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Religion As a Cold War Weapon

By Lev E. Dobriansky

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UNESCO: A VEHICLE FOR SOVIET PROPAGANDA?

Editorial

...“To honor Lenin for his supposedly having served the interest of humanity and justice is pure burlesque and is an insult to the millions of innocents who have died through Lenin's terror...”

(From a Resolution of the American Legion,
August, 1969)

The forthcoming year of 1970 is being heralded in the Soviet Union and throughout the Soviet Russian outer empire as a year of commemoration and reverence: it will mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Russian totalitarian system.

The main celebrations are marked for April, 1970. If Soviet commemorations of the past are any index, next year's programs will force the inmates of the empire to join in with religious fervor. What seems to be unprecedented is the participation of two U.N. agencies in this mammoth salute to Lenin's birthday, the leader of a tyrannical system that is responsible for untold misery and the national and economic enslavement of millions of people who had the misfortune to fall under the rule of the USSR.

In 1950, the fifth anniversary of the end of World War II, *Pravda* thus eulogized the “Russia of Lenin:”

Russia became the homeland of Leninism, that zenith of world science and culture. The Russian people gave humanity the greatest man of genius -- Lenin... The Russian workers' class has played an advance role in the history of all humanity. It was first to achieve the Soviet revolution and with this it founded a new era...¹

It is reliably reported that UNESCO and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights have endorsed the Lenin Symposium, to be held in Helsinki, Finland, next year, and are planning to send their rep-

¹ *Pravda*, May 24, 1950, Moscow.

representatives to glorify the Bolshevik leader for the "historic influence of his humanistic ideas and activity on the development and realization of economic, social and cultural rights. . ."

Meanwhile, on October 8, 1969, U.N. Secretary General U Thant received a petition from Amnesty International, U.S. Affiliate, on behalf of three Ukrainian political prisoners, Mykhailo Horyn, Ivan Kandyba and Lev Lukyanenko. The petition asserted that the Soviet security police and camp administration were injecting poison into the food of Ukrainian political prisoners in a number of labor camps in the Mordovian ASSR. The petition from the Ukrainian political prisoners concluded:

Honored Commission! If you hold that such methods of reeducating human beings are incompatible with the laws of humanity, we ask that you raise your voice in protest.²

A month earlier a group of 46 dissidents in Moscow had asked that "violations of human rights" in the Soviet Union be discussed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The appeal, which was forwarded to the U.N., is similar to one which was signed by 54 dissidents in May, 1969, and sent to the U.N. — and which was never "officially" received. The new petition said: "In various parts of our country repression continues against the dissidents," and went on to ask U Thant to intercede because the "silence of international legal organizations unties the hands of the instigators for further repressions."

Among the signers of the new appeal are signatories of the appeal last May, such as Peter Yakir, a historian and the son of Gen. Ion E. Yakir, who was shot in one of Stalin's purges in 1937, and Zinaida Grigorenko, wife of Gen. Peter Grigorenko, a Ukrainian who was arrested last May after he took up the cause of the Crimean Tartars and was charged with anti-Soviet activities. All are said to be members of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the USSR.

Only recently Alexander Solzhenitsyn, author of *The First Circle*, *The Cancer Ward* and *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, was expelled from the Writers' Union because his works were deemed to be incompatible with "Socialist realism" and the party line. Earlier this year the Soviet security police arrested, in the Ukrainian city of Lviv, Archbishop Vasyl Welychivsky, a high-ranking prelate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, as well as a number of Ukrainian

² Radio Free Europe Broadcast, October 9, 1969.

Catholic priests on the charge that they were practicing their religion (which the Soviet government construes as an "anti-state activity").

All these developments are, of course, known to the United Nations and its special agencies.

How, then, does one reconcile the suppression of human rights by the Soviet Union and its crass denial of all human, individual and national rights with the glorification of Lenin?

LENIN: FATHER OF POLITICAL TERRORISM

Vladimir Ilich Ulianov-Lenin was the "father" of the Soviet state and system. It was he who initiated and established political terror as an instrument of government. As early as 1918, Lenin stated:

So long as we do not apply terror with execution on the spot, we shall get nowhere.

Lenin founded the Cheka and provided the ideological bases for the succeeding Soviet security systems: GPU, NKVD, MVD and KGB. He advocated violence as a necessary step towards success:

Dictatorship is a power which leans on violence and is not bound by any laws. A revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is power gained and maintained by violence over the bourgeoisie, power which is not bound by any laws. . .³

As a result, Lenin sanctioned all excesses of the Soviet regime committed against the Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples in 1917-1920. Violence was legitimized, a fact of Soviet life which persists to this very day.

LENIN'S NATIONALITY POLICY

The Soviet government is presently engaged in a systematic repression of Ukrainian intellectuals and some members of the Communist Party, who accuse the Moscow chauvinistic apparatus of "deviating" from "Lenin's Nationality Policy" and of backsliding to the old Russian traditional policy of Russification and tyranny.

The "Leninist Nationality Policy" is nothing but a loosely-strung collection of clichés designed to appease the national feelings

³ "Proletarskaya revoliutsiia i renegat Kautski," (The Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautski). By Lenin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. 28, pp. 207-302.

of the non-Russian peoples while it actually denies their rights, yet it provides at least a theoretical argument against the outright policy of centralization and Russification.

In one of his articles, "More about Nationalism," Lenin candidly stated that the purely Russian element in the empire amounted to 43 percent, with the remaining 57 percent being made up of non-Russian peoples. The problem was clearly that of preserving the rule of the minority Russians over the preponderant non-Russians. Lenin saw the solution within a framework of traditional Russian concepts: a despotic and centralized authority over vast non-Russian territories. This old policy had to be bolstered with maximal force,⁴ for Lenin recognized that a 57 percent non-Russian population could no longer be ignored or treated as it was by the Czars. The use of violence by the new Kremlin masters was justified through the semantic device of replacing "imperialism" by "Communism."

In his "Summary of the Discussion on Self-Determination," Lenin wrote:

We would be very poor revolutionaries if, in the great liberation war of the proletariat for socialism, we should be unable to take advantage of any national movement directed against imperialism, in order to sharpen and deepen the crisis. . .

Consequently, on November 3, 1917, the Central Committee, prodded by Lenin, issued the illusory "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," providing for the right of self-determination, "including the right of complete separation from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic."

This probably was Lenin's master propaganda stroke. A double edged sword, it slashed away at the aspirations of the non-Russian nations to freedom and independence while it secured the perpetuation of the Russian empire. The other edge hacked away at the iniquity of the colonial systems of the Western nations. A more pedestrian soul, Stalin, even prior to the declaration on the non-Russian nations, ponderously spelled out that the "recognition of the right of separation did not mean the duty of carrying it out, that the party reserved for itself complete freedom of agitation for or against separation, depending solely on the interests of the proletariat," that is, Russia.⁵

⁴ Lenin: *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX.

⁵ J. Stalin: *Marxism and the National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches*, New York, 1942.

Lenin had put the same halter around the right of self-determination:

The propaganda of self-determination is of very great importance for the fight against the ulcer of nationalism in all its forms... Recognizing the right of separation reduces the danger of the disintegration of the state... The question of a nation's self-determination should not be linked with the problem of implementation or purposefulness of the separation of some nationality. This question should be decided in each individual case quite independently, only from the viewpoint of the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism...⁶

Put simply, the supposedly common denominator of a "proletarian class" — which was insignificant to begin with — justified the artificial attempt to divorce self-determination from nationalism. The transparent aim, of course, was to throttle nationalism in order that the territory of the Russian empire be kept intact.

The non-Russian nations were not waiting for any Bolshevik utterance on self-determination. Seething with centuries-long aspirations to freedom and self-determination, the non-Russian nations burst their bonds. On December 5, 1917, Finland proclaimed her independence. On November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* had proclaimed the Ukrainian National Republic; this was followed, on January 22, 1918, by the proclamation of the full independence of Ukraine. In rapid succession there burst into free being Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

Small wonder, then, that those "architects of the Soviet state," Lenin and Stalin, saw force and deceit as virtually the sole tools that could bring into being their so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat." Their difficulties, however, were compounded in the cases of Ukraine, Finland and Georgia, for Communist Russia renounced these lands in the peace treaty with the Central Powers in Brest Litovsk on March 3, 1918. (It was Trotsky and Stalin themselves who recognized the Ukrainian National Republic at Brest Litovsk).⁷ Likewise, the Baltic states had to be given up (only to disappear in the Soviet maw some two decades later.

Lenin expressed himself unequivocally, at least with regard to Ukraine. The *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia* (URE), Vol. VIII, p. 80, quotes Lenin as stating:

⁶ Lenin, *op. cit.*

⁷ Leonard Shapiro, *Soviet Treaty Series: A Collection of Bilateral Treaties, Agreements and Conventions, etc., Concluded between the Soviet Union and Foreign Powers*, Washington, D.C., 1950, Vol. I, p. 25 ff.

Only with the common activities of Great Russian and Ukrainian proletarians is a free Ukraine possible; without such a unity, such (a free Ukraine) is unthinkable. . .

To make sure of this "free" Ukraine, Bolshevik troops invaded and crushed Ukraine by 1921.

The deceitful Soviet declaration on "self-determination" found its way into the Soviet constitutions, as for instance, that of 1936. But Par. 21 of the same constitution states that "every citizen of any of the federative republics is a citizen of the Union, and not of the respective federative republic." Par. 133 makes the matter utterly plain: "The defense of the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and any activity harmful to its power and integrity is punishable as the gravest offense. . ."

The Program of the Communist Party at the XXIIInd Congress in 1961 read in part:

In the Soviet republics people of many nationalities live and work in harmony. The boundaries between the union republics within the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance since all nations are equal. . . The voluntary study of the Russian language along with the mother tongue now taking place is of positive significance, since it facilitates the mutual exchange of experiences and access to the cultural achievements of all the other people of the USSR. . . The Russian language has in actual fact become the common language of intercourse and cooperation between all peoples of the USSR. . .^s

So much for the Soviet concept of "self-determination."

LENIN: ADVOCATE OF UNIVERSAL COMMUNIST SLAVERY

Today there is no doubt that Lenin master-minded the whole concept of the Communist world revolution that is envisioned as bringing humanity under the control of Moscow. His precepts for "world revolution" did more than change the political face of a third of the globe. They built an imperialistic power surpassing anything the Czars ever dreamed of.

In the USSR today, Russians are ruling and controlling more than 100 million Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis and the Islamic peoples of Turkestan.

In seizing the Kremlin by *coup d'etat* in 1917, Lenin grabbed hold also of a five-century long heritage of imperialistic expansion.

^s *New Times*, No. 48, November 29, 1961, Moscow.

His formula was simple: occupy countries too weak and small to defend themselves, win over the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America by revolution, penetration and subversion, and then launch the final assault upon a Western Europe and the United States made relatively innocuous.

The present rulers of the USSR are faithful disciples of this man. They carry on his testament and his political program with the goal of establishing a world Soviet state under the control and guidance of Moscow.

The Russians have good reason to salute the twelve months of 1970 as "the hundredth year since Lenin's birth." But the U.N. agencies, UNESCO and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, are not Soviet Russian instrumentalities, and therefore, their use by Moscow in glorifying the founder of the Soviet tyrannical system is not only highly improper, but is directed against the basic principles of the U.N. Charter. Lenin never preached peace, but revolution and violence as the only means to achieve power — a power to be used to bring the whole world into the Russian Communist fold.

In contrast to the Russian revolution as implemented by Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, the American revolution, whose bi-centennial is only six years off, was a genuine movement for freedom. It not only established a free and independent nation, but it espoused a series of political principles, centering on the inviolate dignity of the individual, that gave rise to genuine revolutions which unseated autocratic rule in many nations of the world. Among these principles is that of national self-determination, one which has since ever been the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.

Consequently, the U.S. government cannot endorse the misguided U.N. action in allowing its agencies to participate in the glorification of the Russian tyrant who was Lenin, a glorification that violates the essential spirit of this international body. A counter-stroke is in order. Needed are a wealth of articles, books and other material for distribution in the non-communist world to show what Lenin really was, a man to whom the end justified the means, the end being a system that destroys the freedom of nation and individual alike.

RELIGION AS A COLD WAR WEAPON

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Although some consider it unfashionable nowadays to speak of the Cold War, the clear fact is that we are more intensely in it than ever before. The reality of the Cold War need not always be punctuated by tense international conditions, unremitting propaganda outbursts, and loud and vociferous threats and counter-threats. In fact, these and similar phenomena considerably warm up the Cold War and could lead to an excessively hot war. Thus, logically, the reduction or avoidance of such warming-up conditions is itself an operation of the Cold War, where the goals and intentions are the same, the warlike spirit is coldly undiminished, but more subtle methods of infiltrating, sowing seeds of confusion, capitalizing on ignorance, and no doubt gaining some measure of agreement and consent from those who have fallen prey to the calculated maneuver are employed. These techniques are by far more dangerous and actually typify the best instruments of Cold War play since the victims of the effort aren't even aware of being taken in. What colder operation in the Cold War could possibly be performed than this. Its intensity is, therefore, greater than ever before, with all its characteristics of cool deception, intellectual predation, and even obvious objective.

For a number of years now, under cover of the "peaceful co-existence" strategy, this approach has been Moscow's main thrust toward the West and particularly the United States. It has been reflected in all spheres, the political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, athletic, scientific and also the religious. The last is a solid case in point, and at that not a new one. In the 1930's Soviet Russian propaganda made deep inroads into the Protestant clergy in the United States, with its spurious perversions of Christian teachings in the mould of so-called Marxian idealism. The formidable Roman and other Catholic Churches were scarcely penetrated by this maneuver in that period. Today, the situation has changed markedly and considerably. Not only have numerous sections of Protestantism been again easily swayed by substantially the same operation, but also

the firm anti-communism of the Roman and other Catholic Churches has been systematically undermined. What had been the strong, impenetrable moral fortress against the mythology of communism has itself fallen into disarray as a result of skilfully executed maneuvers by Moscow staged in circumstances of a refreshing ecumenical movement.

RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AT WORK

Doubtlessly, the first reaction to this overall interpretation is one of skepticism, this despite much proof that exists in connection with Pope John's *Pacem in Terris*, the "cultural" conferences held on the encyclical, the meanderings of the World Council of Churches, and naive Protestant clerical participation in certain anti-Vietnam war demonstrations, detoured civil rights agitation, and youth disturbances. It is not my intention here to enumerate with explanation the evidence existing in each of these areas. For it to be treated in depth would require a brochure, not an article. Nor is it necessary to cover the waterfront when one pungent example, properly documented and examined, will reveal the nature of the beast.

Through a source I have been given the presentations of representatives of "Christian Churches in the USSR" who participated in what was called "The Consultation on the Christian Concern for Arms Limitation," held in St. Louis, Missouri during the period of September 29-October 9, 1969. American Protestant and Roman Catholic representatives made up the bulk of participants, and quite a few evidently were moved by the Russian presentations. The USSR delegation consisted of the following: Bishop Juvenaly of Tula and Belyev, vice chairman of the department of foreign relations of the Moscow Patriarchate and head of the group; Pastor Ilya Mikhailovich Orlov, vice chairman of the department of foreign relations of the Baptist Union of the USSR; Pastor Ludvigs Sidrevics of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia; Archpriest Livery Arkadevich Voronov, professor at the Leningrad Theological Academy; Alexy Sergeevich Buevsky, secretary of the department of foreign relations of the Moscow Patriarchate; Archpriest Matthew Sauvich Stadnyk, secretary to Archbishop Jonathan, Patriarchal Exarch of North and South America; Father Vladimir Sorokin, inspector of the Leningrad Academy and Seminary; Vasily Dmitrievich Sarychev, professor at the Moscow Theological Academy; and Vladimir Petrovich Kotelkin, translator.

In analyzing the papers delivered it would not be a harsh speculation to state that the key man of this delegation was Buevsky, the

so-called secretary of the department of foreign relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. In fact, on the basis of the usual format of USSR delegations, he was probably the state security officer of the group, for aside from all the religious trimmings his paper could well have been prepared in the Kremlin. The three significant papers were delivered by the Russians of the group. It is interesting to note that the visitors publicized themselves as "The Representatives of Christian Churches in the USSR," whereas the official program prepared by the American clerical hosts has the caption "Russian Participants in USA-USSR Consultation on Arms Limitation." The Latvian is made into a Russian, and the American sheep are prepared for the dialectical slaughter. This in itself is an indication of the level of knowledgeability demonstrated by some of the American "consultants," divided into six "Protestant Participants" and ten "Roman Catholic Participants."

What is of prime concern to us is the line of trained argumentation revealed by the Russian Orthodox papers. Anyone in the least familiar with the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR knows that it has been and continues to be an important tool of the state. It was so under the autocratic Czars, it has been and is so under the Red Kremlin. Entering into "consultation" without this basic knowledge would be the height of naiveté. Having this basic knowledge, one can then readily deduce the type of arguments that would be offered even in the area of arms limitation, which is a crucial field for the Russian totalitarians who seek nuclear superiority and thus America's striking disadvantage in the titanic struggle enveloping the world. Before I had even read the papers, this tentative conclusion dominated my thoughts. What remains in such a "consultation" is the wishful consideration that somehow, somewhere, an impact will be made through personal contacts for what our clerics deem "the good," which is tantamount to political day-dreaming in this contest for the stakes of the world, with or without a global hot war. Now for the exemplifying evidence.

CHURCH AND WORLD PEACE

Of the three selected papers the least obnoxious from an ideological point of view is the one delivered by Sarychev of the Moscow Theological Academy or Graduate School. The reason being that the paper is studded with innocuous theological quotations, biblical phrases, and generalities that hardly serve to meet the problem of arms limitation. Under the sub-caption of "How to intensify the de-

fense of the international peace," the professor begins with this exhortation, "Overwhelming love for earthly goods has led to self-flattery, self-devotion, and self-alienation from the same creatures, and it has become the content of sin and cause of sufferings of all the mankind since the times of the first man."¹ The translations were poorly done, but the papers are nevertheless intelligible. As one can expect in this vein, the professor informs his American counterparts that "The monstrosity of war is in the light of the Christianity the most clearly seen, as far as not only the sufferings involved are concerned but the complete perversion of the relations among men proclaimed by Christ. War, as mass murder and violence, is an act of extreme disobedience of the commandment of love as the true basis of life of the world."²

Much of the presentation is filled with this theological rhetoric. Not strangely enough, the rhetoric is not applied specifically, though its field of application would be the greatest for the Soviet Union itself. However, the professor does slip in several political and socio-economic notes that obviously give away his supposedly elevated theological stance. For example, he says, "At present the Christians must intensify their social activities, to meet the needs of the mankind and genuine progress — liquidation of ignorance, diseases, economical backwardness, and mainly, to strengthen the peace. Certainly, the Church can not be indifferent to these problems by its essence, and we see the efforts of some Churches to solve these problems."³ Who are they in particular? Why, of course, those in the USSR. "In particular," he stresses, "there was held a conference of representatives of all religious in the USSR for cooperation and peace among nations, in July, this year, in Zagorsk."

No sooner was this said, immediately we are told: "We support and hope for a support of all the Christians the decisions of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, and we believe that the future Conference on European Security will be a success, as far as these two problems and the problem of settlement in the Middle East, arouse concern and trouble of those who understand and worry about the significance of human personality, justice and peace."⁴ The slant of all this and more is that the Soviet Union itself is not responsible for Vietnam, the gravity of the Middle East problem, and the threat

¹ Vasily Dmitrievich Sarychev, "Church and World Peace," p. 1.

² *Ibid.* p. 2.

³ *Ibid.* p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 8.

to Western Europe. These are ostensibly just self-engaging problems that must be settled peacefully. The fact is that in each case the Russian problem, involving the goal of world domination, basically underlies each of these problems.

Repeated experience has shown that when a Russian leader, Christian or otherwise, in the USSR makes "a fraternal appeal," at the very least be on guard. If you can't be guided by experience, then you deserve the consequences. After landing the otherwise irrelevant presentation with a few politico-economic generalizations — enough to indicate his anticipated position — the professor virtually concludes with this: "That is why we address the Christians of the United States particularly with a fraternal appeal to unite our efforts for making the part of the Christian in the struggle for maintenance and strengthening peace more significant."⁵ As concerns the subject of "the consultation," this paper is almost completely worthless. Theologic rhetoric has its worthwhile place, but it can offer no concrete solution to the problem. A Russian willingness to allow inspection and neutral control for arms limitation and reduction would practically solve the problem. But such rhetoric is like the wind in the USSR. Moreover, the paper obviously shows the professor's hand when the misleading Stockholm Conference on Vietnam is involved. Peace in Vietnam would have been realized several years ago if the major Russian material support had not been given to the totalitarian North Vietnamese aggressor. The professor calls for "solidarity" of all Christians, but on what practical terms? He intimates totalitarian Russian terms.

PEACEMAKING PATH OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

The next paper by Bishop Juvenaly brings us closer to home as to the real line taken by the delegation and the dominant motives of the group. The bishop of Tula and Belyev, it will be recalled, is vice chairman of the department of foreign relations and the ostensible or nominal head of the delegation. The paper is a series of historical untruths and distortions that the bishop felt he could get away with, since the usual American audience is either unfamiliar or indiscriminating when it comes to Russian history, whether religious or otherwise. The effect intended is the reception of a fantastic image of a church long-suffering and completely devoted to peace. Unless the institutional death of others is construed as peace, the paper

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 11.

is clearly deceitful and actually an insult to the American consultants, whether they realized it or not.

An overstatement of the year initiates the bishop's historical presentation when he begins with, "It is impossible to embrace in a comparatively short report the whole peacemaking path of the Holy Russian Church."⁶ Of course, many in that church, leaders and faithful alike, have sincerely and courageously prayed for and sought a true Christian peace throughout the world. No one can deny this, nor is this the issue at hand. If realism has any meaning, certain salient facts must be squarely faced. One is the powerful fact that the Russian Orthodox Church, as an institution, has been a tool of the imperial state, whether white or red, and as such has been deeply involved in religious genocide, Russification, and the expansion of Russian imperial power. Two, during the centuries of the Third Rome mania, the institution scarcely contributed to "peace" with its view of Western Catholicism and Protestantism as representations of the anti-Christ. Third, the church and its monastic branches held for centuries vast lands in the empire and could have on a net basis done far more to advance social justice, peace, and the happiness of the people than it did. The last general fact to be borne in mind is that to the very present the Russian Orthodox Church is riddled with state security men whose prime purpose is to manipulate religion as an efficient Cold War weapon. All of these overall facts are conveniently set aside as the bishop offers both fiction and half-truths to his American listeners.

In writing this piece I cannot help but recall the words of Professor George Fedotov, my old brilliant teacher and Russian scholar on Russian ecclesiastical history, "Be patient with individuals from Russian society but always be on guard with those who identify it with the traditional state." This wisdom of Christian realism applies here fully. A few representative examples of the distortions indulged in by the bishop will show the depth of this wisdom.

At the very start, the American consultants are treated to this fiction: "Since the times of the Grand Duke Vladimir (Xth century) the Russian Orthodox Church participated in reconciliation service and believed these activities as being an essential part of the Church mission of salvation."⁷ Now this poppeycock, suggesting a form of religious Russian imperialism, is clearly contradicted by known fact. At the time of Vladimir there wasn't even any formal

⁶ Bishop Juvenaly, "Peacemaking Path of the Russian Orthodox Church," p. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 1.

body known as the Russian Orthodox Church. There wasn't even a political body known as Russia, which came into being many centuries later. Rus' was not Russia. But our imperialist-minded bishop, who doubtless is familiar with the controversy on this point, presents his statement as one of definitive fact. He continues his fiction by saying, "It is known that the history of ancient Russia presented a grievous picture of independent principalities when during a long period it had no political unity." If he's talking about Muscovy, which is the origin of Russia, there is little need to quarrel with this statement. If he has in mind Rus' and later Ukraine, as no doubt he does, the statement is nonsensical.

That we're dealing here with an ecclesiastic who, on the one hand, preaches fraternal "love" and "peace" (or more accurately, piece) — and, on the other hand, fully subscribes to official and forced Russian imperial historiography, can be seen from numerous other passages. For instance, "In the XIII century the Russian lands were invaded, first, by Swedes from the North West, then by German knights, and by the Tatarians from the East."⁸ What "Russian lands?" Lithuania, Ukraine, etc.? The bishop would be hard pressed to produce an original map for that and other countries, showing "Russia" or "Russian lands." On page after page, he identifies Russia, by which he obviously now means Russian Empire, with "our Motherland." Thus, in the service of the state, the Russian Orthodox Church in 1812 "supported the people's heroic deed of struggle with Napoleon" and the "Orthodox clergy widely participated personally in the defence of the Motherland in 1812."⁹ This might have been commendable from the Russian point of view in resisting an invader, although carriers of the ideas of the French Revolution might also have transformed Russia into a more civilized state with long-run benefits to the Russian people and their church. From the non-Russian viewpoint, i.e. Lithuanian, Latvian, Ukrainian, etc. the unsuccessful Napoleonic endeavor was an historical tragedy. It meant their continued enslavement in the Russian Empire.

From a traditional American viewpoint, these so-called contributions to "peace" by the Russian Orthodox Church were contributions to the maintenance of despotic government, oppression of non-Russian nations, and the preservation of a tyrannical empire. Nowhere will you find in this or the other papers any reference to these crucial points or attempts by the Russian Orthodox Church

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 3.

to bring freedom, love and genuine peace to the subjugated non-Russian nations in the sprawling empire. Instead, as presented here, in "the war with the Germans started in 1914," the ROC served again the despotic state by taking "the most active part in the defence of the Motherland."¹⁰ Again, in "the days of the WW II, the Russian Orthodox Church made everything necessary for the defence of the Soviet Motherland." For the majority non-Russian populations, both World Wars, tragic as they were, factually provided a political opportunity for manifold expressions toward national freedom and independence. The three Baltic countries managed to sustain their freedom — a word that is scarcely used in these papers — and flourished with it for two decades.

Pursuing the line of calculated vaguery, the bishop then stresses that "20 million lives have perished in that war" (World War II) and "it means that every tenth citizen of our country was killed in battlefields or tortured to death in the concentration camps."¹¹ The estimated figure is actually 25 million, and the factual and meaningful breakdown is between Russians and non-Russians who hailed from many countries in the imperial state of the USSR. USSR is no country; it is a forced state holding captive numerous countries and nations. The bishop evidently felt he could pan off the official propaganda on his unsuspecting audience and apparently did, but if you're a man of "peace," "love" and "Christianity," the credentials commence with truth first. For if truth is slighted, the others are just convenient nomers. Nowhere will the reader find in any of these papers any mention of the Soviet Russian concentration camps which over three decades consumed lives far in excess of these deaths of World War II and easily dwarf Hitler's record before and during the war.

