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ASPECTS OF RECENT UKRAINIAN LITERATURE IN THE USSR

by Marko Pavlyshyn



Let us begin with a contrast.

When, on 12th April 1961, Yuri Gagarin successfully completed the first manned space flight, mainstream Soviet culture reacted with predictable elation. Among the Ukrainian contributions was an offering by Mykola Nahnybida, a star of average magnitude in the official constellation of Soviet Ukrainian poets:

*It has happened!
That miracle has happened
Of which mankind dreamed for generations -
Beneath the stars soared happily
Our countryman -
An eagle above the worlds!
I rejoice!
I am proud!
I sing
The praises of the Fatherland's hero.
Who, today, does not elevate
Hot hearts toward you!
I am proud
That my brother in struggle and fate*

*Was the first in the world
Who, like a new star in the azure,
Illuminated the
expanse of the ages.
O Earth!
How could I not rejoice!
You hear it reverberate everywhere:
For the sake of happiness everything can be done
By the people of the great Party!!*

Later, in the mid-1970's, the dissident and former literary critic Ivan Svitlychny took up the same theme in one of his prison sonnets:

"To Yu. Gagarin"
*If it is necessary to
return to Zion,
What need have you to descend to the Earth?
H.Skovoroda.
Now that you have stood above the flux of the
everyday,*

*Above the vanity of glories and of powers,
 Above the bustle of trifles and above
 Yourself, while the nauseating
 Doubting commas mindlessly
 Laugh, the villains, out of the corners of their mouths:
 Now that you see the rule of that which is -
 Its guarantee and order.
 Human beings and the earth as a great plan,
 And yourself as god and master -
 Will you, from your elevated position, wish
 To abandon your orbit
 And return from above the world of vanity
 into the bosom of the everyday?*²²

The two poems exemplify mutually exclusive conceptions of the nature and function of poetic art. Nahnybida, guided by the Socialist Realist precept of *partiinist* ('party-mindedness'), produces a versified panegyric devoid of intellectual or emotional content more complex than naive exclamatory enthusiasm. Svitlychny's poem is conceived as involving its reader in the discussion of a problem - in this case, the relationship between the human possibilities created by technological progress and the actual conditions of life.

The question is, naturally, a provocative one in a state which is a world leader in the exploration of space and, simultaneously, in the subjugation of its citizens. Equally striking is the difference in the manner of the two poems. Nahnybida, abetted by the official requirement that art display the quality of *narodnist*, ('people-mindedness') unashamedly offers the reader a work of surpassing stylistic and linguistic banality. Whether Svitlychny's sonnet is a good one or not (its critical evaluation does not immediately concern us), it is clear that the poem reflects poetic ambitions far more demanding than those that stir within Nahnybida.

The aesthetic within whose framework Svitlychny's poem was written attributes value to individuality of vision, associativeness, semantic multi-layeredness, tautness of diction and novelty in use of language - criteria of aesthetic value that are familiar to the Western reader.

The following discussion concerns itself more with Svitlychny's kind of literature than with Nahnybida's—literature that aspires toward an aesthetic penetration of Soviet Ukrainian reality, rather than literature which repeats official pronouncements concerning that reality. A representation of the typical in Soviet Ukrainian literature, illuminating though it would be, is not the main objective. I shall examine, in turn, Ukrainian literature's response to the possibilities created by the post-Stalin liberalization, the discussion in literature of the particularly central and difficult question of nationhood in the USSR, and the consequences of

literature's descent underground, into the world of *samvydav* (unofficial publishing) that was occasioned by the end of the thaw.

The Spirit of Rebellion

After the *Gleichschaltung* of all literary activity that attended the proclamation of Socialist Realism as a compulsory creative method for all Soviet writers in 1934, the national literatures of the USSR, including the Ukrainian, lost effective contact with literatures in the West. And yet, when Stalin's death occasioned a marginal relaxation of controls over cultural life (a "thaw" that lasted, with intermittent frosts, into the mid-1960's), a literary ferment took place that was, in nature if not in scale, analogous to certain contemporary cultural processes in the West. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, a young generation displayed a new subjectivist, individualist orientation, as well as a willingness to rebel against the established order, that were out of the ordinary in their own cultural contexts.

In the West, the literary spokesmen of the generation born in and after 1930 began to come to the fore after the mid-1950's. Too young to have participated in the Second World War, the members of this generation had no special appreciation of the world of material welfare and security that had been created by the post-war reconstruction. On the contrary, this world, perceived as devoid of ideals other than that of materialism, attracted their radical criticism. In 1956 John Osborne created the literary type of the "angry young man"; in 1959 Gunter Grass's *Die Blechtrommel* initiated the critique of Germany's wartime generation by its sons and daughters.

In the 1960's the spirit of rebellion conquered mass popular culture, which came to be identified, as seldom before, with the culture of the young. The spirit of protest and opposition expressed itself on the intellectual level in the burgeoning of critical thought at the rapidly expanding universities, and on the level of practice and mythogenetic action it took the form of Vietnam demonstrations and student revolution. As a reaction to the perceived hypocrisy of established society, the youth culture gave birth to a cult of sincerity, openness and naturalness, whose symbols were an ad hoc approach to interpersonal, particularly sexual, relations, and a commitment to the ideal of communication.

Above all other positive values was that of freedom—both for whole societies and for the individual, who owed it to himself to achieve self-fulfilment. The quest for self interacted productively with the fashion

for existentialism that the novels of Jean Paul Sartre had stimulated after the War; it encouraged an interest in oriental religions and in modes of thought other than the rational, even to the point of expanding the mind's perceptivity through drugs.

The yearning for the genuineness of a life uninfluenced by the limiting structure of an all-pervasive economic system led to experiments in such alternative, structure-free lifestyles as those of the flower-power movement.

Naturally, nothing approaching this could even be contemplated in the USSR. Stalin's death in 1953 had temporarily ameliorated, but not changed, the coercive nature of the Soviet system. And yet, at the level of literary culture, we encounter reminiscences of the phenomena described above. Ivan Koshelivets has pointed out with his accustomed acuteness that the relationship to the West was not based on mimicry (except in the case of epiphenomena such as the popularity of jeans and rock music), but on a real structural similarity: for the first time a generation felt not only the need, but also the opportunity to protest against existing Soviet reality and the representatives of the older generation who had brought it into being.³

It was in the arts, and especially in literature, that the thaw made itself felt. As it frequently does in coercive societies, literature became a surrogate forum for the discussion of public affairs. In the case of Ukrainian literature, this forum was able to survive the reimposition of the freeze, which was marked by waves of arrests of writers and intellectuals in 1965 and 1972, because a new medium, independent of central control, had been devised for the dissemination literature: *samvydav*, the unofficial semi-clandestine press.

The rise of *samvydav*, which probably began with the circulation of Vasyl Symonenko's unpublished poems and diary after his death in 1963, created a new set of conditions for literature: on one hand, it made possible the appearance of material more provocative in content and form than any publisher could accept; on the other hand, paradoxically, *samvydav* relieved literature of the obligation to act as a public forum, because it could accommodate the genre of the polemical essay.

One might well, therefore, divide the corpus of literature which concerns us into two broad categories and could almost call them "periods" but for the extent to which they overlap: innovative, yet officially sanctioned literature, mostly appearing in the years 1957-1965, and the literature of outright dissent, much of it produced, in prisons, camps and exile, starting in the middle 1960's and continuing to

the present.⁴

The analogy with the West becomes weaker in the latter category, but it has descriptive force for the period of the thaw. A new awareness of the self finds its way into the Ukrainian literature of the period, together with the assertion of the right to a private vision of the world. Occasionally the new self-consciousness becomes not merely the basis, but also the theme of literary works.

In their poetry, Vasyl Symonenko and Lina Kostenko dedicated much of their attention to the exploration of subjective states of mind. Sometimes the declaration of selfhood is so conscious and deliberate that it becomes less poetic than programmatic and assertive, as is the case in Symonenko's "T":

*The world has myriads of people like me,
But I — believe me, I am unique.
... We are not a myriad of standard selves,
But a myriad diverse universes.*

A consequence of the new sense of self is an enhanced awareness of the Other and a yearning for communication and understanding. Hence Symonenko's evocation of a lonely Crusoe praying to be given a Friday and his twin paradoxes of dumb speech and articulate silence:

*Do not make fun of me, please,
And, speaking, do not be silent.
What need has truth of a wordy mask?
Let your silence shout to me.*⁶

The question of the self and the rights which it may legitimately claim is the theme of Valerii Shevchuk's philosophical short story *Ostannii den* ("The Last Day"). The central figure forsakes public life in an eighteenth century Cossack chancery and becomes, like Skovoroda, an itinerant philosopher of the villages. The conclusion of his reflections is both pessimistic and unconcealedly relevant to the contemporary situation. The hero observes that the decline of great general causes - "liberty, equality, freedom of belief, freedom to speak one's own language, the wish that the most ordinary rights of a human being to be human be respected"⁷ — leads to an ever-increasing sense of the separateness of selves and their thoughts and opinions.

Such fragmentation into self-units has as its necessary consequence a powerlessness to act in a socially effective way. Shevchuk's tale, which defines individualism as the result of all cultural development, and at the same time presents this individualism in a dubious and pessimistic light, appeared in *Duklia*, the Ukrainian-language journal published in Czechoslovakia, in 1967. It is unlikely that a work so remote from the officially demanded progress-oriented optimism could have appeared in Ukraine itself.



Lina Kostenko

The theoretical consideration of subjectivism and individualism had as its practical equivalent in the field of art the development of more deliberately individual, even eccentric and (by Soviet standards) provocative modes of self-expression. Originality of image, boldness of metaphor, the introduction of vocabulary previously foreign to the poetic art, and a delight in the surprising logical possibilities of far-fetched conceits were specialties of Ivan Drach. The union of playfulness with intellectualism that is characteristic of his work recollects the Baroque poets, nowhere more so than in the following stanzas from *Baliada syntezy* ("Ballad of Synthesis"), in which the beloved inspires a virtuosity of figurative speech worthy of John Donne:

*Upon your broken eyebrow-yoke
You silkenly carried yourself in.
Thus I hanged myself on conjectures,
On the notions of your dishonours.
Thus I drank insane laughter
Only so that you would shine sunnily.
Thus within the shores of your steep-banked
eyebrows
Two hazel oceans pulsed. . .
The guttural rattle of thunder.
The broken backs of rains. . .
Thus choke with weeping
The salty trumpets of solitude.⁸*

Measured by the tradition in which it stands, this is a new diction - so new that the doyen of the old-

generation poets, Maksym Rylsky, who on the whole gave Drach and the other *shestydesiatnyky* (poets of the '60's) his patriarchal support, felt compelled *a propos* of Drach's famous poem *Nizh u sontsi* ("Knife in the Sun" — 1961) to comment, "I am not certain that it is a compelling necessity for the gifted Ivan Drach to speak obscurely."⁹

The extravagance of Drach is shared on occasion by Mykola Vinhranovsky, but is not general among the other *shestydesiatnyky*. In Lina Kostenko, Vasyl Holoborodko, Borys Maimasur and the older Leonid Pervomaisky the new subjective sensibility finds expression in a less pyrotechnical mastery of the lyric, and is couched, more often than not, in well-trying and familiar verse forms.

