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THE RUSSIANS
IN
GALICIA

EDITED BY

BEDWIN SANDS

NEW YORK CITY, 1916
PUBLISHED BY "UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL",
83 GRAND ST., JERSEY CITY, N. J.

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(NOTE)

“The Russians in Galicia” first appeared in French, in *La Revue Ukrainienne*, at Lausanne.

“The War—a Russian Plot?” is a revised version of an article by the Editor which appeared in the *Labour Leader* in December 1914.

“Eagles and Crows” is a translation of Bishop Nikon’s article in a Russian newspaper.

F O R E W O R D.

The American public have been saturated of late with breaches of international law, and numberless tales of atrocities. Jews, Lithuanians, Belgians, Serbs, Armenians, and even the Poles themselves have one by one brought the story of the wrongs they have suffered, until arson, pillage and rape are taken almost as a matter of course. For this reason, the acts of brutality which are inherent to war have been left out of this volume. This indictment is not a mere recital of horrors. It is the whole system imposed upon the Russian Government by a small but loud-voiced section of the Russian reactionaries which is here laid bare. Their behavior and the whole policy instigated by them have, in the words of several members of the Russian Duma, covered their nation with shame. To deprive a subject nation of all means of education is a fearful crime, but to destroy such means when they exist in a conquered country is infinitely worse. We feel confident that it is sufficient to establish the facts of the Russian conquest of Galicia and of the underhand methods which prepared it, to prevent the possibility of any British or French Statesman being prepared to advocate, now or at any time in the future, the handing over of Eastern Galicia to Russia without the most stringent guarantees. Nor worse service could be rendered to the Russian people who have given their unselfish support to their allies than to keep up the sham

conviction that the Russian Government has changed or humanized itself in any way. The measures which are here exposed have been taken against the interests and the wishes of the great majority of Russians. They desire to get rid of the German methods in their Government. To foster blindly such methods used by the pan-Russians is to render them the worst of services. There is no reason whatever for pretending that the Russian people have so far benefited from the war and from their alliance with England and France. In order to benefit them it is necessary that the widest publicity be given to their complaints and the utmost measure of encouragement be afforded to their endeavor to amend the system of Government from which they still suffer.

B. S.

New York, February 1916.

THE RUSSIANS IN GALICIA.

(Through the courtesy of the Editors of *La Revue Ukrainienne* (Lausanne, Switzerland) we are enabled to give for the first time in English the following detailed account of the temporary Russian occupation of Galicia. This appeared originally in the November issue of that periodical.)

I. PREPARING THE GROUND.

Russia had been preparing for a long time not only the military conquest but also the political and intellectual annexation of Galicia. There were many people occupied with that aim in both Galicia and Russia.

The "Russian-Galician Benevolent Association" with branches in Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and other towns was especially devoted to Galicia. That association was "educating" the public by means of pamphlets and lectures on the subject of "enslaved Russia" and appealed for subscriptions to support the Russophile associations of Galicia and the students who were desirous of utilizing their energies in a Russophile direction. The "Association of Slavonic Benevolence", Slavonic Committees, religious confrerries and various other Societies in most of the towns existed for the same purpose.

High military and ecclesiastic dignitaries belonged to them. At the head of this movement was Count Vladimir

Bobrinsky, who visited Galicia and organized in that Austrian province an active propaganda in favor of Russia.

In Galicia itself the aim of a union with the Russian Empire was fostered by the Russophile party. In spite of internal dissension, for to that party belonged both the *Old Ruthenians* and the *New Russophiles*, the two groups declared themselves in their programs to be in favor of a union with Russia and showed in that direction a ceaseless activity which was spread to several territories and gave signs of a good division of work. Influential and financially well-backed Russian institutions, the Stauropigia Institute and the Narodny Dom represented the Conservative tendency, affected religious and moral tendencies (they enjoyed also the right of patronage in the clerical appointments) and avoided any open agitation. They advocated Russification in their publications in which they endeavored to shunt the language to a Russian line, but acted especially through grants of scholarships to students who were sent to schools in Russia.

The *Obstchestvo Katchkovskoho* also used as a cloak the motto "pray, learn, work, remain sober" but it introduced the Russian language in its publications, openly preached a union with Russia and made of its village reading-rooms so many centers of Russian propaganda. Associations for the young such as "Droug" and "Zizu" (the latter for women) and others were openly helping the Russian plans. A press well subventioned from Russia (*Prikarpatskaya Russ* and *Golos Naroda*) served the same purpose. Of late great attention had been paid to education.

In Galicia, as in many places elsewhere in Europe, it is customary for boys to board together in specially fitted boarding houses whence they go to hear the lectures at the High School or the University. Often these boarding houses are also schools. The Russophiles multiplied the number of their own boarding-schools where either no fee or a nominal fee was charged. In all these, the study

of the Russian language became compulsory. Russian masters were called to Galicia and Russian libraries founded. Always with the same end in view, "patriotic" organizations were formed, secret pamphlets were distributed in the villages and periodicals for the youth were pressed upon them. In order to keep their children from falling under Ukrainian influence, the Russophile parents sent them to the Polish schools where Russophilism on the part of the masters was in favor. The Orthodox agitation was developed, since it was intended to use it as a bridge for Russification. Even in America this Orthodox proselytism was active among the Ukrainian immigrants.

Of course, this persistent and many-sided campaign in favor of Russia could not have taken place for such a long period and with such comparative success, had not the Russophiles enjoyed the support not only of the political parties in Russia, but also of the local Polish authorities and of the very vice-roi who represented the Emperor of Austria in Galicia. When the elections to the *Diet* took place in 1908, the two groups of Russophiles met in conference with the heads of the National Polish Council. This secret meeting was admitted to have taken place when the President of the Polish Council himself, Thaddeus Cienski gave an interview to a reporter on the staff of the *Neue Freie Presse*. The result of the conference was that the Russophile party obtained certain assurances with regard to their associations and a promise not to be interfered with, or prosecuted for their actions, during the election period. The late Statthalter, Count Andrew Potoeki, whom sudden death overtook*, had been aware of, and connived at, the pact between the Poles and the Russophile Ukrainians. His successor, Dr. Bobrzynski, dared not for a long time risk a break with the Russophiles and retained his protection to at least one of the Russophile groups, as he himself admitted in the course of a speech in the Lemberg Diet.

*) He was shot by Ukrainian student M. Sitchinsky.

During the last few years, Russia enjoyed staunch supporters in the ranks of the Polish nationalists groups. Their hatred for the Ukrainians and their fear of Germany had thrown the Poles into the arms of Russia. The most popular Polish party, the pan-Polonist National Democrats, brought about the orientation towards Russia and prepared public opinion, through their organ *Slowo Polskie* and by other means, for the conquest of Galicia by the Russians. The sympathy for, and the inclination towards, the Russophiles on the part of the Poles were shown up during the trial of Bëndasiuk and his accomplices who were charged with high treason in 1914. The accused were acquitted as a sequel to the Russo-Polish compact.