The remainder of the bishop's paper is a brazen indulgence in politics with interpretations slanted in favor of totalitarian Moscow. As every Christian well knows, sins of omission are at times graver than those of commission. Numerous German Christians spoke out against the barbarities of Nazism. We have yet to witness a Russian Orthodox leader condemn the far greater barbarities of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. Instead, in this paper repeated quotations are given of the appeals made by the Russian Patriarch not only to believers of the church but also to "Christians all over the world." For example, in 1943, "The Orthodox Church fervently urges

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 5.

all the Christians to pray to the God. . . to give the final victory. . . in order to annihilate forever the very memory of inhuman teaching of fascism." What of the darker deeds of Red fascism? Not a word. Another, in 1948, is an appeal by Patriarch Alexei to all the Christians of the world "to unite in a firm resoluteness to stand against all the initiatives and actions which are in contradiction to our Christian vocation and which try to make us, if we are not united, the tools of the evil forces."¹² What evil forces? — American imperialism, capitalist aggressors and the like? This union could be easily accomplished by courageous deeds rather than double-meaning words. If, for example, the Patriarch had denounced Soviet Russian genocide of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches, can there be any doubt about Christians the world over uniting with him in this action?

For this play on words let us consider just another quote. "So, for instance, at the IIIrd All-Union Conference of Champions of Peace held in Moscow in 1951, His Holiness, Patriarch Alexei on behalf of the Russian Orthodox Church supported the Appeal of the World Peace Council from February 23, 1951, about reduction of armaments, prohibition of all means for mass annihilation, about the end of the war in Korea and in other places, and about granting the right for self-determination to all the peoples, and about the Peace Pact."¹³ As the record shows, the worst and almost exclusive violator of the right of self-determination sits in Moscow itself. Official Russian propaganda perverts reality by accusing others of the very crime it commits. A Christian specification of this would point with content to the numerous captive non-Russian nations in the USSR that are deprived of this right. Clearly, it is not enough for the bishop to conclude that "We, as Christians proceeding from our religious responsibility must promote the development of mutual understanding and co-operation of our countries in all possible fields. . ." ¹⁴ Religious responsibility, if it means anything, commences with truth. If intellectuals in the USSR have had the courage to face up to it in present circumstances, why have the spokesmen of ROC remained mute on this level?

¹² *Ibid.* p. 6.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 12.

THE SECRETARY PROPAGANDIZES

Really, the important member of the delegation was the secretary of the department of foreign relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. The secretaries in the Communist Parties, in the Republic governments, in Russian embassies, and on CP committees are always the cogs of the machine. So here, even with a sense of perfect equilibrium, Alexy Sergeevich Buevsky's name appears fifth in the official list of nine. His rendition on the "Problem of Limitation of Nuclear Weapons and Anti-Ballistic Missile System" unquestionably reveals the hand of control, interweaving the prime interests of the state and the empty theologic rhetoric of the Russian Orthodox Church as a tolerated institution. If the other papers left any doubt about the good intentions, motives and repressed feelings of their deliverers, a careful reading of this particular paper should have dispelled it completely.

In setting forth the propaganda of the Soviet Russian totalitarians, Buevsky is actually not as subtle and discreet as one would expect. In parts his paper is crass and blunt, and spells out concretely what the other two papers pointed toward. It begins innocently enough with an enumeration of the main features of "contemporary militarism," such as costly allocations for arms resources, military blocs and so forth. Of course, the presenter fails to mention the truly militaristic character of his imperio-colonialist state since its very inception. With intellectualist overtones suggested by thirty-four footnotes, the paper then injects a few ecclesiastic quotes from Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad and Novgorod, and naturally cites "the late Pope of Peace John XXIII" and his *Pacem in Terris*, all in the spirit of peace and against the "menace of atomic destruction of the world," which is a highly disputable fear in itself. By page three, after all the rhetorical amenities are completed, the political skids are fully and unabashedly greased up right to the end of the sixteen-page dissertation which concludes with another high-sounding note of theologic rhetoric and a numerical posting of Luther-like theses.

The secretary immediately invokes the authority of A. N. Kosygin and his interview with the Japanese "Mainichi" correspondent and his view of the non-proliferation treaty as an "undoubtful and great success of the proponents of disarmament," as "a contribution to the cause of universal peace and detente."¹⁵ Kosygin, according

¹⁵ A. S. Buevsky. "Problem of Limitation of Nuclear Weapons and Anti-Ballistic Missile System," p. 3.

to the secretary, underwrites "a prospective program for further development of the 'good-neighbour relations' which is the official policy of our country." Looking beyond the signing of the non-proliferation treaty, Buyevsky stresses "the removal of military bases from foreign territory." What a package deal! A close analysis of these elements shows something entirely different from this so-called trend toward disarmament. The non-proliferation treaty is in essence a species of confetti diplomacy and, from the Russian point of view, a form of nuclear *potemkinism*. Although the treaty has many defects and in no way contributes positively to disarmament, its values for Moscow are a near-monopoly of nuclear arms for itself in the Red Empire and the propaganda effect of appearing to seek peace. Next, behind this facade, Moscow is actually negating disarmament by shipping arms to all continents of the globe for revolutionary activity, particularly Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Lastly, on the fiction of "good-neighbour relations," one need only utter Czecho-Slovakia, not to review fifty years of successive aggression.

As though this isn't enough, our religious secretary states further that "we can appreciate the statements of the former U.S. President Lyndon Johnson concerning the cessation of bombardments in Vietnam, since despite their forced character they testify to the will for peace, for the end of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and for the solution of the Vietnam problem by the people of the country without interference from abroad."¹⁶ From this crass statement it would seem that the so-called religious secretary was working on the presumption that his American listeners, clerical and lay alike, were complete fools. The incontrovertible facts are that the aggression in Vietnam is exclusively Red totalitarian, that against this criminal action against the people of South Vietnam the American bombardments failed to go far enough toward a decisive victory, and that on the matter of interference both Peiping and Moscow were over-involved in this Red aggression from the start. Indeed, the war in Vietnam would have been over four years ago if the heavy Russian and Red satrap support in arms hadn't flowed to Hanoi.

No sooner the fraudulent religious secretary made the above point, he then took a strong swipe against anti-communism. The paper reveals this gem: "Arms drive and the development of the ABM system are related to the corrupting influence of anti-communism which is an integral element of the imperialist policy. Since

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 4.

the establishment of a new social system in our country and up to date the imperialists have produced slanderous accusations discrediting our society, misinterpreting its intentions and distorting real facts. For example, an increasing might of the Socialist camp is treated as a threat to the welfare of the Western world.”¹⁷ Briefly, if a reader of these prevaricating remarks doesn’t by now know the long record of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism since 1917, the long string of captive nations which it has created and victimized since then, well, he deserves to be hoodwinked by this brash fabrication. One of the favorite Russian techniques, which Goebbels learned and applied time and time again, is to repeat an untruth endlessly and in time the audience will begin to believe it as a truth. Not one but many Russian intellectuals and writers have characterized “Soviet society” as a “sick society,” and the long record of Soviet Russian tyranny, genocide, militarism, slave and other barbarities more than justify this characterization. Indeed, without oversimplifying the matter, it can easily be argued that if the reality of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism were non-existent, there would be no real threat to global peace from any source in the world, including Red China. Once you’ve waded through all the data, *the* problem is as simple as this

There are further gems in this brash presentation which obviously assumed a basic gullibility, not to speak of other characteristics, on the part of the assembled religious listeners. The so-called secretary observes, “Distorting the principles of peaceful coexistence the Western political sinner is trying to interpret the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union as ‘a continuation of Czarist imperialist traditions,’ as a policy of capture which uses the principle of peaceful-co-existence in ‘perfidious communist purposes’ aimed at surrounding the ‘civilized world’ and making for the ‘communist domination.’ ” He continues, “In terms of this interpretation average citizens in the West are made to think that anti-communist and anti-Soviet policy pursued by the USA and other Western countries is only the answer to ‘a Soviet challenge.’ ... Under the guise of resistance against Communism many Western politicians consider war to be a political means and search for new versions of anti-communist strategy.” The ersatz secretary then talks about Western “failures in the military intervention against Soviet Russia and in the Civil War,” the peace “strategy of the Socialist camp” as “an alternative to the imperialist one,” and that “Anti-Soviet slander becomes one

¹⁷ *Ibid* p. 5.

of the means of anti-Communist propaganda." All of which leads to this theme song: "It is high time to cease slanderous accusations, to expose 'false prophets' in science who interpret real facts in such a way that they contribute to enmity and division of the mankind. For this purpose it is necessary to witness truth and estimate positive factors wherever they appear." ¹⁸

Yes, by all means, let us witness the truth and appreciate the positive factors of the situation. The very statements of the make-believe secretary indicate in themselves the sensitivity with which his superiors react to the truths of the anti-communist argument and criticism. Every one of his points can be devastatingly demolished. The notion of the "peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union" is misleading in the first instance. The policy is neither peace-loving nor of the Soviet Union. It is a typical Russian stroke of diplomatic potemkinism and is executed with equally typical deftness by the controlling Russian interest in Moscow. In short, it is an old policy, preceding Lenin and well in keeping with "czarist imperialist traditions"; it is a deceptive policy with perfidious pseudo-communist purposes and designed for communist domination. By allusion, Buevsky is quite correct; as a first axiom in international politics, you never trust a totalitarian Russian politico. In this respect the historic Kazakh proverb applies — "Whenever you travel with a Russian, make sure you carry an ax." As for Western military intervention against Soviet Russia and in the Civil War — a thin thesis used by Stalin, Khrushchev and others — the so-called intervention was actually a minor presence of Western forces in various parts of an already vanished empire at the close of World War I. It had no definite political purpose or design, and was of threat to no one. Actually, it represented a grave historical error of omission, for it failed to permanently seal the demise of a centuries-old empire by supporting the many newly-established independent non-Russian states of Byelorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and others. Had this been done, with knowledge and resolution, mankind would have been spared the tragic problems it faces today.

The remaining half of the pseudo-secretary's paper contains several truly comical statements. For example, to eliminate prejudices and enmity in the world, he unabashedly states "it is necessary to allay prejudices with respect to the Soviet foreign policy which really does not conceal any secret or hostile purposes." He could say this again, since Moscow has never made a secret of its goal to

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 6.

dominate the world. Then a series of quotes from President Roosevelt, some historian by the name of T. Baily, George Kennan, and a D. Flemming are drawn upon to buttress the general argument of the need for understanding the poor Russian totalitarians. The quotes are almost useless, having been abstracted out of context and interspersed with parenthesized phrases and excessively dotted separations.

Youth does not escape the secretary's notice. Referring to "the threat of nuclear annihilation" and its disturbing aspects, he says, "Young people of the present time realize this, that is why they are against social institutions of exploitation and oppression, against authoritarian capitalist economy, against fascist and imperialist policy, against class sociology."¹⁹ This hogwash can be quickly dispensed with by simply recording the struggles of youth behind the Iron Curtain for sheer freedom above all. The threat has no meaning in terms of the mythical references made; its only relevant meaning is found in Soviet Russian strategy for world domination. The secretary's brilliant conclusion that the "reduction of nuclear weapons and ABM installations is a means for carrying out the aspirations of the youth as well as of those who are now above forty" scarcely requires comment. His further statement, "If one should speak of the guarantees necessary for the solution of this problem, first of all one should take into account the peace-loving policy pursued by the Soviet Union," is the height of rhetorical insolence.

To complete the comedy imported by the American "consultants," the obvious Russian propagandist cites Gromyko's declaration in July, 1968 of being ready to immediately sign a document prohibiting nuclear weapons. Aside from the deceptive political stance of this gesture and the habitual secretiveness of Russian arms production, what was not pointed out was the timed coincidence of this declaration with the 1968 Captive Nations Week observance. As in previous years, Moscow lost no time in its attempt to dwarf this international observance because it has been and is a deep thorn in the side of Soviet Russian strategy or world domination. Also, not by name but former Secretary of State Dulles is cursed for his "notorious strategy of 'the massive retaliation.'" ²⁰ The "religious" representative even had some choice economic observations to make. For example, decrying the "integration of military and industrial circles" in the Free World, he holds that the "evidence for

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 9.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 10-11.

this is the instability of currency in the world capitalist system." Here, too, aside from the invalid association of data, one need only point to the patent inability of the ruble to measure up as an international currency, not to mention its thoroughly arbitrary value.

Finally, after having devoted most of his paper to political propaganda, Buevsky winds up with Biblical quotations and a Luther-like posting of theses. For the Kremlin mouthpiece "the most significant argument for a Christian is the words from the Holy Bible calling for "beating the swords into ploughshares" and for "putting the sword back into its place." The only proper direction for the application of these time-worn admonitions is Moscow and Soviet Russia. The Luther-like theses are somewhat amateurish both in format and content. For example, point four maintains "The believers should consider the accumulation of nuclear weapons and the development of the ABM system contradictory to the religious principles of the social order and making for moral degradation, fear and isolation. Hence they should work for the limitation and the prohibition of nuclear weapons and ABM systems."²¹ Just like that. Why nuclear weapons receive special mention in this context is not at all logically clear, though the "preacher's" motive is quite clear.

It should be evident from this analysis that the Russians are gaining considerable mileage in their use of religion as a cold war weapon. There is no limit to their propaganda temerity, the exercise of which reflects adversely on their inviting listeners. The judgment of these listeners is subject to considerable question, no matter how pure and commendable their motives. The effect of this type of consultation couldn't but harm Free World interests if it were generalized in use. Consultations are useful, but their productive conduct presupposes a level of knowledgeability which would place the counterparts on guard as to the depth and extent of the enemy's assault. And the enemy will use religion, as indeed any other discipline, to the maximum degree allowable. In this particular case, he literally went to town.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 12.

IVAN KOTLYAREVSKY: AN APPRECIATION

By VERA RICH

Perhaps one of the most difficult tasks in literary criticism is the assessment and appraisal of an author whose work forms a turning point in the history of a literature. Such an author (as the apocryphal story has it of Shakespeare) tends to be "so full of quotations," or if not of verbal quotations, then of situations, trends, themes and tropes which later become a standard part of the literary tradition but which, at the time, represent a new and startling innovation.

With Kotlyarevsky, modern Ukrainian literature commences. Thus the textbooks imply that in his works we find the first examples of a Ukrainian literature, written in the Ukrainian language as spoken by the Ukrainian people, replacing the stilted, formal language, largely derivative of Church Slavonic, used by his literary predecessors. Moreover, on the practical and prosodic side, we find in his poetry a clear break with the older, syllabic, tradition of poetry and the introduction of accentual (stress-based) metres.

In fact, the significance of these two innovations is even more startling than might appear at first glance. They represent not only an establishment of a native tradition of writing *per se*; at a time when the last vestiges of the political independence of Ukraine had disappeared, they imply a break with any continuity of influence by Russian or Polish literatures, to the East and West of Ukrainian. For under the Czars, the Orthodox Church was not only state-controlled, but it could become a means and organ of imperialist expansion. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Czars, as "self-appointed protectors" of the Orthodox, subjugated the Caucasus, meddled incessantly in the internal affairs of Mount Athos, and cast more than covetous eyes on the lordship of Constantinople. In the dark days when the lamps of Europe went out after Sarajevo, it was on ostensible grounds of Pan-Orthodoxy that Russia, in need of a foreign war to absorb public attention from her domestic troubles, involved herself in Europe on the Serbian side.

Had Ukrainian literature remained Church Slavonic-based, i.e., based on the very language which was to become identified with the concept of the "Czar's church," the development of a truly Ukrainian literature might well have proved impossible. As history proved, Ukrainian poets were to return, time and again, to draw inspiration and literary richness from Church Slavonic, but this is always a conscious choice for a particular literary effect (just as, when writing in English, one may consciously select, for some special purpose, an archaic form from the King James Bible). But, from Kotlyarevsky onwards, Ukrainian literature was based on the living traditions of spoken Ukrainian, and not on the formal, stultifying traditions of Church Slavonic.

Again, by breaking with the old syllabic metre, Kotlyarevsky departed from the poetic form which until then Ukrainian had shared with Polish. He also, apparently, was the first Ukrainian poet to use "masculine" (mono-syllabic) rhymes. While it is not quite true to say that masculine rhymes are impossible in Polish, the structure of the language, with its fixed stress on the penultimate syllable, confines "masculine" rhymes to those mono-syllabic words (in which Polish, like all Slav languages, is not particularly abundant). Thus, with Ukrainian rhythm and rhyme-patterns established distinct from Polish tradition, although Western Ukraine and south-east Poland might be politically fused and partitioned with no regard for ethnic boundaries, although many Ukrainian poets were closely familiar with Polish poetry, and although Poland developed a "Ukrainian school" of poets, the possibility of confusion between the traditions was remote. Michal Czajkowski and the other poets of the (Polish) "Ukrainian school" chose subject and inspiration from Ukraine, but wrote their poems in their own, syllabic, metres. From Shevchenko downwards, all Ukrainian poets of note were familiar with the Polish poetic scene, but the differences of rhyme and rhythmic pattern — the very life-stuff of poetry — would serve to keep the traditions apart. Even when so notable a poet as Ivan Franko turns for a time to Polish, it is as a prose medium, for articles and journalism, in which the prime motivation is the communication of content, not artistic creation. Thus, at a time when the political identity of Ukraine appears to vanish from the map, the stylistic innovations of Kotlyarevsky provide the renascent Ukrainian literature with a bastion against absorption by East and West.

In addition to these stylistic innovations, Kotlyarevsky made considerable advances in the choice of subject matter and theme.

Once again, his work appears full of "quotations." *Natalka Poltavka* seems almost too conventional an operetta, with stock characters (dowerless orphan heroine, her poor-boy sweetheart disappeared to make his fortune, the mother eager for her daughter to make a prosperous marriage) until we realize that this work was first produced in 1838, at a time when throughout Europe the theme of such works had hardly progressed beyond "Gothic" fantasy or "blood and thunder" melodrama. The wealth of folklore and ethnographic material which Kotlyarevsky weaves into the portrayal of the adventures of Aeneas and his Kozak-Trojans in his travestied *Aeneid* seems an "obvious" motif — one expects Ukrainian writers to draw on Ukrainian traditions of this kind — until one recalls that this work was first published in 1798. With Wordsworth (the first edition of the *Lyrical Ballads* also appeared in 1798) Kotlyarevsky shares the honor of being the first to introduce into a modern European literature the speech and traditions of the ordinary man, not as comic relief (as in Shakespeare, for example), but as the integral and basic factor in literary creation.

Yet the fundamental importance of Kotlyarevsky's work is not so much the written literary heritage which he left to Ukrainians, as that he created and forged a tool with which Ukrainians of the future could shape a full and abundant literature. Below, we give two tributes to Kotlyarevsky, by the two greatest of those who succeeded him, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko. Both are the tributes of young poets to their predecessor — Shevchenko's is attributed to 1838, the year in which Kotlyarevsky died, and Shevchenko, at 24, was for the first time in his life a free man, while Franko's sonnet is dated 1873, i.e. in his seventeenth year. Both poets pay tribute to the genius of Kotlyarevsky — Franko under the lofty image of the high-soaring eagle, Shevchenko as a "nightingale" (the sweetest toned of all Ukrainian birds). Yet it is not solely as poet they honor him. To Shevchenko, he is a prophet-figure, who "in one single word" can capture all the glory of Kozakdom. To Franko, he is the kindler of the literary spark which now blazes forth "to warm us all."

To him they are grateful, not merely as a creator of the Ukrainian literary tradition, but as the creator of their very tool of literary expression. The works of both these poets were to far outsoar their master — yet without the legacy of Kotlyarevsky Franko might have composed his poems in the German of his paternal ancestry and schooling, while Shevchenko might have been known to posterity solely as a talented painter. At the threshold of their poetic careers,

Ukraine's two greatest poets paid tribute to the genius of Ivan Kotlyarevsky. On this, the 200th anniversary of his birth, it is proper to honor him, not only for his own works, but for making possible the poetry of Shevchenko and Franko.

Taras Shevchenko

TO THE ETERNAL MEMORY OF KOTLYAREVSKY

(Translated by Vera Rich)

Sunlight glowing and wind blowing
 From the field to the valley,
 A guelder-rose above the water
 With the willow hanging.
 On the guelder-rose, a little
 Nest is rocking, lonely.
 But where, now, has the nightingale gone?
 Do not ask: it knows not!
 Remember evil — and what matter:
 It has passed, has waned now;
 Remember good — the heart is pining,
 Why did it not remain so?
 Still I look, and I remember:
 Of old, when night was falling,
 It sang upon the guelder-rose —
 None could pass by its calling:

Whether a rich man, to whom fate
 A mother's love is showing,
 Robbing him, tending — he could not
 Pass by that tree, unknowing;
 Whether an orphan, up at dawnlight,
 Swift to work to hurry,—
 Stops short, listens to the song
 As if father and mother
 Were speaking, asking gentle questions:
 And the heart pulses sweetly;
 The whole world is like Easter Day,
 And people are like people!

Or a young girl, daily watching,
 Waiting for her true love,
 Pining, withering like an orphan,
 Not knowing what to do, now,—
 Wandering the path to look for him,
 Among the osiers crying:
 The nightingale begins to sing—
 And she her tears is drying;

She listens, she begins to smile,
She wanders the dark grove there,
As if she talked with her true love...
While it sings on, above her,

So smoothly, so clearly, as if it were praying,
Till the thief, with a knife in his boot, comes to play
On the path. Through the spinney an echo runs, straying,
Runs, and is silent: why sing for him, say?
The hard heart of the thief can be reached by no music;
Though it injure the voice it can teach him no good;
Let him rage, until he in his turn meet his dooming,
And the raven tears his headless corpse as its food.

Now sleeps the valley, on the hanging
Guelder, the songbird dreams above,
The wind is blowing through the valley,
An echo runs through the oakgrove;
Like God's own speech, the echo playing.
The poor folk rise, and toil begins,
Through the oakgrove cows are straying,
Girls go to fetch the water in,
A touch of heaven — sunshine peeping!
The willow smiles, a feast indeed!
The thief, the fierce thief is weeping.

So was it once, at first, now see:
Sunlight glowing and wind blowing
From the field to the valley,
A guelder-rose above the water
With the willow hanging;
On the guelder-rose a little
Nest is rocking, lonely.
But where, now, has the nightingale gone.
Do not ask, it knows not!
Not long since, not long since in our Ukraine
Old Kotlyarevsky sang in such tones.
He has grown silent, left, orphaned, to keen him
The seas and the mountains where he first roamed,
Where he led, and the world-wanderer's
Warriors did follow.
All bereft, as if for Troy's
Ruins, all in sorrow.
All in sorrow, only glory
Like the sunlight hovers.
The minstrel does not die, for glory
Will hail him forever.
Father, thou shalt rule as lord
While mankind yet is living;
We shall not forget thee, while
The sun still shines in heaven!

O righteous soul, receive my words spoken
 Unwise but sincere, receive them graciously!
 Leave me not orphaned as thou didst the oakgrove,
 Come to me with but one word as a token,
 And about our Ukraine sing to me!
 Let the soul smile, in a strange land sojourning,
 Smile at least once, seeing what thou hast wrought,
 How in one single word thou the whole Kozak glory
 To the poor house of an orphan hast brought.
 Come then, grey eagle, for I am all lonely,
 Orphaned in this world, to a strange land transplanted,
 I gaze at the sea, so wide, so deep flowing,
 To sail to that far shore no boat will they grant me!
 I recall it — at once, like a child, weeping for it;
 And to that distant strand the waves rush and roar.
 Maybe I am benighted and see nothing clearly,
 Maybe over there, too, an ill-fate weeps drearily,
 Everywhere is the orphan a mockery sure!
 Let them mock; for over there seas are playing,
 There sun and moon brighter radiance give,
 Let them mock; for over there seas are playing,
 There sun and moon brighter radiance give,
 In the steppe, there, a gravemound speaks with the wind dally,
 And I, with that gravemound, not lonely would live.

O righteous soul, receive my words spoken
 Unwise but sincere, receive them graciously!
 Leave me not orphaned as thou didst the oakgrove,
 Come to me with but one word as a token,
 And about our Ukraine sing to me.

**
*

Ivan Franko

KOTLYAREVSKY

(Translated by Vera Rich)

A mighty eagle on a snow-peak hoary
 Perched, and his eye roamed keenly, far and wide,
 Then, sudden, over the snow-shallows soaring,
 He winged his strong way to the azure height.

But he struck loose a snow-clod in his flight
 That began rolling down the rocky scaurings—
 A little time elapsed — in all its might
 The avalanche plunged down with thunder roaring.

Thus Kotlyarevsky, in a time most blest,
 With a Ukrainian word set his song flowing,
 And, oft, indeed, that singing seemed a jest.

Yet it bore a rich pledge of forces growing,
 And the small spark he struck was not suppressed,
 But blazed to warm us all in its bright glowing.

CARPATHO-UKRAINE: IMPORTANT PART OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE

By VINCENT SHANDOR

In political life, as in the private life of man, those problems are solved finally which have been solved correctly. This simple precept of life could not find its way into the understanding of the victorious great powers' representatives who "finally" decided on the problems of the world at the close of World War I. They enunciated the policy of self-determination — a far-sighted, healthy and politically effective program — but did not apply it to Czarist Russia, that is, the non-Russian nations, including Ukraine, which had been enslaved by the Russian Czars.

Ukraine, immediately after the fall of Czardom, put forth her claims for national and political rights, and by a series of appropriate state acts implemented them. To be recalled is that the principle of self-determination was accepted unanimously at the Ukrainian National Congress held in Kiev on April 19-21, 1917, well ahead of the time it was enunciated by the *Entente*. But the failure of the *Entente* to recognize this right for Ukraine belongs to the greatest political blunders of the first half of the XXth century. By refusing to recognize Ukraine, the *Entente* made possible the existence and the strengthening of the communist system in the USSR, let go unpunished the aggressions by Communist Russia against the Ukrainian National Republic and, in fact, legalized these aggressions. The few statesmen and scholars who raised their voices in defense of the Ukrainian state were drowned out in the clamorous atmosphere of political quarreling and recriminations in the *Entente* camp.

The Ukrainian state was then, as Ukraine is today, a decisive factor in the struggle against Communism. The fall of the Ukrainian state was quickly felt by those who had strongly opposed its existence, as for instance, Clemenceau. As a private French citizen he realized his mistake in regard to Ukraine, writing in 1924:

...weariness and apathy overpowered Europe at a time when it should have mustered all its forces and supported Ukraine and at one blow finished Bolshevism, which is costing the whole world so dearly...¹

The only part of the Ukrainian land to which the principle of national self-determination was partially applied after World War I, was Carpatho-Ukraine, the most westward segment of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory. It was referred to as Ruthenia in the St. Germain Treaty.² This part of Ruthenia was incorporated in 1919 into Czechoslovakia and was renamed "Podkarpatska Rus" (Subcarpathian Ruthenia), which eventually accepted the name of Carpatho-Ukraine.

