All-Union level.

All-Union Narkomats and similar institutions in 1924

1. Narkomat of Foreign Affairs,
2. " " " Trade,
3. " " " Military and Naval Affairs,
4. " " " Transport,
5. " " " Post and Telegraph,
6. Unified State Political Administration (OGPU),
7. Supreme Court,
8. Military Medical Administration,
9. Administration of Special Forces.

Union-Republic Narkomats and similar institutions in 1924

1. Narkomat of Finance,
2. " " Internal Trade,
3. " " Labor,
4. " " the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection,
5. Higher Council of National Economy,
6. Central Statistical Administration.

Republic Narkomats and similar institutions in 1924

1. Narkomat of Justice,
2. " " Internal Affairs,
3. " " Education,
4. " " Health,
5. " " Social Insurance,
6. " " Agriculture,
7. State Planning Commission (*Gosplan*).

This structure has changed continuously. Before World War II the changes were directed towards, a) greater centralization of management which was manifested by an increase in All-Union *Narkomats* and a decrease in republic *Narkomats*; b) dividing up the administration and establishing more *Narkomats*. This process had the effect of splitting the economic managements.

In May 1939 the schematic division of *Narkomats* had changed somewhat:

All-Union Narkomats	Union-Republic Narkomats
1. Defence,	1. Internal Affairs,
2. Foreign Affairs,	2. Food Industry,
3. Foreign Trade,	3. Fish Industry,
4. Transport,	4. Meat and Milk Industry,
5. Sea Fleet,	5. Textile Industry,
6. River Fleet,	6. Forest Industry,
7. Aviation Industry,	7. Agriculture,
8. Shipbuilding Industry,	8. Grain and Livestock Sovхозes,
9. Ammunition,	9. Finance,
10. Armaments,	10. Trade,
11. Fuel Industry,	11. Justice,
12. Electrical Industry,	12. Health,
13. Ferrous Metal Industry,	13. State Planning Commission (<i>Gosplan</i>).
14. Non-ferrous Metal Industry,	
15. Chemical Industry,	
16. Production of Building Materials,	
17. Heavy Machine Construction,	
18. Medium Machine Construction,	
19. General Machine Construction,	
20. Red Fleet,	
21. Deliveries,	
22. Commission of Soviet Control,	
23. State Bank,*	
24. Arts Committee,*	
25. Committee for Higher Education,*	
26. Committee for the Film Industry.*	

* These existed on the same footing as the *Narkomats*, and the heads of these institutions were members of the Council of People's Commissars.

The Republic Narkomats

1. Education,
2. Social Insurance,
3. Local Industry,
4. Communal Husbandry.

The increase in All-Union *Narkomats* took place mainly as a result of the Central Union Administration taking over heavy industry, the management of which was divided between two *Narkomats* and defence which was also given two *Narkomats*. On the other hand, light industry which was spread among five *Narkomats*, remained in the care of the republics. Agricultural deliveries which came under the *Narkomat* of Deliveries and State Control were completely centralised; Internal Affairs, Justice, Health, *Gosplan* and Agriculture were transferred from the exclusive management of the republics to the overall administration of the Central Union *Narkomats*. Consequently Education was left to the union republics (and this excluded higher centers of learning which became an All-Union matter), Social Insurance, Local Industry (that is the

smallest industrial enterprises which serve only local needs) and also Communal Husbandry; there was however an All-Union Council for Communal Husbandry attached to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR whose administration cover the whole of the Soviet Union.

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR also had under its direct control, a whole number of institutions which perform All-Union tasks such, for example as the Committee for Physical Culture and Sport, the Resettlement Committee, the Main Administration of Hydrometeorological Research, the Main Administration of Forest Protection and Afforestation⁶ and so on.

The existence of such an organization whose activities were operative for the entire Soviet Union greatly limited initiative and freedom of independent action in the union republics.⁷

During World War II steps were taken toward decentralization of the administration. In 1944 important ministries such as those of defence and foreign affairs were transferred from All-Union to union republic ministries. But such ministries were created in only two republics—the Ukraine and Belorussia—which became later members of the United Nations, and therefore it is clear that these changes were influenced by political motives. A most important sign of decentralization in the economic administration, is the recent transformation of three All-Union ministries into union-republic ministries. These are the Ministries of the Coal Industry, Ferrous Metal and Non-ferrous Metal Industries. The Ukrainian SSR only has the Ministry of the Ferrous Metal and Coal Industries.

After Stalin's death in 1953 the number of ministries was at first greatly diminished. However soon afterwards a further process of division followed so that at present there are more ministries than in 1939, including a number of new All-Union economic ministries. In 1955 the ministries were distributed as follows:

All-Union Ministries

1. Foreign Trade,
2. Transport,
3. Sea Fleet,
4. River Fleet,
5. Power Stations,
6. Building of Power Stations,
7. Electrical Industry,
8. Chemical Industry,
9. Aviation Industry,
10. Ship Building Industry,
11. Defence, Industry,
12. Heavy Machine Construction,
13. Medium Machine Construction,
14. Deliveries,
15. Automobile, Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building,


Union Republic Ministries

1. Internal Affairs,
2. Justice,
3. Finance,
4. Agriculture,
5. Trade,
6. Health,
7. Forest Industry,
8. Fish Industry,
9. Meat and Milk Industry,
10. Sovkhozes,
11. Food Industry,
12. Industry of Building Materials,
13. State Control,
14. Foreign Affairs,
15. Defence,

⁶ This is pre-World War II data. There is no subsequent information on these institutions.

⁷ V. Sadowskyj, "The national policy of the Soviets," Ukrainian Scientific, Institute, Warsaw, 1937.

SCHEME
OF THE DIVISION OF ALL-UNION, UNION REPUBLIC,
AND REPUBLIC MINISTRIES



- | | |
|--|---|
| 16. Paper and Wool Processing Industry, | 16. Coal Industry, |
| 17. Machine and Equipment Building, | 17. Ferrous Metal Industry, |
| 18. Building of Oil Industry Enterprises, | 18. Non-ferrous Metal Industry, |
| 19. Transport Building, | 19. Urban and Village Building, |
| 20. Geology and Deposits Protection, | 20. Communications, |
| 21. Radio Technical Industry, | 21. Oil Industry, |
| 22. Machine-Tool and Instrumental Industry, | 22. Higher Education, |
| 23. Building and Road Making Machines | 23. Culture, |
| 24. Building of Enterprises for Metallurgical and Chemical Industries, | 24. Industry of Consumer Goods, |
| 25. Transport Machine Construction | 25. Automobile, Transport and Highways, |
| 26. Administration of <i>Gosbank</i> , | 26. <i>Gosplan</i> , |
| 27. Committee for Building Affairs, | 27. Committee for State Security. |

Republic Ministries in the Ukrainian SSR

1. Education,
2. Social Insurance,
3. Communal Husbandry,
4. Local and Fuel Industries.

Thus in 1939 there were 26 All-Union *Narkomats* and Administrations at *Narkomat* level of which 17 dealt with economic affairs; in 1955 there were 27 economic ministries; in 1939 there were 13 union republic *Narkomats* 8 of which dealt with the national economy, and in 1955 there were 27 economic ministries. In the Ukrainian SSR, there are 2 economic republic ministries.

In connection with this division of competence, the following items are handled by the All-Union budget:

1. The financing of heavy industry, transport, communications, foreign trade, the more important branches of industry, sovkhoses of All-Union importance, MTS and agricultural undertakings at All-Union level.

2. The financing of higher centers of learning, for instance the Academy of the USSR, universities, technical colleges and All-Union medical establishments. The paying of pensions to World War II invalids and the families of war victims, aid to widowed mothers and those with many children, and the pensions of the officers, branches of the armed forces.

3. All expenses for defence, state security and foreign relations.

4. The maintenance of the supreme All-Union organs, of the Central Statistics Administration and the State Prosecutor's Office.

The republic budgets are responsible for financing enterprises and organizations within the national economy and social and cultural establishments at republic level, the upkeep of state administrative organs in the union republics, local financial agencies, courts and other legal offices.

The local budgets finance local industry, communal husbandry, housing and building; in the sphere of agriculture various undertakings are subsidized

⁸ The number of republic as well as union-republic ministries varies according to the republic.

such as exhibitions, congresses, conferences, seed control, agronomical and veterinary stations. This is in addition to the whole school net-work, primary, seven year and ten year schools, pre-school and extra-mural education, clubs, reading rooms, hospitals and surgeries. In this way most expenditure of the national economy and all expenditure for defense, is financed by the All-Union budget. On the other hand expenditure for social and cultural needs which constitutes up to two thirds of the state budgets of the union republics, is divided almost equally among the All-Union, republic and local budgets.

The following table shows expenditure in the individual sections of the budgetary system in 1951 in billions of roubles:

Expenditure	All-Union Budget	State budgets of the union republics, Rep. budgets, Local budgets and those of	State budget of the USSR autonomous republics	
All expenditures	354.0	30.2	67.3	451.5
These include:				
Financing of the National Economy	157.2	12.5	8.8	178.5
Social and cultural expenditure	55.0	13.9	51.9	120.8
Administration and Courts	5.3	3.2	5.8	14.3
Defense	96.4			96.4

Nevertheless the well-known student of Soviet economic affairs Naum Yasny, is correct when he says: "Economic expenditure is carefully controlled by the central government. The various republics and local authorities are granted more independence in matters of education and health. In reality however, even this is non-existent for Moscow ultimately gives all the orders."⁹

The distribution of sources of income

Despite the limited freedom of action of republic and local organs, the tasks which they have to carry out are still considerable and require large means. Although the state budgets of all the union republics constitute only about one fifth of the whole state budget of the USSR, these budgets, in order to cover expenditures, must have sources of revenue allocated to them. It should be made clear that the distribution of revenue changes all the time, but the outstanding ones took place before and after the tax reform of 1930.

During the period before the tax reform of 1930, the distribution of the tax incomes between the Union Central Administration and the union republics was, in general, as follows:

Indirect taxation and customs were an All-Union responsibility; direct taxation (only agricultural, industrial and general income tax) belonged to the union republics. As concerns revenue from non-taxation sources, that which derived from the activities of the All-Union *Narkomats* and allied institutions belonged to the All-Union budget; conversely, all incomes which originated from

⁹ Naum Jasny, *Der Sowjetische Staatshaushalt*, Finanz-Archiv, Neue Folge, Band 15, Heft 1, Tübingen, 1954.

activities of republic *Narkomats* went to the budget of the union republics. The income from stamp duties, according to the law of 1927, served as an equalizing fund which every year was the subject of distribution by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, among the union-republic budgets.

In addition to the non-tax revenue from local enterprises and organizations, a number of local taxes were introduced of which only the building tax still exists. In addition, the local organs were empowered to add certain surcharges to fees and industrial taxes and also local budgets received some revenue in the form of percentage deductions established by the 1926 decree on the local finances of the USSR.

According to the law of 1927, which to a large measure, increased the revenue sources of the union republic budgets, 99% of the three main direct taxes were to be handed over to them, and 1% was left for the Central Union Administration as a symbol of its taxation supremacy.

The tax reform of 1930, having abolished a whole range of taxes and unified them into a single turnover tax which became the most important source of budgetary revenue for the USSR, directed that all funds from this tax should be paid into the general All-Union budget. As a result of this, the revenue funds of the union republic budgets considerably decreased. This is illustrated by the table given below—the state budget revenue of the USSR is taken as 100¹⁰:

	1929/30	1931	1932	1933	1935	1937
Budgets of All-Union Republics . . .	39.1	13.5	12.0	13.2	18.3	23.1
Budget of the Ukrainian SSR . . .	4.66	2.68	2.57	2.8	3.47	4.11

The considerable deficit of the union republic budgets is glaringly apparent. For instance in 1931, 15% of the budget of the Ukrainian SSR had to be covered by grants from the general All-Union budget. It is not possible here to deal with the various phases in the formation of the revenue sources of the union-republic budgets after the taxation reform. This article will confine itself to elucidating the present financial state of affairs.

The main source of budgetary income for the union republics consists of percentage deductions from a whole series of general All-Union taxes and incomes. This is the so-called regulating revenue and is composed of:

1. Goods turnover tax.
2. Income tax from the population.
3. Agricultural tax from kolkhoz peasants.
4. Income tax from kolkhozes.
5. Tax on unmarried persons and those with few children.
6. Income from state loans floated among the population.
7. Income from forests.
8. Income from MTS.

The deductions from the turnover tax for the republics are usually different and are changed almost every year. However, other deductions, with few exceptions, are established at the same rate for all republics. This is illustrated below by a table of percentage deductions from those taxes and incomes for the Ukrainian SSR during the last five years:

¹⁰ Taxation reform was introduced on September 1, 1930, therefore its results were already felt in the last quarter of 1930.

	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Turnover taxes ¹¹	13.2	8.5	13.2	22.5	19.3
Income tax from population	50	25	25	25	25
Agricultural tax	50	25	40	25	40
Income tax from kolkhozes	50	50	40	25	40
Tax from unmarried persons and those with few children	50	50	40	25	40
State loans floated among the population	50	50	40	40	40
Revenue from forests	50	50	40	25	40
Revenue from MTS	50	25	25	25	25

Other income sources permanently allocated to the budgets of the republics are:

1. Tax from sovkhozes administered by a republic.
2. Income deductions from enterprises and economic organizations administered by a republic.
3. Income tax from co-operative and civil organizations.
4. Tax on horses belonging to individual farmers. (25% of this tax belongs to the republic budget itself and 75% is handed over to the local budget.)

Lastly, since 1938, all incomes from local budgets are included in the state budget of the union republics and these occupy the following positions:

1. House tax.
2. Rent tax or land tax.
3. Tax obtained from trading on kolkhoz markets.
4. Tax from proprietors of transport enterprises.
5. Miscellaneous payments.¹²
6. Tax from cinemas.
7. Self-imposed tax from the rural population.
8. Tax from enterprises where no goods are involved.
9. Income deductions from socialized enterprises of local importance.

The state budget of the USSR for 1954 shows that deductions from All-Union taxes and revenues constitute, at least 50% of it. The preliminary income budget of the Ukrainian SSR for 1954 was as follows:

	(Million Roubles)
1. Deduction from tax	9,425.2
2. Deduction from income	4,864.1
3. Income tax from co-operative and civic organisations	727.1
4. Tax deductions from the population	2,235.7
5. Local revenue	4,290.7
6. Other revenue	1,605.1
Total	23,048.9

¹¹ For purposes of comparison, below is indicated the percentage of deductions from the turnover tax during the last three years in some other republics.

	1953	1954	1955
Russian SFSR	9.1	14.4	6.0
Karelo-Finnish SSR	65.3	52.1	47.9
Latvian SSR	6.2	10.7	4.7

¹² Payments for vehicle inspection, for the inspection of scales and certain other items, go to the All-Union budget.

It should be noted that Soviet publications which contain the approved state budgetary law only present a review of general figures on income and expenditure. It was necessary to construct the preliminary data above from information revealed by M. Shchetynin,¹³ Minister of Finance of the Ukrainian SSR, and tax deductions from the population had to be calculated by taking 9.7% (the percentage given by M. Shchetynin) from the total revenue figures (23,048,0 million roubles). Therefore the deduction from the All-Union revenue is composed of the following groups:

1. General tax deductions.
4. Tax deductions from the population.
6. Other incomes.

Group 6 includes: Income from sovkhozes, 25% of the horse tax and deductions from those All-Union income sources which do not belong to groups 1 and 4.

The income from republican sovkhozes in the Ukraine is very small; the most recent data is not available, but in 1937 it constituted only 8.8 million roubles out of the 4 billion roubles of the budget for the Ukrainian SSR and this was without local budgets. The income from the tax on horses belonging to individual farmers is obviously also very small, simply because there are very few individual farms left. In this way the larger part of the so-called "other incomes" group also derives from deductions from All-Union taxes and incomes. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that these deductions exceed 50% of all state budgetary incomes of the Ukrainian SSR. Both the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and the Ministry of Finance are limited in their powers of financial administration. First, four fifths of all state revenue which is collected from the population of the Ukraine and the same amount of state expenditure are balanced within the All-Union budget and the organs of the Ukrainian SSR have, of course, no connection with them. Second, they have no right to establish any independent sources of revenue, and as far as expenditure is concerned, they are bound by the Central Union organs. Third, more than half of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR constitutes concrete percentage deductions from All-Union taxes and incomes through laws fixed *a priori* by the Central Union Administration. Moreover, the law on the state budget of the USSR also regulates the general sum which has to be handed over from the state budgets of the union republics to the local budgets. Therefore the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR looks something like this:

Budget for 1954

	Revenue	Expenditure
	(in thousands of roubles)	
State budget of the Ukrainian SSR	22,988,180	22,988,180 ¹⁴
Republic budget	18,697,498	9,776,291
Local budgets	4,290,682	13,211,889

¹³ It is impossible to make similar calculations in respect of the 1955 budget because Shchetynin does not supply the appropriate information in his exposé.

¹⁴ The sum of 22,988 million roubles differs somewhat from the figure of 23,048,9 million roubles given above. The latter sum was the project of the Ministry of Finance of the Ukrainian SSR had on the income side 22,079,4 million roubles. Therefore small changes in the approved budget could be made by republic organs.

Thus about half of the republic budget is handed over to the local budgets. In previous years 60% of all revenue from the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR had been given to local budgets. Annually the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approves the percentage rates of deduction for the budgets of each particular republic, and establishes the percentage rates of deductions from the same sources for the budgets of each particular oblast.

In the budget for 1955 the same percentage was established for individual oblasts in each republic, but only in respect of revenue from MTS (25%) and of tax from kolkhozes (40%).

The Budget of the Ukrainian SSR within the Financial System of the USSR

Unfortunately, Soviet sources do not show the amount of All-Union revenue collected on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, or what part of All-Union expenditure is allocated to satisfy the needs of the Ukrainian SSR. By knowing the total sum of the All-Union budget of the USSR it can be calculated what part the All-Union budget occupies in the entire state budget of the USSR. The table below serves as the basis for this calculation:

	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
	(in millions of roubles)				
State budget of the USSR .	458.716	509.911	544.264	572.542	509.193
All-Union budget . . .	361.212	411.154	441.619	452.955	462.857
All-Union budget as a per-					
centage of the state budget .	78,6	80,6	81,2	79,2	78,4

It should be noticed that before World War II the situation was approximately the same. For example, in 1934 the All-Union budget represented 83.6% of the state budget and 70% in 1937.

On the other hand, toward the end of NEP the situation was somewhat different. The All-Union budget in 1926—1927 was only 72.9% and in 1928—1929 it was 71.2% of the state budget. Therefore it is clear that since that time, the centralization of state revenue and expenditure has been increased by 10% to 12%.

It will be interesting to give another correlation, namely the percentage of the Ukrainian SSR's budget in terms of the budgets of all the union republics.

	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
	(in millions of roubles)				
Budget of the union republics	97.504	98.756	102.645	119.586	127.335
Budget of the Ukrainian SSR	17.247	17.538	17.963	32.988	26.336 ¹⁵
Budget of the Ukrainian SSR as percentage of the budgets of all the union republics	17.7	17.7	17.4	19.3	20.7

As can be seen, the budget of the Ukrainian SSR was less than 20% of what it should have been in proportion to the budgets of the other union republics, for the very reason that the Ukrainian population exceeds 20% of the total population of the Union. Therefore here the Ukrainian SSR is unfairly treated in favour of the other union republics. Only in 1954 was there a certain change, advantageous to the Ukrainian SSR; the increase in the Ukrainian budget was larger than that of the other republics. This is obviously connected with the fact that part of the coal and ferrous metal industries was transferred to the administration of the Ukrainian union republic ministries for these industries.

Lastly it is worth reflecting whether in the Ukraine, more revenue is collected within the framework of the state budget of the USSR than is spent on its requirements.

This question applies to the so-called geographical distribution of state revenue and expenditure and to the financial exploitation of the Ukraine within the Soviet system of financial economy. Prior to 1927 reliable data enabled some researchers to establish what is known as the territorial budget of the Ukrainian SSR. The first effort in this direction was made by the Ukrainian State Planning Commission (*Ukrderzhplan*).¹⁶

The budget for the years 1922/23 and 1923/24 showed a deficit and therefore expenditure throughout the Soviet Union, as well as in the Ukrainian SSR, exceeded income. Nevertheless, the Ukraine's share in income is much higher than in expenditure. So in 1922—1923 its share in income was 22.2% and in expenditure 17.3%. In 1923—1924 the corresponding figures were 21.7% and 18.9%. The year 1924—1925 balanced and there was a surplus of income over expenditure of 80,951 roubles.

The data for the following years was worked out by V. Dobrogayev.¹⁷

	1925—1926	1926—1927
	(units of 1,000 roubles)	
Income	689,467	852,300
Expenditure	554,250	686,200
Surplus of income	135,217	166,100

¹⁵ In the law on the Ukrainian state budget approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR these figures are slightly different: the income is 26,514 million roubles and expenditure totals 26,336 million roubles.

¹⁶ "Material on the rôle of the Ukraine in the state budget of the USSR in 1913 and 1922." Ukrgosplan, Kharkov, 1925.

¹⁷ V. Dobrogayev, "The problem of the financial balance of the Ukraine." *Khozyaistvo Ukrainy*, No. 2, 1927.

The data worked out by V. Dobrogayev was used by M. Volobuyev¹⁸ another Soviet researcher into the economy of the Ukraine, in order to prove his thesis on the colonial exploitation of the Ukraine and also that "the membership of the Ukraine in the USSR costs too much." This statement caused a real storm in Party circles and "*Volobuyevshchyna*" became a synonym of the economic approach of Ukrainian "bourgeois" nationalism. Unfortunately there are no data for the following years. In the Soviet Ukraine such research has long been considered counterrevolutionary. It can be only assumed that since V. Dobrogaev's days, financial centralism has increased still further.

Every form of financial centralism leads to the accumulation of revenue at the center of the state. In his time V. Dobrogayev explained this surplus of income over expenditure in the Ukrainian territorial budget by claiming the Ukraine gave essential support to the economically weaker republics, that is to say, those with a deficit; he was only against this type of aid, because it bled white a healthy economic organism at the expense of exaggerated and often ineffective investments in other regions.

In past years it has been noted that these investments—ineffectual from the viewpoint of the national economy, but required by the Bolshevik régime for political and strategical reasons—were made on a colossal scale. However this could only be done to the disadvantage of a strong economic unit such as the Ukraine with its large population and great natural resources.

¹⁸ M. Volobuyev, "On the problems of the Ukrainian economy." *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, No. 2, 1928.

The Soviet History of Ukrainian Literature

D. CIZEVSKY

1.

An extensive work entitled, "An Anthology of Ancient Ukrainian Literature," with the sub-title "The period of feudalism," was published in 1949. Despite certain, sometimes quite serious, mistakes in the selection of material, orthographic presentation and comments¹ the book gives the impression that it approaches seriously the problems of the history of Ukrainian literature. On the title page, Kharkov Academician, O. Biletsky, is named as the Editor of the publication and the foreword states that Professor S. Maslov of Kiev and his pupils took part in preparatory discussions on the material to be included in the "Anthology." These names would apparently testify in advance to a certain level of objectivity within the limits which are possible in the Soviet Ukraine. Almost concurrently, a study of the history of Ukrainian literature by O. Biletsky and Y. Kyryluk appeared but it will not be available outside the Soviet Union. The changes in Soviet policy and the intensified struggle against "Ukrainian chauvinism" resulted in the confiscation of this book and possibly of the "Anthology" as well (there is no recent information on the fate of the latter work). In 1954, a new study of the history of Ukrainian literature was issued, entitled "The History of Ukrainian Literature", Volume I, "Pre-October Literature" (Kiev 1954, 732 pages), written by, "The learned members of the Shevchenko Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR." In the editorial, fifteen names are mentioned including those of G. Biletsky, M. Hudziy and Ye. Kyryluk.

