The collapse of the Soviet Union has left many of its former states struggling to forge new political nations out of the legacy of communist rule. Ukraine is no exception and its transition to independent state led many in the West to predict its collapse into ethnic conflict.

Taras Kuzio focuses on post-Soviet developments in Ukraine, analysing the role of nationalism in the forging of a new political nation out of the inherited quasi-state of the former Soviet Union. He examines the new elites of Ukraine, their views and role in the state and nation building project. He also explores other important aspects of the transition to an independent state such as borders, symbols, myths and national histories.

Ukraine uses primary sources and interviews with leading members of Ukrainian elites to survey the ongoing debates surrounding the transformation of Ukraine into an independent state. It also compares the Ukrainian experience with that of other emerging nations within a theoretical framework. The study finds that the threat of ethnic conflict and separatism has been exaggerated and that Ukraine can build an inclusive political nation based upon civic and ethnic Ukrainian attributes.

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UKRAINE

State and nation building

Taras Kuzio

London and New York
An open letter to young Ukrainians of Galicia

‘Before the Ukrainian intelligentsia an enormous practical task is opening up now under freer forms of life in Russia: to create out of the vast ethnic mass of Ukrainian people a Ukrainian nation, a comprehensive cultural organism, capable of an independent, cultural and political life, resistant to the assimilatory efforts of other nations, whatever their origin, and, at the same time, a nation open to receive, on the widest possible scale, and at the fastest rate, those universal human cultural achievements without which no nation and no state, however powerful, can survive.’

Ivan Franko, Ukrainian social democratic political activist, writer and poet, 1905

President Leonid Kuchma on the Fifth Anniversary of Ukrainian Independence

‘This event of great significance (the 1991 declaration of independence), which stands alongside only a few other historical dates…will transform the nasełennia (populace) into a narod (nation) and the territory into a state.’

Uriadovy Kurier, 29 August 1996
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND UKRAINIAN SPELLING

The transliteration used in this book is based upon the Ukrainian Legal Terminology Commission’s decision number 9 (19 April 1996) which outlined an official English-Ukrainian transliteration system. The system was adopted on the initiative of the Ukrainian Language Institute of the National Academy of Sciences. The decree noted that the transliteration system should be made directly from Ukrainian into English without the use of intermediary languages.

The use of this system has meant that ‘Ukraine’ is given throughout this book without the article ‘the’. In addition, Cyrillic soft signs have been rendered by an apostrophe (for example, L’viv). Some traditionally known regions (for example, the ‘Crimea’ and ‘Trans-Carpathia’) have been used rather than their Ukrainian transliterations (‘Krym’, and ‘Zakarpattia’ respectively). The names of Ukrainian oblasts and cities are no longer transliterated from the Russian into English (for example, these now take the form ‘Kyiv’, ‘L’viv’, ‘Kharkiv’, ‘Odesa’ and the ‘Donbas’ instead of the traditional ‘Kiev, ‘Lvov’, ‘Kharkov’, ‘Odessa’ and the ‘Donbass’ respectively). A complete listing of the transliteration system for each Ukrainian letter into English can be found in Ukrainian Weekly (20 October 1996).
Territorial administrative structure of Ukraine
INTRODUCTION

Ukraine became an independent state on 1 January 1992 without a modern nation or united political community enclosed within its borders. In this it faced a similar predicament to that faced by the majority of former Soviet states whose transition to democracy and a market economy is accompanied by state and nation building. Independent Ukraine legally inherited the positive and negative legacies of both the Ukrainian People’s Republican (UNR)/Hetmanate governments of 1917–1920 and the former Soviet Ukrainian republic (1922–1991).

Although many outside observers initially remained highly pessimistic at the chances of Ukraine surviving as an independent state within its inherited borders these prophecies of doom have been proved wrong. The Leonid Kravchuk era was one of transition from Soviet rule, a role in which he largely excelled, whereas the period from 1994 to 1998 under Leonid Kuchma has been one of consolidation. During the first three years of the Kuchma era the irreversibility of Ukrainian independence was secured in five areas. First, the adoption of the June 1996 constitution, President Leonid Kuchma argued, ‘drew a line under a period of (former) statelessness and guaranteed independence to Ukraine’. The constitution was followed three months later by the introduction of the long awaited national currency (hryvna), which linked the independent state to the medieval state of Kyiv Rus’ and the UNR. Second, Kuchma launched a relatively radical programme of economic reform which ended the confused, dangerous and populist policies introduced by his predecessor. Third, the Russian Federation and Romania were the final two neighbours who signed inter-state treaties with Ukraine in May–June 1997 which mutually recognised their borders. All of Ukraine’s inherited borders were henceforth no
longer legally in dispute and Ukraine’s territorial integrity was largely assured from external designs upon it. Fourth, the domestic threat from separatism collapsed in the only Ukrainian region which had ever expressed an interest in it—the Crimea. By 1997 most pro-Russian forces in the Crimea had, ‘forgotten about their slogans calling for the annexation of the Crimea by Russia’.2 Finally, between 1994 and 1997 Ukraine became a strategic asset of the West. The launch of economic and political reform, the peaceful resolution of domestic disputes, removal of the last nuclear weapons by June 1996 and support for NATO enlargement were just some of the factors which worked to convince the West that Ukraine was the ‘linchpin’ of European security.

Ukraine’s choice had never been to build either a purely civic or an ethnic nation. The choice had been, in a manner similar to other independent states, of constructing a political nation composed of civic and ethnic attributes. The ethnic component of this political nation could either be Ukrainian or Ukrainian and Russian. Foreign and domestic critics of state and nation building in Ukraine under former President Kravchuk (1991–1994) argued in the name of a ‘civic’ nation. But they were mistaken in two areas. First, they believed that purely ‘civic’ nations in Europe exist. Second, they understood ‘civic’ nations to be those where Russians and Ukrainians were both defined as the titular nationalities and their languages both were accorded the status of state languages. ‘Ethnic’ nations, in contrast, were understood to be only where Ukrainians were defined as the sole core, titular nation and their language was accorded the status of the only state language. This book argues that these analyses, the theoretical basis which sometimes underpinned them and the definitions used of concepts such as ‘nationalising states’, were misplaced both within the European, north American and the Ukrainian experience.

Within Ukraine and the bulk of the former USSR the model which would resemble their state and nation building projects would be that which historically had prevailed in France, the UK, Italy, north America and elsewhere. This ‘state to nation’ model gave a strong role to the state in the construction of new civic nations and political communities. Although the ‘state to nation’ route was historically territorial, as it is in Ukraine, it always included within it cultural elements. The political nation therefore always incorporated both civic and ethnic factors based usually upon the ethnic core which created the state. In some cases, such as Belgium and Canada, more than one ethnic core was recognised as contributing
towards the political nation. (Those who argued that Ukraine was a ‘bi-national’ Russian-Ukrainian state were, in effect, arguing that it was another ‘Belgium’.)

Ukraine also included a region which had greater significance to the state and nation building project than at first seemed to be the case and in relation to its size within Ukraine. Western Ukraine, under Austro-Hungarian rule from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, had been greatly influenced by the opposite ‘nation to state’ route more popular in Germany and Eastern Europe. The ‘nation to state’ route had traditionally been sought by developed nations who had evolved from ethnoses and given greater emphasis to ethnic/cultural—rather than territorial—factors in the creation of the nation. This process of nation building (ethnos to nation) had characterised western Ukraine during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (During this same period eastern Ukrainians had been prevented from evolving in the same manner by the Tsarist authorities.) By 1917 only western Ukraine had therefore evolved from an ethnos into a nation, a major factor which led to the failure of the UNR to secure an independent state during that period. Nevertheless, the struggle by the UNR and the Hetmanate during 1917–1920 forced the Bolsheviks to concede a quasi-state to Ukraine (and not its outright incorporation within the RSFSR, as Joseph Stalin had wanted). This quasi-state went on to declare independence from the former USSR in August 1991.

What had it inherited? Seven decades of Soviet rule had given the quasi-state some attributes of statehood (such as elites and institutions) which were useful in ensuring the success of the establishment of independence in 1991 (in contrast to 1917–1920). By 1996 President Kuchma could claim that Ukraine had completed its state building.

But what of nation building? Ukraine inherited in 1991 an even more robust west Ukrainian ethnic nation than had existed in 1917–1920, which had been followed by three decades of armed conflict by west Ukrainians with Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Germans and Soviets. The experimentation with indigenisation in the 1920s, if left to run its course, would have also led to the evolution from ethnos to nation in eastern Ukraine. This though was halted by the early 1930s and from then on the Soviet authorities pursued a policy of ‘Little Russianisation’ (see chapter 7), which kept eastern Ukrainians in the pre-modern twilight zone. The independent Ukrainian state therefore inherited what are usually defined as pre-modern/national identities coupled with intermediate, multiple
identities (eastern Slavic, Soviet). Nation building would attempt to secure the transfer of these identities to an exclusive loyalty to a modern political nation, a transfer which is partially dependent upon the socio-economic situation prevailing in Ukraine. This transfer did not have to be accompanied by the eradication of all regional loyalties and identities. Loyalties to both region and the political nation are perfectly compatible.

Seven factors suggest that ethnic Ukrainians are likely to be the only titular ethnic group from which the ethnic component of the political nation will be forged in this nation building project. First, if the Ukrainian leadership accepted that Ukraine was a bi-national state this would have major geopolitical ramifications. Russia would not treat such an entity seriously and would regard it in a manner in which it views Belarus. The bulk of Russians still find it difficult to accept Ukrainians as anything but an inalienable branch of the rus’kiy narod. Growth in support for a Russian-Ukrainian union is already high among Russians at 64 per cent. The definition of Ukraine as a bi-national state, similar to Belarus under President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, would undoubtedly increase this support for union with Ukraine among Russians. Second, the West and international organisations would likewise not regard Ukraine as a viable nation-state. Fears that Ukraine would not survive as an independent state during 1992–1994 were, after all, premised upon accusations that Ukraine inherited no nation or unified community. The international community is biased towards viewing united nation-states as the norm. Third, the 1996 constitution clearly defines Ukrainians as the sole titular ethnic group and Russians as a national minority.

Fourth, the inherited Soviet experience of exclusive territorial homelands for separate ethnic groups is an important factor. Throughout the former USSR nation building is displacing Russians from the commanding heights of these formerly quasi-Soviet republics (even in those where the titular ethnic group was lower in proportion to the total population than in Ukraine, such as in Kazakhstan). Fifth, there is the centrality of national identity to civil society. Without modern national identities, Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians in eastern Ukraine have found it impossible to mobilise. In contrast, western and central Ukrainians have a more developed national identity and modern nation which grew out of the Eastern European ‘nation to state’ route. They are unlikely to accept Ukraine defined as a bi-national state. Sixth, even ‘state to nation’ models of nation building based upon territorial
citizenship and individual rights are still, in of themselves, assimilatory to the culture and language of the core ethnic group. The policies favoured by eastern Ukrainians, such as Kuchma, will also therefore lead to ‘nationalisation’ of the state as one based upon Ukrainians as the core ethnic group.

Finally, those with a pre-modern identity in Ukraine cannot skip the modern stage and arrive at ‘post-modern’ consciousness. The evolution towards post-nation-state identities are largely exaggerated and only confined to EU member states. Ukraine has outlined its strategic objective of joining the EU but it is not clear if this will ever occur and, if so, it is only likely to occur in the distant future. The EU is also in the process of enlargement which will slow down considerably its evolution to a post-nation stage of development.

This book is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 1 provides a theoretical and comparative perspective to state and nation building in Ukraine which defines concepts such as ‘ethnic’ and ‘nation’ while arguing that the Ukrainian case has similarities to that experienced by other countries. Chapter 2 surveys the sources of, growth and establishment of Ukrainian elites. Chapter 3 discusses the creation of a Ukrainian political community based on new ideas and values, the search for unity, and the link between the economy and the national idea. Chapter 4 discusses questions of federalism, regionalism and separatism, as well as focusing on two areas (the Crimea and the Donbas). It also surveys policies towards national minorities (especially the largest, Russians) and citizenship. Chapter 5 stresses the strategic importance of borders and boundaries to state and nation building. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 provide an exhaustive survey of the debates, policies and views in the search for a national idea, expedient nation building and language policies, as well as discussing the link between civil society and national identity. Chapter 9 covers historical myths, memory and national symbols and analyses their importance to Ukraine’s state and nation building project. The final chapter provides a summary of the conclusions reached throughout the book.
This chapter argues within a theoretical and comparative perspective that a Ukrainian ethnos existed prior to the twentieth century in much of what is now independent Ukraine. This ethnos had been allowed to evolve into a nation only in western-central Ukraine because of the differing policies applied by the external powers ruling Ukraine. Military and ethnic conflict, important factors in the construction of nations, only played a role in western Ukraine. In eastern Ukraine the absence of such conflict did not lead to the clear ethnic demarcation found between say Poles and Ukrainians. The borders of the Ukrainian SSR did though play an important role in demarcating the populations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Through a comparative approach we can come to appreciate that many of the inherited legacies found within Ukraine which have to be overcome within its state and nation building project are not ‘unique’ to that country.

In search of a definition

Ethnie

As pointed out in later chapters in this book there is no single definition of a ‘nation’ to which all scholars of nationalism subscribe. Often a ‘nation’ is described as the culmination of a process of evolution from a tribe through to an ethnic group (or ethnos).\textsuperscript{1}
But what then are ethnics? Ethnicties are usually defined as ‘pre-
national’ forms of integration that represent ‘historical antecedents
of the modern nations’. Ethnic groups are a ‘narod’ (a people) that
hold a common belief in their descent, Weber argued. But ethnic
solidarity does not, of itself, signify that a nation exists. Ethnics
usually share a history, hold a common myth of descent, have a
distinctive and shared culture, are associated with a specific territory,
harbour a sense of solidarity and hold a collective name. (But not
all would agree with Smith. Enbe believes that ethnicties do not
necessarily hold single cultural characteristics.) Barth added that
ethnic should also be recognised as somehow different to their
neighbours, that is they must recognise that their ‘We’ is different to
‘Others’ beyond recognised borders.

Some argue that ethnicties are also associated with pre-industrial
societies. In other words, those who argue in favour of nationalism
and nations as being products of the industrial (or modern) era see
ethnicties as predating the rise of ‘modern nations’. As civil
societies only appeared in the modern era, with the rise of
nationalism, literacy, the media, democracy and universal suffrage
one cannot predate civil society to an era where national identity
and ‘modern nations’ did not yet exist. This has profound
ramifications for contemporary Ukraine. If a modern national
identity does not perforce exist, how can there then be a civil
society? Civil society and national identity are both products of
modernity.

All of these attributes of ethnoses existed in Ukraine to varying
degrees by the seventeenth century and continued to exist until the
nineteenth/early twentieth centuries. A people who described
themselves as rusyny (Ruthenians), Ukrainians or Little Russians
(then not yet a derogatory term) recalled a history traced back to
Kyiv Rus’ and associated roughly with much of what is today
Ukrainian territory, and exhibited a common culture and linguistic
group (composed of a number of regional dialects). Anti-statism was
a strong component of Ukrainian political culture right up until
1917, as was their categorisation into socio-economic and religious
terms (peasant and Orthodox). Few Ukrainians in Tsarist Russia
knew who they were, Saunders found, but, ‘most of them knew
what they were not’. This definition of identity in terms of
‘Otherness’ is characteristic of pre-modern nations, Armstrong
believes, and had existed in Ukraine since the seventeenth century.

In the mid-seventeenth century, when Ukraine and Muscovy
signed the Treaty of Periaslav, interpreters had to be utilised because
neither side understood the other. At that time, Ukraine represented a more advanced culture than its northern neighbour (the westernisation of Russia came via Ukraine), with the populations of both countries roughly equal at 5 million each. By the nineteenth century this had changed in Russia’s favour—culturally, socio-economically and demographically. The merging of Ukrainians and Russians was implemented through policies of Russification, Little Russianism and a Russo-centric historiography that sought to blur any differences between the eastern Slavs. These policies were introduced between the mid-1860s and the mid-1980s (except for a fifteen-year interregnum between 1917 and 1932 when Ukraine struggled for independence and the Ukrainian SSR adopted policies of indigenisation).

The inherited legacies of this 100-year encounter with Russia are largely responsible for the failure of the eastern-southern Ukrainian ethnos to evolve into a modern nation (unlike in western Ukraine where more liberal conditions prevailed under Austrian rule). Post-Soviet Ukraine is faced with the unenviable task of attempting to reverse these legacies in total or partially through nation and state building. The domestic debates and policy making within Ukraine discussed in this book centre on whether either of these inherited legacies should be romantically approached, that is, by completely removing them (for example, treating Russian as a foreign language); or only partially removing them through more pragmatic policies that accept the need to maintain some of the inherited legacies as, in effect, a fait accompli? These debates raged throughout all newly independent states and are not therefore unique to Ukraine (see below).

What’s in a nation?

Ethnic solidarities, which exist to varying degrees in both Belarus and Ukraine, should not be construed as implying the existence of ‘nations’, but merely stages in the process of nation building. Soviet Ukrainian dictionaries defined nations (natsii) and peoples (narody) in two different ways. A narod were merely citizens of a state while a natsiya was a ‘concrete-historical form of society’ united through language, territory, economy and race.

It is also perhaps impossible to pinpoint with any accuracy when a ‘nation’ comes into being. Nation formation is a process (and usually a bumpy one at that). National identities and nations are not static, they are continually in the process of change. Smith ascribes similar characteristics to nations as he does to ethnic groups, except
that nations also include a mass public culture (sometimes referred to as a ‘common ideology’), a common economy, legal rights and duties for all of its citizens.\textsuperscript{15} Other scholars stress homogeneity (or unity) and national will.\textsuperscript{16} Seton-Watson and Hobsbawm found no acceptable ‘scientific definition’ of a nation or even which human collectives should be defined as such. They exist, Connor believed, when a significant number of people form a community and consider themselves to be a nation, behaving as if they were one.\textsuperscript{17}

Even the term ‘nation-state’ is difficult to define because more often than not, as in the Ukrainian case, it is the state which is creating the nation. Therefore a ‘state-nation’ might be a more appropriate term.\textsuperscript{18} There is no single type of nation-state, but instead a variety of different examples. The USA has been described as a nation-state, yet it exhibits ethnic diversity, a weaker federal government and fewer homogenising tendencies than many European countries.\textsuperscript{19} Similarly, multi-ethnic Indonesia is commonly referred to as a ‘nation’.\textsuperscript{20}

The modern national idea is also an irrational animal because it is more than usually based on personal disposition while the essence of nations is intangible.\textsuperscript{21} After all, the three concepts that define a nation are subjective (psychological) factors, together with tangible (‘objective’) ones and those of membership of the community.\textsuperscript{22} Even in cases of common racial and linguistic origins children of the same parents can opt for different nationalities.\textsuperscript{23} The language, religion or geographic region into which an individual is born does not necessarily predetermine his/her nationality. Some former Yugoslav and Soviet citizens with mixed parents prefer still to call themselves Yugoslavs or Soviets rather than choose one of their parent’s ethnic groups.

There are few cases in the world where the titular ethnic group encompasses 100 per cent of its territory and none of its co-ethnics reside abroad. Connor found there to be only twelve nationally homogenous countries of the 132 in existence in 1972.\textsuperscript{24} In Europe perhaps only Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Armenia resemble such countries (although there are sizeable Hungarian and Armenian diasporas). The widely used term ‘nation-state’ is applicable in two very different cases: first, in countries where one ethnic group represents close to 100 per cent of the population (such as the five countries listed above); second, when referring to countries, such as Ukraine, which have instituted inclusive nationality policies and the ‘nation’ in the nation-state refers to all of its inhabitants as members of its civic nation.
War and conflict have always played important roles in the formation of national identities and nation-states because they require national unity, conscription and a focus upon a foreign ‘Other’. The struggle of the lower Franconians, then speaking a German dialect, against Spain in the second half of the sixteenth century led to the creation of Holland. Irish, Welsh and Scots identities were forged in conflict with the English whose identity, in turn, was largely forged in conflict with France. German and Italian identities were forged during their conflicts with France and Austria respectively. The Turks can be credited with promoting Serbian and Greek identities during their occupation of the Balkans. The lack of a liberation struggle against the British (for example, for Australia and Canada) has left them still undecided about their national identities. In contrast, the USA was able through its liberation struggle in the 1770s and civil war in the mid-nineteenth century to create a sustainable and coherent national idea. In Central Asia the more peaceful Russian colonisation of Kazakhstan and Kirgiziya is reflected in their more ‘pro-Russian’ attitudes than those found in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where Russian colonisation was violently resisted.

In Ukraine conflict helped to forge a national identity in western Ukraine. Germanisation in Prussia’s eastern provinces had aroused Polish nationalism prior to 1914. The Poles went on to use similar nationalising policies in their eastern provinces in the inter-war period. In both cases the results were the opposite to what were intended; that is, these Polish policies helped to consolidate and forge anti-Polish Ukrainian and Belarusian national consciousnesses. In eastern Ukraine contact between Muscovy/Russia and Ukraine had not led to ethnic conflict since the battles at Konotop and Poltava in 1659 and 1709 respectively. In a similar manner to the last battle fought on British soil at Culloden in 1745, the Battle of Poltava sealed the fate of the Ukrainians making them, along with the Scots, ‘younger brothers’ within their respective Tsarist Russian and British empires. The exceptions to the above were the wars of 1917–1921 between the independent Ukrainian state and its Tsarist and Bolshevik opponents. This absence of military conflict since the eighteenth century was reinforced by Tsarist and post-Leninist historiography, which purposefully exaggerated the collaboration and the closeness of Ukrainians and Russians, while playing down any historical conflicts. The rewriting of history within post-Soviet Ukraine will not though ignore historical conflicts in the past between Ukrainians and Russians. On the contrary, these may be played up in a reversal of past policies.
The general absence of Russian-Ukrainian ethnic conflict prior to 1917 has meant that the dividing line between Ukrainians and Russians is more blurred in eastern Ukraine than that between Poles and western Ukrainians. In western Ukraine attitudes are similar to those held in the three Baltic states which all perceive ‘Russians’ as the invaders of 1939 who imported Soviet rule. Nationalist partisan activity in all four states lasted until the early 1950s and its mythology is anti-Russian (as well as anti-Soviet). It is not surprising therefore that the communist parties in these three states and in western Ukraine were largely removed from their political maps in the first parliamentary elections held in March 1990 in the former USSR. In Lithuania, the first former Soviet republic to declare independence, the Communist Party had to rebuild its image along more social democratic and national lines in order to maintain any electoral support.

Nation and state building in comparative perspective

Is the Ukrainian nation-state building project ‘unique’, as some Western scholars have alleged, or are there common threads running through past and current nation-state building programmes in Europe, Eurasia and elsewhere?

Local identities

Are local identities a Ukrainian phenomenon? The simple answer to this question is ‘no’. Regionalism and border identities have remained in most European and Asian states. Some ethnic, local identities (for example, Cornish, Breton, Okinawan, Skanian, etc.) are now resurfacing and exposing the exaggerated claims that they would be lost in the drive to modernisation and national homogenisation within the core, dominant culture as being fallacious. Regionalism is therefore a world-wide and growing phenomenon.

Until the nineteenth century identity was not defined in national terms but as religion, race, colour, locality or allegiance to a monarch. Prior to the late nineteenth century both France and Italy resembled more conglomerations of divided regions. In the German lands there were a variety of dialects and cultures, where border regions often exhibited belts of mixed settlement (for example, Alsace Lorraine). No ‘Germany’ as such existed prior to 1870. An overarching Spanish identity is more a product of the
post-war era in a country where the Galicians, Basques and Catalans retain strong and legally separate identities.

Border identities are often defined as ‘situational ethnicities’ where a particular period of time may determine which of a person’s collective identities or multiple loyalties are promoted. Static models of national identity cannot accommodate the existence of ‘situational ethnicities’. On the other hand, ‘situational ethnicities’ allow processes of change to be tabled into the analysis, thereby giving a better analysis of the transition at work in a given society.³⁰ ‘Situational ethnicity’ implies that identities are not fixed, but blurred, possibly in a state of flux, dependent upon prevailing economic and geopolitical circumstances.

Prior to the collapse of empires certain peoples, such as the Albanians, the Turks of Anatolia and the eastern Ukrainians, did not have to decide who they were. Prior to 1900 Anatolian Turks were unaware of a Turkish identity separate from an Ottoman or Islamic one. Ukrainians and Slovaks in the Carpathian mountains, Ukrainians in Kholm and Pidlachia, Germans in Alsace, Poles in Upper Silesia and in Lithuania (where they called themselves krajowcy) were also unaware of their national identities or had forgotten their allegiances to their ethnic group by 1914. When Poland became an independent state in 1918 it included Silesians and Mazurians whose identities were confused. In Mazuria peasants, usually Protestant, harboured a distrust of Polishness with a knowledge that they were, at the same time, not Germans. Instead, they attached greater feeling to their region and spoke a local dialect (or separate language, depending upon one’s point of view).³¹ Turks in the 1920s, together with Russians and eastern Ukrainians in the 1990s, were or are being encouraged to transfer their multiple identities of empire or pan-Slavism to a more mutually exclusive identity confined to their newly created nation-states. In Ulster there is no common national identity that spans both the Catholic and Protestant communities. The latter are more aware of who they are not than who they are—the Protestants being neither fully Irish nor fully British.³² They are therefore similar to the Anglo-Irish of Eire and the Little Russians of Ukraine. In the South African Republic only 29 per cent linked their identities with the country in polls—even after Nelson Mandela became its first black President.

The communist regimes of Eastern Europe often helped to create fully fledged identities which had not necessarily existed before (as did the Treaty of Versailles in 1919). Macedonians in the USA usually believed themselves to be ‘Bulgarians’ because they had
emigrated to that country prior to 1945. After the Second World War the Yugoslav state encouraged the emergence of a Macedonian nation that had, at one stage, been claimed by the Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs. In the USA there are also rusyny, former residents of the Hungarian region of the Austro-Hungarian empire, who emigrated to that country prior to 1917. Unlike in the Austrian region of that empire, where liberal nationality policies permitted the evolution of the rusyn ethnos into the Ukrainian nation, in the areas controlled by the Hungarians Magyarisation and the maintenance of a rusyn ethnos was the preferred policy. The nation building policies introduced after 1918 and 1945 in Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian SSR respectively transformed the majority of these rusyny into Ukrainians. Today rusyny only exist in north eastern Slovakia, an area which was administered by Hungary during the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rusyny resemble their Little Russian brethren in eastern Ukraine, believing themselves to be part of a larger east Slavic rus'kiy narod rather than a narrow Ukrainian nation. In an independent Ukraine both rusyny and Little Russians would be encouraged to replace their loyalties to the rus'kiy narod with those towards a civic Ukrainian nation.

**Bi-national states**

Some scholars and political commentators believe Ukraine to be a country of two equal, or near equal, ethnic groups (Ukrainians and Russians) whose languages and cultures both comprise the Ukrainian identity. There are, of course, precedents to such bi-national states that are usually united through some form of consociational democracy. Belgium (comprising French-speaking Wallonia and Dutch-speaking Flanders), Switzerland (comprising four ethnic groups) and Canada (with its French and Anglo-Saxon regions) are all bi- or multi-national states. None of these examples are purely civic states; instead, they are all amalgams of two or more ethnic groups. Bi-ethnic states do not promote civic policies—instead they are commonly associated with nationalising projects in each of their ethnic components.

In other words, if we are to accept that Ukraine is a ‘bi-national Belgium’ then this would be tantamount to arguing that it has more of an east Slavic than a purely Ukrainian identity, a product of the intense contact with Russians and Russia since the mid-1860s referred to earlier. Supporters of this Russian-Ukrainian fusion trace it back through Tsarist/post-Leninist historiography to Kyiv Rus’ as representing one long unity occasionally broken by invading Poles or
Tatars. Understandably this ‘Little Russian’ view, that the three east Slavic peoples are really branches of the same rus’kiy narod, is not as widespread in Ukraine as certain Western scholars have claimed. It is mainly confined to the Communist Party (KPU), its ally, the Inter-Front-leaning Civic Congress, and the centrist Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms party [MRBR].

But, does Ukraine really fit the Swiss, Canadian or Belgian models? Well, not really. According to the 1989 Soviet census Ukrainians comprised nearly three-quarters of the inhabitants of the Ukrainian SSR and were a majority in every administrative region except the Crimea. All of the 100 ethnic groups which exist in multi-national Ukraine are very small, apart for the 12 million Russians who accounted for 22 per cent of the population. But, these Russians, although largely concentrated in eastern-southern Ukraine, do not constitute a majority in any region except for the Crimea. This exception has been recognised by the granting of political autonomy to the Crimean peninsula. Because no non-Ukrainian ethnic group holds a majority in any other region political autonomy has not been advanced in any other Ukrainian region. In addition, the 1989 Soviet census figures do not reflect those of a bi-national state divided into two clear ethnic groups, particularly as the bulk of Russians and Ukrainians in eastern-southern Ukraine exhibit more pre-modern than modern national identities.

If we were to take the language factor into account, then Russian speakers did indeed account for 40 per cent of the republic’s inhabitants in the 1989 census. But these Russian speakers were spread over many ethnic groups. Linguistic groups though (in contrast to ethnic groups), are unlikely to be given special rights in Ukraine or in any other European state. If Russophones are given special rights in Ukraine (although it is doubtful that such a coherent group exists), then why not also for Turkic, Arabic and Urdu speakers in Germany, France and the UK respectively? Collective rights refer to ethnic groups—not to linguistic ones. Kymlicka defines these ethnic groups as ‘nations’ which are ‘a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture’. These national minorities refer to a ‘people’ or a ‘culture’. They are therefore clearly different from linguistic groups which are amorphous in their identity and span many ‘peoples’ and ‘cultures’.

Throughout the former USSR, Russians have been largely removed from the political commanding heights of the successor
states. Although the non-indigenous populations have only been disenfranchised in Latvia and Estonia, which were originally pursuing exclusive nationality policies, in the remainder of the non-Slavic regions of the former USSR their inclusive policies do not tell the full story. In the Trans-Caucasus, Lithuania, Moldova and Central Asia, Russians may have been given automatic citizenship in 1992; at the same time, their control of the political commanding heights of these states have been largely replaced by the titular ethnic group. Only in Ukraine and Belarus (and, of course, Russia) have Russians managed to maintain their foothold within the political ruling elites of these states. Russians have though maintained their influence within the economic elites of most Soviet successor states, an inheritance similar to Chinese dominance of business in Malaysia.

Of these three east Slavic states only in Ukraine is the jury still out on whether it will become a state politically dominated by its indigenous ethnic group (Ukrainian) or remain a Ukrainian-Russian state? (Belarus has accepted that it is an eastern Slavic, rather than an exclusively Belarusian, state). To maintain Ukraine as a bi-national state would be to reward those who have instituted the policies since the 1860s that have led to this troubled inheritance; policies that left a legacy of cultural and socio-economic apartheid even after Ukraine became an independent state itself. Such domestic debates and struggles over the colonial legacies imparted to newly independent states occurred in Eire and Algeria. In both cases the English and French, like the Russians in Ukraine, believed that these countries were really natural extensions of the fatherland.

**In the shadow of ‘Big Brother’**

During the second half of the twentieth century both Austria and Ukraine have attempted to free themselves from the embrace of their ‘Big Brothers’—Germany and Russia respectively. Ninety eight per cent of Austrians speak the Austrian German dialect, compared to 40 per cent Russian speakers in Ukraine. The latter therefore have a slight advantage over Austria on the linguistic question because Austrian does not radically differ from German in linguistic terms. Austria and Ukraine both began their nation-state building after 1955 and 1992 respectively as neutral states, largely through the insistence of, or to maintain a discreet distance from, Germany and Russia.
Austria has been identified as the country of the same name since 1156. Nevertheless, the post-1918 Austrian state was a confused entity, as reflected in its name (Deutsch-Osterreich), the nation-state of German-speaking Austrians. (This was then the state of those Germans who had formally lived within Austria-Hungary, where they, like the Moldovans in Tsarist Russia/the former USSR, had diverged from their ethnic German and Romanian roots respectively.) In similar circumstances to Ukraine, during the bulk of its first five years of independence (and, in some cases, still today), most outside observers regarded Austrians as really nothing more than ‘Germans’ (or in the Ukrainian case ‘Russians’). In mid-1993 former French President Giscard D’Estaing said that Ukraine separating from Russia was as preposterous as the Rhône-Alpes region seceding from France. Most European powers did not object to the German annexation of Austria in 1938.

Only after 1945 was German-Austria renamed Austria in an attempt to dissociate it from Nazi Germany (for example, the significance of a small anti-Nazi resistance movement was exaggerated in new post-war historical myths). To do this the Austrians had to emphasise non-German elements in Austria’s new history to show how they were really ‘different’ to the Germans (a task that the Ukrainian pre-eminent historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky was also assigned to perform). New symbols, an anthem and a national holiday were devised. Nevertheless, despite becoming an independent state in 1918 an Austrian national identity separate from the German only became a reality decades later in the 1960s. Even then Austrian national identity remained confused as late as the 1980s (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2).

Language

The language question in Ukraine has been the focus of intense study and interest by Western and Ukrainian scholars. Is Ukraine though a ‘unique’ case? Can it justify a single state language in a country where only 60 per cent of its inhabitants were Ukrainianophones in the 1989 Soviet census? If we take the European experience again the answer is ‘yes’. In the Spanish region of Catalonia 40 per cent of its inhabitants are non-Catalans, yet the region’s ‘state language’ is Catalan and Castillian is an optional language for instruction in its schools.

In France in the late eighteenth century and Italy, when united in the 1870s, the dialect which was to become the ‘state language’ was
only spoken by a small proportion of the population. The USA nearly chose German as its state language. In Italy only 2 per cent of its inhabitants could write Italian in 1861 and its first King Victor Emmanuel II and Prime Minister Camillo Cavour were more at ease with French or Piedmontese than Italian. Hence Massimo d’Azeglio’s well known comment: ‘We have made Italy, we now have to make Italians.’ Standard Italian (based on the Tuscan/Umbrian dialect) is still to this day only spoken by 80 per cent of the country’s inhabitants. Two-thirds of Italians remain bilingual, using both Italian and their regional dialects. Mass literacy and knowledge of Italian only came about after the introduction of universal education and mass media in the 1950s. A modern state does not therefore require a 100 per cent linguistic homogenisation to survive and effectively function. Attempts at copying the French model of nation-state building of total homogeneity in Africa have proven to be largely a failure, as the country’s ethnic tribes have not assimilated into ‘nation-states’ based on the borders inherited from the colonial era.

The linguistic debates which raged throughout inter-war Eire and still rage today in Wales are reflected within the often highly charged
atmosphere of debates over language policy in post-Soviet Ukraine. In the early seventeenth century half of the population of Scotland were Gaelic speakers. In contemporary Wales a national idea which is sufficiently inclusive to include non-Welsh speakers is still being formulated and discussed. Not all Welsh speakers accept that Anglophone Welshmen/women should be defined as ‘Welsh’. Therefore the question of the search for an inclusive national idea is as relevant to contemporary debates within Wales as it is to post-Soviet Ukraine. In both cases the imperial metropolis had propagated that they were incapable of running independent states. Participants in the Welsh debate over what constitutes its national idea still ask:

‘What is Wales? Is it the valleys and wild sheep runs of the countryside? Is it the anguished deprivation of the old coal valleys? Is it Cardiff or Caernarfon? Is it those who speak the Welsh language or those who don’t?’

Meanwhile in Ireland, on the eve of the potato famine, (which suspiciously resembled the 1933 artificial famine in Ukraine that was also designed to break the back of a national identity) half the Irish population spoke Gaelic. Within less than a decade after the famine had taken its toll this figure had dropped by half. By the 1890s the majority in Ireland spoke English. Both the Irish and Ukrainian languages became castigated as ‘inferior’ and ‘peasant’ languages spoken only by the poor. For many decades both prior to, and after, independence the English and Russians could not look upon Irish and Ukrainian separatism as serious entities (for how could ‘peasants’, after all, create modern nation-states?). In Eire and Ukraine local inhabitants with divided loyalties emerged (Anglo-Irish and Little Russians). Living between two worlds they could not be accepted by either, proud of both their Irish/Ukrainian and British/Russian roots.

Therefore, in both Eire and Ukraine independence was seen as an opportune time to reverse the previous policies of denationalisation undertaken by the former imperial metropolis. Language was perceived as an important marker of identity and loyalty to the newly independent state, as was the writing of a new national history tracing the Irish/Ukrainian struggle for independence back into history. But demands for linguistic revivals also served to divide society. The words of Thomas Davis, writing in the 1840s, could have been written by a Ukrainian writing with the same concerns in the 1990s:
A people without a language of its own is only half a nation. To lose your native tongue and learn that of an alien, is the worst badge of conquest—it is the chain on the soul. To have lost entirely the national language is death; the fetter has worn through.40

In Eire and Ukraine new myths and national histories portrayed them as heroic peoples fighting against outside oppressors. Their struggles had been spiritual and national, an important aim of which had been to remove the stigma of inherited inferiority complexes. National and linguistic revival was and is seen as tied to the search for national identity and a new national idea. A true Irishman/woman or Ukrainian is one who speaks Gaelic or Ukrainian and cultivates that language’s historic and cultural traditions. The independence of both Ireland and Ukraine therefore set in motion debates about the essential differences with the former metropolis in quests for new identities, a central element of which was language. Was the former metropolis an ‘Other’ and, if so, what degree of distance should be kept from it?41

After becoming an autonomous Free State in 1921 Eire took twenty-eight years to eventually withdraw from the British Commonwealth, the entity which had replaced the British empire. Ukraine helped found the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991 to replace the Soviet empire. But it has always insisted on maintaining only a de facto (not a de jure) presence in the CIS as a participant. Its leaders have openly stated their desire to withdraw from the CIS and join European and transatlantic structures in the medium term. Perhaps Ukraine might then follow the Irish path towards greater independence from the former ruling metropolis?

**Internal colonialism**

Ukraine inherited similar examples of the internal colonialism found within the UK. Internal colonialism required persistent inequalities, economic dependency, a lower standard of living, a cultural division of labour and a reactive nationalism. Hechter’s adaptation of his internal colonialism model to the UK is also applicable to some degree to Ukraine within the former USSR.42 While Ukrainians perform many of the traditional occupations reserved for immigrants from the developed world (for example, refuse collectors, street sweepers, maids, etc.) the Russian minority, ‘still
occupies today the key positions in government, the army, education, culture, industry, and new private business'. This view, held by many Ukrainians, regards the continued domination of some areas of the commanding heights by Russians as a disturbing legacy of Soviet internal colonialism.

The UK had allowed a greater degree of diversity than France vis-à-vis its outlying areas. The Scottish-English union of 1707 had maintained much of Scotland’s separate distinctiveness—unlike the Ukraine-Muscovy Treaty of Periaslav signed fifty-three years earlier. Nevertheless, the UK also used homogenising policies through the English language and the Protestant religion to unify the UK into a single entity under a London-based parliament. In addition, ‘Tudor policy was to make the aristocracy reliable by anglicizing it’.44

The Scots, like the Ukrainians, helped in the building of the British and Russian/Soviet empires as the ‘younger brothers’ of the English and Russians respectively. Both the Scots and Ukrainians excelled in military prowess and figured prominently in the armed forces of Great Britain and the former USSR (particularly as sergeants). The rejection by either Scots or Ukrainians (as happened in December 1991 in the latter case) of union with their English and Russian counterparts might spell/spelt doom for the UK and the former USSR respectively. In both cases it would be tantamount to a revision of the 1654 Russian-Ukrainian and the 1707 English-Scottish treaties.45

In south-west Scotland, southern Wales, Ulster and eastern Ukraine socio-economic and nationality policies helped to cement these territories within the sphere of influences of the former imperial metropolis. In all of these four areas industrialisation had gone hand in hand with denationalisation to such an extent that all these areas represent the staunchest pro-union regions of the UK and Ukraine. In Ukraine, Tsarist and Soviet policies of internal colonialism had left an important mark on the Ukrainian SSR, where ethnic Ukrainians were side-lined in favour of Russians in the republic’s top positions, many of which remain (unlike in the non-Slavic regions of the former USSR) in Russian hands, itself a source of domestic disgruntlement. On the eve of Ukrainian independence the Ukrainian ethnic group was only ahead of Russians within its republic in two occupational fields—forestry and agriculture (see Table 1.3). Only after independence did ethnic Ukrainians with higher education feel more confident about entering the republics elites.46
Post-independence leaders

After Ireland’s independence its politicians devoted more time to cutting all links with England rather than to economic prosperity and social reforms. This resembled Ukraine and many former colonies who initially sought to place some distance between themselves and their former rulers. These policies were initially denounced as ‘isolationist’ by Kuchma. Eventually a degree of balance and equilibrium was obtained between the desire to be free of the former imperial metropolis and the need for economic pragmatism and normal inter-state relations.

Post-Soviet Ukraine also resembles the Republic of South Africa. Its first black President, Mandela, has to undertake a similar balancing act to former President Kravchuk, in two countries where identities are mixed and in transition. In both Ukraine and South Africa the President lacked strong executive powers, privatisation was slow and policies were adrift because Kravchuk and Mandela both attempted to please too many constituencies. As centrists, both leaders preached national reconciliation over and above offending any interest group, thereby leading to paralysis and lack of action. National unity and stability came ahead of economic reform for both Kravchuk and Mandela. This, in turn, led to low foreign investment and high doses of criticism by Western governments and international financial institutions.

Conclusions

Prior to the twentieth century the Ukrainian ethnos, as defined by the scholars of nationalism quoted earlier in this chapter, did exist
throughout the majority of what is today recognised as Ukraine. But, a consequence of more liberal (Austrian) and repressive (Hungarian, Tsarist and Soviet) nationality policies in different regions of Ukraine bequeathed it both a modern nation and ethnos. The rusyny (Ruthenians) of western and the Little Russians of eastern Ukraine were encouraged to believe of themselves as part of the greater rus'kiy narod rather than a Ukrainian nation within a state independent of Russia. In western Ukraine this view had largely been defeated by 1914 and rusyny had evolved into Ukrainians.

The task of Ukraine’s leaders is therefore to carry through this state and nation building, particularly in regions of the country where the transition from ethnos to nation was never permitted. The new Ukrainian nation, as defined in political terms, does not have to include a ‘state Church’ or 100 per cent linguistic homogeneity to ensure its acceptance as a ‘modern nation’. There was never any doubt that the Ukrainian political nation would be composed of both civic and ethnic elements. The question was always one of whether the ethnic component of its political nation would be based upon Ukrainian or Ukrainian-Russian cultural and linguistic criteria. As argued throughout this book, and witnessed by the June 1996 constitution, the Ukrainian political nation will be based upon Ukrainians as the titular, core ethnic group.

The independent Ukrainian state inherited many of the same legacies of colonialism found earlier within other countries, such as in Austria and Eire. Austria/Germany and Ukraine/Russia share similar historic parallels regarding the shaping of their national identities. English policies within Ireland, Scotland and Wales, French policies within France, as well as British and French policies within their former empires, resemble those undertaken by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes within Ukraine. The use of language, historiography, religion, economic and social policies all left legacies which still bedevil Ukraine, Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
This chapter surveys the transition from the elites of the Soviet Ukrainian regime to that of independent Ukraine. It argues that it was inevitable that the new elites would be composed both of elements of the ancien régime (economic, political and cultural) and those of the political opposition. The situation in Ukraine was little different to world experience in Europe, North and South America and post-colonial Africa. This chapter therefore places the growth of Ukraine’s new elites within historical and current context and traces their origins and evolution since independence. It then ends with an evaluation of Leonid Kravchuk’s record as Ukraine’s first elected president.

Elites and states

Unlike the situation in 1917, Ukraine did inherit some elites and counter elites from the Soviet regime (see chapter 1), the bulk of which would probably come from former communist apparatchiks who retained an esprit de corps.¹ The scale of the problem facing Ukraine in the formation of a new elite could be seen by the fact that it was allegedly the largest country in the world without political elites (this assumed that Russia had inherited better established elites from the former USSR).² Vydrin and Tabachnyk believed that the formation of Ukraine’s new elite would be undertaken in four stages:³

- 1990–1991: nomenklatura (a ‘formal elite’);
- 1992: politicians who explained what had happened (a ‘pre-elite’);
- 1993–1994: politicians who performed the role of guides (a ‘corporate elite’);
- ?: integral politicians (an ‘elite’).
The transition from the Soviet era to that of an established, modern Ukrainian independent state resembled that which had occurred elsewhere in Europe and contained the following five attributes. First, the transition period was one of sharing power between Old and New Ukrainians. In the early phases of the Western democracies elements of the ancien régime (kings, aristocrats, peasants and artisans) shared power with elements of the new order (industrialists, an urban working class and a new national bourgeoisie). ‘Similarly, in the post-communist world, former party apparatchiks, atavistic heavy industrialists, and downwardly mobile military officers share the stage with populist demagogues, free-market entrepreneurs, disgruntled workers, and newly mobilised ethnic groups’, Mansfield and Snyder point out. This elite crossbreed would remain in place during the transition period with elements of the ancien régime gradually being eclipsed. The creation of elites did not occur over night. At different periods in history this had taken between seventy-five and 300 years in other countries.

Second, the defection of the ancien régime in Ukraine was similar to that which occurred in former colonial countries. In Africa, ‘when the colonial rulers had run out of indigenous collaborators they either chose to leave or were compelled to go. Their nationalist opponents…sooner or later succeeded in detaching the indigenous political elements from the colonial regime until they eventually formed a united front of collaboration against it’. In all former colonies the new ruling elites were therefore composed of elements of the defecting ancien régime and those who had championed change. Ukraine was therefore no exception here. The difference between the former USSR and Africa remained in the degree to which the former was better prepared for independence.

Third, discontent was directed by the national elites, Hugh-Seton Watson reminds us, into nationalist movements rather than towards economic change. The order of first priority was nation-state building—not political and economic reform (as seen in both Ukraine and South Africa under former President Kravchuk and President Nelson Mandela respectively). It is highly doubtful (see below) if Ukraine could have embarked upon political-economic reform in 1992 after five reformist presidential candidates had lost the elections to a former national communist, Kravchuk. Kravchuk’s priorities, like Nelson Mandela’s in South Africa, were to appease those who had voted for him and ensure that the ancien régime remained neutral or, at the very least, not hostile, while promoting unity and stability through centrist nation and state building policies.
Kuchma could afford the luxury of reform because by the time he had come to power the *ancien régime* had evolved in favour of it. His reforms therefore built upon Kravchuk’s state-building policies. It was only due to this gradual evolution that the ‘Red Director’ lobby inched grudgingly towards support for the market economy, something that could be seen in both the personal evolutions of Kravchuk and Kuchma. During the Kravchuk era they both fumbled in the dark for a mythical ‘Ukrainian Third Way’, with, at one point, Prime Minister Kuchma asking parliament for advice on what he should do. Only by 1994–1995, after the severe economic crisis of 1993 and the elections of 1994, were these ‘Red Directors’ ready to be painted a lighter shade. As their domestic capital accumulated they also became largely patriots of the Ukrainian state. Ukraine was therefore hardly ready for reform in 1992, and any attempt at steamrolling it through may have been detrimental to the viability of the Ukrainian state, a factor recognised by Kravchuk. Nevertheless, this did not give grounds for Kravchuk to sit on his laurels and either ignore the economy or, worse still, together with then Prime Minister Kuchma, adopt populist monetary policies.

This evolution of the ‘Red Director’ lobby could be readily seen by 1995–1996, by which time it had given its support to a ‘state directed transition to a social-market economy’. The political party of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (SPPU), the Party of Labour, had moved away from its previous flirtation with the radical left and joined the *Mist* (Bridge) alliance with the Democratic and Social Democratic Parties. Addressing the May 1997 congress of the SPPU Kuchma thanked them for ‘actively supporting the economic reform and deep market transformation’. He pointed out that those people formerly depicted as ‘Red Directors’ were no longer criticised for lobbying the interests of conservative forces. The SPPU had become convinced, Kuchma argued, ‘by its own experience that the only possible course for economic survival is not by blocking reform but by an accelerated and all-around adaptation of every enterprise to market conditions’.

Fourth, in the drive to independence of many countries there is a natural convergence of economic and cultural nationalists. Nationalism creates a monopolistic barrier to competition from outside, defending the domestic market for consumers of culture and accumulated capital. Both the cultural and the economic elites therefore come to support, perhaps at different times (the former in the late 1980s and the latter by the mid-1990s), the link between their prosperity as an elite to the continued vitality of the
independent state which defended them against Russian culture and capital. Brubaker believes that we should pay particular attention to these elites, which were the main source of the institutional and republican struggles (not nations) in the former USSR. Kuchma’s reforms had laid great stress upon building up Ukraine’s domestic capital reserves for two reasons. On the one hand Kuchma wanted to make Ukraine a stronger state, able to demand greater attention and equality in international and inter-state relations. He also understood that by allowing the accumulation of domestic capital, which in the peculiar conditions of the post-Soviet transition could not be undertaken in complete honesty, he would build a domestic constituency in favour of reform that would have a stake in the continued independence of Ukraine. Kuchma understood the close relationship between a strong economy and a strong state (unlike Kravchuk).

Finally, the failure to establish an independent state on previous occasions, most noticeably during 1917–1921, has usually been blamed upon the lack of an elite (or internal unity). The Ukrainian elites had been either Polonised or Russified by the nineteenth century. Of the 1,300 names listed in *Ukraine’s Who’s Who* in 1995 only thirty-two were of aristocratic origins (2.46 per cent). In 1993 at a gathering to found a civic group uniting Ukrainians with aristocratic ancestry only two of the eighty-six present could trace their family lineage to the Cossack *Starshyna*. Among Ukraine’s 1,743 writers only 2.29 per cent had aristocratic surnames while among the 1,644 members of the intelligentsia this was even worse, accounting for only thirty-one (1.89 per cent). These figures reflected the degree to which Ukraine’s elites had been either assimilated or annihilated by Polish, Tsarist Russian and Soviet rule. Ukraine therefore had to devote greater energy and scarce resources than Russia to creating a new ruling elite.

Is it therefore hardly surprising that many of Ukraine’s cultural elites and democratic counter elites, realising that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to achieve independence single handedly and thereby fail again, were willing to sign a pact with the national communists if this at least ensured success on this occasion for the independence struggle? Volodymyr Filenko, then the leader of the New Ukraine bloc, remained in constructive opposition to Kravchuk. But he had to admit that, ‘There was a time when we had to leave power in the hands of Communist Party apparatchiks for the sake of attaining the great goal—establishment of independent Ukraine’. If one adds to this the widespread fear that
Ukraine would go the way of Belarus in the extent of its denationalisation if the drive to attain independence again failed, then we can perhaps appreciate the degree to which the personal background of the Party of Power was of secondary importance to many people.

Elites in the former USSR

Some of the Western studies of the former USSR have singled out Ukraine as the country still dominated by former communist, turned nationalist, corrupt apparatchiks. In reality, Ukraine is typical of the overwhelming majority of former Soviet states—not the exception. This is clearly seen by the fact that of the fifteen former Soviet republics only Estonia, Latvia and Armenia possessed leaders in 1997 who had not originated in the former communist nomenklatura. Of these three states only Armenia was led by a former dissident.16

During the late Gorbachev era the ruling elites in the Soviet republics experienced both a greater differentiation, itself a product of growing pluralism in the Brezhnev era, and a shift of power to economic elites who lacked public accountability. The late 1980s and early 1990s were also a period of disintegration during which the new institutions of statehood (for example, customs and a tax inspectorate) had still not been created, thereby allowing great fortunes to be made from illegal exports and other semi-legal economic activities. Meanwhile regional loyalties remained pronounced within republican elites that were still fractured and divided.

Throughout the former USSR counter elites had been largely unsuccessful in coming to power, except for short periods of time. These ‘apprentice politicians’, as Hroch describes them, have since largely joined forces with veteran bureaucrats and emergent entrepreneurs to create the future elites of these new states.17 Where counter elites came to power, as in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Lithuania, they usually only served to worsen their inter-ethnic relations and domestic stability. Faced with the May 1992 declaration of Crimean independence, would a nationalist president of Ukraine have acted in the moderate manner in which Kravchuk responded or in the heavy handed fashion used by former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Abkhazia?9

In Latin America historical experience showed that no stable democracy was created where a mass movement came to power.
The reasons for this were the need to assure the *ancien régime* that their vital interests would not be threatened so that they, in turn, would not serve to subvert the new order. In Latin America and South Africa those involved in human rights abuses had therefore been largely amnestied in exchange for not opposing the transition to democracy. This is why, Bova believes, ‘democratisation requires some institutional compromises, often taking the form of explicitly negotiating pacts’. This had also occurred during earlier periods of history in the USA and Western Europe. This transition, with the consent of the *ancien régime*, was usually most successful where it had occurred in an evolutionary manner. 

This compromise between the *ancien régime* and the new regime occurred throughout the former USSR, as well as in Russia. Seventy five and 61 per cent of Russia’s new political and economic elites respectively originated in the former *nomenklatura*. Of New Russians, 38 per cent were former members of the Komsomol while another 38 per cent were former members of the economic *nomenklatura*. Compared to Ukraine, where only 40 per cent of its elites originated in the *nomenklatura*, in Russia this was much higher (75 per cent). In the Russian government 74.3 and as high as 82.3 per cent of the government and regional elites respectively traced their origins to the former Soviet *nomenklatura*. The former Soviet elites in Russia, whose social origins were practically identical to those of New Russians, are well placed to direct economic reforms in a manner which suits their corporate and clan interests.

The transition from Soviet to elites of the newly independent states of the former USSR were largely identical to those which occurred elsewhere in earlier periods of history. Although much of Western literature on the subject has focused upon Ukraine’s national communists and Party of Power all of the elements which existed and are taking place in Ukraine in varying degrees occurred, and still are occurring, in the other former Soviet states.

**Elites in Ukraine**

*Imperial to national communists*

Where there was greatest popular mobilisation (in the case of the former USSR this was in the Baltic republics and the Trans-Caucasus) the greatest detachment of the elites from the Soviet centre occurred. Belarus and Central Asia had no tradition of dissident counter elites (former political prisoners played a crucial
role in the early Gorbachev years in organising counter elites and mobilising the population, which was lacking in Belarus and Central Asia). Belarus and Central Asia also lacked mass mobilisation and the native elites were not detached from the centre, remaining largely pro-Russian. Ukraine lay between these two extremes (the Baltic republics/Trans-Caucasus, on the one hand, and Belarus/ Central Asia, on the other,) of elite detachment. It therefore attempted to balance between the Baltic (and initially Trans-Caucasian) policy of opting for total independence from Russia, while still maintaining one foot in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in an observer capacity. For this reason Kravchuk and the ‘sovereign communists’ supported confederation (not full independence) until the August 1991 coup d’état and then initiated the creation of the CIS four months later.

Ukrainian independence was therefore, by definition, forced to become the work of two elite groups in an, at times, uneasy alliance (national communists and national democrats). The initial stages in the early Gorbachev era involved a revolt from below led by the cultural intelligentsia and the dissidents of the pre-Gorbachev era. But this was insufficient to achieve power and independence in Ukraine. Nationalist action covering the entire republic proved to be impossible, was late in appearance and never encompassed a majority of the population (unlike in the Baltic republics and the Trans-Caucasus). All opinion polls conducted in the 1990s, together with the December 1991 presidential elections, consistently showed that nationalist and democratic groups commanded only a maximum of one-third of the electorate in Ukraine.

In addition, only nationalism could provide an alternative set of myths and symbols to succeed the now discredited Soviet and Marxist-Leninist legacy and hold together an atomised society. The absence of proletarian internationalism as a guiding ideology could be only filled by national values, cultural and linguistic demands, long repressed and neglected. Many within the political and cultural elites shared common values; after all, the counter (dissident) elites had grown out of the cultural elites prior to the 1960s. Soviet Ukrainian dissidents had always held close ties to national communists and had not attacked Marxism-Leninism or had not rejected the socio-economic achievements of the Soviet era. Calling for Ukraine’s independence had been largely taboo, except on the part of radical right nationalist groups, such as the National Front. Mainstream Soviet Ukrainian dissidents had therefore clamoured for the transformation of the USSR into a confederation of equal,
sovereign states.\textsuperscript{25} This had been supported by Rukh until its September 1989 congress, when it adopted a pro-independence platform, and by the national communists until August 1991. It had its ideological, programmatical and historical precedents in the programme of Ukrainian national communists in the 1920s.

In the late 1980s Kravchuk, then head of the Ideology Department of the central committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), was already showing his true colours. During this period (1989–1991) many people in Ukraine, including within the KPU, ‘rediscovered’ their national identity and national pride. (Prior to 1989 many Ukrainians had been afraid to show their patriotism in public because of its repeated denunciation in the Brezhnev era as ‘bourgeois nationalist’.) Mikhailchenko, Kravchuk’s former adviser on domestic issues, recalled: ‘I am absolutely convinced that Kravchuk became a Ukrainian patriot between 1989–1991.’\textsuperscript{26} Until 1988 Kravchuk had been a communist, ‘and if this had not taken place would have remained a normal nomenklaturnik until his pension’.\textsuperscript{27} At the September 1989 Rukh congress a blue and yellow national flag badge was pinned to his jacket. Instead of removing this he took off his jacket and placed it over his chair. Kravchuk helped Rukh to print the uncensored version of its programme in a 100,000 print run.\textsuperscript{28} At a meeting held to denounce the Ukrainian Language Society Kravchuk deflected KPU leader Volodymyr Shcherbyt’skyi’s criticism by pointing out that such bodies had been allowed to function in Moscow. Unwilling to challenge Moscow’s lead, Shcherbyt’skyi replied, ‘If that is the case, do whatever you want’.\textsuperscript{29}

In Ukraine, where 40 per cent of the population was Russian-speaking, nationalism inevitably would be moderate and inclusive. The influence of Kravchuk and his defecting national communists, who promoted centrist and compromise policies, also played an important role in moderating the programmes and demands of national democrats who, in comparison to their opposite numbers in the Trans-Caucasus and the Baltics, were already relatively moderate.\textsuperscript{30} Nationalism, of the liberal or radical kind, is tailor-made for regional elites to legitimise their own aspirations to sovereignty at a time of the disintegration of an empire. As Smith argues, in eras of rapid change ‘people have an overriding need to feel that they belong to a community, hierarchy or belief system’. The ruling elites foster a sense of continuity by inculcating new values and a new guiding ideology.\textsuperscript{31} They also require a new ideology and set of myths to justify their continued rule under different national symbols.
Kravchuk argued that it would have been highly unusual for a political party with 18 million members to ‘think, speak and act in the same way’. Especially when ‘communists have begun to think about sovereignty’. By 1989–1991 Kravchuk admitted that the KPU was highly divided. There was no longer ‘that unity which existed before or which looked like unity. Today in the party there are left, right and centre wings.’ This political heterogeneous feature of former KPU members/turned Party of Power has remained. In both Russia and Ukraine the Party of Power did not resemble one monolithic group with similar views. The Party of Power included a very diverse group with political views ranging throughout the political spectrum (except in Ukraine within either the extreme left or right). In Ukraine this was reflected in the July 1994 presidential election which was, in effect, a battle between different wings of Ukraine’s Party of Power.

The bulk of the KPU transferred their loyalties to national communism during the 1989–1991 period; many of them later joined the Party of Power. Of the 3.5 million KPU members in 1985 only a million had formally left by the August 1991 putsch. After the failure of the putsch the KPU was banned and its assets nationalised for the benefit of the independent state. When a new KPU was registered in October 1993 only 120,000 members joined it. To argue, as does Wilson, that Ukraine was very different to other former Soviet republics, where all the republican Communist Parties defected to the nationalist cause, is misleading. In Latvia and Estonia the non-titular populations were disenfranchised and therefore Russian-speakers, who may have been expected to support ‘imperial communists’, were left with no voice. In Ukraine less than 4 per cent of the pre-1985 KPU membership rejoined the post-October 1993 new KPU (or less than 5 per cent if we take the August 1991 KPU membership). To therefore argue, as does Pyotr Symonenko, leader of the post-1993 KPU, that, ‘Those who have disowned communist ideals are traitors and chameleons. They were never real communists’, is to denounce the 95 per cent of the pre-1991 KPU who never bothered to rejoin his KPU. This also reflected the extent to which large numbers of pre-1991 KPU members only joined the Communist Party for socio-economic motives. Symonenko may also not be happy with the fact that derzhavnyk tendencies are growing even within the ranks of the moderate left and to a lesser extent within the KPU.

