

The Mazepists

Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century

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To my wife and parents

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Clinton, N.Y.

PART ONE

I

Introduction

November 10, 1708. In the Ukrainian town of Hlukhiv, Tsar Peter I, the newly elected Cossack Hetman, Ivan Skoropadskyi, numerous members of the Ukrainian *starshyna* and ecclesiastical hierarchy participate in a most unusual ceremony. Amidst somber hymns and clouds of incense, the name of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who several weeks earlier had defected to the invading Swedes, is declared anathema. On the same day, in the Uspenskii Cathedral in Moscow, in the presence of Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich and Russian boiars and ministers, a similar ceremony is enacted. Every year for almost two centuries thereafter, on the first Sunday of the Great Fast, Mazepa's anathemization is repeated in the churches of the Russian empire. In the view of the rulers, servitors and loyalists of the empire, these repeated condemnations were necessary because the Hetman had committed an "unpardonable sin" — he had tried to withdraw Ukraine from Russian rule. Little wonder that, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the opponents of the evolving Ukrainian national movement in the Russian empire habitually referred to Ukrainian activists as Mazepists and labeled their movement *mazepynstvo*. The identification was meant to be derogatory. If the incipient movement could be linked to the name of Mazepa which, in the Russian empire, was associated with treason, then the movement itself could also be denounced as treasonous.

July 12, 1918. The Russian empire has crumbled. In Kiev, a Ukrainian state bearing many of the trappings of the old Cossack hetmanate and headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi, a direct descendant of Ivan Skoropadskyi, has come into existence. Thousands of Ukrainians jam St. Sophia's Cathedral and the adjoining square to attend an elaborate service during which the anathema is

removed from Mazepa's name and prayers are offered for his soul. Immediately after the service, plans are discussed (but never implemented) for bringing the Hetman's remains back to Kiev from Rumania. For Ukrainian nationalists the identification with Mazepa was welcome because it meant that their new and foundering movement and, more specifically, their desire to break away from Russia, had a centuries-long tradition which, they felt, conferred on it political legitimacy. By virtue of these and similar arguments, Mazepa and his associates have remained to this day the idols of Ukrainian nationalism.¹

Even a cursory examination of the historiographical treatment (or, more accurately, mistreatment) of Mazepa quickly leads one to the conclusion that, in scholarship as well as in ideological polemics, he has been for the proponents of Ukrainian separatism a revered symbol and, for the devotees of Russian centralism, a whipping boy. As a result, the goals, motives, ideas and interests which were germane to Mazepa and to Pylyp Orlyk, his epigone in exile, were usually distorted or misrepresented. This being the case, the task before us is clear: Ranke's famous dictum "wie es eigentlich gewesen" must be applied and it is in the context of their own times, not in the framework of anachronistic ideologies, that Mazepa's and Orlyk's endeavors and activities must be examined.

THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

One of the most widespread and intense forms of political conflict in early modern Europe was the power struggle between the absolutistically-inclined monarchs and the privilege-minded nobilities. The tension between monarchs and nobilities was inherent, for the former almost always attempted to extend their hold on their far-flung domains while the latter invariably resisted any limitation by their sovereigns on their rights or any interference in their local affairs. In the medieval period, because it monopolized military skills and administrative office, the nobility usually managed to keep its sovereign in check. But, in the 16-17th centuries, as the monarchies created standing armies and extensive bureaucracies, the contest began to swing in favor of the sovereigns.

The regional elites resisted stubbornly. In the middle of the 17th century, a wave of anti-royalist uprisings swept through Portugal, England, the Netherlands, Catalonia, Naples and France.² Their results were varied. The first three rebellions proved to be success-

ful while the last three failed. While local circumstances often predetermined the outcome of specific uprisings, it was clear that, taken as a whole, Western Europe was in the throes of what Trevor-Roper has called “the crisis of the 17th Century.”³

What was happening in the eastern part of the continent during this age of crisis? Did it also experience the sovereign vs. elite conflicts that had flared up in the West? Eager to extend their generalizations, Western historians looked eastwards with unprecedented interest. And they did find a major upheaval there in the mid 17th century: the Ukrainian Uprising of 1648, led by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi shook the entire region and had far-ranging effects. However, the vast revolt of the Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants was essentially a reaction of the lower orders against the oppression of the Polish or Polonized nobility. As such, it did not fit well into the pattern of the anti-royalist uprisings in the West.

But had they looked a little further, historians would have been richly rewarded. A series of anti-royalist uprisings did take place in Eastern Europe; however, they occurred roughly fifty years later than did those in the West. (This might have been expected in view of Eastern Europe’s pronounced time-lag with regard to developments in the West.) Thus, in 1697, the Livonian nobility, led by Johann Reinhold von Patkul, sharply challenged the fiscal policies of the Swedish Vasas; in 1703, Ferenc Rakoczi II began his eight year long rebellion against the Habsburgs; in 1706, Stanisław Leszczyński, representing the republican traditions of the Polish *szlachta* and aided by the Swedes, replaced the absolutistically-minded August II as King of Poland; in 1708, Ivan Mazepa, Hetman of Ukraine and spokesman for the rising Ukrainian elite, rose against Peter I; and in 1711 Dimitrii Kantemir, Hospodar of Moldavia, rebelled together with the boiars of the land, against the Ottoman Sultan. Thus, as the Fronde was becoming a thing of the past in the West, variations of the Fronde were just beginning to get underway in Eastern Europe.

It is in the context of this general East European phenomenon that the present study of Mazepa and Orlyk must be viewed. But, before dwelling on these Ukrainian frondeurs, it would be fruitful to examine several other general aspects of the opposition of nobilities to royal absolutism.

Both in Western and Eastern Europe the rationale for the nobles’ rebellion was basically the same: the rebels invariably sought to protect “the ancient rights and liberties” of their land. The upris-

ings were not against the monarchy as such but rather against sovereigns who tampered with the status quo. And the preservation of ancient ways and customs, which every traditionalist society considers to be among its highest moral prerogatives, justified, at least to the rebels themselves, their actions.⁴ Of course, the fact that the traditional order and the nobilities' self-interest were mutually supportive explained to a large extent their militant conservatism.

In Eastern Europe the two most powerful nobilities, those of Poland-Lithuania and of Hungary, felt that they had not only a moral duty but also a legal right to resist an unjust, that is, a tradition-breaking sovereign. The famous Hungarian *jus resistendi* explicitly emphasized this point. In Poland-Lithuania, the right of the estates to confederate in order to protect their interests implicitly gave the nobility a legal right to resist the king, by force if necessary. Since the elites of Livonia, Moldavia and the Ukraine modeled themselves very consciously on the Polish nobility and its privileges, they too felt that rebellion against the sovereign was justified if their rights had been transgressed against and their traditions disregarded by their rulers.⁵

Similarities existed not only in the nobilities' rationale for rebellion but also in the forms of this resistance. (This is not to say, of course, that all the rebellions of the nobility were essentially alike.) Compared to the spontaneous outbursts of the peasantry, the rebellions of the elite were much more deliberately planned. As men who had immeasurably more to lose than lowly peasants, nobles usually reached their decision to rebel only after much preparation and even more hesitation. Therefore, elaborate conspiracies often preceded or accompanied open opposition.⁶

Besides the obvious advantages of avoiding detection, conspiracy provided its participants with much greater flexibility than did a large-scale uprising: a small band of conspirators could easily alter, postpone or abandon their designs when this was deemed appropriate. Moreover, a conspiracy was a relatively precise method of resistance since it allowed its participants to aim at specific goals—the abolition of a hated set of innovations or the removal of overly zealous representatives of the King—without upsetting the entire political and socio-economic order of which the conspirators themselves were a part.

Another feature which was very marked in all the anti-royalist uprisings, except in the rather atypical case of England, was the dependence of the rebels on foreign aid. To a great extent this

dependence was a matter of simple statistics. Most nobilities constituted about 1-2% of their societies (in Poland-Lithuania, however, the figure was an abnormally high 8-10%). As monarchs began to identify themselves ever more consciously with the interests of society as a whole, the nobility felt sharply its political isolation. And since nobilities tended to alienate the townsmen and peasants, they could expect little support from within their own societies. Furthermore, when some noblemen did rise against their sovereigns, many of their colleagues, while sympathetic to their cause, preferred to play a game of wait-and-see, and eventually joined the winning side. As a result, rebellious noblemen had a relatively narrow base of support at home and, consequently, their only recourse was to seek aid abroad.

This tendency to seek foreign supporters was strengthened by the timing of many of the rebellions. Frequently they broke out when sovereigns were involved in wars and could not bring all their troops to bear on the rebels. This was especially evident in all of the East European uprisings. From the sovereigns' point of view, such actual or potential alliances between their internal and external foes posed an exceedingly fearsome threat. But the allies themselves also faced serious difficulties.

There was, first of all, the problem of reliability. Neither the rebels nor their foreign supporters could be sure, once they committed themselves, that the aid which had been promised them would be forthcoming (or ongoing). For example, when France negotiated peace with the Habsburgs in 1714, it promptly cut off aid to the Hungarians, whose anti-Habsburg rebellion it had encouraged, leaving Rakoczi in a hopeless situation. Foreign sovereigns who meddled in their foes' internal problems were also subject to disillusionment and loss. Believing Patkul's assurances about the imminence of an anti-Swedish rebellion in Livonia, August II launched an invasion of that land only to find, to his dismay, that most Livonians preferred Swedes to Saxons. Charles XII drastically altered his plans for the invasion of Russia and moved toward Ukraine with the hope that Mazepa would join him with 30,000 Cossacks. However, when the Ukrainian Hetman did link up with the Swedes he brought along only 3-4,000 men.

Conflicts of interest were, as always, quite common among the allies. In 1676 the Dutch promised to aid the Portuguese against their common enemy, the King of Spain. But soon afterwards the Dutch-Portuguese colonial rivalry became so intense as to dis-

courage all attempts at cooperation. When the French came to the aid of the Catalans they found the latter happy to accept their military assistance against the Spanish King but most unenthusiastic about recognizing French sovereignty. In 1711, Pylyp Orlyk and his Tatar allies launched an initially successful invasion of Ukraine. However, the Tatars' insistence on taking captives from among the populace that Orlyk was trying to win over to his side soon led to a conflict between the allies and the failure of the invasion.

The invitation of foreign allies could backfire against the rebels in yet another fashion. Often the appearance of foreign troops aroused deep-rooted feelings of xenophobia among an otherwise uncommitted populace. This could lead to a complete loss of local support for the rebels and an even greater dependence on external backing which, in turn, allowed sovereigns to represent the rebels as puppets of foreign interests. Yet, despite the troubles which foreign entanglements entailed, almost every nobility which rose against its sovereign sought aid from abroad. Usually the rebels found their monarch's enemies to be receptive—for their own interest, of course—to their pleas.

Once open rebellion broke out both sides were quick to employ propaganda and polemics to rally support for their causes. Indeed, in the conflicts of the nobility vs. the sovereigns in the 17–18th centuries, secular issues, such as the distribution of political power in a society, replaced religious questions as the primary topics of public debate throughout most of Europe. And while the propagandistic tracts and manifestoes, replete with distortions, exaggerations and vilifications, abounded, they also had their uses, for they revealed, explicitly or implicitly, the basic principles upon which each side acted.

Despite these similarities, there were also marked differences between the uprisings of the nobility in the eastern and western parts of the continent. In the West, the numerically large and powerful bourgeoisie frequently played a prominent role in the anti-royalist movements. In Naples the rebellion against the Spanish king was primarily an urban affair while in the Netherlands it was the opulent burghers of Holland and Zeeland who led the struggle against the Habsburgs. Townsmen were also prominent in anti-royalist causes in England, France and Catalonia. This was rarely the case in Eastern Europe. There the nobility had antagonized the already impoverished towns to such an extent that, despite royal exactions, they preferred to side with their sovereigns. In the few cases when

townsmen did join the rebels it was usually under duress. (A notable exception was the loyal support which Gdansk offered to Stanisław Leszczyński in 1713.)

Ethnic loyalties and antagonisms were more apparent in the rebellions in the East than in the West. In England and France the ethnic dimension was almost totally absent; in Naples and Portugal it was noticeable but of minor importance; only in Catalonia and the Netherlands was antagonism against another people, i.e., the Spaniards as well as a tyrannical monarch, significant enough to urge on the rebels. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, where all the sovereigns were foreigners to their subjects and where ethnic heterogeneity was much greater (to a large extent the towns were ethnically distinct from the nobility-dominated countryside), ethnic tensions played an important role in the uprisings. The anti-German feelings of the Poles and Hungarians fueled their animosity toward their Saxon and Habsburg sovereigns; the Moldavians despised not only the infidel Ottomans but also the Greek Phanariots who, with the backing of the Porte, were beginning to dominate their land; a common faith barely disguised the mutual dislike that Ukrainians and Russians felt for each other (Mazepa ordered his men to avoid marriages with Russian women and Peter had to issue an *ukaz* forbidding Russians to insult Ukrainians).⁷ Thus, East European nobles, much more so than their Western counterparts, feared that not only would they be oppressed by tyrannical monarchs, but that they would come to be dominated by a foreign people.

It was this aspect of the uprisings that 19th and 20th century East European historians seized upon and exaggerated, indeed, distorted, so as to make the rebellions of the nobility fit the pattern of modern struggles for national liberation. As a result Rakoczi, Leszczyński, Patkul, Kantemir, Mazepa and Orlyk were represented by many modern historians as, first and foremost, fighters for their national causes and enshrined as such in their respective national pantheons. It should be stressed, however, that while patriotism—as opposed to nationalism—certainly motivated all of these men to a greater or lesser degree, it was the defense of traditional, estate-oriented rights and privileges which was the primary concern of their revolts.⁸

Finally, the East European rebellions shared yet another trait: they all failed. And one of the effects of these failures was the appearance of the first all-East European political emigration. One after another, Patkul, Leszczyński, Mazepa, Orlyk, Rakoczi and

Kantemir with their followers fled abroad to commence there the classic lifestyle of political émigrés. With funds and supporters constantly dwindling, they invariably slid into complete dependence on their foreign patrons who often cynically exploited them for their own purposes. When their usefulness ran out, they were frequently dismissed or forgotten by their backers to whom they then appeared as nuisances. Always hoping to return to their homelands, preferably but not necessarily in triumph, the East European émigrés became involved in countless and often unrealistic schemes to recoup their losses. The flighty and transitory field of diplomatic intrigue became the stage on which they acted. Some, like Patkul, Leszczynski and Orlyk, would mount serious second efforts. And their ceaseless if rarely successful activity would continue to cause irritation and even some anxiety to their erstwhile overlords. It would also lead to numerous attempts on the lives of the émigrés. Nevertheless, despite their proven commitment to their causes, their efforts would ultimately prove fruitless.⁹

THE UKRAINIAN CONTEXT

To understand the Ukrainian framework of Mazepa's uprising of 1708 one must begin with the Khmelnytskyi Revolution of 1648. The two events could not have been more different. As stated earlier, Khmelnytskyi's uprising was aimed against the Polish or polonized nobility (the *szlachta*). It was a mass movement of the Ukrainian Cossacks and peasantry, motivated primarily by socio-economic factors. And its goal, at least that of its rank-and-file participants, was a radical restructuring of society. In contrast, Mazepa's uprising was an undertaking of the nascent Ukrainian Cossack elite (the *starshyna*). Its basic issues were essentially political in nature: they revolved around the prerogatives of the Tsar as opposed to those of the *starshyna*. And the goal of the Mazepists was the preservation of the political and socio-economic status quo in Ukraine.

Yet despite these vast differences there were organic links between the two Hetmans and their respective causes. It was Khmelnytskyi who formulated the agreement with the Tsar in 1654 which Mazepa so desperately tried to maintain more than sixty years later. And it was Khmelnytskyi who laid the foundations for the creation of the *starshyna*-elite whose leading representative and embodiment Mazepa would later become. Finally, it was Khmelnytskyi who, when

he became disillusioned with the Tsar, began to consider and even actively sought the sovereignty of other overlords, setting thereby a precedent which Mazepa (and all the Hetmans before him) would assiduously follow. Because these three links created an element of continuity in the policies of all the Hetmans between 1648 and 1708, they deserve to be examined more closely.

Soon after 1648, Khmelnytskyi and the Zaporozhian Host, the new masters of Ukraine, found themselves in a precarious position; on the one hand, they were too weak to wage a successful war against the vengeful Poles and, on the other, they were too strong to be decisively defeated or incorporated by any power in Eastern Europe. Hoping to find a way out of this impasse, Khmelnytskyi turned to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich of Moscow. And, at Pereiaslav in 1654, the ambiguous Ukrainian situation produced an equally ambiguous arrangement between the two rulers.¹⁰

Employing terminology which was reminiscent of Moscow's extension of its sovereignty over Novgorod, Kazan and its other acquisitions, the Tsar declared that he was willing to accede to the "pleas" of the Ukrainians and accept them "under his high hand." As a sign of special favor, he then conferred on his new subjects the generous rights and privileges which they had requested, in a manner which implied that the grant was discretionary. While in its tone and style it was quite consistent with traditional expressions of the Muscovite Tsar's autocratic pretensions, the Pereiaslav Treaty had a strikingly unique feature. The rights which the Ukrainians had been granted were unprecedented in their scope and, more importantly, in their implications. Among the more important rights which Aleksei Mikhailovich conferred was his acquiescence to respect the customs and traditions of Ukraine, to allow the Host to elect its own officers which he was then to confirm, to permit Ukrainians to judge themselves according to their own laws without any interference from the Tsar's representatives, and to allow Hetmans to receive foreign envoys except those from such enemies of the Tsar as Poland and the Porte.

In effect, these rights gave the Ukrainians self rule. Moreover, they were, to a large extent, similar to the privileges which other nobilities could expect to receive from their sovereigns elsewhere in Europe. Therefore, Khmelnytskyi, who insisted that the Tsar swear to honor the rights which he had granted, reluctantly agreed to drop his demand (which the Muscovite envoys argued was incompatible with the autocratic image of their ruler) because what

he considered to be a formality, albeit an important one, should not stand in the way of an agreement which gave the Ukrainians much of what they wanted.¹¹ Thus, the Treaty of Pereiaslav was a compromise of sorts between the forms of Muscovite autocracy and the content of feudal vassalage.

This Janus-faced nature of the treaty meant that no matter how the Tsar wished to interpret the agreement, the Ukrainian Hetmans and the *starshyna* always considered that it represented a formal and irrevocable guarantee of their rights. And that if this guarantee were not honored, the *starshyna* felt, as did elites everywhere in Europe, that it no longer owed the Tsar its obedience and allegiance. It was in this sense that Mazepa viewed the treaty and for this reason that he considered himself to be “legally” justified in breaking with Peter I once the latter refused to honor many of the basic provisions of the agreement reached in 1654.

The relatively rapid emergence of the new Cossack elite after the turmoil of 1648 provided the Ukrainian interpretation of the Pereiaslav Treaty with its most dedicated (and self-interested) supporters.¹² In some ways, the appearance of this *starshyna*-nobility was paradoxical. After all, Khmelnytskyi's revolt was anti-noble and strongly egalitarian in spirit. Nevertheless, the rise of the *starshyna* was also predictable. The expulsion of the *szlachta* created in the upper levels of Ukrainian society a gap which had to be filled. Although it possessed the typically egalitarian overtones of all frontier societies, the basic socio-economic and political structure of Ukraine was and remained a hierarchical one. As such, it had a functional need for a nobility, that is, for the relative few who were not bound by work in the fields and who could afford to devote themselves to the land's military and political needs (a service for which they then extracted a crushing socio-economic price from the rest of society).

From the outset of the 1648 revolt it was apparent from where this new elite would emerge. As the Zaporozhian Host mastered the land, its leaders—the *starshyna*—began to slip naturally into the role vacated by the Polish *szlachta*. Indeed, it would not be long before the *starshyna* would quite consciously seek to transform itself in the image of its Polish predecessors. At the outset, a barrier to this process of elite formation was the principle of elective office which existed in the Zaporozhian Host. It complicated somewhat the hereditary transmission of status among the *starshyna*. However, this problem was soon resolved in a manner typical of many

feudal societies. Because the line between public and private ownership was always vague in such societies, those who attained high office in the Host eventually came to consider that office as their private and hereditary property.

By the 1670s, the outlines of this nascent Ukrainian nobility had become discernible although their numbers were still difficult to estimate. A very rough estimation reveals that at the outset of the 18th century, when the population of the Hetmanate was approximately 1.1 million people, the *starshyna* consisted of about 1000 families.¹³ A relatively small number of these families, largely stemming from Right Bank Ukraine, were descended from the pre-1648 Orthodox, Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nobility. The majority of the *starshyna* descended from the officers and registered Cossacks of the pre-1648 era. The cream of the Ukrainian Cossack elite was the *heneralna starshyna*, that is, members of the Hetman's staff and the ten colonels (*polkovnyky*) of the Ukrainian Left Bank regiments. For all of the Cossack leaders the example of the Polish *szlachta* and its *pacta conventa* with its king served as a model of the relationship they wished to achieve with their own sovereign.

But perhaps the most direct political effect of the 1648–1657 period on Mazepa and his predecessors arose from the precedent which Khmelnytskyi set in his dealings with the Tsar. In case after case, the Khmelnytskyi insisted on the equality of Ukrainian interests with those of their new overlord. Having assumed that the acceptance of Russian suzerainty would rebound to the good of his land, the Hetman made it quite clear that he was willing to consider the selection of a different sovereign if this did not prove to be the case. In his relations with Karl-Gustav of Sweden, Khmelnytskyi's attitude was revealed most clearly.

Angered in 1656 by an armistice which Alexei Mikhailovich had signed in Vilnius with the Poles without Cossack participation in the negotiations—the *starshyna* openly called this action a betrayal by the Tsar—Khmelnytskyi embarked on a policy which was advantageous to the Ukrainians but which ignored and even harmed the interests of the Tsar. At this time Karl-Gustav was conducting a war against both Poland and Russia. Khmelnytskyi proposed military cooperation between the Swedes and Cossacks which would be aimed against the Poles. But soon rumors, not unsubstantiated, began to fly that the Hetman was planning to accept Swedish sovereignty and turn against the Russians. When the Tsar sent his envoys to complain to the Hetman, Khmelnytskyi angrily replied:

I will never break with the Swedish King for there has always been a long-lasting friendship and cooperation between us. It existed for more than six years, even before we came under the high hand of the Tsar. Moreover, the Swedes are an honest people; when they pledge friendship and alliance, they honor their word. However, the Tsar, in establishing an armistice with the Poles and in wishing to return us into their hands, has behaved most heartlessly with us.¹⁴

Similarly, the Hetman maintained his close contacts with the Crimean Tatars even though the latter had devastated Russian lands. And despite oft repeated expressions of Muscovite displeasure, he energetically negotiated with the Ottoman Porte and continued to consider the Sultan as a potential overlord.¹⁵ By these actions, Khmelnytskyi not only set a precedent for pursuing Ukrainian interests by means of foreign aid but he drew the attention of foreign powers to the Ukrainian problem.

Although Khmelnytskyi had been on the verge of breaking with Moscow, he in fact never did so. In this respect, his successors were much more resolute. Egged on by the Tsars' ever-increasing disregard for the Pereiaslav Treaty, one Hetman after another turned to foreign powers for aid and protection against the Russians. By negotiating the Treaty of Hadiach in 1658, Khmelnytskyi's immediate successor, Ivan Vyhovskyi, hoped to return Ukraine, with rights equal to those of Poland and Lithuania, back into the fold of the Commonwealth. When this attempt failed, Moscow helped to install Khmelnytskyi's young son, Iurii, as Hetman in the hope that he would prove to be more tractable. But within a year Iurii abandoned the Tsar and joined, first the Poles and then the Ottomans. Even such a subservient and venal servant of Moscow as Hetman Briukhovetskyi could not tolerate the Tsar's systematic disregard for Ukrainian rights and he too attempted to come to an understanding with the Ottoman Porte. During the hetmancy of Petro Doroshenko, which was limited to the Right Bank, Ottoman involvement in Ukraine reached vast proportions. A huge Ottoman army invaded Ukraine in 1676 and came close to bringing the entire land under Ottoman suzerainty. When Mazepa's immediate predecessor, Ivan Samoilovych, was deposed, one of the major accusations leveled against him was his suspicious ties with the Crimean Tatars. Thus, by the time Mazepa came to power in 1687 all the alternatives to Muscovite suzerainty — Sweden, Poland-

Lithuania, and the Ottoman Porte—had been tried. When the time would come for both Mazepa and Orlyk to seek foreign aid against the Tsar, they would be following a well-trodden path.

COSSACK UKRAINE'S LINKS WITH THE TSARS

In view of the Tsars' recurrent problems in Ukraine during the latter part of the 17th century, the question arises of the means which they had at their disposal to exercise their authority in that land. How did they maintain contact with the Ukrainians? How did they supervise them? And to what extent could they count on having their orders obeyed?

The agency which maintained contact between the Tsar and the Hetmanate was the *Malorossiiskii Prikaz* (hereafter: MP).¹⁶ An integral part of the Muscovite *prikaz* system, it operated as a subsection of the *Posolskii Prikaz*, that is, of that agency which dealt with the foreign affairs of the Tsar. Established in 1663 (up to that time it was the *Posolskii Prikaz* itself that maintained ties with Ukraine) the MP existed until 1717. Throughout this period, the *prikaz* was staffed, on the average, by about twenty *diaks*, scribes, translators and guards. These men were based exclusively in Moscow where they were housed in a separate building along with the Hetman's representatives who happened to be in the city.

In its dealings with Ukraine, the MP carried out three basic types of activity: (1) Communication and information gathering. It was the MP which drafted and transmitted the Tsars' wishes to the Hetmans and passed on the latter's requests and reports to the tsars. The *prikaz* also dispatched the Tsars' confirmations of Cossack elections and of decisions reached in Cossack councils. Gathering intelligence was another important and difficult part of the MP's duties. The *prikaz* attempted to gather information about all aspects of Ukrainian life from Muscovite envoys returning from the land, from *voevodas* stationed there, from Russian and Ukrainian merchants, and from Ukrainian delegations. But these efforts did not always provide an accurate picture of the actual situation in the south. By the terms of the Pereiaslav Treaty, Muscovite officials had access only to several Ukrainian towns, while the rest of the land was off-limits to them. As a result, they had to depend on Ukrainians for much of their information. And the Hetmans tended to be very selective in the type of information they forwarded to Moscow. For this reason Moscow was very frequently surprised by develop-

ments in Ukraine. (2) Supervision and supply of Russian garrisons. The MP was responsible for the provisioning, replacement and general behavior of the Russian garrisons which were stationed in several Ukrainian towns. Because conflicts often arose between these garrisons and the Cossacks, one of the MP's most delicate and time consuming tasks was the adjudication and mitigation of these conflicts. (3) "Consular" activities. Finally, the MP looked after the interests of Russian merchants in Ukraine, issued permits for travel between the two lands, apprehended and returned to the Hetmanate those Ukrainians who were in Russia illegally, and settled jurisdictional disputes.

In addition to the MP, the Ukrainians had their own means of maintaining contact with the Tsar. In 1669, after a series of violent anti-Russian uprisings in the Hetmanate, the Cossack *starshyna* obtained the right to maintain one of its members in Moscow as its permanent representative. Among the most important of this official's duties was the transmission to the Tsar of complaints about the behavior of Russian garrisons in Ukraine. The Tsar's rescript in this matter stated that this official "whom the Hetman, the *starshyna* and the entire Host in Left Bank Ukraine are to elect, is to live permanently in Moscow in a special residence, along with five or six other men, so that the Hetman can write to the one elected about various matters and about his complaints against the *voevodas* and the troops. And the one elected will take these letters to the *prikaz* people and they will pass them on to the Tsar."¹⁷ Thus, the Ukrainians obtained a means of voicing their dissatisfaction about Russian behavior in their land.

While relatively systematic contact was maintained between the Tsar and Ukraine, it was obvious that the *Malorossiiskii Prikaz* could not, in and of itself, enforce the Tsars' orders in the Hetmanate. For this the Tsars had to be able to deploy a sufficient amount of force.

At first glance, it would appear that the Tsars had a direct and effective coercive capacity in Ukraine. According to the Pereiaslav Treaty, Russian *voevodas* and garrisons could be stationed in certain Ukrainian towns. Initially, it was agreed that Kiev and Chernihiv were to have the garrisons. However, neither Khmelnytskyi nor his successor, Ivan Vyhovskyi, ever allowed a *voevoda* in any town except Kiev. Later, under weaker Hetmans, the number of towns with *voevodas* was enlarged to five—Kiev, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Nizhyn and Oster. The total number of troops in these garrisons

sons fluctuated greatly during the latter part of the 17th century. In the mid 1660s it reached a high of about 12,000 men but later it fell to as low as 1,900 men.¹⁸

For the most part, the Ukrainian Cossacks did not find the *voevodas* and garrisons to be especially intimidating. Khmelnytskyi agreed to their presence because he believed that the Tsar, as Ukraine's sovereign, ought to participate in the defense of the land. But neither he nor his immediate successors would allow these garrisons to interfere in Ukrainian internal affairs. And while the *voevodas* and garrisons did strengthen the Tsars' authority in the Hetmanate, they by no means assured Moscow that its wishes would be obeyed there.

The coercive impact of these garrisons was limited by their relatively low numbers. Even at peak strength, their ratio to combat-ready Ukrainian Cossacks was 1:4, and at times this ratio sank to 1:20.¹⁹ Thus, since the discipline and military technology of the Ukrainian and Russian troops was roughly equal in the 17th century, the Tsars and their *voevodas* could not count on force to impose their policies. For example, when Hetman Vyhovskiy rejected the Tsar's suzerainty in 1658 and Aleksei Mikhailovich raised a levee of 150,000 men to crush the Hetman, the Cossacks and their Tatar allies decimated a greater part of the Russian force at Konotop in June, 1659. The traditional Muscovite cavalry formations never recovered from this blow.²⁰ And the weakness of the Russian garrisons in Ukraine was convincingly demonstrated in 1668 when Ukrainian Cossacks and townsmen, angered by the growing number of *voevodas* and their exactions, attacked and expelled the Russians from the Ukrainian towns with relative ease. Thereafter, the *voevodas* were again limited to five towns and the number of their troops decreased drastically.

It was clear, therefore, that neither bureaucratic institutions nor Russian garrisons could guarantee Ukrainian compliance with the Tsars' wishes. What, then, were the primary means by which Moscow sought to impose its will on Ukraine? To a great extent, this was achieved through the use of astute political tactics. Specifically, a policy of divide-et-empera was applied to pit, on the one hand, the *starshyna* against the rank-and-file Cossacks and peasants and, on the other hand, to create tensions between the *starshyna* and the Hetmans. In both cases, the Tsars played the role of arbiters and herein lay the real basis of their influence in Ukraine. However, for such a policy to succeed, Moscow had to see to it that

Hetmans were elected who were committed to the Tsars. Thus, throughout the latter part of the 17th century, the election of a new Hetman could have a crucial effect on the nature of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

HETMAN IVAN MAZEPA

According to the Eye-Witness Chronicle, Ivan Mazepa was “of noble lineage, of ancient Ruthenian nobility from the county of Bila Tserkva and highly esteemed in the (Zaporozhian) Host.”²¹ The Hetman’s ancestors were first mentioned in the documents in 1572 when a certain Mikolai Maziepa-Kolodynski received an estate from Sigismund II August in return for military service on the eastern frontiers of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Like so many of the indigenous Ukrainian gentry in the region, the Mazepas developed close ties with the Cossacks. Thus, when Khmelnytskyi’s uprising broke out in 1648, Mazepa’s father, Stepan-Adam, joined it along with many of his fellow Orthodox gentrymen and played a prominent role in the turbulent events which followed.²²

As a representative of the Ukrainian gentry in Khmelnytskyi’s camp, Stepan-Adam was present at the Pereiaslav talks. When another member of this gentry, Ivan Vyhovskyi, became Hetman, the elder Mazepa was chosen to lead an important diplomatic mission to the Polish King, Jan Casimir. Mazepa’s father was also involved in Vyhovskyi’s attempt to create a Ukrainian principality. However, when this plan failed and, in 1666, Ukraine was divided between Russian and Polish sovereignty, Stepan-Adam chose to remain on the Polish dominated Right Bank. Thus, the Mazepas embodied the symbiosis of the Catholic Polish szlachta and Orthodox Ukrainian Cossack societies.

Although there is some controversy about the date of Ivan Mazepa’s birth, in all likelihood he was born on 20 March 1639 in the village of Mazepyntsi.²³ He received an exceptionally broad education. After studying at the Kiev Mohyla Academy, he entered the Jesuit Collegium in Warsaw. In the words of his father, the reason why he was sent to Warsaw was, “in order that he might learn behavior from people in the King’s entourage, and not from those in the taverns.”²⁴ The plan worked exceptionally well. Because of Stepan-Adam’s contacts with such Polish magnates as the Wisnio-wecki and Leszczynski and thanks to his son’s natural talents, the

young Mazepa was made a gentleman-in-waiting of the King. Soon afterwards, he was sent, at the King's expense, to complete his studies in Europe and he spent 1656–1659 in Germany, Italy and France. Upon his return, he rejoined the King's entourage and was sent on several diplomatic missions to Ukraine. In 1659, he delivered important information to Vyhovskyi; in 1660, he was an envoy to Iurii Khmelnytskyi; in 1663, he dealt with the Polish-backed Hetman of the Right Bank, Ivan Teteria. It was during these years in Polish service that Mazepa developed his excellent contacts with the Polish magnates, his consciousness of an elite's rights and privileges vis-a-vis the sovereign, and the sophistication, polish and political skill for which he became famous in later years.

But, in 1663, Mazepa's promising career at the Polish court came to an abrupt end. In later times, an imposing array of writers, poets, painters and composers—among them, Voltaire, Byron, Pushkin, Slowacki, Hugo, Liszt, Tchaikovsky—preferred to see the reason for this in the young courtier's romantic misadventures.²⁵ It is more likely, however, that court intrigue, his father's failing health and perhaps Mazepa's Cossack ties forced him to return to his family estate in Bila Tserkva. In any case, the Polish phase of his life was over.

Sometime in 1668–1669, Mazepa married Anna Fredrikewicz, a widow of a Polish nobleman and daughter of Semen Polovets, a noted associate of Khmelnytskyi's. His wife's relatives brought him into contact with Hetman Petro Doroshenko, who at the time was attempting to establish a Ukrainian Cossack principality under Ottoman protection. Upon entering Doroshenko's service, Mazepa initially served as the commander of the Hetman's personal guard and then rose to the rank of adjutant-general (*osaul*). During this period, he was sent on several missions to the Crimean Tatars and learned well the intricacies of dealing with the Muslim world. In 1674, during a mission to the Tatars, Mazepa was captured by the Zaporozhians and handed over to Doroshenko's rival, Ivan Samoilovych, the Russian-backed Hetman of the Left Bank.

Although his arrival on the Left Bank was unexpected, Mazepa would not regret this change in his life. Exactly at this time, Ukrainians by the thousands were fleeing the war-torn Right Bank for the relative safety of the Left Bank.²⁶ Members of such leading Cossack families as the Lyzohub, Skoropadskyi, Kandyba, Hama-liia, Khanenko and Kochubei had become disillusioned with Doro-

shenko's policies and sought their fortune in Samoilo vych's service. Quickly finding his bearings, Mazepa managed to impress Samoilo vych so favorably that the latter made him a member of his entourage and the tutor of his sons. But not only was the Hetman impressed. Russian authorities demanded that Mazepa be sent to Moscow for interrogation. During his first visit to Moscow, Mazepa also found favor with the leading Russian statesmen and returned to Samoilo vych with the Tsar's *zhalovannie* (gifts). The way was now open to him for a brilliant career in the Hetmanate.

As a confidant of Samoilo vych's, Mazepa aided him in his attempts to regain the Right Bank from the Poles and to extend his authority over the Slobodas—lands along Russia's southwest borders which were occupied mainly by refugees from the Right Bank but administered by the Russians. Although Samoilo vych's efforts proved to be unsuccessful, Mazepa managed to benefit from them. In the process of negotiating with the Russians, he established contacts with V. V. Golitsyn, the favorite of Tsarina Sophia and the most influential man in Moscow. It was a relationship which Mazepa cultivated carefully and fruitfully.

The close ties with Golitsyn took on decisive importance in 1687 when the latter led a huge, costly and disastrous campaign against the Crimean Khanate. During his retreat, the Tsarina's favorite anxiously searched for a scapegoat for his failure and—probably with Mazepa's connivance—he chose Samoilo vych. The Hetman was certainly vulnerable. He had angered Golitsyn by criticizing the conduct of the campaign; his overbearing ways and aggrandizement of unprecedented wealth had alienated the *starshyna*; and his undisguised desire to lay hereditary claim to the hetmancy was distasteful to both the *starshyna* and Russian statesmen. As Golitsyn's needs and the *heneralna starshyna*'s resentment combined to effect Samoilo vych's overthrow, it was Ivan Mazepa who played a pivotal role in the conspiracy.²⁷

On 23 July 1687, in the camp near the Kolomak River, Samoilo vych was arrested on the basis of a denunciation submitted by the *starshyna* (Mazepa did not sign the document), charged with treasonous contacts with the Crimean Khan and sent first to Russia and then to Siberia. With the arrest came unexpected turbulence in the Cossack camp. Disgruntled by the conduct of the campaign and by the *starshyna*'s exactions at home, rank-and-file Cossacks mutinied and killed some of their officers. This put the *heneralna starshyna* in a precarious position: confronted by their rebellious men, they

turned to Golitsyn for support, but the Russian commander was willing to provide it only on his own terms. One of these was that Mazepa was to be elected Hetman. Thus, on 25 July, at a hastily called and poorly attended council (*rada*) the election of Mazepa was carried out.

However, Golitsyn was still not satisfied; he demanded a renegotiation of the traditional pacts based on the Pereiaslav Treaty. As could be expected, the so-called "Kolomak Articles," which Mazepa and the *heneralna starshyna* had to accept, reflected a further diminution of Ukrainian autonomy. The Ukrainians' repeated request for the original right to maintain contacts with neighboring monarchs was flatly rejected. Russian garrisons in Ukraine were to be enlarged, and the Hetman and *heneralna starshyna* were obliged,

To unite by all means possible the Little Russian and Great Russian people . . . and bring them into tight, indissoluble agreement . . . so that no one would dare say that Little Russia was under the Hetman's rule . . . (but that) all in unison would say that the Hetman and the *starshyna*, and the Little Russian and Great Russian people are under His Tsarist Majesty's autocratic rule.²⁸

Thus, under terms which contradicted Ukrainian autonomy, Mazepa became the Hetman of Ukraine.

The degree to which the new Hetman's political instincts were finely honed was evident not only from the way in which he had obtained his position, but also from his ability to retain it. After Golitsyn's second unsuccessful Crimean campaign in 1689, Mazepa, with a resplendent retinue of 307 persons, came to Moscow to pay his respects to Tsarina Sophia and her influential favorite, Golitsyn. But, during his stay in the capital, Mazepa saw the Tsarina and Golitsyn removed from power by Peter I. Normally, he would have gone the way of his patron. Indeed, the *starshyna* who accompanied him had already begun to discuss a possible successor. One can imagine the tension which the Hetman must have felt when, on 10 August, he was summoned to his first audience with Peter I.²⁹ To Mazepa's great surprise and relief, however, the Tsar began by praising the Cossack's service during the Crimean campaigns. Taking advantage of this opening, the Hetman replied by emphasizing the difficulties of his office, the mistakes made by Golitsyn and his own commitment to the present Tsar. Pleased by

Mazepa's speech and his bearing, Peter gave the Hetman and his officers generous gifts and graciously allowed them to return to their homeland. This was the beginning of a close political and personal relationship—at least up until 1708.

Later, during the 1690s, when the Tsar launched his attack against the Tatars and Ottomans on the Black Sea coast and greatly needed the aid of the Ukrainian Cossacks, Mazepa proved to be remarkably accommodating. Year after year, he personally led his Cossack regiments into the Wild Fields. At Peter's behest, he supervised the difficult construction of a series of anti-Tatar forts along the Dnieper. During the Azov campaigns of 1695–1697, the Ukrainians, in particular, the Zaporozhians, proved to be invaluable. It was the latter, renowned specialists in anti-Tatar and Ottoman warfare, who launched the last, desperate attack which brought final victory at Azov. Furthermore, Mazepa regularly provided his sovereign with astute advice in his dealings with the Poles and Ottomans. The Tsar rewarded this service with unusual generosity. Mazepa received vast grants of lands in Ukraine and even in Russia. In 1702, he was the second man, after Prince A. D. Menshikov, to receive the newly established Order of St. Andrew. More importantly, the numerous denunciations which came from his many enemies in Ukraine were consistently ignored by the Tsar (the *starshyna* ruefully noted that, "The Tsar would sooner disbelieve an angel than Mazepa").³⁰ Treating each other as personal friends, the aging Hetman and the young Tsar regularly exchanged gifts, the former often sending fine wines to Moscow while the latter replied with fresh fish from the North. Thus, as the Great Northern War began in 1700, the relations between Mazepa and Peter I were as good as they had ever been between a Hetman and a Tsar.

II

The Temptation to Resist

It was no accident that Peter I's extensive reforms coincided with Russia's first modern war. The Great Northern War and, more specifically, the early defeats suffered by the Russians precipitated these reforms. With their comparatively advanced technology, systematically trained troops and excellent support services, the Swedes had one of the most effective armies in Europe. However, only the mobilization and integration of all the resources and efforts of Sweden's two million people allowed its armies to attack not only Russia (which was about six times larger in terms of population) but Saxony, Denmark and the Commonwealth as well. For Peter I to compete with the Swedes meant to imitate them. Not only his army but also the society that supported it would have to be reorganized. For the Tsar's subjects this would make the war doubly painful: its demands and duration would totally exhaust them, and the radical reforms would leave them confused and insecure.

UKRAINIAN GRIEVANCES

In Ukraine, the war's dual burden was especially resented. Compared to the rest of the Tsar's lands, Ukraine bore a disproportionately high share of the war's human and material costs. (Ukraine, with a population of about 1.1 million, put 40,000 men into the field while Russia, with a population of about 13.5 million, had in 1700 an army of 112,000 men.)¹ But even more ominous for the Ukrainians was the talk of change that accompanied the war effort. Past experience showed that whenever the Tsars talked of changes, the rights and privileges of the Zaporozhian Host had suffered. For example, at the confirmation of every newly elected Hetman, the original agreement of 1654 was altered in the

Tsar's favor.² Fearing for their rights, Mazepa and the Cossack *starshyna* were intent on maintaining the status quo at any cost.

Complaints related to the war began to pour in from every segment of Ukrainian society. Peasants and townsmen most often protested about the behavior of Russian troops in their villages and towns. Between 1705–1708 both the Hetman and the Tsar received a constant stream of complaints relating how Russian officers allowed their men to beat and insult Ukrainians, rape their wives and daughters, destroy their homes, drive off their cattle and, in some cases, kill them. "From everywhere," Mazepa wrote to Moscow, "I receive complaints about the willfulness (*svoevolstvo*) of the Russian troops."³

Alarmed by the situation, Peter I ordered his commanders in Ukraine to appoint special officers who would be given the right to use the death penalty in order to prevent such behavior by his troops. But the problem worsened when, in 1708, the Russians began to apply the scorched earth policy in the face of the invading Swedes. In the fall of 1708, Peter I felt constrained to issue a series of *ukazs* to mollify the Ukrainians. One of them stated:

We have forbidden our Great Russian troops, under pain of death, to despoil or harm the Little Russians. Several willful miscreants have been executed already near Pochep. And if some harm has been caused by the burning of dwellings and bread this has been brought on by the extreme necessity of depriving the enemy of shelter and provisions so that they might perish for lack of them.⁴

Admitting that the Ukrainians suffered from the Russian troops which moved through their land, Peter I went on to say that, "in view of the war with the Swedish king, these difficulties are unavoidable; it is necessary to bear these difficulties for the general welfare of the state. . . . I myself do not spare my own person for this purpose."⁵

Peasant discontent in Ukraine was matched by that of the Cossacks on campaign. For the latter, the war brought a series of painful novelties. Instead of traditional Polish, Tatar or Ottoman enemies close to home, the Cossacks had to fight, at their own cost, modern Swedish armies in distant Livonia, Lithuania or central Poland. During these campaigns, it became clear that the Cossacks were no longer a match for regular European regiments. Peter I's

German and Russian commanders treated the Cossacks accordingly: they were utilized as auxiliaries and, quite often, simply as cannon fodder. This did little good for Cossack pride and even less for their chances of survival. Year after year their regiments returned from the north with casualty rates as high as 50, 60 or even 70 percent.⁶

Cossack morale worsened in 1705 when Peter I, in an effort to coordinate his forces, assigned Russian and German commanders to Cossack units. Contemptuous of what they considered to be inferior troops, these officers, in the opinion of their Cossack subordinates, were needlessly cruel and arrogant. Moreover, when the Ukrainians returned from the campaigns, they were often set to work, under bullying Russian supervisors, building fortifications such as those of the Perchersk fortress in Kiev. For their part, the commanders and supervisors often complained to the Tsar of the unreliability and lack of discipline of the Cossacks. In any case, the war contributed greatly to heightening tensions between the Ukrainians and the Russians.

Even the highest levels of Ukrainian Cossack leadership were not immune from insult and injury. In 1705, Dmytro Horlenko, the acting Hetman of the Cossack forces in Lithuania, was accosted by Russian soldiers, thrown from his horse which was confiscated for mail service, and barely escaped a beating.⁷ Mazepa himself learned that the Tsar's favorite, Alexander Menshikov, regularly disposed of mercenary troops which the Hetman had paid for and he never bothered to inform the Hetman about this. In one of the campaigns, the Tsar placed the Hetman under the command of Menshikov. Mazepa found this to be especially galling since he suspected the Russian of plotting to remove him from office. Moreover, he felt that it was below his dignity to serve under such a low-born parvenu.⁸

But what upset the Cossacks, especially the *starshyna*, most of all were the rumors of Peter I's plans to reorganize them. A deeply worried Horlenko informed Mazepa of his suspicions that the Tsar intended to dispatch Ukrainians to Prussia for training as dragoons. Another of the Hetman's officers claimed that he saw the Tsar's *ukaz* to this effect and only the exigencies of the war led to the cancellation of the order.⁹ To understand the *starshyna's* sensitivity on this issue it must be recalled that the Cossack military organization corresponded to their socio-economic status: to alter the former meant, in the view of the *starshyna*, to change the latter.

An incident which seemed to confirm the fears of the Ukrainian Cossack elite occurred during the Tsar's visit to Kiev in 1706. After some heavy drinking, Menshikov blurted out to Mazepa—with reference to and within the hearing of many of the *starshyna*—that, “It is time to rid the Tsar of these enemies.”¹⁰ Later, when the Hetman was already in touch with the Swedes and it suited his purposes to agitate the *starshyna*, he informed his officers that, as a close confidant of the Tsar, he had heard comments like Menshikov's quite often. Furthermore, he added that the Tsar and his ministers wanted “to destroy the *starshyna*, bring the towns under their control by installing *voevodas* and garrisons there. If we should resist, they will force us across the Volga and settle Ukraine with their own people.”¹¹ After a similar discussion, a distraught colonel cried to the Hetman:

Just as we always prayed to God for the soul of Khmelnytskyi and blessed his name for freeing Ukraine from the Polish yoke, so we and our children will forever curse your soul and bones if, as a result of your hetmancy, you leave us in such slavery!¹²

Although this comment came at a time when Mazepa and the *starshyna* were already on the verge of joining the Swedes, it illustrates well the repercussions which the Tsar's war effort had on the Ukrainian Cossack elite.

Despite signs of favor—at Peter's recommendation the Hetman was named a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire and was honored with the Cross of St. Andrew—Mazepa himself began to feel insecure in his position. There were strong indications between 1705–1708 that the Tsar wanted to “promote” him out of office.¹³ A well-founded rumor had it that Peter I, in order to entice the Duke of Marlborough into his service, offered him the Princedom of Ukraine.¹⁴ And Prince Boris Sheremetev, a member of the old boiar aristocracy and a personal friend of the Hetman, warned that the ambitious Menshikov was “digging a hole” under Mazepa in the hope of obtaining the hetmancy for himself.¹⁵ The old Hetman was well aware of the possibility of such machinations. Referring to the prestigious but empty title of Roman Prince which he received in 1708, he said, “They want to satisfy me with the Princedom of the Holy Roman Empire and then deprive me of the hetmancy.”¹⁶ Insecurity and resentment were beginning to undermine even the unmatched loyalty of the Ukrainian Hetman.

The grievance which finally convinced Mazepa to begin serious negotiations with the enemy involved the issue of protection. As Charles XII invaded Russia, rumors spread that his ally, Leszczynski, was to attack Ukraine. Realizing that his troops were too weakened by the Baltic campaigns to defend the land, the Hetman turned to his sovereign for aid. According to Orlyk, their discussion went as follows:

I proposed to his Tsarist Majesty that, should the Swedish King and Stanislaw divide their troops and the former go into the Muscovite realm and the latter into Ukraine, we, with our weak army, ruined by frequent campaigns and wars, would not be able to defend ourselves against the enemy. Therefore, I requested from his Tsarist Majesty . . . that he be so pleased as to give us at least 10,000 of his regular troops. His Tsarist Majesty replied to me: "Not only 10,000, but I cannot even spare ten men; defend yourself as best you can."¹⁷

For Mazepa, this was the last straw. Confronted with the threat of Polish invasion, a disaster which would not only devastate the land but also destroy the Cossack order established more than fifty years earlier, the faithful vassal heard from his sovereign a blunt refusal of aid. To be sure, Peter I had, first and foremost, to care for his own lands. But this was just the point: an insurmountable distinction had been drawn between the interests of the Tsar and those of the Hetman. For the Hetman this meant that the Pereiaslav Agreement—the basis of his loyalty to the Tsar—was no longer mutually beneficial and, therefore, could no longer be binding.

Mazepa's line of argument constantly repeated and stressed certain phrases and ideas: rights and privileges; overlordship freely chosen and open to recall; and protection, always the issue of protection. For anyone with an acquaintance with medieval political theory, these concepts strike a familiar note. They are the components of the contractual principle, European feudalism's most common regulator of the political relations between sovereigns and regional elites. One needs only to recall the basic elements of this principle, so widespread and so cherished by the nobilities of seventeenth-century Europe, to see how it coincided with the thrust of Mazepa's arguments.

The contractual arrangement was an act of mutual obligation. The vassal promised his lord obedience, service, and loyalty in return for the latter's protection and respect for the vassal's privi-

leges and the traditions of his land. If the vassal had good reason to believe that his lord was breaking his obligations, he had the right—the famous *jus resistendi*—to rise against him to protect his interests. Thus, in theory, the lord as well as the vassal could be guilty of disloyalty. Throughout Europe, the contractual principle rested on the prevailing cornerstone of legal and moral authority—custom. The German *Schwabenspiegel*, one of the primary sources for customary law in East Central Europe, provided a concise summary of the principle: “We should serve our sovereigns because they protect us, but if they will no longer defend us, then we owe them no more service.”¹⁸ Mazepa’s position could not have been stated more succinctly.

MAZEPA’S CONTACTS WITH LESZCZYNSKI AND CHARLES XII

As the war went on, the possibility that the Poles might return to Ukraine increasingly worried the Cossack leadership.¹⁹ Although they were themselves rent by internal strife, the conflict had put the Poles in a very advantageous position vis-a-vis their lost but by no means forgotten Ukrainian lands. In the event that Peter I and King August II triumphed, it was almost certain that the Tsar would return at least a part of Ukraine to his Polish allies. If Charles XII and Leszczyński won, then the Poles could expect to regain all of Ukraine. In either case, the Zaporozhian Host would be the loser. Moreover, as the Swedish invasion rolled deeper into the Tsar’s territories, the possibility that Ukraine might become a battleground, suffering tremendous devastation, also sorely worried the Hetman. Confronted by these threatening developments, Mazepa began to cast about for a way out of this potential predicament.

It was the desire to prepare himself for all eventualities that inclined the Hetman towards an understanding with both pro-Swedish and pro-Russian Poles. With August II and particularly with his strongest Polish supporter, Crown Hetman Adam Sieniawski, Mazepa attempted to establish the most cordial relations possible (while simultaneously inciting the Tsar against his Polish allies and blocking their return to the Right Bank, lost by the Poles in a Cossack rebellion of 1701). Much more dangerous was the attempt to neutralize the potential dangers of a Charles XII-Leszczynski victory, for it meant dealing with the enemy. The wily old Hetman

would have to muster up all his skill in intrigue to emerge unscathed from this "Scylla and Charybdis" as he often called it.

Apparently, Leszczynski thought along similar lines because it was he who took the initiative in establishing secret contacts with the Hetman. What a coup it would be for the puppet-king if he managed to draw Mazepa over to the Swedish side! In the fall of 1705, when the Hetman was stationed with his troops in Zamostia, a Polish priest, Franciszek Wolski, was sent to him by Leszczynski with "secret and diversionary proposals."²⁰ The Hetman questioned him in private, then had him arrested and handed over to the Russian commander. As proof of his constant loyalty, Mazepa sent these "diversionary proposals" to the Tsar. At this point he was not yet so desperate as to bite at the first bait.

A year later, Leszczynski tried again, this time with greater success. Taking advantage of the skillful mediation of the Princess Anna Dolska, one of the high-born intrigantes so typical of the age, the Polish king was able to involve the Hetman in a discussion of concrete proposals.²¹ This sudden change of heart was to a large extent brought on by the successful progress of the Swedish invasion which forced the Hetman to treat the possibility of a Swedish victory ever more seriously. As he later explained to a close associate, he took this initial step so that, "it would show them (Charles XII and Leszczynski) my inclinations towards them and so that they would not treat us as the enemy and ravage poor Ukraine with fire and sword."²² While, at this point, Mazepa was still acting on his own, without revealing his plans, he carefully sounded the *starshyna* on the possibility of an understanding with "the opposing side." Almost all of the major officers supported the idea. Encouraged, but still keeping his contacts with Leszczynski secret from the leading *starshyna*, Mazepa began discussing with the Poles the terms on which he might consider joining them.

Because the negotiations were conducted in great secrecy and, therefore, no documentary evidence of their progress has survived, historians have had to piece together bits and pieces of contemporary accounts in order to establish Mazepa's position in the bargaining. From the outset, the issue of Mazepa's goals was surrounded by controversy. Some contemporaries claimed that the Hetman's goal was to establish a separate Ukrainian principality. Addressing his officers before the Battle of Poltava, Peter I stated that Charles XII and Leszczynski wanted to "separate the Little Russian people from Russia and to create a separate principality

under Mazepa's rule."²³ Similar allegations were noted in the official Russian journal of the events of 1708–9.²⁴ And one of Mazepa's colonels, Hnat Galagan, who remained loyal to the Tsar, noted (in 1745) that the Hetman went over to the enemy "in order to break us away from Russia and place us under Mazepa's own rule, which would be independent of all monarchs."²⁵ Peter I, and later, Russian historians, stressed these alleged plans to create a separate Ukrainian principality in order to provide proof of the Hetman's purely egotistical motives for breaking with the Tsar. Some Ukrainian historians also accepted the view that Mazepa's goal was a separate Ukrainian principality, but their interpretation of this separatism was very different. They saw it as evidence of the Hetman's patriotism and of his desire to establish an independent Ukrainian state.²⁶

A more widespread interpretation of Mazepa's goals states that the Hetman was to receive a princely title, while Ukraine became the third and equal member of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.²⁷ Several arguments make this interpretation the most convincing one: such an arrangement would have solved the Polish-Ukrainian relationship to the mutual benefit of both parties, and it would have preserved the socio-economic interests of the *starshyna*; furthermore, it had a well-known precedent in the Hadiach Pact of 1658.

Once the Hetman's dealings with Leszczynski became known, most contemporaries also spoke of them in terms of a union of Ukraine with the Commonwealth. Contradicting his own statements, Peter I also accused Mazepa of wanting to return the Ukrainians into "Polish slavery." Danylo Apostol, a leading colonel and a central figure in the conspiracy who later accepted the Tsar's offer of pardon, reported that Mazepa "presented us with a document from King Stanisław. . . . This document contained guarantees of the same liberties for Ukraine as those which the Polish Crown and the Lithuanian Duchy enjoyed. . . . Mazepa was thanked for placing Ukraine under the (Polish) King's sovereignty and he was assured that the Zaporozhian Host and Ukraine would be granted all the rights and privileges they desired."²⁸ Universals to this effect were secretly sent by Leszczynski to Mazepa in 1707 for his perusal and for distribution at the appropriate time.²⁹ This was also the reason why the colonels, by now partially informed of the negotiations, met in Kiev and secretly studied a copy of the Hadiach Pact which they obtained from the Pechersk Library.³⁰ Whether

Mazepa (or Leszczynski) concluded such an agreement for purely tactical reasons, as some historians assert, having no intentions of adhering to it after the war, will never be known. Suffice it to say that at the given moment an agreement of this type corresponded to the needs of both parties.

The understanding with Stanisław paved the way for Mazepa's contacts with Charles XII. In a proclamation issued after the Battle of Poltava, the Hetman's desire to join the Swedes was described as "following exactly and directly the brave Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, of blessed memory, who in his ideas and military actions agreed with Carl XI and . . . received considerable aid in his own plans."³¹ But precedent was certainly not the primary consideration for striving for direct contacts with Charles XII. Given the dominant political and military position of the Swedes, an understanding with them would certainly carry more weight than would one with their Polish protégé. Moreover, despite the kind words and mutual assurances, neither Leszczynski nor Mazepa completely trusted the other. If the Ukrainian Hetman could get Charles' imprimatur on his agreement with the Polish King, it stood a much better chance of being honored. At the outset of his contacts, Mazepa envisaged Charles XII's role as primarily that of guarantor of the understanding which had been reached between the Hetman and Leszczynski.

Initially, Charles XII did not evince a great interest in serving as a guarantor or even in developing contacts with the Ukrainian Hetman. Monarchical solidarity made the young King wary of dealing with a double-dealing vassal. But, after Leszczynski concluded his pact with the Hetman and as the Swedes encountered increasing difficulties in the north, Charles XII became more receptive to the Hetman's overtures.

A Ukrainian historian, Oleksander Ohloblyn, has suggested a provocative explanation for rising Swedish interest in Mazepa.³² Charles XII's plans called for the deposition of Peter I similar to that which had been forced on August II in 1706. To achieve this, the Swedish king would need the support of the old Muscovite aristocracy which was known to be critical of the Tsar's rule. According to Ohloblyn, Mazepa had close ties with this old aristocracy, particularly with the boiar and field marshal, Boris Petrovich Sheremetev. As noted above, it was the latter who warned him of Menshikov's machinations and of Peter I's plans to introduce reforms in Ukraine. Commiserating with the Hetman, Sheremetev once added that, "We also suffer much from the Tsar and Menshi-

kov, but we are forced to keep silent.”³³ Perhaps it was attitudes such as these among the Russian boiars that, in January of 1709, led the Prussian envoy to Moscow to report that the Tsar “after the unexpected defection of Mazepa, has begun to doubt the loyalty of almost all his boiars and princes.”³⁴

Another of the Hetman’s links with the traditionalist critics of the Tsar lay in his close friendships with Ukrainian clerics who held high posts in Muscovy, such as the Metropolitan of Rostov, Dmytro Tuptalo, the Metropolitan of Riazan, Stefan Iavorskyi, and especially the Kievan Metropolitan, Ioasaf Krovovskyi, who was later arrested in connection with the Tsarevich Aleksei affair.³⁵ Although there is little concrete evidence of actual cooperation between the defenders of the old order in Muscovy and those in Ukraine, indications such as those cited by Ohloblyn would at least suggest that they sympathized with each other.

For many historians of these events there is some confusion as to whether a formal treaty between Mazepa and Charles XII was signed even before the Swedes arrived in Ukraine. Numerous contemporary sources mention some sort of informal understanding between the Hetman and the Swedish King in which the latter promised to take Ukrainian interests into account. The one source which distinctly mentions such a treaty is a document entitled “Déduction des droits de l’Ukraine.” Published in 1925 by Ilko Borshchak, a well-known specialist of this period, it was identified by him as a memorandum addressed to the courts of Europe in 1712 by Pylyp Orlyk.³⁶ According to Borshchak, the purpose of the memorandum was to establish Ukraine’s claims to sovereignty. Included in it is a six-point summary of a treaty between Mazepa and Charles XII which was supposedly signed in 1708. The points of the treaty were as follows: (1) Ukraine was to be independent and free, (2) the Swedish King was obligated to defend the land from all its enemies and send aid when requested to do so by the Hetman and the “estates,” (3) all the lands conquered by Russia which once belonged to the “Ruthenian” people should be returned to the Ukrainian principality, (4) Mazepa was to be the life-long prince of Ukraine, (5) the Swedish King had no right to acquire the title of Prince or the coat-of-arms of the Principality, (6) and for strategic purposes, Swedish troops could occupy five Ukrainian towns.

While the memorandum has been generally accepted as a vivid statement of Mazepist ideals, two historians delicately expressed some reservations about it. Borys Krupnytskyi wondered about its

terminology (“états”) and about it being overly advantageous to Mazepa; and Mykola Andrusiak found the exclusion of any mention of Poland to be curious.³⁷ The problem with this document is, however, more basic: the original has never been produced. After carefully following up Borshchak’s citations, we were unable to find the “Déduction” in the French archives.³⁸ Nor are there references to it in any of the contemporary sources or in any of Orlyk’s other papers. In view of these facts, the authenticity of the “Déduction des droits de l’Ukraine” must be questioned, and, with it, the view that a formal treaty between Mazepa and Charles XII was signed in 1708.

Only in April of 1709, when Charles XII was in Ukraine and the Hetman had already joined him, did the Ukrainian Cossacks conclude a formal agreement with the Swedish King. The impetus for this agreement was provided largely by the Zaporozhians who had recently acknowledged Mazepa as their overlord and joined the Swedes. Because their trust of all authority, particularly Mazepa’s, was limited, the Zaporozhians insisted on clarifying the purposes and the terms on which the war against the hated Russians would be waged in Ukraine. To mollify the Ukrainians, Charles XII concluded, in Budyshche on 8 April 1709, a simple, straightforward agreement with them.³⁹

The first point of the pact was the most important one: Charles XII promised to protect Ukraine with his armies and to not make peace with the Tsar until the Ukrainians were completely and permanently freed from Moscow and restored to their former rights and privileges. The rest of the terms were of a technical nature: Swedish troops were to be quartered in a manner which would not harm the Ukrainian population and soldiers who mistreated the populace were to be severely punished. For their part, the Ukrainians were to encourage the peasants to desist from their attacks on Swedish units and to provide their allies with provisions. These, in sum, were the contents of the Ukrainian-Swedish pact.

Mazepa’s conspiratorial-diplomatic edifice was now complete. With Leszczynski he came to an understanding about the basic political question of the future: once Ukraine left the “high hand of the Tsar,” it would be accepted under the incomparably less stifling protection of the Polish King and it would become a full-fledged partner in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. With Charles XII, Mazepa settled the pressing problems of the present; he obtained guarantees that, in the conduct of the war and in the

making of the peace, Ukrainian interests would be safeguarded. But, while the details of this carefully wrought conspiracy were unique, its general pattern was quite familiar. Mazepa and his followers were acting in a manner typical of noblemen everywhere in Europe who planned to rebel against monarchs whom they considered to be overbearing and tyrannical.

MAZEPA'S CONSPIRATORIAL TECHNIQUE

In discussing Mazepa's conspiratorial-diplomatic arrangements, we have gotten ahead of the actual flow of events; at this point it would be useful to glance back and examine how the Hetman, in the words of the *starshyna*, "constructed his *machina*."

While the decision to abandon or overthrow one's sovereign was taken quite often in 17th century Europe, it was never an easy one. It was usually taken by leaders of the nobility, men who had much to lose—royal favor, great wealth, distinguished careers and, quite often, their lives. The risks were extremely high. Because preparations for such a decisive step had to be carried out conspiratorially, the anti-royalists never knew, with any degree of certainty, the extent and reliability of their internal and external support. To come out against one's sovereign often meant leaping into the unknown.

Rarely was the situation of an anti-royalist leader as complicated as was that of Mazepa. To come out against the Tsar made sense only if Charles XII won or was about to win the war. But the Hetman had no way of knowing what the outcome of the war would be. Therefore, the goal of his dealings with Charles XII and Leszczyński was to reach an understanding with the enemy *in case* they emerged as the victors. Options, not commitments, were what Mazepa hoped to gain through his secret negotiations.

To attain these options, Mazepa decided to pursue, until the last possible moment, his traditional role of being "the Tsar's most loyal servant." At the same time, he tried to persuade Leszczyński and the Swedes that he was sympathetic to their cause. He explained his plan in these words:

If they (the Poles and Swedes) see an inclination on my part towards them, then they will not treat us as enemies and they will not ravage unfortunate Ukraine with fire and sword. I will, however, remain constant in my loyalty to His Tsarist

Majesty until I see with what forces Stanisław will come to Ukraine's borders and what kind of progress the Swedish armies will continue to make in Muscovy.⁴⁰

While this policy of humoring both sides was in itself difficult to follow, Mazepa's task was complicated by the *starshyna*. On the one hand, he had to sound out whether it would support his plans and, on the other, he had to be careful, for fear of denunciation, of not revealing too much. The manner in which the Hetman managed to juggle all these considerations revealed his mastery of the conspirator's craft.

The Hetman's greatest success was that, after three years of plotting, not a hint of suspicion was raised in the mind of the Tsar. There were several reasons for this. For more than eighteen years the Hetman served the Tsar loyally and well. This fact alone made it difficult for Peter I to believe that the Hetman, in his advanced age, would change his life-long policy. Nevertheless, Mazepa had reason to fear that concrete proof of the conspiracy might surface. In Poland, the Hetman's contacts with Leszczyński were a poorly-kept secret.⁴¹ And in Ukraine, members of the *starshyna* were systematically encouraged by Moscow to inform on their superiors. In both places, Mazepa had numerous enemies who would be only too happy to contribute to his demise.