In the state-juridical relations of Carpatho-Ukraine with Czechoslovakia, which lasted from 1919 to 1939, the following basic political and juridical acts are registered:

1. The international Treaty of St. Germain of September 10, 1919, whereby Carpatho-Ukraine was incorporated into Czechoslovakia on the basis of extensive autonomous rights consistent with the unity of the state.

2. The constitution of Czechoslovakia of February 29, 1920, No. 121, in which the decisions of the St. Germain Treaty on the autonomy were included (Par. 3).

Thus, Carpatho-Ukraine had a double guarantee of its autonomous rights, an international and a constitutional one.

But the government of Czechoslovakia, instead of preparing for the autonomy of the country, imposed a centralist state administration which lasted until the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a federative state system. The aforementioned constitution, which, with a few insignificant changes, was in force until March 14, 1939, had several juridical gaps and inconsistencies with respect to Carpatho-Ukraine, specifically:

- a) The constitution was adopted not by the parliament of Czechoslovakia, elected by the population, but by the National Revolutionary Council, which was created *ad hoc* in Prague to proclaim the independence of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and which was

¹ General Mordacy, *L. Clemenceau au soir de sa vie, 1920-29*. Tome premier, Librairie Plon, 1933, p. 147 (Cited from O. Shulhyn: *Without Territory*, Paris, 1934, p. 25).

² Ruthenia, the name of the territory inhabited by Ruthenians (Ukrainians) in the southern part of the Carpathian Mountains, until World War I belonged to Austria-Hungary. This territory embraced the countries of Abauj, Bereh, Hajdu Dorog, Marmorosh, Sharysh, Satmar, Sabolch, Spish, Ugocha, Uzh, Zemplin. There are about 700,000 Ruthenians in the U.S.A. today.

later enlarged with the addition of representatives of the Czech political parties;

b) The first elections in Carpatho-Ukraine were held in 1924, whereupon elected representatives of the country entered the Prague parliament. Representatives of Carpatho-Ukraine never had a chance to vote for the constitution or to sign it.

3. The constitutional law regarding the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine of November 22, 1938, No. 328, whereby Czechoslovakia was transformed into a federative state of Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians (Ruthenians), was the first act in which Czechoslovakia showed its realization of its international and constitutional obligations regarding the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine. This act was the result of a 20-year Ukrainian struggle for the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine.

4. The proclamation of independence of Carpatho-Ukraine on March 14, 1939, was the result of prevailing political developments and specific conditions. It was not a cause of the fall of Czechoslovakia, as some would have it, but rather a result of it. Opponents of the Ukrainian independence cause are always trying to connect the freedom and independence aspirations of the Ukrainian people with alien and unpopular policies of other countries, in this case, with those of Hitler's Germany. It is plain enough that the government of Carpatho-Ukraine could not stop Hitler from using the Ukrainian liberation problem for his own political and strategical aims in the international arena. In fact, Carpatho-Ukraine itself fell victim to Hitler's strategy of aggression.

It is to be underscored that under the conditions prevailing in Central Europe in the fall of 1938 any other solution than a federation with Czechoslovakia would have been detrimental to Carpatho-Ukraine. Therefore, the government and its representative in Prague exerted maximal efforts for the preservation of the federation and the defense of its boundaries. In this lies the basic difference between the policies of the governments of Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia. The political interests of Carpatho-Ukraine were not parallel with those of some members of the Slovak government, a fact which was already evident in Prague in February, 1939, after the return of two Slovak ministers from Germany. The government of Slovakia never informed the government of Carpatho-Ukraine about its political objectives, and therefore to equate the governments of Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia in the matters of relations with Germany and the fall of Czechoslovakia could only signify gross ignorance if not of outright malice,

The proclamation of the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine was communicated by the representatives in Prague of Carpatho-Ukraine on March 14, 1939, to the embassies of the United States, England, Germany, France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Rumania. In the evening of the same day Premier Msgr. Augustine Voloshyn, in an address over the radio station in Hust, made public the proclamation of independence. The next day the Diet (*Soym*) of Carpatho-Ukraine ratified the proclamation, elected a president of the state and adopted a series of laws. Thus the proclamation of independence of Carpatho-Ukraine and the creation by Germany of the Protectorate of Czechia and Moravia brought about the following consequences:

- a) Abrogation of the Treaty of St. Germain;
- b) Abrogation of all existing state and juridical acts between Czechoslovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine;
- c) Emergence of completely new foundations for international juridical relations between the two lands.

The re-establishment of Czechoslovakia after World War II could not restore the previous juridical *status quo ante*, for involved were new partners, a new international juridical basis and new boundaries with a new constitution. Carpatho-Ukraine did not enter into the new Czechoslovak Republic.

The existence of the young Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic appeared undesirable for Germany and Hungary, and it menaced the USSR and Poland. Its strength lay not in great military forces, which it did not possess — but in the strength of the Ukrainian independence idea, which was more alive than ever and which could inflame the oppressed Ukrainian people on the Ukrainian lands occupied by Poland and the USSR.

As far back as the beginning of 1939 Stalin had been seeking an understanding with Hitler, with whom he sought to delineate the future roles in Europe for Moscow and Berlin. Stalin, who knew and understood the Ukrainian problem very well and who appreciated the vigor of Ukrainian nationalism, was eager to pay any price in order to divert Hitler from exploiting it for his own political objectives. As far back as 1937 two special emissaries of Stalin worked in Berlin along these lines, reporting directly to the Russian dictator. A hint of the secret Soviet-German understanding was given in Stalin's address at the XVIIIth congress of the Communist Party, held on March 10, 1939, in Moscow. Stalin castigated the American, British, and French press because it "was yelling out its throat to the effect that Germany will march into Soviet Ukraine." Stalin continued:

It looks as if the purpose of this suspicious cry is to push the Soviet Union against Germany, to create a special atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any cause whatsoever. They speak quite clearly and write black on white that the Germans had disappointed them because, instead of marching against the Soviet Union, they turned, you see, to the West and demand their colonies.

Thus a small country like Carpatho-Ukraine was dignified by considerable attention, and some of the cynical remarks of Stalin only confirm the thesis that the Ukrainian liberation problem brought Stalin and Hitler together. Molotov, then the Soviet Foreign Minister, at a reception honoring German guests, expressed gratification over the fact that "in Germany they had correctly understood the address of Stalin."^{2a})

In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall an incident involving the writer (then a representative of the government of Carpatho-Ukraine) in the first half of February, 1939, in Prague. One day, all the newspapers of the Czech capital that had carried articles on Ukraine, were confiscated by the government censor. Many editorial offices turned to this writer asking for enlightenment. The writer paid a call on a high official of the Prague government in charge of censorship. During the interview the official went to a safe and removed two documents. Without uttering a word, he showed them to the writer. They were diplomatic notes from the foreign ministries of Berlin and Moscow. The contents of these letters were strikingly similar: the tenor of both notes was that it was undersirable that "the press, in treating the subject of Carpatho-Ukraine, should write about the independence of Ukraine and accent the Ukrainian state, or in general to enhance the significance of Ukraine." Surprising though it may be, the two despotic dictators had found a common interest in suppressing the small flame of Ukrainian freedom flickering in Carpatho-Ukraine.

CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET TREATY CONCERNING CARPATHO-UKRAINE

The development of political events in Carpatho-Ukraine in 1938-1939 had a constitutional and international-juridical basis, not an arbitrary or a revolutionary one. The three-man government of Carpatho-Ukraine were also members of the central government in Prague, possessing their own constitutional basis as expressed in Constitutional Law No. 328 on the autonomy of the country. Un-

^{2a} J. V. Stalin: *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947, pp. 596-606.

derscoring the constitutionality of the state and the juridical position we conclude that the act of proclamation of independence itself was a constitutional act. In this sense, the President and the government of Carpatho-Ukraine became the highest spokesmen and representatives of freedom, of the political and national interests of the country.

The young Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic was attacked almost immediately by Hungary with the blessings of Hitler and Mussolini. The first chords of the cacophony of World War II sounded through the fields of Carpatho-Ukraine. As a result of aggression Carpatho-Ukraine was again occupied by Hungary; the occupation which was marked by great brutality, brought neither honor nor glory to Hungary, nor was it recognized by any state. It lasted from March, 1939, to October, 1944.

In concluding a treaty with the USSR with respect to Carpatho-Ukraine without the knowledge of the government of Carpatho-Ukraine, President Eduard Benes violated elementary canons of law and order.

Throughout the twenty-year period during which Carpatho-Ukraine belonged to Czechoslovakia there took place many discussions about the national character of the country. Despite many academic and historical proofs and the everyday reality itself that the Carpathian Ruthenians were a part of the Ukrainian nation and their land a part of the Ukrainian ethnographical and state territory, the Czech political centralist parties, notably the agrarian and the national-socialist party of Dr. Benes, stubbornly combatted this thesis, calling it Ukrainian irridentism, and officially supported the Russophile movement among the inhabitants of Carpatho-Ukraine. This struggle effectively poisoned the atmosphere between the Czechs and Ukrainians.

President Benes, upon entering into negotiations with the USSR in the matter of Carpatho-Ukraine, was not so much motivated by the constitution of his own state as he was by strategical and political reasons. He belonged to that category of statesmen who welcomed the Soviet influence in Central Europe as a counterpoise against Germany, and so guided, he conducted his policy consistently. In this respect, it would be opportune to recall some of his statements which refer back to 1918:

Dr. Benes explained that as far back as in 1918 both he and President Masaryk regarded Czechoslovakia as a trustee of Ruthenia and were willing to relinquish this trusteeship when the Ukrainian people became nationally

united. This occurred when Eastern Galicia was absorbed into the Soviet Ukraine.³

It is quite apparent that the treaty between Benes and Stalin was not an act of coercion or violence, but rather an act of free will, one of a feeling of duty that was felt back in 1918. Nor was it an accidental nor a provisional political act on the part of Dr. Benes, as he himself writes:

On September 19, 1939, Maisky returned my visit at my Putney home and we again discussed events of the preceding four dramatic weeks. I said (Benes): "After this new war we must be neighbors of the Soviet Union directly and permanently. For us this is one of the lessons of Munich! The question of Subcarpathian Ruthenia will be solved between us later and we surely will agree..." Maisky answered me that it certainly would be the aim of the Soviet Union to establish itself somewhere on the line of our Slovak frontier because it was already concerned about what Germany, Poland and Hungary might do later.⁴

Thus, Carpatho-Ukraine, by virtue of its important strategic and geographic position, had become for a second time a political bridge for the state interests of Czechoslovakia: during the time of the first Czechoslovak Republic it had constituted a bridge to the Little *Entente*; now it was one to the USSR.

Despite the fact that Benes concluded this treaty with the USSR without the knowledge and agreement of the government of Carpatho-Ukraine, this treaty of June 29, 1945 possesses all the attributes of an international treaty. It was ratified by the Czechoslovak Parliament; its ratification was confirmed by President Benes and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk; the exchange of ratification documents took place in Prague on January 30, 1946. To be stressed is the fact that in the voting on the agreement in the Prague Parliament not a single opposing vote was cast. Moreover, not a single person abstained from voting. Furthermore, in accordance with the constitution of Czechoslovakia, only those international accords have legal internal validity which are published in the official gazette; the agreement in question was entered in the official gazette on October 21, 1946, under No. 186, Collection of Laws and Decrees, thereby acquiring valid internal force. If we are to attach significance to the declaration of former members of the Czechoslovak government who today figure as members of the Council of Free

³ Dr. E. Benes, "Postwar Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24, 1945-1946, pp. 397-398.

⁴ *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes*, p. 1939.

Czechoslovakia to the effect that all decisions and decrees of the Prague government enacted prior to February, 1948 (at which time the Communists seized power) were expressions of the free will of the government and the population, then by the same token this agreement must also be viewed as a case of the free expression of the will of the government and population.

On the occasion of the ratification of the treaty there were many speeches in the Prague Parliament which expressed gratification that those Ukrainians formerly citizens of Czechoslovakia would now be part of their fatherland, Ukraine. A prominent leader of the National-Socialist Party (the party of Dr. Benes) declared in the Parliament on December 2, 1946, that this decision is not regretted by the Czechs and never will be.

Stalin never ceased to be interested in Carpatho-Ukraine. He knew well that if it remained within Czechoslovakia, it would mean a free development of Ukrainian national thought which would inevitably generate a drive in the free world towards a free and independent Ukrainian state. In addition, Carpatho-Ukraine was the only bridge through which Stalin could expand Soviet Russian influence and, indeed, his empire, into Central Europe.

Under the guise of "spokesman" and "defender" of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine, Stalin wrote to Benes on January 23, 1945:

The Soviet Government has not forbidden and could not have forbidden the population of Subcarpathian Ukraine to express their national will. And this is even more comprehensible as you yourself have told me in Moscow that you are prepared to cede Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. As you will certainly remember, at that time I did not give my consent to it.⁵

At that time Benes and his government were in England. The war was approaching its end and there was no doubt as to its outcome. Benes had ample opportunity to rectify the statement by Stalin regarding their talks on Carpatho-Ukraine. Benes concluded a pact of friendship with the USSR in 1943, placing his wager entirely on the Russian card. He believed in the sincerity of the Soviet Union as much as he trusted his own political genius (and, apparently, he had no qualms about *that*). His own words best attest to the enthusiasm with which he went to and returned from Moscow. Over the Moscow radio he said:

⁵ Maxim Litvinov, *Notes for a Journal*, New York, 1955, p. 173.

This moment is one of the greatest in my political activity and my political life.⁶

In his answer to Stalin on January 28, 1945, he wrote:

Nevertheless, I assure you most emphatically, Mr. Chairman, that neither I personally nor the Czechoslovak Government has for a moment suspected that the Soviet Government desired to solve the question of Subcarpathian Ukraine unilaterally or had the intention of violating the agreement between our two states. I am thoroughly acquainted with the principles of the policy of the Soviet Union and I know that such action on their part can be definitely excluded. I therefore beg you to believe my words.⁷

We have presented some salient facts which unequivocally illustrate the causes, method and form of the incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR and the role of the Czechoslovak government and of President Benes especially. Stalin took full advantage of the military situation and of the hope in him which Benes, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and the entire Czech people placed. One can only be bemused by the inconsequentiality of the members of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia who, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Carpatho-Ukraine's incorporation into the Ukrainian SSR, adopted in the U.S.A. the following resolution:

The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, which, in addition to the Czechs and Slovaks, also represents the Carpathian Ruthenians, on the occasion of the above-mentioned sad events and in accordance with its program underscores that "it does not recognize the separation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which occurred against the will of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and upon the demand and pressure of the Soviet Union..."

In view of the cited facts, such a statement is puzzling indeed if we take into consideration that almost all members of the present-day Council of Free Czechoslovakia were at that time members of the Prague Parliament or members of the government, and had voted for the incorporation. Benes and the Czechs firmly believed in Moscow, signed solemn treaties with it and refused to countenance even theoretically any possibility of their violation by Moscow. Even now they lack the courage to admit that they had been hood-winked by the Russians.

We are still in the dark as the motives which in January, 1944, led President Benes to order the leaders of the Czechoslovak under-

⁶ Miloslav J. Boucek: *Ceskoslovenska tragedia* (The Czechoslovak Tragedy), Germany, 1956, p. 151.

⁷ Litvinov, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

ground organization in Czechoslovakia to make contact with the Carpathian Ukrainians. According to his instructions from London, a representative of the Czechoslovak underground visited the writer, to whom he transmitted material in written and oral form. Its gist was that President Benes and the Czechoslovak government-in-exile wish to enter into contact with the Carpatho-Ukrainians, that they had a sad experience with the local Russophiles (the so-called Russophile trend), and that the Ukrainian national movement has proved itself strong and healthy, is well organized, is backed by the people and resists the Hungarian occupation. After a prompt verification through Radio London and after three talks with a representative of the underground, the writer cooperated. The latter also added that his political actions would be conducted with the full understanding of the members of the government of Carpatho-Ukraine, which supported the plan.

In April, 1944, the writer submitted a memorandum specifying the following demands:

United by fate and the will of the Ukrainian people in Carpatho-Ukraine in 1919 and in bringing at this time our mutual national interests together, we in principle agree with your appeal for cooperation provided you honor the following demands:

1) The constitutional law of November 22, 1938 (No. 328) on the autonomy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to remain valid in all its ramifications and in the future to serve as a basis for the state and juridical relations of Carpatho-Ukraine;

2) The juridical relations of Carpatho-Ukraine in economic and social matters to be analogous with those of Slovakia, especially in the matter of national treasures;

3) As soon as the power in the liberated territory of Carpatho-Ukraine is turned over to a representative of the allied armies, he shall have an adviser, proposed by us, from the local Ukrainian population;

4) An announcement of the principle that the present-day Czechoslovak government-in-exile now and in the future cease supporting the so-called Russophile trend, which is hostile to the state and to our common interests, and that the government rely on the Ukrainian population exclusively.

The memorandum was prepared in the Ukrainian and Slovak languages. It was transmitted to London, where it was acknowledged. The memorandum, however, was not acted upon politically by the Czechoslovak government, and we shall not dwell here on the reasons why. For the record, however, we should like to state that this was the sole case of an effort by President Benes and his government-in-exile to establish contact with the Carpatho-Ukrainians.

Eventually, President Benes and the Czechoslovak government decided to tie their political fate with that of the new partner, the Soviet Union. In it they saw better and surer guarantees than any the western democracies could offer. Such a decision on the part of President Benes was not dictated by World War II alone. A curious episode took place when he was elected President of Czechoslovakia on December 18, 1935: it was the first time that the Communists had failed to put up their own candidate for president. Gottwald and Kopecky, both leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, were *en route* from Moscow, whence they had fled the previous year. During the presidential elections of April 24, 1934, the Communist Party ran Gottwald against Masaryk, and its propaganda slogan in Prague was: "Not Masaryk, but Lenin." Facing arrest and trial for high treason, both Gottwald and Kopecky escaped to Moscow. After his election to the presidency, Benes pardoned them.

Today, Carpatho-Ukraine is united with the Ukrainian mainland, Ukraine, which is not a free and sovereign state, but like the Ukrainian SSR, a captive nation in the system of the USSR. It has shared the lot of the entire Ukrainian people for almost a quarter of a century. In this connection, the future role of a free and independent Ukrainian state in Central Europe and in the Danube basin has undergone considerable changes.

SIGNIFICANCE OF INCLUSION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE IN THE UKRAINIAN SSR

Ukraine occupies a key strategic and economic position in Central and Eastern Europe. Through its steppes in the course of long centuries passed the Asiatic hordes on their way deep into the European continent, and it was mainly Ukraine that served as a barrier, being bled white in the process. In modern history two great world wars were waged in Ukraine, in part for its territory and its wealth. This demonstrates the exceptional strategic significance in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean area that Ukraine, by its very situation, possesses. Both world wars exposed the existence of two aggressors in Central and Eastern Europe: the Germans with their *Drang nach Osten* and the Russians with their *Drang nach Westen*. Each of these aggressors tried to secure for himself domination over Ukraine, because such was indispensable in securing his position in this area.

At a time when mankind is trying at all costs to remove all causes of conflict and to secure a permanent peace, in Central and

Eastern Europe the basis for such peace exists through the weakening of the two aggressors by full and unstinting support of the creation of a free and independent Ukrainian state. The establishment of such a Ukrainian state would permanently remove the perennial causes of aggression which have turned Ukraine into a springboard for imperialistic and aggressive designs. A strong Ukrainian state could not but induce a new balance of power, and jointly with the neighboring states Ukraine could help establish a powerful bloc that would hamstring German aggression to the East and Russian expansion to the West. History has shown that the so-called *cordon sanitaire*, although well conceived after World War I, was too weak to resist these aggressive powers. The final rearrangement of the Central and Eastern European area is also dependent on whether its inhabitants will properly understand the role which history offers. The validity of this theory is perhaps best exemplified by Poland. Polish historians often repeat a thesis about the "fourth partition" of Poland, but neglect to mention that before each partition Poland had concluded a treaty with Germany and at each partition Moscow always managed to find a common language with Berlin.

To a certain extent the conflict and misunderstandings between peoples in this area were due to the fact that each of these peoples had its own prime enemy. The peoples enslaved by Russia, for example, came to regard Germany as a possible ally in their struggle against Moscow; similarly, those dominated or threatened by Germany sought support and assistance in Moscow. World War II simplified things: there occurred a sort of "exchange of enemies." This development contributed considerably to mutual understanding and respect among these victimized nations.

The presence of a free Ukraine in Central Europe would strengthen also the position of Austria, would diminish the possibility of a new *Anschluss*, and would prevent the establishment of a common German-Hungarian boundary line.

Through Carpatho-Ukraine the Ukrainian independent state would have a certain influence on the maintenance of freedom and order in the Danube basin. Throughout the centuries the Danube basin was a point of departure of German aggression against the Balkans, Poland, and Ukraine, that is, Eastern Europe. When Napoleon embarked on his ill-fated campaign against Russia, he secured his positions in the Danube basin with the Treaty of Pressburg in 1805. Also, Hitler, in his march to the east of Europe, followed the example of Charlemagne, who some 1100 years ago occupied Czechia and

Moravia and subordinated Western Hungary by creating the Eastern Marchia. Hitler seized Austria (*Anschluss*) and occupied Czechoslovakia in order to secure his hinterland.

Therefore, the concept of the Danube basin and the creation of certain blocs from among the Danube nations is still very much alive today. Through it initiators of such blocs, such as the Hungarians, are trying to strengthen the position of Hungary and to expand their political role on the territories which once belonged to the Crown of St. Stephen. The Czechs also are interested in this problem, and they, like the Hungarians, recognize the strategic significance of Carpatho-Ukraine and endeavor to include it in the scheme of a Danubian federation as a territorial unit, separated from Ukraine, as if it were an orphan.

Through the Killian Gap, through which the Danube falls into the Black Sea, Ukraine belongs to the so-called riparian states. This fact strengthens the significance of Ukraine as a Danube power and certainly entitles it to a voice in decision-making policies regarding this area. (This should not escape the attention of Ukrainian statesmen.)

Peace and stabilization of national and political relations in Europe is possible only with the neutralization of the threat of Soviet Russian and German aggression, which contributed to the outbreak of World Wars I and II and which wreaked such havoc in the world, especially in Ukraine. Neutralization can be attained only with the establishment and strengthening of a free and independent Ukrainian state, which, along with neighboring nations, could constitute both bulwark and counterpoise. The role of Carpatho-Ukraine here is self-evident.

Ukraine must of necessity develop its own political concept and define its own role and significance in the family of free peoples. From the perspective of historical relationships among the nations, Ukraine must advance new ideas, seek new forms of cooperation and find amity and support in the world for a final balance of power. The present era provides a good foundation for such initiative, especially after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the USSR and its communist allies. Given the proverb that "history is a good teacher of life," it is plain that the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe have not learned much as yet.

If the nations of this important part of Europe would live in peace and freedom, the lessons of history must be learned and utilized.

UKRAINIAN ELEMENTS IN MYKOLA HOHOL'S "TARAS BULBA"*

By OSTAP STROMECKY

In treating of the Ukrainian elements in Hohol's *Taras Bulba*, this article seeks to educe where, why and how the author uses a linguistic mixture of Russian and Ukrainian.

Although a fictional work, *Taras Bulba* is based on the Kozak struggle against Polish domination. Since the action of the story takes place in Ukraine, Hohol employs Ukrainian phraseology in order to render the scenes more realistically. The whole of the story is a mixture of romanticism, realism and surrealism. Realism is most prominent when Hohol describes the Kozak traditions of the *Sich* (fortress) and the Kozaks in battle. (The word "Syech" is spelled and pronounced in Russian whenever the author speaks in the story. However, in the dialogue of the Kozaks, the word is spelled and pronounced in Ukrainian, "*Sich*.")

Hohol's early works, which include *Taras Bulba*, were based on a rich background of Ukrainian folklore. Consciously, or unconsciously in many instances, the texture of his language is heavily interwoven with Ukrainian words, phrases, melodiousness.

His early literary output was influenced by such Ukrainian writers as I. Kotlyarevsky, P. Hulak-Artemovsky and, to some extent, V. Hohol. M. Hohol took much of his information from *Istoriia Rusov*, which circulated throughout Ukraine in the form of handwritten copies and which was published later (in 1846) in Moscow.

Taras Bulba may be divided into two distinct parts. The first part, consisting of chapters 1 up to 11 and chapter 12, is more alive, more artistic and more poetic than the second part. In these chapters Hohol makes a broader use of the musical and phonetic effects of Ukrainian folklore, imparting charm and melodiousness to the story. (It is noteworthy that the Kozaks speak of themselves in the plural "we," conveying an aura of unselfish pride and comradeship that is foreign to the Polish invaders of the second part, who refer

*) Gogol — is the Russian spelling of the famous author's name; in Ukrainian he is known as "Hohol."

to themselves in the singular "I.") In the second part, which consists of chapter 11 alone, Hohol leaves Ukraine and her rich folklore behind. Without the folklore, the descriptions of Poland are often overstylized, even grotesque. In chapter 12, Hohol returns to Ukraine and its folklore. The element of grotesqueness disappears and the story again acquires the beauty of Hohol's melodious style.

By tracing Hohol's literary path, it is not difficult to realize that his writing of stories with Ukrainian backgrounds, like *Evenings on a Farm Near Dikanka* and the longer stories of *Mirgorod*, was almost an inevitability.

As with many a writer, his first literary attempt was a total failure. The poem "Gans Kukhelgarten," published in 1829 under the pseudonym "A. Alov," met with unfavorable criticism in the *Moscow Telegraph* and *Severnaia Pchela*. In frustration, he collected all the copies of his first published work and destroyed them.

His unsuccessful poem behind him, Hohol realized that it would be easier for him to write about the more familiar environment of the Ukrainian countryside, and so turned to Ukrainian folklore for thematic resources. As early as April 30, 1829, he wrote to his mother to send him material on Ukrainian customs, dress, and village life:

...and a more thorough description of wedding customs not omitting the smallest detail. You can ask Demian about this (it seems he is called so — I don't remember his exact name), whom we saw acting as master of ceremonies at weddings, and who seemed to know all possible beliefs and customs. Also send a few words about Christmas carols, and about Ivan Kupalo and about mermaids. And, if there are besides these, any kind of ghosts, send minute details about them with their names and deeds. A multitude of superstitions are extant among the common people, along with ancient maxims, legends, anecdotes, etc. All of this will be extraordinarily interesting to me...

There was nothing new, however, in his interest in the details and customs of the countryside. While still a student in Nizhyn, he had begun to collect folksongs, sayings, historical documents, and descriptions of meals and folk garb. These materials were entered by hand in his personal notebook. A modern Russian literary critic, N. Stepanov, writes:

There was written on the first page: 'The Book of All Sorts of Things or Handy Encyclopedia,' with the note: 'Begun in Nizhyn in the year 1826.' In this 'Encyclopedia,' Ukrainian songs and poems were copied in Hohol's own hand along with 'The Zaporozhian Sayings to Hetman Potemkin,' parts from the 'Eneida' of Kotlyarevsky, sayings and proverbs, folk customs and foods, descriptions of peasant beliefs and wedding customs.