However in reading the book one gains the impression that the main part in discussing it was taken, not by the specialists mentioned in the foreword, but by politicians: The whole of this history is in the nature of a political pamphlet, and such great stress is laid upon certain purely political theses that it can hardly be considered a scholarly work. The book begins with a paragraph on the high quality of Ukrainian literature: "The Ukrainian nation . . . created a great, ideologically rich and highly artistic literature which occupies one of the most prominent places among the literatures of the world" (page 7). Unfortunately, the reader is left unconvinced for the entire panorama of Ukrainian literature in the XIX century, according to the authors of this book, is apparently a kind of preparation for the ideas of contemporary Communism.

While reviewing the book, its political digressions which take up at least one hundred pages, will be disregarded as the concept of the "unity" of the

¹ See the authors review in the "Annuals" of the Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, New York, No. 1, 1951, pp. 57—62.

eastern Slavic tribes, the struggle of the Ukrainian nation for "reunion" with Moscow during the XVI and XVII centuries and lastly the common struggle against tsardom of the Ukrainian and Russian "revolutionary democracy" led by Lenin are already well-known to western students.

Regrettably this political approach also permeates a large part of the literary and historical sections of the book. It is, however, interesting to see how this approach leads to the complete distortion of literary and historical facts which are presented there. Such distortion is already apparent in the foreword which is mainly devoted to an outline of research made into Ukrainian literature. It begins with a decidedly negative approach toward the "cultural and historical," "comparative" and "philological" methods (pages 14—15).² This attack is restricted as far as the "philological method" is concerned, to the quite unfounded identification of it with "formalism" (page 14); its merits particularly in the editing of texts are not even mentioned. "The cultural and historic" method is reproached for "ignoring the specific features of the literary language" and "the study of the artistic nature of a literary work" (page 14); "the comparative method" is accused of "cosmopolitism," that is of searching for analogies in literature "of various epochs, nations and classes" (page 14). It must be said that the authors of this new book on Ukrainian literature could equally well be reproached for this, inasmuch as the representatives of the cultural and historical approach, were dealing with literary works as the "illustration of social history" (page 14), and the compilers of this new text-book do precisely the same thing, but with the "Marxist" approach. That is, they perceive in the history of the Ukrainian people exclusively social and political elements. The reproaches made against "comparativism" could be directed even more justifiably against the authors of this book; they instance a large number of analogies with Ukrainian literature, but take them almost exclusively from one and the same literature, namely Russian. This unilateral comparativism is obviously detrimental and no more objective than seeking analogies in literatures of "various epochs, nations and classes." It should be mentioned that the old "comparativists" (only O. Veselovsky is mentioned here) never stated that in all cases where there are eastern or western analogies with Ukrainian literature that such analogies prove their influence on Ukrainian literature. Nevertheless the authors of this new book almost always see in analogies between Ukrainian and Russian literatures, a proof of the influence of Russian literature, even when this seems to be most unlikely chronologically or geographically.

The outline of research into Ukrainian literature is also marked by the suppression of facts which are undesirable from the Soviet view point. Only the history of Ukrainian literature by M. Petrov (1880—1884) and the similar work by O. Ohonovsky (1886—1894) are mentioned and, although these are very valuable sources, they are outdated. Works by S. Yefremov, M. Voznyak and M. Hrushevsky are not even mentioned.

Instead stress is laid on the importance of the "revolutionary democrats," Byelinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov in the history of Ukrainian literature (page 15 onwards). In their bibliography (page 16) the authors do not even give a single article by Byelinsky and the articles of the others above-

² Potenbya's works on folk-lore which are his most valuable scholarly legacy, are given only one sentence. His method is described without foundation as "historico-psychological" (p. 14), and is rejected without material arguments.

mentioned which are listed here deal, almost exclusively, with political problems and not with Ukrainian literature at all.

Among Ukrainian historians the books and articles of Ivan Franko (page 16—17) are listed quite fully, but there is not a word about the methods he employed (it is well-known that Franko used both the comparative and the philological methods). It is merely emphasised that Franko formed his views as a "follower of the work of the great revolutionary democrats—Byelinsky, Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov and Shevchenko" (page 17), that he popularized in the Ukraine the works of the "most eminent representatives of Russian literature" (there follows a list of eleven names), and that he also "wrote a great deal about French, German, Italian, Polish, Czech and other writers" (page 17).

Only the article of P. Hrabovsky and Lesya Ukrainka, some notes, a review and a lecture delivered by M. Kotsyubynsky are mentioned. It is known that Lesya Ukrainka's article on Bukovinian literature was written for Russian readers, and, that the articles by M. Kotsyubynsky and P. Hrabovsky were merely popular in character. There is not a single word about the works of M. Drahomanov, P. Zhytetsky, M. Sumtsov or V. Peretz and his school; their names are just mentioned (page 14—15) and it is pointed out that they presented the history of literature in general "from the view point of bourgeois liberalism." The foreword also contains pages on Lenin, Stalin, Gorky and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which, it is stressed, is "continuously taking care of the development of literature and literary research in all the Soviet republics, especially in the Ukraine" (page 18—20).

Nevertheless from 1917 to 1954, not a single work has appeared on the history of Ukrainian literature which the authors consider to be worthy of mention in their review.

The foreword ends with a scheme showing the development of the history of Ukrainian literature. The period of this development (there are as many as fourteen and six of them belong to the Soviet period), are exclusively determined by political criteria. It is interesting to note that important occurrences in the development of Ukrainian literature and changes in literary Ukrainian are not mentioned here at all although, as already stated, the authors accuse the representatives of the cultural historic school of neglecting the "specific features of the literary language."

2.

The part of the book which is devoted to ancient Ukrainian literature during the period of feudalism, that is from the XI to the XVIII centuries, covers only one hundred pages. This is the only part of the book which offers some useful, factual material, although there are the usual ambiguities of detail.

The literature of the Period of Princedom (XI—XIII centuries) is described on pages 25—54. This literature, in accordance with the present Soviet view, is depicted as the "common source" of later Ukrainian, Russian and Belorussian literatures that is the literatures of the "three fraternal nations." However, the only striking fact is the absence of any mention of the sermons of St. Theodosius, and even more, of the "Lives" (Zitiye) written by Nestor the Chronicler. Though the prominent place of the ancient Ukraine among other European states (page 26) is emphasized and also its "connections" with "Byzantium, Hungary,

Poland, Germany, Bohemia, France, Scandinavia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia," little information is given about the role of these countries vis-à-vis the Ukraine. On the other hand, the remarks about the Gospels and the "Symposium" (*Isborniki*) of 1073 and 1076 are formulated in such a way that the reader has the impression that these are Kievan translations and works, while in fact the Gospels were translated in Moravia and came to Kiev via Bulgaria; it is known that the "Symposium" of 1073 was transcribed from the Bulgarian original and only part of the "Symposium" of 1076 was probably written in Kiev.

Without mentioning Byzantium, the author begins his prelection by indicating that the basis of literature at that time "was to a certain extent oral folklore" (page 27). No analysis is offered of this very doubtful statement and apart from the quotations from Gorky, Marx and Engels, there are only very superficial remarks about the folk-epics (*Byliny*). The descriptions of the literary language of that time are equally vague. However, contrary to the erroneous thesis of P. Obnorsky³ who thinks that the literary language was the same as the common language, the writer says that the literary language of that time was old Slavic (page 30).

Further on, for instance, dealing in detail with the text of the first few pages of the Chronicle, the author completely omits any mention of the legend of the "Convocation of Princes." On the pages devoted to the literature of the XI—XIII centuries, a parallel is drawn between the "Tale of Prince Igor's Regiment" and a later work "The Knight in the Tigers' Skin" by Shota Rustaveli (page 48). The author shows how old Kievan literature was utilized by Ukrainian writers in the XIX century, but hardly alludes at all to its tradition in the XVI—XVII centuries. It is indeed strange that, for example, the author mentions Pushkin's delight at the Kiev-Pechersky *Pateryk*, but does not mention the part the *Pateryk* played in Ukrainian literature of the XVIII century (page 41). Nevertheless despite the inevitable shortcomings in a work of this kind, this chapter should be considered as a relatively unequivocal part of the book.

3.

The next 70 pages are devoted to the XIV—XVIII centuries. This should be sufficient to elucidate the literary phenomena of that period. It is regrettable that the authors devote part of the chapter to political history.

Even the explanations of literary phenomena are permeated with the same tendency to illustrate the great and incontrovertible influence of Muscovite literature and culture on the Ukrainian. It is a great pity that there is absolutely no analysis of the style of the works mentioned. Remarks on the language used by particular authors are partly incorrect; we read of the language of Ivan Vyshensky that he "united the elements of Russian and Polish with colloquial Ukrainian" (page 80). It would be interesting to see the examples of Russian in Vyshensky's works: he was a Galician and had no direct contact with Moscow whatsoever. It is possible that in the Muscovite scripts of his works there are individual Russian words, but they almost certainly derive from the pen of

³ P. Obnorsky, *The Outline of the History of the Russian Literary Language of the Earlier Period*, Moscow, 1946.

the transcriber who changed Ukrainian words into Russian and in addition did not understand the text.

Thus Vyshensky's original Ukrainian text contained such words as:

Musyt (it must),
Tsnoty (virtues),
Prahnul (disired),
Blazenstvakh (buffoonery),
Mnemanye (opinion),
Pylnuuyut (are watching).

These were changed into Russian as:

Muchyt (tortures),
Tsennosti (valuables),
Pravdu (truth),
Blazhenstvakh (beatitude),
Vnimanye (attention),
Imenuyut (are naming).⁴

Identically, in the "Anthology"⁵ mentioned above, the extracts given from Vyshensky's works are taken from inaccurate editions and are therefore of little use in judging his language. There are a number of remarks on the part played by Polish but practically nothing about the influence of Latin on Ukrainian literature which was used a good deal by the Ukrainian writers at that time. As was said before, the entire book is an example of one-sided comparativism: it compares Ukrainian literature exclusively with its Muscovite counterpart and does it in such a way that the Muscovite emerges as the superior one.

Mentioning the activities of Ukrainians (a list of thirteen names is given), in Great Russia in the XVII and XVIII centuries the authors rightly consider them to have "participated in the creation of Russian culture," but they begin this part of the book with a sentence, "Ukrainian-Russian relations are becoming stronger and stronger and have attained a special significance in the development of Ukrainian culture generally and especially in literature." They end this paragraph by saying, "The books of Russian writers were spread wider and wider across the Ukraine." It is interesting to notice that in the "History of Russian Literature" published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR,⁶ these same facts are presented in an entirely different light. It is true that the volume in question was published as long ago as 1948, but the reader will find in it such passages as for instance, "At the end of the XVI century, the first echoes were heard of that powerful cultural and educational movement in the Ukraine and Belorussia which originated at the end of the XV century and continued until the beginning of the XVIII century" (page 11). A further three pages are devoted to the influence of the Ukraine on Moscow: in them are mentioned the Ukrainian printer O. Radyshevsky who lived in Moscow and Ukrainian translators; there are remarks on the emulation of the Ukrainian literary works by Russian writers and also the fact that Ukrainian writers were persecuted for "unorthodoxy". The author does not leave us in any doubt that this persecution was based, to

⁴ See article by I. Yeremin in the *Works of the Department of Ancient Russian Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR*, Volume IX, 1953, pp. 292—293.

⁵ Quotation at the beginning of the article "Anthology" pp. 100—124.

⁶ I quote further the collectively written "History of Russian Literature" published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Volume II, part 2, 1948. As far as is known, it is still in use in the USSR.

a great extent, on misunderstandings, the comparatively low level of Muscovite literature, and partly on the wish of the Russians to show that "in problems of theology, Muscovite writers were more authoritative than the Lithuanians" (page 13).

Throughout the whole of book, proof after proof is given of the colossal influence of Ukrainian literature on the Muscovite in the XVII and XVIII centuries. It was through the Ukraine or Belorussia that the tale of *Bora Korolevych* (Prince Bova), the "History of the Seven Sages," Aesop's Fables and so on came to Moscow; the struggle against "the old believers" in Moscow was waged by the Ukrainians because "there was a great lack of even theologically educated men" (page 138); the Russians started going to the Kiev Academy to study only from about 1650.

Although these facts are given in the "History of Ukrainian Literature" they are dealt with cursorily. We read for instance, "information exists that Lomonosov studied for sometime" [in the Kievan Academy]. The expression, "information exists" gives the impression that there is some doubt about the fact.

However Lomonosov's period of study in Kiev is not subject to any doubt whatever. There are, moreover, indications of the part played by Ukrainian publications in Moscow (page 141—142), especially the grammars by Melety Smotrytsky and P. Berenda's "Lexicon." There is also information about the works which were translated for Moscow by Ukrainians and which were largely brought by them from the Ukraine. If everything to be found in this Russian work concerning the influence of Ukrainian literature and culture on Muscovite literature during the XVII and XVIII centuries was quoted, the quotations would fill almost the same number of pages as are devoted, in the "History of Ukrainian Literature" to the whole of the XVI—XVIII centuries. Soviet scholarly literature written in Russian demonstrates the fact that the Ukrainian and Russian languages in XVII and XVIII centuries were very different and that theological teaching in the Ukraine was incomparably higher than in Moscow.⁷ But the "History of Ukrainian Literature" contains only vague remarks about this. The author has purposely quoted only Soviet, and particularly new Soviet, publications, omitting the testimonies of older works such, for example, as those of A. Sobolevsky, Academician M. Kharlampovych, or authoritative émigré scholars such as the Rev. H. Florovsky and the late Prince N. C. Trubetskoi.⁸

Wishing to prove that Moscow was culturally helping the Ukraine, the authors can refer only to the fact of Ivan Fedorov's work in the Ukraine (page 64—65), but they omit to mention that he was not only forced to leave Moscow but that his printing works there were demolished and that he arrived in the Ukraine as a refugee seeking asylum. The *Cheti-Mynei* of St. Dmitro Rostovsky

⁷ Compare the article by Yeremin quoted in note 4.

⁸ A. Sobolevsky, *Foreign literature in the translation of the Muscovite Rus*, St. Petersburg, 1903, "Review of the Department of Russian Language and Philology of the Academy of Sciences," Volume 74.

By the same author *Foreign literature in translation at the time of Peter*, St. Petersburg, 1908, in the same "Review," Volume 84.

K. Kharlampovych, *The Influence of Little Russia on Great Russian Church Life*, Volume I, Kazan, 1914.

N. S. Trubetskoi, *On the Problem of Russian Self-Knowledge*, Paris, 1927. Even in this book the Russian literary language of the XVIII century is presented, to a large extent, as the work of the Ukrainians.

were apparently based on the *Cheti-Mynei* by Makari sent from Moscow; but the authors do not say why Makari's work did not satisfy Muscovite readers and why the *Mynei* of St. Dmitro acquired such glory and success in Moscow as well as the Ukraine (page 87). The most doubtful statement is that concerning the prestige of Russian literary works in the Ukraine during the XVIII century, especially the influence of the works of M. Lomonosov and particularly those of Novikov and Radishchev. The Songs of Sumarokov (page 121) are apparently analogous to the Songs of Skovoroda, yet the latter were written in the reformed syllabic verse, therefore they do not reveal any influence of the new Russian metrics: Also as they were largely written in the early 1750's there could not even have been talk about Sumarokov's "Songs" in the Ukraine. There is not even a thematic resemblance between the songs of Sumarokov and those of Skovoroda.

The most doubtful part in the whole section devoted to the XVI—XVIII centuries is that the religious problems, with which at that time Ukrainian literature was greatly occupied, is always pushed into the background or even completely ignored. Such is the case with the Protestant influence (Unitarians), whose part in the development of the national language in religious literature is disregarded.

The polemic literature of the XVI and the beginning of the XVII centuries is only discussed from a national point of view and Vyshensky's activities are presented as having occurred after the middle of the XVII century, and therefore, as Vyshensky died before 1625 and his works which are mentioned in the text, were written prior to 1605, they would be chronologically 25 or even 40 years out of date. In addition to this, he is called "an ardent patriot and social critic" which is, of course, a complete distortion. H. Skovoroda suffers even more; his mysticism and philosophy are completely overlooked, although the author not only quotes from his works, but also from articles by Khidzheu which are certainly forged (page 114 and further) and states quite without foundation that Khidzheu definitely wrote them "according to the memoirs of his contemporaries." As H. Skovoroda died in 1794 and Khidzheu wrote his articles in 1835 it is difficult to believe that "memoirs" written after at least 40 years are even approximately exact. To say that Skovoroda as well as the Russian satirists Kantemir, Fonvizin and Novikov attributed great importance to education (page 115), is a new method of drawing together Ukrainian and Russian literature on the basis of sheer generalizations. Naturally the differences between the pedagogical concepts of Fonvizin and H. Skovoroda obviously do not permit even consideration of such a literary merger.

4.

Much less can be said about the second part of the "History of Ukrainian Literature," which has nothing in common with its title and is simply a political pamphlet. It is so primitive in approach that it will suffice to give a general review of the last six hundred pages to show the level to which scholarship has descended in the Soviet Ukraine.

The authors' main task is to show that Ukrainian literature has always been dependent on the Russian which was, so to speak, infinitely higher. The continuous repeating of this thesis seems adequate to the authors and therefore

does not apparently require them to prove the correctness of their statements to the reader.⁹

The basic, constantly reiterated sentence in this work is, "In Russian literature, there are writers of world importance such as M. Nekrasov, O. Ostrovsky, M. Saltykov-Shchedrin, Ivan Turgenev, M. Chernyshevsky, I. Goncharov and Lev Tolstoy."

In the majority of cases the authors do not even try to show that a given Ukrainian writer was acquainted with this or that Russian work: it is quite sufficient to state that the Russian work referred to, appeared at the same time which then, apparently, proves its influence on Ukrainian literature.

Another characteristic tendency of this book is the division of all authors into "reactionaries" and "progressives." This division, incidentally, is entirely arbitrary and leads to the complete exclusion of a good many eminent writers from this history of literature. For instance, such is the case with A. Metlinsky, Kostomarov and even Kulish; their works are not even mentioned and only their "reactionary behaviour" is remarked upon. In order to prove the progressive nature of those who are admitted to the pages of the "History of Ukrainian Literature," simple methods are employed; as it is quite clear that Chernyshevsky's influence on Shevchenko is *chronologically* impossible¹⁰ in order to associate them, it is stated that Chernyshevsky was heard on some occasion to quote Shevchenko; it is true that the well known passage on "prosperity" in Russia was often repeated at that time and it was quite unnecessary to have read Shevchenko in order to be able to quote it (page 239). Further, "Shevchenko, as well as Dobrolubov, Chernyshevsky and Ushynsky,¹¹ attached much importance to the education of the people" (page 269). Lastly, "Gorky, Lenin and various anonymous authors wrote with appreciation of Shevchenko in the Bolshevik press" (page 277).

In a review which is attributed without any foundation to Byelinsky, he too, apparently, acknowledged Shevchenko (page 223). This review which is now re-printed as Part of Byelinsky's works,¹² designates Shevchenko's verses as "clumsy." Kulish is not redeemed either by his writing in the Russian press of the 1850's when he was considered to belong to the class of writers such as Lev Tolstoy and Ivan Turgenev,¹³ nor by his positive evaluation of Peter the Great or Catherine II in the newspaper of the "revolutionary democrats," *Iskra*, and not even by his diligent research into Gogol and the subsequent biography he wrote on that author. No allusion at all is made to these facts and the reader is left unaware that Kulish helped to bring about the publication of the works of Shevchenko, Marko-Vovchok and others. Peculiar methods are

⁹ This is a method which recalls parodies on the Soviet regime such as George Orwell's "1984", "Animal Farm", or Ye. Zamuatkin's "We".

¹⁰ It should be recalled that in 1939 the relationship of Shevchenko to Chernyshevsky was described in the Soviet Ukraine as follows: "The eminent leaders of Russian revolutionary democracy, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolubov were listening to his [Shevchenko's] voice" (*Kommunist* of June 20, 1939). This is quoted from I. Borshchak, *Ukraine*, Volume VIII, 1953, p. 647.

¹¹ Ushynsky is also a Ukrainian and this is sometimes mentioned in Soviet publications.

¹² "Works," volume III, 1954, pp. 171—172, see notes, pp. 652—657.

¹³ See V. Petrov: *Kulish in the 1850's*, Kiev, 1928. Publication of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

employed to link this or that author with Lenin and Stalin. So Marko-Vovchok it seems is "close to Nekrasov and Saltykov-Shchedrin" about whom Lenin wrote. The fact that the "reactionary" Kostomarov, was the author of the revolutionary "Books on the History of the Ukrainian Nation," which are dealt with superficially within the framework of Shevchenko's biography and without quotations, undoubtedly created some difficulties for the authors; this is why it is stated that the "sharp words" addressed to tsardom "contained in the 'Books' could not have been written by Kostomarov," and that they have, of course, been added by somebody else.

Having excluded Kostomarov and Kulish from their "History of Ukrainian Literature," the authors include in it such persons as Storozhenko or Afanasyev-Chuzhbynsky. Even Drahomanov is only given a cursory mention and Vynnychenko is not saved by the protection of Gorky who valued him highly, nor is he redeemed by his participation in the publications of the Russian socialists. There is nothing about Oles, Vorony, Krymsky, Chuprynka, the Galician modernists and so on. The real foundation for the evaluation of these or any of the authors included in the book, is not literary or even political, but exclusively national. Only three pages (pages 271—274) out of the 65 devoted to Shevchenko discuss the literary aspect of his works. Out of six pages on L. Hlibov there are only a few lines on the form of his verses. The real political democracy of the writers does not play any role whatever. When A. Metlinsky was reproached for "eulogising the autocratic régime, the relations between landlords and serfs and the idealization of patriarchal antiquity" (page 194), exactly the same could be said of H. Kvitka and Hrebinka, and even more so about Storozhenko, Chuzhbynsky or Hulak-Artemovsky. The main accusation is of course, that A. Metlinsky and Korsun were preaching nationalism (page 194).

True, the love for the homeland of A. Metlinsky and Korsun was "pseudo-patriotic" (page 194), but if the book is carefully examined, it is easy to see that though the authors require patriotism and nationalism from the Ukrainian writers, it has to be Russian in type. All other admonitions toward the reactionaries are of little importance; they are reproached with advocating religious mysticism" and for their "extreme pessimism," although the works of real pessimists such as M. Petrenko and Zabala (page 192—193) are positively assessed.

A closer look at the methods employed to adapt individual writers to the russophile trend of the book, shows them to be most unscrupulous. The first means of establishing the orientation of the Ukrainian writers toward Russia is to count their Russian acquaintances, and Ukrainians such as Gogol and Shchepkyn are automatically included among them. A Ukrainian writer comes to Moscow or St. Petersburg, naturally he becomes acquainted with Russians. In this way, for example, a chapter about Hrebinka is begun. Among Hrebinka's acquaintances were, "P. Yershov, V. Benediktov, Dal, Pletnev, Pushkin, Koltsov, I. S. Turgenev and Nekrasov." Even the Russian contributors to the publications in which Hrebinka used to print his works are listed although it is most uncertain whether or not he knew them personally. There is a list of contributors to the *Fiziologia Peterburga* which appeared in the last years of Hrebinka's life (he died in 1848), therefore its contributors could not possibly have influenced his earlier activities. It is interesting to note that these associates include a number of writers who, in other Soviet publications, are severely condemned.¹⁴

¹⁴ Compare "The Literary Heritage," Volume 58, 1952. Benediktov is removed even from the issued volumes of the "Poets Little Library."

However, for the benefit of the Ukrainian reader, the largest number of Russian writers have to be provided to prove their influence on this Ukrainian poet.