Mazepa's solution to this problem was ingenious: he simply preempted all possible informers.⁴² At every opportunity he warned the Tsar to beware of the Poles in whichever camp they may be, informing him of real or fabricated cases of their disloyalty. A typical example of these tactics was the game Mazepa played with Adam Sieniawski, the most influential (if not reliable) supporter of August II and Peter I in Poland.⁴³

When, in the fall of 1708, Mazepa finally decided to join the Swedes, he desperately wanted to bring Sieniawski over to Charles XII in order to assure victory for his new allies. To do so, the Hetman had to inform Sieniawski of his plans. But this would make him vulnerable to denunciation. In order to ensure that Sieniawski's potential denunciation would be considered an exaggeration or a fabrication, Mazepa told the Tsar of the Polish Crown Hetman's double-dealings. When Sieniawski, after much wavering, decided to remain loyal to Peter I and, as expected, informed on Mazepa, the Tsar refused to believe him.⁴⁴ On the other hand, if Leszczyński had tried to blackmail him by threatening to reveal

their secret contacts, the Hetman was ready to point to the Wolski case as evidence of Polish provocations and of his steadfast loyalty.

One Russian who saw through the Hetman's game was A. I. Dashkov, the Tsar's envoy to August II. Apparently, he sent several warnings to Moscow about Mazepa, but these were ignored. After Mazepa's defection, Dashkov stated, with some satisfaction that, "I was right and issued enough warnings but they did not want to listen."⁴⁵

In dealing with the *heneralna starshyna*, the Hetman was at his Machiavellian best. By exaggerating the threat to the interests of the Ukrainian Cossack elite that loomed from Moscow, he provoked it into demanding him to seek an understanding with the Swedes. This allowed Mazepa to act as if he were merely an instrument of the *heneralna starshyna's* collective will. When the Tsar demanded that Mazepa link up with the Russian army and the Hetman had already decided not to do so, he nevertheless turned to the *heneralna starshyna* for "advice." As expected, they insisted that the Hetman ignore the Tsar's order. And when the Swedes approached and Mazepa pretended to waver, the leading colonels frantically pleaded that he join the Swedish King. In this manner, the Hetman skillfully implicated the *heneralna starshyna* in his conspiracy and tested its resolve.

But, in "giving in" to the *starshyna's* wishes, Mazepa insisted on one stipulation: that the planning and execution of the entire conspiracy be left strictly up to him. Only when he deemed it appropriate would he reveal the entire *machina* to the officers. In case any of his associates should consider denouncing him, the Hetman could be brutally direct in his warnings: "Beware, Orlyk," he told his chancellor, "that you remain faithful to me. You see what favor I enjoy with His Tsarist Majesty. There (in Moscow) they will not take you for me. I am wealthy—you are poor. And Moscow loves money. Nothing will happen to me, but you will perish."⁴⁶

Despite these precautions, two leading members of the *starshyna* broke ranks and, in the fall of 1707 and spring of 1708, informed the Tsar about the conspiracy. Vasyl Kochubei, a member of the *heneralna starshyna*, and Ivan Iskra, colonel of Poltava, acted for political and personal reasons.⁴⁷ The Hetman's arbitrary ways had caused dissatisfaction among some of the prominent members of the elite and the respected and influential Kochubei became the leader of the malcontents. On the personal level, Mazepa's life-long habits as a womanizer heightened the tension between the

two. In 1704, at the age of about 65, the Hetman began to court, much against the will of her parents, Kochubei's 16-year-old daughter, Motria.⁴⁸

Matters came to a head in the fall of 1707 when Kochubei, supported by Iskra, submitted to the Tsar a detailed list of 33 points attesting to Mazepa's secret contacts with the enemy.⁴⁹ When the two repeated their accusations the next spring, the Tsar summoned them for questioning. One might easily imagine Mazepa's fear and panic at this point. Confident that they could prove their case, Kochubei and Iskra left for the Tsar's headquarters near Smolensk. But they miscalculated badly. Peter I considered the denunciation as just another annoying attempt by the constantly feuding *starshyna* to undermine his loyal Hetman. After having Kochubei and Iskra tortured, the Tsar sentenced them to death and, as a sign of special favor, sent them to Mazepa for execution.⁵⁰

Although he emerged unscathed, the Kochubei-Iskra affair shook the Hetman's confidence badly. He was sure that the Tsar now suspected him and was only waiting for the proper time and circumstance to have him arrested. Therefore, he tried by every means possible to avoid joining the Tsar's army. He even went so far as to pretend that he was on his deathbed. (Mazepa was, indeed, ill but not as seriously as he made out to be.)

In the fall of 1708, pressure on the Hetman continued to mount. As the Swedish and Russian armies converged on Ukraine, it became impossible to equivocate any longer. When on October 23, his nephew, Andrii Voinarovskiyi rushed in, breathless, from the Russian camp and informed his uncle that Menshikov with a strong force of cavalry was moving towards him, Mazepa "took off like a whirlwind." Gathering all the troops available, he moved towards the Swedish lines. Now the die was cast.

In his negotiations with the Swedes, Mazepa indicated that when he joined Charles XII he would bring 30,000 Cossacks with him. However, as the decisive moment arrived, the Hetman had only about 7,000 men at his disposal. The rest were scattered, on the Tsar's orders, on several fronts.⁵¹ Leaving 3,000 men to defend his beloved Baturyn, Mazepa moved to the Swedish camp with only about 4,000 men.

Just before making contact with the Swedes, the Cossacks were drawn up and, for the first time, informed of the Hetman's intentions. In his speech, Mazepa again outlined the wrongs inflicted upon the Ukrainians by Moscow—the reduction of Cossack rights

and liberties, the plans to alter the Cossack order, and the alleged plan to resettle the Ukrainians beyond the Volga. The Hetman stated:

The only solution for us is to rely on the compassion of the Swedish king. He has promised to respect our rights and liberties and to protect them from all those who would threaten them now or in the future. Brothers! Our time has come! Let us use this opportunity to avenge ourselves on the Muscovites for their longstanding oppression, for all injustices and cruelties they inflicted. Let us preserve for the future our liberty and our Cossack rights from their incursions.⁵²

The Cossacks responded with silence; they were totally confused. To curse or grumble against the Muscovites was one thing, but to join foreigners, and “heretics” to boot, was another matter. Here it became evident that the success of the conspiracy—its relatively well-guarded secrecy—was also its drawback: the Cossacks and, as it appeared later, the mass of Ukrainians were totally unprepared for such a radical turn of events. Although the Cossacks with the Hetman followed him, they maintained a wait-and-see attitude.

If Charles XII was disappointed with the small number of Cossacks who joined him, he did not show it. Mazepa and the other Cossack dignitaries—most of the *heneralna starshyna* and the major colonels—were received with all due respect. At a ceremonial supper, Swedish generals and ministers crowded around to catch a glimpse of the famous Mazepa. The Hetman, a polished courtier in the European (Polish) style, created a favorable impression. Swedish observers commented that, judging from the style and content of the conversation he carried on in Latin, the Hetman was a man of education and intelligence.⁵³ Charles XII could console himself that he had obtained, if not a large allied army, at least an experienced advisor and expert in Ukrainian and Russian affairs.

III

The Struggle for Ukraine

It was with "great wonderment" that Peter I learned of "the deed of the new Judas, Mazepa, who, after twenty-one years of loyalty to me and with one foot already in the grave, has turned traitor and betrayer of his own people." With the shock came uncertainty. What was the extent of the uprising? How would the Ukrainian masses react? But Mazepa was also uncertain of his support. Only the *heneralna starshyna* knew of the conspiracy. The rest of the *starshyna* and the Cossacks were completely uninitiated. One thing was clear: during the coming months, the attitude of the Ukrainian population could be decisive in the approaching confrontation between the Russians and the Swedes.

PETER I'S INITIAL REACTION

The Russians recovered quickly. Menshikov's quick, energetic measures were especially effective. Arriving in Baturyn within a day of the Hetman's departure, Menshikov realized what had occurred and, without delay, ordered his men to storm the town. After taking the town in a fierce two-hour battle, Menshikov ordered a systematic destruction of Baturyn and the massacre of all its inhabitants. About 6,000 men, women and children were slaughtered. The fate of Baturyn produced the desired effect. As the news of Mazepa's defection spread throughout Ukraine, it was accompanied by the terrible tale of what had occurred at Baturyn.¹ At this point, many would-be Mazepists probably reconsidered their plans about joining the Hetman.

As things settled after the initial confusion, Peter I realized that not as many of the *starshyna* had defected as he had feared at the outset. Nonetheless, he dispatched ten dragoon regiments to

Ukraine.² Unlike the garrison troops, these regiments were quartered among the Cossacks in rural areas. And they stayed in the land permanently. Their commanders were given the right to interfere, under the pretext of searching out sedition and treason, in local affairs and to bypass Cossack authorities.

Within weeks of their arrival in Ukraine, the Russian regimental commanders initiated a reign of terror in the land. Confiscations of property, interrogations, executions, and exile were the fate of anyone not only slightly associated with Mazepa's *izmena* (treason) but even suspected of uttering an uncomplimentary remark about the Tsar. Real or suspected Mazepists were brought to the town of Lebedyn where they were first interrogated by the officials of the Field Chancellery and then by those of the *Posolskaia kantselaria*.³ Also collected at Lebedyn and eventually exiled to Moscow were the extended families of all known Mazepists. In order to encourage denunciations, the Tsar rewarded those who made them by granting them the lands of rebels who had fled or had been arrested. Within months of Mazepa's defection, Ukrainian society was effectively terrorized into complete submission. Never again would a Hetman and his *starshyna* dare to rise against the Tsar.

But simultaneously with these intimidating measures, the Tsar applied a soft approach to the Ukrainian elite. In the first week of November, Peter I instructed his commanders "to summon courteously as many of the colonels and *starshyna* as possible . . . for the completely free election of a new hetman which will be conducted according to their ancient rights and privileges."⁴ On 11 November, at Hlukhiv, the *starshyna* elected Ivan Skoropadskyi, the aged colonel of Starodub, as their Hetman. Because of Skoropadskyi's formerly close ties with Mazepa, the Tsar was not pleased with the selection, but, not wishing to irritate the loyal *starshyna*, accepted their choice.⁵ Immediately after the victory at Poltava, however, the old *Malorossiiskii prikaz* method of supervising the Hetman was altered. On 29 July 1709, a permanent Russian resident (initially he was called a minister in order to give him greater authority in dealing with the Hetman) was assigned to the Hetman's court. The first such official, the *stolnik*, A. Ismailov, was accompanied by a small staff and one, sometimes two, dragoon regiments.

Ismailov brought along two sets of instructions, one formal and the other secret.⁶ In the former set of instructions, the resident was ordered to be at the side of Skoropadskyi, "for the sake of the Great *Gosudar*'s affairs and counsels . . . and, together with the *Gospodin* Hetman . . . to see to it that the entire Little Russian land remains

calm and loyal to the Great *Gosudar*.”⁷ Furthermore, Ismailov was told to observe all of the Hetman’s foreign contacts, to receive with the Hetman, all messengers and letters from abroad, to send copies of these letters to the Tsar, and under no circumstances to allow the Hetman to reply to these letters without the Tsar’s orders. Meanwhile, in his secret instructions, the resident was enjoined to “observe most carefully that neither the Hetman nor the *starshyna* and the colonels evince any inclination to treason or agitation of the masses.”⁸ In case of need, Ismailov was informed that he could use the Russian regiments in Ukraine at his own discretion. This, however, is getting ahead of the flow of events. It should be pointed out again that before the Battle of Poltava Peter I, while punishing the clearly identifiable supporters of Mazepa, was careful not to give the impression that he planned to limit Ukrainian rights and privileges.

THE PROPAGANDA WAR

The election of Skoropadskyi was accompanied by two masterful pieces of propaganda. If Mazepa himself could not be punished, then at least his name could be blackened. For this purpose two ceremonies were arranged. On 5 November, prior to the election, Menshikov had the effigy of Mazepa dragged through the streets of Hlukhiv to a specifically constructed scaffold. There he read a list of the Hetman’s crimes, tore the sash of St. Andrew from his effigy and then had it hanged. In copying this Western practice of execution in absentia, Peter I hoped to emphasize the enormity of the crime committed by Mazepa against his sovereign.⁹

The ceremony which immediately followed the election had an even greater impact on the deeply religious Ukrainian masses. Its thrust was to show that Mazepa had also sinned gravely against God. This time, Peter I and his entire entourage were present. By special order of the Tsar, all the major Ukrainian prelates were also in attendance. After the installation of Skoropadskyi, the entire assembly filed into church and listened, in a haze of incense and to the sound of solemn hymns, as the name of Mazepa was thrice declared anathema. That same day, in the Uspenskii Sobor in Moscow, in the presence of the Tsarevich Aleksei and all the leading boiars, Stefan Iavorskyi, once a close friend of Mazepa’s and now the highest ranking churchman in the realm, performed a similar ceremony.¹⁰

These ceremonies had a widespread effect. Large segments of the

Ukrainian population joined in the chorus of condemnation and for centuries to come, Ukrainian peasants would not mention the name of Mazepa without appending to it the epithet "accursed."

Before, during, and after the events in Hlukhiv, Peter I issued a series of manifestoes denouncing Mazepa and his Swedish and Polish allies. The latter answered in kind. As military operations slowed somewhat for the winter, an intense "war of manifestoes" developed in Ukraine.¹¹

The Swedes were prepared for such a conflict. For the purpose of issuing what the Russians called "alluring letters to the populace" they brought along with them a Cyrillic printing press.¹² Olaf Hemerlin, one of the King's ministers and a former professor at the University of Dorpat, was considered an expert in East European affairs and was therefore assigned to prepare the Swedish manifestoes.

Some of the Swedish proclamations had penetrated into Ukraine even before Mazepa's defection and, given the widespread dissatisfaction with the Russians, caused Peter I some anxiety. But when Mazepa joined the Swedes and provided them with numerous agents who, masquerading as merchants, musicians and beggars, widely disseminated the Swedish propaganda, the problem became more acute. The Tsar sent orders to Ukraine urging the population "to close their ears to these alluring letters." Anyone caught distributing these manifestoes was immediately executed. Public burnings of these letters took place in many Ukrainian towns (which explains, in part, why so few of the Swedish manifestoes have survived).¹³

Menshikov urged the Tsar to counteract the Swedish propaganda by issuing his own manifestoes:

I advise you that at this evil moment it is necessary to keep the common people on our side by all kinds of promises and by the publication of universals which will express all of the Hetman's mischief against his people so that they should not be persuaded by any of his enticements.¹⁴

Soon afterwards the Tsar instructed the printers in the Kiev Pechersk monastery to prepare large editions of his manifestoes (in some cases almost 5,000 copies of a proclamation were printed).¹⁵ These were read in all the towns and villages which were under Russian control. For months each side bombarded the population

with its arguments. Never before was such a fierce struggle waged for the "hearts and minds" of the Ukrainians.

Three major issues emerged in the propaganda war of 1708-1709: (1) the question of Mazepa's motives, (2) the purported dangers that faced Ukraine and (3) the religious dimensions of the defection. In his manifestoes, Peter I struck a theme that has been repeated in traditional Russian, Soviet and often in Western historiography. According to him, Mazepa's actions were motivated by strictly personal, egoistic considerations. As evidence, the Tsar pointed out that the old Hetman wished to return Ukraine "into Polish slavery" for which service he would then receive a principality from the Poles. Unfortunately for Mazepa, one of his letters to Leszczynski discussing Ukraine's relationship with Poland was intercepted by the Russians and seemingly compromising excerpts from it appeared in the Tsar's manifesto. Moreover, the Hetman was accused of levying illegal duties and contributions on the population which he then used for his private purposes. On Peter's orders these contributions were abolished. In this manner the Tsar attempted to transfer the resentment of the masses against the war from himself to Mazepa.¹⁶

The Hetman tried to contradict these accusations. In a series of oaths which he took before his associates and the Zaporozhians, as well as in his manifestoes, the Hetman swore that he acted not for his own benefit but for that of entire Ukraine.¹⁷ (In a letter dated October 26, 1708, Menshikov wrote to the Tsar: "If he did this it was not for himself for but all of Ukraine.")¹⁸ Why should he, the Hetman argued, who was old, sick, without a wife or children take such a risk? It was, he stated, the increasingly burdensome Russian yoke which caused him to join the Swedes. On the heels of this statement there usually followed a litany of the wrongs committed or threatened by the Russians: the dangers of reforming the Cossack order, the resettlement of Ukrainians beyond the Volga and, most important, the systematic liquidation of Ukrainian rights and liberties.

As might be expected, both sides proclaimed that they had the best interests of Ukraine at heart. In one of his most publicized proclamations, Peter I stated:

We can without shame assert that no people under the sun can boast of their liberty and privileges more than the Little Russian people under our Imperial Highness, because not a

single penny from the Little Russian land is allowed to be taken into our treasury. . . . And with our troops, maintained at our own expense, we defend the Little Russian land, the Holy Orthodox churches and monasteries and towns and villages from the Muslim and the heretic onslaught.¹⁹

In his own manifestoes, Skoropadskyi denied that "Moscow, that is, the Great Russian people, are inimical to our Little Russian interests." He added that the Tsar "promised with his own gracious lips and signed with his own hand the royal order that preserves our liberties and graciously guarantees our rights."²⁰

The Swedes also entered the rhetorical fray. Bemoaning the "tearful state" of the Ukrainians under Russian rule, Charles promised "with God's help . . . to protect and defend this oppressed nation until they can cast off the Muscovite yoke and return to their ancient liberties."²¹

In one of his last universals, Mazepa added another set of reasons for "disassociating ourselves from the disadvantageous, unfortunate and futureless protectorate of the Muscovites":²² it was the Tsar's duty to protect Ukraine from destruction, yet not only was he unable to fulfill his obligations in Ukraine but his own land was exposed to the Swedish invasion. Before his defection, early in 1708, Mazepa became extremely disillusioned when, upon asking Peter I for 10,000 Russian soldiers to help defend Ukraine, the Tsar replied: "Not only 10,000, but I cannot even give you 10 men. Defend Ukraine as best you can." If the Tsar was unable or unwilling to defend Ukraine, then Mazepa had to do it in the only manner open to him: by exchanging the protection of the Tsar for that of the Swedish king. Since the Swedes seemed to have the best chance of winning the war, this exchange of sovereigns seemed to Mazepa the best way to protect "poor, unfortunate Ukraine."²³ And for this, the Hetman complained, he received criticism from his countrymen rather than gratitude.

But perhaps the most effective arguments, those that played best on the feelings of the masses, were those of a religious nature. Here Peter I had a distinct advantage. By joining the Swedes and the Poles, Mazepa was open to the accusation that he was betraying Orthodoxy by dealing with Catholics and Lutherans. To emphasize this point, Russian propaganda circulated exaggerated accounts of Swedes, supposedly on Mazepa's advice, keeping their horses in Orthodox churches and otherwise desecrating holy places.

The Hetman was also accused of plotting to introduce the hated union with Rome into Ukraine.²⁴

In attempting to counter these accusations, Mazepa and the Swedes came up with some far-fetched counter-accusations of their own. They stated that the Tsar was engaged in secret negotiations with the Pope for the purpose of suppressing the Greek faith and of introducing Catholicism in his lands. Proof of this was the alleged establishment of Jesuit-run schools in Moscow. Mazepa also added that if the greatly honored Khmelnytskyi could turn to the Ottoman infidels for aid against the enemies of Ukraine, then turning to a Christian monarch like Charles XII for aid against "our eternal enemies, the Muscovites" was certainly acceptable. Many of his agents were sent into Ukraine with express orders to convince the population that the Hetman had "acted for the faith."²⁵ But, with the church leaders on the side of the Tsar and with himself involved with Catholics and Lutherans, Mazepa had a difficult time convincing Ukrainians that he was acting in the best interests of Orthodoxy.

For months salvos of rhetoric echoed throughout Ukraine. The "manifesto war" served to publicize the values that each side contended it stood for. However, factors more concrete than propaganda played the primary role in convincing Ukrainians as to whom to support.

THE BASES OF THE TSAR'S SUPPORT IN UKRAINE

Soon after Mazepa's defection, it became evident that most Ukrainians were opting for the status quo, that is, for loyalty to the Tsar. An obvious reason for this choice was the fact that most of Ukraine was occupied by Russian troops. Orders were issued by Menshikov to hand over anyone who had any dealings with the enemy. The massacres at Baturyn and the executions of Mazepists at Hlukhiv and Lebedyn had very intimidating effects. But it was not only these preventative measures which explained Mazepa's failure to mobilize broad support; each segment of the Ukrainian population had its own particular reasons for remaining loyal to the Tsar rather than siding with the Hetman.

Mazepa had never been popular among the peasants and the rank-and-file Cossacks.²⁶ The Cossacks disliked his aristocratic habits and mannerisms and, long before 1708, rumors circulated about his pro-Polish sympathies. It was even rumored that he was

secretly a Catholic. This resentment was fueled by more than a mere question of personal style. As everywhere else in Eastern Europe, the *starshyna*-nobility in Ukraine, especially during Mazepa's 21 year tenure, was in the process of totally subordinating the peasants and even the Cossacks to its socio-economic and political control. As the leader of this elite and as the wealthiest man in the land, Mazepa had been in the forefront of this development. He was the embodiment of the rising elite and its efforts to dominate the rest of Ukrainian society. Therefore, when the Tsar's manifestoes described the Hetman's treaty with Leszczynski as an attempt to "return Ukraine under Polish slavery" they found ready acceptance among the masses. The underlying social tensions in Ukrainian society rebounded, as they had so often in the past, to the Tsar's advantage.

Also working against the Hetman and his Swedish allies was the natural xenophobia of the masses which was highlighted by their deep religious commitment. Foreign observers in Moscow commented that, "There is hardly a people more bigoted in their faith than the Ukrainian Cossacks."²⁷ Generations of religious persecution in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had made the Ukrainians extremely sensitive to religious issues. This made Mazepa's alliance with the Lutheran Swedes and especially with the Catholic Poles of Leszczynski—an alliance aimed against their fellow believers—extremely distasteful to many Ukrainians.

Ironically, it was Peter I who, throughout his reign, had shown very little regard for Orthodoxy. And it was Mazepa who was probably the most generous benefactor that the Orthodox church in Ukraine had ever had.²⁸ There was hardly a major church or monastery in the land which had not been built or renovated by the Hetman. Some reliable estimates indicate that he spent over one million gold pieces for the construction of churches and monasteries. Moreover, the Hetman's mother was an abbess; his sister was in a monastery; and his contacts with the Ukrainian hierarchy were excellent. Varlaam Iasinskyi, Lazar Baranovych, Stefan Iavorskyi, and especially Ioasaf Krokovskyi were his personal friends. The Hetman might, therefore, have expected to get some support from the Ukrainian clergy. Yet it was not forthcoming. Since 1686, the Ukrainian church had been subordinated to the Patriarch of Moscow and it was from the north that it now took its orders. Moreover, many Ukrainian churchmen did not want to jeopardize their chances of joining many of their colleagues in pursuing brilliant careers in

Russia. Finally, the churchmen were scandalized by Mazepa's cooperation with the heretic Lutherans and hated Catholics. Thus, the Ukrainian clergy obediently obeyed the Tsar's orders and severely castigated its former patron.

The Hetman could also expect little support from the townspeople.²⁹ Again, deep socio-economic tensions inherent in Ukrainian society harmed the Mazepist cause. As the rising Cossack elite gained in power and confidence, it sought to exert its influence in the towns by limiting their autonomy and impinging on their commercial privileges. By and large, the Hetmans, Mazepa included, favored the *starshyna*. This left the towns with little choice but to turn to the Tsars for aid against the pressures of the territorial elite. Inasmuch as it served their interests, the Tsars obliged by issuing guarantees of the rights of the townspeople. It was this dependence on the Tsars which precluded any meaningful support for Mazepa and his *starshyna* from the Ukrainian townspeople.

Both Peter I and Mazepa realized that the crucial social element in Ukraine was the approximately 800–1000 families which comprised the *starshyna*. It was on their support that Mazepa counted most because the *starshyna* had benefited greatly from the Hetman's generous distribution of common lands.³⁰ Moreover, it was concerned with the Tsar's infringement on Cossack rights and liberties. And the idea of joining the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was attractive to it because it meant that it would obtain the same broad privileges that the Polish *szlachta* enjoyed. It was not surprising, therefore, that almost all of the high officeholders in the Hetmanate followed Mazepa into the Swedish camp.³¹ However, the vast majority of the *starshyna*, surprised by the Hetman's move, adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

Although the Tsar received reports that many of the *starshyna* favored the Hetman, he decided, after staging the intimidating events at Baturyn, Hlukhiv and Lebedyn, to win the Cossack elite over "with kindness." To those who remained loyal to him or at least did not follow Mazepa, Peter I gave generous allotments of confiscated lands and appointments to offices formerly held by Mazepists.³² Measures were also taken to entice back those of the *starshyna* who had gone over to the Swedes. The Tsar declared that all those who returned to his camp within a month of their defection would receive a full pardon and all their lands and offices would be returned to them.

Seeing that matters were developing badly for the Swedes, a

number of Mazepa's closest associates accepted the Tsar's offer. Danylo Apostol, the colonel of Myrhorod, and Ivan Sulima, the Standard Bearer-General, deserted from the Swedish camp. They were followed soon afterwards by the colonel of the mercenaries, Hnat Galagan, and the colonel of Korsun, Andrii Kandyba. Other members of Mazepa's entourage also planned to defect (several of them did so during the Battle of Poltava). Even before these members of the *starshyna* left, a large number of the 2–3,000 Cossacks which Mazepa brought along also deserted. Irritated by these defections, the Swedes placed armed guards—under the guise of a guard of honor—around some of the wavering members of the *heneralna starshyna*. And Swedish generals began to have their doubts about the reliability of their new allies.

An intriguing episode took place during Apostol's defection.³³ After a stern warning (“Beware, Apostol, do not play the same trick with me as you did with Charles”), the colonel was well-received by the Tsar. Apostol brought along with him a note from Mazepa in which the latter offered to deliver Charles XII into the Tsar's hands in return for a full pardon for himself. At first the Russians thought that the offer was genuine and responded favorably. But soon afterwards they captured letters from Mazepa to Leszczyński which indicated that the Hetman had no intention of betraying the Swedish king. Convinced that the wily Mazepa was simply trying to confuse them, the Tsar and his ministers broke off their correspondence. How serious Mazepa was himself about this offer will probably never be known.

Another indication of the worsening situation of the Swedes was the growing animosity displayed by the Ukrainian peasants. Initially, the Swedes were careful not to antagonize the population and offered to pay for the provisions they needed. However, when the peasants failed to respond to their requests for provisions, the Swedes were forced to take what they needed. This led to conflicts which, in the spring of 1709, developed into a widespread partisan war.³⁴ The Tsar encouraged the peasants' attacks on the Swedes by offering rewards for captured enemy officers: 2,000 rubles for a captured Swedish general, 1,000 rubles for a colonel and so on down the line to 5 rubles for a private. Moreover, three rubles were paid “for clear evidence of killing an enemy.”³⁵

An event which further helped to arouse the peasants against the Swedes was a probing attack which the latter launched into the Slobodas.³⁶ These lands lay between Russia and Ukraine, and al-

though they were formally a part of Russia, 100,000 out of their 120,000 inhabitants were Ukrainian. The primary goal of this operation was to reconnoiter the approaches for a planned attack on Moscow. Other benefits were also expected from this operation: it was hoped that such a thrust into the Tsar's own lands would encourage the Don Cossacks and the non-Russian peoples of the Volga to join the Swedes.

The operation, however, miscarried. Considering the Slobodas to be strictly enemy territory, the Swedish troops entered the land, as they themselves stated, "with fire and sword." All the villages in a swath seven miles wide were destroyed and many of their inhabitants killed. This drove many of the natives to form large partisan units which not only killed off Swedish stragglers, but also attacked patrols and disrupted transport. Moreover, a sudden thaw made further progress nearly impossible. Charles XII was forced to call back the expeditionary force. But the partisans followed it back into the Hetmanate and fueled the anti-Swedish struggle there. Clearly, Ukraine was not providing the Swedes with the rest and support which they had hoped for.

MAZEPA AND THE ZAPOROZHIAN

Not everything went Peter I's way in Ukraine. Mazepa also scored a major success which caused deep concern for the Russians. In April, 1709, he managed to draw the Zaporozhian Cossacks over to his own and Charles XII's side.

There was some irony to this development. For almost twenty years, the Hetman had been constantly at odds with the Zaporozhians. The socio-economic and political gap between, on the one hand, the Hetman and the aristocratic elite which controlled the settled Left Bank and, on the other hand, the military fraternity based on its *Sich*, a stronghold on an island in the lower stretches of the Dnieper (*za porohamy*—beyond the rapids), was vast.³⁷ In their social composition and their sympathies, the Zaporozhians were closely linked with the lower social strata of the Hetmanate. They too resented the Hetman's and the *starshyna*'s attempts to expand their socio-economic domination.

The Zaporozhians took pride in the fact that they were an association of free men who followed their own rules and interests. Often the Tsar himself complained that when he was at war with the Tatars or Ottomans, the Zaporozhians would trade and cooperate

with them and, vice-versa, when Moscow was at peace with the Muslims, the Zaporozhians often attacked the Crimea or the Ottoman towns on the Black Sea. For their part, the Zaporozhians were incensed when, in the late 1690s, Peter I ordered a series of Russian-manned forts to be built along the lower Dnieper and Samara Rivers, that is, on the boundary of traditionally Zaporozhian lands. Fearing Russian interference in their affairs, the Zaporozhians strongly resented the Russian presence.³⁸ And, one of the strongest grievances the Zaporozhians had against Mazepa was his subservience to Moscow which, because of its insistence on absolute obedience, posed a threat to them. Only when Mazepa broke with the Tsar did the Zaporozhians feel that common ground had been established between them and the Hetman.

With the arrival of the Swedes in Ukraine, the strategic importance of the Zaporozhians rose perceptibly. The *Sich* controlled access to the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire—already there was talk that Charles XII was seeking an alliance with the latter—as well as to the Right Bank and the Don. Among the Ukrainian Cossacks, the Zaporozhians were known as fierce fighters and the approximately 10,000 men they could muster could be of considerable importance to whichever side they chose to support. Furthermore, the Zaporozhians' influence on the Ukrainian masses was considerable. Little wonder, then, that throughout the winter of 1708 and the spring of 1709, both Peter I and Mazepa desperately tried to draw the Zaporozhians into their respective camps.

In wooing the Zaporozhians, both sides used similar tactics. They bombarded the *Sich* with letters and manifestoes which repeated the usual rhetoric but with an added twist: Peter I sent copies to the *Sich* of letters Mazepa had previously written to him complaining about those “accursed dogs,” i.e., the Zaporozhians. Meanwhile, the Hetman informed the *Sich* of how often he had heard the Tsar speak of destroying the “willful Zaporozhians.” Both sides sent delegations to address the *rada* (council) and offered rich bribes to the Zaporozhian leadership.³⁹

As was so often the case, opinion was divided at the *Sich*. The more established Zaporozhians, called the *staryky*, did not wish to take risks and preferred to stay on the side of the Tsar; however, the *molodyky*, the younger, more militant Cossacks favored an anti-Russian policy. In such a case, the view of the Zaporozhian leader, the *koshovyi*, was usually decisive.

The Zaporozhian *koshovyi* at this time was Kost Hordienko,⁴⁰

one of the most colorful figures in the history of the *Sich*. A strong, willful individual, Hordienko often came into conflict with Mazepa (on several occasions the Hetman had tried to have him killed). But as much as Hordienko disliked Mazepa, he hated the Russians even more. The *koshovyi* was convinced that Moscow's centralizing policies represented a greater danger to the *Sich* than did the Hetman's aristocratic leanings. During an important *rada*, Hordienko insulted the Russian envoys and sent them back to the Tsar with a long list of grievances that the *Sich* had against Moscow. Afterwards, the decision was taken to join Mazepa and the Swedes. In March of 1709, the aforementioned treaty between Mazepa and the Zaporozhians was concluded and in April it was followed by one between the Ukrainians and Charles XII.⁴¹

The effects of the Zaporozhian decision were soon felt. Anti-Russian unrest flamed up in the southern part of the Hetmanate, especially in the Poltava regiment which was closest to the *Sich*. Bands of armed peasants and Cossacks, numbering close to 15,000, caused serious disturbances in the area. A number of smaller towns—Perevolochna, Kelerberda, Maiachka, Novyi Sanzhar—sided with the Zaporozhians. In several forts and towns, the Russian garrisons were massacred and three Russian regiments were ambushed and completely smashed by the Zaporozhians (115 prisoners taken during this encounter were sent to Charles XII as a token of esteem). General Renn, the Russian commander in the area, wrote to the Tsar on March 30 that, "A great conflagration is developing here and it must be put out before it is too late."⁴²

The Zaporozhians' actions had important diplomatic and strategic repercussions. On the Dnieper, the Cossacks had a large flotilla of boats which was capable of transporting 3,000 men at a time. If the Swedes hoped to receive reinforcement from the West, the flotilla would be invaluable in transporting fresh troops. The Zaporozhians also assured Charles XII of good communications with Poland and, very importantly, with Crimea and the Ottomans.

In view of Charles XII's growing difficulties, contacts with such potential allies as the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans were becoming increasingly important. In another section of this study, the involvement of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Porte with the struggle in Ukraine will be analyzed in greater detail. At this point, suffice it to say that, in the spring of 1709, both the Swedes and the Crimean Tatars, urged on by Mazepa, were seriously considering an alliance. Indeed, in mid-March, as the Zaporozhians

were trying to decide which side to choose, they received letters from Khan Devlet Girei urging them to join Mazepa and the Swedes and promising them aid in case of need. Once the Zaporozhians sided with Charles XII, they immediately sent envoys to the Crimean Tatars to encourage them to follow suit.⁴³

The Zaporozhian-Crimean connection demonstrates the pattern of Charles XII's alliances in the East: they had a kind of chain reaction, each alliance paving the way to another. Leszczynski established contacts with Mazepa; the Hetman convinced the Zaporozhians to join the Swedes; the *Sich* made an alliance with the Crimean Khanate possible; this, in turn, would make a treaty with the Ottoman Porte more feasible.

With his broad network of contacts and his experience, Mazepa was especially effective in seeking out new allies. Well aware of the animosity which the people on the periphery of the Tsar's realm felt toward Moscow, the Hetman envisaged an alliance of all the anti-Russian elements in the south. It was to include his own Cossacks, the Zaporozhians, the Crimean Tatars, the Don Cossacks (the Zaporozhians had excellent ties with K. Bulavin's and, later, with I. Nekrasov's men), the Bashkirs, the Kalmuks and the Cherkess of the Kuban.⁴⁴ This ambitious plan was probably the first instance of anyone contemplating the formation of an anti-Moscow bloc of "minorities" in and around the nascent Russian empire. As early as the fall of 1708 and the first months of 1709, the Hetman sent missions to the Crimea (D. Bolbota and later K. Mokievskiy and F. Myrovych), to the *Sich*, to the Don and possibly to Nekrasov's men in the Kuban region.⁴⁵ Lack of time and the desire of some of those peoples to adopt a wait-and-see attitude prevented the creation of the alliance. However, a precedent had been set and several years later, Orlyk, Mazepa's successor-in-exile, would try again to form a far-ranging anti-Russian coalition.

Access to all these potential allies was provided by the Zaporozhians. Not only Mazepa and Charles XII, but also Menshikov and Peter I were well aware of this fact. The Tsar and his field-marshal agreed that, since attempts to hold on to the Zaporozhians "with kindness" had failed, harsher measures would have to be taken to check the damage which their defection had caused. On April 12, a Russian force of about 2,000 men under the command of Brigadier P. Iakovlev was dispatched down the Dnieper to destroy the *Sich*.

At the outset, the Russians took the Zaporozhian stronghold at Perevolochna where they massacred over a thousand of the inhabi-

tants and destroyed the Zaporozhian flotilla. They then proceeded slowly down the river and, on May 7, began the siege of the *Sich*. Their initial efforts proved costly and ineffective. Only when Hnat Galagan, who had recently deserted Mazepa and who knew the *Sich* and its environs very well, arrived with a strong force of Ukrainian Cossacks, did Iakovlev begin to make headway. Realizing that they would be unable to withstand the combined forces of Iakovlev and Galagan, most of the Zaporozhians secretly abandoned the *Sich* at night, leaving behind a small holding force of 300 men. The next day, after a bitter struggle, the *Sich* fell. On the Tsar's orders, all the buildings and fortifications were destroyed and all the prisoners were executed. Some of the latter were nailed to planks and floated down the Dnieper as a warning to their colleagues. The Tsar's vengefulness against the Zaporozhians was extreme. A standing order was issued to execute on the spot and in a most cruel manner, any Zaporozhian caught anywhere. When informed of the fall of the *Sich*, Peter I joyfully proclaimed that, "Gone is the last nest of Mazepa's treachery."⁴⁶

The destruction of the *Sich* had an effect similar to that of the destruction of Baturyn. Again the ability of the Tsar to punish those who offended him and the inability of Charles XII to protect his supporters were demonstrated. And again those who considered joining the Swedes were discouraged. Khan Devlet Girei, while still professing his willingness to fight the Russians, put off uniting his forces with those of Charles. Any hope of attracting the Don Cossacks had disappeared. The Ottoman Porte, promptly informed by the Russians of their victory, became more hesitant than before about aiding the Swedes.

In announcing the victory to the Ukrainian population, the Tsar was careful not to gloat over his success. He realized that for them the *Sich* had been a place of refuge from the overbearing demands of the *starshyna*. Therefore, on May 26, Peter I issued a series of manifestoes in which he carefully explained why the Zaporozhians had to be punished and concluded with the statement that, "The Zaporozhians themselves are responsible for the disaster which befell them."⁴⁷ For Mazepa and his followers the situation before Poltava looked very bleak indeed.



June 28, 1708, marked the date of the Battle of Poltava. The results of this battle, one of the most decisive in European history, are well

known.⁴⁸ Through his victory, Peter I not only inflicted a crushing military setback on Charles XII but he also simultaneously demolished the Swedish attempt to create an East European empire. And in doing so the Tsar opened up the way for the expansion of his own nascent empire. Because much has been written about the battle, there is no need to dwell on it here. For our purposes, it is the plight of Charles's Ukrainian allies after Poltava that will be examined more closely.

One can imagine Mazepa's shock when it became clear that the battle had been lost: all his carefully wrought plans were ruined and his personal fate, if he were captured by the Russians, was horrible to consider. Little wonder that, when the Swedish King, unable to accept defeat, wished to return to the fray, it was the Hetman who most insistently urged him to flee. The retreat of the surviving Swedish forces and their Cossack allies to the Dnieper crossing at Perevolochna was relatively orderly.⁴⁹ But, at the crossing, Menshikov's cavalry caught up with them. Several hours after Charles, Mazepa and a select force of about 1,000 Swedes and 2,000 Cossacks crossed the Dnieper and continued their flight toward the safety of the Ottoman frontier, approximately 13,000 demoralized Swedes and close to 3,000 Ukrainians surrendered to the Russians. Several hundred Zaporozhians, realizing the fate which awaited them—captured Zaporozhians were impaled on stakes—fought to the death or hurled themselves into the Dnieper and drowned. By the end of the day, the Swedish army had ceased to exist.

Unaware of what had occurred at Perevolochna, Charles and his small force, closely pursued by the Russian cavalry, on July 7, crossed into Ottoman territory near Ochakiv. Had it not been for the aid of Mazepa and the Zaporozhians, the Swedish King would probably have been captured by his pursuers.⁵⁰ After some hesitation, the Ottoman authorities extended their hospitality to the refugees and asked them to move closer to Bender, which was the seat of the *serasker* (governor). This marked the beginning of the so-called Bender Period in the life of Charles XII and his Swedish and Ukrainian associates.

PART TWO

IV

The Bender Period Begins

Except for the fact that it was the seat of an Ottoman *serasker* (governor) and the major listening post on the Ottoman Empire's sensitive northern frontier, Bender, a dusty, provincial town on the Dniester, had little to distinguish it. Charles XII and his followers expected to stay here only briefly as they planned to continue on to Sweden by way of Poland. The unexpectedly rapid deployment of Russian troops in Poland, however, forced a postponement of these plans. Furthermore, increasingly serious anti-Russian rumblings were heard from the Crimean Khan and the Porte. This encouraged the King to prolong his stay in the area in the hope of taking advantage of these developments. But hardly anyone of the refugees could have guessed that they would remain in Bender for the next five years.¹

Although he was well received by the *serasker* and the town's inhabitants, Charles XII did not take up residence in Bender itself. Instead, he ordered his Swedes to set up camp on the outskirts of the town. Most of the Ukrainians followed suit, setting up their encampment in Varnitsa, a small village near Bender located about 15 minutes' march from the Swedish camp. Because of his failing health, Mazepa stayed in the town where he could be looked after more conveniently. The *heneralna starshyna*, however, some of whom had begun to toy with the idea of asking the Tsar for a pardon, took up residence in Jassy in Moldavia. About nine months after the arrival of Charles XII, the refugee colony in Bender was enlarged by the arrival of several thousand of Stanisław's supporters who, led by Józef Potocki, the *wojewoda* of Kiev, had fought their way through Hungary and Poland in order to join the Swedish king. Thus, within a year, a rag-tag force of about 8,000 men had gathered in Bender. Of these, about 500 were Swedes (later

their number would rise to 1,365), over 2,000 were Poles, and about 4,000–5,000 were Ukrainian Cossacks. As Charles XII began to re-establish his contacts with various European courts, the town took on a cosmopolitan character; the diplomats, couriers, secret agents, and military men turned Bender into a mini-center of international diplomacy and intrigue. As their plans evolved, Charles XII and his allies began increasingly to view the town as the base from which they hoped to recoup the losses they had suffered at Poltava and Perevolochna.

UKRAINIANS IN BENDER: COMPOSITION, CONDITION AND CONFLICTS

The Ukrainian refugees consisted of several distinct groups. Fewest in number, but most significant politically were the members of the *starshyna*. Despite defections, about 45 members of the *starshyna*, together with their families and entourages, had followed Mazepa into exile and formed the Cossack leadership here.² Among them were some of the most prominent members of the Ukrainian Cossack elite, such as Andrii Voinarovskiy, the Hetman's nephew and heir-apparent, Pylyp Orlyk, the Chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host, Dmytro Horlenko, the colonel of Pryluky, Klym Dovhopolyi, the Adjutant-General, the Hertsyk brothers, sons of the colonel of Poltava, Ivan Maksymovych, Illia Lomykovskiy, Fedir Myrovych and others. The men in this group have usually been considered the Mazepists par excellence.

Another category of Ukrainians in exile consisted of the rank-and-file Cossacks from the Hetmanate, members of Mazepa's mercenary regiments, chancellery officials and scribes. These could not have been numerous, since, at Perevolochna, 2,700 had surrendered to the Russians.³ The sources—mostly Swedish diaries and accounts—do not provide numerical data on this group, although it is apparent that the Swedes were very careful to distinguish them from the Zaporozhians. A rough estimate would put about 500 men in this category.⁴ Their numbers diminished during their stay in Bender because they were the ones most likely to leave the town to try to make their way back to their homes.

By far the largest group among the Ukrainians in Bender were the Zaporozhians. After the *Sich* had been destroyed, some of them established a new *Sich* at the juncture of the Kamenka and Dnieper Rivers. But, in 1711, Russian troops again attacked and demolished

the *Sich* and the Zaporozhians were forced to move even further south to construct a third *Sich* on the lower Dnieper near Oleshki on Tatar territory.⁵ However, most of the Zaporozhians—about 6,000 in number—had joined Mazepa in the spring of 1709 and followed him, not uncomplaining, all the way to Bender. They had no choice but to do so, as Peter I had forbidden Zaporozhians to return to Ukraine, and those who had attempted to do so and had been captured, were killed on the spot. The Tsar had demonstrated on several occasions that he was in earnest: several hundred captured Zaporozhians were massacred at Perevolochna; the same occurred on the Dniester crossing. A part of these losses was made up by a small but steady trickle of stragglers from Ukraine which, by the winter of 1709, increased the number of Zaporozhians in Varnitsa to about 4,000.⁶

As might be expected, materially and in terms of morale the refugees presented a lamentable picture. Almost all of them had arrived in Bender with little more than the clothes on their backs and their weapons. They were able to survive the very difficult initial period only because a gathering swarm of Jewish, Greek and Turkish Janissary merchants advanced them credit at the cost of pawning their few surviving valuables. Many of the Zaporozhians sold their weapons and hired themselves out as laborers to local landowners. In 1710, the Tsar was informed that, "There were 4,000 Zaporozhians with Orlyk and their *koshovyi*. . . . They have no weapons because, while in Bender, they sold them because of hunger."⁷ And in 1711, when Charles XII wanted the Cossacks to take part in a campaign against the Russians, he first had to provide them with funds to obtain clothing and to buy back their weapons. The Swedes were only a little better off than the Cossacks, while the Poles were even more bedraggled.

There was one very notable exception to this general state of impoverishment. Foreseeing the worst, Mazepa had managed to collect together and bring along with him on his flight across the steppe a fortune in gold and jewels. But it was a small comfort to him in Bender. From the day he arrived, the Hetman was unable to leave his sickbed and it became evident that his days were numbered. After parting with Charles XII and the *heneralna starshyna*, Mazepa stayed behind in the town in a mean, little room. Surrounded by bags of gold, his head propped up by saddlebags stuffed with precious stones, and accompanied only by his nephew, he worried about what would happen to his fortune after his death.

For the Ukrainians, particularly for the *heneralna starshyna*, the Hetman's condition raised two burning issues: who would succeed him and what would happen to the riches in his possession.

These questions bitterly divided the Ukrainian émigrés. Somewhat unclearly, Mazepa indicated that he wanted his nephew, Voinarovskiyi, to inherit his title and the fortune. But the *heneralna starshyna* felt that Voinarovskiyi, who was in his late twenties, was too young and too inexperienced. Meanwhile, the ailing Hetman, noting the *heneralna starshyna's* move to Jassy, accused them of defeatism and of secretly attempting to gain the Tsar's pardon with the aid of the Hospodar of Moldavia. An indication of how strained the relations had become between Mazepa and the Cossack elite is the following verbal exchange reported by Orlyk: "On Mazepa's orders, Voinarovskiyi not only insulted me but even threatened my life. I asked Mazepa, 'Is this the reward that I get for my loyalty?' He replied, 'Had you not remained faithful to me, you would have perished like Kochubei.' Offended, I left him and withdrew to Jassy."⁸

The Zaporozhians also contributed to the tensions that surfaced in the émigré camp. Many of them blamed Mazepa for their plight. Even before their arrival in Bender, some of them had tried to express their resentment in a manner which had almost proved fatal to the old Hetman. Just before the fleeing Ukrainians crossed into Ottoman territory, a group of Zaporozhians had tried to plunder Mazepa's baggage train and hand the Hetman over to the Tsar in hopes of gaining amnesty. Only the energetic intervention of Stanisław Poniatowski, the Polish adjutant of the Swedish King, had saved the Cossack leader. After crossing the Dniester, the Zaporozhians continued to manifest their dissatisfaction as evidenced by a riot which they staged on July 11–12 of 1709. Many promises and presents both from Charles XII and from Mazepa were required to appease the rebellious Cossacks.⁹

But the old Hetman's troubles soon ended with his death on 22 September 1709. Despite the disagreements that the *starshyna* and the Zaporozhians had had with the Hetman, they realized that they had been deprived of a leader of outstanding stature. The funeral was conducted with as much pomp and circumstance as the conditions allowed. Preceded by drummers and trumpeters and by Cossacks bearing the insignia of the Hetman's office, the carriage with Mazepa's remains was pulled by six white horses. Alongside marched long lines of Cossacks with bared swords and lowered banners.

Behind them came a huge crowd of sorrowing Ukrainians, including many wailing women. Behind them, on horseback, rode Voinarovskiyi, Orlyk and other members of the *starshyna*. Even Charles XII, still recovering from a foot wound, came to pay his last respects to his ally whom he had prized and trusted to the end.

After the funeral, the struggle for the fortune began in earnest. It was complicated by the fact that Mazepa left no testament. The sides were quickly drawn: it was Voinarovskiyi against the *heneralna starshyna*. The key question in their debate was whether the Hetman's treasure was his private property or the property of the Zaporozhian Host. If it were to be considered private property, Voinarovskiyi would inherit it outright as Mazepa's only heir; but if it were judged to be the Host's property, it would be placed at the disposal of the new Hetman and the *heneralna starshyna*. Voinarovskiyi exacerbated the issue by declaring that, although he claimed the treasure, he would not accept the burden of the Hetman's office.

The *starshyna* decided to bring the matter to Charles XII's attention.¹⁰ On 22 October they addressed a memorandum to the King in which they expressed their happiness that Ukraine had renewed its ties with Sweden which, hopefully, would lead to the removal of "the Muscovite yoke" from their land. They humbly requested Charles XII to remain as their protector, and, in the event that he should sign an alliance with the Porte or a peace treaty with the Tsar, asked him not to forget Ukrainian interests. In a pious gesture to Mazepa's memory, they also asked for permission to rebury his body in an ancient monastery in Jassy which would provide a more fitting grave than the simple one in Bender. While on the subject of Mazepa, the *starshyna* made one more request: could the King inform them of what the full extent of Mazepa's plans for Ukraine had been? Charles XII's inability to do so demonstrated once more how well the old Hetman had kept his thoughts to himself.

In the midst of their pleas and declarations, the *starshyna* raised the question of the fortune.¹¹ Their approach was to tie the issue to broader, political problems. They argued that if the Hetman's treasury were empty, it would be difficult to elect a new Hetman for how could he fulfill his duties and continue the struggle against the Russians if he lacked money — "the nerves of war?" Voinarovskiyi also turned to the King, declaring that while he too was willing to continue the struggle against the Russians, he saw no reason why it should be financed by his uncle's private fortune. Thus a typical

émigré squabble developed in which noble phrases and intentions mingled inextricably with personal motives and interests.

Charles XII could not afford to ignore the conflict if only because of the huge sums of money involved. Although much of the wealth under his control had been lost, Mazepa still managed to bring along two large bags of gold coins, several smaller ones, two saddlebags filled with diamonds and other precious stones, a diamond-encrusted head ornament which had once belonged to the Sultan and which was valued at 20,000 gold pieces, several jewel-encrusted swords and spears, hundreds of sable furs and many other valuable items. A rough estimate of this fortune placed its value at about 3/4 to 1 million Swedish reichstaler.¹² This was almost equivalent to 1/4 of the Crown's income in Sweden in 1699 or three times the income of the Crown from its richest overseas province, Livonia, in that same year. Another reason why the King became involved in this case was because he had already borrowed 60,000 talers from Mazepa before Poltava and he had hopes of borrowing more from whoever controlled the fortune. Obviously he wanted a cooperative creditor. Therefore, he appointed a commission whose members were the ubiquitous Stanisław Poniatowski, councilors H. H. von Miller and J. H. von Kochen and finance minister Klinkenshera, to investigate the matter and report back to him.

The nasty debate which the opposing sides engaged in before the commission was too detailed to bear repetition. It did, however, touch on several issues which had broader implications. A point that came across quite clearly was that Mazepa and most of the previous Hetmans, as well as the *starshyna*, had found it very difficult to draw distinctions between their own and the Host's property and income. As a result, the Host's funds were regularly misappropriated, to use a modern euphemism. However, the debate seemed to indicate that a major reason why this was the case was the lack of distinctions in Cossack Ukraine between private and public property. It is quite possible that during their debate with Voinarovskiyi, the émigré *starshyna* realized the extent of this problem and tried to deal with it several months later when they formulated the so-called "Bender Constitution."

Some of the points raised with respect to this issue of public vs. private interests were noteworthy. When the *starshyna* accused Mazepa of purposely combining his private treasury with that of the Host (to the detriment of the latter), Voinarovskiyi replied that this was hardly anything new since almost all the Hetmans, Khmelnytskyi included, had done the same.¹³ Moreover, the colonels and

captains followed similar practices in their own bailiwicks. An interesting and revealing statement on this issue was made by Voinarovskiyi. In reply to the *starshyna's* argument that "public welfare" demanded that the fortune be used for the continuation of the struggle against Moscow, Mazepa's nephew stated that, "(I support) public matters above private ones as long as they are not crumbling and there is a chance of recovery. But if there is no hope, it is only natural to try to save one's own health, life and all that is associated with it."¹⁴ In all likelihood, this was the credo not only of Mazepa's nephew, but also of the Cossack *starshyna* which did not support the Hetman's attempts to defend Ukrainian "rights and privileges" against the Tsar's encroachments.

The debate also underlined how deep had been the tensions between Mazepa and the *starshyna*. While criticizing the Hetman's financial practices, the Cossack officers bitterly recalled his autocratic ways, going so far as to say that, "It was the Tsar and the Hetman who enslaved us."¹⁵ Replying that he was "surprised to hear the liberator of his country referred to as its oppressor,"¹⁶ Voinarovskiyi pointed out that his uncle had not so much disliked the *starshyna* as he had looked down on it, often berating its members for "their untutored speech and boorish manners." When asked why they did not complain to the Tsar about the Hetman's transgressions, the *starshyna* stated that they did not wish to upset the public order, adding ruefully that, "The Tsar would sooner have disbelieved an angel than Mazepa."¹⁷

In the end, it was Voinarovskiyi who won the case. Apparently he was more clever and unscrupulous than his opponents. He bribed witnesses by promising them a share—albeit a very small one—of the fortune, and he made it clear that he would be willing to make further loans, on very favorable terms, to the Swedish King.¹⁸ (In the fall of 1709, Voinarovskiyi lent Charles XII about 40,000 talers; in March 1710 he advanced about 100,000 talers; and in January 1711 about 60,000 reichstaler.) Eventually the amounts which the Swedish King borrowed from both Mazepa and Voinarovskiyi totaled over 300,000 reichstaler. Since such transactions could best be carried out if the fortune were in private hands rather than under public, i.e., the *starshyna's* control, the financially hard-pressed Charles XII made a decision that suited him best.

THE ELECTION OF PYLYP ORLYK AS HETMAN

When the fortune was judged to be private property rather than

part of the Host's treasury, the office of Hetman-in-exile, already burdensome under the circumstances, became even less attractive. And yet the position had to be filled or else the Cossacks would, as Voinarovskiy put it, "scatter like gypsies." Charles XII also had his reasons for wanting a new Hetman to be elected as soon as possible. The King had begun to think ever more seriously about another, Ottoman-supported thrust against the Tsar and he realized that in such a case the Zaporozhians, if capably led, would be of great use to him. Therefore, in the final months of 1709 and the early months of 1710, the problem of finding a suitable successor to Mazepa had become paramount.

Initially, despite his recent disclaimers, it was thought that, with so much wealth at his disposal, Voinarovskiy might still accept his uncle's office. But as he was anxious to enjoy the wealth at his disposal, he reiterated that he had no interest in the position. In fact, referring to himself as a Polish *szlachcic* rather than a Ukrainian Cossack, Voinarovskiy began to cultivate the company of Polish and Swedish aristocrats and made it clear that he wished to have little to do with the Ukrainians.¹⁹ Another possible candidate was Dmytro Horlenko, the aggressive and ambitious colonel of Pryluky. His candidacy, however, did not find favor with Charles XII. The choice of the *starshyna* and the backing of the Swedish king went to Pylyp Orlyk, the Host's chancellor—probably the most intelligent and certainly the best educated of the Mazepists.²⁰

When he was approached in the matter, Orlyk's response was clearly unenthusiastic. The plight of the émigrés was not encouraging and the Hetman's office would only complicate the situation of the man who held it. Moreover, Orlyk feared—and with good reason—that the costs of the office, of carrying out diplomatic missions, of helping to feed and arm the Zaporozhians would drain the meager amounts of gold and jewels that he managed to preserve from "the rapacious fury of the enemy." But Charles XII applied strong pressure and Voinarovskiy, anxious to have the entire issue of succession settled, provided Orlyk with the unimpressive sum of 3,000 ducats to defray some of the costs of the hetmancy.

Realizing that his options were limited and fearing to anger the King, Orlyk reluctantly accepted the office of Hetman. But he did so only on certain conditions: Charles XII had to agree, formally and explicitly, to strengthen his commitment to the Ukrainians. Specifically, Orlyk wanted the King's assurance that he would not make peace with the Russians until "the Muscovite yoke was re-

moved from Ukraine and the land returned to its ancient liberties.”²¹ Charles XII agreed and on May 10, 1710, soon after the ceremony of election, he issued the *Diploma assecuratorium pro duce et exercitu zaporoviensi* in which he obligated himself to help the Ukrainians in their struggle against Moscow and to carry on the struggle for the rights and privileges of the Ukrainian people and the Zaporozhian Host.²²



Orlyk was not, to use a favorite phrase of the times, a “true son of the fatherland,” that is, he was not born in Ukraine.²³ His distant ancestors were Czech (Bohemian) nobles who had left their Bohemia during the Hussite wars of the 15th century, emigrated to Poland and settled in Cracow. Some time in the 17th century a branch of the family moved further east to Lithuania where it obtained lands near Vilnius (Wilno) in the county of Oszmiana. There, in the village of Kossuta, on 11 October 1672, Pylyp Orlyk was born. Respected but impecunious, his parents had formed a mixed marriage: the father, Stefan, was a Catholic who died fighting for the Commonwealth and the faith against the Ottomans at Khotyn (Chocim) in 1673 and the mother, Irene nee Malakhovska, came from an Orthodox family. This mixed religious background explains to a great extent why throughout his life Orlyk was fascinated with questions of religion and theology.

Many Ukrainian historians like to stress that the excellent education of the future Hetman-in-exile was the product of the Mohyla Academy in Kiev. This is only partly true. Orlyk’s diary, which was inaccessible to most of these historians, indicates that he began his formal studies in the Jesuit Collegium in Vilnius where philosophy was his favorite subject.²⁴ It was with an educational background provided by the Jesuits that he came to Kiev—when and for what reason is unknown—to continue his studies in the Orthodox Mohyla Academy.²⁵ There Orlyk’s native intelligence and knowledge of philosophy caught the eye of Stefan Iavorskyi, a leading professor at the school.²⁶ Apparently, the relationship between student and professor became a close one, for throughout his life Orlyk always referred to Iavorskyi as his “beloved teacher, confidant and patron.” While at the Academy, Orlyk perfected his knowledge of Latin, poetics, stylistics, rhetoric and logic. His poems were noteworthy enough to be included in a sampler of Latin poetry which was published in the Academy and to which such luminaries as

Iavorskyi and Teofan Prokopovych contributed.²⁷ In this connection, it ought to be mentioned that the stereotypical image developed by Western historians of Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans as rough, primitive “chieftains” certainly does not do justice to cultured and sophisticated men like Orlyk, Mazepa and, for that matter, most of the other Hetmans.

As a result of his success at the Academy, career opportunities opened up for Orlyk in Kiev. In 1693, probably with Iavorskyi’s aid, he obtained his first position as secretary in the consistory of the Kiev Metropolitan. Soon afterwards, he became associated with the Hetman’s chancellery and moved to Poltava. There the young foreigner began to cultivate his contacts with the Cossack elite. One of the ways in which he did this was by writing panegyrics for influential members of this elite. In 1695, Orlyk wrote a panegyric entitled *Alcides Rossiiskii* and dedicated it to Mazepa.²⁸ Interestingly enough, the work was published in Vilnius, indicating that Orlyk still maintained contact with his homeland. Another panegyric appeared in 1698 and it was dedicated to Ivan Obidovskiy, colonel of Nizhyn, a relative of Mazepa and the son-in-law of Vasyl Kochubei who was at that time Chancellor of the Host and Orlyk’s immediate superior.²⁹ On 6 November 1698, Orlyk established even closer contacts with the *starshyna* when he married Anna Hertsyk, daughter of the colonel of Poltava. As a result of this marriage, the formerly indigent nobleman from Lithuania gained entrance into the highest circles of the Cossack elite.³⁰

Always appreciative of men of education and culture, Mazepa was by now aware of and favorably impressed by the newcomer. In or about 1699, Orlyk was appointed to the position of senior chancellorist, a promotion that required him to move to the Hetman’s residence in Baturyn. An even more direct indication of the Hetman’s favor came in 1702 when Mazepa agreed to be the godfather of Orlyk’s first born son, Hryhor. During this time, the landholdings of the senior chancellorist began to grow as he acquired villages in the Starodub, Chernyhiv and Poltava regiments. In 1706 Orlyk’s career received a spectacular boost when, with the Hetman’s backing, he was appointed Chancellor (*heneralnyi pysar*) of the Zaporozhian Host. This was one of the key positions in the Hetmanate since it involved carrying on the Hetman’s domestic and foreign correspondence, formulating his universals, and supervising the Host’s archives. It also provided the Chancellor with easy access to the Hetman and this in turn gave the Chancellor a

great deal of influence. When Mazepa initiated his secret correspondence with the Poles and Swedes, Orlyk was not only aware of what was happening but he also facilitated these contacts. Later Orlyk claimed to have had doubts about the wisdom of the Hetman's undertaking. Nevertheless, he faithfully obeyed his instructions and loyally adhered to Mazepa through all the ensuing misfortunes. Despite the tension which arose between the Chancellor and the Hetman shortly before his death, Orlyk retained a sincere respect for the memory of Mazepa, visiting his grave whenever he had the opportunity.

Unlike the complicated personality of Mazepa which is only vaguely discernible from documents and fragmentary accounts, the basic features of Orlyk's personality stand out much more clearly. To a certain extent this is because Orlyk's was a less enigmatic individuality. And in part this is also due to the fact that the former chancellor faithfully kept a journal throughout his life which provides numerous insights into the nature of the man. What immediately strikes the reader of this journal is the author's religiosity. Hardly a day went by without his going to Mass, commemorating a saint's day or visiting with a priest. Especially during his later exile in Salonika, the émigré Hetman enjoyed nothing more, with the possible exception of hunting, than participating in a theological debate or discussion. So intense was this commitment to religion—Orlyk never made it clear whether he preferred Orthodoxy or Catholicism—that it warped his perception of political issues, particularly where Muslims were concerned.

Given his educational background, it is not surprising that the new Hetman had bookish interests. During his far-ranging travels he rarely missed an opportunity to visit a library or book collection. Not only was he a voracious reader—Fenelon's *Telemaque* was his favorite book—but as he grew older and his political fortunes sank lower, this amateur theologian planned to write a history of the Great Schism.³¹ The undertaking was not unrealistic for the countless manifestoes, universals, memorials and political letters which Orlyk formulated indicate that he was an indefatigable writer.

From the comments and personal notations which are scattered throughout the approximately 2,000 pages of Orlyk's journal, an image emerges of a warm, mildly emotional, well-mannered man who liked good company and was especially fond of his huge family. Other sources suggest that he was a humane landowner:

even after Poltava, Orlyk's peasants fondly recalled his just and lenient treatment and when his Tatar allies invaded Ukraine he protested fiercely against their mistreatment of the villagers.³² These praiseworthy characteristics notwithstanding, the question arises of how this apparently virtuous but hardly forceful individual managed to rise to the positions of prominence which he held. The answer lies in Orlyk's almost instinctive tendency to gravitate to the powerful and, more importantly, gain their favor.

First, at the Mohyla Academy, it was Iavorskyi who became his patron; then, Mazepa made him his confidant; and in Bender, Charles XII was very favorably disposed to him. An even more vivid illustration of Orlyk's ability to establish close ties with the influential are the godparents which he arranged to have for his numerous children: in 1699, at the christening of his first child, Anastasia, the young newcomer from Lithuania had Pareskavia Iskra, wife of the current colonel of Poltava, and Ivan Levenets, soon to be appointed colonel of Poltava, serve as godparents; as mentioned earlier, in 1702 Mazepa was the godfather of the eldest son, Hryhor; in Bender in 1711, when another son, Iakub, was christened, it was Charles XII and Anna, the wife of Voinarovskiyi, who attended at the ceremony; in 1713, Stanisław Leszczyński and Michał Korybut Wisniowiecki participated in the christening of Marta; in 1715 at the christening of Marina, Leszczyński, Poniatowski and a noblewoman representing Sweden's Queen Ulrika Eleonora did the honors; finally, in 1718 in Sweden, the godparents of Orlyk's youngest child, Katherina, were the Swedish governor of Scania and a Swedish general.³³

Much of this ability to attract favor was due undoubtedly to Orlyk's intelligence, erudition and pleasing manner. In fact, the diploma of his election to the hetmancy stated that he was "worthy of this high honor because . . . of his great wisdom and knowledge."³⁴ To be sure, in cultivating his relations with the influential, he could also be quite calculating. But it would be incorrect to think of him as a sycophant. Orlyk was loyal to a fault. He could easily have abandoned Mazepa after Poltava, but did not do so. When the Tatars and Ottomans attacked Charles XII during the *Kalabalik* in 1713, and Devlet Girei threatened Orlyk with death if he did not abandon the Swedish King, the Hetman refused to comply.³⁵ But perhaps the most telling indication that the new Hetman was not only intelligent and skillful but a man of principle and determination, was that once he shouldered the burden of

“freeing Ukraine from the terrible Muscovite yoke,” he would carry this burden—long after Ukraine’s “true sons” had abandoned it—for the next thirty-two years, until the day he died in 1742.

THE “BENDER CONSTITUTION”

On 5 April 1710 in Bender, before the *starshyna*, Hordienko’s Zaporozhians, and the delegates of the Zaporozhians at Oleshki, Pylyp Orlyk was elected Hetman. It was not the first time that a Hetman had been chosen while another, Skoropadskyi, was already installed. Such events occurred frequently in Ukraine during the internecine conflicts of the 1660s and 1670s. But never before had a Hetman been elected abroad. And there was another, most significant aspect to the ceremony: for the first time, the newly elected Hetman concluded a formal agreement with his electors in which the conditions under which he assumed authority were clearly stated. In Ukrainian historiography this document has often been admiringly, if not accurately, called the “Bender Constitution.”³⁶

Modeled on the *pacta conventa*, agreements which the Polish *szlachta* concluded with its elected kings, the Ukrainian document—grandiloquently titled *Pacta et Constitutiones Legum Liberatumque Exersitus Zaporoviensis*—consisted of 16 articles, very diverse in scope and significance, which dealt with the practice of politics rather than its principles. Nonetheless, implicit in these stipulations were the political views and values not only of the Mazepist émigrés but of many of their like-minded compatriots who remained in Ukraine. Despite the fact that the document was formulated by a small group of dissidents abroad, it was not meant to be simply an exercise in wishful thinking. At the point the *Pacta et Constitutiones* were concluded, preparations were already in progress for another campaign against the Tsar. Therefore, the “Bender Constitution” was a good indication of the changes the Mazepists hoped to effect if and when they returned to their homeland.