Later, when Hohol had become an established writer, his interest turned to history, especially to the heroic past of the Ukrainian Kozaks. He planned to write a history of Ukraine; however, he never accomplished this.

In 1834, Hohol was appointed a Professor of History in Petersburg University. In the beginning, he took his position seriously, but it was not long before his interest ebbed, and he left his pedagogical career. One consequence of this occupation were several articles on historical themes. One of these articles, "About Ukrainian Songs," spelled out the importance and the value of these songs for historians:

In this relationship, the songs are everything for Ukraine; its poetry, its history, and its father's grave. The historian should not look for an indication of the date or the number of the battle or the location, or exact reality. In this relation, not many songs will help him. However, if he wants to learn of the true mode of life of the characters, all curves and shades of feeling, agitations, sufferings, and happinesses which represent the nation; if he wants to learn of the spirit of the past century, the general character of the whole, and of every part, then he will be satisfied completely. The history of the nation will be revealed to him in a clear gloriousness... The Ukrainian songs can be called truly historical songs because they don't withdraw for a single moment from life, and they are always true to the circumstances and feelings of that moment in time. They are everywhere infused with the sense of boundless will found in Kozak life. Everywhere there is seen that strength, that happiness, that sense of glory with which the Kozak leaves his secure domestic life so that he may incorporate himself completely into the poetry of battle — all dangers and the playful feast with his comrades.

By that time Hohol had amassed a large collection of historical materials. On March 6, 1834, he wrote to I. I. Sreznevsky: "You are correct, both of us need the materials." Here he speaks about the materials on Ukrainian folklore and historical events:

And in case your book becomes history, even then we would not become competitors. I'm glad about everything that appears about our country. And should I learn that at this moment someone is preparing a *History of Ukraine*, I would stop my publication until his work was sold out. The more publications on this subject the better it is for me, for by this my history will be more complete. You have done a great service for me by publishing *Zaporozhkaia Starina*. Where did you dig out so many treasures? All the *dumas*, and especially the *bandurists'* stories are blindingly beautiful. I only knew five of them, the others are new to me. I'm not pleased with the Polish historians, they speak very little about these events. If the Crimeans and the Turks had literature, I'm certain that not a single independent nation in the Europe of that time would have such an interesting history as that of the Kozaks... Of all the materials mentioned by you in the *Zaporozhkaia Starina*,

there were two which were not known to me... *Prostrannaia povest ob Ukraine do smerti Khmelnytskogo*. The title of this handwritten copy appeared to be unknown to me. Inform me whether there is anything new in contrast to the *Chronicles* of Konisky, Shafonsky, or Rigelman? If I should be so lucky and there should be something new, then I will hope for your indulgence and shall ask you to send it to me in whole. Then I can find in it things which have remained undiscovered by others or things that seemed unimportant to others, which has frequently happened to me... The reason I didn't signify the kind of material I possess was because I know that then I wouldn't receive so many copies. I possess almost all those printed ones which were used by Bantysh-Kamensky. I know and have very many songs. Last year I gave about one hundred and fifty songs to Maksymovych which were totally unknown to him. Afterwards, I gathered one hundred and fifty more. Maksymovych already has twelve hundred songs. But I am throwing myself into the search for any kind of song. It is now possible to find on every estate away from the main road and depravity, a score of songs unknown to neighboring estates.

This letter suggests that his collections of materials concerning Ukraine's past was probably one of the largest extant.

Before completing his first edition of *Taras Bulba* in 1835, Hohol wrote several historical stories concerned with the past of Kozak Ukraine. In 1831, he produced the story *Hetman*, in 1834, the story *Krovavyi Bandurist*, which was later renamed *Plennik*, and some fragments for the *History of Ukraine* which he was planning to write in six small or four large volumes. A modern literary critic, V. Zhdanov, writes:

Gogol's deep interest in history brought him to attempt to publish a large work about the history of Ukraine. This work remained incomplete, only a few fragments were saved from it, but from the "Announcement of the Publishing of the *History of Ukraine*," written by Gogol in 1834 in several newspapers, we know what objective the author had in view. He was trying to show how the Kozak nation was educated... This objective Gogol achieved in the story *Taras Bulba*.

Using some of the materials from the aforementioned works, Hohol wrote *Taras Bulba*. In 1835, this work was included in the collection *Mirgorod*. Hohol called *Mirgorod* a continuation of *Evenings on a Farm Near Dikanka*.

The first edition of *Bulba* was much smaller than the second one in 1842. It had only nine chapters and about sixty-five pages. The second version consisted of twelve chapters and, with 120 pages, was almost twice as long. Hohol had worked periodically on the second version for seven years. In this version, he used a much greater amount of historical and descriptive details and relied heavily

on folklore. The descriptive scenes and the psychology of the characters are sharper and surer. The presentation of heroes — especially of Bulba himself — received more natural characteristics of the Kozak of the era as a defender of the land, a husband, and a father.

The evolution of Hohol's style can be noted clearly in his early works. In *Evenings on a Farm Near Dikanka*, Hohol presents two generations that differ noticeably. The older generation is depicted as extremely backward, comical and primitive; full of superstition and prejudice. To this generation belong the characters, Cherevyk, Khyvria, Chub, and Solokha.

To the second generation, more serious and quieter, belong the young people whose thoughts and concern about the life of the past and the future have a maturing effect on them. To them, the past is the heroic life of the Ukrainian Kozaks. They look toward their future more realistically than their parents. The fantastic world in which their parents have lived gradually becomes obsolete in their minds.

Hohol's stories written after the completion of *Evenings* became progressively more serious. With each new story, the treatment achieves new earnestness and depth. The early characters with their pots and pans, their peasant garb, and their superstitions are replaced by young, strong Kozaks with their weapons and their devoted, faithful wives. The Cherevyks and Chubs give way to Ostrianytsia in *Hetman*, Danylo in *Terrible Vengeance*, and Taras, Ostap, and Andrei in *Taras Bulba*.

A Russian literary critic, V.F. Pereverzev writes:

The scenes and attitudes of mind of Gogol's surroundings poured through his soul purely through a literary channel, through the Kozak *dumas* and songs, the legends of old Ukraine, and finally, through a knowledge of the history of the Ukrainian people... the influence of these surroundings on the creative genius of Gogol was without a doubt most important. We know that the native surroundings where he was born and grew up were close to him.

Hohol's style cannot be compared with any other writer of his time. It is extremely readable and lively. It is melodious and poetic. In analyzing his style in *Taras Bulba*, one senses immediately that here is something new in prose writing. The passages in *Bulba* sound, one after another, like musical *bandura* chords, beguiling the reader into unconscious submission to the rhythm. Especially melodious and rhythmic are the lyrical digressions in which Hohol turns to folklore. Particularly moving are the speeches of dying Kozaks.

When describing battle, Hohol diverts the reader's attention from the fighting by introducing the thoughts of a Kozak before his parting from his soul. In most cases in his narrative, the Kozak's death is deliberately delayed by the author in order to stress the importance of the individual. In Hohol's *Taras Bulba*, Kozaks do not die in depersonalized crowds, like the Poles; they die as individualized heroes.

One of the longest lyrical digressions is accorded the dying Kozak, Kukubenko. The passage reads:

Kukubenko looked around and said, 'I thank God that I've had the good fortune to die before your eyes, dear friends! May men have a happier life after us, and may our land, dearly beloved of Christ, flourish forever and ever!' And the young soul flew out of the body and the angels received it in their arms and carried it into heaven: it will be well with him there. 'Sit on my right hand, Kukubenko,' Christ will say to him. 'You've not been false to your brotherhood; you have been guilty of no dishonorable deed; you have never deserted a man in trouble; you have always guarded and preserved My Church.'

Hohol, further, makes wide use of autology, which is heavily employed in folk poetry, especially in the Ukrainian *dumas*, historical songs, and love songs. Repeated words and phrases are especially noticeable in *Bulba*.

It is not a simple matter to pinpoint Hohol's style. It changes perceptibly in almost each one of his works. In *Bulba* it can be summarized as one in which folklore, melodious and poetic, finds wide usage, one in which Ukrainian words, phrases, and grammatical structure is incorporated into the Russian language.

In scrutinizing *Bulba*, it is difficult to believe that during his work on this masterpiece, Hohol was always thinking in Russian. Very probably, his thoughts returned to his early environment, and though he expresses himself in Russian, his thought patterns are basically Ukrainian. The following Ukrainian phrases and words never left Hohol, no matter how hard he fought to erase them; they recur time after time throughout his entire literary career:

Smutno stoialy (sadly stood) is an expression that would only be used by Ukrainians. *Smutno na sertziu* (sadly on the heart), *smutnenko khodyla* (sadly she walked — diminutive form of "sad"), *porospivalys*, *popadaiut*, *porubaty*, *povlizaly*, *postrilialy*, *vyznachuvallys*, and phrases like *chudno* — *dyvno*, etc., are expressions used only by Ukrainians. These and many other examples of Ukrainianisms are interwoven throughout Hohol's works creating the major

linguistic factor of Hohol's style in *Taras Bulba*. Professor Mandelshtam writes:

Gogol always preserved a corner where no one was permitted to intrude, where he lived only the life of a Ukrainian; he felt much freer here, spontaneously truthful — and artistically inspired.

We are convinced that during the direction of his thoughts toward Ukraine, his language transforms and then it becomes purely Gogolian.

The Ukrainianisms are clearly noticeable when the reader who is familiar with the Ukrainian language becomes acquainted with the names of the various Kozaks in the story. Most Ukrainian names end with "ko," and this is evident in the naming of Hohol's Kozaks.

The word *chudno* (wonderful) is one of Hohol's favorite words. He employs it very often for describing various things; *chudno-novo-prekrasno*; *chudno virno*; *chudno lubo*; *chudna-dusha*; *chudne-dilo*; *khto-to chudno*; *strashno-chudno*; *chudno-pyshno*. Even though the word *chudno* has the same meaning in Russian as in Ukrainian, the manner in which Hohol uses it is typically Ukrainian. A Russian would not express himself in the same way as did Hohol in the aforementioned word-combinations.

On the average, there are nine Ukrainian words per page in *Taras Bulba*. Some of these words appear two or three times per page. In the edition of *Taras Bulba* which the writer has used, the story consists of 120 pages in which he counted 1,085 Ukrainian words in use.

Naturally, it is the dialogue of the Kozaks and quotations from the *dumas* in translation that are more heavily penetrated with Ukrainian words, thoughts, and grammatical structure.

In analyzing *Taras Bulba*, it is not always possible to determine when, and in which language, he originally conceived his sentences. In many cases, he takes a Russian thought or passage and puts it into Ukrainian grammatical structure or orthography, or vice-versa. In order to avoid the obviousness of his manipulations, many times he executes them so skillfully that only through very careful analysis can a bilingualist, sensitive to both the Ukrainian and Russian languages, identify the language. But there are some instances so carefully camouflaged that they defy analysis.

The historical song, "Oi na hori tam zhenci zhnut," is thoroughly exploited by Hohol. After close and careful study, one can see the workings of Hohol's genius in using a small historical song to build the framework for his masterpiece *Taras Bulba* almost in its entirety.

In the song, *Hetman Sahaidachny* trades his wife for tobacco

and pipe. This shows the traditional unimportance of women in a Kozak's life. As the *Hetman* treats his wife, Hohol wants Taras to treat his own.

After she had borne him two strong sons, she had done her duty. The troubled times that have descended on his native land do not allow a Kozak any time to develop into a tender husband and a loving father. Hohol begins his story with the dramatic departure of Taras and his sons for the *Sich* where they feel they are needed — leaving behind their wife and mother. The *lulka* (pipe) of Taras is a symbolic substitution for his wife. His concern for his pipe is so great that when he misses it during the final battle, he returns for it. This all but foolhardy act leads to his capture and his execution by being burned alive while tied high in a tree.

"Beyond the wide valley the Kozaks are riding," reads a passage in the song. For the "wide valley" Hohol substitutes a wide river toward which Bulba directs his Kozaks as the angry flames are sealing his fate. To the very end he remains true to his principle: "One for all and all for one."

The word *neobachny* stands by itself in the song. Thus Taras, in a crucial moment, became *neobachny* (careless) and lost his pipe. (Again, the pipe represents his wife whom he loves deeply even though the circumstances and manners of the times do not permit him to show it.)

Three major personalities are mentioned in the song: Doroshenko, Khorunzhy, and Sahaidachny. In *Bulba*, there are three major personalities in the *Sich*: the one who is called *Koshovy* upon the arrival of Taras and his sons, *Koshovy Kirdiaga*, who is elected through the machinations of Taras, and Taras Bulba himself. There are also three major personalities in the story — Taras, Andrei, and Ostap. The number three is very common in all folklore; its commonness indicates a certain symbolism which is not the subject of this article, although its repeated use in *Taras Bulba* is evidence of the folk sources from which Hohol drew his material.

The line from the song, "hey khto v lisi ozovysia" (whoever is in the forest, reveal yourself by shouting), is reworked by Hohol to suit his purposes. He replaces the *lis* (forest) with the single lightning-damaged tree on which Taras is crucified and burned. The word *ozovysia* (reveal yourself by shouting), Hohol represents as the call by which Taras directed his Kozaks to safety.

The phrase *Oi na hori tam zhenci zhnut* (Upon the hill, the harvesters are reaping), is reconstructed by Hohol as follows: The execution of Taras takes place upon a high hill so that everyone

can witness this horrible death. The word *zhnut* (reap) indicates the sheaf of dry branches and grass used as fuel for the burning of Taras Bulba; and applies to his son Andrei also, who was cut down by his father's bullet as wheat by a sickle. The line *Ta vykre-shem ohniu* (and we'll kindle the fire) is used by Hohol as the fire which burns Taras. The last phrase of the song, *Nezhurysia* (don't worry) is used to describe the character of Taras. He is not afraid to die, nor is he unduly concerned with his own fate. His concern is for the safety of his Kozaks. Here are projected the principles of brotherhood and comradeship with which all Kozaks were blessed.

Hohol's character Andrei is based on the song, *Oi buv u Sichi staryi kozak*.

In the plot of the song, the young Kozak, Sava, leaves his father and betrays the Kozaks for a comfortable married life in Poland. Under the leadership of Hnat Holyi, the Brotherhood assembles to pass judgment on Sava for his betrayal. After his capture, he pleads for mercy. He is forgiven and permitted to join the Brotherhood in battle. Afterward, they thank him for proving himself a good knight. Sava's father, however, did not attend the meeting at which judgment was passed on Sava; his fatherly love transcended patriotism and loyalty to the Brotherhood.

In *Bulba* the situation is somewhat different. Andrei does not betray his people for gross materialistic benefits. Instead, he falls in love with a beautiful Polish girl; her beauty bewitches him. Here Hohol, as at many points throughout his work, shows his distrust of women, whom he treats as instruments of evil. Andrei, who is very sensitive and who recognizes beauty in nature and art as well as in women, becomes a victim with no retreat. In contrary fashion to Sava's father, Taras does not allow fatherly love to overcome his duty, and he executes Andrei.

The three names, Taras, Ostap, and Andrei, are carefully selected by Hohol. They are his instruments of psychological play. Hohol uses the symbolic number three and divides it into two uneven parts; two and one. The first two names, Taras and Ostap, are found repeatedly throughout Ukrainian folklore and represent characters of fidelity. They must remain faithful to their cause until death. They could not become traitors; they are typical Ukrainian names. However, the name Andrei, like the name Sava, is not typically Ukrainian. Not being endowed with this peculiarity, he can and does become a traitor.

Thirty *dumas* and folksongs are utilized by Hohol in *Bulba*.

Hohol's reading of *Istoriia Rusov* gave him the pattern for the name, Taras Bulba. He based it on the hero *Hetman* Taras Triasylo (1624-1632), whose victories over the Poles were popularized in an heroic *duma* entitled "Tarasova Nich." Numerous passages, descriptions and battle scenes were taken by Hohol almost *in toto* from *Istoriia Rusov*.

The master of travesty and the founder of modern Ukrainian literature in the vernacular was Ivan Kotlyarevsky, whose literary devices were frequently adopted by Hohol in establishing his own unique style.

Kotlyarevsky chose for his work the subject matter of Virgil's *Aeneid*, traditional material for travesties. His creativeness enabled him in his work to make use of ethnographic material, to enrich the language by abundant use of synonyms for concrete conceptions, and to bring the jargon of seminarians, cantors, drunkards, thieves and others into popular use.

Hohol also uses a mixture of two languages in *Bulba* in order to achieve a melodious style. The difference lies in the fact that Hohol's intent was serious, whereas Kotlyarevsky sought the comical.

Kotlyarevsky's language and range was very wide because he created new words, taking full advantage of poetic license. Along with simple vocabulary, he created onomatopoeic words for which he introduced a separate explicator. Hohol also furnishes an explicator for those who do not understand the language. Similarly, Hohol creates new Russian words by using Ukrainian cognates in order to create the effects he desires.

Kotlyarevsky's *Eneida* had a specific meaning for Hohol. Kotlyarevsky's heroic but humorous descriptions of both gods and people, along with his general optimistic outlook on the world, influenced Hohol greatly.

In the clever and living burlesque of Kotlyarevsky, there is clearly described Aeneas with his Trojans — a proud and brave brotherhood. Humor is intermingled with heroism. Irony changes to pathos and sometimes to lyricism during the adventures of the Trojan Zaporozhians.

Kotlyarevsky's vulgarisms are especially created to describe things or persons who are not to his liking. Thus, he called Juno the "daughter of a bitch" and Hecuba "shrewd as a devil." Later, we find in Chapter VI of *Eneida* Hecuba being called "a loud bitch." Toward Aeneas and the Trojans, on the other hand, Kotlyarevsky displays sympathy, treating them as brave Kozaks. This is similar

to Hohol's treatment of women as creatures of evil and the opposite, virtuous treatment of the Kozaks as faithful and stalwart.

In *Confessions*, Hohol wrote that his early works, full of light and joyful scenes, were devised to entertain himself. This lightness disappeared together with his early years. Also, in the first chapters of *Eneida*, Kotlyarevsky's purpose is to incite laughter, but in later chapters, a different kind of laughter is elicited. Not an empty laughter where one human simply brays at another, but a laughter that is born of love for the other person. With this kind of laughter, Kotlyarevsky differed from other representatives of burlesque literature. Hohol's, too, is a sympathetic laughter:

Wait! Wait! Let me have a good look at you, Taras went on, turning them round. "Just look at their long coats! What coats! I'm sure you won't find such coats anywhere in the world! Now then, one of you, run across the yard, will you? I bet you get all tangled up in your skirts and fall sprawling to the ground!

Most of the works of Hohol abound in numerous examples and comparisons with the work of Kotlyarevsky — showing the definite influence on Hohol. However, the classic *Taras Bulba* is singularly devoid of such instances: it was not intended as a burlesque, but by and large as an account of the Kozak traits of brotherhood and loyalty.

In summary, it may be stated that Hohol was one of the first writers in Russian who was able to cross the boundaries imposed by the limitations of the literary language of Russia. To Russian literature he brought the literary humor and language of Ukraine.

Time has shown that those critics who have attacked Hohol's language as being incorrect and, in some cases, vulgar from a literary standpoint, obviously have not been aware of the value of a living language which, in order to maintain its virility, must remain flexible and reflect the spirit, as well as the intellect, of those who speak it.

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THE THREE CIRCLES OF COMMUNISM

By STEFAN T. POSSONY

Part III: Stalin's Supreme Crime

(CONTINUED)

Motto: "There is one eternally true legend, that of Judas."
Joseph V. Stalin to Lion Feuchtwanger

The pact which Stalin concluded with Hitler in 1939 resulted in the partition of Eastern Europe between the two dictatorships. This pact provoked World War II and proved to be the condition and, to some extent, the proximate cause of the expansion of communism between 1939 and 1949. Communists and leftists prefer not to mention this most monstrous strategic maneuver of Stalin's entire career which, however, fits entirely into the second or Machiavellian circle of communism.

The *rapprochement* with the Nazis was due to Stalin's initiative who in a speech to the XVIIIth party congress on March 10, 1939, indicated to Berlin that he wanted to come to terms.

There are numerous references throughout the confessions about imaginary alliances which the alleged "rightists" and "Trotskyites" wanted to conclude with foreign imperialists. Those imperialists often remain unnamed but in many instances the Nazis (and Japanese) are identified as the alleged allies of the counter-revolutionaries.

Between February 23 and March 5, 1937, the Central Committee met to deliberate about further purge measures with Beria sitting in. Yezhov addressed the Committee and asserted that since 1918, there had been going on a fantastic conspiracy against the communist party. There was no doubt that the "Bukharin group" together with the "Trotskyites" were in the service of Nazi espionage and that they were preparing war against the USSR. To support the accusations, Karl Radek and Gregory Sokolnikov were brought in from jail to testify. In 1917 these two men had been transported

with Lenin in the famed "sealed car" through Germany to Russia. Both were defendants in the second purge trial and their lives had been spared. In the third trial, Rakovsky who was heavily implicated with German intelligence during World War I, also escaped with a prison sentence. Most of those who had been "allied" with the Germans before were given lenient treatment.

Bukharin no longer was editor of *Izvestia* but he still was a member of the Central Committee. In the fall of 1936, the plenum of the Central Committee voted for Bukharin and against Stalin. The Generals who were candidates and full committee members still felt free to oppose Stalin: this "fronde" included Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Gamar-nik and Blukher. But in the spring of 1937 the fronts were turned.

Bukharin is reported to have replied to Yezhov that, yes, a monstrous conspiracy was being hatched against the party and the state, but that Stalin and Yezhov stood at the head of this conspiracy. Stalin's aim, Bukharin asserted, is to establish his personal power over the party and the country through lies, deceit, and provocations. The NKVD is ruling the country, not the party; the NKVD and not the friends of Bukharin are preparing the *coup d'etat*.

Reportedly, five of twelve members of the Politbureau sided with Bukharin, which was not enough to save him. The Central Committee voted to indict Bukharin, Rykov, and Yagoda who were hauled away from the meeting and taken to jail.

In March 1937 Stalin won the decisive internal struggle because, it has been said, Khrushchev helped him in his maneuvers. At that time, Khrushchev was party secretary in Moscow: he was rewarded by being promoted to running Ukraine. Undoubtedly, Beria also did "his thing" and he, too, was soon promoted. The five dissident Politbureau members were subsequently purged, and some of them were subjected to particularly cruel torture. There is little doubt that Stalin had prescribed the treatment because of personal revenge. By January 1938, Stalin put together a commission for foreign affairs of Beria, Khrushchev, Zhdanov, Mekhlis, Manuilsky, and Lozovsky. This commission was anti-Western, i. e. pro-Nazi in orientation.

In retrospect, it would seem as though there was a chance that the Central Committee could have overruled Stalin early in 1937, but Stalin walked away with the majority. The comrades were *not* watching zealously over the party's integrity but most of these men were Stalin's creatures. For that matter, the party no longer was Stalin's power base: his power rested, as Bukharin had observed, on the secret police.

Bukharin's allegation that there had been a conspiracy since 1918, if indeed he put the matter in those words, was incorrect. The specific conspiracy which was to cost him his life, had begun by 1930. But except for interruptions, Bolsheviks had been cooperating with German nationalists and militarists since 1915. Since 1919, Radek, whom Bukharin described as a "paid agent," had tirelessly worked to form an alliance between the USSR and Germany. He maintained close relations with the leadership of the *Reichswehr*, often through retired Colonel Nicolai, German World War I military intelligence chief, and Colonel Bauer, Ludendorff's planner during the war. Radek also had negotiated through the Swiss socialist Carl Moor, who for years had been a German agent and who in the early 1920's was working for the Comintern. This collaboration had been initiated by Lenin who, for that matter, as I showed in my Lenin biography, had failed to support the German revolution of 1918.

On June 3, 1921, G.M. Smirkov, on orders of the Soviet government (supposedly Lenin) wrote a letter to Field Marshal von Hindenburg, who was then retired.¹ "Smirkov" explained the need for a German-Russian alliance and stated that he had been instructed to determine how the objectives of the German rightist parties differ from those of the "Russian government" and could possibly be harmonized. He promised that if Germany and Russia were to agree, the German CP would be told to submit and "Soviet propaganda" would be stopped. "A skillfully initiated war could be won with the help of rightist parties." The Germans, apparently, did not

¹ Buber-Neumann, p. 88f gives the references. The improbable name "Smirkov" obviously was a pseudonym and it sounds suspiciously as though it was invented by, or was concealing, Radek. "Smir" could stand for "schmieren" or "to scribble dirtily" and "Kov" could equal "Kopf" or "head." "Schmierkopf" would be something like "smear head" or "filthy fellow" — Radek was the premier beatnik of his time. This strange pseudonym may have been chosen, to allow, in case of German indiscretion, a graceful retreat, on the grounds that the letter was a forgery. In that period, Zinoviev and the Comintern had been busy revolutionizing Germany, but "Soviet Russia," as the country was then called, was in the midst of a terrible famine. Lenin pulled back the Comintern, which, in a speech on July 11, 1921, he admonished against "left stupidities." He explained later that he stood "on the extreme right wing" and that this was the only correct position. Documents incriminating the Comintern were allowed to fall into the hands of the German police by Klara Zetkin, one of Lenin's few friends who stood by Stalin. Since a short while later Lenin promoted Stalin to Secretary General, a post which had not existed before, and since Lenin was already ailing badly, Stalin may have been involved in this delicate operation and he may even have conducted it.

react, but a few weeks after Stalin had become Secretary General of the CPSU, the Rapallo Treaty was concluded, in April 1922.

During 1923 Radek was promoting a nationalist-Bolshevik movement in Germany. Contacts were maintained with Count Reventlow, a leading rightist theoretician who was invited to write in the German communist press. Radek published a book on national Bolshevism with Moeller van den Bruck, originator of the term "The Third Reich." Early in the fall the Comintern with Trotsky's help decided upon a revolution in Germany, which was put in motion but soon was torpedoed mysteriously from within the communist *apparat*. A revolution in Bulgaria also was derailed by treason. Stalin soon proclaimed his belief that the "chain of imperialism" probably would not break in Germany but in India and other Eastern countries and presented his theory of "socialism in one country."

The Germans and the USSR established secret military cooperation in mid-1924. Through the Treaty of Versailles, the German army had been restricted in armament and training. Accordingly, the USSR gave shelter to a German school for tank warfare, two aircraft plants, two ammunition factories, and one chemical ammunition plant. The Germans undertook to give advanced training to Soviet staff officers. This arrangement was concluded after Trotsky had been replaced as Commissar of War. It came to an end in 1933, after Hitler commenced German rearmament and ordered that the military collaboration with the USSR be terminated. Without this Soviet aid the Nazis could not have carried out their massive rearmament program within the short span of six years.