It is a characteristic of such lyric poetry that it is seldom without some level of allegorical reference to the society in and for which it was written. Koshelivets once made out a case that Lina Kostenko's *Paporot* ("Ferns") should be regarded as evidence of her rediscovery of "pure lyric" for Ukrainian literature.¹⁰ Lyrical the poem certainly is; but it is not, as Koshelivets would have it, without a "sub-text". Here it is in full:

*Green birds
late in the day
flew down to sleep
in a freshly-chopped clearing.
Green birds,
green birds
silently descended
onto the yellow pine needles.
They flapped their wings,
lost their feathers,
and bowed low
their grey heads.
The tree-stumps around about
are their blood relatives.
The stump's cut faces
are like the full moon.
Green birds!
What more do you need?
you have a moon,
you have a sky.
Yet at dawn,
at that golden time of day
the green birds
surged upward.
But fly
they could not;
they crowded one another,
and their wings tangled.¹¹*

It is true that what is lyrically effective in the poem is the novelty and "rightness" of vision that characterizes its central metaphor: fern-fronds are bird-wings. But the allegorical sting is in the tail. The

last stanza draws attention to the limitation in the validity of the comparison and gives it melancholy point: though birdlike, the ferns are earthbound; it is contrary to their nature to fly. The reader cannot help but construct a mental analogy to the limitations of mankind in general (human beings are apparently made for freedom, but in reality are unfree) or to the special constraints on *homo sovieticus* in particular. Wings, one might note in this context, are a common symbol for fragile ideals in this period. Kostenko invokes it herself in another poem, *Kryla* ("Wings"): *Mankind apparently does not fly. . . And yet it has wings. And yet it has wings!*¹²

Vasyl Holoborodko's golden bird is a symbol of poetic inspiration, and in Symonenko's famous *Lebedy materynstra* ("Swans of motherhood") the wings of the swans, tinged pink in the light of sunset, are a visual expression of a mystical, emotive, subconsciously inherited devotion to the *patria*.

Inevitably, self-orientation tends to self-romanticisation, especially where the subject is the poetic self. The division of the human universe into "citoyen" and "bourgeois," where poet and citoyen are one, and where the citoyen is the socially responsible idealist and the bourgeois is the smug self-interested hypocrite, has been familiar since Heinrich Heine. The Ukrainian poetry of the 1960's finds it timely and appropriate to re-invoke this model. Thus Leonid Pervomaisky proclaims, with a perhaps superfluous self-righteousness:

*Poets reserve one right for themselves,
While relinquishing all other rights:
To belong to those who suffer death
And not to those who coldly kill.*¹³

Vitalii Korotych in similar vein points an accusing finger at the contaminated hypocritical pseudo-art produced by - one presumes - the artist-collaborators who survived the Stalinist period:

*"Clean art."
It is unnecessary to drown
Thoughts in the water of words,
And heroes are not everywhere beautiful
And broad-shouldered.
I am for clean art,
And art is clean
When it is made
With clean hands and thoughts.*¹⁴

Korotych's poem illustrates the close interrelationship between the ideals of sincerity, openness and honesty on one hand, and social protest on the other; one can scarcely lay claim to the former without practising the latter. But the direct expression of disaffection with the political or economic system was never admitted into the official public sphere.

Symonenko's splendid invective, *Zlodii* ("The Thief"), could not be published in the USSR. Its theme is the frustrated anger of the poet who is obliged to write a versified denunciation of theft from a collective farm, when he can see that the system, not the thief, is to blame:

*Why is he a thief? For what reason?
Why did he go and steal from himself?*

. . .

*I'm supposed to slay the old man with disdain,
But in my breast a storm is raging:
Who plundered his soul?
Who tied the hands of his conscience?
Where are they — the well-fed, grey,
Useless demagogues and liars,
That wrung the neck of the old man's faith
While struggling into their chairs and high posts?*¹⁵

The tone of the "angry young man", who can have no peace while the injustice and falsity of the *status quo* remain uncorrected, is equally characteristic of Mykola Kholodny in such poems as *Sobaky* ("Dogs"), in which the representatives of authority are denounced as carnivorous beasts. And yet, invective is not, on the whole, a common stylistic device, even in the more recent literature written in prison conditions.

There, one might have thought, the certainty that nothing that is written could be published through normal channels would purge the author of any vestiges of self-censorship. Yet the literature "from



Vasyl Symonenko

behind bars" tends to be elegiac or melancholy. When it is rancorous (as in the case, say, of Ivan Svitlychny), it prefers sarcasm to rhetorical anger.

The reason for this at first glance paradoxical self-restraint lies in the poet's perception of his position *vis-a-vis* his audience. Symonenko's *Zlodii* and Kholodny's *Sobaky*, though they were not published, were nevertheless conceived of as public poetry; their fierce engagement invites the reader to regard them as speeches in verse.

The pose of the tribune, however, does not at all fit in with the frame of mind of the prisoner or one who has been in prison; for both, the idea of a large responsive audience is remote. Herein lies the reason, perhaps, why Mykhailo Osadchy, author of the documentary novel *Bilmo* (Cataract), in which the experiences of a political prisoner may well affect the reader with a sense of horror, writes a poetry characterized by understatement and emotional self-restraint.

The Question of Nationhood

In the literary facts enumerated thus far, the analogy to Western phenomena has been strong: the emphatic declaration of the self as a theme, the insistence on honesty and sincerity, and the air of rebellion, accusation and protest. One determining feature — perhaps the main determining feature — of the literature of the *shestydesiatnyky*, however, had a very depressed profile in the cultural topography of the Western world in the 1960's: patriotism.

In the West, patriotism remained a discredited value in the 1960's through its association with the generation of the "Fathers", who had participated in the Second World War and were identified as responsible for the conflict in Vietnam. In the USSR, the very opposite was the case; the "Fathers", who were perceived as having acquiesced in the horrors of Stalin's regime and were the bureaucratic instruments of a perverted system, had advocated, not a nationally-oriented patriotism, but an internationalism that, in practice, amounted to Russian cultural hegemonism.

The national patriotism that emerged in the literary and intellectual circles of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR constituted a decisive rejection of the pseudo-internationalism of the fathers and was perhaps the most emphatic and provocative element in the rebellious climate of the times.

In the field of practical activity, the new patriotism in Ukraine manifested itself in protests against the discouragement of the Ukrainian language and culture in favour of the Russian, against the destruction or bureaucratic neglect of historical

monuments and libraries, against the harassment and arrest of cultural activists; it manifested itself in semi-public literary readings and in the commemoration, in a spirit remote from official rhetoric, of nationally significant literary figures of the past, notably Taras Shevchenko, the 100th anniversary of whose death fell in 1961.

In literature a national pathos became evident, which at the more restrained and cautious end of the scale took the form of expressions of devotion to Ukraine, and in more extreme cases recollected the libertarian nationalism that had flourished in the Europe of 1848. Symonenko's officially unpublishable poem *Kurdskomu bratovi* ("To the Kurdish Brother") is possibly the most outspoken poem of the latter category. Modelled on Shevchenko's *Kavkaz. Kurdskomu bratovi* turns the resistance of a small but determined national group (the Kurds) against the imperial ambitions of a much larger neighbour into a symbol of all national resistance movements.

Symonenko does not name a specific aggressor - the Kurds live in Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria, as well as in the USSR - and the argument of the poem has universal application. Yet the Ukrainian reader could not but read the work as an allegory of a situation closer at hand. Symonenko openly turns against the slogan of an internationalism which is a euphemism for the subjugation of one national group by another. The result is provocative and startling, not only within the context of the compulsory "partisanship" of soviet poetry, but from the viewpoint of liberal democratic etiquette as well:

*Do not rock into slumber the power of hatred.
You will take friendliness for your coat of arms
When the last chauvinist on the planet
Falls into the gaping maw of a burial mound.¹⁶*

Kurdskomu bratovi is, of course, an extreme case. In such works as Drach's splendid, formally ambitious (and published!) *Smert Shevchenka* ("Shevchenko's Death"), Shevchenko's role in galvanizing Ukrainian national consciousness is celebrated without any antagonistic allusion to forces at present obstructing the development of such consciousness.

The problem of Ukraine's nationhood, historical fate and role, and of the individual's consciousness of nationality is discussed without constraint, as one would expect, in the unpublishable dissident poetry. In the works of Ihor Kalynets, Mykola Rudenko, Mykhailo Osadchy one encounters treatments of the theme of love for, and solidarity with, the culture and country of origin that fall between the fury of *Kurdskomu bratovi* and the prudent understatement of *Smert Shevchenka*. Kalynets, most interestingly, approaches the question of national feelings from a philosophical perspective, and thus gives rise to a patriotic *Gedankenlyrik*.

The emotional and ideological thrust of the literature of the *shestydesiatnyky* has been described from time to time as the expression of a spirit of humanism.¹⁷ This is a plausible and yet not completely satisfactory encapsulation of the state of affairs. For the "humanism" of Symonenko, Kostenko, the early Drach — not to mention the imprisoned poets — adds to universalist human values a strong commitment to one country. It is a humanism that acknowledges as truly human only a person who has a fully developed relationship to the collective past and present of his or her nation, and a vigorous interest in its future.

Concern for the protection of the national heritage found a useful carrying medium in the new worldwide theme of conservation and lifestyle protection. Under the stimulus of such key documents as the Club of Rome reports, Western public opinion during the 1960's became concerned about the destruction of mankind's living environment through pollution and the destruction of natural resources.