The *Pacta et Constitutiones* begins with a brief, cyclical view of the history of the “famous and ancient Cossack nation.” At the outset this people was so mighty that it even threatened the “Eastern Kingdom,” i.e., Byzantium, but, because of its sins, it fell under Polish domination. For the sake of the oppressed Orthodox faith, the “great Bohdan Khmelnytskyi” led an uprising against the

Poles and, for the same reason, accepted the protection of Moscow. But this led to Moscow's attempts to destroy the traditional rights and liberties of the Cossacks and Mazepa, "moved by truth and concern for the welfare of the fatherland," attempted to repair the damage by breaking with the Tsar and joining the Swedes. In order to facilitate the completion of Mazepa's undertaking, the Zaporozhian Host elected Pylyp Orlyk as its Hetman.³⁷

A number of historians have commented that the articles seem to have been compiled without any logical arrangement. But a closer examination of the document indicates that the 16 points break down neatly into four thematic categories.

I. Issues of Concern to Ukraine in General (articles 1-3).

The first article affirmed that Orthodoxy, for the sake of which Khmelnytskyi had accepted Moscow's protection—again the point was reiterated—was to be the dominant religion of the land. No other faiths, Judaism in particular, were to be tolerated. The desire to break with Moscow was underlined by the recommendation that, in order to raise the prestige of the Kievan Metropolitan and to eliminate Muscovite influence, the Ukrainians should again accept the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, "for it was from there that they received their faith." Apparently, the recent subordination (1686) of the Kievan Metropolitan to the Patriarch of Moscow still rankled the Ukrainians, especially the clergy with whom Orlyk was so well acquainted. It was, therefore, no accident that throughout his career in exile, Orlyk would maintain close contacts with the Patriarch of Constantinople and that the latter would come to the aid of the Mazepists on several occasions.

Interestingly enough, the only reference to Ukraine in terms of statehood, and it is an indirect reference at that, appeared in the second article which discussed Ukraine's borders: "Just as every state (the Polish term *panstwo* was used) is preserved and confirmed through the sanctity of its borders, therefore let Little Russia, our fatherland, be confirmed in its borders with the Polish Commonwealth and with Muscovy."³⁸ On the basis of the precedent set by Khmelnytskyi, the Sluch River was declared to be the border with the Poles. There was, however, no mention of an exact border with Muscovy probably because the *slobodas*, areas in the northeast of Ukraine with a primarily Ukrainian population but under Russian jurisdiction, made this question problematic. In

the third article, the Hetman was authorized to negotiate an alliance with the Crimean Khanate, "because we always need the friendship of the Crimean state."³⁹ The implication of this statement was that if Ukraine wished to hold off Moscow, such an alliance would have to be a permanent, not occasional, arrangement.

II. Issues of Concern to the Zaporozhians (articles 4-5).

Because the Zaporozhians were in the overriding majority in Bender, their interests were well represented in the *Pacta et Constitutiones*. Article 4 addressed their major concern—the Russian presence on the lower Dnieper.⁴⁰ During the late 17th century, the Tsars built a series of strongpoints along the Dnieper and Samara Rivers, primarily for purposes of defense against the Tatars. To the great irritation of the Zaporozhians, these forts also allowed the Russians to interfere in their affairs. Therefore, the Zaporozhians insisted that if, in the oncoming campaign, their lands were not "freed and cleared of Muscovite oppression," the Hetman must attempt to convince the Swedish King, in case the latter signed a peace treaty with the Tsar, to effect a Russian evacuation of these lands. In the following article, the Zaporozhians were granted control of Terekhtymyryv, a town which they traditionally used as a hospital and place of recuperation and retirement. Intent on keeping the lower Dnieper as their exclusive preserve, the Zaporozhians also received a few key towns in the area as well as the Hetman's commitment to help them keep out interlopers. In effect, these articles granted the Zaporozhians the autonomy which other Hetmans had been loath to concede.

III. Issues Pertaining to the Hetman's Authority (articles 6-10).

A rhetorical question introduced the central issue in this section: if consultations are held regularly in autocratic states and if even autocratic rulers avail themselves of the advice of their ministers, why should a free people like the Cossacks not hold consultations with those chosen leaders, especially since this was the custom in the past? According to the authors of this article, the problem arose when Hetmans fell under the influence of autocratic rulers and began to act in the spirit of the phrase, "Since I wish it to be so, let it be so."⁴¹ There can be little doubt who the authors of these articles were; the *heneralna starshyna*, long resentful of being excluded from the decision-making process in the Hetmanate, now had its

chance to regain political influence. In order to control future Hetmans it pressed for the right of consultation. Specifically, the Hetman was required to consult with the *heneralna starshyna* and the colonels in all important matters, particularly those dealing with foreign affairs. Moreover, each regiment was to choose two “worthy and notable” representatives who would also participate in the consultative meetings which were to be held three times a year. In political terms, article 6 was the most significant one in the “constitution” for it allowed the *starshyna* to dominate the Hetmans in a way similar to the Polish *szlachta*’s dominance over its kings. There was a certain logic to this development, for the same motives which led Mazepa to reject the Tsar’s absolutism led the *starshyna* to react against the Hetman’s autocratic ways.

The *starshyna*’s prerogatives did not end with the right of consultation. The *Pacta et Constitutiones* also forbade the Hetmans to punish those who insulted their honor, stipulating that such cases must be referred to special tribunals of the *starshyna* (article 7). In all matters concerning the affairs of the Host—here the attempt of the *starshyna* to draw clear distinctions between public and private sectors is evident—the Hetman was to utilize only the appropriate officials of the Host and not his personal servants (article 8). After the controversy surrounding Mazepa’s fortune, the *starshyna* was especially intent on distinguishing between the Host’s and the Hetman’s incomes. For this purpose, the elective office of *heneralnyi podskarbia* was established to which only men who were “notable, conscionable and propertied” could be chosen (article 9). The Hetman was to have no access to public funds and was to live only from the lands which had been set aside for his office. Each regiment was also to choose two *podskarbia* whose duties would be analogous to that of the *heneralnyi podskarbia*. Thus, both in economic and political terms these articles drastically narrowed the Hetman’s prerogatives.

IV. Social and Economic Abuses in the Hetmanate (articles 10–16).

While in the preceding sections it is easy to identify the respective influences of the Zaporozhians and the *starshyna*, this section of the “constitution” did not bear the imprint of a specific interest group. Indeed, despite the *starshyna*’s influence in Bender, several articles appeared in it which directly attacked the interests of the Cossack officers. Perhaps these articles were included for propaganda purposes, to appeal to the Ukrainian masses; however, this is unlikely

since there is no evidence that the articles were distributed at all. Maybe the Zaporozhians spoke up for the lower classes from which many of them came, but this does not explain why these articles are concerned with such matters as corruption in high offices and the plight of the towns. One must simply assume, therefore, that the articles were a reflection of their authors' desire to correct some of the most glaring faults in the Hetmanate, even at the cost of their own class interests.

Article 10 admonished the *starshyna* not to use their offices to exploit Cossacks, peasants and craftsmen and it forbade the "corrupt practice" of buying offices since, "the worst oppression and extortion comes from those who make these self-serving purchases."⁴² To avert such practices, the Hetman was enjoined to see to it that all offices were elective, especially those of the colonels. Concern for the lower strata of society was expressed in articles 11, 12 and 14 which excluded the families of Cossacks on campaign, widows and orphans from taxes and from the performance of various duties; limited the peasants' onerous obligation of providing transportation for the Host's officials; and urged the passage of measures that would lighten the tax burden of the poorest peasants. In view of the fact that in Ukraine, as in all of Eastern Europe, the tension between the local nobility and the towns was intense, article 13 was most surprising for it took into account the declining fortunes of the towns and it proposed that, "the capital city of Kiev and the other Ukrainian towns" retain their rights and privileges, that is, continue to govern themselves according to Magdeburg law.⁴³ The final two articles again proposed means for alleviating the plight of the poor. Article 15 stipulated that the taxes on the peasants that supported the Hetmans' mercenary troops should be abolished, and the last article instructed the Hetman to prevent tax-farmers from imposing such high taxes on marketgoers "that it is impossible for a poor man to approach a market."⁴⁴

In terms of the values of the times, the *Pacta et Constitutiones* was an enlightened and well-intentioned document. It acknowledged the rights of the *starshyna*, of the rank-and-file, of the Zaporozhians, and of the towns. It rejected the absolutist tendencies of the Hetman, affirmed the electoral principle, condemned corruption and drew distinctions between the public and private realms. The willingness of the *starshyna* to address abuses in the society it dominated was a mark of candor for a territorial elite—a willingness that had few parallels in contemporary Eastern Europe.

But it is also possible to view the "constitution" with a touch of skepticism. One may argue that the authors of the document conceded those things which they did not possess. For example, the "constitution" sharply curtailed the Hetman's prerogatives, but a Hetman who was in exile was not in a position to exercise many of these prerogatives; in several articles the *starshyna* agreed to refrain from corrupt practices and the exploitation of peasants and Cossacks, but since they possessed little more than the clothes on their backs, such concessions could easily be made; the Zaporozhians were promised the lands on the lower Dnieper, but these were under Russian control. Thus, while the intentions of the Mazepists were praiseworthy, one must reserve judgment as to the extent to which their proposed measures would or could actually have been implemented.

V

The Crimean Alliance

The victories at Poltava and particularly at Perevolochna, may have been too complete to have been entirely to Peter I's advantage. As a result, with his army almost completely destroyed, Charles XII was forced to seek refuge in Bender. This involved the Tsar in a predicament he would have dearly wished to avoid, for, suddenly, the focus of the Northern War was transferred to the south where the Russians were least prepared and most vulnerable. The possibility now loomed before Peter I that, instead of simply tracking down the fleeing Swedish King and his ally, the hated Mazepa, the Russians might be forced to confront the formidable Ottomans.

Not that the Ottomans were looking for such a confrontation. In fact, since Karlowitz (1699), they had been assiduously trying to avoid any conflict with European powers, even to the point of ignoring the ever more strident pleas of their Crimean vassals for help against the Russians.¹ However, the appearance of Charles XII and Mazepa suddenly brought the problem of the Tsar's alarmingly increasing power to the steps of the Porte. It also had a catalytic effect on the internal tensions within the empire itself. The struggle between the old military establishment with its belligerent anti-Russian policy and the rising bureaucratic elite with its pacifist and neutralist attitudes was now brought to a new pitch.

Both pro-war and anti-war parties agreed to accept Charles XII and Mazepa within Ottoman borders, but their reasons for this were diametrically opposed. The Grand Vizir, Çorlulu Ali, wanted peace with the Tsar but he wanted it on the best terms possible. By allowing the Swedish and Ukrainian refugees to stay briefly within the borders of the empire, he hoped that their presence could be used to apply pressure on the Russians in the very near future when the Treaty of Constantinople would be renegotiated. Çorlulu Ali

demonstrated his desire for peace by confirming the existing peace treaty with the Tsar in December of 1709, even with Charles XII still on Ottoman territory.

The war party at the Porte was led by the Crimean Khan, Devlet Girei. For more than a decade, he had been warning his suzerain in Constantinople about the ambitions and aggressiveness of the Tsars.² When the Porte ignored his warnings, he organized an anti-Ottoman revolt in 1702-3. The Ottomans put down the rebellion and exiled Devlet Girei to the Isle of Rhodes. But, in 1708, he managed to regain the throne, whereupon he resumed his anti-Russian activities. Immediately after Poltava, the Khan offered Charles XII and Mazepa his hospitality and accepted many fleeing Zaporozhians in his realm. Once Charles XII became ensconced in Bender, Devlet Girei established contact with him and offered to continue the war against the Tsar even if the Porte would not do so. Cooperation between Charles XII and Devlet Girei was quickly set in motion and its primary goal became to push the Porte to a declaration of war against the Tsar.³

In order to achieve this, it was obvious that the incumbent Grand Vizir, Çorlulu Ali, would have to be removed. With the aid of Devlet Girei and the skill of Charles's diplomats, such as the ever commodious Stanisław Poniatowski and Martin Neugebauer, this was accomplished on 5 June 1710. Numan Pasha, a friend of the Swedes, was chosen as his successor, but was unable to maintain himself in office. After two months, Baltacı Mehmet became the Grand Vizir and it appeared that the anti-Russian party had regained control. With the help of European, especially French diplomats, whose governments were worried by Russian expansion, tensions between the Porte and Moscow were pushed to the point where, on 19 November 1710, the Divan declared war on the Tsar. A second chance had been offered the Bender refugees to strike at the Tsar and, in the final months of 1710, they feverishly prepared to take advantage of it. A crucial aspect of these preparations was the coordination of the efforts of the two most intensely anti-Russian forces—Orlyk's Cossacks and Devlet Girei's Tatars.

UKRAINIAN-TATAR COOPERATION: THE PRECEDENTS

In turning to the Crimean Tatars for aid against the Russians, the Ukrainian émigrés followed a well-established pattern. But it was

a pattern not without its paradoxes. Ukrainian Cossackdom had developed some of its most distinctive features of self-government as a result of its constant struggle with the Tatars in the steppe. And yet, when the Ukrainians sought to defend their political individuality, it was to the Tatars that they came most often for support. Thus, two societies which were inherently antagonistic in socio-economic and cultural terms, often found themselves facing common political enemies in the form of the Muscovite Tsars or, earlier, in the 17th century, in that of the aggressive Polish *szlachta*. Indeed, it may be argued that the occasions on which the Ukrainians were able to overcome their deeply rooted anti-Muslim prejudices and cooperate with the Tatars and Ottomans, represented the high point of their desire for political self-expression.⁴

This relationship between Ukrainian political individualism, on the one hand, and cooperation with the Muslims, on the other hand, was evident from the outset of Tatar-Ukrainian political relations. In 1620, at a time when the Zaporozhian Host assumed patronage over the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and thereby became the defender of the rights of all Ukrainians against the Polish-Catholic *szlachta*, Hetman Mykhailo Doroshenko intervened for the first time with Cossack troops in the internecine struggle for the Crimean throne at the request of one of the Tatar claimants. What this event signified was a broadening of the Cossacks' political horizons abroad as well as at home.

When this process of political maturation reached its climax in Khmelnytskyi's creation of the Hetmanate, it occurred with the direct support of Khan Islam Girei III and the Crimean Khanate. As mentioned above, the major reason why Hetman Vyhovskyi was able to defy Moscow in 1658 was because of the military aid provided by the Tatars. The era which epitomized the cooperation of the Ukrainian Cossacks with the Tatars and especially with the Ottoman Porte, was that of Hetman Petro Doroshenko (1665-1676). Petro Doroshenko aligned himself completely with the Porte on the condition that Ukraine be granted even more autonomy than the considerable freedom that the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities enjoyed. This attempt to incorporate a Christian land voluntarily into the Ottoman Empire was undertaken by Doroshenko only because it represented the best possibility of preserving Ukraine's position as a distinct and truly autonomous political entity.

In the early years of Mazepa's hetmancy, the tendency to search

for an understanding with the Crimean Khanate against Moscow was very much alive among certain groups of Ukrainian Cossacks. While Mazepa himself loyally adhered to Moscow's anti-Crimean policy, leading members of the *starshyna*, like Kochubei and Iskra, who had lands in exposed southern regiments, like that of Poltava, surreptitiously argued for closer ties with the Crimean Khanate. There was also a strong party among the Zaporozhians that advocated friendly relations with the Tatars.⁵ A major reason for these pro-Tatar attitudes was the budding trade which had begun to develop between the Ukrainians and the Crimeans in the latter part of the 17th century. Ukrainians exported furs and textiles to the Crimea and to the Ottoman Empire in return for salt, rugs and luxury goods. For Ukrainian merchants and *starshyna* who were involved in the transit trade with the Ottoman Empire, the good will of the Crimean Tatars was an absolute necessity. Even rank-and-file Zaporozhians counted heavily on trade with the Tatars in order to obtain such necessities as salt, weapons, etc. Thus, when by launching its Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689, Moscow undermined the budding commerce with the Crimea, it sorely irritated many of the Cossacks, especially in the southernmost regiments, and led to the potentially dangerous episode associated with the mysterious figure of Petro Ivanenko-Petryk.⁶

In 1692, Petryk, a member of Mazepa's chancellery and a distant relative of Kochubei, secretly left his post and fled to the Zaporozhian *Sich*. Well-educated and politically experienced, he was soon elected chancellor of the Zaporozhians. Promptly thereafter, Petryk began to agitate for an alliance of the Zaporozhians and all the Ukrainian Cossacks with the Khanate aimed against Moscow. With the secret support of I. Husak, the Zaporozhian *koshovyi*, he made his way to the Crimea. There, on 26 May 1692, as the self-proclaimed representative of the "Principality of Kiev and Chernihiv, and of the entire Zaporozhian Host and the Little Russian people,"⁷ he signed a treaty of mutual aid with the Crimean Khanate.

While it was not very clear who Petryk's supporters were, it was quite clear why he thought that an alliance with the Tatars was necessary. In a letter to the Zaporozhians, Petryk argued that the Ukrainians could expect only harm and oppression from their former — Polish — and especially their current — Russian — overlords. The only way in which Ukrainian interests could be preserved was if the Ukrainians were to rule themselves. And this was

possible only with the aid of the Tatars. In concluding his long missive to the Zaporozhians, Petryk again warned them to beware of the Muscovites:

The Muscovite Tsars did not take us by force. Our forefathers voluntarily accepted them for the sake of the Orthodox faith. [The tsars] . . . surrounded themselves with our people as if by a wall. . . . And whenever the enemy attacked, it was our towns and villages which were burned and our people who were taken captive. Meanwhile, Muscovy, protected on all sides by our people, escaped damage. And not being content with this, [Moscow] attempts to make all of us its serfs and slaves.⁸

Initially, it seemed that the Zaporozhians were completely behind Petryk. In the summer of 1692, they agreed to join the alliance against the Muscovites. However, when Petryk and about 20,000 of his Tatar allies moved into Ukraine, the Zaporozhian leaders renegeed on their offers of aid. Only several hundred young and poor Zaporozhians (*holota*) went over to Petryk, primarily because of the opportunity to avenge themselves against the land-grabbing *starshyna* in the Hetmanate and only secondarily because of anti-Russian feelings. The presence of these anti-*starshyna* elements and the inevitable pillaging and captive-taking by the Tatars precluded the possibility of any meaningful support for Petryk in the Hetmanate. Clearly, the southern *starshyna*, a number of whom were almost certainly involved in Petryk's adventure, did not consider this to be an appropriate time to come out against the Tsar and Mazepa. Thus, Petryk's raid into the Hetmanate failed. Several other raids which he initiated in subsequent years with Tatar support also failed. However, the entire episode indicated that, as the Northern War began, the possibility of a well-formulated alliance was still attractive to certain Cossack groups and that Orlyk had numerous precedents to guide him as he entered into negotiations with the Tatar Khan.

THE UKRAINIAN-TATAR TREATY

Late in October 1710, Khan Devlet Girei stopped briefly in Bender on his way to Constantinople to argue for war against Russia. During his stay in Bender, he conferred with Orlyk. Their meeting

must have been successful, for, a few days later, the Hetman wrote to the Khan that their encounter had brought him "great joy, as did the idea of liberty that emerged from the conference."⁹ The first step towards an understanding between the Ukrainian émigrés and the Tatars had been taken.

About one month later, when the Khan returned from his successful stay in the capital, a delegation of Ukrainian dignitaries set out for the Crimea. It consisted of Dmytro Horlenko, the colonel of Pryluky, Klym Dovhopolyi, the Judge-General of the Host and Ivan Maksymovych, the Chancellor-General. Its goal was to negotiate a treaty with the Crimean Khanate on the basis of which the Hetman and the Khan could launch a campaign against the Russians.

On 23 January 1711, after several weeks of negotiations, a treaty was concluded. Since both the list of Ukrainian desiderata and the final, Tatar-approved text of the treaty have survived, it would be fruitful to examine them more closely. For purposes of analysis, the list of Ukrainian desiderata, which consisted of 23 articles, may be divided into two separate groups.¹⁰ One group consists of "traditional" stipulations, that is, those recurring, in one form or another, in all the agreements made between the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars (and, where applicable, with the Sublime Porte) from the time of Khmelnytskyi; the other group contains articles which are peculiar to this treaty, that is, ones which reflect the issues of the specific situation which existed in 1710-1711.

By far the majority of articles (Nos. II-VI, VIII, IX, XII-XVIII, XXI-XXIII) presented by the Cossack envoys for negotiation come under the category of traditional stipulations. They are keynoted by the second article, which proposes that the treaty signed in 1648 between Khmelnytskyi and Islam Girei III serve as the model for the treaty to be negotiated.¹¹ The articles in this group may be subdivided as follows:

I. Guarantees against plunder and the taking of captives (iasyr) in Cossack territories

In view of past experiences, it was obvious that the Cossacks needed guarantees that their families, homes, churches and lands would be safeguarded once they allowed their dangerous allies to enter their midst. Hence, the invariable demand for such a guarantee which appears in articles VIII and IX. Orlyk, however, realized that the

Tatar appetite for booty and *iasyr* had to be satisfied in some way and therefore a qualification was added to this point. Article X states that if the inhabitants of the "Muscovite *slobodas*" [sparsely settled territories in what is now eastern Ukraine, which, although colonized by a predominantly Ukrainian population, were under Russian jurisdiction] did not accept the "protection of the allies' army," or if the inhabitants refused to return to the Hetmanate once it came under Orlyk's control, then they "should be treated as enemies," i.e., become subject to the prey of the Tatars. In this manner, Orlyk strove to divert Tatar appetites from the lands he hoped to govern.

II. Guarantees of an economic nature

While article XIII aimed at preventing the encroachment of any foreign power on Zaporozhian territories, article XIV demanded exclusive rights for the Zaporozhians to the lands of the lower Dnieper—lands which they considered to be their inviolable hunting and fishing areas. Finally, article XVIII requested for Ukrainian merchants equal rights with Muslim merchants within the Khanate and the Ottoman Empire.

III. Political guarantees

These included non-interference in the internal affairs of the Cossacks (articles IV, V, XXI); the Khan's guarantee of Ukraine's borders (article XII); and his acceptance of the principle of the free election of the Hetman (article XXIII). Also, the Tatars had to agree to give up jurisdiction over Cossacks who committed crimes against them and hand them over to Cossack courts (article XV). Finally, no peace could be made by the Khan with the enemy (the Russians) until the consent of the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host had been secured (article VI).

Since the articles summarized above recurred in all the Ukrainian Cossack-Tatar treaties, we may conclude that these stipulations went beyond immediate political considerations and encompassed the general issues which had to be regulated in order that the Ukrainian Cossack and Crimean Tatar political, social and economic systems could cooperate for the attainment of a common goal.

We may now consider the aspects of the treaty which reflect the specific situation in which Orlyk and his followers found themselves at the time the treaty was formulated.

I. Confirmation of Charles XII's protection over the Zaporozhian Host

It is somewhat surprising that negotiations between Cossacks and Tatars should begin with the demand that the proposed alliance should in no way interfere with the relationship of the Cossacks and the entire Ukrainian ("Ruthenian") people with Charles XII, their protector and patron (article I).¹² But there were good reasons for Orlyk to wish for a confirmation of Charles XII's patronage. One of the reasons why Mazepa sought Swedish protection was because he considered a preferable form of patronage to be that of a strong but distant overlord. Apparently, the Cossack émigrés in Bender wished to follow this principle as well. Furthermore, even after Poltava, it appeared that Charles XII had the possibility of defeating the Russians militarily and this possibility seemed to be the best assurance that the émigrés' goals would be attained. Finally, the inclusion of this point might have been motivated by the émigrés' desire not to become overly dependent on their Tatar allies.

II. Tatar aid in case of internal problems

Orlyk and his advisors had no illusions about the difficulties they would encounter in attempting to maintain their regime once they succeeded in re-establishing themselves in Ukraine. In such a case, the adherents of the Tsar in Ukraine who would be forced out of their positions would not give up without a bitter and protracted struggle. Therefore, the Cossack delegates were instructed to request the aid of Tatars in such internal conflicts (article VII), hoping, at the same time, that the protection of the Swedish King would prevent their allies from converting aid into political domination. Other indications that internal opposition was expected are evident in the requests that the Khan provide the Hetman with a bodyguard (article XVII) and that he promise to return to the Hetman all traitors and would-be assassins who might try to escape to his Crimean domain (article XXII).

III. Pretensions of the Hetman to authority over the Don Cossacks

As a result of the Bulavin revolt and the arrival of some Don Cossack envoys to Bender, the Hetman and his staff felt that they had an opportunity to establish their authority over the Don Cossacks on the pretext that this would help in the anti-Russian effort.

Therefore, they requested that the Khan aid the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host in bringing the Don Cossacks under his authority (article XX) so that "one flock may be under one shepherd." This request is interesting in several aspects. Not only does it reveal that, in the early 18th century, Cossacks, be it in Ukraine or the Don, felt the Russian system of government to be a common threat to their way of life (i.e., to the proverbial Cossack rights and privileges), but it also reflects an awareness of the need to unite in the face of this threat. For example, in 1704, Mazepa informed G. I. Golovkin that, "just as one crow will not jab out the eyes of another crow, neither will a Cossack effectively fight against another Cossack."¹³ It is also noteworthy that Mazepa's successor considered common social forms to be sufficient reason to extend the Ukrainian Hetman's authority over the Don Cossacks.

The final text of the Ukrainian-Tatar treaty of 1711, which has survived only in the Tatar version, indicates that not all the Ukrainian desiderata were met. Nonetheless, this formulation seemed to be acceptable to Orlyk and his colleagues for they often referred to it as the binding version of the treaty. In essence, the basic terms of the treaty between the Ukrainian émigrés and the Crimean Khan were as follows:

- that under no pretext should harm be done to Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks and their families and that they should be allowed to live according to their ancient customs, rights and privileges;
- that, in diplomatic correspondence, the same titulature be used in reference to the present Hetman as had been applied to Khmelnytskyi;
- that the Cossacks have the right to dwell, fish and hunt in the same areas they had traditionally done so;
- that the Cossacks have freedom of religion and that their churches not be harmed.

The Tatars concluded that part of the treaty which regulated their general relations with the Cossacks with the statement, "In brief, let them (the Cossacks) be a free people and a free province."¹⁵

However, the Tatars refused to make any specific commitments pertaining to the current political situation. Indeed, in comparing the list of Cossack desiderata with the text of the final treaty, it is evident that the non-traditional group of stipulations was completely omitted. As far as the planned anti-Russian campaign was concerned, only a general statement was made to the effect that the

allies should aid each other against the mutual enemy and be united in concluding the peace as well as in carrying on the war, and ending with the sanctimonious phrase that, "Everyone who is wise acknowledges this treaty as just (and) created with the aid of God."¹⁶

What was omitted from the final text of the treaty was as interesting as that which was included. The fact that the Tatars excluded the non-traditional stipulations may be explained, to some degree, by the Tatars' innate traditionalism. There were also very concrete and immediate reasons for the Tatars' omission of such points as the recognition of Charles XII's protection over the Cossacks, the proposal to extend the Hetman's authority over the Don Cossacks and Tatar aid against the Hetman's internal enemies.

As Orlyk might have suspected from the beginning (and as later became quite evident), Khan Devlet Girei had his own designs to secure protection over the Cossacks.¹⁷ Not only did the Khan refuse to recognize Charles XII as Ukraine's protector, but he would later consider the treaty of 1711 as the legal basis for his own claims of protection and suzerainty over the Cossacks. From the Tatar point of view, this was justified by the Khanate's unilateral grant of guarantees and rights to the Cossacks. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Khan was loath to support the Hetman in his ambitious plans vis-a-vis the Don Cossacks, since the unification of the Ukrainian Cossacks with the Cossacks of the Don would have created an ally almost as dangerous as Russia. Moreover, there are indications that the Tatars suspected Orlyk and his followers of wanting to exploit the Tatars for their own ends while doing very little of the fighting themselves.¹⁸ As to the commitment to support the Hetman in his internal difficulties, it was obvious that the cost to the Tatars would be high, while the advantages would be few. In any case, it is safe to assume that, in the negotiation of this treaty, mutual suspicions were only thinly veiled.

In summary, the analysis of the Cossack-Tatar treaty of 1711 indicates that it was based on general and traditional terms whose purpose was to regulate the cooperation and coexistence of the Crimean Khanate with the Ukrainian Cossacks. However, the treaty left unsettled the specific and pressing problems connected with the current political situation.

THE ALLIES' ANTI-RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

Just as Mazepa had disseminated anti-Russian manifestoes prior to

Poltava, Orlyk and his Tatar and Swedish allies also launched an elaborate propaganda campaign prior to their invasion of Ukraine. Surprisingly, one of the most widely distributed manifestoes was that of Mehmet, Sultan of the Bucak Horde. Originally published in Latin, Polish and Ukrainian, the manifesto was later translated into German, probably for distribution in Western Europe.¹⁹ The proclamation argued that both the Khan and the Sultan were fervent defenders of both Polish and Ukrainian Cossack rights. Regarding the Ukrainians, Sultan Mehmet stated that, "The Army of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the provinces of Little Russia, which have always been free and subject to no man, have been exposed to fire and sword, murder and pillage, and subjected to Muscovite servitude."²⁰ The manifesto appealed to public-spirited men to join Stanislaw, Potocki and Orlyk, with whom they would find understanding and protection, and warned those who thought only of their own private welfare that they would be considered traitors and enemies. It concluded with the statement that peace would not be made until "the freedom and security of these neighboring lands (Poland and Ukraine) are put on a solid basis."²¹

On 28 January, the same day that Sultan Mehmet issued his manifesto, Charles distributed his own statement: the *Litterae Universales Regis Sueciae ad Ucrainenses*.²² This was a longer and more sophisticated piece of propaganda. It first established Orlyk's intent to continue the work of his predecessor, Mazepa, in striving to rid the Ukrainians of the "Muscovite yoke," with the aid of Charles and in concert with the Tatars and Ottomans. The *Litterae Universales* contended that the Russians intended to expel the Cossacks from their lands:

The perverted plans of the enemy reach even further, so that the Cossacks, able and famous in war, are to be expelled from their ancient habitations and transported to areas distant from their ancestral lands; the Muscovite is always on the lookout for the rich lands of Ukraine and wants them for himself forever.²³

The statement concluded on the prophetic note that if they did not act now, the people of Ukraine would not have the right to complain in the future about their unfortunate lot (at the hands of Moscow), because they will have brought it upon themselves through their own sluggishness.

Although Orlyk probably influenced the formulation of Charles

XII's and Sultan Mehmet's statements, it is unlikely that he had much to do with the preparation of the manifesto issued by Józef Potocki, the *wojewoda* of Kiev, on 15 February. Stanisław's field commander also used the anti-Russian and patriotic appeals of his colleagues, calling on the population of Ukraine to emulate the "great Mazepa" and—here the Polish perspective of the campaign emerges—fight so that it might be united with the Polish Commonwealth.²⁴ Essentially, this statement was quite similar to the singularly unsuccessful appeals issued by Stanisław on the occasion of Mazepa's change of allegiance.²⁵ This particular appeal by Potocki, like those of Stanisław, did not elicit a favorable response from the Cossacks.

Orlyk was especially experienced and energetic in issuing his manifestoes. Unfortunately, there are no extant texts of his proclamations, a fact that attests to the thoroughness and zeal with which the Russian authorities and their Cossack compatriots collected and destroyed these documents. Nevertheless, subsequent events indicated that Orlyk's manifestoes evoked a favorable response from the Ukrainian population, especially on the Right Bank.

It may be noted, parenthetically, that Ukrainian historiography of the late 18th and early 19th centuries devoted special attention to Orlyk's "subversive letters and *universals*." Its invariably negative appraisal of this aspect of the Hetman's activity rested on a single source—a short and inaccurate passage in the *Istoriia Rusov* (actually more a political pamphlet than an historical work):

After the death of Mazepa, the Ottoman Porte and the Swedish King nominated Semen (sic) Orlyk, Mazepa's chancellor, as the Little Russian Hetman and he, with his *universals*, spread falsehoods in the Trans-Dnieper regiments and all of Little Russia, urging the people to accept his authority. He did this until mid-1711, that is, up to the time when the Turks signed an eternal peace with Russia and then, together with his cohorts, he disappeared forever, going to live in France.²⁶

The author of the *Istoriia Rusov* stresses the fact that the inhabitants of Ukraine "completely ignored his diversions and temptations and remained consistently faithful to their legal authorities."²⁷ Soloviev, however, provided evidence that leads to different conclusions. He cited a report by Dmitrii Golitsyn, the Russian *voevoda* of Kiev, who noted a conversation between two ostensibly

loyal Cossack officers to the effect that the Zaporozhians would be fools if they submitted to the Tsar and that, "They do well that they (Orlyk and his associates) agitate the Horde to attack, for when the Horde will attack, all Ukraine will be free."²⁸ The same report also included the following statement overheard during a conversation with two Zaporozhians:

The reason why all the Zaporozhians do not go to submit to the Tsar is that they have received word from Ukraine: if you go (to the Tsar) all is lost. Conclude a treaty with the Tatars and liberate us because we perish on account of Moscow.²⁹

Clearly, there was fertile ground in Ukraine for Orlyk's appeals to take root. However, these appeals were not directed only to the general public; Orlyk also attempted to utilize his contacts with his former colleagues who remained in the Tsar's service. In a letter to Skoropadskyi, Orlyk first appealed to such generalities as the public welfare of Ukraine, feelings of patriotism and anti-Russian resentment.³⁰ This was followed by an effort to set Skoropadskyi's mind at ease as to his personal fate should the Russians be defeated. In such a case, Orlyk promised to resign his claims to the Hetman's office in favor of the older Skoropadskyi, on the condition that Orlyk's private lands would be returned to him. As for the unpopular possibility that Ukraine might become the vassal of the Porte, the Hetman stated that Charles XII, the Khan and the Porte had issued a guarantee that, "Ukraine should not be a vassal to anyone but should remain forever a free and independent republic (*Rzecz Pospolita*)." ³¹

Thus, all the manifestoes and letters which the allies sent into Ukraine emphasized the same themes: they fueled anti-Russian resentment, guaranteed ancient liberties and privileges, and assured the populace that an alliance with the Tatars and Ottomans was not to be feared, on the contrary, it was the primary means of removing Russian oppression.

THE ALLIED CAMPAIGN OF 1711

The winter campaign, so imaginatively planned by Charles XII, was launched near the end of January.³² The Khan, leading a force of about 50,000 men (among whom were several hundred Zaporozhians), set out from the Crimea, moved along the lower Dnieper

and then swerved towards Kharkiv. The Tatars met with little resistance. In fact, some towns in the Hetmanate handed over their Russian garrisons to the invaders and welcomed them with the traditional bread and salt.³³ However, just before reaching Kharkiv, the Khan abruptly ordered his men back to the Crimea. Apparently, the Tatars feared that the deep snows and the possibility of a sudden thaw might paralyze their cavalry. Therefore, the Horde retreated without having come close to Voronezh, its main objective.

The raid led by the Sultan of Kuban, one of Devlet Girei's sons, was quite similar both in its progress and its results. No attempt was made to capture Azov, the major objective of this action. It seems that, in both cases, it was Charles XII who made a crucial error in assigning the capture of strong fortresses to light Tatar cavalry, a task for which the Tatars were totally unsuited. They were, however, eminently successful in performing the secondary objective of the raid—pillaging the land.³⁴ In fact, in their enthusiasm, they not only ravaged Russian territories but also did much damage within the Hetmanate, especially in the Poltava regiment. Apart from the fact that little military benefit derived from the pillage, Russian propaganda saw to it that the blame for it devolved on Orlyk.

Meanwhile, that part of the offensive on which Charles XII and his allies had placed their greatest hopes—the force of 20–30,000 Bucak Tatars and Nogais under Sultan Mehmet combined with about 3,000 Zaporozhians led by Orlyk, and 2–3,000 Poles commanded by Potocki—set out from the vicinity of Bender on 31 January.³⁵ Unlike their compatriots operating to the east, this force produced some very encouraging successes as it pushed into Right-Bank Ukraine during the month of February. Charles XII had hoped that this thrust into the Right Bank would, first of all, rouse the Poles to open support of Stanisław. But this did not happen. Orlyk, on the other hand, began to draw very impressive popular support right from the beginning of his incursion into ethnically Ukrainian territories. Evidently, after Mazepa's debacle, Charles XII was somewhat skeptical about the ability of Mazepa's successor to mobilize popular support. Therefore, it was not without some surprise that all sides, including Peter I, began to note that almost all of Right-Bank Ukraine was joining Orlyk and his allies.³⁶ Orlyk proudly reported to the Swedish King that his forces had increased more than five-fold.³⁷ And, indeed, entire regiments of Right Bank Cossacks were moving to join him.

Although the Hetman, especially in later and less fortunate moments in his life, was guilty of grossly exaggerating the size of his army at this point, there is no doubt that his chances looked very good at this stage of the campaign. Several factors induced the populace to support or at least tolerate Orlyk. Dissatisfaction with the Russian military administration and with its Cossack appointees was widespread, and the Russians had had little time to entrench themselves in the area.³⁸ In addition, the 'allies' propaganda had clearly had at least some effect. Moreover, at Orlyk's constant urging, the allies, especially the Tatars, managed for the moment to restrain their troops from antagonizing the inhabitants of the area, as the Russian garrisons had done earlier.

The impact of these early successes was great, particularly on Orlyk. For the first time, the followers of Mazepa had succeeded in mobilizing the masses even though their success was limited to areas outside the Hetmanate. This fact would be used by Orlyk in the future as concrete proof of his allegations that Ukraine wished and always had wished to break away from Moscow. At the same time, it strengthened Orlyk's position among his allies, giving him leverage to maneuver more independently in the unexpected political situations which were to arise. For Orlyk personally, this moment marked the high point of his career as Hetman-in-exile.

Orlyk's allies, especially the Tatars and Ottomans, also noted the Hetman's support, and began to draw their own conclusions. For the Porte, these events seem to have rekindled visions similar to those it had once had in connection with Doroshenko—projects of a Ukrainian principality, an almost natural addition to the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, acting as a bulwark against Muscovite expansion and as a safeguard of the Black Sea coast. For Peter I, on the other hand, Orlyk's success acted as a warning of the constant danger of the Mazepist émigrés, reinforcing his hatred of them and his resolve to eliminate them at all costs. And for the Poles, both the supporters of August II and of Stanisław, any Cossack successes in the Right Bank could only fill them with a sense of foreboding.

But, during February 1711, precisely at the point when Orlyk's fortunes looked brightest, internal problems appeared within the allied camp. As enemy opposition stiffened and provisions became more difficult to procure, differences developed between the commanders of the allies' forces, in particular, between Orlyk and Potocki. While Orlyk, in line with Charles' instructions and his own preferences, wished to advance directly towards Kiev, the

Polish *wojewoda* of Kiev, still hoping to attract supporters in Poland and Lithuania, insisted that the offensive be directed toward the borders of Poland. Undoubtedly, the differences between the Polish and Cossack leaders went even deeper. In their correspondence, Orlyk accused Potocki of allowing his troops to pillage the land and even of abducting some Cossacks who had been on their way to join him.³⁹

Despite these difficulties, however, Orlyk managed to emerge victorious from his first major confrontation with the enemy. On or about 15 March, Orlyk met and defeated a force led by Stefan Butovych, Skoropadskyi's Adjutant-General. By now, most of the regiments of the Right Bank, except that of Bila Tserkva and the wavering Chyhyryn regiment, had gone over to Orlyk. The only major obstacle which lay between the Hetman and his objective, Kiev, was the strong fortress of Bila Tserkva. Apparently against the advice of Potocki, who pointed to the allies' lack of proper siege artillery, Orlyk decided to besiege the fortress. On 25 March, Orlyk began the siege, expecting a quick and easy victory. But he had miscalculated. The garrison, commanded by Colonel Annenkov and consisting of 500 Muscovites plus several hundred Cossacks under Colonel Tanskyi, repulsed the allies' attacks.⁴⁰ In the face of determined opposition, the allies' offensive stalled. A critical moment arose and, as had so often happened in the past, the Cossacks' Tatar allies failed them under pressure.

THE CAMPAIGN'S DISASTROUS CONCLUSION

The historiography of the Cossack period abounds in descriptions of situations in which, at a decisive point, the Tatars suddenly abandoned their Cossack allies, often pillaging their lands and families in the wake of their retreat. Explanations of such events are customarily presented in terms of treachery or betrayal on the part of the Khan or some other Tatar leader. Although often valid, such explanations are incomplete. One reason for this is that the internal problems of the Tatars themselves were never taken into account.

In analyzing the case at hand, one must realize that there were conflicts of interest at work within the Tatar camp itself. While there is no doubt that Devlet Girei was interested in the success of the offensive and that, as far as military cooperation was concerned, his commitments to the Cossacks were genuine, the Khan—even a

strong one like Devlet Girei—was unable to guarantee a similar attitude on the part of the leading *mirzas* and the nomadic Nogai clans.⁴¹ Thus, the Khan and his son, Sultan Mehmet, realized that, from the point of view of the Khanate's political interests, they should support Orlyk and seek the good faith of the Ukrainian populace. However, the leaders of the Tatar and especially the Nogai clans had narrower and more concrete interests. Their authority and position depended on their ability to lead their followers to booty and *iasyr*, the staples of the Tatar and Nogai economy.

The campaign of 1711 came at the end of a long and economically difficult period for the Tatars.⁴² A principal reason why the combined Tatar and Nogai participation in the campaign was so great (well over 100,000 men) was their need for booty and *iasyr*. Optimally, they would have preferred to take this booty from the Russians and their Ukrainian allies. But, if this proved too difficult, the Tatars were easily tempted to seek compensation for their services by turning on the Ukrainian population within their reach, regardless of whether it had sided with Orlyk or not.

Apparently, the leaders of the Nogais who constituted the majority of the Mehmet Sultan's Horde, first applied pressure on the Sultan to guarantee them some profit from the campaign.⁴³ The latter referred them to Orlyk who had the unpleasant experience of hearing the following question presented by a certain Beubek Aga: "Should there be no gain (from the campaign) will it not be possible to take as *iasyr* the townspeople of Berdychiv and other (towns) as well as those in the vicinity of Kiev?"⁴⁴ Muratca Aga, the vizir of Mehmet Sultan, and Cantimir Mirza were even more insistent in demanding, in open negation of the recent treaty, that the Hetman assign them several Ukrainian towns to pillage as recompense for their military aid.

In desperation, Orlyk pointed out the promises which the Khan had made before Charles XII that only the enemy would be taken as *iasyr* and that the taking of Ukrainian captives was expressly forbidden by the treaty. These arguments did not make an impression on the *mirzas*. In fact, the Tatars' own position was becoming more precarious. Their horses were exhausted by the fast pace of the offensive and they had great difficulties in obtaining provisions for them. Even worse, the thaw was due, bringing with it mud and rising rivers which would rob them of their strongest weapon—their mobility. In addition, news arrived that strong Russian rein-

forcements were on the way. The *mirzas* again applied pressure on the young Sultan, demanding that he order a retreat. According to Nordberg, the Sultan then summoned Orlyk and Potocki and informed them that, although he personally wanted to continue the operation, it was impossible to force his troops to do so since they were accustomed to campaigns of no more than three months' duration. In order to appease Orlyk and Potocki somewhat, the Sultan promised to leave 6,000 men behind with the allies. Within two or three days, however, this number dwindled to fewer than 2,000 men and no responsible Tatar leader could be found to lead them. Orlyk later described this episode more melodramatically, stating that the Sultan had fled incognito during the night, without breaking his ride until he reached the Boh River.⁴⁵

It was during this withdrawal that the Tatars tossed aside their promises and obligations to the Cossacks and commenced wholesale looting and taking of *iasyr*, precisely in those areas from which most of Orlyk's support had come. In the political, military and personal sense, this was a moment of deep anguish and disillusionment for Orlyk. In a report sent to Charles at this time, the genuinely humane and deeply pious Hetman described the catastrophe: The Tatars ravaged churches, turning some of them into stalls for their horses. They raped young girls, killing and robbing their parents. From the Dniester to the River Ros they took priests, Cossacks, women and children into captivity, leading them off to the Bucak, Bilhorod and Nogai steppe. Then, from the Ros River to the Dnieper and Teterev Rivers, they destroyed all the large and small towns even though some of them had the Hetman's guarantees of safety. In the town of Hermanivka, which exhibited all three universals from Orlyk, the Sultan and Potocki, a *mirza* called Canibeg perpetrated a great calamity. Although he was greeted by the townspeople as a friend, he attacked them and took more than 5,000 captives. The districts of Uman, Kalnyk and Targytsia were also completely devastated, while those of Korsun and Bratslav escaped with partial damage.⁴⁶ Even the members of Orlyk's chancellery were not safe. He complained that Tatars had kidnapped three boys from it and, at the time of writing, he had managed to get only two of them back. Also, some Polish envoys, carrying letters from Wisniowiecki to Charles XII, were captured and Orlyk and Potocki managed to free them only with the greatest of difficulty.⁴⁷

It was not only to Charles XII that the Hetman presented his

protests; he also directed them to the highest Muslim authority—the Ottoman Sultan, Ahmet III. On 3 July, the Sultan responded favorably to the Hetman's grievances.⁴⁸ In an edict sent to Mehmet Pasha, the *serasker* of Bender, Sultan Ahmet first emphasized the friendly reception which the Cossacks had given the Tatars and then, after severely reprimanding the Tatars for their actions, he ordered the *serasker* to return all the Ukrainian captives found in Bender, Kilia, Ismail and Bilhorod to their homes. By then, however, it was much too late to salvage the political and military advantages which had been lost.

As the Cossacks rushed back to protect their homes and families from the Tatars, Orlyk's army, which had been so quickly and impressively swollen by the great numbers of Right Bank Cossacks who had joined it, dissolved just as quickly. Again Orlyk was left with the three or four thousand Zaporozhians with which he had started. In contrast to their previously gloomy messages, Russian officials reported with satisfaction that not only the Cossacks, but even the peasants had turned against the Tatars.⁴⁹ Just as earlier on the Left Bank, Orlyk was blamed for the terrible depredations of his allies on the Right Bank. For many decades thereafter, especially in the towns and settled areas of the Right Bank, Orlyk's name was associated with all the unpleasant memories linked with the Horde.⁵⁰ Obviously, in the eyes of the Ukrainian population, the cause and political alternatives represented by the Hetman and his fellow émigrés suffered irreparable damage. By the same token, this disaster could not but have had a profound effect on Orlyk himself, on his future political plans and on his attitudes toward his Muslim allies. Indeed, the coming period of Orlyk's relations with the Khan and his Ottoman suzerain would reveal the bitter fruits of this experience.

VI

The Ottoman-Ukrainian Alliance

After their failure to recoup their losses by means of force and with Tatar aid, the Mazepist émigrés attempted, through the mediation of the Ottoman Porte, to attain their goals by diplomatic means. The basis for these efforts was created by the Ottoman victory over the Russians at the Prut River in 1711. In the ensuing peace talks, “The issue of Ukraine,” according to the noted Polish historian, Józef Feldman, “would push all other problems into the background.”¹ How and why this issue played such a crucial role in the negotiations needs, therefore, to be examined more closely.

Alarmed by the concentration of his enemies in the south, Peter I launched a pre-emptive attack into the Rumanian principalities. However, the Tsar’s haste and over-confidence led to disastrous blunders. Rushing ahead with his troops, Peter I outdistanced his source of supplies and reinforcements. Furthermore, he miscalculated the amount of support that the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia would be able to provide (shades of Charles XII’s mistakes in Ukraine!). As a result, in July of 1711, the Tsar and his entire army found themselves in Moldavia, near the Prut River, surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered by the Ottomans and Tatars.

For the Porte, long worried by Russian expansion to the south, this was an opportunity to inflict a crushing blow on its enemies. But, instead of capturing and/or destroying the Tsar and his army, Mehmet Baltaci, the Grand Vizir, allowed the Russians to withdraw. In return, Peter I promised to surrender the Azov fortress to the Porte, destroy Taganrog and other Russian fortresses on the Dnieper, withdraw from Ukraine and cease interfering in Ukrainian and Polish affairs.² Blessed with the benefits of hindsight, historians will always be amazed by the opportunities which the

Grand Vizir allowed to slip through his fingers at the Prut. Nonetheless, from the Ottoman point of view, it seemed that the concessions which Mehmet Baltaci won from the Russians were a great success, for they appeared to provide the Porte with a long-sought prize—control of the Black Sea littoral.

Despite the Russian concessions, however, it was clear to the Porte that its current advantage in the Black Sea area was only temporary and that it would take more than the Tsar's promises to transform these temporary gains into permanent ones. In considering the means to establish their hold firmly on the area, the Ottomans resurrected an oft-attempted project: the creation of a vassal Cossack state in Ukraine. During the hetmancies of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (1648-1657), of his son, Iuras (1659-1663), and of Petro Doroshenko (1665-1666), the Porte had attempted to implement such a plan.³ But Ukrainian internal politics and Russian intervention foiled these attempts. Now, in 1711, it appeared that an ideal time had arrived to attempt once more to create a vassal Cossack state. It was for this reason that the Ottomans suddenly evinced an intense interest in the Ukrainian issue and in Orlyk and his followers.

There was, however, one problem which had to be resolved before the Ukrainians and the Porte could come to an understanding. That problem was Charles XII of Sweden. The Swedish King was not pleased by the Ottoman interest in the Ukrainian émigrés; he feared that it might involve the Porte in protracted negotiations with the Tsar and divert it from continuing the war against Russia. If this occurred, Charles XII would lose his only opportunity to strike at Peter in his vulnerable southern flank. This approach was directly opposed to that of Mehmet Baltaci who was now committed to securing the Ottoman Empire's northern frontier by means of negotiations based on the Prut Treaty. A clash between the Grand Vizir and the Swedish King was inevitable.

In the ensuing conflict, Orlyk was caught in the middle. The Porte and the Tatar Khan invited him, indeed, they insisted that he come to Constantinople for talks.⁴ Meanwhile, Charles XII, who considered the Hetman to be his vassal, forbade him to go. The King argued that, "The Porte is hardly willing or able to liberate your fatherland from the Muscovite yoke; it is evident that it can hardly force the Muscovites to fulfill the articles according to which it (Ukraine) would return to its ancient state."⁵

While Orlyk himself sided with Charles XII, the *starshyna* and

the Zaporozhians insisted that the Hetman and a Cossack delegation go to Constantinople. Giving in to the pressure of his colleagues, Orlyk and a delegation of leading émigrés set out for the capital on October 31, 1711. On the way they were intercepted by Gustav Soldan, one of Charles XII's leading ministers. Apparently the King threatened that if Orlyk went to the Porte he would have nothing more to do with the Ukrainians. After a lengthy discussion, a compromise was achieved: while the Ukrainian delegation went on to Constantinople, the Hetman returned to Bender.⁶ In the years to come, Orlyk would often bemoan the fact that his personal loyalty to Charles XII at this and other times cost him dearly in political terms.⁷

THE UKRAINIAN-OTTOMAN NEGOTIATIONS

Although the Hetman did not comply with the repeated requests of Devlet Girei and Mehmet Baltaci to come to the capital, the delegation which represented him included the most experienced and important men among the Ukrainian émigrés, such as Dmytro Horlenko, colonel of Pryluky and the leader of the delegation, Klym Dovhopolyi the Judge-General, Ivan Maksymovych, the Chancellor-General (these three men had also been in the delegation which concluded the treaty with the Tatars) and Hryhor Hertsyk, the Adjutant-General. In the letter of accreditation, *koshovyi* Konstantyn Hordienko, who also accompanied this mission, was mentioned separately as the special representative of the Zaporozhians. The delegation's primary objective was to establish the specific conditions for the expected Russian withdrawal from Ukraine and to discuss the nature of the Cossacks' relations with the Porte.

Orlyk provided his representatives with a detailed set of instructions dealing with these two major aspects of the ensuing negotiations.⁸

Regarding the Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, the Hetman's desiderata were:

- that the Russians forever abandon Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper and renounce all future pretensions to rule over it;
- that Ukraine be ruled by Hetman Orlyk, his government and his successors, with no outside intervention;
- that all prisoners taken in the previous war (pre- and post-Poltava) and banished to the depths of Muscovy be returned (this refers especially to the Zaporozhian envoys arrested in Moscow

just before the battle of Poltava and to the Cossacks sent to work in St. Petersburg);

- that the families of those who opposed the Russians and were arrested be allowed to return to their homes in Ukraine;
- that fortresses formerly occupied by the Russians be handed over intact to the Cossacks and that no attempt be made to remove the inhabitants from the area;
- that Ukraine's boundaries with Poland and Russia "which are known to all" be guaranteed by the Porte;
- that the artillery found in Ukraine be left behind;
- that the Tsar pay the Zaporozhian Host reparation payments for damages suffered in the last war;
- that the Russians publicly retract the propaganda they circulated to the effect that Orlyk and his Muslim allies planned to establish Islam in Ukraine and collect *harac* (Ottoman poll-tax) from the inhabitants.

This rather ambitious and optimistic list of desiderata was based on the assumption that, first, the Tsar actually intended to live up to the terms he signed at the Prut, and secondly, that these terms included both Right and Left Bank Ukraine. The subsequent negotiations would show that both assumptions had been made much too hastily.

The second major matter to be negotiated was the terms which were to regulate Ukraine's relationship with the Porte. What the Cossacks wanted to bring back from Constantinople was a statement similar to Charles XII's *Diploma Assecuratorum*. They were to propose that the Porte guarantee the following points:⁹

- that "Ukraine on both banks of the Dnieper together with the Zaporozhian Host and the Little Russian people always remain free of foreign domination" and that its allies associated with it under the Crimean Treaty "should not under the pretext of liberation or protection attempt to establish absolute dominion, vassalage or subjugation (over Ukraine);"
- that forts in Ukraine should not be occupied by Ottoman garrisons;
- that there be no religious oppression applied by the allies of Ukraine and that the Orthodox religion, under the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, dominate in Ukraine;
- that the Porte not infringe upon Ukraine's rights, privileges and boundaries;
- that the Porte not interfere in the election of the Hetman nor

seek to replace the Hetman who is the highest authority in Ukraine; furthermore the Hetman need not go personally to the capital for his investiture;

- that the Zaporozhians' ancient rights to fish and hunt as far as Ochakiv be guaranteed;
- that Ukrainian merchants have equal rights in the Ottoman Empire with their Muslim counterparts;
- that the Porte acknowledge Swedish protection over Ukraine.

Should the Porte accept these points, the delegates were to request that it then inform the populace of Ukraine of the terms by means of manifestoes.

These desiderata were quite similar to those presented to the Tatars in 1710–1711. However, considering the Porte's vastly greater authority, power and prestige, the presentation of such demands reflected a somewhat unrealistic negotiating posture vis-à-vis the Porte, on the part of Orlyk and his colleagues. Especially the expectation that the Porte, after forcing the Russians out of Ukraine and guaranteeing its territorial and political integrity, would then acquiesce to Charles XII's protection over this area, appeared to be almost naive.

To a certain extent, this commitment of the Ukrainians to the Swedish King can be explained by the fact that it was not yet clear that the Swedes had lost their struggle with the Russians. And Charles XII had formally committed himself to the Ukrainian cause through his *Diploma Assecuratorum*. Nor should the personal magnetism of the Swedish King, to which Orlyk was especially susceptible, be discounted. But, on the other hand, it was obvious that the Tatars and Ottomans had a vital interest in keeping Ukraine (or at least a part of it) out of Russian control. It was also evident that the Khan and the Porte were willing and apparently able to help Orlyk push the Russians out. In any case, by including the stipulation about Charles XII's protection over Ukraine, Orlyk showed that he considered Swedish assurances a more tangible and concrete basis for his plans than he did Ottoman and Tatar motives.¹⁰ Obviously, this attitude would hinder the Hetman from developing a viable working relationship with the Porte.

Another point in the desiderata provides an insight into some of the broader implications involved in these negotiations. As was already mentioned, in the Tatar talks, the problem of *iasyr* loomed large. This issue was important not only in the specific political

situation which obtained in 1711, but also because it reflected a basic and unresolved problem in the relations between the sedentary Ukrainian and the nomadic Tatar societies. Similarly, the question of Ottoman garrisons and forts in Ukraine, aside from its obvious military and political ramifications, was also extremely sensitive because it involved a confrontation between the Muslim and Christian religions and cultures. Allowing Ottoman garrisons to be established in Ukraine was, in Orlyk's view, more dangerous in the religious sense of letting the "infidel" within the Christian fold than in purely political and military terms. Hence, the article in the desiderata against religious oppression by Ukraine's allies. This concern also prompted Orlyk's request that the Porte publish manifestoes repudiating the contentions of Russian propaganda that Orlyk was ready to allow Islam to be established in Ukraine in exchange for Ottoman aid. Thus, even though the Hetman might have found the garrisons helpful in repulsing later Russian aggression or in dealing with his enemies in Ukraine, he had to insist, both in view of his own deep religious dedication and the traditional tension between Christianity and Islam, on banning them from the Ukrainian towns. In any case, this stipulation was an example of how crucial and complicated the issue of religion was in Orlyk's relations with the Porte; to see this relationship only in terms of *realpolitik* would, therefore, be an over-simplification.

An indication of the Hetman's religious interests was the request that the Patriarch of Constantinople be recognized by the Porte as the nominal head of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. This point not only repeated desires expressed in the "Bender Constitution," but it also reflected precedents set in Doroshenko's treaty with the Ottomans in 1672. The logic behind this request was that if Ukraine was about to enter into a political arrangement with the Porte, then it followed that the Patriarch of Constantinople or Jerusalem, and not the Patriarch of Moscow, should exercise ecclesiastical authority in Ukraine. Orlyk was so taken by this idea that, after establishing close personal contacts with the Patriarch of Constantinople, he pushed the matter to the extent that, according to Shafirov, the Patriarch of Jerusalem "was already nominated as the Patriarch of the Cossacks."¹¹ As it happened, Shafirov's report was based on unsubstantiated rumors that he heard in the Ottoman capital. But the fact that such rumors circulated indicates how insistent were the Hetman's efforts to remove the Ukrainian Church from under the ecclesiastical authority of Moscow.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the Ukrainian Hetman did not repeat his request, which he had presented to the Tatars in 1711, namely, that the Porte recognize his authority over the Don Cossacks. A possible reason for this may have been that the negative reaction of Devlet Girei in this matter discouraged the Hetman from presenting this point again. Or perhaps it was due to the disastrous results of the 1711 campaign in which plans for cooperation between the Zaporozhians and the Don Cossacks came to nought. Even without this point, however, the delegation which set out for Constantinople did not have an easy task before it. And just as the delegation was approaching the capital, major changes in the Ottoman government occurred which further complicated its task.

Due to the Tsar's procrastination in living up to the terms of the Prut Treaty, the agitation of Charles XII's agents against Mehmet Baltaci, and the opposition of his personal rivals, on 20 November, the Grand Vizir was removed from office. The former Aga of the Janissaries, Yusuf Pasha, was nominated as his successor.¹² While the removal of Mehmet Baltaci might have been a matter of great personal satisfaction for Charles XII, it did not greatly improve his position since the new Grand Vizir could not be counted among the friends of the Swedish King or his Polish allies.

Like his predecessor, the new Grand Vizir was anxious to ameliorate the unstable situation on the Ottoman Empire's northern frontier. And like Mehmet Baltaci, Yusuf Pasha felt that the safety of the northern frontier could be safeguarded by using the Ukrainian Cossacks as a bulwark against Russian expansion.¹³ To attain this goal, the new Grand Vizir hoped to entice the Russians into a trade-off most advantageous for the Ottomans: he was prepared to eject the troublesome Swedish King from Ottoman territories if the Russians would be willing to make concessions in Ukraine.

However, there was a more militantly anti-Russian party in the Porte, led by Devlet Girei and supported, when his interest was aroused, by the Sultan himself. This group was also backed by the French diplomats at the capital who, on orders from Louis XIV, worked for the outbreak of a new Ottoman-Russian conflict. It might be noted that it was at this juncture that French statesmen acquired a closer acquaintance with the Ukrainian issue which would play a brief but prominent role in their Eastern policy several decades later.

Shortly before the arrival of the Cossack delegates, negotiations

between the Porte and the Tsar, represented by Peter Shafirov and Boris Sheremetev, began. Their purpose was to ratify or, more precisely, to renegotiate the treaty signed at the Prut. Thus, the Porte was about to conduct two sets of negotiations simultaneously; on the one hand, it would discuss the evacuation of Ukraine with the Russians and, on the other hand, the terms on which Orlyk and his staff were to take control of the land were to be established. Obviously the progress made in one set of talks would affect the course of the other negotiations. This became evident when the Sultan, in reaction to Peter I's refusal to return Azov, destroy Taganrog and the Dnieper forts, declared that: "I will not sign a peace with him (Peter I) until I take from him the entire Cossack land."¹⁴ Peter's obstinacy played into the hands of the anti-Russian party which scored a victory when Yusuf Pasha, somewhat unwillingly, was led to declare war on the Tsar on 10 December 1711.

Anti-Russian activity in Constantinople increased sharply with the arrival of the Cossack delegates. They wasted no time in agitating against the Russians. Soon their influence was so noticeable that Shafirov reported to the Tsar that, "The Little Russian traitors arouse the Turkish court against Russia and they are the main obstacle impeding the conclusion of peace."¹⁵

The main line of the Cossacks' argumentation was that Ukraine was ripe to be plucked from the hands of the Tsar because its inhabitants were on the verge of revolt against him. Proof of this was the widespread support of Orlyk during the recent campaign. This theme, played on various occasions and to various audiences, would later become the major motif of Orlyk's political propaganda. Other arguments, probably invented or elaborated by the Hetman and his staff, were presented to the Porte in the form of secret Russian plans which purportedly had fallen into Orlyk's hands and which exposed the Tsar's blueprint for the incorporation of Ukraine, subjugation of the Tatars and expansion to the Black Sea.¹⁶

So disturbed was Shafirov by the activity of the émigrés that he urged the Tsar to take punitive action against their families in Ukraine. As a result, on 8 April 1712, the Tsar's chancellor, Golovkin, issued an *ukaz* which stated that:

Because the apostate and traitor Orlyk and many others with him live to this day in the territory of the Turkish Sultan and some are even in Constantinople, which gives good grounds

for suspecting—and there is no other way to explain this—that they receive support there from their relatives in Ukraine . . . who maintain a correspondence with them which is difficult to observe and control as long as they (the émigrés' relatives) continue to live in Ukraine. Therefore, the Great *Gosudar* has ordered that the families of all traitors who are today in the Turkish land and who did not return to the fatherland after the publication of all the *gramotas* exhorting them and providing hope of forgiveness, their names are attached hereto, (these émigrés') wives and children, mothers and brothers are to be sent to Moscow for interrogation and they are to live there until the Turkish danger passes.¹⁷

Furthermore, the émigrés' relatives were forced to write letters to them urging them to return home or to refrain from rebellious activity, for otherwise their families would be condemned to death. This tactic, long a Russian favorite in dealing with recalcitrant émigrés, had little effect, because most of the families had long since been arrested and banished deep into Russia.¹⁸

Despite these measures, Shafirov continued to warn that, "First of all, it is necessary to be extremely careful in Ukraine lest it revolt once the Turkish troops enter it."¹⁹ Golovkin was also worried about the loyalty of the Ukrainians. In case of an Ottoman incursion, he advised that the following steps should be taken in Ukraine: if possible, taxes should be lightened in the land; Ukrainians could be used for garrison duty but only if the other half of the garrison consisted of Russians; an important Russian should constantly accompany Skoropadskyi "for the sake of advice and for other precautions"; if any of the Ukrainian notables acted suspiciously, they should be taken under surveillance and "held politically"; and if outright treason occurred, the miscreants should be punished in a manner that would frighten the other Ukrainians.²⁰ Apparently, such measures were effective for almost twenty years later, when Orlyk was discussing another possible invasion of Ukraine, he advised that the *starshyna* be secretly informed of the impending invasion,

"So that they might bring their families to this side of the Dnieper, into Polish Ukraine or to Bender in time and so that Moscow itself, in its effort to hinder a revolt, might not have the chance to take their families and move them to the lands

beyond (Ukraine's) borders in the same way as it did a year after Prut in 1712 when the Porte twice declared war against it."²¹

THE UKRAINIAN-OTTOMAN TREATY

Although the Porte had declared war on the Tsar, this was more of a threat to force the Tsar to live up to his promises than an actual intention to commence military operations. The Russian envoys realized this and, throughout January 1712, they steadfastly refused to give in to Ottoman demands that they abandon all of Ukraine. An impasse developed and the Ottomans again made a show of preparing for war. In early February, a break occurred in the deadlock. Peter, not wishing to risk another war with the Porte, agreed to give back Azov, destroy Taganrog and the fortresses on the Dnieper. This radically changed the complexion of the Ukrainian issue. Yusuf Pasha, highly uncomfortable in the uncompromising position into which he had been pushed, now had more room to maneuver. Accordingly, he too began to show an inclination to bargain, even on such a basic question as that of Ukraine.

On 27 February, Orlyk was informed of this new development by Horlenko, the chief of the Cossack delegation. Horlenko wrote that the Grand Vizir had told him that agreement had been reached with the Russians on all points except that of Ukraine and that when this matter was discussed, "Moscow declared that it was ready to abandon all of Ukraine and only asked us that it be allowed to keep Kiev to which we were about to agree. . . . But now, having realized how important Kiev is for Ukraine, we will attempt to get Kiev for you also."²²

Upset by the thought of not regaining Kiev, the Hetman responded with a long treatise, based on "authentic historical books" as well as on arguments of a geo-political nature, which he addressed to the Grand Vizir. He argued that it was impossible even to consider letting the Russians retain the Ukrainian capital because, "Neither Kiev without Ukraine nor Ukraine without Kiev can possibly exist, for what good is a head without a body or a body without a head?"²³ In support of this contention, Orlyk described the central role that Kiev played in the social, cultural and religious life of Ukraine:

What could be dearer and more resplendent for the political

and ecclesiastical position of Ukraine than her capital, Kiev, where the source and beginning of our religion glitters, where the holy places are preserved with great pomp, whither the people from all Ukraine flow to take their marriage vows and fulfill religious duties, where they become fortified in the study of our Orthodox faith, where our clerics establish the holy laws, where the Roxolanian (Ukrainian) youth obtains its education.²⁴

Not only would Ukraine be unable to exist without its ancient capital but, by retaining it, the Russians would have a gateway to renewed control of the land and a bridgehead for a future offensive against the Ottomans. Orlyk also warned the Porte not to consider accepting only Right Bank Ukraine since this area was so ravaged that it would be unable to support him and his men. Moreover, it would only embroil the Porte in a conflict with the Poles.

