Contemporary Ukraine on the Cultural Map of Europe
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Edited by
Larissa M. L. Zaleska Onyshkevych
and
Maria G. Rewakowicz

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Introduction
The Mapping of Ukraine

Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych and
Maria G. Rewakowicz

I.
What comprises Europe today, both geographically and culturally? Geographically, it is popularly understood to be the European continent/peninsula all the way to the Ural Mountains, down the Ural River and then to the Caspian Sea (Wikipedia). Ukraine is one of the countries situated in the eastern part of Europe. In discussing contemporary Ukraine in the present book, we refer to the newly independent, post-Soviet country that is now trying to reaffirm its identity.

Many countries in Europe found or built their own national identities over the past several hundred years. This concerned not only each country’s identity as a nation but also its geographic and cultural mapping. History occasionally changes the fates of countries and individuals to such a degree that it almost seems to dislocate them. Until the early twentieth century, mapping Ukraine on the European continent was not an issue. For example, a fourth-grade reader by Ostap Levytsky, published in Western Ukraine in 1872, contains a text addressing “Languages and Religions of the Europeans,” stating that “Slavs speak seven languages, which are nevertheless similar to each other, and these are further divided into dialects that number in the teens” (Levytsky, 141).1 “The main languages are Russian, Ruthenian, Polish, Czech, Slovenian, Serbian and Bulgarian. . . .” With the term “Ruthenian” (a term for Ukrainian used earlier), Ukrainian children, their teachers, parents, and grandparents identified the area where they lived (“from the Vysloka River all the way to the Don, and from the Prypiat and the middle Dnipro Rivers, all the way beyond the Carpathian Mountains and down to the Black Sea”)2 (155). But Ukrainians also located themselves on the wider map of Europe, seeing their country as one of the largest European states, although divided, at the time between the Austrian (one-seventh of the country) and the Russian (six-sevenths) states/empires (155). By calling themselves European, they went a step beyond identifying with a nation, or state, or empire, a move especially
notable during the period of Romanticism, which emphasized the nation. This wider or more universal perception of one’s geopolitical place, in terms of a continental identification, may have been a reaction to the constantly changing boundaries of states and empires, to the changing political claims of foreign rulers, as opposed to more stable cultural roots.

In his study of the concept of a “European,” John Lukacs suggests that the term was first applied by Pius II around 1450 (139). But even in the eighteenth century, only the leading/educated classes considered themselves European (140), and that was primarily in political terms. Perhaps only after World War II “the adjective ‘European,’ for the first time in history, has become recognized, current, accepted and self-ascribed by the majority—and this, very much like the recent mutation of the idea of Europe, has been even more of a cultural than a political development” (140–141).

Through the centuries, this cultural aspect nurtured a respect and/or justice for the individual as well as a shared decision-making process between the ruler and the officers. Since the days of the Kyïvan princes, autocratic rule was not acceptable: the prince shared his power with his officers. Later, in the seventeenth century, the Zaporozhian Cossacks elected their leader, their hetman. The 1714 Cossack Constitution of Bendery (written by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk in the town of Bendery) reiterated the tradition, the rights of officers/counselors to advise and approve the hetman’s policies and acts.3 This was far removed from the autocratic and/or despotic practices of the East, and was closer to the principles of the Magna Carta (1215) and to those of the Renaissance, espousing ideas of humanism. Ukrainian scholars often studied at West European Universities, while Ukrainian universities used West European textbooks and Latin was often the language of instruction.

At the end of the nineteenth century, those Ukrainians who had been ruled by the Russian Empire for almost two hundred years and exposed to a different culture discussed whether to maintain closer ties with the West or the East, or to focus on Ukraine itself and its unique position between the two poles. In considering these future relationships, Ukrainians never actually considered their existing culture to be much different from that of the rest of Europe, since they shared the same Greco-Roman and Christian traditions. The Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, tried to disrupt this identification. It not only divided Europe into two parts, it “contained” Ukraine politically on the non-Western side of the wall, and attempted to redirect the culture as well. Later, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s proclamation of independence in 1991 put Ukraine firmly back on the map of Europe. Whereas the first formative years of the post-independence period may have been characterized by political hesitance and uncertainty, the Orange Revolution of 2004 affirmed that the majority of Ukraine’s population had strong European leanings and expected its government to democratically steer its country toward European reintegration. But lately, Ukraine’s aspiration to be a part of Europe again, not just geographically but culturally as well, has met some resistance both internally (especially from Ukrainian citizens with family ties to Russia) and externally (Westerners ready to place
Ukrainians in Russia’s sphere of influence). This external move to remap Ukraine and other East European countries is a renewed attempt to rename that part of Europe as “Eurasia.” Such a move drives the new Ukraine to a dislocated “nonplace,” away from Europe not only marginalizing Ukraine in the process but also, in a way, marginalizing Europe itself.

Milan Kundera deals with the issue of being assigned an identity by outsiders who lack understanding. When he emigrated from Czechoslovakia to France, he was shocked to be grouped with Russian writers, since he did not identify with them or with Russia: “I still recall the strange anguish the piece stirred in me: that displacement into a context that was not mine felt like a deportation” (Kundera, 31).

Kundera explains European self-assessment:

Whether he is nationalist or cosmopolitan, rooted or uprooted, a European is profoundly conditioned by his relation to his homeland; the national problematic is probably more complex, more grave in Europe than elsewhere, but in any case it is different there. Added to that is another particularity: alongside the large nations Europe contains small nations, several of which have, in the past two centuries, attained or re-attained their political independence. Their existence may have brought me to understand that cultural diversity is the great European value. (31)

In a way, the European Union’s eastward expansion all the way to Ukraine’s western frontier is reminiscent of and implicitly delineates the former Soviet borders, and at the same time it strengthens Ukrainians’ determination to reassert their roots and claim the benefits of Ukraine’s European ties. This resembles Kundera’s reaction toward the “deportation” that he describes above, when he was assigned to a group with which he did not identify. This was so during the Soviet period. Today, Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko writes about Ukraine as a European democracy making a “choice to return to Europe” (Yushchenko).

The concept of “a return to Europe and a return to ‘itself’ [oneself] ran like a red thread through the Ukrainian national rebirth of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,” observes a popular Ukrainian writer, Oksana Zabuzhko, who also questions some of the supposed instant benefits (i.e., economic) of such ties now, in comparison with those of earlier centuries when various alliances were struck by Ukrainians to protect themselves from the Turks (2). A young parliamentarian and pop singer, Ruslana Lyzhychko, reemphasizes her generation’s dream of a European Ukraine, that is, one “without dirty political games, bribery, and corruption” (Lyzhychko). Many Ukrainians desire to see a political culture cleaner than the one the present generation in power acquired from its Soviet upbringing. Thus, while the dream of a better political future exists, there is a certain comfort in the knowledge and hope that numerous expressions of Ukrainian culture continue to develop in the same spirit and direction as in their pre-Soviet days, that is, similar to that of its Western neighbors. Ukrainians are not looking for a “roadmap to Europe” since they feel that they have always been there—even during the periods when parts of Ukraine were in different empires or under different political regimes. Obviously, there have been some gaps and divergences,
but Ukrainians feel that they share a common culture and common values with the rest of Europe, a culture that is reflected and manifested in so many fields. The chapters in this compilation discuss many examples of this sharing in contemporary Ukraine, that is, since it regained independence in 1991.

II.

Many aspects of Ukraine’s contemporary culture are addressed in this volume: history, politics, and religion (Section I), literature (Section II), and language, media, and the arts (Section III). What emerges is a fascinating picture of a young state grappling with its past and its colonial heritage, yet asserting its voice and preferences amid the diverse, and at times conflicting, realities of the contemporary political scene. Despite the diversity of issues raised and discussed, one overarching theme permeates all of the contributions, namely, a European cultural connection. Europe becomes a powerful point of reference, a measure against which the situation in post-independence Ukraine is gauged and debated. Such a framework allows for a better understanding of the complexities deeply ingrained in the social fabric of Ukrainian society, and enhances the case for strengthening democratic reforms as well as understanding the choices that the government makes.

This volume, divided into three thematic parts, analyses today’s Ukraine, simultaneously providing the reader with a useful historical context that in some cases goes back to the nineteenth century, or even as far back as the sixteenth century. The approaches offered here question stereotypical thinking about empire and the colonial subject, political or religious affiliations, and the processes of national and cultural self-identification. The first section, “Mapping the Nation: History, Politics, and Religion,” clearly demonstrates that the way a nation shapes its image, and reaffirms itself on the world’s map, is largely determined by its past. Ukraine’s historical predicament of being divided among many empires over the centuries understandably leads to some consequences today in the political and religious thinking of its citizens. On the one hand, this past political fragmentation no doubt contributes to religious plurality and tolerance, a positive feature by any democratic measure; on the other hand, it creates deep linguistic as well as cultural divisions among the electorate, which come to the forefront every time parliamentary or presidential elections are held. These internal divisions also play a significant role, whenever the opportunity presents itself to deal with the atrocities of the communist past, among which stands out the Soviet government-directed famine of 1933, the Holodomor (i.e., death by hunger), which more than decimated the Ukrainian nation, with the demise of 4–7 million victims. Together with the liquidation of thousands from the intelligentsia (scholars, academicians, writers, and artists), this represents a genocide of Ukrainians. Yet, today, the lack of courage or will on the part of the Ukrainian political elites to bring to justice those responsible for crimes during the Soviet rule does not allow for a clean break with the twentieth-century totalitarian and colonial past.

For any stateless nation, its culture and particularly its literature serves as a mir-
ror as well as a beacon of hope and progress. Modern Ukrainian literature has not only reflected national and cultural identity issues, but in many cases has also shaped them. In the post-independence period, literature still provides a number of meaningful examples of how the process of identity construction evolves and changes under new social and political circumstances. The second section of the book, “Reflecting Identities: The Literary Paradigm,” examines the most important literary trends since independence and places them within the context of identity politics.

The project of national identity in modern Ukraine has always gravitated between two powerful “Others,” Europe and the East, that is, Russia. And even though choosing a European identification has historically prevailed in Ukrainian intellectual circles, it is not an exclusive tendency now, as some of the contributors in this literary section attest. Some writers, rather than opting between these two alternatives, aim at a third choice, which can be designated as Ukraine-centered. Any self-identification entails a struggle with alterity, that is, any identity construction simultaneously involves a degree of self-reflection and a measure of projection onto the world of others seen as the world one wants either to associate with or dissociate from. The geography of belonging plays a crucial role in contemporary literary texts. In fact, the contributions in this section on literature and identity make it abundantly clear that geography matters not only because it brings out the regional divisions in literary circles with the corollary of opposing outlooks on future cultural developments but also because literature itself reflects geographic idiosyncrasies and/or demographic habits that stem from diverse historical and political realities.

Since 1991, the language situation in Ukraine has become one of the most hotly contested issues. Despite the fact that the law on languages naming Ukrainian as the only official state language was passed as early as 1989—that is, before independence—usage of the Ukrainian language and issues regarding its quality and standardization have yet to achieve widespread acceptance throughout the country. The language issue still stirs passions and seems to be a divisive tool in the hands of neighbors, as well as politicians who want to manipulate the electorate in the hope of winning extra votes in elections. The Soviet goal of blending languages and using only Russian is showing results, especially in that the latter was considered as the only language that would guarantee personal success.

The final section of this volume, “Manifesting Culture: Language, Media, and the Arts,” begins with a discussion of language politics and presents it as an inextricable part of a larger set of cultural issues. Studying the history and politicization of current language standardization efforts as well as examining attitudes toward the West Ukrainian variant of Ukrainian, or the value of language purity and correctness, facilitates an understanding of the choices made by the media, illustrates the strategies assumed by pop stars, and makes the case for a full-fledged government-sponsored cultural policy, which would support art, film, and music endeavors. In order to appreciate the complexities of post-independence tendencies in culture, the long-lasting trend of imperial appropriation of cultural capital needs to be addressed.

How does Ukraine compare with other post-Soviet states or Soviet satellites? What
are its aspirations and inspirations in terms of political affiliation and cultural leanings? What are the main obstacles that hinder its European reintegration, and what are its accomplishments in the past decade and a half? How do the media and other artistic endeavors shape identity politics? These are some of the questions posed by twenty-five scholars from different parts of the world who study contemporary Ukraine within the broader historical and cultural context.

Roman Szporluk draws similarities between German and Ukrainian nation-building efforts (going back to the mid-nineteenth century), and argues that a Ukrainian attempt at nation formation, when compared with the German one, is in no way more delayed. Ukrainians of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, like the Germans, overcame a religious divide; when it came to the conceptualization of a Ukrainian nation, Ukrainians looked east to their compatriots under tsarist Russian rule. Moreover, he points out chronological parallels, namely, that the German lands were at last reunited in 1990, and Ukraine gained its independence in 1991. He also underscores the role of the Polish struggle to regain independence. The Poles were considerably ahead of the Germans (and Russians for that matter) in nation building, and greatly influenced the formation of the Ukrainian nation in the nineteenth century. The “European” theme became dominant in Ukrainian discourse mainly as a way to assert its distinctiveness from Russia.

Mykola Riabchuk studies the electorate’s attitudes in recent parliamentary and presidential elections and seeks explanations for regional election patterns in the historical past. He too emphasizes the significance of the Polish factor, namely, that the rule of the First Rzeczpospolita over Ukrainian territories (from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries) appears to have left a trace in Ukrainian politics today, whereby the area that belonged to the Polish sphere of influence in the past now tends to vote for democratic- and reform-minded politicians. Riabchuk argues that the slogan “a return to Europe” seemingly constitutes for Ukrainian nation-builders a return to the norm, or a way to compensate for historical injustice, healing in the process “a developmental pathology.”

Giulia Lami sketches the political landscape in Ukraine from the Orange Revolution to the disbandment of the Supreme Rada in April 2007, and places it within the context of European Union (EU) expansion. Studying the contemporary political climate in Ukraine, her focus is not on its historical underpinnings, but on the European reactions. She states that the EU’s goal vis-à-vis Ukraine lies in the latter’s stability. Europe’s attitude toward Ukraine is cautious and pragmatic, and to some extent conditioned by its relations with Russia. This is especially true as far as Italy is concerned; Lami underscores the Italian bias toward Russia, and sees it as an obstacle to building support for Ukraine’s membership bid in the European Union.

Oxana Pachlovska also refers to the Orange Revolution, but studies it from the religious angle. She contends that a traditional war between East and West invariably unfolds as a war between Orthodoxy (in its Russian variant) and Western Christianity. When describing the events leading up to the Orange Revolution, with Viktor Yanukovych named as the “Orthodox candidate,” Pachlovska states: “The politicization of
Orthodoxy took on brutal, Soviet forms, which were primitive in a characteristically Soviet manner.” What is revealed in the process is the use of religion as a tool of social engineering, which seems especially true for Russia, where a neototalitarian regime is upheld with the help of communist-orthodox rhetoric. Within this dynamic, Pachlovska concludes that the so-called Eurasian space is promoted now with the aim of restoring the “homologous ‘Russian space.’” She argues that the East–West divide in post-independence Ukraine should be defined not so much in religious and linguistic terms as in cultural and ideological terms. There are indeed two Ukraines, Pachlovska contends, a European and a Soviet one. She ends with a bold conclusion: “Ukraine can exist only as part of the European continuum. Otherwise, it will simply not exist.”

Andrew Sorokowski also focuses on religion, but presents it as a function of law. He studies European legal culture in order to apply its standards to the situation in post-Soviet Ukraine. Sorokowski outlines the effects of Ukrainian law on the subjects of minorities, tolerance, church and state, church and school, family, and conscientious objection to military service, and concludes that “Ukraine’s legislation strikes a balance between individual and group rights, and rights and responsibilities, that is typically European.” He also underscores the fact that the European legal tradition has been part of Ukraine’s heritage.

Catherine Wanner points out that relatively tolerant legislation toward nontraditional religious communities after the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a sharp rise in conversions to evangelical faiths. Moreover, she claims that religious pluralism in independent Ukraine has made it one of the most active and competitive religious marketplaces in Europe. Wanner shows how the individual’s turning away from the historically Ukrainian national denomination affects identity and cultural change. She argues that evangelical communities challenge the link between religion and nation-state and replace it with a religiously based sense of identity that transcends national borders.

Elehie Natalie Skoczylas outlines public attitudes toward human rights and personal freedoms, privatization measures, elections, and a multiparty system, based on survey findings and exit polling that she has conducted since 1998. By examining public perceptions about sociopolitical and economic values, she presents a convincing account of Ukraine’s political culture. Her most stunning conclusion is how widespread and steadfast the public has been in support of liberal democratic values. Beginning with the 2004 presidential elections, Ukraine’s voting public has emerged as informed and engaged, politically cultured and savvy. Skoczylas further states that “what was not predicted was that the 2004 elections would demonstrate the power of a public, the success of Ukrainian voters to demand and have free and fair elections.” She demonstrates that Ukrainians, faced with the question of what kind of state they would like to live in, answer without hesitation that they prefer to live in a democratic one.

While the above chapter looks into the future, the one by Myroslava Antonovych brings into the equation the crimes of the communist past. She studies the resolutions of the Council of Europe as well as its practices and mechanisms dealing with
accountability for communist human rights abuses in the former communist states. Within that context, she analyzes the case of Ukraine’s coping with its totalitarian past. In her view, unlike the neighboring Central and East European countries, post-Soviet Ukraine has not adequately dealt with the abuses of the communist era.