It is not, of course, surprising to learn that Shevchenko's relations with Russian writers are emphasized. We do not hear about his Ukrainian entourage in St. Petersburg and his associations with the Poles are only superficially alluded to. But we read that in St. Petersburg, Shevchenko "made the acquaintance of Bryulov, Zhukovsky, Venetsyanov and Hrebinka" (page 220); Shevchenko "read Pushkin, Griboyedov, Lermontov, Gogol, Byelinsky, Herzen, Krilov, Koltsov and Davydov" (page 220). Exactly what Shevchenko read of these authors is not known and nothing is said of his acquaintance with Polish literature, particularly Mickiewicz, Bohdan Zaleski and Zeligowski. The following then appears without any supporting quotations: "The social, political and aesthetic views of Byelinsky greatly influenced the formation of Shevchenko's outlook and activities" (page 227). In the first place Byelinsky's views prior to the early 1840's often varied, and the above comments concern the period before 1843; moreover, Byelinsky was a decisive enemy of folk-lore in literature, and Shevchenko certainly didn't adhere to his views in this respect.

How is it possible to prove that Shevchenko took a positive attitude towards the Pereyaslav Treaty? This has supposedly been proved by the authors of the book. As an example, it is said that Shevchenko painted "water colours with loving care" of Subotov (page 235)! Also with the help of the work "The Great Vault" it is attempted to show that Shevchenko's approach toward the Pereyaslav agreement and the activities of Peter the Great was positive. The first part of this "mystery" takes the form of a conversation between the souls of three Ukrainian girls, one of whom greeted Khmelnytsky when he was riding to sign the Pereyslav treaty, another, Peter who was going to war against Mazepa's uprising and the third, Catherine II who was traveling on the Dnieper. All three were unaware of the significance of their actions. For these unconscious expressions of sympathy towards persons who took an active part in events, which were harmful to the Ukrainian nation, the souls of the three girls "are being punished" and they "are not admitted to Heaven." The authors of the "History of Ukrainian Literature" do not make it clear that Shevchenko depicts the girls as the guilty souls who are being punished by Heaven, and present this part of the work in the following manner: "Shevchenko, as it were, in the form of the three souls personifies the Ukrainian nation and... his support of Khmelnytsky's struggle for the union of the Ukraine with Russia... and the struggle of Peter against the foreign usurpers and the traitor Mazepa" (page 235). If the readers of the book will turn to Shevchenko's work itself, they will see that in all three cases there is not the slightest possibility of a conscious connection between the three souls with Khmelnytsky, Peter or Catherine, and moreover that even though their activities were unconscious expressions of sympathy to Khmelnytsky, at a moment when he was about to commit a serious political mistake, and to Peter and Catherine, the souls are being punished. Shevchenko is also accredited with a negative attitude toward Slavophilism and this is on the same page where his dedication of *Ivan Hus* to the leader of the Slavophiles, Shafarik is quoted (page 238). Andruzky is included among Shevchenko's "revolutionary" friends from the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methody, probably because the authors do not know his mystical religious verse, or they are certain that it would remain unknown to the reader.¹⁵

¹⁵ Andruzky's verse in the "Notes of the Shevchenko Scientific Society," Vol. 83, 1908, pp. 181—182.

Another peculiarity of this book is that the humanist I. Kotlarevsky is revealed almost as a revolutionary, simply because in his entourage, for instance in the masonic lodge to which he belonged, were the future *Decembrists* and among them "an ardent republican" M. Novikov who praised Kotlarevsky. "It is quite possible that Novikov acquainted the writer with the statute of the masonic "Union of Contentment" (page 153).

The chapter on Franko is prepared in the same way and the admonition that Austria was reactionary is hilarious. Without denying the fact that Austria at that time was a police state, one can hardly draw a parallel between the police system operating there and the system which now reigns in the Soviet Ukraine. Readers will certainly notice with surprise that Franko's works were published and circulated in Austria—a so-called reactionary state. Franko's "attitude towards decadent western literature was irreconcilable,"¹⁶ but there is no mention at all of the enormous influence which western writers, for example the Swiss K. F. Meier, had on Franko. It appears that he was entirely influenced by Russian literature. All elements of modernism in Franko's works are carefully obliterated.

On the whole, Franko's attitude to modernism was not so consistently negative as is declared by the authors. M. Zerov once rightly said that "the quarrel in verse" between Franko and M. Vorony... is more like a friendly correspondence than a literary polemic between irreconcilable rivals."¹⁷ But there Franko the poet, is only depicted as a primitive "realist."

Among the collection of his verse the least attention is paid to the best of them such as "The Withered Leaves" (page 524—525). The content of the "Prologue" (to Moses), which does not coincide with the general political primitivism of the book, is not of course, given. There are only a few lines about *Moysei* and naturally the symbolic meaning of the separate passages of the poem are left out. Moses is leading his people westwards, but his enemies want to go to the East; this is a symbolic presentation of the Ukraine between Western Europe and the East (ie. Russia).

The statements on the influence of Ostrovsky's "Storm" on Franko's "The Stolen Happiness" (page 555) and Pushkin's "Boris Godunov" on "The Dream of Prince Svyatoslav" (page 557) are incredible. While mentioning Franko's translations from European poetry (page 533—534) the authors completely ignore the question of why Franko was learning from the poets who gave him examples for translations. The authors can only assert that Russian writers alone could have had any influence on Franko. However, if Franko's attitude towards Russian literature of the XIX century was positive, it does not necessarily mean that he would evaluate positively the present Soviet state.

It is interesting that in the chapter on Franko and the short note on Pavlyk (page 560—562), Drahomanov's name is only mentioned. On the other hand the authors state that "the beneficial influence of the ideas of the Russian liberation movement was imprinted on Pavlyk (page 560). Drahomanov is not even mentioned in the chapter on Lesya Ukrainka who corresponded with him continuously and on whose spiritual development he had an enormous influence. Instead, Lesya Ukrainka is connected with Lenin who hardly even knew of the

¹⁶ With reference to the quotations in the "History of Ukrainian Literature," it should be pointed out that with the exception of a few cases, the authors do not give their sources.

¹⁷ M. Zerov, "At the Source," re-print, Cracow-Lvov, 1943, p. 143.

existence of the great Ukrainian poetess: Lesya apparently "unmasked the treacherous activities of the Ukrainian nationalists— V. Antonovych, O. Konysky and M. Hrushevsky" (page 638). But strangely enough, she used to publish her works in "The Literary and Scientific Herald" which, according to the book, belonged to M. Hrushevsky himself. One of the fundamental motives of Lesya Ukrainka's works was to contrast the revolutionary struggles of the dominating (i. e. Russian) and of oppressed nations as illustrated in her "House of Work," "Orgy" and other works, and this is naturally ignored by the Soviets. All Shevchenko's poetry and all the activities of Lesya Ukrainka are presented exclusively as a call to social struggle. Such explanations as that "The House of Work" is "directed against the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and Zionism" (page 662), or that the dramas based on the history of early Christianity such as "The Advocate Marthian" and "In the Catacombs" can only result in a pointless polemic.

Nevertheless, even the authors of the book could not find Russian examples for Lesya Ukrainka's dramas and thus they limit themselves to the remark that "The Stone Guest" by Pushkin "certainly stimulated" Lesya Ukrainka to write "The Stone Landlord," despite the fact that she "worked out this theme quite originally" (page 667).

On the other hand, "In the Jungle" is quite wrongly interpreted as an attack on contemporary America; it was in fact a polemic against those contemporaries who demanded direct benefit from artistic and particularly poetic, creation (compare page 658).¹⁸ In addition, an absolutely unnecessary assumption is made for the better understanding of this play, by saying that its theme was influenced by Herzen's book "From the Other Coast" (pages 658—659),¹⁹ but it is not known whether Lesya Ukrainka ever read it.

It is interesting that a large share of the book is devoted to a few "realist" writers who have attained a certain popularity. These are Panas Myrny, Kropyvnytsky, Karpenko-Kary, Nechuy-Levytsky, Manzhura, Kotsyubynsky and Stefanyk, the peculiarities of whose impressionist style is completely obscured by the revolutionary phraseology used by the Soviet authors. Strangely enough, this selection of writers leaves the reader with the same one-sided impression as the "History of Ukrainian Literature" by S. Yefremov. The distorted approach of Yefremov's work has been pointed out more than once by later researchers: According to Yefremov, Ukrainian literature is entirely "democratic and popular." According to the new "History of Ukrainian Literature" it is apparently completely "revolutionary and democratic." The unbelievably low level of scholarship demonstrated here, is additional testimony to the fact that different intellectual levels have been established in the USSR for the Russians and the national minorities.

In view of the methodological weaknesses of the book, its false interpretation of literary works, its direct falsification of facts and ignoring of important literary phenomena, it must be said that the publication of this book in the Soviet Ukraine, is a very regrettable fact.

¹⁸ It is also against the requirement of political advantage; quite a good interpretation of "In the Jungle" appeared in the Soviet Ukraine sometimes ago in Volume 9 of Lesya Ukrainka's works (the article was written by P. Fylypovych).

¹⁹ The interpretations of Lesya Ukrainka's works on purely national themes can only be taken as humorous. But the authors do not hesitate to mention even the anti-Muscovite *Boyarynya* again replacing national problematics by social ones, page 670.

Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Soviet Historiography

B. KRUPNYCKY

Any objective and scholarly study of Ukrainian history during the Khmelnitsky period is linked in Soviet Ukrainian historiography with the name of M. Hrushevsky. Hrushevsky returned to the Ukraine from abroad in 1924. It was then that his monumental work *The History of Ukraine-Russ* was written. It was published in Kiev in the years 1928—1931. Two long chapters in volume 9 deal with the years when B. Khmelnitsky was the hetman of the Ukraine.¹

Despite Soviet conditions, Hrushevsky's outlook did not change, as may be seen from his research on the Khmelnitsky epoch. He pursued his work independently and irrespective of the government's wishes or public opinion. During these critical years Hrushevsky remained one of the last Narodnik adherents, but his work, placing greater stress than before upon the historical role of the working population as well as the social issues involved, emerged, so to speak, in the form of reminiscences of a former chief of state regarding his enthusiasm for the socio-revolutionary movement.²

It is not surprising that the great Ukrainian historian should view with scepticism the outstanding personalities in Ukrainian history, including Khmelnitsky, whose political role is regarded as questionable even though an entire epos has been created around him. Hrushevsky used a mass of archival and other material to depict and elucidate the man and his times. However Khmelnitsky is not Hrushevsky's hero. The author states that his work is devoted "not to Khmelnitsky the leader but to the creative sufferings of the Ukrainian masses."³

Even in Hrushevsky's popular works on Ukrainian history, which appeared in the first two decades of the XX century, the founder of the Ukrainian state was evaluated quite favorably and in his great monograph on Khmelnitsky, the author concluded that he was "a great man—great because of his own talents." But these talents he believed were inadequate to untie the historical knot of Ukrainian existence. Hrushevsky wrote that "as a leader, inspirer and subjugator of the masses he proved very effective but he was not a great politician and his political guidance of the Ukraine was not very judicious."

¹ B. Krupnitsky, *M. Grushevsky i ego Istoricheskaya Rabota* (M. Grushevsky and his Historical Work). Publications "Knigospylki," New York, 1954, pp. 11 onwards. (Introduction to the *Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi* (History of Ukraine-Russ) Vol. 1 by M. Grushevsky.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³ B. Krupnitsky, *B. Khmelnitsky v Osveshchenii Ukrainskoi Istoriografii* (B. Khmelnitsky in the Elucidation of Ukrainian Historiography) Arka, Munich, 1948, No. 3—4, pp. 7 onwards.

Hrushevsky felt that Khmelnytsky was not consistent in his statesmanship, having only one great aspiration—to achieve the independence of the Cossack state; he did not have the interests of the people at heart, otherwise he would not have maintained such a stubborn alliance with the Tartars who in fact during Khmelnytsky's time brought such grief to the Ukrainian masses. Hrushevsky felt that Khmelnytsky's policy toward Moscow was rashly implemented and not particularly successful. His policy as a whole was not founded on any clearly conceived plan or significant national concepts nor was it implemented logically. Using almost the same word as his teacher Antonovych, Hrushevsky stressed the fact that Khmelnytsky's policy consisted of facets which clashed with each other and ultimately cancelled each other out.⁴

This evaluation appeared when the favorable views of the Polish historian Kubali⁵ and the Ukrainian historian Lipinsky⁶ were published. Hrushevsky himself stated that by his critical approach—essentially sceptical in nature, for his work reflected less a thorough and convincing analysis of revelant sources than of the author's general philosophical outlook—he wished to avoid “the pathological idealization of the epoch and of Khmelnytsky' personality “which, in the author's opinion, was reflected in Lipinsky' works.”⁷

Hrushevsky's work was nevertheless unique, for even during the Ukrainian renaissance of the 1920's, it was risky to deal with great problems of Ukrainian history, and especially to publish monographs on its outstanding leaders, above all the hetmans.

In addition to the above-mentioned study by M. Petrovsky of individual figures during the Khmelnytsky period, research was done into the activities of Petryka (by Oglobin) and of Polubotka (by Vassilenko). Certainly Petrovsky opened up wide vistas for analytical research. In his detailed monograph on the *Chronicles of Samovydets*, he contributed greatly to increasing our knowlegde of the Khmelnytsky period.⁸

In 1929, however, great changes took place in the development of the Soviet Ukraine. The renaissance ended suddenly and unexpectedly. Stalin's new “general” line with its main slogans of collectivization and industrialization implied a crusade not only against the Ukrainian peasantry but against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. This new policy cost the Ukraine millions of victims: Neither Ukrainian scholarship in general nor Ukrainian historical research in particular were spared. Ukrainian “bourgeois” historians were persecuted as well as Communist historians. In fact the first accusations were levelled against the Marxist M. Yavorsky for the national-Ukrainian deviations which appeared in his courses on the history of the Ukraine.

This blow, however, was only the prelude to the implementing of reforms. In 1930, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was reorganized and the historical-

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Well-known Polish historian and author of numerous monographs on the Khmelnytsky period. Cf. D. Doroshenko, *Ocherk Ukrainskoi Istoriografii* (Essay on Ukrainian Historiography), Prague, 1923, p. 152.

⁶ Particular attention should be paid to the monograph *Ukraina na Perelome 1657—1659* (The Ukraine during the Crisis of 1657—1659), Vienna, 1920.

⁷ See note 3.

⁸ M. Petrovsky, *Ocherki s Istorii Ukrainy* (Essays on Ukrainian History) I. Research on the Chronicles of Samovidets, Kharkov, 1930.

philological section removed: Only two departments remained, that of physics and mathematics, now renamed the natural-technical section, and that of sociology and economics, to which were added certain committees of the former historical-philological section.

Then began the transitional period of Stalin's "reevaluation of values." Even the Russian school under the authoritative M. Pokrovsky fell into disgrace, as it considered its most important task to be the application of Communist doctrine to the historical panorama of Russia or the Soviet Union. The new approach consisted of giving the "great" Russian people first place. This people was, henceforth to play the leading role as the main herald of revolution and Communism as well as the guiding cultural factor in eastern Europe.

Once again famous leaders of the past, including the tsars, were re-appraised. Services to the "homeland," especially for having consolidated and propagated its greatness, were most favorably interpreted by the Soviet leaders. Now neither Stenka Razin nor Pugachev were such "pure" representatives of revolt but rather such figures as Alexander Nevsky, Ivan the Terrible, Minin and Pozharsky, Peter the Great, Suvorov, Kutuzov and the heroes of the defense of Sebastopol.

This patriotic, Kremlin note which signified the complete victory of Russian nationalism over that of other nations was linked in Stalin's directive with increased demands to utilize the orthodox Marxist method. Under Stalin's editorship the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* appeared, containing basic instructions for every worker and scholar, particularly for historians.

In general this was a period of dictated and controlled research work. The situation has in fact not changed to this day. There is no research accomplished as a result of the free cooperation of scholars and only tasks set by the Kremlin to further its interests may be implemented.⁹

With the new reforms of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1934, based on the newly created research institutes and autonomous centers directly under the control of the presidium of the Academy, the Institute for the History of the Ukraine (initially under the name of the Historical-Archeological Institute), attached to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, also began its research. With the disappearance of historical research the Institute was called upon to carry out very important work. After the removal of *Yavorschina* together with history text books written by this first Ukrainian Marxist historian, literally nothing remained either for students or teachers. Instead of textbooks, collaborators at the Institute prepared a series of monographs, approaching Ukrainian history from a new point of view. These monographs included a contribution by M. Petrovsky, at that time the most outstanding Ukrainian historian. His work was called *The Ukrainian People's War of Liberation against the Oppression of the Polish Ruling Class and the Annexation of the Ukraine to Russia, 1648—1654* (Kiev, 1940, No. 4).

The Institute's work marked a new period in Ukrainian Soviet historiography. Whereas in the twenties, Khmel'nitsky could at least be referred to, and Hrushevsky could express his own opinion of the great hetman, all this was now at an end. Practically every historical personality was allotted his interpretation

⁹ B. Krupnitsky, *Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion, 1921—1941* (Ukrainian Historiography in the Soviet-Union), 1941, Vols. 2/4, p. 150.

under the watchful eye of the Kremlin. Thus for example, I. Mazeppa, P. Doroshenko and I. Vyhovsky were described as Ukrainian traitors, because the Kremlin considered them to have betrayed the idea of a union between the Ukraine and Moscow, traitors who were ready to seek other than the Moscow type of orientation.

The figure of Khmelnytsky was unable to escape this type of rigid interpretation. M. Petrovsky was by no means a Communist adherent, nor did he support as a historian the idea of a *rapprochement* with Moscow, and yet he was compelled in his monograph to depict Khmelnytsky although positively, as nevertheless failing to stress the fundamental issue, from the Ukrainian historical viewpoint, of the alienation of the Ukraine from Poland and the creation of the Ukrainian Cossack state. Instead Khmelnytsky's efforts to unite the Ukraine with Moscow were given prominence.¹⁰

If the 300 years of union between the Ukraine and Russia (1654—1954) had not been celebrated, the works devoted to Khmelnytsky would have been far more modest in scope. One can hardly take seriously the popularly written essay on Khmelnytsky by the Russian K. Opisov which appeared in 1948.¹¹ The most characteristic feature of this author, who was not especially well-versed in the epoch and lacked adequate knowledge of Khmelnytsky's personality, was a return to old legends about the great Ukrainian hetman—to those legends which Hrushevsky tended to dismiss and which no longer figure in Ukrainian historiography. But Opisov defamed Khmelnytsky in accordance with the new Soviet policy, that is, in connection with Khmelnytsky's unification of the Ukraine and Moscow.

Even before the anniversary many individual works appeared, which were however devoted only to localized problems and were written in an official vein on orders from above. As an example we may point to Petrovsky's report entitled *The Initial Relations between Bogdan Khmelnytsky and the Russian Government on the Annexation of the Ukraine to Russia*, which was read at a session of the Shevchenko Kiev State University.¹² Attacking the representatives of the "bourgeois-nationalist" school of historiography—M. Hrushevsky and M. Korduba,¹³ the author attempted to prove that negotiations with Moscow were already in existence in 1648 and that the discussions in 1649 were only a continuation. He pointed out the important role as mediator in these relations played by the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Paisie who on Khmelnytsky's instructions held discussions with influential people in Moscow, including the tsar. Petrovsky wrote that he had discovered new archival documents concerning Paisie's speech and that he was preparing them for publication.¹⁴ However such Ukrainian historians as Hrushevsky and Korduba had already known a good deal about Paisie before Petrovsky.

Further research has since been concerned with elucidating the epoch from the above described point of view. The climax was reached in 1954 when the anniversary of the 300 years of union between the Ukraine and Moscow was

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Molodaya gvardia* (The Young Guard), Moscow, p. 480.

¹² *Voprosy istorii* (Questions of History), Moscow, 1949, No. 4, pp. 156—158.

¹³ D. Doroshenko, *Ocherk Ukrainskoi Istorii*, p. 197.

¹⁴ Very valuable information published for the first time on Patriarch Paisie's conversations is to be found in volume 11 of "*Vossoedinenia*" (Unification), Moscow, 1954, No. 46.

celebrated. Preparations for these celebrations began early and final instructions were issued by Moscow as far back as 1953. The presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR decreed that the following be published in connection with the celebrations: a work entitled *The Ukraine and Russia in the Joint Work of the Institute for Historical Research of the USSR and the Historical Institute of the Ukrainian SSR*; a symposium of reports delivered at the anniversary session of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; a collection of articles on the "union," published by the Historical Institute and the Slavic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in conjunction with the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR; popularly written pamphlets on the union to be prepared by the Ukrainian Professors Huslisty and Holubotsky.¹⁵

The celebrations themselves acquired more and more splendor in the course of time. They took place mainly in the spring of 1954 in conjunction with a long series of official anniversary measures and sessions of the All-Union and Kiev Academies of Sciences, etc. Military parades were organized in Moscow and Kiev as well as exhibitions of archive and museum documents and illustrations. Dankevich's opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* was produced in Moscow; the May Day slogans of the Ukrainian journals *Vychyzna* and *Dnipro* were mainly devoted to the 300 years of union; anniversary celebrations were held, of course, in the various republics.¹⁶ The satellite countries also responded; Khrushchev spoke, apparently in Poland, on this occasion.¹⁷

The press was particularly diligent in responding to the events with a stream of articles in every newspaper and magazine. In Kiev the press spoke in elevated tones of "the two great Slavic peoples."¹⁸ In the Moscow *Izvestia* on March 15, 1954, Ivan Tsyupa wrote that "the long history of humanity has never known an example of such genuine, unselfish and ardent friendship as exists together with brotherly unity between the two great Slavic peoples—the Russian and the Ukrainian."¹⁹

As the 1954 spring session of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, devoted to the 300 years of union, scholars expressed themselves far more cautiously than before in the presence of representatives from Moscow and from the other Soviet satellites. The leading role of the "great Russian people" was stressed, and it was for this reason that reports dealt with such themes as "the historical significance of the Ukraine's union with Russia;" "economic cooperation between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples;" "the leading role of progressive Russian scholarship and of the creative, friendly cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian scholars;" "the beneficial influence of Russian literature on the development of Ukrainian literature."²⁰

It is impossible to say definitely whether the promised symposiums and pamphlets by Huslisty and Holubetsky ever appeared. It was certainly easy enough to write the stereotyped newspaper articles on these celebrations, whose content was pre-determined by the central government.

The publication in 1954 of a three-volume collection of documents was completely unexpected.²¹ These volumes concerning the union between the Ukraine

¹⁵ *Voprosy istorii*, 1953, No. 10, p. 143.

¹⁶ *Ukrainsky visti*, Ulm, 1954, Nos. 33, 34, 36, 39.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1954, No. 27.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 33—34.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

and Russia deal with the periods 1620—1647 (vol. 1); 1648—1651 (vol. 2); and 1651—1654 (vol. 3).

All these publications have a common feature: they focus attention on Khmelnytsky as the great state leader. It is, however, astonishing that Soviet scholarship has not paid serious attention either to Khmelnytsky or to the Pereyaslav-Moscow negotiations. The whole issue revolves not around personalities, even outstanding ones, but around theses. In examining the fundamental processes of research into the Khmelnytsky epoch, after Hrushevsky's contribution, primary attention must be paid to M. Petrovsky's work entitled *The Ukrainian People's War of Liberation against the Oppression of the Polish Ruling Class and the Annexation of the Ukraine to Russia, 1648—1654*²² and to the contents of vol. 1 of the *History of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic*²³—a work which apparently has not yet been completed.²⁴ The first volume is supposed to contain a separate chapter on the Ukrainian War of Liberation from 1648—1654 under Khmelnytsky's leadership and on the unification of the Ukraine with Moscow.