Orlyk's letter arrived too late. After Peter I agreed to give up Azov and burn Taganrog, the Ottoman-Russian talks proceeded smoothly, putting the anti-Russian party in Constantinople on the defensive. On 15 January (O.S.), the leader of this party, Devlet Girei, left the capital. He was accompanied by the Zaporozhian *koshovyi*, Hordienko, whose departure with the Khan was an indication of serious disunity within the Cossack delegation. Under these circumstances Yusuf Pasha had much more leeway to deal with the Russians as he saw fit. And just what he considered to be fitting became apparent to the Cossack delegates on 5 March 1712.

On this day a charter (*hatti-sherif*) signed by Ahmet III was issued to the Ukrainian delegates. Its contents must have caused them boundless, if not unexpected, disappointment. Not only Kiev and its environs, but entire Left Bank Ukraine as well were left in the possession of the Tsar. Apparently, the Grand Vizir, anxious to conclude the long and frustrating negotiations, felt that the Right Bank was sufficient for Ottoman needs. However, in order to profit from the acquisition, the Ottomans would need the aid of Orlyk and his Cossacks. Hence the charter contained this magnanimous statement:

Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper (Right Bank) which we tore away from the Tsar with our victorious armies last year on the river Prut was previously inhabited and ruled by the Cossacks. It was also formerly ruled and occupied by Petro

Doroshenko, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and his entire people under the most gracious protection of our realm. We and the most powerful and illustrious Khan wish that Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper again be granted by us to the current Hetman, Pylyp Orlyk, so that Cossacks should live there as before and so that Ukraine should again be their land.²⁵

It is noteworthy that the charter was granted in the name of both the Sultan and the Khan, thereby establishing dual authority over the Hetman. The other points included in the grant were:²⁶

- the Hetman was given supreme and exclusive authority over the Cossacks
- the Cossacks and the entire Ukrainian population were guaranteed their freedom
- the Hetman was to be freely elected
- the Porte was not to interfere in Cossack affairs
- Ukraine was to pay no taxes or tribute to the Porte.

On the other hand, the duties and obligations of the Cossacks to the Porte were as follows:

- the Porte was to have the Hetman's and Cossacks' constant loyalty
- the Cossacks were to partake in the defense and military campaigns of the Ottoman Empire
- the Hetman, Cossacks and all the inhabitants of Ukraine were to acknowledge the protectorate of the Sultan.

Taken as a whole, this treaty, like the agreement concluded with the Tatars a year earlier, was based on precedents set by Khmelnytskyi and Doroshenko. And, like the Tatars, the Porte also refused to discuss current political issues such as the matter of Charles XII's protection over Ukraine. Indeed, this Ottoman traditionalism was evident in one of the concluding phrases of the treaty: "Let the current Hetman and his successors possess Ukraine, free and whole, on this bank of the Dnieper on the same basis and in the same manner as did Petro Doroshenko who remained under the protection of our realm."²⁷



In assessing the negotiations between the Ukrainian émigrés and the Ottoman Porte, it is evident that the one point which both sides had in common was the desire to expel the Russians from Ukraine.

But besides this, there were few other interests which the two parties shared.

The émigrés' main concern in the negotiations was, assuming that the Russians were expelled, to arrange a future relationship with the Porte which would be favorable to the Ukrainians. Essentially, this meant limiting as much as possible any influence which the Porte might have in their land. It was for this reason that the Ukrainians insisted, unsuccessfully, to have a weak and distant Swedish king rather than the nearby and powerful Sultan recognized as Ukraine's sovereign. When the time came to proclaim the agreement with the Porte, Orlyk attempted to present it not as an acceptance of Ottoman sovereignty, but rather as an alliance so favorable to the Ukrainians that, "They (the Ottomans) could not find such a precedent in all their history and all their registers."²⁸ And since the Porte refused to recognize Charles XII as Ukraine's sovereign and Orlyk did not want to acknowledge the Sultan as his overlord, the Hetman added: "Ukraine . . . should be as she was in the beginning (i.e., during the times of Khmelnytskyi)—a republic under no one's protection."²⁹

The religious dimension also strongly influenced the negotiating postures of the Ukrainians in general and of Orlyk in particular. The Hetman clearly felt extremely uneasy about cooperating with the enemies of Christendom. Therefore, when he announced the treaty, Orlyk assured all Christians that "neither the ambition nor the sincerity we feel for our dear fatherland can force us to act against a Christian nation."³⁰ Furthermore, he insisted that the Porte publicly repudiate Russian allegations that he had any intention of establishing Islam in Ukraine.

The Porte, on the other hand, viewed the Ukrainian issue from a different and more pragmatic perspective. Orlyk represented a chance finally to take advantage of such opportunities as those which glimmered in the times of Khmelnytskyi and Doroshenko—to detach rich and strategically important Ukraine from such dangerous opponents as Poland and Russia. However, Orlyk's case was quite different from that of his predecessors since, in terms of external policy, the Ottoman Empire was in the process of basic change. During the 1660s and 1670s, the Ottomans were still on the offensive in Eastern Europe. They were still intent on incorporating the Christian lands they conquered, the absorption of Podillia in 1672 being a case in point. By the beginning of the 18th century, however, the empire was on the defensive. Ottoman statesmen now

saw the value of Ukraine more in terms of a buffer against an expanding Russia rather than as an addition to the Ottoman Empire. Ukraine was to be situated between the empire and its enemy, not necessarily within the empire itself. Orlyk, who was raised in a period when Ottoman expansion was at a high point, never comprehended this change in Ottoman policy and continued to fear absorption into the empire.

Furthermore, the Ottoman conception of Ukraine's role was essentially a static one, i.e., that of a land area sufficiently large to act as a barrier. The function of Orlyk and his Cossacks was to be something akin to a garrison which, at a minor cost to the Ottomans, would occupy and defend this bastion against Russian expansion. This explains why a series of five Grand Vizirs consistently supported the Ukrainian project from 1710 to 1713, a fact most striking since it occurred during a period of chronic disruptions and vacillations in the Porte and its policies. Given this Ottoman view of the Ukrainian issue, it is easier to understand why the question of Kiev and the Left Bank seemed irrelevant or unimportant to them and why they relinquished them so easily.

For Orlyk, however, this attitude of the Porte was suspicious. It did not take into account the need to provide the Hetman and his exile government with a basis for a viable state which could exist autonomously, if not independently. In the opinion of Orlyk, the ravaged Right Bank, without Kiev, was inadequate for such a function. The conclusion which he reached was that the Porte and the Khan planned to commit him and part of Ukraine to a position of subordination and servitude, actual if not formal, to the "infidel."

VII

The Ottoman Orientation Fails

Within months of its conclusion, the alliance between the Ukrainian émigrés and the Ottoman Porte began to founder. The main point of contention between the two sides was the issue of Right Bank Ukraine. For the Ottomans and their plans of creating a buffer zone on the northern shore of the Black Sea, the establishment of Orlyk and his men in Right Bank Ukraine seemed to be sufficient for their purposes. But, for the Hetman, the occupation of the devastated, depopulated Right Bank, which was, to make matters worse, formally a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, promised to create greater problems than solutions for him and his men. Thus, although formally allied, the two sides began to pursue divergent and even conflicting policies.

Well acquainted from his experience as Mazepa's chancellor with the complexity of the problem, Orlyk made one more attempt to dissuade the Ottomans. In a long letter to Yusuf Pasha, he argued that the Russian willingness to give up the Right Bank was an outright trick:

It (Moscow) concedes that which it does not and cannot have. Behind this frightening mask (Moscow's concession) I perceive the machinations, fraud and deception of the Muscovites who seek to take advantage of the Sublime Porte's trustfulness. What right, actually, do the Muscovites have to Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper which belongs to us (Ukrainian Cossacks) not by right of secession but by right of perpetual habitation.¹

He also emphasized that this Russian move was aimed at embroiling the Porte and the Cossacks in a conflict with the Poles to whom

the Tsar had also promised the Right Bank. The letter concluded with an appeal which pointed out that Mazepa had risked everything to liberate all of Ukraine, not just a part of it, and it was this goal which should be pursued further. But the Porte chose to ignore these arguments. Resolutely it moved ahead to fulfill its "Ukrainian Plan."

RISING TENSIONS BETWEEN ORLYK AND THE OTTOMANS

First of all, the Ottomans attempted to bring the Ukrainian Hetman into line. Along with a document granting him the Right Bank, an Ottoman *aga* brought Orlyk "eight bags full of money" to cover the Cossacks' initial expenses in occupying the area.² But, when the Hetman continued to raise objections about the Ottoman plans, the Crimean Khan began to apply pressure by approaching other Cossack leaders behind the Hetman's back.³ The most susceptible to these advances was Kost Hordienko, the Zaporozhian *koshovyi*. Hordienko was a favorite of Devlet Girei who considered him, in contrast to Orlyk, to be a brave and capable soldier.⁴ The close contacts between Hordienko and the Khan were demonstrated during the course of the talks in Constantinople when, in mid-January, the *koshovyi* prematurely left the talks to accompany the Khan in his departure from the capital. Hordienko maintained close contact with Devlet Girei throughout February and, near the end of March 1713, he and fifty other Zaporozhians deserted from the Cossack camp in Bender. Soon afterwards, he began to agitate among the Zaporozhians who stayed with Orlyk, urging them to move into the Right Bank without waiting for the Hetman's orders. Moreover, the Khan, bypassing the Hetman and the normal chain of command, ordered Horlenko, the colonel of Pryluky, to lead a detachment of Cossacks into the Right Bank.⁵

The primary reason for the Khan's pressure on Orlyk to lead his men into the acquired area as soon as possible was his hope of disarming the expected Polish protests by confronting them with a *fait accompli*, i.e., establishing control of the area by means of Orlyk's Cossacks. Some time in early May, an apparent *modus vivendi* was reached between the Khan and the Hetman. The details of this understanding are unknown, but, in mid-May, the Khan sent a series of manifestoes into the Right Bank proclaiming the sole authority of Orlyk over the area. The initial manifestoes were

carried by Tatar emissaries whose prime task was to assess the condition of the land and to report on it to the Khan and the Porte.⁶ Afterwards came the Khan's manifesto on 15 May 1712 which stated:

The Porte, by means of its victorious armies, freed Ukraine, your homeland, from Muscovite repression and placed it in the possession of none other than Pylyp Orlyk, Hetman of the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks, and ratified this grant with its diploma. Therefore, we send to you with our letter, our faithful *mirzas* and *agas* so that they themselves may explain to you in the name of the Porte and in our own name that henceforth neither Poles nor Muscovites will have any authority over you. As far as the Prut, all authority will belong to your Hetman, Pylyp Orlyk.⁷

The Hetman may have allowed his name to be used in these declarations, but he was not about to support actively the Porte's and the Khan's plans for the Right Bank. The fact that, in June, Horlenko, with whom the Hetman also came into conflict, was persuaded by the Khan to occupy several towns in the Right Bank, convinced Orlyk that not only were the Porte and Khan to be suspected in their plans for Ukraine, but also, in view of the Khan's tactics, that his personal position was not completely secure.

In late spring of 1712, Orlyk found himself in a difficult situation. He was convinced that no good could come of the Porte's grant of the Right Bank to him and yet he could not reject it outright because it was still in keeping with his goals. Therefore, the Hetman decided to maintain correct relations with the Khan and the Porte while avoiding commitment to their immediate plans for occupying the Right Bank.

There was another reason why the Hetman decided to back away from closer cooperation with the Porte: while the Cossack-Ottoman negotiations did not bring the Cossacks what they had hoped for, they did go further than Charles XII and his Polish allies would have preferred. Public announcements that Orlyk, the protege of the Swedish King, was about to assume control of the Right Bank and reports that some Zaporozhians were already moving into the area were harmful to Charles XII's interests because they aroused the anger and suspicion of all Poles whose favor the King was so eagerly courting. Thus, Orlyk felt that he had not only to satisfy his

Muslim allies, but also to placate the anger of his Swedish protector and to dispel the suspicions of the Poles.

During an audience with Charles XII on 13 June 1712, the Hetman attempted to excuse his ties with the Ottomans by explaining that his delegates had overstepped their instructions in accepting the *hatti-sherif* of the Sultan.⁸ He also agreed to inform the Porte that he would not enter the Right Bank until the Ottomans negotiated a settlement of this matter with the Commonwealth. In this manner, Orlyk backed away (but did not openly disavow) from what he felt to be an overcommitment to the Ottomans and returned to the safer if less promising fold of the Swedish King.

POLES ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS

Just as the Hetman was mending his fences with Charles XII, the Polish dimension of this entangled situation took on great significance.⁹ On 4 April 1712, the Russians finally ratified, in an amended form, the Prut Treaty. One of the main clauses in the treaty stated that the Tsar was obliged to withdraw all his troops from Poland because the Porte considered their presence there to be a threat to its security. In order to ensure that the Russians honored this point, the Ottomans, in June 1712, sent a mission to Poland led by two Tatars, Suleiman Aga and Abdul Mirza.¹⁰ These envoys were also instructed that, when an appropriate opportunity arose, they were to sound the Poles on the question of the Right Bank.

The mission of Suleiman Aga and Abdul Mirza was not a success. It was soon apparent to the envoys that the Russians had no intention of pulling their troops out of Poland. And the Poles had already heard about Ottoman plans for the Right Bank. Prior to the mission's arrival, a Polish informant in Bender wrote to August II's government that:

Our Ukraine (the Right Bank) stretching from the Dnieper to the Sluch, and from the Teterew to the Berezhyna (Rivers) has been given by the minister of the Tsar to the protection of the Porte. . . . This is the manner in which the Cossack malcontents have drawn up their map and already 60 men have been sent into Ukraine to proclaim possession.¹¹

The Ottoman envoys' mention of Ukraine only increased Polish consternation and rage. Upon the mission's return to Constan-

tinople, it became clear to the Porte that Polish opposition to its Ukrainian plan would be fierce.

The news of the renewed Tatar and Ottoman interest in Ukraine was most upsetting to the powerful eastern magnates of Poland, such as Crown Hetman Adam Sieniawski, who had spent most of their careers struggling with the Cossacks for control of the area. The thought that the Cossacks now had the backing of the Khan and Porte must have filled them with trepidation.¹² To August II it was obvious that the matter of the Right Bank could not be left to the Tsar and the Sultan to decide and that a Polish embassy would have to be sent to Constantinople to discuss this problem. In late summer of 1712, however, before the special embassy could be prepared, Sieniawski sent several of his field commanders into the Right Bank to secure the area against the bands of Zaporozhians which had begun to appear.

On 12 August 1712, Colonel Rogowski, the administrator of the Kalinowski estates near Rashkiw, had surprising news to report. He stated that he had established contact with the Cossack Hetman who expressed his good intentions vis-à-vis Poland.¹³ In the following months, other Polish magnates indicated that they too had been approached by Orlyk who offered them his services.¹⁴ The Hetman not only informed the Poles of Ottoman plans but also advised them on how they should react, namely, to insist on the terms of the Karlowitz Treaty which acknowledged their control of the Right Bank while simultaneously sending troops into the area to prevent the Cossacks and their Tatar allies from establishing themselves there. Orlyk urged the Poles to act swiftly, for otherwise, the Ottomans might force him to participate personally in the occupation of the area. Sieniawski and his colleagues were only too happy to benefit from this unexpected assistance and instructed their agents to maintain close contacts with Orlyk. It was evident that the Hetman was looking for other alternatives to Ottoman patronage.¹⁵

Ottoman designs on the Right Bank coupled with the Ukrainian Cossack presence there, convinced August II that a Polish mission would have to be dispatched to the Porte as soon as possible, Orlyk's friendliness notwithstanding. The man chosen to lead this mission was Stanisław Chomentowski, *wojewoda* of Mazovia.¹⁶

It was an exceedingly difficult task which confronted Chomentowski when he arrived in Constantinople in late November 1712. And it was complicated by the drastic and rapid changes in policies,

attitudes and statesmen which occurred regularly at the Porte during the stay of the Polish mission. Basically, these fluctuations were the result of a bitter, seesaw struggle between the war and peace parties in the Ottoman capital. Because Peter continued to refuse to withdraw his troops from Poland and because Swedish troops, led by General Magnus Stenbock, launched an initially successful offensive in the north, the war party was in the ascendant when Chomentowski arrived. Indeed, on 10 December 1712, the Porte once again declared war on Russia. As usual, the declaration was more a threat than an indication of Ottoman willingness to fight. Nonetheless, as allies of the Tsar, August II's envoys were coolly received when they arrived in Constantinople.

But, several weeks later, the situation changed again with typical abruptness. The Swedish forces led by Stenbock concluded an armistice in the north. Immediately, the Ottomans' warlike ardor cooled. The peace party, intent on ejecting the troublesome Charles XII from the empire, had come to power. Pressure mounted on the King to leave. With characteristic obstinacy, Charles XII refused to comply and thereby he set the stage for the famous *Kalabalik* which took place on 1 February 1713 when hordes of Ottoman Janissaries and Tatars attacked the Swedish compound in Bender. After a brief, confused and heroic resistance, the Swedish King was arrested and interned in Adrianople.

For Orlyk and Chomentowski these dramatic events were of the greatest import. Just as the Khan and the *serasker* of Bender were preparing to storm the stockade of the obstinate king, Devlet Girei sent an Ottoman official with two Tatar *mirzas* to the Hetman to ask which side he favored—the Swedes or the Tatars and Ottomans. At a moment when there could be no question of compromising or procrastinating, Orlyk resolutely rejected Ottoman protection because he had already accepted that of the Swedish King.¹⁷ As the Hetman later described it, the Khan's fury knew no bounds:

During the *Kalabalik*, when the Swedish King was attacked, Khan Devlet Girei could neither persuade me nor (frighten me) with threats that he would cut off my head before the portals of my quarters and take my family into captivity if I did not desert His Royal Highness and accept the protection of the Turks.¹⁸

It was only the intercession of the Khan's son, Mehmet Sultan and

of Jan Sapieha, the *starosta* of Bobrujsk, that saved Orlyk from death.

After Charles XII was forcibly removed from Bender, Orlyk was left to face the Khan alone. Now he could no longer use the Swedish King as a shield against the Khan's or the Porte's demands. Nor was it wise to oppose openly the angry Khan when, shortly after the *Kalabalik*, he had demanded that the Hetman personally lead his men into Ukraine. Ironically, Orlyk's miserable financial situation proved helpful in this case. The Hetman pointed out that he could not leave Bender until he had taken care of his considerable debts. Apparently the state of Orlyk's finances was so deplorable that even the angry Devlet Girei had to agree to postpone the Hetman's participation in the planned campaign for six weeks.

Nevertheless, the Khan insisted that a combined Cossack-Tatar force immediately set out for Ukraine, even if the Hetman could not accompany it. The colonel of Pryluky, Horlenko, was chosen to lead the Cossack force of several thousand men. In the final days of February and early March, this Cossack force, supported by some 20,000 Tatars, occupied Bratslav and began to advance towards Kiev.¹⁹ This incursion, however, was not meant as an offensive move but rather as a consolidating action. Orlyk strictly ordered Horlenko to avoid all possible conflicts with Polish forces and to explain the Cossack presence in the Right Bank as a move directed against the Russians and as a means of preserving order in that chaotic land.²⁰ Although the Poles did not find these arguments convincing, neither side appeared ready to commence open hostilities. For the next several months, Cossack and Polish forces tensely eyed each other but did not engage in major clashes.

Before the six weeks which Devlet Girei had allowed Orlyk were over, the Khan himself was removed from his throne. Another abrupt change in the general political situation had claimed him as its victim. Late in February, 1713, delayed news arrived at the Porte about a resounding victory which General Stenbok had won against the Danes and Saxons on 9 December 1712 at Gadebusch. Charles XII again regained favor in the Sultan's eyes, and those who precipitated the *Kalabalik* were severely punished.²¹

After the excitement subsided, the Porte turned its attention to the Polish envoys and the Ukrainian problem. Initially, it seemed that the setback which Charles XII had suffered would work in Chomentowski's favor. For several years it was the obstinacy of the Swedish King which had prevented an agreement between August

II and the Sultan. But, internal changes occurred at the Porte which, rather than facilitating Chomentowski's task, made it more difficult. The Sultan, after a short period of active but not very productive involvement in matters of state, decided to concentrate his interests again within the confines of the Serai. A strong and experienced politician, Ali Pasha, was installed as Grand Vizir and took complete control of the government.

THE OTTOMAN-POLISH DEBATE OVER THE UKRAINIAN ISSUE

In March 1713, the Ottoman-Polish talks commenced.²² It was a shaky start. Issues such as those of sending Charles XII back to Sweden by way of Poland and of removing Russian troops from Poland did not pose major difficulties. But when Ibrahim Pasha, the Ottoman negotiator, indicated that the Porte wished to take over the Right Bank, including the very important fortress of Kamianets-Podilskyi, Chomentowski flatly refused to discuss the point. In retaliation, the Ottomans questioned the legitimacy of August II's titlature. On this unpleasant note, the negotiations broke off.²³

In the weeks that followed, several developments occurred which seemed to strengthen the Ottoman hand. During its talks with the Poles, the Porte was simultaneously negotiating with the Russians. After some bickering, on 5 June 1713, the Russian envoys agreed once more to give up any claims to the territory between the Samara and Orel Rivers, i.e., a large part of the Right Bank. Actually this was just a minor adjustment of the Ottoman-Russian agreement concerning Ukrainian territories which had been signed in Constantinople in 1712.²⁴ Nonetheless, with the Ukrainian issue finally settled with the Tsar, the Ottomans felt more confident about demanding similar concessions from the Poles.

Concessions were made by the Poles—but not by those Poles who mattered. Stanisław Leszczyński and his adherents were in desperate straits in Bender after the *Kalabalik*. Unable to count on Charles XII for support, they realized that their only hope of regaining their positions in Poland depended on the aid of the Porte and the Khan. So desperate were they for this support that they literally threw themselves at the feet of the Khan and begged for his backing. In return, they promised that which they knew both the Khan and the Porte wanted most—Right Bank Ukraine.²⁵

The response to this offer was mixed. It was well received by Kaplan Girei, the new Khan, who promised to provide a large force of Tatars for an incursion by Stanisław into Poland. Ali Pasha had reservations about the expedition because he preferred to negotiate and to avoid major military undertakings. Chomentowski's resoluteness, however, left the Grand Vizir with no choice but to support the expedition in the hope that it might either topple August II or frighten Chomentowski into making concessions.

Although his relations with Stanisław were good at Bender, Orlyk received his fellow émigrés' offer of the Right Bank with a notable lack of enthusiasm.²⁶ A major reason for this reaction was his completely pessimistic view of Stanisław's chances of regaining the Polish throne. Furthermore, the Ukrainian émigrés were secretly trying to gain the confidence of August II and the official Polish government. Therefore, it made little sense for them to support Stanisław.

On 3 August 1713, a combined force of Poles, Tatars, Ottomans and some Cossacks under the command of Abdi Pasha, the *serasker* of Khotyn, set out toward the Polish borders. A brief panic broke out in Poland, but August II, after arresting some of Stanisław's major supporters within the country, managed to restore control. Moreover, his troops appeared ready and able to face up to the invaders. This was enough to persuade Abdi Pasha that Stanisław's cause was hopeless and he ordered the expeditionary force to retreat. In effect, this meant the withdrawal of Ottoman support for Stanisław who was now left with no choice but to follow Charles XII to Europe and exile.

After Stanisław's failure, Ali Pasha resumed negotiations with Chomentowski. Again agreement was quickly reached on the issues of Charles XII's transit, of Russian evacuation of Poland and of amnesty for Stanisław's supporters. And again the Porte left the most difficult point—the matter of Ukraine—until the very last. This time, however, the Porte's demands were better prepared and more cogently argued.

At first, the Grand Vizir tried to place Ottoman demands on a legal basis. He argued that the Porte had gained a legal right to Ukrainian territory both by right of conquest and because this right had been acknowledged by its treaty with the Russians.²⁷ Chomentowski replied that the Tsar had never meant to keep the territories on the Right Bank permanently: "His Majesty the Tsar had issued several *ukazy* that the land should be returned (to the

Poles), but Mazepa, the betrayer of his master, did not obey them and wanted to keep it and place it under the Swedes.”²⁸ The Russian envoy, Shafirov, was called to testify in this matter. His testimony, which infuriated the Grand Vizir, supported the Poles. The Russian went so far as to state that, since the original concessions in Ukraine had been imposed on the Tsar under duress, they could not be considered binding.

The Porte tried a different approach. Maurocordato, the Chief Dragoman, was sent to reason with the Poles.²⁹ He first stated that the Poles should allow the Porte to have the Right Bank out of gratitude for the Ottoman refusal to support Stanislaw further. When this brought no reaction, Maurocordato assured Chomentowski that the Porte did not want the Right Bank for its own enrichment since there would be little benefit from such a ravaged land. Nor were Ottoman demands motivated by a desire to expand their borders since the empire already had enough provinces. It was to save face that the Porte wanted Ukrainian land. However, Chomentowski adamantly refused to budge.

But Ali Pasha was remarkably persistent. Orlyk and his Cossacks were now brought directly into the negotiations. The Grand Vizir stated that actually the Porte desired Ukrainian territory not for itself, but for Orlyk and his men.³⁰ This was hardly a more attractive argument for Chomentowski who had been personally involved in the bitter Cossack-Polish conflicts in the Right Bank some ten years earlier. The Polish envoy pointedly replied that, on the basis of the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Porte should not allow the presence of anyone in the Right Bank—either Poles or Cossacks—who might disturb the peace.

Exasperated, the Grand Vizir made his final offer. He proposed that a stretch of land between the Dnieper and Dniester rivers be set aside in Ukraine for Orlyk and his Cossacks. But, instead of being under Ottoman sovereignty, the Cossacks were to accept the protection of the Polish King and the Commonwealth. Should this proposal be acceptable, the Porte would officially recognize August II and renew the Treaty of Karlowitz.³¹

Caught off guard by this unexpected variation in the Porte's demands, Chomentowski replied that he could make no decisions and proposed that special envoys be sent to August II and to the *sejm* (parliament) with the new proposal. At the end of September, Ottoman and Tatar envoys set out for Poland and on 17 October, in Warsaw, the following proposal was presented to August II:

Orlyk's Cossacks, of which there should be about twenty thousand, should live in the land set aside for them in Ukraine and they (should) not be dependent on the Porte, or on the Khan, or on the Tsar . . . but only on the King and the Commonwealth.³²

The King and his advisors responded cautiously. They stated that no decision could be taken in this matter until the electoral sejm convened and order was restored in Poland.³³ This reply did not satisfy the Porte and it seemed that only war could decide the issue of the Right Bank.

ORLYK'S PRO-POLISH ORIENTATION

While the Porte was casting about for ways to establish Orlyk and his men on the Right Bank, the Hetman responded to his Muslim patrons' efforts in an initially uncooperative and then increasingly antagonistic manner. During 1713, the Hetman's correspondence was sprinkled with recurrent denunciations of his Muslim allies. "Persevere me, O Lord, lest I perish," he wrote in a private letter, likening his stay on Ottoman territory with that of the Jews in Egypt.³⁴ Shortly after the *Kalabalik*, the Hetman openly exhorted the Zaporozhians not to cooperate with the Tatars because Muslims, "from the very inception of their accursed religion are the primary enemies of Christendom and seek nothing more than to destroy the Christian people."³⁵

A similar theme was repeated in Orlyk's secret correspondence with Marcin Kalinowski, the Polish field commander on the Right Bank. The Cossack Hetman requested Kalinowski to refrain from attacking the Zaporozhians who had moved into the area because this would only bring the Tatars to the aid of the Cossacks and, in the final result, it would be the civilian, Christian population of the area which would suffer most.³⁶

In October, 1713, Orlyk expressed his attitude toward the Muslims even more categorically. In a letter to von Müllern, Charles XII's foreign minister, the Hetman requested that:

If His Majesty the Swedish King should make peace with August II, then I would dare to request His Majesty that I, the Host and Ukraine, previously included in that treaty, should

not be shamefully abandoned to Muslim slavery . . . as I absolutely do not agree to Turkish protection over Ukraine.³⁷

Orlyk's antipathy toward the Muslims went even further. The Hetman proposed to Charles XII that now was the time to conclude peace with Peter I so that the two monarchs could strike against the Ottomans together:

For what could be more pleasing to God and simultaneously agreeable and desirable to the general expectations of all Christianity than if His Royal Majesty concluded peace with Moscow, combined His armies with hers and (together) turned against the major enemies of the Christian people (i.e., the Ottomans).³⁸

It is doubtful whether this idea was seriously considered. However, the point of this and of similar statements was to show the Hetman's distrust of the infidel and the earnestness of his desire to be disassociated from him.

How sincere were Orlyk's tirades against the Tatars and the Ottomans? And why were they flaunted publicly? Undoubtedly, the Hetman's personal antagonism to the Muslims was deep and genuine. And it was certainly an attitude of long standing. But, the harshness and timing of Orlyk's anti-Muslim outbursts indicated that there were also other reasons for making them.

Ottoman patronage and Russian propaganda had associated the émigrés, Orlyk felt, too closely with the traditional enemies of Christendom; this could only harm the émigrés' cause both in Ukraine and in all of Europe. What distressed Orlyk even more, however, was the fact that his close association with the Ottomans and Tatars blocked the way to a rapprochement with August II and the Polish Commonwealth, since any Cossack-Turkic cooperation was bound to raise the suspicions of the Poles. Therefore, the anti-Muslim tirades, especially those propounding the unification of all Christians against the Turk, were destined as much for Polish ears as for those of his immediate correspondents. Orlyk had to prove that he and his men would not be Ottoman puppets should they be allowed to settle in Ukraine.

The reasoning which led the Hetman to turn his back on the Porte and its efforts to obtain the Right Bank and to offer his services to August II and the Poles, who obviously had no sympathy

for the cause Orlyk represented, was complicated. As long as the possibility existed that the Porte might free entire Ukraine “on both banks of the Dnieper” from Russian control, Orlyk was willing to cooperate with the Ottomans. No matter what formal relationship this large, self-governing area might establish with the Porte, it would be strong enough to maintain a great degree of autonomy if not total independence. However, when it became evident that the Porte was interested only in the Right Bank, ravaged, depopulated and clearly destined for complete dependence on the Khan and the Porte, such a possibility was unacceptable to the Hetman for whom total dependence on the infidel was personally and politically abhorrent.

The efforts to reach an understanding with official Poland reflected Orlyk’s conviction that sooner or later Charles XII himself would be forced into an agreement with August II. In such a situation, it would be not the Porte, which Orlyk suspected was not ready to fight for the area, but these two men who would decide the fate of the Right Bank. The Hetman had no illusions about the Poles agreeing to an independent Cossack state, but he felt that if the Cossacks had to accept a sovereign, a weak, Christian Polish Commonwealth would be preferable to the infidel Sultan or autocratic Tsar. Therefore, Orlyk’s goal was to gain the confidence of August II and his ministers, avoid the enmity of the Porte as long as possible, and hope that would allow Orlyk and his men to settle on the Right Bank.

The response of the Poles—Chomentowski, Sieniawski, August II, and the *sejm*—to Orlyk’s overtures was uniform: initially they met the proposals with caution and then rejected them. Stanisław Rzewuski, the Crown Field Hetman, formulated what was probably the most widespread opinion among the Polish magnates, especially those with lands in the east:

Some consider that it might be helpful to the public welfare to maintain a Zaporozhian militia, at least on probation, so as not to leave it under Turkish rule; others, however, (feel) that, on the basis of the many Cossack revolts and betrayals, they do not wish to accept these men into Ukraine, because of their infidelity.³⁹

In view of these doubts, Orlyk redoubled his protestations of good intent and loyalty to the Commonwealth, continuing at the same

time to emphasize his anti-Muslim attitudes. But apparently the Hetman, who was in Adrianople during the negotiations, was not on the best of terms with Chomentowski and his colleagues. One of them, Franciszek Gosciecki, noted in verse these scathing remarks about the Cossack Hetman and his role:

In the manner of a Hetman, the traitor accepted
the *bulava* (Hetman's mace)
In the footsteps of his dead master. He ruled
over the Cossacks
Who, under Mazepa's banners, had taken money from
the Turk.

These (Cossacks) had nothing to return home for,
except maybe death.
They preferred to nestle under the Porte's protection.
And it was for these fugitives that Turkey energetically
demanded a housewarming in Polish Ukraine.⁴⁰

Thus, the last real chance for a Ukrainian Cossack accommodation within the Polish Commonwealth was met with suspicion and derision, assuring the exclusion of Orlyk and the Cossacks from the Right Bank and leaving the area vulnerable to the expansionist appetites of the Commonwealth's aggressive neighbors.

THE PORTE ABANDONS ITS UKRAINIAN PLAN

After the return of the Ottoman envoys from Poland with their inconclusive reply to Ali Pasha's proposal concerning the Cossacks, the Grand Vizir began to grow impatient with the protracted negotiations. He wished to liquidate the Ottoman conflicts in the north and concentrate his attention on a war he planned to launch against Venice. Yet, with every passing day, the Grand Vizir saw that he was getting further from securing the Right Bank.

Matters took a turn for the worse when, in December of 1713 and the early months of 1714, Horlenko and his men, disoriented by Orlyk's policy and exposed to renewed Polish pressure, were forced to abandon the Right Bank.⁴¹ Even more importantly, Khan Kaplan Girei, encouraged by August II's heavy bribes, entered into secret negotiations with the Polish King.⁴² As a result, his support of the Cossacks weakened considerably. In Europe, the great Bour-

bon-Habsburg conflict was coming to an end and the threat of unhampered Habsburg activity in the Balkans loomed before the Porte. Ali Pasha realized that, as far as Ukraine was concerned, the time had come to make a final and decisive effort to secure his goal.

In the middle of January 1714, Chomentowski was summoned to renew the negotiations. As expected, when the question of Ukraine arose, the Polish envoy replied that he did not have the authority to make any decisions in this matter. In replying to this argument, the Porte made what appeared to be a harmless request. Ali Pasha asked that Chomentowski sign, ostensibly as proof of the Commonwealth's good will, the following statement:

Ukraine, which at the last treaty of Karlowitz was conceded to the Commonwealth (and) now when the Porte has forced the Muscovite armies to abandon it, is now requested as a habitation for the Cossacks. Whereas we have no plenipotentiary rights in this matter, but for the sake of friendship with the Porte . . . at the coming *sejm* this matter will be discussed with the Khan and *serasker* (of Bender) and this point will be decided at that *sejm*.⁴³

When Chomentowski was about to sign this declaration, the Grand Vizir demanded that it be attached to the pact signed at Karlowitz. This, in effect, would amend or at least question the Polish Commonwealth's right to Ukraine as acknowledged at Karlowitz. Realizing the Ottoman trick, Chomentowski refused to sign the declaration. This infuriated Ali Pasha and he issued orders for the Ottoman army to prepare for war.

But the Poles were not intimidated, for they had recently learned of a development which would have a decisive impact on the Ukrainian issue: the Khan, tempted by a huge subsidy from the Polish king and hoping that August II would join him in an anti-Russian alliance, agreed to withdraw support from the Porte's Ukrainian plans. He even hinted that he would help the Poles regain the Left Bank.⁴⁴ The Khan's offer to the Poles concerning the Left Bank was quite similar to one which Orlyk had made previously and which he continued to make to August II and his government. However, rather than consider the Khan's or the Hetman's proposals seriously, the Poles wished only to defuse a joint Cossack-Tatar-Ottoman effort to establish Orlyk in the Right Bank. Thus, while they did not openly reject either the Khan's or Orlyk's offers, they also did not make any move to act upon them.

In the spring of 1714, Ali Pasha realized that all opportunities, so numerous and promising since Prut, to gain control of the Right Bank and/or at least establish Orlyk there, were gone. On 22 April 1714, Chomentowski finally fulfilled his mission when a treaty was signed between the Porte and the Polish Commonwealth. Essentially it liquidated all the issues raised between the Porte and the Commonwealth in the course of the Northern War and renewed the terms of the Treaty of Karlowitz. As far as Ukraine was concerned, the Grand Vizir declared:

The Sublime Porte, seeing that its demands as to Ukraine are causing great difficulties and although it expelled the Muscovite troops from Ukraine at the cost of its own blood, graciously bestows it (Ukraine) to the Commonwealth at the request of the Khan.⁴⁵

However, even this statement did not conclusively settle the Ukrainian issue. Both Tatar and Ottoman envoys continued to insist that the Commonwealth accept Ali Pasha's proposal that Orlyk and his men be allowed to settle in the Right Bank under Polish protection. But, as the Porte turned its attention west and became involved in a war with Venice, it was obvious that these demands were merely pro forma gestures and that, in effect, the Porte's last major engagement in Ukrainian Cossack affairs was over.

PART THREE

VIII

A Period of Transition

On 25 October 1714, Charles XII set out on his famous ride across Europe. Riding at breakneck speed and incognito, he covered the distance between the Ottoman outpost at Pitești and the Swedish fortress in Straslund in an incredible thirteen days and four and a half hours. The King's dramatic return to his homeland caused a sensation throughout Europe. But, in Bender, his departure, although not unexpected, placed the Ukrainian and Polish émigrés in a quandry: what were they to do now and where were they to go?

Even as the Swedes prepared to leave, some of the Mazepists, led by Horlenko, Maksymovych and Lomykovskyi, decided that it was time to capitulate. Through the mediation of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, this group, numbering about thirty members of the *starshyna*, received the Tsar's permission to return to Ukraine.¹ But, if the returnees thought that permission to return meant that Peter I's anger with them had subsided, they were sadly mistaken. Soon after their arrival in the Hetmanate, the former émigrés were rounded up, sent to Moscow for lengthy interrogations and, without exception, sentenced to life-long exile.

For the several thousand Zaporozhians in Bender there was no question of being allowed to return to Ukraine. No matter how much they disliked the prospect, the only alternative open to them was to return to their newly established *Sich* at Oleshki. And since the new *Sich* was on Tatar territory, they had to accept—temporarily, according to Orlyk's consolations—the overlordship of the Khan. In view of his great trust in and commitment to the Swedish King, what Orlyk chose to do was almost predictable: he, his large family and about a dozen of the *starshyna*, the most notable of which were his brother-in-law, Hryhor Hertsyk, Fedir Myrovych and Fedir Nakhymovskyi, followed Charles XII to Sweden.² Fi-

nally, there was one Mazepist who looked to the future with great expectations. Well provided for, Voinarovskiy set off for Vienna to commence a free-spending tour of European capitals. Thus, by the end of 1714, the Bender period in the history of the first Ukrainian political emigration was over.

THE MAZEPIST INTERLUDE IN EUROPE

Although Orlyk and his companions left Ottoman territory with a sigh of relief, their departure would have been less gratifying had they known that what they left behind—bitter as the disappointments of the Bender period had been—was better than what awaited them in the future. No matter how tenuous the Mazepists' position may have been in Bender, during their stay there they had at least a measure of political and military influence on the course of events. Orlyk was acknowledged as a commander of a sizable body of troops; he and his *heneralna starshyna* concluded international treaties (the last Cossack leaders to do so); and the cause they represented—that of an independent or autonomous Ukrainian Cossack state—was of interest and relevance to the great powers involved in the Northern War, especially in its eastern theatre. However, with their departure from Bender, the Mazepists began a new phase in their careers—that of powerless, wandering, penniless and insecure political émigrés.

The small cohort of Ukrainians stayed in Sweden from 1715 to 1720. In political terms, their sojourn was of no political consequence. As he turned his attention to North Germany and other areas closer to home, Charles XII could not help but consider the Cossacks and their cause to be, for the time being at least, of little relevance. Nonetheless, the King's strong sense of honor prevented him from completely ignoring the commitments he had made to the Ukrainians. He continued to treat Orlyk as a bona fide political leader (to bolster this image, the Hetman maintained, and when this was impossible, pretended to maintain a correspondence with "his army," that is, the Zaporozhians).³ Moreover, a modest sum of 13,000 talers annually was assigned for the support of the émigrés. Because these funds were woefully inadequate, Orlyk spent most of his time bombarding the Swedish government with appeals for more aid.⁴ Matters turned from bad to worse when, on 30 November 1718, during the siege of Frederiksten fortress in Norway, a stray bullet ended the life of the "Lion of the North." With their patron

gone, it became increasingly evident to the Ukrainians that any financial or political support from Sweden would soon run out.

At this critical juncture, a ray of hope appeared on the European diplomatic scene. On 5 January 1719, the so-called Vienna Alliance was concluded between George I, acting in his role as the Kurfürst of Hannover, Emperor Charles VI of Austria and, most importantly for the Ukrainian émigrés, August II as the Elector of Saxony. Completely reversing his recent diplomatic ties, the Saxon ruler joined an alliance whose avowed purpose was to block the alarmingly aggressive designs of Peter I. To Orlyk and his colleagues it seemed that this turn of events would certainly provide the Mazepists with a political role again.

During the early months of 1719, the Ukrainians busily prepared to leave Sweden and move eastwards where the anticipated clash between the European powers and the "Muscovite menace" was most likely to occur. While Hertsyk, Nakhymovskyy and Myrovych departed on missions to the Zaporozhians and Khan Saadet Girei,⁵ Orlyk resumed his correspondence with August II and his ministers.

After reminding the Poles of his past services to the Commonwealth (his refusal to accept the Right Bank from the Ottomans), Orlyk tried to convince them of his and the Zaporozhians' potential usefulness in the looming confrontation with the Russians.⁶ Specifically, the Hetman pointed out the role that he could play in mobilizing the Tatars and Ottomans to come to the aid of the Commonwealth. In elaborating on this theme, he sketched an imaginative if somewhat unrealistic project.⁷ Because of his alliance with the Muslims, Orlyk argued that he was in a position to organize a grand alliance of Muslims, stretching from Constantinople to Kazan. To prove that such a project was feasible, he described an incident which he witnessed in Adrianople in 1713. That year a delegation of Tatars from the Volga region appeared before the Sultan. Complaining bitterly about the religious oppression of all Muslims in the Tsar's realm, it fervently requested the Porte's aid against their oppressors. Although it was graciously received, the delegation was informed that the Muslims along the Volga would have to be patient and wait for the moment when the Porte found a promising opportunity to help them. According to Orlyk, this incident demonstrated that there was a Muslim feeling of community which could be utilized against Moscow in much the same way as Peter I's defense of the Orthodox in the Balkans was being used against the Ottomans.

In addition to religious motivations, the Ottomans had commercial reasons for going to war with Russia.⁸ Analyzing Peter I's drive into the Caucasus and towards Persia, the Hetman argued that the Tsar's goal was to reach the Caspian Sea in order to obtain a terminus for the great canal which he was building. This would provide the Russians with a water-route from the Baltic to the Caspian Seas which, in turn, would give them control of the great East-West trade route. Thus, income which once flowed into Ottoman or Safavid coffers would now be diverted to Russian hands. The Tsar would grow richer while the Sultan would be threatened with the loss of a large portion of his income. Such a threat, in Orlyk's opinion, would certainly rouse the Porte into a war against the Russians.

In case of war, the Hetman and his Zaporozhians would provide the perfect link between the Poles and the Ottomans. Orlyk went on to present a plan of a grand offensive against the Russians.⁹ It called for the Ottomans to launch an attack from the Caucasus, link up with the Muslims of the Volga and strike at the soft underbelly of the Russian defenses. Meanwhile, Orlyk and his men, after uniting with the Bucak Horde, would move into Ukraine. Finally, the coup de grace would be administered by Polish and Swedish attacks from the west and north.

Another of the Hetman's gambits was to point out the benefits which would accrue to the King and the Commonwealth if Cossacks, under Orlyk's leadership, were granted autonomy on the Right Bank. Such a step would be pleasing to the Ukrainians everywhere and it would lead to the retrieval of the Commonwealth of Kiev, Smolensk and its lost provinces on the Left Bank. Moreover, the King, who always had great difficulties in raising an army among the *szlachta*, would have 100,000 (!) Cossacks ready to serve him at no expense to the Crown. All this could easily be achieved if only August II would bypass the opposition of "certain parties," i.e., of the eastern magnates.¹⁰

The response of August II and his chief minister, Flemming, to these proposals was noncommittal.¹¹ (Perhaps they recalled another imaginative plan, one concerned with the supposedly easy conquest of Livonia, which was presented to the Saxon court by the Livonian émigré Johann Reinhold von Patkul in 1699 and which led August II into the disastrous Northern War.) Undaunted, Orlyk proceeded with his preparations to leave Stockholm. The Swedes, anxious to rid themselves of a burdensome guest, went out of their way to be helpful. On the condition that the Ukrainian émigrés not

return to Sweden, they provided Orlyk and his family with funds for their journey. Moreover, King Fredrick presented Orlyk with letters of recommendation to a number of European courts as well as to the Sultan and the Khan.¹²

On 11 October 1720, the Hetman and his party left Sweden. As they departed, the émigrés were unaware that the very basis of their plans and hopes—the Vienna Alliance—was already beginning to crumble. Under the pressure of his English subjects, George I was forced to seek a rapprochement with Russia. Soon Charles VI and August II would have to do likewise. It was not, as Orlyk would soon discover, the best time to play on anti-Russian themes in Europe.

THE TSAR'S MANHUNT FOR THE MAZEPISTS

On his way to the east, Orlyk stopped in Hannover where an audience was arranged for him with George I. However, at the last moment, the meeting was cancelled because of the King's premature departure to England. The Hetman had to content himself with discussing his plans with the King's chief minister, Baron A. von Bernsdorf.¹³ From Hannover the émigrés crossed Germany and, in late January, arrived in Breslau, in Habsburg territory. There a pleasant surprise awaited them. Almost by accident they made the acquaintance of Baron Orlik who, as it happened, belonged to the same ancestral line as did the Hetman.¹⁴ Fortunately for them, this highly placed Czech aristocrat—he was one of Emperor Charles VI's courtiers—took the Orlyks under his wing.

While in Breslau, the émigrés would need all the help they could find for it became evident that the Tsar had not forgotten them. In 1716, two years before the famous pursuit of Peter I's runaway son, Aleksei, one of the Ukrainians fell into a Russian trap. Using a well-known beauty, Aurora von Konigsmarck as bait, tsarist agents in Hamburg enticed the unsuspecting Voinarovskiy into a snare.¹⁵ Before local authorities could intervene, Mazepa's nephew was spirited off to St. Petersburg. After detailed questioning and a prolonged stay in the jails of the capital, the self-indulgent Voinarovskiy was sentenced to end his days in the wilds of Yakutia. In 1720, the Tsar's agents struck closer to home. While on his way to the Crimea, Hertsyk stopped in Warsaw where Nakhymovskiy and Myrovych were lodged at the home of Poniatowski. Upon learning that hopes for a war against Russia were fading, the young Hertsyk

began to have his doubts about the usefulness of a mission to the Khan and the Zaporozhians. Under the pretext of illness, he extended his stay in Warsaw. Nakhimovskyi was sent to the Crimea in his place. This desire to avoid the hardships of a dangerous and seemingly pointless mission sealed the young Hertsyk's doom. The Russian resident in Poland, Prince Georgii Dolgorukii, learned of Hertsyk's presence in Warsaw and arrested him in broad daylight.¹⁶ Despite the outraged protests of the Poles, Hertsyk was secretly removed from Poland and brought to St. Petersburg on 15 March 1721. After the usual questioning—the interrogator was especially interested in Orlyk's activities and concerned about any contacts the Hetman might have in Ukraine—Hertsyk spent several years in the Petro-Pavlovsk fortress and was later exiled to Moscow.¹⁷

But the main prize which the Tsar's agents sought was Orlyk. When the Hetman left Sweden, D. Iaguzhinskii, the younger brother of the Russian envoy at the Habsburg court, was sent to Hamburg to intercept him. Arriving too late to do so, the younger Iaguzhinskii followed the émigrés to Breslau. There, in March of 1721, preparations were made to abduct the Hetman. Only the recent acquaintanceship with Baron Orlik saved the Hetman from a fate similar to that of Voynarovskyyi and Hertsyk. Through his contacts in the Habsburg court, Baron Orlik learned of the Russian plans, and, on 10 March, he transferred his distant "relative" to a hiding place outside of Breslau. Just hours after Orlyk departed, at one o'clock in the morning, the younger Iaguzhinskii attempted, unsuccessfully, to break into his quarters.¹⁸

After the failure of the attempted kidnapping, the elder Iaguzhinskii attempted to persuade and/or bribe key officials at the court in Vienna to detain the Hetman and hand him over to the Russians.¹⁹ The matter came to the attention of Emperor Charles VI who refused to allow the hapless émigré to be arrested; he did, however, agree to have him expelled from the empire.²⁰ Orlyk mobilized all his contacts—Count Bielke, the Swedish envoy, Count Szlik, the Bohemian chancellor, even August II—in an effort to convince the Emperor to grant him asylum. But, in view of the improving relations with Russia, Charles VI insisted that Orlyk leave Habsburg territory. In despair, the Hetman noted in his diary:

Thus the efforts and intrigues of my enemies conquered the

goodwill not only of Count Bielke but even that of the King of Poland, who ordered his envoy to intercede in my behalf. Hidden in a monastery, my family remains in Breslau . . . and I, without a place to safely rest my head, have become an object of contempt to the world and its people. For the sake of security I must continually move from place to place, using a false name and playing the role of a foreigner.²¹

The logical place to go next was Poland. Leaving most of his family in Breslau, Orlyk took along only his eldest son, Hryhor, and, on 21 April, arrived in Cracow. Immediately he sent out a series of letters to such leading statesmen of the Commonwealth as Flemming, Manteuffel, Szaniawski, Mniszek and Rzewuski reminding them again of his potential usefulness to Poland.²² The response was polite but discouraging. Although August II had tried hard to convince the Commonwealth to declare war on Russia, the *szlachta*, suspecting—not without reason—that he would use the conflict to limit its treasured “golden freedoms,” refused to go along. Thus when Orlyk arrived with his plans of anti-Russian offensives and hopes of Cossack autonomy on the Right Bank, he was politely informed that the time when such projects could be implemented was already past. The best August II and Flemming could do for the Hetman was to accept his son Hryhor, under a false name, into the king’s own regiment in Dresden. As for Orlyk himself, because the Commonwealth could not guarantee his safety, Flemming and others advised him to seek an understanding with the Tsar.²³

At about this time the Hetman learned that, despite the promises of Charles XII, Sweden would not raise the Ukrainian issue in the Nystadt peace talks with Russia.²⁴ Even when Orlyk asked Swedish diplomats to discuss only his personal interests with their Russian counterparts, the latter refused to do so. Discouraged, the Hetman decided to apply directly to St. Petersburg for a pardon. Using the services of Colonel Johann Sztenflucht, an old friend from Bender and the current representative of Holstein in St. Petersburg (later he became Orlyk’s son-in-law) the Hetman sent a proposal to the Russian government in which he expressed his willingness to return to Ukraine under certain conditions.²⁵ Unfortunately, the text of this note is unavailable. Judging from comments made later, Orlyk still held out for some sort of recognition of his official title if not with regard to the Hetmanate then at least in regard to

the Zaporozhians. It was at this point that he also prepared his lengthy and well known letter to Stefan Iavorskyi, in which he claimed to reveal all he knew about Mazepa's *izmena* (treason).²⁶

The response from St. Petersburg was negative. The Tsar refused to guarantee Orlyk any special consideration. According to Sztenflicht, the best that could be hoped for was permission for Orlyk and his family, which, in the meantime, had joined him in Cracow, to return home.²⁷ But, in view of the fate which befell Horlenko, Maksymovych and Lomykovskyi and the constant remonstrances of his wife "to be careful of Moscow," the Hetman decided not to return to Ukraine under such uncertain circumstances. Again the same old problem arose—what to do next?

ORLYK'S INTERNMENT IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Only one option remained open to the Hetman. In a letter to a friend, he noted that "the imperial (Habsburg), Swedish and Polish courts advised me to look to my safety and seek safer lands. For this reason I decided to flee to the protection of the Ottoman Porte."²⁸ After bidding his family a tearful farewell, on 27 February 1722, Orlyk set out for the Ottoman border at Khotyn. There was something inevitable about his return to the empire. Historical experience indicated that any Cossack leader with "separatist tendencies" would sooner or later come courting the favor of the Porte. Unfortunately for Orlyk, his return was not well timed.

Since the Ottoman settlement with the Russians in 1713 (Peace of Adrianople), the Porte assiduously avoided confrontations on its northern borders. This was especially the case during the vezirate of Damad Ibrahim Pasha (1718-1730). In order to cater to the Sultan's desire to lead a quiet, cultured life and to rule without complications, this cultivated and clever son-in-law of Ahmet III based his entire foreign policy on the avoidance of conflicts.²⁹ Thus, in 1720, largely through the efforts of the Tsar's very capable envoy, I. I. Nepluev, a treaty of "eternal peace" was concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. From then to the time of Peter I's death in 1725, the Ottomans showed remarkable passivity towards the Russians, allowing them to make impressive gains in the Caucasus and along the Caspian Sea.³⁰ Clearly, the scorn which the Porte had for the Russians previously had now turned to respect and even fear.

Such was the state of Ottoman-Russian relations when, on 10

March 1722, Orlyk entered Ottoman territory. Immediately he ran into difficulties. Abdi Pasha, the governor of Khotyn, was an old acquaintance of the Hetman's from the time of Stanisław Leszczyński's attempted incursion into Poland in 1713. However, this did not insure him a friendly welcome. In fact, Abdi Pasha was very negatively disposed to Cossacks in general and to Orlyk and his collaborators in particular. He felt that the Zaporozhians were no better than brigades and troublemakers who constantly disturbed peace and order along the Ottoman-Polish-Russian borders.³¹ As for Orlyk and especially his advance man, Nakhymovskiy, they too were troublemakers, though of a more sophisticated type, engaged in spying and "disturbing the peace among great monarchs."³²

Abdi Pasha converted his opinions and pro-Russian sentiments into action when, several weeks before Orlyk's arrival in Khotyn, he arrested Nakhymovskiy and sent him off to Crown Hetman Sieniawski in Poland.³³ This "tyrant and vulgar beast" as Orlyk called the Pasha, responded to news of the Hetman's arrival with an order that he return from whence he came. Orlyk then produced his trump cards—letters of recommendation from European monarchs addressed to the Sultan, the Tatar treaty of 1711, and the charter of Ahmet III. This made an impression on the Pasha who allowed Orlyk to wait in Khotyn while he sent to the capital for instructions on how to deal with this guest.³⁴

In Constantinople, meanwhile, news was filtering in about Peter I's increasing involvement in Persian affairs. In addition, another series of complaints by Khan Saadet Girei against the Russians reached the capital.³⁵ It seems very likely that the nature of this information had a positive effect on the Porte's initial reaction to Orlyk's arrival. In May 1722, an official arrived at Khotyn from the Porte with very friendly greetings for the Hetman and informed him that he was to travel to Seres. There he would pass the high Muslim fast and holidays of Ramadan and Bayram and proceed thereafter to Constantinople for "conferences" at the Porte. Even the surly Abdi Pasha changed his tone and provided Orlyk with an escort of eighteen horsemen for his journey.

On his way, the Hetman stopped at Bucarest where he was met with great pomp and circumstance by the Hospodar, Nicholas Maurocordato. Since the Hospodar's brother was the Chief Dragoon at the Porte, it is likely that this cordial reception reflected the attitude of the Porte towards Orlyk at this point. Another indication of friendliness was the fact that the Hospodar arranged a ceremony at which Ahmet III's charter to the Hetman was publicly

read.³⁶ The latter used this occasion to re-establish his contacts, broken since the arrest of Nakhymovskiy, with the Zaporozhians and the Khan.

On 13 August, the Hetman and his party reached Seres. Here Orlyk stayed much longer than expected. The delay reflected new, and unfavorable, developments at the Ottoman capital. The Tsar, through Nepliev, had learned about Orlyk's presence on Ottoman territory and demanded his extradition.³⁷ According to the Austrian diplomat, Talmann, the Porte had already decided to allow Orlyk to go to the Crimea and join the Zaporozhians there, when Nepliev protested that such a move would be contrary to the peace treaty.³⁸ Apparently, Orlyk's case led to a sharp confrontation between Ibrahim Pasha and Nepliev. Peter I's envoy reported that the Grand Vizir was distressed by the developments in Persia and even mentioned war, in which case Orlyk would be utilized against the Russians.³⁹

Meanwhile, the waiting at Seres was becoming unbearable. It was more with a sense of relief than suspicion that, on 26 November, Orlyk noted in his diary that a "bey of imposing bearing" had arrived from Constantinople and informed him that, "although the Porte wished to bring me to Stambul, the present situation with Moscow does not allow it." For the sake of "greater convenience," the Hetman was instructed to go on to Salonika with the Grand Vizir's personal assurance "of his unalterable intention to bring me, after a few days, to Stambul."⁴⁰ Little did he realize that these "few days" would stretch into more than ten years.

THE ZAPOROZHIAN UNDER TATAR OVERLORDSHIP

In the myriad letters, memorials and projects which Orlyk addressed to European statesmen, he invariably referred to the Zaporozhians as "his army," a force which was ready to fight at any moment for the liberation of its "suffering fatherland." The point of these remarks was obvious: they were meant to convince the Hetman's correspondents that he had a military force at his disposal and was thus a factor to be reckoned with. But in view of the great distance—and it was not simply a geographical distance—which separated the émigré Hetman from his "lusty lads at the *Sich*," the question arises of how accurate was his image of the Zaporozhians and their attitudes.

At the Oleshki *Sich* the traditional rivalry between the pro- and

anti-Moscow factions among the Zaporozhians continued to exist. In fact, the longer the Cossacks remained under the Khan's overlordship, the more intense did the rivalry become. As long as Hordienko served as *koshovyi*, pro-Russian sentiments were stifled. And even after he was removed from office in 1717, his anti-Russian views were still influential. Thus, when Nakhymovskiyi arrived at the *Sich* in 1721 with an enthusiastic letter from Orlyk telling the Zaporozhians of how the members of the Vienna alliance planned to move against Russia "by land and by sea," the Cossacks responded positively and asked the Hetman not to forget about them.⁴¹ Soon afterwards, however, the new *koshovyi*, Ivan Malashevych, began to explore the possibilities of obtaining a pardon from the Tsar.⁴²

One of the reasons for the increasingly conciliatory tendencies among the Zaporozhians was connected with commerce. When the Tsar ordered the inhabitants of the Hetmanate to avoid any contacts with the Zaporozhians—even Hetman Skoropadskiyi could not write to them without the Tsar's permission—he not only isolated them socially, but also undermined their profitable trade with the Left Bank. Although some Ukrainian merchants still traded secretly at Oleshki, most went on to the Crimea, where they were allowed to trade, without stopping at the *Sich*. Since the Zaporozhians received a large part of their supplies from the Hetmanate the Tsar's ban caused them extreme hardship.⁴³

Even more burdensome for the Zaporozhians were the problems which they encountered in the Khan's service. Unable to get the supplies they needed by trade, the Cossacks proceeded to raid Polish and Russian controlled territories in search of booty. This brought on a storm of protests from the Commonwealth and Russia to the Khan and the Porte. Furthermore, when the Khan ordered the Zaporozhians to participate in his campaigns in the Kuban, many of them complained bitterly about the difficult conditions under which they had to fight and the unfair treatment which they received from the Tatars. So irritated was Saadet Girei by these complaints that he ordered some of the most vocal Zaporozhians to be sold as galley slaves.⁴⁴ By 1722, the relationship between the Zaporozhians and their Muslim overlords became so tense that when Russian-Ottoman talks over Persia commenced, Ibrahim Pasha, at the Khan's behest, raised the possibility of returning the Zaporozhians to Russian sovereignty.⁴⁵ The Russian

response was positive, but influential elements in the Crimea reacted vigorously against the idea.

In 1724, an uprising of the leading *mirzas* took place against Saadet Girei. This so-called “aristocratic revolution” has often been described as an internal Crimean struggle between the Khan and Cantimir Mirza, the leader of the powerful Shirin Jan.⁴⁶ However, according to Orlyk and the reports of Russian spies in the Crimea, the major reason for the revolt was the Zaporozhian issue. Both of these obviously unrelated sources contend that the *mirzas* rose up and mobilized their troops, “so that the Khan would not give up the Zaporozhians to Russian rule since the Zaporozhians are our first defense against the Russians.”⁴⁷ The *mirzas* also argued that the Zaporozhians knew the Tatar defenses and general situation in the Crimea too well to be allowed to go over to the Russians.⁴⁸ In the end, the Zaporozhians remained under the protection of the Khan—but not of Saadet Girei, who was deposed, but of his successor, Mengli Girei II.

In distant Salonika, when Orlyk learned of the plans to return the Zaporozhians to Russian sovereignty, he warned the Porte not to believe Russian misrepresentations of the Cossacks and not to underestimate their military value:

I cannot help but believe that the Muscovites have painted this Army in false colors, attempting everything and straining their cleverness in the effort to induce the Sublime Porte to surrender the Zaporozhians before they begin their war with the Sublime Porte so that during the blazing war Ukrainians will have no place to flee and will have no one to ally themselves with in order to throw off their yoke.⁴⁹

Orlyk’s perception of Russian motives and the Zaporozhians’ possible role in a coming Ottoman-Russian conflict was well-founded. He realized that Peter I’s current attempts to liquidate Ukrainian autonomy were causing widespread dissatisfaction in Ukraine and that dissident elements within the Hetmanate might try to establish contact and coordinate their opposition with the Zaporozhians and even Orlyk himself. It was clear to him that, in securing the Zaporozhians, the Tsar would eliminate the traditional rallying point of Ukrainian opposition which, if allowed to crystallize, could leave the Russians very vulnerable in the event of a Russian-Ottoman clash.

THE TSAR'S TIGHTENING GRIP ON UKRAINE

If Orlyk's depiction of the Zaporozhian attitudes was less than accurate, how true were his claims that Ukraine "groaned under the Muscovite yoke?" And what exactly was the nature of this oft mentioned yoke? To deal with these questions, it is necessary to examine more closely the series of measures which Peter I imposed in Ukraine after Poltava and again after the victorious conclusion of the Great Northern War in 1721.

On 29 April 1722, the office of resident was replaced by the *Malorossiiskaia Kollegia*.⁵⁰ Unlike the *Malorossiiskii Prikaz*, which was abolished in 1717, the *Kollegia* was based in Ukraine, at the court of Hetman Skoropadskyi. It consisted of six Russian officers selected from the dragoon regiments, one of whom was appointed president. The *Kollegia's* first president was Brigadier S. Veliaminov. The new institution's powers were extremely broad: although initially it could deal with the Ukrainians only through the intermediary of the Military Chancellery of the Zaporozhian Host, the *Kollegia* was soon allowed to bypass Ukrainian authorities and to intervene at all levels of the local administration. No order could be issued by the Hetman or his staff without being countersigned by the *Kollegia*. It could also act as the highest court of appeals in the land, overturning, if it wished, the Hetman's decisions. This was not merely dual government; to a large extent, the *Malorossiiskaia Kollegia* was designed to rule in Ukraine. It was at this point that the Pereiaslav Treaty was, in effect, abrogated by the Tsar.

If the establishment of the *Kollegia* was a radical step towards the abolition of Ukrainian self-rule, the rationale which Peter I gave it was well within the tsars' traditional policy of divide et impera. In a manifesto issued to the populace, Peter I declared that "It (the *Kollegia*) has been created for no other purpose than to protect the Little Russian people from the unfairness of their courts and from the oppression of the *starshyna*."⁵¹ By claiming to alleviate the indisputably difficult plight of the masses, the Tsar pushed his centralizing measures in Ukraine. Peter I's most audacious claim concerning the *Kollegia* was that it did not really contradict the terms of Khmelnytskyi's treaty and that, in fact, the treaty allowed for the creation of such an institution.⁵² Interestingly, while the Tsar completely subverted the Pereiaslav Treaty, he was not yet ready to ignore it completely. But perhaps what was most revealing of Peter I's views on the *Kollegia's* function was not

what he said about it but rather the place which he assigned for it in his new bureaucratic system. In contrast to the *Malorossiiskii Prikaz* which, as part of the *Posolskii Prikaz*, implied Ukrainian separateness, the *Malorossiiskaia Kollegia* was subordinated to the Senate, i.e., to that body which dealt with internal affairs.⁵³ This was an explicit indication that the Tsar now considered Ukraine to be an integral part of the Russian imperial state.

Coordination extended to all levels and all aspects of Ukrainian society. The Hetman's residence was moved from Baturyn to Hlukhiv which was much closer to Russia. Previously, the Cossacks had operated as an autonomous army; after Poltava, they were placed under a Russian commander-in-chief. As early as 1715, the practice of electing Cossack officers was altered. Regiments and companies were allowed to elect two or three candidates, all of whom had to be acceptable to the resident. One of these was then appointed, in close consultation with Russian officials, to the vacancy by the Hetman. Whenever vacancies appeared in the all-important offices of colonel, the *Kollegia* saw to it that foreigners were appointed. For instance, M. Myloradovych, a Serb, was appointed commander of the Hadiach regiment, and Russians were installed as commanders of the Starodub, Chernyhiv and Nizhyn regiments. Moreover, a large part of the lands of the Mazepists was distributed to Russian notables. Most assiduous in obtaining these lands and peasants was A. Menshikov. In 1704, for example, he controlled 1,261 peasants in the Hetmanate; in 1709, the figure skyrocketed to 28,035, and by 1725 it was 55,176.⁵⁴ Anxious to take advantage of such opportunities, B. Sheremetev, G. Golovkin, G. Dolgorukii and P. Shafirov also obtained vast properties in the south. The Tsar's government also encouraged Serbs, Moldavians, Montenegrins and Greeks to settle in Ukraine, especially in the south where not only was land more available but where the Ukrainian population had proven itself to be the most inconstant in its loyalty to Moscow.

Nor did the social and cultural life of the land escape the attention of the Tsar. The *starshyna* was discouraged from marrying Poles and Lithuanians and was urged instead to marry into Russian families.⁵⁵ The measures taken in the field of culture had a disturbingly modern ring to them. Regarding the printing of books in Ukraine, the Senate ordered as early as 1720 that:

No new books except old religious texts are to be published.

And before these old church books are published, they should be brought into complete accordance with the Great Russian church books so that the (Ukrainian) books do not reflect any differences or separate dialect. As to non-religious books, neither old nor new texts are to be published without first informing the *Dukhovnaia Kollegia* and receiving its permission. This is in order that these books not contradict the Eastern Church and disagree with Great Russian publications.⁵⁶

It was clear, as one of the Tsar's close associates admiringly recalled in 1726, that Peter I "meant to take Little Russia in hand."

Because Peter I's projects were so vast and the means at his disposal relatively meager, his need for money was unusually pressing. It was no doubt galling for him to know that the Ukrainians, who constituted nearly 12 percent of his subjects, contributed practically nothing to his treasury. Up to the Battle of Poltava, little was done to alter this state of affairs. But after the battle, as the Tsar initiated his first great wave of reforms, a concerted effort was made to tap the resources of Ukraine.