Gender issues constitute an important part of contemporary Ukraine’s social and political landscape. Marian J. Rubchak examines the factors behind the emergence of female centrality in contemporary cultural discourse, and traces the heritage of empowered Ukrainian women. By situating the legacy in Ukraine’s prehistoric stage of development, she emphasizes the ancient heritage of Ukraine as a nation/country itself. Her study reveals the contradictory, if not paradoxical, nature of gender relations in post-independence Ukraine. On the one hand, there is a tendency to resurrect ancient myths about matriarchal power as a way to enhance the status of women; on the other hand, as Rubchak discloses, the topos of empowered womanhood is but a surrogate symbol, an illusory reality designed to “keep women content with a subordinate status.”

Ukrainian literature of the post-independence period found itself right in the middle of identity-formation issues. Contemporary literary works reflect the politics of identity and to some extent still influence social and cultural change. Nine literary scholars contributing to this volume discuss a European connection when approaching cultural processes in Ukraine, and some of them turn to specific metaphors that best convey the aspect of self-identification as reflected in literary texts.

Maria Zubrytska’s mirror/window metaphor, for example, helps to construct the framework within which the identification mechanisms unfold: “If one sees oneself in a mirror, in a window one sees the world of others, or Otherness.” She invokes those writers from the Ukrainian literary tradition who viewed literature as “a window onto the world, particularly onto Europe, and its culture.” Zubrytska insists that in order to understand current trends in literature, one needs to look back and fully assimilate the past. She skillfully links the efforts made by writers of the cultural renaissance of the 1920s who, according to her, “created a new map of European culture without any artificial political borders,” with the efforts of such contemporary writers as Iurii (Yuri) Andrukhovych, who engenders his own Europe and promotes his own topology of national identity.

Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych’s chapter, while continuing the mirror/window metaphor, proposes to look at current Ukrainian drama as an indicator of cultural values and individual and/or group identification. The way in which an individual identifies self is associated with the way that person sees others. The topology described above, of a mirror (seeing oneself) and a window (seeing/searching for another world), also discloses cultural stereotypes. The 120 plays studied reflect a considerable degree of inclusiveness, “especially in terms of respect for individuals and for western nationalities.” There is also a tendency among playwrights to dispense with Soviet-era stereotypes, as well as an inclination to underscore the European connection through the choice of protagonists or through the use of a Western cultural backdrop.
Michael M. Naydan focuses mainly on the poetry produced by the Bu-Ba-Bu group: Yuri Andrukhovych, Viktor Neborak, and Oleksandr Irvanets. He compares the trend to that of the 1920s, to the “coercive intertextuality” practiced during the 1960s, and to the poetic avant-garde of the 1980s. He discusses various changes in expressions of Ukrainian linguistic and cultural identity as well as a return to European roots. Yet he also provides a broad context for the group’s avant-garde activity, which he sees as using a two-step approach: first destroying traditional Ukrainian icons by means of postmodernist carnivalization, and then formulating a new identity by means of a close examination of Western and Third World mass culture. Naydan argues that the contribution of the Bu-Ba-Bu poets with respect to the issue of identity construction lies in their ability to dethrone socialist clichés and in their successful incorporation of taboo subjects—often through parody and trespassing. By taking on the establishment and foregrounding the performative aspects of poetry, they became quite popular among younger audiences.

Ola Hnatiuk provides a thorough presentation of literary discussions of the previous century, and then delves deeper into Ukrainian cultural identity discourse of the mid-1990s. She sees it primarily as one between the nativist and the “liberal” literary groups, with the pro-Western “modernizers” dominating at first. She discusses, for example, how the anthology Dinner for Twelve People (1997) played “a special role in polarizing the writers’ circles” in this discourse. Thus, at the end of the 1990s, the author claims that the nativist group, that is, the Zhytomyr literary school, “had become mainstream in the identity debate.” However, this direction lasted only until 2004, when the Orange Revolution reflected society’s “hopes for European integration,” a position symbolized by such pro-Western writers as Yuri Andrukhovych.

Lidia Stefanowska also focuses on discursive formations around literary issues. She views contemporary Ukrainian literature primarily in terms of varied ideologies (e.g., those who reject Western influences and those who remain open to them). She concentrates on the significance of Galicia (Halychyna) in the contemporary cultural discourse of Ukraine. Stefanowska discusses Andrukhovych’s essays as a reflection of the writer’s imaginary constructs, with a considerable dose of nostalgia about the borderless reality of Central Europe before World War I. The historical plunge into the Austrian past as a stable bridge to European culture is what Andrukhovych cherishes the most. She also recognizes in his essays the value of what is termed “the small homeland” (i.e., Galicia) to which he belongs. In these strong local attachments, Stefanowska concludes, one might discern a defense mechanism against globalization processes and the postmodern absence of values.

Marko Robert Stech studies the “identity shift” reflected in four novels of the mid-1990s. His approach to literary analysis is psychological, and it is no coincidence that he invokes Carl Jung’s work Symbols of Transformation. He concentrates on Jung’s motif of death and resurrection and follows its various manifestations in novels by Yuri Andrukhovych, Valerii Shevchuk, Iurii (Yuri) Izdryk, and Iurko Hudz. Stech claims that the content and form of an artistic creation mirrors the psychological and existential condition of its author. Similarly, the sum of individual texts, ideas and artifacts reflects the nation’s “collective self.” He concludes that the search for a new
voice in Ukrainian literature began with two models offered by Izdryk and Hudz: “either through assimilating and transforming in novel ways European literary models, or by revitalizing the sources of Ukrainian national tradition (or, more precisely, by some combination of both).”

Marko Pavlyshyn examines how Europe and its context have affected Ukrainian writers since independence. He claims that Europe constitutes a nontraditional cultural paradigm that especially attracts younger writers. Pavlyshyn focuses on Yuri Andrukhovych and Yuri Izdryk and contrasts their positions vis-à-vis West European tradition. Andrukhovych’s fascination with Europe manifests itself best in territorial appropriations, that is, his Europe is a construct that allows him to place his own native town within a continuum that stretches from Bukovyna to Munich; Izdryk’s Western orientation unfolds as the appropriation of the European intellectual tradition.

Maxim Tarnawsky focuses on two writers, who belong to a younger generation than Andrukhovych and Izdryk. He analyzes two novels by Serhii Zhadan and two novels by Anatolii Dnistrovyi, and underscores the passivity and hesitance of their protagonists. Tarnawsky contends that the Zhadan and Dnistrovyi generation of writers in post-Communist Ukraine retreat from the extreme individualism characteristic of the Bu-Ba-Bu generation and instead glorify the collective sense of responsibility, even if it includes drugs, violence, sex, and overall moral decay. The connection to things European is not particularly pronounced but manifests itself mainly through icons of popular culture, especially rock groups.

Maria G. Rewakowicz outlines the discourse around the issues of gender and feminism in Ukrainian post-Soviet literature, and points out the progressive nature of women’s approaches to literary studies. She also underscores the uniformly Western-oriented bias among female authors. Unlike their male counterparts, who seem to be divided between the nativist and Western orientations or ideologies, women authors display unambiguous affinity with Western values and models.

Language choice, quality, and standardization remain at the center of Ukraine’s post-independence politics. It is also through the language that a national culture manifests itself and finds its distinctiveness when confronted by hostile Others. The third section of the book discusses cultural issues through the prisms of language usage and colonial conditioning.

Serhii Vakulenko points out that the historical circumstances of the Ukrainian nation necessarily contributed to the development of at least two variants of the standard language. He provides an outline of the formation of the standard Ukrainian language, focusing on standardization practices in the 1920s. He also discusses the process of Russification of the Ukrainian language following the purges of the 1930s, and its ramifications on current efforts of reconciling Ukrainian orthography in the post-Soviet period.

Michael Moser demonstrates that cyber attacks on the Galician variant of the Ukrainian language entail deeper hostility toward things Ukrainian, and in reality constitute an attack not only on Galician expressions but also on the modern Ukrainian standard language. He studies the various attitudes of bloggers toward Galicia and its specific
Laada Bilaniuk focuses specifically on the Ukrainian language of the post-Soviet period, when it was proclaimed the state language after many decades. This disrupted the hierarchy of languages established during the Soviet period (Russian first), as well as during the tsarist era (Russian only). The chapter examines the role of judgments of language quality in shaping the linguistic marketplace, hence the linguistic-cultural definition of Ukraine. Various aspects of confidence or insecurity and choice are discussed in terms of language use today, which is associated with both ethnic allegiance and education accessible in that language. Insecurity in language quality, in turn, often contributes to the continuing maintenance of the Soviet-established linguistic hierarchy. According to the author, language quality has as much currency in public discourse as language choice, mainly because it is linked to social legitimacy and authority.

Yuri Shevchuk studies linguistic strategies employed by the empire to appropriate the cultural capital of its colonial subjects. He specifically focuses on Ukrainian filmmaking and examines the reasons behind its absence on the cultural map of Europe. Shevchuk offers numerous examples in spelling, lexical semantics, and lexical distribution, all pointing to concerted efforts on the part of Russia to appropriate and designate Ukrainian contributions to film as Soviet. Shevchuk’s article reads as a guideline against imperial appropriation and provides tips for navigating through the body of texts written on film in the former Soviet Union, in both East and West.

Marta Dyczok examines the role of the media in identity formation and in the illustration of the ongoing process of change in the collective categories of identity, as well as the ongoing competition between European and Soviet-era orientations. She argues that the media in post-communist Ukraine does not so much shape identity as reflect various changes and conflicts in the processes of identity construction. Her three case studies underscore the presence of a variety of identity leanings, those tied to European institutions, those still rooted in the Soviet past, and those reflecting hybrid attitudes.

Marko Pavlyshyn’s chapter enters the territory of popular culture and discusses its implications for identity politics in independent Ukraine. He provides an analysis of the Ruslana (Ruslana Lyzhychko) phenomenon, focusing especially on her Eurovision-winning contest in 2004. He argues that Ruslana’s appearance carried a double message, one directed to a non-Ukrainian audience, stressing freedom, individualism, and hedonism, and the second one to a Ukrainian audience, stressing the importance of the local and the national (she incorporated ethnic elements of Hutsul folklore in her song). Pavlyshyn concludes that identity is not so much defined by the possession of certain cultural attributes as by “the wish to belong to a community that cherishes a cultural heritage and confidently assumes a right to equal presence with others in the culturally heterogeneous contemporary world.”

Myroslav Shkandrij presents an account of trends in contemporary art in Ukraine through a meticulous description of the avant-garde movements from 1908 to 1930.
He reasons that in order to understand and appreciate the quest of Ukrainian artists for international recognition today, it is useful to examine the experience of their predecessors, especially those of the historical avant-garde. Shkandrij convincingly depicts the depth of cooperation between artists in Western Europe and Ukrainian artists in the first three decades of the past century. He concludes that since independence, new links are being forged, but there is no single prevailing attitude. There are forces that question the necessity of looking toward the West, and there are those that advocate closer ties with Europe.

Virko Baley describes the music scene in Ukraine immediately preceding and following its regaining of independence. He focuses on the organization of festivals as a way to expose the world to Ukrainian achievements in the realm of music, and as a mechanism to introduce Western contemporary music and performers to the Ukrainian public. Baley concludes that expectations were not met for further development of international cooperation, mostly because of the government’s lack of serious cultural policy in today’s Ukraine.

By and large, the imperial appropriation issues introduced by Shevchuk in the realm of film, apply to art and music as well. Both Shkandrij and Baley are forced to provide double spellings for artists, composers, and performers on quite a few occasions. This difficulty stems from the fact that name spellings known in the West often came via the Russian rather than the Ukrainian transliteration system.

As John Lukacs wrote in 1965, the Russian Revolution, and Russia’s (or actually the Soviet Union’s) separation or withdrawal from Europe in 1921 made the term “iron curtain” valid (Lukacs, 27). The enforced Great European Divide served as both political and cultural barriers to a European identification for seventy years. The present post-Soviet and postcolonial period represents an open window, serving as a two-way mirror to the former cultural inheritance of Europe and new opportunities for growth in Ukraine.

**On Transliteration**

For the transliteration of Ukrainian words and names, we have mainly relied on the Library of Congress Table of Transliteration, except in the chapter by Michael Moser, where the Linguistic Transliteration is used. We have also consistently omitted the soft sign in personal names, but preserved it in transliterated titles and bibliographical references and in the word Rus’. In the text, adjectival masculine surnames ending in –s’kyi or -yi were simplified to the more accepted English usage as –sky or -y.

Names that have become established in the English-speaking world in a particular spelling are rendered accordingly, and the names of authors who have published books in the Latin alphabet are rendered as in those publications. Geographical references are transliterated from the original Ukrainian, except in the case of Halychyna and Galicia, which appears in two variants. Similarly, the word kozak is preferred by some authors, while others use Cossack.
Notes

1. Information about this textbook was provided by Michael Moser in his presentation at the Shevchenko Scientific Society on November 10, 2007, in New York.

2. Vysloka or Wisłoka (in Polish) river is now at Poland’s southeastern border with Ukraine. It is a tributary of the Vistula, close to the San River (or Sian River in Ukrainian).

3. An abridged form of “The Bendery Constitution” in English may be found in Lindheim and Luckyj, 53–64. Significantly, this culture of sharing responsibilities as well as an expression of the right to individual opinion led Stanislav Orihovsky (1513–1566), widely educated in Western European universities, to send his moral lectures to the Polish king in 1543. Orihovsky stressed the humanitarian responsibilities of kings and certain natural human rights (Orihovsky, 118–153).

4. A counterproposal to “Europe” for the countries of Eastern Europe, especially for the formerly Soviet nations, started to surface from a resurgent political movement in Russia, a movement aspiring to continue Russian influence on the once-Soviet republics, and/or to resurrect the Russian Empire. Some institutions in the West quickly acquiesced to the term Eurasia, desiring to refer to the former Soviet countries by just a single word. However, the logic in using this term is questionable (since the countries involved do not include all of Europe and all of Asia), and also the only truly Eurasian countries would be those that are partly in both Asia and Europe (e.g., Russia, Turkey, etc.). With the use of this term by some institutions came many political and cultural implications as well as limitations on the East European countries’ participation in the society of the free countries of the rest of Europe. Furthermore, the countries involved were not consulted regarding their willingness to be in the Eurasian grouping that was being artificially promulgated by outsiders.

References


In the first chapter of this book, Roman Szporluk quotes Goethe in 1797 asking “where is Germany?” A similar question may well have been asked in reference to Ukraine, whether in 1797 or 1979. The answer would have been more complicated for Ukraine, because of its historically shifting borders as the Ukrainian lands were absorbed into one or another empire. Even the boundary between Europe and Asia shifted over the centuries; yet Ukraine was always on the European side of the dividing line recognized at the time, whether it was the Don River or the Ural Mountains.

Ukraine is a presence on maps of Europe dating back to the sixteenth century. Spelled *Ukrania, Ucraniae, Vkranie, or Ukraine*, it appears on old English, French, Dutch, Prussian, and Austrian maps showing both the lands of Ukraine and the dominant political imperial presences of a given period. It was from maps such as these that students studied and adults learned about their own country in relation to the whole of Europe (see Introduction).
Map 1. ca 1650.
“Carte d’Ukranie. Rouen.”
By Guillaume Le Vasseur Sieur de Beauplan (1600–1673).

Beauplan, a renowned French cartographer, who lived in Ukraine for many years (1630–1648), has left us more than a dozen maps of Ukraine. Among them is the rather unusual Rouen Map, which shows Ukraine and the Black Sea from a northern standpoint, looking southward. (Andrew Gregorovich. “300th Anniversary. Beauplan. 1600–1673.” *Forum*, no. 24, 1974, 16–17.)
Map 2. 1700.
“A New Map of Sarmatia Europaea, Pannonia, and Dacia,” by Edward Wells of London.

“Wells’s New Map of Sarmatia Europaea was issued in 1700 in his atlas A New Sett of Maps Both of Ancient and Present Geography. [...] The work of Wells, a mathematician and professor of geography at Oxford, was highly regarded for its accuracy, and his maps were frequently reproduced.” “Wells follows Ptolemy and distinguishes European Sarmatia from Asian Sarmatia with its frontier being no further than the river Tanais (Don).” (Bohdan Kordan, The Mapping of Ukraine. European Cartography and Maps of Early Modern Ukraine, 1550–1799. New York: The Ukrainian Museum, 2008, p. 32.) The map is from the Titus and Sophia K. Hewryk Collection.
Map 3. 1770.
“L’Europe.” Map by Rigobert Bonne (1727–1795).

“The map shows Poland before it was partitioned by the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1722 and 1973. [. . .] Western Europe is reasonably accurate but Eastern Europe including the Black Sea (Mer Noire), Crimea and Azov Sea are very inaccurate.” (Andrew Gregorovich, *Forum*, no. 114, 2007, p. 18–19.)
Map 4. 1897.
“Europe (Political).” (Revised 1914.)

Contemporary Ukraine
on the Cultural Map of Europe
I
Mapping the Nation
History, Politics, and Religion
In the coming years, analysts of current affairs are certain to examine and debate the “Orange Revolution’s” significance for Ukrainian and more broadly post-Communist politics and societies. Guided by their own views of “2004,” historians will be rethinking and rewriting the history of Ukraine. In so doing, they will remain faithful to a long-established academic tradition: as everybody knows, “1917” inspired generations of scholars, both in Russia and in the West, to search for—and find—in the history of nineteenth-century Russia the origins of the Bolshevik revolution.

A longer version of this chapter, “The Making of Modern Ukraine: The Western Dimension,” was first published in March 2004. Thus, it does not qualify as an attempt to write Ukrainian history in the light of the Orange Revolution, but it does contribute, as a historical commentary, to the current political debate about Ukraine’s future relations with Europe and Russia.