II. ADMINISTRATION.

When in August and September 1914 the Russian troops occupied Galicia they found the soil prepared for them. Nevertheless the Russian administrators failed to strike the right attitude and took contradictory measures.

The first governor of Galicia Sergius Sheremetief inclined at once towards the Polish circles where an attitude friendly to Russia had been taken up. He inaugurated a policy of benevolence towards the Polish elements. The manifest of the Grand-Duke Nicholas was placarded everywhere announcing the reestablishment of the Polish State; proclamations were published in Lemberg and throughout the Province both in Polish and Russian. Polish schools were opened in Lemberg. This policy was too partial and M. Sheremetief had to withdraw at the instance of the Russophiles. The new chief of Galicia, Governor-General Count George Bobrinsky stood for another program. From the first, as he proclaimed in September 1914, his policy aimed at the Russification of Galicia. Galicia, he said, was "Russian land" and he would introduce therein the Russian language, Russian laws

and Russian organization. No account was taken in that program of the Ukrainians but to the Poles he promised certain rights in the Polish, that is the Western part of Galicia.

The Governor gave the Russophiles a special audience and invited them to collaborate in the intellectual transformation of the country. From the religious point of view however, Count Bobrinsky foretold a policy of complete tolerance. His utterances seemed liberal enough in Russia: the Poles were deceived and the Russophiles triumphed. Count Bobrinsky was given, as the instruments of the executive power, officials from the various Russian ministries and a few members of the Duma who belonged to the conservative parties. Among these gentlemen there were some who were already acquainted with the state of affairs in Galicia and had previously visited the country; such as M. N. D. Chikhachev, reporter in the Duma on the separation of Kholm from Poland and N. Ostrogradski, agent of the Russian ministry of Commerce in Vienna. There were also Dr. M. Glushkevich and M. L. Labensky, who were both given special missions. The interpreters and clerks of the Chief Command of the district were selected exclusively from the ranks of the Russophiles; for instance in Lemberg the latter were chosen to represent the high command. Several Russian ministries sent delegates to make special studies in Galicia: the whole land was over-run by them. Some had been born in Galicia and emigrated to Russia, as for instance M. Dragomiretsky, delegate from the ministry of the Interior. Plentiful material was prepared for the Government by the Russko-Narodny Sovyet (Russian National Council) the central organization of the Russophiles in Galicia. Moreover the Poles of Lemberg, especially the National Democrats, were informing the authorities on the questions which affected the Poles.

III. THE SCHOOLS.

It was intended that the schools should become a true instrument of Russification. They were placed under the direction of Chikhaev who was helped by the notorious S. Bendasiuk and Dr. Yavorsky, a native of Galicia, lately professor in the Kiev gymnasium, by the famous Russifying agent Plesky and by five school-inspectors. First of all, they began to prepare pupils for the Russian schools. In Lemberg, Tarnopol, Sambor and Stanislau, courses in the Russian language, literature, history and pedagogy were started. These were to last three months and to prepare Galician school-masters for their new diploma of Russian teachers. The masters were professors in the high schools of the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire, men who were accustomed to the methods necessary in schools for non-Russian elements. The students of these lectures enjoyed free board and received their books free of charge. Each course had from forty to sixty persons, the majority of whom were Russophiles and Poles and took their degree with success. Later on it was decided to start similar courses of lectures in other towns but the Austrian offensive cut short the realization of this project. Nevertheless the success of the students was not satisfactory as a whole because they had no time to go deeply into the subject. It was therefore decided to open special courses in Petrograd under the direction of Madame Lokhvitska-Skallon. The expenses were to be met by the Russian-Galician Benevolent Society. Similar lectures were also given in Kiev. Two aims were thus satisfied: candidate teachers, a species difficult to find in Russia owing to the shortage of intellectuals, were prepared, and the scholastic profession was demoralized since most of the men presented themselves through sheer starvation and many became Orthodox at the same time.

The Russian schools were not numerous. The ministry of Public Instruction had declared itself prepared to start ten popular schools, five of which were to be in the villages. The Holy Synod showed more activity in this respect for it opened fifty schools. No secondary school with teaching in Russian was opened. A few Russian directors of such schools had obtained permission to open private schools in Galicia but the fortune of war decided otherwise. The Russian National Council tried also to open high schools and preparatory schools but nothing could be done without a subvention from the Government. A petition was sent to that affect to Petrograd but the request of the Russophiles was so exaggerate (200,000 roubles for the mere start) that the petition was pigeon-holed. The Governor-General authorized the opening of private schools but with this provision that in each class the Russian language and history should be taught. A few Polish schools agreed and took up such teaching.

For the future it was decided that Polish schools could only be opened in the towns; in the villages none but Russian schools should be started. *The Ukrainian schools without any exceptions should be closed down.* The Ukrainian language was henceforth to be considered as a mere dialect which could be used only at the beginning and simply in order to facilitate teaching. Nevertheless this project was also given up.

For "Russian" Galicia nothing but Russian schools! Such was the line adopted by the authorities. This policy would have of course seriously influenced the national and intellectual situation in the country.

IV. ORTHODOXY.

Another instrument to help Russify Galicia was at hand in the Orthodox Church.

The Governor-General, Count Bobrinsky promised when he took charge that his policy was to be one of complete

tolerance and that Orthodoxy should not be forced upon the people. Only in the case of three quarters of the inhabitants asking to be received in the Orthodox Church, would a pope (Russian priest) be appointed in each locality. When the Uniat priests wished to retain their religion, the church was to remain the property of the Uniats even if the whole community became Orthodox. The progressive section of the Russian Press showed its approval of this tolerance but it was soon made apparent how vain were the promises of the Governor-General, for in practice a very different attitude was marked.

It is possible that Count Bobrinsky was really disposed to abide by his intentions. He met, however, with serious obstacles in high places, that is on the part of the Holy Synod. The latter, faithful to its traditions, had already decided to force Orthodoxy upon the people. The Orthodox Archbishop of Volhynia (Russian Ukraine) Eulogius, well known for his fanaticism and pan-Russian tendencies, was sent to Galicia. He looked upon Galicia as a land which had once been Orthodox and wherein the union with Rome had been introduced by artificial means. His own method to set things right was to enter by force the Uniat Churches, forcibly to take possession of the priests' houses and parishes for his Orthodox popes whenever he found that the priest in charge was absent owing to the events of war. In all his acts, Eulogius showed persistently his hatred of the Catholic religion. The Ukrainian priests were treated as suspects, suspended and replaced by Russophiles Orthodox popes. Thus was Orthodoxy introduced in more than a hundred parishes. This figure was of course small in comparison with the total number of 2,000 Uniat parishes, but it showed the intentions of Eulogius. Of all the Uniat priests 15 only accepted Orthodoxy. The greatest harm done to the Uniat Church was the arrest of its head, the Metropolitan Archbishop Count A. Sheptitsky. He was arrested by the Russian troops and taken into Russia. Bishop Chekhovich