The national communists and the national democrats/cultural elites held similar views on a variety of issues. They all believed in
a strong derzhava which should take upon itself the tasks of national-
spiritual revival, the raising of national consciousness and nation
building. The drive for unity in society called for collective to be
higher than individual rights and interests. They all agreed that
Russia was Ukraine’s main (and mortal) enemy, from whom
Ukraine should distance herself as much as possible. ‘Europe’, to
which Ukraine was proclaimed as wishing to return, ended on the
Russian-Ukrainian border. Politics came before economics where,
‘The neocommunists are experienced enough to resist change; the
democrats are too inexperienced to bring it about.’ There was also
a need for a new ideological legitimisation for the independent state
(which Kravchuk, in his former role within the KPU, was ideally
suited to play).39

National communists to Party of Power

Discussions of Ukraine’s Party of Power are usually confined to the
Kravchuk era. But, the second round of the 1994 presidential
elections were, in effect, a battle between two wings of the same
Party of Power. When Kuchma criticised Kravchuk and the Party
of Power Kravchuk replied that, ‘Kuchma still now belongs to the
“party of power”, because he heads the Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs. Kuchma had also been a member of the central
committee of the KPU and secretary of his local KPU branch, as
well as director of the huge Pivdenmash plant, itself “a state within a
state”.’

Stagnation, political and economic conservatism, mutual
protection of the old boy network and clannish ties were the
hallmark of the national communists who became the new ruling
class through the Party of Power (Partia Vlada). They lacked any
ideology, were pragmatic and represented the inner, higher levels of
the former KPU who controlled the state apparatus, media and
economy and had a majority of deputies within parliament. Their
most striking characteristic was their amorphousness and lack of
any programme, except to be accepted as true ‘Europeans’ and
‘democrats’, being all things to all men/women but with constantly
shifting views, depending on the prevailing mood and balance of
forces. The Party of Power did not constitute itself as a political
party or faction in the Kravchuk era; during the 1994 parliamentary
elections they largely stood as ‘independents’. In the 1998
parliamentary elections the Party of Power is represented by the
People’s Democratic Party (NDPU) and New Ukraine.
By agreeing to ban the KPU in August 1991 its inner core knew that they would nevertheless continue to dominate the commanding heights of the independent Ukrainian state. By 1991 there was no longer any need for the discredited KPU to camouflage their intentions. Their national democratic allies proved to be useful in legitimising their new role as derzhavnyky and to aid them in their struggle against ‘imperial communists’. Any economic change in the Kravchuk era would only be allowed if it did not threaten their dominance of the state and their ability to use it as a vehicle to accumulate personal wealth.43

It was probably inevitable in Ukraine’s case that events proceeded as they did. Nevertheless, three factors had negative consequences upon Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition. First, the Party of Power exhibited authoritarian tendencies and was little interested in political reform or the creation of a civil society which might only serve to subsequently challenge it. Consequently, is it really a coincidence that Ukraine was the last of the former Soviet republics to adopt a constitution in 1996? Second, the Party of Power preferred rentier capitalism where they could earn large revenues, rather than the establishment of a market economy. Again, is it coincidental that Ukraine’s economic reform and stabilisation were delayed until 1994, or that it has one of the worst records of corruption in the former USSR? Third, the Party of Power, ‘adjusts its slogans and ideology to the requirements of the moment, becoming a kind of mirror of social attitudes, their populist mediator and mouthpiece’.44 Is it therefore a coincidence that the Kravchuk era lacked direction and vision?

Was alliance with the national communists wrong for the national democrats to contemplate? Indeed, should we even ask such a question? After all, the national democrats were never really given a share of power.45 Nevertheless, this question divided Rukh into romantic and pragmatic wings, leading to the creation of the pro-Kravchuk, pragmatic Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS). Levko Lukianenko, Ukraine’s longest serving former political prisoner and a former leading member of the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), who went to Canada as Ukraine’s Ambassador in 1992, believed that his fellow colleagues were wrong to wholeheartedly back Kravchuk.46 Kravchuk’s overtures to Rukh in early 1992 that it was capable ‘of leading all progressive forces and parties in Ukraine today’ was rebuffed.47 Rukh’s rebuff to the Party of Power was backed by the New Ukraine bloc (of which Volodymyr Hry’nniov was then a leading member, going on to
become Kuchma’s ally in the 1994 elections as joint leader of the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms). Kravchuk and New Ukraine therefore remained in ‘constructive opposition’ to the Kravchukite Party of Power and its KNDS allies.

Kravchuk’s continued support for the ancien régime at government level and elsewhere was a serious obstacle to agreement to cooperate with him on the part of Rukh and New Ukraine. As Filenko, the then head of New Ukraine, pointed out, the old guard still held power at all levels. The next goal of democratic forces, Filenko and Viacheslav Chornovil believed, should be to build not only an independent state (which was completed by 1996)—but a democratic Ukraine; in other words, to complete Ukraine’s ‘unfinished revolution’. This though, was largely left to Kuchma to tackle after 1994. In this endeavour New Ukraine became Kuchma’s main ally and was, in turn, dubbed the Party of Power.

The pragmatists within the national democratic camp were more pessimistic at their ability to succeed in nation-state building without the support of the former national communists/Party of Power. Iuriy Badzio, also a former dissident and the ideologue of the Democratic Party, the URP’s ally in the KNDS, argued in favour of the alliance with the Party of Power. He defined the Party of Power as all those who had left the KPU and now supported Ukrainian independence. In realpolitik terms Badzio therefore stated that:

At the beginning of the 1990s of the twentieth century the Ukrainian state could only come into being as a state of the ‘partocracy’ and ‘communist nomenklatura’. This will remain so until a new social class is formed in society—a class of free entrepreneurs, a wide section of privileged property holders into which, of course, will be included the ‘nomenklatura’.

This situation was not ideal, Badzio admitted, but basically Ukraine had no choice if it wanted to build an independent state despite the fact that it would have a new ruling elite which would be primarily composed of former members of the Soviet Ukrainian SSR nomenklatura. After all, as argued earlier, most former African colonies incorporated their indigenous colonial elites into the ruling strata of the newly independent states. Badzio would have been better served to point to the other former Soviet states, the majority of whom also had Parties of Power of similar origins.

Nevertheless, Badzio ignored the motives behind the nomenklatura’s decision to back Ukrainian independence. Some of
them were undoubtedly patriotic in their objectives, but many others had other more corrupt, clannish intentions. This, in many ways, was an objective process. With the accumulation of domestic capital the patriotism of these members of the Party of Power was likely to grow if only to defend their interests, which could only be undertaken within the confines of an independent state. The economic elites within Ukraine’s Party of Power therefore never supported Ukraine’s unification with Russia because in the case of such an eventuality they would no longer be in charge. Upon coming to power Kuchma, who largely represented these economic and industrial elites, said in an interview in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta (28 October 1994) that he would never accept the status of a ‘vassal’.

If we take Ukraine’s transition and nation-state building policies not as a static event, but as a process, we can only then perhaps appreciate the manner in which change is occurring. Current criticism of New Ukrainians as devoid of patriotism is therefore somewhat misplaced. ‘The new Ukrainian is just being born’ Borys Soloviev, leader of the Kyiv branch of New Ukraine and Chairman of the First Ukrainian Investment Bank, pointed out. ‘The most important thing is to convince him that he should trust in God, Ukraine, and himself’, he added. During the transition phase these New Ukrainians would co-exist with Old Ukrainians—the political constituency of the left—because the latter were easily attracted by ‘cheap authorities or dubious values’ and ‘longed for the return of old times’. Old Ukrainians, in contrast to the New, became accustomed to the state providing them with everything (rather than relying on themselves as individuals) and that everything should be divided equally. Old Ukrainians were a ‘deceived generation. It is difficult for them to admit that seventy years had passed almost in vain.

Sources of Ukraine’s Party of Power

The bulk of Ukraine’s ruling elites therefore came from the former Ukrainian SSR nomenklatura. Yevgeniy Kushnariov, head of the presidential Administration, snapped back when rebuked about his nomenklatura past: ‘That’s where we all come from!’. Indeed, he was correct: ‘Practically everyone in state positions today is a descendent of the management elite formed at the end of the 1980s. Ukraine is in effect run by a small elite of approximately 1,500 people who, Badzio correctly predicted, are gradually evolving
towards derzhavnyk positions. These 1,500 or so members of Ukraine’s top elites trace their origins to the central committee of the KPU. The state apparatus of independent Ukraine is nearly identical to that of the Ukrainian SSR. This Party of Power has four groupings (Kuchma, Kravchuk, Pavlo Lazarenko and Oleksandr Moroz) who, ‘In terms of the breadth of their authority, knowledge and ability to influence on a wide basis nobody can compare.’

The democratic elections of 1994 proved to be a convenient jumping-off point for many deputies of the 1990–1994 Rada. The two-thirds who were not re-elected or did not bother to stand again largely remained within the ruling elites of the new state. Here the growing institutions of the state (the diplomatic corps, the Cabinet of Ministers, Presidential Administration, etc.) soaked up many of these former members of parliament. This new generation of political elites in Ukrainian society has contributed to the ‘formation of statehood consciousness’. In this respect Kravchuk was right when he always argued against the ‘romantics’ in Rukh that one should not reject all of the 3.5 million former members of the KPU, the majority of whom had ‘found for themselves a place and were working for Ukraine’.

**Party of Power to party politics**

In Donets’k in November 1992 the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (SPPU) established the Labour Party of Ukraine (which was originally labelled as the ‘Party of Red Directors’ by national democrats). The Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR), created to fight the 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections, united the political parties in New Ukraine with the businessmen in the SPPU and was led by Hryn’iov and Kuchma (chairman of the SPPU between 1993–1994). In the Crimea the Party for the Economic Revival of the Crimea (PEVK) was also launched in 1992.

All of these political parties in eastern-southern Ukraine were launched by former high-ranking members of the KPU and represented competing interests within the Party of Power. The creation of these parties represented an attempt to defend their economic, political and local interests. In the Crimea the PEVK was backed by the former Chairman of the autonomous republic’s Supreme Council, Nikolai Bagrov, a key ally of Kyiv and Kravchuk. In western-central Ukraine the Party of Power did not create its
own local political structures because it was backed by the ‘statehood firsters’ and pro-Kravchuk centre-right KNDS.\textsuperscript{59}

After Kuchma’s victory in the 1994 presidential elections New Ukraine became the main vehicle upon which Kuchma began to legitimise the Party of Power in Ukraine. New Ukraine, a centre-left/liberal bloc, had always been in favour of pragmatic, economic cooperation within the CIS, policies which Kuchma backed. Its main political party, the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDVU), had grown out of the Democratic Platform of the KPU. In 1996 the PDVU and the Labour Congress of Ukraine (TKU), created by former Komsomol members turned New Ukrainians, united to form the People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU). Ukraine had therefore gained its own structuralised Party of Power, similar to Our Home is Russia created in 1995 by the Russian executive.

The former liberal wing of the KPU and the Komsomol had therefore become successful in politically legitimising their economic gains. These had occurred through the transfer of KPU funds and insider contacts which had opened up opportunities for semi-legal deals in the late 1980s/first half of the 1990s which had formed the basis for Ukraine’s emerging market economy. Spectacularly, within less than a decade former Komsomolites had become New Ukrainians and the Party of Power. Therefore, it was not perhaps surprising that 73 per cent of Ukrainians believed that the same people were essentially in charge as those who were running Ukraine before 1991.\textsuperscript{60} Only 14 per cent believed these were new faces. The past monopoly of political power enjoyed by these former communists ‘has been turned into economic power and now back into political power’, as Anne Applebaum convincingly argued.\textsuperscript{61}

In December 1996 long-time close ally, but publicly unpopular, Dmytro Tabachnyk was removed from the post of head of the Presidential Administration and replaced by Kharkiv Mayor Kushnariov. The promotion of Kushnariov signalled that Kuchma had, together with Tabachnyk, ditched his 1994 allies in the MRBR which he had helped to establish. The MRBR would not have won Kuchma the forthcoming 1999 presidential elections. It had not succeeded in expanding into a popular political party, it was regionally based, it had an unpopular leader (presidential adviser Hryn’iov) and was perceived as too ‘pro-Russian’ and pro-Eurasian.

On 21 February 1997 this pre-election coalition building went one step further when a presidential decree established a Political Council attached to the presidency. The decree declared that the Council aimed to take the views of Ukraine’s political forces into
account when state policy was being decided, something similar to Kravchuk’s Presidential Council created in 1992. Oleksandr Iemets, who was also a member of the Kravchuk Presidential Council and is a leading member of the NDPU and New Ukraine, was appointed secretary of the Kuchma Council. Despite the provisions within the presidential decree the Council only invited centrist, pro-reformist political parties to join it. These included political parties ranging from the centre-left to the liberals. Rukh was invited to join as well but snubbed this presidential offer of open collaboration with President Kuchma. The Council therefore brought together social, liberal and some national democrats—three ideological tendencies that secretary to the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council, Volodymyr Horbulin, believed were all simultaneously evident in Kuchma’s policies.

It had always been incorrect to label various political parties, such as the Labour Party, as ‘Red Director’ and as being allied to the radical left. The director’s lobby never remained a monolithic group. It included many reformers as well as those who continued to demand state credits, depending on the profitability of the enterprise and their suitability for privatisation. Directors were also divided into pro-Western and pro-CIS lobbies, depending on their export markets. Anatoliy Kinakh, chairman of the SPPU and a member of the NDPU, described Russia as both Ukraine’s ‘strategic partner’ and ‘strategic competitor’.62

Ukraine’s ‘sly fox’

Kravchuk: an evaluation of his record

Any evaluation of Ukraine’s first elected president, Leonid Kravchuk, should not succumb to either fulsome praise or complete negativity. His motives and record deserve to be treated with a greater degree of balance and in-depth analysis. As Kravchuk put it in answer to his critics during the 1994 presidential elections: ‘Only he who does nothing can avoid making mistakes.’63

Kravchuk’s greatest contribution was probably towards the disintegration of the former USSR and the peaceful birth of independent Ukraine. As an ideologue he was ideally placed to act as an explainer to a largely confused population of the momentous events which had happened in their lives.64 Zenon Pozdniak, leader of the Belarusan Popular Front, believed that Belarus had been
unsuccessful in consolidating independence because of the lack of a Kravchuk figure of its own.65

But, after criticising national democrats for their inability to shift gear from state ruination to state creation, Kravchuk proved incapable of this move himself. By 1993 he seemed to be in way over his head. In December of that year he accepted that: ‘I must admit that I could not imagine the scope of the situation to the full.’66 The Kyiv newspaper Nezavisimost (22 August 1993) offered $150 to any of its readers who could prove that Kravchuk even had a serious electoral programme. Kravchuk never showed signs of understanding where Ukraine was going. Kravchuk admitted that although he had never wanted things to get worse: ‘I have misunderstood things, not done things. Some things I was just unable to understand.’67

Perhaps then Kravchuk will be remembered by history precisely because he lost the 1994 presidential elections. History could not take away from him that he was the first elected (and second) president of Ukraine, Kuchma believed.68 If Kravchuk had been re-elected in July 1994 he might have undone his earlier achievements and thereby harmed his image. While praising him, Kuchma was therefore probably also correct in stating that the Kravchuk era had been one of ‘wasted opportunities, significant mistakes, unbalanced ideas and unfounded declarations’.69

**The ‘balance of forces’**

As president in December 1991 Kravchuk successfully projected himself as a ‘centrist’ who based himself ‘around the great idea—the building of a Ukrainian state’. He promoted a very cautious approach to politics, attempting to be all things to all men/women, arguing for consolidation—and not disunity. He stated his opposition to grand steps and in deciding his moves he claimed he ‘took into account the balance of political forces’. ‘Any desire becomes reality’, Kravchuk explained, ‘if it is supported by real forces. That is, if there are forces that resolutely support statehood in an oblast or in a rayon or in a town, then a presidential representative has someone to rely on.’70 This would then give one an idea of what were the real possibilities for policies.

This ‘balance of political forces’ represented both Ukraine’s inherited regional legacies from colonialism and the competition between various constituencies that Kravchuk believed he had to appease. These included the ancien régime (regional elites, local councils, the industrial and agricultural lobbies and former national
communists); the working classes (fearful of unemployment and angry over price rises); the democratic left (applying pressure for economic reform and democratisation); and the derzhavnyky in the KNDS (calling for a stronger state and internationally recognised borders, Ukrainianisation of education, the media and armed forces as well as non-involvement in the CIS). Kravchuk meanwhile, projected himself as the guarantor of coherence, reconciliation and stability among these different constituencies.

There were undoubtedly positive aspects to Kravchuk’s ‘go slow’ policies, which probably played a role in maintaining Ukraine as a calm republic devoid of inter-ethnic tension. Inheriting the Ukraine that he did, Kravchuk was not one to steamroll ahead change which he knew would be opposed in certain regions of Ukraine and by large sections of society and the former Soviet Ukrainian elites. At the same time, there were also major negative aspects to it. The most important negative aspect was, of course, the economy which former President Kravchuk seemed to possess little understanding of and which could have unravelled the very success he had achieved in obtaining independence peacefully.

Cadres decide everything

In addition, we should not ignore the fact that although the collapse of the Soviet regime set free regional elites it also confronted them with tasks that they were ill prepared to undertake. The new elites were just ‘learning politics’. Where were the new people to come from to staff the bureaucracy of the independent state? How could they be re-trained? ‘One can’t do anything about it: the old communist party nomenklatura system of preparing cadre reserves is today no longer any good—while a new one has not yet been created’, one writer commented. The former provincial elites in Ukraine required a radical overhaul, politically, ideologically and psychologically.

Kravchuk admitted that a shortage of qualified cadres and his poor record in choosing correct ones had badly affected his policies. All foreign trade, for example, had previously been undertaken through Moscow. A Ministry of Foreign Economic Trade for the independent state to begin earning hard currency, a new tax collection system and a Defence Ministry had to be established. This is probably why the Cabinet of Ministers, which had been led by no less than six Prime Ministers since independence, lacked cohesion, direction and purpose:
the Cabinet of Ministers has been reminiscent of a ship’s crew, each member of which is ready to sail in only one known direction, and the captain does not know whose opinion to take. So the ship jerks around in all directions, losing crew members, damaging its mechanisms, and, it seems, sinking a little bit.

The bureaucrats inherited by Ukraine had a dependency mentality. They usually showed little initiative: ‘They can do good, or bad, but can also do nothing at all’, Kravchuk complained. This passivity proved to be a disaster during times of crisis. They were usually corrupt and with little formal higher education. Many members of the elites put their personal enrichment ahead of their loyalty to the state or the citizens they allegedly served. Ukraine’s lack of a civil society and public accountability only served to encourage leaders in office to rely on their nepotistic clans for support and favours. It was usually more preferable to put forward somebody from one’s own clan rather than an outsider with better qualifications. Few members of the elite wanted to take responsibility for holding power.

To reform this civil service and train a new elite of state bureaucrats would take a generation and represent more of a medium term objective. The new elites were only just finding their role within the Ukrainian state. In the meantime, the socio-economic crisis was having a negative effect on Ukraine’s existing elites. Five thousand scientists (physicists, chemists, biologists, mathematicians) had been lost to the National Academy of Sciences since 1992. The shortage of the right cadres to run an independent state undoubtedly played a role in the negative side of Kravchuk’s record. But he still remained too passive and lacked willpower and vision. After Kuchma came to power Viktor Nebozhenko, head of the Information-Analytical Service of the Presidential Administration, complained that this directorate had to be built from scratch after Kuchma came to power. One wonders how Kravchuk’s Presidential Administration could have effectively functioned without it for nearly three years.

Conclusions

Ukraine was never unique in the creation of a new ruling elite from an amalgam of the ancien régime and counter elites. This had occurred elsewhere in Europe, North America and in former
colonial Africa. It was also the norm throughout the former USSR. The incorporation of the ancien régime within the new Party of Power was therefore as prevalent in Russia as it was in Ukraine. Within Latin America and South Africa the new ruling elites were forced in the interests of a stable transition to undertake deals with the old guard, even with those who had committed crimes against humanity.

Co-operation between the political, cultural and economic elites of the ancien régime with the political opposition was inevitable. Even in former Soviet republics where the opposition had come to power either through presidential or parliamentary elections they had not remained in power for long. In Ukraine national consciousness was insufficiently high to elect a political oppositionist in December 1991 as president. Instead, Kravchuk, a former national communist, became the first elected President of an independent Ukraine. His legacy is still open to debate but it should not be painted either totally black or white. Like President Mandela in South Africa, Kravchuk’s main role was to oversee the difficult first years of transition from the old to the new regime. Economic and political reform played second fiddle to emphasis upon stability and consensus politics, nation and state building. Although these were all important, the consequences of an over-emphasis upon consensus politics could be seen in delayed reform, high corruption, the slow emergence of civil society and national identity. Kravchuk’s role as leader of the immediate transition period had been fulfilled by 1993. Ironically therefore, his failure to be re-elected in 1994 may have earned him a more secure place in history than if he had gone on to become President for a second term.
FORGING A POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Ukraine was not alone among the Soviet successor states in not inheriting a united political community. All Ukraine’s non-communist leaders, regardless of their political beliefs or regional origins, will now support policies designed to create just such a political community and civic nation out of the inherited quasi-state and quasi-nation. It is the purpose of this chapter to survey and comment upon the domestic debates surrounding the forging of this political community in Ukraine, as well as the role of education, new values, morals and the ideas which will underpin this new civic nation. This chapter links the forging of a new political community from the peoples of the Ukrainian SSR with that of the creation of a new Ukrainian civic nation. It argues that these two processes cannot be divorced; they therefore should be regarded as crucial factors in the consolidation of democracy and a market economy in Ukraine in the transition from totalitarianism and external domination.

An atomised and divided society

The search for unity

The Ukrainian independent state inherited a disunited polity, regional disparities and the need to build a coherent political nation to fit the state borders inherited from the former Ukrainian SSR. Integration, consolidation of the political space and the search for unity have therefore been central themes within post-Soviet Ukrainian state and nation building. As former President Leonid Kravchuk said: ‘the question of the consolidation of the people, unity of all of its forces is one of the decisive factors of our further independent development’. Kravchuk remained convinced that Ukraine could lose its statehood
on account of two reasons. First, it did not take into account its real possibilities which were determined by the domestic and external ‘balance of forces’. Second, Ukrainians failed to unite at the decisive time. Kuchma agreed with his predecessor: ‘Well, today the main aim of everybody should be to work for the unity of Ukraine.’ In a 1996 opinion poll the existence of a disunited society where people did not feel themselves to be Ukrainian citizens came out as one of the top three threats to Ukrainian independence, a view shared by 41.5 per cent of those polled.

The search for unity in post-Soviet Ukraine is not though a uniquely Ukrainian phenomenon. Smith believes that ‘nationalism is primarily a quest for unity, not for a rationality based on equal rights’. In other words, the fraternité of the French revolution is what peoples in the process of nation building search for. Consequently, it is not surprising that the search for consolidation and unity in post-Soviet Ukraine is closely bound up with its state and nation building programme. This search for unity was a feature of all nation building projects throughout Europe and North America. In addition, this desire for unity should not be equated with total homogenisation because not all states which are recognised as nations develop strong integrative bonds, yet they still continue to exist as internationally recognised states.
Ukraine inherited no modern and developed nation from the former USSR. This, in itself, required the Ukrainian elites to undertake nation (and state) building with a view to unifying Ukrainian territory through a united political culture. Kravchuk believed that ‘only part of our country has fully matured’, probably referring to western Ukraine which had been under Austrian-Hungarian rule prior to 1914.

As Connor has explained: ‘the prime cause of political disunity is the absence of a single psychological focus shared by all segments of the population. Admittedly, ethnic homogenisation is not in itself sufficient to guarantee such a consensus.’ This ‘imagined community’ consists of citizens who never meet or see each other, ‘yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. Without the creation of this unifying psychological identity, no matter how artificially organised, Weber believed it would be difficult to construct a commonly accepted nation. Once the citizens of a state look towards it for protection against domestic and foreign foes, as well as see benefits accruing to them from giving it their loyalty, then a unity upon which a political community can be built has been created.

What are the requirements for national and political unity which Ukraine lacked when it became an independent state and which it is seeking to develop? According to Smith, ‘In nationalist language “unity” signifies social cohesion, the brotherhood of all nationals in the nation’. Whereas Huntington believes that stable civic polities require the following four key characteristics:

- consensus;
- community;
- legitimacy;
- organisation.

What though is a ‘political community’ around which a common sense of consensus, nationhood and loyalty to statehood can develop? A political community, as defined by Deutsch, is one that encompasses a clearly defined, geographically delimited space (hence the importance of borders). It requires shared experiences, attitudes, values and perceptions which are different from those of other states. A unified political culture refers to perceptions of history, shared beliefs and values that are the focus of loyalty and identity by being common to the majority of the population.

Nisbet describes a political community as an ‘ideal system’ which includes many factors (some of which may be too closely tied to the
‘ideal’ political community formerly associated with the French nation-state):\textsuperscript{18}

- unity of authority and functions;
- one whole society with few diversities;
- ‘fraternity’ as the ‘bond of political brotherhood’ that rules out all other ‘brotherhoods’ based upon ‘interests, place, or belief’;
- particular interests should submit to the ‘General Will’;
- new structures, authority and belief systems should replace the ancien régime where the past should be removed;
- this is coupled with the weakening and elimination of earlier bonds and of the ‘attachment to the political state of new emotional loyalties and identification’;
- the state is absolutely identified with the political community and its new value system penetrates all of its citizens;
- centralisation and standardisation;
- diversity, localism and regionalism are usually perceived as elements of the past which should be replaced or placed below the list of loyalties to the political community.

Do Ukraine’s histories, cultures and ethnic mix preclude the creation of a future viable community which would then encapsulate the characteristics that Huntington, Deutsch and Nisbet believe are necessary? No, not necessarily.

Smith also points to the lack of a dominant ethnic base as a major problem slowing up the forging of national consciousness and cohesion.\textsuperscript{19} In Ukraine ethnic Ukrainians make up the dominant ethnic core of 72 per cent of the population, according to the 1989 Soviet census. This proportion is higher than that of core ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, Latvia and Estonia (and only around 10 per cent lower than that found in Russia). But, the Ukrainian case is slightly different in that Ukrainians are not themselves united, but divided by history, region, language and political culture. In the former USSR eastern and western Ukrainians were deliberately played off against each other. Social solidarity and unity is therefore deficient. Former President Kravchuk complained that ‘we have no narod, no nation’, because after the 1654 Treaty of Periaslav with Muscovy Ukraine had lost the love for its land, language and culture while forgetting its own history.\textsuperscript{20}

Integration into a modern political nation and state in Ukraine will be synonymous with the development of a shared set of values,
culture and history. Within Ukraine there is a basis for the development of a political community based upon these shared values. In Ukraine (outside of the Crimea, a region which should be always treated separately) there is a consensus on both maintaining the country’s territorial integrity as well as providing inclusive citizenship. In other words, there is widespread public support as to who rightly belongs within the Ukraine community; whilst there are elements of a shared fate and there is only minority backing for the disenfranchisement of some ethnic groups. Ukrainians also differ from Russians over their attitudes to their country’s territorial integrity and conflict within the former USSR; they are less xenophobic of the outside world and towards international assistance. The domestic debates on foreign policy orientations and strategies within Russia and Ukraine also reflect diverging trends and alliances between both emerging political communities.

**Disunited polity**

A Ukrainian author pointed to seven divisions within Ukraine which were preventing the unity to which he, like Ukrainian leaders, would like the country to aspire:  

- political: left and right-wings;
- regional: west and east;
- nationalism: patriotism and cosmopolitanism;
- territorial structure: separatism, federalism and centralists;
- statehood: *derzhavnyky* and its opponents;
- religion: believers and non-believers;
- economy: supporters of capitalism versus those in favour of a planned economy.

To what degree are these either insurmountable divisions or the kind which are commonplace also within democratic societies? Democracies are premised upon pluralistic differences (and, in some cases, divisions) between its citizens’ views on economics, politics, territorial structure and religion. In the Ukrainian case these are only felt to be acute because of the difficult transition to a market economy at a time of economic depression. In addition, some Ukrainian authors argue that many problems within the economy and state administration are due to the lack of (or weakness of) the national idea.
The failure of the French nation-state model

Connor pointed to the failure of nation-state building in many post-colonial countries because of their attempt at importing the ‘French model’. Modernisation, communications and transportations, he contends correctly, did not always undermine ethnicity or nationalism. The growth of regionalism throughout Western Europe in recent decades, including in France, has also shown that nation-state building failed to completely assimilate and absorb ethnic groups or dilute regional identities. The earlier absence of ethnic strife in former colonies and Europe was wrongly assumed to be a reflection of the successful development of an homogenous nation-state.

Ukraine inherited a variety of different regions with different histories. Only one of these regions has an ethnic Russian majority—the Crimea. Nevertheless, large areas of eastern and southern Ukraine have Russian-speaking, ethnic Ukrainian majorities. These regions also hold the bulk of Ukraine’s large 12 million Russian minority. Some authors, such as Wilson and Arel, remain pessimistic that a Ukrainian political community can be forged from these inherited Russian and Ukrainian-speaking regions. Surely though this depends on what criteria one applies to define a political community? If we define a political community as that largely based on the ‘French model’ of total domestic homogenisation then Ukraine may have a long—and maybe even impossible—path to follow. Wilson and Arel may therefore be right to be pessimistic about the chances for Ukrainian nation building on the traditional ‘French model’.

But, should we be looking at the ‘French model’ as that to which Ukraine should aspire in its nation and state building project? There are, after all, many other European models which could be better suited to Ukraine’s inheritance (see chapter 1). France and the UK are themselves changing, granting greater local self government to their Bretons, Basques, Corsicans, Scots and Welsh, itself part of a general trend towards greater devolution away from central power that we are witnessing throughout Western Europe.

In addition, Smith has pointed out: ‘A shared culture, race, religion or common language may each be sufficient factors, but none is entirely necessary.’ Ukraine’s two main religions and two main languages are therefore not of themselves obstacles in the way of the creation of a political community that would encompass its geographical territory. ‘Societies can and do function with a minimum level of consensus’, Sochor believes.
Ukraine is not, after all, on the verge of disintegrating (despite reports to the contrary in the Western media during 1993–1994). But, this ‘minimal level of consensus’ can—and, indeed, should—be improved through the promotion of new values, the promulgation of programmes and a vision which will be supported by a majority of its citizens. As Vydrin and Tabachnyk have pointed out, Ukrainian society is largely united at a ‘minimal’ level through a relatively high backing for statehood and sovereignty (particularly among its central and regional elites).

But, clearly, overcoming current economic difficulties will represent an important step towards greater consolidation of society within one political community. It is economic difficulties—not language—which are slowing the transition from Soviet/Slavic/regional identities among Russian-speakers to members of a Ukrainian civic and cultural community. Some Ukrainian authors, including then still to be elected President Kuchma, argued that a unifying factor for Ukraine would be the idea of economic change. ‘Understandably, this is not to Kravchuk’s liking, as economics were always his weakest point,’ one newspaper wrote. This had to wait for the election of Kuchma in July 1994.

Perhaps therefore the drive to excessive unity under Kravchuk was more a product of both the inheritance of the Soviet mindset of homogenous conformity coupled with a misuse of the alleged ‘French model’. During the Kravchuk era the national democratic-national communist alliance held a consensus on the need for a drive to unify society (see above). It is probably not surprising that the national democrats are largely based in western Ukraine whose political culture is very different to that of eastern-southern Ukraine (Kravchuk is also from western Ukraine).

**Towards consolidation**

**Political culture**

Both Kravchuk and Kuchma promoted the view that Ukraine needs political centrism in its current stage of state and nation building. Kravchuk backed a call by sixty civic organisations and political parties as early as Autumn 1992 to support consolidation on the basis of state building leading to agreement and consensus. A similar policy was introduced by President Boris Yeltsin in 1993. Ukraine, Kuchma told a congress of the New Ukraine movement, needed the ‘politics of centrism as an integrating model for Ukraine’s
development, the removal of confrontation, their promotion of compromise of different branches of the authorities, the bringing together of society’. Kuchma believed this was possible because there was more that united—than divided—Ukrainians.

Indeed, Kuchma may be right—many of these factors working in favour of consolidation have been outlined already. But, there are nevertheless factors working against unity (for example, religion).

Ukraine’s political and ethnic stability is a factor which has been lauded as being ‘among our most important achievements’ in its post-Soviet transition. President Kuchma said in his 1996 state of the nation address to parliament that, ‘in order to ensure Ukraine enters a steady trajectory of development, whatever happens we must maintain political stability, directing political and public energy into a civilized channel’. This was particularly important when compared to other Soviet successor states, ‘where conflicts, including aggressive ones, have become an indispensable character of the transitional phase’ (presumably here Kuchma was also referring to Chechnya).

But to what degree is this societal support for stability merely used by the authorities for their own benefit? The emphasis on stability during the transition phase through structures created under Kravchuk, such as the National Council on Social Partnership, merely created corporatist models of development which hampered the growth of the private sector, civil society and worked against political-economic reform. Indeed, some Ukrainian leaders are privately grateful that a civil society is slow to develop in Ukraine because if one had been in place social (and maybe ethnic) strife may have already occurred as a consequence of the economic crisis. Suffice it to say that although Kuchma gives credit to the ‘Ukrainian character’ for this stability, at a time when wage arrears totalled nearly US$3 billion, this had probably more to do with an absence of civil society. In opinion polls the population at large feel that they have little opportunity to influence their leaders (except, perhaps, during elections). Strikes actually decreased after Kuchma came to power; in 1995 only 0.3 per cent of employees took this course of action. When asked what they would do if their standard of living declined only 4 per cent said they would attend meetings, demonstrations, strikes or pickets. Only another 1.3 per cent admitted to being willing to use force or conduct pogroms.

In one poll respondents were asked if they had an interest in political problems. Only 1 per cent replied that they took an active part in political life, while 29 per cent attempted to keep abreast of political developments. At the same time, 28 per cent were not
interested at all while 42 per cent only became interested when it affected their own lives. In a separate poll, which asked if respondents trusted political parties, 63 per cent replied that they did not. Only 12 per cent admitted to trusting them (with 25 per cent of no opinion). When asked with which political current they identified two-thirds said nobody or they didn’t know.

Nevertheless, Kuchma credited this ‘the result of wisdom and the well-considered nature of our people’ for Ukraine’s political stability (not the absence of a civil society). This ‘uniqueness’ of the Ukrainian character is pointed to as an important component of its newly emerging political community. Nikolai Borisov, Chairman of the US-AID-funded Donets’k Mediation Group, said that ‘Ukrainians are essentially a calm, optimistic people. We are not as extreme as the Russians. I don’t think you will see the Parliament being blown up in Kyiv and I don’t think you will see a war over the Crimea. This is good soil for mediation.’ These views are widespread. This author, taking an unofficial taxi ride with military officers in Kyiv in Summer 1996, hit a traffic jam. To my off-the-cuff remark that maybe we were in the middle of a putsch they replied in Russian/ Ukrainian: ‘This is Ukraine. Those kind of things happen only in Moscow.’ There is a widespread accepted view that Ukrainians are naturally ‘conservative’, ‘centrist’ and reject extremism (which does not tally completely with the integral nationalism of inter-war western Ukraine).

At the same time, not all Ukrainians accept that they only hold positive characteristics. Mykola Porovs’kyi, a leading national democratic member of parliament, blames the crisis in the state, in the main part, ‘on the weakness of the Ukrainian mentality, the absence of will and political consciousness’. This he sees as a consequence of centuries of Russification, denationalisation, ‘physical, cultural and spiritual destruction’ which created the current Ukrainian mentality composed of introvertedness, sentimentality and anarchic individualism that lacked discipline and organisation. Mykola Tomenko also believes that the Ukrainian character is composed of the same introvertedness, as well as a lack of free will, anarchism, nihilism, lack of aggressiveness and the search for justice.

**A Ukrainian political community**

What is the idea, or complex of ideas, around which the Ukrainian people should unite and be consolidated into one political
community? Are these ideas available or in the process of being elaborated? Serhiy Soboliev, leader of the centre-right Reforms faction in the 1994–1998 parliament, believed that Ukraine lacked such a unifying national philosophy.\textsuperscript{43} Hence the widespread debate in the Ukrainian media and elsewhere over these questions.

Some of the suggested factors that should be propagated and/or developed for the consolidation of a Ukrainian political community include:\textsuperscript{44}

1 \textit{Collective, historical memory} Without this, ‘the nation is transformed into a primitive people which can be used for any kind of social experiment’.\textsuperscript{45} This would include new myths, ‘golden eras’, symbols, legends and the articulation of traditions of common descent. Two major problems exist with regard to collective memory. First, the lack of an historical tradition of statehood (although this is not an exclusively Ukrainian problem. Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia all had little experience in this field as well.) Second, as a member of the Civic Congress of Ukraine, Valeria Mesherikov, pointed out, ‘Western Ukraine’s heroes are Eastern Ukraine’s traitors’.

2 \textit{Language and culture} Many Ukrainian authors and political leaders argue that language is central to the question of Ukraine’s unity and consolidation. Porovs’kyi believes that ‘Without language there is no people, no state.’\textsuperscript{46} States built on the unity of language, he believes, are stronger than those which rely solely upon political-economic unity. During the Tsarist and Soviet eras Ukrainian language and culture suffered from repression and degradation. Ukraine inherited a stereotype of language and culture which suggested that it was fit only for the village, peasants and uncouth individuals. The Russian language was seen as the language of advancement, the one to use in communications with the outside world. This is now changing. When spoken, the Ukrainian language is no longer scorned on the streets of Kyiv and Kharkiv.\textsuperscript{47} The only city in Ukraine where there is hostility to the use of the Ukrainian language is in Sevastopol.\textsuperscript{48} But even in Sevastopol this is declining and demand for Ukrainian-language instruction is also growing there. There are now more applicants than places on Ukrainian-language teacher training courses in Sevastopol. After the signing of the Russian-Ukrainian treaty in May 1997, which recognised Ukrainian sovereignty over Sevastopol, the city council decreed that the Ukrainian language would become compulsory in all of the city’s schools from September of that year.\textsuperscript{49}
3 **Geography** This implies an affection for the national soil. Support for the building and renovation of monuments, private farming, anniversary celebrations and festivals.

4 **A community of interests** Kravchuk complained that one of the factors holding back Ukraine’s transition was the fact that it had inherited a ‘slave ideology’. How can this be changed and a new democratic system and a market economy be grafted on to the old values, morals and ideals inherited from the ancien régime? Ukrainian authors argue that the state should promote a new value framework through education, the media, employment training and legislation. The source for these values should be twofold—Ukrainian traditions, philosophy and culture as well as the values which underpin western democracies and its political, economic and cultural thought.

5 **Economic reform** The modernisation of the political system and the economy, the unification of Ukraine’s regional economies into a single national economy, expectations of higher standards of living and the provision of social welfare.

6 **The rule of law** This would embrace both human and national rights, elaborating a concept of the state for the people, the state as a provider of the means for individual self expression, the post-Soviet constitution.

7 **Democratic reform** But will the growth of bourgeois individualism consolidate society? Is democratic reform getting in the way of economic transition which might be better undertaken in an authoritarian setting? Does the parliamentary-presidential constitution block economic transition, as international financial institutions believe?

8 **The national idea** In the early twentieth century the Ukrainian writer Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi complained about the lack of an all-embracing national idea. But, with nation building still in its early stages, is it too early to consolidate around this factor? Most Ukrainian leaders now accept the need for a national idea—the question is how to define its content.

9 **Stability and lack of conflict** Nation and state building, Kuchma believes, requires ‘patience, social unification, civil accord and peace,
and an end to ethnic splits’. The main duty of any president, he contends, is therefore to ‘consolidate peace and calm’ during the reform process.\(^{54}\)

10 An ideology of state building  Can Ukraine’s consolidation and unity be ensured ‘without some type of ideological underpinning’\(^{55}\)? Former President Kravchuk attempted to persuade his parliament that ‘We are talking about not monolithic unity, but about consolidation.’ The Ukrainian constitution bans any ideology from being compulsory for society as a whole. But many Ukrainian authors, and President Kuchma himself, still believe in the need for an ‘ideology of state building’ (as does Russian President Yeltsin). Socialist Party Chairman and Parliamentary Speaker Oleksandr Moroz told a rally of his nationalist opponents that ‘Both the left and the right want a powerful and prosperous Ukraine, so we have a common interest and we can unite around the idea of building a strong state.’\(^{56}\)

11 National leaders  Will the leadership articulate a vision, craft a programme, muster the political will to enforce this programme and then find the charisma to gain public support that will extend throughout Ukraine? Kuchma’s policies combine support for liberal economic reforms, social democratic welfare programmes and the national democratic consolidation of statehood.\(^{57}\) His foreign policy therefore remained open to all of these domestic influences.\(^{58}\)

12 Political will and vision  Post-Soviet societies, such as Ukraine, require two factors Zbigniew Brzezinski believes. First, the articulation of a broad vision of what a transformation will resemble. Second, the population should be mobilised for short-term sacrifices by presenting a concept of what Ukraine will encompass in the medium-long terms.\(^{59}\) Kravchuk lacked such a vision. President Kuchma came to power claiming that he, unlike his predecessor, had the political will to implement reform. Three years into his presidency his former Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic reform, Viktor Pynzenyk, resigned claiming that there was an absence of political will within the Ukrainian leadership to implement reform.\(^{60}\)

13 The desire to be hospodar over Ukraine  The refusal of Ukraine’s ruling elites to be vassals of other states. In Ukraine’s case this includes attempts to transform its inherited quasi-state into a
modern state, its refusal to return to the status of a Russian ‘younger brother’ and a demand for equality in inter-state relations. Foreign Minister Udovenko stated that Ukraine’s membership of the CIS must not lead to the loss of ‘even a bit of sovereignty’.61

14 Integration of the regional elites Maintaining access to central power for the local elites, regardless of their ethnic background. This should allow regional elites from throughout Ukraine to enter the central authorities, and not—as is the case under Kuchma—where these positions are largely monopolised by the Dnipropetrovs’k clan.

15 Territorial integrity Support for Ukraine’s sobornist, ‘the maintenance of its unity, wholeness and its territory’.62

16 Foreign enemies This would be divisive (not unifying). After all, the main ‘enemy’ would undoubtedly be Russia. With 40 or more per cent of the population Russian-speaking and with only 6 per cent of the population professing to hold negative views of Russians63 this could be dangerous for domestic stability and cohesion. Former President Kravchuk included a strong anti-Russian component in his foreign policy, attempting to use the Russian threat as a unifying element as well as an excuse to by-pass economic reform.64 President Kuchma though, is opposed to viewing Russia ‘in the form of an enemy’.65

A national economy

Is the transition to a market economy a divisive issue which is not supported by the bulk of the population? In an address to his parliament in January 1992 Kravchuk accepted the need for a government of ‘national unity’—although nothing in the end came of it. He complained at that time: ‘Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to unite all citizens of Ukraine to the idea of building an independent, democratic state on the basis of a market economy.’66 Society at large, as well as regional and central leaders were largely unprepared psychologically for any rush, Russian-style, into the market. By 1994–1995 this had changed, with both Kravchuk and Kuchma having become supporters of market economic reform. Kuchma had himself chaired the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs between 1993 and 1994 where he undoubtedly influenced the transition of ‘Red Directors’ towards a more social democratic/liberal orientation.67
The emphasis on this Ukrainian gradual approach was due to three factors. First, Kravchuk had never been elected as a reformer and had probably agreed to a quid pro quo with many members of the ancien régime to leave things largely as they were in return for their neutrality (or possibly support) for independence. These former members of the ancien régime preferred to maintain Ukraine in a no man’s land between communism and capitalism where rent seeking would be most profitable. Second, emphasis on stability and consensus politics, so as not to upset the building of a modern state out of the inherited quasi-state, also played a role in the choice not to utilise the radical policies adopted by Russia. Third, Ukrainians exaggerated the likely rise in living standards after Ukraine had become free of Moscow’s control.

But, even with the launch of the Kuchma reform programme not everything changed. Gradualism with a ‘Ukrainian face’ became the vogue and its leaders asked: should Ukraine’s economic transformation be modelled on other post-communist countries, or should it undertake a ‘uniquely Ukrainian path’ or, indeed, combine both traditions? Kuchma, as so often on such questions, seems confused. During his state of the nation address in Spring 1996 he criticised those who advocated moderate inflation and cautious reform without outside assistance where ‘the road to economic recovery should also be a unique one’. He pointed to similarities in most post-communist countries of the causes of their economic crises. ‘Most of them successfully overcame their difficulties without looking for some special way but by persistently implementing reforms.’

Half a year earlier though, on the anniversary of Ukrainian independence, Kuchma told those gathered to celebrate this event that Ukraine should refrain from any blind copying of the ‘Western model’. Ukraine needed, Kuchma argued, ‘to more actively and persistently search for our own Ukrainian market transformation model’. Elaborated a month later to an All-Ukrainian Gathering of Economists, Kuchma claimed that economic development in the West had taken place ‘on the basis of their historical traditions, genetic roots, national identity and their people’s culture’. This ‘Ukrainian model’ was backed wholeheartedly by then Prime Minister Ievhen Marchuk, a contender in the 1999 presidential elections. In a Ukrainian poll that gave large support for more energetic economic reforms there was also strong support for not blindly copying other countries. A ‘Ukrainian model’ (which remains ill-defined) reflected ‘the unique and independent character of Ukrainians’.
In addition, when asked which path was best for Ukraine one poll found that both Poland (15.8 per cent) and Russia (13.5 per cent) obtained a greater than 5 per cent rating.\textsuperscript{72} Russia did not therefore dominate public opinion as the example to which Ukraine should aspire in its political-economic transition process. Those who looked to ‘Russia’ as an economic and political model were usually supporters of the left nostalgic about the former USSR; they were not supporters of economic reform. This link in the minds of the Ukrainian public between integration with Russia representing the revival of the former USSR and a return to the command-administrative system has been strengthened by the Belarusan-Russian union whose national anthem is that of the former USSR (minus its old lyrics). Liberal supporters of integration with Russia therefore find it difficult to build a domestic constituency in support of a union with Russia. Supporters of market reform, limited government, multi-party systems and centrist political parties look westwards for their political and economic models. When looking to the political and economic model for Ukraine, contemporary Russia is not high on the list. This is particularly the case in Kyiv, one of the most westward-leaning of Ukraine’s regions (see Table 3.1).

\textbf{Economics and the national idea}

Should the national idea permeate economic questions in Ukraine? Economic modernisation and reform without a strong national idea
(or with only a weak one) would be unlikely to produce dynamic and concerted change. A community of economic interests is important in creating a modern nation. But it is not sufficient on its own—as Kuchma quickly found out. Renan, speaking in the Sorbonne over a hundred years ago, pointed out correctly that a ‘Community of interests brings about trade agreements, but nation has a sentimental side to it, it is both soul and body at once; a Zollverein is not a patrie.’

Nationalism and the national idea were important factors for mobilising society in periods of transition in Western Europe in the four decades prior to the First World War. Modernisation through nationalism remains central today in South-East Asia (particularly in Japan, China, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea). Nationalism, Rustow informs us, was always important in the process of overcoming backwardness. National identity and mobilisation are recognised as important ingredients in social mobilisation. It is difficult to mobilise a population without ‘reference to popular cultural traits’. Ukraine’s slower post-Soviet transition in comparison to Russia’s is partly a consequence of the stimulus of the national idea in the latter’s transition to a market economy. In Russia its leaders shifted from liberal to ‘pragmatic nationalists’ in 1993. Contemporary Russia and China are therefore similar in this respect. The national idea remains an elusive one in Ukraine, still not accepted by all of its citizens.

The growth of a national community and domestic capital are important factors which help sustain and enforce a political community. This is particularly the case when the growth of capital, as in Ukraine, leads to the creation of a middle class, an important element of any democracy and market economy. Nevertheless, purely civic states are only a theoretical possibility; an economic community needs a state and a cultural basis to underpin its legitimacy and provide it with an historical past, present and future.

This linkage between the growth of domestic capital and the national idea was quickly recognised in Ukraine. One Ukrainian author pointed out that although cultural-linguistic unity is not vital to create a civic nation its absence will make the creation of one national economy united within the geographic space of the new state more difficult. Zhulyns’kyi, former Deputy Prime Minister under Kravchuk responsible for the humanities, argued that there is an inherent link between the strength of the national idea and the dynamism of economic change:
The five-year experience of state formation in Ukraine provides evidence that social and economic transformation will not be dynamic without a definite national and cultural policy financially supported by the state. It shows that it is impossible to overcome economic crisis and acuteness of social contradictions without a renaissance and establishment of national self-identification, without unification around an all-national idea.\textsuperscript{79}

The question of the weakness of the national idea within Ukraine’s industrial regions, a factor it shares with Scotland and Wales, is highly important in a country where its industrial heart lies in predominantly Russian-speaking regions. One Ukrainian author voiced his concern that ‘big money in Ukraine is now mainly in the hands of people who are nationally indifferent or openly hostile to everything in Ukraine’.\textsuperscript{80}

The bulk of businessmen and their newly founded publications catering for the private sector are mainly in the Russian language, which, to some nationally conscious Ukrainians, remains an indication of their lack of allegiance to the national idea. Seventy per cent of private capital and state industry is located in the Donbas, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovs’k oblasts, the city of Kyiv and the Crimean autonomous republic of Ukraine. This private capital will play a significant role in the formation of a new Ukrainian middle class and civil society. With this will come a redistribution of power in the direction of south-east Ukraine, and of the ‘representatives of its political and business elites’.\textsuperscript{81}

Ukrainian civil society quickly re-established itself in western Ukraine largely due to its historical development under the more liberal Austrian and Polish regimes. Here national consciousness is high, the cities are Ukrainian-speaking, political parties and civic groups very active and the emerging business class is strongly supportive of the Ukrainian state and the national idea. In other words, the national idea is not absent from economic issues in western Ukraine. The economic elites in western Ukraine had been ‘Ukrainianised’ since 1991 and one Russian newspaper complained: ‘At auctions, only business developed within the “Ukrainian national idea” can buy property.’\textsuperscript{82} ‘Outsiders’ (that is, Russians) were therefore not allowed to participate in privatisation in western Ukraine, or so Russians believed. In eastern-southern Ukraine, on the other hand, civil society is only now in the process of creation. Whereas the newly emerging business and political interests in the region will be supportive of statehood, some central elites fear that
they may be less likely to be enthusiastic supporters of the national idea.

The International Union of Ukrainian Entrepreneurs, founded by former President Kravchuk in 1996, aimed to attempt to bridge this gap between the business and cultural elites and the intelligentsia in Ukraine. The organisation aimed to maintain ‘on its economic basis the national idea of national spirituality’. Ukrainian business, Kravchuk argued, must be based upon a ‘spiritual, Christian basis’. This was similar to Kuchma’s calls to introduce a concrete socio-economic base into the Ukrainian national idea, something largely absent under Kravchuk when the economy was neglected. ‘Economic pragmatism’, the head of the Presidential Administration Internal Affairs Directorate Serhiy Teleshun said, needs to be implanted into the national idea. This ‘economic pragmatism’ should unite rather than divide people, with all programmes clearly understood and accepted by the majority of Ukrainian citizens.

There is evidence that a new Ukrainian middle class committed to both the market economy and Ukrainian statehood is emerging. The eastern Ukrainian political and business establishment has been converted to the Ukrainian cause. Kuchma and his government have been ardent defenders of ‘Ukrainian capital’ for three reasons. First, to strengthen the Ukrainian state through some protectionist measures ‘in defence of domestic producers’. These measures resemble some aspects of the early phase of the transition to a market economy found in most South-East Asian countries. Kuchma has always linked strong statehood to a strong economy. Second, to defend Ukraine primarily from the more advanced and accumulated Russian capital. Russian leaders have not hidden their desire to use their country’s economic power to resubordinate the ‘Near Abroad’ to Russian suzerainty.

Finally, the growth of domestic capital has increased support domestically for Ukrainian statehood, particularly in eastern and southern Ukraine. The overpowering presence of the Dnipropetrovs’k clan both within the ranks of the ruling central elites and as a base for one of the large, emerging concentrations of domestic capital has been heavily criticised in both Ukraine and the West. But, there is also a positive aspect to it; namely, the spread of derzhavnyk loyalties within the Dnipropetrovs’k-Zaporizhzhia-Kirovohrad axis, one of Ukraine’s most important urban and industrial belts. Domestic capital accumulated by these ‘clans’ has to be defended, after all, against both the domestic taxman and foreign governments. The accumulation of domestic capital by these clans
gives them, and the regions they represent, a big stake in the continued independence of Ukraine. Both former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tyhipko come from Ukrainian-language backgrounds and are not hostile *per se* to the national idea.86 Yuliya Tymoshenko, the head of the United Energy Systems Corporation, Ukraine’s leading importer of energy and the main beneficiary of Gazprom’s declining influence, describes her company’s ‘ideology’ as one of ‘pragmatism and patriotism’.87

Businessmen are increasingly turning to national and liberal democratic political parties to cement alliances ahead of elections and to create joint forums to lobby for reforms and the interests of the emerging private sector. Mykhailo Brodskyi, an influential Kyivian businessman, cemented an anti-communist and pro-business alliance with Rukh. Liberal-leaning mayors of cities in eastern and southern Ukraine had also approached Rukh with offers of financial help.88 At a congress in Kyiv in Spring 1997 an All-Ukrainian Association of Entrepreneurs was founded which united small and medium-sized businessmen from seventeen *oblasts* with a number of mainstream political parties.89 This congress, which was reportedly organised by Christian Democratic groups, in turn financed the Vpered Ukraiina (Forward Ukraine) Election Bloc in the 1998 parliamentary elections.90

**New values and morals**

**Education**

Education has many important functions to play during periods of intense state and nation building. Not only is it seen as a crucial vehicle for the promotion of national consciousness and self pride as well as a sense of belonging to one community, it should also (for example, *vis-à-vis* conscripts in the armed forces) usually inculcate patriotism. Mass conscription and schooling were, after all, the two main vehicles (together with the media) which forged nations from ethnoses in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Western Europe.

At the same time, it is recognised by Ukrainian authors that the national revival should be accompanied by democratisation, which would prevent a simultaneous growth of chauvinism and national nihilism with the rise of national consciousness. Consequently, social, national and political ideas are all equally significant in the
creation of a new system of values through education. By supporting both democratisation and nation building, the national identity which will grow simultaneously with democracy, it is hoped, will be constrained within a civil society and the rule of law.

In the former USSR education was the responsibility of three bodies—the Ministry of People’s Education, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Education and the State Committee on Vocational and Technical Education. These three bodies were merged in June 1992 into a Ukrainian Ministry for Education.

The aims of the newly founded Ministry, according to then First Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for Education, Anatoliy Pohribnyi, were to ensure that ‘education in Ukraine has to be fully and unconditionally subordinated to the building up of an independent Ukrainian state’.91 Towards these ends a programme entitled ‘Ukrainian Education for the Twenty-First Century’ was approved by the first Congress of Employees of the Educational Sector in Ukraine. This programme, based on provisions previously outlined in the 1989 Law ‘On Languages’, included the following main items:

- by September 1993 instruction in the first year of higher education would be in the Ukrainian language;
- by September 1993 nursery and elementary schools would be converted to the Ukrainian language in proportion to the number of ethnic Ukrainians living in each region;
- departments for Ukrainian studies were to be established in higher education, which would focus on language and culture;
- Ukrainian history was to be introduced as a separate subject;
- in higher education students would be given Ukrainian-language tests;
- the integration and opening up of the Ukrainian education system into world education;
- the development of a ‘nationally orientated educational system corresponding to historical traditions’;
- education would be based upon Ukrainian and world traditions;
- Ukrainian history, culture and language were to become compulsory;
- all pupils were to begin taking Ukrainian-language exams from 1993.

In some regions of Ukraine there were spectacular results. By the 1996–1997 school year in Kyiv 92 per cent of school children
were enrolled in Ukrainian-language first grade classes. Kindergartens teaching in the Ukrainian language increased from 49.8 to 65.1 per cent between 1991 and 1995. Ukrainian-language teaching in schools had grown since 1989 from 47.5 to 59 per cent. In higher education, which had always been subject to greater Russification, progress was slower. Between 1991 and 1995 Ukrainian-language instruction only increased from 23.4 to 44.4 per cent.

Important aspects of these new policies which Ukraine’s educational workers attempted to promote were aimed at grappling with the legacies of colonialism and communism. Only by removing the colonial inheritances found in the spiritual, political, economic, financial, social, military and cultural spheres, one Ukrainian author believed, would it be possible for the realisation of the national idea.

Therefore state policies aimed to:

- raise the prestige of all facets of Ukrainianness by making it equal to other languages and cultures;
- create a separate national history;
- establish and uplift Ukrainian culture;
- fashion and mould a Ukrainian political culture loyal to and identifying with the independent state;
- promote national traits and traditions;
- elevate and expand usage of the Ukrainian language;
- create nationally conscious citizens and patriots;
- prepare future members of the national elites.

In November 1993 the Ministry of Education approved its programme for education entitled ‘Ukraine in the Twenty-First Century’, which was approved by the June 1994 All-Ukrainian Pedagogical Council. The programme aimed to introduce a national education system into Ukrainian schools and universities. State education and upbringing would be based upon the philosophy of the national idea and the ideology of state building. This would serve to bind together these elements into an inclusive Ukrainian political nation that would be composed of its ethnic and civic components. The educational system would therefore unite both democratic and social science, and national and internationally accepted concepts and ideas. Children would be taught ‘to see themselves in unity with the past-today-the future’.
Values, morals and ideas

Arblaster believes that ‘all societies have to make choices and commitments which will embody and express its central or dominant values’. Societies require unifying ideologies, common ideas and unity within an overall political culture. ‘We need to cherish the sense of belonging to a single society, even if it is an “imagined community”, to use Benedict Anderson’s phrase.’

The need for a new spiritual revival and the inculcation of new ideas and values to support the political and economic transition in Ukraine was recognised from day one of its independence. ‘Today, for Ukraine it is both fortuitous and, at the same time, difficult moment for a return to one’s national truth, one’s national priorities and glories’, a well known Ukrainian anthropologist said. In Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition the country’s modernisation also aims to rescue Ukrainian language and culture from its relegation to rural backwaters in the Tsarist and Soviet eras. Political-economic modernisation is also therefore synonymous with the modernisation of Ukrainian culture, spirituality and values. The inherited complexes of the past (provincialism, inferiority complexes and a feeling of being ‘second best’) all will be replaced by a ‘radical socio-cultural reconstruction, filled with real contemporary content in its form and values’.

Zhulyns’kyi, former Deputy Prime Minister under President Leonid Kravchuk with responsibility for the humanities, sees the state’s role as one of freeing the Ukrainian spirit from centuries or decades of dependency; that is, the creation of ‘spiritual independence’. This would be undertaken by stressing unifying factors in society through a ‘state church’, a national history and the Ukrainian language. On the basis of these factors a new system of value orientations would be created. Zhulyns’kyi understands that these should not be solely based on western Ukrainian traditions; they have to take into account all branches and regions of society. The ‘spiritual independence of Ukraine’ is impossible, Zhulyns’kyi believes, without ‘national identification’ and the ‘crystallisation of historical consciousness’.

Zhulyns’kyi understands the importance of pushing forward with these new values and a new framework for society in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union is not dead; it is alive and kicking within people’s psychology’s and mindsets. The introduction and acceptance of new Ukrainian and world values is therefore also a struggle against some vestiges of the old which are incompatible
with the new order. Communism and colonialism, we have already
pointed out, perverted Ukrainian history, culture and language,
turning many Ukrainians into nihilists and making them hostile
towards these three vital facets of any nation. The revival of
national history, culture and language—and their integration into
‘European’ (world) values—is therefore regarded by many
intellectuals as a negation of both Ukraine’s colonial and totalitarian
past.