In the USSR, industrialization had brought about the same problems. Yet every public reference to them meant a challenge to the official myth of the necessary link between technological progress and human happiness. Oles Honchar departed from his previous steadfast ideological conformism to mount such a challenge in his novel *Sobor* (The Cathedral) (1968).

The novel is set in a steel-milling region beside the polluted Dnieper: the hero, Ivan Bahlai, is a young engineer who has invented a new method of controlling the emission of noxious gases and particles from the mills into the atmosphere. His mission is to improve the health and happiness of his fellow-workers by persuading inertia-bound bureaucrats in the steel enterprises to adopt his pollution-control plan. Into his concern for establishing a humane environment for life and work, Bahlai incorporates a commitment to protect the neglected cathedral of his home town. The cathedral, built by Zaporozhian Cossacks and threatened with destruction by party careerists, is Honchar's symbol for the life—enriching consciousness of national heritage, which, the novel openly hints, is as much under threat as the natural environment. Bahlai wonders:

Will they demolish it? Virunka reassures him there's no reason for demolition. . . . But if they are really out to get the cathedral, if it has got in someones's way, they'll find a reason... Oh, it will be difficult for it to survive!... And one day our descendants will come and ask, what were they like? What did they build? What did they destroy? What made their spirit soar?

Honchar's dual conservationism — oriented both on nature and on national culture — was not an isolated phenomenon. In the novel *Zorianyi korsar* (1971) and in later *samvydav* essays, the science-fiction writer Oles Berdnyk explored non-antagonistic models for the co-existence of mankind and nature, postulating a utopian future in which technology is bypassed and human beings can satisfy their needs merely through the exercise of will. At the same time he developed a theory of spiritual nations, which would conserve the national traditions into eternity, even after the essentially exploitative state structures have withered away.

Berdnyk's literary nonconfirmism was matched, until his recantation in 1984, by his practical activity in defence of human rights: he was a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1976 and became its chairman in 1977. His predecessor in that position had been Mykola Rudenko, a former secretary of the Ukrainian Writers Union. Rudenko was imprisoned in 1977, Berdnyk two years later. An establishment figure who developed into a critic of the system, Rudenko also takes up the convenient theme of conservationism. His novel *Orlova Balka* (Eagle's Ravine) (published in the West in 1982) is set in the heavily industrialized Donbas region.

One of the novel's most prominent symbols is the gigantic slag-heap, the result of intensive underground mining, which continually grows and gradually encroaches on the clear, spring-fed stream that flows through Eagle's Ravine. The artist-hero paints this unequal combat between Mining and Nature, and his painting is so eloquent that it persuades both managers and workers to rescue the stream from certain destruction. Again, the natural environment is not the only fragile entity that craves protection. One of Rudenko's characters exclaims:

*If we want to protect every kind of grass, every insect for our descendants, how could we neglect to protect the human word? Does the language of a people matter less than some species of butterflies?*¹⁹

Many writers themselves — whether inside or outside the pale-demonstrate such a conservationist approach to language in their own style. Pavlo Zahrebelny and to an even greater extent Oles Honchar are such enthusiasts for lexical jewels and rarities that at times their prose achieves a Baroque ornateness. (In Zahrebelny's *Ia, Bohdan* (I, Bohdan) (1983) this barqueness is a deliberate element of historical colour). The reader of such prose might well form the impression that the author is determined to ventilate the disused elements of the language so as to rescue them from atrophy or, indeed, revive them from a premature death.



Mykola Rudenko

An optimist would, no doubt, detect related conservationist tendencies in the utilization, in the officially sanctioned literature, of themes from Ukrainian history. The treatment of the Khmelnytsky period by Ivan Le, Natan Rybak and, most recently, Pavlo Zahrebelny in long novels is, on one hand, of course, a compulsory celebration of Khmelnytsky's treaty (interpreted as a "unification") with Russia. On the other hand, such works keep alive for their readers the national myth of the Cossack golden age, as a time when "the people" took its destiny into its own hands. The same is true of Lina Kostenko's first published work after years of silence, *Marusia Churai* (1979), which the author calls a "historical novel in verse". Kostenko's heroine is a woman who helps create the heroic myth of Cossackdom by crystallizing into folksongs the events of the Khmelnytsky period.

A major limitation on writers who wished to remain within the limits of the permissible in order to continue publishing was the obligation to abide by the philosophical rules of Marxism-Leninism. Honchar's *Sobor*, controversial though it may have been in many respects, retains the tenet that the objective of human development should be arrangement of productive processes in such a way as to facilitate the maximum degree of self-realization for every human being. To deviate from this ideological highway, as Berdnyk did, was tantamount to losing one's public voice.

The only permissible alternative to beating the common ideological drum was to withdraw into the realm of private experience — the traditional domain

of poetry. The novel, given its tendency toward the formulation of *Weltanschauungen*, could not, on the whole, evade the intellectual uniformity demanded by the imperative of *partiinist*.

The personal memoir, on the other hand, was in a different, less constrained, situation. It is generally agreed that the text which began the thaw in Ukraine was Oleksander Dovzhenko's *Zacharovana Desna* (*The Enchanted Desna*) (1955), a "film story" with strong autobiographical overtones. It avoids the issue of world-interpretation. Its depiction of a pre-revolutionary childhood affects the reader through the beauty of its visual imagery, the benign humour of its characterization, the sureness of its psychological observation, and its finely controlled sentimentality. Probably because it is a time of life in which the obligations of the positive hero do not yet apply, the theme of childhood attracted many other writers, including Yevhen Hutsalo, Volodymyr Drozd and Valerii Shevchuk.

More radical and interesting phenomena occur beyond the pale of what is acceptable to the censorship. Here the taboo on alternatives to Marxism-Leninism is lifted. *Samvydav* writers turn to exotic and unlikely sources for philosophical inspiration. Oles Berdnyk went too far in *Zorianski Korsar*, his last published novel: upon a foundation of Zoroastrian mythology he constructed a postulate of a future omnipotent mankind that is strongly reminiscent of the utopian visions of such early German Romantics as Novalis and Schlegel. In a later novel, *Prometei* (Prometheus) (published in the West in 1981), Berdnyk takes his reader on an excursion through early Christianity and agnosticism.

Mykola Rudenko advocates a pantheistic world-view that smacks of the 18th century, and in *Orlova Balka* ventures a critique of the work theory of value that originated with Adam Smith and was adopted by Marx, and advances a new version of the old physiocratic theory. Such experiments may well seem to be eccentric and anachronistic, yet they are understandable attempts to return to pre-Marxist forms of thought. If contemporary Soviet reality could have been constructed on the basis of Marx's ideas — such is the implied argument — then one must discard that entire philosophical tradition and investigate others.

Rudenko's *Orlova Balka* may well leave the reader with a sense of irritation: as though intoxicated by the opportunity to express what self-censorship had previously restrained, the novel tries to do too much. It offers a world-interpretation that is too full of motley detail. An existential novel, the *Bildungsroman* of an artist and a crime thriller all in one, it contrives to be none of them convincingly. Such breathlessness is not completely foreign to some

of the poetry which has used *samvydav* for its medium. But *samvydav* has also been the vehicle for poets of such first-rate stature as Ihor Kalynets and Vasyl Stus. About them it is less easy to generalize than about the early *shestydesiatnyky*. Each is less the "product of an age" than the finder of an individual poetic vision of the universe.

Kalynets, in his large and elaborately structured poem cycles, gives poetic expression to the *contexts* of being. The collection which appeared in the West under the title *Poezii z Ukrainy* (Poems from Ukraine) (1971), for example, is a poetic exploration of tradition, folklore, religion and the whole cultural frame within which the sensitive self exists.

Kalynets has a Baroque genius for the composition of large, balanced architectural structures, every detail of which, however, is as deliberately conceived and as finely wrought as the whole. There is a Baroque religiosity, stability, hierarchic certainty and stoicism in the world view that emerges from his poems. There is also a Baroque optimism, determined by a belief in the ultimate benevolence of Supreme Being, which prevents tragedy and which permits Kalynets, in his *Trenos nad shche odniiein khresnoin dorohoiu* ("Threnody on Yet Another *via dolorosa*") to select the passion of Christ as an appropriate symbol for his conception of Ukrainian history.

Kalynets impresses through the coherence and consistency of his opus; Stus amazes through the diversity of his. Uncommonly varied in content, tone, diction, and source of inspiration, his poems are unified by an admirable sharpness of sensual perception and a sovereignty over words that can rise to a high musical virtuosity, as in the opening lines of an essentially romantic work on the theme of the poet in a night setting:

*The garden grew drowsy from song:
from nightingales, and overstrain,
and from the lonely candle,
and from stinging night stars.
In the heavens the mountain (?) moon
is a curved Tartar scimitar.²⁰*

Stus's poetry has delighted and exercised erudite critics like Carynnyk and Rubchak through its undisguised creative reception of a "broad and even rather motley 'West-Ostlicher Divan'" of poetic stimuli (particularly from Rainer Maria Rilke), and the complexity, grandeur and at the same time threatenedness of the poetic "I".²¹

The poetry of Kalynets and Stus might be regarded as a new demonstration of a consoling fact: despite pervasive official tutelage that would diminish literary expression to mere panegyric conformism, despite every form of hostile pressure from censorship to prison camp, a Ukrainian literature of

uncompromising standards continues to exist.

The most notable endeavours to render the cosmos into poetic word, to discuss the human universe in general and its Ukrainian constellation in particular, and to create new sensibilities appropriate to the world as experienced at present — these endeavours are being undertaken in prison camps and in exile. They assert themselves inside the punitive mechanism which is designed to render all such exercises of the independent spirit impossible. The tradition of Shevchenko, it would appear, lives.