Between 1709 and 1722, an indirect approach was taken to extracting wealth from the Hetmanate. Ukrainians were ordered to support the newly-arrived regiments because, as the Tsar put it, they should now consider these forces as their own. It has been estimated that the annual cost of maintaining these ten regiments came to about 147,000 rubles.⁵⁷ A regiment of Serb and of Kalmuk cavalry was also kept at the Hetman's expense. Moreover, Cossacks were used to provide free labor for the Tsar's many construction projects. In 1716, 10,000 Ukrainian Cossacks were sent to work on the Don-Volga Canal. Two years later, the same number was dispatched to build fortifications in the Caucasus. And in 1721 and 1722, two parties of 10,000 each were ordered to work on the Ladoga Canal. Because of poor provisioning and disease, the death rate among these men averaged 30%, in some regiments reaching as high as 50%.⁵⁸

Peter I's policies had a disastrous effect on Ukrainian trade. Formerly, Ukrainian merchants were free to trade wherever they wished and many of them developed extensive contacts in the Baltic region and in Western Europe. In 1714, they were suddenly ordered to shift their business, regardless of the losses this entailed, to Russian or Russian-controlled ports such as Arkhangelsk, Riga and finally,

St. Petersburg. In 1719, the export of Ukrainian wheat to the West was forbidden. This allowed the Russian government to buy up the wheat for its own use at a very low price. Simultaneously, an elaborate and stringent system of import duties was set up on Ukraine's western borders. It was designed to prevent the import of finished products which might compete with Russia's fledgling industry. Finally, Russian merchants were given preferential treatment in the export of their goods to the Hetmanate, while Ukrainians had to pay duties of 10–37 percent for the goods they sent to the north.⁵⁹ Taking advantage of the situation, such men as Menshikov and the Stroganovs became heavily involved in the Ukrainian trade, forcing many local merchants out of business.

But the greatest financial shock for the Ukrainians came in 1722. That year, the *Kollegia* introduced direct taxation in the Hetmanate. This was not an easy matter for the *Kollegia* to implement. Veliaminov had no precedents, no data and absolutely no cooperation from the *starshyna*. Before initiating the taxation, the perplexed president traveled to St. Petersburg to the Tsar with a long list of questions and problems (foremost among these was the passive resistance of the *starshyna*). But no helpful advice was forthcoming. And so upon his return, Veliaminov began to collect taxes wherever and however he could. Initially, the payment of taxes in Ukraine was, to say the least, uneven. For example, in 1724, the Bolkan company of the Starodub regiment paid 7 rubles in taxes while the Korop company of the Chernyhiv regiment, roughly equal in size, paid 227 rubles. Even more striking was the disparity between the 8 rubles which the Poltava company of the Poltava regiment paid and the 2,276 rubles taken from the Kremets company of the Myrhorod regiment.⁶⁰

Despite the unevenness in the collection of taxes, Veliaminov pushed on doggedly, introducing innovations which would increase the amount collected. Besides initiating the regular collection of taxes, the *Kollegia's* most important innovation was to include the *starshyna* and the higher clergy among the taxpayers. Since these two groups possessed the most wealth in the land, substantial amounts of money could not be collected without their inclusion. To make sure that the *starshyna* paid its allocated sums, Russian subalterns were assigned to supervise the collections. In order to further facilitate collection, Ukrainians were expected to pay in cash rather than in kind as had been the case with the Hetman's tax collectors. The results of the *Kollegia's* efforts were

impressive: in 1722, the amount collected was about 45,000 rubles in cash and 17,000 in kind; in 1723, it was 86,000 rubles in cash and 27,000 in kind; and in 1724, it was 141,000 rubles in cash and 40,000 in kind.⁶¹

How did the Ukrainian Cossack leadership in the Hetmanate react to the Tsar's measures? As one who had been implicated, if only peripherally in Mazepa's *izmena*, Hetman Skoropadskyi had long been careful not to allow any doubts about his loyalty to arise. During Orlyk's campaign of 1711, for example, Skoropadskyi's loyalty to the Tsar had been beyond reproach.⁶² But the growing infringement of traditional Ukrainian rights and especially the impending establishment of the *Kollegia* became too much to bear even for a careful man like Skoropadskyi.

On 3 May 1722, the aging Hetman personally appeared in St. Petersburg to argue before Peter I that there was no reason or precedent for the reforms that were introduced or were about to be introduced in Ukraine.⁶³ According to Skoropadskyi, the complaints lodged against the Cossack administration were for the most part the fabrications of the Russian resident in Hlukhiv, Feodor Protasev, a man known for his bribe-taking and intrigue. Even bolder was the Hetman's rebuttal of the Tsar's claims that the Pereiaslav Treaty allowed for Russian interference in Ukrainian affairs:

During the time of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi there were no such courts (as instituted by the *Kollegia*) and no collections of money or bread for the treasury. . . . And only after Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's death were changes made in the (Pereiaslav) articles during the insecure hetmancy of his son, Iurii, and that of Briukhovetskyi. However, later . . . Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich . . . treated Little Russia with his previous graciousness and then the articles of Iurii and of Briukhovetskyi were revoked and the original articles of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi were again granted, even with some additions, to Damian Mnohohrshnyi and Ivan Samoilovych.⁶⁴

Despite Skoropadskyi's uncharacteristic forcefulness, the results of his bold stand were disappointing. Peter I simply ignored the Hetman's arguments and proceeded with his plans to eliminate Ukrainian autonomy.⁶⁵ On 3 July 1722, very soon after his return from St. Petersburg, Skoropadskyi died. Some historians claim that his death was hastened by a deep depression that set in after his fruitless mission.

Skoropadskyi's death raised the issue of succession. Because Peter I was on campaign in Persia, the Senate, which was empowered to act in his name, postponed the election of the Hetman. However, in response to the pressing requests of the *starshyna*, it did allow the influential and respected colonel of Chernyhiv, Pavlo Polubotok, to fulfill the duties of acting Hetman "in concert with" the *heneralna starshyna*. Just as this decision was taken, Veliaminov arrived in Ukraine. A conflict between Polubotok and the Russian Brigadier was unavoidable.

As the *Kollegia* began its work, Polubotok did everything possible to undermine it. He ignored many of Veliaminov's instructions, and refused to provide statistical information. In order to undermine the avowed rationale for the establishment of the *Kollegia*—the alleged complaints from the Ukrainian masses against the Cossack administrative system—Polubotok ordered Ukrainians to lodge their complaints with Ukrainian authorities rather than with imperial institutions. This was only a stop-gap measure. The acting Hetman also tried to eliminate the causes of these complaints. Assessors were assigned to the Cossack courts to improve their performance and to prevent bribe-taking. And the *starshyna* was enjoined to be moderate in its demands on the peasants.⁶⁷ Finally, in December of 1722, Polubotok confronted Veliaminov directly. In a petition to the Senate, he accused the Brigadier of interfering with the Hetman's affairs and of going beyond the limits of his authority.

Surprisingly, the Senate sided with the acting Hetman. It ruled that Veliaminov's task was to cooperate with the Cossack administration, not to order it about. In Peter I's absence, the Senate assumed that the issue in this case was that of the rational delimitation of authority. From this point of view, it was clear that Veliaminov had overstepped his prerogatives. Polubotok's triumph was shortlived, however. As mentioned above, in March 1723, soon after Peter I returned from Persia, Veliaminov hurried to Moscow to present his case to him and to complain about the acting Hetman's obstruction. The Tsar supported Veliaminov completely. It was obvious that he was not interested in the coordination of the *Kollegia's* and the Hetman's functions, but rather in the replacement of the latter by the former.

The stubborn Polubotok did not give in. He was especially adamant about the need to elect a new Hetman. But when he approached the Tsar in this matter, Peter I refused to discuss it. At this point, the Tsar was planning to abolish the hetmancy and there-

fore the Hetman's insistence was especially inopportune. Moreover, Peter I had always distrusted Polubotok (in 1708 he vetoed his candidacy for the hetmancy) because he feared that his influence in Ukraine was too great. There were, moreover, rumors and indications that Polubotok might be in league with Orlyk and the Zaporozhians.⁶⁸ Early in 1724, a denunciation from Ukraine stated that the acting Hetman secretly corresponded with Orlyk. The governor of Kiev was ordered to investigate this matter immediately but, unable to find any evidence, he speculated that Polubotok's power intimidated the Ukrainians from revealing what they knew. Another denunciation accused Polubotok and his associates of corresponding with the Zaporozhians. Convinced of the veracity and importance of this lead, Peter I gave Rumiantsev the following instructions:

Try to send someone to the Zaporozhians (preferably a person who is especially resentful of the *starshyna*) in order that the letters which the *starshyna* wrote to them might be retrieved. For this you can use 5,000 rubles which, I believe, should be enough for the purpose.⁶⁹

On the heels of these denunciations came even more disturbing news from Nepluev in Constantinople:

The French consul arrived from Crimea and secretly informed me that several times this year people from several Cossack commanders in Ukraine . . . came to the leading Tatar *mirza*, Cantimir-bey and complained that their original rights have been revoked. Although they petitioned St. Petersburg in the matter, they were not successful. Therefore, the Ukrainians desire to accept Turkish help because in Ukraine there are many Russian troops. The *mirza* advised Khan Saadet Girei to intervene in these Cossack affairs but the Khan refused because, firstly, the Porte ordered him strictly to maintain peace with Russia and, secondly, because he is a peace-loving man.⁷⁰

The extent to which these denunciations and reports were accurate is difficult to establish. Orlyk does not mention any contacts with Polubotok in his diary. However, there are indications that Orlyk avoided noting extremely sensitive information in his jour-

nal. In any case, it was evident that the situation in Ukraine was tense and that Peter I was nervous about it. Therefore, when, in 1724, Polubotok incited the *starshynà* to petition once more for the election of a new Hetman, the Tsar became furious. The acting Hetman and several of his colleagues were "invited" to St. Petersburg to explain these petitions. There they were arrested, questioned and jailed in the Petro-Pavlovsk fortress. Polubotok did not survive the rigors of imprisonment and, on 29 December 1724, he died. Only the death of Peter I which followed soon after saved his colleagues from a similar fate.

↳ Echoes of the events in Ukraine reached Orlyk in Salonika. However, his perception of what was happening was necessarily incomplete. While aware that the *starshyna* and many rank-and-file Cossacks were deeply dissatisfied with the Russian measures, Orlyk did not know how far-ranging and effective these measures were. He assumed that dissatisfaction in Ukraine would inevitably lead to some sort of uprising against the Tsar. At least this was the way it had always been in Ukraine. But the Hetman-in-exile did not realize how much had changed since the days of Mazepa and how incomparably tighter was the Tsar's grip in Ukraine.

IX

In the Vortex of Diplomatic Intrigue

Salonika was not the worst place to be interned.¹ A large and bustling port, it was one of the most important commercial centers of the Ottoman Empire. It had a varied population of Greeks, Turks and Jews. But, most important for Orlyk, who enjoyed good company and conversation, there was also a sizable European colony comprised mostly of French and English merchants and their respective consuls. Moreover, the city had a Catholic church run by French Jesuits. The commercial and cosmopolitan nature of the town was a blessing to the Hetman for several reasons. Not only was he spared the exclusive company of Muslims, but here he also had access to the latest political information about developments both within the Ottoman Empire and in Europe. Thanks to the fact that Salonika lay on the route which many Greek merchants and Orthodox clergymen took in traveling to and from Ukraine and Russia,² Orlyk was able to keep more or less abreast of the developments among the Zaporozhians and in Ukraine.

These considerations, however, did not obviate the glaring fact that the Hetman was completely at the mercy of the Porte. This was a situation which Orlyk had always tried to avoid. Therefore, from the moment he arrived in Salonika, his primary goal was to free himself from the Ottoman's enforced hospitality.

For years the Hetman had protested to the Porte about his detention, but to no avail.³ However, in 1725, two events occurred that augured well for the Hetman. On 28 January, Peter I died. With the unforgiving Tsar's death, Orlyk's hopes of reaching an understanding with the Russian court were revived. This optimism was reinforced by the fact that Karl Friedrich, the Duke of Holstein, a favorite of Catherine I, knew and sympathized with the Hetman.⁴ It seemed to Orlyk that, with such support, not only would he

receive a pardon, but its terms would be favorable. For the next few years, the Hetman worked on the assumption that an understanding with the Russians offered the best chances of resolving his predicament.

But, another event in 1725 complicated this policy. In September of that year, Louis XV of France married Marie Leszczyńska, daughter of the Polish king-in-exile. Immediately, the chances that the half-forgotten Stanisław Leszczyński might regain his crown rose perceptibly. And during 1726, when European powers again polarized into two distinct camps, these chances improved even more greatly. On the one hand, Austria and Russia concluded an alliance while on the other hand, France, England, Prussia, Denmark, Holland and later, Sweden prepared to establish the Hannover League. The position of Poland was crucial in this diplomatic configuration. If August II joined Russia and Austria, as it seemed likely he would, their alliance would become even more powerful. However, if Stanisław were to be re-elected to the Polish throne to succeed the ailing August II, then Poland could be counted on to favor the Hannover League.⁵

What effect could these diplomatic maneuvers have on the lonely exile in far-off Salonika? Stanisław knew quite well that his candidacy would be opposed by Russia. He also realized that while the Hannover League, especially France, would be willing to lend him diplomatic support, it would be most reluctant to commit its troops to distant Poland to fight for his election. Therefore, Leszczyński had to (a) mobilize military support elsewhere and (b) convince his European supporters that, with the aid of this military support, his candidacy was a realistic one. In looking for potential sources of military support, Stanisław turned to his former allies of the Bender period.

LESZCZYŃSKI, ORLYK AND THE "UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION"

On Saturday 1 June 1726, Orlyk noted in his diary that

After Mass, a Frenchman who works for various French merchants here came running to my lodgings and informed me that some officer who had just arrived from France and was in the harbor asking about me and saying that he had a letter for me. . . . I guessed that if it were from France then it could be from none other than King Stanisław and, indeed, it was. . . .⁶

The officer, Tottandras, a Hungarian in Rakoczi's service, delivered the letter soon afterwards, thereby renewing contact between the two veterans of the Bender period and opening up for the Hetman new opportunities for his political future.

The letter began with an expression of sympathy for the Hetman's fallen fortunes and a promise to do everything possible, with the aid of French as well as English and Dutch contacts, to alleviate Orlyk's predicament. However, Stanisław did not propose to free the Hetman from the Ottoman grasp. On the contrary, he wrote that, "Your Excellency should not leave the land where he is at present because peace between the Porte and Moscow cannot last long and Your Excellency's fortunes can rise only in the event of such a war."⁷ After elaborating on the power and anti-Russian feelings of the Hannover League, the Polish ex-king revealed his reason for writing to the Hetman: he proposed that, for Orlyk's private interests and for the "public good," the Hetman should work "to raise a revolution in Ukraine."⁸

Stanisław did not elaborate on this phrase, nor did he need to. Orlyk knew exactly what was meant. In case of an open conflict with Russia, Orlyk, supported by the Tatars and Ottomans, was to organize a diversionary movement among the Ukrainian Cossacks and thus prevent the Russians from concentrating their full strength in Poland. This was a variant of the strategic plans drafted by Charles XII during his offensive against Peter I and Orlyk was expected to play a role similar to that of Mazepa in 1708. Unlike Charles XII, however, Stanisław did not intend to keep his contacts with the Ukrainian émigré a secret. Should Orlyk agree, the ex-king would spread the idea of a revolution in Ukraine through the courts of the Hannover League as proof that it would be difficult for Russia to oppose his election. Such was the context in which the idea of a Ukrainian revolution against "the Muscovite yoke" would make its final appearance in the courts and chancelleries of Europe and the Ottoman Empire prior to the twentieth century.

One might have expected Orlyk to welcome Stanisław's advances as a means to rise from the political obscurity of Salonika and resume his anti-Russian activity. But Orlyk was not enthusiastic about the letter from France. He had already spent many fruitless years trying to propagate the idea of a revolution against the Russians. Furthermore, he had never had great confidence in Stanisław, for he doubted the ex-king's chances for success and strongly distrusted both his and his allies' motives. He considered Stanisław's

approach to be “a political trick by means of which they (i.e., Stanisław and his French supporters) want to draw me to their and the English side against Moscow and, taking advantage of me, use me for their own ends.”⁹ Moreover, Stanisław had urged Orlyk to remain in the Ottoman Empire while the latter wanted nothing more than to leave it.

But experience had taught the Hetman not to ignore any possibilities of support. Therefore, rather than reject Leszczyński’s advances outright, Orlyk tried to string him along with ambiguous responses, hoping to use his influence with the French to help him leave Salonika. Thus, he thanked the ex-king for the information about the new situation in Europe and stated that he would definitely take it into account. But, according to Orlyk, if Stanisław really wished to help him, he should convince the French to work at the Porte for his release. No mention was made, however, of the revolution in Ukraine.¹⁰

Soon afterwards, French envoys both in Salonika and in Constantinople were instructed to apply pressure on Orlyk to maintain his contacts with Stanisław. On 26 October 1726, the Hetman noted: “On Saturday the French consul persuaded me—actually, forced me—to reply by letter to King Stanisław.” Orlyk added that his reply was “a ceremonial not serious letter.”¹¹ Orlyk sighed with relief when, in April of 1727, he received news of the death of the French ambassador at the Porte, J. D’Andrezel. The latter had earlier contacted him and offered him his services at the Porte. This had put the Hetman in a quandary, for, although he wanted to take advantage of the offer, he did not wish to become associated with the French and their allies. The ambassador’s death spared him much agonizing over a reply.

But no matter how Orlyk maneuvered to avoid a direct reply, Stanisław persisted, plying the Hetman with ever more “temptations.” In March, 1727 he informed him:

The local (i.e., French) court and England have taken my recommendation concerning Your Excellency’s status under consideration. Obviously, all the allies united by the Hanover Treaty see, on the basis of my presentation, what utility Your Excellency’s person and character can have for the common cause for which they are allied. I have also been assured of the possibility of obtaining a subsidy to ease Your Excellency’s difficult situation. . . . From Your Excellency’s side

there should be no delay in demonstrating by means of memorials to the French, English and Dutch envoys (at the Porte) your readiness, for the sake of the public welfare, to create a diversion against Moscow by means of a great Ukrainian revolution.¹²

Another specific promise made by Stanisław was to help Orlyk move either to Bender or Khotyn which, being closer to the Zaporozhians and to his family, was preferable to Salonika. Commenting on this letter, the Hetman noted that, "It is with such temptations that from all sides, King Stanisław from France, the French and English ambassadors from Stambul, tempt and sway me. And from the (Austrian) Emperor and the Empress of Russia I have no positive (response) as to my interests."¹³ Clearly Stanisław's persistence was beginning to have an effect.

Although Orlyk continued to hope and count on obtaining amnesty, he decided that it might be profitable to give the ex-king a more encouraging reply. The result was a remarkable document which provided, on the one hand, a vivid and generally accurate expression of Ukrainian discontent with Russian overlordship and, on the other hand, an insight into Orlyk's clever manipulation of the spectre of a revolution in Ukraine for his own immediate ends.¹⁴

As usual, Orlyk began with profuse expressions of thanks and flowery formulae of gratitude not only for the king's concern for his personal fate, but also for his wish to help the "Cossack nation" regain its ancient liberties. Then the main theme of this epistle was introduced: "There can be no doubt of the (possibility of a) revolution in Ukraine; its sparks are already smoldering and need only to be fanned."¹⁵

To substantiate this point, the Hetman presented a catalogue of Ukrainian grievances against Moscow and the deceased Tsar. As soon as the Swedish peace was signed (in 1721), Peter I—contrary to the pact signed between his father and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi—began systematically to liquidate Cossack rights and privileges and eventually hoped to destroy the Hetmanate itself. If anyone resisted, he was "dispatched to the other world, or to Siberia or some other distant place" and this included the *heneralna starshyna*, the colonels, captains and most of the other people of distinction. In their place, a *Kollegia* consisting of 12 (sic) Muscovites was assigned to rule Ukraine.¹⁶ Should anyone speak out in protest against this

new order, he was given the knout; for this reason, people were afraid to talk to one another openly. This oppression included beatings and other forms of torture and was so widespread that Ukraine became a "place of carnage." All assemblies were forbidden and if they did take place, the participants were arrested and taken to Hlukhiv for interrogation. Cossacks were sent to the war in Persia or to the constructions of the canal linking the Volga with the Ladoga where they perished by the thousands.

As a result, great numbers of Cossacks fled from the Hetmanate into the Right Bank, but mostly to the Zaporozhian *Sich* which was now filled to overflowing with them. Orlyk estimated that there were over 60,000 well-armed and experienced soldiers there, "for in Ukraine, every peasant is a soldier." Finally, the Hetman made what might have been considered by Stanisław an unfortunate analogy: Ukraine now awaited Orlyk just as she had once awaited Khmelnytskyi.

Orlyk's sources of information about the current situation in Ukraine were, according to him, based on contacts with the Zaporozhians and personal visits by Ukrainian monks. On the matter of monks, the Hetman took the opportunity to mention Peter I's repression of the Ukrainian Church. He complained that the Metropolitan of Kiev was now a Russian and that Russian pressure had led many Ukrainian monks to flee to the Right Bank, Moldavia, Wallachia and Mount Athos. These monks were also supposed to have told Orlyk that:

The clergy as well as the general populace await me as if in limbo and rebuke themselves that they did not want to ally themselves with and follow the deceased Mazepa who, in vivid colors, foretold their present fate to them. . . . From all this it may be concluded that a revolution in Ukraine is an assured matter and that there is no need to debate the point further.¹⁷

However, Orlyk rejected Stanisław's suggestion that the uprising be planned in concert with the Tatars and Turks because, "This scum, by enslaving innocent people, would frighten off the populace more than encourage and attract it (to the uprising)."¹⁸ Moreover, the Hetman expressed the fear that Ottoman aid would only give the Porte a pretense to claim overlordship over Ukraine, which would thus, contrary to Orlyk's fervent hopes, pass from

“Scylla to Charybdis,” that is, from the control of Moscow to that of the Porte. If Ottoman aid had to be utilized, it would be best to divert it to the war in Persia, and not to Ukraine.

In conclusion, the Hetman presented three stipulations which he wanted the Hannover League to guarantee before he would commit himself to its side. First, the allies should get him out of Salonika and closer to “his Army.” Second, the Hannover League, or at least the French king, should be willing to accept Ukraine under its protection and force Moscow to sign a statement that it had no pretension to rule over Ukraine. And third, Orlyk asked for a financial subsidy from the allies.

How should the purpose and content of this letter be interpreted? In his diary, Orlyk provided his own suggestions. He noted that, after much thought, he had decided to raise Stanisław’s hopes of a revolution in Ukraine. But, at the same time, he would try to avoid committing himself to the Hannover League. Hence, the unrealistic second stipulation which he knew could not be fulfilled. Apparently, what the Hetman sincerely feared was joining again the side of the Tatars and Ottomans. Never again did he want to aid “these infidels,” as it would lead to the ruin of his soul, the harming of innocent people and the spilling of Christian blood. Orlyk makes quite clear that what he wanted to achieve was to return “in obsequium” to the Russian empire or to the Polish Commonwealth. Referring again to his letter, he remarked: “Let no one be scandalized by what I wrote, for politics demanded that I write thus so that, with the aid of God, I might find my way out of this land.”¹⁹

Soon afterwards, however, such disclaimers became unnecessary. With the death of Catherine I on 6 May 1727 and the subsequent fall from favor of Karl Friedrich of Holstein, the Hetman’s chances of receiving an amnesty dwindled. The return to power of Menshikov, whom Orlyk considered to be his and Ukraine’s sworn enemy, virtually eliminated any hope of pardon.²⁰ Orlyk no longer had any choice; he would now have to cease his flirtations with Leszczyński and commit himself to the cause of the king-in-exile and to the latter’s powerful French patrons.

HRYHOR ORLYK’S FRENCH-SPONSORED MISSION TO THE OTTOMAN PORTE

Although it was Leszczyński who directed French attention to Orlyk, Versailles had other reasons than the election of its candi-

date to the Polish throne for being interested in the Hetman. Confronted by an alliance of Austria and Russia, French strategists hoped to create a *cordon sanitaire* between the two empires which would consist of Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Poland was to be the cornerstone of this coalition. However, since Poland under Leszczyński's rule would clearly be unable to withstand Russian pressure alone, Ottoman and Tatar support would have to be readily available.²¹ In these geo-political speculations, the area between Poland proper and the Ottoman Empire, that is, Ukraine, was of crucial importance. Only if Orlyk and the Zaporozhians could be utilized as a link between Leszczyński's Poland and the Ottomans, did the French feel it would be worth coming to the aid of the exiled Hetman.

The man entrusted with the implementation of these plans was the new French ambassador to Constantinople, Marquis Louis-Sauveur de Villeneuve.²² He arrived in the Ottoman capital in the fall of 1728 and remained there for more than a dozen years in the course of which he earned for himself a well-deserved reputation as one of France's greatest diplomats. Initially, Villeneuve's major goal was to coax the passive Ottoman government to take a more resolute stand against the Russians. In connection with this task, the French ambassador attempted to establish closer contacts with Orlyk.²³ But the Hetman's isolation in Salonika stood in the way of any meaningful cooperation. A solution to this problem came from an unexpected quarter.

Late in October of 1729, Józef Potocki, the *wojewoda* of Kiev, and his brother, Teodor, the primate of Poland, established contact in Poland with the Hetman's eldest son, Hryhor, who was serving in August II's army on a commission provided by the now deceased Flemming. Apparently, the Potockis, strong supporters of Stanisław, had decided on their own to mobilize their former Ukrainian ally for their cause and Hryhor was chosen as a means to this end.

Through the mediation of G. Zulich, another old acquaintance of Orlyk's from the Bender days and the current Swedish ambassador in Warsaw, a meeting was arranged at which Hryhor, the Potockis, Zulich and the Marquis A. Monti, the French ambassador to Poland, were present.²⁴ Zulich provided Monti with an historical sketch of Mazepa's and Orlyk's activity, concluding with the statement that the Zaporozhians remain faithful to Orlyk and "only wait for an opportunity to rebel against Russia and regain their old liberties."²⁵ The outcome of this meeting was that Hry-

hor, armed with the recommendations of the Potockis, Zulich and Monti, was secretly dispatched to France to present his father's case before higher authorities.

This co-option of Hryhor by Stanisław's supporters introduced into Orlyk's future political plans and orientation a factor whose importance cannot be overestimated. Hryhor was to become a mobile and effective representative of his father's interests and of "the cause of Cossack liberties" in royal courts from Stockholm to Bakhchesarai. It was he who, more or less in accordance with his father's wishes, would present the arguments for "a revolution in Ukraine" to the courts of the Sultan and the Khan.

Hryhor was well-received in France.²⁶ On 10 December, Stanisław welcomed him at his residence in Chambord, where he received further instructions and more letters of recommendation to Chauvelin, the French Foreign Minister, and to Leszczyński's daughter, the Queen of France. After a series of meetings with Chauvelin, the French government agreed to finance Hryhor's journey to Salonika for consultations with his father and then to Constantinople to collaborate with Villeneuve for Orlyk's release and permission for him to join the Zaporozhians.²⁷

In early April, Hryhor boarded ship in Marseilles and, on 15 May, his father could happily note, "On Monday, on exactly the same day as the one on which, in 1721, God afflicted me with the death of my exceptionally beloved and dearest son, Jakub, in His unbounded and unending pity, He cheered me with the arrival to this port from France of my dearest and deeply beloved son, Hryhor."²⁸ For fear of spies, Hryhor was traveling under the name of Captain Hag, a Swiss officer, and, after not having seen each other for almost a decade, father and son had to pretend in public that they were strangers to each other.

However, during Hryhor's nearly four week stay, father and son had ample opportunity to converse in private about preparations for Hryhor's mission to the Porte. Orlyk instructed his son about the arguments which might convince the Grand Vizir to release him from Salonika and allow him to join or move closer to the Zaporozhians.

The Hetman's main objective was to convince the Grand Vizir of his usefulness to the Porte.²⁹ Referring to the constant problems which the Grand Vizir and the Crimean Khan had with the Zaporozhians, Orlyk argued that such difficulties would not arise if he were allowed to return to the Zaporozhians, restore discipline

among them and maintain smooth relations between them and the Khan. He added that, "It was my long absence from the Host which has not only brought the Zaporozhians but the entire Cossack people to dire straits."³⁰ Although the Hetman carefully avoided giving the impression that he hoped for an Ottoman-Russian war, he did emphasize the superior fighting skill of the Zaporozhians and their potential usefulness to the Porte.

Orlyk also prepared a lengthy set of instructions for Villeneuve indicating the arguments which the French ambassador should raise while discussing his case with the Grand Vizir.³¹ Villeneuve was asked to stress the positive role the *Sich* could play in the future both of Ukraine and of the Ottoman Empire:

With their (i.e., the Zaporozhians') return to Muscovite rule, all hopes of liberation among the people of Ukraine who suffer under the tyrannical (Muscovite) yoke, would disappear since they would no longer be able to escape to their brothers-in-arms at the *Sich* and they could no longer contemplate an uprising. In this manner the Porte would lose its advantage.³²

In his advice to Villeneuve, Orlyk also discussed in greater detail the service he could render to the Porte if he were transferred to Bender or Khotyn, that is, closer to the Zaporozhians. From there he could easily work to persuade the Zaporozhians to remain under Ottoman protection which he felt was their greatest hope for the liberation of their fatherland. He would also counter the spread of pro-Russian sentiments among the Cossacks. But, most importantly, he could "create channels for concealed communication with the local *starshyna* and take counsel with the *starshyna* by means of these secret contacts."³³

In mid-June, Hryhor personally delivered his father's letter to the Grand Vizir and his instructions to Villeneuve in Constantinople. But Hryhor soon discovered that, in contrast to his easy successes in Warsaw and Versailles, dealing with Ibrahim Pasha was a frustrating undertaking.

Because of difficulties which the Russians were creating for the Ottomans in Persia, the Grand Vizir did not want to discuss Orlyk's case. According to Villeneuve, he feared that the Hetman might either provoke a war with the Russians or defect to their side if brought closer to the Zaporozhians.³⁴ Upon learning about the

Grand Vizir's fears, Orlyk, in a letter to Hryhor, gave vent to his contempt for Ibrahim Pasha. He also provided a very sober and realistic view of his own capabilities:

I am not, thank God, so deprived of intelligence and so desperately mad as to attack thoughtlessly with a handful of men, and irregulars at that, such a great power (as Russia), starting out like a lion and perishing like a fly.³⁵

In a moment of anger, Orlyk at last revealed a more realistic and straightforward assessment of his own situation. There was no talk here about an imminent "revolution in Ukraine," and the reference to the Hetman's potential force was not to a 60,000 or 100,000 man Cossack army, but rather to "a handful of men, and irregulars at that."

The Hetman also pointed out that the Russians had over 30,000 regular troops in Ukraine. These could be resisted by the Zaporozhians and other Cossacks only if they recaptured the artillery that Peter I had seized when he destroyed Baturyn and the *Sich*, and if Poland and Sweden came to their aid. Further in the letter, Orlyk softened his tone considerably and repeated that, although he did not doubt the feasibility of mounting a revolution in Ukraine, he stressed that it could not take place without foreign aid. To this he added sarcastically: "Is it not curious that I, resting in their beautiful protection here, am without sufficient funds even to buy horses and forage for several of my people . . . and yet they fear that I may prematurely start a war!"³⁶

However, Orlyk did make a suggestion to Hryhor. If it appeared that the Ottomans were beginning to concentrate their attention on the Persian front, he should state that, if his father were allowed to join the Zaporozhians, he would station them on the Dniester and protect this Ottoman border in case the Russians felt tempted to take advantage of Ottoman involvement in Persia.³⁷ This was a landmark proposal in the history of Orlyk's relations with the Porte. Almost twenty years earlier, in 1712-1713, when the Porte had wanted the Hetman to perform just this type of function by taking the Right Bank under its protection, Orlyk refused to do so because he felt it was demeaning to serve as a guardian of "infidel" borders. Now he pleaded for a chance to perform this very service. Although this was partially a ploy to obtain his release from Salonika, it also indicated how much Orlyk's position had deteriorated since the Bender days.

As for the Porte's fear that he might defect to the Russians, Orlyk stated that he "would prefer to die a thousand times than to do homage to that 'Moldavian scum'," Apostol (the current Hetman in Ukraine), by placing at his feet the insignia of the hetmancy which Orlyk felt only he rightfully possessed. In conclusion, Orlyk expounded on how little one could trust Russian promises and how his former compatriots, who had mistakenly believed the Russians and returned to Ukraine, were now suffering imprisonment and exile. "In the end," he remarked, "let him who does not know what the Muscovite *fides* is, rashly depend on it! I, (for my part), have had too much experience with that people's inherent slyness, falsehood and deceit."³⁸

Neither Hryhor nor Villeneuve would have another chance to approach Ibrahim Pasha in Orlyk's behalf again. As a result of Ottoman defeats in Persia and the subsequent uprising of Patrona Halil (Septemer, 1730), the Grand Vizir lost his office and his life, while his father-in-law was removed from the throne. For a brief while it appeared that Canum Hoca, a proponent of an aggressive policy toward the Russians and an acquaintance of Orlyk's who was well informed about the Ukrainian situation, might use his great influence with the new government to aid the Hetman. But, it soon became evident that the new Grand Vizir, Kabakulak Ibrahim Pasha, intended to follow his predecessor's passive policy toward the Russians. This meant that now Hryhor and his father could not count on the Porte for any support at all.

HRYHOR ORLYK'S MISSION TO THE CRIMEA

While the upheavals in Constantinople in 1730 did not bring Orlyk any immediate benefits at the Porte, they did work to his advantage in the Crimea. As a result of Ibrahim Pasha's overthrow, Kaplan Girei, another old veteran of the Bender days, returned again to the throne from exile in Chios.³⁹ On his way home, Kaplan Girei stopped in Constantinople where he had a long discussion with Villeneuve. The French ambassador was delighted to learn that the Khan was still a dedicated anti-Russian. Moreover, Kaplan Girei promised to mobilize 150,000 Tatars to come to Leszczynski's aid even if the Porte refused to support the Polish exile.⁴⁰ And when Orlyk's name was brought up, the Khan warmly called the Hetman "one of his good friends" and promised to do his best to reunite him with the Zaporozhians.⁴¹ In view of these statements, Villeneuve and Hryhor decided that both Orlyk and Leszczynski

should establish direct contacts with the Khan and in so doing decrease their dependence on the Porte. But, before this could be done, official approval would have to be obtained from both Stanisław and the French government. Therefore, in early October of 1731, Hryhor set out from Constantinople to France to consult with the Polish King-in-exile and the French foreign minister.

On 9 December 1731, Hryhor arrived for the second time at Stanisław's residence at Chambord. He presented him with a report of the past year's activity and about plans for the future.⁴² Stanisław quickly gave his support to the idea of establishing direct contact with the Khan and trying to bring the elder Orlyk into closer proximity to him. Adding his own lengthy recommendations and instructions to those Hryhor already had from Villeneuve and his father, he sent the young man off to Versailles. There, during the last week of December, Hryhor had meetings with Chauvelin and Fleury to discuss his plans and to obtain formal French support for them. In order to elaborate and substantiate the reasons for undertaking a mission to the Khan, the younger Orlyk presented them with a series of six memorials.⁴³

In one of these, Hryhor dealt with the question of Cossack-Tatar and, partly, Cossack-Ottoman ties. After pointing out that the Russians could have no claim to his father because of his Polish origin, Hryhor added the usual remarks about Russian oppression in Ukraine. Throughout the memorial he stressed that the Cossacks were "une nation libre" and that, in order to preserve or regain this status, they had the right to seek protection from whoever would provide them the greatest benefit:

Whereas the Zaporozhian Host, of which my father is the leader, has always been a free people, it has looked for protection where it was most advantageous. . . . The conclusion of this eternal alliance (the 1711 treaty) unites and serves inseparably the interests of both peoples (the Ukrainian Cossacks and Tatars), and no one can come between them except by unanimous consent of both peoples.⁴⁴

As an example of how deep and widespread the appreciation of this treaty was among the Tatars themselves, Hryhor pointed to the revolt of the *mirzas* in 1724, emphasizing the connection between the uprising and Saadet Girei's attempt to break the treaty by handing the Zaporozhians back to the Russians. This event, according to Hryhor, only underscored the eternal alliance and the

common interests linking the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars. However, and this was probably for the benefit of Stanisław and the Poles, the younger Orlyk also added that the alliance with the Tatars did not mean that the Zaporozhians were indefinitely bound to remain under the Khan's protection, but that they could always choose the overlord who best suited their interests. But, in the near future, the Ukrainians should renew their treaty with the Tatars and, when the time came for Stanisław to make his bid for the Polish crown, the two allies could attack the Russians from the south while the Swedes attacked from the north. This was, of course, a repetition of the projects the elder Orlyk had proposed to Flemming in 1720-1721.

The French response to these arguments was favorable.⁴⁵ Apparently, the analogy with 1711-1712 and the documents from that period impressed Chauvelin and, contrary to the Hetman's fears, neither he nor Cardinal Fleury found anything to criticize in the charter of Ahmet III. As a result of these conferences, Hryhor was provided with funds for his journey to the Khan's capital at Bakhchesarai and promised even greater remuneration if his mission were successful.⁴⁶ Most important, however, the French agreed to give the younger Orlyk a royal letter of recommendation to the Khan.⁴⁷ As Hryhor later informed his father, even Stanisław was surprised that such a recommendation was given. The young Orlyk explained the French willingness to comply by their desire, in view of the imminent crisis in Poland, to embroil the Russians and Austrians in Tatar and Ottoman problems.

When, in March of 1732, Hryhor set out for his second mission to the East—this time he traveled under the name of La Motte—his father again showered him with instructions.⁴⁸ Orlyk advised his son to remind Kaplan Girei of that hoary "document" from the Bender period in which were outlined the alleged plans of Peter I for the conquest of Ukraine, Poland and the Crimea. The Hetman also noted that the Treaty of 1711 would probably have to be renewed but only on the condition that general war was imminent and the Zaporozhians were consulted. Finally, Orlyk brought up a disquieting matter. In a previous letter to his son, the Hetman had warned him not to try to contact or visit the Zaporozhians. This had puzzled Hryhor. Now Orlyk explained the reasons for this advice. Recently he had heard that, "It was not my name, but that of the colonel of Myrhorod (Danylo Apostol, the current Hetman in Ukraine) which was read out in church services at the *Sich*."⁴⁹

This fact was only a reaffirmation of other information that

Orlyk had received concerning the growing strength of the pro-Russian orientation among the Zaporozhians. He also informed his son that not long ago a delegation of Zaporozhians had gone to the court of Empress Anna Ivanova to request her protection over the Host. Although the request was refused as untimely, due to the Russians' unwillingness to enter into a conflict with the Ottomans at this point, the Zaporozhians received a verbal promise that, at the appropriate moment, they would be granted protection. Under these circumstances, the Hetman felt that it would be dangerous for his son to go among the Zaporozhians lest he be kidnapped and sent off to Apostol or to the Russian court.⁵⁰

Undaunted by this unpleasant information and unwilling to change his plans, in early July 1732, Hryhor set out from Constantinople to the Khan's capital at Bakhchesarai.⁵¹ Soon after his arrival there, he was received in audience by the Khan.⁵² The discussion concentrated on the Tatars' support of Stanisław, which, as far as the French were concerned, was the primary goal of the mission. Kaplan Girei again promised his aid but feared that the position of the Porte was not yet clear on this issue due to Austrian and Russian bribes, and suggested that the French and Stanisław concentrate their efforts at the Porte. In his next audience, Hryhor hoped to bring up the matter of his father and the Zaporozhians. At this point, however, complications arose. A Polish envoy, who knew Hryhor personally, arrived at the Khan's court from August II. Because Hryhor did not wish to be recognized by the Poles, he stayed away for several weeks from the Khan's court. Later, other obstacles arose, so that it was almost two months before the young Orlyk again saw the Khan.

In October, Hryhor was granted two final audiences: one with the Khan and the other with his Vizir, Hacı Ali Aga. He tried to convince the Khan that the Zaporozhians and Ukrainian Cossacks in general did not want to be under Russian or Polish control and that they were satisfied with their union and treaty with the Tatars—a union which, he added, was equally beneficial to the Khanate in view of increasing Russian pressure. But, to obtain maximum advantage from this treaty, Orlyk would have to be reunited with his Army.

The Khan, choosing to overlook the recent difficulties with the Zaporozhians, replied:

It is not only from today that he is aware of the advantages a

liaison with the Cossack nation offers and which he always tried to preserve. He tried not to violate any of the articles of the treaty and he hopes that now the Host is content after he has come on the throne. He now protects it (the Host) against the moves of its enemies better than ever before. And since the treaty has made them guests and friends, he, during his exile in Brusa, always regretted the manner in which this Host was being neglected since the Zaporozhian Cossacks only wait for an opportunity to cause discomfort to the Muscovites.⁵³

Concerning the specific problem of releasing Orlyk from Salonika, the Khan convinced Hryhor that he was sincere in his efforts to help the Hetman. He blamed the pro-Russian Chief Dragoman, Ghika, for sabotaging his attempts to free Orlyk from his internment. Kaplan Girei stated that, instead of sending the Hetman to Jassy as he had previously suggested, it would be better to bring him to the Crimea, since the Moldavian Hospodar was also suspected of pro-Russian sympathies. Furthermore, the Khan promised to write a letter in Orlyk's behalf to the Grand Vizir.

Shortly thereafter, Hryhor had a long meeting with the Vizir, Haci Ali Aga.⁵⁴ He described him as a man of experience and another old acquaintance of his father's from the Bender days. When the problem of Tatar-Zaporozhian relations came up in the conversation, the Vizir showed himself to be more straightforward and frank than the Khan. Although he admitted that the Poles and Russians were mistreating the Ukrainian Cossacks, that did not mean that the Tatars should interfere in the affairs of their non-Muslim neighbors. Haci Ali Aga made it clear that, to date, he personally was not sure whether the Tatars' relationship with the Zaporozhians had brought the Khanate more good than harm. In any case, it was obvious that the Zaporozhians had not behaved themselves very well vis-a-vis the Khan and the Tatars during their stay within the Khanate. However, the Vizir even went so far as to state that, personally, he would not be opposed to the liquidation of the alliance with the Zaporozhians and to allowing them to go where they wished.⁵⁵

Hryhor admitted that the Zaporozhians were of a "turbulent and inconstant humor" and sometimes let themselves be carried away. But he attributed their anarchistic tendencies to the lack of a strong commander who could establish military discipline among them. Clearly, the elder Orlyk was the man who could do this, and this

again provided the reason for his release from Salonika. Hryhor reminded the Vizir that, in general, it was in the interests of the Tatars to have the Zaporozhians on their side and that he should not allow the action of a few rogues blind him to their common interests. In conclusion, Haci Ali Aga admitted to Hryhor that he agreed with his arguments and said that he would advise that protection to the Zaporozhians be continued, "since they reject the Muscovites as well as the Poles and have no other support than our aid."⁵⁶

Before leaving Bakhchesarai, Hryhor received important letters from the Khan to Louis XV, Stanisław, Villeneuve and Orlyk. He assured his correspondents of his best intentions and promised them his active support.⁵⁷ Thus, to a great extent, Hryhor's mission could be considered a success. This certainly was the opinion of Villeneuve when the young Orlyk returned to Constantinople on 14 November.

There were several reasons for the Orlyks' success with the Khan as opposed to their failure at the Porte. First, the Tatars had always been more attuned to Russian expansion southwards and they had long ago realized the need to cooperate with the Zaporozhians against this common threat. Secondly, the return of Kaplan Girei and his associates—almost all of them veterans of the Bender period—assured the Orlyks of an understanding for their goals and problems which previous Khans like Saadet or Mengli Girei were unwilling or incapable of providing. Finally, Russian influence at the Khan's court, unlike that at the Porte, was virtually nonexistent and therefore could not work to the detriment of the Hetman's interests.

X

The Denouement

The first half of the 18th century in Europe was marked by a series of conflicts over issues of succession. Since these conflicts were foreseeable, the parties involved had time to prepare themselves for the coming confrontations. This was certainly true in the case of the Polish succession. For years, August II's health had been deteriorating. During this time, Leszczyński worked feverishly to obtain the backing of France, England, Holland, the Ottomans and the Tatars. The Polish candidate also counted on the support of Orlyk and his "Ukrainian Revolution." But the powers which opposed the election of Leszczyński, that is, Prussia, Austria and Russia—the "Alliance of the Black Eagles"—also had time to prepare. After some hesitation, they finally agreed to support the candidacy of August II's son, August III. Meanwhile, the Russians, aware of Leszczyński's contacts with Orlyk, began to make the necessary military and political adjustments in case the conflict in Poland spread to the Russian-Ottoman border and involved Ukraine.

From the Russian point of view, Ukraine had all the makings of a potential trouble spot. Orlyk's activity abroad, the dangerous proximity of the Zaporozhians, the recurrent possibilities of a Tatar-Ottoman intervention were worrisome enough. But St. Petersburg was also well aware that discontent with Russian rule was widespread in the land, especially among the politically crucial *starshyna*. Therefore, as long as the possibility of an Ottoman war and especially one combined with the Polish conflict loomed large, Russian statesmen attached great importance to Ukrainian affairs.

UKRAINE IN THE POST-PETRINE PERIOD

Initially, Peter I's death did not bring about major policy changes

in the Hetmanate. The election of a new Hetman continued to be put off and Polubotok's associates, like Savych, Charnysh, and later, Apostol, remained in confinement in St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, the *Malorossiiskaia Kollegia* lorded over the Ukrainians and sought to send its roots deeper into the land.

On 27 May 1726, "For the sake of more effective conduct of affairs," Veliaminov requested the Senate to transfer the *Kollegia* from Hlukhiv, near the Russian border, to a more centrally located town in Ukraine such as Nizhyn or Pryluky.¹ He also petitioned for permission to erect a building suitable for housing the Russian bureaucrats. But, most importantly, the *Kollegia* requested that its members be allowed to hold their appointments permanently rather than on an alternating basis. Not to be outdone by the bureaucrats, Russian officers in Ukraine also strove to establish themselves more comfortably. On 23 June 1727, the *Voennaia Kollegia* petitioned for the right to acquire permanent quarters for the ten regiments stationed in the Hetmanate.²

Not all of these requests received a positive response from St. Petersburg. The Supreme Secret Council, the most influential imperial institution during the reigns of Catherine I and Peter II, rejected the military's request for permanent quarters and Veliaminov's petition for the relocation of the *Kollegia*. In doing so the Council reflected a new sensitivity to the discontent among the Ukrainians. (At about this time a Russian official in the Hetmanate anxiously reported to St. Petersburg that, "I hear of great wrongs that have been inflicted on the local people by members of the *Kollegia* and there are many petitions (*chelobitiia*) directed against the deeds of the members (of the *Kollegia*) as well as their scribes.")³

At a meeting of the Council on 11 February 1726, Menshikov, F. M. Apraksin, G. I. Golovkin and D. M. Golitsyn debated a proposal to make concessions to the Ukrainians. The Council decided to recommend to Catherine I that, "Before a rupture occurs with the Turks, a person who is worthy and loyal should be chosen as Hetman in order to satisfy and coddle the local populace."⁴ It was, incidentally, on these conciliatory tendencies as well as on his close ties with the Duke of Holstein, who was also a member of the Council, that Orlyk based his hopes for amnesty during this period. In addition, the Council also concluded that it would be wise to deal again with the Ukrainians on the basis of the traditional terms, that is, those based on the Pereiaslav Treaty. Finally, the *Kollegia* was to be instructed to limit its functions to those of the

highest appellate court and cease its intervention in the administration of the Hetmanate. As Krupnytskyi correctly noted, this proposal of the Council was a compromise: while traditional Ukrainian rights were to be reinstated, the *Kollegia*, albeit with reduced authority, was still to maintain its presence in Ukraine.⁵

Several weeks later, this proposal elicited a sharply negative response from one of the members of the Council, P. A. Tolstoi, who argued:

I could not concur with the advice to allow a Hetman (to be elected) in Little Russia since His Imperial Highness of blessed memory did not allow the election of Hetmans and reduced the power of colonels and *starshyna* so that he could take Ukraine (firmly) into his hands. In this way, conflicts were brought about between the Hetmans, colonels and *starshyna* (on the one hand) and their subjects (on the other). If today a Hetman were allowed to be elected and the *starshyna* were allowed to regain its previous power, then, in view of the current state of affairs between Russia and Turkey, this could have dangerous consequences.⁶

This echo of Peter I's Ukrainian policy had a powerful effect on Catherine I. She rejected the Council's recommendations and agreed to only one concession: that the *starshyna* detained in the Polubotok affair, notably the highly respected Danylo Apostol, colonel of Myrhorod, be allowed to return to Ukraine (but only if he left his son as hostage in St. Petersburg).⁷ The *Malorossiiskaia Kollegia's* hold on Ukraine now seemed more secure than ever.

At this point, however, opposition to the *Kollegia* appeared from an unexpected quarter. After the death of Catherine I on 6 May 1727, A. D. Menshikov, acting as guardian for Peter II, became the de facto regent of the empire. This old and bitter enemy of Mazepa's and Orlyk's now emerged as a champion of Ukrainian rights. What lay behind the powerful Menshikov's new-found sympathy for the Ukrainians and his animosity toward the *Kollegia*?

To put it simply, it was a matter of vested interests. As indicated earlier, Menshikov controlled 55,175 peasants in Ukraine, a fact which made him one of the largest landowners in the land. When the *Kollegia* imposed its taxes, the Tsar's favorite was hard hit. During Peter I's reign Menshikov refrained from confronting Veli-

aminov and his associates, but soon after the Tsar's death, a conflict erupted between him and the *Kollegia* over the issue of taxation.⁸ As long as Catherine I reigned, the *Kollegia* could count on support from St. Petersburg. But, as soon as Menshikov came to power, the fate of the *Kollegia* was sealed. One of the first orders of the Council, issued less than a week after the death of the Empress, forbade Russians from acquiring land in Ukraine, "So that no harm might come to the Little Russian people."⁹ Apparently, Menshikov had this measure passed in order to keep out Russian competitors from the Hetmanate. The same order abolished the taxes imposed by the *Kollegia* and the per-capita tax collected for the support of Russian troops. On 16 June, the Council decided to return the responsibility for supervising Ukrainian affairs from the Senate to the *Kollegia* of Foreign Affairs. In July, Veliaminov was axed. He was ordered to appear in St. Petersburg with all of the *Kollegia's* accounts.¹⁰ With the *Kollegia's* dismantlement, the final step towards the restoration of the forms, if not of all of the content, of Ukrainian autonomy had been taken.

On 20 June 1727, the Council appointed a member of the Senate, Fedor Naumov, to go to Ukraine to supervise the election of a new Hetman. There was little doubt about who the new Hetman would be—Danylo Apostol, who was the colonel of Myrhorod and who had very strong personal and commercial ties with Menshikov, was elected on 29 September 1727. Two days earlier, the Council had issued an *ukaz* abolishing the *Malorossiiskaia Kollegia*.

But the man who had been instrumental in pushing through these concessions to the Ukrainians did not stay in power long enough to see the election of the Hetman. On 9 September, at the behest of Peter II, Menshikov had been removed from all his offices. Even at his downfall, Menshikov's close ties with Ukraine were evident. According to Lefort, the Polish envoy to St. Petersburg, when he realized that his position was hopeless in the capital, Menshikov asked the Tsar for permission to retire to Ukraine and to take over the office of Hetman. This request, however, was denied.¹¹ Nevertheless, Peter II did not revoke the concessions made to the Ukrainians and the election of Apostol was allowed to proceed. These conciliatory measures taken during the reign of Peter II toward the Ukrainians helped to a large extent to defuse some, if not all of their dissatisfaction with Russian rule.

THE ZAPOROZHFIANS RETURN TO RUSSIAN SOVEREIGNTY

For Orlyk, the election of Apostol was both a personal and a political setback. Personally, he had always been on bad terms with the former colonel of Myrhorod whom he considered to be a man of mean birth and of an extremely opportunistic nature. Politically, the easing of tensions in the Hetmanate made any attempt at "raising a revolution in Ukraine" even more difficult. Furthermore—and this was of crucial importance to Orlyk's role as a political figure—the relaxed Russian hold on the Hetmanate made amnesty all the more attractive to the Zaporozhians who were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the overlordship of the Crimean Khan.

Friction between the Zaporozhians and their Tatar neighbors had increased in the late 1720s. As always, a major reason for this was socio-economic in nature. During the greater part of their sojourn in the Khanate, the Cossacks had had a difficult time earning a living. As mentioned earlier, in retaliation for its "betrayal," the Tsar had banned all commercial intercourse between the *Sich* and the Hetmanate. This was a severe economic blow since it deprived the Zaporozhians of an outlet for their exports (primarily salt and the products of fishing and hunting) and virtually eliminated the profit they gained from their favored position on the trade route between the Hetmanate and the Crimean and Ottoman commercial centers.

As long as the possibility of war with Peter I existed, both the Khans and the Porte recognized the need to compensate the Zaporozhians for their losses. In 1711-1713, the Porte supplied Orlyk with provisions and subsidies for his men. The Tatars, for their part, placed the income from several major fording places on the Dnieper and Boh Rivers at the disposal of the *Sich*.¹² The Zaporozhians were also given the right to gather salt in the lakes of the Crimea without paying the usual fees, while the treaties with the Khanate and the Porte stipulated that the Zaporozhians could engage in trade within the Khanate and the Ottoman Empire without paying higher rates than did Muslim merchants. But, only a few years after these concessions were made, did the Zaporozhians begin to feel the negative economic effects of their alliance with the Tatars.

After the hostilities with the Russians ceased, the Khans demanded that the Zaporozhians participate in campaigns against their enemies in distant Kuban and Circassia. Unlike the Russian Tsars, the Khans did not pay for such services, expecting their men to recompense themselves with booty (which was usually scarce in such difficult campaigns). Invariably, the Zaporozhians incurred more expense than profit from such ventures. Furthermore, they were accused, probably by their Tatar competitors in the salt trade, of allowing their compatriots from the Hetmanate, disguised as Zaporozhians, to use the Crimean salt works to which they had access. As a result of these accusations, the rights of the *Sich* in these areas were revoked.

Probably the most vexing problems were caused by the *Sich's* Nogai neighbors. The Zaporozhians often complained that the nomads stole their horses and cattle. Even worse, they interfered with fishing and hunting, frequently abducting the Zaporozhians thus engaged and selling them as slaves to the Circassians. When the *koshovyi* brought such complaints against the Nogais to the Crimean courts, the judges invariably favored their co-religionists.

Not surprisingly, many Zaporozhians turned to brigandage, often raiding Polish and Russian controlled territories in search of plunder. This brought down the wrath not only of the Poles and Russians on them but also that of the Tatar and Ottoman border officials, who, not wishing to irritate their neighbors, severely punished the trespassers for such raids.

As for the Tatar point of view, it was best summarized by the Crimean Grand Vizir, Haci Ali Aga, who stated that he was not sure whether the "union" with the Zaporozhians had done the Tatars more harm than good. The Khans undoubtedly had a difficult time controlling the Zaporozhians as illustrated by the latter's decision, after the first abortive attempt, to leave the site provided by the Khan at Oleshki and return to the site of the old *Sich* at Bazaluk. This event, which occurred in 1728, was motivated to a great extent by the desire of the Zaporozhians to be as far away as possible from the authority of the Khan. Another high point of tension was reached in 1731 when, during a minor altercation, some Zaporozhians killed a Nogai *mirza*. Kaplan Girei, supposedly accompanied by close to forty *mirzas* and several thousand Nogais practically besieged the *Sich* in order to have the guilty parties surrendered and amends made.¹³

As similar altercations continued to take place during the fol-

lowing years, the long-expected death of August II of Poland occurred on 1 February 1733. Immediately, all the interested parties put their well-prepared plans into effect. Stanisław, assisted by Hryhor, prepared to leave France and present himself for election in Poland; the Russians prepared their troops for an intervention in Poland; and the Tatars and Ottomans finally decided to join the anti-Russian camp. In Constantinople, Villeneuve worked feverishly to activate the plan for a Tatar-Zaporozhian diversionary attack against the Russians. On 25 November 1733, he wrote to his government that, "I am using all possible means to have the Tatars attack Muscovy and to have Orlyk finally allowed to leave Turkey and join his army."¹⁴ The Khan vigorously seconded the French ambassador's efforts in this matter. At long last, on 12 March 1734, Villeneuve was able to report to his government that, "The present Grand Vizir, Ali Pasha, decided to allow Orlyk to leave Salonika and proceed to the Crimea."¹⁵ Some three weeks later, after having left the place of his twelve-year detention, Orlyk was reported on his way to Kaushany to meet with the Khan to prepare to go to the aid of Stanisław.

While on his way to join the Zaporozhian Host, the Hetman heard the shocking news that the Zaporozhians had already made arrangements to go over to the protection of the Russian Empress. This was a terrible blow to Orlyk. Yet, it could have hardly been avoided. It was precisely those same forces which had finally freed the Hetman from Salonika—the Polish crisis, the Russian intervention, the preparation of the Khan to go to Stanisław's aid—that also enabled the Zaporozhians to abandon the Tatars. And the Russians had just been waiting for such an opportunity to accept the Zaporozhians. Early in 1734, Nepliuev had been instructed to inquire how the Porte would react in such an event and to prepare arguments justifying Russian acceptance of the Zaporozhians.¹⁶ Both Nepliuev and his government agreed that this case was extremely delicate as it might involve the Russians in a war with the Porte before the Polish question was settled. However, as soon as the Russians heard about the intention of the Porte to release Orlyk, they felt justified in accepting the Zaporozhians. On 8 May 1734, the Zaporozhian Host, while still on Ottoman soil, was formally pardoned and granted the protection of the Empress Anna Ivanovna.

The importance of this event as a turning point in the life and career of Orlyk can hardly be exaggerated. The very basis for two

decades of political proselytizing had suddenly been pulled out from under the Hetman's feet. Now it became almost impossible, even theoretically, to claim an influential role in Ukraine and among the Cossacks. In the eyes of his French and Polish supporters, Orlyk now assumed the position of a semi-private individual. Although the Zaporozhian move did not immediately deprive the Hetman of all his usefulness (either actual or potential) to his allies and compatriots, it did underscore the fact that his political role had been dramatically reduced.

Orlyk was not about to accept the new situation without attempting to alter it. Even before the final decision was made to abandon Tatar protection, Orlyk tried to convince the Zaporozhians that they were making a mistake. According to him, his letter to the Host arrived at the same time as did the Empress's envoys bearing rich gifts to the Zaporozhians. A council was held that very day to decide whose arguments were more convincing. The Hetman contended that the rich gifts prevailed over the arguments of reason and duty. Regardless of what the scenario for the reading of the letter might have been, Orlyk's pleas were characteristically long and wordy. The points he stressed can be divided into three categories: political, ideological and pragmatic.¹⁷

The political argument was not original. Just as in his letters to the Zaporozhians in 1720–1721, the Hetman described the international political situation in terms of a great anti-Russian coalition which included most of the European states and the Ottoman Empire. "Muscovy" was politically and military isolated and about to be overwhelmed. He chided the Zaporozhians that, at a time when the Ottoman and Tatar armies were once again ready to move against the Russians and the opportunity to free their fatherland was at hand, they had allowed themselves to be fooled by false Russian promises and lured to what would surely be the losing side in the coming conflict.

Ideologically, the Hetman-in-exile presented the classic Mazepest position. He recounted how, from the time of Khmelnytskyi, Moscow had systematically whittled away Ukraine's rights and privileges by a combination of trickery and force. The high point of this tyranny came under Peter I when an open and vicious attack was made against Ukrainian autonomy as represented by the attempt to abolish the Hetmanate and to establish in its place the *Malorossiiskaia Kollegia* which was merely a guise for putting Russians into governing positions in Ukraine. For obvious rea-

sons, Orlyk did not discuss the changes which were introduced in 1727. The Hetman wondered how the Zaporozhians could be so foolish as to trust the Russians, "Now when the entire Ukrainian nation, your brothers, relatives and cohabitants, woefully and tearfully lament that they did not listen to the well-meant and true warnings of the deceased Hetman Mazepa of blessed memory." Orlyk concluded with the warning: "Beware, my honorable and worthy lads of the Zaporozhian Host, to what kind of friends you have gone or are about to go to."¹⁸

Finally, the ex-Hetman brought up a technical but very important problem. If the Zaporozhians left the Khanate and went over to the Russians, where would they be allowed to settle? The Zaporozhians' traditional lands between the Samara and Orel rivers would remain, as guaranteed by the Russo-Ottoman treaties of 1711, 1712 and 1713, under Ottoman and Tatar jurisdiction. Certainly they could not be so naive as to think that the Russians would risk a war with the Ottomans to regain these wild plains for the Zaporozhians. Nor was there any room for them in the Hetmanate or the Slobodas. Therefore—and here Orlyk reiterated one of his old and most favorite arguments which he had utilized since the time of Mazepa—the Russians would resettle the Zaporozhians in the barren lands across the Volga, far from their fatherland.

Ironically, after years of languishing under Ottoman detention and bemoaning his stay in "that godless Babylon," the ex-Hetman urged the Host to remain under that same rule. The reason for his ire and disappointment was, according to him, that, by their act, the Zaporozhians had undercut all his political plans by irritating the Tatars and "embarrassing me before the Ottoman Porte and the Christian allies, all of whom I have told of the bravery and strength of the Zaporozhian Host."

The Zaporozhian reply was also not without its irony.¹⁹ In a polite and respectful manner, the Zaporozhians stated that, in case of an Ottoman-Russian war, they did not wish to find themselves in a situation where they would fight on the side of the Muslims against their Christian brethren. Knowing Orlyk's religious commitment, they stressed that, should they join Stanisław and Orlyk and attack Ukrainian lands,

Then . . . as usual, when some (Ukrainian) towns would be taken, the Horde would, as it had done in past years (1711 and 1713) at Bila Tserkva and the Slobodas, round up our Chris-

tian people and, returning to Crimea, lead them into eternal slavery. Then we would surely fall from the grace of God and into eternal damnation for (causing) the cries of Christians and the spilling of Christian blood.²⁰

In addition, the Zaporozhians seriously doubted whether the Khan, even if he gained control of Ukraine, would hand the land over to Orlyk this time. Therefore, they advised their former Hetman to desist from his efforts and to seek pardon as they had done. A similar letter, with thanks for his hospitality, was sent to Kaplan Girei.²¹

Unpleasant and painful as this reply may have been for him, Orlyk did not desist. He continued to emphasize the point concerning the Zaporozhian lands and the exchanges became more bitter. When, in one of their letters, the Zaporozhians declared that the land between the Orel and Samara was theirs because they had won it by the sword, the ex-Hetman retorted that it had been won only with Ottoman help at the time of Doroshenko. This must have irritated the Zaporozhians enough for them to counter with personal accusations against Orlyk. They wrote to Russian government officials that the reason the ex-Hetman so adamantly favored the Ottomans was that the Porte had promised him and his descendants title to the lands which he would help to bring under Ottoman suzerainty. Thus, for all practical purposes, Orlyk's speculations, Stanisław's hopes and Kaplan Girei's expectations concerning the "revolution in Ukraine" evaporated in the bitter recriminations between the ex-Hetman and the Zaporozhians.

THE LAST EFFORTS

According to Hryhor, the loss of the Zaporozhian Host left his father in "terrible despair."²² It was compounded by the fact that not only was the ex-Hetman helplessly dependent on the whims of the Ottomans and Tatars, but that he had completely no basis to assert any authority or influence on developing events which could have the greatest significance for both his own personal fate and that of Ukraine. The situation was intolerable and, at the end of 1734 and in early 1735, he tried to organize a military force. With the aid of Ottoman and French funds,²³ Orlyk managed to attract close to a thousand of his old supporters, dissident Zaporozhians and roving Cossacks. An encouraging addition to this force was the

arrival of the famous Cossack chieftain, Sava Chalyi, and his unit (*vataha*) of several hundred horsemen. Orlyk's old colleagues, such as Fedir Nakhymovskyi, Fedir Myrovych and Ivan Hertsyk, also joined him at Kaushany, thus forming the basis of his staff. The Khan seemed pleased enough with Orlyk's efforts to recommend him again to the French king.²⁴

But the funds Orlyk had at his disposal were not enough to maintain a significant military force. In Poland itself, the cause of Stanisław, with which Orlyk was so closely if not enthusiastically linked, was losing ground and the King was about to flee the country before the advancing Russian troops. In view of this, the Khan postponed the planned incursion into Polish territory to support Leszczyński. As a result of these circumstances, just before the outbreak of Ottoman-Russian hostilities (the Russian cabinet of ministers declared war on 16 June 1735), the ex-Hetman was forced to disband his forces and retire with his staff to Bender to await new developments.

Although it was not feasible for Orlyk to carry on any military action against the advancing Russians, he proved to be useful to the Ottomans and Tatars as an advisor, informant and anti-Russian agitator. Indeed, the final years of Orlyk's involvement in the military and political conflicts along the Ottoman-Russian border were characterized by this type of activity. As early as August, 1734, as soon as Orlyk moved nearer to Ukrainian territory, the Russian Empress complained that:

(Orlyk) not only secretly continues to spread his intrigues and malicious suggestions against our empire, but this year he has been brought to the Crimean Khan and there, in proximity to our borders, he creates among our Little Russian subjects unrest and incitement to inimical acts against us, especially (encouraging) conflict and disagreement between us and the Porte.²⁵

In another report, it was noted that the ex-Hetman's activity was especially dangerous because, "he enjoys great esteem at the Porte and especially with the Khan."²⁶

Orlyk also made available his wide range of important contacts, especially in Poland, to the Ottomans. It was through him that, in 1736, in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ottoman territory, a secret meeting was arranged between J. Potocki, the *wojewoda* of

Kiev, and the Ottoman envoy, Ibrahim Pasha, to negotiate for Polish permission for Ottoman and Tatar armies to enter the Right Bank and strike back at the Russians by taking Kiev.²⁷ This plan, however, did not materialize due to Count B. C. Münnich's invasion of the Crimea.