I argue that the revolution of 1848 was a significant event in the history of Ukraine at a time when its history intersected with that of other nations of central and eastern Europe, including the Germans, Italians, Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles, and during that historical juncture when traditional empires were beginning to face the challenges of nationalism. The chapter then proceeds to situate the Ukrainian story in a broader chronological and spacial frame, since the Ukrainian national idea had first been formulated before 1848, and in the Russian Empire, not Austria. By choosing to become Ukrainian, Austria’s Greek-Catholic “Ruthenes” chose to be a part of a nation whose main part lived under the tsar and belonged to the Orthodox Church. The making of modern Ukraine thus required overcoming a deep religious divide, a problem familiar in the history of other nations, including Germany.

Whereas Ukraine became connected to German history through the Habsburg monarchy, the decisive moments in the making of modern Ukraine occurred in confrontations with Poland and Russia. In the post-1945 period, after centuries of Ukrainian-Polish conflicts, Poland became a supporter of Ukrainian national aspirations. As for “the Russia connection,” the chapter leaves open the question of Russia’s post-1991 policies and intentions toward Ukraine. It suggests that Russia has not yet decided whether it wants to restore its empire or to become a
nation-state, whether it sees its future as a European power or as an entity outside Europe.

More than five decades ago, in February 1948, the British historian Lewis Namier delivered a lecture commemorating the centennial of the European revolution of 1848 (Baker 59–63; Julia Namier 31). His lecture has been published many times since then as “1848: Seed-Plot of History” (Lewis Namier 21–30).

Namier’s choice of 1848 as a point of departure was well founded. The year 1848 saw the first European revolutions: France was at the center, and there were also revolutions in Palermo, Naples, Vienna, Berlin, Buda, and Poznań, to name a few. It was also the year of nationalist revolutions in central Europe and the year of publication of The Communist Manifesto, which predicted that an international proletarian revolution would abolish capitalism, the state, nations, and nationalism.

A central theme of Namier’s lecture was that “every idea put forward by the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1848 was realized at some juncture, in one form or another” during the next century. Namier concluded: “1848 remains a seed-plot of history. It crystallized ideas and projected the pattern of things to come; it determined the course of the following century. It planned, and its schemes have been realized: but non vi si pensa quanto sangue costa.”

Namier believed that the solution of the German Question—that is, “What is Germany?”—was and would remain the central national problem in central and eastern Europe for the next hundred years, that beginning in 1848 and continuing through World War I and World War II, the history of Germany defined the entire region’s history. The other cases he reviewed (Hungarian, Italian, Polish, Yugoslav, and Ukrainian) were directly related to the German story. As one of the nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy that put forward their programs in 1848, Ruthenians or Ukrainians were also a part of Namier’s scheme. West Ukraine (Galicia and Bukovyna) was the easternmost extension of the European revolutions of 1848–1849, and for modern Ukrainian history 1848 was a turning point.

Namier’s “German-centered” schema helps to see better the larger stage on which Ukrainian history was made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He draws our attention to the fact that at the very core of the Habsburg monarchy there grew and intensified a conflict—a “dialectical contradiction,” to use a popular Marxist phrase—between the dynasty and its principles, on the one hand, and German nationalism, the German national question, on the other. The tension and conflict between “Empire” and “Germany” influenced the imperial government’s treatment of other nationalities, Ukrainians included. Bringing the German story into a Ukrainian narrative allows us to correct the common view that Ukrainian nation formation was a delayed or retarded process, whereas the German one represented an advanced case. A closer look at Namier’s German story makes one wonder whether that distinction can be made.

In order to understand Namier’s story about what happened in 1848, it is necessary to go back half a century to the period when the stage for those later developments was set. The late eighteenth century saw two events that defined the course of Ukrainian history for the next 150 years. The first was the abolition of an autonomous Ukrainian entity in
1785 (the Hetmanate) in the Russian Empire, which occurred at virtually the same time as the beginning of a Ukrainian cultural and literary revival there. The second was the partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795. In the first partition (1772), Austria took Galicia, of which the western part was Polish-speaking and the eastern part Ukrainian-speaking. Prussia took Poland’s Pomerania, and Russia took what is now Belarus. In the 1793 and 1795 partitions, Russia took the Right-Bank Ukraine, Lithuania, and the rest of Belarus, whereas Prussia and Austria divided between themselves the remaining core Polish territory (Warsaw went to Prussia; Kraków, to Austria). The former Polish territories that now found themselves in Russia formed the stage on which the Ukrainian movement would coexist and compete with both Polish and Russian power (Armstrong 29).³

The Seed-Plot in Brief

Germany played the most important role in Namier’s scheme. He wrote that during the revolutions of 1848, four different models of Germany had been proposed, and each of them was realized, at one time or another, between 1848 and 1945. After the Habsburg defeat of 1848–1849 came (1) the Greater Austria of 1850; (2) in 1866, after the Prussian-Austrian war, a Greater Prussia emerged (Germany being partitioned in 1866); this was followed by (3) the Lesser Germany (Klein-Deutschland) of 1870–1871; and, finally, (4) Adolf Hitler’s Greater Germany created in 1938–1939—a Germany that included Austrian and Czech provinces and that was one of the radical ideas of the 1848 revolution (and Karl Marx’s preferred German state). According to Namier, several other nationalities of the Habsburg Empire realized their ideas in the century following 1848. The Hungarians’ 1848 program was achieved in the Compromise of 1867, which transformed the Austrian Empire into Austria-Hungary. That arrangement constituted a defeat for the “non-historic” peoples for whom the Greater Austria of 1850 had promised a better deal. The Italians also had some of their claims satisfied during 1866–1867: Vienna was forced to give up most of its Italian possessions to the new Kingdom of Italy. The Poles also gained: Galicia became autonomous in 1868, and the Polish nobility there became its real master, though under a constitutional regime.

“In 1918–19 came the time for the subject races of the German and Magyar spheres,” Namier continues. The Czechs and Slovenes won their independence from the Germans; and the departure of the Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbs reduced the Greater Hungary of 1867. I add to Namier’s account the facts that Hungary’s Ukrainians became citizens of Czechoslovakia, and twenty years later, after the Sudetenland crisis in 1938, Prague granted autonomy to Czechoslovakia’s “Ruthenian” province, which at the same time began to call itself “Carpatic-Ukraine.” The events of 1938 and 1939 (when Hungary annexed that area with Hitler’s approval) illustrate the connection between the unfolding of the Namierian German agenda and Ukrainian history.

The post-World War I period was also “the time” for the Poles: they and the Italians fully realized the goals they had set while living under the Habsburgs. In 1918–1921,
the Poles were able to assert their power by taking physical control of Ruthenian territory in Galicia and claiming all of Galicia as Polish. The Italians were able to do the same with respect to the Yugoslavs—meaning Slovenes and Croats. (Namier wrote Yugoslavs: in 1948 Yugoslavia’s survival seemed secure.)

The last act of the 1848 drama took place in 1939–1945, when “the Ruthenians completed their 1848 agenda with respect to the Poles, and the Yugoslavs completed their agenda in the Italian sphere.” In consequence of World War II, the Ruthenians finally disentangled themselves from the Polish bond—a legacy of 1848 and 1918–1919. Namier did not elaborate on the meaning of the term “came the time” as it applied to Ruthenians. Although Polish rule over Ukrainians ended by 1945, national independence did not follow (thus, their 1848 agenda was not realized in 1945).

Namier’s story ends in 1948, but here it will continue to 1991, in an expanded geographical framework. For a historian of Ukraine, Namier’s lecture serves as a very clear point of departure for a review of Ukraine’s European or western connection. Germans were involved in Ukrainian affairs in 1914–1918 and again after 1939; and in 1991, only one year after German unification, Ukraine finally gained its independence.

German Nationalism and the Habsburg Empire

In 1797 Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Friedrich Schiller asked the famous question: “Deutschland? Aber wo liegt es? Ich weiß das Land nicht zu finden.” Without giving an answer, they explained the source of their difficulty: “Wo das gelehrte beginnt, hört das politische auf.”

Fifty years later, in 1848, Germans remained deeply divided about the question of what Germany was. In 1848, the German nationalists’ program was to create a unified Germany as a nation state that would embrace all German kingdoms and principalities. The “Greater Austria” that emerged in 1850 dominated politics in all German lands, but it also included such countries as Hungary, which German nationalists were not ready to accept. Namier’s listing of different models of Germany is a useful reminder that the German nation, which some old-style studies classify as a “historic” and thus well-defined nation, was itself undergoing complex processes of making, remaking, and unmaking during its transition to the age of nationalism. The new idea of a single, united German nation state was revolutionary: it called for the destruction of the historic states of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and dozens of others, and it challenged the integrity of the hereditary dominions of the house of Habsburg that lay within the Holy Roman Empire.

We can understand why the partitions profoundly influenced Polish, Ukrainian, and German history. They transformed Prussia and Austria and thus helped to “de-Germanize” these two states by adding substantial Polish populations and territories. The Polish question became a problem in Prussia’s internal politics, and the inclusion of Polish territories into the Habsburg monarchy moved Vienna’s center of attention east into the Slavic world. Thus, post-1815 Austria was less German than it was before 1772. This shift influenced the balance between the Germans and Slavs in favor of the latter.
When Austria took Polish territories (Galicia), it had to deal with a Polish nation that was more advanced in nation building than the Germans. Compared with Polish developments, German nationalism was still largely an intellectual phenomenon, not only in Napoleon’s time, but even after 1815 and until 1848. Polish nationalism had inspired wars and uprisings in 1794, 1807, 1809, 1812, and 1830. Even when there was no Poland on the map, no Polish poet—let alone two!—would have answered the question “Where is Poland?” in the way Goethe and Schiller spoke about Germany. The Poles were ahead of the Germans (and the Russians) in nation building at this time—a fact that would also greatly influence Ukrainian nation formation, since the Poles constituted a major part of Ukraine’s “Western dimension.”

Not only were the Germans divided and confused about what their country was or should be. Other nationalities had problems deciding how to define their countries. Vienna wanted to create a multiethnic “imperial people,” in opposition to German and other ethnic nationalities. The Czech historian Jiří Kořalka writes that the Czechs faced no less than five concepts of nation by 1848: Austrian, Pan-German, Slavic, Bohemian, and Czech. He notes the efforts of the Josephinian system “to create an Austrian state nation, whose main support was to come from the enlightened homo austriacus (Austrian man) in the Austrian state administration and school system, in the army and in the church, guided by the state.” Until approximately 1860, Vienna was still trying to create an Austrian imperial national identity, which was just as anti-Czech or anti-Hungarian or anti-Polish as it was anti-German (Kořalka 19–20).

The Ruthenians (or West Ukrainians) in Galicia were also confused about their identity in 1848. Ruthenians had had a long relationship with the Poles. Galicia was the first Ukrainian-inhabited area to find itself under Polish kings and had been under their rule uninterrupted from the mid-fourteenth century until 1772. Following the 1772 partition, Germany (as “Austria”) entered into the Polish-Ukrainian connection in Galicia as a third force during a period of intellectual and political revolution. Galicia was drawn into the world of German problems, and the imperial government began to participate in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship.

The empire’s policy aimed at creating a homo austriacus explains why even though Austria’s entry into Ukrainian lands made possible the rise of a political community, Ruthenian peasants and Greek Catholics (Uniates) there did not become “Ukrainians.” Their first political consciousness was imperial—that is, what Thomas Masaryk, writing in the late nineteenth century, ironically called “Viennism,” while describing the Czechs’ continuing loyalty to the monarchy. In general, even after subjects of the monarchy had adopted a modern national self-identification (as Czechs, Ukrainians, Slovenes, and so forth), as a rule they retained their loyalty to the Emperor until the monarchy’s end.

At the time of the partitions, Austria failed to carry out its centralizing enlightenment-influenced reforms in Hungary and Bohemia, but it was more successful in Galicia. In the long run, the Poles benefited most from those reforms.

Some Polish historians have claimed that Vienna practiced a “Germanization” of Galicia after 1772, but that is not true. The addition of Galicia to the empire fostered the de-Germanization of Austria because it further diverted Vienna’s attention from the
German scene into the Slavic world. Any Germanization that the Habsburgs practiced was motivated by bureaucratic needs and not a part of German nation building. Vienna did not tell the Ukrainians (or others) that they were really German. And, as noted earlier, German nationalism had come into conflict with the Habsburg Monarchy, which the German revolutionaries wanted to dissolve by 1848. After 1772, Ruthenian Galicia became integrated with the other ex-Polish regions under Vienna. Until the revolution of 1848, the Poles generally believed, as did most politically aware Ruthenians, that Ruthenians were Polish. The dialect spoken by ethnically Polish peasants in western Galicia was different from that spoken by the eastern Galician peasants, but nationhood was considered a matter of politics, not ethnography. Choosing to be Polish meant choosing the Polish heritage as one’s own, regardless of one’s ethnic or religious background. Thus, as Jerzy Jedlicki writes, heritage was understood metaphorically: “the Polish peasant, the Polonized Jew, Ruthenian or German became the heir of the Polish nobility and of the entire history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth” (Jedlicki 53–76).

A Ukrainian national alternative to Polonism emerged in Galicia under the influence of ideas coming from Ukrainians in the Russian Empire. The 1837 publication in Buda of Rusalka Dnistrovaia, a slim collection of folk songs and poems written in the vernacular, was a landmark in the history of Galician Ruthenians, but as the contents reveal, its authors had been inspired by their East Ukrainian brothers. The young men who put it together were also responding to the national revivals among the Czechs and southern Slavs within the Habsburg monarchy. This was a slow process, however, which we can better understand by remembering how much trouble the more highly educated Germans had with choosing their own political identity.

For Austrian Ukrainians, their national revolution in 1848 was a declaration of secession from the Polish nation; it was a break with “Polonism,” not with “Viennism.” But even in 1848 they were still torn between different national alternatives. Vasyl Podolynsky, in a short Polish-language book printed in 1848, titled Słowo przestrogi [A Word of Warning], identified and examined four national orientations current among his Ruthenian compatriots: Ruthenian/Austrian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian. Those who opted for the Ukrainian nationality declared that their homeland extended beyond the Austrian Empire, as far east as the Don River. But even in the Main Ruthenian Council, some defined their nationality more narrowly, as a much smaller “Galician-Ruthenian people.” Eventually, however, upon the insistent demands of Yulian (Iulian) Lavrivsky, a member of the council who was not a clergyman, the declaration was revised to state that the Galician Ruthenians were a part of a fifteen-million strong Little Russian (Ukrainian) nation (Bohachevsky-Chomiak 29–30; Hrytsak 52). One needed a secular view of politics to be able to declare that the Greek Catholics of Galicia belonged to a nation that was overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox.

Between Russians and Poles: Ukrainians in the Russian Empire

Because his lecture stressed the centrality of the German Question, Namier left out the Russian dimension in the making of the Ukrainian nation, a dimension with its
own western connections beyond the frame of “Vienna.” The Ukrainian culture that the Galician Ruthenians were adopting from Russia was produced in part during the encounter of East Ukrainian awakeners with Polish culture there. Similarly, the Russian-Ukrainian relationship was influenced by Russia’s direct relations with western Europe. Thus, Russia was also part of Ukraine’s western dimension during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in order to understand the Ruthenian declaration of unity with Ukraine in 1848, we must briefly consider intellectual and political developments involving both Poles and Ukrainians in the framework of Russian history before 1848. While the Ruthenians of Galicia entered the European stage in 1848 through their experiences in that revolution, their ethnic kinsmen in the Russian Empire had participated in a very different kind of opening to Europe that was launched during the reign of Peter I (1689–1725) and continued under his successors, most notably Catherine II (1762–1796). In her study of nationalism, Liah Greenfeld argues that Russian nation formation was a direct consequence of Russia’s opening to the West, and she offers a theoretical-comparative perspective in which to interpret it. She asserts that in order for nationalist ideas to spread (a prerequisite for nation-building projects), “a supra-societal system,” or shared social space, has to exist (Greenfeld 495). Considering that from the eighteenth century on Russia’s rulers were trying to define their state in a European context, Greenfeld’s concept of “shared social space” (better perhaps to say “shared cultural or mental space”) supports Russia’s inclusion in Europe. When imperial Russia first opened itself to the West, then, it was reasonable to expect that “Little Russia,” as the former Hetmanate was called, would become integrated in the new St. Petersburg-centered and Europe-oriented Russian state and society then emerging. In Marc Raeff’s words: “All seemed to conspire to bring about the integration of the Ukrainian elite and its culture into that of the empire, leading, in fact, to russification, since Russian political culture had achieved dominance and monopoly in the empire” (Raeff 78). Indeed, because of Ukraine’s more developed educational network then, during Catherine II’s reign natives of Ukraine were prominent in various governmental, educational, and other institutions in St. Petersburg and Moscow. They were among the most enthusiastic builders of an imperial Russian national identity—as a way to become European.

There were limits to Russia’s Westernization or Europeanization, however. Russia’s state-sponsored “opening” to Europe was closely controlled and very selective. It did not provide for the adoption of modern political ideas and institutions of the West, such as representative government, an independent judiciary, or freedom of the press. The tsarist state’s refusal to evolve in the western direction became especially evident during the final phase of Catherine II’s reign and under her two immediate successors, emperors Paul (1796–1801) and Alexander I (1801–1825). All doubts on this score were removed during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855) with its declaration of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and narodnost’ as the fundamental principles of Russian statehood. Tsarist ideology and policies worked against the formation of a “European,” modern Russian nation.