1. Mykola Nahnybida, *Tvory*, 3 vols. (Kiev: Dnipro, 1981), pp. 198-99.
2. Ivan Svitlychny, *Gratovani sonety*, (Munich, New York): Suchasnist, 1977), p. 43.
3. Ivan Koshelivets, "Shestydesiatnyky", in his *Suchasna Literatura v URSR* (New York: Prolog, 1964), pp. 275-334, here pp. 276-78.
4. This division is adopted, e.g. by Ostap Tarnavsky in his article, "Vid shestydesiatnykiu do poetiv dysydentiv", *Slovo*, 9 (1981), 288-303.
5. Vasyl Symonenko, *Bereh chekan*, ed. Ivan Koshelivets (New York: Prolog, 1965), p. 161.
6. *Ibid.*, "Tysba i brim," No. 5, p. 86.
7. Valerii Shevchuk, "Ostannii den," in *Panorama nainovishoi literatury v URSR*, ed. Ivan Koshelivets, 2nd ed. (Munich: Suchasnist, 1974), pp. 418-42, here p. 441.
8. Ivan Drach in *Panorama*, pp. 92-93, here p. 93.
9. Maksym Rylsky, "Batky i dity," in *Panorama*, pp. 500-11, here p. 506.
10. Koshelivets, "Shestydesiatnyky," in *Panorama*, p. 291.
11. Lina Kostenko, *Poezii*, ed. Osyp Zinkevych (Baltimore, Paris, Toronto: Smoloskyp, 1969), p. 72-73.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
13. Leonid Pervomaisky, "Koly ne zamovkaje hriznyi homin," in *Panorama*. p. 30.
14. Vitalii Korotych, *Panorama*, p. 97.
15. Symonenko, *Bereh chekan*, p. 151.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
17. Ostap Tarnavsky gives examples of such judgments, both Western and Soviet, in "Dissident Poets in Ukraine," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 6 (1981), No. 2, 17-27, here pp. 20-23.
18. Oles Honchar, *Sobor* (New York: Nasha Batkivshchyna, 1968), p. 24.
19. Mykola Rudenko, *Orlova Balka*, intro. Ihor Kachurovsky (Toronto, Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1982), p. 240.
20. Vasyl Stus, "Posoloviv od spivu sad . . ." in *Svicha v svichadi*. Marco Carynnyk and Wolfram Burghardt (New York, Munich): Suchasnist, 1977), p. 92.
21. Carynnyk, "Povernennia Orfeia," Introduction to *Svicha v svichadi*, pp. 7-20; the quotation is from Bohdan Bubchak, "Peremoha nad prirvoiu. Pro poesiuu Vasylia Stusa," *Suchasnist*, 23 (1983), No. 10, 52-83, here p. 53.

MYKOLA VINHRANOV'S'KYI: INTERVIEW

Mykola Vinhranov's'kyi's name entered Ukrainian poetry at the beginning of the 1960's. This was a time when a whole group of new names burst into our literature. Not a few of the former so-called "poets of the 60's" (shestydesiatnyky) are now re-knowned poets and prose writers; each one of them was able to preserve his own unique voice.

Mykola Vinhranov's'kyi's poetic debut coincided with his acting success: he played the leading role in a film, "A Story of the Fiery Years," whose screenplay was written by his teacher, Oleksandr Dovzhenko. From that point onward, his creative life became an inseparable union of film and literature. It's not easy to analyze poetry, especially when it is as original, emotional, profound and often as surprising as Mykola Vinhranov's'kyi's. Everyone knows that analyzing poems is necessary and beneficial, but it seems to take the life out of them. Thus, in our conversation with Mykola Vinhranov's'kyi, we will speak more about his work in film, his views on contemporary Ukrainian literature, children's literature in particular. But he is a poet, — and an author of stories and tales about children and for children. (He is) one of our best writers. This year his work has been awarded the T.H. Shevchenko State Prize of the Ukrainian SSR.

Q: Mykola Stepanovych, a few years ago, at a literary evening, in the "Artist's" building, devoted to your work, you talked about what effect meeting Oleksandr Dovzhenko had on you and the role he played in your life. The readers of *Ukraina* would also be interested.

A: This year is the year of Dovzhenko. Oleksandr Petrovych would have been ninety. In September, guests from many countries of the world, who have a high regard for Dovzhenko's talent, will visit us. Three creative conferences in his honor, will take place in Moscow, Kiev and Odessa, where Dovzhenko began his work as a film director.

Q: How did you personally discover Dovzhenko?

A: Well, really, it wasn't I who discovered him, but he who discovered me. This was long ago. . . it was in the fall of 1955. I came to the Kiev Theatrical Institute of Karpenko-Karyi from a village in Mykolaiv oblast. . . The competition for the acting program was very great — 35 people for each available seat!

Q: You were hardly 18 years old then?

A: I entered (the institute) upon completing ten grades. . . (I) passed the exams and was accepted. It

just so happened that I was already taking a basic course in acting and one in advanced directing. It was suggested to me that I visit a directing class of the institute's rector, Ivan Ivanovych Chabanenko. I fell into his favour as a result of my performance on the entrance exams. That fall, Oleksandr Petrovych came to Kiev — he wanted to film "A Poem About the Sea". . . at the Kiev film studio, together with "Mosfilm". . . It was at this time that Chabanenko suggested that (Dovzhenko) acquaint himself with me. . . One day I was taken from a lecture and called into the office of the institute's director. There, for the first time, I saw Dovzhenko. Until when I had no idea who he was.

Q: Despite the fact that you were studying at the Theatrical Institute?

A: Well, how was a village boy who just entered the institute to know about this? In fact, after the release of the film "Shchors," in 1939 and following the war, the release of, in my opinion, two of the most brilliant documentary films shot during the war — "The Fight For Our Soviet Ukraine" and the 1946 film "Michurin," there was a considerable break in Dovzhenko's work. . . Oleksandr Petrovych asked what I was studying. . . He suggested that I go with him to Moscow (where) he was organizing a directing course that year. . . Dovzhenko. . . gave me the choice of either studying directing. . . or literature.

Q: And you chose the cinema? How did the literary life of the capital influence you?

A: In Moscow I had two institutes, one. . . at school and the other, Oleksandr Petrovych's apartment, where I went every day as was his wish. This was the meeting place of his friends: Dmytro Shostakovych, Mykola Tykhonov, Borys Livanov, Ivan Kozlovskiy, Nazim Kikhmet, Viktor Shklovskiy. During their discussions I sat and listened. . . To my sorrow, this did not last long, only one year — on Saturday, November 25 1956, Oleksandr Petrovych died. . .

Q: In 1960, another one of your debuts took place — your literary debut. Your first writings on the pages of *Literaturna Ukraina* called forth many disagreements. Some received your poems with delight, others didn't understand the unusual and surprising imagery, still others tried to bring "the young poet in line." It is interesting that these poems, which twenty years ago evoked great debates, even today seem to be innovative and compelling.

A: First of all, my poems were printed in *Literaturna*

Ukraina, whose editor then was Pavlo Arkhypovych Zahrebel'nyi. He is my literary godfather, so to say, and I am thankful to him, even today — not every editor, even now, would dare to publish such poems. That first publication engaged many.

Q: Then your poems appeared in Moscow in translation. The all-Union critique was also not unanimous?

A: Moscow had enough of its own problems then. A wondrous wave of poetry came to life. At home at that time, new names entered poetic literature, names like Vasył' Symonenko, Ivan Drach, Vitalii Korotych and, a bit earlier, Lina Kostenko, Dmytro Pavlychko and Borys Oliinyk. These names speak for themselves today. . .

Q: In writing about the last collection of poems, *Kiev*, which became your very own anthology, Ivan Dziuba noted (that) poems from various years have become naturally interwoven in it; no time barrier stands between them; they form one poetic canvas.

A: If poems written twenty years ago appear to be written as if only yesterday, is this a source of pride for me as the poet? I am not afraid of time barriers. Twenty years in the life of one person is perceptible; twenty years in the life of one poet is half a second, if not less, for the literary process, for history.

Q: Your work as an actor and director in film has become tightly meshed with poetry. It would be good to hear of your work in prose. How did you approach it?

A: I don't remember what started my children's prose. It happened in and of itself somehow. First came the stories "Byn-Byn," "Don't look at my Back," "A Summer's Night." Just as in writing my poems, I don't write prose straight away. I don't hurry it, for me it's pleasure to write and rewrite. . .

Q: Ievhen Hutsalo, in his thoughts about your children's prose, pointed out (that) the main thing in it is that you don't put yourself in the child's shoes, but yourself accept the world as a child accepts it. What we lose in becoming adults is experiencing the world as a wonder, a mystery, (a time) when one uncovers the essence of things in words. This aspect has been retained in your stories and novels. It would be interesting to hear your thoughts on contemporary children's literature in Ukraine.

A: I suppose that the best contemporary writer for children is Mykhailo Kotsiubyns'kyi. I grew up on his work. Kotsibyns'kyi, Dovzhenko, Ianovs'kyi — these were my teachers. As to contemporary children's literature, well, often it is constructive, often it has too much chemistry of poetic herbicides (in it), it is not very interesting, because it is often directec, superficial, didactic to the end. I am impressed by Hryhoryi Tiutiunnyk's, Ievhen Hutsalo's, Borys

Kharchuk's children's literature. . .

Q: Mykola Stepanovych, what are your thoughts on contemporary Ukrainian cinema? Does it have its own features, such as for instance the Georgian cinema, or Lithuanian (cinema)?

A: Good directors have finally appeared among us. The Kiev studio is making interesting films, but I'm afraid, not the kind of films that the Georgians are making. Georgian films have a successful unity between the present and the folkloric, the national tradition. An artist must have his precise objective — his land. His people must breathe into his art — then, his art will be understood by us and be familiar to us. What makes the art of every nation and of every period in history interesting is it's national content. When it is empty, (designed) as if for everyone, and really for no one — it is no longer art, but the production of films.

Q: Please share your impressions of contemporary Ukrainian poetry. Are there artists arriving on the scene today who are able to equal the talents of the 1960's poets?

A: I have already named those who, in my opinion, are the most outstanding contemporary poets. Vasył' Symonenko occupies a very special place for me. He left us when he was twenty-eight — today he would have been such an inspiration to our poetry. And the poets whom I have named are of an extraordinarily high calibre. We don't always realize what great talents live among us. But the young, in my opinion, even now are not yet able to come into their own after the veritable storm elicited in poetry by the poets of '60s (shestydesiatnyky).

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
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Profile – Mykola Horbal.

Ukrainian human rights activist Mykola Horbal was sentenced to eight years in a labour camp to be followed by three years internal exile after being convicted of “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda” at a three day trial in April, 1985.

The 43 year old dissident was arrested last October in a labour camp near the Ukrainian city of Nikolayev just two days before he was to complete a five year term on a trumped up charge of attempted rape.

According to government sources in Washington, Mr Horbal was tried in Nikolayev, where he was held in an investigative prison following his arrest.

He was accused of “disrespectful discussions” with other prisoners and “spreading anti-Soviet slander” among them.

He could have been sentenced to ten years labour camp and five years exile because he had previously also been convicted under a political rather than criminal statute in 1970, when he was sentenced to seven years for “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”.