The need for a system of new values is not only to help lay the
foundation stones for independent statehood, democracy and a
market economy. It is also required to fill the spiritual vacuum
engulfing most Soviet peoples since the Brezhnev era. The spiritual
atmosphere of Ukrainian society was therefore amorphous when
Ukraine became an independent state. In western Ukraine this was
quickly filled, as in the three Baltic states, by national, religious and
democratic revival. But, what of the remainder of the country?

Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma hold similar views on the
centrality of national revival in Ukraine to the transition away from
communism and colonialism. Kravchuk said: ‘Believe me, I do not
see a free, independent, civilised Ukraine without a spiritual revival,
without a development of culture on a qualitatively new level.’¹⁰² In
looking towards a spiritual revival most Ukrainian authors tend to
focus upon the ‘realisation of the national idea’. But an ethnically
based national idea would not command sufficient support
throughout Ukraine. Therefore there is a greater accent upon
statehood and an identity grounded upon both civic and ethnic
elements.¹⁰³

The need for the transition to democracy and a market economy
to be underpinned by new post-totalitarian and post-colonial values
was not ditched by Kravchuk’s successor. President Kuchma’s
former Chief of Staff, Tabachnyk, pointed to the continued need for
‘the formation of a new psychology in society’, for ‘a new system of
values’¹⁰⁴ Although accepting the need for a national idea President
Kuchma called upon Ukrainians to ‘remove themselves from the
simplified aggressive understanding of the national idea’.¹⁰⁵ That is,
Kuchma called for a rejection of an ethnic national idea.

But Kuchma, while understanding the need for the creation of new
values and morals, also cautioned against the over-hasty rejection of
past values and ideas. Those past ideals worth keeping, Kuchma
believed, included ‘the sound collective ability of sacrifice in the name
of national ideals’ as well as the ‘preparedness to defend our land’.¹⁰⁶
In other words, Kuchma wanted to build Ukrainian patriotism and
national ideals on the basis of Ukrainian historical traditions and the Soviet ingrained respect for the derzhava. Coming from eastern Ukraine Kuchma understood that to unite Ukraine one needed to amalgamate the anti-communist/Ukrainian patriotism of western with the Soviet Ukrainian patriotism of eastern Ukraine.

The morals, ideas and values to unite Ukrainians into a new political culture and community will therefore come from the following three sources:

- Ukrainian pre-Soviet national traditions;
- world values in philosophy, political science, culture and economic thought based upon liberal democratic traditions;\(^\text{107}\)
- certain elements of Soviet life which are not debunked.

**Transformation, mobilisation and the national idea**

Could Ukrainian society hope rapidly to evolve from colonialism and totalitarianism to statehood, nationhood, democracy and capitalism without filling the spiritual vacuum? Indeed, was it not unsurprising that Ukraine’s transition was therefore slower than in countries where consolidation and the national idea were stronger? Rustow has argued that ‘national unity’ is a prerequisite condition for democratisation.\(^\text{108}\) Zhulyns’kyi, probably correctly, thinks not:\(^\text{109}\)

It is important to remember that without the attainment of a sufficient level of political culture, spirituality and legal culture it is difficult to expect a quickening of the process of economic reform; that is, without the formation of new statehood, Ukrainian-centrist consciousness with a clear accent on support for language, academia, culture, revival of historical memory, a national base of values held together, then a spiritual atmosphere in society in support of change will be difficult to muster.

Why are Ukrainians of the view that new morals, values and ideals are required? Zhulyns’kyi, the most prolific Ukrainian writer on this question, believed that Ukraine’s post-Soviet political-economic transformation was slow precisely because of the weakness of its national revival. A weak society, Zhulyns’kyi believes, cannot develop dynamically without a functioning educational system and a national ideal as the central component of culture. In addition,
‘social and economic transformation will not be dynamic without a
definite national and cultural policy financially supported by the
state’. Without national revival and unification around a national
idea it will be ‘impossible to overcome the economic crisis’.110
Without the revival of the Ukrainian ethnic nation, he argues, it
will be impossible to build a Ukrainian political nation. Instead,
Ukraine would remain a Belarusan-style ‘Little Russia’. Civil society
and national identity, as argued throughout this book, are intricately
linked together and the Ukrainian ethnic group is the titular core
out of which the future political nation will emerge.

If political-economic transition in Ukraine was undertaken
without nation building would Ukraine not remain a ‘Little
(cosmopolitan) Russia’, one Ukrainian author asked?111 A new
Ukrainian political culture, therefore, ‘should be not only
democratic’, he argues, which represents a return to a ‘civilised path
of development’. It should also be national, that is ‘national-
democratic’, based upon civic and Ukrainian ethnic factors.

**New values for a new political nation**

In addition to national values as forming the bedrock upon which
nation and state building is to be undertaken in Ukraine, there are
other new values, morals and ideas which should be inculcated
during the transition to democracy and capitalism. The Congress of
Ukrainian Intellectuals, which has been in the vanguard in the
promotion of these new values, believes that young people should
be especially targeted for ‘patriotic education’ and ‘the propagation
of culture, ethical and sanitary norms of human existence’.112 Some
of these were outlined by the Ukrainian author Boroshevs’kyi:113

- greater humanism in interpersonal relations (tolerance, justice, joint
  respect, generosity, principledness, the negation of cynicism and
  hypocrisy);
- care for, and the promotion of ‘adequate feelings’ for those in one’s
  immediate surroundings;
- self-criticism and the ability to think critically;
- hard work;
- patriotism (love for the land, the people, the state, ability to give
  time and concern to the state);
- interest in the past (both its good and tragic moments);
- self-identification with the Ukrainian ethnic nation and political
  community.
It is the elites of independent states, such as Ukraine, who are best placed to ‘produce the necessary social ideas and values, symbols and images for the future’ required for nation building. Socialist Party Chairman and Parliamentary Speaker (1994–1998) Oleksandr Moroz called upon the Second Congress of Ukrainian Writers ‘to continue to formulate national consciousness, inculcate a new generation of Ukrainian citizens’. Most Ukrainian authors accept that it is the role of the state to formulate ‘new spiritual-value orientations’ which lays equal stress upon individual (civic) and national (ethnic) rights.

Conclusions

The search for unity through the establishment of a Ukrainian political community and civic nation are central aspects of Ukraine’s state and nation building project since 1992. The creation of this political community and unity has to overcome inherited legacies of disunity through centrist policies that promote stability, lack of domestic conflict and evolutionary change. An important component of the creation of this new political community will be the economy and Ukraine’s newly emerging economic elites. It has been recognised that a Ukrainian state based on economic, civic criteria alone would not be a viable entity. It also required, as this book argues, cultural elements as well, because every state is composed of civic and ethnic elements. Ukraine’s educators and elites will aim to impart new values, morals and ideas to replace those inherited from the Soviet era. These will be of fundamental importance in the transition from totalitarianism and colonialism to democracy, a market economy and a modern, political nation.
This chapter discusses the questions of federalism, regionalism and separatism within Ukraine and in comparison to the more broader European context. It argues that support for federalism and separatism in Ukraine has always been highly exaggerated. Regionalism should not be equated with separatism and is not a purely Ukrainian phenomenon; it is, in fact, growing throughout the world. It is not incompatible with loyalty to a nation-state, a loyalty which Ukrainian leaders will attempt to instil in their citizens to create the political community to which they aspire. This chapter also discusses official policies towards national minorities within Ukraine, particularly vis-à-vis the largest of these—Russians.

Federalism versus unitarianism

Low support for federalism

It is not surprising, in view of Ukraine’s search for unity, domestic consensus and consolidation, that unitarianism has proved to be the most popular credo among Ukraine’s elites. The reasons for this were outlined by Kravchuk:

To build by all-world standards a Ukrainian nation, to inculcate in every person who lives on Ukrainian land, civic responsibility for one’s nation, for one’s state, to ensure that each person defends and stands up for that history, one’s culture, one’s present and future—all of this can be undertaken only on the basis of the unitarianism of our state.¹
Federalism, Kravchuk pointed out, was only adopted in Germany after the creation of the state—not during the process of state (and nation) building. It is therefore ‘premature’ and ‘impracticable’ in Ukraine; something, the Ukrainian Popular Movement Rukh believes, could be introduced only in the distant future. The former Parliamentary Speaker under Kravchuk, Ivan Plushch, accepted that federalism could be a future option for Ukraine; ‘However, it is necessary to proceed toward this in a civilised and evolutionary manner—by no means a revolutionary one’, he cautioned.2

Consequently, federalism has only ever obtained minority support from both Ukraine’s elites and its citizens. In one opinion poll only 9 per cent gave their support for federalism. There was little regional discrepancy, with the ‘West’ giving only a 4 per cent backing and the ‘East’ and ‘South’ giving 11 and 16 per cent support respectively.3 Surveys in Donets’k and L’viv both show strong majorities against federalism. The unity of Ukraine was more important to both eastern and western Ukrainians than regionalism. In Donets’k and L’viv one poll showed that they both viewed their region as part of Ukraine’s common destiny.4

Anybody who argues in favour of the introduction of federalism today is therefore usually regarded ‘as one that harms the integrity of the state and is even hostile to the very idea of Ukrainian statehood’.5 This has led to the domestic debate over federalism in Ukraine being couched in very sharp words. Kravchuk believed that federalism would ‘even endanger the possibility of preserving the integrity of the state as such’.6 In his eyes it would be tantamount to granting political autonomy to each oblast, leading to the state’s disintegration (parallels are given to the federalist former USSR and Yugoslavia). Federalism, it is argued, would not allow the development of a uniform view of statehood throughout Ukraine or the creation of a Ukrainian political nation. Kravchuk and Kuchma have both only therefore agreed to economic autonomy and local self-government outside the Crimea.7

**A lone advocate of federalism**

A strong advocate of federalism is Volodymyr Hryn’iov, leader of the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR) party, which during the 1994 presidential elections was jointly led as a bloc with Kuchma. (Hryn’iov though, has become rather isolated and marginal within the Ukrainian political spectrum since these elections.) Hryn’iov turned around the argument of those opposed
to federalism by arguing that it was actually the unitary state which was more of a threat to statehood because its ‘aggressiveness’ only led to sharper relations between the periphery and centre. While accepting that central laws would be higher than local legislation he advocates federalism for the following reasons:\(^8\)

- as an instrument of self defence against an homogenising centre;
- to divide the budget better (eastern Ukrainians believe they subsidise the remainder of Ukraine);
- allow the development of the local economy;
- provide for greater local implementation of economic reform;
- grant cultural autonomy;
- reduce conflict between the centre and the periphery over language and cultural policies;
- prevent Ukrainianisation.

**Exaggerated claims**

Despite the public unpopularity of federalism, some Western authors, such as Wilson and Arel, make the cardinal mistake often made by outside observers of Ukraine of assuming that federalism has widespread support. Demands made for federalism, local self-government and Russian as a second state language in the local polls held in the two oblasts of the Donbas in the March 1994 parliamentary elections do not necessarily mean that these should be considered the views of the entire eastern and southern Ukraine. Yet, Wilson argues that the views of the Donbas are shared throughout this large region: ‘the 1994 election demonstrates that such sentiments were widespread throughout the east and south’.\(^9\)

In Zaporizhzhia, an industrial city in eastern Ukraine, current research has shown that there is little evidence of support for pro-Russian separatism or federalism.\(^10\)

To buttress the claim of Ukraine’s acute division into Ukrainophones versus Russophones it is argued that the latter are strong supporters of federalism while the former (who are equated with ‘nationalists’) are its opponents. Therefore, according to this misplaced logic, due to the demographic and economic weight of Ukraine’s Russophone regions, the ‘federal question will remain on the political agenda for the foreseeable future’.\(^11\) In fact the opposite is the case. Federalism finds little support throughout Ukraine; few people actually understand what it means. If they do, it is usually in a negative sense; its implementation, it is believed, would lead to
disintegrative tendencies (such as in the former USSR and Yugoslavia). Support for the inclusion of a clause on introducing a bicameral parliament into the draft constitution, which many initially saw as a means of introducing federalism into Ukraine through the back door, withered during the course of the constitutional debates during 1995 and 1996. By Spring 1996 only the then centre-right Statehood parliamentary faction continued to back a bicameral parliament, a faction which is composed of deputies exclusively from Ukrainophone western Ukraine.

Both Kravchuk and Kuchma are opponents of federalism, as is the former Socialist Chairman of Parliament, Moroz. The centrist factions in parliament, who account for the largest bloc of deputies, largely support a unitary state. President Kuchma has taken a tougher line against Crimean separatists and in favour of a unitary state than his Ukrainophone predecessor. The June 1996 constitution defines Ukraine as a unitary state—with the sole exception of the Crimea as its only autonomous region.

Regional allegiances and a Ukrainian political community

Regionalism

When discussing regionalism in Ukraine we should bear in mind that it is not a peculiarly Ukrainian phenomenon either in the late twentieth century or at earlier times in history. ‘Italians’ arriving in the USA prior to the First World War never declared themselves to be in fact Italians—but inhabitants of their local region. Few knew or understood the Italian (Tuscan) state language.12 Austrians remained confused about their identity until as late as the Second World War; were they a separate nation or ‘Germans’? Regionalism is a Europe-wide phenomenon in the 1990s:13

At varying speeds and to varying degrees, authority is drifting down from national capitals to provinces and cities. Region, whether within or across national boundaries, is Europe’s current and future dynamic.

So why therefore is regionalism regarded as such a different animal in Ukraine? Regionalism in western Europe coexists with the civic nationalism of the states within which the regions are located. Connor points out that German nationalism has not precluded regional
differences (Prussians, Rhinelanders, Bavarians, Friesians, Saxons). ‘The important fact, however, is that in any test of loyalties, those factors which all members of the German nation feel they have in common are deemed more important than are regional distinctions’, Connor adds.  

In other words, Ukraine is different to Western Europe by virtue of history and time. If we were to compare contemporary Ukraine (or more precisely its eastern and southern regions) with that of Western Europe in the mid- and late nineteenth centuries we would find few differences. In both cases regional identities would be stronger than allegiances to nation-states and political communities. No German, Italian, French or Spanish nation existed during the late nineteenth century (as no Ukrainian political nation exists today). The major difference is that western Ukraine exchanged its regional for Ukrainian loyalties at the same time as did the bulk of Western Europe. Regionalism, in the sense of a primary loyalty, is therefore mainly confined to those regions of Ukraine which belonged to Tsarist Russia prior to 1917, where there were far fewer opportunities for nation building. Ukraine therefore includes within it ‘the parallel (synchronous) existence of two groups of the Ukrainian ethnus at different stages of historical development’.  

Regionalism as a contemporary phenomenon exists throughout the former USSR. Ukraine may have its Donbas, ‘Novorossiya’, Pridniprovia and agrarian belt. Russia has its Kuzbass, Kaliningrad; Primorye, central Russia and Cossack south. The various post-Soviet elections held in Russia have pointed to a reformist north-conservative south divide. Political differences also exist between urban and rural regions (as they do in Ukraine outside its western region). In a 1996 poll many Russian residents on the Kuril islands agreed to accept Japanese sovereignty ‘if it meant higher living standards’. This resembles the attitudes of many eastern Ukrainians who blame their drop in living standards upon the disintegration of the former USSR. After a tour of the Russian Far East, Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov warned about its growing separatism due to its isolation from the Russian heartland.  

Peoples inhabiting border regions often develop regional, local identities with mixed languages and confused loyalties. Identities in eastern-southern Ukraine are a mixture of local, east Slavic and Soviet. While recognising that they are different to Russians living across the former Soviet internal administrative, now Ukrainian-Russian, interstate border they do not differentiate between Russians and Ukrainians within eastern-southern Ukraine. They are all, after all, Russian-speakers in a region where all national cultures
had largely been eradicated in urban centres and where few people are religious. Linguistic, religious or cultural markers of separate identity between Ukrainians or Russians in eastern-southern Ukraine do not therefore really exist.

This would not be a major problem if Ukraine did not border Russia, to which many of these eastern Ukrainians gravitate culturally and linguistically. The majority of Russians in Russia do not perceive of Ukrainians (and Belarusians) as ‘foreigners’; but as branches of one *rus’kiy narod* forcibly, but temporarily, torn apart. This is confirmed to them when they see across the border in eastern-southern Ukraine peoples who prefer a local or a Slavic identity. General Andrei Nikolayev, then Commander of the Russian Federal Border Service, could not have put it better when he said: ‘The border between Ukraine and Russia is in fact a border between one nation but two independent states.’

Nation building in eastern and southern Ukraine will ultimately lead to the local inhabitants giving their primary identification as civic Ukrainians (and maybe later ethnic Ukrainians, Russians, etc.), thereby increasingly differentiating them from their Russian neighbours. A crucial factor which will contribute to this process are borders as well as a better economic climate. One of the slogans raised by the coal miners’ strikes of February 1996 in Ukraine was already to slap import duties on Russian and Polish coal because this threatened their jobs.

**Regional elites**

Regional elites in eastern and southern Ukraine do not favour the incorporation of their regions into Russia. These regional elites are only in the process of creation. They have not formulated a clear role yet, ‘and therefore do not know what they should do and how they should act out their political line’.

Within Kyiv *zemliatstvos* are in the process of creation uniting together representatives of local regions resident in the capital city; the aim being to increase ties between the centre and the periphery. The election of Kuchma as President in July 1994 in itself led to the influx of eastern Ukrainians into the central state machine, thereby broadening their participation in the state and nation building project.

In a decree of 7 October 1994 President Kuchma also promoted the patronage of naval vessels by regions as a means of both increasing local identification with Ukraine’s evolving navy, as well
as reducing the financial burden upon the centre for its financial support. Until 1995 the patronage came mainly from western Ukraine. Since then assistance and patronage have mainly arrived from the south-eastern Ukrainian regions of Luhans’k, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and the Crimea. Three western Ukrainian regions have also provided patronage (Vynnytsia, Ternopil and Volyn).27

This shift in patronage is a reflection of two factors. First, the coming to power of an eastern Ukrainian president (Kuchma). Second, the spread of derzhavnyk ideas from western-central to south-eastern Ukraine. This patronage ‘is an example of the unity of our state, the efforts of all regions of Ukraine, geared towards the formation of its state institutions’.28 In return for foodstuffs and other material donations recruits would serve in those vessels named after their region. It was not merely a question of material assistance—but also one of moral and spiritual support for naval officers and sailors. As one author proudly boasted: ‘It is certainly the case that the VMS (Naval Forces) of Ukraine are being built by the entire state, all of its people, despite economic difficulties.’29

The myth of separatism

Ethnic and linguistic divisions

According to Connor, ethnic conflict usually manifests itself in societies where a divergence occurs along an ‘us-them syndrome’.30 Horowitz pointed out that not all ethnic conflict ends in secessionism (especially successful secessionism). This depends upon domestic and international factors, whether the region is economically well off and the attitude of the different ethnic groups within the region towards separatism.31

Those factors which usually spark ethnic conflict, as outlined by Connor and Horowitz, are largely absent from Ukraine, outside the Crimea. Both of the two main linguistic groups in Ukraine have no clearly defined identity or demarcation between them, while Russophone Ukrainians particularly, remain amorphous. Wilson still argues though that ‘Although they blur into one another at the edges, they are sufficiently distinct at the extremes.’32 This theoretical base of Wilson’s study is taken to the extreme when he argues, as he has elsewhere, that centrist factions within the Ukrainian parliament can even be divided into Ukrainophones and Russophones.33
In a detailed study of the Ukrainian political system Chudowsky found that while region and language were important, they were not central issues on the platforms of candidates in the 1994 parliamentary elections and were not therefore the main factors which shaped the formation of political parties and parliamentary factions in the elected parliament. Narrowing the source of Ukraine’s divisions to only one issue (language) simplifies a very complex situation. Chudowsky found that the Ukrainian political system was shaped by attitudes towards a multitude of factors such as ethno-cultural, regional, foreign policy orientation, marketisation, state building as well as legacies of communist rule (statism, low levels of public trust and weak parties). In determining faction membership the Russian language issue was peripheral. Of deputies who favoured economic membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 80 per cent held no views on the Russian language, while only 19 per cent favoured its introduction as a second state or official language. As these deputies tend to be mainly from the centrist factions (national democrats tend to oppose CIS membership per se while the radical left favour additional political and maybe military CIS integration) it is difficult to understand how one can so conveniently divide centrist parliamentary factions into ‘Russophones’ and ‘Ukrainophones’.34

Source: 1989 Soviet census

Map 4.1 Ethnic Ukrainians
Perhaps the greatest exaggeration made by Wilson stretches his theory of Ukrainophones versus Russophones to that of a potential civil war in Ukraine. In Wilson's view, Ukrainian nationalist arguments in favour of nationhood, citizenship and ethnic rights are similar to those propagated by Baltic nationalists. 'The consequent potential for an anti-nationalist backlash in eastern and southern Ukraine is therefore as real as it is in north-east Estonia or in Moldova east of the Dnieper.' Confrontation between Russophones and Ukrainophones 'is therefore more or less guaranteed'. This is especially so in relation to Russophone opposition to Ukrainianisation.35

The inter-ethnic situation within Ukraine has never resembled such an Armageddon-like scenario as painted by Wilson and many other Western authors. All opinion polls conducted during the five or six years of Ukrainian independence show that few Ukrainians or Russians have experienced ethnic discrimination. In an Autumn 1995 poll only 10 per cent of Ukrainian citizens stated that they had experienced any discrimination.36 In the Crimea a different poll found that nearly 20 per cent had experienced ethnic discrimination, twice as high as the all-Ukrainian average, but still low.37 In addition, few non-Ukrainians have migrated out of Ukraine, an indication that they have not experienced ethnic discrimination. Russian migrants who have voted with their feet and moved to the Russian Federation have come from the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Odesa oblast, the most multi-ethnic region of Ukraine, not only has inter-ethnic conflict been avoided, 'but any friction whatsoever'.38

In arriving at his pessimistic prognosis for Ukraine Wilson expressed a lack of understanding of the causes of conflict within the former USSR. In only some of these cases of conflict did ethnicity play a role; a factor which is largely absent in Ukraine where every oblast has a Ukrainian majority. In Ukraine events proceeded in the opposite direction to those in conflict zones in the former USSR. In 1990–1991 the Crimea was elevated from the status of an oblast to that of an autonomous republic with the backing of the allegedly ‘nationalist’ Kravchuk. No other region of Ukraine apart from the Crimea has demanded regional, political autonomy.

In the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the Trans-Dniester Republic the spark which ignited these conflicts was either the refusal to grant these regions any political autonomy or attempts at removing the autonomy they had inherited from the
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former USSR. In the Trans-Dniester Republic an additional factor which sparked revolt was the perceived fear that Moldova would unite with Romania. To equate the Trans-Dniester Republic with the Donbas is to misunderstand the causes of the secessionist campaign in Moldova which were not grounded on ethnic factors. Many more Russians and Ukrainians live in right bank Moldova than in the separatist enclave, where Moldovans are still the majority ethnic group. The Slavs living on the right bank have not supported the separatists. Indeed, on a visit to Moldova in Spring 1993 the author interviewed the then Deputy Interior Minister, a Russian Old Believer, and Russian journalists on the newspaper *Nezavisimaya Moldova* who all opposed the ‘communist leadership’ of the Trans-Dniester Republic. The then Russian Deputy Interior Minister had actually fought in the 1992 brief war against the separatists within the Moldovan police forces.

The above examples again point to the difficulty in speculating on the neat division of linguistic groups into antagonistic blocs in post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine and Moldova. Russians and Russophones working in the Ukrainian presidential administration have often promoted nationalist causes to a greater degree than their Ukrainophone counterparts.

Studies by Laitin, Petersen and Slocum of language standardisation and homogenisation in many European states have shown that ‘rulers were able to impose a single language for purposes of administration without facing uproars from regional elites where the language of the ruler was considered a foreign one’. In Ukraine the ruling elites have two advantages. The Ukrainian language is not ‘foreign’ to the ears of Russophone Ukrainians, many of whom are bilingual. Second, the lack of a civil society in Russophone regions of Ukraine gives great scope to regional elites in the formulation and manipulation of public opinion.

Why then should we expect that the experience of Ukraine will be different to that encountered in Western Europe? Laitin, Petersen and Slocum point to the importance of ensuring that regional elites are not blocked from obtaining the advantages of joining the central ruling elites. In other words, if a policy of inclusion is followed where there is no discrimination against regional groups, as in Ukraine, there is unlikely to be opposition to the introduction of a state language. There is also unlikely to be support for separatism. Instead, Russophones will weigh up the costs and benefits of either assimilating completely into Ukrainian language and culture or becoming more bilingual. In a similar manner Ukrainophones in the
Soviet era weighed up the costs and benefits of adopting Russian language and culture.

The low level of Russophone Ukrainian political activism found in Ukraine is reminiscent of the Spanish working-class immigrant population in Catalonia, where it accounts for 40 per cent of the autonomous region’s population. Despite the introduction of Catalan language laws, protest has been rather low among these immigrants (as it has within the Russian-speaking Estonian region of Narva, an area Wilson points to as a potential area of conflict). Language therefore has not led to ethnic conflict in either Catalonia or Narva. Russians in Estonia feel closer in basic values to Estonians than to Russians in the Russian Federation (a factor also seen among Russians in Ukraine). Economic incentives exist for Estonianisation, although identity change is likely to occur only after a number of generations. ‘We are therefore seeing only the beginning of the process of integration into Estonian life, with early steps toward linguistic assimilation’, Laitin argues. In Latvia, where the plight of the indigenous nationality was probably worst of all the three Baltic states, Pettai also concluded that within a generation or two the Latvians are set to achieve ‘cultural hegemony within their state boundaries, analogous to the accomplishments of the French in France’.

**In search of separatism**

Critical to the success of Ukrainian state and nation building and the creation of a political community are attitudes towards statehood, separatism and regionalism. Security threats to Ukrainian territorial integrity are largely exaggerated due to the internal weakness of Ukraine’s political community, which is still in the process of being created. Ukraine inherited a strong attachment among the bulk of its population to its territory. Seventy nine per cent of Ukrainians link their personal fates with that of this territory; only 2 per cent had decided to emigrate, 8 per cent were undecided and 11 per cent wanted to live where they believed life was better.

In fact, as this chapter later shows, there is strong support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity throughout Ukraine. Even prior to the disintegration of the USSR in April 1990 the Communist Party of Ukraine’s Politburo instructed the Institute of History ‘to prepare scientific and well-founded materials for the use of ruling organs to (reject) illegal territorial claims against the Ukrainian SSR’.
Ukrainian elites hold an even tougher position on this question than the population at large. Fifty three per cent of them believe that the Crimea should not have political autonomy but, instead, be given the same status as other regions. Only 44 per cent championed its autonomy. During the constitutional process of 1995–1996 there was widespread support within parliament for only granting the Crimea a charter—not a constitution.

Only two out of 209 members of the Ukrainian central elites advocated transferring the Crimea to Russia. This tough attitude is reflected in parliamentary votes and resolutions which received more than the constitutional two-thirds majorities in favour of firm action against Crimean separatism or Russian territorial demands. In another poll 50 per cent of the population backed policies which would prevent separatism, while 6 per cent would support the preservation of territorial integrity at any cost (this was similar to another poll which found that only 5 per cent backed the use of armed forces to defend Sevastopol). A third of those polled, meanwhile, agreed with the proposition that nations had the right to statehood. Taken individually, all of Ukraine’s regions exhibited a reluctance to change current borders. There is little evidence of support within Ukraine for border changes outside the Crimea. Public opinion polls show that eastern and western Ukrainians both hold similar views about the need to maintain current borders. In March 1993 Ukraine’s Institute of Sociology found that only 18 per cent of Russians and 5 per cent of Ukrainians backed Russian historical and legal claims to the Crimea.

Most outside observers, both in Russia and the West, mistakenly assume that Russian-speakers are likely to be separatists. In actual fact, only a small minority of Russians in eastern Ukraine regard Russia as their ‘homeland’. Political parties and civic groups which are traditionally labelled as ‘separatist’ in eastern Ukraine (for example, the Civic Congress and the Communist Party of Ukraine [KPU]) do not support separatism. They, like the Party of Slavic Unity and the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR) party, back either a Russian-Ukrainian strategic alliance or Ukraine within a pan-Slavic state or a revived USSR. The KPU believes, therefore, that ‘the Crimea and Sevastopol belong to Ukraine, yet Ukraine is a part of the USSR’. ‘Pro-Russian’ political parties which advocate the Belarusian path for Ukraine are weak. As a leading Russian nationalist, Vladimir Lysenko, lamented: ‘Today there is not a single strong party oriented to Russia. Only in Crimea, Sevastopol, and maybe in Donbas is there still some kind of serious opposition.’
Separatism in Ukraine outside the Crimea is therefore largely a myth which explains Ukraine’s relative stability; factors which will help in the consolidation of a political community. The decline in support for territorial changes in Ukraine follows the general trend of world developments since 1945. Although over fifty secessionist movements exist in the world only two successful cases of border changes of existing states have occurred (creating Bangladesh and Eritrea; Chechnya may become the third).

Although separatism is largely a myth in Ukraine there is a widespread perception that it, like the Russian external threat, is far greater than in reality. This is probably a consequence of the economic crisis, a weakness of the national idea and an undeveloped state building process; hence why the Ukrainian parliament approved a law ‘On enhancing the criminal responsibility for certain crimes against the state aimed at protecting the constitutional system and territorial integrity’. In 1992 the level of those in Ukraine who feared possible ethnic conflict peaked at 49 per cent—yet only 3 per cent had actually experienced ethnic conflict. This discrepancy was largely the result of witnessing conflicts in other regions of the former USSR. During the period of Ukraine’s most acute economic crisis (1992–1994) national tolerance actually grew, as shown by the 1994 parliamentary elections where only ten (out of 450) deputies were elected from the radical right.

No secessionist movements have been successfully mobilised in Ukraine because ‘there is no obvious line along which ethnic tension might lead to polarization’. These regional differences are often exaggerated by outside observers to indicate that Ukraine is threatened by imminent disintegration. Yet a four-year study by the University of Glasgow into political values in Ukraine (and other post-communist countries) found few major differences between east and west Ukraine. Likewise, then presidential adviser on domestic questions, Vydrin, told the author that the east-west split in ethnic terms was non-existent. Regionalism should not therefore be associated with ‘crawling separatism’ but with inherited sub-political cultures that at this moment in time local inhabitants in certain regions of Ukraine have greater loyalty towards than a Ukrainian political community and civic nation. It is also within eastern and southern Ukraine that the national idea is still weak.

The two regions where the national idea is weakest are the Donbas and the Crimea. But, only in the latter have ethnic Russians mobilised to demand political autonomy, with some of them, calling for the transfer of the Crimea to Russian sovereignty.
These regional sub-cultures exist at a time when an all-Ukrainian political culture and community has still to develop. Because of historical, demographic, ethnic and economic factors eastern and western Ukraine have developed differently. Hence the dominance within western Ukraine of the right over the left and in eastern Ukraine of the opposite. Southern Ukraine has a slight left dominance with central Ukraine exhibiting some aspects of both left- and right-wing leanings. The crucial difference rests in their attitudes towards the CIS, with support for the CIS greater in eastern than in western Ukraine. But even here there are not any notable differences. There is little support anywhere in Ukraine for political and military integration within the CIS, while all Ukraine’s regions, including the ‘West’, back some form of economic co-operation within the CIS.63

The Crimea and the Donbas

As stated earlier, the Crimea and the Donbas are Ukraine’s only two regions which are likely to remain problematical in terms of nation building. Although separatism as a mass movement collapsed by 1995 the potential will remain for the Crimea to also remain a threat to Ukraine’s state territorial integrity. This is especially the case in view of the fact that three-quarters of Russian opinion believes that the Crimea and Sevastopol should be rightfully under Russian sovereignty. In the Donbas though, contrary to the view of many outside observers, separatism never became a mass movement and is unlikely to do so in the future. The only scenario one could envisage of separatism taking root in the Donbas would be in the highly unlikely event of radical right nationalists obtaining a majority within parliament and/or, more importantly, taking control of the presidency.

Eighty five per cent of the Donbas lies within Ukraine in the two oblasts of Donets’k and Luhans’k. This region accounted for approximately one-fifth of Ukraine’s industrial output, 9 per cent of its territory and 17 per cent of its population. Traditionally the Donbas has always been the left-wing Piedmont within Ukraine, a factor it has retained to some degree in post-Soviet Ukraine where it has been described as the ‘cradle’ and ‘one of the main bastions’ of communism.64 The bulk of the 10 per cent Bolshevik support in Ukraine during the January 1918 elections to the Constituent Assembly was from the Donbas, Kryvyi Rih and some areas of southern Ukraine. Vladimir Lenin, the first leader of the Soviet state, openly admitted that without the Donbas Soviet power would be weak in Ukraine. Two-thirds of Bolshevik party members in 1917 in
Ukraine were located in the Donbas. The largest number of refusals to voluntarily take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian state, as demanded by the June 1996 constitution, came from the Donbas.

Many outside observers have usually mistakenly extrapolated the sentiments found in the Donbas to the remainder of eastern and southern Ukraine. Russians in the Donbas are different to those in the Crimea, while the region has local peculiarities which make it different from the remainder of eastern-southern Ukraine. Therefore, to argue that the Donbas is ‘typical’ of the entire region would be as wrong as arguing that Galicia is representative of western Ukraine as a whole.

The majority of Russians living in the Donbas have lived there for many generations or more. Russia is not their homeland. They are locals—not vykhidtsi from Russia—who have gone native and inter-married. The Donbas was always an exceptional region within the former USSR, the ‘showcase of communism’. Its local economic elites would usually bypass Kyiv and move to Moscow directly (local Communist Party elites would still have to move through Kyiv). The Donbas is an area with an identity in transition, where hostility to the Ukrainian language has now largely evaporated; bilingualism is slowly on the increase with a growth in allegiance to a civic Ukrainian identity (especially among the younger generation). Nevertheless, at the current level of ‘Ukrainianisation’ it would take eighty to 100 years for the proportion of Ukrainian-language schools in the Donbas to equal the number of ethnic Ukrainians living there.

The weakness of the attachment of residents of the city of Donetsk to Russia as a homeland can be seen from the following poll conducted by Democratic Initiatives. It also provides an indication of the extent of the region’s identity in transition, as reflected in the large number of respondents who regard the former USSR as their ‘homeland’ (see Table 4.1).

The Donbas local elites have, in general, comfortably integrated within those of the independent Ukrainian state. The Donbas elites understand that they have better opportunities within Ukraine than within a Russia which does not require another decaying industrial region with more troublesome coal miners. They also know full well that their region was starved, of investment in the 1970s in favour of Soviet capital investment into industry in the Russian Federation. Asked whether the Donbas would be better in Russia the Chairman of Donetsk oblast council, Vladimir Shcherban, replied: ‘There are no “what ifs” in history. We have what we have. And we have to work from this reality instead of engaging in guesses. Donbas is an inalienable part of Ukraine.’
These local elites have benefited threefold from Ukrainian independence. First, they have not been blocked from entering the central elites. By being part of the central ruling elites they can directly contribute to the discussion surrounding Ukraine’s evolution. Second, they have personally benefited from participation in privatisation (the Donbas is in the forefront in Ukraine’s privatisation campaign). Third, the transition to a market economy has helped those members of the local economic elite whose products can be sold outside the CIS, including Ukraine’s important metallurgical industry, to earn hard currency. This, in turn, has influenced their geopolitical orientation away from Russia and the CIS. Reformist local elites in the Donbas and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine have tended to back parties such as the Liberals, the MRBR, the Party of Economic Revival, the New Ukraine bloc and the People’s Democratic Party.

Local elites therefore have not backed the calls made by the radical left for a revival of the former USSR, understanding, as did Kuchma in the 1994 presidential election campaign, that independent Ukraine was an established fact. They are also painfully aware that any attempt to revive the USSR could only be undertaken at the cost of bloodshed. This view was typified in the explanation given by Stepan Kravchuk, Director of the Avtozaz plant in Zaporizhzhia:

As regards Ukraine, it is true that there was a lot we did not know and were ready for. But Ukraine became independent, and probably this was a good thing. A fact is a fact. Take me for example. I am Ukrainian, but find it difficult to talk in Ukrainian. It is a fact that we have forgotten many of our traditions, but are after all a people.
This means that the union that existed was not correct. Given time Ukraine will become a normal state.\textsuperscript{72}

The Donbas has eight characteristics which make it different from other Ukrainian regions. First, there are no demands for political autonomy in the Donbas (the only region where this demand has been raised has been in the Crimea, where it was granted). Local elites have only backed calls for economic autonomy after similar demands were granted in the Crimea and raised elsewhere in Odesa and Trans-Carpathia.

Pro-Russian political parties and civic groups are closely associated with the Communist Party who do not promote separatism. The most pro-Russian political party in the Donbas, Civic Congress, does not support the secession of the region and its joining to Russia. Unlike in the Crimea, Donbas political groups do not appeal to the Russian leadership to come to their defence. Pro-Russianism or pro-unionism is usually a product of the weakness of the national idea. In western Ukraine the drop in living standards has been offset by the strength of the national idea. This has not therefore led to demands for a new union. In contrast, Donbasites prioritise not just the simple fact of having achieved independence—but their decline in living standards, particularly in comparison to Russia. This drop in living standards is blamed largely on either the disintegration of the former USSR or the breakdown in economic ties with Russia caused by the former ‘nationalist’ President Kravchuk. If pro-Russianism is generally absent in the largely urban Donbas this is even more the case elsewhere in eastern and southern Ukraine where rural areas are still Ukrainian-speaking.\textsuperscript{73}

Second, there are few issues upon which Donbasites could mobilise. Nearly two-thirds believe that political rallies either bring no benefit, or they have no impact and are unlikely therefore to change anything for the better.\textsuperscript{74} The Donbas is dominated by a Russified ethnic Ukrainian majority which prevents ethno-political mobilisation against their own Ukrainian state (the Crimea is the only Ukrainian region with an ethnic Russian majority). There are no institutional resources through which Donbasites could be mobilised (unlike in the Crimea which was upgraded to an autonomous republic in the early 1990s and thereby given these institutions, such as a presidency during 1994–1995). There is also no single local leader with a following throughout the Donbas. Donbasites have not been mobilised along ethnic grounds, therefore, but in a multi-ethnic, political alliance demanding regional, socio-
economic or political reforms.\textsuperscript{75} Russian-speaking elites were removed from power by pro-Romanian nationalists in Moldova in the early 1990s who then campaigned for unification with Romania. These twin factors sparked the revolt of the Trans-Dniester Republic, factors which are absent in the Russian-speaking Donbas.

Third, there is no indigenous Russian culture, folk music and cultural basis for an ethnic national Russian revival in the Donbas. Fourth, Russian political parties have been unable to establish any footholds in the Donbas. There is an absence of issues upon which they could mobilise a population which is not hostile to independence, supportive of separatism or interested in fanning the flames of ethnic conflict (which has no historical basis). Ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers in the Donbas have been largely indifferent to appeals by Russian nationalists. Fifth, the Donbas is highly industrialised and urbanised. There are therefore few Ukrainian-speaking rural regions. This made the region a base of activity for independent trade unions and strikes by coal miners who backed Rukh and the national communists in the drive to independence.

Sixth, Russian-speaking residents of the Donbas, the majority of whom are of Ukrainian ethnic origin, are neither anti-Ukrainian nor anti-Russian. Some opinion polls in the Donbas give upwards of half of the respondents as having a ‘Soviet identity’, indicating mixed marriages and a reluctance to choose one or other family’s ethnic origins. This is also a classic case of an identity in transition. Seven, as in the Crimea, residents of the Donbas have a strong attachment to their region. But this does not preclude them also from developing a civic Ukrainian identity. Finally, as well as economic issues influencing foreign orientations, generational factors will also increasingly come into play. The typical member of the Communist Party is a pensioner, from a section of society which suffers most from the economic crisis and is therefore more nostalgic about the former USSR (where the bulk of his/hers formative years were to be found). The younger generation (and reformist local elites), opinion polls tell us, look westwards for fashion, music, language, seasonal employment and orientation.

The uniqueness of the Crimea within Ukraine was recognised by Ukrainian independent governments which claimed it between 1918 and 1921 and by the Communist Party of Ukraine ideologue Kravchuk, when he was in power in the late 1980s. There was never any doubt therefore that the Crimea within Ukraine would have the right to political autonomy. The only question was would this be a Tatar autonomous republic (favoured by national democrats) or one
dominated by ethnic Russians? The Ukrainian leadership, while
accepting that Crimean Russians were oriented towards Russia, had
always drawn the line on any attempt at infringing its territorial
integrity. ‘There will be no negotiations on borders, territorial
integrity and sovereignty’, Kravchuk said, a policy continued by his
successor. Kravchuk and Kuchma have also both rejected the signing
of any federal treaty between Ukraine and the Crimea.

Although nationalist critics of Kravchuk complained at his support
for upgrading the Crimean oblast to that of an autonomous republic
these criticisms are largely unfounded. Without this measure two
scenarios may have taken place. First, ethnic conflict could have
occurred along the lines of the Trans-Dniester Republic, another
region which had been constituted as an autonomous republic within
the Ukrainian SSR during the inter-war years. The failure of the
Moldovans to accept the need for federal autonomy for this region
was one of the main factors which ignited the conflict. Second,
President Mikhail Gorbachev and other then Soviet leaders threatened
Ukraine on many occasions with the transfer of the Crimea to Russia.
In the absence of political autonomy the Crimean leadership was
prepared to appeal directly to the USSR Supreme Soviet to reverse
the 1954 decision that transferred the region from the RSFSR to
Ukraine. This decision could have been relatively easily adopted.
Ukraine would have then become an independent country in January
1992 without the Crimea and Sevastopol. If the question had only
arisen after January 1992 (when the USSR no longer existed)
Kravchuk accepted that Ukraine could have been able to get away
without granting full political autonomy to it. But, once granted,
autonomy could not be taken back—a mistake made by the Georgians
vis-à-vis Abkhazia. The fact that Ukraine inherited the Crimea and
Sevastopol is therefore a ‘big victory for Leonid Kravchuk’, according
to his former adviser on domestic political issues, Mykola
Mikhailchenko.

Unlike other regions of Ukraine, three-quarters of the Crimea’s
population arrived in the peninsula after 1945. Many of these were
former military personnel, now activists within the radical left and pro-
Russian political movements. They are therefore likely to regard Russia
as their homeland. Many residents of the peninsula are Crimeans first—
and something else only second. But even in the Crimea identity is not
so clearly defined, as reflected in a poll conducted by the Crimean
Liberal Arts research Centre (see Table 4.2).

Between 1994 and 1995 ethnic Russian separatism in the Crimea
reached its greatest heights with the election of Iuriy Meshkov, leader
of the Russia bloc, as president. It then quickly lost its support and subsequently largely faded from public view. Russia’s entanglement in Chechnya also gave President Kuchma a window of opportunity to deal a blow to Crimean separatism by abolishing the post of the presidency in March 1995. One Ukrainian newspaper pointed out: ‘It is understood that the Chechen syndrome today forces the Russian state leadership to reject the policies of double standards and recognise that Ukraine has the right to defend its territorial integrity.’ This defence of territorial integrity, the author added, was undertaken by ‘lawful, constitutional methods’,—something very different to Russian actions in Chechnya.

The collapse of pro-Russian separatism and the now widespread recognition among local and central elites that independent Ukraine is a factor that is here to stay will bring changes in the Crimea—as it has in the Donbas. Most Crimeans did not follow their parliament’s decision in October 1997 to switch to Moscow time, instead turning their clocks back, like the remainder of Ukraine, to remain on central European time. An example of no going back is the issuing of new Ukrainian passports. One in ten of Sevastopol residents now have Ukrainian (not Soviet) passports. The national rights of the Tatar and Ukrainian minorities in the Crimea will have to be addressed by the central authorities and benevolent foreign powers (for example, Turkey). In 1995, of the 300 schools in the Crimea only one provided instruction in the Ukrainian language while two provided it in Turkic (Ukrainians and Tatars make up 25 and 10 per cent of the Crimea’s inhabitants respectively). Only 1.7 per cent and 3 per cent of Crimean television and radio broadcasts respectively were in Ukrainian. However, former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko predicted that:

I think with time there will be no problem regarding the learning of the state language in the Crimea. But, for this we need to be patient with the current situation of artificial opposition (to it).
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Oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian state

The June 1996 Ukrainian constitution states that all deputies should take an oath of loyalty before assuming office, in a manner similar to that undertaken by a newly elected president when he assumes office. This oath is outlined in article seventy-nine as follows: ‘I do swear allegiance to Ukraine. I shall by my acts defend the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and shall care for the good of my Homeland and the well-being of the Ukrainian Nation. I do swear to adhere to the Constitution of Ukraine, and to the laws of Ukraine, and to carry out my duties in the interests of all my fellow countrymen.’

Eighty-five per cent of deputies in the 1994–1998 parliament voluntarily agreed to take the oath of loyalty when there was no threat that they would be barred from maintaining their seats. This high figure is an indication that independent Ukraine is not threatened by internal disintegration and provides confirmation of the basis of Ukraine’s domestic stability.

Nevertheless, a total of sixty-four (15 per cent) deputies from the 1994–1998 parliament refused to take the oath of loyalty. In view of the fact that they were elected prior to the adoption of the constitution they were allowed to keep their seats (refusal after the 1998 elections meant that the elected deputy would not be allowed to take his/her seat in parliament). Of those who voted against the constitution, 69 per cent also refused to take the oath. Among the 314 deputies who voted for the constitution only ten (3.2 per cent) changed their mind and refused to take the oath.

It will not perhaps be surprising that 90 per cent of the total number of 1994–1998 parliamentary deputies who refused to take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian state were from the communist faction. Despite this fact, thirty members of the communist faction (34 per cent) did take the oath of loyalty. This, in itself, indicates that the Communist Party is no longer the monolithic and disciplined force it once was. In addition, it also indicates that at least one-third of the members of this faction were themselves national communists. Of the national communists who took the oath 24.2 per cent were Russians and 69.7 per cent were Ukrainians. Could this mean that one does not necessarily have to be an ethnic Ukrainian to be a national communist in Ukraine?

Of the remainder who refused to voluntarily take the oath only one was from the Peasant Party. The remainder of both left-wing
Socialist and Peasant Party factions took the oath of loyalty. Although these two factions regularly team up with the communists against domestic reform they nevertheless remain loyal to the Ukrainian state. (In 1997 the Socialist and Peasant party factions amalgamated.) Only two of the twenty-eight-strong Inter-Regional Group of Deputies refused to take the oath of loyalty. Yet it has links to the MRBR party outside parliament which is routinely accused of ‘disloyalty’ to the state. No members of the Unity faction, which were mainly centred on Kuchma’s home base of Dnipropetrovs’k and included former Prime Minister Lazarenko, refused to take the oath of loyalty.88

The largest number of refusals to take the oath of loyalty came from the Donbas (44 per cent). Yet these twenty-eight deputies only accounted for 39 per cent of the total number of elected seats (seventy-two) in the Donbas oblasts of Donets’k and Luhans’k. In the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, where one would have thought that there would have also been a large number of refuseniks, only eight refused (or 35 per cent of the total number of elected okruhs). Proportionately therefore, this is a smaller figure than in the Donbas, reflecting perhaps the return to power of pragmatic Ukrainian loyalists after the collapse of support for separatism during 1995–1996.

The 1994–1998 Supreme Rada had 327 ethnic Ukrainians (who accounted for 80 per cent of the total number) and eighty-one ethnic Russians, with a smattering of other ethnic groups (Jews, Romanians, Hungarians, etc., almost all of whom were loyalists). Of the ethnic Ukrainians and Russians thirty-six (11 per cent) and twenty-nine (36 per cent) deputies respectively did not take the oath of loyalty. What was the relationship between refusal to take the oath and language, specifically attitudes towards the Russian language? Of the 147 candidates who ran on a platform of dual state languages and were elected, only sixty-five (44 per cent) of them refused to take the oath of loyalty.

Interestingly, of the elected 123 deputies who ran during the 1994 elections on a platform of full reunion with Russia only sixty-one (49.6 per cent) refused to take the oath. But, nearly 100 per cent of those 126 deputies who ran during the 1994 elections on a platform of full CIS membership took the oath. Support for union with Russia and/or full CIS membership does not therefore necessarily signify disloyalty to the Ukrainian state. Not surprisingly, of the fifty-three deputies who ran during the 1994 elections on an anti-CIS platform all took the oath of loyalty.
National minorities

Russians in the former USSR

Some scholars now believe that upwards of half of Russia’s dramatic population growth since the last century was due to assimilation of other peoples. During the inter-war period 45 per cent of the Russian population gain was due to the re-identification of non-Russians as ‘Russians’. This especially took place in areas adjacent to Ukraine. In the 1926 Soviet census 3.1 million Ukrainians were recorded as living in the northern Caucasus. By 1959 this figure had dropped to 170,000. In the 1926 census 1.63 million Ukrainians were recorded as living in the Voronezh and Kursk oblasts of neighbouring Russia. By 1959 this figure had declined to only 260,000.\(^9\) All Ukrainian-language schools were closed in the Russian Federation in 1937 when the policy of indigenisation and Ukrainianisation was officially declared to be over.

Soviet internal borders therefore did play a role in identifying ethnic groups with the republics they enclosed. This re-identification of Ukrainians as ‘Russians’ did not necessarily lead to a complete loss of Ukrainian identity. In the Kuban, the western Don region and Kursk and Voronezh oblasts many inhabitants still call themselves rus’ky (similar to the rusyn/Ruthenians of Slovakia and Trans-Carpathia) or khokhly (a derogatory name for Ukrainians). They still speak a local patois of Ukrainian which has been Russified, and think of themselves as not ‘true Russians’.\(^9\)

Within the Ukrainian SSR the titular ethnic group did not gain by Ukrainianising the national minorities. But, many of the Russians who migrated to Ukraine and settled did nevertheless ‘go native’, becoming different to Russians in the RSFSR. This was never a peculiarly Ukrainian phenomenon. Even in Estonia, where cultures are very different, Russians who settled there hold basic values which are closer to those of the Estonians than they are to Russians in the Russian Federation.\(^9\) A Russian human rights activist resident in Ukraine preferred life in that republic because she believed the level of ‘culture’ was higher than in Russia. Kyiv was more ‘Slavic’ than cosmopolitan Moscow, with its large number of migrants from all corners of the former USSR.\(^9\) Despite economic hardships only 3 per cent of Russians out-migrated from Ukraine between 1990 and 1993.\(^9\) Even in the most Russified of former Soviet republics—Belarus–Russians did not see Russia as their homeland.\(^9\) In Ukraine a poll, conducted by the Institute of Philosophy of Ukraine’s National
Academy of Sciences as early as 1990–1991, found that 75 per cent of Russians in Ukraine no longer identified with the Russian nation. Russians migrating to Russia from the Crimea complained that ‘If we in Ukraine are regarded as ‘separatists’ and ‘chauvinists’, the Russian police call us Banderovite followers [followers of the 1940s Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera] and, bureaucratically, treat us worse than social outcasts.’

What choices are open to the Russian diaspora which lives outside the Russian Federation? In Belarus and Ukraine many of these Russians had long ‘gone native’, identifying less over time with Russia. At the same time, not all of them yet identified with the newly established independent states. Many still looked to the former USSR as their homeland. Unaccustomed to defining themselves in ethnic terms these Russians had been the true carriers of Soviet internationalism, the transporters of a more ‘advanced’ culture and language to other republics. Although few Russians in Belarus looked upon Russia as their homeland only 10.9 per cent agreed with the suggestion that ‘my motherland is Belarus’. Nearly twice as many meanwhile, looked to the former USSR.

Laitin believes that the Russian minorities have two choices open to them: either competitive assimilation or regional revival. Regional revival could lead to the creation of an independent sub-unit in some type of federal arrangement. In both Moldova and Estonia (but unlike in Ukraine) the titular ethnic groups remained reluctant to grant political autonomy to the Trans-Dniester region or Narva respectively. Nearly 50 per cent of Ukrainians were against the granting of any political autonomy to Russians in Ukraine (compared to only 46 per cent of Kazaks and 24.2 per cent of Estonians). In contrast, 71.5 per cent of Latvians opposed political autonomy for Russians. A major factor why Russians decided to remain in Estonia and, to some degree assimilate, is because of the higher standard of living found there.

Do the 25 million Russians living outside the Russian Federation regard themselves as united by a common culture with an external Russian homeland? Zevelev, like many Russian authors and politicians looking at them from the viewpoint of Moscow, certainly thinks so. But this seems highly unlikely. Even within countries, such as Ukraine, ‘nowhere do they present a solid political bloc’. In addition, Russian-language speakers are increasingly dividing into their ethnic components. Russian identity though, is defined in linguistic and cultural terms where Russian speakers are therefore seen as one united community.
The Russian authorities have tended to see the Russian minorities in the non-Russian independent states of the former USSR as one unified group. Threats to intervene on their behalf, including by military force, have been made by both democrats and more extremist politicians. The two countries most alarmed by these threats are those with the largest number of Russian minorities—Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Threats to intervene in defence of Russians do not take into consideration the fact that many of these Russian diasporas, especially in the Slavic republics, have developed different identities to those in Russia.  

Odesa railway workers wrote an open letter to the newspaper *Holos Ukraiiny* (12 March 1992) stating: ‘We are convinced that not a single Russian who lives in Ukraine will turn to you for defence.’ When not making military threats Russian politicians have also attempted to provide assistance for Russian language and culture. Although this may be harmless it nevertheless is not always undertaken out of the goodness of their hearts but, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, for geopolitical reasons. Russian political leaders therefore look not to Russians per se—but to Russian speakers as a whole as one alleged cultural community which seeks to maintain close ties with Russia.

### National minority policies in Ukraine

In late 1991 Ukraine adopted a liberal citizenship law which not only granted privileges to ethnic Ukrainians by granting them citizenship, thereby creating an ethnic democracy (as formerly in Estonia, Latvia and still in Israel). It also gave Ukrainian citizenship automatically to everybody resident in Ukraine at that time, irrespective of their social, ethnic, political, linguistic, sexual or racial origins who were not already citizens of other countries. The only criteria which citizenship required was a command of the Ukrainian language ‘sufficient for communication’ and an agreement to recognise and observe the constitution. In comparison to the stringent requirements of most Western democracies for citizenship, most of which require language skills (for example, in Germany and the USA), the Ukrainian citizenship law is very liberal. In other Western countries citizenship is refused to large numbers of people even when they have been resident for decades on their territory (for example, Turks in Germany).

In conferring such liberal citizenship criteria the Ukrainian authorities aimed to accomplish a number of objectives. First, citizenship is one of the most important state policies which affect the
construction of identities. Membership of a community as a citizen provides an attachment to and identification with that community (for example, Ukraine). Second, it excludes those from the community who are not granted citizenship. It therefore serves to define the community in relation to ‘Others’.\textsuperscript{103} Third, for Russians it circumscribes their loyalty to Russia (particularly in the Crimea). Fourth, it prevents Russia from spreading its influence among Russians in Ukraine. Russia has long been a strong advocate of dual citizenship in the CIS, a policy which particularly affects Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Precisely because such a policy would legitimise Russian interference in the domestic affairs of CIS states, only one country—Turkmenistan, with a small Russian population—agreed to granting dual citizenship. In Estonia and Latvia fear that not granting citizenship would lead to Russian interference was not originally a concern for the authorities because they hoped that the bulk of their Russian minorities would migrate to the Russian Federation.

In mid-1992 the Ukrainian parliament adopted a very liberal law on national minorities which granted equal political, social, economic and cultural rights to all citizens, ‘regardless of their ethnic origin, and supported the development of their national self consciousness and self expression’. This was immediately followed by a separate article which defined these guarantees as resting upon the national minorities observing the constitution and laws of the land, as well as respecting its state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Article three defined national minorities as ‘groups of Ukrainian citizens who are not Ukrainian by nationality and who manifest national consciousness and community of interest within the group’.\textsuperscript{104} This definition of collective rights is not applicable to, say, Russian-speakers.

Clearly, national minorities, which include all non-Ukrainians and therefore define Russians within this category, are granted certain rights on condition they remain loyal to the independent Ukrainian state and its inherited borders. In turn, these rights are defined as ‘individual rights’ where individual citizens are treated equally regardless of their ethnic, religious or cultural background. The Ukrainian passport follows this logic by not including an entry for ethnicity (unlike the old Soviet passports). Ukraine’s preference for ‘individual rights’ (in contrast to ‘collective minority rights’) is also preferred by international institutions which argue, like the Ukrainian authorities, that ‘individual rights’ help towards the creation of a civic state where civil society—not ethnicity—should be the foundation for the state. Ukraine’s law on national minorities therefore follows the tradition of European nation-states which
recognise the dominance of the ‘core’ or titular Ukrainian ethnic group while guaranteeing individual rights to ethnic minorities. ‘It seeks to identify “national interests” with a civil society rather than with an ethnic community’, Resler argues. The only exception is the Crimea where Ukrainians do not represent a majority of the population and therefore the region was granted the status of political autonomy. But, as argued elsewhere in this book, individual rights also promote assimilation into the culture and language of the ethnic core of the political nation.

**Russians and other national minorities in Ukraine**

Of Ukraine’s national minorities, by far the largest are Russians who account for 22 per cent of the population. Although for the purposes of this study Russians are counted as a national minority, ‘in reality they are second (after Ukrainians) the dominant nation’. The June 1996 constitution did define them as a national minority. Ukraine inherited the fourth largest Russian minority as a proportion of its total population within the former Soviet Union (see Table 4.3).

Although the 1989 Soviet census recorded 11.4 million Russians as living in Ukraine these figures should be looked at critically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>% of Russians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiziya</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brubaker has argued that Russians living outside Russia do not hold fixed identities. Instead, they represent ‘a rather fluid field of competing identities and identifications. One should be sceptical of the illusion of bounded togetherness created by the census with its exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories.’ Following the disintegration of the USSR these identities will be even more in a state of flux, particularly in republics where cultures and languages are so similar. At the same time, we should not go to the other extreme, as do some Ukrainian nationalist writers, who argue that the Soviet census gave a false picture of the size of the Russian population. Iaroslav Dashkevych, a L’viv-based historian, argued that of these 11 million ‘Russians’ in Ukraine, 5 million were really Ukrainians and other national minorities.

It was not only Russians living in Ukraine who had a rather fluid and, at times, confused identity. Russian-speaking Ukrainians who lived among them also exhibited a similar fluidity. The only time that the inhabitants of eastern and southern Ukraine had to decide if they belonged to one or other ethnic group was once in a decade when the census was taken. At other times it was purely academic; their identities were more eastern Slavic than Russian or Ukrainian. Ukraine, after all, even to Russians, could always be constructed in their imaginations as another rus’kiy state whose traditions were more akin to Kyiv Rus’ than to the Muscovy of Moscow or the European-looking Russian empire of St Petersburg.

Russians in Ukraine—like Ukrainians in the Crimea—have a marginal identity. Pirie found that they had a ‘relative weak kinship with their supposed ethnic brethren’. Often when forced to give an ethnic identity in the Soviet era for their passport they gave ‘Russian’. In the immediate aftermath of the disintegration of the former USSR they may give either ‘Soviet’ or a regional identity (or both) in the transition towards a civic Ukrainian identity. There is evidence that many are already re-identifying themselves as ‘Ukrainian’. The number of ‘Russians’ in Ukraine has declined from 22 per cent in the 1989 Soviet census to only 10.89 per cent, a drop of more than half within the space of less than a decade (or roughly a decline from 11 million to less than 6 million). Many of these ‘Ukrainians’ had previously declared themselves in the Soviet era to be ‘Russians’ because they were of mixed ethnic background and it was advantageous to do so. In independent Ukraine it is now more advantageous to define oneself as a ‘Ukrainian’. Pirie pointed out: ‘But given the new political reality of Ukraine, the appeal of identity as a Russian is apparently diminishing.’ Vydrin and Tabachnyk,
formerly a presidential adviser and the head of the Presidential Administration respectively, also found that ‘The process of the assimilation of Russians to some extent in Ukraine has already begun.’\textsuperscript{113} This process has been helped by the closeness of language, culture and religion between Ukrainians and Russians.\textsuperscript{114}

It would be wrong therefore to assume that Russians have a strong identity in Ukraine, something borne out by their inability to mobilise as a lobby. In L’viv and Kyiv Bremmer found that Russians were unmobilised and uninterested in mobilising. The attitudes of Ukrainians and Russians in these two cities held nearly identical views on issues such as the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian-language schools, a Ukrainian currency and separate armed forces. Only Russians in the Crimea were mobilised, not integrated, and held the most negative stereotypes about Ukraine and Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{115} There are no strong Russian civic or ethnic groups and political parties apart from in the Crimea. Russian national symbols are only used in the Crimea within Ukraine.