Thus, while Russia’s “Europeanization” fostered the acculturation and assimilation
of “Little Russia” into a common imperial culture and polity, the processes that were making Russians European—while turning “Little Russians” into European Russians—also created conditions in which the modern idea of a distinct Ukrainian nation could emerge. The selective opening toward Europe reflected in the empire’s anti-liberal course was especially unwelcome in that area from which so many enthusiasts of Russia’s Europeanization had come two or three generations earlier, that is, “Little Russia,” or Left-Bank Ukraine. Its upper class was similar in some respects to the Polish elite and thought of itself as the carrier of Little Russia’s traditions and liberties, a heritage of Ukraine’s Commonwealth past that Ukraine did not share with Great Russia or “Muscovy.” Thus, even after Little Russia submitted to the tsars, it retained a system based on a rule of law, and many of its offices were at least formally elective until Catherine put an end to this tradition by extending the Russian administrative system to the area. It was individuals belonging to that Ukrainian elite who in contact with European ideas, reaching them also through other channels besides St. Petersburg, produced the idea that Ukraine was a nation. Gradually they managed to draw their own road map to Europe—and even persuade the Ruthenians in Galicia to join them. As John LeDonne has written, “while the autonomy of Little Russia was indeed being curtailed . . . a larger Ukraine was coming into being” (LeDonne 305). The idea of a larger Ukraine was no less revolutionary than the idea of a greater Germany.

Thoughts about a Ukraine larger than the just dissolved historic “Little Russia” found support in the geopolitical changes taking place in eastern Europe. By placing, after the partitions of 1793 and 1795, Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine together under one government, the tsarist state helped—unintentionally, of course—the Ukrainian national cause. The Poles were more than simply one of “the nationalities” in the multinational Russian Empire. In addition to the Kingdom of Poland (created in 1815 out of parts annexed by Prussia and Austria in 1795), a Polish-dominated social and cultural space extended far to the east, up to the 1772 border of the Commonwealth. In the case of Kyïv, Polish influence moved even beyond the old border. Kyïv, until then a border town, became a place where the Left- and the Right-Bank elites could meet. Ukrainians from the old Hetmanate found themselves again face to face with the Poles, the tsar’s new subjects. The emergent Ukrainian intelligentsia, owing to contacts with Polish cultural and political activists, discovered that the Poles knew a shorter road to Europe, in particular to its liberal and democratic ideas and institutions.

On the other hand, imperial annexation of so much Polish territory did not help Russia’s “Europeanization.” Vera Tolz has noted that the incorporation of Polish lands turned Poland into “Russia’s internal ‘West,’” but that area became the stage of the Russian-Polish struggle, making Russia’s own problems more difficult and bringing differences between Russia and Europe out into the open.6 Polish writers and scholars working in places like Warsaw and Vilnius were passing on the new ideas of nationality, increasingly popular in Habsburg lands, to the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belarusian intelligentsia in lands contested by the Poles and the Russians.

The emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia rejected Polish claims to Ukrainian lands, which the Poles wanted to make part of a restored Poland one day, and it similarly
refuted the Russia’s claims to those lands. The elite was receptive to Polish—that is, western or “European”—ideas, however. That was most notably the case in Kyïv, where in the 1840s the first significant Ukrainian intellectual and political circle, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, embraced political ideas circulating among the Poles. The Brotherhood held that the Ukrainians, an equal of Russians and Poles, were a member of the Slavic community of nations that also included the West and South Slavs beyond Russia’s borders. Yet there were limits to how far the early Ukrainian activists could open up to the Poles. Under both the Russian and Habsburg empires, Polish landlords continued to dominate the masses of Ukrainian peasantry. When the Ukrainian-Polish national conflict emerged, it had a strong social-class component (peasants against landlords).

Official Russia viewed “Little Russians” as a branch of a greater Russian nation that also included Great Russians and Belarusians. It was not until the 1860s, under the impact of the Polish 1863 insurrection, that the Ukrainian movement (ukraïnofil’stvo) was recognized as an attempt to break the unity of Russia. However, some Russian enemies of tsarism had recognized much earlier that ukraïnofil’stvo, even disguised as an interest in local history, folklore, and literature, carried a political message of “cosmopolitan” or “European liberalism” (Ulianov 156). If they were right, then the Ukrainian “project” was a Ukrainian “road map” to Europe, drawn in an encounter with the Poles and constituting an alternative to official Russia’s position on Europe.

Gradually, the “European” theme became dominant in Ukrainian discourses on the nature of Ukraine’s distinctiveness from Russia. The thesis that the Ukrainians’ historical ties to Europe distinguished them from the Russians became an article of faith in Ukrainian national ideology. According to Mykola Kostomarov, “the basic differences between Ukrainians and Russians rested more on socio-political factors than on ethnicity, language or religion.” Later, the leading spokesman of Ukrainian populism, Mykhailo Drahomanov, stressed that “the preponderance of national differences between Ukraine and Muscovy can be explained by the fact that until the eighteenth century Ukraine was more closely bound to western Europe,” and the twentieth-century conservative ideologue Viacheslav Lypynsky saw “the basic difference between Ukraine and Muscovy” not in language but in a different relationship between the state and society (Pelenski 222–223).

The End of the Vienna Connection

Paradoxical as this may appear, in 1914 the “stateless” Ruthenians of Galicia were a nation in a sense in which the Russians in “their own” empire were not. A Ukrainian subject of the Austrian monarchy enjoyed more personal and political freedom than a Ukrainian or Russian did in Russia. The Ukrainian national idea and the political ideas of the Ukrainophiles were compatible with the legal and political system and values of Europe as exemplified by Austria: what the Ukrainians wanted was even more of Europe—further democratic reforms, greater national rights, especially including autonomy for the Ukrainian part of Galicia. They certainly did not want autocracy to
be introduced. Students are amused to learn that among the many titles of the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary was that of King of Galicia and Lodomeria, which meant that he considered himself the successor of the medieval Rus’ princes of Halych and Volodymyr. But the Habsburg monarchy introduced many modern practices. In 1848, when serfdom was abolished in the monarchy, Austria’s Ukrainian serfs were also freed, and Ukrainians, including the freed peasants, voted in 1848 to elect the monarchy’s constituent assembly, the Reichstag; some of those elected as deputies were former serfs. Ukrainians voted together with Poles, Romanians, Czechs, Slovenes, Germans, and Italians, for all of whom this was a first experience. However critical one may be of the actual conditions under which they lived after 1848, until the end of the monarchy, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovyna knew the rule of law (the monarchy was a Rechtsstaat); were free to develop their own associations of all kinds, including political parties; participated in politics at local, provincial, and state-wide levels; and had their language recognized by the state in education, administration, and the courts of justice. In short, for Austria’s Ukrainians, “Europe” did not mean only noble but abstract ideals but was, however imperfect in practice, something they experienced in their daily lives.

That does not mean that the Ruthenians of Galicia and Bukovyna were somehow better Europeans or better Ukrainians than their cousins under Russia. Their Ukrainian national identity, and thus their self-definition as a European nation, was formed in their interactions with Poltava, Kharkiv, and Kyïv. Choosing the Ukrainian identity, the Galician Ruthenians accepted as their own the conception of Ukrainian history formulated by “Easterners.” Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a Kyïv University graduate, wrote his great synthesis when he was a professor at the University of Lviv in 1894–1914 (Plokhy 150–151). The Galician Ukrainians accepted “the Cossack myth” as a constituent element of their identity, and thus “agreed to forget” past Cossack-Uniate hostilities. Thus, they confirmed Ernest Renan’s famous statement that “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things.” (Renan explained that “every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century” [Renan 11].)

Ukrainian activists in the tsarist state recognized their contribution and also treated the achievements of their Austrian compatriots as their own. They explained the differences between the two Ukraines by the fact that one of them was part of a European state. Looking at pre-1914 Galicia, they expected that Russian Ukraine could do just as well if given an opportunity. Such an opportunity came after the fall of tsarism, between March and November 1917, when the forces of Russian democracy and of Ukrainian autonomy worked to reach a modus vivendi satisfying both sides. But as Thomas Masaryk put it in 1918, the Russian revolutionaries and the Russian masses “have rid themselves of the Tsar, but they have not yet ridden themselves of tsarism” (Masaryk 123). A democratic Russia did not survive. Petr Struve, writing many years later, described the revolution of 1917 as “the political suicide of a political nation” and called it “the most destructive event in world history” (quoted in Pipes 301).
In the civil war both the “Reds” and the “Whites” fought against the Ukrainians. The Poles defeated the West Ukrainians in 1919 and ruled the Ukrainian part of Galicia until 1939. The Polish-West Ukrainian war might have ended differently if the East Ukrainians had not had to fight both the Red and White Russians. Or had the West Ukrainians been able to help instead of fighting the Poles on the western front, East Ukraine might have defeated its Red and White enemies.

The Last Act of “1848”: 1945–1991

Namier was right to think that 1945 inaugurated a new era in European history. A process of European unification began with the Community of Coal and Steel, the Common Market, NATO, and, most recently, the European Union. To the east, there was the Soviet Bloc, or “Socialist Commonwealth.” Nevertheless, after the defeat of the “Greater German Reich,” in addition to the Ukrainian question, other “questions” inherited from 1848 remained, and of these the most important was the German one. As we shall see, Ukrainian history remained linked to German history until 1990. It took almost fifty years from the end of World War II for the new version of the “German Question” to be solved to everybody’s satisfaction. The solution was directly connected to political change within the USSR and the Soviet Bloc. In 1990, “What is Germany?” received an answer no one had anticipated in 1848: but at last everyone seemed happy, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, when prior to German reunification the Federal Republic recognized the 1945 borders, thus renouncing any “revanchist” claims. It then became easier for the Poles (and others) to press for democracy at home and for independence from the USSR. But the end of the German threat did not guarantee the survival of all states we might with some justification call successors of the Habsburg monarchy. German unification was soon followed by the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and in both cases it is possible to see echoes of 1848.

Ukraine’s independence followed the unification of Germany in less than one year. The “intersection” between the histories of Ukraine and Germany during the late 1980s–early 1990s proved to be very helpful to the Ukrainians. Gorbachev’s German policy undermined his political base at home, emboldened nationalists throughout the USSR, and in turn helped to end the Soviet Union’s control over eastern Europe. The Soviet Union fell apart shortly after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the Russian Federation found itself within the “approximate frontiers of Peter the Great’s Russia” (Zelikow and Rice 369).

In 1991, the former “Ruthenians” of Habsburg Galicia were able to freely express their wish to live together with their compatriots in the East in an independent state called Ukraine. In March of that year, in a popular referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, which Mikhail Gorbachev organized in order to save the USSR as a single state, the three ex-Galician regions overwhelmingly voted for Ukraine’s independence. (In March, the option to vote for independence was not available elsewhere in Ukraine.) The Galicians reaffirmed their choice in the Ukraine-wide referendum of December 1, 1991, in which all of Ukraine voted for independence.
After 1991, some western (and Russian) analysts and scholars were predicting that Ukraine would break up the way of Yugoslavia. They pointed out several possible fault lines: one was along the old boundary between Austria-Hungary and Russia; another, following the divide between the mainly Catholic West and the Eastern Orthodox East (as part of a “clash of civilizations”); and, third, a break into Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking regions, with Crimea seceding first, followed by Donbas and Odesa. None of these scenarios materialized.

The Ukraine that became independent in 1991 was hardly a well-integrated country. It included, besides Galicia, two other territories that the Soviet Union had annexed after World War II: the so-called Trans-Carpathian Ukraine (taken from Czechoslovakia) and the northern portion of the old Austrian province of Bukovyna (from Romania). Their populations had lived under the Habsburgs and then, during the twenty years between the wars, under their successors, who, despite their many shortcomings, differed markedly from Stalin’s Soviet Union. Thus, the making of Ukrainians into one nation, a Romantic idea in 1848, would have been a complex, painful, and challenging process under the best of circumstances. Even so, during the final years of the USSR, the older Soviet Ukrainians were able to work with their compatriots in the newly attached western areas to produce a unified national movement. There was a remarkable unity of action between Lviv and Kyïv in 1989–1991, which proved crucial to the success of the independence movement.

During the crisis of the Soviet system, Poland’s support helped to produce a unified Ukrainian politics. The Ukrainian-Polish conflict in the twentieth century was mainly a conflict between West Ukrainians and Poles. Starting in the 1950s, some Poles began to change their position on Ukraine: they accepted the loss of territory once considered part of Poland and decided to help the Ukrainians as part of their own effort to free themselves from Soviet hegemony. By the 1980s, this policy had become the guiding principle of political elites in Poland.8 In dealing with Russia, Ukraine did not face a threat at its “western front.” There was “Im Westen viel Neues.”

2004: An Epilogue—and a Prologue?

When it won independence in 1991, Ukraine was not a democratic state, but it escaped the fate of Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia and remained one country. Only in 2004, some fifteen years after the central European revolutions of 1989–1990, did the Ukrainians, in their Orange Revolution, make an attempt to “catch up” with their former fellow Habsburg nations. The new generation was especially aware that Ukraine’s revolution had not been completed. As a young man at Independence Square told a foreign correspondent: “In 1991 we became independent, now we want to be free.” The fundamental issue in the Orange Revolution was a stand against corruption and for human dignity and human rights. The most popular slogan—“We are many—we cannot be defeated” (Razom nas bahato, nas ne podolaty)—recalls slogans of East German demonstrators in 1989–1990: “Wir sind das Volk” and “Wir sind ein Volk” as well as Solidarity’s call in 1980: Nic o nas bez nas—“nothing that concerns us—without us.” 2004 was also
remarkable for the help their European neighbors gave Ukraine. In Kyiv hundreds of thousands cheered “Poland, Poland” when Lech Wałęsa addressed them, and there were declarations of support and solidarity from Prague and other capitals.

However, by 2004 it was also clear that the breakup of the USSR had not conclusively solved “the Russian Question,” in particular in the area of Ukrainian-Russian relations. In 1991, the Russian Federation had played a crucial role in the peaceful dissolution of the USSR and in Ukraine’s gain of independence, and it seemed then that its leaders and its people had abandoned the goal of imperial restoration and an authoritarian form of government, in short—had agreed to become a “normal” nation, similar to other “post-imperial” nations.

Today, the picture is much less clear. President Vladimir Putin’s open interference in the Ukrainian election process shows that Russia prefers not to view Ukraine as a truly independent country. Lilia Shevtsova recently noted the survival of “nostalgia for the imperialist [i.e., imperial] past” among Russia’s political elites, and their hope, shared by Putin, that Russia will be able “to join the West on their own terms—that is, while preserving at least some elements of the Russian System” (Shevtsova 265–266).

Whatever choices Russia makes, they will reflect the European and Eurasian dimensions of its history, as one would expect of a country extending from the Baltic to the Pacific, and will directly influence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign affairs—despite its choice for Europe in the election of 2004.

Notes


2. The distinguished British historian Sir Lewis Namier (1888–1960) was born Ludwik Bernsztajn (Bernstein) in Russian-ruled Poland. Later the family bought an estate in eastern Galicia and changed its name to Niemirowski. His father was a fervent Polish nationalist, but young Ludwik, who spent his childhood among Ukrainian village children, would later take the side of Ukrainians during the Polish–Ukrainian conflict in 1918–1919. See Mark Baker (59–63), and Julia Namier (31).

3. John A. Armstrong argues that nationalism, which he defines “the contention that the organizing principle of government should be the unification of all members of a nation in a single state,” became “salient” in 1775–1815, “the single decisive watershed in the historical development of ethnicity and nationalism.”

4. For reference to this Goethe-Schiller “epigram,” see James J. Sheehan, “What Is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography,” Journal of Modern History 53.1 (March 1981): 1. Klaus von Beyme (39–52) also includes the post–1945 period in his discussion. David Blackbourn in his The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780–1918 observed that “unification meant that there was now a Germany on the map as well as a Germany in the head,” but he also remarked, “What we call the unification of Germany was actually a partition” (Blackbourn xvi). This explains why the post–1871 Germany on the map did not correspond to the Germany in everybody’s head, as demonstrated by the rise of the Third Reich.

5. Vasyl Podolynsky (1815–1876) considered himself a Pole before 1848, and belonged to a Polish secret society. In 1848, he opted for Ukrainian nationality and wanted Ukrainians to be a member nation of the Slavic federation.
6. Vera Tolz, in making her argument, includes the opinions of nineteenth-century Russian commentators (88–89).

7. Elsewhere Zelikow and Rice write that the Soviets were opposed to German reunification, believing that it “would rip the heart out of the Soviet security system” and undo all the gains of World War II (125–126). (The Soviets were right.)

8. Timothy Snyder, in his The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999, offers a broad synthesis of the Polish “dimension” of Ukrainian and East European history extending to the beginning of the post–Communist era.

References


The notion of Ukraine as allegedly “divided between the pro-Russian east and the nationalist west” has become conventional wisdom in international journalistic reports on the country, and often appears in the academic realm as something too obvious to be questioned, explained, or framed as an issue. Such an approach suits the existing stereotypes perfectly, as well as the general tendency of mass consciousness to digest everything in simplified, ready-made form. It also satisfies media demand for thrilling “stories” and apocalyptic “forecasts”: the prospect of a huge European country plunged into a civil war, ethnic cleansing, or war with neighboring Russia certainly sells better than any attempt at sober, competent, and comprehensive analysis of that country’s complex development.