The Ottomans wanted to utilize Orlyk not only on their eastern front, but also further west, against the Austrians. At the end of 1737, an Ottoman offensive was being planned against the Russians' Habsburg allies. In order to take advantage of anti-Habsburg sentiment among the Hungarians, the Porte decided to utilize Jozef Rakoczi (1700–1738), the son of the recently deceased Ferenc Rakoczi (1676–1735), in the same way it had earlier hoped to use Orlyk in Ukraine before the Zaporozhian defection. Now that the ex-Hetman was not capable of leading a diversionary movement against the Russians, the Ottomans probably reasoned that the young Rakoczi could benefit from Orlyk's experience and advice in performing a similar task against the Austrians. In February of 1738, the ex-Hetman was ordered by the Grand Vizir to leave Bender and go to Vidin to join the young Rakoczi there as his official advisor.²⁸

Orlyk, however, was irritated by this assignment. He felt that it was a blow to his pride to serve the "Ungariae Dux" whom he considered his equal and in no way his superior.²⁹ Moreover, he was upset that the Porte had decided to concentrate on the Hungarian problem and that it was ignoring Ukraine. When, at the end of February 1738, the Grand Vizir, Yegen Mehmet Pasha (1737–1739), also arrived at Vidin, Orlyk voiced his dissatisfaction in a personal audience with him:

I am more than a little distressed by my appointment as advisor to Prince Rakoczi, something which is neither valid nor compatible with my rank. I have always been considered as a leader of a nation (*chef d'une nation*) by the Porte and as such I have rightful claims against Russia. It is not in my interests, which are common with those of the Porte, to be kept away from Ukraine where my presence is necessary under the present circumstances.³⁰

The Grand Vizir appeared to be seriously interested in what the ex-Hetman had to say, questioning him in detail about the state of affairs in Ukraine, the condition of the land, the size of the popula-

tion in various towns and villages and, especially, about the political inclinations of the "Cossack nation."³¹ This renewed interest of the Ottomans in Ukrainian matters was most probably the result of French prodding which, in turn, reflected Hryhor's continuous agitation at the French court. Just a few months before the meeting between his father and the Grand Vizir, Hryhor had addressed a long memorial to Fleury (10 October 1737) in which he urged the French to emphasize to the Ottomans the importance of Ukraine in the Porte's war effort against the Russians.³² He had even presented a concrete plan that the Turks should occupy the Right Bank and the towns of Bila Tserkva, Uman and Bar as soon as possible because "he who controls these points controls Ukraine."³³

During his meeting with Orlyk, Yegen Mehmet Pasha reassured the ex-Hetman that the Porte still considered him the leader of "the Cossack nation" and that any Ukrainian territory which Ottoman troops occupied would revert to his rule.³⁴ The Grand Vizir agreed to let the ex-Hetman leave Vidin and return to Jassy, a location closer to the Polish-Ukrainian border. However, the most pleasant news came just before the Grand Vizir left Vidin. In a note to Orlyk, he informed him that Russian prisoners-of-war had revealed that there was unrest and dissatisfaction with the Russians in Ukraine and in the *Sich*. Yegen Mehmet Pasha asked the ex-Hetman to prepare a plan through which the Zaporozhians could again be brought under Ottoman protection and Ukraine be restored to her ancient rights.³⁵

Sometime in the latter part of 1738, Orlyk sent the outline of such a project to the Porte where, according to him, it was not only discussed at a meeting of the Divan, but also approved by Mahmud I in the presence of Khan Mengli Girei II (re-appointed in 1737). Apparently, Orlyk himself was to be called to the Ottoman capital for consultations, but there are no indications that this meeting actually took place. In any case, it was evident that, in the early months of 1739, the Porte was finally acting to take advantage of the anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine and in Poland. In February of 1739, Potocki, through his representative, A. Gurowski, came to an understanding with the Grand Vizir that was to facilitate Ottoman operations on the Right Bank.³⁶ Shortly thereafter, Orlyk was sent to Kaushany to join the Tatars who were preparing for an invasion of the Right Bank. From here he made another attempt to convince the Zaporozhians to return to Ottoman protection. Without even opening the letter, the Zaporozhians sent it on to Mün-

nich. The Tatar incursion which took place in late February and early March was repulsed by the Russians and, on 21 March 1739, Münnich reported to the Empress that, "In the (course of) my journey through Ukraine today, I could see that the successful repulsion of the Tatars has pleased the local population and it will thus be difficult for Orlyk to fulfill his plans."³⁷

But Orlyk's plans, indeed, his brief return to the forefront of events in the Russo-Ottoman war, were about to suffer yet another reversal. After Stanisław's formal abdication in February 1736, the French substantially toned down their anti-Russian stance (although they did continue to provide some help to Orlyk). On 7 December 1737, Villeneuve was instructed to adopt a completely different course. Rather than encourage the Ottomans in their war with the Russians, the French ambassador was to try to achieve the position of mediator between the warring parties.³⁸ This he attempted to do throughout 1738 and the first half of 1739. Finally, in the summer of 1739, he succeeded in bringing the Ottomans, Russians and Austrians to the negotiating table. The crowning point of Villeneuve's career came on 18 September 1739, when the Peace of Belgrade, of which the French ambassador was acknowledged as the principal architect, was signed by the Ottomans, Russians and Austrians.

Ironically, Villeneuve's great success effectively ended the political career of the man he had tried so much to help. Peace between the Russians and Ottomans left Orlyk without any political relevance to any of the major powers of Eastern Europe. Yet, even after years of frustration and disappointment, and despite his advanced age (67), the ex-Hetman was not willing to cease his efforts. Even while the Russo-Ottoman war was still in progress, both the younger and elder Orlyks became involved in a plan to bring Sweden into the war on the Ottoman side.³⁹ A defensive alliance was signed (2 December 1739) between the Swedes and Ottomans, but it did not lead to military cooperation due to Swedish hesitation. But even after the Peace of Belgrade, the Swedes continued to show a willingness to fight the Russians. Consequently, all of Orlyk's hopes throughout 1740-1741 revolved around the impending Swedish-Russian war.

Meanwhile the Porte, having no more use for Orlyk, ordered him to move to Adrianople where he would be unable to embroil it in any further international complications. The ex-Hetman dreaded the idea of being interned in Adrianople as he had once been kept

in Salonika. He begged to be allowed to move to Jassy where he hoped his acquaintance with the Hospodar, Nicholas Maurocordato, would help him to be reunited with his family whom he had not seen for more than twenty years. The Porte insisted on Adrianople and applied pressure by cutting off its financial support to the debt-ridden émigré. It was only with the greatest difficulty that, through the intervention of the Swedish residents in Constantinople, Orlyk was allowed to move to Jassy. This, however, did little to compensate for the disappointment which the ex-Hetman experienced when he heard that the Swedish-Russian war, which had broken out in 1741, had ended with a Swedish defeat. With his last hopes gone, in poor health, deserted by his staff and nearly penniless, Orlyk spent the last months of his life at the court of Nicholas Maurocordato in Jassy. On 7 June 1742, Castellane, the French envoy at the Porte, reported that, "M. Orlick est mort. . . ." ⁴⁰

Summary

Viewed broadly, it is evident that, in many ways, the activity of the Mazepists closely fitted the general pattern of the East European nobiliary uprisings that swept the region in the early eighteenth century. Like Rakoczi, Kantemir, Patkul and Leszczynski in their respective lands, Mazepa and Orlyk led the Ukrainian Cossack elite in its struggle against foreign absolutism, specifically, that which Russia sought to impose in Ukraine. Their opposition to Peter I's centralizing reforms was based on the conviction that these contradicted the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654 which, as interpreted by the Ukrainians, guaranteed them self-government. Since this was an age in which an attack on the autonomy of a land was, in practice, synonymous with a diminution of the political rights and privileges of its elite, the desire of Mazepa, Orlyk and the *starshyna* to secure their own interests was inextricably interwoven with their concern for their *patria*, for the welfare and liberty of their "beloved fatherland, Ukraine." The mingling of pragmatic and altruistic concerns was typical of the noble patriotism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was a patriotism which had a much more concrete, one might even say, more organic basis than the more idealistically-based nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

If patriotism had a somewhat different meaning for the Mazepists and their contemporaries than it has had in modern times, the same holds true for the idea of separatism. Granted, every Hetman from Khmelnytskyi to Mazepa, like every modern-day Ukrainian nationalist, either desired or actually attempted to withdraw Ukraine from the domination of Moscow. However, while the underlying motive for this separatism—the natural desire of a people to resist foreign domination and to preserve self-rule—was the same, the

goals, perceptions and rationale of the Ukrainian Hetmans were perforce quite different from those of the Ukrainian nationalists. Modern Ukrainian separatism was based on a high degree of national consciousness and it aimed at the creation of an independent nation-state. The Mazepists, however, did not think in terms of such modern-day concepts as the nation-state. For them, political relationships were primarily a matter of relations between a sovereign and the noble-elite which dominated a given land. National-ethnic considerations, while not completely irrelevant, were of secondary importance. As in the case of other noble-elites, the Ukrainian *starshyna's* primary concern was whether its sovereign ruled justly, that is, according to the commitments made when Ukraine accepted his overlordship. Only when the *starshyna* came to the conclusion that its Russian sovereign was behaving contrary to the original compacts did the separatist urge arise. In this context, it meant the rejection of the current sovereign and the search for a more satisfying relationship with another overlord.

The necessity to accept the overlordship of another monarch once that of the Tsar was rejected was obvious to Mazepa and Orlyk because Cossack Ukraine was clearly unable to withstand Russian domination on its own. Undoubtedly, following the precedent set by the Hadiach Treaty of 1658, both Mazepa and Orlyk would have preferred to accept the sovereignty of the Polish King and to have Ukraine enter into a trilateral union with Poland-Lithuania. It seemed to them that the decentralized, noble-dominated nature of the Commonwealth could best guarantee the *starshyna's* rights and privileges and Ukrainian autonomy. But the defeat of Leszczyński and the opposition of the Polish magnates to any arrangement that would limit their chances of regaining the Ukrainian lands which they had lost in 1648 foiled the plan. Most feasible but least popular among the Mazepists was the plan to establish a Ukrainian principality in Right-Bank Ukraine under Ottoman overlordship. But Orlyk's anti-Muslim prejudices, Ottoman unwillingness to force the issue and the stubborn opposition of the Poles, repeatedly blocked the project. At this point, after having tried unsuccessfully to come to an understanding with the Poles and Ottomans, Orlyk and the few remaining Mazepists had no other alternative but exile.

It has often been argued that the major reason for the failure of the Mazepists was their lack of a broad base of support. This viewpoint begs the question. Mazepa's revolt was a nobiliary uprising and therefore, by definition, not a mass movement. The interests of

the *starshyna* and the masses rarely coincided for any protracted period of time. There were, however, added reasons for the limited support which the Mazepists received from Ukrainian society as a whole. The Ukrainian masses and clergy, strongly influenced by the Tsar's religiously-oriented propaganda, found it easier to identify with the Tsar, who was Orthodox like them, rather than with Mazepa's and Orlyk's Catholic, Muslim or Lutheran allies. Since the Ukrainian *starshyna* was a relatively new elite, its recent usurpation of various social and economic prerogatives antagonized the general populace more than did the harbingers of absolutism which Peter I began to introduce in Ukraine. Peter I's skillful use of the carrot-and-the-stick approach toward the *starshyna* after Mazepa's defection was especially effective in discouraging potential support for the Hetman even within his own class. As a result, Mazepa could count on the backing of only his closest associates, the highest officials of the Hetmanate (*heneralna starshyna*) and of the Zaporozhian Cossacks who, although they bore no love for Mazepa, were the only other element in Ukrainian society which felt directly threatened by Russian centralism.

The isolation of the rebels from major segments of Ukrainian society explains why Mazepa and Orlyk, like other East European leaders of nobiliary revolts, were so dependent on foreign support. It was thus the arrival of the Swedes in Ukraine that finally convinced Mazepa to reject the Tsar's sovereignty. During the Bender period after Poltava (1709–1714), it appeared that the Mazepists would be able to recoup some of their losses with foreign help. The patronage of Charles XII allowed Orlyk to mount a serious attack in 1711 which nearly led to the capture of Kiev and Right-Bank Ukraine. However, tensions between the Cossacks and their Tatar allies led to the ultimate failure of the campaign. An even better chance for the Mazepists to gain control of the Right-Bank came in 1712–1713 when, as a result of the Ottoman desire to create a Ukrainian buffer principality against Russian expansion, the Porte offered to make Orlyk the hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine. Due to reasons mentioned above, the Ottomans' "Ukrainian Project" failed. But, in the process, Orlyk's personal attitudes toward his foreign protectors became clear: he preferred to deal with Christian rulers even though they were least able to help him, while he was overly suspicious of his Muslim backers even though they had the potential to help him the most. In any case, the return of many Mazepists to Ukraine in 1714 and Orlyk's failure to establish effective con-

tacts with dissident elements in the Hetmanate left the few remaining Mazepists even more dependent on foreign support.

During and, even more so, after the Bender period, the condition of the proponents of Ukrainian separatism underwent a drastic change: the erstwhile leaders of the Ukrainian elite became—as did Rakoczi, Kantemir, Leszczynski and Patkul—political émigrés. And it was as impoverished, insecure exiles that they continued their attempts to wrest Ukraine from Russia. Completely dependent on the patronage of such powers as Sweden, France and the Ottoman empire, they found in their support a source both of hope and of frustration. On the one hand, their patrons' aid encouraged the émigrés to continue their efforts, to believe in a chance of success; on the other hand, it also made them subservient to their patrons' interests which quite often conflicted with their own.

After the death of Charles XII, the two principal powers most interested in Orlyk's services were the Ottomans and the French. For the former, Orlyk's usefulness was seen primarily in terms of the Porte's revived attempts to create in Ukraine a buffer against Russia's southward expansion. Because this expansion was of primary concern to the Ottomans and Crimeans, they attached considerable importance to Orlyk and the Ukrainian issue, but only when the Russian threat loomed large. When it subsided even temporarily, however, so did Ottoman interest. At such times, in order not to antagonize the Russians, the Porte kept Orlyk in strict isolation and prevented all contacts between him and the Zaporozhians who dwelt within the boundaries of the Crimean Khanate. As a result, when war broke out again with Russia in 1733, the Hetman was unable to rally the Zaporozhians to his side. This failure finally brought to an end the Ottomans' almost century-old attempt to make Ukraine an anti-Russian buffer.

The French involvement with the Ukrainian émigrés and their cause was brief. Versailles also hoped to counter the Russian threat by erecting a barrier, one which would consist of Sweden, Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman empire. The role that French strategists envisaged for the Mazepists and their "great Ukrainian revolution" was that of a fifth column or diversion which could be triggered the moment Russia struck against the barrier. It seemed for the French and their protégé, Leszczynski, that Orlyk provided them, at little cost and no risk, with a tactical option. For Versailles, this made him both interesting and expendable.

As for the Russian reaction to the activities of the Ukrainian

émigrés, this marked the first time that they had to deal with a political emigration, as opposed to individual defectors. The experience came at an awkward time. Just when they were engaged in a series of crucial wars and were extremely conscious of their image in Europe, a group of Ukrainian dissidents roamed the continent, besmirching the image of the Tsar and urging foreign powers to exploit dissatisfaction with Russian rule in Ukraine. In dealing with the Ukrainian émigrés, the Russian government was quite effective. The immediate arrest of the extended families of the Mazepists and their removal to Moscow broke the émigrés' most serviceable links with their homeland. The imprisoned families then became a means of blackmailing the émigrés into inaction and of enticing them to return home (where they faced immediate arrest and exile). Those Mazepists who fled to the West became subject to unprecedented countermeasures: Russian diplomats, newly arrived in Europe, were used, as in the case of Tsarevich Aleksei, to hunt down and kidnap the greatest troublemakers. Those who were not captured were kept under Russian surveillance until their death.

In the final analysis, one might easily come to the conclusion that the Ukrainian separatists lost their one chance for success at Poltava and that Orlyk's and his colleagues' long years of struggle in exile represented an exercise in futility. But perhaps that would be judging too harshly. Compared to what later generations of Ukrainian émigrés were able to accomplish, the Hetman's achievements were considerable. Most noteworthy was the high level of his political contacts. He and his son, Hryhor, were in close personal contact with Charles XII, Louis XIV, August II, Stanisław Leszczyński, Sultan Mahmud I and Khans Devlet and Kaplan Girei, not to mention their most important ministers and advisors. Several of these rulers—Charles XII, the sultan and the Khans—committed themselves by treaty to the creation of a Ukrainian principality independent of Russian control. Moreover, Orlyk, unlike Rakoczi or Kantemir, did manage a second effort. The campaign of 1711 and the negotiations of 1712-1713 came close to giving the Hetman-in-exile control of Right-Bank Ukraine. Finally, Orlyk's activity in the late 1720s and 1730s was worrisome enough to Russia's rulers to contribute, at least indirectly, to the conciliatory attitude they adopted during the period in Ukraine. With Orlyk's death in 1742, the first phase of the long history of Ukrainian separatism, one in which the Hetmans together with Ukraine's new *starshyna*-

elite played the leading role, came to an end. But the precedents set by Mazepa and Orlyk would be far from forgotten when the issue of Ukrainian separatism arose again in the twentieth century.

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Appendices

PYLYP ORLYK'S LETTER TO STEFAN IAVORSKYI (1721): AN EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT OF HETMAN IVAN MAZEPA'S DEFECTION¹

O enlightened in God, most reverend and gracious father, Metropolitan of Riazan', my most gracious father in the Holy Spirit, pastor and benefactor!

Up to this time, my soul has wandered with the detested of the world amongst troubles, banishment and straited circumstances. Now, having rejected with heart and soul this wandering which is harmful for the soul, I embrace with my spirit your prelate's hand which dispenses consolation to all. But, Your Holiness might say to me: "Friend, how has it come to pass that you should have no hope for the monarch's favor?" Why must I fear that, with this daring epistle of mine, I might be rejected from the countenance of Your Holiness? However, with this account which I have for Your Holiness, like a pupil to his teacher, like a son to his father (although I am not worthy to call myself thus), like a sheep to its shepherd, I hasten to Your Holiness, with more daring than hope, so that Your Holiness, as my most wise teacher, sagaciously instructing me and reprimanding me, might open Your paternal embrace like a father to a wayward son. like a good and cheerful shepherd receiving a lost sheep and taking it up in his arms.

Because many men, some wishing me ill, others hoping to exonerate themselves by making false denunciations, have awakened and moved the merciful heart of His Tsarist Majesty to great anger and vengefulness against me as though I, being of one mind and in

counsel with Mazepa, were the author of the betrayal and knew all its secrets—for this reason, I wish to confess before Your Holiness, as before the prelate who spans the heavens and knows the secrets of the heart, with a clear conscience, truthfully and without falsehood (O Lord, destroy those who utter falsehoods!), all that I may know of that betrayal, as Your Holiness will fully comprehend from the following.

Whether, before he went to Poland with his army in the service of the Tsar and before the devil, taking advantage of the bonds of kinship, led Princess Dolska into secret conference with him, Mazepa had any inclination for the opposing side and for thoughts of betrayal, God alone, who perceives [what is in] the breasts and hearts [of men], knows. I cannot penetrate and examine men's hearts; but, seeing the exterior of his [i.e. Mazepa's] unshakable loyalty and his joyous service to His Majesty, the Tsar, I can judge, as a mere mortal, that Mazepa was firm in his loyalty and zealous in his love to His Majesty, the Tsar.

Leaving aside other documentation, I cite as the only substantiation of my opinion [the fact] that, in 1705, when Mazepa stood with his camp near Zamostia, Stanisław Leszczyński secretly sent him Franciszek Wolski from Warsaw with secret and diversionary proposals.² Mazepa listened to him in private. After the secret audience, he had Gregorii Ivanovich Annenkov arrest him and question him under torture about this diversionary despatch and other intentions of the enemy. Afterwards, he had Wolski put in chains and sent to Kiev to Prince Dmitrii Mikhailovich Golitsyn. The diversionary letters he sent to the Tsar.

Could there be a more obvious or greater proof of Mazepa's loyalty to the Tsar than this? However, when Mazepa was in winter quarters in Dubno, Voinarovskiyi and Ivan Chernysh continued to serve as residents at the court of His Majesty, the Tsar in Grodno, and Dmytro Horlenko, the former colonel of Pryluky, substituted for the Hetman in performing the Tsar's service at Grodno with his and the Kiev regiment. Horlenko then wrote long letters to Mazepa, which took several pages and which were sent by special courier. In these he enumerated the many injustices, insults, humiliations, annoyances, horsethefts and mortal assaults which had been inflicted on the Cossacks by Great Russian officers and their subordinates. In conclusion, he also added that once, while he, Horlenko, the acting Hetman, had been riding somewhere, he was supposedly grabbed from his horse and his horse as well as the horses of the

other [Cossack] officers accompanying him were forcibly taken from them for use in the convoys.

Ivan Chernysh also wrote to Mazepa by means of the same courier, enclosing in his letter a copy of His Majesty, the Tsar's *ukaz* which purportedly assigned the two town regiments, those of Pryluky and Kiev, commanded by Horlenko, to be sent to Prussia for training and re-organization into regular dragoon regiments. Mazepa had me read these letters and the copy of His Majesty, the Tsar's *ukaz* to him and solemnly uttered these words: "What good can we expect in the future for our faithful service and who would be such a fool as I not to favor the opposing side on the basis of propositions such as those which Stanisław Leszczyński sent to me?"

Shortly thereafter Dmytro Horlenko came from Grodno to Mazepa in Dubno, having left the Kiev and Pryluky regiments under the command of his son, Andrei. Among other news, he also reported to Mazepa that he feared that he and his regiments might be sent to Prussia to be transformed into dragoons. This would incite the hatred and enmity of the entire Host against him [Mazepa] because it would be with him that the regular formations would be introduced. He [Horlenko] feigned some sort of illness and, using it as an excuse, asked General Renn for leave, ostensibly to go home. In return, he presented him [General Renn] with several good horses and, I think, 300 *efimki*.

Soon after Dmytro Horlenko's arrival to Dubno, Mazepa was invited to Bila Krynysia to act as godparent at the christening of the daughter of Prince Wisniowecki, the *wojewoda* of Krakow. The Princess Dolska, the latter's mother, was also there. What sort of discussions he had with her during the day and night and whether such a small matter as the reports of Dmytro Horlenko and Ivan Chernysh could have shaken Mazepa's heart and inclined it to betrayal or whether it was Princess Dolska who persuaded him to it with her temptations, only God knows. I, however, consider that to a great extent it was that temptress who befuddled him.³

After several days of feasting and conversation, Mazepa, upon returning from Bila Krynysia to his quarters at Dubno, had me write a letter of thanks to that temptress, Princess Dolska, and send her a key for coded correspondence with himself. A few days later he received a response from her; it contained a short coded note which, when deciphered, read: "I have already forwarded where necessary the report of Your Lordship's genuine friendship." After

that coded note was read, he took it from me without uttering a word.

When, on His Majesty, the Tsar's orders, he left Dubno with his troops and arrived in Minsk in 1706, he received there, it is not known by what intermediary, a short coded letter from Princess Dolska. In it the Princess informed him about the return of her messenger from the court and about the despatch of letters to him by an unspecified king. After reading the letter which I decoded, he took it and laughingly stated: "The stupid crone, she wants to use me to outwit His Majesty, the Tsar so that His Majesty might abandon King August, receive Stanisław under his protection, and aid him in obtaining the Polish throne. He [Stanisław] promises to supply the means by which His Majesty, the Tsar could easily crush and defeat the Swedes. I have already told the *Gosudar* about her foolishness and His Majesty laughed about it." I believed him and had no suspicion of Mazepa's betrayal. I did not see and to this day I do not know—for this I have faithful witness in Heaven above—who that messenger was, what kind of letter he brought and from which king it came, nor when and with what reply Mazepa sent him off.⁴

Afterwards Mazepa, on the order of His Majesty, the Tsar, moved with the troops under his command from Minsk to Ukraine. Upon the arrival of His Majesty to Kiev, [Mazepa] ordered the regiments to assemble hastily near Kiev and hurried there himself. There he received a coded letter from Princess Dolska which he had me bring to his bedroom and read to him. In that letter, she requested Mazepa, in the name of Stanisław, to begin the intended deed with the understanding that he [Mazepa] would shortly receive aid from Volhynia from the entire Swedish army and all his wishes, whatever he desired, would definitely be fulfilled. She also promised to send Stanisław's assurance and the Swedish King's guarantee to this effect. Mazepa listened to this letter (ostensibly) in great anger. After hearing it, he jumped from his bed, greatly irritated, and began to deride the Princess with these words: "The accursed old crone is out of her mind! Before she asked me that His Majesty the Tsar take Stanisław under his protection and now she writes something altogether different. That old woman must be mad; she wants to fool an experienced and artful bird like me! I would surely be in trouble if a mere woman could tempt me. How can one abandon the living and join the dead or leave one bank without being able to reach the other? Stanisław himself is insecure in his king-

dom and the Commonwealth is divided. What basis does that woman have for her senseless temptations? I have grown old in the service of His Majesty, the Tsar. I am and always have been faithful to the present Tsar, to his father and his brother. Neither the Polish King, Jan [Sobieski] nor the Crimean Khan nor the Don Cossacks were able to tempt me, and now, at the end of my years, a mere woman wants to make a fool of me!" Having said this, he took the original coded letter and the translation from me and, ordering fire to be brought, burned them. Then, turning to me, he said: "Do not leave! Write a coded letter to that woman as follows:

"I request your Princely Grace to desist from this correspondence which can cost me my life, honor and subsistence. Your Princely Grace should not hope, even contemplate that I, in my old age, would violate my loyalty to His Majesty, the Tsar, which I have preserved unblemished from my youth to this day. I desire to die in this state, not wishing to bring upon my name and person, either during my life or after my death, that dishonorable, treacherous fault and infamy. Therefore, I repeat to Your Princely Grace, please desist from this correspondence and do not write to me again in this matter."

Such was the letter which he had written in code and sealed before him. God as my witness, I do not know whether this letter which he took from me, was sent to Princess Dolska and if so by whom (since I did not see a messenger at that time) or whether he later wrote another in his own hand.

Thenceforth, for an entire year, he did not give me a single coded letter to decipher from the above mentioned Princess which dealt with these treacherous affairs. Especially after the Swedish King and Stanisław moved to Saxony with their armies he completely desisted from this correspondence. However, she wrote a coded letter to Mazepa from Lviv. In it, as a warning, she informed him that she had been present at a certain (I do not remember whose) reception in Lviv together with Boris Petrovich Sheremetev. At a christening, as she sat between Boris Petrovich and General Renn, she happened to mention in passing and in a complimentary manner Mazepa's name to Renn. General Renn replied, also in a laudatory tone but as though he commiserated with Mazepa: "God have pity on that good and wise Ivan! The poor fellow does not know that Prince Alexander Danielevich [Menshikov] is digging a hole beneath him and, after pushing him aside, wants to become Hetman in Ukraine himself." Taken aback by this, she asked Boris

Petrovich Sheremetev whether this was true. Since he evidently confirmed it, she said: "Why do none of his good friends warn him?" Boris Petrovich supposedly replied: "Impossible! We ourselves suffer much but are forced to remain silent."

Having heard this, Mazepa said: "I know very well what they think of you [the *starshyna*] and me; they want to satisfy me with the [title of] Prince of the Roman Empire and then deprive me of the hetmancy, destroy the entire *starshyna*, bring the towns under their control by placing *voevodas* or governors in them.⁵ And if we should attempt to resist, they will force us across the Volga and settle Ukraine with their own people. We need not talk much about this; you yourselves heard what is imminent when Prince Alexander Danielevich whispered in my ear, at my quarters in Kiev when His Majesty, the Tsar was there; "Today is the time to take on these enemies." Secondly, you heard how that same Alexander Danielevich publicly requested the principedom of Chernyhiv for himself by means of which he plans and prepares the way to the hetmancy." He spoke of this and other matters, at length, especially of the injustices done to him.

Mazepa considered it a great humiliation and affront that His Tsarist Majesty, at the time of his arrival with the main army to Kiev from Grodno in 1706, had ordered the Most Serene Prince Alexander Danielevich to move with the cavalry to Volhynia, and commanded Mazepa to follow His Serene Highness with the troops under his command and to do what His Serene Highness ordered. Mazepa declared that after the departure of the Swedish armies to Saxony such a campaign in Volhynia was unnecessary and that His Serene Highness purposely arranged it merely for his own benefit and his [Mazepa's] humiliation, thus demonstrating to the entire world that he had him, the Hetman, under his own command. [Mazepa] resented this, considering it a dishonor that he, in his old age and for his many faithful services (as he said) should be rewarded by being subordinated to Menshikov. In conclusion, he added that he would not feel so bad if he were placed under the command of Sheremetev or some other man of famous name and distinguished ancestors.⁶

Furthermore, Mazepa deemed it a mockery, insult and fraud that His Serene Highness, Prince Alexander Danielevich had agreed with him to give his sister to Voinarovskiyi in marriage which, he hoped, could take place in a few years. He therefore did not search for a wife for Voinarovskiyi. When he suggested to His Serene

Highness that the agreement be carried out, His Serene Highness supposedly answered that it was impossible now because His Tsarist Majesty himself wanted to marry his sister. He spoke, in addition, of other injuries. In conclusion, he stated: "Liberate me, O Lord, from this rule." Then he had me write to Princess Dolska, thanking her for her friendship and her warning.

As for the words of Alexander Danieievich which Mazepa referred to above, namely, "Today is the time to take on these enemies," they were spoken in the following circumstances. In 1706, when His Tsarist Majesty was in Kiev, Mazepa invited His Majesty for dinner. Afterwards His Serene Highness, Prince Alexander Danieievich, being somewhat loud and tipsy, took Mazepa by the arm, sat on a bench with him and leaning towards him, spoke in his ear so loudly that the *heneralna starshyna* and some of the colonels who were standing nearby, could hear these words, "Hetman Ivan Stepanovich, today is the time to take to these enemies." The *heneralna starshyna* and the colonels, hearing this and seeing that they wished to speak intimately, began to withdraw. But Mazepa indicated with a wave that they should remain. He whispered into the ear of His Serene Highness, "Not yet," but did it so loudly that his *heneralna starshyna* and the colonels heard what he said. His Serene Highness replied, "There can be no better time than today when we have His Tsarist Majesty here with his main army." Mazepa answered: "It would be dangerous to begin an internal war without first completing the war with the enemy." Again His Serene Highness replied: "Should we fear and tolerate these enemies? Of what use are they to His Tsarist Majesty? Only you are loyal to His Tsarist Majesty. But, it is necessary for you to demonstrate this loyalty and leave for future generations such a memory of yourself that future rulers will recognize you immediately and bless your name [saying] that there was only one Hetman as faithful and as beneficial to the Russian state as Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa."

At this point His Tsarist Majesty, desiring to return to his quarters, stood up from his place and interrupted this conversation, both parts of which were audible to the *heneralna starshyna* and the colonels. Mazepa escorted His Tsarist Majesty and then returned to his room with the *heneralna starshyna* and the colonels. He asked them whether they had heard everything that His Serene Highness, the Prince, had said. When they replied that they had, he uttered these words: "In Muscovy, everywhere, they constantly sing

this tune to me. O Lord, do not allow them to achieve what they contemplate.”

These words struck the hearts of the listeners with fear. There were many complaints and conversations among the colonels, especially about how, on His Tsarist Majesty's orders, without protest and with faithful and obedient hearts, the Cossacks had fulfilled their obligations in distant and lengthy campaigns. The last of their livestock was ruined; they had spilled their blood in various places, in Livonia, in Poland, in Lithuania as well as in the realm of Kazan and the towns of the Don; they grew destitute and perished [The colonels stated]: “Not only was there no reward for the previous Turkish war nor have we received any for the present one, but they [the Muscovites] rebuke and belittle us, call us loafers and do not consider our faithful service worth a penny. And finally, they plot our doom.”

Soon afterwards, the fortification of Pechersk was begun. Transports of recruits, various persons in positions of command, many convoys with supplies and provisions enroute to the main army passed through the Little Russian towns. The colonels and their officers often came to the Hetman, complaining that the overseers working on the fortifications often struck the Cossacks on the head with their canes, cut off their ears with their swords and caused all kinds of humiliations. [They complained that] the Cossacks left their homes and harvests to perform His Tsarist Majesty's service during the day and night, meanwhile, the Great Russians plundered their homes, destroyed and burned them, raped their wives and daughters, took their horses, cattle and livestock and inflicted mortal blows upon the *starshyna*. In addition, two of the most prominent colonels, those of Myrhorod and Pryluky, took greater liberties with Mazepa than did the others.⁷ The colonel of Myrhorod said to Mazepa: “Everyone's eyes turn to you in hope. God forbid that you should die, because then we will fall into such subjugation that even the chickens will bury us.” The colonel of Pryluky confirmed these words, saying, “Just as we always prayed to God for the soul of Khmelnytskyi and blessed his name for freeing Ukraine from the Polish yoke, so, on the contrary, will we and our children forever curse your soul and bones, if, as a result of your hetmancy, you leave us in such slavery after your death.”

After they had showered Mazepa with such statements, he replied: “I have written often to the court of His Tsarist Majesty about such insults and destruction. If you prefer, choose one among

you to go to His Tsarist Majesty. Perhaps you, colonel of Pryluky, can go, and I will despatch Orlyk from myself and the *heneralna starshyna* along with you. I will give you a letter to His Tsarist Majesty and request that our rights and freedoms remain inviolable." All agreed with this and hoped that Mazepa would fulfill his promise. But after several days he informed us that, apparently, he had spoken to Prince Dmitrii Mikhailovich Golitsyn about this delegation to His Tsarist Majesty and that the latter had informed him that this matter would not be agreeable to His Tsarist Majesty, saying: "If you send it, then you will harm yourself and doom the others."

After the completion of the Pechersk fortress and with winter approaching, Mazepa, on the order of His Tsarist Majesty, disbanded the army to their homes. He himself returned to Baturyn. There, in 1707, he received His Tsarist Majesty's order to meet His Majesty at Zholkva. He arrived there on the Great Friday before the Resurrection. After Fomin's Sunday, a council of war was held at which he too was ordered to be present. I do not know what irritated him there, but after that council he neither went to the Tsar for dinner nor ate anything all day in his quarters. When the *starshyna*, as was customary, came to him at the usual time, we found him very angry. He did not tell us anything except this: "If I were to serve God as faithfully and joyously, I would receive the greatest reward. But here, even if I were to turn into an angel, I receive no thanks for my service and loyalty." After saying this, he told us to go to our quarters.

The next morning, that is, on the third day, Mazepa despatched the *znatnii tovarysh*, Dmytro Dumytrashko with His Tsarist Majesty's *ukaz* to the treasury, which was then being moved from Kiev to Zholkva, for the withdrawal of, I believe, 10,000 rubles. [These funds] were assigned by His Tsarist Majesty to pay for the horses which were bought for the dragoons with [Cossack] regimental funds. Dumytrashko obtained the order of His Tsarist Majesty in the chancellery and together with the receipt for Mazepa he brought a letter from His Grace, the Prince Alexander Danielevich, to Tanskyi, [who was then] the commander of the mercenaries and is now the colonel of Kiev. The sight of the letter addressed to Tanskyi surprised Mazepa. He ordered Dumytrashko to leave His Grace's letter with him and to depart immediately with the *ukaz* for the treasury. After Dumytrashko's departure, he opened the letter. Upon reading it he jumped from his seat in anger. The letter con-

tained an order to Tanskyi to quickly move from his quarters to His Grace, taking with him, I believe, wages and provisions for six months. Infuriated, he cried: "Can there be a greater insult, mockery or humiliation of my person than this! Prince Alexander Danilevich sees me every day, we converse often, yet he has not uttered a single word to me about this. Without my knowledge or acquiescence he sends orders to people under my command! Who will pay the monthly wages and provisions out to Tanskyi without my orders? How can he, without my consent, go anywhere with the regiment which I pay for? And should he do so, I would order him to be shot like a dog. O, my Lord, you are witness to my injuries and humiliations!"

At that time, the devil himself brought along from Lviv the Jesuit, Zalenski.⁸ When informed that he [Zalenski] was waiting in the anteroom, Mazepa quickly subdued his anger and joyfully asked: "Where did he come from?" He ordered the Quartermaster-General, Lomykovskiy, and me to invite that accursed Jesuit into the inner chamber and then sent us to our quarters. Then he locked himself in with him. What they discussed for so long, God only knows. Except for admitting that Mazepa sent him to Stanislaw, in Saxony, that Jesuit did not reveal anything more to me in Bender, declaring that he had sworn to keep the secret. But even then I did not have the slightest suspicion of Mazepa's disloyalty to His Tsarist Majesty.

His Tsarist Majesty gave Mazepa leave to depart from Zholkva with the Tsarevich, of blessed memory, on a journey. After traveling several miles beyond Zholkva, Mazepa requested that the Tsarevich ride on ahead. Meanwhile, he turned off the road and stopped at a small estate belonging to Princess Dolska. There he found a Trinitarian priest who had been sent by her. After conversing with him in private, he caught up with the Tsarevich and accompanied him for the rest of the journey. But even then we had no suspicion of Mazepa's disloyalty to His Tsarist Majesty. We believed that the Princess needed a loan so that she could get her jewels out of pawn, and that in this matter she had made earlier requests, both verbally and in writing.

After Mazepa arrived in Kiev and sent the Tsarevich off on his way to Smolensk, he returned to Baturyn. After staying there several days, he went to Kiev to complete the Pechersk fortress. There he received His Tsarist Majesty's order to reorganize the Cossacks in a manner similar to the *Sloboda* regiments, that is into *piataky*.

This frightened and angered all of the colonels and *starshyna* who, fearing for their liberties, spoke of nothing else. [They considered] the selection of the *piataky* to be a step toward reorganization into dragoons and [regular] troops. Complaining often about this, they gathered frequently at the home of the Quartermaster-General Lomykovskiy. They also met almost daily in the quarters of the colonel of Myrhorod where they took counsel as to the means of defending themselves and read the Treaty of Hadiach which the colonel of Myrhorod had taken out of the Pechersk library.⁹

In a denunciation which was later made to His Tsarist Majesty, he [the colonel of Myrhorod], among other fabrications, falsely informed the deceased Kochubei, to the poor man's demise, that these councils were supposedly held at the Hetman's [quarters] in Pechersk and that it was there that the Treaty of Hadiach was read to the colonel and *starshyna*. Actually, this was not true because Mazepa never gave a single indication, either in word or in deed, which would disclose his inner thoughts and generally evil intentions. He revealed this to no one, cloaking [his thoughts] with feigned loyalty. How destructive is a secret if it is not discovered! I happened to discover Mazepa's secret plotting with the enemy in the following manner.

In 1707, on the sixteenth of September, while in Pechersk in His Tsarist Majesty's service, I was taking down a lengthy correspondence (I do not recall in what matters) from Mazepa to His Majesty's court, and the writing of it was stretching into the night. Mazepa, impatient with the delay, often inquired from his room whether I had finished yet. He urged me to finish quickly, adding that there was still something else to be done. After completing the correspondence, I sealed it and placed it on the table in front of Mazepa. Holding a small envelope in his hand, he said to me: "Princess Dolska sent me this note by means of some Wallachian, sewing it inside his cap. However, I know what she has written. The devil himself urges her on in this correspondence. Some day this crazy old woman will ruin me! It is with good reason that they say "A maid's hair is long, but she is short on wisdom." Can she, a mere woman, outwit me with her foolish mind?" He told me to open the short note and read it. Approaching the candle which was hidden from Mazepa's eyes by a shade, I opened the envelope and took out Princess Dolska's note, which was written in code. [In the envelope] there was also a small piece of paper bearing a personal seal. Thinking that it too was from the Princess and not bothering to

examine the seal closely, I opened it and saw, next to the seal, the signature—King Stanisław. Without saying anything to Mazepa, I carefully read this note.

When Mazepa noticed that I was silent and had not read the deciphered note aloud to him, he said: “Why the delay? Why are you not reading? You know how to read those letters to which you have the code-key and need no translation.” I replied: “Later I will read the Princess’s coded letter without the key but here is a note from Stanisław for which a key is not necessary.” Hearing this, he cried: “Impossible!” I replied, “It certainly is possible, since it contains both his signature and his seal.” He quickly took the note. After examining and reading it, he gasped with fright and let it drop upon the table with these words: “O, accursed woman! You will ruin me!” For a long time he sat silently, deep in thought. Then he asked me: “What should I do with this letter? Should I send it to His Tsarist Majesty or keep it?” I replied: “With your superior intelligence, your Lordship will surely be able to decide that it should be despatched [to the Tsar]. This would demonstrate your unshakable loyalty and earn His Tsarist Majesty’s great favor.” I said this to him being totally unaware of his contemplated betrayal.

Upon hearing this, he was silent and thoughtful for a long while. He then had me read the coded letter from Princess Dolska. It informed Mazepa that the Trinitarian priest whom she had sent to Stanisław’s court in Saxony had departed on the same day that the Swedish armies moved into Poland. Upon his return, he brought a letter which she forwarded to him [Mazepa] from Stanisław. He also carried a verbal message to this effect: [Mazepa] should begin to act according to plan before the Swedish armies approached the Ukrainian borders. In addition, he brought a twelve point treaty for Mazepa and the entire Zaporozhian Host. She requested that a trustworthy person be despatched to fetch it.

After reading that letter, I remembered that this Trinitarian priest was the one with whom Mazepa had met on his way from Zholkva and with whom he had conferred at Princess Dolska’s estate. It was then that I fully comprehended that Mazepa was plotting a betrayal.

When I finished reading that letter, he had me burn it in his presence. For a while he remained deep in thought and then he said: “I am trying to decide whether to send this letter to His Tsarist Majesty or not. We will think about this again tomorrow. Go now

to your quarters and pray to God that His will will come to pass. Because you live in a manner befitting a Christian maybe your prayers will be more acceptable than mine. God knows that I am not acting for my own benefit but for all of you, your wives and children."

Late that night he dismissed me. Returning to my quarters, I took two rubles and went out to distribute them among the old men and women, the poor and the miserable who lived in the shanties, on the streets, in the Pechersk poor houses, hoping that Almighty God would free me from the impending trouble and direct Mazepa's heart from that tempting undertaking. The old men and women of the streets berated me as I knocked on their huts at night. Fearing thieves, they did not expect any favors from me. Nevertheless, since I did not sound like a thief and because my requests for them to open their doors were sincere, they accepted the favors which were offered to them. It is not out of hypocrisy nor to praise myself that I write of this to Your Holiness, but as a revelation of my soul's trials of conscience. Frightened by this betrayal and wishing not to perish with my wife and children because of it, my heart had no inclination for it.

As that September night passed into the seventeenth day of the month, I was summoned early by Mazepa. He sat at the end of a table, a cross inlaid with wood (taken from the Holy Cross) before him. As I stood before Mazepa, he said:

"Until now, I did not dare to disclose to you prematurely my intentions or the secret which was accidentally revealed last night. It was not because I suspected your loyalty to me. I could never imagine that you, in return for my great favor, love and generosity, would repay me with ingratitude and betrayal. But, even though you are an intelligent man and have a clean conscience, you are still young and inexperienced in circumventions. I feared that you, in conversing with Great Russians and with our people of various ranks, might reveal this secret, be it in trust or due to carelessness. Since it can no longer be concealed from you, I swear before God that it is not for my own private gain, nor for higher honors, nor for greater wealth, nor for any other reason that I act. But I do so for all of you who are under my rule and command, for your wives and children, for the common welfare of our fatherland, poor unfortunate Ukraine, for the entire Zaporozhian Host and the Little Russian people, for the elevation and expansion of the Host's rights and privileges so that, with the aid of God, neither you, nor your

wives and children nor the fatherland together with the Zaporozhian Host might perish because of Muscovy or the Swedes. Were I so bold as to strive for private gain of any sort, O, Lord, who art one in the Holy Trinity and in the innocent passion of Christ, strike down my soul and body.”¹⁰

After saying this, he kissed the cross, inlaid with wood from the Holy Cross, which lay before him. Turning to me, he said: “I depend on you greatly and hope that neither your conscience, values or self-esteem, nor the blood of a born nobleman will allow you to betray me, your lord and benefactor. However, for the sake of greater confidence so that I might not have the slightest doubt of your loyalty, swear to me, just as I swore now on that same Christ, crucified upon the wood of the Holy Cross, that you will remain faithful to me and preserve the secret.”

I complied with Mazepa’s command. Word for word, I repeated what he said and, kissing the Holy Cross in his hands, I took the oath. But, after taking the oath, I dared to say to Mazepa: “From this oath I can see Your Lordship’s sincere desire, paternal concern and solicitude for your fatherland and all of us. But who can unravel the fate which God has assigned for the present war? With whom shall victory rest? If it should be with the Swedes, then Your Lordship and we will be fortunate. If with His Tsarist Majesty, then we will perish and doom the people.”

To this Mazepa replied: “Eggs teaching the chicken! I am not a fool to defect prematurely, before it is absolutely necessary [to do so], that is, at the moment when His Tsarist Majesty will be unable to defend not only Ukraine from the power of the Swedes but his own realm as well. While at Zholkva, I informed his Tsarist Majesty that, should the Swedish King and Stanislaw divide their armies and the former go against Muscovy and the latter into Ukraine, then, we with our weak army, ruined and reduced by frequent campaigns and war, will not be able to defend ourselves from the Swedish and Polish armies. Therefore, I requested from His Tsarist Majesty, there in Zholkva, that he be so pleased as to give us in the form of aid at least ten thousand of his regular troops. His Majesty replied: “Not only ten thousand, but I cannot even give you ten men; defend yourself as well as you can.”¹¹ This induced me to send that Trinitarian priest, Princess Dolska’s chaplain, (he did not even mention the Jesuit Zalenski) to Saxony. If they see there an inclination on my part towards them, then they will not treat us as enemies and they will not ravage unfortunate

Ukraine with fire and sword.¹² However, I will remain loyal to His Tsarist Majesty until I see with what forces Stanisław comes to the Ukrainian borders and what kind of progress the Swedish armies make in the Muscovite realm. If we will not have the strength to defend Ukraine and ourselves then why should we go to our doom and doom our fatherland as well? God and the entire world will see that we did this out of necessity, striving as a free, unconquered people for the means of self-preservation. But, unless the necessity is most pressing and extreme, I will not alter my loyalty to His Tsarist Majesty. I have decided, therefore, to write to His Tsarist Majesty and forward, as proof of my loyalty, the letter which Stanisław wrote to me. Before you go, write to His Tsarist Majesty and to Gabrail Ivanovich Golovkin and enclose in his [Golovkin's] letter Stanisław's note so that he may present it to His Tsarist Majesty."

Then Mazepa instructed me how I should write the two letters to His Tsarist Majesty and to His Serene Grace, the Count Gabrail Ivanovich Golovkin. I wrote them according to his instructions and sealed them. Then he took the letters and told me that because his mother, the Abbess of Pechersk, had a faithful servant who was also a distant relative, she promised to send those letters through him to Voinarovskiy so that he could personally deliver them to His Tsarist Majesty and His Grace, the Count Gabrail Ivanovich. But in this matter Mazepa deceived me. Instead of sending the letters containing Stanisław's note, he kept them, fearing, I surmise, that I might betray him once I had those documents in my hands. It was only when we went over to the Swedes that he returned those sealed letters to me, uttering, as I recall, these lies: "I had forgotten to tell you until now about these letters which the Lady Benefactress, my mother, did not forward to Voinarovskiy but kept them herself. Before her death, she gave them to her granddaughter and my relative, Mariana, ordering her to give [them] to me after her death. My mother also said that she had requested a nun, who lived according to God's will, to plead before Our Lord that he resolve this matter of whether it was necessary to forward these letters or withhold them. This nun was supposed to have had a vision to the effect that if these letters were sent to His Tsarist Majesty, then the Hetman would perish."

I placed the letters, together with three decrees of His Tsarist Majesty concerning the matter of Kochubei and Iskra, into a casket with my wife's jewels and several thousand ducats. This casket was

the only one which my wife put into her carriage after the Battle of Poltava, when with only a single dress, she crossed the Dnieper with the children. All my belongings—thirty wagons [containing] silver and money were lost in the Dnieper. In this way, the aforementioned letters remained with me. One of them, written to His Tsarist Majesty, included Stanisław's subversive note. I now send it to Your Holiness so that Your Holiness may see that it was from this letter that I discovered the secret of Mazepa's plotting and contacts with the enemy. Aside from that note, I did not see another letter from Stanisław to Mazepa. Nor did I know whether he carried on a correspondence with him. Only in Bender, after the death of Mazepa, two letters from Stanisław were found which Ivan Maksymovych, my former Chancellor-General, saw lying someplace in Voinarovskiyi's quarters and took surreptitiously to show me.¹³

The next day, on the eighteenth of September, after writing the above mentioned despatch to His Tsarist Majesty's court concerning Stanisław's note, Mazepa had me reply to Stanisław in the same code which he used to correspond with Princess Dolska. In that letter, Mazepa informed Stanisław that he could not fulfill his stipulations and could not initiate any action for the following reasons: first, Kiev and other fortresses in Ukraine were manned by large garrisons and the Cossacks, like quail in a hawk's grasp, could not even lift up their heads. In this connection, Mazepa recalled how, during the time of Hetman Briukhovetskyi, the Great Russian garrisons would sally out of the fortresses and ravage the surrounding towns and villages with fire and sword. Second, all the forces of His Tsarist Majesty were in Poland, closer to Ukraine than the Swedish armies. Third, in Ukraine, the officers and their men, the clergy and the laity, like wheels of different sizes, were at odds with each other. Some desired Muscovite protection; others were inclined toward Turkish protection; and still others, preferred to fraternize with the Tatars because of their antipathy for the Poles. Fourth, Samus' and other colonels, officers and Cossacks, fearing retribution from the Polish armies after the recent uprising in Right-Bank Ukraine, would find it difficult to side with the Commonwealth.¹⁴ Therefore, it was necessary to bring the Host and all the people in Ukraine, on both sides of the Dnieper, to a general consensus. Fifth, he [Mazepa] had several thousand regular, well-trained and well-equipped Great Russian troops constantly at his side. They carefully observed all his moves and had orders to liquidate any attempts at opposition. Sixth, the Commonwealth

was still divided and at odds within itself. However, Mazepa did promise not to harm in any way the interests of Stanisław and the Swedish army. By all possible means he would avoid this. And he requested that Stanisław first try to unite the Commonwealth so that it might unanimously acknowledge him as its lord and King.¹⁵

He also had me write to Princess Dolska that she keep with her the treaty about which she had informed him and forward the letter addressed by him to Stanisław, sending along the key to decipher the code. I declare to Your Holiness upon my conscience that, before Mazepa's defection to the enemy, I never wrote another letter for him to Stanisław, with the exception of the one mentioned above and another one from Romno, [written] when we had already joined the Swedes and it was intercepted on this side of Ukraine [the Right-Bank]. To this day, I do not know whether Mazepa ever wrote to Stanisław himself.¹⁶

In 1707, after the completion of the Pechersk fortress, Mazepa disbanded the troops under his command to their homes and, in the final days of November, left for Baturyn. There, on the second day of Christmas, after the caroling, the devil brought along that Jesuit Zalenski. He did not go directly to Baturyn, but stopped two miles before it in the village of Olenovtsi. From there he wrote to Mazepa, informing him of his arrival and requesting directives as to where he should stay. Upset by this note, Mazepa called me and said: "I confess to you now that I sent the priest Zalenski from Zholkva to Saxony to discover how soon it would be before the Swedish armies set out from there. And now the devil has brought him here. He is waiting in Olenovtsi for instructions from me as to where he should stay. Should he come here directly, he would make me the object of everyone's suspicion."

Afterwards, he ordered me to go directly to Olenovtsi to inform Zalenski that at this point in time it was unnecessary for him to go as far as Baturyn, and that it would be more appropriate for him to report about his journey to Saxony from Vynnytsia. From there, he would forward an account about the matter entrusted to him without coming himself, because it would raise questions among the suspicious as to the reasons for his arrival. [Afterwards] I was to escort Zalenski to his [Mazepa's] estate in Bakhmach.

When, on Mazepa's orders, I went to Olenovtsi and informed Zalenski of all this, he was surprised that I knew about the secret that no one was supposed to have known, not even Voinarovskiyi, whom Mazepa himself informed of it only in Zholkva. Afterwards,

he [Zalenski] informed me of the reasons for his arrival. Aware of the colonels' and *starshyna's* custom of gathering on the holidays to greet the Hetman, he had purposely hurried to this meeting in Baturyn so that he could inform them all about Stanisław's manifesto to Ukraine and bring it along with him. He was also to assure them of all their privileges and of the King's special friendship and grace.

After hearing this message, I escorted Zalenski from Olenovtsi to the estate at Bakhmach. From there, at Mazepa's command, I escorted Zalenski to him twice to Honcharivka. The first time, he came for an audience, and the second time, to take his leave. During the audience, Zalenski gave Mazepa Stanisław's manifesto to entire Ukraine in which he praised the courage, bravery and valor of the Zaporozhian Host and assured it that its rights and privileges would be expanded and multiplied. With a paternal heart, encouraging all to come to him as their benevolent father and hereditary lord, [Stanisław] promised to embrace the entire people under his protection. Under the leadership of their most worthy leader, they would strive to remove the Muscovite yoke from their necks with the expeditious aid of the invincible Swedish and Polish armies. After giving Mazepa that manifesto, Zalenski presented a report about the size and provisions of the Swedish armies. [He also said] that the Swedish King intended to march on Moscow from Lithuania, while Stanisław marched on Kiev from Poland. Supposedly, the [Tatar] Horde, whose aid had been formally promised by the Turkish envoy, was to link up with him [Stanisław]. Zalenski did not have a personal letter from Stanisław. Nor did Mazepa, when he dismissed him, write anything to Stanisław. Zalenski was then discreetly kept at Vynnytsia until further notice. Only on this point was the denunciation [of Mazepa] by the deceased Kochubei accurate; the rest was merely gossip or baseless speculation.¹⁷

After the departure of the Jesuit, Zalenski, it often occurred to me that, should His Tsarist Majesty learn of it from the original documents, Mazepa's correspondence with the enemy would some day expose me to complete disaster. Therefore, fear, dread and sorrow consumed me. And when I looked at my wife and children I would worry the entire day about dooming them along with me. Whenever my wife asked me why I sighed so often and so deeply, I replied that it was because of my sins, through which I had offended God, my Creator, that I sighed with grief. My wife did not believe this

and constantly tried to persuade me with her love and entreaties to reveal the reason for my distress. Bound by oath, I never revealed this secret to her until the very day that Mazepa left Baturyn to go over to the Swedes. Then I explained to her why I had sighed so often and how matters stood. In conclusion, I said about Mazepa: "He will die and destroy us along with him." And, indeed, this is what happened.

In addition to my afore-mentioned fears and worries, I also thought that Mazepa, not being in agreement with the *heneralna starshyna* and the colonels as to his plotting, would not be able to betray this Tsarist Majesty on his own, without them and the Host. Nor would he be able to tempt the enemy with his sympathies toward them and simultaneously manifest his loyalty to His Tsarist Majesty, thus casting himself to both sides for the preservation of Ukraine.

Soon after the departure of Zalenski, at the beginning of February of what was already the new year of 1708, on the orders of His Tsarist Majesty, Mazepa undertook a military campaign to Bila Tserkva. During the campaign, he received an admonition as a result of the points which were addressed to the court of His Tsarist Majesty [by Kochubei] and delivered by the colonel of Akhter. Among these was a separate point concerning Zalenski which upset me even more. From then on, I began to think of some means of preserving myself from the impending troubles. However, I was deterred by several chilling thoughts which passed through my mind.

On the one hand, I took into account what had happened in the case of Kochubei's denunciation. According to the unique, harsh and well-known Great Russian law, if something was displeasing to the Tsar and if there was no written proof, it was the informer who received the first lash. Because of this law, many innocent people had perished. Furthermore, Mazepa himself had often cautioned me thus: "Beware, Orlyk, that you remain faithful to me; you see what favor I enjoy with His Tsarist Majesty. There [in Moscow] they will not prefer you for me. I am wealthy; you are poor. And Moscow loves money. Nothing will happen to me, but you will perish." When we were in Bender, and Voinarovskyyi, on Mazepa's orders, not only insulted me, but even threatened my life, I said to [Mazepa]: "Is this the reward I get for my loyalty?" He replied: "Had you not remained faithful to me, you would have perished just like Kochubei." Offended, I left him and withdrew to Jassy.

On the other hand, my Christian conscience forced me to consider the oath by which I was bound to serve faithfully only him. Mazepa was the Hetman and my lord. In relation to His Tsarist Majesty I was a foreigner and a newcomer to Ukraine, never having sworn either submission or loyalty to him. Therefore, I was troubled [by the thought] of the damnation of my soul not only as an oath-breaker, but also as a betrayer of my lord and benefactor, ungratefully rendering to him evil for good, enmity for favor, and for bread—deadly poison.

Finally, the deceased Mokrievych who, under Hetman Damian Mnohohrishnyi, had occupied the same post of Chancellor-General [*heneralnyi pysar*] as I, always came to mind.¹⁸ Rightfully or wrongfully, God knows, he accused his Hetman of correspondence and an agreement with Doroshenko directed against Russia, and thereby underhandedly delivered him into exile to Siberia. And what honors did he receive for this afterwards? He was deprived of the office of Chancellor-General by Samoilovych and driven from Ukraine. Because of his betrayal, throughout his life he was subjected to insults and abuse from both the laity and the clergy. And especially from the Most Holy Archbishop of Chernyhiv, Lazar Baranovych of blessed memory, who, whenever he saw Mokrievych in church or elsewhere, to his face and within the hearing of all, called him a Judas, a betrayer of his lord and a man of mean birth. When he gave him [Mokrievych] communion, he was wont to say: "And Christ gave bread to Judas and after [receiving] it, Satan was within him."

Pondering these matters—the cruelty of the Great Russian regulation regarding informers; the damnation of an oathbreaker's soul; the dishonorable recriminations against me and my children for the betrayal—my resolve wavered.

At that time, Mazepa received in Bila Tserkva letters from His Tsarist Majesty and, later, public decrees assuring him of His Majesty's favor. These stated that, henceforth, slanderers of Mazepa's unshakable loyalty, such as Kochubei, would not be believed and all such slanderers would receive the proper punishment.¹⁹ These assurances by His Tsarist Majesty diverted me from those thoughts, especially after I saw that Mazepa was greatly frightened and after he said that he regretted his undertaking. But, his remorse soon changed to remorselessness.

The Quartermaster-General, Lomykovskiy, and the colonels of Myrhorod and Pryluky, joined later by the colonel of Lubny, seeing Mazepa greatly frightened and wavering, often prevailed on him in Bila Tserkva to safeguard them and himself.²⁰ They prom-

ised to support him and to defend the rights and privileges of the Host to the death and never to abandon him as their leader and commander, even in the greatest misfortune. In order that he might have no doubt of their constant loyalty and good intentions, they requested that he administer to them a formal oath by which they could swear their loyalty. In response to their continual pleas, Mazepa agreed, and ordered the Quartermaster-General, Lomykovskiy, to compose a formal oath as they saw fit.

After consulting his comrades, Lomykovskiy did this and gave Mazepa the oath. He [Mazepa] examined it and then summoned them to him at Bila Tserkva. In his private chamber, he accepted their oath of loyalty to him, upon which they kissed the Cross and the Holy Gospel. Afterwards, he swore to them on the Gospel in the same manner as he had sworn to me in Pechersk. For this reason, even after the repeated orders of His Tsarist Majesty, Mazepa did not put the colonel of Myrhorod under arrest, but defended him in every way because he was in sworn agreement with him. Thinking that, since the *heneralna starshyna* and the colonels had already begun to agree, the collaboration of Mazepa with the enemy might, in time, expand and attain its goal, I intended to curtail it in the following manner: at Bila Tserkva, His Serene Highness, Prince Alexander Danielovich, had a scribe who was assigned to the chancellery of our Host in order to study the Little Russian language and script. I wanted to swear him to secrecy by the kissing of the Cross, and despatch him to His Serene Highness, the Prince, with a secret request that some important person be sent from His Tsarist Majesty to take an oath from the Hetman, the *heneralna starshyna*, the colonels, and the captains. Because the Hetman was extremely fearful after Kochubei's denunciation and despaired of the monarch's favor, and (because) the *heneralna starshyna* and colonels often grumbled about the many wrongs and violations of their rights and privileges, I intended, in this manner, without breaking my oath or harming my conscience, to curtail Mazepa's plotting and divert the *starshyna* away from it. But then news arrived that Kochubei and Iskra, without any investigation, had been questioned, given the knout and tortured.²¹ It was stipulated that they should be sent to Mazepa for the execution of the sentence.²² The news frightened me and I felt constrained to abandon these plans, fearing a similar disaster for myself. *Felix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum.*

Upon my conscience, I reveal this in all honesty to Your Holi-

ness: Should I be lying to Your Holiness, may God destroy me completely!

Then, with the troops under his command, Mazepa crossed from this side of the Dnieper to the other. Upon receiving word that the Swedish King had turned from Smolensk toward Ukraine, he exclaimed: "The devil is guiding him here! He will upset all my interests and bring the Great Russian army with him into Ukraine, to its [Ukraine's] complete ruin and to our doom!" At that time, Mazepa received His Tsarist Majesty's order to link his troops with those of General Infantii, I believe, and burn the smaller towns, villages, lofts and mills in the Starodub regiment. However, Mazepa understood the order differently; [he thought] that they [the Russians] wanted to lure him closer to that general and then capture him. Therefore, he had the colonels of Myrhorod, Pryluky and Lubny gather at Quartermaster-General Lomykovskiy's lodgings, where he also sent me, to ask them if they should, according to His Tsarist Majesty's order, link up with that general. All unanimously replied that he should not. They advised him to send a request immediately to the Swedish king for protection and haste, and to ask him to link up with them at the borders in order not to allow the Great Russian armies into Ukraine.

They also requested him [Mazepa] to issue a statement describing what loomed ahead for them, for all of Ukraine and for the Zaporozhian Host and explaining why such a move had been made. To this Mazepa replied indignantly: "Why should you know everything prematurely? Rely on my conscience and on my meager, little mind. It will not disappoint you. By God's grace I have more wisdom in my head than all of you put together." Turning to Lomykovskiy, he said: "Your mind has already been used up." To me [he said]: "And he has a mind that is too young and credulous." As to the message to the Swedish king, he stated: "I myself will know when to contact him." Angrily he took Stanisław's manifesto, which had been brought by Zalenski out of his pocket and had me read it to them. They were satisfied with it.²³

Soon afterwards, His Tsarist Majesty's entourage, accompanied by the infantry, came to Hlukhiv. From there, they repeatedly wrote to Mazepa that he should entrust the command of the troops to some trustworthy person and come personally to Hlukhiv for consultations which are often needed in such circumstances. Mazepa requested the opinion of his compatriots as to whether he should go to the court of His Tsarist Majesty at Hlukhiv, but they

all cried out: "If you go you will destroy yourself, us and Ukraine." He did this, I think, to test them, pretending to show an inclination to go to Hlukhiv. However, he actually did not even consider this because he remembered well Kochubei's denunciation of him. He thought and feared that the ministers wanted to entice him to them. And once they had him in their grasp, they would re-open the examination of the Kochubei affair, especially since they might have news from Poland where Mazepa's agreement and plotting with Stanisław were widely known.²⁴ Therefore, he feigned illness to excuse himself before the ministers of His Tsarist Majesty.

One evening, when Quartermaster-General Lomykovskiy and the above-mentioned colonels repeatedly insisted that despatches be sent to the Swedish King, he assigned me to go to them, so that a decision could finally be reached whether to send these despatches or not. I think that he was again putting them to the test. When I raised the question with them, Lomykovskiy answered for himself and the others. Deploring Mazepa's procrastination and delay, [he complained] that, in response to their many proposals and entreaties, he [Mazepa] had recently failed to contact and reply to the King when the latter was still close to the borders. Because of this delay, he had [allowed] all the Great Russian forces into Ukraine which led to its ruin and general bloodshed. Now, with the Swedes right under his nose, it was incomprehensible why he was procrastinating.

I returned to Mazepa with their message. When he heard it, he became angry and said: "I know that no one else has any complaints except that bald devil, Lomykovskiy." Summoning them, he said in great anger: "Instead of taking counsel, you complain about me; the devil take all of you! I will take Orlyk along with me and I will go to His Tsarist Majesty's court. And you can perish if you like." Then, softening his tone, he asked them whether to contact the King. They replied: "How can we not contact him? It should have been done long ago and should not be put off any longer." Hearing this, Mazepa immediately summoned Bystrytskyi and had him sworn to secrecy before us.²⁵ I was ordered to write his instructions to Count Piper in Latin and then Mazepa's apothecary translated them into German. Assigning him a captured Swede as translator, he ordered Bystrytskyi to prepare to leave the next day with that haphazard translation, which had no signature or seal on it and which was without an accompanying letter from him either to the King or to Piper.²⁶

In that note, which he did not sign and which bore no seal, Mazepa expressed his great joy at the arrival of His Royal Majesty to Ukraine. He requested for himself, for the Zaporozhian Host and for the entire people, protection and liberation from the heavy Muscovite yoke. He also emphasized his great danger and asked that troops be sent swiftly for his defense. For them he promised to prepare a crossing across the Desna at the Makoshynskiy pier.

Bystrytskyi soon returned with a verbal message from the King himself who promised to hasten to that pier with his army on the coming Friday, that is, on the twenty-second of October. That day Mazepa hoped for the arrival of the King. But his hopes were not fulfilled. On Saturday the twenty-third day of October, Voinarovskiy came to Mazepa in Borzhnia, secretly leaving His Serene Highness, Prince Alexander Danielovich. He declared that His Highness would arrive in Borzhnia the next day, Sunday, at dinner time. It seems that Voinarovskiy, leaving his wagons and servants behind, secretly fled from His Highness because he heard a German say to another officer in his quarters: "Lord, have mercy on these people! Tomorrow they will be in chains." To this day I do not know whether Voinarovskiy actually heard this or whether he had been instructed by Mazepa to say so in order to deceive us.

After receiving these news about the proximity of His Highness, the Prince [Menshikov], and about His Highness' arrival in Borzhnia the next day, Mazepa took off like a whirlwind. In the evening of that same day, Saturday, he hastened to Baturyn. On the next day, Sunday morning, the twenty-fourth of October, he crossed the Seim River and arrived in the evening at Koropa where he spent the night. On Monday morning, the twenty-fifth, he suddenly crossed the Desna and at night reached a Swedish dragoon regiment quartered in a village beyond Orlovka. From there he sent me and the Quartermaster-General Lomykovskiy, ahead to the King and soon afterwards he hastened there himself.