Russians in Ukraine have largely remained neutral towards developments taking place around them. In the Soviet era only 0.5 per cent of Ukraine’s large dissident movement were composed of Russians (unlike the large numbers of Tatars who accounted for 9.9 per cent of the total number).\textsuperscript{116} They did not create an Inter-Front (pro-communist and Soviet Empire Internationalist Front) against pro-independence forces while their alliance with national democrats (through strike committees and the coal miners’ movement) only lasted between 1989 and 1991.

Russians in Ukraine have therefore a fluid, young identity still in the process of evolution. When many of them migrated to Ukraine in the Tsarist era national identities were still weak and pre-modern in the region of eastern-southern Ukraine where they mainly settled. This pre-modern identity was never allowed to evolve into a fully developed modern national identity in the Soviet era. Nevertheless, while living in Ukraine they had ‘gone native’, thereby in the process differentiating themselves from Russians across the Soviet administrative frontier.

When Ukraine became an independent state it did not therefore inherit ethnic Russians with a modern national identity. Ironically, it may be the Ukrainian state which will impart to them both a civic Ukrainian and maybe an ethnic Russian identity. The Ukrainian authorities were always conscious of the need not to provoke such a large minority.\textsuperscript{117} A state programme for the development of Russian culture and language was adopted in late 1994
—ahead of similarly adopted programmes for Ukrainian culture and those of national minorities, other than Russians.

During the Soviet era the bulk of Ukraine’s national minorities gradually lost their own languages and cultures, becoming part of the amorphous Russian-speaking mass. Their knowledge of the Russian and Ukrainian languages is given in Table 4.4.

The once large Polish national minority was decimated by population exchanges during and after the Second World War. Between 1959 and 1989 it dropped in size from 0.87 (363,300) to 0.43 per cent (219,200). Poles are mainly based in three oblasts—L’viv, Zhytomir and Khmel’nyts’kyi, but there are few remaining exclusively Polish villages. The Polish national minority is the only one to assimilate with Ukrainians, with nearly two-thirds of them speaking Ukrainian as their first language. Two reasons account for this. First, they reside in the Ukrainian-speaking region of western Ukraine. Second, many of them were Polonised Ukrainians.\footnote{Romanian and Hungarian national minorities also reside in Chernivtsi (formerly northern Bukovina) and Trans-Carpathian oblasts respectively. In all three cases inter-state treaties with Poland, Hungary and Romania included provisions in defence of minority rights.}\footnote{Hungarians and Romanians have self-governing administrative regions in Trans-Carpathia and Chernivtsi oblasts respectively.}

Conclusions

There is little support for federalism in Ukraine at this stage in its state and nation building project. Separatism is largely a myth, with the notable exception of the Crimea where its potentiality remains. Regionalism is not a purely Ukrainian phenomenon and should not be equated with ‘creeping separatism’.
The significance of Donets’k, the main city of the Donbas, and its potential threat to Ukrainian statehood may increasingly be a thing of the past. During 1994–1996 the Ukrainian political scene was influenced by the struggle between the country’s two largest influential clans centred upon Dnipropetrovs’k and Donets’k. By 1997 the latter had largely been defeated and it was doubtful that it would recover. Similarly, by 1996–1997 the Crimea no longer seemed to be the threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity that it looked to be under former President Kravchuk. Pro-Russian parties in the Crimea had been forced to re-register as branches of all-Ukrainian parties or had, in one case, become themselves all-Ukrainian parties. With the disintegration of the Crimean Russia bloc in 1994–1995, the abolishing of the Crimean presidency as an institution in 1995 and Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the inter-state treaty signed in May 1997 pro-Russian parties in the Crimea were no longer calling for the secession of the peninsula to Russia. The threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity from secessionism, always exaggerated by outside observers, was now a thing of the past. The threat from separatism was also exaggerated because it wrongly assumed that Russian (and Ukrainian) identities in eastern Ukraine were modern and developed.

Domestic stability and support for the Ukrainian state were reflected in the voluntary agreement to take the oath of loyalty by 85 per cent of the 1994–1998 parliamentary deputies—an act only required for deputies elected after the adoption of the June 1996 constitution. Of the 15 per cent who refused to take the oath 90 per cent of them were from the communist faction who represented constituencies in the Donbas and the Crimea. This again reflected three factors. First, the strong link between the Communist Party and disloyalty to the Ukrainian state, a link which is not evidenced in other political parties. Second, the Donbas and the Crimea again come out as specific regions whose views and local peculiarities should not be extrapolated to the entire eastern-southern Ukraine. Finally, an analysis of those 1994–1998 deputies who voluntarily took the oath showed that there was no direct link with support for dual state languages, reunion with Russia or full CIS membership. In other words, one could still be a supporter of these three positions and remain loyal to the Ukrainian state.
THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDERS

A major focus of Ukraine’s foreign policy since 1990–1991 has been to obtain international support and the legal recognition by Ukraine’s neighbours of its borders (as well as political support for its sovereignty and independence). By Summer 1997 all of Ukraine’s seven borders had been legally recognised by its neighbours in inter-state treaties. In only one case with Moldova did Ukraine agree to a slight change in its inherited borders. Borders play strategic domestic and external roles in state and nation building. First, they help to foster domestic unity, a national identity and political community. Second, they demarcate the emerging ‘We’ from foreign ‘Others’.

Borders, state and nation building

Borders and national identity

Borders can be either primordial or, as is usually the case, circumstantial. They can be simultaneously historical, natural, cultural, political, economic or symbolic. More than anything else they represent a ‘manifestation of socio-spatial consciousness’.

Sandler believes that for any state ‘territory is the critical condition for functioning as a political entity; for the nation represents historical continuity’. Ringmar also argues that:

The relationship between a country’s territory and its identity is in many ways similar to the relationship between an individual identity and his or her body. Our individual or collective selves are not the same as the bodies or
territories we inhabit, yet there is a clear and undeniable connection between the two. There cannot be persons without bodies and no states without territory.\(^6\)

There is a lack of coincidence of ethnic and political borders in the world.\(^7\) In the early 1970s only 9.1 per cent of the world’s states were ethnically homogenous; that is, their primordial, ethnic borders matched their circumstantial, political ones. Of the world’s states at that time, 23.5 per cent included majority ethnic groups which accounted for between 50 and 74 per cent of their populations, a proportion which Ukraine inherited from the former USSR. Of the world’s countries, 40.2 per cent included five significant groups which inhabited ethnically diverse states.

All of the fifteen successor states to the former USSR inherited borders which did not coincide with ethnicity (that is, they were more circumstantial than primordial). Nevertheless, the former Soviet states insisted, in the manner of the former Western colonies, upon the inviolability of existing boundaries. The majority of newly independent states created since the Second World War were not based on ethnic groups or developed, modern nations. Indeed, many former colonies never developed ‘authoritative political nations’. These inherited former colonial boundaries became important after self determination was achieved, as markers within which sovereignty was then instituted.\(^8\)

Despite this lack of coincidence between ethnic and political boundaries throughout most of the world these borders play a strategic role in state and nation building because they fulfil four crucial criteria. First, they dramatise differences between those inside and those on the outside. This external differentiation aims to aid domestic nation building and the development of a sense of one political community in contrast to the ‘Others’ beyond the state’s borders. In the 1920s newly independent Finland immediately set about demarcating its border with the USSR as an essential part of its nation building process. This had two aims—to aid national integration and create cultural boundaries between Finland and the USSR. The demarcation of the boundary was also used to define the USSR as the ‘Other’, with Finland portrayed as the last Eastern European outpost of Western values and Christianity.

Second, borders defend cultures. This has particular significance for former dependencies or colonies which are attempting, as part of their state and nation building processes, to introduce affirmative action in favour of previously repressed cultures and languages.
 Boundaries allow nation building to progress and the integration of previously disparate and regionally based groups who did not constitute one political nation at the time of independence. Paasi argues that:

> The boundaries between nation-states hence receive their meanings in the continual nation building process, in the social reproduction of the nation-state and in the socialization of the citizen into specific territorial frames. Boundaries can hence be understood profoundly only in the historical and social context.9

Third, borders are an additional symbol of the newly independent state which define its territory and sovereignty. As Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko explained, ‘Every independent state has its own borders’ which aim, ‘to seal border lines on the map, rather than to complicate exchanges between people.’10 ‘An independent country’, he therefore argued, ‘must have borders drawn on maps.’11 Colonel Leonid Osovalyuk, head of the Border Delimitation and Demarcation Department of the Ukrainian State Committee on the State Border, compared the definition of the Ukrainian border with the adoption of the constitution (June 1996), the introduction of a new monetary unit (September 1996), ‘or the approval of the Ukrainian state flag and emblem’.12

Finally, borders establish the defined limits of a state’s sovereignty. They represent the status quo, any challenge to which is to be condemned as a threat to regional and, in certain cases, world security. These borders can be legally codified in inter-state treaties, recognised as inviolable by international organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and guaranteed by the world’s great powers in exchange for certain undertakings (for example, nuclear disarmament).

During the period 1820–1945 the greatest number of wars were fought between neighbours where their borders were ill defined or contested.13 The most malignant extremes of nationalism usually manifest themselves where ethnic borders collide or are contested (for example, Transylvania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and inter-war eastern Poland).14 After 1945 the maintenance of territorial integrity, even in continents where borders were drawn arbitrarily with rulers on a map, became a respected feature of international politics. There have only been two successful cases of separatism leading to newly independent states which have been diplomatically
recognised—Bangladesh and Eritrea. Although many of the former colonial borders were drawn up at the whim of the then imperial powers with little regard for tribal or ethnic loyalties these borders have remained in place.

Borders therefore play a role which is essential to differentiating nations, since they are one of the many symbols of the state. Barth, the first social scientist to examine the role of boundaries in the construction of identity, found that ‘Borders are essential to all human processes, both at the individual and the social level. Indeed, all processes of identity construction are simultaneously border-generation and border-deriving.’ Nationalism or nation building is a ‘process of definition’ and ‘If a particular nation is to be defined, it must be bound and delimited, that is, tied to a previously established space.’

The process of reinforcing a new state’s external border goes hand in hand with the elimination of internal borders or barriers to unity. By definition these boundaries exclude ‘outsiders’ who are henceforth understood to be ‘Others’. They signal both membership and exclusion.

Boundaries persist despite the flow of people across them. The former USSR’s internal boundaries between the fifteen republics should not be discounted as unimportant in the creation of identities. In January 1992 these internal boundaries became the borders of the fifteen successor states to the former USSR. The quasi-republican institutions inherited from the former USSR defined the limits of their sovereignty as enclosed within these boundaries. All of the post-Soviet leaders have supported the territorial integrity of their states as a central feature of their state and nation building projects.

Problems arise where identities merge into each other, such as on the Ukrainian-Russian and the Ukrainian-Belarusian borders. Elsewhere, Ukraine’s boundaries were defined by the former USSR’s external frontiers, through historical conflict and/or different cultures and languages. The populations immediately on both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border exhibit neither a firm Russian nor Ukrainian identity—but an eastern Slavic one. In such situations Barth argues that, ‘borders “must” be established, although this effort is often presented by nationalist elites as an attempt to maintain a “pre-existing or primordial national boundary” (see below). The smaller the cultural and linguistic differences between two ethnic groups the greater will be the insistence by at least one state (for example, Ukraine) on the need for established borders: “Similarity will be counterbalanced by stress on alleged differentiae.” Ethnic groups can only persist if ‘they imply marked differences in behaviour, i.e. persisting cultural differences’.
In addition, boundaries cannot be artificially constructed. They require pre-existing elements (shared symbols, memories, myths and a common destiny) upon which to build the state and nation. But the definition of ‘Others’ as strangers also recognises limits on shared values, cultures, criteria, attitudes to the outside world and different perceptions about the correct course of action in response to particular events.

The struggle for Ukraine’s borders

The state and nation building processes under way in Ukraine since the early 1990s are accompanied by a general and growing interest in the historical establishment of inter-republican borders. For both the Russian Federation and Ukraine the border question inevitably became bound up with the evolution of their national identities, the revival of old, and the creation of new, myths as well as the reconstruction of their histories.

But until the establishment of the Ukrainian SSR in 1922 Ukraine as a recognised coherent entity did not exist. The territories that were claimed by Ukrainian political activists were divided between Tsarist Russia, Austria, Hungary and Romania. Attempts to bring them together within one state between 1917 and 1920 failed. This was only successfully undertaken by the Soviet regime during the Second World War.

In the Tsarist era nine guberniyas of the Russian empire were defined by Ukrainian political activists and writers as ethnically Ukrainian—Kyiv, Podil, Volyn, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson and Tavria (without the Crimea). As laid out in the 25 February 1919 ‘Agreement on Borders’ the Soviet regime recognised ‘Ukraine’ as consisting of these nine guberniyas. Of these nine guberniyas ethnic Ukrainian majorities existed only in Poltava, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Kherson, Podil, Katerynoslav and Volyn. Sometimes Ukrainian leaders also included claims to Kursk, Voronezh, Kholm and the Kuban regions in the Russian SFSR.

The Ukrainian ethnographic factor was also used vis-à-vis the Crimea. In the 1897 Tsarist census 47.2 per cent of the guberniya of Tauris, which included the Crimea, were Ukrainians, with another 27.9 per cent Russians and 13.6 per cent Tatars. At that time Russians and Tatars accounted for 50 and 25 per cent of the Crimea’s population respectively. In 1936 the ethnic proportion of the Crimea, then within the RSFSR, had changed to Russians (43.5
per cent) and Tatars (23.1 per cent). Over four decades later the Ukrainian share had risen to 26.5 per cent while the Russian had grown even more to 67.7 per cent (the Tatars were ethnically cleansed in 1944 and now only account for approximately 10 per cent of the population). In contrast, by the 1990s this proportion had dropped to 66 and 10 per cent respectively for Russians and Tatars.

The Ukrainian independent governments of the 1917–1920 period never at any one stage controlled all of the territories they claimed in the Central Rada’s Third Universal. Soviet republics were established in Odesa and the Donbas while the Crimea was controlled by pro-Tsarist forces. During the Ukrainian Hetmanate of 1918 it successfully forced the Crimea to join Ukraine as an autonomous republic through the use of an economic blockade. ‘This forced the Crimean government to look at the state of play in a realistic manner’, Ukrainian authors pointed out. Then, as today, the Crimea was regarded as a strategic region that was the key to the Black Sea region and a Piedmont from which an Imperial Russia could be re-built.

During the 1917–1920 struggle for Ukrainian independence and in the 1920s Ukraine’s nationalist and national communist leaders made demands to extend the Ukrainian SSR into Homel, Brianshyna, Kursk, Voronezh, the Don and the Kuban where, at that time, Ukrainians constituted large majorities. The demands of both nationalists and national communists at that time were to define Ukraine’s borders on the basis of ethnographic criteria. Despite the formation of a commission in the 1920s to study these demands little progress was made on resolving these questions. After 1933, when Ukraine was hit by an artificial famine that claimed millions of lives, the Ukrainian inhabitants of areas in the Russian SFSR living contiguous to the border were reclassified as Russians. The problem was then solved by Stalin’s homogenisation of ethnic Ukrainian regions of the Russian Federation.

The policy of demanding the inclusion within the Ukrainian independent state and the Ukrainian SSR of Ukrainian ethnographic territories in the Russian Federation was contradicted by the demand for the Crimea to be incorporated into its territory, a region where no Ukrainian ethnic majority existed. Similarly, a number of guberniyas or oblasts (for example, the Donbas, Kharkiv, Katerynoslv) included large numbers of Russians. If the demands for ethnographic criteria had been adopted Ukraine might have inherited areas such as Voronezh and the Kuban—but it also might
have lost others which may have been more valuable and which could have cut the country off from the Black Sea.

The creation in October 1924 of the Moldovan Autonomous SSR within the Ukrainian SSSR was more problematic. At that time Moldovans (Bessarabians) accounted for 48.7 per cent of the autonomous region’s population, followed by Ukrainians (34.2 per cent) and Russians (7.9 per cent). The bulk of this region, east of the river Dniester, was attached to Bessarabia, which was re-incorporated from Romania during the Second World War, to then create the Moldovan SSR. The Trans-Dniester Republic, based on the former inter-war autonomous Moldovan SSR, revolted against perceived Romanian nationalism in right-bank Moldova in the early 1990s.27

The Crimean autonomous SSR and the city of Sevastopol were transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and became the source for an acrimonious dispute between Ukraine and the Russian Federation between 1992 and 1997. The Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada did not claim sovereignty over the Crimea. A Crimean Tatar republic under Bolshevik control was declared in 1918 and recognised by the Ukrainian Rada. During the same year the Hetmanate demanded the incorporation of the Crimea into Ukrainian territory on strategic, political, economic and even ethnic grounds (although Ukrainians accounted for only a minority of the peninsula’s population, then and now). The Crimea, in the eyes of the Hetmanate and post-Soviet Ukraine, controls Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea. A contemporary Ukrainian author quoted Tsarina Catherine’s emissary, Potemkin, who said: ‘He who controls the Crimea—controls the Black Sea.’ The author added his own comment: ‘All Russian leaders, irrespective of position, deeds or rank, fully understood the significance of words of the empress in relation to the words of the imperatora to the current period.’28

Between April 1919 and 30 June 1945 the Crimea was constituted as an autonomous republic of the Russian SFSR. In 1945, over a year after the peninsula’s Tatar inhabitants were ethnically cleansed, the autonomous republic was reclassified as an oblast. The decision to transfer the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was condemned by post-Soviet Russian politicians critical of the move as illogical and the result of drunken binges, subsequent hangovers and sun strokes. In reality, the decision was made on the grounds of contiguous territory (that is, the lack of geographical connection to Russia), economics, trade and cultural ties.29 None of the official documents of the time described the Crimea as a ‘gift’ made by
Then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to Ukraine on the occasion of the 325th anniversary of the 1654 Treaty of Periaslav. Ukrainian writers described the 1954 transfer of the Crimea as merely that of, ‘an act of historical justice’. The Crimea agreed to join the Ukrainian Hetmanate in 1918, with similar provisions for autonomy to those which have been granted to it since the early 1990s, when it was upgraded from an oblast to that of an autonomous republic. The Crimea would have its own government and parliament which could issue legislation, but Ukrainian legislation remained juridically higher, trade and economic issues would be decided locally and it would formulate its own budget. There would be one currency, central bank, post, transportation and telegraph system for the whole of Ukraine. The Hetmanate agreed that the Crimea could create its own armed forces, although general foreign and military policy questions would be decided by Kyiv. In addition, the Crimea would sign a federal treaty with Ukraine. Both of these latter two demands (separate armed forces and a federal treaty) were raised by Russian nationalist groups in the Crimea in the 1990s but were rejected by the Ukrainian authorities.

These attempts to include the Crimea within the Ukrainian independent states of 1917–1920 are now used in post-Soviet Ukraine to claim that Ukraine’s ties to the peninsula did not just materialise out of thin air in 1954, but, in fact, had been articulated three decades earlier. The message is therefore clear—as an independent state Ukraine always regarded the Crimea as a ‘natural’ (primordial) part of its territory. One Ukrainian historian argued that:

What is important is that the historical experience of our state towards the organisation of power in the Crimea has shown the existence of the natural organisation of political, economic, geographic and other factors for the inclusion of the peninsula within the confines of Ukraine.

The city of Sevastopol was only included within the budget and under the administration of the Russian SFSR until 1954. In the 1978 Russian SFSR constitution there is no mention of Sevastopol (whereas the city is mentioned in the 1978 Ukrainian SSR constitution). Russian claimants towards Sevastopol argue that the 1954 transfer only applied to the Crimea—not to the city of Sevastopol. Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov’s views were largely
accepted by both houses of the Russian parliament in 1996 that Sevastopol was never financed from the Ukrainian budget. The Ukrainians hold a different legalistic point of view. The 1954 transfer referred to both the Crimea and Sevastopol. The state budget of the Russian SFSR only includes line items for Sevastopol until 1953, thereafter it is included within the budget of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1954 Sevastopol was included within Crimean electoral districts, and in official Soviet maps Sevastopol was always marked as a city subordinate to the Ukrainian SSR republican authorities.

These legalistic wrangles between Ukraine and the Russian Federation continued until May 1997, when they finally signed an inter-state treaty. In the final analysis each side was selective as to what it referred to in defence of its case. The Ukrainian side does have a strong argument when challenging the Russian side about the selectivity of those Soviet decisions it decides to annul. Why should only the 1954 decision to transfer the Crimea be annulled? Why not also annul official decisions made in the 1920s to transfer Ukrainian territory, or even those made in the late 1940s/early 1950s to transfer Estonian territory? On both occasions the transfer of these territories were made from Ukraine and Estonia respectively to the Russian SFSR.

The November 1990 Ukrainian-Russian treaty also recognised Ukraine’s borders, although this was conditional on both countries remaining within the former USSR. The disintegration of the former USSR had made this treaty no longer valid, the Russian executive argued. In contrast, the United Nations and Western governments continued to uphold its validity. When the Russian parliament made territorial claims on Ukraine during 1991–1996 Western governments, the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the UN all pointed to the November 1990 Ukrainian-Russian treaty as being still legally recognised and in force. The Russian Federation, together with the other four declared nuclear powers, all provided security assurances to Ukraine at the December 1994 Budapest OSCE summit. These assurances, provided in return for Ukraine acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, referred to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

The incorporation of western Ukrainian territories occurred during the Second World War. These included areas with large Ukrainian ethnic majorities in eastern Galicia and Volhynia from Poland, Trans-Carpathia from Czechoslovakia (between 1939 and 1944 occupied by Hungary) and northern Bukovina from Romania. The
views of the Romanians and Hungarians were largely discounted by the victorious Allied powers due to their participation for much of the war on the German side. The Poles meanwhile, were compensated by the transfer of large tracts of territory from Germany which allowed them access to the Baltic sea. The Ukrainian inhabitants of these newly incorporated territories largely welcomed their incorporation within the Ukrainian SSR. But, at the same time, this incorporation was accompanied by mass repression and Ukrainian nationalist groups fought a long, bitter and protracted guerrilla war against Soviet security forces until the early 1950s. Ukrainians therefore hold an ambivalent position on the incorporation of these western Ukrainian territories into the Ukrainian SSR.40

The incorporation of these western Ukrainian territories did bring two important, positive results. First, their incorporation made the Ukrainian SSR more ethnically ‘Ukrainian’ by incorporating nationally conscious Ukrainian-language speakers.41 These territories could, after all, have been left outside the Soviet state. The southern regions of Azerbaijan and Tajikistan both lie within Iran and Afghanistan respectively. In Iran and Afghanistan there are more Azeris and Tajiks than in the countries which are named after these ethnic groups. Second, it enabled Ukraine to reconcile age-long historical difficulties with both Poland and Hungary. This process of reconciliation has gone the furthest with Poland, a country with which Ukraine signed an historic memorandum in May 1997 that placed their historical quarrels squarely in the past.

Ironically, the non-Russian successor states therefore largely gained recognised territorial units and borders from the former USSR. In this manner they are as much legitimate as the borders of any former dependency. Ukraine, a country which gained more than any other country from territorial redistribution after the Second World War, is therefore a status quo power which places great emphasis upon its territorial integrity and that of its neighbours. Historically in Western Europe nation-states were assembled by their core ethnic group. In Ukraine the Soviet regime assembled the Ukrainian state after it had been divided for over 500 years. This fact makes it even more difficult for a large proportion of Russian public opinion to accept Ukraine as anything but an artificial Soviet construct. In his capacity as former chairman of the State Duma CIS Affairs committee Konstantin Zatulin ridiculed Ukraine’s interest ‘only in the recognition by Russia of borders that never existed in history, of a state that never existed in history’.42
Contested borders

Disputed borders

Ukraine’s borders with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova and Belarus were all quickly recognised in inter-state treaties by 1994. The delimitation and demarcation of these borders with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary had already been undertaken in the Soviet era. The delimitation and demarcation of Ukraine’s borders with Moldova and Belarus began in the Kuchma era and were completed by 1996–1997. In May 1997 Belarusan President Alyaksandr Lukashenka signed in Kyiv a number of documents which led to the delimitation and demarcation of their common 1,200 kilometre borders.

Romania initially refused to sign an inter-state treaty with Ukraine unless it included a clause denouncing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This demand was perceived, rightly or wrongly, by the Ukrainians as a thinly disguised territorial claim. Two factors changed Romania’s stance. First, the change in Romania’s leadership in November 1996 which ushered in a new liberal President. Second, the July 1997 NATO Madrid summit where new NATO members were proposed. For any country to qualify for NATO membership it had to have firstly resolved its border disputes. Therefore, Romania became interested in signing an interstate treaty with Ukraine as rapidly as possible between November 1996 and June 1997. The Ukrainian-Romanian treaty was thus signed on 2 June 1997, the last of Ukraine’s borders to be recognised by its neighbours.

Territorial claims are usually furthered with the help of three arguments. First, the attempt to maximise one’s territory aided by references to history, seen ‘through some kind of rose-tinted spectacles’. Second, the claim that the land belongs to those who first settled it. Finally, with reference to previous violation of international law and to justice. The problem with references to ‘historically just borders’ is that they ‘are almost always contested by the question, which decisive moment in history established borders for all time’.

Disputes over questions of first settlement within Ukraine are mainly between Ukraine and Russia. Nevertheless, this question
also crops up elsewhere. Four decades ago Polish archaeologists
found the sarcophagus of Prince Danylo who ruled the independent
Ukrainian principality of Galicia-Volhynia that existed between the
thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. His sarcophagus was found in the
Kholm region of what is now eastern Poland. If this find had been
made public it would have given Ukrainian historians ‘proof’ of
their earlier settlement of Galicia and Volhynia prior to the creation
of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the sixteenth century.
The find was therefore covered up by the Polish archaeologists and
only now are their Ukrainian colleagues searching again for the
sarcophagus.\textsuperscript{44}

The disintegration of the former USSR brought about an acute
identity crisis for Russia. The non-Russian republics of the former
USSR accepted the Soviet borders they had inherited (apart from
the radical right who demanded borders based on ethnographic
criteria). For Russia this was a more complicated question. It had to
ask itself ‘Where is Russia?’. Is it confined to the Russian
Federation? Or is ‘Russia’ something bigger—the entire former
USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or only the
territory of the three east Slavic \textit{rus'kiy} peoples?

The borders of the Russian Federation are often described as
‘artificial’ because they had never in the pre-Soviet era existed as the
borders of ‘Russia’. The problem with this is two-fold. First, Russia
had never existed as a nation-state. It was impossible to state with
certainty therefore where the Russian nation ended and the empire
began, a fact hindered even further by the fact that its empire had
been land-locked (and not an overseas empire). But the Russian
Federation is not alone historically in having to adjust to borders
which had not previously existed. After all, this could be applied to
most former African colonies, to Turkey in the 1920s, Germany
and Poland after 1945, as well as France after the late 1950s (when
it lost Algeria). These are all similar examples of countries having to
adjust their nation building and identity to newly acquired borders;
something which required a certain period of time before they
became ‘legitimate’.\textsuperscript{45}

In Autumn 1993 the Russian Security Council adopted a
decision of ‘forward defence’ which would not require the building
of border defences along the Russian Federation’s borders with the
Soviet successor states. Although there may have been a financial
motive here the main reason behind this decision was psychological.
All of Russia’s different political constituencies opposed NATO
enlargement ‘up to our borders’, meaning the borders of the former
USSR (Russia only borders one new NATO member, Poland). Moscow’s Institute of the New Abroad complained about the fact that NATO ‘has approached Russia’s southern sea borders’.

The Russian newspaper Segodnya (9 December 1996) criticised ‘NATO’s passionate desire to expand towards Russia’. Yegor Stroyev, Speaker of Russia’s Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, thinks that Moldova is ‘Russia’s’ south western border, ignoring over a thousand kilometres of Ukrainian territory that happens to lie in between Russia and Moldova.

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin also said that ‘We feel worried and concerned about events which unfold rapidly and may bring a hotbed of tension close to our borders.’

Chernomyrdin was referring to military victories of the Taliban forces in Afghanistan, a country lying over 2,000 kilometres from the Russian Federation.

One cannot therefore agree with Zevelev that these Russian policies represent the development of relations within the former USSR on the basis of equality and the recognition of their full independence. The Russian Federation found it very difficult to sign an inter-state treaty with Ukraine.

In Moscow there is a ‘psychological aversion to the idea of a legally fixed Ukrainian—Russian border’. The signing of the Russian-Ukrainian treaty in May 1997 ‘turned out to be the most difficult thing for the Kremlin’ to undertake, the newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets (3 June 1997) believed. Even after the signing of this treaty, Moscow continued to utilise ‘petty diplomatic tricks’ in an attempt to halt the delimitation and demarcation of its border with Ukraine.

The signing of the treaty with Ukraine was more difficult for Russia’s leaders, Moskovskiy Komsomolets believed, than the signing of treaties with Chechnya and NATO during the same month.

Despite the signing of the Russian-Ukrainian treaty, its ratification by both houses of the Russian parliament and the delimitation and demarcation of their common border would still be problematical. Because Russians and Ukrainians are part of the same east Slavic rus’kiy narod why should there be a border separating them, Russians ask? A commentary in the Russian magazine Granitsa Rossii (no. 41, December 1995) gives a Russian perspective on this question: ‘Do we really need a border with Ukraine? After all, we have managed to come to an agreement with Belarus. We believe that many Russians ask the same questions...For centuries, Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusans lived in a unified state.’ The Russian author’s opposite number, Lieutenant-Colonel Anatoliy Samarchenko, head of the Press
service of the Ukrainian Border Troops, had a different view. The aim of Ukraine was to obtain the ‘legal formulation of its state border with neighbouring states’. But attempts by the Ukrainian side to regulate its border with Russia were largely rebuffed until May 1997.

The Ukrainian Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs sent numerous draft agreements to Russia for the delimitation of their common 2,063 kilometre border. ‘However, Russia remains silent’, Vyacheslav Zhyhulin, head of the Topography Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, lamented. A joint working group to discuss the delimitation of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Straits was established in November 1993 but it has still to resolve these issues. Even after the May 1997 signing of the treaty between them, Ukraine and Russia continued to hold ‘diametrically opposed opinions’ on the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Straits. While Ukraine argued against any ‘blank spots’ on the border, Russia supported the Sea of Azov’s conversion into a ‘common sea’ (a view similar to that held by Moscow on the Caspian Sea).

The Ukrainian view is diametrically opposed to that of the Russian one regarding the necessity of having delineated and demarcated borders. ‘This is not a matter of closing the border’ or building a new ‘Berlin Wall’ between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, asserted Vadym Dolhanov, head of the Directorate on Foreign Policy within the Ukrainian Presidential Administration. But there is nevertheless a need for the delimitation of the border ‘with an exactness down to a metre of the zones of responsibility for Russia and Ukraine’. Delimitation would undertake three tasks:

- define the lines of responsibility of both states;
- define where Ukraine’s responsibility ended;
- elaborate border regimes favourable to both sides.

Inter-state border disputes within the former USSR are intimately bound up with Russia’s identity crisis. First, does Russia accept the right of the other Soviet successor states to independence or is this perceived as a ‘temporary aberration’. This has particular relevance for Ukraine and Belarus. Second, will Russia accept the fact that 25 million people who declared themselves to be Russian in the 1989 census now live in foreign countries? Again, this has particular relevance to Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Third, will Russia accept current borders as final, or will some Russians question, for example, Ukraine’s and Kazakhstan’s sovereignty over the Crimea.
and northern Kazakhstan respectively? Finally, will Russia agree to recognise the borders it has with the remaining Soviet successor states in international law?

Russian authors and leaders look to the CIS as a restraining factor. Without the CIS they believe there would be an explosion of territorial disputes, particularly by Russia towards countries with large Russian minorities. To some degree this was one of the main reasons which then President Leonid Kravchuk sought to avoid in December 1991 when he proposed the establishment of the CIS. Then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had warned that if Ukraine seceded from the USSR, ownership of the Donbas and the Crimea would be disputed. Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev agreed to respect Ukraine’s borders only if it remained within the CIS. Kozyrev’s views were originally formulated by President Boris Yeltsin’s Press Secretary, Pavel Voshchano, three days after Ukraine’s declaration of independence. Like Gorbachev, Voshchano argued that if Ukraine seceded from the former USSR its borders would be challenged. Kozyrev had merely substituted the ‘CIS’ for Gorbachev’s/Voshchano’s ‘USSR’. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenny Primakov elaborated this into the thesis that the Helsinki principles do not apply to the so-called ‘internal’ borders of the former USSR. This, in Udovenko’s view, ‘is laying an ideological foundation for the future redivision of borders in the post-Soviet space’.

Post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine, feel they need to show their determination to defend their borders in the face of territorial demands. This, in turn, requires the expenditure of scarce resources (for example, finances, personnel and time) which could be used more productively elsewhere. Borders also require, as one Ukrainian author described it, an ‘academic, developed legal and historical basis’ to them. They have to be defended by all means at the disposal of the state through diplomats, border troops, the security service, the media and, maybe, most importantly of all, historians.

**High support for territorial integrity**

The defence of Ukraine’s territorial integrity is supported by the entire cross section of political groups. Parliamentary votes in denunciation of Crimean separatism always obtained a larger than two-thirds constitutional majority. Public opinion polls regularly show that support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity is as strong in eastern as it is in western Ukraine. In a January 1997 poll only 5
per cent of respondents agreed to transfer Sevastopol to Russia as Ukraine’s response to territorial claims advanced by the Russian parliament. President Leonid Kuchma warned that ‘You well understand the reason why I will never hand over Sevastopol to Russia, because I will no longer be Ukrainian president the day after I do so and Ukraine will no longer be an independent state. Both the leftists and the right-wing forces hold this opinion.’ Even the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Pyotr Symnonenko, strongly argued that his party is not a supporter of separatism: ‘I once again repeat that the Communists consider Crimea and Sevastopol as an inalienable part of Ukraine.’

Table 5.1 provide an indication of the attitudes of Ukraine’s eastern and southern regions towards ownership of the Crimea. Only 10 per cent of those polled agreed with transferring it to Russia while nearly 50 per cent agreed with the status quo. The poll was conducted by the Kyiv-based Democratic Initiatives Research Centre in 1994.

Throughout Ukraine support for the Crimea’s transfer to Russia was never higher than 10 per cent. The only exception to this was in the Crimea where 55 per cent backed its incorporation into Russia. Support for the current territorial status quo (the Crimea as part of Ukraine) averaged between 45 and 67 per cent throughout Ukraine. Even if these figures are broken down by ethnic group the overall result remains largely the same; that is, high support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity (see Table 5.2).

The majority of both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians supported the retention of the Crimea within Ukraine, with 20 per cent more Ukrainians than Russians backing the Crimea as part of Ukraine. Whereas only 2 per cent of Ukrainians supported the transfer of the Crimea to Russia, a figure similar to that found in the city of Kyiv, 14 per cent of Russians supported such a change in Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Nevertheless, clear majorities of both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North-East</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Donbas</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>67</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Politychnyi Portret Ukraїnї, no. 9, 1994, p. 46*
Ethnographic borders?

The Russian-Ukrainian border does not conform with ethnographic criteria. Both Russians and Ukrainians could challenge it on the grounds of ethnicity. Russians, at 22 per cent of the population, are the largest minority in Ukraine while the 4.3 million Ukrainians in the Russian Federation are its second largest minority after the Volga Tatars. Without a nationally designated territory of their own this second largest minority in the Russian Federation is not offered any collective rights by the Russian central government. Whereas Ukrainians living in areas of Russia contiguous to Ukraine have been largely Russified (until 1932 they accounted for two-thirds of the Kuban; since 1939 they have only made up 3 per cent of the inhabitants of that region) eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, which border Russia, contain large Russian populations. In the 1926 Soviet census 4 out of 6 million Ukrainians living in the Russian SFR lived along Ukraine’s borders.

It would be difficult therefore for any Ukrainian government today, unlike in 1918 and the 1920s, to claim ethnographic lands in the Voronezh, Kursk and the Kuban regions of the Russian Federation. This has not though prevented hints from being made that maybe a tit-for-tat retaliation for Russian claims should not be made by the Ukrainian side. This was the tactic largely used by Estonia. Initially, Estonia demanded that the border be readjusted in line with the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty signed between Estonia and Soviet Russia. Some 2,300 kilometres of inter-war Estonian territory were transferred to the Russian SFSR between 1944 and 1954. In return for the dropping

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**Table 5.2 Should the Crimea remain within Ukraine? (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukraine total</th>
<th>Ethnic Ukrainians</th>
<th>Ethnic Russians</th>
<th>Kyiv</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of its territorial claims against the Russian Federation the latter agreed to sign an inter-state treaty and demarcate their border.

As one Ukrainian member of parliament has pointed out, Ukraine ‘gave away nearly one third of its territory to its neighbours’. Again, this is dependent upon which historical starting point one uses. What about the territory ruled by Kyiv Rus’, which was far larger than contemporary Ukraine? Former President Kravchuk rhetorically replied to early Russian claims on the Crimea with the words: ‘Given such an approach, why don’t they start from Kyivan Rus’? At that time, Pskov, Novgorod and all other Rus’ cities were part of it. Should Ukraine demand that they belong to her? That would be an absurd approach.’ Kravchuk added that ‘Ukraine may also raise similar questions concerning say, the Kuban region.’ A similar semi-serious rebuke to Luzhkov came from the Communist Borys Oliynyk, head of the 1994–1998 Parliamentary Committee on Foreign and CIS Affairs, who pointed out in the Ukrainian parliament that the grave of the Kyivan Rus’ Prince Iurii Dovhorukyi is to be found in Kyiv. As Dovhorukyi is the founder of the city of Moscow could Ukraine not use the location of his burial place as the basis for a territorial claim against Russian sovereignty over Moscow?

Conclusions

Borders play an important role in state and nation building. They help to forge a political community and nation, signify the limits and extent of sovereignty, signal to which state the citizens belong and define them in relation to ‘Others’. They therefore play a dual role of membership and exclusion. Borders are also symbolic, similar in importance to the national flag, the anthem and currency.

All former dependencies, Ukraine included, supported the retention of their inherited borders. This emphasis upon territorial integrity is backed by the majority of Ukraine’s population. The only regional difference remains in the Crimea where a sizeable proportion of the population believes the peninsula should be either independent or transferred to Russia. No Ukrainian registered political party supports the secession of any of its regions. Even in the Crimea the majority of pro-Russian forces had ‘forgotten about their slogans calling for the annexation of the Crimea by Russia’. Instead, they focused upon the defence of Russian-speakers and, in a manner similar to the Civic Congress and the communists, championed an eastern Slavic union.
By June 1997 all of Ukraine’s borders had been recognised in inter-state treaties by its neighbours. But, Russia’s acceptance of Ukrainian independence, popular acceptance within Russia of Kyiv’s sovereignty over Sevastopol and the Crimea and therefore a consequential decline in Ukrainian fears of a Russian threat would only take place in the medium term, for three reasons. First, Ukrainian elites continue to regard Russia as the main threat to Ukrainian interests, as seen in Table 5.3.

Second, since 1994 Russian interest in Eurasianism or the revival of a new USSR had ebbed in favour of a focus upon the eastern Slavic group of nations. Russia had obtained what it had effectively wanted from Belarus. Pressure upon Ukraine would continue therefore to join the Belarusan-Russian union (the evolution of views in the Crimea therefore resembled those found in Russia). Finally, Russian national identity is closely tied to language and culture. Russian speakers in Ukraine (and Kazakhstan) will consequently continue to remain of interest to Russia in its geopolitical designs within the CIS.72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main ally</th>
<th>Biggest threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know?</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Den’, 18 June 1997
Note: The poll was undertaken by the Independent Experts Fund among 420 members of the Ukrainian political, economic, business, civic and journalistic elites.
Ukraine, in the manner of other former dependencies, inherited peoples (or ethnoses) with multiple identities. State and nation building aims to convert these into mutually exclusive identities loyal to the new state and to the emerging political nation. It had always been a mistake of Western scholars or members of the Ukrainian leadership to argue that the choice faced by Ukraine was either to build a civic or an ethnic nation. Accusations of Ukraine as a ‘nationalising state’ were therefore misconstrued. This chapter argues that all states are composed of civic and ethnic elements to a variety of degrees. The adoption of the June 1996 constitution legally confirmed that Ukrainians are the titular nation and the core of the political nation in the making.

**Nation building**

*What’s in a nation?*

Nation building is a difficult process to define because, as argued elsewhere in this book, national identity (together with other identities) is always in the process of change. In addition, Connor correctly points to the fact that ‘The essence of the nation is not tangible. It is psychological, a matter of attitude rather than of fact.’¹ The very process of assimilation into a nation has to be gradual, ‘one that progresses almost without visibility and awareness’.² Nation building is a drawn-out process which will aim to integrate and harmonise the regional, social, political and institutional divisions of peoples within one community. Its success will be seen in the creation of a consciousness that binds together the population. It is therefore a process—not an event.
Nation building in Ukraine cannot therefore be judged as a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ within the paltry space of seven or more years, itself a very short period of time in historical terms. The establishment of newly independent states is not the end—but only the beginning of a process of ‘national liberation’. Post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine, are therefore in a better position than former Third World colonies. All of them inherited quasi-states and quasi-nations. Skak’s comparison of the problems inherited by the former colonies of Western empires and the post-Soviet non-Russian states is true to a certain extent.

In the 1960s leading scholars such as Deutsch assumed that modernisation would lead to a decline in regional ethnic identities. Social mobilisation would then lead to assimilation (that is, nation building) helped along its path by social engineering undertaken by elites. Ethnic divisions would not therefore constitute a long-term challenge to nation building, in Deutsch’s view. Modernisation would serve to integrate and assimilate ‘backward tribes’ in Africa to a common language and culture as the main stage on the way from tribes to nations.

Deutsch’s theories of modernisation and social mobilisation leading to assimilation and nation building are also, Connor pointed out, ‘nation destroying’. In addition, greater pressure for assimilation, as seen in inter-war Poland vis-à-vis Ukrainians and Belarusans, merely led to greater (not lesser) ethnic conflict and national awareness. Indeed, scholars of nationalism have often pointed to conflict as an important factor promoting national awareness. Fundamentally, Connor believes that Deutsch’s views proved to be wrong because they mistakenly promoted the countries of Western Europe as examples of fully integrated states. Yet, national integration is far from achieved even in Western Europe (as it is not in post-communist Europe). Spain, Austria and Italy all only began their national consolidation after the Second World War. Deutsch assumed that assimilation of the periphery to the core would signal that the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ would become coterminous, a mistaken conclusion which contrasts with the growing regionalism found in many countries.

In Africa, in the manner earlier optimistically promoted by Deutsch and others, nation building has since been proven to be a failure. Similarly, in the former USSR, Soviet leaders and most Western scholars of Sovietology until the 1980s, were of the view that modernisation and industrialisation had ended the nationality question. They were also proven mistaken. In the former USSR,
as in Africa, many of the ‘tribes’ which had been slated for assimilation revolted, leading to the collapse of two states (the USSR and Ethiopia) and ethnic conflict in others. In Ukraine nation building may be more successful because ethnic Ukrainians constitute a majority throughout its territory, except in the Crimea, an exception which has been recognised. But it will still need to take into account Ukraine’s different historical and regional legacies.

There is also no commonly held definition of what constitutes a nation. This is perhaps partly due to the fact that nationalism can be construed through Marxism, liberalism, conservatism and fascism. Then President Leonid Kravchuk argued in favour of the simplistic division of Ukrainians into two groups—those struggling to build an independent and democratic state versus those who were working for its destruction. In addition, it is impossible to argue a precise date when a nation is born. Yet, it is quite common to talk about pre-modern and modern identities (which are usually associated with nation-states) and post-modern identities (which are usually defined in terms of the ‘post-nation-state era’ and ‘globalisation’). A nation exists, many scholars would argue, when a group of people accept a set of beliefs regarding their past, present and future.

Smith, Deutsch and Anderson define a nation as composed of and requiring the following attributes in the evolution from a naselenia (an ethnos) to a narod (nation):

- a compact territorial unit of population;
- a common history where nation-state builders act as ‘archaeologists’ who forget, as well as remember, the past;
- a common culture;
- a single economy uniting different regions;
- social communications: urbanisation, developed markets, railways;
- print media;
- common legal rights and duties.

Nation-state builders turn their attention to constructing these features of an independent state which may be in part, or completely, absent. Different leaders, coming from different regions of the state, with different political views, and in power in different eras, are not likely to have similar views as to which of these attributes of a nation and a state should be prioritised. President Leonid Kuchma, unlike his predecessor, perhaps quite rightly
argued that the key to state and nation building in Ukraine was the economy. If domestic capital and a national bourgeoisie were created who would seek to defend their interests, while, at the same time, the economic crisis was ameliorated, then these combined factors would ensure that the majority of the population would give their allegiance to the state (the success of nation building does not require there to be 100 per cent national consciousness). With a better economy the state can then allocate greater funds for the armed forces, the media, culture and education—all important vehicles for nation building. In Estonia and Latvia, where economic conditions are better than in Ukraine, Russian-speakers have not migrated back to their homelands (which the leaderships of these countries had initially hoped). Instead, they have opted to stay and in many cases assimilate.

Hroch’s division of the three stages of a national movement provides a useful guide to the various stages of national revival and nation building. These three stages should not be constructed as separate stages, both in time and activity. Instead, academic, cultural-educational and political self-definition are all interconnected and can develop simultaneously, both in the pre and post-independence stages. Hroch describes nation building in Europe as having taken either of two paths: prior to 1917 Ukraine belonged to his second category of countries, with no ruling class, no administratively defined sub-unit and a weak national consciousness. After 1992 though, largely as a consequence of Soviet rule, Ukraine more clearly fits Hroch’s first group of countries where a feudal state (in this case the former Soviet Ukrainian SSR) with the help of a new ruling class aims to develop a modern state and nation.

Magosci developed Hroch’s ideas of nation building by adapting them to the transition process from empire to independent state. In empires most individuals hold more than one identity. The Ukrainian gentry were both loyal to the Tsar and to their Little Russian territory. But, in independent states these multiple loyalties, which are usually defined as ‘situational ethnicities’, will be encouraged to gradually evolve into mutually exclusive loyalties. Little Russianism or Soviet identities will therefore become anachronisms over time. All inhabitants of Ukraine automatically became Ukrainian citizens. If they wish also to choose an ethnic identity (which is no longer denoted on their passport) they are free to do so.
As pointed out elsewhere in this book Western authors, such as Arel and Wilson, are especially critical of the demands of ‘nationalists’ in Ukraine to prioritise its ‘core, indigenous peoples’ (that is, ethnic Ukrainians). National democrats therefore allegedly hold contradictory policies whereby they back civic liberalism as well as ethnic supremacy. In actual fact, the majority of Ukrainian writers and activists who have commented on this question reject any purely ethnic basis to the Ukrainian state. Instead, they argue in favour of the European norm; namely, a nation constructed from its political and national attributes which is ‘the alpha and omega of the Ukrainian idea’.

Both authors here misunderstand nation and state building in other regions of Europe and the inter-relationship between the civic and ethnic components of modern states. There are no purely civic or ethnic states. All states in fact exhibit a mixture of both civic and ethnic elements. Western Europe’s civic nations are, at the same time, based upon the cultures, traditions and languages of the dominant, core ethnic group. In an investigation of the seventy-three ethnic groups in Europe Krejci and Velimsky found that the majority (forty-two) were both ethnic and political nations (that is, 57.5 per cent). Of the remainder only eight were purely political (or 10.95 per cent), all of which were based in Western Europe.

The problem that Wilson and Arel fail to grapple with rests on their artificial division of nationalism into civic (‘liberal’) and ethnic (‘illiberal’) varieties. But, historically both have sought to homogenise internally and differentiate their societies externally during their state and nation building projects. The achievement of the civic state does not necessarily mean there is less violence than in the struggle to create an ethnic state, as seen in the American Civil War. All modern nations embody both civic/territorial/political and ethnic/cultural factors. Nationalism is both inclusive in creating a political community bound by common values, as well as exclusive separating the ‘We’ from the ‘Others’. Although liberal democracy equates nationalism with citizenship and the state with civil society where all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins are equal, ‘liberal democracy has a clear bias towards ethnic integration and assimilation’. National minorities therefore prefer group or collective rights to individual rights, which are favoured by most states and international structures, because individual rights foster assimilation into the dominant culture and language.
Even in the most civic of all states—Switzerland—its traditions and identity are derived from its German-speaking core. In bi-national states, such as in Belgium and Canada, ethnicity is more important than civic elements in each component of the state. In Canada: ‘Ethnocultural criteria serve to determine membership in the collectivity.’ In Quebec the French language became the official language after much agitation in favour of demands for its compulsory introduction in all schools in the province. In 1976–1977 the number of non-ethnic French pupils educated in the French language was only 23 per cent. Ten years later this had grown to nearly 60 per cent. Those that had refused to accept this pressure to assimilate have left the province, a process welcomed, as it was originally in Estonia/Latvia, to enable the creation of a more ethnically homogenous province (or future state). In Australia a ‘White Australia’ policy, which included attempted forcible assimilation of the Aborigines, was conducted until as late as the 1960s. In the USA, as in Canada, language requirement is a necessity of both citizenship and for state officials.

France is a nation conceived in relation to the state. This political understanding of the nation is not purely civic though, it is also based on both political and cultural unity. The French nation is open to non-ethnically French peoples, both within France and from abroad. But a prerequisite of citizenship is that they assimilate into French culture and language. In Germany the nation is conceived in more ethnic terms. One cannot assimilate by becoming a German citizen because the German nation is not open to non-ethnic Germans. Yet, despite these idiosyncrasies, both France and Germany are perceived as Western European civic states which Eastern Europeans are striving to emulate, two states which possess both ethnic and civic elements.

Brubaker believes there to be three models of nation building—civic, bi-national and minority rights/nationalising state. Of these he feels that the first two are unlikely to be followed in Eastern Europe because all of them ‘to some degree and in some form’ (here only Arel—not Brubaker—singles out Ukraine) will be nationalising states. In his view therefore, the main question is how they will implement their nationalising agendas and to what degree. These nationalising projects are undertaken in heterogeneous states which are conceived as ‘nation-states’, where the ‘language, culture, demographic, economic flourishing, and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation’ are promoted. Brubaker’s division of the choice facing states—civic versus ethnic nationalisers—is misleading because
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civic states are also nationalising states, as argued earlier. But, are Brubaker’s theories applicable to Ukraine? This would seem to be the case only to a certain degree—only in the degree to which all states are themselves nationalisers. Civic, nationalising and bi-national states all promote nationalising policies throughout the state or within their bi-ethnic regions.

But, important elements are missing from this nationalising project, as defined by Brubaker, when applied to Ukraine. First, there are no barriers to the social advancement of non-ethnic Ukrainians to the pinnacles of power (as seen in the presence of former Russian and Jewish government ministers). Second, citizenship and civil rights were granted automatically to everybody resident in Ukraine; Ukraine is not therefore an ethnic democracy, unlike Israel, or formerly Estonia or Latvia. Third, national minorities have been granted cultural (as well as civil) rights. Fourth, political autonomy has been granted to the Crimea in recognition of its uniqueness as the only Ukrainian region with a non-Ukrainian majority. Finally, affirmative action in favour of the Ukrainian language and culture is proceeding in an evolutionary, not in a revolutionary fashion.

Under former President Kravchuk, Arel believes that there was a contradiction between the proclaimed civic and the pursued ethnic components of state policy. But this, as we have argued earlier, should not be regarded in contradictory terms. The choice facing Ukraine was never one of an ethnic versus a civic state promoted by Kravchuk and Kuchma respectively. Instead, the choice was between a civic/ethnic state based upon Ukrainians as the sole titular nation or Ukrainians/Russians both recognised as titular nations. Arel and Wilson therefore implicitly accept the view of those political parties (such as the communists and the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms), who argue that Ukraine is a ‘bi-national state’ composed and created jointly by Russian and Ukrainian cultures and languages. In other words, Ukraine is similar to Belgium or Canada. But even in accepting this definition of Ukraine their use of Brubaker’s theory of nationalising states is misleading. In bi-national states ethnicity plays a central role in the formulation of state policy because in each of the two regions of the bi-national state nationalising policies are pursued.

Arel, Wilson and Hry‘niov are not alone in their view that Ukraine is a bi-national state established by Russian and Ukrainian cultures. This view is also prevalent among the majority of Russians and many Western commentators, who simplistically divide Ukraine into a ‘nationalist, Ukrainian-speaking West’ and a ‘Russian-speaking, separatist eastern Ukraine’. Unfortunately for holders of
these views, they have been shown to be too simplified, lacking in any reality and therefore incapable of correctly predicting the likely course of events undertaken by Ukraine’s ruling elites. Since 1992 the majority of Ukrainian elites have supported the creation of a civic state based upon a single Ukrainian core ethnic culture and language. Although the Ukrainian language will revive, it is never likely to remove the Russian language completely from Ukraine. Ukraine is therefore quite understandably experiencing both national and democratic ‘revolutions’. Only the Tatars are granted the right to be defined, like Ukrainians, as an indigenous ethnic group in Ukraine; that is, neither Ukrainians nor Tatars possess another external homeland.30

However, Ukraine can be both a multi-ethnic state, as Kuchma argued,31 and one which legislates that only one ethnic group is the titular one laying claim to that territory. These views of Ukrainians as the core nationality were recognised within the June 1996 constitution, where Russians were included among the ranks of the national minorities. This core ethnic group should include all shades of Ukrainians (and not just Ukrainian-language speakers). Those opposed to such a definition of Ukrainians as the sole core nationality are usually identical to those who propagate Ukraine as a bi-national, Russian-Ukrainian state. Such a bi-national state would require, for example, two state languages for its two core nationalities (Russian-Ukrainian); Russians would not be legally defined as one of its many ‘national minorities’, and a federal territorial structure and a ‘strategic partnership’ between Ukraine and Russia would also be required.

Unfortunately though, not all Ukrainians themselves understand that it is not a question of choosing either a political or an ethnic nation—but both simultaneously.32 Iaroslav Hrytsak, opening his Institute of Historical Studies in L’viv, asked rhetorically, ‘What does being Ukrainian mean today? Is it a national or a territorial concept?’33 Ivan Dziuba, then Minister of Culture, argued in favour of the creation of a new Ukrainian civic nation (not ethnic)—yet he would be undoubtedly the first to support the revival of Ukrainian culture and provide affirmative action for the Ukrainian language.34 This confusion was also evident during the early part of Kuchma’s career as president (see below).

**Nation building in Ukraine**

Should state and nation building go hand in hand? Or is this impossible in view of the time gap between both processes. On the
fifth anniversary of Ukrainian independence in August 1996 President Kuchma claimed that state building had been completed. Nation building though is a much longer process, particularly in a country such as Ukraine where national consciousness was so severely damaged.\textsuperscript{35} Ukraine is faced with the unenviable task of attempting four simultaneous transitions. Not only state and nation building—but also transitions to the market and a democracy. Motyl describes three obstacles to nation building in Ukraine:\textsuperscript{36}

- Russian-speaking Ukrainians;
- ethnic Ukrainian criticism of the moderate nationality policies undertaken in both the Kravchuk and Kuchma eras and the desire to see Ukraine become more ‘Ukrainian’;
- Ukraine’s neighbours; in particular Russia, which has threatened military intervention in defence of ‘Russian speakers’.

In view of the four-pronged transition Ukraine is undergoing and the obstacles it faces in its nation building, to what degree was Ukrainianisation a policy pursued by the Kravchuk leadership? Indeed, are there fundamental, strategic differences between the Kravchuk and Kuchma eras in this area of policy?

It is certainly the case that Kravchuk supported the national revival, a return to national traditions and the recovering of the historical memory of Ukrainians and national minorities. Ukraine’s government and leadership during the Kravchuk era worked towards creating a new set of values to fill the spiritual void that had appeared after the collapse of communism and the former USSR. These new values included national culture, language and identities—all areas subject to corruption in the Soviet era—as well as the integration of Ukraine within Western models of education, culture and political thought.\textsuperscript{37}

But was the Ukrainian language forced upon non-Ukrainian speakers? Ukrainianisation, in the manner of the 1920s, did not take place under Kravchuk. Dziuba, Minister of Culture under Kravchuk, remembered that:

It was purely declamatory. In real life and politics it didn’t take place. Sometimes when it was not thought through then it gave enemies of Ukrainian statehood the chance to speculate against these declarative slogans about the alleged campaign of Ukrainianisation and that Russian was being pushed out (of Ukraine). No such thing took place.\textsuperscript{38}
Kravchuk certainly believed that the ‘Ukrainian language should be assigned absolute priority as a state language’. This policy did not contradict the 1989 Law on Languages, one of whose authors was Kravchuk himself who was then a member of the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) Politburo. These provisions had been reinforced in the 1996 constitution. Kravchuk understood, like Kuchma who followed him, that the population at large followed the example set by their leaders. If the elites spoke Ukrainian (or switched back to Russian, as under President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus) they understood this as a signal to be followed. As a result, the language policies implemented under Kravchuk did not materialise out of thin air, Kravchuk argued: ‘they did not arise in 1990 and not in 1991, or 1993. When I worked in the central committee (of the KPU) I was among a few in the central committee who spoke the Ukrainian language and people noted this.’

Kravchuk continued:

What kind of Ukraine is it? Without language, without schools, without high schools? A state without language, without culture, without traditions, without respect towards

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**Map 6.1** Ukrainian as native language

Source: 1989 Soviet census
history is not a state—this is a temporary phenomenon, like a guberniya which only resembles a state.

In other words, Belarus was the unfortunate example into which Ukraine would evolve if it did not rescue its language, culture and historical memory. There were—and remain—differences of opinion as to whether the Russian language and culture should be treated as indigenous to Ukraine or be ranked as just one of many other world languages and cultures (for example, together with German or English). Dziuba, himself hailing from the Donbas, supported policies in eastern and southern Ukraine which aimed to revive the prestige of the Ukrainian language and culture by pointing to its long historical roots. This was undertaken through conferences, exhibitions, concerts, festivals and the exchange of cultural groups throughout Ukraine. The annual Chervona Ruta festival aimed to provide the opportunity for young, popular and rock musicians to appear in Ukraine in order to show that the Ukrainian language and culture was also modern—and not just a peasant folk culture of a bygone era.

Indeed, it would have been highly unusual if Dziuba had not supported these relatively moderate policies. But, Mykola Zhulyns’kyi, then Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for the humanities, recalled that, at a time of economic crisis when state institutions were still in the process of creation, there were few resources and often little understanding at the top levels of power under Kravchuk. Often the rhetoric was not matched by political will or budgetary resources. Dziuba complained on the eve of his appointment as Minister of Culture (a post he held from November 1992 to July 1994) that ‘instead of a stimulation of national culture, we have paralysis of its institutions, lack of financial resources, a catastrophe in the Ukrainian press, tragedy in Ukrainian book publishing, the beginning of a mass exodus and loss of intelligentsia from Ukraine in the arts and academia’.

Dziuba complained that the weakness of state institutions and the lack of budgetary resources made it difficult—if not impossible—to influence policy in the regions. This was due to the lack of clout of the executive in the provinces, as well as his own time being filled by mundane day-to-day chores required of administrators (for example, the payment of salaries on time, repairs to buildings, etc.). The damage inflicted on Ukrainian language and culture could not, Dziuba believed, be overcome in the two years he was Minister of Culture. This required between ten and twenty years and should not be forced. Kravchuk agreed with him:
Yes, we’d like it so that in Donets’k oblast all the schools would be Ukrainian. But this takes time, faith, parents, entire policies geared towards high schools, general policies, administrative policies, the publication of books, newspapers, television—we need to unite all of these, as they have to work as one unit in order to support the Ukrainian language.