The sources also said that one factor raised by the prosecution at the trial was that some of Mr Horbal’s writings had been published in the West. Mr Horbal is a musicologist and poet.

His second sentence in 1980 exemplified the Soviet government’s tactic at the time of charging dissenters with criminal rather than overtly political crimes.

According to reports smuggled out of Ukraine, Mr Horbal was on the verge of mental and physical collapse toward the end of his second sentence, and to be re-arrested two days prior to his release must have

been a decimating blow.

Mr Horbal himself has referred to the system that has been persecuting him for 12 years as run by people who “are completely lacking in humanity”.

Mykola Horbal was born in Ukraine in 1941. A musician and teacher, he is married to Anna Marchenko and they have a five year old son.

Horbal’s personal nightmare began in 1970 when he was arrested for having written a poem, “Duma”, two copies of which were circulated among his friends.

For this he was sentenced to five years in a strict regimen labour camp in Perm, and two years internal exile which he served in the Tomsk region of Russia.


After his release in 1978, he could not find work as a teacher or composer.

He took work as an ordinary labourer and electrician in Kiev, where he lived with his family.

In 1979, after numerous attempts to gain permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union, Mr Horbal joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which was set up to monitor Soviet compliance, or rather “non-compliance” with the Helsinki Accords on human rights and security.

Shortly after, on October 23, 1979, the KGB staged a bizarre street scene in Kiev involving Mr Horbal and he was arrested and charged with attempted rape, found guilty and sentenced to five years in a labour camp.

Details about the case did not reach the West until 1981. They clearly indicate that Mr Horbal was the victim of a frame-up orchestrated by the KGB.



The key figure in the scheme was a student in a foreign language class which Horbal attended, who made several attempts to seduce him. Invited back to her apartment, Mr Horbal met with her friend a Ms Naimytenko.

A week later, Mr Horbal was approached on the Khreshchatyk by Ms Naimytenko who worked as a secretary at a Kievan Komsomol office.

Ms Naimytenko threw her arms around Mr Horbal and two men appeared on the scene asking her if she needed help. They attacked Horbal and beat him to the ground. Conveniently, a police car arrived on the scene immediately and Horbal was arrested for attempted rape.

Officers searched his apartment and confiscated his books, manuscripts and private correspondence. None of the materials, of course, were ever returned to him.

While in the labour camp, Mr Horbal has been subjected to brutal treatment at the hands of his jailers. In a statement that reached the West in September 1981, he said that he had never before experienced such suffering. He said that there were moments when suicide seemed to be the only way out.

Writing in a more philosophical vein, Mr Horbal said it was futile and naive to try to prove his innocence, because the government and the camp administration have their repressive functions which they are intent on carrying out.

BRITISH AND UKRAINIAN MINERS: COMPARISONS

Taras Kuzio

At first glance there would be little or no connection between British miners and their Ukrainian counterparts. Yet, the connections do exist, and have dramatically expanded during the last few years. Donetsk, in the Donbas coalfield of south-east Ukraine, is twinned with Sheffield, the headquarters of the *National Union of Mineworkers (N.U.M.)*. In addition, Arthur Scargill, the current leader of the N.U.M., has refused to support attempts to establish independent trade unions among Ukrainian miners through the efforts of those such as Aleksei Nikitin and Volodymyr Klebanov.

The year-long strike by the N.U.M. led to the strengthening of "international solidarity" between the N.U.M. and the Soviet Union, a process begun prior to the strike by Arthur Scargill. At meetings held for visiting British miners in the summer of 1984, Ukrainian miners promised to "voluntarily" donate 10% of their daily earnings to the N.U.M. strike fund. A few months later the Soviet news agency *Tass* reported that Ukrainian miners had "voluntarily" donated 859,000 roubles.

The strike by British miners was sparked by the decision, in March 1984, to close 'uneconomic pits' and reduce manpower by 20,000. The National Coal Board (N.C.B.) promised to honour its pledge that 'every man who wants to stay in the business can do so' — the reduction in manpower being accomplished through early retirement and voluntary redundancy schemes. Those working at pits that were scheduled to be closed could, if they so wished, be re-employed at others.

The Donetsk coalfield is also not without its problems. The share of this regions coal production has dropped from 81% (1913), 51% (1950) to 28% (1984). In the Donetsk basin, reserves of coal are rapidly becoming depleted, whilst what remains is contained in such thin seams that its exploitation is becoming less economically viable.

In the Soviet trade union newspaper, *Trud* (10. Jan. 1984), the declining share of the Donetsk coal output, "cannot help but concern economic managers and scientists". This decline has occurred despite new investment in the 1970's, and the report admitted that, "some people have said that the basin "has no future", and, "that its decline is not far off". Although production levels could be maintained if labour productivity were increased, "this is no easy task". *Radio Moscow* (7 Oct. 1984) also stated that, "since the mid-1970's the Soviet coal industry as a whole has been operating at a loss. Of course, some collieries

Taras Kuzio is the managing editor of Soviet Nationality Survey.

make a profit, but two-thirds of them are operated at a loss". Consequently, it would be true to say that, "the future of coal in both countries is not in doubt, only the location of the industry itself".¹

Mining in the Donetsk basin is becoming more dangerous and the hazards increasing as the miners have to work longer hours to maintain the production levels. Klebanov and Nikitin were partly spurred into action by the lack of attention paid by both management and official trade unions to the concerns for the safety of the miners. *Radio Moscow* (5 Jan. 1985) even admitted that, "whilst particular attention is given to safety precautions in the coal mines, it is difficult to have 100% safety underground".

Radio Moscow referred to a fire that had swept the Krimenaya mine in Ukraine in the summer of 1984, due to a short circuit in an electrical cable. This was caused because, "people who would see to it that cables are in perfect order had failed to perform their duty". *Radio Moscow* shifted the blame from the authorities by claiming how this once again showed, "how much the safety of work depends on the miners themselves".

The sensitivity of the Soviet authorities to Western criticism could be seen in the *Trud* (16. Jan. 1985) rebuttal of an editorial that appeared in *The Times* entitled "The Life of the Soviet Miner". (8. Jan. 1985). *Trud* stated that claims to the existence of low wages, bad safety records and poor consumer service for Soviet miners are unfounded: "that is the real state of affairs which the mouthpiece of the London elite, the newspaper which pompously calls itself the 'Thunderer' preferred not to notice. But the attempts to fulminate about Soviet miners, distort the fact and slander miners will merely rouse their indignation". A Ukrainian miner wrote to the newspaper *Trud* (21. Sept. 1980) complaining that: "We are constantly being deprived of our day off on Sunday". In 1980, in the Ukrainian coal mines, "everyday in March, April, May, June and July was, without exception, a workday". These measures are taken, "without so much as a telegram from the Union ministers or the trade union's central committee, but on the basis of verbal instructions at the local level. No one then asks the permission of the miners trade union committees. Only 73 of Ukraine's 250 mines are meeting the plan during a regular workweek, despite Sunday working. Sunday's output is 50% lower than on a workday.

The reasons for this, according to *Trud* were:

"Sundays are designated as increased output days, so that there is not even time for the routine maintenance of equipment and work areas that is normally done on weekdays. A full 12 hours of repair work is lost". Sixty seven mines were in dire need of repair, because preventative maintenance, which was once done on Sundays, is now "a much less frequent occurrence". Although there is no mention of accidents or safety problems here, one can only guess at the results of this Sunday working and negligence.

The institution of seven—day week in one particular mine, "has resulted in a higher breakdown rate for machinery, the deterioration of labour discipline and a decrease in the workers interest in meeting plan assignments on regular workdays". The mine's trade union, "are not doing a proper job of making sure that normal work schedules are adhered to". In addition, "thousands of miners are recruited for second shifts without the consent of the trade union committee". Another report in *Pravda* (23.March. 1984) described how, starting in 1970, "more and more Sundays became workdays for Donets Basin miners... Miners worked nine Sundays in 1970, 13 in 1975, 40 in 1980 and 54—every single Sunday—in 1983". (obviously the Soviet year has more weeks than the "capitalist year".)

Although the number of Sundays worked has increased by 250% since 1975, the monthly average of work appearances has not. What has happened is that, "workers themselves make up for extra workdays by taking compensatory days off or failing to report for work". Those taking time off could not be punished by the manager, "when he himself is breaking the law by declaring Sunday a workday". The above occurs, "in the majority of mines in the Donetsk basin...". Miners absenteeism has, "increased fourfold since continuous operations were introduced, and the figure is growing every year". Repairs and preventative maintenance, "are either done in a slapdash way or left "for later". Mines are losing 21 million tons of coal a year, "because of production stoppage, absenteeism and equipment breakdowns".

Throughout these official reports there is less concern expressed for the welfare or safety of the miners than for the fulfilment of the plan. One unofficial report described how conditions were "intolerable" in the Ukrainian mines. A Donetsk physician stated that, "at the age of 45 the miners were already old men. They were duped into fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan. Safety equipment and security precautions existed only on paper. The management was constantly poisoning the Russians against the Ukrainians and vice-versa, without forgetting the Jews. This spectacle made me finally

understand that the bright future was not just a long way off; it was totally unrealizable in such a sick society". The physician concluded: "Until I die I will never forget the way the miners lived and worked—not to mention the way they spent their holidays... For those miners there was no way out".²


Bearing this in mind there is little surprise at the attempt in 1977 by Klebanov and Nikitin to establish the Association of Free Trade Unions in the Donbas region of south—east Ukraine—three years prior to Solidarity.³ In Ukraine, the increasing emergence of a nationally conscious working class is occurring for the first time in her history.

This coupled with insufficient investment, which has led to a decline in working conditions, and an average income that in 1979 was 12% below the all—union level, have sparked numerous cases of worker discontent. Food shortages and poor social amenities have also contributed to this unrest. It is no wonder therefore, that Ukrainian workers have been in the forefront of post—Stalinist civil unrest.⁴ In March—April, 1984, disturbances took place at a number of factories in Kharkiv among workers protesting against unsatisfactory work conditions. The authorities blamed a visiting group of Polish workers, who were promptly sent home.⁵

An official survey of 12,000 families in Ukraine over a 30—year period reflecting all population groups, joyfully acclaimed that: "Families with an income of over 100 roubles a month now comprised over 60% of the total". (*Radio Moscow*, 29.Oct. 1984). If we deduct 10 roubles as a donation to the British miners strike fund, then 60% of Ukrainian families have monthly incomes of over 100 roubles, whilst 40% have less than 100 roubles per month. Yet the official minimum wage in the Soviet Union was only 70 roubles per month in 1972.