When Mazepa re-crossed the Desna with the Swedish army, he first heard the news of the capture and burning of Baturyn. Sadly he stated: "Our start is poor and unfortunate! It seems that God has not blessed my intentions. I swear to that same God that I did not desire the spilling of Christian blood. After coming to Baturyn with the Swedish King, I intended to write a letter to His Tsarist Majesty [expressing] gratefulness for his protection and listing all our previous and current grievances: the privileges which had been curtailed, the complete destruction and impending doom which

faced the entire people. In conclusion, [I intended] to declare that we had acquiesced voluntarily to the sovereignty of His Tsarist Majesty for the sake of the unified Eastern Orthodox faith. Being a free people, we now wish freely to withdraw, expressing gratitude for the Tsar's protection and not wishing to raise our hands in the shedding of Christian blood. Under the protection of the Swedish King, we will look forward to our complete liberation." Mazepa (as he himself stated) hoped to achieve this not by means of war, but through peace—by means of a treaty. He said that he wished to incline the Swedish King by all means to such a peace with His Tsarist Majesty.

O what nonsense! Afterwards, he said: "Now, with the situation as desperate as it is, matters will develop differently. Ukraine, frightened by [what happened] at Baturyn, will fear to join us." However, at the request of the colonels, he had manifestoes written and distributed to the towns. In them he enumerated the reasons why he had abandoned His Tsarist Majesty and placed himself under the protection of the Swedish King. When he came to the village of Bakhmach, he swore on the Holy Gospel for the first time before everyone—the *heneralna starshyna*, the colonels, captains and notables of the Host [*znatne tovarystvo*]²⁷—that he had accepted the protection of the Swedish King not for his personal benefit, but for the general welfare of the fatherland and the Zaporozhian Host. Then he ordered all of the *heneralna starshyna*, colonels, captains and notables of the Host, to take an oath to him and to the sovereignty of the Swedish King.

What Mazepa wrote in his manifestoes was that he supposedly had received warnings from His Tsarist Majesty's ministers and from friends who were well-disposed towards him. On my soul's oath, I declare to Your Holiness that none of the ministers will be able to deduce from this report the manner in which it was done.

Mazepa sent Bolbota, a member of the Host's chancellery, with letters from Borznia to His Tsarist Majesty's court at Hlukhiv.²⁷ After his return, he [Mazepa] informed us that one of His Tsarist Majesty's ministers, and also a true friend of his in the chancellery, had warned Mazepa through Bolbota that he should not come to His Tsarist Majesty's court, but rather look to his own and the entire Little Russian people's salvation. And he should see to it that anyone who had anything [of value] should bury it in a safe place, because, under the present circumstances, he should not hope for any stability in Ukraine, as His Tsarist Majesty was con-

triving to take some unpleasant measures with regard to the Hetman as well as the entire people. This minister and this other person from the chancellery, supposedly through the chancellery official, Bolbota, had bound Mazepa by oath so that no one knew of their warning. What Mazepa said frightened all of us. Later he made all this public to the people in his manifestoes.

However, I suspected the falsehood of this and later, in 1714, his cunning and deceit were revealed to me in the following manner. When the late Swedish King was leaving the Turkish land and going through Wallachia to Pomerania, I, following His Highness, stopped off in Bucarest to take care of a spiritual matter. There I found the chancellery official, Bolbota, preparing to enter the monastery. I spent two days in conversation with him, discussing Mazepa's betrayal and our misfortunes. Among other things, I recalled this warning and asked whether it had been genuine. He informed me, under oath, that when Mazepa sent him to Hlukhiv to His Tsarist Majesty's court, he had secretly ordered him to try in every way possible to discover what they thought of him there and why they had sent the *ukaz* for him to come to the court. On Mazepa's orders, Bolbota investigated all this but heard nothing negative from anyone about him. Through Bolbota, Gregorii Fedorovich Dolgorukii sincerely advised Mazepa that he could safely come to the court as soon as possible. He [Dolgorukii] pledged on his soul and conscience that His Tsarist Majesty did not have the slightest doubt of his [Mazepa's] loyalty and would not listen to anyone who spoke against him. The secretary, Orikhovskii, also made a similar statement to Bolbota about His Tsarist Majesty's boundless favor towards Mazepa, which equaled or even surpassed that towards Prince Alexander Danielovich. He advised that the inhabitants of Ukraine be careful of Swedish wiles and that they hide their provisions in the ground or store them in some other inaccessible place, because, although, in their manifestoes to the people, the Swedes guarantee integrity of property and income, they then rob and plunder everything from those whom they have reassured. However, Mazepa turned all this around. By speaking as he did and forcing Bolbota, by means of an oath to say the same, he did this first of all to seduce us. Later, in order to frighten and agitate the people, he had this published in the manifestoes.

I confess before God, the scrutinizer of hearts and souls, and under the seal of confession, this whole truth about Mazepa's betrayal, from the very beginning to the end. Should there be a trace

of falsehood in my heart, then may the Lord not harken to me.

Therefore, Your Holiness, judge my account with your own high intellect: how is my fault greater than that of the others? And did I sin by accidentally discovering the secret of Mazepa's plotting with Stanisław, previously concealed from me? Forced by him to keep the secret, I did what my superiors ordered. By that token, I alone could not have provided Mazepa with the occasion for betrayal and for defection to the opposing side. Nor would Mazepa have dared to defect with me alone if the others from among the *heneralna starshyna*, the Quartermaster-General Lomykovskyi and the colonels of Myrhorod, Pryluky, and Lubny had not joined the plotting in their capacity as the leading and most important figures in the Zaporozhian Host, and [if they] had not drawn along their own officers with their regiments, thereby reinforcing Mazepa in his evil intentions.

I knew of this secret, accidentally revealed to me, and was forced by Mazepa's order, by his terrible oath and, in addition, by subversion, to take a mutual oath of loyalty. I did not reveal the secret to anyone and maintained an unscathed faithfulness, like a servant to his master, like a foreigner and client to his benefactor. I had to preserve it [the secret] since my nature which has been passed on to me by my ancestors, is not to be an informer, but always to remain faithful to my superiors. The Swedish King, eternally worthy of memory, recognized this [trait] in me and therefore I had his respect and affection. I, however, was the only foreigner who knew this secret, and I alone could not have done His Tsarist Majesty any harm because one man can do nothing. Why did none of the others, sons of Ukraine, fervent of their fatherland, from [the time of] their fathers faithful subjects of His Tsarist Majesty, having discovered this secret, not reveal it? Moreover, by their oath they even supported it [the secret] and promised, kissing the Holy Gospel, to stand by Mazepa to the death in [defense] of their rights and liberties.

However, I welcome the favor that they have received from the monarch and do not envy their good fortune. I only sorrow over my own misfortune that I alone am withheld from the countenance of God's anointed and suffer banishment with my family, with no place to provide me with shelter. I appealed for the mercy of His Tsarist Majesty through the intermediary of the Most Holy Patriarch of Jerusalem, through the late Hospodar and *Voevoda* of Wallachia, Constantine and through Constantine and Michael Cantancuzanos. In these efforts, however, my labors were fruitless.

Now, despairing of human aid, I place all my hopes in my only pleader before God, in the suzerain who rules over men, Christ the Lord, in the Royal Majesty of Christ the Lord who pleads for me from the cross: Forgive! He who pities the sinner, moves the monarch's heart to pity. Be merciful just as your Heavenly Father, who punishes and awes, is merciful. And if, in your heart, you do not forgive a man his sins, neither will My Lord, who is in Heaven, forgive you your sins. Peter was ordered to forgive sinners seven times ten fold.

I believe that what has been ordained will fill the merciful heart of Peter. And I humbly entreat Your Holiness, if you are able, to help me with your old mercy and fatherly love, to which I eternally entrust myself.

**DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE TREATY
NEGOTIATED BETWEEN HETMAN PYLYP ORLYK
AND KHAN DEVLET GIREI IN 1710-1711**

**I. The *Puncta Compendiosa* (Hetman Pylyp Orlyk's Proposed
Draft of the Treaty with Khan Devlet Girei)¹**

I

The Little Russian people and the Zaporozhian Host are to enjoy the permanent protection of his Royal Majesty of Sweden, without any limitations and prejudices to the permanent friendship and military alliance with the Crimean realm. This fraternity, constant friendship and military alliance should not limit or prejudice His Royal Majesty of Sweden's protection.

II

A nullification and a subsequent re-confirmation of the articles concluded with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi should take place.²

III

According to this treaty, not only during this war—may its conclusion be fortunate—but once and for all, fraternity, friendship and military alliance should remain unbroken between the Crimean realm and the Little Russian people and there should exist a feeling of common defense against all the enemies of both states, of

mutual reliance and a strong resolution to agree on what they want and do not want.

IV

The Khan and the entire Crimean realm may not, under any pretext of fraternity, friendship and military alliance, have any pretensions, now or ever, to the subjugation of Ukraine, to the construction of fortresses or to any authority in Ukraine. This, it should be understood, also refers to the Sublime Porte.

V

The Khan and the Crimean realm may not assume authority over the rights and laws of Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Host nor may he [the Khan] break these laws.

VI

The Khan and the Crimean realm may not conclude the war with the Muscovites and come to terms with them without the agreement of the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host and until the Illustrious [Hetman] removes the [Muscovite] yoke. When this occurs, he [the Khan] may not come to terms and conclude a treaty with the Muscovites without the knowledge and previous approval of the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, even if the terms were to bring him great gain.

VII

After the removal of the Muscovite yoke, if, during peacetime, internal disruptions caused by Muscovite influence should occur in Ukraine and if the Hetman should be unable to subdue them, then the Khan and the Crimean realm should, at the first appeal, send aid for the quelling of internal disturbances.

VIII

As long as this war against the common enemy lasts, the Tatars have no right to capture innocent inhabitants of Ukraine or those not opposed to our allied armies. They [the Tatars] may not burn

their settlements or rob them under any pretext, be it secretly or openly.

IX

The holy churches not only in Ukraine but also in the Muscovite colonies, commonly called *slobodas*, may not be harmed by Tatars nor may they be exposed to burning or profanity.

X

Whereas the inhabitants of the Muscovite *slobodas*,³ who are from Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper [the Left-Bank], have already been tricked so often by Muscovite declarations of unlimited freedom and preservation of [their] rights and have been forced to colonize and inhabit these colonies [where they] were oppressed by a terrible yoke just as we were, therefore, before they are granted a complete guarantee of their liberties by means of our manifestoes, they should, with our mutual consent, take refuge under the protection of our allied armies. If they do not do so, remaining stubbornly in their places, then it will be necessary to treat them as enemies.

XI

If any difficulty should arise during the occupation of the Muscovite *slobodas* and during their incorporation into Ukraine, be it by force of arms or by conclusion of treaties, then the inhabitants of these settlements, that is, our people, will be forced to abandon these areas and move to Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper.

XII

The borders of our fatherland on both sides of the Dnieper will be maintained by the Sublime Porte as well as by the Khan and the Crimean realm according to ancient stipulations. The Khan, together with the Porte, and with the prior consultation with His Royal Majesty of Sweden, will maintain their inviolability vis-a-vis the Polish Commonwealth and the Muscovites.

XIII

After the military destruction or the occupation of the Muscovite

fortifications at Kamianyi Zaton on the Dnieper and of those fortifications built on the lands of the Zaporozhian Host, these vacant areas will remain in the possession of the same [Zaporozhian Host] and neither the Tatars nor the Turks may take possession of them.

XIV

The famous Dnieper, from the mouth of the Boh River to the Black Sea, and from Ochakiv to the Samara River, including other tributaries and adjoining settlements, will belong, according to ancient custom, laws and privileges, to the Cossacks of the Lower Zaporozhian Host without any prejudicial intervention. Neither Turks nor Tatars should raise any pretensions to its possession, exploitation or to the establishment of colonies and construction of fortifications in these lands.

XV

Whether Ukraine be at war or at peace, the Khan and the Crimean realm may never lay claim to the arbitrary punishment of Cossacks who are guilty of crimes. These [Cossacks] should be handed over to the [Zaporozhian Host's] military court as stipulated by their laws.

XVI

In military affairs there should be a commonly prepared plan of action between His Serene Majesty, the Khan, and the Illustrious Hetman or their deputies.

XVII

As a precaution, the Khan should put at the Hetman's disposal and for his protection, a certain number of Tatar troops who will remain continuously at his side until the conclusion of the war.

XVIII

Ukrainian merchants should not be exposed to any great exactions in the Crimean realm. They should pay a toll equal to that of Tatars and Turks.

XIX

After the conclusion of the war with the Muscovites (may it be successful!) the Khan will be responsible, together with the friendly cooperation and participation of the Royal Majesty of Sweden, for the arrangement and conclusion of a treaty with the Muscovites so that they will never raise any pretensions to the possession of Ukraine. They should pay for the losses which they brought to Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Host in this war which now threatens us and return all kinds and ranks of captives which [they took] among our Ruthenian [Ukrainian] people.

XX

The Don Cossacks are to join the Ukrainian Cossacks and accept the authority of the Hetman. They are to have equal rights and privileges as to laws and liberties as the descendants of the same people. Such a union will be proposed by the Don Cossacks themselves through their envoys and in writing, so that there will be one shepherd and one flock.

XXI

The Hetman of Ukraine and of the Zaporozhian Host will enjoy, both in his country and in other countries, the prerogatives of the Hetman's authority, without any limitations or prejudice from the Khan or the Crimean realm.

XXII

Traitors, disturbers of internal peace, assailants on the life of the Hetman who flee to the Crimea should be extradited.

XXIII

In order that the free election of the Hetmans be preserved in the Zaporozhian Host and among the Ruthenian people, neither the Khan nor the Crimean realm may, by any means, attempt to remove the Hetman.

His Royal Majesty of Sweden was informed of these points in the month of December in the year 1710.

II. The *Pacta Conventa* (The Treaty Concluded Between the Crimean Realm and the Zaporozhian Host and the Little Russian People)⁴

May unending praise be given to the worshipful God, the creator of all, who praised constancy and perseverance in the maintenance of laws and agreements and then confirmed this through his messengers. At the same time let there be thanks and honor given to His Holy Apostles, Muhammad, Ahmed and Mahmud. Muhammad destroyed those who do not abide by treaties and strengthened through irreversible law the contents of treaties. Simultaneously, God prepared paradise for all the friends and companions of Muhammad who distinguished themselves before the Prophet in the maintenance and obedience to treaties—rising above the others as if they were ascending a mountain.

We proclaim—in a region stretching far and wide, throughout the limits of our Lord's realm [which comprises] the Tatars of the Crimea and Perekop, the Great and Little Nogais, and of the Circassian Mountains, and to the knowledge of the forty thousand Kazan Tatars whom that Lord wrested from under the rule of the Kalmuks with the sword and to the realm of the Great Nogai, to the Most Powerful and Felicitous Great Khan, the Lord Devlet Girei (May God preserve him and his realm) as well as to the Khan's royal court—that envoys arrived with the agreement of the entire Host and its leaders and brought letters from the Most Illustrious Hetman of the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks and from the *koshovyi*, the Honorable Konstantyn Hordienko. They are the Honorable Dmytro Horlenko, the colonel of Pryluky, Klym Dvohopalyi, the Procurator-General and Ivan Maksymovych, the Notary-General. The contents of the letter which they presented verbally are: Formerly, in the time of Khmelnytskyi, the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks, concluded a treaty of friendship, fraternity and union with the Crimeans from which they realized great gains. Now the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks again wish to unite with the Crimeans and acknowledge them as friends, brothers and comrades. Whereas the Muscovite is our enemy [and]

has done us much harm then obviously the interests of these two peoples demand that they unite and recoup the losses suffered due to the hostile Muscovite and his oppressions. Therefore we wish that the treaties and agreements concluded with Hetman Khmelnytskyi should again be confirmed and a treaty should be renewed on this basis.

The terms [which the Cossacks proposed] are: First, under no pretext may any harm be done to the Cossacks, to their families and their properties by the Tatars. They should be allowed to live in peace. According to ancient custom, they should have freedom to elect whomever they may wish as their leader and to constitute [their] leadership. No one may interfere, by spreading confusion, with the captains and the colonels and with other leaders in the fulfillment of their duties.

Furthermore, when the Most Illustrious and Powerful Great Khan should wish to write a letter to the Most Illustrious Hetman, let him continue, according to ancient custom, to use such terms as he had previously used with Hetman Khmelnytskyi. Let [the Cossacks] keep their residences, habitations and salt-works and let them have the right to fish and hunt in their traditional places.

Let them have guarantees as to the freedom to practice their religious rites and let no harm be done to their churches and chapels. In short, let it [Ukraine] be a free province and they [the Cossacks] a free people. In general, let them be enemies of all the Khan's and the Crimean realm's enemies and friends of all their friends. When necessity should demand it, they should supply the Crimea with reinforcements and help. When, with the help of God's grace, together we should drive out and weaken the enemy so that he will sue for peace then, just as we were together in the beginning and during the war, so we should also be inseparable when the time comes to sign the peace, so that the plans of both peoples may be fulfilled. We wish that on the strength of these pacts, the Crimean Khan, his dignitaries and the entire Crimean people live in peace with their friends and brothers until the end of time and that they should never separate from them. We request that the reinforced and durable terms be arranged in this matter by both sides and that they be announced publicly.

When the envoys cited above presented these terms and fulfilled the duties of their embassy, the leaders, dignitaries and *mirzas* gathered in separate places and commenced their counsels. Everyone who was wise acknowledged this treaty as proper and drawn up with the aid of God.

We [the Tatars] also sanction this treaty and promise that in the future we will not cause any harm to the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks, or to their families and their property. We wish to be the friends of their friends, the enemies of their enemies and [to act] in time of difficulty as readily available reinforcements. We do not wish to interfere in any way in the election of the Hetman and the dignitaries. We do not wish, for whatever reason, to be troublesome to their provinces, people, boundaries, lands, salt-works, fishing and hunting grounds. We also intend to maintain the same relations with them as with their ancestors, regardless of what some leaders or men among [our] people might do. Let the roads stay open for the merchants of both peoples and, as in the past, let normal tolls be taken from them. If the need should arise, then let the treaty with Khmelnytskyi again take effect. When, with the will of God, the Muscovite enemy will be expelled, weakened and forced to sue for peace, then, just as we were united and allied in time of war by a treaty so also in time of peace we will be inseparable and promise that we will not separate until the last day of our lives.

As confirmation of these terms and treaties we delivered this letter, provided with a seal, to them. Hoping in the Most Merciful God [we stated] that as long as this treaty will not be violated by them, so long, from day to day, our respect for these treaties will grow and we will enjoy mutual friendship.

Given on the Dnieper River, in the year of Mohammad 1122, on the 5th day of Zilhicce.

Devlet Shah Mirza	Elchagi Husein
Ahmet Shah Mirza	Hasan Mirza Mansur
Ahmet Shah	Kaplan Mirza Shirin
Ali Shah Mirza Shirin	Sultan Shahmersay Mansur
Mustafa Mirza Shirin	Sefershah Bey
Hasan Betmur Mirza	Chagi Artimur Mirza Bazdag
Tuhmismir Segud	Husein Aga Bordaz
Murad Shah Mirza Shirin	Hagis Mirza Kipei
Elchagi Kalga Shirin	Adil Mirza Taygam
Mehmet Sahmir Mankat	Elchagi Husein
Mubarek Mirza Mansur	Hasan Mirza Mansur ⁵

**DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE TREATY
NEGOTIATED BETWEEN HETMAN PYLYP ORLYK
AND THE OTTOMAN PORTE IN 1711-1712**

I. Hetman Pylyp Orlyk's Instructions for the Ukrainian Cossack
Envoys to the Ottoman Porte¹

I

When the honorable envoys, together with the honorable *koshovyi-otaman* arrive at the Sublime Ottoman Porte in Constantinople and present, in the name of the Illustrious Hetman of all Little Russia, that is, of Ukraine,² the appropriate expressions of gratitude to the Sublime Ottoman Porte for the special sympathy which—to its eternal praise—it showed to the neighboring people of Little Russia who were groaning under the terrible yoke of Muscovite rule at the time when its [the Porte's] victorious armies forced Moscow to sue for peace. In that treaty [the Porte] also demanded that the Muscovite evacuate and release from his terrible slavery Little Russia or Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper, which has always been free and never acknowledged his rule. At the same time the *koshovyi-otaman* and the envoys-extraordinary should humbly request, in the name of the Illustrious Hetman, the entire Host and all of Ukraine the favor and indulgence that it [the Porte] again conclude a treaty with Moscow which will deserve its undying praise and be in accordance with the gracious declaration which was granted to us in writing. [In this treaty] it should be acknowledged as indispensable that Moscow forever relinquish Ukraine on

both sides of the Dnieper and that in the future it never claim any rights to rule over it. It [Moscow] should allow Ukraine to be free and leave it to the rule and the army of the Illustrious Hetman, Pylyp Orlyk and his successors and to the entire Zaporozhian Host which is, according to ancient treaties and to the new one concluded with the Crimean Khan in the current year and affirmed by our envoys-extraordinary, permanently and irrevocably united [with the Crimean Khanate] in indestructible friendship and brotherhood against their common enemies and [Ukraine is also united] with the Ottoman Porte as a result of its unending gratitude for its salvation.

II

When, with the aid of God's grace and with the protection of the Sublime Porte and the Crimean Khan's solicitude, the Muscovite will release Ukraine on this and the other side of the Dnieper, from his oppressive captivity, then the *koshovyi-otaman* and the envoys-extraordinary should exert themselves in order that a separate treaty be concluded, with all care and adherence to terms, between us and Moscow and they should incline the Ottoman Porte with their most humble entreaties to the resolution and favor of accepting the role of mediator and guarantor [of the proposed treaty] so that in the future the Muscovite will not dare, secretly or openly, to become burdensome to Ukraine and the entire Zaporozhian Host and so that Moscow will not dare to place it under its orders and regulations so that Ukraine as she is presently, should always remain free from oppression.

III

As soon as the Muscovite is constrained to relinquish Ukraine forever on the basis of the recently concluded treaty with the Sublime Ottoman Porte then it will be necessary for him to withdraw from within our borders to his own state [taking with him] all his troops and garrisons and evacuating all the fortresses. Our officers, functionaries and other persons of whatever rank and origin they may be, who were captured, arrested or exiled to Siberia and other remote places of the Muscovite state, should all be returned to our fatherland for the sake of their good and well-being and they should be allowed to reside freely together with us in Ukraine.

Especially the emissaries from the *Sich* who were kept in Lebedyn should be released as well as all the Zaporozhian soldiers who were previously hired for service in St. Petersburg and eventually arrested and exiled as a group, some to Sivsko, others to Vilnius, and where they suffered from hunger.³

IV

Not only the above mentioned people, of whatever origin they may have been, who were sent into exile and to jails [should be freed] but also the wives and children of the generals, colonels, captains, people of rank as well as commoners, whomever they took (if only the Muscovite will listen to the demands of the Sublime Porte!) as a result of the lost war, from their homes and brought under arrest to Hlukhiv, wishing to subject the terrorized inhabitants of Ukraine to their control by means of these acts. Therefore, they [the captives] were sent, on the spot and without their families, with their [Muscovite] units to their lands.⁴

V

His Honor, the *koshovyi-otaman* and the honorable envoys should not spare any effort in obtaining the Sublime Porte's support in guaranteeing that the Muscovite, in removing his garrisons from Ukraine, will not destroy the fortresses but will maintain them in the state in which they were built and kept to this day. After the garrisons are removed from the fortresses they should be transferred to us. He [the Muscovite] should not oppress the Ukrainians with raping and looting nor capturing them, take them into slavery, be it openly or secretly. Nor should the towns and villages be depopulated in any way and their provisions taken away. In general, he [the Muscovite] should not cause any harm, extortions, aggravations, oppressions and losses. Let him instead evacuate his garrisons under the usual discipline and order and also let an exact date be established when Ukraine should be completely evacuated by the Muscovite army.

VI

Our boundaries which separate Ukraine from Muscovy and Poland as well as the articles which protect it are known to all. His

Honor, the *koshovyi-otaman* and the honorable envoys should see to it at the Sublime Porte that they [the boundaries] will be guaranteed by a special treaty. Especially the treaty with Muscovy should be so guaranteed.

VII

Whereas the Muscovite forcibly removed all the cannons and all of the Host's military supplies, especially those for the artillery, from Baturyn as well as from the Cossack's nest which is called the *Sich*, from Bila Tserkva and from other Ukrainian forts therefore, in compensation, let him supply his own cannons to Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Host. If in this matter difficulties should arise due to the inadequacy of the roads for the transportation of those cannons, then Ukraine could be satisfied with the cannons which the Muscovite presently keeps in Ukrainian fortresses. The point is that he should not take them out with him but as soon as [the Ukrainians] are on their territory and the Muscovite is evacuating, this transfer [of the cannon] should take place without any harm to Ukraine. Let the Sublime Porte, by means of humble entreaties, be persuaded to make such an agreement with the Muscovites.

VIII

It would be fitting to request the Sublime Porte that, in connection with these negotiations, it force the Muscovite to compensate Ukraine, the Zaporozhian Host and all of us, for our various losses which we suffered in our estates, and in our movable and immovable properties as a result of the defeat in the recent war.

IX

During the last winter the Muscovite announced, not only in Ukraine but also in Poland and in other lands of Europe, that the Most Serene King of Sweden, in going to the Sublime Ottoman Porte with the intention of taking up arms there, supposedly agreed with the Commonwealth that Ukraine should be placed under Turkish rule and that a tribute, commonly called *harac* would be taken there. This can be seen clearly from the manifesto publicized by the same (Muscovite). And now he [the Muscovite], in order to maintain control in Ukraine, frightens the poorly in-

formed populace by means of rumors to the effect that our Greek faith and our rights and liberties are being violated, that churches are transformed into mosques, and that unbearable tributes are extorted by the Ottoman Porte. This is similar to the lies which were already spread in the previous winter in public letters. Therefore, in attempting to solve such problems, the honorable *koshoviyotaman* and the honorable envoys should request the Sublime Porte for a confirmation of the contents of the treaty which was concluded with the Crimean Khan as well as for a grant of a special charter of assurance [*privilegium assecuratorum*] such as the one which we have among the documents [given to us] by His Royal Majesty, the King of Sweden.

The following points should also be included in it [the charter of assurance]:

—Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper together with the Zaporozhian Host and the people of Little Russia should be free from foreign rule and no harm should be caused by the allied forces to the fraternity and friendship concluded with the Crimean Khan. And that he [the Khan] should not, under the pretext of protection or privilege, attempt to establish his absolute rule, vassalage or subjugation in Ukraine and within the Zaporozhian Host. And he should not collect any taxes or tribute.

—The Ukrainian fortresses which are to be taken away from the Muscovite, either by treaty or by force of arms, should not be placed under their [Ottoman] rule and should not be occupied unlawfully by their soldiers.

—They [the Ottomans] should not build any new fortifications in Ukraine for their own use and they should not allow other neighbors to build them.

—The right to exercise one's religion should not suffer any harm. There should be only one religion and it should be based on the ancient dogmas of the Eastern Orthodox Church and be in obedience, in spiritual matters, to the Patriarch in Constantinople.

—They [the Ottomans] should maintain the integrity of Ukraine and they should not allow her neighbors, under any pretext, to oppress it.

—They [the Ottomans] should faithfully maintain the inviolability of its [Ukraine's] borders, the free exercise of its liberties, order, laws and privileges. Ukraine should always enjoy its rights and liberties without determent from the Sublime Porte.

—The Zaporozhian Host should maintain the right to elect

freely the Hetmans and the Porte should not attempt in any way to remove them.

— The Hetman should have complete control of, and the highest authority in, Ukraine, according to the laws of the fatherland. He should have the right to receive [envoys] from beyond the borders of his fatherland.

— The Zaporozhian Host which inhabits the lower part of the Dnieper should always enjoy its rights, liberties, privileges and immunities and it should have the free use of the rivers, streams and fields up to Ochakiv for hunting and fishing, according to the ancient customs and without any interference from the Porte.

— When the Hetman is elected in free elections he will offer ceremonial homage, not personally but by means of letter, to the Sublime Porte.

— Ukrainian merchants should be allowed to trade in the Turkish empire and its provinces. Additional payments should not be demanded from them and they should pay for their wares at the same rate as the Turks.

It is essential that, with the mediation of the Khan, such a charter of assurance (*instrumentum assecuratorium*) be obtained so that it may be promulgated in Ukraine, by means of the Most Illustrious Hetman's manifestoes, and thereby counter Moscow's arguments and oppression.

X

The Zaporozhian Host and the people of Little Russia, once they have been accepted under the protection of the Most Serene Swedish King, wish never to be removed from under that protection. Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Host should enjoy perpetually the protection of His Serene and Royal Swedish Majesty without wrong or harm being done to the eternal friendship and comradeship of arms with the Crimean Khan. This fraternity, friendship and comradeship of arms should not cause any objection and harm to the protection of His Royal Majesty of Sweden. That protection will bring neither the Sublime Porte nor Ukraine any harm. Indeed, thanks to Ukraine, the friendship and the union of arms between the Porte and the Swedish state may be strengthened and [turned] against Moscow which is a close neighbor of the Swedish state. For these reasons it is fitting, therefore, to request the Sublime Porte to attach this article to the charter [of assurance].

All these things and others which will appear to be necessary for the fatherland and the Zaporozhian Host will be the object of the most careful, faithful and sincere judgment and management of the honorable *koshovyi-otaman* and the honorable envoys-extraordinary for whom these instructions have been issued.

For the sake of greater creditability and importance, this letter is provided with our Hetman's signature and our public seal. (Given in the year, month and day stated above.)

Pylyp Orlyk

Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host

II. The Charter of the Turkish Emperor Granting Pylyp Orlyk, the Hetman of the Zaporozhians, Possession of Ukraine on this Side of the Dnieper⁵

We, the Great Lord, Ahmed Sultan, son of Mehmed, son of Ibrahim Sultan, Emperor of the Turks as well as of Mecca, Medina and of Jerusalem, etc., etc.

Whereas among the magnates who believe in Christ only Pylyp Orlyk, Hetman of the Ukrainian as well as Zaporozhian Cossacks, whose life has lately been adorned with fortune, fled with the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks from the hostility of the Muscovites to our most gracious protection and placed himself under the rule of our empire; and the Most Serene and Powerful Devlet Girei, Khan of the Crimean and other Tatars—let God sanctify his rule and multiply his fortune—has informed us that Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper, which we wrested from the Muscovite Tsar in the past year with our invincible armies at the Prut River, has been the domain and possession of the Cossacks since antiquity and that it is where previously the Hetman of the Zaporozhians and Ukrainians, Petro Doroshenko, lived together with his people and ruled under the gracious protection of our empire—we and the Most Serene and Powerful Khan wish that Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper should again be entrusted by us to the current Hetman, Pylyp Orlyk, and that there, as before, the Cossacks should reside hereditarily.

Let Ukraine again be their land.

Therefore, we offer Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper, which came to our invincible empire from the Muscovite Tsar by right of

war, and graciously confer possession, together with rule over it, to the above mentioned Hetman of the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks, Pylyp Orlyk and to his successors, the Hetmans of the Ukrainians and Zaporozhians. Let him and his successors have the highest authority over the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks and exercise the absolute right of life and death over them, without the possibility of recourse and referral to our Porte. Let the Cossacks and the entire Ukrainian people always have freedom under their current Hetmans. Let them freely elect their Hetmans without anyone from our elevated state meddling in their rights and liberties. Let no payments, public or otherwise, be taken from them.

In remaining under our protection, they are obligated to provide military aid against every enemy of our empire and accompany our army on military expeditions, cooperating with it to the extent that it is possible. Let the current Hetman and his successors freely possess entire Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper, according to the same rights and manner as Petro Doroshenko possessed it, being under the protection of our empire. Let him [the current Hetman] rule, reign and proceed according to his rights and ancient custom. However, Kiev which is on this side of the Dnieper and the adjacent areas and towns are to be outside his jurisdiction. We have given them, together with the nearer Ukraine [Left Bank] to the Muscovite and leave them in his possession. Finally, we expect that the current Hetman, together with his Cossack regiments and the entire Ukrainian people, will remain in constant and undiminished loyalty to us and our empire and that they will eternally remain under our protection in accordance with what has been written. Let no evil, harm or oppression come to their lands because of this.

Therefore, we give this, our most gracious charter, to the current Hetman, Pylyp Orlyk and to his successors. If they will adhere to us in constant faith then let all that has been written in this charter be honored by our successors. Let the Hetman and his successors as well as all the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks and all the people living in Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper remain under the protection of our favor and clemency.

Let all see and believe our seal to this effect.

(Given in our empire on the fifth day of third month of the 1124th Muslim year.)⁶

Notes

CHAPTER I

1. For a survey of the historiography on Mazepa see D. Doroshenko, "Mazepa v istorychnii literaturi i v zhytti," in *Zbirnyk* I, pp. 3-34 and D. Kravtsov, "Hetman Mazepa v ukrainskii istoriografii XIX v.," in *Zapysky Istoryko-filolohichnoho viddilu Ukrainskoi Akademii nauk* VI (1925), pp. 2-18. Also see P. Fedenko, "Hetman Mazepa in Soviet Historiography," *Ukrainian Review*, IX (1960), pp. 6-18 and A. Kozachenko, "Sobytiia 1708-1709 gg. na Ukraine v osveshchenii ukrainskoi dvoriansko-burzhuznoi istoriografii," *Poltava: K 250-letiiu Poltavskogo srazheniia* (Moscow, 1959).

2. Cf. R. Merriman, *Six Contemporaneous Revolutions* (Oxford, 1938).

3. For Trevor-Roper's views and those of his critics see T. Aston, ed., *Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660* (London, 1965).

4. For a penetrating discussion of this issue see O. Brunner, "Die Freiheitsrechte in der altständischen Gesellschaft," in *Verfassung und Landesgeschichte: Festschrift für Th. Mayer* I (1954), pp. 294-303.

5. See A. Kaminski, "The Cossack Experiment in *Szlachta* Democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: The Hadiach (Hadiacz) Union," *HUS*, I, 2 (1977), pp. 178-197, N. A. Mokhov, *Moldavia epokhi feodalizma* (Kishinev, 1964), pp. 307ff. and R. Wittram, *Baltische Geschichte* (Münich-Oldenburg, 1954), pp. 77-89.

6. See Merriman, *Revolutions*, passim.

7. This point is made in "Donoshenie Kochubeia Gosudariu," April, 1708, *Istochniki*, p. 106.

8. A cogent discussion of this question is E. Lemberg, *Geschichte des Nationalismus in Europa* (Hamburg, 1964), I, pp. 98-101.

9. For the activity of these political émigrés see S. Ciobanu, *Dimitrie Cantemir in Rusia* (Bucarest, 1925); G. Szekfü, *A száműzött Rákóczi* (Budapest, 1913); Y. Erdmann, *Johann Reinhold von Patkul* (Berlin, 1970); J. Feldman, *Stanisław Leszczyński* (Wrocław-Poznan, 1948) and Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Pylyp Orlyk (1672-1742). Ohliad ioho politychnoi diialnosti* (Warsaw, 1938).

10. A thorough and non-partisan review of the many different opinions about the nature of the Pereiaslav Treaty is O. E. Gunther, "Der Vertrag von Pereiaslav im Widerstreit der Meinungen," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (1954), pp. 232-257.

11. A description of this tense moment may be found in M. Hrushevskyy, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi* (New York, 1957), IX, 1, p. 740.

12. The rise of the *starshyna*-nobility is thoroughly treated in L. Okinshkevych, *Znachne viiskove tovarystvo v Ukraini-Hetmanshchyni v XVII-XVIII vv.* in *Pratsi istorychno-filosofichnoi sekcii ZNTSh*, CLVII (München, 1948). Also see D. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskago byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie kozatskoi starshyny v dvorianstvo," *KSt I* (1897), pp. 1-31, II, pp. 188-220, III, pp. 351-374, IV, pp. 1-47.

13. This estimate is based on the numbers of Cossack officers listed in I. K. Kirilov, *Tsvetushchee sostoianie userossiiskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 160-170.

14. Hrushevskyy, *Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi*, IX, 2, p. 1417.

15. Cf. O. Pritsak, "Das erste türkisch-ukrainische Bündnis," *Oriens*, VI (1953), pp. 266-298.

16. Cf. K. A. Sofronenko, *Malorossiiskii prikaz russkago gosudarstva vtoroi poloviny XVII i nachala XVIII veka* (Moscow, 1960). It is striking to see how limited were the prerogatives of the *Malorossiiskii Prikaz* as compared to those of the *Prikaz* of Kazan. See M. Rywkin, "The *Prikaz* of the Kazan Court: First Russian Colonial Office," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (1976), 3, pp. 293-300.

17. TsGADA, knigi Malorossiiskago prikaza, no. 65, fol. 112 as quoted by V. A. Diadychenko, *Narysy suspilno-politychnoho ustroiu liuboberezhnoi Ukrainy kin XVII-pochatku XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1959), p. 103.

18. See P. Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII stoletia i reforma Petra Velikago*, 2d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1905), p. 96.

19. The number of Russian troops in Ukraine reached a high of about 12,000 in the mid 1660s but later it fell to as low as 1,900. *Ibid.* The number of Ukrainian Cossack troops was between 30-40,000. Cf. O. M. Apanovych, *Zbroini syly Ukrainy pershoi pol. XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1969).

20. The Tsar would never again be able to raise such a huge levee of his dvoriane. Upon learning of the outcome of the battle Aleksei Mikhailovich appeared in mourning and Muscovites panicked for fear of an impending invasion by the Ukrainian Cossacks and their Tatar allies. See Soloviev, VI, pp. 49-51.

21. See Ia. I. Dzyra, *Litopys samovydsia* (Kiev, 1971), p. 146.

22. For a discussion of Mazepa's background see Ohloblyn, pp. 10-14.

23. Cf. B. Krupnytskyi, "Miscellanea Mazepiana," *Zbirnyk I*, pp. 88-92.

24. Ohloblyn, p. 13.

25. See H. Babinski, *The Mazeppa Legend in European Romanticism* (New York, 1974).

26. The problem of the Right Bank at the end of the 17th and early 18th centuries is discussed in Ohloblyn, pp. 196-244.
27. Cf. D. M. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloirossii*, 4th ed. (Kiev, 1903), pp. 338-343.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
29. For the details of Mazepa's first meeting with Peter I see Kostomarov, p. 38.
30. See below, p. 59.

CHAPTER II

1. For data concerning the population of Left Bank Ukraine see V. M. Kabuzan, *Izmeneniia v razmeshchenii naseleniia Rossii* (Moscow, 1971), p. 52. A study of the Ukrainian Cossack army is Apanovych, *Zbroini syly Ukrainy*. For a study of the socio-economic and administrative aspects of the Hetmanate or Left Bank Ukraine, see Diadychenko, *Narysy suspilno-politychnoho ustroiu*.
2. An analysis of the systematic changes introduced into the Periaslav Treaty is A. Iakovliv, *Ukrainsko-Moskovski dohovory v XVII-XVIII vi-kakh* (Warsaw, 1934), vol. XX of *Pratsi*.
3. Ohloblyn, p. 261.
4. "Ukaz vsemu Malorossiiskomu narodu," 6 November 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, p. 276.
5. Peter I to Mazepa, 24 June 1707, *Istochniki*, p. 56.
6. Kostomarov, pp. 242-265 and Ohloblyn, pp. 251-258.
7. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 179.
8. The tension between these two ambitious men was intense. Mazepa's chancellor, Pylyp Orlyk, felt that the Hetman's hatred of Menshikov was one of the chief reasons for his defection (*Diariusz*, X, fols. 94 and 118). Also see Orlyk's letter to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 183 and Kostomarov, pp. 293-296. Also see G. Georgievskii, "Mazepa i Menshikov. Novye materialy," *Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, 12 (1940), pp. 72-84.
9. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, pp. 180, 188.
10. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 184.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 185. The statement was made by Dmytro Horlenko, colonel of Pryluky.
13. On the recommendation of Peter I, Mazepa received the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire on 1 September 1707. Cf. T. Mackiw, "Mazepa's Title: Prince of the Holy Roman Empire," *Nationalities Papers*, VII, 1 (1979), pp. 95-100. Mazepa also received the Order of the White Eagle from August II in 1705.
14. Cf. Soloviev, VIII, p. 161.
15. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 182.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

18. This argument is treated at length in my article "Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason," *HUS*, II, 2 (1979), pp. 170 ff.

19. Cf. "Razgovor Hetmana Mazepy s Diakom Borisom Mikhailovim o raznykh tainykh delakh," 28 March 1701, *Istochniki*, pp. 30-35 and Kostomarov, pp. 267-268.

20. "Instruktsiia sekretnaia," *Istochniki*, p. 50.

21. Cf. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 180. A thorough study of the Hetman's relations with Princess Dolska is O. Pritsak, "Hetman Ivan Mazepa i kn. Anna Dolska," *Zbirnyk*, II, pp. 102-117.

22. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 191.

23. Cf. *Trudy Imperatorskago russkago voenno-istoricheskago obshchestva*, III (St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 276.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

25. *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii*, part III in *Chteniia* (Moscow, 1847), p. 52.

26. Cf. Doroshenko, "Mazepa v istorychnii literaturi," p. 25 ff.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27. Also see M. Andrusiak, "Zviazky Mazepy z Stanislavom Leshchynskym i Karlom XII," *ZNTSh*, CLII (1933), pp. 35-61.

28. "Dopros Apostola," December 1708, *Istochniki*, p. 214.

29. Cf. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 195. Originals of this manifesto are in *AGAD*, Archiwum Potockich, No. 56.

30. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 188.

31. "Dogovor mezhdou Orlykom i voiskom zaporozhskim," 5 April 1710, *Istochniki*, p. 242.

32. Ohloblyn, pp. 281-282.

33. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 183.

34. Kayserling to King Fredrich I, 31 January 1709 in B. Krupnytskyi, "Z donesen Kayserlinga, 1708-1709," in *Zbirnyk*, II, p. 33.

35. For a study of Mazepa's ties with the ecclesiastical elite of Ukraine see M. Andrusiak, "Hetman Mazepa iak kulturnyi diiach," *Zbirnyk*, II, pp. 69-87. Also see Ohloblyn, pp. 158-160.

36. Cf. I. Borshchak, "Vyvid prav Ukrainy," *Stara Ukraina*, I-II (Lviv, 1925), pp. 1-14. For an English translation see "Pylyp Orlyk's Devolution of the Ukraine's Rights," *Annals* VI, 3-4 (1958), pp. 1296-1312.

37. Krupnytskyi, "Plany Mazepy," p. 103 and Andrusiak, "Zviazky Mazepy," p. 59. See also M. Hrushevskiy, "Shvedsko-ukrainskyi soiuз 1708," *ZNTSh*, XCII (1909), pp. 7-20. For an excellent study of Swedish-Ukrainian contacts during this period see B. Kentschynskiy, *Mazepa* (Lund, 1966) especially pages 333 ff. Very useful is R. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden* (New York, 1968), pp. 276-289.

38. During my visit to Dinteville in August 1971 its owner, Comte De la Ville-Beuge, and I could not find any document resembling the "Deduction." Moreover, Comte De la Ville-Beuge informed me that Borshchak had never visited Dinteville and only used some documents which its owners showed him in Paris.

39. Cf. Kostomarov, p. 515. For a somewhat different version see G. Adlerfelt, *Histoire Militaire de Charles XII, roi de Suede* (Amsterdam, 1740), IV, p. 8 and Kentrschynskyj, *Mazepa*, p. 333.

40. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, pp. 192-193.

41. Sieniawski to Mazepa, 27 January 1708, *Czart.*, 25074. The Polish magnate informed the Hetman about the "gossip" which circulated in Poland about Mazepa's secret ties with the enemy.

42. In 1705, before the Kochubei-Iskra affair, Mazepa informed the Tsar of four "temptations" which had come his way: one was from Sobieski, another from the Crimean Khan, the third was from the Don Cossacks and the fourth was from the Swedes and Leszczynski, that is, the affair with Wolski. Cf. Mazepa to Peter I, 18 October 1705, *Istochniki*, pp. 48-50.

43. Cf. O. Subtelny, *On the Eve of Poltava: The Letters of Ivan Mazepa to Adam Sieniawski, 1704-1708* (New York, 1975) for the dangerous game which the Ukrainian Hetman and the Polish magnate played at this time.

44. See S. Tomashivskyi, ed., "Lysty Petra Velykoho do A. M. Syniavskoho," *ZNTSh*, XCII (1909), pp. 194-238. While these two politicians were tempting each other, they also denounced each other to the Tsar. Cf. Kostomarov, pp. 343-345.

45. A. I. Dashkov to G. I. Golovkin, 11 December 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, p. 868. Dashkov also suspected that Sieniawski might still be in secret contact with Mazepa.

46. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 196.

47. For a discussion of Kochubei's motives see Ohloblyn, pp. 288-300.

48. Mazepa's love letters to Motria Kochubei may be found in *Istochniki*, pp. 127-130.

49. For a full text of Kochubei's and Iskra's denunciation of Mazepa see "Donoshenie Kochubeia Gosudariu po statiamy," April, 1708, *Istochniki*, pp. 98-111.

50. Kochubei and Iskra were executed on 14 July 1708. Cf. the report of Veliaminov-Zernov in *Istochniki*, pp. 138-140.

51. The widely scattered disposition of Cossack troops was described in Mazepa's letter to the Tsar, 4 August 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, pp. 526-527.

52. Kostomarov, p. 435.

53. Hatton, p. 277.

CHAPTER III

1. Peter I to F. M. Apraksin, 30 October 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VII, 2, p. 253. Menshikov first informed the Tsar about Mazepa's defection. Cf. Menshikov to Peter I, 24 October 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, p. 864.

2. Cf. O. Hrushevskyi, "Rozkvartyrovannia rosiiskykh polkiv na Ukraini," *ZNTSh*, LXXVII (1907), pp. 5-25.

3. For the arrests of the Mazepists and the confiscation of their lands

see O. Hrushevskiy, "Po katastrofi 1708: konfiskatsiia zemel u mazepynt-siv," *ZNTSh*, LXXVIII (1908), pp. 85-95 and "Hlukhiv i Lebedyn," *ZNTSh* XCII (1909), pp. 21-65.

4. Peter I to Menshikov, 27 October 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 1, p. 237.

5. Russian suspicions were reflected in the letter of A. I. Dashkov to G. I. Golovkin, 11 December 1708, *Ibid.*, VIII, 2, p. 869. Dashkov wrote that "If Skoropadskiy is elected Hetman, it will be necessary to watch him carefully because he is the creature of Mazepa; the latter established him and enriched him." Also cf. Ohloblyn, p. 317.

6. See "Stati Gosudaria Petra I iavniia i tainiia blizhnemu stolniku Andreiu Izmailovu," 18, 27, 30 July 1709, *Istochniki*, pp. 228-231.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

9. For the significance of this ceremony see my article "Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason," *HUS*, II, 2 (1978), pp. 178ff. For a description of this ceremony see G. I. Golovkin to P. A. Tolstoi, 9 November 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, pp. 910-912.

10. The idea of subjecting Mazepa to anathema was proposed by G. I. Golovkin. Cf. Golovkin to Peter I, 11 November 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, p. 932. Golovkin wrote: "I have concluded that it would be good if the *Gosudar* ordered the hierarchy and the entire clergy to issue an anathema against the traitor Mazepa and those of the *starshyna* who went with him. These published manifestoes should then be distributed throughout Ukraine and publicly read in the churches."

11. Cf. B. Kentschynskij, "Propogandakriget i Ukraina, 1708-1709," *KFA* (1958), pp. 81-124. For an English summary of this article see *Ukrainian Quarterly* XV (1959), pp. 241-259. Also cf. Subtelny, "The Question of Treason," p. 173ff.

12. Kentschynskij, "Propogandakriget," p. 92. For the Tsar's annoyance about this propaganda and the fate of Hermelin see Hatton, p. 300.

13. D. M. Golitsyn to Peter I, 21 November 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, p. 947. The Russian commander complains that Mazepa's agents and manifestoes "mnogikh vozmutili."

14. Menshikov to Peter I, 26 October 1708, *Ibid.*, VIII, 2, p. 865.

15. See V. E. Shutoi, "Polityka rosiiskoho uriadu na Ukraini v period zymovoi kampanii 1708-1709 rokov," in *250-Rokiv poltavskoi bytvy, 1709-1959* (Kiev, 1959), p. 94.

16. For Peter I's manifestoes to the Ukrainian people see *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 1, pp. 244-245, 263-264, 276-284, and IX, 1, pp. 59-66.

17. Few of Mazepa's manifestoes survived. One manifesto, issued in early 1709, may be found in C. J. Nordmann, *Charles XII et l'Ukraine de Mazepa* (Paris, 1958), pp. 68-71. Excerpts from Mazepa's manifestoes are in Kostomarov, pp. 467-470. Also see Mazepa to Skoropadskiy, 30 October 1708, *Istochniki*, pp. 173-175.

18. Menshikov to Peter I, 26 October 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, p. 865.

19. "Ukaz vsemu malorossiiskomu narodu," 6 November 1708, *Ibid.*, VIII, 1, p. 276.

20. Skoropadskyi's Manifesto, 8 December 1708, *Istochniki*, p. 198. This lengthy document contained a point-by-point rebuttal of Mazepa's arguments.

21. Charles XII's Manifesto, 7 November 1708, *Ibid.*, p. 207.

22. Mazepa's Manifesto, early 1709, in Nordmann, *Charles XII*, pp. 69-70. Also see *Pisma i bumagi*, IX, 2, pp. 614-615. Mazepa's propaganda had a strong impact on the Right Bank. Cf. D. M. Golitsyn to Peter I, 21 November 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, p. 947.

23. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix I, p. 191. This concern about the Tsar's inability to fulfill his duty to protect Ukraine was emphasized by Mazepa in his letter to Skoropadskyi, in *Istochniki*, p. 174. Cf. also Subtelny, "The Question of Treason," p. 170.

24. For example, see "Ukaz vsemu malorossiiskomu narodu," 6 November 1708, *Pisma i bumagi*, pp. 280-281.

25. See Charles XII's Manifesto, 7 November 1708, *Istochniki*, pp. 209-210. Also Kostomarov, pp. 476, 485 and Soloviev, VIII, p. 252.

26. See p. 48.

27. Cf. B. Krupnytskyi, "Z donesen Kayserlinga, 1708-1709," in *Zbirnyk*, II, p. 28. This comment was attributed to the Prussian envoy to Moscow, Johann Freiherr von Kayserling.

28. For a detailed list of Mazepa gifts to various churches and monasteries see M. Vozniak, "Benderska komisiia po smerti Mazepy," *Zbirnyk*, II, pp. 130-131. Also see Ohloblyn, pp. 157-159. For a discussion of Mazepa's relations with the church see B. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Mazepa und seine Zeit 1687-1709* (Leipzig, 1942), pp. 78-86 and M. Andrusiak, "Hetman Mazepa iak kulturnyi diiach," *Zbirnyk*, II, pp. 69-87.

29. Peter I was also unsure of support in such a key city as Kiev. Cf. the report of Golitsyn to G. I. Golovkin, 15 February 1709, Soloviev, VIII, p. 268 in which he states: "in all of Kiev I have found only one person, namely, the prefect of the Brotherhood monastery (Teofan Prokopovych) who has been affable to us." Golitsyn also reported, in November of 1708, that the mayor (*viit*) of Kiev, Dmytro Polotskyi, was aware of Mazepa's plans.

30. See p. 8.

31. Almost all the members of the *heneralna starshyna* followed Mazepa over to the Swedes. Among them were: Quartermaster-General Ilia Lomykovskyi, Judge-General Semen Chuikevych, Chancellor Pylp Orlyk, Adjutant-General Antin Hamaliia, Standardbearer-General Ivan Sulyma, Macebearer-General Dmytro Maksymovych. Also 7 of 12 colonels went with Mazepa: Dmytro Horlenko, colonel of Pryluky, Danylo Apostol, colonel of Myrhorod, Dmytro Zelenskyi, colonel of Lubny, Andrii Kandy-

ba, colonel of Korsun, and the three colonels of the mercenaries, Hnat Galagan, Iurii Kozhukhovskiy, and Andriiash. Even though they did not join Mazepa it was widely known that Ivan Levenets, colonel of Poltava, and Skoropadskiy of Starodub also sympathized with Mazepa's cause. So did Pavlo Polubotok, colonel of Chernyiv. However, personal animosity to Mazepa blocked any cooperation between the two men. Moreover, in the Pryluky regiment alone, 9 of 9 captains went over to the Swedes. For reports of deserters about the plight of these men in the Swedish camp see *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, pp. 1047-1051.

32. For Peter I's manifesto to the *starshyna* which followed Mazepa see "Ukaz voiskovoi starshyne ushedshei s Mazepoi k Shvedam," 1 November 1708, *Ibid.*, VIII, 1, pp. 266-268. Also see Kostomarov, pp. 480-481 for the friendly manner in which the Tsar received the returning *starshyna*.

33. For correspondence in this affair see Golovkin and Apostol to Mazepa, 22 December 1708, *Istochniki*, pp. 212-213. Cf. also Kostomarov, pp. 481-485.

34. Cf. Shutoi, *Borba narodnykh mass protiv nashestviia armii Karla XII 1700-1709* (Moscow, 1958) and B. Krupnytskyi, "Shvedy i naselennia na Ukraini v 1708-1709 rr," *Zbrinyk*, II, pp. 13-23. Shutoi estimates that the Swedes lost about 15,000 men prior to Poltava (p. 445). However, Hatton (p. 287) estimates that while the Swedes lost about 20% of their men, that is, 5,000 men prior to Poltava, the Russians lost about 33% of their men.

35. Cf. *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 1, p.

36. For the Swedish incursion into the *Slobodas* see Shutoi, *Borba*, pp. 343-358, Ohloblyn, 340-343, and Hatton, p. 283. When the Swedes set out for the Russian held territory, Mazepa remarked to the effect that they were now entering Asia (Shutoi, *Borba*, p. 353).

37. In addition to Evarnytskii's basic work, recent studies of the Zaporozhians are V. A. Golubutskii, *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kiev, 1957) and by the same author *Zaporizhska sich v ostanni chasy svooho isnuvannia* (Kiev, 1961). Also see N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy* (Münich, 1976), II, pp. 120-138.

38. The Zaporozhians' violent protests against the construction of these forts which were built under Mazepa's direction and then occupied by about 1000 Russian troops are described in Evarnytskii, III, pp. 48-54.

39. Peter issued special instructions regarding the Zaporozhians: "the Zaporozhians should be treated as well as possible; if they act as enemies and it is impossible to win them over by kindness then they should be treated as traitors," Peter I to Menshikov, 1 March 1709, *Pisma i bumagi*, IX, 1, p. 107. Also see Shutoi, *Borba*, pp. 373-376, 379.

40. Cf. Evarnytskii, III, pp. 362, 389ff, 409, for a discussion of Hordienko's anti-Russian attitudes.

41. Kostomarov, p. 520, and Evarnytskii, III, p. 416, cite the figure of 15,000. If the anti-Russian partisans did reach such numbers they were

probably mobs of peasants who did not pose any major threat to the Russians. Traditionally the Poltava regiment had close ties with the Zaporozhians and it was there that Petryk found his strongest support in his anti-Russian campaigns.

42. Gen. Ronne to Peter, 30 March 1709, *Pisma i bumagi*, IX, 2, p. 784.

43. Evarnytskii, III, p. 420.

44. For Mazepa's ties with the Ottomans and Tatars and their greatest interest in his defection see *Pisma i bumagi*, IX, 2, pp. 689-690. Fedir Myrovych, the son of the former colonel of Pereiaslav and Hryhor Hertsyk, the son of the former colonel of Poltava, were sent by Mazepa on missions to the Tatars and Ottomans. Cf. Ohloblyn, pp. 338-340.

45. For the ties of the Ukrainian Cossacks with the Don see O. Hermaize, "Ukraina ta Din u XVII st.," pp. 16-28.

46. The attack on the Zaporozhian *Sich* is described at length in Evarnytskii, III, pp. 38-44 and Shutoi, *Borba*, pp. 385-388.

47. For the Tsar's lengthy explanation why the *Sich* had to be destroyed see his manifesto of 17 May 1709, *Pisma i bumagi*, IX, I, pp. 181-184. On this occasion Teofan Prokopovych wrote his poem "The Repentant Zaporozhian" which reads in part:

What am I to do, I know not,
But to perish in obscurity:
I have wandered in impenetrable forests,
In hungry, arid lands;
Atamans and hetmans,
I have fallen prey to your deceptions. . . .

We have used the translation which appears in Cracraft, "Prokopovyč's Kiev Period Reconsidered," *HUS* II (1978), no. 2, p. 156.

48. The Ukrainian Cossacks, both on the side of Peter I and of Charles XII, played a relatively minor role at Poltava. This was an indication that they were no longer considered to be main force units in modern warfare. For descriptions of their role see Ohloblyn, p. 355 and Shutoi, *Borba*, p. 423.

49. Cf. Hatton, pp. 301-306 and Kostomarov, pp. 565-570.

50. For a description of the flight of Charles XII and Mazepa to the Ottoman borders see Hatton, pp. 309-310 and Evarnytskii, pp. 464 ff. and Kostomarov, pp. 571-580.

CHAPTER IV

1. For studies of the Bender period from the Ukrainian, Swedish and Polish points of view see Kostomarov, pp. 595-596, Krupnytskyi, pp. 9-86, Hatton, pp. 307-380 and J. Feldman, *Polska a sprawa wschodnia 1709-1714* (Cracow, 1926).

2. This estimate is based on the fact that in 1713 Horlenko requested 30 safe conduct passes for "notables" among the Ukrainians who wanted to

return home. Since about 15 members of the *starshyna* decided not to return, the total number of *starshyna* was about 45. Cf. Kostomarov, p. 669.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 571.

4. K. Dmitriev to P. A. Tolstoi, 12 December 1710, *Pisma i bumagi*, X, 2, p. 771. This estimate is based on a report of a Russian spy in Bender.

5. For a discussion of the Zaporozhians during this period see Evarnytskii, III, pp. 510-534. Also see Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy*, II, pp. 122-125.

6. Krupnytskyi, p. 25. This estimate is based on Swedish sources.

7. G. I. Kropotov to Peter I, 16 August 1710, *Pisma i bumagi*, X, 2, p. 506.

8. Orlyk to Iavorskyi, Appendix, p. 196.

9. Krupnytskyi, p. 24.

10. This conflict among the Ukrainian émigrés was examined in detail by M. Vozniak, "Benderska komisiia po smerti Mazepy," in *Zbirnyk*, I, pp. 134-161. Swedish reports about this episode may be found in V. Kordt, "Materialy z Stokholmskoho derzhavnoho arkhivu do istorii Ukrainy druhoi pol. XVII-poch. XVIII vv," *Ukrainskyi arkhheografichnyi zbirnyk*, III (Kiev, 1930), pp. 19-55.

11. Vozniak, "Benderska komisiia," p. 111.

12. A Swedish official, Gustav Soldan, registered the Hetman's wealth shortly before the latter's death. Cf. Kordt, "Materialy," doc. VIII, pp. 44-45. Tales about Mazepa's wealth spread far and wide. For example, Adam Smith in the *Wealth of Nations* (New York, 1937), p. 414, noted: "the treasures of Mazepa, the chief of the Cossacks of the Ukraine, the famous ally of Charles XII, are said to have been very great." My thanks to Dr. John-Paul Himka for bringing this passage to my attention.

13. Vozniak, "Benderska komisiia," p. 128.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

18. Kordt, "Materialy," pp. 50-51. Also see T. Westrin, "Antechningar om Karl XII: s orientaliska kreditor," *Historiska Tidskrift*, XX (1900), pp. 1-38.

19. Vozniak, p. 128.

20. Krupnytskyi's *Pylyp Orlyk* is the most thorough study of Orlyk's political activity. Unfortunately, Krupnytskyi did not have Orlyk's diary or French and Polish archives available to him. Although Borshchak (see bibliography) had access to these sources, he used them so freely that he often misrepresented the content of the documents. While Krupnytskyi's and Borshchak's studies were written, in varying degrees, in a pro-Orlyk spirit, the work by the Polish author, F. Rawita-Gawronski, "Filip Orlik, nieuznany hetman kozacki," in *Studia i szkice historyczne*, I (Lwow, 1903), pp. 29-70 examined Orlyk's activity from a critical point of view.

21. Orlyk to Charles XII, April, 1710, in *Perepiska*, p. 18.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
23. See Krupnytskyi, "Rid Orlykiv," *Rid i Znamia* (Kassel, 1947), pp. 1-4.
24. *Diariusz*, X, fol. 94.
25. A useful study of the Academy during this period is S. Golubev, *Kievskaia akademiia v kontse XVII i nachale XVIII stoletii* (Kiev, 1901). A recent study is A. Sydorenko, *The Kievan Academy in the 17th Century* (Ottawa, 1977).
26. For the biography of Iavorskyi see A. Korolev's article in *Ruski biograficheskii slovar*, XIX (St. Petersburg, 1909), pp. 413-422. Also see J. Cracraft, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great* (London, 1971), pp. 122-126.
27. Cf. *De arte poetica libri II ad usum et institutionem studiosae juventutis Roxolanae dictati Kioviae in Orthodoxa Academia Mohyleana a.d. 1705*, ed. by G. Koniskii (Mohyliv, 1786).
28. In this work Orlyk praised Mazepa for his care of the Orthodox in the Polish Commonwealth. Cf. Andrusiak, "Mazepa iak kulturnyi diiach," pp. 82-83.
29. This panegyric, entitled *Hippomenes Sarmacki*, was published in Kiev. Cf. Rawita-Gawronski, *Filip Orlik*, p. 40.
30. The Hertsyks were one of several *starshyna* families of Jewish origin. During the Khmelnytskyi period Semen Hertsyk was a merchant in Poltava and probably converted to Christianity. His son, Pavlo (d. 1700), also began his career as a merchant but then managed to enter the *starshyna* and served several times as the colonel of Poltava. His sons loyally supported Orlyk throughout their stay in exile.
31. *Diariusz*, X, fol. 91.
32. See Lazarevskii, "Zametki o Mazepe," *KSt*, VI (1898), p. 397. See above, p. 151.
33. Rawita-Gawronski, *Filip Orlik*, p. 41.
34. *Perepiska*, p. 4.
35. Orlyk to Sapieha, 26 June 1728, *Diariusz*, X, fol. 95.
36. The Latin original of this document was published in *Perepiska*, pp. 1-17. We have used the Russian version in *Istochniki*, pp. 242-254. A study of this document is M. Vasylenko, "The Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk," *Annals*, VI (1958), pp. 1260-1296.
37. "Dogovor i postanovlenie mezhdou Hetmanom Orlikom i voiskom Zaporozhskim v 1710" 5 April 1710, *Istochniki*, p. 242.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

44. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER V

1. Cf. S. F. Oreshkova, *Russko-turetskie otnosheniia v nachale XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1971), p. 47f. Also see S. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and of Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1976), p. 203ff.

2. Devlet Girei was born in ca. 1648. He ascended the throne for the first time in 1699 but was forced to abdicate in 1702; he returned to the throne in 1708 and again abdicated in 1713. In 1716 he was again on the throne for several months. For more details see V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khanstvo pod verkhoventvom Ottomanskoi Porty do nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1887), p. 696ff.

3. The relations between Charles XII and Devlet Girei were reported in detail by Sven Lagerberg, *Sven Lagerbergs Dagbok under vistelsen hos Tatar-Chan Dowlet Ghery, 1710-1711* (Goteborg, 1896). Lagerberg was a young Swedish officer who served as Charles XII's special envoy to the Tatar Khan.

4. There is no general study available of the relations, political or otherwise, between the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Tatars and Ottomans. Some of the major articles dealing with this subject are: B. Baranowski, "Geneza Sojuszu Kozacko-Tatarskiego z 1648 r.," *Przegląd Historyczny*, XXXVII (1948), pp. 276-287. O. Pritsak, "Das Erste Türkisch-Ukrainische Bündnis (1648)," *Oriens* (1953), pp. 266-298. D. Doroshenko, "Polsko, Ukrajina, Krym a Vysoka Porta v prvni pol. XVII stol." *Časopis Narodniho Musea I-II* (1933), pp. 1-55. O. Ohloblyn, "Petryk, Khanskii Hetman Ukrainy (1692)," *Zbirnyk Ist.-Filol. Viddilu Vse-Ukrainskoi Akad. Nauk*, 89 (1930), pp. 40-63. J. Kolmodin, "Mazepa i Turkiet. Debatten om hans och Karl XII s utlamnade," *Svensk Dagblatt*, 16/1 (1925). P. Bartl, "Der Kosakenstaat und das Osmanische Reich im 17. und in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Südostforschungen*, XXXIII (1974), pp. 166-194.

5. For a discussion of this "Crimean orientation" among the Ukrainian Cossacks see Ohloblyn, pp. 265-267.

6. The Petryk episode has been thoroughly studied by O. Ohloblyn. See especially his "Dohovir Petra Ivanenka (Petryka) z Krymom 1692 roku" in *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akad. D. I. Bahaliia* (Kiev, 1927), pp. 720-744 and his *Mazepa*, pp. 163-195. Also see Evarnitskii, III, pp. 111-175.

7. Ohloblyn, "Dohovir," p. 740.

8. Petryk to the Zaporozhians, 12 July 1692 in *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv feodalno-kreponostnicheskoi epokhi* (Moscow), *Malorossiiskie akty*, no. 531 as cited in Ohloblyn, p. 179.

9. Orlyk to Devlet Girei, 20 October 1710, *Perepiska*, p. 28.

10. Appendix B, part I. In order to establish the points which recurred in Cossack-Tatar and Cossack-Ottoman treaties we have examined the

following texts: O. Pritsak, "Das Erste Türkisch-Ukrainische Bündnis (1648)," pp. 266-298, which provides us with the text and the textual analysis of Khmelnytskyi's maritime treaty with the Porte; the Doroshenko treaty with the Porte in *AluZR*, VII (1875), pp. 218-220; Petryk's treaty with the Tatars appears in Ohloblyn, "Petryk," pp. 60-63. In addition to the Cossack desiderata and Cossack-Tatar treaty of 1711 we have also examined the Ottoman treaty of 1712, the text of which may be found in *Perepiska*, pp. 61-66.

11. See Baranowski, "Geneza sojuszu kozacko-tatarskiego."

12. In his "Literae Universales Regis Sueciae ad Ucrainenses" (*Perepiska*, p. 34), Charles again repeated the guarantees which he made to the Hetman in his "Diploma Assecuratorium." In his letter Charles declared "that we are angered by the very unfortunate lot of the famous people (of Ukraine) and are inclined and prepared to provide definite means to the end that Ukraine, repressed and hardly alive under the godless yoke of slavery, return to the state of former freedoms and immunities."