Still, there is one more reason for all of these simplifications and homemade sensations. Ukraine, in a sense, really is “divided between the pro-Russian east and the nationalist west,” but each word in this dubious formula needs to be questioned and defined. First, what are “east” and “west,” where is the border between them, is it fixed or moveable, firm or permeable? Does it exist at all as a clear-cut line rather than a broad and indeterminate area where “east” and “west” overlap? Does it exist at all as a clear-cut line rather than a broad and indeterminate area where “east” and “west” overlap?

Second, in this mantra, what does “pro-Russian” mean and what does “nationalist” mean? Why is a binary opposition forged here of two adjectives that are not themselves opposed in binary fashion? Does it mean that the “nationalist” west is more xenophobic than the “nonnationalist” (internationalist? cosmopolitan? tolerant?) east? By the same token, should readers believe that the very fact of being “pro-Russian” (whatever that means) makes anybody less “nationalistic” and therefore superior to anybody who is not “pro-Russian” (or not as “pro-Russian”)? What if we employ the real antonyms in this quasi-binary formula? Would it not be more correct (and intellectually honest) to juxtapose the “pro-European” west with the “pro-Russian” east? Or if one prefers to emphasize Ukrainian “nationalism” in the west, why not look for its real antonym, Russian/Soviet nationalism in the east?
Finally, what does “division” mean in this mantra? Is it much different from the north–south division in the United States, the east-west division in Germany, or the north–south division in Italy? What are the reasons for it, and what are its probable consequences? Is it, or should it be, formalized?

Since I lack the space to answer all of these questions here, I will focus on framing the issue of some stereotypic views that have gained currency as “common knowledge” in both scholarly and journalistic writing. In particular, I would like to draw special attention to the very important changes in the political geography of Ukraine over the past decade. First, I explain these changes from a cultural-anthropological perspective, and then briefly discuss the prospects for future changes in view of recent political developments.

Ukraine’s east-west divide is no surprise for any observer acquainted with the country’s history. One dozen regions, with different historical trajectories, had been exposed to diverse cultural and civilizational influences until they were finally unified by the Bolsheviks in the quasi-sovereign Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It might be more of a surprise that all of the interregional divisions are virtually overshadowed by a single—political—one, roughly attributed to an unspecified “east” and “west.” The eastern border of the “east” is clear, since it coincides with the eastern border of Ukraine; the same can be said of the western border of the “west.” The real problem is the definition of the border between “east” and “west,” which seems to be very vague and fluid.

The issue received prominence in 1994, on the eve of the presidential election, when opinion polls revealed a clear division between regions supporting the reputedly “nationalistic” incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, and his allegedly “pro-Russian” rival, Leonid Kuchma. The reputable Economist published an article on Ukraine under the eloquent title “The Birth and Possible Death of a Country” (May 7, 1994), while the American government had apparently leaked a classified CIA expert’s report to the Washington Post, publicized as “U.S. Intelligence Sees Economic Flight Leading to Breakup of Ukraine” (January 25, 1994).

One may speculate whether talk of Ukraine’s probable split along partly real, partly imaginary fault lines had been influenced by Samuel Huntington’s notorious Clash of Civilizations, published in 1993. Yet there are serious reasons to believe that, in the long run, “Huntington’s thesis on civilizational affiliation to a significant degree both informs and reflects western politics regarding Ukraine and Russia” (Soltys 162). Even though Ukraine did not fall apart in 1994 after Kuchma’s victory, and it did not split in 2004 during the Orange Revolution, the crude Huntingtonian scheme still retains a hold on the imaginations of many Westerners, including EU officials of the highest rank. One of them, a former French president and the recent head of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, gave a graphic explanation of why Ukraine should definitely be excluded from the European Union (EU) project:

A part of Ukraine has, indeed, a European character—these are the lands that belonged to Poland and, earlier, to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But the
territories beyond the Dnipro River and those to the south have a Russian character. Those lands cannot belong to the European Union as long as Russia is not admitted to the EU. Therefore we should wait and see how things develop. (Giscard d’Estaing)

The French logic may seem a bit strange, but it is deeply rooted in imperial stereotypes of West European nations, which, historically, had accepted and adopted a Russian imperial view of Ukraine as a legitimate sphere of Russian influence, and still refuse to decouple it from Russia both culturally and politically. Fourteen years after Ukraine’s independence, and one year after the spectacular Orange Revolution, they are ready to recognize that at least “a part of Ukraine has a European character,” but they still deem the rest of the country semi-Russian or, as they vaguely put it, “Russian in character.”

Apparently, “Russian character” in this formula means something much more substantial than just ethnic, or cultural, or linguistic peculiarities of a region. It is clearly not like the “French character” of western Switzerland or southern Belgium. It is deemed more alien, sinister, and essentially incompatible with Europe. Josef Langer employed the same argument when explaining why the EU placed Ukraine, and Moldova, and Belarus in the same category as North African and Middle Eastern countries within the framework of the so-called European Neighborhood Policy. All of these countries, he wrote, their differences notwithstanding, “are involved in a more or less open civil war which seems to be fed by a disagreement on the adoption of Western values” (Langer). The common factor between Morocco and Belarus, or Lebanon and Ukraine, is that “the EU is challenged by another spiritual power” (ibid.) in all of them: Muslim orthodoxy, in one case, and Russian imperial messianism, in the other.

According to Huntington, the civilizational fault line between the European world of western Christianity and the Eurasian world of Russian/Byzantine eastern tradition crosses over Ukraine, dividing its westernmost part from the rest of the country. His premise that civilizational allegiance is defined most importantly by the factor of religion has substantial political implications as well: “Religion orients the individual or community towards political authority and shapes the larger part of a country’s system of political beliefs and structures” (Soltys 163).

Indeed, in the 1991 presidential election, only three Greek-Catholic (“Uniate”) oblasts in western Ukraine—Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil—provided landslide support for anticommunist candidate Viacheslav Chornovil. They make up the core of historic Galicia, a region that never belonged to Russia and was taken over by the Soviet Union only in 1939, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. In all of the other twenty-two oblasts of today’s Ukraine, the ex-communist leader Leonid Kravchuk scored a victory in the 1991 election. But four of those oblasts—Greek-Catholic Transcarpathia and Orthodox Bukovyna, Volyn, and Rivnenshchyna—are located by Huntington to the west of his notorious fault line, probably because in the nineteenth century some parts belonged to Austro-Hungary (Bukovyna and Transcarpathia), interwar Romania (Bukovyna) and Czechoslovakia (Transcar-
pathia), or interwar Poland (Volyn and Rivnenshchyna). All of this means that not only religion but also other factors should be considered as probable civilizational determinants. In particular, the level of Russification/Sovietization might be a very important determinant of voting patterns and political behavior in a country that strives for decolonization and detotalitarization.

The results of the 1991 presidential election, as well as of the local and parliamentary elections a year earlier, largely confirmed the validity of the Huntingtonian scheme, even though there were substantial internal differences between the regions both to the west and to the east of his fault line. Both “Greek-Catholic” Galicia and “Orthodox” Volyn challenged the dominance of (post-)Soviet nomenklatura much more defiantly than all of the regions to the east, exposed historically to stronger and more protracted Russification/Sovietization (with a significant exception in the capital city of Kyïv, which followed “western” rather than “eastern” patterns of political behavior).

Religion may indeed have determined some political differences between Galicia and Volyn, by contributing to the stronger ethnic identity of the Greek-Catholics, and the higher level of their political (“nationalistic”) mobilization. But in the case of Kyïv, religion played little, if any, role. Political mobilization in Ukraine’s capital was based primarily on civic rather than ethnic nationalism, and was determined primarily by “modernization factors”: a higher level of urbanization, education, income, and so on. In terms of voting behavior, Kyïv established a very important pattern that, under proper conditions, could have been followed by other eastern Ukrainian regions.

By 2002, the whole of central Ukraine (seven oblasts to the east of the Huntingtonian fault line) gave a clear majority of votes to anti-Soviet, pro-Western, prodemocratic parties, and to candidates sometimes labeled (rather simplistically) as “nationalists.” In 2004, during the Orange Revolution, anti-Soviet, democratic Ukraine encompassed all sixteen oblasts of the west and center, shifting the Huntingtonian fault line from the eastern borders of interwar Poland (Second Rzeczpospolita) to the southeastern borders of the seventeenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (the First Rzeczpospolita in its greatest expanse). This new-old line refers to a much more profound civilizational divide than the rather arbitrarily established eastern border of the Second Rzeczpospolita. In actuality, the older medieval border marked a divide between the forest-steppe and open-steppe zones, between ancient settlements and no-man’s-lands, between sedentary and nomadic civilizations.

Today’s Ukrainian southeast consists of nine oblasts, most of them heavily industrialized and densely populated since the days of nineteenth-century imperial colonization. Even though ethnic Ukrainians predominate numerically in the area (except for the Crimea), their ethnic identity is very vague, while the level of Russification and Sovietization is still very high. Multiethnicity has not translated into multiculturalism here, but instead has provided a nutrient substance for the Soviet-style melting pot, producing homo sovieticus. The uprooted population, with no historical memory of any non-Soviet/non-Russian experience, became quite a natural electoral base for the communists and, eventually, for the local mafia-cum-oligarchs who established a kind of patronage network in the region.
The new fault line that (re)emerged in Ukraine in 2002–2004, and was confirmed in 2006–2007 by the parliamentary elections, would probably not be so easily overcome (if at all) as the more artificial (political rather than civilizational) Huntingtonian fault line drawn initially in the west of Ukraine. Huntington missed the point when he failed to decouple Ukraine from Russia, and, specifically, to distinguish the essence and role of the Orthodox Church in both countries. As a Canadian scholar has aptly remarked,

Huntington confuses the question of who is, respectively, catholic, protestant, or orthodox in formal confessional affiliation and catholic, protestant, or orthodox in cultural-political orientation. This confusion occurs because it is the Russian capital and heartland that traditionally constituted the center of ecclesiastical and political catholicism within the Russian empire. That is, Moscow is both the home of the ostensibly universal church and the promoter of political centralism in this region. The adherents of the Russian orthodox church (ROC) are essentially catholics; they are centrists or “insiders,” defenders of the status quo, and their traditional cultural and political orientation is one of empire, obedience to hierarchical and central authority, and rejection of other religious or intellectual currents. Conversely, adherents of the reestablished Ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church and the Ukrainian orthodox church–Kyiv patriarchate (UOC-KP), uniates, Roman Catholics, protestants, Jews, and Muslims belong, perforce, to the “reformation” in Ukraine. These people are peripheralists or “outsiders.” All of these denominations have made the intellectual and institutional break with Russian orthodoxy (or never belonged to it in the first place), the more so that all of them were for long periods the targets of the Russian orthodox tsarist and Bolshevik Russian states’ persecutions. In Ellul’s terms, these are “free people,” with intellects functioning independently of the constituted regime’s preferences. The institutional structures of these groups were never co-opted like the ROC into the Russian state apparatus, but instead belonged to civic society. (Soltys 163–164)

In other words, the “Catholic”/“Orthodox” division between western and central Ukraine is of minor importance, because not only the Greek-Catholic but also the Ukrainian-Orthodox tradition are profoundly different from Russian Orthodoxy, with its byzantine authoritarianism, statism, servilism, and, ultimately, political messianism and pan-Slavic imperialism. The First Rzeczpospolita did not nationalize and domesticate the Orthodox Church, but, rather, strongly alienated it and made it (unwillingly) an influential institution of Ukrainian society. Eventually, the Second Rzeczpospolita (and the Poles within Habsburg Galicia) did the same to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

There are many more common features between western and central Ukraine, brought about by the First Rzeczpospolita, even though the regions eventually diverged under Austrian and Russian sway, respectively. Rule of law, local self-governance, a European system of education, contractual relations between rulers and subjects, elements of republicanism—all of these features radically differentiated the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the absolutist, despotic, and essentially oriental Muscovy that largely informed the political tradition of the Russian Empire and eventually transferred it to Ukraine. Still, while this tradition was imposed without
too much difficulty in Ukraine’s south and east, as a mere extension of the imperial stretch onto the newly colonized “no-man’s-lands,” it encountered an alternative, profoundly different tradition informed by another civilization in Ukraine’s center and, especially, the west. Even though this tradition was eventually suppressed, it has never been fully eliminated.

It was this tradition that eventually permeated the modern Ukrainian national identity throughout the nineteenth century, and provided Ukrainian intellectuals with all the symbolic resources needed to assert Ukraine’s cultural uniqueness and political separateness from Russia. A “Western identity” became for them an important part of the “invented tradition” that any nation-building is based upon. They needed to identify themselves with “Europe” as a symbolic “center” deemed “more central” than the political hub of the highly oppressive and hostile Russian Empire. Since the very existence of a Ukrainian nationality had been officially denied, they had little choice but to overemphasize their “otherness” vis-à-vis Russia, and to elevate the prestige and validity of all things Ukrainian as allegedly “European” versus Russian, that is, “Asiatic,” or “barbarian” (Riabchuk 27–54).

Thus, the “return to Europe” has been seen by Ukrainian nation-builders as a return to the norm, a correction of historical injustice and perversion, a healing of a developmental pathology. This romantic approach has caused Ukrainian activists not only to praise the alleged Ukrainian “Europeanness” as opposed to Russian “Asiaticness” but also to accept the entire set of Western liberal-democratic values as “natural” and “organic” for Ukrainians (yet allegedly “unnatural” for Russians).

In a recent study of the correlation between the strong Ukrainian national identity and adherence to democracy, market reforms, and westernization, Stephen Shulman concluded that the crucial factor was Ukrainians’ self-image. That is, Ukrainian nationalism claims that Ukrainians, historically and culturally, were particularly individualistic and freedom loving.

Elite proponents of this identity typically contrast ethnic Ukrainians and Ukraine historically and culturally with Russians in Russia, a people and a country that are perceived to have strong collectivistic and authoritarian roots. At the same time, elite proponents of this identity argue that Ukrainians have much in common culturally and historically with Europe. . . . [Therefore] democracy and capitalism symbolically raise the status of ethnic Ukrainians, spread the values alleged to be associated with ethnic Ukrainian culture throughout the country, and are more likely to function effectively in a country based on perceived ethnic Ukrainian values. Further, since the main “Other” of this identity, Russia, is seen as having a history and culture estranged from individualistic and freedom-based development models, rejection of nondemocratic and noncapitalistic models symbolically and actually maintains the perceived cultural distance between Ukraine and Russia and thereby reinforces the ethnic Ukrainian national identity. Finally, precisely because European and ethnic Ukrainian culture are seen as close, and Europeans are associated with democracy and capitalism, these models are likely to be favored because they symbolically and actually reinforce the cultural similarity between these two peoples and elevate the status of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine as a core group. (Shulman 67)
The problem with Shulman’s analysis, however, is that this identity has never been dominant in Ukraine—at least until recently. In a sense, it was a “minority faith” because it was repressed for decades by the Russian-tsarist and then Russian-Soviet state, which promoted an imperial Russian/Soviet/East Slavonic identity. By and large, the imperial type of identity became dominant in southeastern Ukraine, and took firm hold in the central part of the country, internalized by a substantial part of the population.

In view of the strong correlation between language, identity, and social/political attitudes, as explained by Shulman, the political development of Ukraine within the past decade can be described as a gradual recovery of “western” political tradition in central Ukraine as well as a strengthening of national identity in the region. While recovery occurred much faster and earlier (during Gorbachev’s perestroika) in western Ukraine, with its shorter record of imperial oppression, the south and east saw no substantial political change, reflecting the important shift in political culture. The presence or absence of these changes is vividly reflected in the results of the 1994 and 2004 presidential elections. In both events, the allegedly “pro-Russian” candidate (Kuchma in 1994, and Yanukovych in 2004) competed with the reportedly “nationalistic” rival (Kravchuk in 1994, and Yushchenko in 2004). It is of little relevance whether they were really “pro-Russian” and/or “nationalistic.” What is really important here is that they were represented and perceived in this way, so that both presidential elections could be viewed as a kind of a referendum on “Western”/“Eurasian” values, geopolitical orientation, and national identity. In 1994, the “pro-Russian” Kuchma edged out the “pro-Ukrainian” Kravchuk by 6 percent (51 to 45). In 2004, the “pro-Ukrainian” Yushchenko edged out the “pro-Russian” Yanukovych by 8 percent (52 to 44).

The combined 14 percent shift from a “pro-Russian” to a “pro-Ukrainian” stance within the ten years cannot be explained by mere personal qualities of the candidates—even though Yushchenko certainly had a better image than his economically inept and allegedly corrupt predecessor Kravchuk, while Yanukovych, with his criminal past, certainly had a worse image than his forerunner Kuchma did at first. Yet all of these differences did not matter much, because voters in the west or in the southeast did not change their minds in any noticeable way between 1994 and 2004. All of the changes that ultimately determined the 14 percent shift in the political sympathies of Ukrainian voters occurred exclusively in central Ukraine, that is, on the Right Bank, which historically belonged to the Rzeczpospolita until the end of the eighteenth century, and on the Left Bank, which had been gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire since 1654 but still retained a substantial autonomy as a Cossack quasi state for about a hundred years. According to Dominique Arel,

A comparison of the regional breakdown of the [1994] vote with the 2004 election is instructive. The support for Kuchma and Kravchuk, compared to Yanukovych and Yushchenko, was virtually the same in 1994 and 2004 for the East, South, and West: 75 percent for the winner in the East and South, 90 percent for the winner in the West. Nearly all the changes took place at the Center-Left and Right Bank, and in the capital. The Left Bank declared itself two to one in favor of Kuchma (66
percent to 31 percent), and that was the biggest puzzle at the time. It now voted for
Yushchenko three to one (72 percent to 24 percent). The Right Bank evolved from a
relatively close contest (54 percent to 42 percent in favor of Kravchuk) into a sweep,
four to one (78 percent to 19 percent) for Yushchenko. (Arel)

One may conclude that both the “democratization” and the “Ukrainization” shifts
within the past decade have occurred mostly in central Ukraine, in the area that had
been heavily Russified/Sovietized over many decades, but still retained some vestiges
of other civilizational identity, gradually recovered now in a less oppressive environ-
ment. At the same time, no essential changes occurred in the southeast, which had
never belonged to any other civilization except for the Russian/Soviet. Paternalistic/
authoritarian values seem to be deeply entrenched here and, apparently, are supported
by not only the totalitarian but also the colonial/imperial legacy, and therefore not
only by political but also ethnic, cultural, and linguistic “otherness.”