was confined to the besieged fortress of Peremyshl and died shortly after the town had been taken. The third bishop, Mgr. Khomishin of Stanislaw, was waiting outside the province. In the absence of these three Prelates, the Consistory of Lemberg took no steps and the Uniats remained without direction. Nevertheless it must be admitted that they gave proof of a strong power of resistance, especially in such places where Ukrainians alone had influence. It was not solely out of religious motives that the Ukrainians rejected Orthodoxy but also because Orthodoxy was used merely as an instrument for Russification. "One year after our fortunate occupation of the country" declared Count Bobrinsky in an interview which he gave in Petrograd "the enemy will have no chance left. The immense majority of the Uniats will have become Orthodox, the others Roman Catholics and the whole thing will be settled." This was intended however *pro foro externo*. The authorities and the promoters of Orthodoxy had to admit that their cause was in a bad way. People well acquainted with ecclesiastical matters declared in the Press that the Uniat priests came out best in any discussion with Orthodox popes because they have University education while the Orthodox clergy never have but an inferior theological education. M.M. Dragomiretsky and Petrov, the delegates from the ministry of the Interior showed themselves most sceptical as to the possible success of Orthodoxy. They were moreover extremely angry with the Russophiles who had misled the Russian Government by pretending that as a result of their efforts (which had been financed on trust, as it were, from Russia) Orthodoxy would find in Galicia a ripe and ready soil. When the greatest part of Galicia had been reoccupied by Austrian troops, the Russians saw that their religious policy had been a ghastly failure. *The reason why the Russians could not maintain themselves in the newly conquered territories must be attributed first of all to their national and religious intolerance.* This

view found confirmation in an open letter written to the "liberators" of Galicia by the Orthodox Archbishop Nikon*. Another proof that this failure created a painful impression in Russia lies in the fact that the Procurator of the Holy Synod, the chief instigator of the Orthodox propaganda was compelled to resign his charge in July 1915.

V. THE PEASANTS.

The means by which it was sought to gain the goodwill of the Ukrainian masses in Eastern Galicia were the means usually employed in Russia, i. e. the roubles. Galicia was an undeveloped, and therefore a poor, country. The events of war ruined the greater part of it. Help was necessary and of that necessity the Russian authorities took full advantage. A *Central Relief Committee* was founded in Lemberg. It was headed by Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, the member of the Duma and pan-Russian free-booter. All the members were avowed Russophiles. Russophile also were the provincial sub-committees. Some of the members were Poles, most likely National-Democrats. The aim of the organization was to win popular support for Russophilism.

Accordingly relief was granted to communes of the population of which was known to be Russophile. In other villages, subsidies were given to individuals who could be bought in the Russophile interests. Official reports show more than a million rubles to have been distributed in this fashion. Even small branches of the Committee received, without giving any receipt, sums of several hundred rubles. Prominent people must have made small fortunes out of this.

On the other hand a scheme of agrarian and fiscal reform was prepared in order to attract the sympathy of the peasants who constitute the bulk of the Galician population. Delegates from various Ministries studied

* A translation of his letter is given at the end of this publication.

local conditions and subsequently introduced the following proposals:

1) The burden of taxation must be shifted from the peasants to the great landowners.

2) The peasants whose property is not sufficient to keep them must be given land at the expense of the great landowners. Some of the land necessary for this reform should be confiscated from the absentee landowners. The parcellation should be entrusted to the peasants' Bank.

3) The civil rights of the Jews must be curtailed, for they exploit the rural population and monopolize both trade and industry.

These reforms never went further than the red-tape stage. The preliminary work attracted nevertheless attention on the question most acute in Galicia and, if the Russian Government had really been able to apply these reforms, the gratitude of the Galician peasants would have been earned. These reforms went no further than their expressed desire but they must not be lost sight of in view of possible contingencies.

When the Russian troops left Galicia, passports were given to all who wished to accompany them. The Russo-phile peasants took full advantage of this, in the hope that, once on the Russian soil, they would be given land and prosper accordingly. They soon came to realize the vanity of their expectations. While they were still on the road, their cattle were stolen from them, together with all their worldly possessions. They had to make the frontier on foot and beg for their food. Then the rumor spread about that the Government would only support the fugitives for a fortnight—10 kopecks and 1 lb. of bread per day. After that period the peasants were to support themselves. Hatred and contempt were shown them by the peasants of the frontier villages. This attitude brought them to a proper understanding of their false expectations and put an end, at least for the time being, to the Russo-phile agitation.

VI. THE NATIONAL QUESTION.

The Russian administration in Galicia tried by every possible means to oust *Ukrainian Nationalism* in Galicia. It was considered impossible to Russify the people so long as the Ukrainian nationalist leaders preserved their influence over the bulk of the peasants. While Galicia remained free, Russia knew that nothing could stop the development of the separatist desire in the Ukrainian provinces of Russia. From the first, after the declaration of war, restrictive measures were taken by the Russian authorities in Russian Ukraine. Newspapers in the native language were suppressed, the sporting of the national colors was forbidden, the *Kobzar* of Shevchenko was everywhere confiscated and the most distinguished Ukrainians thrown into jail. The same policy, although necessarily on a smaller scale, was adopted in Galicia. On the day that followed the occupation of Lemberg all the Ukrainian newspapers had to cease publication. It was even forbidden to print advertisements in Ukrainian, let alone books or pamphlets. All the Ukrainian associations and schools were closed down both in town and villages (the schools for an official period of 16 days). A few were compelled to hoist the Russian flag. Some days later came the repressive measures against the Ukrainian intellectuals. Searches were conducted in the homes of the notable Ukrainians and in the offices of the various societies, whether political, economic, religious or literary. Clerks, professors, school-masters, priests, tradesmen, peasants, working men, students, school-children even and of both sexes, and all of them of course Ukrainians, were arrested. There were several hundred of these prisoners but the exact figures are not known since many arrests were kept secret. In their attempts at apology the authorities complained several times in official communiqués of the faithlessness of the Ukrainians. Count Bobrinsky declared in a speech at Petrograd that all the nationalities

of Galicia were well disposed toward Russia with the exception of the Ukrainians who remained hostile.

In all the projects for the re-organization of the country, judicial, political, scholastic and ecclesiastic, the Ukrainians were left apart under the old Russian motto (*Ukraine has never existed, does not exist, and must not exist*) nevertheless the irrepressible force of the Ukrainian movement made itself felt in spite of all persecutions. Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia was far from crushed but exercised on the contrary a strong influence on the Ukrainian soldiers of the Russian army, thousands of whom were of course in Eastern Galicia during the occupation. The Russian Press itself studied the Ukrainian problem in numerous articles. In fact the question was more discussed than it had ever been and the Russifying measures taken by the authorities were strongly criticised in the Russian progressive Press. After the retreat from Galicia public opinion attributed that loss to the persecution which had been directed against the Ukrainians.

Very different was the treatment meted out to the Poles of Western Galicia. The manifesto of the Grand Duke Nicholas had been published and gained the good-will of the Poles. The policy of the first Russian governor Sheremetief had been openly friendly to them. Under the Bobrinsky era this friendliness was somewhat restricted out of deference for the Russian nationalist circles. Nevertheless the governor lost no occasion to show his favorable disposition towards the Poles.