13. Mazepa to Golovkin, no date, in F. Umanets, *Hetman Mazepa* (St. Petersburg, 1897), p. 232. For some time after these events Orlyk continued to feel that the Don Cossacks were the natural allies and compatriots of the Ukrainian Cossacks. (See Orlyk to Flemming, 2 July 1720, *Sbornik*, p. 60.) The general question of Ukraine's ties with the Don is treated by O. Hermaize, "Ukraina ta Din u XVII St.," *Zapysky Kievskoho Instytutu Narod. Osvity*, III, Kiev, 1928.

14. Appendix B, part II.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 354.

17. This was the opinion expressed in a report from Lagerberg to Müllern, one of Charles XII's ministers. 6 August 1711, *Lagerberg's Dagbok*, p. 203.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

19. Three copies of the manifesto, in German, French and Latin, are in *AAE Turquie*, 51, fols. 8-17. The German copy which was translated from the Latin original, was published under the title: "Manifest des jungern sohns des Tartar Khans" (gegeben im Lager zu Bender den 28 Januar 1711 —aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt); no place of publication given. Other copies may be found in *Ossol.* No. 253 II, fol. 284; *AGAD*, Archiwum Zamoyskich, 3036 I Kozacy fol. 490 and *Czart* 581b; Nr. 11913 (Ukrainian), Nr. 11914 (Polish).

20. *AAE Turquie* 51, fol. 9.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Perepiska*, pp. 34-36.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Osol.* No. 253 II, fol. 283.

25. Copies of these manifestoes are in *AGAD*, Archiwum Potockich, No. 56. One bears the date 26 January 1709 (fol. 409); the other, in which

Stanisław offers to accept the Cossacks under his protection, was issued in November, 1708 (fol. 287).

26. O. Bodianskii, ed., "Istoriia rusov ili Maloi Rossii," *Chteniia* VII (1846), p. 25. This passage was repeated, almost word for word, in the following works: A. Rigelman, "Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii," *Chteniia* (1847), p. 97; D. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, III (3rd ed.: Moscow, 1842), II, p. 536. Cf. also Kostomarov, p. 630; *Perepiska*, p. 39.

27. "Istoriia rusov," *Chteniia*, VII, p. 25.

28. Soloviev, VIII, p. 349.

29. *Ibid.*

30. "Copia Literarum ad Excell. Scoropadscium, ab Orlik Scriptarum Anno 1711, die 7-bris," *Perepiska*, p. 55. Hryhor Orlyk was probably referring to this and similar correspondence in his letter to Chauvelin (21 December 1731 *AAE* Cor. pol. Pologne, 180, fol. 391) describing the events of 1711: "Mon Pere par une secrete correspondance, engage les Cosaques de l'ucraïne de se declarer pour luy. . . ." Peter suspected that Skoropadskyi might have secret contacts with Orlyk and "he feared that the offensive being prepared by the Tatars and Zaporozhian Cossacks under the leadership of Pylyp Orlyk could be used by the Ukrainian military *starshyna* for actions hostile to the Russian government." *Pisma i bumagi*, 1711 (1), p. 346. D. M. Golitsyn also reported a rumor that Skoropadskyi was corresponding with Orlyk (Soloviev, VIII, p. 588). Soloviev states that this rumor was not investigated in order not to irritate the Hetman and his officers in face of the coming conflict with the Ottomans. Cf. I. Borshchak, "Pylyp Orlyk i Skoropadskyi," *Ukraina*, 2 (Paris, 1949), p. 116.

31. *Perepiska*, p. 56.

32. A contemporary account of this campaign is F. E. Fabrice, *Anecdotes de Sejour du Roi de Suede a Bender* (Hamburg, 1760), p. 48ff. See also Hatton, pp. 331-332.

33. An excerpt from Lagerberg's report of 11 April 1711 on this aspect of the campaign is to be found in *AAE* Cor. pol. Turquie, 51, fol. 40. He states that: "Toute l'Ukraine ensuite a fait une alliance avec le Kan contre les Moscovites: de sorte que les Tartares n'ont fait aucun ravage."

34. *Ibid.*

35. Estimates of Orlyk's forces at the beginning of the campaign vary widely. Evarnitskii (II, p. 494) places the number as low as several hundred while Fabrice (p. 48) exaggerates the figure to 12,000. Lagerberg stated that over 2,000 Zaporozhians started out on the campaign, *Lagerbergs Dagbok*, p. 105 while Orlyk himself wrote that he had over 3,000 men when he started out from Bender. *Perepiska*, p. 41. Also cf. Krupnytskyi, p. 42.

36. "Anonymous despatch from Bender," 15 March 1711. *AAE* Turquie 51, fol. 19: "y ayant un grand concours de Cosaques qui viennent se soumettre au Grand general des Zaporoviens." A similar although somewhat delayed report was sent from Bender by the Frenchman, J. Compredon

(fol. 47). Peter wrote to Menshikov 3 May 1711 *Pisma i bumagi*, 1711 (1), p. 216 that "all of Trans-Dnieper Ukraine has gone over to Orlyk and the Kiev *wojewoda* (Potocki)." Also cf. *Lagerbergs Dagbok*, pp. 102-104, about Orlyk's successful progress. Only two Right Bank colonels, A. Tanskyi and H. Galagan, remained faithful to Peter, *AluZR*, III, 2, doc. CCLXXXIV, p. 188.

37. Orlyk to Charles XII, Spring 1711, *Perepiska*, p. 38.

38. *AluZR*, III, vol. 2, p. 188.

39. Potocki to Orlyk, 9, 16, 17, 18, 29 March 1711, *Perepiska*, pp. 66-68.

40. According to the report by Annenkov the allied forces which attacked him consisted of 20,000 Tatars, 3,000 Poles and 10,000 Cossacks. Krupnytskyi, p. 51. Compredon's account of this siege also stresses the Cossacks' lack of siege artillery. In this report Orlyk is titled "Gen. de Tartares" as well as Cossacks. *AAE* Cor. pol. Turquie 51, fol. 48.

41. For a discussion of the social and political organization of the Crimean Khanate see Alan Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783* (Cambridge, 1970) and his *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, Hoover Inst. Press, 1978). Another very useful discussion of this topic may be found in Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, *Aus den Aufzeichnungen des Said Giray Sultan* (Freiburg, 1975).

42. Silahdar Findiklili Mehmed Aga, *Silahdar tarihi* (Istanbul, 1928), p. 18.

43. The names of the Tatar *mirzas* who signed the Treaty indicate that they were representatives of the leading Crimean Tatar clans such as the Shirin, Mansur, Mankat and Segud and members of the current Tatar *kurultai* (council). There did not seem to be any representatives of the Nogais. *Sbornik*, p. 90. For the list of the names see Appendix B, part II, p. 213. I wish to thank Professor Alan Fisher for his help in establishing the correct Tatar forms of these names.

44. Orlyk to Charles XII, Spring, 1711, *Perepiska*, p. 39.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 41. Estimates of the number of captives taken by the Tatars vary between 20-30,000. Tallman, the Habsburg envoy at the Porte, related in August, 1711 that 30,000 were taken. HHS Turcica I, k. 179, fasc. 1711. Lagerberg stated the number was 20,000. *AAE*, Cor. pol. Turquie 51, fol. 40. For estimates of the number taken on the Left Bank during this period see D. I. Bagalii, *Ocherkii iz istorii kolonizatsii stepnoi okrainy* (Moscow, 1887), pp. 254, 295, 460-467. Cf. also *SRIO*, XXV (1878), pp. 345-348.

47. Orlyk to Charles XII, Spring 1711, *Perepiska*, p. 41.

48. "Inpraetatio Edicti Turcarum Imperatoris . . . pro Liberandis Captivis Ukraininensibus. . ." 3 July 1711, *Perepiska*, p. 42. Orlyk continued to feel responsibility for the victims of this raid throughout his life. In April of 1723, while in Salonika, he tried (unsuccessfully) to free a woman taken captive in this raid. Cf. *Diariusz*, VIII, fol. 38, 65, 146.

49. Dashkov to Sieniawski, March 1711. *Czart.* 5787, No. 6836.

50. An example of his association of Orlyk with the Tatars is a remark made by a Right Bank peasant in 1789 who characterized an unpleasant situation as being "as bad as when Orlyk led the Horde into Ukraine." Cf. *AIuZR*, III, vol. 5, p. 689.

CHAPTER VI

1. Feldman, *Polska a sprawa wschodnia*, p. 75.

2. For an analysis of the Prut Treaty see Akdes Kurat, "Der Prutfeldzug und Prutfrieden von 1711," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, X (1962), pp. 55-57 and his *Prut Seferi ve Barishi*, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1951) and S. F. Oreshkova, *Russko-turetskie otnosheniia v nachale XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1971). The Russian version of the treaty varies considerably from the Ottoman, especially in the articles concerning Ukraine. Cf. T. Iuzefovich, *Dogovory Rossii s Vostokom* (St. Petersburg, 1869), pp. 11-12. During the confrontation at Prut the Zaporozhians did not play an important role.

3. Cf. Pritsak, "Das erste türkisch-ukrainische Bündnis," Doroshenko and Rypka, "Hejtman Petr Dorošenko a jeho turecka politika," and Wojcik, *Traktat Andruszowski*.

4. Devlet Girei to Orlyk, 7 September 1711, *Perepiska*, p. 51.

5. Charles to the Zaporozhians, 16 October 1711, *Perepiska*, p. 30.

6. Cf. Krupnytskyi, p. 67.

7. Cf. Orlyk to Queen Ulrika Eleonora in 1719, Jensen, p. 140: "I was ready to do this (go to Constantinople) but the deceased King of blessed memory held me back and ordered me to remain at his side with my men. I obeyed the King's order but my disobedience in regard to the Vizir and the Khan greatly irritated them." Also Orlyk to Hopken, December, 1724, *Diariusz*, VIII, fol. 373a: "He (Charles) ordered me not to join the Turks. . . . I obeyed his orders which were against my interests."

8. Appendix C, part I. In 1720 Hertsyk, one of Orlyk's associates, was captured in Warsaw by Russian agents. During his interrogation he stated that Orlyk prepared three sets of instructions: one for Charles which stressed the ties of the Cossacks with the Swedish king; the second, meant for the Porte, stressed the Ukrainians' desire for the support and protection of the Ottomans; and the third set was given to Maksymovych and not shown to the other members of the delegation. Cf. "Dopros Grigora Gertsika . . .," *KSt*, III (1883), pp. 601-610.

9. Appendix C, p. 214.

10. Eighteen years later Orlyk tried to explain to Grand Vizir Ibrahim Pasha why he acted in this way in 1712. Cf. 13 June 1730, *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 68a: "Since the Porte did not want to take advantage of that favorable opportunity which it had at Prut and force Moscow, by means of its victorious troops to abandon Ukraine, it not only neglected our interests but even assured Moscow in her (Moscow's) possession of Ukraine through

her treaty. On the other hand, I had, in writing, the assurance of the deceased King who assured me, the Host and the entire people, that he would continue the war with Moscow until, whether by force of arms or by treaty, he would free and bring Ukraine to her previous freedom. Also, at my election to the office of Hetman, I and the entire Host were obligated by oath not to leave His Majesty's, the Swedish King's protection until Ukraine would be freed from the heavy Muscovite yoke." In this argument Orlyk ignored the obvious fact that Charles did not have the means to make good his promise to Orlyk and that his commitments to the Poles had already and would continue to interfere with its fulfillment.

11. Cf. Soloviev, VIII, p. 402. Also see N. Iorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, IV (Gotha, 1911), p. 304. The Hetman maintained close ties with the Patriarch of Jerusalem for many years. See Orlyk to the Patriarch, 21 December 1724, *Diariusz*, VIII, fol. 386a.

12. Yusuf Pasha, the former Aga of the Janissaries, was a Georgian who remained in office from 20 November 1711 to 11 November 1712. He should not be confused with Yusuf Pasha, the *serasker* of Bender who was removed from his office in 1710.

13. Feldman, *Polska*, 86–87.

14. Soloviev, VIII, p. 396.

15. Kostomarov, p. 659. Shafirov also worried that Orlyk and his associates were very well informed about the state of affairs in Russia and could provide the Tsar's enemies with good advice. Cf. Soloviev, VIII, p. 412.

16. Cf. O. Subtelny, "'Peter I's Testament': A Reassessment," *Slavic Review*, XXXIII, 4 (1974), pp. 663–678.

17. Golovkin to Skoropadskyi, 8 April 1712, Foreign Affairs archives as cited in Kostomarov, p. 647.

18. Some of these letters may be found in Kostomarov, pp. 665ff.

19. Soloviev, VIII, p. 398.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 408.

21. Orlyk to Ibrahim Pasha, 13 June 1730, *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 68b.

22. Horlenko to Orlyk, 27 February 1712, archives of the Ministry of Justice as cited in Kostomarov, p. 663.

23. Orlyk to Yusuf Pasha, 10 March 1712, *Perepiska*, pp. 57–60.

24. *Ibid.* According to Habsburg agents in Constantinople, the Swedes also insisted that the Ottomans force the Russians from all of Ukraine. Cf. Tallman to Hofkriegsrat, 11 March 1712, *HHS*, Exp. III, 47.

25. Appendix D, part II. Decades later, when the Orlyks presented this document to the French government they modified it to include all of Ukraine. Cf. Hryhor Orlyk's memorial to the French government which included the following document: "Diplome du Grand Seigneur Sultan Achmet qui assure à l'Hetman Orlik la possession de toute l'ucraine," 31 August 1740, *AAE* Turquie 107, fol. 136.

26. Appendix D, part II, pp. 214–221.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Cf. Borshchak, "Orlykiana," *Khliborobaska Ukraina*, IV (Vienna, 1922-1923), pp. 366-367.

29. *Lagerbergs Dagbok*, p. 203.

30. Borshchak, "Orlykiana," p. 367.

CHAPTER VII

1. Orlyk to Yusuf Pasha, 10 March 1712, *Perepiska*, p. 57.

2. Yusuf Pasha to Orlyk, 18 April 1712, Jensen, p. 156. Eight years later Orlyk wrote that he received the Sultan's diploma "den Fordertheil der Ukraine in Besitz zu nehmen" and that the Khan was ordered to send the Cossacks into the Right Bank. The *Aga* who delivered the Sultan's diploma to Orlyk also provided the Hetman with "8 to Beutel mit Gelde, numblich 4,000 Reichsthaler" for the expenses of the expedition. Orlyk to Eleonora Ulrike, 15 March 1720 (p. 152).

3. Devlet Girei knew of and resented Orlyk's caution in dealing with the Tatars. Cf. his remarks to this effect in *Lagerbergs Dagbok*, p. 47.

4. *Ibid.* As early as the summer of 1710 the Khan reportedly stated that it would have been better if a true Cossack as a "general" (*polkovnyk*) had been selected to the post of Hetman.

5. Horlenko to Skoropadskyi, March 1712, Kostomarov, p. 661.

6. "Interpretatio Literarum Universalium Hani," May 1712, *AGAD* Archiwum Sekretne, k. 43, fol. 14.

7. Ukrainian and Polish copies of this manifesto may be found in *Czart*, 5816, No. 11916. A less legible copy is in *Czart*, 484, fol. 107. These manifestoes were followed by letters of Devlet Girei to Orlyk urging the Hetman to move into the Right Bank.

8. V. Kochen, p. 155 as cited in Krupnytskyi, p. 80. Also cf. Orlyk to Hryhor, 15 January 1732, *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 266. The Hetman wrote that this excuse did not convince Charles XII and it was not until Orlyk proved his loyalty during the *Kalabalik* that trust was restored.

9. For a discussion of the negotiations from the Polish point of view see Feldman, *Polska*, passim.

10. A copy (badly faded) of Sieniawski's conference with the Ottoman and Tatar envoys is to be found in *Ossol.* 353, fol. 4, "Konferencya poslow tureckich i tatarskich." Also the report of Sieniawski to Szembek, 15 September 1712, *Czart* 464, fol. 38.

11. "List Tomasza Tuczyzny z Benderu," 25 June 1712, *Czart* 500, No. 94. Also see Sieniawski to August II, 29 October 1712, *Czart*, 464, fol. 107, about the Tsar's decision to give "our Ukraine" to the Ottomans and Tatars.

12. Adam Mikolaj Sieniawski (ca. 1666-1726), one of the leading magnates of the Commonwealth and an important supporter of August II. In 1703 Sieniawski led the struggle against the uprising of Palii. A consistent proponent of a pro-Russian orientation, Sieniawski was Peter's candidate

for the Polish throne in 1706. Cf. also the introduction in Subtelny, *The Letters of Mazepa*.

13. Orlyk to Rogowski, 4 July 1712, Krupnytskyi, p. 195. Orlyk continued to cultivate his contacts with Rogowski to the extent that on 21 February 1713 he issued an "Universal ochronny . . ." to the colonel. Also see *Ukraina* (Paris, 1952), p. 532.

14. Orlyk to Flemming, 20 November 1719, *Sbornik*, p. 47. Also see the letters of Rzewuski to various Polish magnates, *Czart* 493, Nr. 27, fol. 119 and Nr. 31, fol. 141.

15. Rzewuski to Szembek, 6 December 1712, *Czart* 493, Nr. 26, fol. 115.

16. Stanisław Chomentowski (1673–1728) was well acquainted with Ukrainian and Turkish affairs. In 1706 he was sent by August II to Kiev to maintain contacts with Menshikov. In 1711 he commanded the Polish troops on the Ottoman border during the Prut campaign. A faithful supporter of August II, he was also considered a "persona grata" at the court of the Tsar.

17. Orlyk to Charles XII (no date), Jensen, p. 160.

18. Orlyk to Sapieha, 26 June 1728, *Diariusz*, X, fol. 95.

19. Apparently Horlenko had to be prodded by the Khan to be more active in Ukraine. See Devlet Girei to Horlenko, 6 February 1713, *Czart* 5907, Nr. 28530a.

20. Orlyk to Horlenko, 6 February 1713, *Czart* 5907, Nr. 28530b. This is a covering letter to that written by the Khan to Horlenko. Orlyk, like the Khan, requested news about Russian movements in Ukraine.

21. Orlyk to the Zaporozhians, 1 April 1713, *Czart* 5907, Nr. 28529. The Hetman took great pleasure in describing the fate of Devlet Girei: "At first the Khan was to be beheaded but later his beard was shaved and he was sent off to Rhodes where the next few days will show whether he is to remain alive or not. However, neither he nor his sons will ever be Khans in the Crimea again. (Orlyk was wrong on this point—O.S.) The Turkish emperor ordered the newly appointed Mufti to put a curse on anyone who should appoint him (Devlet Girei) or his sons to lead the Crimean Khanate." *Czart*, Relacja, fol. 411: Chomentowski suggests that Devlet Girei was removed because he blocked an agreement with the Russians.

22. The full title of Chomentowski's report on the talks reads "Relacja z poselstwa do Naj. Porty Ottomanskiej Chomentowskiego, wojewody Mazowieckiego." It appears to have been written about three to four years after Chomentowski completed his mission to the Porte, that is, sometime in 1718. Two copies of this report exist: *Czart*, 200 (henceforth, *Czart*, Relacja) and a somewhat more legible copy in *Ossol.*, Nr. 1477 III. For the most part the Czartoryski copy will be cited. This document is especially valuable for its relatively calm, objective manner and abundant factual information.

23. *Czart*, Relacja, fol. 418.

24. The text of this peace treaty (translated from the Turkish into Swed-

ish by Zettersteen) was made available by A. Refik in *KFA* (1919), pp. 153–161. Shafirov, while willing to concede border areas to the Porte, was opposed to allowing Orlyk and his men so close to the border. Soloviev, VIII, pp. 411–413.

25. Theyls, *Memoires*, p. 140: “Le Kam des Tartares gagne par les grandes promesses des factions suedoise and francoise, emploioit tout le credit qu'il avoit aupres du Sultan en faveur du Stanislas.” Also cf. Feldman, *Leszczynski*, p. 93 who asserts that Stanisław, Potocki and Wisnio-wecki were supposed to have flung themselves to the feet of the Khan during a conference and begged his aid in return for which they promised to give their claims to Kamianets, Podillia and all of Ukraine.

26. Orlyk's ostensibly close relations with Stanisław during the Bender period were reflected in Stanisław's grant of lands in Right Bank Ukraine to Orlyk to make up for the property Orlyk lost in the Left Bank. A copy of Stanisław's grant, dated 9 May 1713, was included in Orlyk's letter to Stanisław, 23 April 1730, *Diariusz*, XI.

27. *Czart*, Relacja, fol. 421.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.* “. . . the Sublime Porte does not need the land for itself but wants to give it to Hetman Orlyk and his Cossacks as was done earlier in the case of Doroshenko.”

31. *Ibid.* Also cf. De Goltz to August II, 10 October 1713, *Czart* 494, Nr. 79, fol. 369.

32. *AGAD*. Archiwum Radziwillow, dz. II, Nr. 2268: “Relacya conferencyej . . . Senatorow z Poslannikami Hana i Porty.” 10 October 1713. Also see “Nowiny z Warszawy, 18 October 1713,” *Ossol.* Nr. 353 II for a report on this meeting.

33. “Nowiny z Warszawy, 18 October 1713,” *Ossol.* Nr. 353 II.

34. Orlyk to v. Müllern, November 1713, Jensen, pp. 94–95. It is interesting to note that some six years later, when Orlyk wrote to the Swedish government about the services rendered and sacrifices made for Charles XII, he presented the matter in a totally different light. Orlyk to Swedish Court, 13 November 1719, Jensen, p. 144: “I rejected the great fortune which the Turks offered me (i.e., the Right Bank). . . . I would have preferred to stay in Turkey where, as can be seen from the enclosed document, I received 40 thalers daily from the Porte.”

35. Orlyk to Zaporozhians, 30 March 1713 (o.s.), *Czart* 5907, Nr. 28530.

36. Orlyk to the “Kasztellan Kamieniecki,” 17 December 1713, *Czart* 613, fol. 231.

37. Orlyk to v. Müllern, 11 October 1713, Krupnytskyi, p. 212.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

39. Rzewuski to Szembek, 6 December 1713. *Czart* 493, Nr. 31, fol. 141. Cf. also Feldman, *Polska*, p. 150.

40. This author wrote an account of Chomentowski's entire mission in

verse. See Franciszek Gosciecki, S.J., *Poselstwo Wielkie Jasnie Wielmoznego Stanisława Chomentowskiego Woewody Mazowieckiego od Najyasniejszego Augusta II, Krola Polskiego, Xiazecia Soltana Tureckiego . . . przez lata 1712, 1713, 1714* (Lwow: "we Drukarni Collegium Soc. Jesu," 1732), p. 251. The entire verse devoted to Orlyk is as follows:

Po smierci Mazepowey, Orlik pozostal
U ktorego papiery Mazepy dyszaly,

Jak u pisarza, dworu y kancellaryi
Hetmanskiey dozor, w iego byl dyspozycyi,
Chcąc się Porcie przymilic, sekretne papiery
Sam odwiozl Wezerowi, znac dając iak szczery
i wierny Porty sluga, iako rozbuiami

Gosciecki goes on to state that among the secret papers of Mazepa which Orlyk handed over to the Grand Vizir were some which contained the plans of the Hospodar of Wallachia to betray the Turks. This act supposedly doomed the Hospodar.

41. Sheremetiev to Sieniawski, 24 December 1713, *Czart* 466, Nr. 150. Cf. also the letter of D. Horlewicz (Horlenko) to M. Kalinowski, December 1713, *Czart* 5831, Nr. 14630, informing the Polish commander that his men are in Ukraine under the protection of the Khan and wish to avoid conflicts with the Poles. However, early next year, Kalinowski reported to Sieniawski (1 February 1714, *Czart* 5845, Nr. 17002) that "wygnałem te hultajstwo z tego kraiu." Also cf. Krupnytskyi, p. 106.

42. Kalinowski to Sieniawski, 1 February 1714, *Czart* 5845, Nr. 17002 reported that he had established friendly and frequent contact with the Khan. Also cf. Feldman, *Polska*, p. 152 and Krupnytskyi, p. 108.

43. *Czart*, Relacja, fol. 427.

44. *Ibid.*, fol. 428.

45. *Ibid.*, fol. 429. See also Orlyk's letters to Sieniawski written on 23 January and 14 February 1714, *Czart* 5907, Nrs. 28532-28533 requesting the Polish Crown Hetman's good graces. Also see the letter of Myrovych to Sieniawski, 6 June 1714, *Czart* 5893, Nr. 25796. The letter of Horlenko to Rogowski (?) 31 October 1714, *Czart* 5831, Nr. 14629 is especially interesting in that it clearly reflects the change from Horlenko's previous declarations of adherence to the Khan to statements of relief that the Zaporozhians are finally on Christian soil again and glad to have left the protection of the Turks and Tatars under which they had great difficulties.

CHAPTER VIII

1. The returnees asked for guarantees that they would not be harmed and that their property would be returned. The Tsar guaranteed their personal safety but refused to make any commitments as to the properties as most of these had been distributed among those men who remained

loyal to Peter I. However, it was implied that if the returnees proved their loyalty some of their lands would be returned to them. Cf. Kostomarov, pp. 668-675.

2. Other members of the *starshyna* who went to Sweden were Klym Dovhopolyi, Fedir Tretiak, Ivan and Atanas Hertsyk, Ivan Bystrytskyi. Orlyk's family at this point consisted of his wife, Hanna, three sons, Hryhor, Mykhailo and Iakiv, and two daughters, Anastasia and Marfa. In Sweden, another daughter, Maria, was born. Cf. A. Jensen, "Orlyk v Shvetsii," *ZNTSh*, XCII (1908), pp. 93-169.

3. For details regarding the stay of the Ukrainian émigrés in Sweden see Jensen, "Orlyk v Shvetsii" and Krupnytskyi, pp. 109-122.

4. Cf. Jensen, "Orlyk v Shvetsii." While in Sweden, Orlyk continued to lay claim to the 60,000 ducats that Charles XII borrowed from Mazepa in 1708 in Budyshchi. However, Voinarovskiy's wife Anna also arrived in Sweden and she too claimed the money. Cf. A. Jensen, "Rodyna Voinarovskiykh v Shvetsii," *ZNTSh*, XCII (1908), pp. 170-193.

5. Orlyk to Malashevych, 8 December 1719, *Istochniki*, p. 290 and Orlyk to Flemming, 20 April 1720, *Sbornik*, p. 51 and Orlyk to Saadet Girei (undated), *Sbornik*, p. 84. Included in the Hetman's letter to the Khan was a copy of the 1711 treaty.

6. Orlyk to Flemming, 20 April 1720, *Sbornik*, p. 51.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Orlyk to Flemming (undated), *Sbornik*, p. 107. This letter was written after the departure of the Ukrainians from Sweden, probably sometime in 1722.

9. Orlyk to Flemming, 13 July 1720, *Sbornik*, p. 58.

10. *Ibid.* In a letter to the Swedish minister, Illenborg, the Hetman requested that King Fredrick write to the Khan and urge him in Orlyk's name, to gather an army at Azov and attack Astrakhan "so that the Turkish Muslims might be liberated." Orlyk to Illenborg, ca. 26 August 1720, Krupnytskyi, p. 222.

11. Flemming to Orlyk, 23 September 1720, *Sbornik*, p. 62. Later, August II argued that he could do nothing in Orlyk's case without the *sejm's* approval. Cf. August II to Sieniawski, 11 April 1722, *Czart* 2734, Nr. 84.

12. Letters of recommendation were addressed to: Charles VI, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, August II, Sultan Ahmet III and Khan Saadet Girei. The Swedish king also wrote to the Zaporozhians, informing them that they still had the support of Sweden and urging them to receive Orlyk well "because you will not find a man better suited for the august office of Hetman." King Fredrick to the Zaporozhians, 25 September 1720, *Istochniki*, p. 302.

13. The Hetman hoped that George I would influence August II to provide a place for the Ukrainian Cossacks on the Right Bank. Cf. Orlyk to George I, 20 December 1720 in V. Kordt, "Lyst P. Orlyka do angliiskoho korolia," *Stara Ukraina*, XI-XII (1925), pp. 201-202.

14. For a description of this meeting see *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 65 and 72.

15. This abduction is described in detail in L. Wynar, *Andrii Voinarovskiyi* (Münich, 1962), pp. 68–85.

16. Cf. Kostomarov, p. 684. The Poles raised this matter several times with the Russians. Cf. “Konferencja z Xiezem Dolgorukim . . .,” 5 November 1721, *AGAD*, Archiwum Publ. Potockich, Nr. 58, fol. 209–305.

17. See “Dopros Gertsika,” *KSt*, III (1883), pp. 595–610.

18. For a discussion of these events see *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 78–80.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. Jensen, “Orlyk v Shvetsii,” pp. 107–108. In the meantime, Baron Orlik died sometime in mid-April of 1721.

22. *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 85. In Cracow, as elsewhere, Orlyk made a systematic tour of the libraries and seats of higher learning.

23. *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 101. For Prince Dolgorukii’s attempts to have the Hetman extradited see “Konferencja z Xiezem Dolgorukim . . .,” 5 November 1721, *AGAD*, Archiwum Publ. Potockich Nr. 58, fol. 209–305.

24. *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 101 and Krupnytskyi, p. 131.

25. *Ibid.* Johann Sztenflic (1682–1758) was a Swedish-born soldier-of-fortune who served with Charles XII and took part in his Russian campaign. Previously he had been in Habsburg service (up to 1702) and during the Bender period he also served Ferenc Rakoczi. In 1719 he entered the service of the Duke of Holstein and followed him to St. Petersburg, already with the rank of major-general. In 1722 he married Anastasia, the eldest of Orlyk’s three daughters. After her death in 1728, he married her sister, Marfa. In 1733 he was, together with Hryhor Orlyk, one of Stanisław’s closest supporters and in 1738 he had the rank of lieutenant-general in the French army. Several years later he had the position of the Swedish governor of Hamburg. Throughout his career he cooperated very closely with both Hryhor and Pylyp Orlyk.

26. Cf. Appendix A, p. 178.

27. *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 125.

28. Orlyk to Cachoda, 21 February 1726, *Diariusz*, IX, fol. 19.

29. For a concise treatment of Damad Ibrahim Pasha’s policies see “Nevsehirli Damad Ibrahim Pasa Devri,” in *Mufassal Osmanli Tarihi*, V (Istanbul, 1962), pp. 2431–2467.

30. See Mohammad Ali, H., *Essai sur l’histoire des relations politiques irano-ottomanes de 1722 a 1747* (Paris, 1937), *passim*.

31. Abdi Pasha to Sieniawski, 20 December 1721, *Czart* 5756, Nr. 170. The Pasha complains about the difficulties the Zaporozhians are constantly causing along the Polish-Ukrainian-Ottoman borders and notes that he has given them and the Khan strict warnings that this must cease.

32. Abdi Pasha to “Pana Regimentarza” (Humiecki), 1 February 1722, *Czart* 5756, Nr. 1.

33. *Ibid.* Nakhymovskyi was arrested the second time he passed through

Khotyn with letters from Orlyk to the Zaporozhians. However, the Poles, after the abduction of Hertsyk (which had created resentment in Poland against the Russians) and the arrest of Nakhymovskyyi did not want Orlyk to be arrested. Humiecki wrote to Sieniawski (20 April 1722, *Czart* 5834, Nr. 15216): "If the Pasha of Khotyn did to Orlyk what he did to Nakhimovskyyi then that would be dangerous for Poland. . . ." This matter also caused August II concern as can be seen from his letters to Sieniawski (22 April 1722, *Czart* 2734, Nrs. 84, 90) urging careful handling of this affair.

34. *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 143. Orlyk also accused the Pasha of siding with Moscow and of breaking the Muslim law of hospitality towards refugees.

35. The dispatch of Giovanni Emo, the Venetian resident at the Porte, dated 15 September 1722 in M. L. Shay, *The Ottoman Empire from 1720 to 1734* (Urbana, 1944), p. 94. The Khan was reportedly very upset by the Porte's ignoring of Russian pressure and even threatened to resign from his office rather than tolerate such a passive and infamous policy.

36. *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 162.

37. *Ibid.*, fol. 209.

38. Hammer, VII, p. 311.

39. Nepliev to the *Kollegia Innostranykh Del*, 26 October 1722, in Akademiia Nauk Armiiianskoi SSR, Institut Istorii, *Armiano-russkie otnosheniia v pervoi treti XVIII veka*. (Erevan, 1967), p. 118.

40. *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 241. Nepliev to the *Kollegia Innostranykh Del'* (30 October 1722, in *Armiano-russkie otnosheniia*, p. 121) noted that Orlyk has been ordered to go to Salonika and that local authorities were ordered "to treat him graciously, in contradiction of Your Majesty's orders." N. Theyls also sent a similar report (undated) to Vienna, *HHS*, Turcica I, karton 190, fol. 278-285.

41. Malashevych to Orlyk, 20 December 1721 in Kordt, "Materialy," p. 53.

42. Malashevych's correspondence with Sieniawski illustrates his attempts to stay on good terms with the Poles and the Russians. *Czart*, 5884, Nrs. 24029 to 24036 (Cyrillic script) and 24037 to 24041 (Latin script).

43. Cf. Evarnitskyyi, II and Golobutskyyi, *Zaporozhska Sich*, passim for more detailed discussion of the plight of the Zaporozhians during this period.

44. This incident was described about 15 years later in a letter of the Zaporozhians to Orlyk (May, 1734) in *KSt* IV (1882), p. 119.

45. *Diariusz*, VIII, fol. 335.

46. The most recent study of this event is G. Veinstein, "La revolte des mirza tatars contre le khan, 1724-1725," *Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique* XII (1971), pp. 327-339. Also cf. Hammer, VII, p. 347 and Smirnov, *Krimskoe Khanstvo*, II, p. 186ff.

47. Cf. Prince Golitsyn's report, 15 October 1724, Evarnitskyyi, II, p. 1103 and Orlyk to Ibrahim Pasha, 17 December 1724, *Diariusz*, VIII, fol. 365.

48. Golitsyn's report, Evarnytskii, II, p. 1103.

49. Orlyk to Ibrahim Pasha, *Diariusz*, VIII, fol. 365.

50. Cf. "Ukaz Gosudaria Petra I-go k Hetmanu Skoropadskomu o prichinakh uchrezhdeniia v Hlukhove Malorossiiskoi Kollegii," 20 April 1722, *Istochniki*, pp. 315-317. For a more elaborate version of the *ukaz*, see pp. 321-325. The personnel of the *Kollegia* in Hlukhiv consisted of about 30 Russian bureaucrats. Cf. Kirilov, *Tsvetushchee sostoianie*, pp. 167-168. Also see *Pisma i bumagi*, VIII, 2, p. 869.

51. *Istochniki*, p. 321.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 315.

53. Four years earlier Skoropadskyi had expressly requested the Tsar to have the Foreign Affairs *Kollegia* deal with Ukrainian matters. Cf. "Proshenie Hetmana Skoropadskoho," 1718, *Ibid.*, p. 282.

54. Cf. N. I. Pavlenko, et al., eds., *Rossia v period reform Petra I* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 218-219.

55. See I. Dzhydzhora, *Ukraina v pershyi polovyni XVIII viku* (Kiev, 1930), p. 144. The question of intermarriage between Russians and Ukrainians was a sensitive one. Prior to his defection, Mazepa was accused of not allowing the *starshyna* to associate with and marry into Russian families. Cf. "Donoshenie Kochubeia Gosudariu," April, 1708, *Istochniki*, p. 106.

56. The order was issued by the Senate on 5 October 1720. Cited by B. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol i ioho doba* (Augsburg, 1948), p. 28.

57. Dzhydzhora, *Ukraina*, p. 3.

58. See E. Radakova, "Ukrainski kozaky na Ladozhskim kanalu," *ZNTSh*, XII (1896), p. 14.

59. Dzhydzhora, *Ukraina*, p. 38.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

61. Cf. V. Rudniv, "Finansovy stan," p. 153. However, in 1725, the year that Peter I died, income sagged. In 1725 it was about 118,552 rubles in cash and 36,774 rubles in kind. Cf. Kirilov, *Tsvetushchee sostoianie*, p. 170.

62. There are no extensive studies of Skoropadskyi's crucial hetmancy. For a survey of his hetmancy see Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, pp. 19-30.

63. For the text of this response see "Otvetnaia chelobytnia Getmana Skoropadskogo . . .," 3 May 1722, *Istochniki*, pp. 317-320.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 320.

65. Cf. Peter I's *ukaz* of 16 May 1722, *Istochniki*, pp. 321-325.

66. The most noteworthy of the few studies dealing with Polubotok is A. Lazarevskii, "Pavel Polubotok," *Russkii Arkhiv*, I (1880), pp. 137-209. Also see Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, pp. 31-35.

67. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, p. 32.

68. Soloviev, IX, p. 529.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 530.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 531.

CHAPTER IX

1. For a description of Salonika see N. G. Svoronos, *Le Commerce de Salonique au XVIII siecle* (Paris, 1956). While Orlyk was in Salonika he had close contacts with the Jesuits. In this connection see G. Veinstein, "Missionaires jesuites et agents francais en Crimée au debut au XVIII siecle," *Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique*, XI, 1 (1970), pp. 414-458.

2. Ukrainian monks regularly visited the Hetman in Salonika. For their accounts of the situation in Ukraine see *Diariusz*, IX, fol. 200. In 1728 the famous Ukrainian traveler, Vasyl Hryhorovych-Barskyi surreptitiously visited the Hetman in Salonika.

3. See, for example, Orlyk to Damad Ibrahim Pasha, 17 December 1724, *Diariusz*, VIII, fol. 365.

4. Karl Friedrich, the Duke of Holstein (1700-1730), expressed his sympathy for Orlyk while both of them were in Silesia in January 1721. See *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 63. For the Hetman's correspondence with the Duke see *Diariusz*, VII, fol. 99 and VIII, fol. 94 and IX, fol. 121.

5. An excellent study of this period with great relevance for the understanding of Orlyk's ties with Stanisław is E. Rostworowski, *O Polską Koronę—Polityka Francji w latach 1725-1733* (Wroclaw-Cracow, 1958).

6. *Diariusz*, IX, fol. 53.

7. Stanisław to Orlyk, 19 February 1726, *Diariusz*, IX, fol. 61.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Diariusz*, IX, fol. 132. This remark was made several months later, after Stanisław and his supporters continued to approach Orlyk with their offers.

10. Orlyk to Stanisław, 3 June 1726, *Ibid.*, fol. 55 and 27 September 1726, fol. 99.

11. *Diariusz*, IX, fol. 98.

12. Stanisław to Orlyk, 7 March 1727, *Ibid.*, fol. 238.

13. *Ibid.*, fol. 239.

14. Orlyk to Stanisław, 5 June 1727, *Ibid.*, fol. 249.

15. *Ibid.*, Orlyk noted: "in my response I raised Stanisław's hopes for a revolution in Ukraine."

16. Actually the "Little Russian *Kollegia*" consisted of six members with the commander of the Russian troops in Ukraine, Brigadier Veliaminov, as its president.

17. *Diariusz*, IX, fol. 200. On 28 March 1727 Orlyk noted the arrival of several monks from Ukraine at his quarters. Much of what they told the exile-Hetman was later included, unaltered, in Orlyk's letter to Stanisław.

18. Orlyk to Stanisław, 5 June 1727, *Ibid.*, fol. 249.

19. *Ibid.*, fol. 250.

20. The role of Menshikov in blocking Orlyk's attempts to gain amnesty

and return to Ukraine was decisive. Besides his tendency to follow Peter I's policy towards Ukraine and his personal rivalry with the Duke of Holstein, there was another dimension to his opposition to Orlyk's return. In 1725 Menshikov was approached by the Swedish diplomat, I. Cederhelm, with the proposal that in return for his support of a plan to return the Baltic provinces to Sweden, the Swedes would support him in what Cederhelm (who had been personally acquainted with Mazepa) called the "Mazepa Project." This entailed the separation of Ukraine from the Russian crown and a creation of a separate kingdom for Menshikov who would also bear a royal title. Cf. G. A. Nekrasov, *Russko-shvedskie otnosheniia i polityka velikikh derzhav v 1721-1726* (Moscow, 1964), p. 208. Menshikov's close ties with Danylo Apostol (elected Hetman September, 1727) were another reason for opposing Orlyk's return. Cf. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, p. 52.

21. The French had the means to exert influence on the Porte. There were over 600 French trading houses throughout the Ottoman empire. The major ones were located in Pera, Smyrna and Salonika. Cf. A. Kochubinskii, *Graf A. I. Osterman i razdel Turtsii* (Odessa, 1899).

22. Marquis Louis-Saveur de Villeneuve (1675-1744) had been a provincial official in Marseilles before his appointment to the post of ambassador to Constantinople. Although he had no previous diplomatic experience his great asset was that coming from Marseilles he had a good knowledge of the French commercial ties with the Ottoman Empire. He served in Constantinople from the fall of 1728 to the summer of 1741. See A. Vandal, *Une ambassade française en Orient sous Louis XV. Le mission de marquis de Villeneuve, 1728-1741* (Paris, 1887).

23. The French government instructed Villeneuve to contact the elder Orlyk and report on him. He did this in May 1729, using the delivery of Stanisław's letter as an excuse. For Villeneuve's frequent reports on Orlyk see *Bib. Nat.*, Fr. 7178, *passim*.

24. Monti to Villeneuve, 18 September 1729, *AAE*, Pologne, vol. 185, fol. 86.

25. Monti to Chauvelin, 7 November 1729, *AAE*, Pologne, vol. 184, fol. 261. Zulich's "pro memoria" was attached to this letter.

26. Hryhor to Orlyk, 16 May 1730, *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 56 contains a detailed account of Hryhor's reception and stay in France.

27. A very detailed register of all the funds which Hryhor received from the French government for his services from 1729 to 1736 may be found in *Dinteville*. In 1730 Hryhor received 500 livres for travel.

28. *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 55.

29. Orlyk to Grand Vizir Ibrahim Pasha, 13 June 1730, *Ibid.*, fol. 68.

30. *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 71.

31. *Ibid.*, fol. 75.

32. *Ibid.*, fol. 76.

33. *Ibid.*

34. Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 20 June 1730, *AAE Turquie* 82, fol. 323.
35. Orlyk to Hryhor, 21 August 1730, *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 117.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, fol. 118.
38. *Ibid.*, fol. 119.
39. Kaplan Girei I reigned as Khan three times: 1708–1709, 1713–1716 and 1730–1736. His three depositions resulted on every occasion due to unfortunate military operations (cf. ft. 44). However, he was known to be a very skillful politician, see *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leyden-London, 1925), p. 724.
40. Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 20 November 1730, *AAE Turquie* 82, fol. 449. Also see G. Veinstein, "Les Tatars de Crimée et la seconde election de Stanislas Leszczynski," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, vol. XI, 1 (1970), pp. 24–92.
41. Villeneuve to Chauvelin, *Ibid.*, fol. 446.
42. For a copy of this memorial see "Memoire presentee a S. M. le roi de Pologne par son tres humble serviteur, a Chambord le 9 XII 1731." *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 331.
43. "Memoire presentee a Monseigneur le Garde Sceaux, a Versailles le 21 decembre 1731," *AAE*, Pologne, 180, fol. 392.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Hryhor to Orlyk, 16 February 1732, *Diariusz* XI, fol. 323 contains Hryhor's reports on the course of these conferences.
46. For travel expenses of this trip Hryhor received three times as much as he had been given previously, i.e., 1500 livres. *Dinteville*.
47. Two copies of this letter are available: Louis XV to Kaplan Girei, 29 December 1731, *AAE Turquie* 83, fol. 285 and *Diariusz* XI, fol. 463.
48. Orlyk to Hryhor, 6 April 1732, *Diariusz* XI, fol. 324.
49. Orlyk to Hryhor, 20 June 1732, *Ibid.*, fol. 388.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Nepliev managed to keep Hryhor under observation until his arrival in Smyrna where he lost track of him and concluded that he must have gone to Persia where, as he informed his government, he could do little harm. See Kochubinskii, *Graf Osterman*, p. 43.
52. Hryhor to Orlyk, 23 November 1732, *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 453. This long ten-page letter, written after his return to Constantinople, described in detail Hryhor's stay and discussions in Bakhchesarai.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*, fol. 458.
55. *Ibid.*, fol. 459.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Copies of these letters are in *Diariusz*, XI, fol. 463–465.

CHAPTER X

1. Cf. I. Dzhyzhhora, "Ekonomichna polityka rosiiskoho pravytelstva suproty Ukrainy v 1710-1730 rr.," in his *Ukraina*, pp. 1-96.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, p. 39.

4. Minutes of the Supreme Secret Council, 11 February 1726, *SRIO* LV, doc. 4, p. 26. Russian spies informed their government in 1722 that the Ottomans were planning to incite unrest in Ukraine. Cf. Evarnytskii, III, p. 537.

5. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, p. 41.

6. Minutes of Supreme Secret Council, 23 February 1726, *SRIO* LV, doc. 26, p. 60.

7. Minutes of Supreme Secret Council, 28 March 1726, *SRIO* LV, doc. 64, p. 150.

8. For Menshikov's huge landholdings in Ukraine see Pavlenko, et al., *Rossia v period reform Petra I* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 218-219. Veliaminov's report on the taxes which Menshikov paid on his lands in Ukraine may be found in the Minutes of the Supreme Secret Council, 12 May 1727, *SRIO* LXIII, doc. 208, p. 502. A discussion of Danylo Apostol's close ties with Menshikov appears in Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, 46-47, 52-53. Apostol's son, Petro, became so attached to Menshikov that after the latter's downfall, Petro petitioned, unsuccessfully, to be allowed to share Menshikov's exile.

9. Minutes of Supreme Secret Council, 12 May 1727, *SRIO* LXIII, doc. 206, p. 480.

10. *Ibid.*, doc. 208, p. 484. Also see the order of 19 July 1727, *SRIO* LXIX, doc. 63, p. 109.

11. Lefort reported that Menshikov "voulait se retirer en Ukraine et y avior le commandement." Cf. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, p. 52.

12. The fording places included those on the Dnieper at Kodak, Nykytyni on Kamenka River and Kizikermen. There was also one at the confluence of the Boh and Mertvi-Vody Rivers. Cf. A. Skalkovskii, *Istoriia Novoi-Sechi ili Posliedniago Kosha Zaporozhskago* (Odessa, 1846), II. For the conditions of the Zaporozhians' life under the Khan's rule see Evarnytskii, III, pp. 510-534.

13. This episode was described in the *Kuryer Polski* (23 August 1731). For the problems which Zaporozhian brigandage caused the Tatars see D. I. Evarnytskii, *Istochniki dlia istorii zaporozhskikh kozakov* (Vladimir, 1903), II, doc. CCXXIX, p. 1073 and doc. CCXXXI, p. 1077.

14. Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 26 February 1734, *Bib. Nat.*, Fr. 7179, fol. 394. For the appeals of Stanisław's Polish supporters to the Zaporozhians see Evarnytskii, III, p. 560.

15. Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 12 March 1734, *Bib. Nat.*, Fr. 7180, fol. 59.
16. Secret Order to Nepliev, 27 March 1734, in Evarnytskii, *Istochniki*, II, doc. CCXLIV, p. 1148.
17. Orlyk to the Zaporozhians, 23 April 1734 in A. Skalkovskii, "Filip Orlik i zaporozhtsy," *KSt IV* (1882), pp. 106-124.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
19. Zaporozhians to Orlyk, 8 May 1734, *Ibid.*, p. 119.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 120. Russian officials such as B. P. Sheremetiev estimated that there were about 30,000 Zaporozhians in Crimean territory. However, when the Zaporozhians took the oath of allegiance the total came to about 7,268 men. Cf. Evarnytskii, III, pp. 553, 605.
21. Zaporozhians to Kaplan Girei, 8 May 1734, *Ibid.*, p. 122.
22. Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 31 May 1734, *Bib. Nat.* Fr. 7180, fol. 92. Hryhor passed on to the French ambassador much of the information contained in the letter.
23. Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 31 January 1735, *AAE*, Turquie 93, fol. 50. Besides mentioning the one thousand sequins which he sent to Orlyk, the French ambassador also reported that the Grand Vizir provided Orlyk with "24 purses."
24. Kaplan Girei to Louis XV, 22 September 1734, *Dinteville*. Another copy of this letter is in *AAE*, Turquie 93, fol. 75. Attached is the original Tatar letter.
25. Empress Anna Ivanova to Prince A. I. Shakhovskoi, 25 April 1734, *SRIO* CVIII, p. 134. At this time calendars which caricatured the empire and its ministers appeared in Ukraine, coming from Poland by way of Lviv. Kochubinskii (*Graf Ostermann*, p. xxxvii) assumes, correctly in our opinion, that Orlyk was implicated in their formulation.
26. Cabinet of Ministers to Baron von Keyserling, 31 August 1734, *SRIO* CVIII, p. 348.
27. Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 16 March 1736, *AAE* Turquie 93, fol. 159. Cf. also Konopczynski, *Polska a Szwecja*, p. 141.
28. Orlyk to Hryhor, 30 October 1738, *AAE* Pologne 227, fol. 260. The original of this letter was written in Polish. It was translated into French by Hryhor and presented to the French government. A copy was also sent to Sweden. Ferenc Rakoczi died in April of 1735. His son Jozef concluded a treaty with the Porte on 25 January 1738 and called on the Hungarians to rise against the Habsburgs.
29. Orlyk to Hryhor, *Ibid.*, fol. 262.
30. *Ibid.*, fol. 263. In the letter which Hryhor sent to Sweden the phrase which was used was not "chef d'une nation" but rather "chef de la nation cosaque."
31. *Ibid.*, fol. 264.
32. Krupnytskyi, p. 165.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Orlyk to Hryhor, *AAE* Pologne 227, fol. 265.

35. *Ibid.*, fol. 266.

36. Krupnytskyi, p. 168, and Konopczynski, *Polska a Szwecja*, p. 145.

37. Soloviev, X, p. 451.

38. Vandal, *Une ambassade*, p. 313.

39. Even as early as 1738 both Orlyks had renewed contact with the Swedes. Hryhor cooperated closely with the secret Swedish envoy to the Porte, Major Sinclair, who was assassinated by Russian agents on the way back to Stockholm in the summer of 1738. A detailed account of this event is provided by Hryhor in the following document: "Relation de tout ce qui s'est passe a l'occasion de l'infame assassinat du Baron de Sinclair." *Dinteville*. Russian agents also planned to deal in similar fashion with the younger Orlyk and Rakoczi. Cf. Konopczynski, *Polska a Szwecja*, p. 146 and Soloviev, X, p. 623. The Austrian government was also intent on capturing or eliminating Rakoczi and Orlyk (the younger and the elder). On 7 January 1739 it issued a "Rundschreiben an die Landes-Chefs in Bohmen, Mahren und Schlesien, die Entdeckung und Verhaftung des Rakoczy und eines gewissen Orlik betreffend." It accused "der Beruhmte Orlik, von geburthein Cosack" of having the intention "denen Turken zum unchrist und unwurdiven Werckzeug . . . zudienen." The reference here is to the younger Orlyk. (Kochubinskii, *Graf Osterman*, p. xxxvi.) The new French envoy to the Porte, Castellane, reported on 13 December 1741 (Hurmuzaki, Suppl. 1, vol. 1, doc. DCCCXXIII, p. 567) that "Monsieur Orlick avoit promis aux suedois son concours contre les Moscovites."

40. Castellane to the Foreign Ministry, 7 June 1742, Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, vol. I, doc. DCCCXXVII, p. 569. Also added was the fact the Hospodar of Moldavia, Maurocordato, had ordered that his papers be sent to the Porte. For details of Orlyk's final years, see Krupnytskyi, pp. 170ff.

APPENDIX A

1. Orlyk's long epistle to Iavorskyi is the most complete account of the events which led up to Mazepa's defection. Replete with details, it traces the development of the Hetman's plans from their inception to their culmination. However, the letter also contains a bias, one which reflects the circumstances in which it was written. In July, 1721 Orlyk, newly arrived in Poland, was despondent about his and his cause's future. Seeing few other alternatives, he made one of his periodic attempts to gain an amnesty from the Tsar. As might be expected, he approached Stefan Iavorskyi, his old benefactor and current Metropolitan of Riazan, to aid him in the endeavor [Iavorskyi had previously helped several returned Mazepists]. On July 12 Orlyk completed his epistle which, according to his diary, "had taken very long to write." Addressed to Iavorskyi, the letter was also meant to be read by Peter I himself. In it Orlyk "confessed" all he knew or claimed to know about Mazepa's plot. And since the purpose of the letter was to gain amnesty, Orlyk minimized his own role in the plot, making it

appear as if he was merely the tool of Mazepa. Indeed, Orlyk even argued that he tried to undermine his Hetman's plans. In any case, the point of the letter was to show the supposedly minor part Orlyk played in the plot and to place the burden of the guilt for all that happened in 1708 on the deceased Hetman. Despite this bias, however, Orlyk's letter provides an unmatched insight into the events and persons which decided the fate of Ukraine during the crucial years of Peter I's reign.

The letter was published, probably by N. Kostomarov, in *Osnova* (St. Petersburg, 1862, No. X, pp. 1-28), a monthly which was put out by former members of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. According to Soloviev (*Istoriia rossii*, vol. VIII, p. 314) the original of Orlyk's letter may be found in TSGADA, fol. 6, d. 153, ll. 1-86.

2. For Wolski's secret instructions see *Istochniki*, pp. 50-51.

3. Kochubei informed Peter I about the contacts between the Hetman and Princess Dolska. Cf. *Istochniki*, p. 98. For a thorough discussion of the relations between Mazepa and the Princess see Pritsak, "Hetman I. Mazepa i Kn. Anna Dolska," *Mazepa—Zbirnyk*, vol. II, pp. 102-117.

4. Kochubei contradicts Orlyk on this point, stating that since the Chancellor handled all of Mazepa's secret correspondence he must have been aware of what was happening. Cf. *Istochniki*, p. 87.

5. Even in his private conversations Mazepa emphasized that "Moscow means to impose greater demands on Little Russian Ukraine." *Istochniki*, p. 101.

6. For a study of Mazepa's relations with Menshikov see G. Georgievskii, "Mazepa i Menshikov. Novye Materialy," *Istoricheskii Zhurnal* (No. 12), 1940, pp. 72-85.

7. Dmytro Horlenko was colonel of Pryluky from 1692-1708 and Danylo Apostol was colonel of Myrhorod from 1683-1727. These two colonels were among the most influential political figures in the Hetmanate. Apostol was elected Hetman in 1727 and proved to be a stubborn defender of Ukraine's rights and liberties. Cf. B. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol i ioho doba* (Augsburg, 1948).

8. Zalenski was the rector of the Jesuit collegium in Vynnytsia. According to Kochubei, the Jesuit tried to persuade the Cossacks that they had nothing to fear from the Swedes. Cf. *Istochniki*, pp. 101-103.

9. According to Kochubei this reading of the Hadiach Pact was a definite indication that Mazepa and the *heneralna starshyna* were plotting treason. Cf. *Istochniki*, p. 102.

10. Mazepa often claimed that his actions were not motivated by the desire for private gain. Cf. his letter to Skoropadskyi and Charles XII's manifesto in *Istochniki*, pp. 173 and 206.

11. Peter I's refusal to provide for Ukraine's defense was probably the immediate reason for Mazepa's decision to join the Swedes. This point is discussed at length in Subtelny, "Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason," pp. 170-171.

12. For a discussion of Mazepa's contacts with the Poles see Andrusiak, "Zviazky Mazepy z Stanislavom Leshchynskim" and Subtelny, *Letters of Mazepa*, pp. 15-30.

13. One of Mazepa's letters to Leszczynski was published in *Istochniki*, p. 194.

14. Samiilo Samus', colonel of Bohuslav regiment on the Right Bank from 1688-1713, was one of the leaders of the vast anti-Polish uprising which engulfed the Right Bank in 1702.

15. In 1708 Mazepa continued to urge leading Polish statesmen to set aside their internal conflicts and to unite for the good of the Commonwealth for only this would preserve it against Russian pressure. See Subtelny, *Letters of Mazepa*, p. 132.

16. Cf. *Istochniki*, p. 87.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

18. Karpo Mokrievych was the Chancellor-General of the Zaporozhian Host from 1669 to 1672.

19. For Peter I's manifesto issued on the occasion of Kochubei's and Iskra's execution see *Istochniki*, pp. 81-82.

20. Dmytro Zelenskyi was the colonel of Lubny from 1701 to 1708. In 1709 he was arrested and deported to Siberia where he died.

21. The protocol of Kochubei's and Iskra's interrogation appeared in *Istochniki*, pp. 72-126.

22. Mazepa reported to Peter I on 16 July 1708 that the execution of Kochubei and Iskra had been carried out. Cf. *Istochniki*, pp. 83-85.

23. The manifesto of Stanislaw to the Ukrainians was published in *Perepiska*, p. 20.

24. Crown Hetman Sieniawski, for example, wrote to Mazepa in January of 1708 and informed him that rumors about his contacts with Dolska were rife in Poland. Cf. Subtelny, *Letters of Mazepa*, p. 65.

25. Ivan Bystrytskyi was a distant relative of the Hetman. He had the office of starosta of Sheptivka from 1687 to 1708, that is, as long as Mazepa was Hetman. After Poltava, he followed the Hetman to Bender and from there he went with Orlyk to Sweden where he died in 1717.

26. Count Carl Piper was one of Charles XII's closest associates and a member of his cabinet. He was later taken captive by the Russians at Poltava.

27. The chancellorist Danylo Bolbota was often used by Mazepa for delicate diplomatic missions. For example, in 1707 he was sent on a secret mission to the Crimea and in 1708 he established contact with the Ottomans at Ochakiv.

APPENDIX B

1. This document was published in Latin in *Perepiska*, pp. 44-47. The original title reads: *The Main Points for the Negotiation of the Treaty*

with the Khan and the Crimean Realm. In a report to Charles XII dated 19 January 1711 (o.s.) Lagerberg noted that a delegation of Ukrainian Cossacks had met with the Tatars in order to negotiate a treaty and that their instructions included 24 rather than the 23 points contained in this version. Cf. *Lagerberg's Dagbok*, p. 40.

2. The exact text of the treaty which Khmelnytskyi concluded with the Crimean Tatars in February-March 1648 is unknown. However, at least some of the points which were included in Khmelnytskyi's treaty may have been deduced from the *Puncta Compendiosa* which cites Khmelnytskyi's treaty as its model. See also *Hrushevskyi*, VIII, p. 169 and Smirnov, *Krimskoe Khanstvo*, I, p. 539.

3. For a discussion of the Ukrainian colonization of the *Slobodas* see D. I. Bagalii, *Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii stepnoi okrainy* (Moscow, 1887).

4. The complete title of the *Pacta Conventa* or treaty reads: *The Treaty Between the Crimean Realm and the Zaporozhian Host and the People of Little Russia Concluded for Eternal Friendship, Fraternity and Indissoluble Military Alliance. (Concluded near Cairo [a fording place on the lower Dnieper] in the year of our salvation 1711, the 23rd of January)*. There are two published copies of the *Pacta Conventa*: one, which served as the basis for this translation, is in *Perepiska*, pp. 47-50, and the other is in *Sbornik*, pp. 87-90. Copies of this document are also in the archives of the French foreign ministry. One copy was sent to the ministry soon after the treaty was signed in 1711 (Cf. *AAE Cor. Pol. Turquie*, vol. 51, fol. 19). The others were presented to the ministry by Hryhor Orlyk in 1731 (Cf. *AAE Cor. Pol. Pologne*, vol. 180, fol. 392) and in 1740 (Cf. *AAE Cor. Pol. Turquie*, vol. 107, fol. 136). There is also a copy of this treaty among Hryhor Orlyk's papers in *Dinteville*.

5. These names have been rendered as they appear in the *Perepiska* version. No attempt has been made to reconstruct the proper Tatar forms.

APPENDIX C

1. The complete title of this document reads: *Instructions for the Honorable Dmytro Horlenko, the colonel of Pryluky, Klym Dovhopolyi, procurator-general, Ivan Maksymovych, notary-general, Hryhor Hertsyk, adjutant-general—envoys extraordinary of the Zaporozhian Host to the Sublime Ottoman Porte in the matter of liberating our fatherland, Little Russia, on both sides of the Dnieper, from the terrible Muscovite yoke (and acting) in the name of the Illustrious Hetman Pylyp Orlyk and the entire Zaporozhian Host together with the Honorable Konstantyn Hordienko, the koshovyi-otaman of the Lower Zaporozhian Host and chosen by the same Illustrious Hetman in the name of the entire Zaporozhian Host and the Ruthenian people. (Given in the place of Baba, in the year of Our Lord, 3 November 1711.)* The only full version of this document was pub-

lished in the *Perepiska* (pp. 61-66) and it serves as the basis for this translation. An abridged version, in French translation, was presented to the French government by Hryhor Orlyk in 1740 (*AAE Cor. Pol. Turquie*, vol. 107, fol. 133).

2. In documents written in Ukrainian or Russian Orlyk normally used the term "Little Russia" and in documents written in Latin he used the term "Ukraine."

3. Cf. Kostomarov, *Mazepa*, p. 610.

4. The Ottomans did not attach much importance to this point as can be seen from the Grand Vizir's statement to the Muscovite envoys: "this matter (of the Ukrainians arrested and taken to Muscovy) is not of great importance. . . ." Cf. Oreshkova, *Russko-turetskie otnosheniia*, p. 161.

5. This is the most widespread of the documents dealing with Orlyk's relations with the Muslims. Published versions are to be found in *Sbornik* (p. 75), used for this translation, *Ohienko* (p. 208) and an amended version, which will be discussed below, published by Borshchak (*ZNTSh*, vol. 134-135, p. 133). Latin copies of this document are also in *Czart*, 498, fol. 101-106 and (according to Krupnytskyi, p. 72) in the *Dresden State Archives*, cloc. 698. At least three French copies of the document are to be found in the archives of the foreign ministry (*AAE Cor. pol. Turquie*, vol. 51, fol. 21-22; *AAE Cor. pol.*, vol. 180, fol. 397; *AAE Cor. pol. Turquie*, vol. 107, fol. 136-137). There is also a copy in the *Dinteville* archives. However, all the French versions of this document were later altered by the Orlyks so that it would appear that Ahmet III awarded the Hetman not only the Right Bank but all of Ukraine.

6. 5 March 1712.

Glossary

aga—an Ottoman official

bey—an Ottoman official superior to an aga but inferior to a pasha; in Crimea the title was used by the leaders of the noble clans

harac—a tax paid in the Ottoman empire by non-Muslims in lieu of military service

hatti-sherif—the official mandate or rescript of the Sultan

heneralna-starshyna—the holders of the highest military and civil offices in the Hetmanate; it included such offices as Chancellor, Quartermaster-General, Judge-General, Adjutant-General, Mace-bearer-General, Standardbearer-General.

holota—the poorest stratum of Ukrainian Cossacks

iasyr—a Turkic word for prisoners-of-war and captives; usually applied to captives taken in Tatar raids

Kalabalik—a Turkic term for tumult, fray; refers to the Ottomans and Tatars storming of Charles XII's camp on 31 January 1713 and the subsequent arrest of the Swedish King.

koshovyi, koshovyi-otaman—the highest Cossack official elected by the Zaporozhian Cossack assembly; holder of the highest military and administrative authority in the Zaporozhian Sich.

mirza—leaders of the Nogai tribes in the Crimean Khanate

piataky—modern, western military formations introduced by Peter I

polkovnyk—the highest military, administrative and judicial authority in the regiment (*polk*). The Hetmanate was divided into ten territorially based regiments in the early 18th century

prikaz—from the 16th to early 18th century, an organ of the tsars' central administration

rada—the general assembly of the Zaporozhian Cossacks

Right and Left Bank Ukraine—as one looks down the Dnieper

River Right Bank is on the right and Left Bank is on the left of the Dnieper

sejm—the diet, assembly of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

serasker—an Ottoman military governor or minister

sich—the Zaporozhian camp or stronghold established on the Dnieper beyond the rapids

sloboda—newly colonized lands which were freed for a time from the payment of taxes and various other obligations

starosta—a territorial administrator appointed by the Polish king, the chief official of the *starostwo*, a subdivision of the *województwo*

starshyna—the Ukrainian Cossack officer-elite

szlachta—the nobility of Poland-Lithuania

ukaz—a manifesto issued by the Tsar

universal—a manifesto issued by the Hetman

voevoda—a tsarist official who headed the administration and the military forces of a city

wojewoda—the highest military and judicial official of the provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

Abbreviations

Manuscript Sources

<i>AAE</i>	Archives du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres (Paris)
<i>AGAD</i>	Archiwum Glowne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw)
<i>Bib. Nat.</i>	Bibliotheque Nationale (Paris)
<i>Czart</i>	Biblioteka Czartoryskich (Cracow)
<i>Diariusz</i>	Pylyp Orlyk's journal entitled <i>Diariusz podróżny</i>
<i>Dinteville</i>	Hyrhor Orlyk's family archive (Dinteville, Haute Marne)
<i>HHS</i>	Haus-Hof und Staatsarchiv (Vienna)
<i>Ossol</i>	Biblioteka Zakladu Narodowego im. Ossolinskich (Wrocław)

Printed Sources

<i>AIuZR</i>	Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii, ed. D. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii
<i>Istochniki</i>	Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii, ed. D. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii
<i>Perepiska</i>	Perepiska i drugiiia bumagi shvedskago korolia Karla XII . . . , ed. A. O. Bodianskii
<i>Pisma i bumagi Sbornik</i>	Pisma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikago Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii Iugozapadnoi Rossii izdavaemyi Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov
<i>SRIO</i>	Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva

Periodicals

<i>Annals</i>	Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States
<i>Chteniia</i>	Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnosti rossiiskikh pri moskovskom universitete
<i>HUS</i>	Harvard Ukrainian Studies
<i>KFA</i>	Karolinska Forbundets Arsbok
<i>KSt</i>	Kievskaia Starina
<i>Pratsi</i>	Pratsi ukrainskoho naukovooho instytutu v Varshavi
<i>Zbirnyk</i>	Mazepa-Zbirnyk
<i>ZNTSh</i>	Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka

Secondary Works

Evarnytskii	Istoriia zaporozhskikh kozakov
Hatton	Charles XII of Sweden
Kostomarov	Mazepa i mazyntsi
Krupnytskyi	Hetman Pylyp Orlyk (1672-1742): Ohliad ioho politychnoi diialnosti
Ohloblyn	Hetman Ivan Mazepa i ioho doba
Soloviev	Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen

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