It is not difficult to understand the words of one Ukrainian miner, who stated: "The government has started to deduct 10 roubles from each miner's monthly wages. The money goes into a fund for English miners. Naturally, we were not asked to give prior approval of this measure. The government is doing this for propaganda purposes, to demonstrate the spontaneous solidarity of Soviet miners with their English counterparts..." He continues: "But 10 roubles is a lot for a man with a family to support. You can feed your family for three days with 10 roubles. As far as I'm concerned, the English miners can strike as long as they want to and the hell with them. It's not our problem. I'd just like to see them try to strike like that in the Soviet Union."⁷

Arthur Scargill, the present leader of the British N.U.M., remains an enigma for many, and an



extraordinary phenomenon for others. He is a revolutionary Marxist in a profoundly unrevolutionary society. In March, 1955 he joined the local branch of the Young Communist League and soon became its secretary. The membership of 11 when he joined, rose under his leadership to over 600. Within 18 months of joining the YCL, Scargill had been elected to its National Committee at the 1955 Congress. He also became chairman of the Yorkshire District YCL, and when the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed, became involved in its activities, eventually becoming chairman of Yorkshire CND.

His upward movement in Marxist politics consequently, was at a time when others were leaving in disgust at the suppression of the Hungarian uprising and Khrushchev's revelations on Stalin. His parents had the largest influence upon him, and his father has remained a Stalinist member of the British Communist Party until this day. Scargill admitted that, "at the age of 15 I decided that the world was wrong and I wanted to put it right virtually overnight if possible". In May 1960 he stood as a CP Candidate in an election, but lost to his Labour Party opponent. He left the YCL in 1962-63, and committed himself completely to trade union business.

Scargill's militant brand of oratory and contempt for

compromise, mirror his intransigence in foreign affairs. He is on record as having denounced the Polish Solidarity movement as "anti-Soviet" and "anti-socialist", whilst praising General Jaruzelski as a "patriot". His favourite country remains Cuba, which he has visited a number of times as the guest of Fidel Castro. At the same time, he is passionately anti-American, and harbours nothing but contempt for the American Labour movement. In 1983 he withdrew the N.U.M. from the Miners International Secretariat, based in Brussels, which brings together non-communist miners unions. Scargill's aim was to establish a new Miners International linking East and West under Soviet control.⁹

Although Scargill called for "international solidarity" to back his strike in Britain he must have been disappointed to have found that Jaruzelski's Poland turned out to be the main strike-breaker (exporting more than 400% more coal than prior to the strike to Britain). In addition, despite calls of "international solidarity" with the N.U.M. from Moscow, the USSR is still selling coal and oil to Britain under previously signed contracts.

The Soviet position was somewhat confused because the secretary of central committee of the Soviet union of coal industry workers announced on Soviet television on the 29 October, 1984 that: "... it has


been decided that our foreign trade and freight organisations, regardless of the great loss of currency incurred, should for the entire period of the strike cease the export of coal to Britain and suspend the operation of contracts under which Soviet vessels were due to supply any kind of fuel to Britain".

A few days later, *Tass* (3.Oct. 1984) complained that, "the press in a number of Western countries has of late been floating allegations that the Soviet Union is purportedly using its trading and economic links... as a tool of political pressure. The Foreign Trade Ministry of the USSR declares that the Soviet side always has honoured and will honour the signed contracts and agreements. All fabrications on this score are untenable and pursue aims that are hostile to the Soviet Union".

Although Scargill criticised the "hypocritical and anti-socialist" attitude of General Jaruzelski's regime in a letter to the Polish Federation of Trade Unions of Coal Miners in November, 1984 he has still to backtrack on his attitudes towards Solidarity and Free Trade Unions in the USSR. In November, 1980 Nikitin addressed an appeal to the British trade union movement asking for its support for an "action group in the USSR to organise independent trade unions". He called on organized British labour to offer Soviet workers rights campaigners "directions, practical advice and solidarity".¹⁰ Nikitin's appeal fell on deaf ears. When the cases of the forcible psychiatric imprisonment of Klebanov and Nikitin were brought up at the International Miners' Conference in Newcastle, England, the chief Soviet delegate replied that, "Klebanov was getting better" but that Nikitin "had been found in possession of weapons and would have to submit to court proceedings". Needless to say, Arthur Scargill believed the Soviet authorities that both Nikitin and Klebanov were "unstable".

When their cases were brought up by another Yorkshire miner, John Cunningham, Scargill's answer was deliberate and predictable:¹¹ "I have nothing to add to the previous public statement made by the N.U.M. apart from saying that I only wish that the people who constantly inundate this office with letters about the above two people do not appear to show any concern or very little about the tragedy in El Salvador and Nicaragua where more people are dying in a day than have been killed in the Soviet Union in the last ten year's. "Could it be... that people have not heard of the American intervention, the terror that they are striking at... the whole of Central and Latin America". "International Solidarity" for repressed miners only extended to those under Right-wing dictatorships, in Arthur Scargill's view.

In October-November, 1984, already ten months into the strike, Scargill and his vice-president and long-time member of the Communist Party, Mick



McGahey, visited the Soviet Embassy in London to request aid and a halt in coal and oil deliveries.¹² They were only successful on the former. NUM officials also visited Lybin around this time to seek aid from Colonel Gaddafi's regime; a highly provocative and diplomatically suicidal move in view of the expulsion of Libyan diplomats from Britain after the shooting of a police-woman earlier in the year.

The outcome of the miners strike is now history. But even by February, 1985 nearly fifty per cent of British miners were back at work. Many abandoned the strike for economic and financial reason; whilst others refused to join the strike from the outset because of the refusal to hold a democratic ballot (as laid down in the NUM rules). Arthur Scargill remembered well the negative vote in the previous two ballots. Working miners visited Solidarity leaders in October, 1984 in Poland. Most Polish workers remember Scargill's views on Solidarity and therefore, express little sympathy for him. Lech Walesa gave his support to the working miners struggling for democracy in their union and against violence.¹³ Walesa also admitted to a British journalist: "I admire him for his determination—he is tough—but it would be better if what he fights for is both reasonable and logical".¹⁴

Since the inception of the strike by British miners, it has been supported wholeheartedly by the USSR. After a British miners news conference held in Moscow, *Radio Moscow* (24.Oct. 1984) claimed that:

"International Miners solidarity has played a decisive role in enabling the British miners strike to continue for more than seven months." Derek Reeves, a Yorkshire miner, said that, "This solidarity campaign inspires us in a firm conviction in the ultimate victory of our struggle for our rights". The USSR believed that the strike would show that, "industrial action, . . . has supplied fresh proof that the Marxist doctrine of class struggle will remain unshakeable as long as the working class in capitalism exists". (*Radio Moscow*. 23.Oct. 1984) In addition, "whatever the outcome of the current conflict in the coal industry, Britain will never be the same", and the Conservatives have, "given a spur to processes which may have far-reaching consequences for the political evolution of British society". (*Tass*. 28.Dec. 1984).

At a time when there are reports of yet another disastrous Soviet harvest, the Soviet Union has sent along to Britain food aid for the striking miners. This "International Solidarity", seems to be lacking for the straving millions of Ethiopia— where the principle Soviet import seems to be of a military nature (and the food aid Western). After some of Moscow's food aid was not admitted to Britain because, "some of their meat products are not acceptable to British standards and can be a health hazard",¹⁵ Moscow complained of the "ridiculous and clearly fabricated pretexts" for this. (*Tass*. 21. Oct. 1984) The food aid sent to Britain could have been used for the inhabitants of Krivoi Rog, in Ukraine, who reportedly staged strikes and street demonstrations in protest at the lack of food in the shops.¹⁶

A large group of striking miners spent their 1984 holidays in Soviet resorts. Derek Reeves, leader of the holiday makers, said that British miners attended Soviet miners meetings of solidarity with their colleagues in Britain. They were very impressed and apparently believed that Ukrainian miners had agreed "voluntarily" donate a share of their earnings to the strikers fund. *Radio Moscow* (26.Oct. 1984) quoted Mr. Reeves as having said he had an enjoyable holiday, praising the Soviet miners moral and financial support, and saying "that in a socialist society such a strike would never occur". Another miner said, "Soviet people were friendly, happy and enjoyed a comfortable life style. Soviet miners enjoyed better working conditions than their British counterparts". Keith Towler told a *Tass* correspondent: "one lacks words to express gratitude to the Soviet colleagues for the care for us and our families. For us this is the supreme manifestation of the notion of international solidarity about which we heard from fathers. . . And since that solidarity exists—we feel 10 times stronger. The Tory government shall not break us". (*Tass*. 8.Oct.1984)

The acute naivety reflected in these comments speaks for itself, and cannot be dissociated from the overall Sovietophilia that has permeated the National Union of Mineworkers under Arthur Scargill's leadership. The flagrant disregard for the rights of oppressed workers in Soviet dominated countries, and the disregard for the democratic rights of the members of his union, led the leadership of the NUM to pursue a strike that had absolutely no chance of success.

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The Right to Live by Yuriy Badzio.

Translation of Selected Extracts.

Translated by Basil Chamula.

The historical existence of a nation has, as has the life of an individual, a past, present and future which in totality form a unique psychological unity and distinguish the historico-cultural climate of that nation's society. Years of study of the ideological and real circumstances in which the Ukrainian nation finds itself has led me to a very sad conclusion: today's party-state ideology and politics in the area of national relations deprive Ukrainians, as they do also the other non-Russian people of the Soviet Union, of its basic and essential right - the right to live. The dependant and inferior status suffered by Ukrainians as part of the Soviet Union reveals itself in all spheres of life and pervades all parameters of history, past, present and future. In this chronological structure of historical movement the primary psychological and ideological concern belongs, without doubt, to the future. However the official theory of the future of nations leaves no room for exactly this future prospect for non-Russian nations of the U.S.S.R. The unscientific, dogmatic and reactionary character of this theory is researched in the first section of my book "The Future, or the Prediction of National Demise".