The Rapallo Treaty was supplemented in 1926 by an agreement on neutrality and non-aggression, which was regularly renewed. Those treaties were in force during 1939, although the Soviets felt it necessary to query the Nazis on this point. The pact of 1939, therefore, was necessary only in those of its provisions that went *beyond* the non-aggression and neutrality provisions of 1926 — that is, the provisions in the secret annexa which partitioned Eastern Europe.

Late in 1929 or early 1930, Stalin through intermediaries established political and financial collaboration with General von Schleicher which aimed at putting substantial funds at the disposal of Hitler. (Schleicher was the political brain of the *Reichswehr*.) This help was the prerequisite of the surprising electoral success which the Nazis scored in 1930 and which in due course propelled them

into power. Thus, Stalin served as Hitler's "stirrup holder."²

The communist party of Germany was given the directive to vote together with the Nazis in the legislatures. This policy made it inevitable that Hitler would seize power in 1933. Moscow's directives were subject to a furious struggle within the KPD, which the Kremlin kept in line only with difficulty. The opponents of the pro-Nazi policy were later purged, without exception.

In addition to parliamentary votes, this policy included strikes and plebiscites in which the KPD and the NSDAP "collaborated" in destroying German democracy. Specific orders were given to the combat forces of the KPD not to disrupt Nazi street demonstrations. The KPD adopted an openly nationalist policy "against Versailles" which coincided with the main thrust of Nazi foreign policy. The entire Comintern supported this revisionist "general line."

In addition, national Bolshevism reappeared. The KPD ran, within its *Zer Apparat* (organization for *Zersetzung* or infiltration), a special operation to strengthen national Bolshevik groups. One magazine of this genre was edited by a prominent member of this *apparat*. The *Tatkreis* which was a very successful group of highly intellectual writers and its widely read magazine, as well as one large publishing house, received effectively concealed Soviet subventions. Another group proved to be the recruiting ground for the *Rote Kapelle*, a communist espionage net during the war. As a result of this intellectual subversion various rightist groups between 1931 and 1933 pressed hard for a close alliance with the USSR, including General von Seeckt, former boss of the *Reichswehr* and now member of the *Reichstag*, as well as papers and magazines that were close to General von Schleicher. The communists were not worried about Hitler for, as Radek once expressed it, "we have the *Reichswehr* in our pocket."

The crucial "link" in the chain of Hitler's successes, namely the financial support he received in 1930, was described, albeit in Aesopian language, during the trial of March 1938.³ The conversa-

² This whole affair is too involved to be detailed here but I have told the story in "The Comintern as an Instrument of Soviet Strategy," in Milorad N. Drachkovitch's (editor), *The Revolutionary Internationals 1864-1943*, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution, 1966, pp. 203 to 222; and in *Zur Bewaeltigung der Kriegsschuldfrage*, Koeln and Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968, pp. 268 to 288. For additional information see my *A Century of Conflict*, Chicago, Regnery, 1953, pp. 192-205.

³ People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites,"* Moscow, 1938, pp. 257, 264f, 269, 733ff and *passim*.

tions with the *Reichswehr* apparently were conducted through General Vitovt Putna, the first man of Tukhachevsky's entourage to be arrested, the economic arrangements through foreign trade commissar A. P. Rosengolz, and the political arrangements through ambassador N. N. Krestinsky. Naturally, this plot was disclosed in the customary code, but once the key is understood, the text is not hard to follow. Naturally, it would not do to accept the various details, but as a *generality*, there can no longer be much doubt that Stalin ensured that the Nazis received financial help from the *Reichswehr*. In other words, and taking the whole story together, Stalin put Hitler in power and created the Nazi monster.

There was a prelude to this affair about which it would be interesting to learn more. The Russian emigré paper, *Russkoye Dyelo* which was published in Belgrade, early in 1923 asserted that the former *Okhrana* General M. S. Kommissarov, who was working for the Soviets, had recently met the former Czarist General Vasily Biskupsky and Erwin von Scheubner-Richter in Munich. Kommissarov had been the *Okhrana* specialist on anti-Semitism and had put the notorious *Protocols of the Elder Men of Zion* into circulation. His wife had in 1906 and 1907 infiltrated the Bolshevik organization and had worked with Lenin. Kommissarov also had played a significant role in the events which led to the overthrow of the Czar in 1917. Scheubner-Richter was a Balt who during the 1905 revolution had worked with the *Okhrana* and who during World War I had participated in German "revolutionizing" of Russia. Biskupsky was, from about 1920, the political adviser of Grand Duke Kyrill Vladimirovich, subsequently pretender to the imperial crown. In 1921, Biskupsky organized the monarchists among the Russian emigrés, later ran their pro-German wing, and after 1933, largely unsuccessfully, tried to gain Nazi support for his movement. In 1923, he and Scheubner-Richter were operating a right-wing joint German-Russian organization *Aufbau* and were publishing a magazine, *Wirtschaftspolitische Aufbau-Korrespondenz ueber Ostfragen*. Scheubner-Richter was the organizing genius of the Nazi party and its early financial wizard. He was killed in the Hitler putsch of November 1923.

Now, on February 7, 1923, the *Aufbau-Korrespondenz* issued a denial of the *Russkoye Dyelo* story and stated that neither Biskupsky nor Scheubner-Richter had "seen or talked to General Kommissarov in Munich or any other place since 1920." Hence they saw him in 1920.

On December 17, 1920, Hitler acquired the *Voelkische Beobachter* and by November 16, 1921, disclosed before a German court that he alone owned the paper and the publishing firm which was printing

it. Between May 29 and June 6, 1921, the Russian monarchists held a congress at Bad Reichenhall which had been organized by Biskupsky and which aimed at establishing a counter-revolutionary international based on more or less Nazi principles. Those principles, of course, had their origin in the Russia of 1905 — the Black Hundreds, the ideas of V. M. Purishkevich, and the *Okhrana*. Scheubner-Richter and Alfred Rosenberg, another "German Russian," participated in the congress. It should be added that the concept of an international organization directed against "Jewish Free Masonry" and against the international revolutionaries was based upon a proposal by Count Lamsdorf of January 16, 1906. This proposal was approved by Nicholas II.⁴

Some of the contributors who helped Hitler acquire his paper are known, including the *Reichswehr*, but a large amount of money was never traced.⁵

Rollin wrote:

The question has often been asked whether some unknown conductor did not direct the uproar which provoked, early in 1920, the simultaneous publication of translations of the *Protocols*... in the main countries of the world."⁶

It is a good question, and it is perhaps not beyond reason to assume that Kommissarov who was responsible for the first uproar about the *Protocols*, also had a hand in the second one. It is just as plausible to suppose, that in the style of the famous "trust" operation which was mounted later, the *Cheka* was trying to set up a "white international," presumably in order to *control* the counter-revolution. In the course of this operation, Hitler was enabled to get started.

In 1920 Stalin may or may not have had anything to do with this undertaking, which probably was conducted by his friend Felix Dzerzhinski. But the operation of 1930-1933 merely continued the early work which had remained unsuccessful. Both actions involved a betrayal of German communism. The enthronization of Hitler was a classical third circle or Judas operation.

There is the question, why of all the German rightist groups, Stalin supported the Nazis in the early 1930's. The answer is that the Nazis were the most dynamic "disturbers" in Germany, and they

⁴Henri Rollin, *L'Apocalypse de Notre Temps*, Paris, Gallimard, 1939, Chapter XVIII, gives the details on these inter-connections.

⁵See Werner Maser, *Die Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP*, Frankfurt, Athenaeum, 1965, pp. 257-264.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 480.

also professed to be socialist, while the other rightists were strongly opposed to socialism in all its forms. Somewhere along the line Stalin acquired respect for Hitler whom he described as "quite a fellow."⁷

Hitler wanted no close contacts with the USSR but in August 1934, a Professor Oberlaender, a collaborator of Erich Koch, *Gauleiter* of East Prussia and during the war *Gauleiter* of Ukraine as well as one of the worst Nazi oppressors, met Radek and Bukharin in Radek's *dacha*. The pro-German if not to say pro-Nazi tone of the two communists surprised the Nazi. It is clear, however, that Radek and Bukharin acted on Stalin's orders or at least with his permission, and afterwards reported to the boss. Radek expressed the belief that the Nazi regime would not last but that the "magnificent lads in the SA and SS" one day "will be throwing hand grenades for us."⁸

During the Spanish civil war, Stalin gave instructions to his intelligence services to keep contacts with the Nazis. Soviet secret operators bought in Germany a large portion of the weapons which the USSR made available to the loyalists. A nice set-up, since both the Soviets and the Nazis were intervening in Spain, albeit on opposing sides.

Late in 1939, Stalin approached the Nazi leadership through David Kandelaki, formerly a trusted Georgian of his personal secretariat, a high official of the state bank, and now, incredibly, a minor commercial attache at the Berlin embassy. I referred to Kandelaki before and would like to add that in 1902 he and Stalin organized a strike of oil workers against the Rothschild interests in Batumi. Kandelaki was the local organizer. The strike was run against the workers of Chkeidze, the later Menshevik, who was the dominant leader in the area, and it led to a bloodbath which had all the customary earmarks of an *Okhrana provokatsiya*. There have been suggestions that Stalin at that time may have been working for the Rothschilds and a similar suspicion is attached to Kandelaki. At any rate, the two had been old cronies in dirty dealing.

In 1935 Kandelaki negotiated with Hjalmar Schacht and concluded a credit agreement on April 9. On March 7, 1936, the Nazis occupied the Rhineland, and promptly the Soviets made overtures

⁷ Duber-Neumann, p. 355, who reported on this incident, as Heinz Neumann had described it to her, gives the expression "Teufelskerl." The Russian word Stalin used was "*molodets*."

⁸ Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies*, New York, Macmillan, 1953, p. 268.

to Berlin. In December Kandelaki, accompanied by an NKVD officer by the name of Friedrichson, approached Schacht and suggested direct negotiations with Hitler. The personal relationship between Kandelaki and Stalin was known in Germany.

On January 29, 1937, a few days after the trial of Radek and Sokolnikov, the offer was renewed as a message from Stalin and Molotov. Schacht replied, Germany needed certain guarantees, such as the suppression of "Comintern agitation." Foreign Minister Neurath talked to Hitler, and on February 11 informed Schacht that it would be difficult to get promises about cessation of Comintern activities. Thus, Hitler believed that as things stood the communists would continue to promote revolution. But "it would be quite another matter if things in Russia were to develop further along the lines of an absolute despotism based on the army. . . In that event, we would not, to be sure, let the occasion slip to bring ourselves once more into contact with Russia." ⁹ "This, then, was the advice passed from one dictator to another — let him be master in his own house, basing his power upon rather than sharing it with the army." ¹⁰ Actually, the advice also was to get rid of revolutionary proclivities.

According to General Krivitsky, Kandelaki saw Hitler. This is unconfirmed but Kandelaki continued his contacts.

Shortly after Hitler's message to Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda were arrested, the Gestapo and NKVD cooperated to forge the documents which incriminated the Russian Generals, the Soviet high command was purged by the end of May, and those party leaders who knew about Stalin's policies with the Nazis were killed in March 1938. Kandelaki also was purged at an unknown date. Ivan Serov, head of the NKVD firing squad which executed Tukhachevsky and his comrades, served under Khrushchev as head of the KGB until 1958, and as late as 1964 was head of military intelligence.¹¹ So much for de-Stalinization.

In February 1938, Hitler, the first practitioner of a bloody mass purge (1934), took his own advice and purged the German army without, however, killing the Generals. (This came later.)

Thus, the purge of the Soviet high command was not merely facilitated by the Nazis through their forgeries but was suggested by Hitler to Stalin as a pre-condition of Nazi-Soviet collaboration. Stalin accepted this condition. He went one step further: he made

⁹ John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1962, p. 453 with German file reference on p. 735.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 453.

¹¹ Conquest, p. 224.

sure that the forged "evidence" used to kill the Generals was contributed by the Nazis. In this fashion he wanted to assure that Hitler understood what was going on, namely that Stalin adopted the advice he had been given. (Hitler did not quite understand but believed he, Hitler, had crippled the Soviet high command.) At the same time Stalin created an alibi for himself — he would be able to prove that he had been tricked by Hitler.

At the time of the March 1938 trial, the erstwhile cooperation between the USSR and Germany had ceased, largely upon Hitler's initiative. Although many of his advisers pushed him in that direction, Hitler still was not interested on dealing with Stalin. Nazi-Soviet relations hit a low point after the Munich conference in 1938, which seemed to presage the grand anti-Soviet coalition which Stalin feared and which coincided with military clashes against the Japanese.

Shortly after Munich, Beria assumed power in Moscow and became the second-in-command in the USSR. On March 10, 1939, Stalin made his speech to the XVIIIth party congress, which contained a concealed offer to Hitler. On April 17, the Soviet ambassador told the Nazis that ideological differences didn't mean much. On May 3, Litvinov, who favored an alliance with the West, was dismissed, and on May 5, George Astakhov, a Soviet diplomat and also a confidant of Beria, inquired in Berlin whether Litvinov's dismissal had changed Hitler's attitude. On June 15, Astakhov suggested a "non-aggression pact" between Nazi Germany and the USSR. (Such a treaty already was in existence.)

Hitler did not yet trust the Communists and remained skeptical about the assurances of his experts that the USSR had been changing and Stalin was veering toward a strategy of national interest. But Hitler was weakening, and he needed a free back if he wanted to implement his goal of destroying Poland. Stalin had something Hitler wanted, namely military, economic and political means to support aggression, and he was willing to play — for a price. The two dictators agreed to divide Eastern Europe between themselves.

Subsequent to the Soviet-Nazi pact, the relations with the Nazis were carried out through Ambassador Vladimir Dekanosov, a person most trusted by Beria. Dekanosov was purged after Beria's fall in 1953. Between September 1939 and June 1941 the communist parties, including the German CP, were supporting the Nazi war effort and opposed France and Britain. Ulbricht came out for the pact strongly and stated that the desire of "a few social-democratic

and Catholic leaders. . . to change the regime in Germany . . . through a reactionary war" is "insane and criminal."¹²

THE PRE-EMPTIVE REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE.

The outbreak of the war created most unstable conditions. The outcome of the conflict between Germany and the Western powers was uncertain. Stalin needed a policy for both alternatives of a German or a Western victory, he had to think of various dangerous contingencies, and he needed a concept for the collaboration with Germany.

On the other hand, Stalin was by no means certain that there was no danger of a Nazi attack and that the USSR would be able to defend itself effectively. The danger of a war with Germany had always been present in Stalin's mind and was one of the reasons of the purges. He had every justification to assume that the communists who hated him would take advantage of any trouble that might arise as a result of war. Thus, he liquidated those he did not trust, terrorized the CP and the high command, and based his rule on police (not military) power.

But two additional problems needed to be taken care of. In the first place, he needed an alibi to show that it was not he who had put Hitler into power. The show trials unloaded the responsibility for the various secret deals with the Nazis on the defendants and "exculpated" Stalin. In this fashion "proof" was manufactured that the fascist threat had been created by Stalin's opponents within the communist party, and not by himself. Given this enormous danger which the "Trotskyites" had provoked for the "Soviet motherland," why, Stalin had no other choice but to find an accommodation with Hitler — otherwise the British would instigate war between Germany and the USSR and the "base of the world revolution" might be destroyed.

In the second place, Stalin also needed a "platform" which could enable him to enter into close relations with the Nazis. Hitler would deal only with a dictatorship that was nationalistic (and anti-Semitic), and he opposed internationalist and actively revolutionary Communists. Consequently the logic is simple: to deal with Hitler, the communists had to be eliminated. Since Stalin could not afford to abolish the communist system as such, the system and its formula had to stay; and Hitler had to be satisfied by a counter-revolution which, at one and the same time, was understood by him but remained

¹² Buber-Neumann, p. 488.

concealed within the USSR. This message was to be conveyed to Hitler through the show trials.

In the trials, the defendants were accused of engaging in sabotage, subversion and "ultra-terrorism" as their contribution to the alliance with the "fascist enemy." The confessions, however, produced only pitiful examples of such alleged activity. Yet if this argument is turned around and the word "ultra-terrorism" is substituted for "purges," then obviously it was Stalin himself doing his best to liquidate the CPSU and to terminate the communist threat to Germany.

Radek testified in 1938 that the defendants told the Nazis the ideological controversies between the two systems were entirely sterile and that the alleged Trotskyites were willing to pursue a realistic policy. This was precisely the language which Stalin's envoys later were using at Berlin, e. g. Astakhov in April 1939 told a member of the Nazi party's foreign policy staff that it was senseless for Germany and Russia to fight over a "split hair."

Thus, much of this elaborate theater of the show trials was designed to impress upon Hitler that Stalin was an acceptable partner, because he got rid of the troublesome communists, and was accomplishing a counter-revolution from above. Stalin, however, miscalculated completely because the German diplomats were unable to decipher this complicated double-talk, let alone comprehend the nuances of the trial confessions. Hitler and Ribbentrop weren't even aware of the content of Stalin's March 1939 speech and did not believe that Stalin, with his customary indirection, had made an offer to Berlin.

After some delay, Hitler was briefed about the new situation in the USSR. This briefing indicated that Stalin realized "a healthy and strong political structure could not be erected on the basis of communist doctrine," and that a general "restoration" had occurred in the Soviet Union. This was not entirely incredible because for years, Nazi and rightist German papers, including the organs of national Bolshevism, had expressed their belief that communism was being replaced by nationalism. But only after Litvinov was fired did Hitler show any interest in Stalin's intentions — the publicized purge of a Jew, that was something he understood. But the question remained: how far could the collaboration between Hitler's Third Reich and Stalin's USSR go?

THE OPENING OF THE FRONT TO THE ENEMY

The trial confessions discussed so far referred to *past* events and were largely designed to protect Stalin against accusations about deeds he had committed before and during the trials. Confessions about negotiations with the enemies of the USSR also pointed to the past, and those which dealt with the future war carried the implication that the traitors had been unmasked and that therefore the connection between the opposition within the USSR and the Nazis had been broken. This was precisely the impression which the naive American Ambassador Joseph E. Davies conveyed to Washington.

But there was *one* particular "confession" which reoccurred several times, to the effect that the defendants, in addition to practicing defeatism by undermining the armed forces (which job Stalin himself was accomplishing with singular success), were planning, if war came, *to open the front to the enemy*. In one way or other, accusations and confessions on this point were made in all of the three major show trials.

The overpowering fact is that precisely such opening of the front occurred at the very beginning of the Soviet-Nazi war. Hence, the purge scenario had prescribed confessions of a *future* crime, and Stalin had procured for himself a "preventive alibi."

Article 58 of the criminal code of the RSFSR dominated the purge trials. According to its many provisions, failure to institute effective and timely counter-action against aggression called for "the supreme measure of criminal punishment — death by shooting and the confiscation of all property." According to article 58/1, any act "designed to undermine or weaken the external security of the USSR . . . is deemed to be a counterrevolutionary act." Article 58/1/a stipulated that "acts committed . . . to the detriment of the military strength of the USSR, its state independence, or the inviolability of its territory" are acts of treason. Acts that render assistance "by any means whatsoever" to a foreign state "at war with the USSR or engaged in fighting the USSR" are punishable by death (Article 58/3).

That in terms of Soviet law major counterrevolutionary crimes and treason were committed when it was ordered that Nazi fire was not to be returned, is hardly disputable.

Yet Stalin's supreme crime still is discussed as though it had been a mere error and not a capital crime. And by late 1968 Soviet propaganda began to reappraise Stalin's generalship and to build him up again as the architect of Soviet victory. The USSR paid for this

victory with 20 million dead, including 13.6 million military fatalities. Almost 6 million prisoners fell into Nazi hands, of whom 3.3 million did not survive — a large percentage of those prisoners were taken in the early months of the conflict, because the front had been left open.

Why does the concealment of Stalin's crime which affected the USSR even more than the purges, continue? The answer to this question must be sought in Stalin's motivation. At this point, we reach the deepest of all the mysteries in the enigma that was Stalin.

Stalin's character and his urge for genocide are manifested clearly in his advice given to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as reported by Chinese author Hollington K. Tong:

Towards the end of December, Stalin offered some gratuitous advice to the Generalissimo on how to win. He asked General Yang Chi, the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow, to convey to the Generalissimo his suggestion on how best to unify China as a means toward strengthening Chinese resistance to Japan.

"Tell the Generalissimo," he said to General Yang, "that if he wants to do away with any manifestation of disloyalty on the part of his people while the fight continues, he should arrange to shoot at least 4,500,000 persons. Otherwise, I fear that he will not be able to bring the war of resistance to a successful conclusion."

Stalin explained to General Yang how he himself had upheld authority in Russia. Any Russian suspects were immediately apprehended, he said, and sent to the Ministry of Interior. Once they entered its doors, there were only two exits, either to Siberia or to the grave. The Russian government, explained Stalin, was too poor to administer justice with impartiality. He said that "it took at least eight persons to ascertain whether a suspect is innocent or guilty. The Russian government could not afford this."¹³

(To be continued)

¹³ Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek*, Taipei, China Publishing Company, 1953, p. 251.

AN OUTLINE OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

By NESTOR KOROL

Upon returning from a journey to Western Europe, where he observed the functioning of the various educational state systems, Peter I observed that the difference between the Western systems and that of Muscovy lay in the fact that his officials, including those of the highest rank, lacked even an elementary education. He immediately set out to remedy this situation by following the advice of the famous Ukrainian scholar Theophan Prokopovich: he ordered many young Muscovites to study at Western European universities. (Previously, Peter I had lent an ear to many a useful piece of advice proffered by Prokopovich. One of the latter's suggestions was to transform the Church-Slavonic alphabet into the so-called *grazhdanka*, the characters for which Prokopovich himself designed. Later on, these letters were set up in type in Holland.)

Unfortunately, Peter's endeavors proved to be fruitless, as had those of his predecessor, Czar Boris Godunov, who also had sent young Muscovites abroad to study. In both instances, the youngsters refused to return to their native country upon completion of their studies. Once again Prokopovich came to the aid of Peter I by suggesting the founding of a university "at home" so as to attract young Muscovites to a "Russian schooling" (on November 11, 1721, Peter I had renamed Muscovy "Russia" and the Muscovites "Russians").

Peter I again heeded Prokopovich's advice. He issued a decree on the founding of a university and an Academy of Sciences in Petersburg, this despite the fact that at the time not a single Muscovite scholar could be found in the whole of Muscovy. The university was made subordinate to the Academy and was called the "Academic University." However, it was not founded "at home," i. e. on ethnically Muscovite territory, as suggested by Prokopovich, but in St. Petersburg, an area that had belonged to Sweden for many centuries, which had been wrested from the latter in the war of 1701-1721, and which was inhabited by Finns.

The university was intended for the "well-born Russian nobility," inasmuch as the state wished to have people both well-educated and well-born for its civil and military services. Subsequent experience, however, showed that the location of the university at Petersburg was a most unfortunate one; it was too far out of the way and too inconvenient to reach for the "well-born nobility" by the then existing means of transportation.

Because of the complete lack of Muscovite scholars, seventeen foreign university professors — Germans, French, and Italians — had to be invited from abroad to staff the Academy of Sciences. All were personal acquaintances of Prokopovich, having either attended school with him or studied under him at some Western European university.

Since there were no young people of the "Russian well-born nobility" qualified by education to attend the university lectures, eight German students also were imported. Four of these eight students subsequently became professors at Moscow University (J.H. Meyer, E. Gross, W.K. Weitbrecht, H. F. Miller — "Fyodor Ivanovich"). These professors and German students arrived in Petersburg after the death of Peter I. The first lectures commenced in the fall of 1726.

The absence in Muscovy of preparatory schools continued to be an insurmountable obstacle to the admission of students. Then, in 1736, ten students from the Moscow Zaikonospasskaya School were sent to the University. According to Jul Just, Danish Ambassador to Russia, the rector of this school was "Feofilakt Lopatynsky, who was born and had studied in Lvov" (just as literally all its professors and students also were Orthodox Ukrainians from Poland). A review of the surnames of the teachers and students of the Zaikonospasskaya School indicates that they were in reality Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Not all of the ten, however, were adjudged to be qualified to attend lectures.

In 1738 an attempt was made to begin actual instruction. By 1742 there were only twelve students for the twelve professors who were members of the Academy of Sciences.

In 1747, therefore, thirty state scholarships were established to attract students. Even with these suitable conditions, candidates could not be found. All the stipends had to be given to young people from Ukraine who had been trained in local secondary schools but who, disappointingly, were not of noble birth.

The University's first graduation exercises were held in 1753. Of twenty students, only nine had completed the course success-

fully — four winners of a masters degree (including N. N. Popovsky, A. N. Yaremsky and Danilo Savich, all of whom later became professors at Moscow University), two adjuncts (assistant professors), two translators and one secondary school teacher.

M. V. Lomonosov, who had taken over the management of the University in 1753, declared in a report to the Ruling Senate that "neither the shape nor the likeness of a university is as yet evident." In any effort to gain prestige for the school, he requested that the Senate try to persuade government organizations to give the same consideration to those completing University schooling as that accorded noblemen, although the latter without exception were illiterate or semi-literate.

(The alumni of the Academic University, all young people from Ukraine, were the children of simple Kozaks, clergymen and peasants, who at that time were still free of serf bondage. Serf bondage was introduced later in Ukraine, under Catherine II: the *Ukase* of December 15, 1783 relegated the Kozaks of Ukraine to the level of serfs of the state. The schools in Ukraine were dissolved in order to equalize Ukraine with Russia, who had no schools for the common people. The children of Kozak higher staff officers — the nobility — thereafter obtained their education in Western European universities.)

Lomonosov, moreover, unsuccessfully sought for the University professors the 17th class, or lowest grade in the table of ranks of nobility. But the University continued to decline. Lomonosov also recommended that the Academic University be transferred to Moscow, believing that the main reason for its lowly estate was the lack of nobility in St. Petersburg.

It was decided, therefore, to open a new university in Moscow in place of the flagging Petersburg Academic University. The reasons given were the following:

- 1) Moscow's accessible position in the heart of the Russian nation;
- 2) Moscow's concentration of the well-born nobility;
- 3) The well-born nobility already was spending considerable sums in Moscow on foreign tutors for their children, tutors who very frequently were unfit for the task;
- 4) It cost much less to support an individual in Moscow than elsewhere;
- 5) Everyone had relatives or friends in Moscow with whom it was possible to board.

Moscow University was founded on January 12, 1755, largely because of the efforts of I. I. Shuvalov, a Muscovite by birth and a noble at the court of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna. Set up in accordance with a statute drafted by M. V. Lomonosov, it was founded in order to enable the well-born nobility to succeed in the civil and military state services, entrance into which Peter I had made obligatory for all able-bodied nobles without exception. The semi-literate or completely illiterate nobles of Muscovy proper — the central part of the Russian empire created by Peter I in 1721 — had been humiliatingly compelled, by virtue of the new trends, to yield the higher posts of state service to the educated new subjects from the recently conquered Western regions — Ukraine, the Baltics, Byelorussia. From the time of Peter I's death until the accession of his daughter Elizabeth, Baltic Germans ruled in the Russian state administration, the army and the navy. Ukrainians were preeminent in the clerical, educational, and scientific fields.