This makes the political and cultural/linguistic polarization of Ukraine a daunting
reality. It was said throughout the 1990s that the Right Bank acted as a buffer between
the polarized East and West. But today, as Arel notes, there is no such buffer any-
more, except for tiny Kherson, where Yanukovych beat Yushchenko 51 percent to
43 percent.

In the territories that he carried, Yanukovych received 75 percent of the vote. In
the territories carried by Yushchenko, his score was 80 percent. In only one of
all twenty-seven territories was the vote relatively close: the Southern oblast of
Kherson. . . . In all other twenty-six territories, the margin of victory by one or the
other candidate was enormous. After Kherson, the closest race in the whole country
was in Kirovohrad, a Central Ukrainian oblast which straddles the Center and the
South (partly located in an area that was historically known as Novorossia), where
Yushchenko defeated Yanukovych by 31 percentage points, 63 percent to 32 percent,
which in any country would be considered a landslide. (Arel)

This is probably the main difference between Ukraine and many more regionally
divided countries: in none of them is the margin of victory for any of the candidates
in “their” regions so great. Even though Ukrainian voters have reportedly been disap-
pointed in the “orange” leaders after the revolution, the 2006 parliamentary elections
brought virtually the same result as in the 2004 elections: a landslide victory for the
“orange” parties in the center and west, and a landslide victory of for the “anti-orange”
parties in the southeast.

Now, it looks rather impossible for the “anti-orange” forces to fight back their
“orange” rivals in the center, let alone in the west. But it also seems unlikely that the
“orange” parties would gain substantial support in the southeast in the foreseeable
future. On the one hand, “westernization” and “Ukrainization” tendencies are promoted
by changes in education and, therefore, clearly are pegged to generational change.
On the other hand, these tendencies are strongly defined by local identity, which was
traditionally overshadowed by the overarching Soviet identity, and which comes to
the fore today while the Soviet/imperial identity eventually fades.
In principle, this local identity is not incompatible with any other overarching identity, either Ukrainian or European. The problem, however, is that Ukrainian identity is perceived in the area as more regional (west Ukrainian) than national. By the same token, Europeanness is also perceived here as a regional (west Ukrainian) asset, serving as a kind of symbolic weapon for their regional rivals. Local identity thus becomes an alternative, not to an all-national (Ukrainian) identity, but rather to another local/regional identity that presumably strives to monopolize “all-Ukrainianness.” Consequently, the alleged “pro-Russiananness” serves here primarily as an alternative symbolic weapon to counterbalance the demonized westerners. In fact, a sort of propagandistic brainwashing or intimidation has made regional “Russianness” (or, as Shulman defines it, “East Slavonic identity”) an alternative to rather than a complement to “Europeanness” and “Ukrainianness.”

Paradoxically neither regional differences nor political polarization threaten Ukraine’s territorial integrity in any real way. According to an opinion survey (in March 2006), 75 percent of respondents all over Ukraine claim that they are patriots of their country—a dramatic increase from 60 percent in 2003. Respondents in all regions (66 percent in the west, 61 percent in the south) say they are ready to defend their country even with arms if necessary. Forty-one percent of respondents believe that material well-being would suffice for life satisfaction, while 50 percent insist that it is also necessary to feel pride in one’s country (again, a dramatic change from 34 percent in 2003). Regarding the European Union, 60 percent of respondents in the east and 76 percent in the west express a positive attitude. Finally, when asked how they perceive each other, 67 percent of respondents in the east expressed a very or rather positive attitude toward western Ukrainians, while 82 percent in the west claim a very or rather positive view of those living in the eastern part of Ukraine (Iakymenko and Lytvynenko 5, 11–12). Apparently, easterners are more biased than westerners, as a result of propagandistic “othering” and Soviet stereotyping, but no data suggest that political rivalry in Ukraine translates into strong interethnic or interregional animosity. This clearly allows Ukrainian elites to forge and promote an all-embracing national identity that would be Ukrainian and European in basic values, but at the same time would not exclude and alienate the southeast. The scope of this chapter is too narrow to address this issue, however.

Yet, it seems worthwhile to mention two other political developments that may facilitate the eventual policies. First, even though voting patterns in recent years in the southeast have remained staunchly “anti-orange,” they have substantially changed internally. The Communist Party that dominated the region throughout the 1990s as an ardently Sovietophile force has been marginalized at last, giving way to more moderate and pragmatic local oligarchs, the Party of Regions. Southeastern voters have clearly reoriented their political hopes from the past, however “bright” and uncertain the future.

Furthermore, the 2004 presidential and 2006 parliamentary elections eliminated from the political scene a large number of quasi-centrist forces that used to play a “peacekeeping” role as self-assigned mediators between east and west, left and right,
caricaturized communists and demonized nationalists. Since their whole raison d’être stemmed from Ukraine’s allegedly explosive division, they had a vested interest in keeping it alive and well, by fueling the discrepancies and marginalizing opponents on both sides as dangerous radicals. Today, as these political parasites have been swept away, Ukraine indeed looks more polarized than before, because the political (quasi) center has disappeared. But this development has created an opportunity for the real political parties to bargain without the “virtual” intermediaries (viewed in these terms, the political activity of former president Kuchma and his administration could be graphically compared with the economic activity of the notorious company Rosukrenergo in the Russia-Ukraine gas trade). The new “trade relations” need to be institutionalized, and the formal rules of the game must replace the informal. Certainly, rule of law should be introduced first, since it is the absence of legal, highly formalized mechanisms for conflict resolution that creates a demand for informal mediators and manipulative intermediaries.

The compromise is not easy to achieve, since Ukraine’s main domestic controversy is not about ethnicity, language, or regional issues, as Western reporters and, sometimes, scholars tend to believe. The controversy is primarily about values and about national identity as a value-based attitude toward the past and the future, toward “us” and “them,” toward an entire way of life and thought, symbolic representation and mundane behavior. It seems hardly possible to find any compromise between democratic and authoritarian, anti-Soviet and Soviet, just as the prospect of reconciling an American south and north divided by slavery. Yet it becomes increasingly clear that Ukraine, without coherent de-Sovietization, will never escape the “Eurasian,” authoritarian path of development promoted by Russia, and will never accomplish an effective westernization or modernization.

So far, all attempts to de-Sovietize the country have been strongly resisted by a substantial Sovietophile part of Ukrainian society, led by the local communists and supported by Moscow. Their ability to effectively mobilize people against democratic forces and democratic reforms comes largely from a successful propagandistic identification of the democratic agenda with the (Ukrainian) “nationalistic” one, and from a similar rhetorical fusion of de-Sovietization with de-Russification. Thus, one may presume that the success of Ukraine’s democratic transition largely depends on the ability of democratic leaders to decouple, in people’s minds, the demand for de-Sovietization from de-Russification, and thereby to discharge a powerful source of Sovietophile, quasi-nationalistic mobilization.

To decouple democracy from (west) Ukrainian nationalism and global (American) imperialism in people’s minds might not be an easy task, in view of the peculiar civilizational background of the southeast, and the extensive anti-Western brainwashing from Moscow TV, print media, and pop culture. Political culture cannot be changed rapidly, but it can be gradually influenced, and to this end, Ukrainian leaders should encourage civic nationalism and civic participation in the southeast, which are possible only with strong institutions, firm rule of law, and substantial decentralization of the country.
So far, the capital city of Kyïv vividly illustrates that such policies may be fruitful. Even though the city is predominantly Russian-speaking and ethnically divided, its voting patterns and political behavior in general remain pro-orange, that is to say, rather pro-European and prodemocratic. This apparently results from the fact that Kyïv benefits from its capital status both symbolically and practically, because of its high economic development, social dynamics, cultural and educational level, and other factors that facilitate civic rather than ethnic nationalism. Albeit not perfect and certainly not unproblematic, Kyïv provides, nonetheless, a good example of Russian/Ukrainian, Russophone/Ukrainophone coexistence, and proves that de-Sovietization can probably be accomplished in the southeast as well without the (mythical) threat of de-Russification that hinders the process.

Indeed, there is a long road ahead toward normalization for both “orange” and “anti-orange” Ukraine, but there are no signs that they intend to break apart and move separately.

Note
1. A term from Andrew Wilson’s *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*.

References


This year we celebrate the European Union’s fiftieth anniversary, which coincides with the last phase of its eastward expansion, with the admittance of Bulgaria and Romania. This is a firm point in the historical process that has significantly repaired the fracture created during the cold war between the two parts of the European Continent. I think that, in general, it is appropriate to substitute the word “reintegration” for “expansion,” because the intention was to reincorporate into the European community (in the philological sense of the word) a series of countries that had been artificially separated from the West only after World War II. Curiously, a recent historical fact projected its shadow onto the past, inducing the idea that this separation was unavoidable and dated back to an ancient time, thus canceling the memory of the period between the two world wars when a geographical, cultural, and even political continuum, rooted in a common secular background, extended from the Baltic to the Balkans.

In many analyses of the past decade, a perception emerges that the so-called countries of the East did not participate in the same history that we did, because of the interruption caused by World War II and subsequent satellitization. Thus, we can imagine how difficult it could be to grant a license of “Europeanness” to countries that are not yet members of the European Union, and that traditionally belonged to the former Russian or Soviet spheres. This is the case for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, among others, which are all in the position of outsiders now.

As I argued in my article “The Destiny of Ukraine: Europe or Eurasia?” (Lami 311–323), we need an updated vision of a “free and whole Europe” (a term used in Ambivalent Neighbors, quoted in Lami 316), which does not leave out a set of countries that must still complete their transformation to post-Communism. There, I showed how, in recent years, the European Union (EU) denied the prospect of EU membership to Ukraine, thus encouraging Ukraine’s authorities to delay and eventually dismiss the political and economic reforms requested by the EU.

Now that the EU expansion has reached a new goal, incorporating Bulgaria and Romania, my opinion is reinforced by the perception that the long-term process of Ukrainian-Euro-Atlantic integration could be seriously challenged by internal
Ukrainian development. At this delicate moment, when the euphoria of the Orange Revolution has vanished and the government seems doomed to perennial crisis, it is vital to establish relationships between Ukraine and the EU in order to keep the European option open.

As Mykola Riabchuk argues, it is true that the West overestimates the will of the Ukrainian elites to reassociate the country with Moscow (Riabchouk 109), but the West cannot underestimate this as a perpetual possibility, depending on the further development of Ukraine’s internal situation. The anti-European and anti-NATO attitudes pervading Yanukovych’s declaration are not only abusive blackmail with the goal of making the EU’s attitude toward a Ukrainian delay more flexible, but also a quite viable option, promoted by Russia in many ways.

Eventually, this problem must be evaluated in the broader context of Ukrainian politics as it has evolved in recent years.

Since Kuchma’s time, Ukrainian foreign policy has been characterized by a paradigm of “two vectors,” balancing between Russia and the West. For this reason, I titled my essay on the eve of the Orange Revolution “The Destiny of Ukraine: Europe or Eurasia?” considering that a resolution to this dilemma through unilateral choice was distant.

Viktor Yushchenko presented himself during the Orange Revolution as a champion of the pro-Western option, together with his main ally Yulia Tymoshenko. But the two wings of the Orange Revolution split in August–September 2005, when Tymoshenko was removed from the office of prime minister, leading to a long crisis characterized by conflict between the Parliament and the presidency, fueled continuously by the personal rivalry of the two former allies.

Kyïv’s political troubles gave the Kremlin a new opportunity to interfere in Ukrainian affairs, demonstrating that domestic policy influences foreign policy to a great degree. Yushchenko, undoubtedly weakened by this crisis, has had to abandon his firmly pro-Western course to some degree, reassociating the country with Russia. The long conflict with Russia about gas supplies and pipeline control, in January and February 2006, obliged Yushchenko to soften his position, coming to terms with Russian aspirations to exert influence on Ukraine through this economically and politically crucial issue.

Due to constitutional reforms in effect since January 1, 2006, the balance of power between the presidency and the Parliament has shifted in favor of the latter, transforming Ukraine from a semipresidential republic to a parliamentary democracy, as delineated during the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004 (December 8). Analysts predicted that the reform could “lead to serious standoffs if the president and the parliamentary majority belong to rival camps” (Varfolomeyev 2006a), and this was demonstrated in the long pre- and postelectoral crisis.

Yushchenko’s dissatisfaction with this constitutional change, to which he was obliged to agree in order to secure the Rada’s (Parliament’s) sanction of his final election, was evident from the beginning of his presidency (January 23, 2005), but any effort to revise the reform failed because of a lack of parliamentary support. Thus,
the year 2006 was characterized by a weak presidency that lacked the power needed to carry out the projects envisaged in the Orange Revolution period, because it had become impossible to reunite the Orange coalition and reach a parliamentary majority against the former rivals.

In this context, Russia could play its game, exerting pressure on Yushchenko, especially in the preelectoral period when he signed unfavorable accords with Moscow regarding gas supplies, handing the opposition a powerful weapon against him.

A moment crucial for understanding the present situation is the March 26 election of Parliament and regional and local councils: for the first time since independence, elections were held according to a proportional voting system and in a legal atmosphere. The results of the elections did not solve any problems, but worsened Yushchenko’s political position, reducing his capacity for political maneuvering. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine (NU) bloc was defeated not only by Viktor Yanukovych’s opposition Party of Regions (PRU), but also by its former coalition partner, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYT), creating a situation in which it was impossible to form a ruling coalition because of the ideological differences and the irreconcilable aspirations of the would-be allies.

Yushchenko could call new elections, but it became clear immediately that he would have encountered a new and deeper defeat. Because all attempts to reestablish an alliance with the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialists failed, despite long negotiations, Yushchenko could only reach an incongruous armistice with his former rival Viktor Yanukovych, finding a compromise on the key issues of NATO, federalism, and Russian-language status.

In this search for compromise, the year 2006 was marked by continuous bargaining of posts and ideals, with a great disconnect from public opinion, which was already under some degree of deception. The Party of Regions, well rooted in city and regional councils, defied the government’s Euro-Atlantic integration program several times by questioning, for instance, Kyïv’s right to hold multinational military exercises in the south of Ukraine, proclaiming autonomously “NATO-free areas”; in other words, the PRU tried “to demonstrate its strength to Yushchenko by all means available to it in the Russian-dominated regions where anti-Western sentiment prevails” (Varfolomeyev 2006b). The goal of obtaining a NATO Membership Action Plan for Ukraine in 2006 was seriously compromised.

The internal political paralysis seemed to be overcome in June, when the Our Ukraine Bloc, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, and the Socialist Party agreed to revive the Orange Revolution government coalition that existed until September 2005, when Yushchenko fired Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The latter was named prime minister again, and a compromise was apparently found with the SPU, ideologically far from the NU position on many important issues. In fact, the SPU only pretended to submit the NATO question to a referendum, worked against land privatization, favored a free trade zone with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan under the Single Economic Space (SES) project—sustained by Russia—and maintained the necessity of a strategic partnership with Russia, even though it had also agreed to the restoration of a free trade zone with the EU and a strategic partnership with the United States and Poland.
The new “Orange coalition” survived only two weeks because of personal and ideological differences (Varfolomeyev 2006c). Thus, still another coalition built around the PRU secured a majority in Parliament: it was the so-called anticrisis coalition between the PRU, the SPU, and the CPU, which nominated Viktor Yanukovych for prime minister. Yushchenko threatened to disband Parliament and to call new elections; it thus became evident that the constitutional amendments in force since January 1 were imperfect, and it was not clear whether Yushchenko could dissolve Parliament.

In this context of uncertainty, Yushchenko promoted the roundtable (July 27–August 3, 2006), which produced the Declaration on National Unity that was finally signed by the top leaders of the parties involved. The points of agreement reached by Yushchenko and the leaders of the anticrisis coalition were: the continuation of the European integration track in order to join the EU, the goal of joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the end of 2006, further constitutional, judicial, and economic reforms, and continued efforts to fight corruption and protect property rights.

The declaration signed on August 3 by the NU, PRU, SPU, and CPU (with reservations) was a declarative rather than a policy document: the roundtable testified to the yearlong political crisis in Ukraine, but in “essence, this was a roundtable of party leaders and interest groups at the top, not a roundtable of Ukrainian society” (Socor 2006a). It was a nonbinding document, even though it was meant to provide direction for government action.