In the Polish camp, the Russian orientation was hailed as a triumph. Not only the pan-Poles but the whole Polish society showed marked sympathy for Russia. The Polish legion of Eastern Galicia was dissolved because the men refused to march against Russian troops on behalf of Austria. The representatives of the Polish parties in a manifesto issued on November 10th, 1914, requested the youth to withdraw from the legion of Western Ga-

licia because a struggle against Russia was contrary to Polish interests. Even the late vice-roi of Galicia Count Leo Pininsky signed that appeal. A distinguished Polish member of Parliament, Theophile Merunovich asked Austria to give up Galicia in favor of Russia and the future Kingdom of Poland. The pan-Polish organ *Slowo Polskie* and *Zjednoczenie* openly announced the Russo-Polish alliance.

Accordingly the Poles were granted all kinds of special favors in Eastern Galicia. Those of Western Galicia, moreover, were to see that part of the province annexed to the Kingdom of Poland under the rule of the Russian Tsar. The Governor-General in one of his last speeches made known his change of policy to Polish public opinion and met with great approval.

“All the Austrophile Poles” he said, “have fled Galicia and those who remained are the friends of Russia. Many are still hesitating but they will end by siding with us for the sake of their nationality. Out of gratitude it is promised to the Poles that Western Galicia shall be annexed to the Kingdom of Poland and the Polish minorities in Eastern Galicia shall enjoy national prerogatives.” When the Austrian troops reoccupied the province most of the Russophile leaders withdrew into Russia. Count Leo Pininski alone had the courage to remain in Lemberg and to go and greet the head of the Austrian army.

The Russophiles supported Russia in every possible fashion and rendered useful services to the *Okhrana*. The direction was in the hands of the Russian National Council, headed by Dr. Dudikevich. This Council was in direct relation with the Governor-General and decided what line the other Russophile associations were to take up. Special commissions were established for various branches, mutual societies, schools, Church matters etc. Among the other associations the *Obstchestvo Katchkovskoho* showed great activity as in the opening of reading-

rooms. Other societies postponed their meetings, awaiting subventions. They were to devote themselves especially to the schools but the lack of adequate funds hampered them. The Council worked also on behalf of Orthodoxy which it propagated through its organs *Prikarpatzkaya Russ* and *Golos Naroda*. Other Russophile associations began to take steps in order to transfer the *Stauropighia* institute to Orthodoxy—but there was no time to accomplish this. As mentioned above the relief committees were in the hands of the Russophiles. That was the sinews of war which kept up the whole activity. At first the Russophiles were in close touch with Count George Bobrinsky and it was even rumored that Dr. Dudikevich was the Governor's advisor.

Then a certain cooling off in these relations was noticed. The Russophile aspirations were too ambitious. They wished to take in hand the whole administration of the country; they had a policy of their own; they criticised the decisions of Count George Bobrinsky and lost grace with him. They found however, supporters in the persons of Count Vladimir Bobrinsky and the Archbishop Eulogius and even succeeded by their intrigues in weakening the influence of the Governor. Differences broke out between the two parties. Eventually the Governor proved to be the strongest and showed the Russophiles and their supporters that he was master of the situation. The Russophile daily paper *Prikarpatzkaya Russ* was confiscated and suspended for sometime. A fanatical sermon of Bishop Eulogius and certain passages of the Memorandum issued by the Russian National Council on the schools were censored. The editor of the Lemberg military journal *Lvovskoye Voyennoye Slovo* attacked the Russophiles bitterly calling them "wolves in lambs' disguise" and "traitors to their own people." The creatures of the National Council were dismissed by the district commanders and Dr. Dudikevich was not authorized

to present himself at the audience given by the Governor-General at the occasion of the New Year. The Russophiles were on the verge of being wrecked when the Austrian offensive compelled the two parties to seek a hasty reconciliation.

EASTERN GALICIA BEFORE THE WAR.

The artificial joining into one of what Nature intended to be two provinces with their two capitals of Cracow and Lemberg was of course a move to give wider power to the Polish representation in the Reichsrat. The troubles of the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia were many but they all derived from the same cause. The Poles claim historical Poland—that is all those territories which at one time or another fell under the sway of Poland before Poland herself fell under the sway of other nations. Such dreams are dangerous and lead to wars. The rights do not go with the soil, but with the people. Before Eastern Galicia was Polish it was Ukrainian and it is still inhabited by Ukrainians in spite of Polish landlords. Now since the Poles claim historical Poland they are bound to be as a whole against the Ukraine movement in Galicia. In fact they are so pro-Polish that there is no chance for their being anything else but biassed against the Ukrainian revival. The two points of view are even more difficult of settlement than the question of Ulster in Ireland because the Poles occupy not only Western Galicia and a few villages in the Eastern part but also they are too often the landowners of the Ukrainian villages and they inhabit to a large extent Lemberg, which was and ought to be a Ukrainian town. Moreover the representation in the local Diet was far from equal between the two nations and still more so in

the Imperial Parliament at Vienna. Let the Austrian Government restore to the Ukrainians their own lands and divide Eastern from Western Galicia following the San River and the Ukrainians will promptly forget their past grievances. They are not vindictive. But without such a partition of Galicia there will be no peace between the Ukrainians and the Poles. The record of the several sources of disagreement between Poles and Ukrainians (with now and then a Russian or a German shadow flitting by) should be considered therefore as a mere recital of woes which the sufferer is prepared to forget after his cure.

The grievances can be put under four headings: political, economic, religious and educational. To begin with we must give a list of the Ukrainian parties in Galicia before the war. They were the National-Democrats, the Radicals, the Church party and the Social-Democrats, but all were united on national matters, as appeared at the beginning of the war when all joined hands to form the National Council. The activity of the Ukrainians was spread over two political fields. They had national representation in the Diet which was the Parliament of the so called autonomous Crown-Land of Galicia. They also elected members to the Imperial Parliament of Vienna but with only 28 members that is 26.4% as compared with 73.6% of the Poles. Each Ukrainian delegate represented 110,000 electors while each Pole represented only 51,000. With 28 members, the Ukrainians were not represented in Vienna in the number which they ought to have enjoyed according to the figures of the population as compared with the Poles. They were moreover mis-represented in Vienna by the Polish Parliamentary group who accused the Ruthenians repeatedly, even at the beginning of the war, of harboring anti-Austrian feelings. This was really the reverse of the truth, not that the Ukrainians of Galicia have any special love for the Germans or the German-Austrians, but their hatred of the

Russian government is so deep-rooted in the soul of the nation that they would be willing to cooperate with any nation that would offer them the prospect of safety for themselves and deliverance for their fellow-Ukrainians of Russia.