Why is there no mention of the years 1654—1657? The answer is clear. The Kremlin needed a suitable version of Khmelnytsky's life for wide propagandistic distribution. However, Khmelnytsky as a "unifier" of the Ukraine with Moscow would lose considerable prestige if his independent policy during the later years of his life were factually depicted, which would not be to the Kremlin's advantage, for after extolling Khmelnytsky it would ultimately have to declare him a betrayer of broad interests as interpreted by the Communist center. In fact, after the Pereyaslav-Moscow treaty the paths of Moscow and the Ukraine, following a short period of unity became sharply divergent; by 1656 Moscow had made peace with Poland and had sent its armies against Sweden, whereas the Ukraine was collaborating with the Swedes and continuing the fight against Poland.

The History of the USSR (in Ukrainian)²⁵ published under the editorship of Prof. G. M. Pankratova also mentions the struggle of the Ukrainian people against Poland. Not only are the uprising of 1648 and the Pereyaslav treaty of 1654 mentioned, but also the years 1654—1657. While Khmelnytsky appears in this "History" as an active leader during the years 1648—1654, the contributors make no comment on his later activities but describe in the most general terms the Moscow-Polish armistice (1656) and the Russo-Swedish war.²⁶

It may now be understood why the celebration of this 300 years of union was so important to the Kremlin: it was a most favorable stimulant to Russian propaganda regarding the Kremlin's beneficent influence. Khmelnytsky and the

²¹ *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei* (The unification of the Ukraine with Russia). Published in 3 vol. by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1954. The basic work of this symposium was accomplished mainly by Ukrainian scholars, Russian collaboration was mainly concerned with guidance and supervision. The so-called editorial board of this technically imposing work consisted half of Russians and half of Ukrainians: Therefore the most important role in the compilation of these 3 vols. was played by the Historical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences on which depended ultimately the selection of documents.

²² Kiev, 1940, Vol. IV.

²³ *Voprosy istorii*, Moscow, 1953, No. 5, pp. 130—131.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1951, No. 2, pp. 156—158. Cf. also *Ukrainsky Visti*, 1954, No. 47.

²⁵ *Radyanska shkola* (The Soviet School), Kiev, 1941, No. 1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

Pereyaslav-Moscow treaty were only a means of providing the thesis—very important for the Soviets—of the happy existence of peoples under Moscow's administration. In the journal *Questions of History*²⁷ there appeared as early as 1953 a leading article entitled "On the 300 Years' Union of the Ukraine with Russia—The Inviolable Friendship of Fraternal Peoples." This article stated that the Ukrainian people had striven for centuries to unite with Moscow and that Pereyaslav was only a point of return to the homeland.

A common motherland signifies a common origin. On the basis of this official doctrine, the Soviets speak also of a "single old-Russian character."²⁸ This precept of national character became the basis of Kievan Russ with its high level of culture and brilliant development in agriculture, handicrafts and military techniques. Within this Kievan realm, apparently, all East Slavic tribes developed, the three outstanding East Slavic tribes of Belorussians, Ukrainians and Great Russians acquiring kindred qualities in the process of maturation. The influence of this Kievan epoch was, the thesis continues, so profound that it has left to this day in the consciousness of these three tribes the ideal of unity and common origin as well as of a linguistic and cultural kinship. This awareness was, it seems, most alive in the Ukrainian people, and it is for this reason that the historical development of the Ukraine was determined at an early period, especially when Moscow supposedly was utilizing every opportunity to give the Ukrainians aid in the form of munitions or grain or support for the colonization movement of the Ukrainian peoples.

Consequently the unification with Moscow in 1654 may, it appears, be called progressive in nature. For the Ukraine it was a guarantee that it could develop under the protection of Moscow without fear of the Poles or Turks or of any other form of oppression. The Ukrainians, it would appear, have always found in the Russian people²⁹ their protector and ally.

The initial step in this new account of Ukrainian historical development was to persuade the Ukrainians that their country as a whole had never been able to exist independently. As early as 1941, the textbook *The History of the USSR* (edited by G. M. Pantratova) stated that "The War of 1648—1651 graphically showed that the Ukraine could not free itself from Polish slavery by its own efforts alone. Surrounded on all sides by more powerful states it was unable to become independent at that time."³⁰ The complex historical and political conditions in eastern Europe in the XVII century were not apparently conducive to the creation of independent national states. For the Ukraine, lying under foreign oppression and in a constant state of political and economic conflict, the only other solution was to support an alliance with its fraternal Russian neighbor and to struggle, with the aid of the latter, for its own existence.³¹

This very action by Moscow is purported by Soviet historians to make its policy a progressive one, even though its foreign relations at that time also reflected the interests of the feudal ruling class. It is asserted that the Ukraine by entering the Russian "centralized" state saved itself from destruction by the Poles or Turks.³² For the Ukraine, union with Moscow should have been

²⁷ Moscow, 1953.

²⁸ Cf. also the introduction to *Vossoedinenie*, Vol. 1, p. V.

²⁹ *Voprosy istorii*, 1953, No. 12, pp. 3—6.

³⁰ Kiev, 1941, p. 189.

³¹ Cf. Introduction to *Vossoedinenie*, Vol. 1, p. VII.

³² *Ibid.*

advantageous as the Muscovites are said to have been more advanced economically, politically and culturally than the Polish nobility.³³

At this time the brilliant Polish culture of the nobility was at a particularly high level. It is well-known that in the middle of the XVII century the Ukrainians were the chief founders of Muscovite culture, particularly in the fields of education and handicrafts, the Ukrainians coming from a country which had long been under Polish domination.

Pereyaslav represents a sharp break, in the eyes of Soviet historians, from another point of view. They state that whereas prior to Pereyaslav, the Ukrainian people had striven for union with Moscow, afterwards they became a loyal nation and remained so throughout the vicissitudes of history. Pereyaslav extends its influence into the past and into the future; uprisings such as those of Kossinsky, Fedorovich, Pavlyuk or the Sahaydachny epoch were all at periods when the people's desire to join with Moscow was finding apparent expression. The Soviets stress particularly the loyal activity of Sahaydachny,³⁴ although no mention is made of the true fact, namely, that he together with the Polish king Wladislaw commanded the Cossack army in the struggle against Moscow (1618).

After Pereyaslav, the loyalty of the Ukrainian people, according to the Soviets, followed a clear pattern. The years 1708—1709 and 1812 and the war of 1941—1945 are said to show this without any doubt. If there were any traitors, they were to be found among the leaders, not the people.³⁵

In order to give Pereyaslav its pure Muscovite orthodox interpretation one very fundamental difficulty has to be dismissed. This concerns the question of whether a unification between Moscow and the Ukraine was a lesser evil for the latter or whether Moscow's benevolence was available without reservations.

In the 1940's the theory of a "lesser evil" was the officially accepted doctrine and even the *History of the USSR* edited by Pankratova states unequivocally that "the entry of the Ukraine into the Russian state represented a lesser evil for it than slavery under Polish or Turkish rule."³⁶

The theory of a "lesser evil" was an attempt to examine the Ukrainian-Moscow issue more or less factually. Indeed the concept of Moscow as progressive, as the virtuous defender of downtrodden peoples, was unrealistic and strange even for the Russians themselves. Tsarist Moscow, maintained essentially by the cooperation and support of the great feudal landowners, (boyars) had been censured for too long by its own historians (beginning with M. Pokrovsky) for it suddenly to assume the genuine role of a progressively-minded defender.

Later, when on Stalin's initiative the old regime had to be given official support (particularly such personalities as Alexander Nevsky, Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great) Marxist dialectic was once again put at the service of the Kremlin. The beneficent influence of Moscow and its role as the defender of all oppressed peoples was hard to reconcile with the theory of a "lesser evil." Consequently, starting in 1950, Russian historians began demanding a more consistent policy. The well-known Soviet historian Nechkin wrote in 1951 a letter

³³ *Ibid.*, P. XXV.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Part 1.

³⁵ *Voprosy istorii*, 1953, No. 12, pp. 3—6.

³⁶ Kiev, 1941, p. 189.

to the journal *Questions of History*,³⁷ in which he demanded a renunciation of the "lesser evil" formula and for treatment of the Pereyaslav-Moscow treaty as one which had proved to be completely advantageous to the Ukraine.

This viewpoint is supported by A. Pankratova, who is perhaps at present the most typical representative of Soviet Marxist historians. She feels that there is no point in denying the reactionary nature of the tsarist colonial policy.³⁸ Apparently it is sufficient to point out that many people were menaced by completely reactionary states like Turkey. The only solution for such peoples was, supposedly, union with Russia, a union which can, it appears, only be described as a beneficent historical act. Pankratova thinks it is necessary to distinguish between two phenomena of the tsarist period: first, the cooperation by non-Russian feudal leaders with Russian powerful landowners and nobles and second, as a reaction to this process, military alliances of the subjugated or united peoples with the great Russian people, that is with the Russian masses.³⁹

This is in fact nothing but dialectic fiction. There was no real cooperation on the part of the leaders or of the masses. Indications of Ukrainian participation in the Razin and Pugachev rebellions as well as Russian participation in the 1768 uprising in the Ukraine⁴⁰ do not prove anything, as these were purely military episodes. Further evidence of the lack of collaboration among the leaders is the mood of opposition and even enmity of the Ukrainian nobility toward Russia during the first half of the XIX century.

Consequently, the Pereyaslav-Moscow treaty and Khmel'nitsky's activities are represented by Soviet historiography as phenomena necessary and inevitable for the Ukraine itself. It is asserted that by this agreement the Ukraine saved itself and acquired a guarantee of its development.⁴¹ Moreover, both Khmel'nitsky and the treaty are said to symbolize the general unity of the non-Russian peoples with Russia during both the tsarist and the Soviet periods. The theory of unification is at the same time a theory of a war of liberation in which Moscow is supposed to have played the role of liberator. This so-called positive and progressive nature of Russia's policy is constantly stressed by the presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR whenever it has to reproach its own Historical Institute on this matter.⁴²

In this respect Soviet historiography, both Russian and Ukrainian, was given definite instructions from which it may not digress. Historians well appreciate that the important issues do not center around Khmel'nitsky or Pereyaslav. They are only the initial positions for justifying the policies of Russia and of the Soviet Union but nevertheless positions which are important for their propagandistic potential.

This type of anniversary comment in the press marking the 300-year celebrations, learned articles, an imposing edition of the Pereyaslav treaty—all represent a definitive approach to Khmel'nitsky which has been stressed as favorable, for it would be impossible to regard him in any other way after his having accepted the task—so praiseworthy in the eyes of Moscow—of uniting the Ukraine with Russia. However the situation has not always been as described

³⁷ Moscow, 1951, part 4, pp. 44—48.

³⁸ Cf. *Istoria SSR*, 1941, p. 189.

³⁹ *Kommunist*, Moscow, 1953, No. 6, pp. 64—65.

⁴⁰ *Voprosy istorii*, 1953, No. 12, pp. 6, 7, 18.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, No. 10, p. 142.

⁴² *Ibid.*, No. 5, p. 126.

above, as may be seen from the biography of Khmelnytsky in the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (Moscow, 1935, vol. 59, pp. 816—918). Here the social aspect was stressed. But the Soviets had not yet thought of using the memory of the Ukrainian hetman as a symbol of the 300 years of coexistence between the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples, a symbol of the “friendship of fraternal peoples.” This false romanticism had arisen from the needs of Russian nationalism which was still seeking an outlet in the 1930's. The official interpretation of Khmelnytsky in the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* was based on the thesis that this hetman was a “betrayers and a sworn enemy of the rebellious Ukrainian peasantry.” Apparently even prior to the uprising of 1648 he represented the interests of the Ukrainian feudal leaders who were aspiring to the same rights as those held by the Polish feudal nobility.

It is stressed that Khmelnytsky headed the peasant rebellions, but he is said to have done this in order to force concessions from the Poles because his interests and those of the peasantry diverged sharply. The Ukrainian feudal leaders wished to negotiate with their Polish counterparts and this fact is given as the reason for the “shameful” Treaty of Zborov in 1649 (as a result of which the Cossack leaders gained their feudal rights and serfdom was restored on all noble and monastic estates) as well as the humiliating Treaty of Belotserkov in 1651. It is also used to explain Khmelnytsky's savage reprisals against the popular uprisings. He then went farther than he had planned, for he achieved essentially, at that time recognition of rights for Ukrainian feudal leaders equal to those of their Polish neighbors and only during the last few years of the struggle did he aspire to achieve Ukrainian independence. In his policy toward the rebellious peasantry, Khmelnytsky often utilized purely provocative means which aimed at breaking the force of the peasant uprising, for example by enabling the Crimeans to occupy a provisionally “neutralist” position and thus enabling the feudal leaders to conclude the peace of Belotserkov, so advantageous to them. Even more treacherous was Khmelnytsky's attitude to the insurgents under the leadership of Nechay, Bohun and others. In this case the Ukrainian hetman did not hide behind a neutralist façade but gave direct help to the Polish forces which had suppressed the popular rebellion.

Although Khmelnytsky was an excellent general and diplomat who found allies sometimes in Turkey or the Crimea, sometimes in Sweden, he nevertheless sought aid persistently from Moscow and in 1651 sent his plenipotentiaries to Moscow for negotiations concerning a protectorate over the Ukraine. These negotiations lasted for three years and were terminated by the celebrated Treaty of Pereyaslav which constituted an alliance between the Ukrainian and Moscow feudal leaders and which legalized essentially the beginning of Russia's colonial domination over the Ukraine. Relying on the considerably strengthened feudal class, Khmelnytsky wished at this period to become the autocratic ruler of the Ukraine.

Encyclopedias prior to the 1920's at least recognized that Khmelnytsky wished to be an autocratic ruler of the Ukraine. To admit this would today be considered pernicious by Moscow. Equally untenable would be the admission that the Treaty of Pereyaslav led to Russia's colonial domination over the Ukraine and not to that brotherly love and cooperation which were stressed so frequently during the recent celebrations. Moreover, it is forbidden to express the opinion that Khmelnytsky betrayed the Ukrainian people. All these are theses which must not be substantiated. Russian historians are in the habit of

putting them forward only if it is necessary to prove some issue or other. In the 1930's, social awareness in the USSR was still strong, and it is for this reason that it was natural to develop the theme of antagonism between the reactionary, feudal Khmelnytsky and the ordinary Ukrainian people, who had proclaimed their right to lead a free existence.

Moscow as the elder brother of the Ukraine, the beneficent influence of the former on the latter after the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the progressive nature of their liaison—not a feudal alliance but a people's alliance implying mutual aid—all these factors are now being accentuated by the Soviets. It is for this reason that there is such a great difference between what Soviet historiography was preaching twenty years ago and what it is preaching today.

The Educational System in the Soviet Ukraine

M. SEMCHYSHYN

I

All schools in the Ukraine today are, according to the Soviet Constitution established, maintained and controlled by the state only, and must serve exclusively its interests, that is the interests of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Basically, their primary function is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of Communist ideology. As the Ukrainian SSR organizes all educational institutions in the Ukraine and is guided by the Soviet Communist Party, the Ukrainian educational system therefore is directly administrated by the top party organs in Moscow. All Soviet schools including Ukrainian, despite race, ethnic or other differences have the same pattern and structure. They are as standardized as the kolkhoz or MTS.

As distinct from countries in the West, the Soviet educational system cultivates only contemporary Soviet pedagogical ideas and does not of course, educate young people in the western spirit of Christian civilization.

Long before the revolution, Lenin working on the fundamental points of Communist ideology, drew special attention to the educational problem and provided the first ideological and practical instructions for the Bolsheviks' educational policy.

Already by 1903 he was stressing the important place of education in the Communist plan for destroying the old world and in building up a new non-class society. He pointed out that "bourgeois schools have a class character and our task in the educational field is to struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie. We openly declare that education outside this life, is a lie and hypocrisy."¹

This conception was put into Lenin's "Program Project of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party." Here Lenin proposed very humanitarian and enticing demands which reflect Communism in theory and practice.² These views Lenin developed later in the "Materials for the Revised Party Program" accepted by the VIII Russian Communist Party Congress in 1919.³ In October 1920, during the III. Komsomol Congress Lenin again raised the problems and finally formulated them as leading principles in the educational field.

¹ *Sovetskaya Pedagogika* (Soviet Pedagogics) 1954, Moscow No. 7, p. 7.

² In this "project" the right of the native language as an instructional medium was granted as well as free education, provision of food and clothing for pupils. Moreover the "Project" abolished compulsory work for youth until the age of 16, demanded a 6 hours working-day for youth between 16 and 18 years.

³ *Sovetskaya Pedagogika*, 1954, Moscow, No. 1, p. 3—4.

II

When the Bolsheviks occupied the Ukraine they found there an organized educational system in the form of a school network, which was educating youth in a national Ukrainian spirit. This network was set up after the 1917 revolution and the reestablishment of the Ukrainian democratic state system. Under the government of the People's Ukrainian Republic a General Secretariat of Education was inaugurated under the Ministry of Education. As a result of its efforts a number of new schools—primary, public, commercial and even higher educational centers were created with state funds. In Kiev alone 5 new gymnasia were built and in the Kharkov, and Odessa school districts, 80 public schools and gymnasia were founded.

The military situation at that period did not help further development in this direction. The attempts of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education resulted in the introduction of Ukrainian instead of Russian as the language of instruction in all educational establishments and in the reform of a great many old schools. At the same time all the national minorities in the Ukraine were guaranteed national schools.⁴

In addition the "Association of School Education" was founded in Kiev. This was concerned with producing text-books. At the end of 1918, over 2,000,000 copies were published despite immense war-time difficulties. This same association organized teachers, called conferences and prepared new tasks for the Ukraine's teachers, as a result of the changed conditions under the Ukrainian democratic state organization.

Endeavors by Ukrainian teachers produced by the end of 1917 the plan for a "Single Labor School" with a 12-year course of instruction. This comprised: Classes 1—4 "The Younger Basic School;" classes 5—8 "The Older Basic School" and classes 9—12 "The Collegium"—a general educational higher level establishment.

Professional training did not form part of the "Single Labor School" system but rather a parallel, set up so that children could pursue their studies also in professional schools. The "collegium" taught two classical languages (Latin and Greek) or else one classical language (Latin) and the preference for physics, mathematics and natural sciences.

The military situation did not permit the "single labor school" to develop in the Ukraine, which aimed at developing the pupil's abilities and creative proclivities and encouraging his esthetic tastes and national consciousness.⁵

Apart from the general educational type of school there were also in the Ukraine, special teacher's seminars and teaching institutes, training pedagogical cadres.

In 1918 new universities and other higher educational establishments were founded in Kiev, Kamyanets Podolsky and Ekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk). At the older Ukrainian universities in Kharkov and Odessa, chairs of Ukrainian language and literature were established as well as of Ukrainian history, law and art. Moreover the Ukrainian Academy of Arts was set up in Kiev and the Academy of Sciences, on October, 1918.⁶ Although these achievements of the

⁴ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva* (Ukrainian Encyclopedia), Munich, New York, I/III, p. 933.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

Ukrainian educational system did not have a very long life, it remained basically unaltered during the first years of the Bolshevik occupation. The attempt was even made to create a separate Ukrainian school system different from the Russian and despite Soviet measures to initiate a Communist school system in the Ukraine, Ukrainian national schools were able to continue their work for some time, but were of course, ultimately liquidated.

III

The fundamental principles established by Lenin, were obligatory for Ukrainian Bolsheviks, when they started to organize the Communist educational system in the Soviet Ukraine. In their work they took a Soviet "model" republic—the RSFSR as an example.

The Ministry of Education which either copied all corresponding Russian laws and degrees or simply adopted and applied them to Ukrainian educational legislation issued degrees, according to which:

1. All schools were separated from the Church and religious instruction was prohibited in January 1918.
2. All public schools were placed under the control of peasants' and workers' soviets in June 1919.
3. All private schools and other educational establishments underwent state administration and state control in April 1918.

This Moscow orientation may also be observed in the organizational aspects of Ukrainian education. Close contact was established between the Ukraine and the RSFSR and since March 1920 exchanges of information on educational policy have been customary between both Ministries of Education. In May 1920 these Ministries issued a joint declaration on the "Unity of Educational Policy" and exchanged representatives. In June 1920, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education utilizing the Russian, "Regulations for unified trade schools in the RSFSR" of October 1918, issued a decree on the creation of the 7-year unified trade school in the Ukraine.⁷ At the very beginning H. Hrynko the Ukrainian Minister of Education tried to pursue an independent educational policy. In 1918 he issued a "Declaration on Social Education"⁸ and set up the principles of an educational system which were in force for 3 years. In 1922 however, the Ukraine was obliged to follow Moscow's example; it adopted and introduced a program for the 7-years unified "trade" school into the Ukrainian SSR, which was approved by the State Learned Council in Moscow (1924).

IV

The educational system and school program in the Ukraine to-day resulted from a fundamental reform which took place at the beginning of 1930 throughout the USSR and which pertained especially to primary and public schools and the

⁷ *Sov. Ped.*, 1954, No. IV, p. 87—88.

⁸ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, Vol. I/III, p. 396.

⁹ This reform was based upon the decree of the People's Commissars' Council of the USSR, September 5, 1930.

development of professional schools. This reform⁹ put an end to surviving individualities in the educational system and led to the standardization of this system as regards the structure, program and methods of instruction. This reform also eliminated existing differences between the school system in RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁰ For the Ukrainian schools this reform has had far-reaching consequences. According to the already cited *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*¹¹ this reform was marked by three distinct aspects:

1. Intensified russification.
 2. Liquidation of all strictly Ukrainian features in the educational system.
 3. Complete centralization with Moscow as the controlling center.
- There are three basic types of schools in the Ukraine to-day.¹²

- A) General educational schools,
- B) Lower and Middle professional (trade) schools,
- C) Universities and Colleges.

The general educational schools consist of:

1. Primary schools, 2. Public schools (7 years duration), 3. Public schools (10 years duration).

A.

1. The basic type of general educational establishment is the primary school which is obligatory for children who are between 7—10 years old. It has a four years teaching program, corresponding to the first four classes of the public school.

2. The central type of general educational school is the public school (7 years duration). This is intended for children who are between 7—13 years old. Soviet general educational schools are mostly of this type. The program is identical with the first seven classes of the public school (10 years duration). The school is compulsory for all children in cities and in the larger workers' centers.

3. The third group represents the public school (10 years duration) for children from 7—16 years of age. This school has a 10 years program whose lower grades correspond to those of the primary school and public school (7 years duration).

General educational schools also include the following:

a) "Working Youth" schools. These were created during World War II for pupils engaged on enterprises and having to continue their studies at the same time. This school contains either 5 or 7 grades of from 8 to 10 grades as only those pupils who finished at least a primary school are admitted. Mostly youth between 14—25 years of age attends this kind of school (coeducational), which provides three courses per day. The program differs rather from that in the public school and provides 9 months of instruction at the rate of 16 hours weekly.

¹⁰ The general nature of the Ukrainian educational system during the first 10 years of the Ukrainian SSR (1920—1930) is described in the *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, 1949, Vol. I/III, pp. 934—939.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹² E. N. Medynsky: *Narodnoe Obrazovanie v SSSR* (People's Education in the USSR), Moscow, 1952.

b) *Evening courses for rural youth*. These usually employ the primary or public school program. They are attended mainly by rural youth, who for many reasons could not complete its basic education. Youth between 14—25 years of age attends these courses while engaged in agriculture. The program is shortened and provides 24 instructional weeks. After finishing 7 grades, the pupils are allowed to attend tenchical schools.

The special group of schools established during World War II consists of:

1. *Suvorov and Nakhimov military schools* for boys who apart from receiving a basic education similar to that in public schools also obtain military training which qualifies them for army commissions.

2. *General educational adult schools* for illiterates or semi-illiterates.

3. Special schools for blind, deaf or mentally retarded children with programs similar to those in general educational schools with stress on practical work.

All the above described schools, with the exception of the Suvorov and Nakhimov military schools, are under the control of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education.

B.