Thanks to G. A. Rozumovsky, husband of Elizabeth, the influence of the Ukrainians spread into the civil and military sectors, a state of affairs which continued during the subsequent reigns of Peter III and Catherine II (for instance, Ukrainian Prince A. A. Bezborodko).

Evidently mindful of the failure of the Academic University in Petersburg and despite the University's orientation to the "well-born nobility," in practice Moscow University was open to children of all classes of society in the Russian empire with the exception of peasants, craftsmen, workers, and lesser merchants.

It would be a mistake to think that there had been no institutions of higher learning within the confines of the Russian empire before the opening of Petersburg Academic University in 1725 and of Moscow University in 1755. Long in existence were academies and colleges fashioned after Western European institutions of higher learning. Because they achieved remarkable successes in science and the education of their peoples, they enjoyed esteem and recognition in the Western academic world.

But these were to be found in territories ethnically non-Russian, areas not long before annexed to Russia by force of arms.

Balking at serving Russian centralism to the detriment of their own people, they soon evoked the irreconcilable enmity of the conquerors. In time they were destroyed.

Outstanding examples of such destruction are: The Academia Gustaviana in Dorpat and in Pernov, Livonia, which had been opened by Swedish King Gustav II Augustus in 1623 in accordance with the Upsala statute. At its founding it had nineteen professors, and in twenty-four years had graduated 1,016 doctors of science. When the troops of Peter I occupied the Baltic region in 1710 the schools were completely destroyed.

The famous Kievan Academy had been founded in 1615 solely at the expense of the Ukrainian population and contrary to the wish of the Polish government. At first a secondary school, it was renamed the Academia (1632), and later became known as the Mohyliana. After the annexation of Ukraine to Muscovy, this institution was downgraded to the level of an ordinary theological academy. Foreigners who visited Kiev in the 17th and 18th centuries unfailingly referred to the Kievan Academy as one of the city's chief sights. The French engineer, Beauplan, who is known for his *Description of Ukraine* and who lived in Ukraine for seventeen years (1630-1647), noted it, as did General Mannstein, who visited Kiev during his trip through Ukraine. The Scotsman John Bell of Antermoney, who saw Kiev in December, 1737, wrote: "Besides they have a University at Kioff of considerable repute in these parts."

Other institutions of higher learning in Ukraine at that time were the colleges in Chernihiv and in Baturyn, the capital of the Ukrainian *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa. Founded in 1698 and 1700, respectively, they were destroyed after Mazepa was defeated along with his ally, Swedish King Charles XII. All students and professors were shot or hanged for "Mazepism."

Another noted institution of higher learning in Ukraine was Kharkiv College, founded in 1726 with the funds of the population itself on the initiative of the Ukrainian public figure and patriot Bishop Epiphanius Tikhorsky (referred to in some Russian sources as Tikhoreniy). Every discipline of the time was taught.

In 1739 the Ruling Senate wrote to the Archbishop who was curator of the college that "the College is a source of pride not only for the Kharkiv Territory of Ukraine, but for the whole Russian Empire" — although the state had not given a single kopeck to the College.

When in 1797 the first agricultural school of higher education was established in Muscovy near Petersburg (because a Ukrainian scholar, Archpresbyter A. A. Samborsky, had convinced Emperor

Paul that Muscovy needed such a school), all its eleven professors proved to have been educated at Kharkiv College. Archpresbyter Samborsky, who had obtained both a theological and an agricultural education at the Kievan Academy, was appointed rector. His work, *Osnovaniya Prakticheskago Zemledeliya* (Fundamental Principles of Agriculture), which had been published in 1781 by the Moscow University Printing House, was the first textbook on agriculture in the Russian language. Nevertheless, this agricultural school was soon closed; underdeveloped Muscovy did not feel the need for agronomists that Ukraine did.

Since the population of Ukraine of that time had not as yet become stratified into classes, as was the case with Muscovy, Kharkiv College accepted students from all segments of the population. Moreover, attached to the College were an elementary and a secondary school and a home for orphans where study of the three R's was compulsory. Gifted pupils completed not only the secondary school but the college as well. Before 1783, that is, before serfdom and the division of the population of Ukraine into classes after the Russian pattern, the number of students reached as high as 1,200. Subsequently, the number dropped sharply, never exceeding 400.

As a rule the lectures were given in Latin, but some disciplines were taught in Ukrainian. Besides Ukrainians, the faculty included many Western European scholars — Germans, Italians, French, Dutch, Czechs, and Greeks. The period of study ranged from three years (Music, Vocal and Theatrical Arts) to six (Medicine, Engineering, Architecture).

Many of those who finished the College's course became professors of newly opened universities in the Russian empire, including the "oldest," Moscow University, e. g., I. F. Dvihubsky, Ye. D. Mukhin (real name Mukha), M. T. Kachenovsky and I. F. Vensovich.

This record notwithstanding, with the opening of Kharkiv University in 1804, which was far from being the College's equal but which was founded for purposes of Russification, the College was forcibly reduced to the status of a secondary school for training Orthodox priests.

The inhabitants of Slobidska Ukraine (the Kharkiv Territory plus the neighboring southern part of Kursk and the southern half of the Voronezh region) struggled for a long time to maintain their own educational institution for higher learning — Kharkivsky College — after the opening of Kharkiv University. This struggle was

not an easy one. Where the University was fully maintained by the Russian government, the College required much sacrifice on the part of the inhabitants of Slobidska Ukraine. The year of 1816 is typical. Besides money, the donations included sacks of wheat, rye, flour, groats, one or two oxen, several sheep, pigs, and even a dozen or more domestic birds. Such ardent support of the College, which fostered the ideas of Ukrainian severalty and anti-Russian centralism, actually led to the University's support of the College. This support lasted a few years, since the rector of the University was the well-known Ukrainian poet, P.P. Hulak-Artemovsky, whom the Russian government was exhorted to abide because he was an excellent educator. In 1818, however, the Muscovites won out. The College was closed down and the program of the theological department was lowered to the level of the Orthodox seminaries typical of Russia proper. (The motto was: "Priests, need not be too educated.") The Englishman Robert Bremner, who visited Kharkiv and called it "The capital of Ukraine," referred to Kharkiv University as an old Kozak University, mistaking it for the old college founded in 1726 at the time of the Kozak state and by Kozak efforts and funds.

Another casualty was the Academia Stephaniana in Vilnius, founded in 1570. By 1586 it had had 78 professors and 700 students. It was shut down after the annexation of Vilnius by Russia in 1795, and the professors and students dispersed.¹⁹

Upon its founding in 1755, the oldest Moscow University had three faculties: 1) Juridical — three professors: general jurisprudence, Russian jurisprudence, politics; 2) Medicine — three professors: chemistry, natural sciences, medical pathology; 3) Philosophy — four professors: philosophy, physics, oratory, world and Russian history. Lectures were given in Latin five times weekly. The course of study spanned three years. Students were accepted by special examinations prepared by the professors themselves. Upon completion of the course — few did — the students were taken into government service. More frequently, students entered government service after only one or two years of studies at the university, a practice which lasted several decades.

Of the ten professors at the university when it opened, seven were Germans, two were Ukrainians (N. N. Popovsky — literature, Danilo Savich — physics, astronomy, chemistry) and one was Russian. In the years up to 1787 several Ukrainians joined the faculty: D.N. Sinkovsky — philosophy; M. I. Pankevich — physics, astro-

nomy; V. K. Arshensky, who had studied at the Kievan Academy and at Italy's Padua University, where he obtained his doctorate in mathematics; F. K. Kurika and F. G. Polikovsky, both of whom had studied at the Kievan Academy and at Leyden University (Holland), where they had won their doctorates in medicine.

The number of students, however, began to drop. In time lectures were given on not more than 35 days out of the year. The student body shrank to one per faculty. One student, Count S. R. Vorontsov, in a letter (1765) imploring his father to take him and his brother out of the university, wrote: "They don't know anything at all and we don't learn anything." Since this protest came from the son of a court noble, an inquiry by Catherine II followed. The professors replied the main reason for the decline of the university was that the director, a government appointee, not being "either a scholar or a professor puts many obstacles" in the way of instruction. They suggested that the rector and faculty heads be selected from among the professors, that students not be called to state service until they had completed the full course "since only harm to the Russian empire and throne can come from half-educated officials," that government posts be filled in accordance with academic achievement rather than noble birth, and that a network of secondary schools be set up for the whole population, not merely for the nobility. This thoroughgoing response earned the staff a reprimand; it had not been asked to delve into "affairs of the state."

From the very first the university's students were very poorly prepared to attend lectures. Of some help was the setting up in 1779 of a "noble pension" to train children of the nobility. The University almost closed entirely with the appearance on May 2, 1785, of Catherine II's "Charter of the Gentry," which released the nobility from compulsory civil and military service. The nobility thereby lost its sole motivation for pursuing an education. The number of students dropped catastrophically to 15. Fortunately, representatives of other classes, predominantly the clerical and merchant, foresightedly had been admitted in accordance with the counsel of M. V. Lomonosov, M. M. Kheraskov and G. A. Rozumovsky. In 1791, by *ukase* of Catherine II, the university was given the right to award a medical degree to those who completed the course of study of the medical faculty, provided the aspirants passed an examination given by medico-members of the Academy of Sciences and the Medical Collegium (Ministry). However, the number of university graduates continued to decline. From 1793 until 1804 the university was moribund.

In 1804, at which time ministries were set up in the Russian empire, the university was taken from the management of the Ruling Senate and subordinated to the Ministry of Public Education. From its opening in 1755 until 1779 the funds allotted it by the state amounted to 10,000 rubles a year, a very considerable sum for those times. From 1779 to 1804, this amount increased to a munificent annual sum of 50,000 rubles.

After the annexation by the Russian empire of extensive territories with ethnically alien populations — the Ukrainian in 1775 and 1793, the Byelorussian in 1772 and 1793, the Polish in 1795, the Lithuanian in 1793, the Estonian and Latvian in 1701 and 1710 — the Empire was made up of numerous peoples whose nobility was placed by the conquerors on an equal footing in rights with the Russian nobility. The nobility of the new territories was incomparably more cultivated and educated than the Great Russian since, from schooling on, they had been an integral part of the West. Inevitably, these non-Russian nobles entered the service of Russian centralism and within a relatively short time had filled all the top government posts. To do away with this superiority over the nobility of the Muscovites, Catherine II's son, Emperor Paul, in 1798 forbade his subjects to go abroad to study. This ban was also extended to the Baltic Germans, the titled descendants of the Livonian knights who up to the Revolution of 1917 enjoyed the specially attentive patronage of the Russian emperors.

After Peter I shut down the Academy in Dorpat in 1710, the German Baltic nobles had sent their children to German universities. Paul offered the Baltic Germans their own university with instruction in the German language, stipulating that a plan and charter for it be presented to him as soon as possible. On March 12, 1801, Paul was murdered by palace conspirators. The new emperor, Alexander I, decided to go ahead with a university in Dorpat for the Baltic Germans.

This Dorpat University (subsequently renamed Yuryev) from its very inception up to the introduction of instruction in the Russian language in 1889, was something in the way of an institute for raising the qualifications of professors for Moscow University (and for the other universities in Russia as well). A group of professors was sent from Moscow University to Dorpat for this end in 1808. Such noted Moscow University professors as N. I. Pirogov, the jurists P. G. Redkin and N. M. Krylov, who were sent there in 1822, and many others were trained at Dorpat University. Although

many went annually to Dorpat for this purpose, the important groups — almost the whole professorial staff — went in two groups, one half in 1827, the other in 1828.

The Moscow professors complained that their Dorpat colleagues treated them as ordinary students. The Germans particularly plagued the Muscovites with Latin. Affecting the universities of Moscow, Kazan, and Kharkiv, and upon its opening in 1819, that of Petersburg, the statute of 1804 required not only lecturing in Latin but also its use during all practical studies with the students. According to these statutes worked out by the Ministry of Public Education, the number of faculties was increased to four: 1) Ethical and Political Sciences; 2) Physical and Mathematical Sciences, 3) Medical Sciences and 4) Philological Sciences. The number of chairs was increased from ten to twenty-eight. The period of study remained three years. The university obtained the right to elect its rector and deans and also obtained some autonomy.

Faced with Napoleon's occupation of Moscow, I. A. Heim, the rector of the university, and its professors left for Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky), where the most valuable items of the university's library and museum were shipped. The student body, which then numbered 215 individuals, dispersed or entered partisan detachments. All the university's buildings and property were burned to the ground while Napoleon's troops were in Moscow. Studies were resumed on August 17, 1813, without benefit of any textbooks or manuals, in temporary quarters scattered over the city. Mustered were 129 students. New university buildings were erected in the period 1816-1819. The students, increasing slightly in number each year, came from the middle-class — the clergy, the merchant class and intellectuals (government officials). The university remained barred to the peasantry, craftsmen, workers, and petty merchants. But the students' inadequacies of proper preparation and lack among the nobility of that day of an aspiration for education had an unfavorable effect on the number of students and on the teaching.

In 1835 a new statute was introduced, the principal purpose of which was to make access to the university even more difficult. The number of chairs was increased from 28 to 35 and the course of instruction extended to four years. Use of instruction in the Russian language, which had equalled that of Latin, acquired increasing importance with each year. The 1835 statute was successful in achieving its aim — by 1836 there were only 438 students as against 879 in 1825. In 1841 the Ministry of Public Education decided to

ease the restrictions and issue a supplementary interpretation in accordance with which rectors were appointed from among the professors and often from the same university. The results were an improvement in the teaching and academic activity of the universities and an increase in the number of students, which in 1848 reached 1,168 at Moscow University.

Particularly outstanding among the professors during this period were N. I. Pirogov (medicine), P. S. Shchepkin (mathematics), M. N. Krylov (Jurisprudence), M. P. Pogodin (history); and the following Ukrainians: I. A. Dvihubsky, who had studied at the Kievan Academy, Ye. A. Linovsky, M.A. Maksymovich (natural sciences); M.T. Kachenovsky (history); Th. I. Barsuk (Moiseyev "Moyza"), who had studied at the Kievan Academy and who had been the first to obtain the degree of Doctor of Medicine at Moscow University (in 1793), E. O. Mukhin (real name Mukha) and I. F. Vensovich, both of whom had studied at Kharkiv College, I. K. Tikhonovich, G. A. Ryasovsky, I. V. Varvinsky, who had received his degree of Doctor of Medicine at Dorpat University, V. P. Rizenko, who had studied at the Kievan Academy, A. A. Iovsky (medicine); P. A. Iovsky, P. G. Redkin (jurisprudence); P. K. Sckhatsky, A. F. Timkovsky, O. M. Bodyansky (philology); I. S. Andreyevsky, who had studied at the Kievan Academy and at the University of Pisa where he obtained his doctorate; V. A. Zahorsky, A. A. Antonsky Prokopovich, who had studied at the Kievan Academy and who served as rector of Moscow University in the years 1817-1828 ("He was a native of Ukraine, which had given Moscow university so many outstanding professors," wrote his biographer); K. A. Zalozetsky and Ya. N. Kalinovsky (agronomy).

The existing academic societies at the time were the Free Russian Assembly (founded by Messalino in 1771) and the Friendly Academic Society (founded by J. G. Schwartz in 1782). Now making their appearance were the Society of History and Russian Antiquities (founded by A.S. Schletzer in 1804), the Society of Friends of Science and Learning (founded in 1789), the Society of Natural Experimenters (founded by I. A. Dvihubsky) and the Society of Medical Sciences (founded by E. O. Mukhin in 1805).

By 1804 the university was receiving annually 130,000 rubles from the state. By 1837 the state was allotting 370,000 rubles in currency annually, which calculated in silver was 105,714 rubles. (Calculations were made both in currency and in silver as a con-

sequence of the issuance of an enormous quantity of bank notes after Napoleon's invasion.)

Students first paid tuition in 1817: 28 rubles and 57 kopecks in silver. By 1845 the tuition had become 40 rubles in silver, a substantial sum for the times.

"The forties and fifties of the nineteenth century were an epoch of the flowering of free academic thought in Moscow University," a historian remarks. The case of Professor O. M. Bodyansky is a typical example of this "freedom" of academic thought.

In 1588 Queen Elizabeth of England had sent Giles Fletcher, her authorized minister to Moscow, to conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce. Fletcher spent the years 1588 and 1589 in Moscow. After returning to England, he published in London a work about the Muscovites and their state. In 1848 Bodyansky, member and academic secretary of the Society of History and Russian Antiquities, translated Fletcher's book into Russian and read the manuscript at a general meeting of the Society with the aim of having it published. It was well received and it was published. Subsequently, Bodyansky was discharged from his post as academic secretary and was expelled from the Society "for an attempt to cast aspersions on the past of our people and of the Muscovite state." Moreover, the government ordered the brilliant professor to be transferred to Kazan University as punishment. When Bodyansky refused to go to Kazan, he was deprived of his title of professor and dismissed from Moscow University. His translation of Fletcher's work was reprinted in 1911 without any changes as a separate booklet in a limited number of copies.

This period really is an epoch of "unique" university activity that has not ceased even in our time. It was at this time, for instance, that the old Russian political concept of Moscow as the Third Rome, based on religion, was perfected.

Moscow University was also the center of Moscow's so-called Slavophilism, an undisguised form of Russian great-power expansionism. These "Slavophiles" did not display any genuine sympathy for the Slavic peoples. To justify their Russification intentions they persisted in calling all the Slavic peoples "Slovenian tribes," i. e. parts of the "great Slavic Russian people," in spite of the fact that the Muscovites (Russians) descended from a medley of Finnish and Turkish tribes with a very small number of Slavic elements.

In 1847 T. H. Shevchenko, P. A. Kulish, M. I. Kostomarov and others founded in Kiev the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood, which ad-

vocated equality in the cultural and political life of all the Slavic peoples, large and small, in a future all-Slavic federated state. The Moscow "Slavophiles" correctly viewed this Brotherhood as a means "to divide Russia" and "an attempt to belittle the primacy of the Muscovites." A. S. Khomiakov, one of the founders of Moscow "Slavophilism," wrote of the Brotherhood: "We see in it only backwardness, nonsense, dullness and stupidity."

In accordance with the political views of the Moscow "Slavophiles," the foundation of Russia was to be Orthodoxy, autocratic monarchical absolutism and nationalism. Social life was to be associated with the Russian *obshchina* and *mir* (commune and village community — the prototype of the present-day kolkhoz), which in their opinion were the same as the Christian communes of the early centuries of Christianity, except that the early Christians considered the Roman pagan state an alien, external factor, while in Russia the state authority resided in the person of the Czar, the anointed sovereign of God who was to be accepted unconditionally as having descended from God.

"Doubt was raised," wrote M. N. Katkov, "only about the 'Slovenian tribes' of the Catholic faith — the Poles, Slovaks, Czechs, Kashubians, Lusatian Serbs, Slovenes, Croats and the *Khokhols* (Russian contemptuous name for Ukrainians) — who had been corrupted by the Uniate Church and who despite their reunion with Orthodoxy (compulsory in 1839 — N. K.) continue like wolves to look into the forest."

"Without Orthodoxy," Katkov added, "the Russian people will not manage to absorb all the Slavic tribes and to create a single nationality." But A. S. Khomiakov already had predicted that "all Slavic rivers will flow together into the Russian sea."

In 1856 A. A. Grigoryev wrote: "We are convinced only of the special superiority of the Russian people over other peoples of the world. . ." K. S. Aksakov also devoted a great deal of space to the exaltation of the Russian people not only in comparison with the Slavs but also with the peoples of the whole world. K. M. Leontyev wrote: "For the Russian people to triumph it is necessary 'to freeze' the other peoples of Russia," i. e., to keep down their cultural and economic development.

In the 1870's and 1880's "Slavophile" A. Aksakov saw the greatness of the Russian people in the unshakability of the autocratic monarchical absolutism, easily finding followers in professors K. P.

Pobedonostsev, subsequent Prime Minister who has gone down in history as the most reactionary minister of Russia, and V. A. Gringmut, the ideologist of the Russian Black Reaction.

Since merchants of Russian nationality were recognized as the basis of the "Great Russian People" and the grandeur of Russia, it was necessary to contribute in every possible way to increase their number and to enrich them by expanding their field of activity in the world market.

Turkey, which held in its hands the straits leading to that artery of world commerce, the Mediterranean Sea, was a difficult barrier to surmount. P. N. Milyukov, a professor at Moscow University, found a convenient and pious excuse for the planned conquest of Constantinople and the straits: "To restore the Cross to St. Sophia in Constantinople — the Holy Place of Orthodox Christianity defiled by the infidel Turks."

In addition to those already mentioned many other professors and persons educated at Moscow University, such as professors I. D. Belyayev and A. N. Popov, took part in this activity.

In Soviet times, in order to justify and extol all the pre-revolutionary undertakings aimed at extending and strengthening Russian imperialism and Russification, the Moscow 'Slavophiles' are depicted as defenders of the political and cultural independence of all the Slavic peoples, especially the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Poles. Toward this end the Slavophiles are deliberately identified with the members of the Kievan Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood, which is presented as a branch of Moscow "Slavophilism," because the members of the Brotherhood "viewed the study of the ethnography, folklore and culture of the Slavic peoples as did the 'Slavophiles.'"

The old "Slavophile" policy to reduce the individual, really Slavic peoples to tribes of the Russian people is being continued in Moscow University even today. For these purposes B. L. Grekov sees as common to all Slavic peoples "the spirit of the Russian people," and A. M. Pankratova ascribes the outstanding lineaments of these peoples solely to the influence of Russian figures. An example is her assertion that "N. Chernyshevsky and N. Dobrolyubov had a great influence on the works of T. H. Shevchenko," although Chernyshevsky was only eleven years old and Dobrolyubov three when Shevchenko's best works came off the press in the early spring of 1840.

This is how the epoch of the 1840's and 1850's was reflected in all the subsequent activity of Moscow University, although this

period in the life of the other universities of the state was one of intense reaction and police pressure.

Despite "the epoch of flowering," the number of students in 1859 had decreased to 806 as against 1, 168 in 1839. In other universities of the state the decrease in students was relatively far less.

In 1863 a new university statute went into force. It gave the universities the broadest autonomy and complete self-administration, headed by a council of professors. Before drawing up this statute, the Ministry asked the opinion of the professors of all the universities about admitting women to the universities. The Petersburg, Kharkiv, Kazan and Kiev universities spoke up in favor of their admission. Moscow University was opposed because "by imperial law women were not to be admitted to state service."

In accordance with the statute the council of professors became the main and completely independent organ of administration of the university. The staff of Moscow University took advantage of that statute; they formed themselves into a tight self-perpetrating group, despite the unsuccessful opposition of the better but extremely small element headed by Prof. N. I. Pirogov. It became impossible for new persons to get into this closed circle, particularly since the statute gave the staff of the university the right to elect the rector, vice-rector, deans and other administrative personnel, to invite new individuals to occupy professorial posts and also to open new and abolish old chairs as well as to merge them as they saw fit. According to the statute, there were to be 53 chairs with 57 professors. Many new staff members appeared as professors in the university. Some were relatives of staff members with little or no academic background. Educational qualifications for admittance to the university were greatly lowered.

The quality of teaching worsened. The practice of hiring docents as instructors and candidates for vacant professorial posts on the basis of free competition was abolished by the council of professors. Candidates selected by the professors — professors' sons and in-laws, who frequently had no ability to teach — were sent abroad on state funds for training as professors. The suitability of these candidates for academic activity may be judged from the fact that during a ten-year-period (1863-1874) only 20 of the 68 persons sent abroad by the staff of Moscow University for such training proved to be fit for professorial work.

The frequent student disturbances after the introduction of this statute considerably alienated the professorial staff from the

student body, which had been very poorly trained (as was so often the case in Russia before the revolution in 1917) in the inadequate secondary schools.

The students came from the poorer classes of the population. In Moscow University at this time the number of students who did not have enough money for living expenses made up 27 per cent of the student body, a figure which was even higher in other universities. (In Odessa University the figure was 80 per cent.) Demands for an equitable everyday existence were always put forward at these student demonstrations: stipends for needy students, unhindered organization of student societies, abolition of restrictions on educational qualifications by further easing of entrance requirements, liberalization of admission to government service, abolition of the restrictions on admission of women and an unlimited admission of Jews to the universities.

The reply always was that the function of the universities was to prepare officials for state service, and that persons finishing the universities had to match the need, that is, since Russia is a Christian and predominantly Orthodox country, the proportion of Jews in the universities could not be increased at the expense of Christians. Also, non-Christians and women by imperial law could not be admitted to state service, and the tax burden imposed on the population was already great and unrestricted issuance of stipends would increase it intolerably further.

These considerations caused the government organs to consider changing the 1863 statute.

The result was the new statute of 1884, whose primary aim was the limitation of academic autonomy and self-administration of the universities. It boiled down to confirmation by the ministry of the rector, vice-rector, deans, and other administrative persons and professors selected by the professorial staff of the university, to the raising of educational qualifications for admittance to the university, for which purpose an entrance examination was introduced, to the limiting of the number of needy students to the most gifted and capable, to the issuing of stipends only to those needy students who did well in their studies, to making attendance at a certain minimum of lectures mandatory, to compulsory testing when going on to the next course, to a compulsory state examination written independently of the university by special commissions and given upon completion of the full course in the university, and to the revival of the practice of hiring docents and definition of their hon-

orarium. This statute was applied to Dorpat University as well, which had remained on the sidelines ever since its opening, although the situation that had called forth the 1884 statute was not typical of it. The introduction in 1889 of Russian instead of German as the teaching language, finally "froze."

A very high proportion — which encompassed the best — of the professors of Dorpat University, who were not fluent in or did not want to use Russian, left for universities in Germany. The supremacy of Moscow University in the empire was conclusively assured. It was easily attained, since as far as material support goes it was incomparably better off than the rest of the empire's universities and received incomparably greater sums from the exchequer. Moscow University had the largest number of students, as much as 26 per cent of the total university student body in the empire. In 1900 the state's expenditure per student, apart from stipends, was 334 rubles. In other universities the expenditure per student was: Petersburg — 195 rubles, Kiev — 209 rubles, Yuryev (in 1889 Dorpat University was renamed for Yuryev) — 292 rubles, Warsaw — 321 rubles, Kharkiv — 463 rubles, Odessa — 572 rubles, Kazan — 581 rubles, and Tomsk — 808 rubles. (The higher expenditure at the latter four universities resulted from their very small number of students.) The greatest expenditures per student in that year were made at one-faculty universities designed for Russian aristocrats and nobles: Crown Prince Nicholas Lyceum — 5,600 rubles, School of Jurisprudence — 3,785 rubles, Emperor Alexander Lyceum — 2,800 rubles, St. Petersburg Historico-Philological and Nezhin Prince Bezborodko Historico-Philological Institutes — 1,800 rubles for each, and the Demidovsky Juridical Lyceum — 1,500 rubles.