Kravchuk and Kuchma

In the Kravchuk era national democrats, who had propelled Ukraine to independence in alliance with national communists, provided the ideology for state building based on the legal continuation of the 1917–1920 independent governments. But the portrayal of Russia as an Asian ‘Other’ proved to be unacceptable to many Ukrainians, who were unwilling to be consolidated into a civic Ukrainian nation that was counterposed with Russia. Under Kuchma, Russia is no longer portrayed as an enemy and the Russian language as ‘foreign’ (except in western Ukraine). Ukraine is no longer described as a ‘buffer’—but as a ‘bridge’.43

But, despite these tactical alterations in policy, did Ukraine under Kuchma change the strategic parameters of its nation building? Not really. Kuchma Ukrainianised himself and thereby continued his predecessor’s policy of setting an example for the population to follow. His Minister of Culture and Arts, Dmytro Ostapenko, continued to promote state support for the Ukrainian language and culture through legislative, administrative and financial—economic policies. Kuchma’s former Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Kuras, responsible for the humanities, largely followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, Zhulyns’kyi. In Ostapenko’s view, ‘Ukrainian culture is an important element of rebuilding a fully valued democratic society, the basis for the successful development of Ukraine and its people as an equal member of the world community.’44 The adoption of the constitution in June 1996 had largely resolved the question of the influence of the executive power in the provinces. But the economic crisis still served to limit budgetary resources available for education and culture.

Nevertheless, in contrast to his predecessor, Kuchma has, at times, given contradictory policy prescriptions. His period in office signalled a shift to some degree in the prioritisation of state policies with a greater emphasis upon state (not nation)hood. Statehood,
Kuchma pointed out correctly, is not only symbols, borders and other items: ‘Genuine statehood is impossible without a stable, well-developed economy, social well-being and dignified living conditions for citizens.’ After coming to power Kuchma sought to correct the state’s policies in the humanities by dropping administrative methods and giving the regions a greater say in the development of cultural, educational and linguistic policies. This was to be done by no longer issuing ‘departmental instructions’ without, at the same time, ‘violating the national policy on cultures and languages’.

This withdrawal of the state from its role as an active promoter of nation building would, despite Kuchma’s confused logic attempting to convince us of the opposite, undermine national policies. It was therefore soon replaced by the state returning to the role of nation builder, where it would help turn a naselennia (an ethnos/people) into a narod (nation) and a ‘territory into a state’. Kuchma admitted though that nation building—in contrast to state building—was not easy. At the very least, Kuchma had come to understand that state building could not be undertaken without the state’s promotion of a new political culture and patriotism—otherwise on what basis would loyalty to the state be instilled? This was similar to Kuchma’s initial withdrawal from religious policy which was later rejected in favour of the state playing a role.

By 1996 government officials were therefore talking of replacing ‘national romanticism’ with policies which would unite the state ‘as a call to the creation of a strong, paternalistic and, within reasonable confines, a national state’. The June 1996 constitution provided the legal framework for this active state policy in nation building. Article 11 says that the state ‘assists the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions and culture’. Ukrainians were accorded the first among equals as the korinnyi narod (core nation). In the preamble to the constitution it referred to only one civic nation, which included all citizens of Ukraine: ‘in the name of the Ukrainian people—citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities’.

**Nation building and national security**

These strategic policies, outlined in the constitution, were echoed in the National Security Doctrine adopted by parliament in early 1997. One of the aspects of the country’s national security was the development of the Ukrainian nation, its historic consciousness and
the ‘national pride of Ukrainians’. Ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities of all ethnic groups, who collectively form the Ukrainian narod (people/nation), are to be promoted.51

Another impetus, therefore, for the state returning to the role of nation builder was to be found in national security, of which national-cultural security (national consciousness, language, culture and historiography) is regarded as one of its four pillars.52 Ukraine could not hope to ‘return to Europe’ and world civilisation without nation and state building; that is, without dealing with the legacies of the Soviet era by promoting Ukrainian national consciousness, its language and culture. The government therefore began a campaign to promote nationhood at the local level in mid-1996.53 Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council, linked nation and state building to the country’s national security. This required ‘a comprehensive national system of policies in the humanities, which should be determined not on the basis of existing social and economic realities, but rather on the future prospects and goals of our development’.54 In other words, Ukraine’s strategic goals of joining the EU, the West European Union and maybe NATO in the medium term required it to deal with economic, political and national obstacles which stood in the way of immediate membership.

This aspect of national security required the promotion of both Ukrainian and ‘European’ consciousness through a return to, and the state’s promotion of, Ukrainian and ‘European’ values. Nation and state building were therefore directly linked to political and economic reform, to Ukraine’s return to a hypothetical European ‘model’ by rejecting both the programmes of the pro-Soviet communists and the nationalist radicals. The new Ukrainian national idea would tie together the different strands of these policies and provide the basis for the formation of an ideology of state building. This was because ‘For a transitional society the formation of national identity is the key factor in the formulation of the main orientations of societies’ advancement.’55 Economic and political reform, as well as Ukraine’s ‘return to Europe’, would not be successful therefore without the promotion of a Ukrainian national identity in all of its facets. A new generation of textbooks oriented to the promotion of national and Western culture and the Ukrainian language were introduced in the educational system. These policies were directly tied to Ukraine’s foreign policy strategic objectives. Former Deputy Prime Minister Kuras argued: ‘High spirituality, culture should become the inheritance of every
citizen of Ukraine. Otherwise we will not become a highly civilised state.  

Towards national consensus?

The pitting of the civic versus ethnic state for Ukraine is bound up with the debate since 1994 as to what kind of Ukraine is being built. Will the civic Ukraine to which Kuchma aspires include any Ukrainian ethnic elements? What language(s) will it speak? Does the threat simultaneously from both Russia and the ‘chewing gum ideology’ of the West need to be countered by a spiritual-moral revival? This stark (and, as argued earlier, wrongly stated) choice is seen in very acute terms:

[N]ationally conscious political forces must unite, not so much to fight a threat to Ukraine from the outside...as to firmly resist an internal threat—the threat of Ukraine being transformed by democratic means (after all, everything is done voluntarily) into a Russian-speaking state.

The question of making Ukraine more ‘Ukrainian’ is part of the domestic debate regarding the elements to be stressed in Ukraine’s nation building project. Many nationally conscious Ukrainians see little progress in nation building; on the contrary, they believe there to be a deliberate ‘denationalisation of Ukraine’. Clearly these views represent a combination of exaggerated fears, which claim that ethnic Ukrainians could well go the way of Aborigines in Australia or Arabs in Israel, as well as genuine concern over the slow revival of a previously repressed culture and language. When these authors complain that they feel like a ‘minority’ in Ukrainian society, or that they feel detached from what is being promoted, they are wrongly evaluating several factors. First, they are absolutising language: while the Ukrainian language is obviously important it cannot be—and should not be—regarded as the sole marker of national identity. Second, the Russian language will be impossible to eradicate from Ukraine. Third, they mistakenly confuse continued usage of the Russian language with a Little Russian mentality. They therefore conclude: ‘The Russian ethnic group in Ukraine, as before, remains in command.’

To get around this artificial problem, where civic and ethnic components are counterpoised against one another, requires a compromise on both sides. A new loyalty to Ukraine can be built
on the principles of political, economic and territorial unity which is inclusive and based on the Ukrainian ethnic core. A new political nation will have to incorporate all of the traditions which Ukrainians inherited (for example, including both Ukraine’s contribution to the Soviet war effort and the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army). But in other areas, demands by pressure groups, such as the Congress of Ukrainian Intellectuals, for more radical action (such as the creation of a ‘state orthodox church’) would be only counterproductive.65 The Ukrainian elites have the task of forging and choosing to highlight whichever symbols, values and myths are suitable in uniting the majority of the population within a new patria. The negative legacies of the Russian and Soviet empires will continue to provide the basis for an emerging Ukrainian identity in opposition to the creation of new supra-state structures, a factor explaining Ukraine’s reluctance to support anything other than an amorphous Commonwealth of Independent States.

Nation building, if based exclusively upon ethnic criteria, would lead to domestic conflict; it is anyway supported by only a tiny radical right-wing fringe and unlikely to become government policy. On the whole there is sufficient consensus among the majority of Ukrainian political groups that Ukraine will comprise both civic and ethnic elements in its nation building project. In addition, the overwhelming majority of political parties oppose federalism or political autonomy outside the Crimea. The national democrats support the creation of a modern political nation, the nucleus of which is formed by the Ukrainian ethnos. The liberals (among whom we would include Kuchma) give priority to individual over collective rights, prioritising Ukraine’s civic over its ethnic identity (even here, as argued earlier, individual rights promote assimilation and hence national minorities prefer the recognition of collective rights). They are also more flexible on language questions. But, as also argued earlier, Ukrainian liberals are faced with the same dilemma as elsewhere; namely, that liberal democracies are of themselves assimilatory. The radical right support the usual panoply of exclusive nationalist policies xenophobically hostile to Russians, while their opposite numbers on the left don’t address the question and back dual state languages.66

If we exclude the extreme left and right therefore, there is some room for compromise and manoeuvre between the more moderate political parties who all recognise that the Ukrainian nation will be constructed from both civic and ethnic elements. As even a member of the Socialist party Political Council argued:
In all events one has to arrive at the conclusion that there is the titular Ukrainian people (with all of its regional differences), which make up the majority population and gave its name to the state. This people can historically speaking define itself only in Ukraine and for this it requires its own state.67

Although the discussion within Ukraine will continue as to what proportion the civic and ethnic components of the Ukrainian political nation will be divided it is clear that the majority consensus is now that both are necessary for the construction of a modern Ukrainian nation. Dziuba, Minister of Culture under Kravchuk, rightly believes that the Ukrainian nation should be consolidated firstly on the political and only secondly upon its national components.68 Debate will continue surrounding language proficiency but disdain and hostility towards the Ukrainian language, which existed until the late Gorbachev era, has now all but disappeared. With regard to language issues the most important question is to ‘remove language conflict and not to encourage either those who propagate “the unification of nations and peoples” or the assimilators of the ‘bio(logical) masses’ (here he was referring to the extreme left and right respectively).69

Ultimately, one of the major aspects of Ukraine’s nation building project will be to transform people’s consciousness in an evolutionary, unforced manner that would lead to the consolidation of a Ukrainian civic nation which would signify the successful outcome of this project. Although Kuchma declared in August 1996 that state building had been ‘completed’ this is only partially true. Without the creation of a modern Ukrainian political nation state building will never be ‘completed’. Only when national and human dignity has been restored, and when will power, individualism, pride in being Ukrainian and acquiescence in an ‘imagined community’ are present can one say that a Ukrainian political nation has been forged.70

In search of a national idea

*Where are we heading?*

Is a national idea important for the functioning of a state? What is a national idea? Should there be an ideology of state building? These questions are probably some of the more intensely debated in Ukraine since it became an independent state.71
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The successor to communism, we should not be surprised to hear, could only be national in form. Political and economic reform might eventually create democratic-capitalist states with vibrant civil societies. But, civil societies could not be created by presidential decree; unlike state institutions, they did not appear overnight and, anyway, as argued elsewhere in this book, required national identities in order to function. Meanwhile, the European norm, as also argued elsewhere in this book, is societies constructed out of both cultural/ethnic and civic/political criteria. In the early stages of state and nation building, such as in the former USSR, the balance has been more in favour of ethnic than civic elements in this complicated relationship. Over time, as seen within the developed Western democracies, the balance then shifts towards greater emphasis of civic elements.

In the short run at least, particularly during the difficult socio-economic transition, nationalism, the search for a national idea and the forging of a national identity are likely to play important roles which will vary from country to country in the former USSR. But, the search for a national idea in societies which inherited divided and incompletely developed polities, such as Ukraine, will be all the more difficult. One Ukrainian author therefore remained highly pessimistic, concluding: ‘We have to admit that to find an idea which would please all political forces and groups in a divided and too politicised society is a utopia.’ Nevertheless, the search goes on.

The search for a national idea is closely tied up with the questions of ‘Where is Ukraine going?’ and ‘What is Being Built?’ As formulated by the editor of the L’viv-based newspaper Vysoky Zamok, Stepan Kuril: ‘No one can really question that Ukraine will stay independent.’ This question had been largely resolved by 1994, when the West began to support Ukraine in earnest; by 1996, when a new constitution was adopted; and by 1997, when Russia and Romania became the last two countries to recognise Ukraine’s borders. ‘But what sort of country will it be?’, Kuril pondered.

These questions were being asked because Ukraine had no clearly formulated guiding ideology, a factor in stark contrast to the important role such ideologies had played in earlier periods of nation and state building elsewhere in Europe. This, in turn, meant that the state seemed to lack a sense of direction with its leaders, particularly under Kravchuk, thus lacking a vision as to what they were attempting to achieve and build. The national idea and state ideology are usually united through a set of belief systems which require, Bhikhu tells us, a shared body of rules, conventions and
values ‘which regulate how they should behave towards each other in different contexts as well as their mutual expectations and obligations’.77

This was the question to be addressed next by Ukraine’s elites after the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood, its territorial integrity and independence. State building had largely been completed by 1996, Kuchma claimed, and the last two sections of Ukraine’s borders were then on the verge of being recognised by all of its neighbours. It was now time, many Ukrainians believed, to focus on nation building where the national idea would play a central role in answering the question: ‘of course something is being built, but what?’78 Nation building and the search for the national idea would serve, its proponents argued, to reclaim the state (from whom it was not always clear—Russians or non-Ukrainian speakers?) and create a political nation from the ethnos inherited from the former USSR. ‘An ethnos becomes a nation when it forms a state and in this state it becomes a hegemon’, the newspaper Vechirnyi Kyiv (7 July 1995) argued. The struggle still lay ahead though because the core Ukrainian ethnic group were not yet the political ‘hegemon’, or masters, of the independent state (unlike in all of the other non-Slavic states of the former USSR). In addition, the national idea had to stand in opposition to the Ukrainophobia that had previously promoted the denationalisation of Ukrainians, their language and culture.79

There was therefore a need to urgently answer three questions:

• where was Ukraine going? Towards ‘Europe’ or Eurasia (or will it remain stuck somewhere in between two geopolitical expanses, like Turkey?);

• what society was being built? A democratic, capitalist or social-market economy, based on just its civic elements or on both its ethnic and political attributes;80

• for whom was this society being built? For the ‘Ukrainian people’, the core of whom were ethnic Ukrainians, or for a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Russian-Ukrainian ‘peoples of Ukraine’ with two state languages?

Gosudarstvo ily/chy derzhava?

In November 1995 the Congress of Ukrainian Intelligentsia (KUI) was created by a cross-section of Ukraine’s cultural elites in response to the fear that the Ukrainian leadership was not interested in nation building and was more preoccupied in building a
gosudarstvo rather than a derzhava where the national idea would have no role. The launch of KUI onto the Ukrainian political scene was touted as the second revival of Rukh, which had largely been the body which could claim credit for propelling Ukraine to independence. Ivan Drach, the well known writer and first leader of Rukh, became KUI’s Chairman, thereby reflecting the continuity of these two bodies. KUI would be called upon to complete the second stage of this state and nation building process. Namely, the KUI hoped to help transform ‘Little Russia’ into ‘Ukraine’ through the victory of the national idea by, in Drach’s words, building ‘Ukraine’ in ‘every town and village’ of Ukraine.

There seems no question that the bulk of Ukraine’s non-communist elites were in general agreement by 1995–1996 that independent states could not exist without national ideas. Former President Kravchuk believed that ‘This entire idea, the Ukrainian idea, the national idea, is taking over more and more people. People are beginning to understand that they live in a state.’ The ongoing debate rests more on the content of this national idea. Should it be exclusively ethnic or solely civic—or a combination of the two? If the latter, in what proportions?

Not surprisingly perhaps, a general consensus over the content of the national idea was not always evident within Ukraine’s elites. Already during the first year of Ukrainian independence Kravchuk had called for roundtables, discussions and conferences on the national idea. This was because ‘The reality today is such that for a section of the people the national idea is not the most important’, which made it difficult to consolidate society into a new political community.

In Russia this did not become an issue for its leadership until 1996 because of two factors. First, Russia continued to be undecided between nation and state building or rebuilding a new ‘Union’. In the same month (May 1997) that Russia signed a close treaty on creating a future ‘Union’ with Belarus, which Armenia was invited to join, it ratified a treaty with Ukraine recognising its border. Second, there was less urgency because an old Russian imperial national idea existed, which held a consensus for Russia to regain its great power status coupled with a nostalgia for ‘lost territories’.

**Kuchma and the national idea**

In the early phase of Kuchma’s period in office he claimed that the ‘national idea had not worked’, a product of the influence of his
ideological mentors (see below). Kuchma criticised the fact that the national idea propagated by his predecessor had been based on ‘national-ethnic’ while ignoring ‘state-political’ and ‘economic’ issues. Therefore, while not rejecting the need for a national idea, Kuchma argued in favour of giving it new content. A major criticism of the formulation of the national idea under Kravchuk was the absence of economic issues, the issues which most fundamentally affect the man (and woman) in the street. During the 1994 presidential elections Serhiy Holovatiy, later to become Kuchma’s Minister of Justice, complained, in a clear reference to the then incumbent President Kravchuk, that ‘Ukrainians can’t eat their national flag and Ukrainians can’t survive on national symbols alone’.

National democrats, many of whom had supported Kravchuk, reluctantly agreed, but then countered by arguing that economic transformation would be made more difficult and would be slowed down without the national idea to provide it with sustenance. Ukrainian authors often pointed to Germany and Japan after 1945 as examples where their ‘economic miracles’ had been partly propelled by their national ideas. Japanese businessmen visiting Ukraine were asked what they thought was the root source of Ukraine’s economic ills. Their reply, often quoted in the Ukrainian media, was the lack of ‘nationalism’. If, as some Ukrainians believed, the national idea ‘had not worked’ or was too difficult to locate, the Ukrainian state could propagate an alternative—the concept of a ‘Ukrainian Dream’, clearly copied from the ‘American Dream’.

Without the national idea, New Ukrainians would simply base their relationship to the state not on patriotic loyalty—but on materialism and corruption. These fears, in turn, led to complaints that: ‘Unfortunately, among “new Ukrainians”, there are maybe more ‘New Russians”, “new Americans”, new donors to the Swiss and Israeli states than those whose long-term interests are tied to their native land.’ Complaints aired in the Western press, by Western governments and international financial institutions during the first half of 1997 that Ukraine was one of the most corrupt states of the former USSR seemed to suggest that there is certainly something to be said for this line of argument.

This new appraisal of the national idea would also consist of instilling pride in Ukraine’s historical achievements and ‘golden eras’ going back to the medieval state of Kyiv Rus’, insisting on equality in inter-state relations (particularly vis-à-vis Russia),
propagating a developed economy, democratic rights and liberties. It should also include achievements in culture, the arts and the sciences, defence of previously repressed languages and literatures. ‘For Ukraine’, Kuchma added, ‘there is an urgency to maintain its identity, its national identity, a need for the spiritual and cultural revival of the people.’98 Without a ‘clearly formulated national idea’, acceptable to the bulk of the population and an improvement in Ukraine’s economic situation, there could be no political stability Kuchma believed.99

Kuchma therefore never completely rejected the need for a national idea to underpin and unite the Ukrainian political nation. After all, how could he? The establishment of an independent state, Kuchma reminded us, was the triumph of the ‘national idea and the spirit of freedom’.100 Kuchma had repeatedly argued that the national idea is very important and that no state could exist without it.101 ‘I would first like to stress that I never rejected the national idea. I do not reject it even today’, Kuchma said, because it was one, ‘of the most important mobilisers of the independent Ukrainian state.’ Nevertheless, he did reject a national idea based exclusively on ethnic criteria. Kuchma therefore stressed in all of his speeches that he supported the national idea.102 Contrary to what Russian and Western commentators had argued as early as 1993, the national idea in Ukraine had consequently never been on the verge of collapse.103

Kuchma, a social democrat/liberal, did though have different views from those of Kravchuk, who was allied to national democrats, about how to go about achieving it and in what proportions the ethnic and political/civic (or state) proportions of this national idea should be constructed. Consequently, like his predecessor, he called upon the Ukrainian intelligentsia and others for ‘an all-national dialogue about the national idea, its content and composition, the sources and origins of national self identification’.104

Kuchma remains in favour of a variety of elements which should, in his view, go into creating the substance of Ukraine’s national idea. These should exclude national exclusiveness but will include ‘democratic patriotism’ (for example, love for the homeland and self pride), the two elements that will go into creating the basis for civil society. Self identification begins with a knowledge of one’s history that elaborates on ‘how the people understand themselves, their place and role in the world’. The basis for this identification rested upon four pillars—the individual, the family, society and the
state. The Ukrainian national idea would also promote a ‘strong and flowering Ukraine’, solidarity, spirituality, constitutional order, morality, civic peace, consensus, justice, well being and openness to the outside world. These pillars of the national idea would be promoted through the education system and the media.

Although Kuchma may not openly admit to it, he is, in effect, propagating the view that ethnic and political elements should both contribute towards the creation of a Ukrainian political nation and civil society which would be united by a national idea. The core of this Ukrainian political nation that Kuchma advocates can be none other than the Ukrainian ethnic group. Whereas Kravchuk, because of his link to national democrats, placed the national component ahead of the political, Kuchma, as a centre-left liberal, argued in favour of the opposite proportions of national to political elements within the national idea. This division of views between centre right and centre left leaders about the content of the national idea would not be out of place in most Western societies. As the head of the Parliamentary Committee on Spirituality, Mykhailo Kosiv, argued, ‘let anybody point to one example in world history when a state was built not on the basis of national ideas’.

Kuchma defined the content of his national idea which would unite Ukraine through national security, in politics, economics, and its culture, maintaining control over its natural resources and realising its national interests in its foreign policy. Countries are usually divided by their choice of strategies to cope with these issues. But few of them include political parties, such as the Communist Party of Ukraine or Civic Congress, which openly desire the destruction of the state that they live in.

In view of Kuchma’s continued abidance to the national idea it is not surprising therefore that the ideologues of Kuchma’s election campaign had all been either removed from power or side-lined by 1995–1996. Kuchma’s ideologues, Vydrin/Tabachnyk and Hryn’iov, had brought a great deal of flak upon themselves and upon Kuchma himself for their criticism of aspects of the national idea. Often this criticism was misplaced because the former two had merely condemned, as had Kuchma, the ‘absolutisation’ and ‘romanticism’ of the national idea propagated under Kravchuk. Only Hryn’iov, leader of the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR) party, had rejected the national idea wholesale, arguing in favour of a purely civic state built on Ukraine’s alleged ‘bi-ethnicity’ (Russian-Ukrainian). Nevertheless, after the departure of the highly unpopular head of the Presidential Administration,
Tabachnyk, media reports complained that he had tried to deny Ukrainians ‘the right to their own idea, despite the fact that other peoples have their own idea’.113

The national idea embraced

Given the intensity of the debate surrounding this subject in post-Soviet Ukraine it is not surprising that it had attracted rather colourful and, at times, hostile discourse. One Ukrainian author, clearly exasperated, believed that ‘there is undoubtedly nowhere in the world where there is a state where the national idea is so put down as it is in our country’.114 But this was too pessimistic a conclusion. The weakness of civil society and lack of political purpose or agenda among Ukraine’s Russian-speakers meant that the debate surrounding the national idea in Ukraine is going the way of those who advocate its centrality to Ukraine’s state to nation building project. Those political forces, such as Hry’niiov and the communists, who argued that a national idea was not required therefore represented a distinct minority.115 Consequently, by 1995–1996 the bulk of Ukraine’s elites had rejected the view that the national idea had ‘failed’ and was no longer of any use in Ukraine’s state and nation building programme.116 The KUI argued that the national idea could not have ‘not worked’ because it had never been implemented, and this was something they hoped to achieve as a pressure group. Those who opposed them in this venture they rubbished as being hostile to Ukrainian statehood.117

The search for a national idea is also part and parcel of a search for those factors which will unite society, creating in the process a new political culture and community that will mould the peoples of Ukraine into a new modern nation. By 1995–1996 Ukraine’s democratic elites had reached the same conclusions as a Ukrainian author who argued that ‘The state can have an army, police, ensure all-round political control. But, if it does not have the spiritual cement, an idea, then it is an entity without perspective, a weak creation.’118

Conclusions

Is nation and state building showing signs of progress in Ukraine? As the years pass there are fewer and fewer voices in opposition to Ukrainian statehood as such, even in the Crimea. The adoption of a new constitution in June 1996 and the final legal recognition of
Ukraine’s borders by Russia and Romania the following year all served to indicate that statehood was now irreversible. Vasyl’ Kremen’, head of the Presidential Administration Directorate on Domestic Issues, argued that ‘The constitution imposed a historical divide between (our) non-state past, current state building and the future Ukraine.’

After Kuchma came to power in 1994 the domestic debate focused more on questions of nationhood (Kuchma claimed that state building had been completed by 1996). Then Deputy Prime Minister Kuras, believed that the 1999 census would show sufficiently serious changes that would reflect progress in nation building. In the meantime the debate had largely been won by those advocating that Ukraine required a national idea based upon ethnic and civic elements where Ukrainians were defined as the titular or core nation. But, some questions remained. What was Ukraine building? Should Ukrainians, as the legally defined titular nation, become the ‘hegemon’ in the state (as the titular nations had become elsewhere in the former USSR, except in Belarus)? How fast and in what manner should nation building proceed? These issues would continue to be debated for some years to come.
Nationalist movements usually seek to achieve three goals:¹

- the attainment of state independence;
- the creation of national unity;
- the forging of a national identity.

It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss the latter—national identity—and to argue that national identity cannot be divorced from civil society, as both are conditions of modernity associated with modern nations and states. The amorphous identities of eastern and southern Ukrainians and Russian-speakers have not therefore been conducive to the creation of either national identity or civil society. Nation and state building which help to forge national identities and civil societies are indispensable for political reform because only in nation-states have democracies been traditionally created.

**National identity²**

*National revival*

National identity, Smith argues, involves some sense of a political community, some common institutions, a single code of rights and duties and an economic and a social space with clearly demarcated boundaries with which the citizens identify.³ National identity also requires that the ‘homeland’, whose geography is usually lauded, be also a repository of historical memories. This political community (or patria) should ultimately possess a single political will that, at the very least, encompasses the majority of the population. In other words, this political will does not have to be based upon a 100 per cent homogeneity and consensus.
Not all of these features are immediately present when states become independent. States usually have to implement conscious policies which serve to create national identities by inculcating loyalties, creating social bonds between regions and classes, providing shared values, symbols and traditions that are unique to the patria and are different to ‘Others’. The state is usually called upon to ‘reawaken’ historical memories and shared bonds. This was as true for Turks and Slovaks prior to 1900 as it is for Ukrainians, Russians and others in the former USSR in the 1990s.

This ‘reawakening’ has a particular urgency in countries such as Ukraine, and not only for the reasons outlined in other chapters in this book. When Ukraine became an independent state many members of the cultural elites (the ‘conscience of the nation’, as they were often described) felt a general feeling of urgency surrounding the fate of the Ukrainian language, culture and nation. In the late 1980s Dmytro Pavlychko, a leading writer and member of Rukh, had warned his fellow compatriots that if Soviet policies continued the Ukrainian language would be only spoken in Canada. Given therefore two more decades of Soviet rule, many of Ukraine’s cultural elites and intellectuals believed, perhaps with some justification, that Ukraine might have become as denationalised as neighbouring Belarus. As it in fact turned out, the USSR lasted only three further years after Pavlychko made his alarming statement.

The Ukrainian elites still include those whose Ukrainian national identity revived in the late Gorbachev era; that is, they again felt pride in being Ukrainian and could speak the Ukrainian language without discomfort. The basis for this revival often rested on the memories of their childhood spent in rural, Ukrainian-speaking villages. Yuriy Yekhanurov, former Minister for Economics, recalled that ‘It was my mother who instilled in me a love for Ukraine and the Ukrainian language’, because, ‘it is impossible not to love (Taras) Shevchenko’s language.’ These views are not unusual. For, as Brass points out, most people develop deeply emotional attachments in their childhood:

Even for those persons, participants in modern society, who have been removed from their origins or have rejected their childhood identity, such attachments may remain available in the unconscious, to be revived by some appeal that strikes a sympathetic psychic chord.

This ‘sympathetic psychic cord’ was revived for many Ukrainians during the 1989–1991 period (including for Leonid Kravchuk who
went on to become its first elected President in December 1991). One generation down the road would the Kravchuks and Yekhanurovs still have been around to lead Ukraine to independence? Or would, as Pavlychko feared, the Ukrainian language be only spoken, like Belarusan to a great extent, in North America? Given the close connection between language and national consciousness that many believe exists in the former USSR the urgency of the matter at hand was therefore commonly felt among Ukraine’s elites.

Sources of identity

Consequently, is identity important? The simple answer to this rather complicated question is ‘yes’. Nevertheless, there are two caveats to bear in mind. First, there exist many identities to which one can hold allegiance at the same time. Sometimes these identities overlap without any inherent contradiction. At other times, they conflict with one another.

Second, identities are not static—they can, and do, change over time. National and other identities are not stationary for they are always in the process of change, adaptation and construction. Often studies of Ukraine seem to hold the static view of identity. Instead of looking at identity in Ukraine as a long trajectory, both back in time and forward into the future, the analysis is such that it provides a static, one-dimensional view of identity which then fails to provide the depth required for sober analysis.

National identity is a process of cultural narration that is constantly changing; it is a dynamic series of events that increasingly provide new meanings. What one was born into is not necessarily what one becomes. The fact that nearly all of Ukraine’s citizens were born in the former USSR and some still hold a ‘Soviet’ identity does not necessarily mean that in the years to come this will be either important or still valid. Identities, Pearton, tells us, are often chosen for survival and survival itself is dependent upon adaptation based on rational choices. In the Tsarist empire and the former USSR the Russian language was the vehicle for future social and cultural advancement. The Ukrainian language, meanwhile, was relegated to the past, a relic of rural life to be spoken only by babushkas selling vegetables in town markets. In independent Ukraine the Ukrainian language is now the language of the future. Parents in Kyiv, who themselves are often Russian-speakers, now again make rational choices (as they did in the former USSR) and send their children to
National identity, Bhikhu reminds us, usually refers to a ‘territorially organised community’ or ‘polity’. This, in a world where for the last 100 years or more, it has been assumed that the correct organising principle in international affairs is for every polity to be organised as a nation-state. Usually it is assumed, often incorrectly, that these nation-states are a ‘homogenous and collectively self-conscious ethno-cultural unit’. These communities share a way of life, culture(s), self-understanding, bodies of ideas, images, values, and bodies of rules and myths. Clearly only some of these elements were present when Ukraine became an independent state in 1992; the remainder are still in the process of construction through state and nation building.

Parekh points to a fundamental dilemma for territorially organised societies. Territorially organised states, such as Ukraine, are at the same time both cultural and political communities, ‘and their identity is articulated at both the cultural and political levels’. Often outside observers critical of nation building in Ukraine ignore this factor common to most societies, assuming that a purely civic state (which is only found in theoretical literature) without any
ethnic elements is what, hypothetically, Ukraine should be striving towards (see below). Yet few nationalisms correspond to either purely civic or purely ethnic descriptions.

This mix of civic and ethnic elements is reflected in Ukrainian nation building. The preamble to the June 1996 Ukrainian constitution describes the Ukrainian nation as composed of all Ukrainian citizens of different ethnic groups. But article eleven of the constitution also describes the Ukrainians as the ‘titular nationality’. It also grants extensive rights to national minorities in exchange for their loyalty to the state and their integration within the Ukrainian political nation. The Romanian Member of the Ukrainian Parliament, Popecku, hoped ‘that the national minorities of Ukraine will integrate into the Ukrainian political nation, maintain their historical consciousness, traditions, cultures and the languages of their ancestors’.

In Ukraine the inherited divisions between its regions are not an ethnic divide. Due to contrasting historical experiences of Ukraine’s different regions (like Poland in the 1920s) Ukrainians have a variety of views about how a ‘Ukrainian identity’ should be defined. Whereas western Ukrainians tend to view the nation (ethnic) as the vehicle for change, eastern Ukrainians look to the state (civic). As the majority of states are constructed from a mixture of ethnic and civic elements these different views of what a Ukrainian identity should be composed of are not necessarily incompatible. Both the civic and the ethnic elements cannot coexist without one other.

What other identities can individuals hold? Identities can also refer to a broader range of allegiances than merely national ones. These can be also regional, linguistic, tribal, ideological, professional, class, ethnic, kinship, gender, clan and/or family. Individuals can commute between identities, especially in border regions and during periods of intense change. In India there are five cross-cutting identities—religion, language, tribal, non-Indian Tribal and aryan/dravidian—which compete for loyalties and within which Indians commute. These cross-cutting identities help to preserve stability in India (as they may do in Ukraine). In pre-modern societies local and regional identities are very widespread. In Ukraine attachment to region is a safety valve, something to which some citizens, confused and shaken at the changes occurring around them, often without their participation, fall back upon. They can be a product of the loss of one country to which some citizens previously felt attached (the former USSR) and the, as yet still absent, Ukrainian political community to which they, or their children, will eventually give allegiance.
National identity has never been exclusive and uncontested—it has always competed for allegiance with class, religion and local identities. It is therefore never a coherent whole. Few societies, even totalitarian ones, are homogenous and monolithic. Yet often the criteria which Ukraine is judged against is precisely from the standpoint that its lack of homogeneity is its main weakness. But heterogeneity—not homogeneity—is the rule, Connor pointed out. Loyalties to one’s nation and state often do not coincide; indeed, they sometimes compete for the allegiance of citizens.

National identity in Ukraine

*Identity in transition*

National and ethnic identification in Ukraine are influenced by many factors and cannot be reduced to a single element (for example, language) because identity is ‘fundamentally multidimensional’, as Smith persuasively argues. This is clearly shown in Table 7.1.

Other polls provide an indication of the various factors with which Ukrainian citizens identify. For those under 30 years of age the most important element of their identity is their ‘native land’, which they associate with Ukraine (not the former USSR or Russia). Those over thirty gave language as the most important indicator of their identity. Meanwhile, those in age groups over 50 and 60 gave ‘national traditions’ and religion as their most important markers of identity when asked ‘What unites you most with those of your nationality?’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of ethnic identification in Ukraine (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory/Residence</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to tradition/culture</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National consciousness</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common historical fate</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some Western scholars believe that the problems with national identity inherited by Ukraine are ‘unique’ to that country. This is clearly not the case. Historically, the majority of countries which became independent inherited dis-united polities, a lack of a single political culture and values, regionalism and identity in the throes of intense transition. Stent pointed out that ‘The problem of forging a unifying, as opposed to a divisive, nation in a multinational society is common to most post-communist states.’ State and nation building, policies intended to overcome these inherited difficulties, are therefore common to all post-communist countries. Indeed, if we could travel back in a time machine to Poland in the 1920s, which emerged from three periods of occupation by foreign powers, we would find similar problems to those encountered by Ukraine in the 1990s.

Similarly, Ukraine is not unique within the former USSR in terms of its inherited legacies. Among Russians there is a weak sense of national identity. Only 30 per cent agreed with the statement: ‘I never forget that I am a Russian.’ Few Russians spontaneously mentioned ethnic affiliation when asked who they were. The weakness and confusion within Russian national identity is seen by the following poll of Russian national identity (Table 7.2).

These figures point to similarities with Ukraine. First, there are difficulties among Russians in identifying solely with the Russian Federation as their patria or rodina. A large number of them still describe themselves as belonging to, or identify with, the defunct former USSR, reflecting a growing dissatisfaction with its disintegration. Finally, the number of those identifying with the Russian Federation have shown a sharp decrease. In both the Russian Federation and Ukraine this is undoubtedly linked to the socio-economic crisis. ‘If the economic situation was normal here

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russian Federation 1993</th>
<th>Russian Federation 1995</th>
<th>Russians only 1993</th>
<th>Russians only 1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to answer</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jerry F. Hough, ‘Sociology, the State and Language Politics’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2 (March-April 1996), p. 112
and in Russia, this question would not arise’, said then President Leonid Kravchuk. A coal miner’s wife from Donets’k explained: ‘You know, I used to feel that I could be part of Ukraine, but now I don’t feel Ukrainian at all, I just feel Soviet.’ The identification of many Ukrainians and Russians with their new states is therefore linked to the socio-economic situation.

Identity is in the throes of radical transition in Ukraine. Opinion polls provide at times contradictory evidence to support this thesis. Sotsis-Gallup found that only 54 per cent of the population considered themselves to have a Ukrainian national identity (whereas a different poll found that nearly 60 per cent identified themselves with Ukraine.) Meanwhile, 44 per cent declared their primary identity as being that of the region they lived in, while 20 per cent also declared themselves to be ‘Soviet citizens’ (respondents could provide more than one answer). Clearly, although identity is in transition throughout Ukraine it is in greater flux among that segment of the 46 per cent of the population who are under pressure to re-identify with Ukraine as their main focus of allegiance.

Identity in Ukraine is now in the process of reconstruction with a ‘reconstruction of national culture with political orientations and people’s social problems’. This, in turn, will lead to ‘national self-organisation’ and ‘national self-orientation’ from mass consciousness to that on a personal level. This though is proving to be more convoluted and difficult because of the socio-economic crisis. In the last four decades prior to the First World War nation building in Western Europe underwent a radical transition during a period of intense industrialisation and urbanisation (that is economic boom). The resolution of the socio-economic crisis in Ukraine would also make nation building easier and more rapid.

**Inherited legacies of colonialism and communism**

Colonial rule usually brings with it negative self-images which developed and were internalised over time. This ‘collective shadow’, in Carl G.Jung’s words, leads to a perception that the metropolitan power is superior in language, culture, achievements and in other areas. A nation’s own negative qualities cannot be turned against the oppressor; instead they are turned against oneself. ‘The subordinated society further develops doubts about its quality (cultural, moral) and accepts the point of view of the oppressor.’ It then proceeds to co-operate with the metropolis in its own depreciation and subjugation; actually coming to believe that it is
culturally and morally inferior. The colonial dependency then begins to despise its own culture and language. This, in Ukraine’s case, led to a significant portion of the population rejecting its own traditions while adopting ‘the beliefs, attitudes and values of the oppressor’. Ukrainians became instrumental in the destruction of their own culture and language which led to passivity and a dependency syndrome.

Under both Polish and the Russian rule Ukrainians internalised negative aspects of the dominant culture, especially the inferiority of the Ukrainian language and culture. Russians held stereotypes of Ukrainians as sly, cunning, provincial *khokhli* (a derogatory nickname similar to ‘niggers’). The Poles held stereotypes of Ukrainians as violent, anarchic, stupid and uncivilised barbarians; images even propagated by the Polish communist regime between 1945 and 1989. Ukrainians were constantly told that they had never wanted to exist as an independent state—but only in union with the eastern Slavs under Moscow’s benevolent leadership. Ukrainians were therefore an ‘unhistoric nation’ whose language and culture had no future perspective. This explains the hostility towards the Ukrainian language encountered during the Soviet era, complaints about which led Ivan Dziuba to write his masterful *Internationalism or Russification? A Study of Soviet Nationalities Problem* in the 1960s. Western Ukrainians were depicted collectively as ‘*zapadentsi*’ (‘Westeners’), ‘German-fascist collaborators’ or ‘*banderovtsi*’.

**Multiple identities**

Ukraine therefore inherited at least two countries within one state. Whereas approximately two-thirds of the population identifies to a greater or lesser extent with Ukraine as its ‘homeland’, the remaining third identify either with a disintegrated country (the former USSR) or their region (or both). In the Crimea there is also attachment to Russia as their ‘homeland’. Although national identity is in transition throughout Ukraine, it is among the one-third of the population who do not see Ukraine as their primary loyalty that identity is in the greatest flux.

One Ukrainian author found four dominant ethno-cultural identities in Ukraine:

- Soviet;
- Little Russian;
a pre-modern identity defined only in terms of ‘Otherness’; that is, not being Russian, Jewish, Polish or Tatar but with no clear idea of what or who they were;
• conscious Ukrainian.

Association with Ukraine among the inhabitants of different regions varies throughout the country. While most Ukrainian citizens maintain a low attachment to Russia as their homeland, the former USSR and the CIS do still obtain some loyalty. Region is also a focus of strong attachment in certain areas of Ukraine (see Table 7.3).

Russians in eastern Ukraine are closer in their identification to Ukrainians than to Russians living across the border. They have long lost their emotional and cultural similarity to Russians living in the Russian Federation. One Russian author admitted that ‘there are many more differences between a Ukrainian and a Russian than there are between an Austrian or a German, or a New Zealander and an Australian for example’.27

The mixed identities found in eastern Ukraine are a product of two factors. First, the Tsarist regime deliberately adopted policies of intense Russification during the last five decades of the Tsarist Russian empire which prevented the intelligentsia from spreading the national idea among the masses. During the Russian Civil War many eastern and southern Ukrainian peasants therefore held greater loyalty to their regions than to a Ukrainian identity. In other words, their identity was pre-modern, as in Western Europe prior to the mid-nineteenth century, where allegiance was primarily to one’s region.

Table 7.3 What do you consider to be your homeland? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>North East</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Donbas</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, they often described their identity as *tuteishi*, that is ‘from here’. This was similar to other border regions, such as Pidlachia in eastern Poland, eastern Lithuania, western Prussia (where the Germanised Polish Kaszuby were to be found) and in Lower Lusatia.

Second, under the Soviet regime, particularly during the Brezhnev era, Soviet nationality policies attempted to use the three east Slavic peoples as the core for the creation of a new *homo sovieticus*. These Soviet nationality policies and the historiography which underpinned them amounted to the pan-Slavisation of Soviet internationalism. The new Soviet people would be based on the three branches of the core *rus’kiy* peoples who had once allegedly existed in unity (during the medieval ages in Kyiv Rus’), a unity to which the Soviet leadership aspired to return—except that this time it would be ruled from Moscow—not Kyiv.

It is not surprising that these Tsarist and Soviet policies and historiography are now being negated in Ukraine (and supported in Belarus). For state and nation building to proceed in Ukraine they have to be rejected. Ukrainian and Russian identities have to be disentangled from one another; that is, they have to return to the more clearly defined separate nationalities which existed prior to the first half of the nineteenth century.28

In Ukraine the existence of multiple identities contains both negative and positive aspects within it.29 The negative lie more in the realm of the difficulties in constructing a civil society and in mobilising the population for post-Soviet transformation and modernisation. The positive aspects of these identities rest on the ease with which Russians, Soviets or Russophone Ukrainians can commute between identities. In Kyiv this lack of clear-cut dividing lines between Ukrainians and Russians has meant that the latter have not opposed the Ukrainianisation of the city since the early 1990s.30 This also proved crucial in the nationalisation of the Soviet armed forces during 1992.

Identity therefore in eastern Ukraine is *neither* Ukrainian nor Russian, but multiple, ambivalent, unstable and in transition. It is therefore mistaken to argue, as do Arel and Wilson on the basis of findings by Khmelko,31 that there are three *clearly defined* groups in Ukraine (Ukrainophones, Russians and Russophone Ukrainians). These mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities are particularly strong in the Donbas. Will this mixed identity remain neither fully Ukrainian nor fully Russian, ‘vacillating on the margin between the two’, as Pirie suggests? In contrast to Pirie, the author believes they could be gradually replaced by an overall Ukrainian political identity.32
Little Russianism

Some Ukrainians have traditionally defined those with mixed identities and/or Russian-speaking Ukrainians as Little Russians. Russophiles, or Little Russians, played a similar ‘little brother’ role in the building of the Tsarist and Soviet empires as that played by Scottish landowners, soldiers and clerics in the creation of the British empire—a role in which they took great pride. But in the United Kingdom the Scots were allowed to retain their distinctive separateness after the 1707 Union. To be a Scot and be pro-British and/or empire did not necessarily require one to reject one’s Scottish identity. In the Tsarist Russian empire Little Russianism was not allowed such a role. Between the destruction of the autonomous Ukrainian Hetmanate in the 1780s to the suppression of the Ukrainian language in the 1860s Ukraine (or Little Russia) gradually came to resemble more a Russian gubernia than a separate country.

Little Russianism therefore increasingly came to reflect a Ukrainian inferiority complex vis-à-vis Russian, its language and culture. It is consequently not surprising that nation and state builders in Ukraine have tended to look negatively upon Little Russianism, as an attitude similar to that philosophically promoted by Belarusan President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Little Russianism is consequently regarded as a threat to Ukrainian independence by some nationally conscious Ukrainians. The existence of Little Russianism did not exist in other regions of the former USSR, apart from Ukraine and Belarus.

Russian intellectuals meanwhile perceived of Ukraine merely as an ethnographic mass, ripe for incorporation into the Russian nation. Ukrainians and Belarusians, like Bretons in France, were to be assimilated into the ‘higher’ Russian and French cultures to create the Russian (rus’kiy) and French narods respectively. (A similar attitude in the inter-war period prevailed among Poles towards Ukrainians.) Soviet nationality policies since Ukrainianisation was halted in the early 1930s, fostered Little Russianism by promoting Ukrainian culture and language as a provincial and backward, peasant culture and language. As an ethnographic mass the Ukrainian language was not therefore suited for official documents, business and high politics. As the well known Ukrainian historian Lysiak-Rudnytsky pointed out some time ago, ‘as long as the main social function of the Ukrainian language will be as a “kolhosp language” [rural dialect]—then until this time Ukraine will remain a

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Little Russia’. Hence the importance of the promotion of the Ukrainian language to that of a state language, the language of government and officialdom.

The promotion of this Little Russianism was far worse, Lysiak-Rudnytsky believes, than actual Russification. Soviet nationality policy in effect reverted to the Tsarist policy of maintaining Ukrainians in a pre-modern, ‘half-nation, regional difference of one imperial complex’. Ukrainians, both Lysiak-Rudnytsky and Saunders believe, were artificially kept as a naselennia—without being allowed to evolve from an ethnos into a modern nation. Ukrainians were deliberately maintained at the level of a folklore ethnographic mass, allowed to perform ‘peasant’ dances and songs—while remaining loyal to the Soviet regime and the concept of one east Slavic rus’kiy narod.

But to what degree is Little Russianism likely to remain an attractive option? Are the mixed and ambivalent identities, as described by Pirie, likely to continue to provide sustenance for Little Russianism in an independent Ukrainian state? The central credo of Little Russianism is not the dominance of the Russian language. If this were the case Kyiv, still largely a Russian-speaking city, would not vote for national democratic and even radical right political parties. The credo of Little Russianism is that Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians are three branches of the same rus’kiy narod. In other words, Little Russians have accepted and internalised the view held by a majority of Russians that Ukrainians and Belarusians are not separate ethnic groups who can create independent states based on a historical past different to Russia’s.

Little Russianism is unlikely to provide a continued viable programme for four inter-related reasons. First, Little Russianism is backward looking to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Attempts to form a stable Little Russian identity in the nineteenth century failed because of the Russian unwillingness to accept even a Little Russian identity (let alone a Ukrainian one) in federation with Great Russia. Procyk concluded that the White armies, which were dominated politically by the Liberal Cadets, lost because they regarded Ukrainian nationalism, even when only demanding a federated Russia in 1917, to be more dangerous than the Bolsheviks. This Russian unwillingness to accept even a Little Russian identity pushed many of them towards becoming Ukrainian nationalists. Belarusan Little Russianism under President Lukashenka will also face the same crisis in its relations with Russia, as has Ukraine on many occasions previously. Whereas Lukashenka seeks a federal
treaty of two equals which would not damage his political sovereignty, Moscow, even under its democratic leader President Boris Yeltsin, refuses to recognise this Belarusan Little Russianism. Instead, Yeltsin backs the total incorporation of Belarus into the Russian Federation. Yeltsin’s actions may well therefore turn the Belarusan leadership into nationalists; Russian policies which earlier helped to develop Ukrainian nationalism and may have even contributed to Kuchma’s evolution. Little Russians, once in power in nationally conscious Kyiv, have tended to become Ukrainians very quickly.

Second, Little Russianism cannot develop into a stable political and cultural alternative because there is no body of Little Russian political thought. This is reflected in the lack of any strong Ukrainian domestic Little Russian (or even ‘pro-Russian’) political parties (see Table 7.5). Those that Wilson includes within this group, such as the Civic Congress, espouse an eclectic mixture of pan-Slavism, Soviet internationalism and anti-Ukrainian chauvinism. The Communist Party of Ukraine, the major champion of Little Russianism, is also therefore a backward-looking political force with a declining demographic constituency of support. Third, there are now alternative points of focus for Ukrainians. Young Ukrainians no longer need to travel mentally, psychologically or geographically through Moscow to reach the outside world. Finally, the English language is a serious competitor to Russian for the younger generation. In a survey of the origins of films on Ukrainian television in March 1996, a staggering 69 per cent were from the West while only 8 per cent were from Russia.

Little Russianism can only therefore look backwards with nostalgia to the Tsarist or Soviet past. It cannot—and is not—building a viable future programme that would amount to serious competition for the state and nation building policies followed by all Ukrainian leaders since 1992; policies which are tantamount to a rejection of any Little Russianism.

**Soviet identities**

Former President Kravchuk complained that his greatest concern was the ‘deformed consciousness’ found among some Ukrainians. ‘Soviet people are no more, but Soviet people have remained’, he said. Those who look to a Soviet identity tend to be:

- elderly;
- Communist and Socialist Party supporters;
• supporters of a revived USSR;
• desirous of a ‘return to socialism’;
• generally hostile to Ukrainian independence.

The inheritance of a Soviet identity is therefore largely linked to those who most clearly identify with the Soviet regime from their childhood. It will be difficult—if not impossible—for them to commute from the multiple identities associated with the former Soviet empire to a mutually exclusive Ukrainian identity. This Soviet identity is most closely associated with regions of the former USSR where industrialisation, urbanisation, Sovietisation and Russification were most intense. Soviet identity is consequently usually given by those with lower education attainments; that is, the industrial proletariat. During the same period of Russification and Sovietisation of the Donbas the cities of Kyiv and L’viv became increasingly Ukrainianised.

As inhabitants of Ukraine and Russia who migrated to the Donbas and the Trans-Dniester Republic of Moldova held no modern national identity at the stage of their migration their Russification and Sovietisation left them with few, if any, national identification; that is, neither Ukrainian or Russian. But, at the same time, Soviet nationality policies and historiography incorporated both elements of pan-Slavism and the elevation of the Russian language to that of higher prestige and culture. Hence Soviet identities in the Donbas and the Trans-Dniester Republic of Moldova are also both pan-Slavic and Russophone. Therefore, the Communist Party of Ukraine incorporates all of these policy objectives (support for the Russian language as a second state language, coupled with calls for the revival of the former USSR, Little Russian homage to Moscow as the centre of world civilisation and close ties to the eastern Slavs). In the city of Donets’k 63.2 per cent of Russians and 65.7 per cent of those who declare a Soviet identity support the union of Ukraine and Russia. Within Russia it is usually only communists who talk of the alleged existence of a Soviet people (the extreme right reject claims by Ukrainians and Belarusans to be separate ethnic groups).

In view of this connection between a Soviet identity and support for pan-Slavism and/or a revived USSR it would be indeed strange for any Ukrainian leadership not to adopt two policies. First, to launch a nation building project and forge a Ukrainian political community. Second, to oppose transparent borders, that is the de facto retention of Soviet-style purely formal, administrative frontiers,
policies which were preferred by Russia in the CIS. Transparent borders have therefore less to do with aiming to copy integration in the EU, which some Russian leaders use as an example, than with hoping to maintain multiple, mixed identities in strategically important countries such as Ukraine.

A Soviet identity is largely absent from western Ukraine and Kyiv—as it is from Chisinau and left-bank Moldova (where more Russians and Ukrainians reside than in the Trans-Dniester Republic). This is clearly seen from the poll shown in Table 7.4.

In L’viv and Kyiv, as in Chisinau, Russians identify themselves primarily as ‘Russians’—not as ‘Soviets’. In the Donbas and the Trans-Dniester Republic, on the other hand, the primary identification of Russians and, to a lesser extent, of Ukrainians, is ‘Soviet’. In the 1989 Soviet census residents of both the Donbas and the Trans-Dniester Republic had to choose between either Russian or Ukrainian, which gave a Ukrainian majority in the Donbas and Ukrainians as the second largest group after Moldovans in the Trans-Dniester Republic. But this did not give a clear picture of identity in the Donbas or the Trans-Dniester Republic. Post-Soviet polls have shown that only 50 and 45.5 per cent of those who have Ukrainian and Russian ethnic entries in their Soviet internal passports now identify themselves as Ukrainian and Russian in the city of Donetsk.

This inherited Soviet identity is characterised by two factors. On the one hand, it represents an atomised, socially passive population. Those who define themselves as Soviet in regions such as the Donbas are not hostile to Ukraine or Ukrainians and do not desire a change in borders. In Moldova pro-Romanian nationalists gained power and influence in the early 1990s and then clamoured for unification with Romania and the introduction of the Romanian language as the state language. This, in turn, provoked the normally passive Trans-Dniester Republic into rebellion. If Rukh had come to power in Kyiv at the same time—and not former national communists—the Donbas could have also similarly revolted. This, though, was not to be in Ukraine.

Table 7.4 How best do you characterise yourself? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L’viv</th>
<th>Donetsk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>25.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mixed identities and border regions

Border regions usually create overlapping and mixed identities. When a Hungarian statesman visited the disputed Czech-Polish border in the 1930s he asked how many Poles lived in the area? He was told that the number varied between forty to 100,000 depending upon the prevailing economic climate.45

In Ukraine mixed identities are most prevalent in three regions on its western, southern and eastern extremes. To some degree in Trans-Carpathia, but more so in north-eastern Slovakia, a local rusyn (Ruthenian) identity has remained among a segment of the population.46 These regions had been part of the more nationally repressive Hungarian regions of the Austro-Hungarian empire. As in Tsarist Russia, this rusyn ethnus had therefore not been allowed to evolve into a modern Ukrainian nation. That is, their identity had remained at a pre-modern local level and they had not developed an awareness of being part of a larger Ukrainian ‘imagined community’. Some rusyny in north-eastern Slovakia, with the active encouragement at times of the Hungarian and Slovak authorities, claim to be a fourth eastern Slavic peoples, distinct from Ukrainians. Wilson claims that there is a movement back away from Ukrainian to a local rusyn identity in Trans-Carpathia that is linked to strong local support for federalism.47 This is at odds with the fact that no deputies were elected from the rusyn movement during the 1994 parliamentary elections. In addition, nearly 100 per cent of school children are being taught in the Ukrainian language in Trans-Carpathia—without any protest from allegedly strong rusyn groups.48

In western Prussia prior to 1918 Germanic policies had also attempted to cultivate a distinct Kaszub identity different from the Poles; an identity which still remains. Similarly, although Catalonia claims that Valencia and the Balearic Islands, which had belonged to the Crown of Aragon in the Middle ages, are ‘Catalan’, Valencian nationalists argue that they speak a separate language (not a Catalan ‘dialect’).49 This problem is therefore not unique to Ukraine.

Along the Polish-Ukrainian-Belarusan border in the Kholm and Pidlachia regions the local population to this day call themselves tuteishi (literally ‘from here’) or pravoslavni (Orthodox). The Crimea has a majority Russian ethnic population, some of whom look to Russia as its ‘homeland’. Of the three Ukrainian border regions the Crimea is the only one to have been recognised as not purely an identity in transition (as in the Trans-Carpathian and the Donbas regions)—but primarily as a non-Ukrainian ethnic area where the central authorities
introduced two policies. First, they attempt to act as an arbiter between two mutually hostile groups, one of which (the Tatars) claims for itself the title of the ‘indigenous’ (korinne) people. Second, the central authorities are attempting to provide affirmative action for the Ukrainian minority in the Crimea, which numbers between 750,000 and 1 million, but were denied any national rights in the Soviet era.

In the Donbas there is a similar mixed identity which is multilayered, ambiguous and composed of multiple loyalties. Nevertheless, these identities are not ethnic and hence the region has neither mobilised along ethnic grounds, called for separation from Ukraine or demanded political autonomy. In contrast to the Crimea, where the population largely gravitates towards Russia in the same manner as Jews towards Israel, in the Donbas polls do not show Russia as the homeland towards which the majority of the region’s inhabitants gravitate. Russians in the Donbas therefore identify first and foremost with the territory in question as part of Ukraine.

In the Donbas some polls indicate upwards of 50 per cent of the inhabitants as giving their identity as ‘Soviet’. Other polls, which may not give this possible response, provide figures closer to those in the 1989 Soviet census. In addition, the Donbas (together with the Crimea) had the highest number of mixed marriages in Ukraine. Only 32.5 per cent of Donets’k marriages in the 1970s were between two ethnic Ukrainians, while 55 per cent of marriages were mixed. Those of mixed marriages usually prefer not to choose one or other of their parent’s ethnicity. Instead they often opt for a Soviet identity (in the former Yugoslavia they opted for a Yugoslav one). Many Russian migrants who have moved to the Russian Federation from Central Asia since 1991 also prefer to describe their identity as Soviet (and not Russian). Many of these Russians resemble the Muhajirs of Pakistan who fled from India after the 1947 partition. They include both Urdu and Gujurati speakers and hold no coherent identity, other than being ‘Muslims’. It is highly likely that Russians will increasingly identify their ‘Russia’ as the Russian Federation (and not the former USSR), in the same manner as Turks gradually reidentified ‘Turkey’ away from the Ottoman empire to that of Ataturk Turkey.

**National identity and civil society in Ukraine**

*Towards a Ukrainian ‘We’*

As argued elsewhere in this book the Ukrainian elites could accept the inherited legacies from the former USSR, freeze them and attempt to
forge closer all-round ties with the Russian Federation. These are the policies pursued by President Lukashenka in Belarus since 1994. The other alternative is to attempt to rectify these inherited legacies by forging ahead with state and nation building. These policies would recognise that societies cannot function coherently and effectively without a recognisable and inclusive ‘We’. Without this ‘We’ society will be ‘simply a nominal amalgam of fractured and alienated parts’. It is the function of elites to ‘construct this hegemonic ‘We’.

Many regions of eastern and southern Ukraine resemble this ‘amalgam of fractured and alienated parts’, described by Walker. National identity (and access to resources) are both important facilitators of social mobilisation. As national identities are largely absent in eastern-southern Ukraine it is little wonder that civil society is also weakest in this region, where identity is multiple, mixed and in the throes of greatest flux. The construction of a Ukrainian ‘We’ different to ‘Others’ would serve two functions. First, it would remove many of these multiple and mixed identities through nation building that would give Ukraine as the primary level of identity. Second, the majority of citizens would be united through civil society within one political culture, ‘holding one system of general values, moral basis, ideas, myths, values, social norms, etc.’. Society would be increasingly united beyond the mere dominant values, largely inculcated in the Kravchuk era, of loyalty to Ukrainian independence and sovereignty.

The centrality of civil society to national identity

This new identity and civil society based around a Ukrainian ‘We’ would build on the one-third of the population whom Ukraine inherited and who have a clearly developed civic and national identity. In the Spring 1991 Soviet referendum for a ‘revived federation’ one-third voted against it. Nine months later one-third of the electorate voted in favour of reformist presidential candidates and against the then national communist Kravchuk.

Political scientists have long believed that ‘National identity contributes most to the formation of civil society.’ The nation, Shils argues, sustains civil society. Civil society could not exist in pre-modern civilisations. Like national identity, civil society is therefore a product of modernisation, the transition to, or the attainment of, a modern nation. Russophones may represent about 40 per cent of Ukraine’s population but their influence on the dynamics of policy making in Kyiv remains minimal. In contrast,
Ukrainophones and national democrats have a much greater influence on policy making through the media, Think Tanks, higher education, the Academy of Sciences and the activism of political parties and civic groups. Of the forty political parties in Ukraine the ‘absolute majority’, one author complained, promote Ukrainian as the sole state language (see Table 7.5.).