The professional (trade) schools consist of:

- a) Lower professional and
- b) Middle professional.

The first category includes industrial, rail-road and factory schools. Pupils who have completed their primary education may be admitted to these establishments. Industrial and rail-road schools have a teaching program lasting from 2 to 3 years and the factory school instructional program lasts from 6 to 12 months. The main task of these schools is to train skilled workers for industry. They remain under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Labor Reserves Ministry.

Middle professional schools consist mainly of industrial, agricultural, pedagogical, medical and musical establishments. Admission to this type of school is only for those who have completed at least public school (7 years duration). Its course extends over 2 or 3 years. Concerning programs and teaching methods, these schools are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Higher Education. Up to the end of 1954 they were under a Central All-Union Committee for Higher Education and later on under the Ministry of Higher Education established by the Soviet Council of People's Commissars. At the beginning of 1955 the Government of the Ukrainian SSR inaugurated a Ministry of Higher Education which is to be the highest authority for such schools.

The general administration of these schools belongs to various Ministries depending on the school, (medical schools, for instance, come under the administration of the Ministry of Health, agricultural schools under the Ministry of Agriculture, and so on. Musical and pedagogical schools are controlled by the Ministry of Education.)

C.

Admission to universities and colleges is only possible after finishing at a public school (10 years duration) and passing a satisfactory entrance examination. All higher educational establishments in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic are under the jurisdiction of the respective Ministries. As regards financial, administrative and organizational control they come under the Ministry of Higher Education.

Thus the educational system in the Ukraine is subordinate to three ministries: The Ministries of Education, Higher Education and Labor Reserves. A special committee established by the Ministry of Education deals with art, physical culture and sport.

The local educational authorities are represented by provincial, district and urban branches whose officials are appointed directly by the Ministry of Education.

V

The Soviet school program states that Communist ideology must be taken into account in the teaching of any subject. Moreover teachers are obliged to cultivate among pupils patriotic feelings for the Soviet homeland as well as mistrust and even hatred for everything non-Communist. The program is based on Lenin's thesis that "non-party science does not exist." Hence non-party schools cannot exist and consequently education as a whole must bear the Communist Party stamp and reflect a materialistic ideology.

Apart from ideological and political tasks, the Soviet school program, on Party orders, includes special duties (such as lectures on current events, economics, etc.) assigned by the school authorities at the beginning of each school-year.

The school principals are responsible for the fulfilment of these duties as well as of the whole program, to the local educational and Party authorities and Party controlled trade unions. The programs in Ukrainian schools do not differ from those in Russian schools. Moreover, as in the other Soviet republics, all pupils in Ukrainian schools must learn Russian (3—4 hours per week in primary school) as it is regarded by the Soviet regime as equal in value to Ukrainian. According to Party and government instructions—"after finishing primary school, pupils must be able to speak and write Russian." Further, "the teaching of Russian in non-Russian schools should be of the highest standard."¹³ The number of hours allotted to Russian language teaching in Russian and non-Russian schools is almost the same. The question naturally arises as to which subjects must suffer in view of more Russian language courses particularly as the teaching program for all schools in the Soviet Union is identical. The answer in our case is Ukrainian and mathematics, a fact which is not denied even by Soviet pedagogues. Pupils in Russian primary schools for instance who do not learn any other language, benefit more from their program than pupils in non-Russian schools.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

The primary school program also has the task of "inculcating Communist morals at the earliest stages," because as already quoted, Medinsky stated "the primary school must teach pupils the basis of a dialectical-materialistic ideology."

In order to fulfil these aims, Soviet pedagogues advise the teaching of natural sciences and of the native language. In addition, the primary school has to teach Soviet history and geography and to explain the basic structure of the Communist regime, Party and government. At Ukrainian primary schools the pupils must therefore know more about the USSR in general than they do about their own homeland.

In the first three classes of primary school, history is taught simultaneously with the native language. However Ukrainian history is interpreted as inalienable part of general Russian history. A preliminary course of general history is offered in the fourth grade of primary school together with an elementary survey of Soviet history. This pays special attention to the importance of historical processes, particularly of the October revolution, of the role of Lenin and Stalin and of the Communist Party. Moreover both Soviet patriotism and hatred for the Soviet Union's enemies are fostered.¹⁴ Such are the basic aims in teaching history to the first grades of primary schools.

Similar wider aims, are provided by Soviet educational programs for public schools. In the program for public schools (7 years duration) the Communist Party's role and achievements of the Soviet Union are especially accentuated. In addition the public school (7 years duration) has the task of giving its pupils a complete scientific course and of developing those concepts of Soviet patriotism, which have already been taught in the primary school. The Soviet constitution and geography with special regard to Soviet natural resources and the Soviet transformation of nature are important additional subjects taught there. Education at this stage must be carried out by compulsory membership of Pioneer and Komsomol organizations, which are equally responsible for the educating of Soviet youth. The program of grades V—VI—VII in public school (7 years duration) also comprises:

1. In Ukrainian schools the intensified teaching of Russian at the cost of other subjects (10 hours weekly in the V grade, 8 hours weekly in the VI and 6 hours weekly in the VII). This excessive number of hours is the most typical feature of Ukrainian schools. This is despite the fact that article 121 of the Soviet Constitution emphasizes above all the "right to learn the native language."

2. Much less time is allotted to the teaching of Ukrainian in Ukrainian schools than to Russian in Russian schools.¹⁵

3. An insufficient number of hours is assigned to the teaching of history and geography (only 2 to 3 hours weekly per subject).

4. An identical situation may be observed in the teaching of foreign languages (mainly English, French or German). Compared with the amount of time devoted to teaching Russian the number of hours allotted to these languages is less than half (4 hours weekly in grades V—VI and 3 hours in grade VII).

The teaching of history at this stage (V—VI—VII grades) aims at acquainting pupils with the development of social systems, with the Marxist-Leninist

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70—71.

conception of history and with an idea of the "new progressive world," which the Communists hope to achieve. The history course at this level aims at teaching pupils to distinguish between "just and unjust wars;" the Bolsheviks have, of course, been interpreted as "just." When examining the main features of the instructional program in the public school's highest grades VIII—IX—X, it is necessary to point out that:

1. Most instructional hours are assigned to teaching Russian language and literature, 5 hours weekly in the first term and 8 in the second in grade VIII, and 6 hours weekly during both terms in grades IX and X. In the same grades the number of hours devoted to teaching Ukrainian is as little as in the public schools (7 years duration).

2. The history programs of the three highest grades are intended to show the restricted nature of bourgeois revolutions in comparison with their socialist counterparts, to foster love for the "socialist homeland," to show the heroic past of the Russian people and to display the USSR's achievements in the political, economic and cultural spheres.

Everything Russian is favored and national elements are consequently neglected especially in the Ukrainian schools. The Ukrainian language has been clearly russified for many years and littered with non-Ukrainian elements, mainly lexical; Ukrainian literature has been given a purely Party interpretation and Ukrainian history has been falsified according to the Bolsheviks' need's.

Another interesting aspect of Ukrainian public schools concerns a decree issued by school authorities in October 1954. According to this decree the preparatory teaching of technical specialists in the higher grades of 36 public schools (7 and 10 years duration) has been introduced.¹⁶

In addition, in 6 public schools (10 years duration) in the Ukraine, in the Kiev and Kharkov region, industrial subjects are to be taught in grades VIII—X to give pupils a modicum of technical knowledge. The graduates of these schools will also receive a special certificate which describes their technical qualifications for work to which they will be directed by the school authorities.

The appearance of professional training in general educational schools should be regarded as the initial attempt of Ukrainian educationalists to introduce technical subjects into all such schools. The above step may be explained only by the shortage of technically qualified personnel in the Ukraine despite the fact that many professional schools already exist there. It is noteworthy that the pupils of these schools are automatically deprived of further education because after graduating from such schools they must accept the job assigned to them by the authorities.

Before examining statistical data on Ukrainian schools it should be remembered that statistical figures taken from official Soviet sources are imposing and show the unquestionable development of these schools. However the serious shortcoming of such statistics is that they give adequate information as far as general-educational schools are concerned, but are most unsatisfactory as regards professional schools and all higher educational establishments.

Basing his analysis therefore on available Soviet data particularly on that presented by the well-known Soviet pedagogues N. M. Hryshchenko¹⁷ and E. N. Medynsky¹⁸ the author hopes to show the expansion and present state of schools in the Ukraine.

¹⁶ *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, Moscow, September 28, 1954.

¹⁷ *Sovetskaya Pedagogika*, 1954, No. IV, p. 90—93.

Development of General-Educational Schools since 1914

Year	Schools	Pupils	Teachers
1914—15	19,568	1,678,128	
1924—25	15,555	1,795,193	44,622
1925—26	17,032	2,105,664	
1926—27	18,604	2,185,700	
1928—29	20,446	2,554,403	
1937—38	22,315	5,816,537 ¹⁹	
1938—39	22,396	5,453,966	
1940—41	29,314 ²⁰	5,955,100	237,748
1950—51	29,424	6,500,000	
1954	30,000	6,800,000	300,000

State of Ukrainian Schools in 1940

Type	Schools	Pupils
Elementary	14,560	3,580,700
Public schools (7 years duration) .	10,740	1,948,200
Public schools (10 years duration)	4,014	426,200
Total	29,314	5,955,100

According to a report of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party on March 23, 1954, there were 1,185 new public schools (10 years duration), in the Ukraine, containing 494,000 pupils.

Analyzing these figures it emerges that:

1. The increase in pupils was very great, particularly in 1925—1926 (2,105,664). In 1928—1929 this number was 2,554,403 (more than 350,000 in comparison with the 1926—1927 data). The number of pupils increased by 100% over the next 10 years and reached 5,816,537 in 1937—1938. A sudden decline of 400,000 can be observed in the following school year. This originated in a serious famine in the Ukraine (1932—1933) when the infant mortality rate was very high. No statistical data is available for World War II.

During the last three years the increase of pupils in Ukrainian schools has been rather slow (from 6½ millions in 1950—1951 to 8 millions in 1954).

2. The corresponding rate of increase in new school building is far from satisfactory. From available figures it may be observed for instance, that in 1928—1929, 2,554,403, pupils were being taught in 20,446 schools. Ten years later however for twice the number of pupils, the Ukrainian school authorities only disposed of 22,315 schools. This slow rate of building can also be seen during the post-war reconstruction period: Only 1,000 new schools were built between

¹⁸ Medynsky, op. cit., p. 70—71.

¹⁹ 1/5 of total Ukraine population.

²⁰ An increase in the number of schools of nearly 7,000 and of 500,000 pupils was due to the incorporation of the western Ukrainian territories into the Ukrainian SSR in 1939—1940.

1946—1950. The same tortuous progress has continued during the last four years. From 1950—1954, only 600 new schools were created. In view of the 300—400 increase of pupils per annum, this is far from sufficient.

3. Table II gives a more detailed picture of general educational schools in the Ukraine in 1940. It shows that approximately half of them were primary schools, more than a third were public schools (7 year duration) and the rest public schools of 10 years duration. According to Soviet official sources. 7 years obligatory school attendance had already been achieved by 1949. However this information must be accepted with reserve and it is to be assumed that still 20%—25% of all general educational schools consist of primary schools.

4. Another question to be asked in connection with the above data is how many of the 6.8 millions of pupils, attending general educational schools in the Ukraine today, are of Ukrainian origin?

Speaking of the achievements of the Ukrainian national schools during the IX Party Congress of the Ukrainian Party of Bolsheviks in 1925, Kaganovich stressed, that 78% of all Ukrainian schools, used Ukrainian for instructional purposes. It is difficult to ascertain accurately the percentage of Ukrainian pupils in Ukrainian schools to-day, but according to figures for universities and colleges in the Ukraine given by K. Lytvyn²¹ this percentage was 59.9 in 1952. The same percentage approximately may be assumed at pre-university and college level, taking into consideration that not all graduates from public schools (10 years duration) enter higher educational establishments. Consequently around 70% of all students attending general educational schools may be Ukrainian nationals and this figure is in accordance with the total Ukrainian population to-day. During the last 35 years this number has decreased considerably as many millions of Ukrainians have been deported and replaced by elements from other parts of the Soviet Union, mostly Russian.

Little accurate information is available on lower and middle-professional schools. Nevertheless available data²² points to the existence of nearly 500 lower professional schools in the Ukraine in 1953 with around 100,000 students. These included 186 industrial schools with 55,654 students and 229 factory training schools with 36,044 students. The small number of students at factory training schools could be explained by the fact that admission to them is now voluntary and not compulsory as in previous years. These schools are attended by nearly 800,000 pupils yearly, throughout the USSR.²³ At the beginning of 1954, there were 601 technical schools with 261,000 students, 126 agricultural schools and 72 pedagogical centers which train primary school teachers.²⁴

Higher Education

The Soviets constantly extol the magnificent development of their higher education. However their policy in this sphere is to send mostly non-Ukrainian students most of them Russian to Ukrainian higher centers of learning. After

²¹ K. Lytvyn, *Rozkvit Kultury Radianskoi Ukrainy* (The cultural development of the Soviet Ukraine), Kiev, 1954 p. 36.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²³ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 18, 1954.

²⁴ *Radyanska Ukraina* (The Soviet Ukraine), March 24, 1954.

they complete their studies, the authorities settle them in Ukrainian ethnographical territory thus increasing the number of non-Ukrainian inhabitants.

The higher educational system comprises Universities, Pedagogical and Teachers Training Colleges and many institutes including Politechnical, Medical, Agricultural and Art Institutes. Unfortunately recent figures on the number and location of these establishments are not available.

The development of universities and colleges in the Ukraine during the last 27 years is illustrated below:²⁵

Year Higher centers Number of students

1914	19	26,695
1927	28	28,634
1937	119	108,121
1940	166	127,572
1945	150	99,104
1946	156	118,722
1947	158	129,172
1949	159	137,317
1950	156	150,006
1951	156	164,404
1952	144	177,114
1953	144	190,955
1954	137	185,000

**Percentage of Ukrainian at higher²⁶
centers in the Ukraine**

Year

1929	51,8 ⁰ / ₀
1938	54,2 ⁰ / ₀
1946	51,8 ⁰ / ₀
1947	53,5 ⁰ / ₀
1948	53,8 ⁰ / ₀
1949	55,6 ⁰ / ₀
1950	57,9 ⁰ / ₀
1951	59,1 ⁰ / ₀
1952	59, ⁰ / ₀

²⁵ Lytvyn, op. cit., pp. 36—37.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Number of professors and lecturers²⁷

Year	Number
1938	7,675
1949	12,739
1952	14,425
1954	17,170

Percentage of women-students

Year	
1929	25,8%
1938	41,6%
1952	49,0%

Looking at these figures it can be seen that the number of centers increased regularly until 1949 when their total was 159.

Before World War II there were only 119 higher educational establishments in the Ukraine. In 1952 there was a decrease in the number of higher centers to 144 and another reduction to 137 in 1954.

This has been explained by the Soviets as the "consolidation of higher educational institutions." They also claim that those schools have produced 160,600 graduates during the last seven years. The percentage of Ukrainians in these schools is approximately 56%. The number of professors and lecturers in higher centers of the Ukraine is also increasing. Many scholars are being sent to the Ukraine from other Soviet republics, primarily from the RSFSR. The data on Ukrainian universities, colleges etc. as presented by Lytvyn extend to 1953 inclusively. The figures for December 1954 are available in a report published by the official Ukrainian news Agency (TARS)²⁸ in connection with the creation of a new Ministry of Higher Education.

According to this report²⁹ there are 137 educational centers in the Ukrainian SSR which include 7 universities (Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Lvov, Chernovtsi, Ushgorod) and 20 agricultural institutes. These schools were attended by 165,000 students and 117,000 students took college-level correspondence courses. The Ukrainian colleges and universities employ 17,170 professors and lecturers, 40.5% of whom possess higher degrees. From the other available information particularly on the universities in Kiev, Kharkov, Ushgorod and Lvov it would seem that Soviet data does not correspond to the true situation.

First, a high percentage of students are of non-Ukrainian origin; second, apart from Ukrainian as the officially accepted language of instruction, Russian

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ ²⁹ Degree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, December 31, 1954, and of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, February 10, 1955.

is very often employed; third, Party and Komsomol members have a better chance to attend universities. Moreover, high fees for higher education make admission to these centers practically impossible for workers and rural youth and these are compelled mostly to attend professional schools.

VI

Another problem in Ukrainian education is linked with the sharp criticism of a former Ukrainian Communist Party Secretary, Melnikov, on the shortcomings of Ukrainian schools during the XVII Party Congress in 1952. On the one hand he emphasized the fine development of Ukrainian schools and on the other hand, he pointed out the defects of textbooks particularly those on Ukrainian literature which "distort the Soviet way of life," and fail to show adequately the "beneficial influence of Russian culture on the Ukrainians." He also pointed out serious ideological and methodological errors made by Ukrainian schools.³⁰

The Soviet school authorities have also many difficulties of an organizational and administrative nature. For example O. Filipov, Deputy Minister of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, published an article in the *Radyanska ukraina* on April 27, 1955, entitled "More Public Attention in Preparing for the New School-Year," in which he enumerated the shortcomings of the Ukrainian educational system. These include:

1. The program of general compulsory education has not been realized, particularly in the western Ukrainian Provinces. The pupils after completing the public schools (7 years duration) are not automatically promoted to grade 8 owing to a shortage of school premises.

2. At many village the pupils are compelled to live in poorly equipped boarding schools, under very primitive conditions.

3. New schools are being built very slowly. In many provinces the building program was only fulfilled by 46⁰/₀—52⁰/₀. This situation can also be observed in the restoration of old or war-damaged school buildings.

4. Lack of desks and textbooks. For instance in the Sumy Oblast in September 1954, 94,000 necessary text-books were not delivered to schools. Similar cases have occurred in the other provinces.

5. Of 185,000 desks ordered early in 1954, only 20,000 were delivered.

6. Discharging or transferring of teachers to other schools has reached an enormous scale. It is often practiced by the school authorities, without informing the Central Administration. For instance in Melnytsia (Podilla District) in 1954, 70⁰/₀ of all teachers, among them many principals, were discharged without reason. The district education officer who ordered these dismissals has been released from his duties, but Deputy Minister Filipov pointed out how much damage had already been done.

Another important issue still to be discussed is whether freedom of vocation exists in the Soviet Union. Examining this question M. Hrechko³¹ concludes that the

³⁰ *Radyanska Ukraina*, September 25, 1952.

³¹ V. M. Hrechko, *Kommunisticheskoe Vospitanie v SSSR* (Communist Education in the USSR), Munich, 1951, p. 16.

Soviet educational system aims above all at directing the pupils' interests toward fulfilling state tasks. Choice of profession in the Soviet Union particularly in the Ukraine is very limited. Only children of Party officials can afford to study at the universities and to pay the necessary fees. The children of average workers and kolkhozniks are deprived of this possibility and mostly attend professional schools. It often happens, says Hrechko, that due to overcrowding at certain higher centers the authorities transfer students compulsorily to other types of school without consulting the students concerned. Such transfers from university to pedagogical institutes or to similar higher centers are normal in the Soviet Union. However, occasionally, extraordinary things occur, as for instance in 1940, in Kiev, where 60 students from a School of Music and Drama were compulsorily transferred to the Sugar-Industry Institute.³²

There is no doubt that the Soviet educational system which preaches the worship of non-class society, serves itself as an example of class selection of its pupils. Neither general educational values nor pedagogical ideals play the main role in Soviet schools in the Ukraine but primarily those ideas established by the Communist Party.

³² *Ibid.*

The Cultivation of Virgin and fallow lands in the USSR

Y. VAKULENKO

The decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in September 1953, on the "sharp increase" in all branches of agriculture which accelerated development in the light industry and boosted the production of consumer goods, was based on statements made in August-September 1953 by G. Malenkov and N. Khrushchev.

A most significant aspect of both these statements is the partial disclosure of a considerable agricultural crisis throughout the USSR.

This unexpected retreat from the general Party line requires some explanation. Stalin's death engendered feelings of uncertainty and confusion at top Party level and an internal struggle for succession. This is how the much publicized Soviet "collective leadership" came about. Through their secret police, the leaders became aware of the deep dissatisfaction among the masses of the population which had given up hope of there being any real changes to improve conditions.

Initially the collective leaders felt themselves to be insecure and lacking in authority; they needed to make it clear to the people that their desire for an improvement in existing conditions would be met. Thus the Stalin cult ended; the group of doctors who had earlier been accused of intriguing with foreign agents in order to bring about the liquidation of a number of high Soviet officials were rehabilitated; the MGB was dissolved and those of its leaders who had applied forbidden methods of investigation were tried and sentenced. Russification methods in the Ukraine were condemned, a promise was made to review the legal code, an amnesty was promised and Beria himself, as the personification of the former terror, disappeared from the scene.

The compulsory, state internal loan was reduced by 50% and lastly the September resolution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was passed on a sharp increase in living standards.

All this was bound to have some influence on the psychology of the Soviet population. The extreme dissatisfaction and almost complete lack of confidence in the government was neutralized and replaced by the hope for something different and better. The collective leadership thus had time to elaborate plans and at the same time to maintain control of the people without violating the fundamental dogmas of Communist doctrine.

But hardly a year had elapsed when at the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a new resolution was passed "To Further an Increase in Grain Production and Cultivate the Virgin and Fallow Lands."

By this resolution the country was given the task of achieving "a sharp increase in the production of grain, fodder, groats and pulse crops ensuring that

deliveries to the state would increase quickly by 35—40% as compared with 1953." "This" dates the resolution, "will enable supplies for the workers to be improved, the securing of fodder for livestock and the creation of sufficient sowing stocks will enable the necessary quantity of grain to be put aside for industrial processing, for state reserves and export."

It will be seen that the recent declaration by top Communist leaders on the final solution of the grain problem in the USSR, is unjustifiably optimistic; there is not even enough grain to supply the normal needs of the population or livestock, for sowing or reserves.

The resolution further stresses that an increase in grain production throughout the country is of enormous importance. Apart from raising the grain yields it is also necessary to expand the sown areas through the cultivation of virgin and fallow lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia (Western Siberia, Altai and Krasnoyarsky areas, Chita and Amur-Primorska oblasts), the Ural, the Volga basin and part of the northern Caucasus.

The initial plan as resolved by the Plenum, for increasing the sown areas under grain crops amounted to 13,000,000 ha. but at the end of 1953 this was increased to 28—30,000,000 ha. It is intended to fulfill this vast plan by 1956. It is interesting to reflect on the reasons behind such hasty activity and why they provoked Khrushchev's drive for grain in the arid and mostly Asiatic steppes instead of trying to solve the crisis by increasing the yields in areas already under grain by 20—30% which would have been quite feasible with the recent improvements in farming techniques, increased fertilization and especially as these areas have a more propitious climate.

The motives behind this policy can be divided into military-strategical, internal-political and economic.

Until recently the main producers of agricultural produce and especially of grain crops were the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus (Kuban), parts of the Donbas, the Volga river basin and the South Ural lands. The population of these territories, as compared with other parts of the Soviet Union, has suffered most from the Communist system and therefore they are especially ill-disposed towards the Soviet authorities. This was clearly seen in various guises during World War II e.g., the surrender of hundreds of thousands of soldiers or the organization of anti-Soviet partisan groups particularly in the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Crimea.

All this is very well-known to the Kremlin which consequently does not trust the population in these areas. The fact that they are situated on the periphery of the Soviet Union creates an additional danger from a strategical point of view. The Communist leaders remember only too well the difficulties which arose during World War II owing to the rapid advance of the German armies through Soviet territories and the colossal strategical resources centered in the Ukraine, the Don river basin and the Kuban, lost as the direct result of inadequate means of transportation. This is why it is vitally necessary to create in the shortest possible time, a new grain producing base and also vital reserves in a safer area such as Central Asia.