Having the greatest facilities at its disposal, Moscow University from olden times has widely attracted and held renowned professors from other universities of the state, thereby creating for itself the reputation of being the leading university. This stature is persistently stressed in Soviet times, apparently in order to convince the peoples of the Soviet Union of the beneficial influence of the "advanced learning of the Russian people." Listings therefore of Moscow University professors, particularly scientists and scholars known abroad, are quite frequently encountered. Sometimes, however, the individuals listed have never had any connection with the university.

The following professors of this period were notable: V. V. Markovnikov, chemistry; M. N. Bogdanov, M. A. Menzbir, D. N. Anu-

chin, zoology; A. G. Stoletov, I. M. Sechenov, physiology; A. I. Chuprov, economics; and the Ukrainians: N. I. Storozhenko, Western European literature; I. V. Vernadsky, I. I. Yanzhul, economics; V. O., Kovalevsky, geology; K. Ya. Mlodzievsky, L. Z. Morokhovets, A. Ya. Danilevsky, medicine and physiology; M. M. Kovalevsky, international law (who was dismissed from the university by the governmental authorities, after which he served as lecturer at Stockholm and Oxford University).

After the emancipation of the serfs and the reforms (1861-1870) students from the lower, taxed, classes began to appear at the universities. Until 1891 only the lower classes, peasants, craftsmen, lesser merchants and workers, were taxed in the Russian empire. Hence the disdainful name for those classes in the Russian language is "podatnye sosloviya," the taxpaying classes. To enter the university, a member of those classes had to get a "release permission" from his class. This was not readily given since it necessitated an increase in taxes on those who remained in the "obshchina."

Under the leadership of Prof. L. Z. Morokhovets, in 1890-1892 a Physiological Institute of the university was set up. It came to be considered the best of its kind in the world. Morokhovets also organized the Society of Lovers of the Natural Sciences, the Society of Anthropology and Ethnography, and the Physiological Society.

From year to year the number of students increased. In 1871 there were 1,543; in 1880 — 1,643; in 1890 — 3,471; in 1896 — 4,147; in 1900 — 4,407. Funds also increased each year. In 1895 the university received state funds in the sum of 976,815 rubles and a further sum of 178,440 rubles from students (for the right to study and so forth). In addition, the university had its own capital, amassed from contributions in preceding years, of 2,895,596 rubles. In 1904 the state furnished 1,205,815 rubles to the university.

The revolution of 1905 had more serious consequences for Moscow University than for others in the state. During the early days of government confusion, the most radical segment of the Moscow professors arbitrarily abrogated the operative 1884 statute and began to revive autonomy in accordance with the 1863 statute. Again there appeared students with extremely poor theoretical training, but with extremely leftist political views. These students considered their main task to be engaged not in learning but in revolutionary activity. The university was transformed into a hotbed of revolutionary action. When the rumpus was over, the government demanded that the 1884 statute be observed. L. A. Kasso, the new

minister and a former Moscow professor, discharged the most radically-oriented professors and ordered the expulsion of about 2,000 students who were both unqualified and revolutionary-minded. He also demanded that the 1884 statute be observed, in particular the right of the ministry to confirm the rector chosen. In protest, more than 125 professors, docents, and assistants left the university.

Nevertheless, the number of students continued to increase as did state allocations to the university. On the eve of the revolution of 1905 there were 4,496 students. In 1912 there were 9,242; in 1914 — 9,892; and in 1916 — on the eve of the revolution of 1917 — 11,181 students. At that time there were 80 professors, 228 docents, and 35 lecturers. The state allotted the university 1,581,976 rubles for the academic year 1916-1917. In addition, the university's capital swelled to 4,997,983 rubles. The university now had an astronomical observatory, a zoological garden, a botanical garden, a library, eleven learning institutes and museums, and eleven scientific societies. At that time Moscow University, like all others, operated under the 1884 statute, to which only insignificant amendments and changes had been made.

After the revolution of 1917 Moscow University, like all others on the territory of the Soviet Union, was subjected to endless reorganizations and reforms. Instead of the four faculties existing before the revolution (physico-mathematical, medical, historico-philological and juridical), in 1923 three faculties were set up: physics and mathematics, with divisions of physics, chemistry, mathematics, biology, and geology; medicine; and the social sciences, with divisions of economics, law, foreign relations, public pedagogics, literature and languages, and statistics. 1925 saw a new reorganization with four faculties: physics and mathematics; medicine; Soviet law; and ethnology. Another reorganization in 1930 produced five faculties: physics and mathematics; biology; Soviet law; philology; and literature. In 1930 the medical faculty was detached from the university as a separate and independent institute; and in 1931 the faculty of Soviet law and the geology division of the physics and mathematics faculty also became independent. In 1932 the faculties were abolished and the university was broken down into eight divisions: physics; soils; geography; botany; zoology; mechanics; astronomy, and chemistry. In 1934 a governmental decree appeared ordering all institutions of learning to teach the history of the USSR and world history, which had been abolished after the revolution as a

bourgeois science. The decree was promulgated because it had been decided to educate young people in the patriotic spirit on the basis of expansionism and Russian chauvinism. The slogan that had reigned until then, "The proletariat has no homeland," had already produced fruits which were expressed in an unwillingness to defend the regime. Therefore, history won the right of citizenship within the walls of the university; and a division of history was opened. After another series of reorganizations, the university in 1954 had the following twelve faculties; mechanics, along with mathematics; physics; chemistry; biology and soils; geography; geology; history; physiology; philosophy; economics; jurisprudence; journalism.

The university also underwent great changes in its teaching staff. Some of those who had remained after the October revolution were repressed. Gradually, new people were brought in to fill vacant professorial posts and the training of new "Soviet cadres" began.

In 1936-38, eleven per cent of the new individuals being trained as university professors were Communists. The proportion of Communist professors at the university increased from year to year; and just before the war (1941) only half of the staff was non-Party. Since World War II non-Party professors have been a rarity in the faculties.

Preparation of students for studies at the university improved markedly each year. Instead of the semi-literates sent by the trade unions in 1932, students largely from ten-year schools appeared. By 1936-37 the level of knowledge of those entering was more than adequate. On the negative side in comparison with prerevolutionary times, there was a poor knowledge of foreign languages, literature and history and a complete ignorance of universal history. Instead, knowledge in the fields of mathematics, chemistry, physics and the natural sciences was incomparably greater.

Ninety per cent of the university students lived in special student dormitories, a development considered by the students to be an achievement of the revolution and the Soviet regime, although right up until the end of the 1890's, when the dormitories were closed, their ancestors were forever revolting against dormitories, viewing them as a means of police constraint. Moscow University has continued to play its role in Russian expansionism.

After the war of 1941-45 admittance to the universities, which are less attractive to young people than the more profitable specialized technical institutes, was completely closed to young people

of the peasantry and the working class. Their lot at best has remained teachers' institutes and schools connected with farming and animal husbandry.

Although Moscow University possesses impressive attributes which are always set forth before the eyes of foreigners, at the present time it has no autonomy or self-administration. The rector is "elected" for an indefinite term from a one-man slate, a professor-Communist proposed by the university's Communist organization. This candidate obtains a preliminary recommendation from the Section of Cadres of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. Appointments to all other posts are made by the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR, which replaced the former Committee for Higher Education after the Second World War.

In 1954 the university had 915 professors, and 980 docents, lecturers and assistants.

In 1930 there were 3,057 students; in 1937 — 4,455; in 1954 — about 13,200 and 4,600 so-called "correspondents," who do not attend lectures nor use the laboratories but merely take examinations. This number represents 57 different nationalities of the Soviet Union. It will be these students' duty to persuade their peoples that Russian science and learning is the "most advanced" and that the Russian people are their true friend and defender.

The university's own funds of about 5,000,000 rubles from contributions were confiscated after the revolution. The university is, like all other institutions of learning in the Soviet Union, wholly maintained by the state. In 1937 the state allocated to the university 23,414,000 rubles, not too large a sum considering that the value of the ruble in that year was about 1/30 that of 1914.

In the last decades before the revolution and in post-revolutionary times the following professors have been outstanding: N. Ye. Zhukovsky, aerodynamics; S. A. Chaplygin, aero- and hydrodynamics; A. D. Arkhangelsky and A. P. Pavlov, geology; A. S. Belopolsky, astronomy; P. I. Stepanov and S. L. Sobolev, mathematics; K. A. Timiryazev, physiology; and professors of Ukrainian origin: A. P. Karpinsky, geology (he is the president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR); N. D. Zelinsky, chemistry; V. I. Vernadsky, geochemistry; N. N. Burdenko and A. A. Kissel, medicine; V. E. Hrabar, international law; I. E. Hrabar, fine arts.

Moscow University's services to the Russian people in their age-old aspirations have been enormous and incalculable; its role is more important than ever.

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BOOK REVIEWS

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN PRACTICE. The Contemporary Soviet Union Series: Institutions and Policies. Edited by Robert Conquest. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York-Washington, 1967, pp. 160.

One of the most important problems which has been plaguing the USSR ever since its inception is the presence of almost two scores of distinct nationalities and ethnic groups within the confines of the present Soviet Russian empire. Indeed, the search for a workable nationality policy has been a major preoccupation of the Kremlin. It is true that the Soviet government is repeatedly claiming that it has found a "just solution" to the nationalities question, and it is boasting that the Soviet constitution assures all the non-Russian nations the full guarantee of their rights, even to the extent of their seceding from the USSR.

Yet there exists abundant evidence that nationalist loyalties of the non-Russian nations remain firmly entrenched among the nations of the USSR, despite constant and, at times, ruthless persecution by the Soviet government.

Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, compiled and edited by Robert Conquest, is a well-documented survey of Soviet nationalities policy in theory and practice, from Lenin's 1903 Party program to the present. The book was compiled by a prominent international authority on Soviet affairs. Robert Conquest is an English poet and political writer, and a former Research Fellow in Soviet affairs at the London School of Economics. Among his works are *Common Sense About Russia*, *The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*, *The Pasternak Affair*, *Russia After Khrushchev* and above all *The Great Terror*. One can see that his credentials for writing this important volume are more than excellent.

The volume embraces only five chapters, heavily-studded with references based almost entirely on Soviet sources. These chapters are "Pre-Revolutionary Theory on the Nationalities Question," "The Formation of the USSR," "The First Years of Soviet Rule," "The Creation of Soviet Nations" and "The Sovereignty of the Union Republics." There is an Editor's Preface, an Introduction, two Appendices and a very extensive bibliography.

Author Conquest points out the basic fallacy of the Marxist view, to the effect that the nation is a result of "rising capitalism," and Lenin claimed that the nation, a "temporary phenomenon," will give way to a world community with a single culture and language. But the entire history of the Soviet state has utterly disproved this Marxist precept as a sociological validity. The failure of the Kremlin to "fuse" the non-Russian nations into one "world nation" (Russian in essence, undoubtedly) is quite plain, if we realize that allegiance to one's "nation" requires no official propaganda; it resides in the simple realities of one's language, culture, and land and history. In 1917-18, writes Conquest, it became clear that the non-Russian nations sought not

merely cultural but also political expression. "In the largest minority area, the Ukraine, where there had previously been little national sentiment, a movement sprang up which is to this day perhaps the most refractory of all elements on the Soviet scene..."

Lenin declared that the right of nations to self-determination was to be understood solely in terms of their right to political self-determination, i.e. to secession and the formation of independent states, and this formula formed the basis of the *Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia*, issued by the Soviet government on November 15, 1917. This declaration enunciated the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of the Czarist empire, their right to self-determination, including secession, and the establishment of independent states. The formula also provided for the abolition of national and religious privileges and guaranteed the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups. These principles were officially declared to be the core of the Communist Party's program when the dictatorship of the proletariat was in force, and now, when a new stage is held to have been reached, they are still said to be the fundamental doctrine guiding all Soviet legislation on "national sovereignty" of the Union Republics.

The Soviet Russian brand of self-determination was adopted as a necessity in view of the rising tide of nationalism in Eastern Europe. The overthrow of the Czarist regime in February, 1917 provoked the full disintegration of the Russian empire; numerous non-Russian governments and nationalist parties sprang into being and proclaimed their independence, which Lenin and his Bolshevik associate leaders had to recognize.

Lenin, it is to be recalled, was an ardent advocate of Communist-style "self-determination" and accused the Russians of chauvinism and mistreatment of the non-Russians. He said that the "freedom of secession from the Union... will prove to be a mere scrap of paper incapable of protecting the other nationalities from the inroads of that truly Russian type, the Great Russian chauvinist, essentially a scoundrel and a bully, which is the typical Russian bureaucrat..."

But Lenin's "self-determination" was merely an expedient slogan to keep the non-Russian countries under the control of Moscow. He believed that the Soviet state should be centralized:

"Our Socialist Republic has done and is continuing to do everything possible for implementing the right of self-determination for Finland, Ukraine, etc. But if the concrete position that has arisen is such that the existence of the Socialist Republic is endangered at a given moment in respect to an infringement of the right to self-determination,... then it stands to reason that the interests of the preservation of the Socialist Republic must take preference..."

Throughout the whole history of the USSR, the conflict between the dogma of the Communist Party (identified more and more closely with Russian nationalism) and non-Russian nationalisms was one of the most important issues of Soviet domestic policies, an issue which grew in strength after the death of Stalin in 1953 and the Khrushchev policies of "de-Stalinization." The evolution of events, both in the satellite countries and in the USSR, went contrary to the official pronouncements of the Party leadership. For many years the Party tried to forge a new "Soviet man," a new "Soviet culture and patriotism," but to no avail. In 1961 the Party adopted a series of measures to strengthen the rule of the Russian element over the non-Russian nations:

it accepted the population shifts — that is Russian immigration into the non-Russian republics; the de-nationalizing of the local Party and State leaderships; the "voluntary" acceptance of the Russian language as the teaching language, and the like.

The book provides a lucid picture of Moscow's attempts at "integration" of the non-Russian nations into one "Soviet (Russian) nation"; it also gives an insight into the Communist Party's role in the process of Russification policies — all of which provokes resentment and opposition on the part of the non-Russian nations.

Author Conquest is well at home as far as Ukraine is concerned. He quotes Ukrainian books, journals and newspapers published in Ukraine, and enumerates a number of prominent Ukrainian Communists and Ukrainian poets, writers and literary critics who were executed or forced to commit "suicide" as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists."

It is regretted, although it is no fault of the author — that *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice*, appeared in 1967, before a series of publications of persecuted Ukrainian intellectuals in Ukraine became available in the West. Such books as *The Chornovil Papers* by Vyacheslav Chornovil and *Internationalism or Russification?* by Ivan Dzyuba, and others, fully support Conquest's penetrating analysis of the perfidious "Soviet nationalities policies."

This zig-zag Soviet Russian policy is well described in the chapter on the efforts of the Soviet Russian leadership to create new "nations" in the USSR by the reconstruction of new nationality languages, and the outright suppression. Such books as *The Chornovil Papers* by Vyacheslav Chornovil and *Internationalism or Russification?* by Ivan Dzyuba, and others, fully support Conquest's penetrating analysis of the perfidious "Soviet nationalities policies."

Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice is an objective, unemotional account and analysis of the very important issue in the USSR — the non-Russian nations, which are forced into a "Soviet federalism" against their will. It is a straightforward and well-balanced book, dealing with the policies and practical implementation of the Communist Party's program as regards the subjugated non-Russian peoples in the USSR.

The nationality problem in the USSR has indeed proved to be the Gordian knot of the Kremlin. Despite 50 years of Soviet power, no solutions have been found. Any Soviet constitutional and cultural arrangements with respect to the non-Russian nations proved to be wholly unsatisfactory in the forties when whole nations had to be arrested and deported under the pretext of mass collaboration with the Germans.

In the postwar era every advanced country or empire has faced one of its most pressing problems, the demand for independence by people previously ruled by colonial power. The Soviet Union is unique in having succeeded in delaying this confrontation by sheer administrative and police power. But, it has yet to face the problem and solve it on a political plane.

In this respect, Robert Conquest has contributed immensely toward understanding of the problem by Western statesmen and the journalistic and academic worlds.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY; Three Essays, By Henry A. Kissinger, (New York: Norton, 1969), 143 pp.

This slim volume is essentially a reprint of three articles written by Mr. Kissinger in *Daedalus* (1966), *Agenda for the Nation* (1968), and *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1969). The first essay is entitled "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy." In it the author contrasts the pragmatic tradition in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy with the ideological approach of the USSR, dwelling on the dangers inherent in excessive empiricism and unchecked ideological fervor.

Mr. Kissinger says of Soviet foreign policy: "When there is a choice between Western good will or a physical gain, the pressures to choose the latter have been overwhelming... The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered by the prospect of undermining the Western position in the Middle East. The many overtures of the Kennedy administration were rebuffed until the Cuba missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not in fact favorable for a test of strength." He believes that it is inherent in the nature of the Soviet system to be hostile: "Nothing in the personal experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to accept protestations of good will at face value. Suspiciousness is inherent in their domestic position. It is unlikely that their attitude toward the outside world is more benign than toward their own colleagues or that they would expect more consideration from it."

The author contrasts constitutional and totalitarian systems: the West, he says, developed pluralism because of the existence of independent churches, the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, an emerging bourgeoisie, a stalemate in religious wars imposing tolerance, and the various by-products of industrialization. Communism, he points out, has never succeeded in the industrialized West. The reason is that industrialization, in its early stages, "multiplies dislocations." "It requires a system of values which makes the sacrifices involved in capital formation tolerable and which furnishes some integrating principles to contain psychological frustrations."

The ironic feature about Marxism, according to Kissinger, is that it is accepted only where it does not exist: in some new countries and among protest movements of the advanced democratic countries: "Its philosophy has totally failed to inspire the younger generation in Communist countries, where its bureaucratic reality is obvious."

Kissinger states that leftist critics of U.S. foreign policy "seem incapable of attacking U.S. actions without elevating our opponent (whether it happens to be Mao or Castro or Ho) to a pedestal." But, he says, rightists "presuppose *our* good intentions and conclude that the other side must be perverse in opposing us."

Those in the West who are forever discovering a thaw in the Soviet structure come in for criticism: "The eagerness of many in the West to emphasize the liberalizing implications of Soviet economic trends and to make favorable interpretation of Soviet intentions a test of good faith may have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the Soviet hard-liners. Soviet troops had hardly arrived in Prague when some Western leaders began to insist that the invasion would not affect the quest for detente while others con-

tinued to indicate a nostalgia for high-level meetings." Such attitudes, writes Kissinger, hardly serve "the cause of peace."

His last essay, originally published in *Foreign Affairs*, deals with Vietnam. With respect to the notion of imposing a coalition government on the south, "We must be clear that our involvement in such an effort may well destroy the existing political structure of South Vietnam and thus lead to a Communist takeover." Mutual withdrawal "cannot be treated as a camouflage for a Communist takeover." And if Hanoi insists on total victory, "the war must continue." Any other posture "would destroy the chances of a settlement and encourage Hanoi to wait us out." In that case, "we should seek to achieve as many of our objectives as possible unilaterally." Most importantly, "ending the war honorably is essential for the peace of the world."

LeMoyné College

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

STAUFFENBERG. The Architect of the Famous July 20th Conspiracy to Assassinate Hitler. By Joachim Kramarz. Translated from the German by R. H. Barry. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967, pp. 255.

Fascinating and absorbing are hardly adequate adjectives to describe this highly important work. It is one of the finest analyses that the reviewer has read in connection with a critical episode of World War II. The book is not only for historical interest but also, and more important, a standing warning for the Free World as to the tragic consequences that may result from a deficient understanding of and thus a defective policy toward the substrate empire known as the Soviet Union. This treatment of a German officer who attempted to assassinate Adolf Hitler is deeply tied up with the Russian problem, namely imperio-colonialist engagement and expansionism.

In an exceptionally well written account, Claus Phillip Maria Graf von Stauffenberg is the central figure under examination. A product of German aristocracy, Stauffenberg was the leader in a plot to overthrow the Nazi government by assassinating Hitler. He was the hero of the bomb plot of July 20, 1944, which fell short of its mark and for which the colonel paid with his life at the age of 37. This attempt was not the first during the war. Several were tried in the period from March 1943 on. A bomb placed in Hitler's plane failed to explode in one early endeavor. Others involved direct suicide attempts under cover of presenting new uniform models to Hitler. Captain Axel von dem Bussche was to lunge at the Fuehrer with a bomb under his uniform. Postponements of the model presentations in this case and that of von Kleist only served to delay the final attempt made by Stauffenberg himself in the middle of the following year. In all of this plotting Stauffenberg was a key figure from the start and only by June 1944 did he decide to undertake the task himself. His professional background was essential to the use of the Valkyrie plan as a cover for the conspiratorial plan. The former called for a general re-mobilization in the event of a domestic emergency marked by internal disturbances.

The careful and methodical research done in preparation of this study, extending to the U.S. National Archives in Alexandria, Virginia, shows Stauffenberg as an intelligent, spiritual man who made up his mind in 1942 that

for the good of the German nation, of humanity itself, Hitler and his regime had to go. Significantly, it was the thoroughly stupid Nazi policy in the Soviet Union that brought him to this decision. The continuing conflict between the Wehrmacht and Hitler on other issues intensified this resolve to eliminate the Nazi leader. Two years later, Stauffenberg placed the bomb in Hitler's headquarters at Rastenburg in East Prussia; the attempt failed, and the modest colonel was executed in the courtyard of the German War Ministry on orders of General Fromm, who a few weeks later himself was shot in Hitler's prison.

In the introduction to the study H. R. Trevor-Roper makes several highly pertinent points. For him, Stauffenberg "had both the conviction and the courage of the great tyrannicides of the past." He also points out how history might have changed if the conference had been in the usual underground bunker, if the briefcase with the bomb hadn't been shoved under the table, and if communication with headquarters had been severed and the military junta in Berlin had taken over. The course of history might have been altered considerably. But now for the determining basis of Stauffenberg's decision.

Chapter X on "The Russian Volunteer Formations" is the crucial chapter in the book. The title of it is really not in conformity with its content and raises the question as to the reliability of the translating job. There are numerous discrepancies, though the chapter in general conveys the proper and accurate thrust toward the many nations in the USSR. There is some poppycock about "an offensive in southern Russia," despite the main campaign through Ukraine and into the Caucasus. A bit of confusion is seen in the author's ostensible statement that "a million former Soviet soldiers were serving in Germany" (p. 96); then he talks about "Russian volunteers," and yet on the next page relates the units being formed of Armenians, Georgians and other Caucasian and non-Slav peoples. Whatever this breed may be, it is held that "Pure Russians were at the time not being admitted to the volunteer formations." It would be interesting to see an impure Russian. These few examples are sufficient to show some of the book's weaknesses.

It is a pity that the concepts used do not fit the realities of the USSR situation. And one then wonders who's at fault — Stauffenberg himself, the author or the translator? For instance, in the same chapter Stauffenberg is presented as having "thought it possible that the war against the Soviet Union might be turned into a Russian civil war" (p. 98). That, of course, was a possibility. But didn't Stauffenberg's thoughts go beyond this to the greater probability and actuality of non-Russian wars for independence and in the full spirit of national self-determination, a right that Germany demanded for the Sudetanland. In all of this, the Army leaders had a far clearer picture of the USSR than had their Leader. Hitler literally feared these national unit formations on ideological grounds. On February 10, 1942 Hitler issued an order forbidding any further recruitment. Stauffenberg watered it down in some degree so that when it reached corps HQ's, it read: "The Fuhrer has decided that the constitution of additional Ukrainian or Baltic formations for guard duties or for us as field units at the front will cease." It appears that of all the occupied areas of the Soviet Union, the most leniently treated was North Caucasus, the worst was the Slav area.

The accounts given of the conferences held between and among Dr. von Mende, General Wagner, Stauffenberg, General Köstring and others make

for highly interesting reading. Köstring, for example, was a former military attache in Moscow who advised against Hitler's invasion of the USSR. Because of the displeasure he incurred by this, Köstring wasn't brought into these conferences until later. The author waxes a bit over-enthusiastic in describing Köstring's meeting with Stauffenberg in this vein: "This meeting — an historic moment for humanity — was the genesis of the idea of a real war of liberation for the peoples of the Soviet Union, in alliance with a different type of Germany" (p. 101). This idea was an old one, reaching back some twenty years when the USSR was forcibly contrived on the basis of many conquered non-Russian nations. Nonetheless, its advancement by the army clearly demonstrated the political intelligence of some German military leaders and the foolery of the Nazis, from Hitler down.

A number of examples supporting this political intelligence are vividly described in the work. In the Caucasus, for instance, the "collective farms were broken up, and the population given a wide measure of self-government... The success of these measures was soon to be seen. There was no guerrilla warfare in the Caucasus, and the North Caucasian people were soon fighting enthusiastically on the German side" (p. 101). This was not the story in Ukraine and Russia, and when the army sought to rectify the political errors of the Nazis, it was too late. Stauffenberg was in favor of breaking up the entire collective farm system in the USSR. In the Caucasus he upheld the principles of freedom, independence, and collaboration for all the populaces. Moreover, he was quite outspoken in his renunciation of the National Socialist concept that the populations in the east were "creatures of a lower order." As reported, in "Vynnytsia at a staff conference he made a half-hour extempore speech amounting to a passionate condemnation of German policy in the east," (p. 102). It was frustrating experiences such as these that convinced Stauffenberg of the necessity for Hitler's removal.

Outside of Vynnytsia, Stauffenberg was quoted as saying "Is there no officer over there in the Fuhrer's headquarters capable of taking his revolver to the brute?" (p. 106). Following his tour of duty on the eastern front, Stauffenberg was eventually reassigned to Africa where he was seriously wounded. The wounds inflicted on him would have killed another soldier; and he interpreted this as the work of Providence preparing him for the supreme task. As to the nature of the conflict between Hitler and the generals, Stauffenberg was guided by his own experiences and acted accordingly. A little insight into the conflict can be gleaned from Goebbels' diary entry for March 9, 1943: "The Fuhrer thinks nothing of the generals. They throw dust in his eyes whenever they can. Besides, they are ignoramuses and do not even understand their own job of making war" (p. 105). The attitude of the General Staff is depicted as follows: "Whatever comes from Hitler is nonsense." Hitler's military directives were studded with phrases such as "political guidance," "fanatical determination," "righteous wrath," and "ardour of belief in National Socialism."

A careful examination of this work will reveal that the prime significance of Stauffenberg lies in his rebellion against the myopic and vicious Nazi policy in the Soviet Union. He knew and realized by this experience the utter necessity of eliminating Hitler. Moral conscience played a very vital role in his years of personal struggle with the regime, but it was this experience in Eastern Europe that resolved his struggle and determined the dictates of his con-

science. The author of this book has made a substantial contribution by his painstaking research, his discriminating and sharp assessment of the data and testimonies obtained, and his lucid and objective presentation. Aside from the needed work that had to be done on Stauffenberg and his plot, there can never be enough books written about the Nazi fiasco in the Soviet Union. That fiasco was the prime political blunder of this century. For good rather than evil purposes and objectives, the lessons of that blunder should be intensely studied by the anti-communists in the Free World.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

MANY ROADS TO MOSCOW. Three Historic Invasions. By Leonard Cooper, Coward-McCann, Inc., New York, pp. 240. 1968.