Table 7.5 Attitude of political parties in Ukraine to state languages, 1995–1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of party</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>State languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>220,900</td>
<td>R/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>37,700</td>
<td>R/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>16,600</td>
<td>R/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Revival of the Crimea</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>R/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>R/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Congress</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>R/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hromada</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukh</td>
<td>89,300</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>46,800</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>36,700</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic</td>
<td>15,900</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Christian Democratic</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Conservative</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Republican</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (in Ukraine)</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statystychnyi Shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1995 Rik, Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukrainy (Kyiv: Tekhnika, 1996), p. 479, except where stated for the People’s Democratic, Hromada and the Agrarian parties, created only in 1996–1997. The People’s Democratic Party was not included within the Ministry of Statistics table because it had not yet been registered. Figures for its membership are taken from Demokratychne Ukraina, 7 June 1997 and have been added by the author. The Agrarian Party was created in Winter 1996–1997 with evident presidential approval as a pro-reform alternative to the anti-reform Peasant Party. Its membership figure is given in Vysoky Zamok, 7–13 November 1997. Hromada’s membership figure is taken from Kievs’kiye vedomosti, 25 December 1997. Note: R=Russian; U=Ukrainian
Russians and Ukrainians) are therefore weak in their ability to participate in Ukrainian civil society because of the amorphousness of their national identities.62

**From multiple to mutually exclusive identities**

Is there a process of re-identification taking place in Ukraine? Yes, but a slower one than anticipated because of the socio-economic crisis.63 A half of those who declared themselves to be ‘Russian’ in the 1989 Soviet census now define themselves as ‘Ukrainians’. There is a growth of national pride, as evidenced during the 1996 Olympic Games, as well as a self-identification with the Ukrainian ‘We’. This inclusive re-identification is part and parcel of the growth of national consciousness and the decline in embarrassment at being Ukrainian or speaking the Ukrainian language. When this ‘nationalistic language’ was spoken in the Soviet era Russian and Russophone Ukrainian chauvinists were heard to say: ‘Gоворите на человеческом языке’ (‘Speak to me in a human language’). The most important development, one Ukrainian author argues, is that ‘within the Ukrainian people there appear state (derzhavnytskyi) instincts among a people who have few historical traditions of statehood’. This ‘path to ourselves’, or re-identification of Ukrainians and the growth of a Ukrainian identity that unites the bulk of the population ‘will still be long and not easy’.64

Not only does Ukraine not possess strong traditions of statehood, but state and nation building is being conducted at a time of acute socio-economic crisis. This crisis affects all Ukrainian citizens. Western Ukrainians do not blame independence for the crisis, thereby continuing to support an independent state irrespective of the economic climate. But, eastern Ukrainians, particularly in regions such as the Donbas, link their worsening economic plight to the collapse of the former USSR. This sentiment, which is backed by the Lukashenka leadership in Belarus, is thereby given credence by the clamouring for a revived USSR and/or a union with Russia. This, in turn, is translated into support for the Communist Party of Ukraine for the reasons outlined earlier. In Donets’k 88.2 per cent viewed changes since 1991 in negative terms, whereas 74 per cent of L’viv’s inhabitants viewed them positively.65

There are also more difficult problems associated with constructing a political nation than in simply basing state and nation on ethnic criteria. The construction of a political nation is dependent on the successful outcome of political and economic
reforms. A final factor which is negatively affecting and slowing this process of nation building is Ukraine’s geopolitical situation and external influences, primarily from Russia.

Old traditions, customs and values should also be ‘modernised’. In the Soviet era the Ukrainian language and folk culture were depicted as ‘provincial’ and ‘backward’. The modernisation and adaptation of these inherited customs and traditions should be undertaken at the same time as the promotion of Western values usually associated with democratic systems. The state, the intelligentsia, ideologists, politicians, political parties and civic groups, literati and the media will contribute most to the construction of this new Ukrainian identity. It will be these groups in society who will be the most active in the search for a new identity not based on ethnic criteria that would serve to unite the Ukrainian population.

Three elements will necessarily go into the construction of this new Ukrainian identity:

- earlier cultural traditions;
- some aspects of the Soviet cultural legacy;
- new universal trans-national cultures.

To unite the majority of Ukraine’s population into a new political community to which they hold their primary allegiance and find their identity cannot be undertaken by ignoring any of these inherited legacies. This fact has already been recognised in school textbooks which, for example, give due credit to both Ukrainians serving in the Soviet army and in nationalist partisan groups in the Second World War. This is also not surprising in view of the fact that both Kravchuk and Kuchma lost fathers who served in the Soviet army during the Second World War. The forging of a new national identity in Ukraine will therefore resemble a melting pot of different ingredients that will ultimately go towards creating a political community based on united values and myths.

**Conclusions**

Ukraine inherited no modern national identity that was uniform throughout its population. In this it was not unique either historically or in relation to developments taking place in other successor states of the former USSR. Attachment to region, the former USSR and pan-Slavic loyalties still persist among a segment
of the population, loyalties which were deliberately fostered by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. These multiple loyalties are unlikely to remain indefinitely. The construction of a new Ukrainian ‘We’ will encourage the re-definition of many loyalties towards both new ethnic and civic loyalties, particularly if the socio-economic situation improves. National identity and civil society are both products of modernity. The amorphous, multiple identities found among many Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine has therefore not been translated into political mobilisation.
This chapter surveys Ukrainian state policies in the field of languages and investigates the approaches undertaken by Ukraine’s different presidents. It argues that Ukrainian leaders understood early on that the elaboration and inculcation of new values, morals and ideas through education, the media and other institutions were an essential part of any successful transition away from totalitarianism towards democracy and a market economy. The elaboration and inculcation of these policies have been undertaken within a broad domestic debate about which programmes should be applied, within what time frame and how. The most sensitive aspects of these nationality policies persist within the sphere of languages and in regard to Russian speakers, the subject of this chapter.

The importance of language to nation building

Does a nation need a language?

Is language important? Can national development take place without language? Igor Chubais, writing about ‘The New Russian Idea’, found it unsurprising that ‘In all of the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) the foundation of independence was accompanied by a special interest in language.’ This interest in the revival of languages previously subjected to Russification remains an important component, Chubais argued, in the search for post-Soviet identities and in an attempt to overcome the spiritual crises they all inherited.\(^1\)

Isaacs found that in most post-colonial countries language issues often create problems and obstacles to nation building.\(^2\) But language should not be made an absolute in order that every nation
building project should be regarded as successful or otherwise. A common language is neither necessary nor sufficient to distinguish ethnic groups, Enloe believes. Of the seventy-three ethnic groups in Europe tabulated by Krejci and Velimsky, forty-seven had their own languages, while twenty-six were bilingual (using their own and another language). They concluded that a separate language was not absolutely necessary for a national identity.

Western scholars of nationalism do not hold a uniform opinion about the role and significance of language in nation building projects and for the survivability of nations. Shils believes that language is a ‘referent of collective self consciousness’, it is ‘integral to a nation’. ‘Participation in a common language has a solidarity-producing function’, Shils argues, because there is, ‘a particular sacrality attached to language’. The most important aspect of language, Anderson, says, is its ‘capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities’.

Other scholars of nationalism remain more circumspect in their judgement about language. Bereciartu criticises those who link language to culture and ethnicity, identifying languages and cultures with specific nations. Without denying that language is one of the most important elements constituting nations he argues that ‘The erroneous identification of language, culture, and a people supposes a grave obstacle for the proper reconstruction of the so-called prohibited nations that currently struggle to recover their identity.’ Bilingualism is perfectly compatible, Bereciartu argues, with a single community of culture and nation. In nations, such as Ukraine, which are ‘deficient’ this ‘constitutes an element of the first order for effective integration between the community of culture and the community of consent. In short, it makes it possible to involve the entire collective making up the nation in the common, integrative project.’

Language is therefore one of many important elements that constitute the various building blocks which constitute—or will go towards constituting—a political nation. Nevertheless, we should not absolutise its significance. To do so would be to fail to appreciate why Ukraine, for example, exhibits a great degree of continuity under both of its post-Soviet presidents in state and nation building—something we would not necessarily expect if we had based our analysis purely upon language as the criterion of whether Ukraine would survive or not as an independent state. As Pirie correctly argues ‘Language usage is an important factor which informs national self-identification, and political attitudes, but it should not be regarded as the Alpha and Omega of national
identity in Ukraine—other factors play a significant role in shaping identity as well.9

When Western scholars analyse nation building in the former USSR many look to language as the central component of identity. Language and Russification were important themes running throughout Ukraine’s post-Stalinist dissident movement.10 Marples, a well known expert on Belarus, believes that language is central to the sustainability of state independence. The Russification of the majority of Belarusians, Marples argued, placed them on the road to assimilation and therefore made it impossible to sustain an independent state.11 Wilson also argued that the large number of Russophone Ukrainians presents a major weakness for the Ukrainian nation building project.12

Affirmative action

The question of language usage becomes an important issue in all newly emerging states because of the feeling that past wrongs should be rectified—and quickly, at that (see chapter 1). In the Ukrainian case it was not surprising therefore that this issue became an important question in the Kravchuk era. After all, national democrats who allied themselves with the former national communists were largely from the Ukrainian-speaking region of western Ukraine. In addition, many of the leading national democrats were former dissidents who had championed the Ukrainian language in the face of Russification in the pre-Gorbachev era.

Consequently, it was not unusual to assume that Ukraine’s post-Soviet leadership would attempt to implement affirmative action in favour of a previously discriminated language and culture. The question was not whether this would be undertaken—but how, by whom and within which time frame? Kolstoe believes that the crucial question is the ‘means, the speed and the ultimate goal of this policy, and not the policy itself. Will the stick or carrot be its main instrument?’ Will, for example, the Russian language become a ‘foreign language’ throughout Ukraine (as it already is in western Ukraine)?213

Ukraine was not alone in this endeavour—either within the former USSR or vis-à-vis the remainder of Europe during earlier periods of history. Those scholars who argue against any affirmative action, a rather illiberal view in itself, should look to history. If no affirmative action had been taken in Tallin, Riga, Budapest, Prague or Bratislava in the second half of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, these cities today would still be largely German-speaking. In the mid-nineteenth century Budapest was still a German-speaking city with a large number of Serb, Greek and Slovenian national minorities. Half a century later it had become Hungarian-speaking. 

Affirmative action in favour of a formerly discriminated-against language and culture is a perfectly reasonable policy. Therefore, ‘an unbalanced language policy (needs to) be adopted, but inverse to the former one’. Therefore, proponents of affirmative action argue that:

to the extent that the minoritized language is deficient or debilitated, there should be a stronger policy favouring its development and promotion, as well as a plan for its effective implantation. The object should be to achieve a relative bilingual or multilingual balance, and this promotion should be extended to each and every member of the national collectivity whatever his or her actual linguistic status.

Ukrainian as the state language

The law on languages: inclusive or exclusive?

Throughout the former USSR during the late Gorbachev era non-Russian republics began adopting laws proclaiming the titular language of their republics as the state language. The law ‘On Languages in Ukraine’, which came into effect on 1 January 1990, gave state employees three to five years to ensure they possessed an adequate knowledge of Ukrainian ‘to the degree needed to execute their official responsibilities’.

Despite the moderate requirements made by the law ‘On Languages’ some commentators, such as Arel, described it as an ‘exclusionary language law’. Like Volodymyr Hryn’iov, leader of the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR) party, Arel believes that to give only one language the status of a state language means it is granted greater rights than others. This, Arel argues, is wrong in a supposedly ‘bi-ethnic state’ such as Ukraine. But to grant Russian and Ukrainian both the status of state languages would still only serve to discriminate against others (Polish, Yiddish, Hungarian, and so on).

In view of the fact that Ukrainians remain a majority ethnic group in every oblast it is difficult to understand where Arel finds evidence for his claim that Ukraine is ‘bi-ethnic’. Canada and Belgium are
Indeed both bi-ethnic states. But is this true of Ukraine? Arel argues that Ukraine is not a nation-state where citizens are all of the same ethnic group, ‘but, sociologically speaking, a bilingual and bi-ethnic state, home to two major linguistic groups’. This defines ethnicity in a curious manner as being linked primarily to linguistic criteria, an analysis curiously similar to Hryn’iov’s view that Ukraine is composed of ‘the unity of the Ukrainian and Russian components in its ethnic structure and in its national-linguistic community’. Arel also mistakenly defines a ‘nation-state’ in purely ethnic—and not political—terms. A Ukrainian nation-state can still exist as a political nation based upon Ukrainians as the titular nation and their language as the only state language. In addition, to argue that the provision of facilities to increase Ukrainian-language instruction is tantamount to ‘nationalisation’, where the authorities ‘are acting as if Ukraine was a nation-state’, clearly misconstrues Rogers Brubaker’s definition of ‘nationalisation’.

Data from throughout Ukraine on language issues do not bare out the clear divisions that Arel alleges exist in Ukraine, divisions which, as we have seen, are difficult to place boundaries between. Bremmer, when surveying attitudes to the Ukrainian language throughout Ukraine, did not find open hostility towards it. Ukrainians everywhere, regardless of whether they were Ukrainophones or Russophones, said that they had a knowledge of Ukrainian. Even in Simferopol, capital city of the Crimea, nearly three-quarters of Ukrainians claimed a knowledge of the language. Although there is always a difference between actual and self-proclaimed abilities this data still implies that there was a desire to speak Ukrainian, if provided with adequate resources. Other data confirm Bremmer’s conclusions. In a 1996 survey 83 per cent of the population gave their ‘native language’ as Ukrainian (up from 60 per cent in the 1989 Soviet census). But, only 53 per cent used the Ukrainian language on a regular basis. There is therefore, tremendous scope to increase the use of, and proficiency in, the Ukrainian language without it provoking widespread hostility.

Bremmer also found that although Ukrainians could be Russophones this did not dampen their support, even in the Crimea, for national issues such as a Ukrainian-language media, a national currency and a national army. When asked in Simferopol if they believed there should be Ukrainian-language schools, 43 per cent replied positively. In Kyiv and L’viv there were only minor differences between the views of Russians and Ukrainians on these questions.
These findings, backed up by others, indicate that if provided with resources in the Ukrainian language which had hitherto been absent (such as media and schools) a large proportion of Russophone Ukrainians would Ukrainianise or become bi-lingual. For an independent Ukrainian state not to attempt to provide the resources (meagre as they are anyway) in a policy of affirmative action would be rather unusual.

The manner in which some critics of Kravchuk’s alleged support for ‘nationalisation’ attempt to get around this intellectual confusion is by claiming that Russification had never taken place. Wilson therefore does not use the term ‘Russification’ because, in his view, ‘it implies a prior loyalty to Ukrainian language and culture which may not necessarily have existed’. Like Hryn’iiov therefore, Arel and Wilson see Russophone Ukrainians as always having been Russophones. This contradicts findings by the British historian Saunders who has investigated Tsarist Russian linguistic policy towards Ukraine, one of only two regions of the Tsarist empire where the local language was banned (the Belarusian language was banned in 1866, three years after the same fate befell Ukrainian).

Between 1959 and 1989 Russian speakers increased from 2 to 4.6 million in Ukraine. These policies particularly affected Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs’k, Mykolaiv, Luhans’k and Donets’k oblasts—some of the regions in the forefront of opposition to any affirmative action for the Ukrainian language in post-Soviet Ukraine.

The figures (see Table 8.1) certainly do not bear out claims that Ukraine was a ‘nationalising state’ under former President Kravchuk, as argued by Arel and Wilson. In the 1994–1995 school year, that is the year Kravchuk was replaced by Kuchma as president, 42.7 per cent of school children in Ukraine were still being taught in the Russian language (while in the 1989 Soviet census only 22 per cent of the population were recorded as being Russians).

Kravchuk always refuted claims that he was a ‘nationalist’. Indeed, his pluralistic, multi-cultural and liberal policies were not those of a ‘nationalist’. His speeches never mentioned nationalist struggles, national goals, national sacrifice or mission, the slogans usually used by nationalist leaders. Kravchuk recalled that

We undertook very correct policies, taking into account that Ukraine historically differs in its eastern and western parts, in its attitudes and in many factors. We carried out centrist policies in a Ukrainian way which would prevent west and east quarrelling.
Table 8.1 School pupils instructed in the Ukrainian language, 1990–1995 (%)

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<td>7</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
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**TOTAL**          | 49               | 50             | 54               | 45             | 57               | 43             |

Source: Ukrainian Ministry of Nationalities, Migration and Cults, August 1995. * Includes the city of Sevastopol. Note: Totals do not add up to 100 per cent because school instruction in languages other than Ukrainian and Russian has been omitted from this table.

Throughout Ukraine the proportion of schoolchildren studying in the Ukrainian language ranged from:

- 100 per cent in the L’viv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne and Trans-Carpathian oblasts;
- 80 per cent in the Volyn, Khmel’nyts’kyi, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Vynnytsia, Cherkasy and Poltava oblasts;
- between 50 and 80 per cent in the Kirovohrad, Kherson, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts;
Map 8.1 Ukrainian language instruction in schools, 1990–1991

Map 8.2 Ukrainian language instruction in schools, 1991–1992
Map 8.3 Ukrainian language instruction in schools, 1992–1993

Map 8.4 Ukrainian language instruction in schools, 1994–1995
between 30 and 50 per cent in the Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs’k, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia oblasts;
less than 10 per cent in the two oblasts of the Donbas and the Crimean Autonomous Republic.31

In the Donbas and the Crimea the situation was by far the worse—the two regions pointed out elsewhere in this book as being exceptional. In the two oblasts of the Donbas only 5 per cent of schools taught in the Ukrainian language. This led to protests by the T. Shevchenko Ukrainian Language society Prosvita to the Constitutional Court about the ‘open widespread discrimination against the Ukrainian language’.32 In regions such as the Donbas and the Crimea hostility by some regional elites to the transfer of some Russian-language to Ukrainian-language schools, in order to at least partially provide some facilities for ethnic Ukrainians, is usually blocked not by Russian speakers per se—but those hostile to Ukrainian nation building. In the Tsarist and post-Stalinist Soviet eras the Ukrainian language was equated with a national consciousness which might develop into ‘bourgeois nationalism’. The leader of the Liberal Party, Volodymyr Shcherban, pointed out that in his position as former head of Donets’k oblast council he had never attempted to interfere in language issues by blocking the growth of Ukrainian language provision in schools and its usage in state institutions.33

Therefore accusations that Ukraine was a ‘nationalising state’ are not borne out by the statistics cited in this chapter. In January 1993, during the middle of the Kravchuk era, Russian Ambassador to Ukraine, Leonid Smolyakov, denied accusations that Ukraine was implementing a policy of Ukrainianisation.34 The Russian government newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta (29 April 1997) also disagreed with both former Russian Minister for the CIS, Aman Tuleyev’s (see below) and Arel’s depiction’s of Ukraine as a ‘nationalising state’:

The policies of the Ukrainian state as a whole are one thing, and the anti-Russian activities of a few, albeit influential, political circles are quite another. After all, the vast majority of the Ukrainian people have nothing to do with this provocation.
Domestic debate within Ukraine on language issues

Can one be a Ukrainian patriot, loyal to the independent state, without knowledge of the Ukrainian language? Could a Ukrainian state exist without a Ukrainian language? Many Ukrainian authors do not think so, linking the survival of the Ukrainian language to the continued existence of the Ukrainian state. The language question is therefore seen as an aspect of the country’s national security. President Kuchma himself told Ukraine’s literary intelligentsia: ‘Without Ukrainian books there cannot be Ukrainian culture and our own state.’

Connor is of a different opinion. He asked in reference to Ukraine: ‘Is the language the essential element of the Ukrainian nation, or is it merely a mythic element which has been elevated to the symbol in a struggle for continued viability? National identity may survive substantial alteration in language, religion, economic status, or any other tangible manifestation of its culture.’ Those Ukrainians, Connor believes, who looked to low language usage in the former USSR as an indicator of the strength or weakness of national identity (or ‘nationalism’) are therefore neglecting many other factors which go to make up national identity. As Connor pointed out, cultural and physical assimilation are two separate processes.

Ukrainians are not all of one mind. Neither were other peoples who inherited regions of their country which had been denationalised after periods of external domination. This debate is therefore not unique to Ukraine as to whether knowledge and use of the Ukrainian language is a requirement for a nationally conscious civic Ukrainian.

What reasons are given for the importance of the Ukrainian language? First, it is argued that it is one of the few markers of identity which provides a cultural boundary between Ukrainians and Russians. Nation building is a process of differentiation from ‘Others’, which, in the east Slavic case, has to prioritise language. Second, support for Ukrainian is an attempt to right a historical wrong. Third, de-Ukrainianisation always led to a ‘deformation of mentality’. De-nationalised masses have few markers of identity (either Russian or Ukrainian), with no civic or national cultural elements. These prove difficult to mobilise due to their amorphousness, because there cannot be civil society without national identity. Fourth, the division of Ukrainian culture into Russian and Ukrainian-language parts is a tragedy. Fifth, every
country has a state language which is that of the core group which established the state. The only exceptions to this rule are Canada, Belgium and Switzerland where more than one ethnic group created the state in question.\textsuperscript{41} Finally, Ukrainian-language schools should be in the same proportion to the number of ethnic Ukrainians resident in every administrative region of the country.

Other factors have also been argued in favour of supporting the Ukrainian language. Ukrainians, probably influenced by decades of Soviet nationalities policies, link language to nationality. Language represents ‘the spirit of the nation’. Pointing to Ukraine’s immediate northern neighbour for evidence of this argument one author argued that ‘There is no language—then there is no state. A sad example of this is Belarus—and, by the way, a fresh example.’\textsuperscript{42} The Ukrainian language is therefore elevated to the status of one of the elements of national security because ‘Our enemies know well that without the Ukrainian language there will not be a Ukrainian state.’\textsuperscript{43} Such authors see evidence of this by pointing to the patriotically untrustworthy communists as being the main proponents of dual state languages. Language is also a central factor in creating a patriotic ideology in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{44} Nearly all of the approximately forty political parties in Ukraine support Ukrainian as the sole state language (see Table 7.5. on p. 163). A Kharkiv round table to discuss Ukraine’s language polices was only attended by the Communist, Socialist, Civic Congress and the MRBR parties; that is, only those four political parties which support two state languages (Russian-Ukrainian).\textsuperscript{45}

Connor is therefore correct only to a certain degree. It is certainly true to say that Eire is mainly English-speaking while remaining an independent state. But, Scotland and Wales have been largely homogenised as constituent parts of the UK through the English language and Protestant religion. At the same time, any analogy between Eire and Ukraine is rather misplaced. Eire and England are divided not only by the Irish Sea, but also by religion, Celtic culture and history. If Ukrainians were neither Slavic, Orthodox or claimants to the same historical origins as Russians, as well as being separated by a sea from them, the fact that they spoke Russian would not be of great concern. Unfortunately therefore, the closeness of Russians and Ukrainians in their history, ethnicity and religion places greater emphasis upon language as a marker of a different identity. The Ukrainian language had become such a ‘principled question’ because it ‘plays a role as the sole criteria from which one can differentiate “one’s own” from “foreigners”’.\textsuperscript{46}‘
made especially more poignant by the fact that the majority of Russians still do not regard Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group (the English also initially looked down on the Irish as a ‘peasant ethnos’ unfit for independence).

It is argued that the loss of the Ukrainian language through Russification is the reason why Ukraine is not yet united into a political community. Language, Zhulyns’kyi believes, should become ‘the spiritual means for the consolidation of Ukrainian society’. Language is therefore promoted as the main integrator of the state. A person who speaks the Ukrainian language will also choose a certain historical, cultural, spiritual and intellectual tradition. Is it not surprising, they wonder, that some Russophone Ukrainians remain committed to a pan-Slavic/Little Russian (rather than a Ukrainian national) historiography? Is there not therefore an interconnection between language, one’s attitudes to statehood and Ukraine’s historical past?

A problem of definition

‘Native language’ or ‘language of convenience’?

Although we have statistics from the last 1989 Soviet census on language usage in Ukraine these are not as clearly defined as one would hope. This Soviet census found that 60 per cent of the population gave their native language as Ukrainian, while the remainder giving Russian. Of the 40 per cent who were Russian speakers approximately 12 per cent were ethnic Ukrainians. Other studies based on the ‘language of convenience’ (not ‘native

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<td>Crimea</td>
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language’) by the Ukrainian sociologist Valerii Khmelko and widely quoted by Arel and Wilson found Ukrainian speakers to be as low as 45 per cent. Russophone Ukrainians account for 33–34 per cent and Russophone Russians for 20–21 per cent.49

But, neither the use of ‘native language’ (Soviet census) or ‘language of convenience’ (Khmelko/Arel/Wilson) provide us with a true indication of either the current situation or the dynamics of identity transition in post-Soviet Ukraine. Some examples will suffice to show this. In a poll conducted after Ukraine became an independent state 61 per cent then gave their ‘native language’ as Ukrainian with 37 per cent giving Russian.50 This was similar to two other polls conducted two years later which found 55 and 59 per cent respectively, who regarded Ukrainian as their ‘native language’.51

**Transition in language usage**

The dynamics and interplay of language usage, identity transition and current situation are therefore not captured by usage of either of these concepts (‘native language’ or ‘language of convenience’). For one thing, they are too narrow a definition, forcing the respondent to make a decision on the spot. The reality is both more complicated and less divisive than the proponents of ‘language of convenience’ would have us believe. Only in western Ukraine and the Crimea do we largely find mono-ethnic regions where the Ukrainian and Russian languages predominate respectively, largely to the exclusion of others.

In 1994–1995 the Kyiv-based Democratic Initiatives Research Centre found that Ukrainian and Russian were used by 34–37 and 32–33 per cent of the population respectively. Between 30 and 32 per cent meanwhile, used either Russian or Ukrainian depending on circumstances.52 In the city of Kyiv, one-third used Ukrainian, another third used Russian, while the remainder used both languages at home.53 Those claiming to be able to speak, read and write the state language (Ukrainian) made up 88.2 per cent of the population.54 The Ukrainian language therefore, is not a ‘foreign’ language to the majority of the inhabitants of Ukraine. In a survey of the use of the Ukrainian language by Western businesses in advertisements, only in Sevastopol did they find hostility to using this language.55 Iryna Bilyk, Ukraine’s foremost popular singer, sings to packed audiences throughout Ukraine—yet she only sings in Ukrainian. Not only is this language not received negatively, her
professional stage performance is an added attraction. When the L’viv-based rock band Plachi Yaremiya played in Kyiv the lead singer shouted to the audience: ‘After all the Russification do we have a chance to be Ukrainian?’ The crowd, the majority of whom probably were Russophones, answered back ‘Yes!’

In the first five years of Ukrainian independence there has already been a remarkable change. Use of the Ukrainian language in public is no longer looked upon with hostility in the city of Kyiv and eastern-southern Ukraine—as it most certainly was in the pre-Gorbachev era.

The language dominant in the workplace and in higher education is still largely Russian; this ensures the continuation of bilingualism, with Ukrainian being the language of private communication at home and among friends. With the spread of Ukrainian as the state language within government and state structures this is likely to gradually change even in the workplace, where already 59 per cent use Ukrainian. The language of official documents sent from Kyiv to the provinces is Ukrainian. In the Presidential Administration President Kuchma said that if he is approached by someone in Russian, ‘then I immediately stop him: “Please be so kind as to communicate in the state language”’. Nevertheless, in a survey of the use of language in the business environment, the Institute for Statehood and Democracy found that the Ukrainian language was still not commonplace (in contrast to Russian and English). This they blamed on representative offices and distributors of Western companies who had little interest in the Ukrainian language. Often staff moved around these companies, usually transferring from Moscow to Kyiv. They therefore did not feel the need to learn Ukrainian or use it, because of their prior knowledge of Russian. Diplomatic staff were a mixed group. If they came directly from the West they usually learnt the Ukrainian language. President Kuchma, when welcoming the new Canadian Ambassador Christopher Westdal, told him: ‘I am pleased to welcome a truly exceptional individual who has learnt the Ukrainian language. You could be an example to those in Ukraine who have yet to learn our language.’ On other occasions journalists have complained when ringing Western Embassies in Kyiv after they have been told to speak only in Russian.

Ironically, the main problem is not hostility to the Ukrainian language per se, but the lack of resources available for Ukrainian-language instruction in schools. Even with these limited resources provided by the authorities, Ukrainian-language schools are increasing
in eastern-southern Ukraine. For example, in the city of Kyiv (see below), priority has been given to pre-school and first grade education. In the city of Chernihiv in north-eastern Ukraine the proportion of kindergartens had increased to that of the ethnic Ukrainian-Russian balance in that region. The number of Ukrainian-language kindergartens had grown from 78.4 to 92.8 per cent, with the number of children taught in Ukrainian overall now 91.2 per cent (up from 54.7 in 1991). In the city of Zaporizhzhia in south-eastern Ukraine the number of children taught in Ukrainian had grown from 20 to 37 per cent since 1991.\textsuperscript{62} In the Crimea former Education Minister Anatolii Soledchenko was sharply criticised for insufficiently introducing the Ukrainian language into secondary schools.\textsuperscript{63}

Mykhailo Pozhyvanov, the reformist Mayor of Mariupol, a city in the Donbas, told the author that they ‘are ready to place Ukrainian-language teachers in every school’, but Kyiv was simply not providing the necessary resources for this. Was he personally against greater Ukrainian language teaching, I asked him? He replied in both Russian and Ukrainian:

\begin{quote}
I am absolutely not against this. I am learning Ukrainian myself, because [at this point he changes to Ukrainian] for myself it is very difficult and because I never learnt Ukrainian in school or higher education. It is also difficult for many inhabitants of our city. That is why it should be understood that it is not opposition from the local authorities or the inhabitants of the city, it is an objective reality. It is a question of time.
\end{quote}

The Mayor went on to explain how he had gone about this:

\begin{quote}
I explained this to the inhabitants of the city, to students and pupils and their parents, and said that it was necessary to learn Ukrainian. Not one of them disagreed. For if they were to disagree, they would become second class people and would then criticise me for not ensuring that they had the opportunity of learning Ukrainian. This is my view. I never heard a single voice in protest against what I had said. The population are in agreement.\textsuperscript{64}
\end{quote}

A number of questions arise here. First, as we have already seen, the majority of the population are neither hostile to the Ukrainian language nor find it ‘foreign’ to their ears or are unable to speak,
read and converse in it. In a poll conducted in the city of Donets’k in early 1997, 43 per cent of the respondents gave Ukrainian as their second language. Another 25.6 per cent gave Russian as their second language while, more surprisingly perhaps, 25.8 per cent now gave English.65 Second, opposition to the spread of the Ukrainian language is often associated with political beliefs. Reformist, non-communist local officials and political activists are on the whole less hostile to greater Ukrainian-language use than the Communist Party (within the Socialist and former Peasant Parties the Ukrainian language dominates). This close link between the Communist Party and the Russian language can be seen in Table 8.3.

Third, intolerance of the spread of Ukrainian is often a product of lower social class and education. In the city of Kyiv, for example, Russian-speakers (76 per cent), ‘do not appear to disagree with the nation-building premise that an independent Ukraine must speak Ukrainian’.66 Fourth, differences over language usage are also generational. The younger generation, brought up in a more democratic climate of toleration, is not hostile to Ukrainian. It also looks to English as the main foreign language it wishes to learn, with some even regarding Russian as a ‘foreign language’. In the city of Kyiv, Arel found that ‘it seems that, in that realm of high culture, Ukrainian is de rigueur’. Arel also noted the following changes that had occurred since 1991 in the city of Kyiv:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputies group</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>In favour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-regional</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the growth of Ukrainian as the official/state language;
the growth in the use of ‘pure’ Ukrainian (i.e. neither Galician nor Russian/Ukrainian surzhyk) as a mark of prestige. ‘Pure’ Ukrainian was regarded with greater prestige than Russian;
the lessening of hostility and disdain towards public use of the Ukrainian language;
the greater use of Ukrainian in higher education;
a higher per cent of Russophones in Kyiv agreed that their children should learn Ukrainian because they would require it later in life. While remaining reluctant to learn Ukrainian themselves, they sent their children to Ukrainian-language schools;
a decline in the knowledge and use of Russian;
a growth in the use of English.

We therefore have the paradoxes usually associated with a dynamic, transition process. Both Russians and Russophone Ukrainians do not oppose the sending of their children to Ukrainian-language schools. Ninety per cent of children in the first grade in the city of Kyiv are now taught in Ukrainian-language classes, a 300 per cent increase since the late 1980s. This has not led to opposition or even any debate in the central media.67 At the same time, many of these Russophones remain reluctant to learn Ukrainian themselves.

One therefore reads complaints in the newspaper, such as appeared in Vechirnyi Kyiv (31 January 1997): ‘Well, walking along the streets of Kyiv, the Ukrainian language will not be heard… One gets the impression that Ukrainians no longer live in Kyiv.’ This, of course, is assuming that the only definition of a ‘true Ukrainian’ is one who speaks the Ukrainian language, which is hardly the case. The strength of Ukraine’s national identity cannot be linked to Ukrainian-language usage. When Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Kyiv in May 1997 he was greeted by Ukrainian-language protesters who supported the signing of a Russo-Ukrainian treaty, and Russian-language pickets who complained that this was a great tragedy. A Russian newspaper commentary stated later that ‘In no way did this eclectic illustration fit in with the desire of Ukrainian nationalist forces to transform language from a means of communication into some kind of symbol of the country’s independence.’68 Knowledge of the Ukrainian language should not therefore be recognised as the main criterion reflecting the degree of a person’s patriotism.
Bi-ethnic states and bilingualism

Rejection of two state languages

Neither Kravchuk nor Kuchma proposed during the 1994 presidential elections that Ukraine move towards two state languages (Ukrainian-Russian). Demands for two state languages have not since been a burning issue of debate, especially as there are conflicting opinion poll data on the strength of public support for dual state languages. In one poll quoted by Vasyl’ Kremen’ of the Presidential Administration to a Prosvita conference, 49 per cent remained in favour of one state language (Ukrainian). Only 32 per cent argued in favour of the state language being dependent on the dominant language in the region, while 19 per cent expressed no interest in the subject.

It should not be assumed, as is the case on occasions by some scholars, that all of those who use Russian or both Russian/Ukrainian are necessarily supporters of the introduction of two state languages. Khmelko found that nearly a third of Russian speakers voted for Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential elections. In one poll only 15 per cent agreed with the view that Russian should be introduced as a second state language.

In addition, if support for two state languages was so widespread it would be difficult to see how the Ukrainian constitution would have been adopted with Article 10. This article states that ‘The state ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.’ The important aspect of this article is that the state should support usage of the Ukrainian language in all regions of Ukraine. The inclusion of this article in the constitution was undoubtedly a significant victory for the national democrats. In addition, the constitution made no mention of any special status for the Russian language; instead, it was bracketed with the languages of other national minorities.

The adoption of such articles in the Ukrainian constitution is linked to widespread opposition within the ruling elites to the idea of two state languages. Within the literati and some national democratic-nationalist groups and political parties there is a barely disguised disdain for Russian-speaking Ukrainians. They are accused of being those who would ‘inevitably transform Ukraine into a Little Russia’, who voted in the 1994 elections for ‘cheap salami’ and ‘march-parades’.
There are also arguments against dual state languages based on the premise that it would not be a union of two equals, but merely serve to entrench the Russification process begun during the Soviet era. Dual state languages would be outwardly democratic—but without affirmative action in its favour, Ukrainian could not hope to compete. The population as well as bureaucrats, Kravchuk pointed out, followed the actions of the authorities. If the President spoke Ukrainian (or Russian, as in the Belarusan case) then the population largely followed his or her example. The ‘equality’ of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in practice (not in theory) on the eve of the disintegration of the former USSR were depicted in the manner shown in Figure 8.1 by an unknown Kyiv satirist.

Figure 8.1 ‘Status of state bi-lingualism’ in Ukraine

Source: Circulated in the samizdat during the Gorbachev era

Note: The larger figure holds a book entitled Native Language in Russian while the smaller one holds a book with the same title, but in Ukrainian.
Kuchma’s views on language

Kuchma had initially toyed with the idea of maintaining Ukrainian as the state language while recognising Russian as an additional official language. This confused everybody. After all, the 1989 Language Law had described Ukrainian as the sole state language while granting Russian the language of inter-communication. In addition, in areas of Ukraine where non-Ukrainian languages were widely spoken these could be designated as official languages.

National democrats were therefore quick to rally in opposition to what they saw as Kuchma’s support, they believed, for the elevation of Russian to a second state language. An appeal issued from the conference ‘State Language—Official Language!’ argued that ‘state’ and ‘official’ languages were one and the same. They linked language to the continued existence of the nation and the state and complained that ‘To give official status to the Russian language in the Ukrainian state shows a lack of respect for the Ukrainian people—it means civil war in Ukraine, insecurity in Europe, millions and millions of victims, for whom, as before, nobody will be responsible.’ If Russian is elevated to the status of a second state (official) language the conference would ‘call upon citizens of Ukraine to counter and create an all-national struggle against reactionary forces, suppressers of Ukraine with all possible constitutional means’.

A policy of dual state languages would have the following effect, a study by the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences, and Democratic Initiatives argued:

- Ukrainian language and culture would not be able to revive;
- it would conserve the results of Russification;
- it would intensify regional divisions;
- it would lead to the growth of Russian ethno-nationalism in Ukraine;
- it would lead to the rise of another generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, which would harm the creation of a future Ukrainian elite;
- it would lead to ‘the dying out of the Ukrainian nation’ because the social base for nation building is not cultivated.

Understandably, not everybody agreed. Besides the Communist and, to a lesser extent, the socialist parties, only the MRBR has similar policies of support for dual state languages. One hundred and fifty-two mainly left-wing members of parliament called upon President Kuchma to raise the question of elevating Russian as a
second state language, an appeal countered by 170 other deputies. Hryn’iov argued that ‘an attempt to declare one of these languages as the state (language) means discrimination against others’. With nearly half of Ukrainian citizens Russian-speaking, Hryn’iov believes that the 1989 law ‘On Languages’ ‘is directed not towards the defence of the Ukrainian language, but at the discrimination against Russian with all of the consequences that flow from this’.

Nevertheless, Kuchma has not followed the advice of his former ally and supported the introduction of dual state languages. In any event support for dual state languages would not be within his competence as it would be up to parliament to amend the 1989 language law (or introduce a new one, which is planned). Yet, as we have seen earlier, within parliament support for Russian as a second state language is largely confined to the radical left. Within the ruling elites only 17.2 per cent supported giving Ukrainian-Russian dual state language status. In addition, Kuchma needed the votes of national and liberal democrats, many of whom are Ukrainian speakers, to back his reform programme in the teeth of opposition from the left.

Kuchma, unlike Belarusan President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, is also not hostile to the Ukrainian language and accepted the widespread viewpoint (especially held in the city of Kyiv) that a President of Ukraine should speak Ukrainian. One of the many ‘crimes’ leading Russian politicians therefore accuse Kuchma of, is that he ‘has actually stopped speaking Russian’. Kuchma’s wife, an ethnic Russian, had also begun to declare herself to be a ‘Ukrainian’.

Nevertheless, some nationalist writers still accuse Kuchma of presiding over a programme of Russification worse than that conducted under Ukrainian communist leader Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi, who ruled Ukraine between 1972–1989. Certainly the proportion of Ukrainian-language media has declined in relation to the growth of Russian-language publications. Even the communist and poet Borys Oliynyk argued against the further ‘poisoning’ of Ukrainian culture by Russian publications which was a consequence, he believed, of the state leaving culture and publication in the hands of the private sector.

Official and unofficial policies

Language policies

Despite accusations made against former President Kravchuk that he supported a policy of ‘nationalisation’ of Russophones, this has to be
taken with a large pinch of salt. Even if Kravchuk had backed such a policy it would have been difficult to implement for two reasons. First, the state apparatus was still in the process of creation. The centre did not have effective enough levers to implement policies in the regions and no constitution had yet defined the division of powers between the executive and the legislature. Second, such a policy of nationalisation would have required rhetoric to be backed up by resources. As we have seen earlier, resources will remain limited as long as Ukraine suffers from an economic crisis.

Both Kravchuk and Kuchma always argued that Ukraine could only have one state language—Ukrainian. At the same time, the 1989 language law allowed for many official languages to be used additionally in regions where they predominated. This is to some degree contradicted by the article in the Ukrainian constitution mandating Ukrainian as a state language to be used throughout the country. Hence the widespread recognition of the need for a new language law to replace that adopted in 1989.

The difference between Kravchuk and Kuchma on this language question is also a question of who is the messenger? As quoted earlier, when the Mayor of Mariupol outlined his recommendations for the learning of Ukrainian, they were not objected to by the inhabitants of the city he led. If these same recommendations had been made by say Viacheslav Chornovil, leader of Rukh, it is doubtful whether the audience in Mariupol would have stayed to listen to the end of his speech. Similarly with Kravchuk and Kuchma: Kuchma (unlike Kravchuk), in the eyes of Russophones cannot be accused of being a west Ukrainian, a nationalist, a Ukrainian-speaker (prior to 1994), hostile to Russian as a language or linked to the national democrats.

In addition, Kuchma would, as an eastern Ukrainian, be more inclined to take local sensitivities into account. As Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko admitted, ‘it is not always easy in some of our regions’ to introduce the Ukrainian language into everyday life. Kuchma was more forthright, pointing to the need for a language policy that was sensitive—not abrasive—in its implementation: ‘The language question is not straightforward, one has to approach it according to the situation which has developed, taking into account the historical past.’ Kuchma was also more adamant that Russian should not become a ‘foreign language’ (although this was, in fact, already gradually happening in some regions).

Kuchma though has nevertheless complained at the lack of respect afforded to the language provisions of the Ukrainian
constitution in some regions of Ukraine. The central authorities, he pointed out, would no longer stay passive in the face of ‘local language law-making’ where there were widespread ‘local decisions pertaining to the official language’. A new language law would, Kuchma believed, ‘settle this problem and provide for responsibility for actions contravening the Constitution’. But this local language policy-making was partially a consequence of Kuchma’s own misguided and confused policies after coming to power in 1994.

The proposals accepted by Kuchma as part of his Council on Language Policy did not go as far as the Congress of Ukrainian Intellectuals had insisted. If accepted in total, their suggestions would have included attestation of state officials within three months for their knowledge of the Ukrainian language. If they failed the test they would be given one year to learn the language (quite a liberal time-frame as most had some knowledge of Ukrainian and it was not that dissimilar to Russian). If after the second test fifteen months later they again failed they would be released from their post. These policies are not that unusual even in some democracies where language requirements are necessary, such as in Canada where all state officials need to know French even if they are based outside Quebec. They probably would have been too reminiscent, in Kuchma’s eyes, of previous Soviet policies of diktat from the centre. In addition, not all aspects of the language plan submitted by Prosvita were likely ever to be adopted officially, such as the attestation of state officials and the introduction of Russian as a ‘foreign language’ in schools only after fifth grade.

Prosvita’s programme specifically aimed to squeeze out Russian as the ‘means of inter-national communication’ in Ukraine. As with Zhulyns’kyi’s formulation, this programme would help in the ‘consolidation’, ‘unity’ and ‘cultural development’ of Ukrainians. Defining Ukraine as a ‘mono-national state’ (not as a ‘bi-ethnic state’) Prosvita is seeking to spread the Ukrainian language into key strategic areas—business, public usage, in translated literature (translations of Western literature usually reach Ukraine from Russia in Russian translation), into higher education, the state apparatus and the security forces.

As seen earlier with the Ukrainian constitution, national and liberal democratic lobbying on the language question is not something that Kuchma has been able to ignore (assuming, of course, that he has wanted to). Kuchma himself sent greetings to the second Congress of Writers, where he attempted to mend fences with this influential body of intelligentsia by telling them that the
Ukrainian language was a key ‘important fundamental value’ of the state. In one of its resolutions the Congress called upon parliament, government and the President to defend and expand Ukrainian language usage by creating a State Committee on Language Policies. This would upgrade the Commission to control the Implementation of the Language Law, attached to the Cabinet of Ministers and led by former Deputy Prime Minister Zhulyns’kyi.

On 1 February 1997 a Council on Language Policy attached to the presidency was actually created which would, together with the State Committee on Nationalities and Migration, ensure the implementation of both the 1989 language law and the language provisions within the constitution. Some of these affirmative action policies which were proposed to the Council on Languages and were then backed by a presidential decree included the following elements:

- tax breaks on Ukrainian-language publications;
- greater subsidies for Ukrainian-language textbooks in literature and education;
- financial subsidies to the societies, Prosvita, Znannya and Ukraïina to help implement these policies;
- the promotion of the Ukrainian language within the school system;
- support for the introduction of Ukrainian terminology;
- the introduction of ‘evolutionary protectionist’ policies for the printing of Ukrainian-language publications. What was especially important was to ensure ‘a high artistic intellectual basis’ in print, radio and television;
- the drafting of a new law on the ‘Development and Use of Languages in Ukraine’ to replace the 1989 version.

**Publishing and the media**

The media play an important role in the formation of national consciousness. When asked ‘What more than anything influences national consciousness today?’ the results shown in Table 8.4 were found.

The Ukrainian authorities are rightly concerned at the trend towards continued, and even in some cases, growing, Russification of the media in Ukraine. Many new publications established since 1992 are in the Russian language. The Ukrainian authorities see this as a threefold problem. First, with such tendencies evident in
Ukraine’s media, ‘Is it such that it could play a role in Ukraine?’ in state and nation building? President Kuchma complained that these processes were a threat to Ukraine’s national identity, its ‘spiritual and cultural revival’.

Second, control over a country’s media space is perceived as a question of national security. President Kuchma told the Plenum of the Creative Unions that ‘we have become objects of active (and in some cases expansive) spiritual, ideological, cultural, informational influences, interests and value orientations which fundamentally differ from those which are acceptable to the Ukrainian people’.

This was particularly the case with regard to the Russian media. They not only paid no taxes by organising fictitious joint ventures with Ukrainian firms, but attempted directly to influence domestic developments in Ukraine (for example, the Crimean question and Kuchma’s possible re-election in the 1999 presidential elections). The daily newspaper Den’, is reportedly financed by Gazprom and backs Ievhen Marchuk in the 1999 presidential elections as Kuchma’s main opponent.

Broadcasts of Russian radio to Ukraine were halted in 1993 while Russian Public Television (ORT) was removed from prime Ukrainian State television channels, which were then given to new Ukrainian television companies. Meanwhile, greater support was given to improving the quality of Ukrainian television programmes and its range of imported Western films and soaps. The popular soap Santa Barbara could be watched from Autumn 1995 on Ukrainian state television in the Ukrainian language five times a week (and not twice a week, as previously, in Russian on ORT).

This rather astute form of Ukrainianisation produced only muffled protests from a small number of Communist Party pensioners in Sevastopol, which again showed that only in this region of Ukraine was there hostility to the Ukrainian language per se.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third, licences and advertising are a source of large financial revenues. The former CIS Channel Ostankino (now ORT) obtained large revenues from Ukrainian advertisers which were transferred to Moscow. Ostankino, like ORT, refused to pay for licences in Ukraine because it did not perceive CIS member states as ‘foreign’ territory. This short sighted approach by ORT merely led to German and other Western television companies cornering Ukrainian television and radio airwaves because of their willingness to pay licence fees. ORT, which broadcasts throughout the CIS, can only be received by two-thirds of Ukraine’s population now that frequencies have been won by Ukrainian and Western television companies. Volodymyr Tsendrovs’kyi, Chairman of the Ukrainian Television Union, which represents the interests of private television stations, predicted in Autumn 1996 that Russian television would disappear altogether from Ukraine by the end of 1997.

The state is also providing affirmative action by supporting Ukrainian book publishing through, for example, the publishing of textbooks in Ukrainian. Sixty per cent of educational textbooks are now in Ukrainian. Ukrainianisation, if it were to ever occur, could only do so from the bottom up through the school system. On 28 February 1995 a presidential decree did outline affirmative action in a ‘State Programme to Develop National Book Publishing and the Press to the year 2000’. But, this has been slow to develop. The creation of a Ministry of Information in 1996 aimed to ‘shape and secure the protection of the national informational space of Ukraine’. Another problem here was more one of the adaptation of the cultural intelligentsia, a pampered elite in the former USSR, to the new market economy. While supporting reform the creative intelligentsia has found it difficult to adapt to the market. Ukrainian cultural publications found it difficult to compete with Russian-language translations of horror, erotic and science fiction books published in Russia and sold cheaply in Ukraine.

As for newspapers, the proportion of Ukrainian language media dropped during the first two years of independence, that is under the then supposedly ‘nationalising’ President Kravchuk, from 60 to 27 per cent. During the same period the Russian language media doubled in size. Ironically, under the Russophone Kuchma the Ukrainian media improved its position. Of the 451 registered publications in Ukraine 208 are now in Ukrainian (46 per cent), although these only account for 35 per cent if circulation figures are taken into account. Of the 214 newspapers in Ukraine only seventy-eight (or 32 per cent) are in Ukrainian. Mykola Syrota, head of the
1994–1998 parliamentary Constitutional Centre faction, concluded after surveying these figures by saying that ‘Ukrainianisation in Ukraine is a myth’.\textsuperscript{112}

What of television and radio, still the most influential media in Ukraine? The National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the State Radio Company and the Ministry of Information all threatened to apply sanctions, including the withdrawals of licences, from television and radio companies if they failed to introduce some Ukrainian-language programmes in their schedules by the end of 1997. This move was in response to demands by the T. Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society Prosvita that Article 10 of the Ukrainian constitution, which outlines Ukrainian as the state language throughout Ukrainian territory, be implemented.

**Russian views on language policies in Ukraine**

Is post-Soviet Ukraine undertaking a conscious policy of discrimination against the Russian language in the media and in publishing? Is it in fact a nationalising state by nature of its linguistic, educational and publishing policies? If Ukraine is a ‘nationalising state’ this is not reflected in the opinion polls, which do not draw such conclusions. In fact, as Table 8.5 reveals, they show an absence of ethnic discrimination in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, despite such polls, many Russian government officials certainly do believe that Ukraine, under Kuchma, is now a nationalising state. This contrasts with their earlier assessments of Ukraine, under Kravchuk, as not resembling such a nationalising state (see above). ‘Ukraine is openly pursuing an anti-Russian policy by equating the spread of Russian literature and printing matter with the propagation of pornography’, Tuleyev, former Russian Minister for CIS Co-operation, was convinced.\textsuperscript{113} This may be

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences, Sotsis-Gallup and Democratic Initiatives; Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy, no. 17, 1996, p. 81*
unsurprising coming from the lips of a communist. But, attempts to rectify the Russification and de-nationalisation of the Tsarist and Soviet eras through affirmative action is likely to be met with condemnation even from Russian democrats. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin complained: ‘We are concerned with the increasingly evident Ukrainian tendency towards limiting and actually forcing out the Russian language from the state and intellectual life of society.’ Chernomyrdin claimed that Russians and Russian-speakers were increasingly discriminated against in Ukraine. Grigorii Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal leaning Yabloko, also complained that ‘there is a big problem in Ukraine with Russian schools’. ‘A creeping linguistic revolution’, one Russian newspaper warned, ‘is actually in progress in Ukraine. Russian schools and Russian-language departments in institutions are being quietly closed. There cannot be any thought of a “Russian career” on television.’

Russia’s main concern in airing these grievances is twofold. First, Russian national identity is itself in the throes of radical transition. Most Russians define their identity and community in linguistic and cultural terms to include not just ethnic Russians, but Russian speakers. Second, the September 1995 presidential directive on ‘Strategic Policy of Russia to the CIS Member states’ explicitly points to the Russian-speaking communities in the former USSR as being its agents of influence and its geopolitical allies. Through the dissemination of the Russian media, radio, television, cultural exchanges and the training of new cadres the Russian authorities hope to maintain their influence within the ‘Near Abroad’. An International Conference and Festival of Arts was held in early October 1997 dedicated to preserving and strengthening ‘a unified cultural, economic and informational area between Russia and Ukraine’. Russia and Ukraine therefore hold different objectives in the CIS; while the former seeks to maintain the inherited closeness and lack of widespread national differences between the eastern Slavs inherited from the Soviet era, nation building in Ukraine will inevitably lead to a growing divergence with Russia.

The reality is, of course, very different to that propagated by a large cross-section of Russian opinion. Whereas in 1991 only 5,857 books published in Ukraine were in the Ukrainian language (33.7 per cent), this had only risen slightly to 6,109 books (or 46.7 per cent) by 1995, the same year the decree was issued on supporting Ukrainian-language publishing. In 1993, during the middle of the Kravchuk era, only 2,277 books were published in Ukraine, a
reflection of the economic crisis. Of these, 62 per cent were in Russian (with a print run of 54.5 million). For every 100 citizens there are seven Ukrainian and fifty-four Russian-language publications in Ukraine. The worst situation with regard to Ukrainian-language media was, perhaps not surprisingly, in the Donbas, the Crimea and Odesa oblast. At the end of 1995 there were 1,398 Ukrainian-language newspapers in Ukraine, while another 955 were in Russian. Meanwhile, 374 newspapers, were in both languages. Of books on sale in Ukraine, 79 per cent are in the Russian language, most of them imported from Russia.

**Conclusions**

Five years into Ukrainian independence the number of school children taught in the Ukrainian language (57 per cent) is still far less than that achieved by 1930, after seven years of Soviet Ukrainian indigenisation policies, when 80 per cent of school children in Ukraine were taught in the Ukrainian language. As for books and journals published in the Ukrainian language, these also show no evidence of ‘nationalisation’ under Kravchuk. In 1993, of all books published in Ukraine 41 per cent were in Ukrainian and 59 per cent in Russian. A year later, the last year of the Kravchuk era, the number of Ukrainian-language titles had dropped to 27 per cent, while Russian titles had grown to 73 per cent. Between 1993 and 1994 the proportion of Ukrainian-language journals dropped from 59 to 29 per cent. These figures are further examples of conclusive proof that nationalisation did not take place under Kravchuk. On the contrary, they indicate that the authorities should devote greater (not lesser) attention to the matter and provide more affirmative action for Ukrainian language and publishing.

Language is undoubtedly an important attribute of any nation’s characteristics. But Ukraine has to reject two extremes, both of which would be damaging to its nation building project: rapid Ukrainianisation, or the introduction of Russian as a second state language. The former would not be permissible in a democratic society at the turn of the twenty-first century. It would also worsen inter-ethnic relations both domestically and vis-à-vis Russia. If the latter option were adopted the Ukrainian language would be unable to compete. Contrary to the views of advocates of this policy, both in the West and in Ukraine, it would merely legitimise and legalise the inherited inequalities between the Ukrainian and Russian languages.
But, for Ukraine to undertake a moderate, middle course between these two extremes requires the type of language planning undertaken in other democratic states. After all, language policies affect not only linguistic issues; they attempt to influence the behaviours and choices of citizens and are usually associated with modernisation and the assertion of political hegemony. In the Ukrainian case, this is tantamount to removing the Russification and bilingualism inflicted on the Ukrainian nation by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. Questions have to be asked and answered about what the aims of these policies will be, who its target will be and what means will be used to achieve the desired results. To be successful, Ukrainian language planning will require new levels of prestige for the language, it will also need it to be associated with career and social advancement.126

These processes will be helped, in turn, by any improvement in the socio-economic situation in Ukraine. In Kharkiv’s Military University the Dean offered to increase the salaries of any officer cadets if they exclusively used the Ukrainian language. Overnight the university was ‘Ukrainianised’. In the Baltic states Russian-speaking minorities are seemingly willing to assimilate into very different cultures and languages because of the attractive socio-economic situation in these states, especially in Estonia which has been invited to join the EU. The Russian authorities understand this only too well. Russia will find it difficult to maintain its cultural and linguistic ties to, and influence in, Ukraine if its economy improves because this would encourage a greater degree of re-identification of its largely amorphous Russian speakers into civic and even ethnic Ukrainians, something, as we have seen (see chapter 4), which is already occurring.127 Many of these Russophones, after all, voted for independence in December 1991 on socio-economic grounds.
This chapter surveys the role of history, myths and legends in the formation of national identity and historical memory. Each of these areas has strategic relevance, beyond the subject of historiography, for the tasks posed by Ukraine’s state and nation building project. It has usually been the duty of historians to assist nation and state builders since at least the nineteenth century, particularly during times of rapid and uncertain change. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that historians will be called upon to play a similar role in Ukraine and in other former Soviet republics.

This chapter discusses the role of history, myths, memory and symbols in the development of national consciousness, which is crucial for the success of any nation building programme. The chapter also surveys the growth of a new, and the return of the old, Ukrainian historiography from within Ukraine and the diaspora. It argues that the Mykhailo Hrushevsky scheme of Ukrainian history is being adopted in Ukraine and that the ensuing new myths, symbols and legends will inevitably lead to the country’s external divergence from Russia.

The role of history, memory and myths

What is history?

Is objective history possible? E.H.Carr has pointed out that objectivity is not always the essential function of historians. Facts do not speak for themselves: ‘The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context’, Carr believed. The facts the historian utilises rest upon his/her interpretation of events. ‘The ‘facts’ that the historian receives are always selected, interpreted and restructured
through the eyes of the recorder. By and large, the historian will get
the kind of facts he/she wants. History means interpretation’, Carr
added. It is therefore difficult for the historian to be ‘neutral’ because
‘the historian is engaged on a continuous process of moulding his/her
facts to his interpretation and his/her interpretation to his facts. It is
impossible to assign primacy to one over the other.’ History is a
process whereby causes and ‘facts’ are selected according to the
historians’ views of their relevant significance. Interpretation in
history, therefore, ‘is always bound up with value judgements, and
causality is bound up with interpretation’.

On occasion the historian investigates the past through the eyes
of the present, with his/her role being not one of recording past
events, but one of evaluating them. The historian’s environment
and the era he/she is writing in will all play a crucial role in
determining his/her insights into historical problems.

In the eighteenth century history focused upon elites, while during
the last century it evolved around the history of national communities.
The historian, like the political scientist, is a product of the society he/
she lives in. It is perhaps impossible or, at the very least difficult, to
make sense of the past without reference to the present. Shils argued:
‘Much of the effort to promote a nation is focused on the reaffirmation
of the continuation of the present state of the nation with significant
elements of the past.’ If societies are in the throes of transition and
transformation where the future is uncertain, ‘the past intrudes with
increasing severity. In this field there is no such thing as a fresh start.’
This is certainly the case for post-Soviet societies such as Ukraine.

The historian is compelled to investigate and to place causes into
some semblance of order, to establish them into a hierarchy and
continuously ask the question ‘Why?’ and ‘Whither?’ The head of
the Department on General Security Questions at the Ukrainian
National Institute of Strategic Studies said that although ‘The
Ukrainian nation is one of the oldest in Europe…we lost all of this
during various twists of our history. For historians, there is hardly a
more important task (now) than answering “Why?” Historians, he
believed, will also be called upon to answer the question as to
‘whether we can preserve our state now’.

Value judgements are usually made by historians when they ask
questions such as to what degree has a cohesive and group unity
been achieved? What validity do certain ethnic groups have in their
demands for autonomy or independent status? When historians
deny the existence of a separate nationality they are inadvertently
making a value judgement about its right to seek autonomy.
These are questions with particular relevance for Ukraine. When Ukraine became an independent state in January 1992 only a minority of Western scholars, media and governments accepted that it was somehow ‘different’ from Russia. On a visit to Western Europe in Spring 1992 then President Kravchuk was asked by the leader of a country: ‘Which part of Russia is Ukraine in?’ Its independence was consequently somehow ‘temporary’. The impact of Tsarist Russian historiography, which had largely been adopted by Western historians of Russia and the former USSR, was clearly evident in the general view of independent Ukraine during its first two years of existence as a temporary ‘illegitimate child’ that would soon seek to re-integrate with Russia. Already comfortable with one set of historical myths largely incorporated from Russian and Soviet historiography, Western public and scholarly opinion is now finding it difficult to readjust to the new post-Soviet historical myths propagated by newly independent states, such as Ukraine.