It should moreover be remembered that Asia, within the boundaries of Soviet rule, is a colossal reservoir of many raw materials and sources of energy for industry: rich deposits of coal, oil, iron-ore and various non-ferrous metals especially gold, vast reserves for producing hydro-electric power and so on. Since the beginning of the 1930's and specially during and after World War II,

industry has been developing rapidly in various regions of the Soviet-Asiatic territories.

"During World War II" writes A. Popluiko, "The transfer of enterprises and factories from occupied territory to the eastern areas of the USSR took place on a gigantic scale."¹ Popluiko, in his book based on the work of N. Voznesensky ("The Military Economy of the USSR during the First Years of the Patriotic War," Gospolitizdat 1948), writes:

During approximately three months in 1941, 1,360 large enterprises were evacuated (including 455 to the Ural area, 210 to Western Siberia and 250 to Central Asia and Kazakhstan). According to Voznesensky, during three years of war (1942—1944), 2,250 enterprises were rebuilt and being utilized in the eastern areas.²

All this naturally created labor demands and, consequently caused a rapid increase in the population of Siberia and Central Asia (mainly Kazakhstan). This increase, together with the expansion of old towns and building of new ones in the eastern Asiatic areas of the Soviet Union, was carried out by well-tried Soviet methods; there were few volunteers for work in these areas and labor was supplied mainly by compulsory resettlement, in some cases of whole republics as for instance, the Crimean Autonomous Republic, the German autonomous oblasts in the Volga region, the Kalmuk Autonomous Republic, Karachaevska and Adegeyska autonomous oblasts and so on. It should also be recalled that the immense Asiatic regions still contain innumerable concentration camps with millions of inmates who can supply slave labor.

The creation of new centers of industry in Asian territory as well as the precipitate increase in the population and the necessity of supplying it with consumer goods also served as an important reason for establishing new grain producing areas with a view, in case of war, to making Asia independent of the European food producing centers, especially the Ukraine. Purely economic considerations played an important part in these decisions, taking into account the unsuitability and unprofitableness of transporting large consignments of food over long distances.

The latter factor becomes even more important when it is remembered that the Soviet Union has continually to supply all kinds of aid including consumer goods, to her Asiatic neighbour and ally—the Chinese People's Republic.

By the creation of a new grain producing base in the virgin and fallow lands in the arid steppes of Asia, where, without previous ameliorative measures, only an extensive form of grain husbandry has been possible, Communist leaders also expected to solve as quickly and cheaply as possible, the problem of supplying with agricultural products the Soviet population which, since the beginning of collectivization has been at least in a permanent state of semi-hunger. Obviously such a situation worries the Soviet leaders. Those times when the false and demagogic propaganda of the Communists found favorable ground among the uneducated masses of the Soviet people who were culturally, on a very low level, are gone for ever.

Direct experience showed the people the hollowness of the slogans of the Communist regime, which promised them the fulfillment of all their needs after

¹ A. Popluiko, *The Socialist Location of Industry and Economic Development of the Union Republic*, 1955, Munich, No. 6, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*

the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture had taken place. Also the large number of contacts made by Soviet citizens with the West during World War II and subsequently their lengthy occupation of certain central European countries, could not be without serious effect as they were able to acquaint themselves with the conditions of life prevailing outside the USSR. Broadcasts by the emigré groups from abroad are also helping to influence the population of the Soviet Union. This is why the government of the USSR spends large sums on jamming them. All this deepens the dissatisfaction which is prevalent among the masses of the Soviet population and especially the peasantry because continuous pressure and extreme exploitation have reached a limit beyond which the policy of coercion and terror can no longer be justified and on the contrary, leads toward the breaking up of discipline. The Soviet press testifies to this. In the *Radyanska Ukraina* of December 23, 1954, the leading article comments:

In many artels, labor discipline is still very low; not all kolkhozniks are actively participating in kolkhoz production.

And later,

In one artel nearly 200 woman did not even complete the minimum number of working days. Some of them of their own accord, left their work in gardening, livestock raising and other branches of production.

The *Pravda Ukrainy* of December 8, 1954, mentions kolkhozes where, "up to 20% of the kolkhozniks did not work in agriculture at all." Obviously there is no sense in working when the work is not paid in proportion to the amount of time and energy expended.

In the light of this mood prevailing among the kolkhozniks, the effort of the Communist regime to increase their material interest in their work and to improve discipline, become understandable.

Measures taken include:

1. An increase in state purchases and purchase prices,
2. The paying of cash advances to kolkhozniks out of the sums received from kolkhozes, after selling animal and garden produce,
3. The lowering of the compulsory delivery norms,
4. Supplying the kolkhozniks, contributing to state purchases of fodder, with 10% of the stored hay and straw;
5. Exemption from taxes on individual private plots belonging to the kolkhozniks.

But such efforts as these are no more than palliatives. They are not sufficiently strong to neutralize the present production crisis in the collective husbandry system which has brought Soviet agriculture to its most extreme predicament; they are not able to diminish noticeably the mood of dissatisfaction among the population. This internal political situation was one of the fundamental factors which caused Khrushchev's drive for grain in the virgin lands of Asia.

The following tables explain the current state of crisis in the USSR's agriculture, especially as concerns grain production. The first and fourth tables are taken from a Soviet author who is compelled to show only the positive side of the question. The second and third tables are the result of analytical work by an independent, non-Soviet author and represent a serious corrective approach to the facts on Soviet agriculture which may be obtained by studying Soviet sources only.

Sown Areas of the Principle Crop Groups³

		(millions of hectares)					
		1913	1928	1933	1938	1940	1954
Total area under cultivation	105.0	112.9	129.7	136.9	150.4	164.1	
1. Grain crops	94.4	92.2	101.5	102.4	110.4	114.1	
2. Technical crops	4.5	8.6	12.0	11.0	11.7	12.7	
3. Fruit, vegetables and potatoes	3.8	7.7	8.6	9.4	9.9	10.2	
4. Fodders	2.1	3.9	7.3	14.1	18.0	26.0	
[Population in millions]	139.3	154.2			174.0	214.0]	

Note: Figures for 1913—1940 are taken from an article by L. Hrekulov, "The increase of grain production is an urgent task" published in the journal *Economic Problems*, 1954, No. 5, p. 7, and for 1954 from a lecture given by Professor V. S. Mertsalov at the economic conference of the "Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR" in Munich, on April 25—28, 1955.

When analysing the above figures it can be seen that while the population of the USSR has, in the last 40 years, increased by 54% (in absolute figures by 74.7 millions), the sown areas as a whole have increased by 56%, although the area under grain crops has increased by only 20.9%. Such a change in crop structure during the Soviet period undoubtedly testifies to progressive tendencies in agricultural production. The system of collectivization has nevertheless slowed down these progressive tendencies as is illustrated by the following table:

Yields of Grain Crops in the USSR⁴

		(granary yield per ha.)					
		Years: 1913	1928	1940	1950	1953	1954
Yield per ha. in centners		8.5	7.9	8.6	9.6	9.1	8.7

Thus in 37 years of continuous "successes and achievements" about which official and semi-official Soviet sources so often speak, the yields of grain crops have remained practically at the pre-revolutionary level and in recent years have shown even a greater tendency to regress. In this connection the amount of bread, per capita in the Soviet Union over the year is worth noting:

³ *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Problems of Economics), 1954, Moscow, No. 5, p. 7.

⁴ Prof. V. S. Mertsalov, *The Policy of the Sharp Increase in Agriculture*. A paper read at the conference of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, on April 25.—28., 1955, Munich.

Annual Bread Distribution Per Capita in the USSR⁵

(in centners)

Years:	1913	1928	1940	1950	1953	1954
	4.9	4.0	4.6	4.3	4.0	3.9

Thus, bread consumption under the Soviets in 1954 was 80% of what it was 1913. The impact of collectivization in the Soviet Union is even more apparent if we consider the colossal efforts made by the Soviet government by introducing modern farming technique, especially by agricultural mechanization.

A Soviet author, A. Shibanov,⁶ writes "On January, 1954, 90.7 kolkhozes were served by 8,995 MTS. They had at their disposal over one million tractors and 266,000 combine harvesters. The MTS carried out 80% of all basic work on kolkhozes in 1954." The level of mechanization of all basic farm work has increased considerably as will be seen from the following table:

Percentage of basic farm work achieved ⁷				
Basic farm work	1940	1950	1952	1953
1. Autumn plowing	72	92	97	98
2. Plowing of fallow lands . .	84	96	96	98
3. Spring sowing	52	64	80	83
4. Autumn sowing	53	75	88	93
5. Harvesting of grain crops . .	43	50	70	77

Analyzing the above facts, the following conclusions made be drawn: The crisis in Soviet agriculture will not be resolved until the collective farm system, which is built on the slave labor of the kolkhozniks—whose initiative and interest in their work have disappeared as the result of the unbelievable exploitation by the Communist state—has been abolished.

Another reason for the grain drive in Kazakhstan, is ideological and doctrinal in character. Expanding steppe farming as widely as possible by the net-work of sovkhoses, the Communists, applying to the fullest extent the principles of agricultural mechanization are trying to achieve the ideal of agrarian Communism.

This argument is supported by recent disclosures of Soviet authors. V. Ovchinnikova⁸ writes:

In Kazakhstan, in addition to the lands cultivated this year, 15,000,000 ha. of suitable state virgin and fallow land were opened up, as well as lands which have not yet been exploited belonging to sovkhoses and kolkhozes. In the krais and oblasts of the RSFSR, 3,000,000 ha. of such land were disclosed. In these lands, in addition to 124 sovkhoses organised in 1954, hundreds of new grain sovkhoses are planned. Experience shows

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1954, No. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1954, No. 12, p. 71.

⁸ *Ibid.*

that the organization of sovkhozes at the present time is the most expedient form of achieving the mass cultivation of fallow lands and an increase in grain production.

Thus the basic form of agricultural husbandry in the new lands are sovkhozes, notwithstanding the fact that they did not justify themselves in the old populous agricultural areas, or under Stalin's experiment in cultivating Kazakhstan and the northern Caucasian steppes in the early 1930's. By organising the so-called "grain factories" the Communists were trying through the mass export of grain and by undercutting world prices, to deepen the economic depression in capitalist countries as a prerequisite of world revolution and the seizure of power.

Recently, the Soviet press pointed out the economic unprofitableness of the sovkhoz organisation. This is apparently due to the high cost of production and the consequent working at a loss, the lack of rational labor organisation, the partial exploitation of agro-machine techniques and so on.

Yet a second motive is national-political and closely connected with military-strategical considerations. The completion of large scale measures connected with the cultivation of the virgin and fallow lands in the sparsely populated territories, obviously required an additional labor force. Such cadres could only be found in the densely populated European territories. Therefore there was a need for mass resettlements which, in fact, began immediately after the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was passed in February 1954. According to Soviet sources, most of the population resettled for this purpose was taken from such European territories as the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Kuban, Latvia and other peripheral republics. Reports in the Soviet press, state that last year over 150,000 young people, and also thousands of kolkhoz families were sent to cultivate the new lands:

In the kolkhozes of Altai alone 2,300 families from Belorussia and the Ukraine were resettled by October 15, 1954. 1,440 kolkhozes in Kazakhstan are preparing to receive resettlers. Over 1,000 families of resettlers are going there from the Ukraine. Resettlers are also going to the Krasnoyarsk krai, Kemerovo, Tjumen, Chelabinsk and other eastern oblasts.⁹

The Belorussian paper *Batskovshchyna* published in Munich, March 25, 1955, in an article "The deportation of Belorussians to the virgin lands," says that about 80,000 young people were sent to the new lands last year. The review of broadcasts from January 25—February 2, 1955, gives the following picture of the mobilization of the "patriots" for the cultivation of the virgin lands:

Radio Moscow, January 25, 1955.

55,000 young Ukrainian patriots have expressed their willingness to cultivate the virgin lands.

Kuban: About 6,000 peoples are already working in the new sovkhozes and MTS. In a short time 13,000 applications were received by the Komsomol committees.

Radio Kiev on January 8, 1955.

The first party of people this year from Volynia numbering 30,000 persons has departed for the virgin lands of northern Kazakhstan.

Radio Moscow, February 1, 1955.

⁹ *Selskoe khozyaistvo* (Agriculture), 1955, Moscow, No. 2.

Over 4,500 young Latvian patriots expressed their willingness to work in the regions under cultivation in the virgin and fallow lands. The Komsomol organizations of Belorussia, received over 30,000 applications from young patriots willing to work in the cultivation of the virgin lands.

By removing the young people, the Communist leaders are obviously trying in the first place to weaken the biological strength of those territories; second, to remove from the territories those elements which, in case of war, would be the most active and dangerous and to replace them by persons from the districts who are more loyal to the Communist regime; third, by uprooting the young people from their national environment and throwing them into an alien habitat, the most propitious conditions are created for their "de-nationalization" and the creation of a single Soviet nation; fourth, to establish sizable human reserves in sparsely populated Asia in case of war; lastly, to continue the terror campaign against those opposed to the Communist regime, but in a less drastic form: The resettlement of the population, in the underpopulated lands is, according to Moscow, being implemented in order to raise the living standards of the whole Soviet population. These are the conditions which enable a policy to be implemented which in some ways resembles genocide, but in a camouflaged form.

This drive for the cultivation of 30,000,000 ha. in three years, requires a colossal effort of material resources and moral sacrifice. The realization of such a huge plan would be much easier if there had been appropriate preparations. The work began simultaneously in all directions; cadres of leaders were mobilized, directors of new sovkhozes as well as specialists—mechanics, tractor drivers, building engineers and hydrologists. At the same time, another exceptionally important task was performed by those directing the allocation of the virgin lands to the sovkhozes and the selecting of sites for central living quarters. Agricultural machinery had to be amassed and its transportation organized, roads had to be made, workshops and accommodation for the new settlers built, plans had to be prepared for the buildings and the necessary building materials estimated, transport for the newly arrived colonizers, food-stuffs and domestic necessities had to be arranged and so on.

How all this worked in practice can be learnt from the Soviet press and radio. It should however be noted that both press and radio, while giving certain facts, undoubtedly phrased them in such a way as to present them in the best possible light, and no mention is made of the most blatant errors. A sombre picture of Soviet organization emerges from the following fragments of information:

The delegates of the grain sovkhoz 'Kievsky,' situated in the Akmilinska oblast of Kazakhstan, arrived in the capital of the Ukraine. The chief of this sovkhoz, Komsomol member Ivan Ryashchenko, said to those present, "We arrived in Kazakhstan in February last year. After a few weeks we received our tools and went to the field where the future sovkhoz will be situated. The place was marked by a pole. In two days time the brigade had erected tents where the whole staff of the sovkhoz lived, in all 18 people." (*Review of the Ukrainian SSR's broadcast of January 7, 1955.*)

In an article by A. Trubnikov, "Every Care and Attention for the New Settlers" (*Selskoe khozyaistvo*, December 19, 1954), we read:

It is already the second half of December, but only one third of the buildings in the MTS of the krai [Altai] have been put into commission.

Several of them are occupied although far from complete. According to plans 11,000 square meters of window glass were to be supplied but only 2.2 thousand square meters were received.

Therefore the new arrivals either have no living quarters at all or are living in houses with no glass in the windows. Further the same article comments, "The trade in consumer goods is very irregular and the supply of such goods most erratic."

The same paper on December 12, 1954, in a leading article "More Care Should be Taken in Establishing Proper Living Conditions for the Mechanizers in the New Lands" writes:

In March this year, in answer to the Party's appeal, we came here to cultivate the virgin and fallow lands. During the period of field work we, Komsomol members, were laboring without thought for ourselves and are still ready to work anywhere we might be sent by the MTS management. At the same time we want to be given normal working conditions. But this is not the case at present. The Director of the Station, T. Kurchenko, treats us brutally and does not attend to our requests. The supplies of footwear, clothing and other consumer goods are also very poor here.

Finally a statement by Soviet engineer-planner, Drachuk should be quoted. He published an article in the newspaper *Selskoe khozyaistvo* on January 18, 1955, entitled "The Selection of Sites for Central Living Quarters."

The author points out quite correctly that the location of these quarters within the boundaries of the sovkhoz lands is one of the most important factors of internal farming. When choosing the sites he says, the boundary setters should take into account the external factors which are important for husbandry (railways, communications, loading points), as well as the internal ones (water supply, soils, geological analyses of the land and so on).

Evaluating the work of the boundary setting commissions in various localities, he concludes that in several places, errors were made when sites were selected for central living quarters. In a number of sovkhozes, plots of land without any water supply whatsoever were recommended; in other cases it was proposed to take water from unsuitable sources such as lakes and rivers.

Concentrating attention on the individual cases of high yields in some parts of the virgin lands and then generalizing and applying them to the whole area the initiators of this plan are calculating how many additional million poods of grain will be harvested and allocated to satisfy the needs of the entire population. They forget that crop yields depend, not only on the quality of the soil, but to a great extent on other natural factors, in particular on sufficient water during the growth of the plants, both in the ground and in the form of vapour in the air.

The whole territory where the cultivation of the virgin lands is planned, begins in the European part of the USSR, East of the Volga river, crosses the southern Urals by their northern boundary around the town of Chkalovsk, and then further on at Asis nearly overlaps the northern frontier of the Kazakhstan SSR and the great Trans-Siberian Railway, continues to Vyzhneudinsk at the Krasnoyarsky krai in the East. The southern boundary of this territory runs approximately through Aleksandrov—Hai South-West of Urals and then through Antyubinsk, Turgai, Karaganda, Semipalatinsk, Minusinsk, South of Krasnoyarsk and cuts across the Salaisky mountain range.

The length of this zone approaches 4,000 km. and the width is from 400 to 500 km. Most of this territory is part of the Kazakhstan SSR, the rest including Altai Krai is within the RSFSR. Therefore the Kazakhstan SSR plays a leading part as far as the size of the virgin lands are concerned. By its natural, geographical features, this territory is steppe land and is the continuation of the European, and in particular the Ukrainian steppe. It differs from the latter in the considerably smaller quantity of its precipitations, the long cold winters with small snow falls, the hot dry summers and also because of the longer vegetation period; most of this steppe is composed of brown soil which is marked by a small humus content and only in the northern part are there either the ordinary black soil or, more often, the so-called southern (low humus content) black soils.

Compared with the European, the vegetation of this steppe is considerably poorer. It is less colourful and contains different forms of feather-grasses and other cereals (mostly the narrow bladed varieties which indicate a higher degree of xeromorphism).

This vegetation, according to the general character of soil and plant cover, can be divided into:

1. Northern feather-grass and smooth grass black soil steppe,
2. Southern feather-grass-typchak of the brown soil steppe.¹⁰

So that the natural geographical features of the Altai steppe zone and its agricultural importance may be more clearly appreciated it would be well to consider briefly the individual and most important climatic indices of this zone; the temperature during the vegetation period, mean monthly and annual temperatures and precipitations. This data, while varying a great deal between different stations, on the whole indicates a considerable amount of warmth in the zone during the vegetation period.

Monthly and yearly mean temperatures and sums of precipitation for the steppe zone of Kazakhstan¹²

Mean temperatures for several years

Months of the year	Temperature C.	Sums of precipitation in mm.
I.	—17.3	12
II.	—16.5	9
III.	—10.4	11
IV.	1.4	16
V.	12.4	26
VI.	18.0	40
VII.	20.4	40
VIII.	17.9	32
IX.	11.5	22
X.	3.0	22
XI.	—6.5	17
XII.	—14.8	16

¹⁰ BSE (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), II Edition, p. 324.

¹¹ Kazakhstan. Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1950, p. 291.

¹² Ibid.

The mean monthly temperature of the warmest month (July) reaches 20.4° varying in different stations from 17.9° to 24.1°. Sometimes in drought years the temperature reaches 40°. The mean temperature for the coldest month (January) is quite low, —17.3°. The frosts sometimes reach —51°. The snow cover in the southern part of the zone disappears in the second part of March, but during the cloudless nights that follow, the frosts continue for a considerable period. In the northern zone they continue until the first part of April. The frostless period begins in May and continues until September. The length of the vegetation period is 160 days, from the end of April until the middle of October. The average precipitation per annum is only 260 mm for various stations; depending upon geographical latitude and longitude, it varies from 150 mm to 340 mm. During the year most atmospheric precipitations fall during the summer months, June and July. As precipitation is slight during the winter months, January and February, the snow cover is usually rather thin. The rainfall in summer does not penetrate the ground deeply because of high temperature and continuous winds.

The humidity penetration into the soil is also hindered by another factor, that is the sharp change of temperature from winter to summer, as the result of which the snow thaws faster than the deep layers of soil and because of these high temperatures and winds, the water evaporates too quickly to benefit the soil. Another characteristic of the Asiatic steppe is the periodic change in climatic conditions which causes periods of intensive drought and relatively high humidity and which is sometimes observed in the European steppe areas.

The above factors clearly testify to the fact that the climate in the Asiatic steppe is of a sharply continental character with large amplitudes of annual and day temperatures. The continental character of the temperature and dryness intensify from West to East. These climatic features create favorable conditions for the high salt content in the steppe soil, which may prove harmful to vegetation.¹³

Summing up it would seem the basic defects of the Asiatic steppe from an agricultural viewpoint, are:

1. The small amount of precipitation and the high coefficient of evaporation and therefore a negative balance of humidity in the ground and air,
2. Dry winds, dust storms, winter storms; increase in the salinity of the ground.

These conditions clearly show that the newly cultivated areas of the virgin and fallow lands are most unsuitable for agricultural purposes. It is doubtful if Khrushchev will succeed in his campaign even if he applies the modern tricks of agrotechnics as recommended by Maltsev, kolkhoz agronomist and the Soviet authority in these matters.

This conclusion does not conflict with the announcement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on the fulfillment of the state plan of 1954 grain deliveries by kolkhozes. It said, "Considerable increases in production and deliveries of grain throughout the country were achieved as the result of the successful cultivation of the virgin and fallow lands, as well as a considerable

¹³ S. P. Suslov, *Fizicheskaya Geografiya SSSR* (The Physical Geography of the USSR), Moscow, 1954.

¹⁴ *Izvestia*, November 10, 1954.

increase in yields in the regions of Siberia, Kazakhstan and the Urals."¹⁴ The reasons for this optimistic statement are:

1. The characteristic features of the dry Asiatic steppe have already been described; that is to say the periodic change of climate as the result of which dry years alternate with humid. Therefore certain successes during the last agricultural year can be explained in the first place by meteorological factors; otherwise it would be difficult to find the reason for a "considerable increase in the yields" in the newly cultivated regions. Maltsev's new methods of soil cultivation could not have been effective last year because they were carried out in limited areas and no other agrotechnical measures were ever mentioned.

2. The increased total harvest of grain in the new regions improved the general balance throughout the whole Soviet Union only to a limited extent, because at the same time grain deliveries in the Ukraine decreased by 224.6 million poods. This decrease was explained by the fact that "in the southern Ukraine and in the Vogla basin meteorological conditions were unfavorable."¹⁵ The Soviets are doubtless suggesting that drought conditions prevailed.

In reality the reason was probably quite different. Professor V. S. Mertsalov in the lecture, mentioned earlier in this survey, stated that according to meteorological data published in the Soviet press, there was no drought in the Ukraine at all and that the shortage of grain was the result of the lack of agricultural machinery and trained cadres which had been transferred *en masse* to the virgin lands. The author fully agrees with this statement.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Professor V. P. Tymoshenko

E. GLOWINSKYJ

V. P. Tymoshenko was born in April 25, 1885, in the Ukrainian village of Basylivka, Konotop region, Tchernyhiv. After completing High School he studied at the Institute for Road Building Engineers, later in the Department of Economics of the Politechnical Institute in St. Petersburg and graduated there in 1911.