In spite of these difficulties the Ukrainians made their influence felt in Vienna even if at times they had to resort to methods of obstruction well known in every parliament of Europe, such as continuous noises, speeches of 24 hours' duration etc. Their difficulties were, however, so deep-rooted that their progress in Vienna was slight. The Poles not only had a very much larger representation owing to the reason stated above and to graft methods and their manipulations at election time but also their aristocracy (all-powerful in Vienna and against which the Ukrainians had but two or three names to array) was persistent in its misrepresentation in Court circles. During the last two or three years, however, thanks to a stronger organization on the part of their leaders, the Ukrainian national elements were gradually gaining strength.

This is no less true when we study the situation in the local Galician Diet. That parliament being nearer home affected the Ukrainians to a larger degree.

In the Lemberg Diet the electoral law of 1861 granted the Ukrainians forty-seven deputies that is 33.33 per cent. For years before the war there had been no business transacted. The Lemberg Diet was not like the Vienna parliament where if Poles and Ukrainians disagreed there always remained the other nations of the empire with their own delegates to pass the laws. But in Lemberg there were only Poles and Ukrainians in constant opposition to each other. The Poles were always in majority but not strong enough to treat the whole province altogether as they pleased. There were therefore constant elections, constant friction and constant referring to Vienna. Vienna could not interfere officially not only because the province enjoyed home-rule, but also because

the Polish nobility has always been very influential in Vienna. Finally under semi-official pressure the Poles were compelled to reorganize the electorate. But for some reason which has not yet been thoroughly elucidated the Polish bishops obstructed the agreement.

After interminable negotiations accompanied by persistent demands on the part of the Ukrainians, the Polish majority in the Lemberg Diet adopted, without much argument among themselves, a project of Electoral Reform which seemed to satisfy the Ukrainians, at least as a stepping stone.

Unfortunately in March 26th 1913, the Polish Bishops gathered in conference and decided to abstain from voting in the Diet in this question of the Electoral Reform. They comprised the Polish Archbishop of Lemberg and the Bishops of Cracow, Peremyshl, Tarnow and the Armenian-Catholic Bishop of Lemberg who, following the lead of the Poles, was looked upon as a Pole like all his flock, since not being Ukrainians they cannot do anything else but belong to the ruling race. The attitude of these prelates meant the end of the negotiations and raised doubts as to whether the project could be accepted by the Poles after all.

The Conservative Catholics through their Chief, Count Stanislaw Tarnowsky, asked the Bishops to motivate their decision. The motives were given in accordance with this request and as was expected by the Ukrainians, they brought forth no reasonable argument. It would not interest anybody to read their elucubration for it is too often the case that when clergy step into politics, they usually make a grievous mess of it. The conclusion is worth quoting however:

“The present project of Electoral Reform gives rise to objection on principle because it threatens to introduce radicalism into politics. That would be dangerous to religion, public morality and national progress. Partisans of the democracy, the Bishops are decided adversaries of

radicalism. The democratisation of Society brings to the service of the public fresh and new element. The radicalisation of Society introduces principles of discord and hatred, it weakens, disagregates and keeps away the saner elements."

Upon this, Bobrzynski, Governor of Galicia, resigned, for the compromise between Ukrainians and Poles had been partly his work. Then the Lemberg Diet was dissolved. New elections were ordered in May, 1913, for as was to be expected, the Conservative Catholic Poles had accepted the Bishops' argument and given up their support of the project of Reform. Count Stuerghk tried once more to realize another compromise between the Bishops, the Polish leaders and the Ukrainians but his efforts were of no avail.

The elections took place at the beginning of July and went well for the Ukrainians in so far as the limited chances given them allowed. From sixteen seats the Ukrainians had jumped to thirty-two, being thirty-one Ukrainian Nationalists and one Russophile. Moreover, they formed a compact body, while the Poles were divided into nine parties. In the whole of Eastern Galicia which is, as we know, the Ukrainian part of that huge province, the Poles were being ousted from the seats which they still held owing to their political manipulation of the parliamentary districts. Until then they had preserved their hold over forty-seven non-Polish districts but after the election they retained only fifteen. This helped the Ruthenians to adopt a stiffer attitude still against the Poles and to demand more than they would have thought of asking two months before. Finally another compromise was reached in 1914 which was not put into practise owing to the war.

This recital is hardly adequate to explain the fierce and relentless antagonism of the Ukrainians and the Poles. The latter had the supremacy in Galicia and they used it especially for political purposes. It was the same attitude

which some Irish might have taken up, had the Ulster people been delivered over to them. The Irish, however, were in their own whole-Irish island while Eastern Galicia had always been Ukrainian.

This supremacy not merely of a ruling class but of a whole nation, as it were, over another nation, of about four million Poles over three and a half million Ukrainians, was manifest in every aspect of public and private life in Galicia, east of the San River. Even with Lemberg which being the official capital of the whole province contained many Poles, the Ukrainians numbered seventy per cent of the population.

Another complication was the continuous Russian intrigue among the Ukrainians. These intrigues were countenanced by the Poles and carefully hidden from and protected against the Vienna authorities. Two notorious trials on the eve of the war let however the cat out of the bag. Polish pressure could not prevent the scandal. I want here to throw a little light on the sides of the Russian activities which have direct bearing on this problem. It is necessary first of all that I should review the situation in Galicia as it was in May last when I undertook a trip to that country in company with several Englishmen. I went because I was told that Russia was preparing for war then. Ample evidence was at hand to confirm that information. In April, 1914, it was announced that the Russian military and naval departments and the State railways were no longer to obtain material from Germany, and Austria-Hungary; and that orders should in future be given to British, French and Belgian firms. On June 23d at a secret sitting of the Duma, an increased military credit and a supplementary naval credit of 100,000,000 roubles were voted, the period of army service was extended by three months, and the export of horses to against their Government.

I can say truly that we saw almost every town and every village of interest in Eastern Galicia and spoke

with a thousand and one persons who could tell us everything that worried them in the political situation and everything they found hopeful, although, perhaps, merely from their own parish-pump point of views.

Nowadays Great Britain and America are learning something of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia. A year ago they were quite unknown. Little Russians, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Malorussians, Hutzuls, Podolians, Bukovinians, Galicians or South Russians—hidden from the world under these many names was a nation of 35,000,000 people, subjects of Russia, of Austria-Hungary, and even citizens of Canada and America. The Russian Government wants them all, to oppress them as it does their Little-Russian brothers. Wholesale arrests, including that of the Archbishop of Lemberg took place. Russians themselves had to rise in the Duma with a clamor of anger against their Government.

I have spoken with dozens of Ukrainians from Russia, Kiev, Odessa, Katerinoslav, Kharkiv, Poltava, even from Canada and the U. S. A. and I am convinced that national life was much stronger in Russian Ukraine than it has ever been in Galicia or Bukovina, although its manifestations are, of course, more repressed in Russia. "We have made the whole of the Russian Empire, we Ukrainians" said a Russian agent but this is hardly the way the Ukrainians themselves look at the question. The attitude of the Russian Government hardly convinces them that the whole Russian Empire is their domain. In March, 1914, the Provincial Authorities throughout the Ukraine were prohibited by the Ministry of the Interior from celebrating the memory of Shevchenko, the great national poet, or from holding any sort of public meeting for that purpose. Church services in memory of the poet of the Ukraine were also forbidden.