**Historical memory**

Is a nation’s survival as an independent state imperilled if its historical memory is distorted or if it is denied a separate history? Deutsch believes it is: ‘Autonomy in the long run is dependent on memory.’ Society must receive a full amount of information about itself, its history and the world. If it is cut off, ‘the society becomes an automation…it loses control over its own behaviour’.10

The loss of historical memory is therefore a crucial element which erodes national consciousness, the sense of political and cultural community which is perceived to be different to ‘Others’. The tampering with Ukraine’s and Belarus’s historical memories provides us with one of the best examples of a state-inspired attempt to prevent the transition from ethnographic peasant and pre-modern, local consciousness to that of a modern nation. Ukraine and Belarus were not entirely alone in this state-sponsored manipulation. Throughout the former Soviet bloc authorities manipulated history to suit their then ruling ideologies. In post-war Poland the teaching of history could not criticise Russians; instead teachers directed their campaign against Ukrainians and West Germans.11 In Hungary the authorities managed to manipulate opinion to such an extent that on the fortieth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising the majority of Hungarians were found to hold no views on the subject. Only 10 per cent believed that it should become a national holiday.12
Historical memory is a central component of national identity. On the fifth anniversary of Ukrainian independence, President Leonid Kuchma called for the ‘need to revive its genetic memory, a deep understanding of one’s own history’. This historical memory could be in the form of popular myths, self images and ethnic stereotypes where they profoundly affect how we perceive the outside world.

Collective memories and myths and a shared history are essential to unite a heterogeneous populace into a united polity and nation. Otherwise the sense of being one whole united in a political community is absent. Ethnies (or peoples) bequeath myths, symbols, values, memories, customs, traditions and territory which will be used in the construction of the new modern nation. Without these, ‘the basis for creating a nation is tenuous and the task Herculean’.

Smith believes that ‘Memory, then is bound to place, a special place, a homeland. It is also crucial to identity. In fact, one might almost say: no memory, no identity, no identity, no nation.’ The nation is built on shared memories of joy and suffering, and, above all, of collected sacrifices. ‘Hence the importance of battles, defeats no less than victories, for mobilising and unifying ethnies and nations.’ History in the form of archaeology ties the present to the past, today’s living to one’s ancestors, today’s inhabitants to the ‘homeland’ and its land. The homeland is an amalgam of sacred sites and popular pilgrimages. When Serbs decided to leave areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina granted to the Muslims within the Dayton Peace Accords in 1996 they moved to Serb-controlled areas, taking with them the exhumed remains of their ancestors. They could not migrate to new areas of settlement while leaving behind the graves of their families. Kohn described Russian nationalism as being, ‘based on monuments and graveyards’, a factor which has particular significance for many Russians who find it difficult to come to terms with the ‘loss’ of the city of Sevastopol to Ukrainian sovereignty.

The ‘Restoration and strengthening of historical memory is one of the most important tasks for the Ukrainian political elite.’ Without ‘historical consciousness’ it would be difficult to construct a complete Ukrainian national identity for a modern nation and state. Ukrainian and émigré historians of Ukraine consequently describe Tsarist Russian and Soviet rule as more debilitating than that encountered by the former colonial subjects of Western empires. Only the French sought to manipulate history in their colonies, the subjects of which
were taught that they had descended from the ‘Gauls’ (this history is still taught in French Polynesia). The erasure of a nation’s historical memory is tantamount to ‘intellectual colonisation’. Tsarina Catherine provided instructions in 1764 to her Attorney-General that ‘When the hetmans are gone from Little Russia every effort should be made to eradicat from memory the period and the hetmans.’ These instructions were on the whole implemented by both the Tsarist and Soviet leaders who followed her.

Consequently, historical memory plays a central role in the state and nation building project. ‘In other words, it is not only a problem of “where we are going?” which is not resolved, but also “from where?”’, as one Ukrainian historian has commented. The recognition that national consciousness cannot be revived without historical memory is now accepted in Ukraine. Former Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Kuras with responsibility for the humanities stressed the need to re-print the previously banned histories of Ukraine in order to help in the ‘national-cultural revival of the people’. The independent Television station ICTV launched a series of 144 programmes in 1996 entitled Nevidoma Ukraina (Unknown Ukraine) that aimed to awaken pride in Ukrainian achievements and history. Part of this re-annexation of important personalities (who were often previously defined as ‘Russian’) aims to claim their achievements for Ukrainian history in such diverse fields as music, medicine, law and philosophy.

Many of the histories of Ukraine published in Ukraine since the early 1990s were originally published in the diaspora and then reprinted in Ukraine, a link which has remained strong. Volodymyr Furkalo, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Canada, thanked the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) on its twentieth anniversary in 1996 for its ‘careful studies in this field (which) are extremely important to an independent Ukraine. This information will help my country reclaim its concealed history.’

The role of myths

What is the role of historical myths in the process of nation and state building? Is all history—including modern historiography—mythology, as many scholars in this field have argued? Tudor defined the myth as ‘a practical argument, the chief condition for its success is that it be understood as a true narrative of events. If it is regarded as a pack of lies it…will fail as an explanation and it will lack prescriptive force.’
Myths should have the following seven characteristics:

- believability;
- be created through social process;
- incorporate a dramatic structure (beginning, middle and an end);
- be seldom questioned;
- have a practical purpose;
- be easily understood, make life easier to grasp and accept;
- give some sense of one’s self, purpose and importance.

It would certainly be difficult for the construction of a national identity without recourse to some myth making in history. All modern nations have their historical mythology, including the English (although Hugh Seton-Watson commented that many English people would claim that this was not in fact the case). In post-Second World War Japan history was rewritten with no guilt about the actions of the country during the war: ‘the education system, the teaching of history and the textbooks that are used reflect this gloss’. In Germany though, post-war historiography was rewritten and guilt was accepted for the war crimes of the Nazi era. At the same time, the ‘good’ Wehrmacht were contrasted with the ‘evil’ SS and Gestapo, a myth which had little resemblance to reality on the eastern front during the Second World War.

A country’s external orientation, its traditional ‘foes’ and ‘friends’, its desirable partners, its national grievances, a vast pool of historical symbols and re-jigged ‘facts’ all need to be assembled by the new court historians of the independent state to ‘prove’ that their country had always striven for self determination and that it possessed historical title to the lands over which it now had sovereignty. The modern myth makers of the late nineteenth century were priests and scribes. They now also include poets, lexicographers, historians, novelists, poets, academics, journalists and lawyers. This becomes a pressing issue: ‘the rediscovery of the national self is not an academic matter, it is a pressing practical issue, vexed and contentious, which spells life or death for the nationalist project of creating a nation’.

The states of the former USSR are not unique in using historiography for the needs of their state and nation building project. Iaroslav Isaievych, director of the L’viv-based Institute of Ukrainian Studies and head of the International Association of Ukrainianists, argued that the use of history for nation building ‘is a general rule, not an exception’. New myths and traditions are most
frequently introduced during periods of upheaval. With the old myths and legends in disarray new ones are urgently required. Hobsbawm and Ranger believe that invented traditions are important for nation building, in the same manner as symbols, histories and legends that all require ‘social engineering’. They point to three types of invented tradition:

- established or symbolic tradition providing social cohesion to its members or a group of a real or artificial community;
- those traditions established legitimately within institutions by the authorities;
- those that provide the main aim of socialisation, inculcation of beliefs, a value system and conventional behaviour.30

The invention of traditions became the norm during previous periods of intensive state and nation building (1870–1914 in Western Europe and North America, as well as since 1992 in the former USSR). These invented traditions become particularly important in countries which inherited mixed ethnic groups that required unification into a single identity. In Scotland new traditions and myths were invented to unite the Celts (Irish) of the Western Highlands, the Picts (Goths) of the East and the Saxons of the lowlands. Ukraine may require myths for the same reasons as Scotland.

Invented traditions and myths should be inculcated into the popular memory and accepted through primary education, public ceremonies and monuments. The ‘rediscovery’ of history and the invention of new traditions no longer remain scholarly pastimes. This process of rediscovery and invention seeks to give answers to difficult questions of ‘who we are, whence we came, when we emerged, who our ancestors were, when we were great and glorious, who our heroes are, why we declined’.31 Post-Soviet state and nation builders have to cope with similar problems to those faced by their predecessors in the last century and between 1917 and 1921.32 For countries with no inherited national unity and modern nation, such as Ukraine, the process of rediscovery and invention of myths therefore becomes all the more important. Myths are an essential construct for structuring beliefs, for group definition and assistance in assimilating diversity. Armstrong gives myths a central, integrating role, ‘through which symbols of national identity acquire a coherent meaning’.33 Myths shape national identity.
History in the service of state and nation building

Historiography in the new Ukraine

There has been an explosion of interest in historical subjects in post-Soviet Ukraine. Numerous previously banned histories of Ukraine have been re-published and their historians rehabilitated. Historical collections prepared by a younger generation of new historians are planned. A new Institute of History was established within the Academy of Sciences in L’viv on the basis of the pre-war T.Shevchenko Scientific Society. These Institutes of History play an active role in the state and nation building processes.

The growing prestige of interest in history is particularly evident among the younger generation. This is directly linked to the change in historical themes studied and the curriculum taught in Ukraine’s education system. The head of the Department of History in Donets’k University, Nikolai Bespalov, who had been dispatched to the region from the Russian SFSR in the Soviet era, explained to the author how the teaching of history had been completely overhauled. Now there was greater emphasis upon the teaching of the history of the struggle for, and the achievement of, Ukrainian independence. A central role within post-Soviet historiography is the study of state-building processes in Ukraine and the national-liberation movements of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.

Ukrainian history is no longer written within the context of ‘Russian history’ or Russian state development. By separating Ukrainian history as an entity different to Russian history, the Ministry of Education, who often commission these texts, are consciously or otherwise adopting Hrushevs’kyi’s schema (see below). Stress is now laid upon the history of the Ukrainian state from Kyiv Rus’ through the Cossack era to the present.

Ukrainian history classes are very popular among students. Donets’k University’s History Department produced textbooks for students based upon the Russian-language translation of Orest Subtelny’s Ukraine. A History. Originally published in 1989 in Toronto, Subtelny’s book has become the most widely used textbook in Ukraine in the teaching of history. One author claimed that this book is ‘without exaggeration triumphantly dominant within our education system’. This reflects the degree to which revolutionary changes in education are occurring with the assistance of diaspora historians even in Russian-speaking regions of eastern Ukraine.
The return of Hrushevs’kyi

Why is Hrushevs’kyi so important to Ukrainian state and nation building? Hrushevs’kyi neutralised the Russian historiographical view of Ukraine by inventing a ‘superb intellectual legitimation of the national myth’, Armstrong believes. Hrushevs’kyi was essential in the intellectual context of the nineteenth century in legitimising the Ukrainian separate identity myth which could compete with Russian historical mythology. Probably, most importantly of all, as Ukraine’s Ambassador to France pointed out, Hrushevs’kyi’s works showed that ‘we are not some sort of “younger brother”, but a separate Slavic people which lives on our rightful land and belongs to European civilisation. That is why it is important to immediately throw off inferiority complexes which our neighbours attached to us for years.’ Hrushevs’kyi’s works therefore enable Ukrainians to demand to be treated with equality by Russians and to be proud of their historical achievements, past ‘glories’ and separate distinctiveness.

What was the basis for Hrushevs’kyi’s schema of history? Hrushevs’kyi’s historiography extended Ukrainian history to pre-historical times and forward to the modern era. Many of the key elements of his historiography were diametrically opposed to those propounded by Tsarist and Soviet historians. Hrushevs’kyi emphasised Ukraine’s Western links and Ukraine’s role for the West as a buffer; he linked Ukrainian history as one continuous line, argued in favour of Kyiv Rus’ as a proto-Ukrainian state, combined the search for national and social justice among the Cossacks and criticised both Russian and Polish expansionism. In contrast to Russian and Soviet historians, who prepared surveys of the ‘Russian state’ (for which read ‘empire’), Hrushevs’kyi focused on the history of the Ukrainian peoples who had continuously inhabited a certain geographic unit for a millennia.

In contrast to the traditional histories of Russia Hrushevs’kyi argued that it was irrational to link Russian history to Kyiv Rus’ and far more logical to trace its origins to Vladimir-Suzdal and Muscovy. The relationship between these regions and Kyiv Rus’ resembled that between Gaul and Rome. By adopting this imperial historical scheme the origins of Russians were obscured, while Ukrainians only briefly appeared on the scene in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. It would be far better therefore to organise the history of the eastern Slavs as separate histories of each national group traced back to their separate origins.
Hrushevskyi was rehabilitated in Ukraine from 1988 onwards. The return of Hrushevskyi to Ukrainian life came after a fifty-year hiatus during which he had been accused of providing ‘ideological inspiration for Ukrainian-German nationalism’. Ironically, this attempt at tarnishing Hrushevskyi with the brush of being an ‘Austrian’, ‘German’ or ‘Polish agent’ had been lifted from Tsarist criticism of him and merely reflected the degree to which Soviet historiography returned after 1934 to its Tsarist Russian roots (a view kept alive in the West by White Russian émigrés). Hrushevskyi was first condemned in 1934 when Soviet historiography shifted gear back to the more traditional Tsarist schema. Yet, during the 1920s Hrushevskyi’s historiography had been considered quite acceptable by even Marxist-Leninist historians (Hrushevskyi was himself a Socialist and at one time even a federalist). During the 1920s the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) took the lead in declaring all documents and archives in Ukraine to be the property of Ukrainian history.

By 1990–1991 the KPU was facing a losing battle and Hrushevskyi was well on his way to becoming fully rehabilitated. His works could be accessed publicly in the Academy of Sciences (and not for the lucky privileged few in the spetsfundy—the special holdings of foreign literature which only high ranking members of the Communist Party had access to). Reprints of his articles, memoirs, histories and surveys of Ukrainian culture began to reach the Ukrainian market after 1990. The state then began to place its resources behind the rehabilitation of Hrushevskyi. In 1991, on the eve of Ukrainian independence, Kyiv’s Naukova Dumka publishers began reprinting his eleven-volume History of Ukraine-Rus with the full support of the Ukrainian leadership. It was the completion of this project which was Hrushevskyi’s task when he decided to return to Soviet Ukraine in the early 1920s, a return which was opposed by Ukrainian émigrés. In 1925 the Soviet authorities told him that it was not opportune to publish his eleven-volume history. This was followed by the first attempts of Soviet Ukrainian authors to analyse his historical schema. After the August 1991 Declaration of Independence the 125th anniversary of his birth was commemorated with great pomp. He was thereafter described as the ‘first president of Ukraine’ (Leonid Kravchuk is described as the ‘first elected president’).

After the disintegration of the former USSR this trickle turned into a veritable flood, which is ‘an altogether logical reaction against its long term illegality’. Kravchuk recalled that after 1989 he
stopped reading novels because of his fondness for newly published historical works.\textsuperscript{48} It became quickly clear that Hrushevs’kyi’s schema would become the basis for the new Ukrainian national history.\textsuperscript{49} But Ukrainian historians have not always been able to keep up with the dynamic changes that required greater attention devoted to an analysis of Hrushevs’kyi’s large volume of works. ‘Systematic thematic research is developing only slowly’, one critic lamented.\textsuperscript{50}

Hrushevs’kyi as a historian ‘raised Ukrainian history to world levels’.\textsuperscript{51} Until the late 1980s Hrushevs’kyi was little known outside the Ukrainian diaspora. His monumental \textit{History of Ukraine-Rus} is only now in the process of being translated into English by the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies. Yet the breadth, range and volume of his works makes him ‘the greatest historian of the Slavonic world and Ukrainian historians...It was precisely he who gave Ukraine its full history. He was also its creator.’ Hrushevs’kyi will, ‘be an example for all generations of Ukrainians’.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{Hrushevs’kyi and new myths}

Hrushevs’kyi’s works have since been used by Ukrainian authors to promote parliamentarism and the adoption of the 1996 constitution. Former Deputy Prime Minister Kuras pointed out that ‘M.S. Hrushevs’kyi was one of the main ideologues of this constitution [1917]’ whose spirit permeated Ukraine’s constitutional debate during 1994–1996.\textsuperscript{53}

Hrushevs’kyi has been brought in to do battle with demeaning concepts such as those which argued that Ukrainians were incapable of creating their own state. He also provides a rationale to define Ukrainians and Russians as two different peoples with their own separate histories.\textsuperscript{54} Hrushevs’kyi’s ideas have been called upon to aid Ukraine’s full emancipation from foreign rulers and domestic repression.\textsuperscript{55} Hrushevs’kyi provided proof that Ukrainians have their own roots and language. He is therefore used extensively to promote patriotism in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{56}

Hrushevs’kyi’s works will be the basis for the creation of a new all-Ukrainian national idea that, it is believed, is needed as a foundation for the independent state. Clearly pointing the figure at today’s leaders one author praised Hrushevs’kyi: ‘Raising himself above political squabbles, Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi gave the Ukrainian people a national idea.’\textsuperscript{57} Hrushevs’kyi’s works will become the basis for the creation of a national idea that will
encompass all of Ukrainian territory. The development of the Hrushevs’kyi schema tracing Ukrainian history from Kyiv Rus’ to the present day showed that the Ukrainian people ‘based itself upon its national idea—the idea of national independence’. Hrushevs’kyi symbolises this ‘national idea’, which the Ukrainian intelligentsia is looking towards reviving and re-adapting, ‘as the concept for an ideology of state building’. Hrushevs’kyi’s works showed that Ukrainians were never an inert mass—but ‘always striving towards liberation and independence’ (see below).

Hrushevs’kyi entered politics through history. Both his historical and political legacy therefore combine to legitimise the right of Ukrainians to possess an independent state. On the eightieth anniversary of the 1917 Ukrainian People’s Republic’s Third Universal this document was showered with praise. Without the struggle for independence during 1917–1921, ‘who knows if there would be today an independent Ukraine’. The Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) implemented Hrushevs’kyi’s historical schema by adopting the tryzub (trident) and hryvnia monetary unit of Kyiv Rus’ as its symbols, while linking the UNR to a ‘1,000-year old tradition of state-building’. The tryzub and hryvnia were reintroduced into Ukraine between 1991 and 1996 and the 1991 Declaration of Independence referred to a ‘1,000-year tradition of Ukrainian statehood’. Hrushevs’kyi’s legacies as a political activist and historian therefore link the UNR to the present-day independent state and trace both of them back to Kyiv Rus’.

Hrushevs’kyi’s relevance for contemporary Ukraine

The works of Hrushevs’kyi have proved to be popular again today because many of the same questions which were being asked by him in the first two decades of the twentieth century are again relevant. Titles such as ‘Who are these Ukrainians and what do they want?’, ‘Free Ukraine’, ‘From whence came Ukrainians and where is it they are going?’ all have as much relevance to post-Soviet Ukrainian nation building as they did seven decades earlier. As one author has stressed: ‘[A]ll of the problems which were raised by the learned one (Hrushevs’kyi) were relevant at that time in the early part of the century, they remain relevant today at the end of the century.’

On the occasion of Hrushevs’kyi’s 130th anniversary then Deputy Prime Minister Kuras outlined what he believed to be his significance for contemporary Ukraine. Hrushevs’kyi’s works would be useful in
six areas. He would help Ukraine’s national revival, the creation of new myths, the formulation of a new ‘ideology of contemporary state building’, the consolidation of society and the formation of an ‘all-national mentality’ that would unite Ukrainian lands through sobornist. Hrushevs’kyi’s philosophy of parliamentarism, his support for democracy, for people’s sovereignty and his placing of Ukraine within the realm of European civilisation all have continued significance today.66 As someone responsible for education Kuras was neatly placed to therefore implement Hrushevs’kyi’s ideas.

Even the moderate Socialist Party of Ukraine finds something in Hrushevs’kyi to its liking; after all, he was both a Socialist and, at one stage, a federalist.67 Hrushevs’kyi supported Ukraine’s administrative division along federal lines into 10–12 historic ‘lands’. Above these ‘lands’ would stand an all-Ukrainian Congress (Central Rada) and below them communes and volosts. Hrushevs’kyi therefore not only stood for national independence after 1918—but also for political, economic and social emancipation. All three planks of Hrushevs’kyi’s philosophy (national, political and socio-economic emancipation) enable a broad spectrum of political groups from left to right to accept him as ‘the Patriarch of Ukrainian statehood’. Hrushevs’kyi stood for a ‘Great Ukraine’ in the social-moral sense of that phrase.68 Socialists, as well as nationalists, can claim him because he was not only a narodnyk and a derzhavnyk—he was also a ‘historian (given to us) from God’.69 President Kuchma credited Hrushevs’kyi with reviving ‘Ukraine’s genetic memory’, showing that they had their own roots within Kyiv Rus’. Hrushevs’kyi therefore produced a fundamental 11-volume work which is the ‘historical Bible of the Ukrainian people’. Kuchma credited him with being the ‘symbol of sobornist, consensus and all-Ukrainian unity’.70

Hrushevs’kyi and the state

Hrushevs’kyi’s return to Ukraine and his rehabilitation as the country’s foremost historian was celebrated at the official level in both 1991 and 1996. But on the latter occasion, on the 130th anniversary of his birth, Hrushevs’kyi was commemorated in widespread pomp and pageantry. He had surely ‘returned’.

On the occasion of the 130th anniversary of Hrushevs’kyi’s birth the state outlined plans to establish a museum in Kyiv,71 finish republishing his historical works,72 hold conferences and exhibitions, ensure his full coverage in the media, unveil a statue to him in Kyiv73 and provide 100 monthly stipends for students to research his legacy.
At that time, President Kravchuk, who unveiled a monument to Hrushevskyi in L’viv in Spring 1994, was also a member of the 1996 state commemorative committee. The official commemoration held in the National Opera House was attended by the parliamentary, governmental and presidential leaderships. The Deputy Chairman of the Security Service, Volodymyr Prystayko, co-edited a collection of documents entitled Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and the GPU-NKVS. A Tragic Decade, 1924–1934. A plaque for Hrushevskyi was unveiled at Kyiv University where he had studied between 1886 and 1894, after which he had to leave Tsarist-ruled Ukraine for the more liberal environment of Austrian-ruled L’viv. This plaque would enable students to see ‘the first president of Ukraine’.

The construction of new, and the revival of old, myths in Ukraine

New myths and ‘golden ages’

The search for ‘golden ages’ has occurred the world over in the quest for legitimacy, continuity, dignity and a shared destiny. If ‘golden ages’ do not exist they can be rediscovered, invented or borrowed. Historians become archaeologists in the quest for ‘golden ages’ and ancient traditions. In Mexico modern cultural nationalism has attempted to recover and re-appraise the pre-Columbian, Aztec past. Both Egypt and Zimbabwe have also attempted to locate ‘golden ages’ in their pasts. The unification and revival of nineteenth-century Italy referred back to the ‘golden age’ of the Roman Empire.

Wilson believes that ‘the modern Ukrainian state has a relative paucity of material with which to work’. He argues that because Ukraine’s regions never interacted with each other, it is difficult to imagine Ukrainian history as ‘either a temporal or a geographic continuum’. Wilson’s view that these problems are unique to Ukraine are though mistaken. Kappeler found that ‘Throughout the history of wide regions of Europe there were discontinuities in political boundaries, elites and high cultures.’ At one stage the same question ‘Does Ukraine Have a History?’ could have therefore also been asked of Italy, the Czech Republic, Finland and Germany. Ukraine did not have a history because since the last century European history has been written from the perspective of independent nation-states. As Ukraine possessed no nation-state and was largely viewed as ‘Russian’ by Western and Russian historians there could not be therefore a ‘Ukrainian history’.
In actual fact, the opposite is the case to that which Wilson argues. Ukraine has an abundance of resources from which to construct new myths, legends and historical ‘golden ages’. These include Kyiv Rus’, despite the difficulties, as Wilson rightly points out, of tracing modern national consciousness back to the medieval era. Ukraine is likely to propagate at least four ‘golden ages’—Kyiv Rus’, the medieval Galician-Volhynian Principality, the Hetmanate of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries and the independent governments of 1917–1921 (the Central Rada, the Hetmanate and the Directory). A new journal and series of books entitled Ukraïns’kyi Litopys has already began publication by focusing on these ‘golden ages’.

A central proponent of these new historical myths is the argument that Ukraine is an ‘ancient’ country; in fact, it is one of the ‘oldest nations in Europe’: ‘We are an ancient nation, our ancestors walked along these lands more than 6,000 years ago. These were the Trypillians, Goths, Scythians, Rus’, Cossacks, Ukrainians—these are all of us, this is all our history, a glorious history, a history which one cannot but be proud of.’ Historical justice demanded a Ukrainian state because of this. Such a myth has the added element of debunking the view of Russian and Soviet historiography that Ukraine is somehow Russia’s ‘younger brother’. A conference on Ukraine’s historic cities in December 1996 pointed out that the country had 500 cities which date back more than 300 years. The tracing back of Ukrainian statehood to Kyiv Rus’ therefore flips Soviet historiography and nationalities policies on its head. If Ukrainian statehood is traced back to Kyiv this ‘can be understood as meaning that we are going through our own “national revenge” where some are now saying that Ukrainians are the true ones who will play the role of the elder brother of the east Slavs.’

In the Ukrainian case one of the important aspects of the revolutionary changes to the myths of the Soviet era is the need to trace back Ukrainian ‘statehood’ to ancient times, something which Hrushevsky facilitates. Ukraine has a ‘long and glorious history’ through which it struggled under unfavourable conditions to achieve the goal of independence. History moved naturally towards, and culminated in, the August declaration of, and the December 1991 referendum on, independence. The establishment of a Ukrainian state in 1992 was a natural conclusion to other events because ‘Throughout many centuries the Ukrainian people strove to possess their own independent unified state.’

The fact that Ukrainian independence was achieved without loss of blood and therefore did not inherit martyrs was not necessarily a
drawback. Flot Ukraiinyi (30 November 1996), the newspaper of the Ukrainian navy, traced the struggle for independence, ‘through the blood and fatigue of thousands of Ukrainian patriots who gave up their lives for liberty’. The seeds of the 1991 Declaration of Independence are traced back to earlier struggles by the armies of the civil war period and the nationalist partisans of the 1940s. In the words of the Defence Minister, General Oleksandr Kuzmuk, speaking to his troops on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of independence: ‘Five years ago, after centuries of dreams and hopes and a selfless struggle by many generations of Ukrainian patriots our young state was born and has been gaining strength day by day.’

A common myth found in Ukrainian historiography is that they are the ‘victims of history’. Ukraine never enslaved any other nation or created exploitative classes. Frantiszek Palacky, the Czech historian, similarly portrayed the Czechs as a peaceful people oppressed by both the Germans and the Magyars. Another myth argues that Ukraine’s culture and philosophy has deep and powerful roots in democracy and state bearing traditions going back to the medieval state of Kyiv Rus’ and even proto-Slav times. These, in turn, were nourished and put into practice by the Cossacks. ‘The quintessential Ukrainian spirit is the Cossack-freedom loving individualist’, one Ukrainian author believed.

The right to a ‘national memory and spirit’ is the same right as human rights or freedom of conscience, President Kuchma believes. The Soviet ‘cosmopolitan ideology’ ruined Ukraine’s national, cultural and historical memory and it now needs to be revived to help in the inculcation of new democratic values and national consciousness. Kuchma has therefore accepted the argument advanced by his nationalist critics in 1994–1995 that political and economic reform without nation-state building is impossible. The new system of values and national idea which the state should propagate has to be based upon Ukraine’s ‘deep historical traditions’ going as far back as Kyiv Rus’. Ukraine’s President Kuchma has therefore made the link between democratic reform via Ukraine’s ‘return to Europe’, through the revival of historical memory and national consciousness that seeks to unify the territory of Ukraine into a new political community and national identity. This, in itself coming from someone who was tainted with the brush of ‘Little Russianism’ and ‘Eurasianism’ when elected in 1994, reflects the speed with which the transformation of consciousness and identity is taking place in Ukraine.
Black into white?

The search for legitimacy is the basis for the modern state. One of the sources for this legitimacy will be a new historiography. The writing of ‘national histories’ was always selective: ‘it was as important to forget things as to remember others’. Carr pointed to how it was difficult enough attempting to write objective histories in developed democracies. In the post-Soviet environment of Ukraine it is especially tempting to convert what was previously depicted in blackened terms as white by a largely debased profession of historians. In independent Ukraine it is almost as difficult to avoid mixing politics and history as it was during the Soviet era.

The dominant themes of the Soviet era (the building of socialism, close Ukrainian-Russian ties) have been replaced by the study of Ukraine’s struggle for self determination through the re-establishment of a unified historical memory. The growth of national consciousness will be ‘stimulated by attempts to frequently transfer myths into socio-political engineering’. This is because it is generally recognised, as the former Commander of the Ukrainian Navy Admiral Borys Kozlyn said, ‘that the nation is educated, developed on the basis of the historical spirit of the people’.

The wholesale switch to, and adoption of Hrushevs’kyi’s historiography since 1991, builds on a tradition among Soviet historians of believing in the one ‘true faith’. They can therefore relatively easily transfer their allegiances from the Soviet ‘historical truth’ to that of Hrushevs’kyi. The rewriting of history is therefore likely to be selective. The focus of the history of post-Soviet Ukraine is to legitimise the independent state by searching back in history for a long line of struggle that culminated in the events of 1991–1992. It is therefore probably the case that only those historical figures and events which fall within these newly defined parameters will be acceptable as worthy of study. Hrushevs’kyi, although idolised in contemporary Ukraine, is nevertheless at times therefore criticised for having first propagated federal ties to Russia as did Mykhailo Drahomaniv, the late nineteenth-century political activist and writer. It was only after the Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine that Hrushevs’kyi’s federalism was ditched: ‘[at that time] his main slogans became samostijnist [self determination] and nezalezhnist [Independence]’, former Deputy Prime Minister, Zhulyns’kyi, pointed out.

To be worthy of study historical events and figures need to fulfil three criteria. First, they should have supported Ukrainian independence, or at the least, confederation. Second, Ukrainian
Historians, perhaps understandably, are likely to focus upon tragic events and on those areas which were banned during the Soviet era. Third, the elevation of events and personalities should work towards the consolidation and unity of the Ukrainian peoples at a time of nation building. President Kuchma told the second congress of Ukrainian writers that ‘Ukraine especially needs an understanding towards our historical past which should bring us together—not disunite us.’ Therefore, Kuchma argued in favour of not painting the Soviet era completely black. There was a need to look for both positive and negative factors in the legacies of the UNR and the Ukrainian SSR so that Ukraine could ‘in the past have one history and in the future one [national] idea’, as Kuchma instructed the country’s intelligentsia.

But there are evident dangers in this philosophy. Former President Kravchuk warned his parliament that ‘It would be a mistake if when we raise [new] heroes it becomes necessary to condemn others.’ Kravchuk does not seem to see the contradiction in arguing for this when he still openly backs Ukraine’s sole title to Kyiv Rus’ history. President Kuchma has also himself warned on separate occasions about the growing trend of glorifying Ukrainian history: ‘it seems to me that some politicians are exaggerating the role of the Ukrainian people in all the epoch-making events which have taken place on our Ukrainian land. I think this stereotype should be rejected.’ The Director of the Department of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Myroslaw Popovych, while understanding the need for new myths to sustain Ukraine’s independent state, lamented that ‘Nothing, except for problems, can be brought by a mythological rethinking of the past.’ Nevertheless, Kuchma, consciously or not, is himself supporting the creation and elaboration of new myths and symbols.

The Ukrainian radical left, who stand to lose the most from the rewriting of Ukrainian history, are understandably not too happy with these developments since 1992. Often their criticisms largely echo those made by Russian politicians and historians. Ukraine’s new national history, according to Pyotr Symonenko, leader of the KPU, is a ‘falsification’, it spreads ‘national-chauvinism’ and is ‘Russophobic’. Oleksandr Moroz, Chairman of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and Parliamentary Speaker (1994–1998), criticised the framing of Ukraine’s history from Kyiv Rus’ to the present as a continuous struggle for national liberation.

These critical views are, however, unlikely to halt the use and abuse of history as a tool of Ukrainian state and nation building.
The Ukrainian leadership faces a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, Hrushevs’kyi’s schema, as evidenced by the official commemorations held in 1996 in honour of the anniversary of his birth, is indispensable to post-Soviet Ukrainian state and nation building. This is particularly with regard to the separating out of a Ukrainian identity from the pan-Slavic or Little Russian identity inherited by a proportion of Ukraine’s population. After all, Hrushevs’kyi’s contribution to Ukrainian history ‘laid the foundations for the process of transferring the non-historical ethnographic mass into a historical Ukrainian nation’.114

On the other hand, the Russian Federation probably has no option but to return to the pre-1917 Tsarist Russian state as the source for its state building policies (the 1917 Provisional government was too briefly in power to accomplish this role). Remnick fails to see any negative conclusions stemming from the Russian Federation reverting to its Tsarist roots. In his eyes it is merely ‘an attempt to reconnect Russians to their own history and the notion of national development that was shattered with the Bolshevik coup of 1917’.115

Yet the adoption of the Tsarist tricolour and double-headed eagle by the Russian Federation has two strategic ramifications. First, it amounts to an acceptance of the ‘loss’ of Kyiv Rus’ history to Ukraine. Second, Muscovite history has also been rejected in favour of Tsarist imperial history because only through the latter can the contemporary Russian Federation claim its ‘Great Power’ status. Ukraine may welcome the fact that Russia has resigned itself to Ukraine’s possession of Kyiv Rus’ history. But, at the same time, Muscovy only became the Russian empire after the Treaty of Periaslav with Ukraine in 1654. Could the Russian empire or the Russian Federation still be a ‘Great Power’ without the incorporation of Ukraine into some new union, in a manner similar to Belarus?

Hrushevs’kyi’s negative views about Tsarist rule were similar to those of Soviet historians (Russian and Ukrainian) with whom he worked in the 1920s. Karl Marx described Tsarist Russia, after all, as a ‘prison-house of nations’. It is therefore probably impossible for Hrushevs’kyi’s schema to be adopted in Ukraine without harming relations with Russia. Nation and state building involves two processes—the creation of a unified political community and identity, together with external differentiation from foreign ‘Others’. The adoption of Hrushevs’kyi’s schema will inevitably lead to Ukraine’s external differentiation from Russia, to a parting of the ways that will be resisted by both the majority of Russian opinion and by the
elder generation of those who inherited multiple loyalties in eastern and southern Ukraine.

Yet, the external differentiation that will come about as a result of the introduction of Hrushevs’kyi’s schema may actually produce one positive result. Perhaps by being forced to concentrate on only Muscovite and Russian history Russian historians may be able to come to reject empire restoring in favour of state and nation building within the confines of the Russian Federation. With an independent Ukraine that is externally divergent from the Periaslav Treaty of 1654, it would be difficult for the Russian Federation again to become either an empire (or even maintain its status as a ‘Great Power’). Similarly, it would be difficult to see how Britain could remain ‘Great’ without Scotland, brought together as the United Kingdom through the Act of Union of 1707.

National symbols

Symbols and nation building

Are symbols important for nation building? The answer to this question was given by a Ukrainian author who simply wrote that ‘Well symbols—they are the code of the nation.’ Motyl has pointed out that the elaboration of national rites, customs and symbols, the public displays of national solidarity through a new national elite and mythology and the endorsement of national symbols are all closely interconnected issues. The process surrounding the redefinition of national symbols includes:

- the revival of flags and anthems;
- the renaming of cities and streets;
- the purposeful downplaying of the symbols of the ancien régime;
- the removal of monuments of the ancien régime;
- the return of symbols from the pre-communist era;
- the renaming of buildings, streets and museums;
- the construction of monuments to new national heroes.

The process of reforming people’s psychology in order to debunk the symbols of the ancien régime and replace them with new symbols is an ongoing medium-term process. One military officer complained: ‘After three years of independence we have not learnt to respect and relate in a proper manner to the symbols of our state.’ President Kuchma, who is himself now described by his
aides as the ‘symbol of the nation’ and ‘its highest judge’, also cautioned:

Let each and every one of us finally understand that true statehood is not just symbols, borders and other attributes, although these are also necessary and compulsory. True statehood is impossible without a stable, developed economy and social well being and without a worthy life for citizens.

Kuchma was indirectly criticising the neglect of economic questions and the preoccupation, in his view, with national symbols under his predecessor, Kravchuk. While Kuchma has presided over an expansion of the introduction and the use of national symbols in Ukraine he has not neglected either to prioritise economic issues as well. Kuchma has therefore kept to his election manifesto that the promotion of strong statehood is only possible as part of an attempt to create a strong economy.

The struggle over symbols

Demands for the introduction of Ukraine’s pre-communist era symbols began to be raised at the same time as other demands were raised on national issues in the late Gorbachev era. The Soviet regime had attempted, as it had in the realm of historiography, to eradicate Ukraine’s national symbols. Within eastern and southern Ukraine the memory of Ukraine’s pre-communist symbols had therefore been largely lost.

In 1989 Ukraine’s national symbols were first raised in western Ukraine, they then spread to Kyiv and then slowly to the remainder of the country. The KPU was so alarmed at the spread of these symbols that it launched a propaganda campaign which argued that they had never been true all-Ukrainian symbols, but only those of western Ukrainians, of nationalist ‘war criminals’ and those forces defeated by the Bolsheviks during the 1917–1920 struggle for independence. At an 80,000-strong rally in L’viv in August 1989 a resolution therefore demanded ‘an end to the obscene attack by the mass media and officialdom on that which is sacred to the Ukrainian people—the national flag’.

It proved difficult to halt the spread of the popularity of, and public interest in, these symbols because they were directly linked to the revival of Ukrainian national historiography and the growth of
new myths about past ‘golden ages’. These symbols directly linked
the Ukrainian people to their ancestors, reaffirming interest in
Ukrainian history, its roots and traditions. Such pre-communist
symbols were also important because, along with ballads, they
were the only things Ukraine had to offer its population apart from
Siberian grave mounds, as one young Ukrainian poet lamented.

The propaganda campaign by the KPU therefore largely backfired.
As many commentators during the late Gorbachev era pointed out,
the red flag had a far greater and growing association with bloodshed
than the blue and yellow. The growth of publications, first in samizdat
between 1987 and 1990, and then in the official press after
1990–1991, which dealt with the ‘blank spots’ in Ukrainian history
undermined the campaign against national symbols and consequently
even the legitimacy of communist rule. The increase in public
alienation from the Soviet regime in the late Gorbachev era led to a
commensurate drop in public identification with the symbols of the
Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR. Perestroika, hlasnost and
national revival became directly associated with Ukraine’s pre-
communist symbols. The more people were banned from wearing or
carrying them—the greater became their popularity. The entire
spectrum of anti-establishment groups ranging from former dissidents
to the literati, reform communists, hippies and punks began to
deliberately wear them as a sign that they no longer associated
themselves with the Soviet regime.

Attempts to link the flag of the Ukrainian SSR (blue and red) to
the revival of Soviet power in Ukraine also failed. Nevertheless,
ot all shades of non-communist opinion in Ukraine welcomed the
return of national symbols. At the September 1989 Rukh congress
the Donbas Strike Committee threatened to leave the hall if national
symbols were not removed from its walls. The Donbas, which is
overwhelmingly Russian-speaking, had largely internalised Soviet
nationality and Communist Party policy linking these national
symbols to those of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
(OUN). Rukh therefore decided that although these symbols would
remain national they were not compulsory for Rukh supporters.
Veterans groups also continued to remain vociferous in their
hostility to these national symbols.

Nevertheless, between 1989 and 1990 public pressure had
succeeded in forcing the state to concede the defeat of Soviet and
Soviet Ukrainian symbols. The first decision to be made though
was, which national symbols should be chosen? One survey of
public opinion called for the incorporation of Cossack crimson into
the blue and yellow flag (something half-heartedly supported by Kuchma himself during the 1994 elections). This would have had two advantages: first, it would have united the blue and yellow traditions of western-central Ukraine with those of the Cossack crimson of eastern Ukraine. Second, it would have reduced opposition from moderates in the anti-nationalist camp who could identify with the crimson and blue colours in the flag as being similar to the blue and red of the Ukrainian SSR flag.

Even within the nationalist community there was at first no consensus as to which national symbols to adopt. Cossack revivalist groups began to adopt a flag with a golden cross on a crimson background. During the 1917–1920 struggle for independence some armed forces had used both the blue and yellow and red flags (for example, the Red Galician Army), while Hrushevs’kyi had proposed a yellow plough imposed upon a blue background. During the 1940s the Bandera wing of the OUN had its own revolutionary black and red party flag representing blood on Ukraine’s black-earth soil. Its opponent, the Melnyk wing of the OUN, meanwhile used a trident (tryzub) imposed on a blue and yellow background.

In the late 1980s Kravchuk, secretary of the Department of Ideology of the KPU and head of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine’s Commission on Patriotic and Internationalist Education, was initially hostile to the introduction of national symbols. He complained that those groups which had chosen as their symbol the blue and yellow flag, ‘proclaim clearly that they are for separation from the Soviet Union’. He was right. These national symbols, in Kravchuk’s eyes, had been used by ‘counter-revolutionary and anti-popular forces’ who, ‘emerged in a less favourable light in the years of the Great Patriotic War when their wearers collaborated with the Nazis’.

Kravchuk’s call in 1989 to ‘inculcate in people deep respect for the USSR’s colours and coat of arms’ was by that stage whistling in the wind. A year later he had become Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, a position he used to demand the reconstitution of the USSR into a confederation of sovereign states (a demand raised by Ukraine’s national communists in the 1920s). After the failed putsch of August 1991 Kravchuk transferred this demand into full independence. This period of Kravchuk’s evolution from Communist Party ideologue to derzhavnyk coincided with the great surge in public interest in Ukraine’s pre-Soviet symbols.

On the eve of the 24 August 1991 declaration of independence Kravchuk himself launched a competition for a new flag, state
symbol and national hymn. By that stage he had realised that no amount of ‘internationalist education’ would revive the symbols of the Soviet Union or Ukrainian SSR. As a member of a confederation, or as an independent state, Ukraine therefore needed new symbols. But Kravchuk remained concerned that ‘These symbols should satisfy everyone—those who live in the west, south and in the north. This is understandable. In the east they don’t think like those, for example, in the west.’ Consequently, Ukraine’s new symbols should unite Ukraine’s population in order ‘that all regions are satisfied’. Demands by conservative members of the pre-August 1991 KPU for a referendum on Ukraine’s new symbols were rejected by the ‘Historical Traditions of Ukrainian National Symbols’ conference devoted to this question, which was held in L’viv in June 1991. ‘In no country of the world is the question of symbols decided through the path of referendum’, they argued. Undoubtedly, what they feared most of all was that, at that stage, they might lose just such a referendum (President Alyaksandr Lukashenka abolished his country’s national symbols in a May 1995 referendum in favour of a return to neo-Soviet ones).

**The endorsement of national symbols**

In the post-Soviet era only the KPU has maintained its pre-1991 hostility to Ukraine’s national symbols. It has therefore continued to argue that Ukraine’s national symbols are linked to nationalist collaborators with the Nazis during the 1940s. Although, as then President Kravchuk admitted, there was still ‘no uniform perception of them today in various regions of Ukraine’, nevertheless, the KPU is fighting a losing battle. In a December 1994 opinion poll public support for a return to the Soviet past was shown to be insignificant:

- Soviet power (7.1 per cent);
- Soviet symbols (3.2 per cent);
- leading role of the Communist Party (2.8 per cent).

In other words, some of Ukraine’s population rejected a return to Soviet symbols and the regime associated with it, while still remaining unsure and in a state of identity transition. This could mean that the majority of Ukraine’s population would, given time, support these national symbols. This would be helped by the fact that the bulk of the supporters of the KPU are to be found among
the older generation; particularly, as mentioned earlier, veterans groups, who would remain entrenched in their hostility to Ukraine’s national symbols. These problems though, were not peculiar to Ukraine. In the Russian Federation communists also preferred the red to the new Russian national flag. In April 1997 they proposed a draft law to the State Duma which would have re-instituted the Soviet flag and anthem (minus its lyrics). Although this gained high levels of support (239 in favour with only ninety against) it was not adopted because it did not gain the required two-thirds constitutional majority.

Between August 1991 and January 1992 the flags of the Ukrainian SSR and the national flag were flown side by side. On 28 January 1992 a parliamentary resolution to introduce the blue and yellow flag, the trident and the national anthem was approved by a large majority. A separate decree of the Parliamentary Presidium thirteen days earlier had annulled the Soviet Ukrainian hymn and introduced the national one. The trident was introduced after heated parliamentary debates on 19 February 1992 and described as the ‘Small Symbol of Ukraine’. The ‘Small Symbol of Ukraine’ would henceforth be used on state stamps, currency, by the post office, in identification cards and on official letterheads. Five years later a presidential decree called for the creation of a new ‘Great Symbol of Ukraine’ to raise the prestige of the state authorities.

Seventy-two deputies voted against the trident, although this proved too small a number to halt its adoption by a parliamentary majority. Of the seventy-two deputies seventy represented the minority conservative remnants of the pre-August 1991 KPU, including former KPU leader Stanislav Hurenko. There was little ethnic complexion to the negative vote against the trident as Ukraine’s state symbol. Of these seventy-two deputies 37.5 per cent (twenty-seven) were Russian, which is higher than their population share of 22 per cent, and another forty four were Ukrainian. Of these seventy-two deputies 70.8 per cent hailed from eastern and southern Ukraine (including sixteen and eight from the Donbas and the Crimea respectively). Again we have the close connection between the communists, the Crimea and Donbas as the three elements where we find those most critical of the Ukrainian state and nation building project.

These state symbols remained in force by virtue of parliamentary majorities until their inclusion in Article 20 of the June 1996 constitution. For the first time in post-Soviet Ukraine their legitimacy remains beyond doubt because they now possess
constitutional force. On 3 September 1996 a parliamentary resolution ‘On State Symbols of Ukraine’ introduced a competition for new designs for the trident which would incorporate the symbols of the Zaporozhzhian Cossacks. By January 1997 the committee established under First Deputy Prime Minister Vasyl Durdynets to look into this question announced that they had received 420 new designs for the trident. Of the ten best, one would be chosen which would most unite the traditions and symbols of Kyiv Rus’ and the Cossacks, again linking historical myths to contemporary Ukraine’s national symbols. Of the 784 proposals for a new national hymn all were rejected and it was decided to maintain the old one for the immediate future.

**Historical myths and symbols**

The flag, hymn and trident chosen to become Ukraine’s new national symbols were not randomly chosen but encapsulated two criteria. First, they were endowed with special properties. ‘In the blue-yellow flag of Ukraine is impregnated the age-old striving towards liberty, peace and good fortune’, a Zaporizhzhia-based author wrote. Second, they linked independent Ukraine to its past and therefore served to buttress parallel developments in historiography. The trident, for example, was described as a 2,500-year-old symbol geographically linking contemporary Ukraine with its southern regions and the Crimea, as well as historically to Kyiv Rus’ and earlier eras. In the June 1996 constitution the trident is described as the ‘Princely sign of Volodymyr the Great’. This was a compromise, as the parliamentary left remained hostile to the description of this symbol as the trident (tryzub), which was denounced in the Soviet era as a nationalist symbol. But in demanding this compromise the left unwittingly merely reinforced Ukraine’s link to Kyiv Rus’. As a Ukrainian author argued, the inclusion of the trident within the new constitution ‘emphasised the connection of these links of the Ukrainian historical process within the context of ethno-political, cultural and territorial ties of contemporary Ukraine with Kyiv Rus’.

The VIIIth Great Council of Ukrainian Cossacks also called upon the authorities to change the title of head of state from President to Hetman, in an attempt to bring to its logical conclusion the growing glorification of the Cossack era. Kuchma himself had encouraged this by issuing a presidential decree supporting the revival of
Ukrainian Cossacks—as opposed to Cossacks in Ukraine (which might have included pro-Russian Cossacks in the Crimea and the Donbas). While willing to be photographed holding the Hetman’s bulava (staff) Kravchuk had been unwilling to bring into force just such a decree. The Hetmanate of 1918 under Pavlo Skoropadskyi has been rehabilitated as a new ‘golden age’ with the active support of both Kravchuk and Kuchma.

Ukrainian authors also pointed out that the blue and yellow flag, which represented the sky and Ukraine’s wheat fields respectively, was used by some Cossacks as well as during the 1848 Galician and the 1905 Russian revolutions. But, more importantly, it was officially adopted by the West Ukrainian People’s Republic and the UNR, the latter under the Presidency of Hrushevs’kyi in 1917–1918. Calls for the revival of Ukraine’s naval flag would also link the current navy to that of the navy of the UNR.

Anniversaries

While creating new national holidays to fit Ukraine’s new pantheon of myths and symbols many of the anniversaries of the ancien régime still remain in place. Only 126 deputies voted to abolish the annual holiday on 7 November, the anniversary of ‘the ‘infamous for our country October coup d’état in a neighbouring state’. It was argued that any cancellation of Soviet-era public holidays would both complicate labour legislation and upset people who were used to taking many Soviet-style praznyki (or sviaty). ‘It’s illogical, it’s not normal, but people today approach such issues very pragmatically. It’s just another day off to work in the garden’, one official explained. In the Russian Federation attempts to abolish the 7 November holiday were also met with opposition. A presidential decree therefore got around this problem by redesignating it as a different anniversary. In Ukraine there have been calls by women’s civic groups to abolish the 6 March International Women’s Day anniversary as a communist legacy. But this is unlikely. President Kuchma described it as ‘a holiday of spring, youth and love’.

The main anniversaries celebrated by the Ukrainian state are the 24 August 1991 declaration of independence and the 1 December 1991 referendum on independence. Ukraine’s two other declarations of independence are not officially commemorated by the state. Commemoration of the 22 January 1918 declaration of independence by the UNR is still largely restricted to national democrats, although its significance has been being accepted by
Ukraine’s ruling elites. The 30 June 1941 declaration of independence in L’viv will only ever be celebrated by the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the ideological heirs to the Bandera wing of the OUN. Whereas commemoration of the latter act is likely to remain anathema in official eyes the former (22 January 1918) has already been rehabilitated. Kravchuk had accepted the transfer of the legitimacy of the exiled UNR to the independent state in August 1992, a symbolic act reminiscent of the Polish transfer of legitimacy from its government in exile. Following his predecessor’s lead, and in a clear allusion to the mid-seventeenth century and the 1917–1920 struggle for independence, Kuchma described the August 1991 declaration of independence as Ukraine’s ‘third attempt at revival as an independent European state’.155

**Stamps and currency**156

The introduction of national stamps and a national currency (the hryvnia) in 1992 and 1996 respectively has played an important role in linking state symbols to Ukrainian history. On 1 March 1992 Ukrainian national stamps made their reappearance (the last time they had appeared was in 1918–1920 under the UNR). These stamps commemorated the new myths and symbols which had now come into vogue—Cossacks, Hrushevs’kyi and other historical figures.157

The introduction of the new currency represented the greatest confirmation of the link between state symbols, nation building and Ukraine’s history. As President Kuchma explained: ‘The world over, the national currency is an integral attribute of the state, just like the flag, the coat of arms and the anthem. Our hryvnia must become such a symbol.’158

The hryvnia linked post-Soviet Ukraine to both the UNR and, maybe more importantly, to Kyiv Rus’. It includes portraits of Hrushevskyi, Kyiv Rus’ figures and even Ivan Mazepa, the eighteenth century Hetman who led an unsuccessful revolt against Russia. The new currency says that ‘we Ukrainians, as a nation state, are not five years old but at least 1,000 years old’.159 The UNR had also begun by using the karbovanets ersatz currency, like Ukraine during 1992–1995. The hryvnia had been introduced in March 1918 after it had been printed in Berlin. With the takeover by the Soviets the hryvnia was banned for seven decades.160 As one author warned: ‘Let’s hope that its circulation will not, over time, become too wide. Enough inflation!’161—an allusion to the destruction of the value of the karbovanets by hyper-inflation in 1993.
Medals

Under President Kuchma the introduction of new medals has developed into another means of state and nation building, in two ways. First, it again links the Ukrainian state to the revived past. Second, it utilises the inbuilt respect for medals with which Soviet citizens were indoctrinated under the former communist regime. Under Kravchuk, who, of the two post-Soviet Ukrainian presidents, is usually perceived as being the more interested in national symbols, only one medal was created (another twenty-nine non-communist medals were inherited from the former USSR). Under Kuchma the creation of a new system of medals and state rewards began in April 1995 and has developed into a wide-ranging campaign.

Why are such medals important? The former head of the Presidential Administration, Dmytro Tabachnyk, was also the head of the Committee on State Rewards attached to the presidency (created by presidential decree in December 1994). Tabachnyk argued that ‘At every phase of history the commemorative politics of the state should reflect its political and social structure, the priorities of its development and serve the high ideals of strength, sovereignty and the independent state.’ Tabachnyk and President Kuchma clearly regarded the new systems of rewards and medals as important components of state and nation building: ‘Rewards are needed. They are a symbol of our statehood. They can be found among the main symbols of independent Ukraine—such as the flag, the emblem, the hymn.’ Tabachnyk went on to publish a three-volume history of Ukrainian medals which aimed to show that they had not been conjured out of thin air—but had, in fact, a long history in Ukraine.

These new medals deliberately played on the new historical myths and heroes pursued in Ukrainian national historiography. The order of Prince Iaroslav Mudry (a Kyivan Rus’ Prince) was aimed at those with outstanding service to state building. A medal of Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi is to be awarded to citizens for their special service in defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the strengthening of its defensive capacity and security. New medals geared towards the armed forces were also introduced for service to the nation and the state. As the Director of Ukrainian Studies at Kyiv State University explained: ‘[T]hese symbols revive in themselves historical memory—a sacred intellectual spirit, feelings of personal links to the great activities of our ancestors, the leaders and the genesis of our people’.
Monuments and landscapes

Like Russian and English literature and art, Ukrainian culture often evokes the countryside and landscapes as national symbols. Volodymyr Sosiura’s 1944 poem ‘Love Ukraine’, Oleksandr Dovzhenko’s landscape imagery of love, endurance and death in his films and Oles Honchar’s well known novel Sобor (The Cathedral) all tapped into a deeply held Ukrainian connection to the land and an idealised pre-Soviet past. Honchar’s Sобor associated Soviet modernisation with the destruction of Ukraine’s culture and language. Ukraine’s top leaders attended his funeral in 1995.

The growth of interest in Ukraine’s past can be seen by the growth of museums, up from 202 in 1991 to 272 in 1995.170 Launched in 1992 the journal of the Ukrainian Parliament—Viche—symbolically linked it to Kyiv Rus’ (a віче was a council in Kyiv Rus’). The well known historical journal Кieвская Старина, published in Russian between 1882 and 1907, was revived as the Ukrainian-language Київська Старовина in 1992. As interest grew in buildings linked to Ukrainian history those associated with the Тsarist regime were left to decline.171 In contrast, the Палац Україна and the National Philharmonic Hall in Kyiv were both given major and expensive overhauls in 1995 and 1996. The latter was built in 1882, but had been closed after a fire in 1988. It was officially reopened on the fifth anniversary of Ukraine’s independence referendum in December 1996.

In December 1995 a State Committee was created for the ‘Preservation of Important Monuments of History and Culture’. It aimed to ensure ‘the revival of the spirituality of the Ukrainian people’.172 The 1996–1997 government programme on culture included the erection of new monuments in Kyiv to the Kyivan Rus’ Prince Mudry (erected in May 1997)173 and to Hrushevs’kyi. The National Academy of Law in Kharkiv was renamed after Prince Mudry by a presidential decree.174 The Ministry of Culture established a museum on its campus dedicated to the Kyivan Rus’ Prince Mudry. The reclaiming of Ukraine’s historical link to Kyiv Rus’ could also be seen in the unveiling of monuments in Kyiv to Princess Оlha and Saints Cyril and Methodius, a monument which had existed prior to 1917. Іvan Drach, the well known writer and head of the Congress of Ukrainian Intelligentsia, openly proclaimed that ‘This is our monument as the inheritors of Kyiv Rus’.175 A large monument to Ukrainian independence is also to be unveiled in central Kyiv on the same spot where Kyiv’s main statue to Vladimir Lenin had stood until 1991, symbolically representing the
victory of independence over communist rule. This method of symbolising the victory of one regime over another has a long history in Europe—mosques and churches had long been converted back and forth by successive Muslim and Christian rulers.

A monument to Hetman Mazepa is to be erected in his home village near the town of Bila Tserkva. The former Cossack encampment on the island of Khortytsia, Zaporizhzhia, is also to be upgraded to an ethnographic and historical theme park, something that was originally planned in the 1960s but which was halted after the removal of national communist KPU leader Petro Shelest in 1971.176

But the return to pre-Soviet historical roots is not always problem free. There are fewer problems, if any, within Ukraine over the question of the legacy of Kyiv Rus’—the problem remains more at the inter-state level between Ukraine and Russia. In an address over Radio Rossii (21 November 1997) President Yeltsin complained that a ‘common history’ and ‘cultural legacy’ was now being divided between Russia and Ukraine. This meant that ‘We are still deciding whether Iaroslav Mudryi was a great Russian or a great Ukrainian statesman.’ Both Ukrainians and Russians within Ukraine will support the nationalisation of Kyiv Rus’ history by Ukraine as long as Ukraine continues to pursue an inclusive nationality policy.

Dealing with the Cossack era the problem of returning to a historical past becomes more problematical. The Soviet regime never removed the statue to Hetman Khmel’nyts’kyi erected under Tsar Alexander III in the late nineteenth century. The statue, which still stands in Kyiv, shows the Hetman pointing his arm to Moscow and therefore could be used by both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes to promote the alleged ‘unification’ of Ukraine and Russia in the 1654 Treaty of Periaslav.

In Donetsk plans to erect a statue to its nineteenth-century Welsh founder, John Hughes, have been condemned by Ukrainian authors. Donetsk, they point out, was the site, prior to the creation of the modern city, of the Cossack settlement of Oleksandrivka. Similarly, it is argued, Mariupol was not founded by Greek émigrés but was originally a Cossack fort named Domakh and later Pavlovskyi. In other words, Ukrainian authors are claiming earlier title to the territory of the Donbas than the industrial cities built by the Tsarist regime in the nineteenth century. Moves to put up a monument to the founders of modern cities in the Donbas are blamed on the radical left. They are accused of hostility to independent statehood and of being prepared to ‘put up a monument to the devil himself, were he only to claim that the Donbas consisted of nothing but wild steppes instead of Ukraine’.177
In Odesa its streets have been given their pre-Soviet names again and the city has regained its historical city symbol. Few complained about the removal of Soviet symbols (including 104 Lenin statues). But the decision to rebuild the statue to Tsarina Catherine provoked a storm of indignation. Tsarina Catherine is negatively perceived in Ukrainian history for having ordered the destruction of the autonomous Zaporozhzhian Cossack state in the late eighteenth century which was ‘a unique for its time democratic system, of high culture and free Cossackhood’. In any event, most cities in southern Ukraine, including Odesa (and Sevastopol), according to the same Ukrainian author, were built by Ukrainian Cossacks and serfs. In place of the monument to Tsarina Catherine the Soviet regime had erected a monument to sailors who had joined the 1905 revolution. Those opposed to returning the Catherine monument from its museum home argued that this would be too expensive, while, at the same time, insulting to the rebel sailors of 1905, who had been mainly ethnic Ukrainians.

Conclusions

It was inevitable that the independent Ukrainian state would quickly reject the historiography of the Tsarist era that had been propagated in the former USSR since 1934. If Ukraine had wanted to maintain itself as a Russian quasi-state, like Belarus under Lukashenka, it would have kept this historiography in place. But the newly independent Ukrainian state needed, like other states, the revival of old and the creation of new historical myths and ‘golden ages’ to provide depth, breadth, continuity and legitimacy for Ukrainian statehood. These revived and new myths coupled with a new national history based upon the Hrushevs’kyi schema would serve to integrate a heterogeneous society, provide ‘evidence’ pointing to the ‘age-old’ strivings of Ukrainians for a state of their own and show how they possessed a separate, ‘glorious’ and older history from Russia’s. All of these factors were important in the inculcation of a new national identity and the forging of a Ukrainian political community. History was not only important in framing attitudes to the past, President Kuchma believed. ‘History continues in the present and has an impact on forming the future’, he argued. If Ukraine was to be a future independent state it therefore required a separate past history that gave sustenance to its national identity and political community.
10

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The following conclusions can only hope to outline some of the many key points raised within this book. Chapter 1 pointed to the difficulties political scientists still have in defining concepts such as ‘ethnic’ and ‘nations’. In lieu of better definitions this study has used these concepts to describe different stages of nation building. The use of the term ‘nation’ remains open to confusion and differing interpretations. Is there a ‘British nation’ or is Great Britain composed of four ‘nations’? Both definitions are commonly used. Indeed, on the basis of some looser definitions of ‘nations’ Ukraine could already be classified as a ‘nation’. For example, Indonesia, probably the most heterogeneous country in the world, is described by respected publications as a ‘nation’.