Before the 1917 revolution, Professor Tymoshenko worked for numerous tsarist ministries. In 1914 he took part in a expedition to the Forgan oblast in Turkmenistan. In 1917 he served with the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic as advisor to the Ministry of Trade, later as Director of the Economic Affairs Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and finally as economic advisor to the Ukrainian diplomatic delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

In 1922 Professor Tymoshenko was appointed assistant professor at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague and at the Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture in Czechoslovakia. In this capacity he lectured on economic geography and world economy etc. In 1924 Tymoshenko was elected professor of both the above mentioned establishments; in 1925 he received a Rockefeller Institute scholarship and spent 18 month at Cornell University. He graduated there as doctor of philosophy with his thesis on *Prices and the World Wheat Market*. On his return to Czechoslovakia, Professor Tymoshenko continued his teaching until 1928 when he was invited to lecture at Michigan University. He lectured for six years at this university on economics and published research works on *The Role of Agricultural Fluctuation in the Business Cycle* (1930) and *World Agriculture and the Depression* (1933) which were edited in the series of university publications entitled "Michigan Business Studies."

During 1928—1931 V. Tymoshenko was also temporarily employed by the Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California, and for this Institute he wrote a study on *The Danube Basin as a Producer and Exporter of Wheat* (Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, Vol. VI, No. 5, March 1950).

Professor Tymoshenko collected the necessary material for this work while living in Czechoslovakia whence he made special journeys to the Danube basin countries in 1928—1929. He wrote a similar study on the Soviet Union in 1932, which was published in two editions: *Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem* (a monograph of 600 pages) and *Russia as Producer and Exporter of Wheat* (a synopsis) published in "Wheat Studies," Vol. VIII, No. 5—6, 1932. In 1934—1936 Tymoshenko gave up his activities as professor and was engaged as Senior Agricultural Economist by the US Department of Agriculture. In 1936 he returned to his research work and joined Stanford University. He became a Research Associate at the Food Research Institute and later Professor of Commodity Economics. Since then he has been consultant Professor-Emeritus. He lectures on specialized aspects of agriculture, such as Soviet economics and

Soviet agricultural policy. His research works, which were published by the Food Research Institute (Stanford University) include:

1. *Soviet Agricultural Reorganization and the Grain Situation* (Wheat Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 7, 1937).
2. *Monetary Influence on Post-War Wheat Prices* (Wheat Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 7, 1938).
3. *Wheat Subsidizing and Exports: The Experiment of 1938—1939* (Wheat Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 1940).
4. *Variability on Wheat Yields and Outputs*, Part I. Cycle or Random Fluctuations, Part II. *Regional Aspects of Variability* (Wheat Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 7, 1942, Vol. XIX, No. 6, 1943).
5. *International Correlations of Wheat Yields and Outputs* (Wheat Studies, Vol. XX, No. 6, 1944).

The last two works were published in one volume under the title *World Wheat Production. Its Regional Fluctuations and Interregional Correlations*.

Other publications of Professor Tymoshenko comprise:

The Agrarian Policy of Russia and War (Agricultural History, Vol. XVII, No. 4, 1943).

The Soviet Sugar Industry and its Postwar Restoration (War-Peace pamphlets of Stanford University).

The New Soviet Economic Plan and its Agricultural Aspect (Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXI, No. 6, 1953). *M. Tuhon-Baranovsky and Western-European Economic Thought* (Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Art and Sciences in the USA, Vol. III, No. 3 (9)).

Professor Tymoshenko has also written a number of works in Ukrainian, German and French. These include:

(In Ukrainian)

Cartels and Trusts (Ukrainian Free University, Prague, 1932).

World Economy (Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture, Podebrady, 1924).

Wheat Prices and World Market (Memoirs of the Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture, Vol. II, Podebrady, 1928).

Problems and Competition (Jubilee Collection in honor of Prof. S. Dnistryan-sky, Ukrainian Free University, Prague, 1923).

(In German)

The Ukraine and Russia and their Economical Relations (Mitteilung des Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Instituts in Berlin, 1928). This work was published also in French.

The Brotherhood of the Slavic Peoples and Bolshevik Reality

I. MIRCHUK

Two recent publications, both very characteristic of Moscow's national policy, deal with the tercentenary of the union of the Ukraine with Russia.

The first, and better written of the two, was published in Polish and entitled "Under the Banner of Fraternal Friendship; a Collection of Documents on the Common Struggle for Liberation and the Inviolable Friendship between the Polish, Ukrainian and Russian Peoples."¹

The importance attached to this book is shown by the fact that the introduction is written by Stefan Zolkiewski, Secretary of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The President of the Polish state himself, Boleslaw Bierut, adds a recommendation, and finally there is an extract from Khrushchev's speech delivered at the II Congress of the Polish Communist Party. This collection contains documents on the friendly relations existing between the Ukrainian and Polish nations; it is devoted to the "tercentenary of the union of the Ukraine with Russia and the history of the fraternal friendship which binds the Polish nation to the Ukrainian and Russian nations and the other nations of the Soviet Union." Although this work was published on the anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty, the Russian partner in this historic event is disregarded and the documents reflect Polish and Ukrainian "fraternal friendship" through the centuries, the common interests of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, and the sympathies between the spiritual leaders of both nations. The book emphasizes that friendship and cooperation between both nations was an historical necessity conditioned by contiguity, vital political as well as economic and cultural interests and by the necessity of co-ordinating action against their common enemies, the Teutonic invaders in the West and Tartar invaders in the South and East. It should be made clear at the outset, that the Ukrainian nation never had any disputes with the Teutonic West, and while it is true that the *Rus regimens* took an active part in the battle of Grunwald in 1410 on the Polish side, this was not an expression of the independent political orientation of the Ukraine, but only a consequence of its belonging to the Lithuanian state which was linked with Poland by the Dynastic Union.

There is, however, a degree of truth in the statement that there were no great discrepancies between the most essential aims of the Ukrainian, Polish, Belorussian and Russian nations and that mutual distrust was engendered among them, in the first place, by their ruling classes, namely the Polish *Shlachhta* and the Muscovite *Boyars*.

¹ Warsaw, 1954.

At that time the mass of the population had no influence whatsoever and was represented by its ruling class. But these internationally inimical feelings were, as Zolkiewski maintains, fed conscientiously by "enemies" of the Slavic nations, and this, apparently, was the reason for the grave and bloody conflicts. Such a policy, maintains the author, was grist to the mill of German reaction and its infamous *Drang nach Osten* which exploited any feelings of hatred for its own ends. It is true that the *Drang nach Osten* existed, but it was in fact based on different principles. First, the colonization of Polish territories, second, cultural influences which at that time were very strong, particularly in Poland, third, economic measures such as giving credits to or subsidizing the Polish kings and magnates, and lastly armed conflicts: Nevertheless it was never an internal Polish movement aimed at spreading mistrust among various classes of the population. It is useless to discuss the activities of the Vatican at that time as it was apparently pursuing the same policy and trying to unite eastern Europe with the western Church. It should really be admitted, in theory, that the Ukrainian Uniats or the Muscovite Uniats would probably have been more friendly toward the Polish Catholics on the basis of the same Church allegiance, than toward the Orthodox. If this peaceful co-existence was not achieved, it was not the fault of the Vatican but entirely of the Polish ruling class and the Polish clergy who used the idea of the union for imperialist purposes. Resentment existed throughout the centuries but its source will only be found in the psychological structure of the Polish and Muscovite nations and their ruling classes, who had not the slightest respect for the needs of the Ukrainians or Belorussians and took every opportunity of enslaving them for their own purposes.

However, despite this unpropitious atmosphere, provoked, according to the author, by hostile factors, the solidarity of the working masses in these countries, who struggled for a better future and for social and national liberation, was being established. As an example, the book quotes the struggle for liberation led by hetman B. Khmel'nitsky against the Polish magnates, which ended in the "glorious union" of the Ukraine with Russia, thus provoking a revolutionary ferment among the Polish peasantry which took the form of the peasants' revolt against the *Shlachhta* and magnates.

The author states that this solidarity of the progressive forces of the "brotherly" nations gave birth to cooperation and contacts between the "best sons of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Polish nations," who united round the banner of the common struggle "for your and our freedom."

Against this background the author mentions the friendship and co-operation between the *Decembrists* and leaders of the "Patriotic Society," Pushkin and Mickiewicz, the revolutionary democrats and patriots of the 1850's and 1860's—Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Shevchenko, Sierakowski, Dombrowski and others. But, as might be expected from the author, living as he does behind the Iron Curtain, only "the triumph of the idea of Leninism, the victory of the great October socialist revolution, the creation of the Soviet Union and within it the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics . . . have inaugurated a new era in the history of mankind." Against the background of Bolshevik reality, a fundamental change took place in the relations between the Polish, Russian and Belorussian nations based on mutual confidence and friendship. In the epoch of a "triumphant socialism," the dreams of the best sons of the fraternal nations were realized, as well as the prophetic words of Pushkin,

Shevchenko and Mickiewicz. A new era of eternal, inviolable friendship and brotherly aid had begun, which bound Poland with the united Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belorussia and the all-powerful USSR. "The material collected in this work," states the author, "testifies to the bonds of friendship binding the Polish, Ukrainian and Russian nations together with the other nations of the great country of the Soviets. They are a reflection of the heartfelt sentiments of the Polish nation towards the great family of Soviet peoples, which celebrates the tercentenary anniversary of the most fruitful and important union in the life of the fraternal nations."

Similar thoughts, expressed in almost the same manner are to be found in the speech by Khrushchev printed at the end of the book; consequently the national program of the Soviet Union is also presented to the reader. It consists of a removal of all national differences among the individual nations of the USSR on the basis of "fraternal friendship," so that this amorphous mass will finally be cemented into a new, apparently Soviet but in fact Russian, nation. This plan is far from novel. In the XIX century it was included in the program of the "Slavophiles" in many variations and was also steadfastly adhered to by the tsarist government. The national policy of the Russian state remains the same, irrespective of whether it is headed by the oldfashioned tsars or the Soviet rulers. For instance, the attitude towards the Ukrainian nation has changed very little since the time of Peter the Great or Catherine the Great. The same attitude is taken by Moscow towards Poles, Belorussians, and other nationalities, which used to be or are at present within the Russian empire. It is true that at the beginning of the October revolution, when national feelings were stirred, when the West was ringing with Wilson's slogans on the self-determination of nations, when from the ruins of Austro-Hungary there emerged new, quasi-national states such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and out of what had been the tsarist empire, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it was impossible to cling to the old concepts. It was necessary for the sake of public opinion to develop national culture, equality of language and to use attractive catch-phrases such as "independence to the point of separation." But even at the very beginning, Lenin, who would not consider any equality or separation, corrected these principles, namely by asserting that the culture of every nation was to be national in form, but socialist in content; this precluded the development of national and cultural elements, their originality and their spirit, and was in itself a preparation for the ultimate russification of public life based on pseudo-fraternal amity.

Whether Bolshevism will succeed in removing national differences and feelings of hostility among the individual groups, is very difficult to say. If, for instance, Polish-Russian relations are considered, then it must be concluded that the expressions of mutual friendship in the past such as those between Pushkin and Mickiewicz, Alexander the First and Prince Adam Chartoryski, Stanislaw August Poniatowski and Catherine the Great were very rare and on the whole of a personal nature, and did not attain any far-reaching results. On the other hand, the hatred of the Poles for Moscow or indeed Russia as a whole, was of a mass character and was based on traditions over the centuries. This antagonism originated in the XVI century and took on its most tragic form during the rule of the last Polish King in the second half of the XVIII century. Then, Poland was partitioned and Russia was primarily responsible for this. In order to defend his endangered fatherland, the national hero Tadeusz Kosciuszko, started an uprising, but only against Russia, the main occupying power. This revolt

embraced the peasant masses and therefore assumed an all-national character. After a short period of existence of the so-called Polish Kingdom bound by personal union only, there came a period of further persecution and new restrictions of Polish liberty. This provoked a reaction among the Poles in the November uprising of 1830 and the January rebellion of 1863. Both these movements were cruelly suppressed and resulted partly in the mass emigration of the Polish intelligentsia to the West, mainly France, and partly in mass deportations of Polish patriots to Siberia. In Poland the autonomous rights of the population were completely removed and Poles were barred from state service. The University of Warsaw became Russian. These events were strongly re-echoed in Polish literature which up to the World War I was filled with anti-Russian sentiments; Polish art (works by Jan Matejko and Grottger) reveals the same tendency. This was the position up to 1914. Afterwards three different trends emerged; the Austrian conception of the Galician politicians, the Germanophile conception of Prince Radziwill, and also a Russophile orientation preached by R. Dmowski. The last tendency did not find any support among the Polish community. The Polish legions commanded by Pilsudski fought on the side of the Central Powers against Russia. When in 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland, the USSR on the strength of its treaty with the Germans, made an armed attack on Poland with whom she had a pact of non-aggression and thus caused the final liquidation of the Polish state. Further proof of the "sentiments of fraternal love and friendship" towards the Polish nation is found in the tragedy at Katyn where, on Stalin's orders, 10,000 Polish officers who had escaped from the German army and become prisoners of the Bolsheviks, were shot. A similar happening took place in Warsaw in 1944 when the Poles, who had expected help from the Red Army and who had even been promised that the Bolshevik forces which were near Warsaw on the other side of the Vistula, would come to their aid, rose against the German occupying forces. General Rokossowski, the Commander of the Red Army, did not lift a finger to help the insurgents, but waited for the moment when the Warsaw uprising was liquidated by the Germans, with tremendous losses for the Polish intelligentsia who had constituted the majority of the insurgents. The Bolshevik policy was quite clear; with the aid of the Germans, another state was liquidated and thousands of Polish intellectuals and officers who would never have accepted the Bolshevik regime in their country, were wiped out. It is difficult to reconcile all these facts with the expressions of friendship and with the ideals of peace which are propagated by the Bolsheviks on every occasion. It is difficult to believe that the Polish nation, steeped in ancient traditions and having before its eyes these recent events, could forget the past and be convinced by paper arguments. What has been said about the relationship between Poland and Russia applies equally well to the Ukraine or Belorussia.

Such is the ideological background against which the structure of this book is depicted. The material which illustrates Ukrainian-Polish relations during the course of three centuries is found in six chapters of uneven quality.

The first chapter concerns peasant movements in the Polish lands proper which came about as the result of Khmel'nitsky's uprising. It is very noticeable that apart from original material on this period, excerpts from other scholarly works, which throw light on these events, are also included. The second chapter takes us back to the XIX century and gives the opinions of the Ukrainian and Polish revolutionaries. Along with works by Shevchenko and Dombrowski, articles taken from the Polish press are reprinted. The third chapter contains

material which throws light on the anti-Ukrainian policy of the Polish *Shlakhta* in Galicia, when the Ukrainian part had been handed over to Poland by the Viennese Government. These first three chapters which cover the period from the XVII—XX centuries contain only 90 pages, but 260 pages are devoted to the contemporary period. The fourth chapter presents authentic documents describing the terror methods of the Polish ruling classes in the western Ukraine between the two wars. There are some interesting documents, particularly the statements of the Communist Party of the western Ukraine, which apparently supported the national claims of the Ukrainians. The two last chapters describe the common struggle of the Ukrainian and Polish nations against the Hitlerite occupation and concurrently describe the principles of the new epoch of friendship between the liberated Polish, and united Ukrainian peoples within the limits of Bolshevik reality. The last chapter is devoted to expressions of sympathy from the Ukrainians toward the Poles and vice versa. Included in this chapter is a verse by M. Rylsky about Chopin, articles about M. Rylsky taken from Polish journals, reviews of performances in the Ukrainian theatre in Poland, information about a visit paid by Polish peasants to the Ukraine, and a note about the second edition of the Ukrainian translation of "Pan Tadeusz." The whole work throws a biased and tendentious light on the subject.

The second book, published on the occasion of the anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty is much weaker both in its contents and propaganda value. It is a Ukrainian publication called, "*Forever with you, Russia,*" a literary almanac containing the works of Ukrainian writers, most of whom are from the western Ukraine.² The introduction is anonymous, but its aim is clearly indicated by its title. The poet Andriy Voloshchak also reveals the trend of the book:

We all have
The same propinquity, same mother,
And abide near the Volga or Dnieper deep.
We share like brethren happiness and dolor
In lands from the Kurilas
To the Carpathian steep.

★

The great land, Rus,
United us amidst the mêlée,
We left the darkness, finding the shining sun;
Into one family the peoples rally,
To Communism
They boldly run.

Those who are acquainted with the history of the Ukraine before the end of World War I know that the greatest antagonist of the Ukrainian people was, in fact, the Russian government, which combated its national aspirations. For example it should be remembered that Valuev, Russian Minister for Internal Affairs, in an order in 1863, said "It was not, it is not, it never will be" [i. e. a Ukrainian language].

The book also states:

² Lvov, 1954.

The decision [of the Pereyaslav Council] was a real and sincere manifestation of the will of the Ukrainian nation, an expression of its centuries-long desires and expectations, a turning point in its history. The union of the Ukraine with Russia, despite the fact that Russia was then ruled by the tsar and the landowners, had an enormous progressive influence for the further political, economic and cultural development of the Ukrainian and Russian nations.

Concerning the Ukrainian nation, this statement is not only a denial but is a complete refutation of objective historical facts. If we were considering the Russian nation, then it is true that the union with the Ukraine contributed greatly to its political, economic and cultural development. The extending of its frontiers to the Black Sea has, without doubt, increased the political prestige of the Russian state, and the acquisition of the Ukrainian *chornozem* and its other natural resources has helped to create economic prosperity, whereas the Ukraine has been obliged to relinquish its independence.

After the October revolution relations between the Ukraine and Russia remained basically unchanged. Despite this, we read in the book *Forever with you, Russia* that:

The hearts of the workers in the western oblasts of the Ukraine are filled with boundless love for their brother Russians. Not long ago those lands were plundered by foreign enslavers. Only recently, the workers groaned under the yoke of the landowners and unspeakable poverty and misery were to be found under every roof. The workers of the western Ukrainian regions could only realise their centuries-long dream of union with the Soviet Ukraine, with the aid of all the Soviet nations and, in the first place, the great Russian nation.

The fate of the Ukrainian nation under the yoke of the Polish state was undoubtedly unenviable; nearly all the Ukrainian community desired a state of independence and union with the Ukrainian lands on both sides of the Dnieper but on no account under Moscow's sway, irrespective of whether it was Red or White. Aid from the "great Russian nation" was not desired even by the few members of the Communist Party of the western Ukraine.

This travesty of historical truth poses the interesting question whether propaganda of this kind will achieve the expected results. Even those persons who have no clear views on the facts will be able to detect the duplicity of such arguments. As far as the content of the book is concerned, a uniformity of thought is noticeable and a complete one-sidedness of purpose as shown in the introduction by the slogan "Forever with you, Russia." Whether we take the poem by Petro Karmansky "I believe in the sunny country of the Soviets," or an essay by Mykhaylo Rudnytsky on the writers Stefanyk, Martovych, Cheremshyna, Makovey and their enthusiasm for Russian literature, or a novel by Mychailo Yatskiv "The Red Apple," written to the glory of the known and unknown heroes who should be as numerous as possible for the "full realization of the sunny dream of mankind—Communism," the trend is everywhere the same. It is unnecessary to describe in detail all the phantasies in verse and prose included in the book because they carry only one and the same thought. Nevertheless an article by Yaroslav Halan, "The light from the East" should be mentioned in which he consciously distorts historical facts concerning the western regions of the Ukraine, insults the former Ukrainian leaders including the late Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky and writes blasphemously against the Church.

The Ukrainian *Sich Striltsi*—riflemen, are presented in a similar light. They were, according to the author, a detachment of janizaries, who went to war to the music of Radetzky's march for the glory of the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns. The author does not mention that they were fighting conscientiously, not for the glory of the German or Austrian states, but against tsarist Russia and its oppression of the Ukrainian nation. The ultimate object for the Ukrainian soldiers was an independent united Ukrainian state but there was no question of this being imposed by any alien or even "fraternal" force.

The author then says:

In the 22nd year of the existence of the Ukrainian SSR, the frontier on the Zbruch and Dniester rivers ceased to exist. The Ukrainian Republic of the working people reached the Carpathian mountains and the San river. The soldiers of the Soviet motherland were coming from the East and the light followed them.

But this "light from the East" killed millions of innocent people and so blinded others that sometimes they were deprived of the ability to examine the world critically and of the freedom to express their thoughts according to their convictions.

A fairly good article by Roman Turyn on Ivan Trush, an outstanding painter of the realistic school, is included but it is permeated with false information on the life and activities of the artist. It should be admitted however that compared with other material in the book, the propagandistic element in this article is not particularly noticeable.

In conclusion it should be mentioned that to stress the "deep friendship" of both nations the texts are written in both languages, Ukrainian and Russian. The external appearance of the whole publication is excellent.³ Printed on excellent paper with very clear print, the cloth binding richly decorated with gold, there is on the inside of the cover a picture of the Kremlin and a silhouette of Kmelnitsky's monument in Kiev. The editors include the Ukrainian writers Irena Wilde, P. Kozlanyuk, Yu. Melnychuk, T. Odudko, D. Tsmokalenko and A. Dimarov. At the end there are seven illustrations, among them two pictures by V. Manastyrsky, "The amateur Hutsul ensemble" and "First Tractor," and also a picture by H. Razmus, "The meeting between B. Khmelnitsky and Buturlin." The price of this technically luxurious publication is rather low.

Both books are worthy of attention as documents of Bolshevik propaganda which hopes to inculcate into the masses of the population, its thesis on the unbreakable bonds between the various national groups and particularly the Ukrainians, the Poles, and the Russians.

³ Soviet post-war propaganda uses artistic editing of its books as a means of reaching the largest possible number of intelligent western readers and also to create the impression that publishing in the USSR is flourishing.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

D. CIZEVSKY. Studied at the Universities of St. Petersburg, Kiev, Heidelberg and Freiburg. Dr. Phil. of Halle University. Taught at the Ukrainian University in Prague, at Halle and Jena from 1932 through 1954. Taught at Marburg 1945—1949. Currently lectures at Harvard University. Author of many works on Slavic literature and philosophy.

✱

E. GLOWINSKYJ. Professor and Department Chief of Ukrainian Polytechnical School and professor of Ukrainian Free University at Munich. Associate of Shevchenko Society. Worked for many years in Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw. Author of many works on the Soviet economy, in particular a large-scale monograph "Finances of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" published in Warsaw, 1939.

✱

O. JURCZENKO. Jurist, associate of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev; professor of law at the Ukrainian Free University at Munich; associate of Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences.

✱

B. KRUPNYCKY. Doctor of Philosophy, graduate of Berlin University, professor of the Ukrainian Free University at Munich, associate of various Academies of Science. Author of the following works: "History of the Ukraine," "Mazeppa and His Era" (both in German), "The Basic Problem of Ukrainian History," "Pylyp Orlyk—Hetman of the Ukraine (1672—1742)," "Danylo Apostol, the Hetman (1727—1734)"—all in Ukrainian.

✱

I. MIRCHUK. Doctor of Vienna University. Professor and rector at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. Director of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin. Member of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences. Head of the philosophic-historical department of the Ukrainian Shevchenko Society. Member of the *Deutsche Kantgesellschaft*. Member of the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Member of the Academia del Mediterraneo in Rome. Member of the Académie Internationale des Sciences et des Lettres, in Paris. Has published a number of historico-philosophical works.

✱

S. G. PROCIUK. Economist, assistant professor of the Polytechnical Institute at Lvov; author of many articles on the economy of the Ukraine and the USSR published in Ukrainian and English.

✱

Y. VAKULENKO. Professor and Dean of the forestry faculty of the Ukrainian Economic Institute in Western Germany. Specialist in agricultural affairs. Member of the Learned Council of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich.

UKRAINIAN PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTE

G. SOVA. *"A Ukrainian's Twenty-Five Years in the USSR."* Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 24, 100 pp. (In Ukrainian).