It was unclear from the beginning how the different interests and ideologies of the involved parties’ representatives would be reconciled (Socor 2006b, 2006c). Interestingly, the problem of gas supplies and pipeline control was not mentioned at all. A compromise was reached on Ukraine–NATO relations: cooperation but not membership, with a referendum to be held at some later date. The eventual need to obtain a MAP (NATO’s Membership Action Plan) was not mentioned. In regard to the sensitive language issue, the charter referred to the right to use the Russian language in accordance with the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.\(^2\) In conclusion, we can see that the status quo of the final Kuchma years was restored on some major issues, above all on foreign policy, stressing the return to a multivectoral course, as was demonstrated in subsequent months, leading up to Yanukovych’s September 13–14 announcement in Brussels that Ukraine was not prepared to embark on a MAP (Socor 2006d, 2006e). This unilateral initiative by Yanukovych, which received the support of Parliament and the cabinet (this was unilateral, since it was not supported by the president, see below!) was evidence of his growing influence, and challenged presidential authority on foreign policy, on the basis of an unclear division of power in the amended constitution. Eventually, the National Unity Declaration proved to be ineffective because of the shift in political power in the country.

The conflict between the president and the prime minister continued for the rest of the year on major issues, relying on every possible interpretation of the constitution (Korduban 2006a). In fact, Yushchenko had to face a situation in which his party controlled neither the cabinet nor the Parliament, while his popularity was severely diminished within the country as well as his own party (Korduban 2006b; Varfolom-
At the end of the year, Yushchenko began to see an early election as the best way to regain real power. The new crisis of the spring of 2007 was largely foreseeable: Yushchenko repeatedly declined to disband the Parliament, in an attempt to delay a final rendering of accounts. On April 2, 2007, Yushchenko finally did dissolve the Parliament, and called for early elections. He explained that he had disbanded Parliament in order to save the Ukrainian state, its sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and he promised free and fair parliamentary elections (BBC Monitoring).

The issues dividing the president, the prime minister, and the Parliament controlled by the latter’s majority are numerous: the right to appoint ministers, top government officials, regional governors, and local administrators in chief positions; the question of Russian-language status; the powers of the cabinet and the presidency; and the entry of parliamentarians into an anticrisis coalition, thus increasing its size despite the electoral results. Finally, we must stress again that in foreign policy Yanukovych did not support Yushchenko’s pro-Western vector. As mentioned above, during his visit to Brussels September 2006, Yanukovych said that Ukraine was not prepared for a NATO Membership Action Plan. Furthermore, Ukraine’s admittance to the WTO, foreseen for the fall of 2006, was delayed, probably in order to let Russia get into the WTO first, as some commentators believe (Lozowy).

The European reaction to the Ukrainian crisis has been cautious, because as usual, the EU does not want to interfere in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries. The German president’s first declarations stated that the Ukrainian crisis must be solved with moderation and general agreement on reaching political compromise, and that he hoped the crisis would not have a negative effect on relations between the European Union and Ukraine. In fact, the EU is Ukraine’s first financial contributor (since 1991). The European Commission recently announced an increase in its financial support for the period 2007–2010, amounting to €123 million; Ukrainian stability is an EU goal.

In a long article by Kostis Geropoulos, are some samples of this cautious but pragmatic approach. Christiane Hohmann, the European Commission’s spokeswoman for external relations, told New Europe on April 4 that “Ukraine is in a position to settle its current political crisis by itself,” pointing out that “the talks about the new enhanced agreement with Ukraine should tell you that we trust the Ukrainian politicians to sort it out” (Geropoulos). The author reminded readers that “Ukraine and the EU on April 2–3 held the second round of talks on the new enhanced agreement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in Kiev. The delegations of Ukraine and the European Commission expressed mutual interest in the new agreement to shift the Ukraine-EU relations on a qualitatively new level, to strengthen present ties and to give an impetus to the rapprochement of Ukraine and the EU, the Mission of Ukraine to the EU said in a statement” (ibid.). The author stressed that the EU needed “geopolitical stability in its eastern border in order to promote economic ties in the region, which are the core of the European Neighbourhood Policy,” and the cautious reactions of both the EU and the United States. In conclusion, he reported the words of Lilia Shevtsova, a political analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center: “Western
politicians understand much better that Ukraine for some time will be sandwiched between Europe and western Russia and Ukraine has to have good relations with both sides. So nobody is going to repeat this desperate struggle in Kiev as we saw in 2004,” commenting that “the ball is on the Ukrainian side now and Yanukovych and Yushchenko have to come to some kind of compromise” (ibid.).

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), intervening officially in the Ukrainian crisis, said in a resolution adopted by 107 votes to 5 (April 19) that leaders and Parliament must resolve the current crisis in a legitimate, strictly constitutional, and peaceful manner, “whether that be by calling legitimate early elections, emanating from the ruling of the Constitutional Court, or by way of a negotiated compromise” (PACE).

Although the Assembly affirmed that early elections are a “normal practice” and could be accepted as “a key building block of the political compromise,” it criticized “personal rivalries and short-sighted fights for personal gain, linked to posts and positions,” concluding that the reputations of all the political leaders in Ukraine were “tarnished,” and recommending further constitutional reform to help resolve the current crisis. In the meantime, it said that an “imperative mandate” should be avoided (PACE).

As Pavel Korduban commented:

The PACE resolution was generally welcomed by both the Yushchenko and Yanukovych teams, although some of its provisions have been rejected. Notably, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko did not accept the PACE recommendation to scrap the ban on parliamentary deputies swapping caucuses, as it had been a migration of deputies from the opposition factions that triggered the crisis. Yanukovych’s team did not accept the advice that Yushchenko’s decree should be obeyed until—and if—the Court outlaws it. The main message of the resolution—the need for a compromise based on the rule of law—was nevertheless accepted by both sides. (Korduban 2007b)

In this atmosphere of compromise, the date of the elections was postponed to June 24, in accordance with the opinion expressed by the Central Electoral Commission regarding the impossibility of completion of all the organizational work before May 27, as first planned by Yushchenko. The months that followed displayed a confrontation between the political actors of the Ukrainian scene, involved in a red-hot electoral campaign of 2007.

Looking at Europe, I will briefly focus on Poland’s and Italy’s immediate reaction to the crisis. As Kyiv Post stressed in an article on April 27, commenting on the cooperation pact signed by Yushchenko and Lech Kacynski, “Warsaw is one of Kiev’s closest allies in Europe, pushing for its [Ukraine’s] membership in NATO by 2008 and calling on the European Union not to shut out new members,” emphasizing that Poland reiterates its support for Ukraine’s EU bid. The European soccer championships of 2012, which Poland and Ukraine will host jointly, are a good opportunity to demonstrate, even through sport, that Ukraine can participate constructively in common European events, collaborating with EU member countries.

Traditionally, Italy has maintained good relations with Russia, identifying this
country as the main speaker for the Eastern world, as Western Europe generally has, in a consolidated deference toward the old Soviet Union, still influencing psychological and political attitudes toward Russia, even though the European geopolitical situation has changed profoundly and would have required a new approach vis-à-vis the remnant of the dissolved Soviet superpower.

Criticism of the personal relationship between Berlusconi and Putin has been common in the Italian press since last year, suggesting, in a way, that the former prime minister shared with Putin an authoritarian propensity in leading society. But, as J.C. Daly noted in a clever comment on the relationship between Moscow and Rome after the recent Italian–Russian meeting in Bari (March 2007), Prodi and Putin have met four times in the past ten months, while Prodi has met only once with U.S. President George W. Bush, at the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg in July 2006 (Daly).

It is a matter of fact that Italy is Russia’s “third-largest trading partner after Germany and China, but ahead of Great Britain or France” (Daly). It is true that “Russia’s possible benefits from the Bari summit extend far beyond Italy,” because the joint statement issued after the summit clearly states:

that talks on reaching a new strategic partnership agreement between the European Union and Russia should be started as soon as possible. This goal assumes even more fundamental meaning now that there is no need to provide a high level of economic development and security on the European continent. Strengthening cooperation in the energy sector should also facilitate this. (Daly)

This convergence of interests seems to have been secured by the recent acquisition of Yukos (a large piece of the Russian oil and gas industry) by the newly founded Italian company ENIneftegaz (60 percent Eni and 40 percent Enel). The radical parliamentarian Daniele Capezzone (April 17, 2007) has condemned our media’s exalted coverage of the successful transaction, protesting that this acquisition was done on Putin’s behalf, calling attention to the unlucky fate of the previous owner of Yukos, who was expropriated and sentenced to prison, and warning that it is necessary to react against this creeping Finlandization of Italian politics (Giachini).

In this context, it is not surprising that Yushchenko’s attempts to limit Russia’s interference in Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy cannot be supported with the strength that will be necessary if we really want to promote Ukraine’s membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations.

Prodi has spoken many times about building a circle of friendly countries around the EU, as cultural and economic partners more than as potential members, and this point of view applies to Ukraine as well, eliciting much attention and concern from Berlusconi (Berlusconi was much more concerned than Prodi). If we reflect on the fact that this new Italian government is composed of former communists or “new communists,” who to some extent continue to claim the name and the symbols of communism, we can understand that in this majority, it is not easy to find a balanced opinion of Russia and the former Soviet republics.

In a way, this question has avoided attention because the process of revisiting the
Italian communist experience is paved with *omissions* and all of this has consequences on the general view of the former-Soviet or Sovietized world. We may encounter criticism of Russia (because since the Gorbachev era communists would probably have liked a new kind of milder communism in order to avoid the general crisis that also affected their parties), coupled with an in comprehension of the new realities born after its dissolution, but, above all, we see an anti-American position that affects all judgments regarding NATO, NATO expansion, and NATO duties in the new post–cold war reality (Riscassi 23–24). In this way, “Europeanism” is often played against the United States, in a utopian expectation of a new European integrated system of defense, which nobody knows how to build, how to finance, or how to direct. Certainly this is a pan-European problem, and it is no secret that NATO is undergoing a crisis of redefinition of its aims and purposes. For this reason, it is now difficult to bring together the European and the Atlantic paths of integration regarding former Soviet republics.

In Italy, common knowledge about Ukraine (and not only about Ukraine, unfortunately!) is generally scarce, because of old attitudes that Eastern countries are the Soviet Union’s territory, worthy of consideration only when “something happens.”

In recent years, thanks to immigration and the resulting personal contact with people coming from countries of the former Warsaw Pact, as well as newer information on the expansion of the European Union, we are more aware of the reality beyond the fallen Berlin Wall, but we have not yet become acquainted with the history, the culture, and the life of the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine.

Our leading newspapers and TV broadcasts showed this lack of comprehension, which often could be judged as a sign of incompetence, when Yushchenko decided to dissolve Parliament. Openly, without any deeper analysis, his move was frequently defined as a *golpe* (coup d’état). This is a very serious charge, with immediate resonance in the hearts and minds of the general public, induced, directly or indirectly, to condemn the democracy of this “distant” country as extremely unstable and in serious danger. It would have been more appropriate to explain that this act took place after a long process of change in the balance between the president and Parliament, in a constitutional context open to different interpretations regarding the division of power, because of contradictions in the constitutional text. Eventually, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court will examine the question of the presidential decree’s legitimacy. The political and economic pressure exerted by Russia on Ukraine was barely mentioned in much of the coverage provided by the media; was this a lack of comprehension or competence, or was it caution in regard to Ukraine’s powerful neighbor? Another remarkable element was the contemptuous mention of the so-called Orange Revolution as the result of American machinery and money, suggesting that nothing interesting or relevant happened there, and that the actual president lacked legitimacy from the beginning. This attitude was reinforced once more at the end of May during the standoff between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, when the president issued a decree that put the troops of the Ministry of the Interior under his control, which provoked new alarmism about a possible “civil war.” While waiting for the scheduled elections (on September 30, 2007), I must repeat that it is important to avoid
any alarmism and to try to understand the general context into which this Ukrainian reality is inserted. Now the problem is the growing tension between the United States and Russia, in reaction to American plans to locate ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic. In a long interview published by *Il Corriere della Sera*, Putin touched on the Ukrainian question as well, stressing that Russia is not against Ukrainian admittance to the EU, but is definitely against its admittance to NATO (Dragosei and Venturini). In a new cold-war climate, both sides could revise all of their geopolitical strategies in Europe, with serious consequences even for the European integration process (Caretto).

It is always difficult for a historian like me to speak about current affairs, because I am accustomed to reflecting on past events, and when contemplating the future, I experience a sort of “blindness of the fortuneteller.” I am convinced that Ukraine will continue its fruitful collaboration with Europe because the already developed partnership cannot be interrupted and is useful for both sides. Meanwhile, I think that Ukraine’s admittance to the EU is far in the future because at the moment the EU does not foresee further expansion of its borders. The NATO issue, apparently more promising at the beginning, will remain in limbo for some years because of general uncertainty regarding its further development. But enhancing cooperation with both organizations is the main way to reverse, sooner or later, the destiny of being sandwiched between Russia and Europe, in an uncomfortable terra nullius, where Russia can play its traditional role as magnet, in connection with the fluctuations of domestic politics.

Notes

1. I would like to thank my student Gabriele Papalia, who is writing a thesis on Ukraine, for providing me with some relevant material.

2. Although the Russian language is provided with all the opportunities that other minority languages have and more, what lies behind this mention is the move carried on by Yanukovych’s side to grant the Russian language an official status, thus perpetuating the discrimination of Ukrainian language that characterized the past. Surely, the issue is very sensitive, because the official use of Ukrainian is perceived as “forced Ukrainization” by those who never needed to employ this language, first of all at the bureaucratic or educational level, where Russian was dominant. Meanwhile, the promotion of Russian language today has a clear pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian meaning (see Korduban 2007a).


Bibliography


4

Finis Europae

Contemporary Ukraine’s Conflicting Inheritances from the Humanistic “West” and the Byzantine “East” (A Triptych)

Oxana Pachlovska

The Orange Revolution Against the Background of the Religious Mystery Play, “Orthodoxy or Death!”

On the eve of presidential elections in Ukraine, October 30, 2004, the British journal the Economist predicted that these elections would have far-reaching consequences for the global balance of power, particularly for relations between the West and Russia. These elections, it claimed, were the West’s last hope of stopping the specter of Soviet geopolitics, and of opening the road to democracy for Russia and thus the entire post-Soviet space.¹

As a counterweight to these pragmatic political analyses, the elections in Ukraine itself unfolded like a medieval mystery play about the struggle between Good and Evil. Behind the wings of this mystery play stirred real “specters of Soviet geopolitics” in whose political language only a single word had changed: the term communism was replaced by the term orthodoxy. The former powers in Ukraine, represented almost exclusively by a Soviet and post-Soviet type of political class, announced a crusade under Orthodox flags and insignia against the political, cultural, religious, and spiritual model of the West, which was represented in this interpretative paradigm by the opposing candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. The picture grew more complicated inasmuch as the opposition was also the expression of a particular political credo, which was also Orthodox. Thus not only did the process of the elections lead to a traditional war between East and West, between Orthodox and Western Christianity, but the political battle also became an open opposition between two Orthodox worlds: Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Russian Orthodoxy. These two worlds not only proved different from each other, but the encounter laid bare the impassable historical chasm between them, a cultural, spiritual, and moral chasm.

The presidential elections of 2004 are often referred to as the event that proved
to be tectonic for the future of the whole geopolitical area, and marked a watershed
between the postcolonial period of Ukrainian history and its first realistic democratic
perspective. The phenomenon is much more complicated than it appears from the
visible political part of this iceberg. It is not only a matter of reinforcing a new politi-
cultural but also a challenge presented by Ukrainian Orthodox civilization to the
Byzantine monolith that stretches from Moscow to Belgrade. It foretells a potential
radical reorganization of the rest of post-Soviet territory.

The grandiose dimensions of this historical cultural phenomenon stand out par-
ticularly well against the background of recent theories on civilization, particularly
*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* by Samuel P. Huntington
(1996). The author is convinced that *the frontier of the democratic world lies on the
borderline between western and eastern Christianity*, and that eastern Christianity,
together with Islam, comprises a space where it is impossible for democracy to flour-
This is why victory for the democratic choice in Ukraine, even though it is only
the beginning of a permanent, complicated democratic path, opens a new page in
the history of the Byzantine-inspired world and promises far-reaching political and
spiritual consequences. Let us try to understand why.

First, let us review some chronology of the Ukrainian “Orange Autumn” of 2004,
with its three dramatic rounds of voting on October 31, November 21, and December
26. Long before the beginning of the elections, the strategy of the former Ukrainian
powers, together with the Kremlin pundits, was constructed according to a medieval
Manichean scheme, programmed for a confrontation between two poles. Two forces
confronted each other on the political stage of the country: the supposedly pro-Russian
and the supposedly pro-Western, or the “correct” and the “incorrect,” the “orthodox”
and the “hostile,” the “peaceful” and the “terrorist.” The opposition was simply seen
as the Enemy.

The post-Communist government in Ukraine monopolized a type of “Orthodoxy”
that acquired fundamentalist characteristics. Orthodoxy began to epitomize the hopeful
“positive” and beyond that pale was “everything else”: the Other, an entirely suspi-
cious “negative,” as a mirror image. Whereas the “right” power was one-dimensional
(Orthodoxy–Russia–peace–unity–growth), the opposite power was perceived as mul-
tifaceted and threatening in its many dimensions (the West–Ukraine–war–breakup of
country–decline). It was a given that the “sacred” cannot be opposed, for its opponent
could only be the Devil himself. Indeed, the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanuk-
olvych, was clearly named “the Orthodox candidate.” Strangely enough, he was not
pronounced to be Christ, even though the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko,
was presented as the “anti-Christ.”

The tone and pathos of the political discourse of those in power at the time were
quite eschatological in character. The opposition’s potential assumption of power was
described as the end of the world, as Armageddon. Organizations and movements that
fought the “orange plague” defined themselves as “Orthodox.” During the elections,
organizations such as the “Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods,”’ the “Union of Orthodox
Citizens,” and the “Pathway of the Orthodox” appeared. They denied the existence of
Ukrainian culture and language, and of the Ukrainian people as such. They opposed the very existence of the Ukrainian state. The politicization of Orthodoxy took on brutal, Soviet forms, which were primitive in a characteristically Soviet manner.