But this is nothing compared with the efforts of the Russian Government and of the semi-official agents to produce an active antagonism against Austria. These

activities forced the Austrian Government to resort to trials which caused a good deal of sensation at the time, and which extended over so many weeks that public opinion abroad refused absolutely to be stirred by the dull enunciation of what appeared to be nothing but a set of petty grievances.

On March 3, 1914, judgment was given against thirty-two Ruthenians on a charge of inciting to revolt against the King of Hungary, the Emperor Francis Joseph. The trial opened on December 29, 1913, at Marmaros-Sziget in the North of Hungary in a wild and beautiful part of the Ukrainian mountains. After the preliminary sifting of the 189 accused by the Public Prosecutor, ninety-four were charged before the Court, ten of whom were released on the opening day of the proceedings. No fewer than 247 witnesses were summoned, among them being Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, member of the Duma and President of the Russian National Association. Had Count Bobrinsky himself been in the dock, and the prisoners in the witness box, the guilt would have been fastened on the right person.

It is barely five years since he began his pan-Slav agitation, assisted by large sums of money from the Russian Government and private individuals who shared his views. His methods were the same in Hungary, Galicia, and Bukovina. One or two educated writers were bribed or lured by his rash promises, and with the help of the imported journalists from Russia a small periodical was practically forced upon the peasants. This course proving insufficient, Count Bobrinsky took up the weapon of Orthodox proselytism. Innumerable methods were employed to persuade the population to shake off their nationality and religion and to commit high treason against the State to which they belonged. War, the Ruthenians were told, was to break out and the Tsar was coming to deliver them from "the tyrannical rule of the Germans any Magyars." Free boarding-schools, distribu-

tion of money, excursions to the famous monasteries in Kiev, and the introduction of Orthodox priests from Russia, whom Russian money enabled to give their services free of charge, were the means used to foster the spirit of rebellion. The most seditious statements against the King of Hungary were disseminated, always mingled with promises of a better and less expensive religion, and of baptisms, marriages, and funerals performed without fee. The whole agitation was directed, after the departure of Count Bobrinsky, by a certain Alexander Kabalyuk, called Father Alexius. He spent freely the money sent to him by Count Bobrinsky and the heads of various Russian monasteries.

One of the pamphlets used in this propaganda contained the following sentences:

The Russian Tsar is angry with our Emperor. He will soon conquer all the Hungarian districts inhabited by Ruthenians. You must at once join the Russian Orthodox Church, for when the Tsar comes into this country he will place the Ruthenians who have embraced Orthodoxy on his right hand and the Catholic Ruthenians on his left, and will then order the former to shoot the latter.

This, although hard on the Tsar, was bound to make an impression on the peasants.

Such a movement, fostering ideals inimical to Austria-Hungary, implied a serious danger, and the Government realized it. Father Alexius and his agents were arrested and put on the trial at Marmaros-Sziget. Father Alexius was sentenced to four-and-a-half years' imprisonment, and thirty-one others of the accused to terms of imprisonment, varying from two years to six months. One of the most telling incidents of the trial was when Count Bobrinsky made his deposition in Russian and an interpreter had to be found. One Ruthenian (Ukrainian) was brought, but he could not understand. Yet Bobrin-

sky and others of his kind always claimed the Ruthenian language to be but a dialect of the Russian, easily understood by Russians and *vice versa!*

The Hungarian Government awakened to a sense of its responsibility towards the most wretched of its subjects, and the trial seemed to bring happy results in its train. An attempt was made to ameliorate the lot at the Ruthenians of Hungary. It was not difficult to show them what they might expect if they joined their fellow-Ukrainians of Russia as subjects of the Tsar. They were told of the countless persecutions and petty tyrannies which the Russian Ukrainians "enjoyed" during 1913 alone, when every new manifestation of national Ukrainian life was immediately suppressed.

The second trial was, perhaps, even more important. It resembled that which took place at Marmaros-Sziget, but there were differences which rendered the Lemberg trial more arresting to outside observers. The charge was no longer merely one of religious propaganda and disloyalty to Austria, as it was in the case of the simple peasants who were tried in the Carpathian district of Hungary. The four accused were educated men who knew perfectly well what they were doing and why they were doing it. Their propaganda was complicated with State treason and espionage.

Their leader was a remarkable man, Simon Bendasiuk by name, and, of course, an Austrian subject born in Galicia thirty-seven years ago. I had a good look at him in Court. His eyes were those of a fanatic. He is obviously one of those men who live by their nerves; but he strikes me as an honest if somewhat crafty man. He was the Editor of a pro-Russian daily paper printed in Lemberg and of a popular pro-Russian weekly, both of which were circulated almost entirely by the help of money received through the usual semi-official channels. He was converted to Orthodoxy in July, 1914. With him

were two Orthodox priests and a University student, all Austrian born.

I sat many weary hours in the Lemberg Law Courts listening to the evidence read out in Polish by the Judge, who was interrupted in Ruthenian (Ukrainian) by the accused, and in German by one or two Jewish jurymen. Enough, it appeared to many of us, had already been said to secure the conviction of the ringleader and the two priests, especially Hudyma, who, with his nervous fingers constantly playing through his long, curly hair, looked more like a coxcomb than like one of God's ministers. The Judges were Poles and of the twelve jurymen, ten were Poles or Polonized Ukrainians and two were Polish Jews. They looked weary of the ease, and several times I saw them eating biscuits and nuts or reading the newspapers while the evidence was being read.

The Polish leaders inclined towards Russia at that time, and it was not safe to foretell the verdict. One thing, however, was evident; Russian money was at the back of this Moscalophile movement in Galicia. There were, at the outbreak of the war, about thirty boarding-schools in Galicia maintained by Russian money. There, poor Ukrainian boys were enticed for the sake of a free education, of which the Russian language and Russian history (so-called) formed the basis. Altogether, towards the close of 1913, over a thousand Ukrainian boys were educated in this fashion in Galicia, and their enhanced status was bound to influence their parents. Let me add that it was due to Polish influence that the movement had been allowed to proceed so far. There were very few German-Austrian officials in the autonomous province of Galicia. The Russian propaganda was carefully concealed by the Polish officials, who belonged to the all-Poles Party and who were still considered to represent Galicia, be it Eastern or Western, in Vienna. They hoped in exchange for their leniency in Galicia to obtain favors for their fellow-Poles of Russia. Once the Poles were pro-

Austrian, but they had obtained all that was to be obtained from the Austrian Government. Weak nationalities, like the stronger ones, are prone to selfishness.

However vehemently Count Bobrinsky may have asserted that nobody in Russia desired to see the map of Europe altered again by the annexation of Galicia, the trial proved that Russia, through her semi-official agents, was doing systematic work in Galicia. Day by day her emissaries—priests and students, journalists, and even army officers—sought to attract sympathizers in Austria-Galicia so that when the occasion offered Russia might declare war on the pretence of defending her alleged co-religionists, invade the province, and annex it. Then Russia might be able once more to crush the Ukrainian revival on her own soil by suppressing the “irredentism” of Galicia. Here we find a repetition of the story of the period that preceded the events of 1772, when, in the cause of the dissentients in Poland, Russia marched out her armies and succeeded in realizing her heart’s desire.