The author, a participant in the revolution of 1917, has been a Soviet civil servant, a political prisoner of the Soviets and local administrator in the German-occupied Ukraine. The present work draws from his memoirs to present valuable material on the Bolshevik system and, to some degree, on the German occupation of the Ukraine.

Dwelling on the early years of Soviet power in the Ukraine, this work deals particularly with the famine of 1921 and the beginning of the struggle against religion, including the closing and destruction of churches. The New Economic Policy resulted in economic improvements in the region. As a member of the raion administration in Novy Sandzhar, near Poltava, the author became well acquainted with all the aspects of life under the Soviets. He goes into detail on the reasons for and the circumstances surrounding the second great famine in the Ukraine, 1932—1933. He points out the economic and political background of the famine and the true motives of the Kremlin, which was responsible for the tragedy that caused the death of some seven million Ukrainians.

Other chapters describe the Soviet system of justice and the concentration camps, presenting a list of the most important of the latter. It is pointed out that in 1913 in tsarist Russia there were 32,758 prisoners, about 5,000 of whom were confined for political reasons. In the USSR today their numbers run into the millions.

In 1936, suspected of sympathy to the right deviation of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the author was arrested and sentenced to three years imprisonment in the concentration camp in Kolyma. He describes

in detail his experiences in Kolyma and the geography of the surrounding territory, where around two million prisoners, mostly engaged in goldmining operations, were kept.

In 1940 the author returned to the Ukraine, where, after a short period of work as a Soviet civil servant, he was caught up by the German occupation. As a raion administrator he had an opportunity to become acquainted with the German methods of administration and, at the same time, to observe how the Germans exploited the resources of the Ukraine.

★

M. KOVALEVSKI. *"Opposition Movements in the Ukraine and the National Policy of the USSR."* Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 26, 73 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

In examining the national liberation movement of Ukrainians within the confines of the USSR, the author takes as his starting point the chief stages in the Ukrainian revolution of 1917. At that time, when Petrograd and Moscow became the main centers of Bolshevism (colored with internationalism), Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, was the organizing center for the peoples of the former Russian Empire.

In his analysis of the national policy of the Bolsheviks, the author dwells on Lenin's ideas and points out the variance between revolutionary theory and the Bolsheviks' revolutionary practices. A result of this policy was the creation by the Bolsheviks in December 1919 of the Ukrainian SSR, which together with the Belorussian SSR and others, concluded Federation agreements with the RSFSR and renounced their sovereign rights.

The author explains all the Bolsheviks' attempts to liquidate the national differ-

ence in the USSR as primarily the result of the Communist doctrine, which aims at complete centralization. For this, the paradoxical methods of ukrainianization, belorussification and georginization are used under the mask of "the right of the peoples to self-determination." Against the background of these characteristics of the nature of Communism in the national question, the author describes in detail the apposing national and Communist movements in their relation to the All-Union Communist Party Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Communist Party Bolsheviks and their colonial policy in the Ukraine. The opposition's speeches against the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) had a great effect on the rulers in Moscow.

The task of solving the problem of Ukrainian opposition was given to the executive committee of the Comintern, as was the problem of the "nationalist" deviations in the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine and of its leader Maximovich. Apart from considering opposition movements in the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the author throws light on the ideology and history of the national organization "The Soviet for the Liberation of the Ukraine" on the basis of the stenographic report of the trial of 45 members in 1930.

The author also mentions the new forms of opposition and the national policy of the USSR.

★

IVAN MAISTRENKO. *"The Crises in the Soviet Economy."* Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 29, 124 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

The author analyzes the Soviet economy and devotes special attention to the crises which in his opinion arise in connection with the collectivization of agriculture and industrialization, or rather the militarization of Soviet industry.

The economic system of Stalinism was bureaucracy, a system of "war communism" first introduced during the Civil War. Stalin returned to this system after the collectivization of agriculture.

During the 25 years of its existence the Stalinist economic system has been unable to establish a healthy economic life which

would both ensure the development of the economy and satisfy the needs of the population. Throughout the period the Soviet Union has been in a permanent economic crisis. Enforced collectivization led to the decline of the peasant's interest in the results of his work. It was therefore essential to establish an enormous bureaucratic machine, both in agriculture and in industry, in order to drive the workers and peasants to work harder. The system of "socialist competition" and "Stakhanovism" which were conceived by the Soviet bureaucrats failed to give positive results.

The weak spot in the Soviet regime is agrarian overpopulation. Collectivization only made this problem more acute and brought it out into the open. Tens of millions of peasants found themselves to be superfluous under the kolkhoz system. This provided the reason for a harsh Bolshevik offensive against Soviet society in the form of resettlement and even the liquidation of millions of persons.

Postwar developments and the emergence of the atomic bomb may make wars impossible. The reflection of these developments in the USSR has been a crisis in the military economy. Stalin's death made this crisis apparent. Consequently the Soviet economy is showing a tendency to transfer gradually and carefully to a peacetime footing. To a certain extent this is taking place in an elemental way, although it is in part being furthered by government measures. However, the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus left behind by Stalin will hardly be able to demilitarize the Soviet economy.

★

N. POLONSKA-VASILENKO. *"A History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences."* Part I (1918—1930). Series I (Printed Editions), No. 21, 152 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

The work deals with a period when the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences enjoyed a relative amount of freedom, not yet being totally subordinate to Communist aims.

The second part of the work, which is to appear in 1956, will consider the period after the Communists took over the Academy in 1930.

In order to prove the creative role of Communism in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks assert that the Academy in Kiev was founded by them and that all its achievements are therefore the achievements of Bolshevism.

Professor, Polonska-Vasilenko gives the history of the Academy of Sciences, an institution which was established by the Ukrainian people before the Bolsheviks came to power. She throws light on the fate of more than a thousand scholars whom the Bolsheviks condemn to oblivion.

When the Bolsheviks occupied the Ukraine during the period of war Communism the Soviet authorities completely ignored the Academy. They provided no funds for its maintenance but on the other hand did not interfere with its freedom. During the period of the New Economic Policy material conditions improved considerably and the occupation government supplied the Academy with money, but

the ideological offensive on the institution had already begun.

An outstanding event in the life of the Academy was the return from abroad of Academician M. S. Hrushevsky.

After the appointment of M. Skrypnyk as People's Commissar for Education in the USSR, constant interference of the Soviet government in the life and activities of the Academy began. Several political trials were held. In 1930 the trial of members of "The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" (SVU) served the Bolsheviks as a pretext for establishing complete control over the Academy. This trial marked the commencement of the Bolsheviks' hostile attitude toward Ukrainian culture in general and to the Academy in particular.

The work contains ten supplements in the form of documents on the Academy's activities from 1918 to 1930.

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 1 (In Ukrainian)

P. Kurinny, Bolshevik Aggression in the Ukraine (1917—1921).

B. Martos, The Bolsheviks' Conquest of the Ukraine.

O. Jurczenko, The Sovietization of the National Republics in the USSR.

H. Waschtschenko, The Bolsheviks' Liberation of the Western Ukraine.
(Documents and Facts)

I. F., Soviet Ushgorod.

H. Kostinuk, M. S. Hrushevsky's Last Days.

S. Prociuk, The Principles of Planned Economy and their Realization in the Ukraine.

S. Nahay, Housing Construction and Housing Conditions in the USSR.

P. Lutarewytsh, The MTS in the Ukraine.

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 2 (In Ukrainian)

E. Glowinskyj, Ukrainian Finance as Part of the Soviet Financial System.

B. Krupnycky, Mazeppa and Soviet Historiography.

A. Hirsch, Conditioned Reflexes and Despotism.

A. Lebed, The Problem of Soil Amelioration in the Ukraine and the Crimea.

D. Solovey, The Ukrainian Village from 1931 to 1938.

P. Lutarewytsh, Facts and Figures on the Ukrainian Famine in 1932—1933.

O. Kultschitsky, Puberty and Adolescence as seen by Soviet Educators and Psychologists.

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 3 (In Ukrainian and English)

O. Jurczenko, The Bolshevik conquest of the Ukraine.

The current Soviet approach.

D. Cizevsky, The Soviet history of Ukrainian literature.

B. Krupnycky, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Soviet historiography.

M. Semchyslyn, The educational system in the Soviet Ukraine.

Y. Vakulenko, The cultivation of virgin and fallow lands in the USSR.

E. Glowinskyj, Professor V. P. Tymoshenko.

I. Mirchuk, The brotherhood of the Slavic peoples and Bolshevik reality.

Ukrainian Sbirnyk No. 4 (In Ukrainian)

E. Glowinskyj, The structure of Soviet Ukrainian agriculture.

N. Woronzuk, The feeding of the Soviet population.

P. Kotowicz, Contemporary Ukrainian drama.

N. Wassiliw, The Soviet economy and its social structure.

W. Pluschtsch, Medical services in the Ukraine to-day.

P. Lutarewytsh, The Poltava rebellion 1920—1926.

O. Archimowitsch, Grain cultivation in the Ukraine.

Reviews

R. Zybenko, Charles Bettelheim, «Problèmes théoriques et pratiques de la planification».

E. G., Romain Yakemtschouk, «L'O.N.U. La sécurité régionale et le problème de régionalisme».

Institute Publications

I. PERIODICALS

VESTNIK (In Russian):

No. 1 to 7, 1951 to 1953;
No. 1 to 6, 1954;
No. 1 to 4, 1955.

BULLETIN (In English):

March 1954 to December 1954;
No. 1 to 12, 1955.
Special Edition in French on the Munich Conference, July 1954;
Special Edition in German on the Munich Conference, July 1954.

BYULLETEN (In Russian):

No. 1 to 5, March to August 1954.

DERGI (In Turkish):

No. 1 to 3, 1955.

UKRAINSKY ZBIRNYK

(Ukrainian Review):

No. 1, 1954;
No. 2 to 4, 1955.

UKRAINIAN REVIEW (In English):

No. 1, 1955.

BELARUSKI ZBORNIK

(Belorussian Review):

No. 1 and 2, 1955.

BELORUSSIAN REVIEW (In English):

No. 1, 1955.

CAUCASIAN REVIEW (In English):

No. 1, 1955.

II. CONFERENCE MATERIAL

Materialy konferentsii nauchnykh rabotnikov (emigrantov), sostoyavsheisya v Myunkhene 11-14 yanvarya 1951 g. (Proceedings of the Conference in Munich on January 11-14, 1951), 5 Volumes.

Materialy konferentsii Instituta, sostoyavsheisya v Nyu Iorke 20-22 marta 1953. (Proceedings of the Conference in New York on March 20-22, 1953.) 228 pp.

The Results of the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Death of Stalin. (Proceedings of the Conference in New York on March 20-22, 1953), 140 pp.

SSSR segodnya i zavtra. Trudy konferentsii Instituta, sostoyavsheisya 15-17 avgusta 1953 g. v Myunkhene. (The USSR Today and Tomorrow. Proceedings of the Conference in Munich on August 15-17, 1953), 214 pp.

The USSR Today and Tomorrow. (Proceedings of the Conference in Munich on August 15-17, 1953), 208 pp.

Academic Freedom Under the Soviet Regime. (Proceedings of the Conference in New York on April 3-4, 1954), 120 pp.

IV konferentsiya Instituta (Tuttsing bliz Myunkhena, 5-7 iyulya 1954 g.) Doklady i diskussii. (Proceedings of the Conference in Munich-Tutzing on July 5-7, 1954: The Present Situation and Future Prospects in the Political, Economic and Nationality Questions in the USSR.) 2 Volumes.

V konferentsiya Instituta (Myunkhen, 25-27 aprelya 1951 g.) Doklady i diskussii. (Proceedings of the Conference in Munich on April 25-27, 1955: The Soviet Government's Policy of a "Sharp Increase," its Results and the Reasons for its Abandonment), 304 pp.

VI konferentsiya Instituta (Myunkhen, 28-30 iyulya 1955 g.) Zadachi i metody izucheniya SSSR: Doklady i diskussii. (Proceedings of the Conference in Munich on July 28-30, 1955: The Aims and Methods of Research on the USSR), 148 pp.

III. PRINTED EDITIONS

1 Kovankovsky, P. L. *Finansy SSSR vo vtoruyu mirovuyu voynu* (The Financial System of the USSR During World War II), 1951, 21 pp.

2 Mikorsky, B. *Razrushenie kulturno-istoricheskikh pamyatnikov v Kieve v 1934-1936 godakh* (The Destruction of Cultural and Art Memorials in Kiev During the Years 1934-36), 1951, 21 pp.

3 Saaruni, G. *Borba Armyanskoi tserkvi protiv bolshevizma* (The Struggle of the Armenian Church against Bolshevism), 1951, 29 pp.

4 Galin, P. *Kak proizvodilis perepisi naseleniya v SSSR* (Census Methods in the USSR), 1951, 50 pp.

5 Schulz, G. *Sanitarnaya i protivooepidemicheskaya rabota v SSSR* (Public Health and

Anti-Epidemic Measures in the USSR), 1951, 47 pp.

6 Rzhnevsky, L. *Yazyk i totalitarizm* (Language and Totalitarianism), 1951, 64 pp.

7 Grechko, V. *Kommunisticheskoe vospitanie v SSSR* (Communist Education in the USSR), 1951, 56 pp.

8 Legostaev, F. *Fizicheskoe vospitanie i sport v SSSR* (Physical Education and Sports in the USSR), 1952, 54 pp.

9 Semenov, N. *Sovetsky sud i karatel'naya politika* (Soviet Courts of Justice and Penal Policy), 1952, 145 pp.

10 Valensky, Yu. *Akademik E. A. Kosminsky i voprosy interpretatsii istorii Srednikh vekov v sovetskoi shkole* (Academician E. A. Kosminsky and the Interpretation of Medieval History in the Soviet School), 1954, 110 pp.

11 Karov D. *Partizanskoe dvizhenie v SSSR v 1941-1945 gg.* (Partisan Activity in the USSR from 1941 through 1945), 1954, 118 pp.

12 Miller, M. A. *Arkheologiya v SSSR* (Archaeology in the USSR), 1954, 150 pp.

13 *Spisok russkikh sokrashchenii, primenyemykh v SSSR* (List of Russian Abbreviations), 1954, 314 pp.

14 Lebed, A., Yakovlev, B. *Transportnoe znachenie gidrotekhnicheskikh sooruzhenii SSSR* (The Importance of Hydrotechnical Projects for Soviet Transport), 1954, 200 pp.

15 Arkhimovich, A. *Selektsiya i semenovodstvo sakharnoi svckely v SSSR* (Sugar Beets in the USSR: Selection and Seed-Raising), 1954, 170 pp.

16 Fedorovsky, N.N. *Usloviya proezzhaemosti gruntovykh dorog SSSR* (Utilization of Dirt Roads in the USSR), 1954, 168 pp.

17 Rink, N. *Sovetskoe mezhdunarodnoe chastnoe pravo i vneshnetorgovye sdelki* (Soviet International Private Law and Foreign Trade Agreements), 1954, 69 pp.

18 Nedasek, N. *Bolshevizm na putyakh k ustanovleniyu kontrolya nad Belorussiei* (The Development of Bolshevik Control over Belorussia), 1954, 68 pp.

19 Kotsevalov, A. *Antichnaya istoriya i kultura Severnogo Prichernomor'ya v sovetskom nauchnom issledovanii* (Soviet Research on the Ancient History and Culture of the Northern Black Sea Coast), 1955, 75 pp.

20 Adamovich, A. *Yakub Kolas u supratsivno savetyzatsyi* (Jakub Kolas' Resistance to Sovietization), 1955, 56 pp.

21 Polonska-Vasilenko, N. *Ukrainska Akademiya Nauk: Naris istorii — Chastyna I 1918-1930* (History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences — Part I 1918-1930), 1955, 148 pp.

22 Philipov, A. *Nauchny sotsializm i nauka ob obshchestve* (Scientific Socialism and Social Science), 1955, 159 pp.

23 Yakovlev, B. *Kontsentratsionnye lageri SSSR* (Concentration Camps in the USSR), 1955, 256 pp.

24 Traho, R. *Severny Kavkaz kak zdorovitsa SSSR* (The North Caucasus: The Health Center of the USSR), 1955, 76 pp.

IV. MIMEOGRAPHED EDITIONS

1 Marchenko, V. *Planirovanie nauchnoi raboty v SSSR* (The Planning of Scientific Work in the USSR), 1953, 44 pp.

2 Semenov, N. *Sistema sovetskoi yustitsii* (The Soviet Judicial System), 1953, 28 pp.

Semenov, N. *The Soviet Judicial System as Represented in Diagrams*, 1953, 28 pp.

3 Krylov, K. *Gotovnost traktornogo parka k posevnoi kampanii 1953 g. v SSSR* (The Preparedness of the Tractor Supply for the Spring Sowing of 1953), 1953, 12 pp.

4 Zaitsov, A. *Dinamika naseleniya SSSR na 1952 god* (Dynamics of the Soviet Population for 1952), 1953, 90 pp.

5 Krylov, K. *Khod vesennikh rabot v SSSR v 1953 godu* (The Course of Agricultural Spring

Activity in the USSR in 1953), 1953, 22 pp.

6 *Ukazatel periodicheskikh izdaniy emigratsii iz Rossii i SSSR za 1919-1952 gg.* (Index of Emigré Publications from 1919 through 1952), 1953, 165 pp.

7 *K sovremennomu sostoyaniyu selskogo khozyaistva v SSSR-sbornik statei* (The Present Agricultural Situation in the USSR: A Symposium), 1953, 50 pp.

8 *Vnutrennyaya i vneshnyaya politika SSSR* (Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy), 1953, 48 pp.

9 Krylov, K. *Khod letnikh i osennikh rabot v SSSR v 1953 godu* (The Course of Summer and Autumn Agricultural Activities in the USSR in 1953), 1954, 39 pp.

10 Kolosov, M. *Kommunisticheskaya partiya i Sovetskaya armiya* (The Communist Party and the Soviet Army), 1954, 52 pp.

11 Tush, B. *Presledovanie tserkvi v Polshce* (Persecution of the Church in Poland), 1954, 53 pp.

12 *Ukazatel sovetskoi periodicheskoi pechati* (An Index of Soviet Periodicals), 1954, 151 pp.

13 Karmakov, A. M. *Reaktsiya sovetskogo naseleniya na propagandu* (The Soviet Population's Reaction to Propaganda), 1954, 61 pp.

14 Poplujko, A. *Proizvodstvo tovarov shirokogo potrebleniya v SSSR - 1951-1955* (Consumer Goods Production in the USSR - 1951-1955), 1954, 64 pp.

15 Semenov, N. *Gosudarstvennoe ustroistvo i organy upravleniya SSSR i RSFSR* (Government Structure and Organs of Administration in the USSR and RSFSR - In Diagrams), 1954, 162 pp.

16 Kovankovsky, P. L. *Finansy SSSR posle vtoroi mirovoi voyny* (Soviet Finance since World War II), 1954, 80 pp.

17 Marin, Yu. *Problema uvelicheniya proizvodstva zerna i osvoeniya tselinnykh i zaleznykh zemel* (The Problem of Increased Grain Production and the Cultivation of Virgin and Idle Lands), 1954, 36 pp.

18 Renning, R. *Ekonomicheskie vzaimootnosheniya Estonii i SSSR do 1940 g.* (Estonian-Soviet Economic Relations before 1940), 1953, 58 pp.

19 Uranov, P. *Rol gosudarstvennogo banka v rabote mestnoi promyshlennosti* (The Role of the State Bank in Local Industry), 1954, 72 pp.

20 Arkhimovich, A. *Zernovye kultury SSSR-khlebynye zlaki* (Grain Farming in the USSR-Cereals), 1954, 104 pp.

21 Arkhimovich, A. *Kultura khlopchatnika v SSSR* (Cotton Cultivation in the USSR), 1954, 110 pp.

22 Mertsalov, V., Krylov, K., Dudin, L., *K issledovaniyu problem psikhologicheskoi voyny* (On Psychological Warfare), 1955, 132 pp.

23 Gaev, A. *Tsenzura sovetskoi pechati* (Soviet Press Censorship), 1955, 51 pp.

24 Sova, G. *Do istorii bolshevyskoi diinosti* (On the History of Bolshevik Activity), 1955, 107 pp.

25 Seduro, V. *Dostoevskovedenie v SSSR* (Dostoevsky Research in the USSR), 1955, 80 pp.

26 Kovalevsky, M. *Opozitsiini rukhy v Ukraini i natsionalna polityka SSSR - 1920-1954* (Opposition Movements in the Ukraine and the National Policy of the USSR - 1920-1954), 1955, 73 pp.

27 Kalinovskiy, G. *Sostoyanie molochnoi promyshlennosti SSSR v predvoenny i poslevoenny period* (The State of the Soviet Milk Industry in the Pre- and Postwar Years), 1955, 100 pp.

28 Dyachenko, S. *Po voprosam organizatsii kolkhozov v SSSR* (On Kolkhoz Organization in the USSR), 1955, 41 pp.

29 Maistrenko, I. *Kryzovi protsesy v sovetsky ekonomitsi* (The Crisis Process in the Soviet Economy), 1955, 116 pp.

30 Kulikovich, N. *Sovetskaya opera na sluzhbe partii i pravitelstva* (Soviet Opera in the Service of the Party and Government), 1955, 149 pp.

31 Shiryayev, B., Koshevaty, N. *K problemam intelligentsii SSSR* (The Intelligentsia in the USSR), 1955, 80 pp.

32 Skorodumov, V. *Struktura rukovodstva sovetskoi shkoloj* (The Structure of Soviet School Administration), 1955, 88 pp.

33 Mishalov, Yu. *O podgotovke i usloviyakh raboty prepodavatelei sovetskoi shkoly* (Training and Working Conditions of Soviet School-teachers), 1955, 190 pp.

34 Panutsevich, V. *Belaruskoe tkatstva i zni-shchenne yago balshavikami* (The Belorussian Weaving Art and its Suppression by the Bolsheviks), 1955, 212 pp.

35 Nagai, S. *Vodopostachannyya i kanalizatsiya v SSSR* (Water Supplies and Sewerage Systems in the USSR). (In preparation).

V. CATALOGUES

1 *Predvaritelny katalog po Otdelu gosudarstva i prava* (Preliminary Catalogue on State Affairs and Law), 1954.

2 *Predvaritelny katalog po meditsine i fizicheskoi kulture* (Preliminary Catalogue on Medicine and Physical Culture), 1954.

3 *Predvaritelny katalog knig po biologii* (Preliminary Catalogue on Biology), 1954.

4 *Predvaritelny katalog po selskomu khozyaystvu* (Preliminary Catalogue on Agriculture), 1954.

5 *Predvaritelny katalog sovetskikh zhurnalov i gazet na slavyanskikh yazykakh biblioteki Instituta* (Preliminary Catalogue of So-

viet Slavic-Language Magazines and Newspapers in the Institute Library), 1955.

6 *Predvaritelny katalog literatury po voennym voprosam* (Preliminary Catalogue on Military Literature), 1955.

7 *Katalog entsiklopedicheskoi i spravochnoi literatury* (Catalogue of Encyclopedias and Reference Works), 1955.

VI. SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS

5 *let Instituta po izucheniyu istorii i kultury SSSR — 1950-1955* (The Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR — 1950-1955), 40 pp.

Fünf Jahre Institut zur Erforschung der Geschichte und Kultur der UdSSR, 36 pp.

Pyatiletie Instituta po izucheniyu SSSR — Rech'i i privetstviya na yubileinom sobranii

(The Fifth Anniversary of the Institute for the Study of the USSR — Special Meeting, Munich, July 28, 1955), 33 pp.

Die sowjetische Wirtschaftspolitik des „steilen Aufstiegs“ und deren Fiasko. Ergebnisse der Fünften Wissenschaftlichen Konferenz des Instituts zur Erforschung der UdSSR, 25.-27. April, 1955, 160 pp.