The ideological circumstances influencing the existence of nations in the U.S.S.R. and the practical national politics of the Communist Party manifest themselves in an official doctrine which is formulated as the concept of the development and the bringing together of nations. The ruling tendency is the fusion of nations and this activity is defined as the removal of national differentiations, resulting in the demise of nations and the formation, in the future, of a non national communist society. This ideology not being born spontaneously of democratically organized circumstances, is a politically tendencious doctrine which most clearly reflects the less than equal place of non Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. and is the quintessential form of national repression. However neither theoretically nor practically is the perspective of national demise brought to bear on the Russian nation; the theory of the bringing together and mixing of nations is joined, in the official ideology, by the idea of a "second mother tongue" (Russian) by accenting the historico-cultural and political role which for non-Russian nations is, as it were, an objective conformity to established law. It is joined also by the broadly propogandised Russian patriotism, the idea of exceptional internationalism of the Russian people, their extraordinary service in the history of Soviet society, etc. All this proves

without doubt that the root and political essence of both the doctrine of the bringing together and mixing of nations and the ideology of the so called internationalism of Soviet society in no more than Russian great-state nationalism. It was not Marx's theory of Communism but this Russian great-state nationalism that gave birth to the idea of the mixing of nations and now holds this idea in its ideological armoury. Secondly, even if the idea of the demise of nations were part of the Marx and Engels future ideal (Communism), then this should in no way mean that our contemporary society must conform to the imaginations of authorities of the past, even if these authorities were among the greatest. Each generation writes its own ideals, and only a spontaneous historical movement, freely permitted the dialectic process of challenge and rebuttal, can secure a democratic form of social life and the development of the humanist strength of a society.

The idea of the mixing of nations is a Leninist addition, created by Lenin. From its inception this idea revealed its dogmatic character, its great-state allegiance and its essentially reactionary nature. The sad reality of the Russian "Prison of Nations" demanded from its social elite, which pretended to represent progress, an ideology of rebirth of nations and an historical and generally humane regard for the national individualism of its peoples. Instead, Lenin put forward the idea of the mixing of nations and ethnical assimilation as the objective progressive norm of historical development and as a condition essential to the socialist transformation of the world. He welcomed the intermixing of races in the "American Melting Pot" without noting somehow that it consisted of human suffering and that it was the result of a non harmonious and antagonistic development of bourgeois civilization and not a mature social ideal, not a process chosen by people or moreover whole nations.

Marx and Engels spoke of an equilibration of conditions for national development, of the international character of capital, of the harmonious co-existence of nations after the triumph of the revolution of the proletariat, of course, of the demise of political and state parasite. Lenin proclaimed the ethnical assimilation of nations as a social ideal. In the politic-national circumstances of the Russian empire and in the context of Russian historical tradition it would be difficult to imagine something more useful to the supporters of a "one and indivisible Russia" than the idea of the mixing of nations and a national



future for mankind. This idea and a non-national future permitted the maintenance of a centralised state on a socialist foundation, in other words, the maintenance of great-state Russia. It is worth remembering that from the outset Lenin was negatively disposed to the principle of a federated structure for the new society and any pressure from below, from the national liberation fronts of non-Russian nations, compelled him to think differently.

Lenin and his sympathisers in the Soviet Social Democratic Workers Party proclaimed the right of nations to self distinction including separation and the formation of independent states. This was an historically progressive internationalist position. But there was more to Lenin's right of national distinction: Separation was regarded conditional and in this way was stricken out. Because who was to decide whether or not a national separation was appropriate? It is obvious that, to the ruling nation,

national separation is never appropriate. The political advantage of the imperial nation will always win out when the fortunes of statehood for dependant nations are being decided. Furthermore the idea of mixing together of nations removed from the question of independant statehood for smaller and dependant nations the status of demand, or even of need. "We are supporters of great centralized states, and only through such states will socialism be achieved" announced Lenin. And this was not only a concession to Imperialism but the origin of psychological tension towards non Russian nations, in other words a certain form of national repression towards non Russians by the Social Democratic Party. The Bolshevik proclamation concerning the right of nations to form separate states accorded equal legal rights to nations, however the notion of conditional separation and the theory of the mixing of nations gave the ruling nation, the Russians, ideological and psychological advantages, namely, the privilege of

their own national state. ”

Lenin's ideology on perspectives of national development, predicting the demise of nations in the distant future, after the triumph of Communism on a global level, immediately brought about negative results not only in the area of the ideological and psychological situation of non Russian representatives of the social liberation movement, but also in the area of practical party politics. One would expect that a party which proclaims the ideals of social and national liberation and the equal rights to national statehood of its peoples would take the earliest opportunity to realize this ideal. And the opportunity existed from the very beginning to realize the principle of an equal right to national statehood among members. But it was here, on the question of the structure of the proletarian party, that Lenin and his like-minded supporters revealed their strongest great-state intolerance to the aspirations for autonomy of the non Russian leaders of the Social Democratic movement decisively opposing the principle of a federated proletarian party structure, coarsely labelling their opponents' 'narrow minded nationalists' and woeful marxists. This standpoint had neither theoretical nor practical justification. It represented a retreat from the ideology of equal national rights, violated the principle of the right of nations to self determination and set the stage for the superiority of the Russian detachment of the proletarian movement, a detachment which was already more numerous and more talented.

The argument that separately organised delegations in the non Russian proletariat movement would divide nations and weaken the general front of the anticapitalist struggle was only a reflection of imperialist designs, of inertia of centralist imagination and would not survive political examination, whereas sincere international respect, consistency in the politics of equal national rights, and the separate organization of all detachments of the proletarian liberation movement could only have cemented together the general front of the struggle and strengthened the reciprocal bond between the party and the national masses. On the contrary, the lack in the non Russian proletariat of its own organizational structure meant that its fate fell into the hands of Russian political power and that it had lost its most important instrument of self preservation. Taking into account conditions of political life in Russia and Russian historical traditions, it could not have been hard to predict therefore what the future held concerning relations between those nations within a Russian state. History has confirmed that those fears were not unfounded.

Regrettably, I have little time for a wide analysis of the historical circumstances of the time of the Revolution of the Proletariat in Russia and the formation of the Soviet Union, nor do I have time for a more detailed survey of the evolution of Bolshevik National politics. Suffice it to say that the theoretical and practical national relations in Soviet society have been constantly in the shadow of Lenin's concept of the mixing together of nations, consistently directing the national politics of the party towards a great state Russia. Today the ideology of such politics is revealed in the concept of one Soviet nation and one united, or more simply, just one state (although formally the Soviet Union is not one or unitarian but a federated state). The constitutional ground which sees the U.S.S.R. as the embodiment of the state unity of the Soviet peoples - all this denotes an ideological and theoretical preparedness for the liquidation of even the formal elements of statehood of the non Russian nations of the U.S.S.R. The party doctrine concerning the internationalization of Soviet society theoretically and in reality means the russification of non Russian nations and the renewal of a "one, indivisible" Russia, in other words the liquidation of the achievements of the October socialist revolution in the area of national relations.

Logical analysis of the phenomenon and all historical evidence go to prove that the idea of the mixing together of nations runs contrary to nature, is dogmatic and unscientific, and politically this idea is essentially reactionary. I have no doubt, therefore, that when Soviet socialism becomes democratic, it will pass this idea on to the archives of history.

The current party political line on nationalities removes from my nation the right to a past. Within the framework of the current Soviet historiographical view of Ukrainian history, the dependant and subordinate place of the Ukrainian nation is revealed no less markedly than by the official concept of the future of nations. These are then two ends of the one political idea - the rebirth of the "one, indivisible" Russia. I examine the current historiographical place of the Ukrainian nation in the second chapter of my book: "The past; or the current historiographical neocolonization of Ukraine by Soviet Russia". The falsification of Ukrainian history by current Soviet historiography does not involve only some single historical period but involves the whole history of the Ukrainian nation, contradicting our self sufficient historical development and subjecting its explanation to the political interests of the Russian state.

The concept of "Old Rus" people, a concept which is an ideological twin theory of the "One Soviet



Nationality" theory completely eliminates the early feudal period in Ukrainian history. And no place is retained for Ukrainians and Byelorussians in the family of slavic nations in the early middle ages. The speculative and unscientific idea of "Old Rus" people as a "Common forebear" and "Kievan Rus" as a "common heritage" to Ukrainians, Russians and Byelorussians does not mean equal legitimacy for Ukrainians and Byelorussians in the official explanation of the history of the eastern slavs. Russians do not segregate themselves from early eastern slavic history of the 6th-13th centuries, neither terminologically nor conceptually — everything therein is referred to only as "Russian": "Russian tribes", "Russian peoples", "Russian culture", "Russian state", "Initial period of Russian history", "beginnings of Russian statehood" and so on (instead of Rus'ian, culture, Rus'ian history, etc). Furthermore, in Soviet literature, one will find nothing Ukrainian until the 14th-15th centuries, neither territory, nor language, nor culture, nor any ethnicity at all. A scientifically and historically absurd idea is constantly confirmed: that eastern Slavs of the 9th-13th centuries consisted of one nation, one ethnicity - "Russian" of course, and that Ukrainians and Byelorussians somehow appeared as late as the 14th-15th centuries. They appeared for a reason, in order to "dream" about their "unification" with Russia. All nations of the world have aspired and continue to aspire to national independence, including statehood, and only the Ukrainians and Byelorussians are exceptional - they "dream" of their "unification" with the Russian nation. What it has come to is that Soviet press and literature speaks of

Ukrainian aspirations of unification with Russia in a "united state". Formally, this is a crude mutilation of historical record, because there is documentary evidence that the Ukrainian Government with Bohdan Chmel'nytskyj at its head, in putting together its treaty with Russian state representatives, negotiated political autonomy to its satisfaction. The concept of "unification" contains the idea of a single nation and essentially contradicts the right of the Ukrainian nation to a separate independent state and is therefore a serious violation of the constitutions of both the Ukr. S.S.R. and U.S.S.R.

The theory of "a Single Old Rus People" or a "Single Russian Nation of Kievan origin" (as it is often mistakenly referred to in Soviet historical literature) and the concept of "Unifiction" are added to by the speculative and mythicized idea of struggle with so called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism with which the Ukrainian national liberation movement against Russia is actually identified — particularly and most importantly the idea of a Ukrainian state independent of Russia. Again the right of the Ukrainian nation to an independent state is denied. And in this way historiographical context is formed in which the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nations are transformed into an ethnographic mass, an ethnographic section of a "One Russian nation from the Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean." The continuous and increasingly consistent use of the term "Great Russian" conclusively dots the "i": As an example, in 1944 a book named "The Origin of the Russian Peoples: Great Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian" was published (by the state).