In spite of the fact that England is to-day fighting by the side of Russia, I have great doubts as to the genuineness of Russian promises of liberty.

But to return to the trial and its results, the verdict of “Not Guilty” returned by the Galician jury was not unexpected. The jurymen were obviously weary of their task. The word “bribery” is of current use in Eastern Europe and, although we all know well enough it is part of the stock-in-trade of the Russian Nationalists, there is no need to seek such an explanation. The situation was not without its farcical features. The fact is both the counsel for the defence and for the crown were Russophiles, whilst the President of the Court was of Polish, and the chief witness for the prosecution of Magyar sympathies. But who represented Austria? No one but an army-officer in full uniform, who seemed strangely out of place in Court.

Neither the judge nor the twelve insignificant jurymen were in the last prompted in their motives by a feeling of patriotism for Austria. Galicia was an autonomous province; the Poles ruled it, and there might well have been written over the public buildings of the province "None but Poles and Polonized Germans or Ukrainians need apply." The tendency of the Polish leaders, in spite of broken promises and wrecked Bills, was to turn towards Russia in the expectation of favors to come, and to show more openly the second of their national hatreds, that for their German rulers. It can safely be said that the point of view of the Austrian Government was ignored throughout or, if listened to, it was given scanty consideration.

The result was that the men who were acquitted, Simon Bendasiuk and his Orthodox friends, had their campaign legalized, as it were, in Galicia. Once more they began to tour the villages, distributing newspapers and literature, with the enhanced prestige of Polish sanction,* and the "martyrdom" of two years' imprisonment pending their trial. From the Austrian point of view, it would, perhaps, have been better if the trial had never taken place.

Russian money once more flowed through the channel of that remarkable organizer, Simon Bendasiuk. But even had the Russian rubles disappeared, I have now come to the conclusion that the campaign would not have abated. There were sections of the Polish parties in Galicia who were ready to support financially a pro-Russian Ukrainian movement in the future as they had occasionally done in the past. Yet, in spite of money, of official support, of private reserve funds, the result of work of the Russophiles justified a pessimistic opinion on their part. They were not gaining, and in some parts

* A few days later Count Bobrinsky thanked the Poles publicly in the Duma for the acquittal of his tools. The loss of L'viv has already caused the Poles to realize the folly of treachery. It never pays to break one's bond.

of Galicia were losing ground. Their propaganda was becoming almost a defensive one. Whatever the outcome of the war, Russophilism is dead in Galician Ukraine. It never was very strong, although dangerous enough to the State. Russia is trying to annex a country that will never be satisfied with Tsarism.

Among the many things that came out at the trials was the repeated assertion by the witnesses that some of the Russophiles had openly told them that Russia was preparing to wage war upon Austria, with the help of France and England, to "rescue them from the grip of the Germans and Magyars." People in Austria laughed when they read this. Now it has been proved true. The murder of an Austrian Prince, had to prepare the way though. The Russian Black Hundred had, of course, to give up their Pan-Slav dream or fight the reawakening of the Ukrainians in Galicia and the growing Nationalistic movements among the subject peoples of Russia.

I am not now studying this war from the International point of view, nor from the British point of view; if I were, I should have to agree with people in this country that the war could have been prevented at first if England had taken up a stiffer attitude towards Russia. But once France and Belgium were dragged in I believe we had to act as we did. It is not a question of whether or not we like Prussian ways, Prussian aspirations, and the Prussian character. They are certainly antagonistic to ours. But to have proved himself unable to prevent the clique that surrounds him, from obtaining the extension of a war to which Austria-Hungary was absolutely forced—that should burden the conscience of the French and British Governments until the end of their days, unless they obtain from Russia an unequivocal promise of amnesty for all political offenders and of federation for all the subject races of the Russian Empire, including first of all, Ukraine, if Ukraine falls into Russian hands in its entirety. Our antiquated diplomacy, ill-informed, supercilious, easy to in-

fluence, is more to blame than anything else. When the Peace Treaty is signed, does anyone who knows Russia believe that the Ukrainians will be happier? If so, why are they being terrorized by Russia to-day? Why do all their civilian leaders find themselves in jail or in exile? Why have over 200,000 Ukrainians fled in haste from Eastern Galicia?

One must not blame, however, all the Poles of Austria, for those in the West, that is those who were farthest from the Ukrainians were rather favorable to them than the others. The democrats and the socialists were also fair in their opinion. In spite of the Russian activities before the war the only Ukrainian newspapers which had any circulation at all were *Dilo*, *Nove Slovo*, *Ruslan*, *Hromadsky Holos* and *Vpered*.

All were distinctly anti-Russian. Exception may be made of *Prikarpat'skaya Russ* which was a paper subventioned by the Russian Nationalists. It had a circulation since it was sent free to all the Ukrainian peasants whose names the editor could obtain in any possible way. To return to the Poles, their pro-Russian papers were, of course, anti-Ukrainian but the others were not.

It is plain then that the Poles were divided on the vital point. A strong rich minority was pro-Russian because they expected Russia to win and to give them back in exchange for help, the ancient Kingdom of Poland, including a part of Ukraine. That however, is only Poland from the historical point of view because Poland for a time occupied that territory—just as England occupied Calais. From the ethnographical point of view, no part of Ukraine could be handed over justly to Poland, and this Poles would not recognize.

Another reason for the pro-Russianism of some Polish parties "All-Poles" section of the Polish nation was the hope of obtaining favors for the Poles of Russia. For this reason they fostered, helped and winked at religious and political propaganda of the Russians agents.

EAGLE AND CROWS.

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX BISHOP NIKON DEFENDS UKRAINIANS.

[In the Petrograd newspaper *Birzeviya Viedomosti* for July 24, 1915, Bishop Nikon published a long article in favor of the Ukrainian claims as an answer to some remarks of M. Menshikof in the *Novoye Vremya*. This prelate, now bishop of Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is himself a native of Great Russia but having exercised his ministry for a long time in Ukrainian provinces he came to learn the conditions of the Ukraine and to know the people well. He grew to be very fond of them and became the advocate of their rights and of their claims. We need only mention the projected Bill which he laid before the Duma before the war and which was intended to provide for Ukrainian national schools and for the use of the Ukrainian language in the Courts. This honest and straightforward attitude on the part of a high dignitary of the Orthodox Church displeased unfortunately the heads of the Holy Synod and supporters of the Black Hundreds and the bishop was removed from the Ukraine and sent into Siberian disgrace. Bishop Nikon was a member of the Duma and there was no excuse under which he could be deprived of that charge. Nevertheless since it is necessary for any minister of religion to obtain a special permission of the Synod to leave his post and to attend the meetings of the Duma there was a way

for the enemies of the Ukraine. While all the reactionary bishops and priests obtained with the greatest ease such a permission it was denied to bishop Nikon. It should be noted that this prelate does not belong to any of the liberal parties, which fact gives all the more weight to the voice of this honest conservative. There was in consequence but one means for him to express his opinion, the Press.]