Here is a very well-written book which should attract the attention of many educated readers who have only a superficial knowledge of the complications of the terrain in the Russian Empire—USSR. Unfortunately they will hardly gain much, even by reference to the map on the front and back covers, for they immediately will ask themselves how “Pultava” (as he calls it) and Stalingrad figure on a road to Moscow. Those who have even a cursory knowledge of the intricacies of Eastern and Central European politics and movements will pause in some astonishment at many of the author’s statements.

Charles XII of Sweden, who is regarded as a vital link between the two Europes and a general of remarkable power and courage, took a very erratic road to Moscow. The author gives an excellent picture of the heroic King and of the strange and overwhelming blindness of which he was guilty during his swing to the south into Ukraine.

His treatment of Mazepa, “that figure of legend and romance,” can scarcely be considered satisfactory or accurate. The story that is given of his joining with the Kozaks, the Knights of the Zaporozhian *Sich*, is highly suspect. It was a tale concocted so far as we can tell by a loud-mouthed Pole who was Mazepa’s personal enemy, Jan Chrysostom Passek, who, despite all his love for scandal, did not come up with the name of the magnate who supposedly tied Mazepa to his horse and sent him away to be killed. Nor was any reference made to the place or the date. The story was obviously made up, although we may well agree that such actions were not unknown in the Poland of that day. In addition, we may note that Mazepa was *Hetman* of the Cossacks (Kozaks, in Ukrainian) and was the technical ally of the Czar, not a subordinate under the disputed Treaty of Pereyaslav. He was an educated man, well known for his wealth and influence in Moscow society, a good Latin scholar and, for the day, a competent leader of men. His mother, as a widow, had become the Abbess of an important convent in Kiev and frequently went to Moscow on religious business. She was in a sense his main adviser till she died in 1708 at an advanced age.

The important fact was that Mazepa, then also at an advanced age, was pressed by the uncustomary, if not illegal, demands of Czar Peter for aid in the early stages of the war against Charles and the newly established support of the Czar for Augustus of Saxony, another claimant to Ukraine. At the urging of the Kozak officers, Mazepa was forced to act to maintain himself. Yet he was overcautious. As Charles turned south, Mazepa allowed the sudden

movements of his rival, Menshikov, to seize Starodub and Novgorod Siversky before he alerted his commanders.

Neither Peter nor Menshikov could believe their ears when they learned the truth about Mazepa's "defection," but the latter had waited too long. When he finally met Charles, the Swedish King had varied his route to such an extent by a prolonged march that it required a poorer commander than Peter to let Charles' reinforcements march across the entire front of the Russian army without destroying his wagon train. By now Charles was infatuated with his ideas, and when Menshikov's troops broke into Mazepa's capital of Baturyn and put the population to the sword, Mazepa was in a sense ruined, but so was Charles.

Then the Russian winter set in. The Swedish troops and Charles himself were unprepared. After being beaten back by the weather in an attempt to reach Moscow, Charles had to survive till spring. In 1709 he moved south with Mazepa to Poltava, the only fortified post in the south. There he was wounded accidentally because of his rashness, and Peter forced a battle in which the leading Swedish generals, personally antagonistic, succeeded in reducing incipient victory to an overwhelming disaster, ruining the hopes of Sweden to make the Baltic Sea a Swedish lake. On the steppes the escape of the King was guided by the Kozaks, who knew the locality; the King reached Bendery on the Dniester. Here came Mazepa as well, to die a natural death and in honor.

We can see many of the same factors in "The Road by Smolensk," for it was by way of Smolensk that Napoleon planned his campaign. To him the battle of Borodino and the approach of winter — as well as the tactics of Kutuzov, who laid all his hopes on the weather — proved fatal; after the burning of Moscow, a fire regarded by Eugene Tarle as incendiary and by Leo Tolstoy in *War and Peace* as almost accidental, Napoleon had to retreat, his forces completely exhausted and destroyed when he finally recrossed into Western Europe.

In "The Road by Stalingrad," Hitler, relying on his intuition and acting against the advice of his higher officers, used up his Panzer forces in needless maneuvers and tried too late in the year to reach Moscow; the mud time and the winter made them useless. The troops that moved on Stalingrad were not those which had tried to take Moscow but those destined for the seizure of the oil wells of the Donets basin and the Caucasus. Hitler made them besiege Stalingrad until they were forced to surrender more than a year later.

The author is quite correct in his emphasis on the unfavorable climate of the plains and forests of Eastern Europe during the long and severe winter. It is very significant that in the Middle Ages Moscow was threatened more often by the nomads of the steppes, the Mongols and Tatars, than by troops from the West. They, too, were familiar with the winter and flexibly adapted their tactics to suit, something the rigidity of conventional methods of Western warfare and command prohibited. He rightly shows the discords in all three invading armies and the refusal of the three conquering leaders to accept the natural limitations to their plans. In every case they started too late in the year for active and sustained campaigning.

When we add to this the willingness or endurance of the peasants in adopting a scorched earth policy, he noted an important characteristic of the

area. Devastation of the agricultural lands of the East could be repaired more rapidly than the cities of the West; the leaders of Russia — USSR knew this and used it to full advantage despite their own defects in planning.

The good features of the work are its pictures of the leaders of the three invasions. It is almost a tour de force in presenting these and their ideas and delusions rather than a picture of the three campaigns as such.

We must note also the curious nomenclature for many localities. There may be divergences in spelling but no Slavic language uses Pultava instead of Poltava. The town is Hadyach and not Haydach, though undoubtedly both spellings could be found in some of the eighteenth century texts from the West written by men also unfamiliar with the native languages and their variants in the Latin and Cyrillic script of the day. This may pose a serious handicap for some readers and scholars; more such could be cited if space permitted.

In every case the actual background other than the enormous distances and the difficulty of supply is not depicted clearly, detracting from a well-written book. Still it represents an interesting attempt to picture some of the vital problems of Europe in this way, though it would have been solidified by a deeper understanding of the material.

Columbia University (Ret.)

/ CLARENCE A. MANNING

SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE SOVIET UNION. Alex Simirenko, Ed., Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. Pp. 439.

In spite of its glaring weaknesses (to be pointed out), this is quite a valuable collection of original essays on Soviet "social sciences," describing each of the following eleven disciplines: philosophy, political science, law, historiography, economics, education, psychology, psychiatry, linguistics, anthropology, and sociology. The major *leitmotiv* of these studies lies in the changes undergone by the various social sciences since Stalin's death and their contributions to the knowledge of both national and international significance. "It is an attempt to familiarize readers with the formal side of current Soviet social thought and the conditions of its development."

In general, most contributors have done a respectable job; in fact, since this is the latest symposium covering this field, it might be considered also as a dictionary and a reference work — in spite of its very poor index.

Yet the editor displays weakness in his editing of the symposium, and weakness even more striking in his chapter on "Sociology: International Contributions by Soviet Sociologists" (pp. 392-426) — curiously enough, the same sort of weakness which characterized a similar work edited by him: *Soviet Sociology* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). 1) In the first place, although Simirenko was born in Kiev, he does not consider it worthy of his interest to consider, as a special sub-topic, the development of Ukrainian sociology, although there are specific studies focused on this field. 2) Second, this approach is mirrored in his "Notes," where we find no reference to such studies, as well as in his Index, where Ukraine is not listed (although a few references to the Ukrainians can be found in Dunn's chapter on "Current Soviet Ethnography: A Status Report," (pp. 375-391). 3) In the third place, such an important subject as Education is given a treatment which even rivals Simirenko

for weakness; it is merely a summary of two papers published by Broenfenbrenner in *Religious Education* and in *Some Views on Soviet Psychology* (both in 1962), which treats only one aspect of the whole field of Education, "Theory and Research in Soviet Character Education," adding, in obvious afterthought, 3 pages on "Soviet Psychology" — a subject which certainly merits a more thorough coverage in view of some remarkable developments in Soviet Educational Psychology and other aspects of "Pedagogy."

All in all, then, although the symposium opens up new vistas, it needs to be scanned more thoroughly and more competently. Simirenko's treatment, unfortunately, gives us a work which is more introductory in its character than a definite contribution to this important subject. It is more or less an indication of the investigation that needs to be done rather than a systematic survey of what has been accomplished. When compared to Simirenko's earlier work, perhaps the fairest thing to say is that both publications have been poured from the same cocktail shaker, the melting ice making the second round thinner and less intoxicating than the first.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

GREEK FIRE! By W.H. Spears, Jr., Adams Press, Chicago, Ill. Cloth, 416 pages, 1969. \$4.95.

"The Fabulous Secret Weapon That Saved Europe," is how Spears subtitles his historical novel. Following his *Constantine's Triumph* and *The Emperor's Charioteer*, it constitutes a trilogy, each of whose parts is inspired by some reference in Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. For this one it is:

"In the two sieges the deliverance of Constantinople may be chiefly ascribed to the novelty, the terrors, and the real efficacy of the Greek Fire." (Chap. III). The Greek Fire rebuffed the Saracen naval sieges of 674 and 718 A.D.

This novel is in the tradition of the old adventure tales in which the protagonist travels far and wide, fights often, does considerable wenching, and finally comes home safely and wiser. Its plot is less complication than it is a series of events and coincidences without much significance or idealism. The protagonist, Gregory, is kidnapped in Constantinople by the Saracen Ali, who is the antagonist throughout, and is to be ransomed by his father, possessing the formula for the Greek Fire, or to be trained as a spy to learn its secret. The Greeks execute the father for fear of his paying the ransom, and Ali raises Gregory as a Saracen. He then has him sent to Constantinople to get the fire formula. The plan is for him to marry a Christian girl and become officer on a fire ship. He does this, learns the formula, only to be exposed by his brother-in-law Basil. He narrowly escapes and hies back to Ali and Damascus.

He reverts to Mohammedanism, marries a Coptic childhood sweetheart — despite his wife and family in Constantinople — but shrinks from revealing the formula which would destroy family and city. When with his enforced help, Ali captures two barrels of the inflammable liquid, Gregory at night puts the torch to them. He is not suspected, but the Greeks keep trying to kill him. One assassin inadvertently kills his Coptic wife. On another attempt

he is wounded in the groin so that, though he has married four girls, Mohammedan fashion, he conceives no children, and eventually divorces his wives. When Ali gives up hope of a male heir from his harem, he adopts Gregory as his son and entrusts him with the plans for the second great Saracen siege in 718. But now Gregory deserts to the Greeks, and, on betraying those plans, is rehabilitated with the government and his family. He is entrusted with a Fire Ship, which helps destroy the Saracen fleet, and destroys Ali's ship and life. He returns in triumph to Constantinople.

The novel ranges from Constantinople to Alexandria, from Persia to Spain. Besides Orthodox and Coptic Christianity and Mohammedanism, Jews are prominent in the story. They facilitate the Saracen conquest of Visigothic Spain, whose mistreatment of Jews is touched upon.

But the novel does not really try to give any insights into these religious philosophies. Although it seems to favor victory for the Christian Greeks, it actually gives the impression that the Greek Christians were more cruel and intolerant than the Mohammedans. Most unfortunately, the nature of the plot makes Gregory, the hero, neither heroic nor sympathetic. A spy most of his life, he customarily lies. Summing-up: innocuous, sometimes interesting, entertainment.

La Salle College (Ret.)

AUSTIN J. APP

EGYPT: MILITARY SOCIETY. By Anour Abdel-Malek, New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. XXXX, 459. \$6.95.

This is the story of the final stage of "Egypt's national revolution" — 15 years — and of the military regime of Nasser's Egypt, full of contradictions, contentions, and repression of the Left. The work deals, specifically, with the people of Egypt — the national movement and the economic and social transformation in relation to the ideological struggle — between the two "Black Fridays." The analysis stems from an interpretation of Egypt's seventy-century-old history, within the same geographical and geopolitical framework. Malek features especially Egypt's historical contradictions, for contradiction apparently lies at the very heart of this singularly complex ensemble of tradition and modernity.

The presentation is supported by rich "Source Notes" (pp. 387-444) and Bibliography (pp. 445-448).

The value of the work is indicated also by the fact that it has been translated into English by Charles Lam Markmann.

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UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"INDEPENDENT LATVIA," a commentary by B. Kalnins. *Latvian Information Bulletin*, Washington, D.C., March, 1969.

In this commentary, one of the last two survivors who signed the declaration of Latvia's independence, makes some striking points that deserve to be registered not only throughout the Latvian community in the U.S. but also all others. He is hopeful, and rightly so, that "History provides evidence that empires (such as the USSR—own) thriving on subjugation of free nations, are bound to founder sooner or later." He asks, "How will Soviet Russia, including in its boundaries many nations amounting to a total of 45 per cent of the Empire's population (it's more than 50 percent — own) be able to ward off the inevitable?"

His primary point is "We must not put excessive stock in assistance to our national aspirations by the Western powers... We must learn to trust in our own endurance, and our common interest with the other captive nations of the USSR and Eastern Europe, anticipating that Soviet Russian imperialism will collapse by the weight of its own bloated expansion." The captive nations concept, extending into Asia and the Western Hemisphere, provides this guide. The more this is recognized by so-called ethnic groups in the U.S., and coupled with inevitable Free World reverses in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere, the outlook will be more bright than this author shows. For everything we do here now, in time it will show there, and toward the realized objective he seeks. This "captive nations togetherness" was not the rule ten years ago, but it is becoming progressively so now.

"FROM RESTIVE UKRAINE: SMUGGLED DOCUMENT LISTS SOVIET ILLS," an article by Henry S. Bradsher. *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D. C., August 3, 1969.

In a most stimulating article the author states at the outset "An incisive listing of ills of the Soviet system and a call for reforms that would democratize and decentralize the Soviet Union has been smuggled out of the Ukraine." The listing refers to the document written by "voter Anton Koval" who enumerates openly the many repressions prevailing in Ukraine.

With a firm comprehension of Ukraine, the writer observes, "A large, economically rich region of the southwestern Soviet Union with a distinctive history and culture, the Ukraine has long smouldered with nationalistic resentment against Russian rule from Moscow." In exemplifying this resentment Koval's letter is cited as to the imprisonment of critical intellectuals and hundreds of others "who have not committed any state or social crimes and are

being subjected to civic punishment — loss of jobs, deprivation of the opportunity to publish or to speak to the workers, etc.”

For nearly five years Moscow has been tightening the screws on intellectual criticism, and a resurgence of what has dubiously been called Stalinism has taken place. This process of reconsolidation of tyrannical rule in the USSR is clearly in preparation for more strident moves by Moscow in the Free World, most likely the Middle East. It may even be in Red China under the formal banner of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

“THE THIRD WACL CONFERENCE CONCLUDED,” a commentary by José Ma. Hernandez, *Freedom Center News*, Seoul, Korea, December 12, 1969.

The Third Anti-Communist League Conference was held in Bangkok, Thailand in the period of December 3-8. Some 180 delegates from all corners of the Free World attended. Judging by the high-powered addresses and lively discussions, it proved to be a most successful meeting. Press coverage in the Orient was extensive, and the official receptions accorded the delegates were warm and impressive.

As the commentary points out, “The Conference had the rare opportunity to listen to experts on Communism like Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, Madame Suzanne Labin of France, Prime Minister Thant Khoman of Thailand, and Mr. Mario Lopez Escobar of Paraguay.”

“TEXT OF UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS U.N. PETITION,” transmitted by Amnesty International. The United Nations, New York, October 9, 1969.

The world renowned Amnesty International translated and transmitted to the U.N. Human Rights Commission a letter, nay a human appeal, written by Mykhaylo Horyn, Ivan Kandyba and Lev Lukyanenko in June, 1969. The Ukrainian political prisoners are quite specific about the charges.

They point out, “We were arrested for demanding improvements in the condition of Ukrainian workers, and for defending the rights of the Ukrainian language, education, and culture. Insofar as these demands are permitted by the Soviet Constitution, we continue to uphold them. Having failed to break us morally, the KGB organs (secret police) are trying to transform us biologically from intellectuals into primitives.”

The *bona fide* letter specifies the means used to achieve this transformation. Referring to Lukyanenko's imprisonment, it states “Chemicals which cause poisoning were added to his food. He was given to know that prolonged usage of this poison causes the human organism to deteriorate.” The letter cites other cases of methodically applied poisons. The significant question, of course, is what action will the U.N. commission take?

“THE CZECH OUTLOOK,” an editorial. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., March 3, 1969.

The relationship between liberalizing developments in Czecho-Slovakia in 1968 and their impact on the situation in Ukraine is generally admitted today. “Following the Russian rape of Czecho-Slovakia, the men of the Kremlin,”

according to this editorial, "have made it only too clear: Czechoslovakia will not be permitted to do large-scale business with the West in order to revitalize and modernize its run-down industrial plant."

"In other words," the editorial goes on to say, "Czechoslovakia is to be kept heavily and increasingly dependent on Russia both for raw materials and as an export outlet." It ends by noting "The phrase 'captive nation' is by no means old hat: it fits in here with bleak appropriateness." Indeed, the captive nations concept never lost its applicability to any of the nations in Eastern Europe, despite State Department attempts to discourage its usage in the course of this decade. The "good" in the tragedy of Czecho-Slovakia, which entails two captive nations, was that it sobered up somewhat our opinion-makers who pursued the illusion of "the growing independence" of the once satellite states in Central Europe.

"LET'S PYSANKY SOME EASTER KRASHANKY!", an article by Bradley Ward. *Yankee*, Dublin, New Hampshire, April 1969.

This magazine enjoys wide and popular circulation in New England. This important issue features an article on Ukrainian Easter eggs. A basket full of these colorful eggs is photographed and commented on by the author. As he puts it, "The decorated eggs on these pages are the work of James L. Hreshko, a psychologist who is currently the Director of Counseling at Franklin Pierce College in Rindge, New Hampshire."

The beauty of Ukrainian culture is resplendently reflected in this intricate art. The writer describes in detail the step-by-step preparation of these beautiful eggs. He explains also the folklore meaning of the productions. He states, for example, "As long as egg decorating continues, the world will exist. Should the custom cease, evil will encompass the world and destroy it."

The value of such article exceeds the evident utilitarian objective. The patterns of egg-coloration transmit centuries of cultural development in a country that has been subjected to foreign tyrannical rule for too long. The tradition freely expressed in America will make its contribution to a free Ukraine.

"SOVIET GENERAL IS ARRESTED, ACCUSED OF DEFAMING STATE,"
a report. UPI, Moscow, USSR, May 9, 1969.

It's former Maj. General Piotr G. Grigorenko again. As the wire service puts it, "A Ukrainian by nationality, Grigorenko has supported efforts by the Tatars to return to their homeland in Crimea from which they were deported by Stalin during World War II." Grigorenko has been in the news for the past two years, supporting openly several causes for reform in the USSR.

This time the activist former general was arrested under Article 191, section 4 of the Uzbek Criminal Code, which deals with distribution of "falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet state and Socialist system." In 1968 he publicly denounced the "totalitarianism that hides behind the mask of so-called Soviet democracy."

The general's courage and convictions can hardly be denied. More Grigorenkos in the huge concentration camp known as the USSR can't help but contribute historically to freedom in this part of the world. Their assumed risk, of course, is life itself.

"SOVIET SLAVE LABOR CAMPS TODAY," introduction by the Honorable John Rarick. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., August 6, 1969.

An increasing amount of evidence has been tapped in the past five years to show an extensive revival and expansion of Soviet Russian slave labor camps. The outspoken legislator from Louisiana, who has introduced further evidence here, makes the apt point that "we have even been subjected to distorted testimony from some of our Nation's leaders that forced labor camps have been eliminated from the so-called new modern Russia."

The complete text of a personal testimony by Anatoly Marchenko is presented. Marchenko, a Ukrainian, was confined in a Russian political prison in 1966. Because of his testimony of his personal experiences there, he was returned to the slave labor camp under a new charge of "anti-Soviet propaganda." The Marchenko testimony appeared also in the August issue of the *Reader's Digest*.

The story the prisoner relates is the same story of political tyranny, barbarism and genocide that has filled volumes on Soviet Russian totalitarianism and imperio-colonialism. "In time," he says, "I learned that the diet was scientifically designed to keep us barely alive." The long article brings out the many beatings he sustained, the indignities suffered, and the incredible mistreatments to which he and other political prisoners were subjected.

It is strange, indeed, that little has been heard from the United Nations concerning this and countless other cases. The United States is hamstrung because of its myopia in not ratifying the genocide convention. Do others fear to irritate the Russian totalitarians with the truth?

"A NEW SOVIET GENERATION CHALLENGES CONFORMITY," an article by Henry S. Bradsher. *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D. C., August 24, 1969.

Demonstrating an incisive grasp of dominant developments in the USSR, the writer gives a vivid account of the rebellion by intellectuals and writers in that empire-state. Andrei Sinyavsky, Yuli M. Daniel and others are adequately covered. An area that receives special emphasis is Ukraine.

As the writer describes it, the "largest and strongest provincial struggle is to keep the traditional regional identity of the Ukraine from being submerged in Russian domination of the Soviet Union." Of course, it is far more than a "provincial struggle" and Russian domination of the USSR has been and is the consistent rule. Nonetheless, the writer continues, "Authorities have burned Ukrainian national archives, rewritten history and imprisoned numerous persons in the southwest region."

This is not the first wave of oppression and genocide suffered by the Ukrainian people. They survived numerous others and will certainly survive this one. What is required is more writing, more talking, more protesting about these manifestations of totalitarian Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. This, more than anything else, would dispel the illusions too many Americans live by.

"REMEMBER THE CAPTIVE NATIONS," a commentary by Dr. Billy James Hargis. *The Weekly Crusader*, Tulsa, Oklahoma, April 18, 1969.

"Uninformed Americans who have never tasted the bitter dregs of life under a Communist dictatorship cannot imagine the reality of life behind the Iron Curtain," so begins this commentary. And how true this observation is.

It is difficult for those who have always enjoyed freedom to really appreciate the loss of it. Yet, it is incumbent upon all of us to exercise imaginative thinking.

In its review, the commentary is quick to point out that "One of the long-suffering nations within the USSR itself is the Ukraine. Along with those from other Communist-enslaved nations, Ukrainian refugee groups have for years pleaded with people in the free world to recognize their nation's plight." The commentator then recites the cases of Yuriy Shukhevych-Berezynskyi, who was arrested by the Russians in 1948 at the age of 15 and sent to prison just because his father happened to be commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Vyacheslav Chornovil and others.

Emphasizing the lasting captive nations theme, the commentary ends in this vein: "Americans should not forget that our nation is the prize captive nation of the future toward which all Communist efforts are ultimately aimed. The captive nations presently under the iron heel of communism could become our strongest first line of defense if America's leaders can be brought to recognize this." They do, but they fear it.

"ASIAN MINORITIES RESTIVE IN RUSSIA'S GRIP," an article by David Korn. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., November 16, 1969.

The writer of this absorbing article is currently at Howard University and is writing a book on "the nationalities of the Soviet Union." From the contents of this piece it appears that he perceives the strategic importance of Ukraine in relation to all the non-Russian nations in the USSR. The article is based on the writer's experiences and recollections in 1944 and again in 1968 in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

A Kazakh friend of the writer is quoted as saying "whether I knew that the Russians were afraid of the non-Russian nationalities." The native of Turkmenistan went on to say "We don't want to leave the Soviet Union. We want to stay here, but only as equal partners. The day will come when all the minorities will constitute a majority, a strong group, and then we will make equality."

The fact is that the so-called minorities as a majority is already in being. Moreover, the growing pressure for "equality" is unlikely to cease there. Nationalism and the respected desire for national self-determination will and must lead to national independence.

"THE FORGOTTEN AMERICAN," an article by Peter Schrag. *Harper's Magazine*, New York, September 8, 1969.

The major thrust of this well-written article is in the direction of the so-called ethnic or nationality groups in the United States. Herein lies the forgotten American, hard-working, low middle-income, loyal and neglected. The characterization and some of the statistical data advanced are open to debate, but by and large the thesis carries validity.

Americans of Ukrainian background figure with a number of citations throughout the article. Geographical hallmarks of "the forgotten American" include "Union halls, American legion posts, neighborhood bars and bowling leagues, the Ukrainian Club and the Holy Name." Politically, the writer poses the question, "What does it take to be a good American?" And immediately

answers himself, "Suddenly there are demands for Italian power and Polish power and Ukrainian power."

The writer is way off base when he concludes that this forgotten American, who really is not as forgotten as this piece argues, "will identify with the politics of the Birchers and other middle-class reactionaries..." Actually, and with statistical verification, the massive drift has been away from traditional Democratic identification to that with the Republican Party. There is no question about this as concerns the past fifteen years.

"UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM," a letter by Ivan L. Rudnytsky. *Times Literary Supplement*, London, England, April 24, 1969.

An excellent rebuttal is furnished by this letter to a standard and really outworn misrepresentation of Ukrainian nationalism. The English organ reviewed *The Chornovil Papers* last January, and in the reviews stated that "in the past Ukrainian 'nationalism' was associated with all that was most reactionary, Fascist, pro-Nazi, anti-Russian, anti-Polish and anti-Semitic in the country." This certainly is a mouthful.

The writer replied to this forcefully and objectively, though in parts he was needlessly concessive. He states forthrightly, "Ukrainian nationalism was anti-Russian and anti-Polish not in the sense that it was hostile to the Russian or Polish peoples, but only in the sense that it was naturally and legitimately hostile to Russian and Polish domination over the Ukraine."

No apologies are needed in this case. By and large the writer, a professor of history at the American University, expresses none. "It is true," he says quite candidly, "that many Ukrainians tended to be pro-German during the inter-war period, but this too was natural. Ukrainian patriots opposed a *status quo* which meant national annihilation, and they looked to the only country which was likely to bring about a revision of the Versailles system." Careless and irresponsible charges can be dealt with in only one way, that of factual, objective and courageous rebuttal. This the professor accomplished.

"UKRAINIANS BACK SLIPY AS PRELATE," a report. *Daily News*, New York, October 10, 1969.

According to this Reuters report, bishops of the Ukrainian Catholic Church have requested Pope Paul to appoint Joseph Cardinal Slipy, the archbishop of Lviv, as their patriarch. It went on to state that the plea may prove embarrassing to the Vatican because of a presumed agreement with Moscow in 1963 to keep the released prelate "out of the public eye."

The fact is that the Cardinal was well within the public eye during his trip to this hemisphere in 1968. It seems that the first order of business is the establishment of the patriarchate itself. The institution would carry considerable weight for Ukraine itself and the Roman Catholic Church as well.

L. E. D.

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