I have argued that the transition from ethnic to nation was only allowed to happen by external ruling powers in Austria-ruled western Ukraine. In eastern Ukraine, except for a brief interlude during the struggle for Ukrainian independence in 1917–1920 and the Ukrainianisation campaign of the 1920s, the Ukrainian ethnic was not permitted to evolve into a modern nation. In other words, if all of Ukraine had been ruled by the Hapsburgs a Ukrainian ethnic nation would have existed by 1918, a fact which would undoubtedly have meant greater success in creating an independent state at that time. The bulk of the elements which go to make up a separate Ukrainian ethnic, Saunders found, were in existence in eastern Ukraine by the late nineteenth century. It was only Tsarist policies, in contrast to Austrian, which prevented the transition from ethnic to nation in eastern Ukraine.

This though, was not to be. From the 1860s to 1916 and between the 1930s and the 1980s the Tsarist and Soviet regimes respectively pursued policies of Russification and Little Russianisation through nationality policies and historiography.
Moscow’s support for Little Russianism was identical to Hungarian policies prior to 1918 for preventing the transition from rusyn/ Ruthenians to Ukrainians in Trans-Carpathia, and Polish policies in western Ukraine during the inter-war period which had deliberately stressed local (Hutsul, Lemko, Boyko)—in contrast to national—identities. But the Hungarians and Poles, unlike the Soviets, never possessed the totalitarian machinery or time frame within which to purse their objectives. In 1992 the independent Ukrainian state therefore inherited a mêlée of different regions, a disunited political community, strong local attachments and allegiances to defunct states (the former USSR) or mythical pan-eastern Slavic unions.

Was Ukraine alone within the former Soviet Union in the legacies it inherited? Indeed, did the problems encountered by Ukraine resemble those found in other European and North American states during earlier periods of history?

The answer to both these questions is ‘no’ and ‘yes’ respectively. There are many similarities to be found between the Ukrainian state and nation building project and that undertaken, and still being undertaken, elsewhere. Austria, Italy and Spain all began nation building in earnest only after the Second World War. Austria’s confused national identity and ‘Little Germanism’ resembled Ukraine’s ‘Little Russianism’, with both attempting to free themselves from the embrace of their respective ‘big brothers’. English and British nationality policies in Wales, Scotland and Ireland closely resembled those pursued by Tsarist Russia and the former USSR in Ukraine. There are uncanny resemblances between Scotland and Ukraine as the ‘younger brothers’ of the British and Soviet empires respectively. There are also strong similarities between the debates which raged within inter-war Ireland and contemporary Ukraine about the extent to which the legacies of colonialism should be erased and forgotten. The Anglo-Irish, the French colonial settlers in Algeria and the Little Russians of Ukraine are all products of imperial policies which created a class of people divided in their cultural allegiances.

The creation of new elites would inevitably be the priority of any independent state. During the early transition period elements of the old and new always coexisted side by side. In contrast to 1917, Ukraine inherited some elites from the quasi-Ukrainian SSR state. These, coupled with the former dissident counter elites and New Ukrainian entrepreneurs, would go to make up the Ukrainian ruling elites of the independent state. The former Soviet Ukrainian elites required time to evolve away from their inherited stereotypes; this
was clearly seen in the personal evolution of Ukraine’s two presidential Leonids (Kravchuk and Kuchma). This evolution is already creating a natural alliance of cultural, political and economic entrepreneurs in defence of their domestic interests from ‘Others’, a process which will form the bedrock of the emerging civic nation.

No newly independent state or regime comes into being with a clean slate. Ukraine was not unique therefore in inheriting a Party of Power. In Latin America and the South African Republic new regimes had to compromise with the ancien régime (even those with a bloody record) in return for a stable transition. In Ukraine, as in South Africa, this transition inevitably prioritised stability, unity and consensus politics over reform, which would have damaged the interests of the old guard. In Ukraine the national democrats were insufficiently powerful to come to power or propel Ukraine to independence because the national idea was weak in large parts of the country. They therefore formed a natural alliance with the national communists in opposition to Moscow’s continued diktat. This may have been advantageous in the short run in providing Ukraine with stability and a smooth transition from the old to the new regime, something Kravchuk was particularly good at managing. But it also had its negative downside as well. The lateness of Ukraine’s reform programme and new constitution, the slow emergence of civil society and high corruption could partly be blamed upon the lack of opposition to the Party of Power’s insatiable appetite.

This book has argued that the transition from totalitarianism and a command administrative system to that of a democracy and a market economy respectively would not be successful without the creation of a new system of values. These new values, ideas and morals could only function within a defined and united political community. Economic unity and the creation of a national economy were also constituent parts of this new Ukrainian political community.

Ukraine in the period 1917–1920 was not clearly defined and its borders were nearly all contested. The newly independent state, though, had faced a more auspicious start. The clearly defined borders of the Ukrainian SSR were bequeathed to its successor, independent Ukraine. By June 1997 all of its neighbours had finally legally recognised these borders. Domestic support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity had never been in doubt because separatism had always been largely a myth promoted by outside scholars, politicians and journalists who confused three factors. First, that ‘Russian
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speakers’ would naturally wish to secede to neighbouring Russia which they allegedly regarded as their ‘homeland’.

Second, that Russians and Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine possessed developed, modern national identities through clearly demarcated ethnic groups. Third, that regionalism represented ‘creeping separatism’.

As neither of these three factors were correct conclusions it is perhaps not surprising that evidence of separatism, apart from in the Crimea for a brief period of four years (1992–1995), proved difficult to locate. This was also perhaps not surprising because no single political party, from Ukraine’s forty or so registered parties, supported separatism. Support for federalism, which had also been touted by some outside scholars as popular in eastern Ukraine, also proved highly illusory. Supporters of federalism were usually those, such as the Communist Party of Ukraine or the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms party, who opposed the transition from ethnic to nation (that is, nation building) within eastern and southern Ukraine and who defined Ukraine as a bi-ethnic (Russian-Ukrainian) state. Characteristically therefore, suggestions to introduce a bicameral parliament into the constitution, as a way of introducing federalism through the back door, failed to be included in the June 1996 constitution. Opposition to the introduction of a bicameral parliament remained one of the few issues that the national democrats and the radical left could agree upon.

Would the definition of Ukraine as a bi-ethnic (Russian-Ukrainian) state, as argued in favour of by some domestic and outside observers, be a panacea for Ukraine? This is highly unlikely. The experiences of both Canada and Belgium have shown that bi-ethnic states merely end up introducing nationalising policies within each of their two ethnic regions. These, in turn, lead to the growth of separatism (as seen in Flanders and Quebec). If Ukraine were defined as a bi-ethnic state, in the manner of Belgium or Canada, four negative consequences would be likely. First, no united Ukrainian political community and civic nation which encompassed the entire country would be created. Second, it would be practically impossible for the Ukrainian leadership to overcome the inherited legacies of regional disparities and discrimination against the Ukrainian language. Third, it would lead to the creation of ‘two Ukraines’, where Ukrainian and Russian ethnic nationalism would grow within each component part, eventually stimulating separatist tendencies. Fourth, Ukraine would become a source of instability and possibly even strife, with Russia taking strategic advantage of Ukraine’s divisions and weaknesses.
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Borders and boundaries have long been recognised as important in their twin role of creating a domestic political community and civic nation different to ‘Others’. If Ukraine had abandoned nation building, as in Belarus, there would be no need for borders with neighbouring Russia because Kyiv, like Miensk, would have accepted the Little Russian argument that the eastern Slavs were all branches of the one rus’kiy narod. Borders are a national symbol, like the flag, the hymn and the constitution. They signify and define the extent of sovereignty and spatial territory within which citizens unite within an emerging civic nation, to the exclusion of those outside the political community. Ukraine remained committed and steadfast in maintaining its territorial integrity in a manner similar to other former colonial dependencies. All borders are to some degree ‘artificial’. Nevertheless, there have been only two recorded border changes since the Second World War, which created Eritrea and Bangladesh, carved out of Pakistan and Ethiopia respectively.

Does a political nation need a national idea? Yes, if the political nation is defined in the manner in which they have been defined throughout this book; namely, that it is composed of both civic and ethnic elements. The search for a national idea is part and parcel of the nation building project, which, like national identity, is a process—not an event. There was never any doubt that Ukraine would be defined in inclusive terms. But, would this inclusivity be based upon ethnic Ukrainian or Ukrainian-Russian cultural and linguistic criteria? By 1996 there was no longer any doubt that it would be the former; the constitution defined Ukrainians as the sole titular ethnic group and their language as the only state language. President Kuchma had himself accepted that the national idea had to be based upon civic and Ukrainian ethnic criteria (after initially arguing upon coming to power in 1994 that the ‘national idea had not worked’). The next stage of the implementation of the nation building policies which grew out of the constitution might prove to be more difficult than winning the debate over Ukraine’s future identity.

The application of the term ‘nationalisation’ to these processes seems misplaced. If applying affirmative action in support of previously repressed languages and culture (see chapter 8) is defined as ‘nationalising tendencies’ then the author is only too glad to be counted among its supporters. If ‘nationalising states’ refers to state and nation building then all liberal democracies were or still are ‘nationalising states’ for, as argued throughout, even territorial states, such as France and the UK, are assimilatory.
It would be difficult to imagine what any newly independent state, such as Ukraine, could hope to accomplish in the transition to democracy and a market economy without state and nation building (or, if you wish, ‘nationalising’ policies). As Nodia has pointed out, nationalism and liberalism are closely inter-twined and democracies have only been successfully created within nation-states. Nationalism and democracy are, therefore, ‘joined in a sort of complicated marriage, unable to live without each other, but coexisting in an almost permanent state of tension’.\(^5\) Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s cardinal mistake was to assume that democracy would function in an empire. Civil society is largely absent in eastern and southern Ukraine precisely because of the weakness and amorphousness there of national identity. Both civil society and national identity are products of modernity. Without national identity it would be impossible to create a new political community and civic nation (and therefore a successful transition to democracy and capitalism).

Language will play an important role in the creation of the new Ukrainian political nation. Not all political scientists hold a consensus upon whether language is essential for a nation. The people of Eire, after all, we are told, primarily speak English and it is still an independent country. But Scotland, Ulster and Wales also speak English—and they are not independent states. If Ukraine were geographically separated from Russia by a sea, as well as being composed of different cultures and religions, the language issue would no doubt be less worrying and a civic Ukrainian identity could be forged without the centrality of the Ukrainian language. The closeness of Ukrainians and Russians culturally, religiously and geographically will continue to ensure that language remains an important marker of identity in Ukraine.

The definition of Russian identity in cultural and linguistic terms, as the community of Russian speakers, continues to place official pressure upon Russian speakers in Ukraine to therefore Ukrainianise or adopt a bi-lingual profile. Although support for the revival of the Ukrainian language is perfectly compatible with liberal policies of affirmative action in the West, these policies should not be tantamount to radical Ukrainianisation. The Russian language has been made a ‘foreign’ language in western Ukraine, but this is unlikely to occur throughout the country.

The creation and revival of a new national history are important components of state and nation building through the revival of historical memory. Every nation has its myths, legends and ‘golden
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ages’ which help to integrate diverse peoples into a new civic nation. Historiography, based upon the Mykhailo Hrushevskyi schema, will answer the questions where Ukrainians came from, why historical events took place and what their future might hold. It will counter the former Tsarist and post-Leninist Soviet historiography which sought to fashion Little Russianism, where Ukrainians were instructed that they were physically unable to create an independent state and their ‘natural’ condition was to be united with Russia. As defined earlier in relation to borders and a national history, Ukraine’s national symbols, its flag, hymn, currency, anniversaries, commemorative medals and monuments are also central to the creation of a new national identity.

President Kuchma triumphantly proclaimed in 1996 that state building had been completed. After all, presidential decrees can create state institutions. But decrees cannot establish nations or civil societies. The creation of civil society and a civic nation would take far longer to accomplish and should be viewed as a series of processes (not events) within the general transition from Soviet to independent Ukraine. Political, economic, state and national transformation in Ukraine would inevitably be bumpy. The emergence of a new political nation will be determined by an improved economic climate as well as the use of wise, and prudent policies that do not attempt to fully eradicate regional differences or the Russian language from Ukraine. Nation building therefore has to remain sufficiently inclusive to satisfy both Ukrainian demands to be recognised as the core nation, while including non-Ukrainians as co-partners within the emerging civic nation. Such policies would entail the rejection of both extremes of ‘Ukraine for Ukrainians!’ and ‘Ukraine without Ukrainians!’.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION
2 See the survey of Crimean political parties by Volodymyr Prytula in Holos Ukrainy, 29 May 1997.
4 Argumenty i Fakty, no. 27 (July 1997).

1 THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
1 See Karl Deutsch’s and William J.Foltz’s classic Nation-Building (New York: Atherton, 1963).
11. Little Russianism argues and accepts that Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians were three branches of the one Russian people (rus’kiy narod).
12. Although Ukraine and Muscovy signed the Treaty of Periaslav in 1654 it was not until the 1790s that Ukrainian autonomy was destroyed. Similarly, until 1863 the ruling elites in Kyiv and much of right bank Ukraine were either Poles or Polonised Ukrainians. Russification and denationalisation were introduced from the 1860s onwards, except for a brief period between 1905 and 1917.
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also Anna Biscoe, ‘Internal Colonialism in the USSR: The Case of Soviet Ukraine’, MA Thesis submitted to the University of Alberta, Fall 1986.

46 See the poll commissioned by the Institute of Sociology and Sotsis-Gallup in Den’, 5 June 1997.

2 SOVIET TO UKRAINIAN ELITES

3 Ibid.
5 Politychna Dumka, no. 3, 1994, p. 135.
9 Uriadovyi Kurier, 22 May 1997.
11 These views were stressed by former President L.Kravchuk at the conference ‘Soviet to Independent Ukraine: A Troubled Transformation’ held at the University of Birmingham, 13–14 June 1996. See also John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, ‘Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3 (May-June 1996), p. 53.
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16 ‘Ex-Communist Bosses still in Majority in Ex-USSR’, Reuters, 2 December 1996.


20 Izvestiya, 10 January 1995.


26 Interview with Mykola Mikhailchenko, former aide to Kravchuk on domestic issues, Kyiv, 26 May 1995. Kravchuk, a member of the Politburo and central committee of the KPU until August 1991, still admitted on the eve of this putsch ‘Well then, for me the programme of the party is the deciding factor.’ He had ‘great respect for Lenin’ (Holos Ukrainy, 15 August 1991).

27 Interview with M. Mikhailchenko, Kyiv, 26 May 1995.


29 This episode was recounted by Yurii Mushketyk, head of the Writers Union, on a visit to the USA (Ukrainian Weekly, 12 April 1992).

30 Interview with M. Mikhailchenko, Kyiv, 26 May 1995.


34 See the analysis of the Russian Party of Power in Moskovskaya Pravda, 2 August 1995.


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43 Interview with M. Ryabchuk, Kyiv, 28 August 1995.


45 Interview with Ivan Dziuba, Kyiv, 3 October 1994.

46 Interview with Levko Lukianenko, Kyiv, 2 October 1995.

47 See the comments by L. Kravchuk made to the Supreme Rada (*Holos Ukrainy*, 30 January 1992).


51 Interview with D. Vydrin, former adviser on domestic issues to Kuchma, Kyiv, 29 September 1995.


53 Ibid.


55 Quoted from Taras Stetskiv, a leading member of the People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU) and a member of parliament, in *Kievski vedomosti*, 15 March 1997.


58 See the interview with L. Kravchuk in *Holos Ukrainy*, 15 October 1994.

59 See Y. Badzio’s views in *Visti z Ukrainy*, 7 April 1995.

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64 D.Vydrin and D.Tabachnyk, Ukrainiia Na Porozi…, op. cit., p. 171.


68 See Kuchma’s interview in Kïevski vedomosti, 5 May and his comments as quoted by ITAR-TASS News Agency, 8 July 1994.

69 Quoted from Kuchma’s independence day speech (Holos Ukrainy, 28 August 1995).


75 Vechirnyi Kyiv, 22 May 1993.

76 Ukrainina Moloda, 16 May 1997.

77 See the criticism of the ‘slave spirit of our people’ and ‘slave psychology’ of Ukrainians by L.Kravchuk in Holos Ukrainy, 19 August 1995.

78 Holos Ukrainy, 18 May 1993.

79 See the views of then Deputy Economics Minister Yuriy Yekhanourov in the Financial Times, 13 April 1994.


81 D.Vydrin and D.Tabachnyk, Ukrainiia no Porozi…, op. cit., p. 31.

82 See the comments by T.Stetskiv about former Prime Minister P.Lazarenko in Kïevskiye vedomosti, 15 March 1997.

83 Comments by Viktor Medvedchuk, President of the Ukrainian Lawyers Union (Kïevskiye novosti, 31 January 1997).

84 Interview with I.Dziuba, Kyiv, 3 October 1994.


86 As cited by Boris Paton, head of the Academy of Sciences (ITAR-TASS News Agency, 16 May 1997).

87 Sil’s’ke Zhyttia, 23 February 1995.
3 FORGING A POLITICAL COMMUNITY


4 L.Kuchma interview in Vechirnyi Kyiv, 1 February 1996.

5 The poll was conducted by the National Institute of Strategic Studies, the National Security and Defence Council, and the Ukrainian Academy of Research into Youth Questions (Molod’ Ukrainy, 14 March 1996). The other two threats were the absence of real reforms (49.6 per cent) and corruption (61.7 per cent).


9 Interview with L.Kravchuk in Ukrainian Weekly, 29 January 1995.


17 See Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979).


20 L.Kravchuk interviewed in Ukraïns’ki Visti, 2 October 1994.

21 Demokratychna Ukraina, 18 April 1996.


23 In 1981, the newly elected Socialist government announced a ‘vast programme of decentralisation’ (‘la grande affaire du septennat’). The
Deferre Reforms, known after then French Minister of the Interior and Decentralisation, changed the political and administrative map of France. In contrast, during the eighteen years of Conservative government between 1979 and 1997 the UK became more centralised. See John Loughlin and Sonia Mazey (eds), *The End of the French Unitary State*? (London: Frank Cass, 1995).


28 *Post Postup*, no. 35 (29 September–5 October 1994).


30 *Ukradovyi Kurier*, 20 February 1997.

31 UNIAR News Agency, 1 January 1996.

32 *Holos Ukrainy*, 4 April 1996. Kuchma was not elaborating anything new here. In one of his last speeches former Prime Minister Vitold Fokin said: ‘Our greatest wealth is our political stability and inter-ethnic accord’ (*Holos Ukrainy*, 17 September 1992).

33 *Holos Ukrainy*, 4 April 1996.

34 See L. Kravchuk’s state of the nation address to Parliament in *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 22 May 1993.


38 *Den*, 16 April 1997.

39 V.H.Kremen’ et al., *Sotsial’no-Politychna Sytuatsiya…*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

40 *Ukrainian Weekly*, 23 June 1996.


46 Holos Ukraïiny, 7 December 1995.
47 Interview with Ukrainian activist Stepan Sapeliak, Kharkiv, 26 August 1996.
48 Molod’ Ukraïny, 26 November 1996.
52 Anatoliy Hryshchuk, Deputy Head of the Union of (national-democratic-leaning) Ukrainian Officers, called for a ‘national-patriotic dictatorship’ that would inculcate patriotism, forge a national community and promote loyalty to the state. Democracy would be possible only after a number of generations had changed, having gone through this process (Vechirniy Kyiv, 25 February 1997).
54 Extracted from L.Kuchma’s appeal on the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Kyiv (Radio Ukraine World Service, 7 October 1994).
57 See the comments by Volodymyr Horbulin in Kievskiy vedomosti, 3 February 1997.
58 This necessity for Ukrainian leaders to combine the policies of social and liberal democracy with conservatism is also proposed by Tomenko. See M.Tomenko, ‘Ukraiins’ka perspektyva…’, op. cit.
60 See the report of V.Pynzenyk’s press conference in Interfax News Agency, 7 April 1997.
61 Interfax news agency, 28 March 1997.
63 Another 26 per cent were neutral while 61 per cent were positive (Den’, 27 February 1997).
64 See the comments by the former US Ambassador to Ukraine, Roman Popadiuk, in ‘Ukraine: The Security Fulcrum of Europe?’, Strategic Forum, no. 69 (April 1996), p. 4.
68 Holos Ukraïiny, 4 April 1996.
69 Holos Ukraïiny, 28 August 1995.
70 Holos Ukraïiny and Uriadovyi Kurier, 16 September 1995.
71 Intelnews, 16 May 1997.
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80 Heorhii Bachynskyi, ‘Chy zalyshtsvia Ukraïna Ukraïns’koho?’, Universum, September-October 1995, p. 3.
82 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 November 1995.
83 Leonid Shkliar, ‘Chy potalanyt’ poyednaty natsional’nu ideiu ta natsional’nyi kapital?’, Molod’ Ukraïny, 2 July 1996.
84 Interview with S. Teleshun in Uriadovyi Kurier, 13 January 1996.
86 Lazarenko claimed: ‘Currently I have only one wish: prosperity for my country, and I am working in and for my country. I have no intention of leaving it’ (Uriadovyi Kurier, 8 May 1997). See also the profile of S. Tyhipko in Ukraina Moloda, 3 May 1997 which commented that Tyhipko joined the local branch of the Ukrainian Language Society in Dnipropetrov’sk in 1988. He learnt Ukrainian and attended their meetings.
87 Kievskie Novosti, 11 April 1997.
88 See the interview with V‘iacheslav Chornovil in Ukraina Moloda, 17 April 1997.
89 Alternatyva, no. 17 (5–11 May 1997).
90 Ukraina Moloda, 22 April 1997.
91 In Ukraine, August 1993, p. 6.
92 Vechirnyi Kyiv, 18 September 1996.
93 See the interview with former Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Kuras in Narodna Armiya, 31 August 1996.
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95 Čas, 22 March 1996.
98 Ibid, p. 205.
105 See L.Kuchma’s comments in his annual state of the nation address to parliament (Holos Ukrainy, 4 April 1996).
106 See the views of L.Kuchma as outlined in his independence day anniversary speech (Holos Ukrainy, 28 August 1995).
115 Literaturna Ukraina, 6 November 1996.
NOTES

4 FEDERALISM, REGIONALISM AND SEPARATISM

1 Holos Ukrainy, 22 July 1994.
2 Holos Ukrainy, 5 May 1994.
5 V.B. Hryn’iov, Nova Ukraina: Iakoiu ia ii Bachu (Kyiv: Abrys, 1995), p. 27.
11 A. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, op. cit., p. 168.
14 W. Connor, ‘A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a…’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 1, no. 4 (October 1978), p. 393.
16 See the comparisons made in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 January 1996.
21 Many outside observers mistakenly assume that the former Soviet internal administrative borders played little role. Stephen R. Burant wrongly believes that ‘Ukrainians are more likely to consider themselves part of an all-Russian nation, composed of Great Russia, Ukraine and Belarussia’. See his ‘Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 47, no. 7 (November 1995), pp. 1127. Misha Glenny also argued that ‘The east barely considers Russia a foreign country’ (New York Times, 14 July 1994).
NOTES

22 Reuters, 3 August 1994.
23 UNIAN and Interfax News Agencies, 3 and 4 February 1996.
24 Interview with V.Chornovil, leader of Rukh, Kyiv, 6 July 1995.
26 Literaturna Ukraina, 28 November 1996.
27 See the interview with Rear Admiral Mykhailo Yezhel, Commander of the Ukrainian navy, in Uriadovy Kurier, 11 January 1997.
29 Ibid.
32 A.Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, op. cit., p. 23.
35 A.Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 149, 172 and 199.
41 Ibid, p. 156.
44 The poll was conducted by Sotsis-Gallup and published in the newspaper Den’, 16 February 1997.
45 A.Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, op. cit., p. 264.
46 The elites polled by the Kyiv Centre for Political Studies and Conflictology included thirty-five members of parliament, forty government members, party leaders, businessmen, the media and power ministries (ITAR-TASS News Agency, 10 November 1996).
NOTES

48 Demokratychna Ukrajina, 2 March 1995.
51 Ukraina Moloda, 13 March 1997.
52 Lysenko is the leader of the Republican Party of Russia and a member of the State Duma (Trud, 13 May 1997).
54 An example of this exaggerated threat can be seen in the comparison of Ukraine to Austro-Hungary in Volodymyr Doroshkevych, ‘Chy Zahrozhuye Ukraiini Sumnyi Dosvid Avstro-Uhorshchyny?’, Viche, December 1996, pp. 77–80.
57 Sarah Birch and Ihor Zinko, ‘The Dilemma of Regionalism’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 22 (1 November 1996), p. 22. Tór Bukkvoll concluded that ‘since Ukraine became independent in 1991, attempts at mobilisation against its independence in ESU (eastern-southern Ukraine) have been few and scattered’. The agenda has been more a question of reintegration—not separatism. See his Ukraine and European Security (London: Royal Institute International Affairs and Pinter, 1997), p. 29.
61 See the poll conducted by PULS in Odesa which asked what interests should define the new constitution. Sixty-three per cent said human rights while only 11 per cent gave state interests and another 9 per cent the revival and development of the Ukrainian people, language and culture (Holos Ukraiiny, 3 February 1996).
NOTES

64 Vseukraynskiye Vedomosti, 16 April 1997.
66 See the report on the local businessman from the company Donets’khliprom in the city of Makievuhillia who are financing local Ukrainian language and cultural activities (Utriadovyi Kurier, 12 October 1996).
67 Interview with Volodymyr Bilets’kyi, head of the Donets’k-based Ukrainian Culturological Centre, Donets’k, 29 August 1996.
68 Interview with Hryhoriy Nemirja, director, Centre for Political Studies, University of Donets’k, Donets’k, 30 August 1996.
69 See the comments by then President L.Kravchuk in Leonid Kravchuk. Ostatni Dni Imperii, Pershi Roky Nadii (Kyiv: Dovira, 1994), p. 162. The President of KINTO Securities, Serhiy Oksanych, also pointed to the growth in interest of eastern Ukrainian elites in Ukrainian statehood which they understood to be now an established (not a temporary) fact of life. They ‘understand that the existence of the state allows the realisation of their ambitions’. Quoted from Chrystyna Lapychak, ‘The Quest for a Common Destiny’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 18 (6 September 1996), p. 8.
70 Nezavisimost, 24 February 1995.
73 The author visited Zaporizhzhia on the anniversary of independence on 24 August 1995. There I interviewed Viacheslav Ononko, the main specialist in the Department of Humanities of the oblast council. Ononko is in charge of liaison with political parties and groups. He said that of the thirty-six registered political parties in the oblast none of them were ‘pro-Russian’ or separatist.
74 Poll on the socio-economic and political situation in the region in October-November 1995 conducted by the Centre for Political Studies, University of Donets’k. Copy in the authors possession.
76 Krymskiye vedomosti, 26 March 1994.
79 Interview with L.Kravchuk, Kyiv, 28 November 1995.
80 Interview with M.Mikhailchenko, Kyiv, 26 May 1995.
82 Uriadovy Kurier, 23 March 1995.
83 Figures provided by then presidential prefect Dmytro Stepaniuk (Krymska Svitlytsia, 24 February 1996).
84 Interviewed in Krymska Svitlytsia, 4 January 1997.
85 The following figures in the ‘Oath of Loyalty to the Ukrainian State’ section were provided by Victor Chudowsky, then a PhD student at the University of Connecticut.
87 Chas, 13 September and Vechernyi Kyiv, 25 September 1996.
91 Stepan Vovkanych and Serhiy Tsapok, ‘Chy Zavzhdy Zbihaiutsia Natsional’ni i Regional’ni Vektory?’, Chas, 26 April 1996.
92 This was found by a survey conducted by the Estonian Science Foundation entitled ‘Identity Structure Analysis’. See D.Laitin, ‘National Revival and Competitive Assimilation in Estonia’, op. cit., p. 38.
93 Ukrainian Weekly, 7 May 1995.
NOTES


121 Holos Ukrainy, 29 May 1997.

5 THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDERS

1 Shortly after the referendum on independence the Ukrainian parliament issued an appeal to ‘Parliaments and Peoples of the World’ which stated: ‘Ukraine considers its territory indivisible and inviolable,
recognition of the inviolability of existing state borders and has no territorial claims towards any state’ (Holos Ukrainy, 5 December and Demokratychna Ukraina, 7 December 1991). This has remained Ukraine’s principled position throughout the post-Soviet era.

2 This was an exchange of the Ukrainian village of Bessarabka for four kilometres of the Odesa-Izmail road and the village of Polanka inside Moldova (Den’, 25 June 1997).


12 Ukrayina Moloda, 10 June 1997.


14 The lack of a sharp ethnic dividing line between Ukrainians and Russians probably accounts for the peaceful manner in which they have resolved their disputes since the disintegration of the former USSR. As Jack Snyder put it, ‘primordial ethnic consciousness’ is not high among eastern Ukrainians. See his ‘Nationalism and Instability in the Former Soviet Empire’ in Stuart Croft and Phil Williams (eds), European Security without the Soviet Union (London: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 9.


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18 Ibid, pp. 15–16.
19 Ibid.
22 Uriaudyvuy Kurier, 22 December 1994.
26 Dmytro Doroshenko, then a member of the Hetmanate government, pointed to these strategic, as well as the ethnic and economic links, between the Crimea and Ukraine in his History of Ukraine 1917–1923, vol. II (Winnipeg-Toronto-Detroit: n.p., 1993), p. 260.
30 B.D.Boyechko, O.I.Hanzha and B.I.Zakharchuk (eds), Kordony Ukrainy, op. cit., p. 105. See also David R.Marples and David F.Duke, ‘Ukraine, Russia and the Question of the Crimea’, Nationalities Papers, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1995), p. 272. Marples and Duke pointed out that the transfer was a ‘purely internal administrative matter without, it would seem, much significance in political or economic terms’. It was justified, as in the 1918–1921 period, on common economic and territorial proximity, close economic and cultural links between the Crimean oblast and Ukraine. The 600th anniversary of the Treaty of Periaslav in 1954 was therefore not the reason behind the transfer.
33 While backing territorial claims against Ukraine, Y.Luzhkov is ready to sacrifice the Russian Federation’s own territorial integrity by supporting the secession of Chechnya (Trud, 13 February 1997).
34 See the information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate on Treaties and Legal Questions in Flot Ukrainy, 30 November 1996.
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35 Mayor Y.Luzhkov warned: ‘We should also remember that the Russian public will never agree that Sevastopol is not a Russian city, a city of Russian glory.’ He claimed that opinion polls showed that approximately 75 per cent of Russians support the return of the Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation (Trud, 13 February 1997).

36 Radians’ka Ukraina, 21 November 1990.


40 The official commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary were outlined in Pravda Ukrainy, 6 May 1989. V'iacheslav Chornovil, leader of the Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh), had a different view about whether it should be celebrated. He argued that western Ukraine had been transferred from a mild authoritarian rule to that of Stalinism. ‘And can we forget that the Ukrainian lands were gathered together not for the good of the people, but in order to widen, under the pretext of reunification, the Russian empire.’ Ukrainian Press Agency, Press Release, 26 July 1989.


45 R.Szporluk, ‘The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR. The Russian Question and Imperial Overextension’ in Karen Davisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1997), p. 85.


48 AP, 4 October 1996.

49 Margo Light points out that ‘When Russia argues that the Russian border has to be defended in Tajikistan, they mean this literally. There is no other physical border between Russia and Afghanistan.’ See her ‘Foreign Policy Thinking’ in N.Malcolm, A.Pravda, R.Allison and M.Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 86.


NOTES

52 UNIAN News Agency, 20 August 1996.
53 Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 3 June 1997.
54 Narodna Armiya, 13 December 1995.
55 UNIAN News Agency, 16 December 1996.
57 Ukraïna Moloda, 10 June 1997.
58 Nezavisimost, 27 December 1996.
59 N.Zagladin and M.Muntyan, ‘Several Aspects of the New Geostrategic Situation of Russia’, World Economy and International Relations, July 1993, pp. 5–19.
60 Izvestiya, 9 December 1991.
62 The CIS founding document specified that each side respected the territorial integrity and existing borders of its members only ‘within the Commonwealth’ (ITAR-TASS News Agency, 9 December 1991).
70 Ukrainian Weekly, 15 December 1996.

6 IN SEARCH OF A NATIONAL IDEA

2 Ibid., p. 351.
3 Mette Skak, From Empire to Anarchy. Post-Communist Foreign Policy and International Relations (London: Hurst, 1996), p. 16.
NOTES

7 Holos Ukrainy, 1 October 1992.
10 See also Mykola Riabchouk’s article entitled ‘To Rush Along Slowly’ in Moloda Halychyna, 5 December 1991.
21 Sammy Smooha and Theodor Hanf, ‘Conflict-Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies’ in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (eds), Ethnicity, op. cit., p. 333.
Raymond Breton, ‘From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Quebec’, in J.Hutchinson and A.D.Smith (eds), Ethnicity, op. cit., p. 349.


Fedir Kanak, ‘Natsional’nyi prohres i derzhavnist’ v Ukraiini’, Rozbudova Derzhava, no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 29 and 30.

In L.Kuchma’s inaugural speech to parliament he described Ukraine as a ‘multi-ethnic state’ (Holos Ukrainy, 21 July 1994).


Ukrainian Weekly, 23 May 1993.


See the article by Petro Tălanchuk, Education Minister under Kravchuk, who compared Soviet repression of Ukrainian language and culture in the 1970s and 1980s to another ‘Chornobyl’ (Literaturna Ukraina, 17 December 1992).

Interview with I.Dziuba, Kyiv, 3 October 1995.

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40 Interview with L. Kravchuk, Kyiv, 28 November 1995.
42 Kultura i Zhyttia, 29 August 1992. Dziuba was the author of the well known Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem published in London in 1968 by Weidenfeld and Nicholson. The report was written for the then national communist leadership, but earned him eighteen months in prison after Communist Party of Ukraine leader Petro Shelest was removed in 1972.
45 Ukrainian Weekly, 22 December 1996.
46 Holos Ukraïiny, 28 August 1995.
47 Extracted from Kuchma’s speech on the fifth anniversary of Ukrainian independence in Uriadovyi Kurier, 29 August 1996.
48 See his independence day anniversary speech in Holos Ukraïiny, 28 August 1995.
50 This was emphasised by Mykola Syrota, head of the Constitutional Commission, in an interview in Flot Ukraїiny, 3 August 1996.
51 Holos Ukraїiny, 4 February 1997. This was not sufficiently strong enough for some. See the criticism of its alleged lack of attention to the ‘core ethnic Ukrainian nation’ by Hryhorii Musienko, ‘Khto i shcho zahrozhuye ukraiinstem?’, Vechirniy Kyiv, 24 April 1997.
56 See the interview with I. Kuras published as ‘Utverdzhuvaty ukrain’s’ku dukhovnist”, Uriadovyi Kurier, 14 May 1996.
58 Petro Zhuk, Director of the Centre for Informational Problems of Territory, National Academy of Sciences (Za vilnu Ukraїnu, 8 April 1997).
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60 See the editorial in Vechirnyi Kyiv, 11 October 1996 entitled ‘Korinna Natsiya i Natsmenshyni’.
62 Oleh Hrynov wrote: ‘Now an independent Ukraine! So independent that even Ukrainians are independent from it’, Molod’ Ukrainy, 11 August 1995.
64 Ukrains’ka hazeta, 18 January 1996.
67 See the article by Viktor Yakovlev in Towarysh, no. 11 (March 1995).
69 Towarysh, no. 11 (March 1995).
71 See the special issue of Ukrains’kyi Svit, nos 1–3 (January-March 1995) devoted to the ‘National Idea’.
73 Vasyl’ Kryrychenko, ‘Ukraïns’ka Natsional’na Ideya ta Rozbudova Ukrains’koi Derzhavnosti’ and ‘Natsional’na Zalahoda iak Novyi Istorychnyi Vymir Dlia Ukrainy’, Rozbudova Derzhava, no. 9, (September 1993) and no. 7 (July 1994), pp. 4 and 13 respectively.
NOTES

78 Quoted from former Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov in Vechirnyi Kyiv, 10 January 1996, at a meeting between the Congress of Ukrainian Intellectuals and Kuchma.
82 Narodna hazeta, no. 48 (December 1995).
84 Narodna Armiya, 30 August 1996. One Ukrainian author argued that Ukraine’s elites were divided into three on this question. Those who supported and opposed it, as well as a third group who ‘use it as a means of political manipulation’. Elena Kovaleva, ‘Political Elite Discourse Modification in Ukraine’. Paper presented to the fifth Conference for the Study of European Ideas, Utrecht, August 1996, p. 4.
85 Interview with L.Kravchuk, Kyiv, 28 November 1995.
86 Holos Ukrainy, 1 October 1992.
87 Molod’ Ukrainy and Za vitnu Ukrainu, 10 June 1992.
88 See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 September and 19 October 1996.
90 See the comments by L.Kuchma interviewed in Zerkalo Nedeli, 18–24 November 1995.
94 Holos Ukrainy, 7 December 1995.
97 I.Drach in Literaturna Ukraina, 14 March 1996.
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101 See his speech at Chyhyrin on the anniversary of Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi’s birth, Molod’ Ukrainy, 26 October 1995.
102 Vechirniy Kyiv, 1 February 1996.
104 Quoted from L.Kuchma’s greetings to the second Congress of Ukrainian Writers (Literaturna Ukraina, 6 November 1996).
105 Extracted from L.Kuchma’s anniversary of independence speech in Uriadovyi Kurier, 29 August 1996.
106 Ibid.
110 See the criticism of these three authors by Mykola Tomenko of the Ukrainian Perspectives Fund Think Tank in Kyiv entitled ‘Iaku Ukraïinu buduye komanda Prezydenta Leonida Kuchmy?’, (Holos Ukrainy, 13 June 1996).
112 The MRBR claimed that instead of political-economic reforms we have ‘a surrogate pseudo-consolidation of the land through the patently dead-end national idea, which could turn our state into a hotbed of civil and fratricidal wars’ (Krymskiye Izvestiya, 3 March and Uriadovyi Kurier, 4 March 1995).
113 Sil’s’ki Visti, 15 December 1995.
115 Petr Tolochko, Deputy President, National Academy of Sciences, also remained sceptical of the value of a national idea. See his ‘Umeem li Ukraina natsion’niu ideiu?’, Kiyevskiye Novosti, 20 October 1995. See also the criticism of Tolochko’s views in Vechirniy Kyiv, 19 December 1995, Molod’ Ukrainy, 4 January, Literaturna Ukraina, 11 January, Vechirniy Kyiv, 27 January and 12 March and Chas, 22 March 1996.
116 See I.Drach, ‘Chy Pratsuye Ukraïins’ka Natsional’na Ideya?’, Ukrain’s’kyi Svit, nos 1–3 (January-March 1995), pp. 3–4; Mykhailo Vivcharuk, ‘Chomu “ne spratsiuvala natsional’na ideya”?’, Narodna Armiya, 21 March and 28 August, Petro Kononenko (Director of the Institute of Ukrainian Studies), ‘Natsional’na Ideya: Istoriya dukhovnoho stanovlennia’, Chas-Time, 10, 17 and 24 November 1995; the appeal from Ukrainian organisations in St Petersburg (Vechirniy Kyiv, 12 January); the appeal by the Learned Council at the Ivan Franko
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119 *Uriadovy Kurier*, 21 June 1997. See also V.H.Kremen’ et al., *Sotsial’no-Politychna Sytuatsiya v Ukraini: Postup P’iaty Rokiv* (Kyiv: National Security and Defence Council, National Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 10. This argued that there was no going back to the former USSR after the adoption of the constitution.
120 See his interview in *Narodna Armiya*, 31 August 1996.

7 NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY

4 Translated and published as *Natsionalnyi Identychnist* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1994).
10 Ibid. p. 260.
11 See James Manor, ‘Ethnicity’ and Politics in India’, *International Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (July 1996), p. 463.
NOTES

16 Angela Stent, ‘Ukraine’s Fate’, *World Policy Journal*, vol. XI, no. 3 (Fall 1994), p. 84.
18 Reuters, 12 April 1994.
24 Interviewed in *Literatura Ukraina* (26 November 1992) L. Kravchuk pointed to the widespread ‘imperial, slave’ mentality which is found among some Ukrainians.
27 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 17 January 1996.
29 Robert Seely, then a Western journalist based in Kyiv, typified the pessimism that Ukraine would merely evolve into a ‘Little Russia’, that is following the Belarusian path under President A. Lukashenka. See his ‘Ukraine’s Identity Crisis’, *Moscow Times*, 12 June 1994. See also Daniel Sneider, ‘In Search of a Ukrainian Identity’, *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 May 1994.
NOTES


37 See Anna Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine. The Nationality Policy of the Volunteer Army during the Civil War (Edmonton-Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1995).

38 See the views of A.Lukashenka and B.Yeltsin respectively in Reuters, 6 and 14 May 1997.

39 Interview with Mykola Riabchuk, Kyiv, 10 May 1997.


41 Molod’ Ukrainy, 8 October 1992.


44 Aman Tuleyev, a Communist and former Russian Minister for the CIS, argued that: ‘The Soviet people were an historical reality, whether we like to admit it or not. The people living on the bulk of CIS territory today are not so much different nations as different parts of the former Soviet people. They are ethnically mixed, united by a common past and joint cultural traditions, and they share a common fate, in my view.’ (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 15 February 1997).


46 Trans-Carpathia and Slovakia were under more harsher Hungarian rule prior to 1914 which largely prevented the evolution of the rusyn ethnos into the Ukrainian nation. This occurred in inter-war Czechoslovakia and in the post-war Ukrainian SSR. Across the Carpathian mountains the more liberal Austrian rule in Galicia fostered this evolution and by the late nineteenth century the rusyn ethnos there had evolved into Ukrainians. Between 1848 and the 1880s the majority of Galician rusyn elites were either sympathetic to Russia or held local political sympathies. Only after the 1890s did this rusyn identity evolve into a Ukrainian one.

47 A.Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, op. cit., p. 165.

48 Za vilnu Ukrainu, 8 April 1997.


51 See the comments on the Crimea and Jews by then President Kravchuk in Reuters, 12 April 1994.
NOTES


54 One member of the Ukrainian parliament from the Inter-Regional Deputies’ faction and a staunch defender of the Russian language boasted that ‘weddings between them [Ukrainians and Russians] were never regarded as inter-national’. See Volodymyr Alekseyev, ‘Osoblyvyi poriadok dla movy Rosiys’koii’, Holos Ukrainy, 20 February 1997.


62 See A.Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, op. cit., pp. 77 and 154–155 on the amorphousness of Russophone identities in Ukraine.

63 Viktor Kaspruk, ‘Mental’nist natsional-marhinala’, Chas, 10 January 1996.


66 V.Stepanenko, ‘Natsional’ne derzhavne budivnytstvo…’, op. cit.

67 See for example, I.T.Mukovs’kyi and O.Ye.Lysenko, Zvytiaha i Zhortovnist’. Ukraiintsia na Frontakh Druhoii Svitovoiii Viyny (Kyiv: Knyha Pam’iat’i Ukrainy, 1997).

8 LANGUAGE POLICIES

1 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 October 1996.
8 Ibid., p. 139.
15 G.J.Bereciartu, Decline of the Nation-State, op. cit., p. 139.
17 Dominique Arel’s views of Ukraine may be influenced by his Quebec origins. See his ‘Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?’, Nationalities Papers, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 1995), p. 598.
18 Ibid., p. 609.
23 Ibid.
24 A.Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, op. cit., p. 214.
25 These views differ from Valerii Khmelko, head of the International Institute of Sociology, Kyiv Mohyla Academy, who told the author that Russification had taken place. Compare Arel’s and Wilson’s views to those of V.Hryn’iov, Nova Ukraiina, op. cit., p. 70.
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30 Interview with L.Kravchuk, Kyiv, 28 November 1995.

31 These figures were provided by Petro Zhuk, Director of the Centre for Informational Problems of Territories, National Academy of Sciences, Za vitnu Ukrainu, 8 April 1997.


33 See his interview in Ukraina Moloda, 23 April 1997.


37 Walker Connor asked this same question long before the disintegration of the former USSR, pointing to the persistence of Eire despite its Anglicisation. See his ‘Nation-Building or Nation Destroying?’, World Politics, vol. XXIV, no. 3 (April 1972), p. 338.


40 See the views of the head of the Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences, Myroslav Popovych, ‘Shcho zh Take “Ukraïns’ka Natsional’na Ideya?”’, Kul’tura i Zhyttia, 27 November 1996.


42 Vechirnyi Kyiv, 18 January 1996.
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44 See the views of General-Major Hryhoriy Têmko, Head of the section on propaganda in the Directorate On Éducation of the Ministry of Defence (Nârodna Armiya, 3 August 1996).


53 See the poll undertaken by the Institute of Sociology, National Academy Of Sciences, and Democratic Initiatives. The results were given in a press release dated 10 September 1995 in the possession of the author.

54 A Political Portrait of Ukraine, no. 4, 1994, op. cit., p. 124.


56 Ukrainian Weekly, 6 October 1996.


58 Vechirnyi Kyiv, 1 February 1996.

59 Molod’ Ukraïiny, 26 November 1996.

60 Ukrainian Weekly, 4 February 1996. See also Holos Ukraïiny, 4 January 1996.

61 See the report of a Holos Ukraïiny (19 December 1996) journalist who rang the Swiss Embassy.

62 Uriadovyi Kurier, 14 May 1996.

63 See the remarks made by Deputy Prime Minister Vasyl Durdynets as reported by UNIAN News Agency, 17 August 1996.

64 Interview with M. Pozhyvanov, Birmingham, 2 March 1996.


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67 Ibid.
68 Rossiyskiye Vesti, 3 June 1997.
70 Vechirnyi Kyiv, 19 November 1996.
72 Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy, no. 9, 1994, p. 56.
76 Suchasnist, no. 12 (December 1995), p. 81.
77 Interview with L.Kravchuk in the Ukrainian Weekly, 29 January 1995.
78 See the appeals by Prosvita, the Union of Ukrainian Officers and the Ukrainian Pen Club in Ukrains’ki Visti, 28 August, Shliakh Peremohy, 1 October and Ukraïns’ke Slovo, 16 October 1994.
79 See the proceedings of the conference ‘State Language—The Official Language!’ organised by Prosvita, the Writers’ Union, the Institute of Ukrainian Language and Linguistics and the Institute of Ukrainian Studies (both of the National Academy of Sciences) in Narodna Armiya, 28 September, Uriadovyi Kurier, 29 September and Literaturna Ukraina, 6 October 1994.
80 Holos Ukrainy, 5 October 1994.
82 See the appeal by the Communist Party of Ukraine entitled ‘Nimovniy dyskrimitatsii i fundamentalizmu!’, Holos Ukrainy, 14 September 1994.
84 V.Hryn’iov, Nova Ukraina, op. cit., pp. 69–70. Ukrainian authors have turned this argument on its head. Other ethnic groups should, one author believes, actually help the largest (the Ukrainians) to revive their language. See Ivan Belebekha, ‘Ia-Druhy, A Ne Pershyi Prezydent Ukrainy’, Ukraïns’ka hazeta, 7 March 1996.
85 ITAR-TASS News Agency, 10 November 1996.
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90 *Ukrainian Weekly*, 6 October 1996.
91 See the interview with L.Kuchma in *Vechirniy Kyiv*, 1 February 1996.
93 *Vechirniy Kyiv*, 4 March 1997.
94 See the draft ‘State Plan to Develop the Ukrainian Language to the Year 2005’ drawn up by Prosvita in *Holos Ukrainy*, 20 December 1996.
95 The programme is outlined in *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 4 December 1996.
96 *Literaturna Ukraina*, 6 November 1996.
97 M.Zhulyns’kyi is also head of the Institute of Literature, National Academy of Sciences. See the reports in *Literaturna Ukraina*, 13 June and *Narodna Armiya*, 31 August 1996.
105 Louise Jackson, then a PhD student at the University of Birmingham undertaking research in Zaporizhzhia, experienced the commotion that this Ukrainianisation of Santa Barbara caused.
106 Interview with Valeriy Bebyk, Chief Consultant of the Presidential Administration Press Service, the University of Birmingham, 5 February 1996.
107 RIA News Agency, 14 August 1996.
108 See the figures provided by Minister of Press and Information Mykhailo Önyfrychuk, ‘Dukhovna Misiya Presy Ta Knyhy’, *Uriadovy Kurier*, 22 June 1996.
110 See the former Minister of Culture, Valeriy Kravchenko, ‘Ne Maye Sliv, A Vse—Taky Vidrodzhennia!’, *Viche*, June 1996, pp. 68–79.
115 Interviewed on Mayak Radio, 1 June 1997.
116 MoskovskiKomsomolets, 3 June 1997.
119 See the interview with former Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Kuras in *Narodna Armiya*, 31 August 1996.
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122 See the interview with then Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Kuras in *Uriadovy Kurier*, 14 May 1996.
123 *Uriadovy Kurier*, 17 April 1997.

9 HISTORY, MYTHS AND SYMBOLS

1 The author is grateful to Dr Arfon Rees, Senior Lecturer in Soviet History, and Ms Maureen Perry, Reader in Russian History, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, The University of Birmingham, for their earlier comments and useful suggestions on this chapter.
3 Ibid., p. 23.
4 Ibid., p. 29.
5 Ibid., p. 108.
8 See the interview with Ihor Binko in *Kyivska Prawda*, 23 August 1996.
11 Poland published and produced a huge volume of books, articles and films devoted to the activities of Ukrainian nationalists, many of which were required reading in schools. The Ukrainian minority as a whole in Poland felt that it had been tarred collectively with guilt. On visits to Poland in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s the author found many Ukrainians afraid of even speaking Ukrainian in public. See T. Kuzio, ‘The Polish Opposition and the Ukrainian Question’, *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 12, no. 23 (Winter 1987) pp. 26–58.
13 *Uriadovy Kurier*, 29 August 1996.
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15 A.D. Smith, ‘Memory and modernity…’, op. cit., p. 383.
16 Ibid., p. 381.
22 Ibid.
23 Holos Ukraiiny, 5 October 1996.
24 Press release of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, n. d.
32 Petro Kraliuk, ‘Kudy zh My Iydemo?’, Suchasnist, no. 6 (June 1993), p. 91.
35 See the review of the newly published Ukraina XIX-Pochatku XXst history textbook which will be used by the Ministry of Education (Ukrains’ke Slovo, 24 September 1995). The book was published in a print run of 350,000 Ukrainian and 200,000 Russian-language copies.
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37 See the review of V.Korol’, Istoriya Ukraïiny (Kyiv: Femina, 1995) in Narodna Armiya, 31 October 1995. The textbook is used by the Ministry of Education.

38 Interview with N.Bespalov, Donets’k, 30 August 1996.


40 J.A.Armstrong, ‘Myth and History…’, op. cit., p. 129.


50 Ukrains’kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal, no. 5, 1996, p. 80.

NOTES

57 Narodna Armiya, 8 October 1996.
56 Holos Ukrainy, 9 December 1995.
56 Narodna Armiya, 26 October 1996.
61 ‘By building a contemporary democratic Ukraine we are fully aware that this is being undertaken on the state building legacies of the UNR era of Mykhailo Hrushevs’ky’, another author wrote (Narodna Armiya, 26 October 1996).
63 Kul’tura i Zhyttia, 2 October and Narodna Armiya, 26 October 1996.
64 Oleksandr Kopylenko, ‘Vin mriav pro Velyku Ukrainu’, Uriadovy Kurier, 24 August 1996.
65 Quoted from L. Kuchma’s preface to the commemorative volume Mykhailo Hrushevs’ky (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1996).
67 The Ukrainian historian Ruslan Pyrih called for the creation of a special commission to publish all of Hrushevs’kyi’s works in fifty volumes. See his ‘Vitchyznenia hrushevs’koznavstvo: problemy stanovlennia’, Uriadovy Kurier, 28 September 1996.
68 A competition for the best design for the monument was held in 1996 (Literaturna Ukraina, 16 May and 18 July 1996).
69 Quoted from L. Kuchma’s preface to the commemorative volume Mykhailo Hrushevs’ky (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1996).
70 See also Hennadiy Strel’s’kyi and Anatoliy Trubaychuk, Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, Iyoho spodvyzhnyky iy oponenty (Kyiv: Chetverta Khvylia, 1996).
NOTES

79 Andreas Kappeler, ‘Ukrainian History from a German Perspective’, *Slavic Review*, vol. 54, no. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 691–701.


81 Interview with M.von Hagen, Director of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 19 November 1996. Von Hagen criticises these attempts at tracing the concept of Ukraine as an entity back to the pre-modern era: See his ‘Does Ukraine Have a History?’, *Slavic Review*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 658–73.


83 Paul R. Magosci’s new *History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) covers an alleged 2,500 years of Ukrainian history.


86 *Holos Ukrainyi*, 7 December 1996.

87 *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 9 April 1992. While arguing that Kyiv Rus’ is ‘more Ukrainian than Russian’ A.Kappeler believes that Ukrainian statehood should only be traced back to the seventeenth century. See his ‘A “Small People” of Twenty-five Million: The Ukrainians circa 1900’, *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 18, nos 1–2 (Summer-Winter 1993), p. 87.

88 The Ukrainian leadership continually reiterates that independence came about because of the ‘natural results of our people’s centuries-long aspiration to be masters in their own house’ (L.Kuchma on the fourth anniversary of independence, *Holos Ukrainyi*, 28 August 1995). Until 1991, L.Kuchma believes ‘Ukraine had always maintained its own ferment of independence’ (*Uriadovyi Kurier*, 29 August 1996). Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, told a reception on Capitol Hill that ‘The proclamation of independence brought to life the age-old yearning of our ancestors to be masters of their own land, the creators of their destiny’ (*Ukrainian Weekly*, 29 September 1996). Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko added that ‘This was a historical decision, this was the dream of the Ukrainian people, in particular for patriotic and nationally conscious Ukrainians’ (*Finansova Ukraina*, 20 August 1996).
NOTES


The battle of 500 cadets and 130 students against invading Russian Bolshevik troops in January 1918 at Kruty, north east of Kyiv, is commemorated each year (the majority of these young people died in the battle). Calls to officially honour their memory and rename a street in Kyiv after Kruty have appeared in the media. See Pavlo Kyolyi, ‘Ukraïins’kyi fermopily’, *Holos Ukraïiny*, 29 January and Vitaliy Kovalenko, ‘Prysiahnuty na Virnist’ na Kurhani heroiv’, *Chas*, 31 January 1997.


96 *Uriadovy Kurier*, 29 August 1996.


98 The then head of the parliamentary committee on Peoples’ Education and Sciences, Petro Kislyi, complained about ‘when old social and political dogmas are changed by the same dogmas but of an opposite colouring’ (*Holos Ukraïiny*, 6 January 1993).


101 *Chas*, 15 November 1996.


105 *Literaturna Ukraïina*, 6 November 1996.

106 See L. Kuchma’s speech on the fifth anniversary of independence in *Uriadovy Kurier*, 29 August 1996.


109 Ukrainian State Television, 7 September 1996.


See the special issue of Pam’iatky Ukraïiny, no. 2, 1995 devoted to ‘Nahorody Ukraïiny’ (commemorative medals). The special issue of this colour magazine was ordered by the Presidential Administration.


On the orders of the city council all Soviet symbols were to be removed in Odessa by 1 May 1996 (heralds, monuments, busts and memorial tablets). One hundred and forty Soviet monuments were to be removed to a separate open-air museum (Ukrains’ke Slovo, 7–14 April 1996). In a presidential decree on the ‘Ordinances of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea’ Ukraine’s state symbols had to be worn by officials of the Crimean Ministry of Internal Affairs.


Reuters, 20 December 1996.

Radio Ukraine World Service, 1 December 1996.


One of the first official publications dealing with national symbols was published in 1990 by Tovarystvo Znanija in a 87,000 edition which was immediately sold out (Volodymyr Serhiychuk, Dolia ukraiains’koi symvoliki). As Mykola Chubuk of Tovarystvo Ukraina explained, ‘The brochure is not large in size. But its relevance is very great. It is the first attempt in our time of a systematised publication dealing with the origins of Ukrainian national symbols’ (Suchasnist, no. 2 [February 1991], p. 88).

Nauka i Suspilstvo, August 1989.

See the protest of the Second World War veterans in Radiants’ka Ukraina, 11 August 1989 and the resolution of the ‘Veterans of the Anti-Fascist Struggle and Soldier-Internationalists’ in Pravda Ukraina, 1 August 1989. Pravda Ukraina (2 June and 10 November 1989) directly linked these national symbols to anti-Soviet nationalism during the 1917–1920 struggle for independence and the partisan struggle of the 1940s.
NOTES

131 Ibid.
134 See *Komunist*, no. 15 (April 1996).
135 Radio Ukraine World Service, 25 January 1994. L.Kravchuk also said in an interview that ‘They don’t understand that the struggle today around the question of flags, around symbols, around language—this is the break-up of Ukraine by regions’ (*Holos Ukrainy*, 15 October 1994).

The introduction of a Soviet flag at the Ukrainian parliament in December 1996 to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the ‘Stalin’ constitution was widely condemned, including by O.Moroz among others, who was then Parliamentary Chairman and leader of the Socialist Party (Reuters, 5 December 1996).

136 The resolution was reprinted in *Demokratychna Ukraїna*, 15 February and *Sіl’ski Visti*, 21 February 1992.
138 The parliamentary resolution was published in *Holos Ukrainy*, 21 February 1992.
141 *Uriadovy Kurier*, 19 November 1996.
144 Nikolai Stepanenko, ‘Luna V olkov Ne Boitsia’, *Flot Ukrainy*, 24 August 1996. The Republican Party newspaper *Samostijna Ukraina* (no. 13 [March 1992]) described the introduction of the trident as ‘one more difficult step to independence, one more proof that the Ukrainian people are not a “younger brother” but a great people whose history has spanned a millennium’.
145 According to Mykola Syrota, head of the Constitutional Commission, the left agreed to include national symbols within the constitution in return for the parliamentary right dropping its demand for the Crimea not to be given a separate constitution (but, instead, only a statute). See the interview with Syrota in *Flot Ukrainy*, 3 August 1996.
149 *Chas*, 15 November 1996.
NOTES

152 See the interview with Viacheslav Chornovil, leader of Rukh, in *Ukraïna Moloda*, 15 November 1996.
159 Mykola Lytvyn, ‘Vid Bohdana do Ivana Ne Bulo Het’mana’, *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 24 October 1996. The author disclosed that when the hryvnia was first printed in 1992 the then Chairman of the National Bank, Vadym Het’man, complained about attempts by the Russian secret services to destroy the currency.
166 *Narodna Armiya*, 31 December 1996.
171 For example, the Tsar’s Limestone Palace in Yalta. See AP, 19 October 1996.
173 A monument to Prince Y.Mudry was unveiled in Kyiv in May 1997. See *Vechirnyi Kyiv* and *Uriadovy Kurier*, 27 May 1997.
175 *Molod’ Ukraїiny*, 19 April 1996.
177 *Uriadovy Kurier*, 1 April 1997.
178 See the interview with Odesa Mayor Eduard Gurfits in *Vseukrainskiye Vedomosti*, 5 July 1997.

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181 The Cabinet of Ministers, Chairman of the Odesa State Administration, local Ukrainian political parties and civic groups all protested at the decision of the city council to return the statue of Tsarina Catherine to the spot where it had once stood (*Vechirniy Kyiv*, 20 September 1995).

10 CONCLUSIONS

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