I have just read Menshikof's article in which he gives a faithful account of the violence done to Russia by Germans and describes what influence an alien culture made-in-Germany has exercised on the real Russian culture and on our people. While I read this article of Menshikof, these words from one of our writers, "Men like the corn bow under the breath of the wind," came back to my mind. There are times in the life of nations when in spite of all arguments and dangers one must call for a halt. For some time so many unexpected events have unfolded themselves before our eyes in Galicia that from the oppressed heart of every Russian who loves his country there comes an irrepressible cry of oppression and anguish at the sight of the peril which threatens Russia and Galicia. Those who have followed our Galician campaign can but admire the glorious deeds of our heroes in the Carpathians.

But while the eagles were pursuing their victorious advance they were being followed by a plague of crows. The valiant eagles were working towards the noble aim of reuniting the Slavs; but the crows, in the persons of Count Bobrinsky, Archbishop Eulogius and M. M. Bis..., Tch... etc (all these Russian Nationalists are countless) were hastening to build a new Russian province in a foreign land. And lo, there fall down as by magic Russian teachers, Russian schools an Orthodox bishopric while the Ukrainian institutions, lower schools, high schools, reading-rooms, libraries, these are all closed. Menshikof recalls the popular saying: "ill-gotten gains

do not profit," when he writes of Germans and Russians but we must bear in mind the depth of this proverb, so that in the end Russian culture does not seem to the Ukrainians to be as short-sighted as the German culture with which Russians have been saturated. It is most painful and a thing much to be deplored that the Russian Nationalists have for nearly 300 years courted the Ukrainians merely to Russify them. It is only the obstinacy of the meek and lowly, unfortunately not of the educated classes, which has saved the Ukrainian nation in Russia from utter decadence and desintegration.

The Ukrainian nation, however modest it may be, has the right to exist, according to the declarations of our publicist himself; Ukraine has the right to defend its independence and its national culture. Mme. Alexandra Effimenko speaking on the subject of Ukrainian schools said "Do allow Little-Russians this equality with the other human creatures that they can study in their own schools!" But what do we see instead? I have long lived and labored in Ukraine and I left it with a most sorrowful feeling after having witnessed the result of the activity of Russian schools in that country. Where the school-master knows the Ukrainian language, the situation is perhaps not so hopeless but in the schools where he is a real Russian (*Katsap*), the children understand almost nothing and hate all studies. Much printers' ink has been poured over this matter, and much discussion ensued with never but one result in Russian Ukraine: the *failure to Russify*. M. Menshikof should withdraw his statement that Russia imposes her culture upon none. Russian schools have fettered the Ukrainian and his intelligence with this result that the son does not understand his own father, does not know what he himself is or what he should be. The Ukrainian is compelled to swim useless between two currents of culture. He is already injured to this misfortune. Nevertheless to become used to a long illness does not mean that one

does not suffer. The conscious Ukrainian, not at all a Mazeppist, suffers much in Russian Ukraine.

But let us take our flight after the crows that wished to pass themselves for eagles and sought to organize Austrian Ukraine. There do Nationalists of all shades, there are enough of them, oppress an alien nationality, the Ukrainian nation. These "heroes" take no heed of the old traditions of the Austrian Ukrainians, who are quite conscious of themselves and who, under the Austrian rule, have learned who they are, what their fore-fathers were and by whom they have been yoked. Whereas the Ukrainians under Russian rule live in dirt and ignorance, unable to borrow that which is good in the schools and the civilization of Russia, and merely ape others by wearing a coat and cap instead of their national dresses, the Ukrainians under Austrian rule, with their own village schools, their university, their high schools, their reading-rooms, their libraries, their own national Press, look upon themselves rightly and consciouly as an independent Slav nation.

The Ukrainians of Austria have to put up with economic yokes* but they can enjoy at least the most precious thing in life: their mother, Galicia, with its own ancient customs, its language, its schools. These Ukrainians from beyond the frontier, in spite of the terrible oppression of the Poles and the Jews, could nevertheless truly say that they were living up to the last wish of their martyr-poet, Tarass Shevchenko.

*"Study, my brothers,
Think and read,
Learn what comes from elsewhere.
Do not forget what belongs to you,
He who forgets his own mother
Suffers God's punishment!"*

* That of the Polish big landowners. Translator's note.

As regards culture, the Ukrainian peasants of Austria are infinitely superior to the Russian Ukrainian. Lovingly they tell their children, in their own tongue, of the ancient days in Ukraine, they relate its short but glorious history; they speak of the sons of the Zaporogian Cossacks, of which none of our own peasants have ever heard*.

Today, this army of Russian crows has fallen upon Galicia in the wake of our glorious troops; and now they have taken to organizing everything after the fashion of carrion-crows. Interdictions began to pour down; institutions were closed. From the soil, like mushrooms, as it were, arose Russian schools, Orthodox priests and parishes; bishoprics and a metropolitan archbishop were announced. No, you crows, learn that every people requires respectful treatment. A nation is not a gramophone disc upon which one can impress any kind of tune; every national sentiment should be preserved, not insulted. This is holy truth; that our Russian Nationalists forget it and, while singing the praises of nationalities oppress nationalities fills one with sadness. Menshikof sheds tears, of which he is very prolific, over the bad influence which German culture has had on the Russian people, but himself, and the Nationalists with him, behave unjustly to their sister Ukraine. The latter both abroad and in Russia clamors for schools and for the establishment of public education. Our duty is to help it develop its own intellectual culture. Then will the mystical Mazeppist movement loose its force. Oh, Nationalists, please do not keep the people in ignorance. The Ukrainian people shall awake one day and ask you, "Oh! my brother, what have you made of me? Where are my children? Where is my own dear tongue, where is justice, where is my mother Ukraine." What answer

* The reminiscences of the Bishop tell of a time already long gone by. For several years the intellectual level of the Ukrainian has been raised considerably. Translator's note.

shall we be able to give? These crows have devoured everything.

Not only can an individual sin; a whole nation can sin also. The Russian people will have to take upon itself the heaviest burden of sin if it denies to Ukraine the satisfaction of its most irreducible needs and before everything else if it refuses to grant the Ukrainians schools in their own language. Then will the big brother prove to be a loser as well as his little brother. He will lose the possibility to develop himself peacefully along with the latter. You cannot deprive a people of its very breath. Necessity, honor, justice, reason and conscience require that we should let the Ukrainian people develop itself.

As for you, crows from Russia, organizers of the Russian and of the Austrian Ukraine, whatever you may do, you are bound to do wrong. Do not fly behind the eagles, do not hamper them. They are the glory of Russia: you are nothing but her shame! They are eagles, they are heroes. You are merely crows and brainless actors, you the unfortunate "Saviours" of the motherland.

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