The great state concept of prerevolutionary Russian historiography is renewing itself in full, repeating the doctrine of the black hundreds which disallowed the ethnically separate existence of Ukrainians and Byelorussians. On this topic one can read unbelievable texts of Soviet historiographical publication. The "One Great Russian Nation" and the "One Soviet Nation" — are links in the one political chain, the one political doctrine — the so called internationalization of Soviet society. The falsification of Ukrainian history by Russian great state nationalism is a very important instrument of national repression of the Ukrainian nation.

In my third chapter — "The past versus the present", or the myth about 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism', I analyse the theory and practice of anti-Ukrainian statewide propaganda which is carried on under the auspices of the struggle with so called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism". From Stalin's day to the present this has been a psychological battle against Ukrainian national awareness, a battle which is

expanded by the uninterrupted physical repressions against nationally aware Ukrainians. This battle demoralizes Ukrainian dignity, oppresses it psychologically. The current party "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" doctrine is merely an ideological relative of the prerevolutionary "Mazeppa followers" and "sepa". In this section of my book I prove, using a mass of factual material, that the current party "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" doctrine would not be blessed with the support of our revolutionary — democratic activists of the past, nor would the party view of the origin of the Ukrainian nation, nor would its attitude to "Unification", nor would its understanding of the character and obligations of the Ukrainian national liberation movement.

Taras Shevchenko, I. Franko, Lesya Ukrainka, P. Hrabowski and all the other great figures of Ukrainian history whom the current party propaganda includes as allies in the struggle against so called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" would, if one were not to falsify their works and if one were to apply criteria consistently, be included within the ranks of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists", and what is more, within their leading ranks. Prewar the "Black Hundreds" did not segregate, say, I. Franko from M. Hrushevskij and from the point of view of a "one nation" and "one fatherland" they were correct not to do so. The official doctrine of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism", the mass of so called anti-nationalistic literature, the uninterrupted State-level propaganda campaign against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" — all this plays an extremely reactionary part in the international relations between the Ukrainian and Russian nations, damages the regard that Ukrainians and Russians have for one another, and stirs up the bureaucracy against the rationally conscious Ukrainians, rousing suspicion and lack of tolerance to any expressions of the national dignity of Ukrainians. The struggle against so called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" has as its aim, above all to destroy the political awareness of the Ukrainian nation, to retard its development and therefore to facilitate the creation of "One Soviet Nation" — in other words to russify non Russian nations. Suffice it to say that party propaganda brands the idea of an independent Ukrainian state as "nationalistic" even though we have a constitutional right to step out of the Union of Socialist Republics and to form a separate independent Ukrainian State.

The fourth chapter which I have called — "The present, or the state of siege" has been approached by me as an analysis of today's psychological, political and cultural situation of the Ukrainian nation, as a basis to thoughts concerning the fact that current

national ideology and politics of the party do not allow our nation to deviate from its path of "legitimate" national demise. Our culturo-political form of existence, all this is permitted to a certain level, the level at which the Ukrainian form and setting are evident, but without independent Ukrainian expression, without serious and distinctive Ukrainian content.

I have called my fifth chapter "Perspectives, or a word about the unity of human history". On the basis of an exact theoretical and factually historical analysis of the situation the idea of nationally-historical optimism finds support. Apart from our many historical achievements, the most important of which is the formal evidence of Ukrainian statehood, the basic agreement here is that requirements of progress and legitimate historical development will not leave us without direction and will assure support for our desires for national freedom as they are objectively progressive desires which lie in the mainstream of universally legitimate historical development. Soviet party-state socialism is socially antagonistic, because the party and the party-state bureaucracy, in the process of development of Soviet society, have transformed themselves into a ruling social class. This thesis has its origins in the politico-economic and socio-philosophical logic of marxism.

Soviet intellectual H.K.L. Shakhnazorov, author of the book "Socialist Democracy: Some Theoretical Questions" (1972) writes "Social ownership denotes social administration of property. The state, in bringing about a methodical management of socialist production, in accounting for and controlling the quantity of labour and consumption, acts in the name and by the authority of the collective owner of the means of production — the whole nation" (Page 12). But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union admits that it controls the state and is a superior governing power over the state! On the other hand, the nation — its society personified by its citizens — not only do not elect the organs of party power, but do not even have any formal right to audit its activity (of course, the superior status of the party is reinforced by the constitution). It is not even worth considering the possibility of such an audit in practice, the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia cannot conduct such an audit because within their classes and social strata they enjoy neither the material nor ideological conditions to do so. Nor, above all, do they possess their own political organizations which are independent of the Communist party of the Soviet Union; that is, they do not possess their own organ of social thought. The Party, being the only organized power in society, forms the highest political level of



social intercourse and, in the absence of private individual ownership of the means of production, transforms itself into the collective owner of the means of production, and therefore into a separated social class, the ruling exploitative class of Soviet society.

This argument is both convincing and perfectly adequate. However, the sociology of Marx and Engels suggests another theoretical way of supporting the correctness of the conclusion that the Soviet party bureaucracy and the party-state bureaucracy form a separate social stratum, a separate social class. I refer here to Marx's concept which equates private ownership and the division of labour. The authors of the "German Ideology" wrote: "... division of labour and private ownership are identical expressions: the same thing is said with regard to activity on the one hand as is said with regard to the product of activity on the other" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works in 3 Volumes, K, 1977, Vol. 1. p.22).

"Different degrees in the development of the division of labour are simultaneously different forms of ownership, that is every degree of division of labour indicates also the relationship between individuals

reflecting their relationship to material, to instruments, the means of production and to the products of labour" (ibid, p.9.). Therefore the Marx and Engels wider understanding of private ownership encompasses not only the objective and concrete but also the subjective side of social life, "private ownership as an impersonal activity" (K. Marx and F. Engels, From their Early Works, K., 1973, p. 540).

The subjective existence of private ownership is the relationship of a person to the product of that person's activity, and the reciprocal relationships between subjects of work. Whence comes the third category of the Marx and Engels social philosophy — the category of alienation (self-alienation, alienated and self-alienated work). These categories of private ownership, division of labour and alienation reflect both the different divisions of social vitality in man and their dialectic unity. Brought together they reveal the scientific crux of the Marx and Engels sociology. On the basis of these categories was revealed the Marx and Engels theory of the future: Communism.

Private ownership is divided labour, divided labour is alienated labour, self alienated, the source of social and general mass alienation — and such is the concept beyond which the authentic content of the Marx and Engels theory of Communism will not be found. Its realization is the communist idea concerning the destruction of the division of labour (including professional labour) and the idea of liquidation of the social enshrinement of people into their separate aspects of social life-function and the transformation of work into the free and voluntary self-expression of individuals. Only in this way is it possible to destroy the classes, the antagonism between intellectual and physical labour. In doing this, what was expected was the formation of a methodical communist production free of the phenomena of demand and supply, a communist society of self administration free of political interchange and of those social relations pertaining to ruling or to subjugation. In other words, a society without statehood. Therefore the concept of the wider understanding of private ownership lies at the centre of the Marx and Engels theory of communism. Soviet philosophical literature confirms that the "mature" Marx liberated himself from this wider explanation of private ownership, however this conclusion cannot find support from either of the social ideal of Marx and Engels or from the texts of their works.

Of course, the Marx and Engels expectation, in their words, to "destroy work", or liquidate all division of social life-function, has shown itself to be utopian.

However their social philosophy realistically reflects the conflicts in life and in this dialectico-material section is true to life and constitutes a great scientific and methodological contribution. This philosophy even gives us the theoretical key required to discover both the social nature of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its social, non party service. The political direction of Soviet society is not performed by elected civil minded people, both formally and actually accountable to all the citizens of the state, but by the activity of a separately organized stratum of people, the Party, which exists both formally and in practice outside the control of the whole society. In other words, the Party activity in Soviet society is not the private group concern of individuals, but a separate function of a separate, organized social group of usurpers, which has a ruling relationship with regard to all material and spiritual production in general at a level which covers the whole society. Its main activity is a distinct aspect of *social* function, and the group of usurpers itself is a subject of social reference (relations) and therefore a distinct social class.

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K. Marx in “Economico-philosophical essays, 1844” wrote that in the context of division of labour “with the help of alienated and self-alienated labour a worker begins to feel a particular relationship to labour similar to that of a person who does not know what labour is and regards himself beyond labour. The worker then bears that sort of relationship to labour as has a capitalist, or however else one would name a master of labour” (K. Marx and Engels, From Early Works, K., 1977, p. 259). This sort of master labour in Soviet society is the communist Party and the party-state bureaucracy. Neither the working class, the peasantry, nor the intelligentsia (being the subjects of the three basic aspects of social function) do not have their own separate political organizations, or their own separate representation in the organs of state power. And because they are not self organized, they find themselves deprived of the material provisions required both to form a joint class determination and to protect their own particular class interests. Because of this they do not govern their own output and they cannot, as a collective owner, scrutinize either the means or the product of their creative activity. Such governor and owner is the Party and the Party-state bureaucracy.”

Consistent with Marxist sociology, the state is the political form of social rule, and the state organization is created by the ruling class for its own self preservation. Such a state is our so called Soviet Government which is both formed and controlled by the Party. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union itself admits that it exercises a higher governing

power than, and directs, the state. That the party forms state organs is no secret to anybody. We, the electorate, are not even formally given a choice, because only one candidate is nominated for any one ministerial seat. In practice the candidate is nominated by the organs of the party organization, but in essence the candidate is appointed by them.”

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Stalinism was indeed a counterrevolution that defeated the Soviet Government and removed political freedom from the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, making the Party the fully governing and only political manager in the country. This idea of the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union represents nothing more than the fact that the highest fully-fledged pinnacle of political power does not reside in the government but in the Party organs. Therefore, they form the government of the state in Soviet society.”

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In this chapter of my book I analyze the history of the appearance of a new ruling class in Soviet society, and on the basis of Marxist sociology I review the internal structure of this class. What I confirm is that the Soviet ruling class in its characteristic traits and socio-political nature does not differentiate itself from other ruling social classes known in history. The Soviet ruling class uses its state form for self preservation and self confirmation — whence the Party idea concerning the growth of the role of the Party and state on the path of establishment of Communism.”

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From the point of view of Marxist theory of Communism, this concept is completely absurd, because according to Marx, Communism grows in inverse proportion to the growth of state, meaning any state.”

This article has been reprinted from last issue due to the number of typographical errors.

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