During the electoral campaign, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) was, in fact, the political hub of the former government. It even spread defamatory flyers with messages such as “Yushchenko’s wife is a CIA officer.” In addition to propaganda flyers, calendars, and the like, believers received the text of “A prayer of the faithful children of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for the servant of God, Viktor Yanukovych.” The metropolitan of the UOC MP personally blessed Yanukovych for leadership of Ukraine.

Thus, during the elections, the Ukrainian religious world split into two opposing camps. The UOC MP declared itself against all religions in Ukraine that supported the opposition: Ukrainian Orthodox (Kyïv Patriarchate) and Jews, Catholics and Moslems, Protestants and Buddhists.

Except for the Orthodox Churches of the Moscow Patriarchate, churches held prayers only “for honest elections,” without supporting any particular candidate, only stressing the necessity of expressing individual choice. On the eve of the third round of voting, the churches that supported the opposition published, “An address from all religious groups to all citizens of Ukraine,” which was subtitled “For Truth, Unity, Peace, and Freedom.” Rather than impose propaganda, it stressed the need to vote according to personal conviction, defending the right of individual choice. Believers and nonbelievers, Christians and non-Christians, all rallied around such spiritual values as freedom and dignity, finding in every religion a moral answer to these imperatives.

What was most important was that they did not appeal to particular religions, but to the moral and social dimensions of every religion, thus acknowledging their parity.

In the tensest moments of the Orange Revolution, when there was fear and anticipation of force in Kyïv’s Independence Square, the Maidan, the priests read Our Father in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, English, and Latin. Both the synagogue’s faithful and the Protestants did everything possible to support the Maidan. Priests and Buddhist monks prayed together.

In contrast, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church turned to the “pastors and to the fold of Orthodox Ukraine” with the entreaty “to stop the confrontation and to demonstrate a will for unity . . . of the fraternal Slavic peoples, reinforced by a common faith, a common destiny, a common history.” But what about the non-Slavic people, the Jews, Greeks, Tatars, Hungarians? What about the Slavic, but non-Orthodox people, the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks? According to what parameters is the history of Ukraine and Russia “common,” and that of Ukraine and Poland not “common”? The answer can be read in a sign (in Russian) over the entrance to one of the Kyïv churches of the Moscow Patriarchate: “Inovertsam vkhod vospreshchen!” [Entrance to people of other faiths forbidden!].

Indeed, “non-Orthodox” people have no place in such a mental paradigm where political elections can be treated as “a celebration of Orthodoxy.” On December 22, 2004, four days before the third round of elections, the incumbent party’s choice was
not simply candidate Yanukovych, but “the humble servant of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.” Speaking in Donetsk, he addressed only the Orthodox citizens and asked them for their “holy prayers and active support on December 26, to bring about the celebration of Orthodoxy in Ukraine” in the struggle against “orange insanity.”

He also quoted the words of the monk Feofan Zatvornik (Russian saint and religious writer, 1815–1894): “The Lord punished us and is punishing us by the West!”

In other words, the choice for a European path to development just cannot be seen as the free will of the people, only as the result of a deceitful proposition by “foreign well-wishers.” It will inevitably prove to be lethal and will bring “much harm to the people of Holy Kyïvan Rus’.”

**Russian Orthodox Discourse Today**

The “true” Orthodox religion, supposedly unchanged from the time of Holy Kyïvan Rus’, stands in opposition to the lack of spirituality of the West. Furthermore, Orthodoxy is juxtaposed to the rest of the Christian world. On both the elite and popular levels, from the hierarchs of the church to its anonymous servants, these stereotypes are continually repeated. A 400-page interview of Patriarch Alexei, published in Italy, contains claims that:

- The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic (Uniate) church is a pseudomorph of Orthodoxy (a similar thesis was proposed long ago by Georges Florovsky [1893–1979]);
- The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church represents the fundamental obstacle in the path of dialogue between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Holy See; Russia had always defended the ungrateful “Little Russia” “from the religious expansion of the West”;

This is why it would be a mistake to attribute the collision between the Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxies solely to the tension of the election period. This juxtaposition has existed for centuries, and was provoked by complicated historical and cultural determinants, which will be discussed in the second half of this chapter.

One must, however, note that the social fiber of this archaic behavior is still quite functional, and is the product of deep historical determinants, as well as of the economic and cultural degradation of society during Soviet times. The “medieval mystery play” character of Orthodoxy during the Ukrainian elections in 2004 was not just an episode of hysterics, but displayed a systemic character, inasmuch as the Kremlin puppeteers marvelously exploited the post-Soviet cultural-societal degradation. An emblematic episode took place in Sevastopol: as a totally peaceful “friendship train” organized by the opposition was approaching the city, a service was held in the St. Nicholas church “for the salvation of Ukraine from the satanic orange force.” The service was broadcast by loudspeakers throughout the city. What is significant is that the hostile
citizens of Sevastopol, who decided to meet the “friendship train” with suitable opposition, came with portraits of Stalin and red flags. They forgot or did not know how methodically and cruelly Stalin had destroyed Orthodoxy, not to mention the other religions. The spirituality of the people was destroyed along with those religions for many decades to come.

This blending of Communism with Orthodoxy occurs everywhere in that part of post-Soviet European territory that Russia considers its “sphere of influence”: southeastern Ukraine, Transdnistria, and Belarus. These areas have their own sociocultural uniqueness.\textsuperscript{11} While no longer “Soviet,” the postcolonial population has not acquired a Ukrainian identity and even its Russian identity is tied not to cultural but to abstract ideological paradigms, not to qualitative but to quantitative dimensions of an a priori claimed “greatness of Russia.”\textsuperscript{12} These regions exist in a political and cultural timelessness. In fact, the deeper the Russification and the Sovietization of the region, the more difficult it became for democratic and pluralistic consciousness to take root.

This leads us to the all-important question of the very character of Soviet and post-Soviet atheism. In Stalinist times, a most brutal, aggressive form of communism was very successfully implanted, especially in traditionally Orthodox and widely Russified areas. At the same time, Greek-Catholic Ukraine, despite severe persecution, maintained a deep and authentic religious feeling. That is why political exploitation of religious ideologemes by people totally illiterate in these matters, such as yesterday’s party nomenclature and atheists of the Soviet school, is particularly dangerous. Soviet atheism was not a complicated intellectual or spiritual challenge to existing dogmas, as was the French Enlightenment, for example. On the contrary, it was the cynical atheism of a barbarian, of a nomad, whose only religion was blind aggression against man, against culture, against the dimension of sacredness of human life. Thus, whole generations grew up at a time when the very concept of sacredness was being systematically destroyed. The religious, theocentric, Orthodox model of the world was replaced by the sacrality of Stalin’s idea of “the absolute state” (Ancewicz 214).

The Soviet Union arose on the ruins of mined churches, burned icons, and crushed mosaics. For decades, churches were turned into storage space for tires and brooms, if not into prisons where people, including priests, were tortured. For a time, Stalin forbade even the Christmas tree as a religious symbol, and when he did allow it, only pennants with pictures of party leaders could be hung on it. That is why post-Soviet leaders, formerly cogs in the wheels of the totalitarian, atheistic state, now armed themselves with religious rhetoric to perpetuate the power of the state with its mafia-like methods.

At first, however, the Kremlin tried to redirect Orthodoxy in Ukraine into an instrument of “social engineering,” or, literally, to make religion use the same methods that Russia has practiced since 1991 in the post-Communist Orthodox territories, namely, upholding neototalitarian regimes with the help of Communist-Orthodox rhetoric. Belarus is a tragic example of such “social engineering.” The muscle of the Orthodox continuum of the Russian model became one of the instruments for changing that country into a post-Communist prison. And the Transnistrian republic? It is a phantom pseudo-state.
not recognized by anyone, fabricated by Russia in order to pressure Moldova with a mixture of ideological Orthodox and Communist slogans, and in reality, it is a venue for the ceaseless trafficking of weapons, narcotics, and people (and, maybe, their organs) between Russia and the West, as well as for money laundering.

In other words, the continuation of such a practice means that Russia has not yet recovered from the fall of its Soviet empire. It is significant that one of the “éminences grises” of the Kremlin, the political “technologist” Sergei Markov, characterized the Orange Revolution in one of his speeches as “a Polish plot,” or to be precise, an expression of the “Brzezinski wise men’s plot” (antisemitic hints are all too clear, considering that the pun refers to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion). While he defined Yanukovych as a product of Russian-Ukrainian politics, he considers Yushchenko to be a product of Polish-American politics. This comment illustrates the total inability of most Russian elites to understand that social movements can be provoked not only by political machinations but also by deep cultural determinants, such as the will of the people.

Thus, political elections, which should not have touched on religious matters, revealed the tragic crisis of today’s Orthodoxy, in its Russian variant. In Russia itself, not only did the church not separate itself from the state, it actually became a basic prop of the state’s neoimperial endeavors. The welded triad of government, military, and church, forms an effective mechanism for fostering nationalism. This is also the path to destruction of faith. It is generally known that “Free State, Free Church” is an untouchable principle of democratic systems. That is why the cynical exploitation of the paradigms of Russian Orthodoxy, which was effective in Ukraine mostly in the least sophisticated population, laid bare the merciless picture of the state of that church, capable of acting only within the boundaries of archaic and provincial systems.

This Manichean approach to reality, this rigorous duality of “the West” and “the East,” was one of the reasons for the failure of the Russian strategy in Ukraine. Kremlin political technologists worked on the breakup of Ukraine into the would-be Orthodox, Russian-speaking East and the would-be Catholic, Ukrainian-speaking West, without understanding one basic truth: Ukraine is indeed divided, but in a different way. There are two Ukraines: European and Soviet. The European one is multireligious, although Orthodox by provenance, as well as multicultural. The other one is of the monoreligious, monocultural Soviet model. In both realities, we find citizens of Ukraine of various nationalities, the same Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews, but they form two directly opposed worlds.

In the “European” Ukraine, each of these nationalities clearly and openly identifies itself culturally and linguistically. Jews are Jews, Russians are Russians. The Tatar minority was unified completely on the side of the opposition, for example. In “Soviet” Ukraine, the situation does not vary much from the idea of “one Soviet people,” which identifies itself only with an a priori accepted “Russianness” in its Soviet, which is “supranational,” variant. That is why the Kremlin strategy, founded on a synthesis of the post-Soviet and the reborn Orthodox factors, wielded a mortal stroke to the spiritual basis of Orthodoxy as a faith.
In his book *Dostoevsky in Manhattan*, the French philosopher André Glucksmann, gives an analysis of Russian social psychology, tying the matrix of contemporary Islamic terrorism with the “galaxy of nihilism” in nineteenth-century Russia, from the heroes of Pushkin and Dostoevsky to the Russian terrorists of the end of the century. He holds that one of the reasons for this dangerous tradition was the bureaucratization of the Russian church and the subjugation of faith to the needs of the state and its politics. *This bureaucratic and policing church became a factory of Russian nihilism.* Nihilism, the theory of “global nothingness,” transforms the world and life into a game. In such a society, the powerful of that world get mired in “a general anesthesia,” and become indifferent to the sufferings of others. The weak of that world become desensitized to their own suffering and dive, without struggle, into a vegetative sleep. Such a society is blocked, has no future, and is capable only of degradation.

This line of interpretation differs completely from Huntington’s thesis that democracy is impossible beyond the boundaries of Western Christianity. Both approaches do have a common denominator, however: the conviction that a culture, whether Orthodox or Islamic, that erases the dimensions of individual personality in the name of a *great abstract idea*, does not contain any building material for democracy. This may explain how it is possible, on Moscow’s orders, to defend Orthodoxy under red banners without comprehending that *this type of Orthodoxy* does not cherish the individual (and) has become an inhuman system of communism.

The split between Ukrainian churches during the Orange Revolution illustrates this fundamental division well. The only church in Ukraine that defended the posttotalitarian societal model was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. In other words, the cultural distance between authentic Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the churches of Western Christianity, as well as of other religions, was overcome by common democratic values. In a system of values where respect for the individual is guaranteed by law, there can be no antagonism between members of a shared society. This was precisely the “unity in diversity” that represents the basis of contemporary European civilization. However, Russian Orthodoxy, because it did not accept European democratic values, took the stand to oppose Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

**An Uprising Against the “Byzantine God”: Ukrainian Orthodoxy in a Historic Retrospective**

The political and social impact of the Orange Revolution was a phenomenon that transcended the frontiers of Ukraine and could even be compared with the fall of the Berlin Wall. What happened in 1989 and 1991 was the breakup of the East European world into two very different realities. On one side were Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, for whom entry into the European Union (EU) was simply a process of conforming to the bureaucratic system in Brussels and adapting their economies to Maastricht rules. On the other side was the post-Soviet zone and ongoing attempts to resuscitate Soviet ideology as well as reconstruct the former empire.

Thus, in both camps, processes of integration were set in motion in order to put
together a “common space.” There was, however, a fundamental difference. The EU is a “horizontal” space of equal partner states with open, but inviolate, borders, with the rule of law, with constitutional guarantees against any form of coercion.

The concept of “Eurasia” is an opposite world: a centralized, quasi-totalitarian, “vertical” system, amorphous in structure and politically ambiguous. In this new but old system, the interior post-Soviet boundaries were determined by secret talks of politicians in casual meetings, closed to journalists. Laws were changed at the will of the government. One of the basic rules of the European sphere is the preservation and defense of national identity, language, and cultural tradition of every member of the fraternity. The “Eurasian space,” however, was planned with the barely concealed aim of restoring the homologous “Russian space.”

It would be hard not to notice that the basic separation line of the East European world falls along the divide between Western and Eastern Christianity, as if to support Huntington’s pessimistic vision. Indeed, through this new geopolitical map, one can see the old historic map on which today’s Europe and “Eurasia” are juxtaposed as spheres of Western and Eastern Christianity, where the civilization of the First Rome stood in opposition to that of the Second, that is, Constantinople.

If the opposition between Eastern and Western Europe was camouflaged during the Soviet Union’s decline by a common political game, further evolution of the post-Communist world revealed the fiction of the rapprochement between the West and the Byzantine-influenced areas of the world. There, all the retaliatory syndromes were revitalized: the Balkan tragedy, provoked by Serbian nationalists in its post-Communist variant, and the renewal of the centuries-old Caucasus conflict, actively supported by the Orthodox Church. In both cases, the aggression of posttotalitarian powers against Muslim populations led to the radicalization of Islam. If we look at the contours of the world of the post-Communist crisis, from the Balkans to the Black Sea to the Caucasus, it is the same as the map of “Byzantine” domination. It is precisely here that permanent political crises and military conflicts persist and democratic institutions cannot take root.

The radical difference between the Byzantine East and the European West lies in the East’s foundation in the symbiosis of religious and political powers, and the West’s foundation in the separation of spiritual and secular powers, expressed in the concept of “Free State, Free Church.” This division was achieved in the West after centuries of conflict between Church and State. Thus the European nations rationalized the dimensions of faith, became secularized, and evolved as civil societies. In the West, the passive object of history, the vassal, became its active subject, a citizen who created the basis of a democratic system. In the East, man, referred to in liturgy as the “servant” or (for some) “slave” of God, was at the same time “a serf of the tsar.” He could not become a free individual, a process without which a free citizen, a voter, could not be born. The autocratic empire grew into Communist totalitarianism without any essential change in the power system or in the status of the human being within the state. Because of this, even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the countries of Eastern Christianity revealed themselves to be not newly democratic,
but posttotalitarian. This immutability in the “primeval structure” of power, the same “longue durée” of the cultural paradigms of the “Byzantine” world, explains the fact that various intellectual currents or personalities in Russian history can in practice be unified by the same vision of the Russian state as a “world empire,” and by the same anti-Western ideology.17

In today’s Western world, theocratic structure would be impossible because of the primacy of law in place since Roman times. In the Eastern world, for example in the Islamic countries, we see the primacy of religion or of its surrogate, an ideology that holds the state as sacred. In his day, Georges Florovsky, an ideologue of “Eurasianism,” said that Russia was not only seduced but was also paralyzed by the perfection of Byzantine civilization. However, does paralysis not represent an absence of motion and of growth?

In Western Christianity, paradise is the noblest gift that a person is called to earn through the merit of hard work. This principle, as Weber maintained, was brought to extremes by the Calvinists, by the Pilgrim Fathers, the founders of America. In the Byzantine world, paradise is granted (Figes 292–293).18 “The profane West,” the civilization “without a soul,” stands against the sacral world of the “Russian soul.” Thus, “Holy Rus’” is the only and exclusive criterion of “truth.” “Veritas,” the truth of Western civilization, is subject to critical methods of verification. In Eastern civilization, “veritas” becomes “faith,” which is not subject to criticism. This faith has an absolute, holistic (in Karl Popper’s terminology) dimension. This dimension of messianic, fundamentalist ideology is so very typical of closed, exclusive cultures, not given to dialogue. This cultural paradigm excludes any possibility of building a rule-of-law society.

Ukraine clearly finds itself in the center of the global encounter between the West and the East, a place of conflicting, unfinished discourse between them, which continues to the present. For many centuries, Ukraine was the “great mute” of European history, not only because of its statelessness but also, perhaps even primarily, because the chasm between the two civilizations, in their ongoing process of engagement and disengagement, fell over the body of Ukraine, in its conflicting opposition to Russia.

To a great extent, the Ukrainian Orthodox tradition is also an inevitable part of the historical dynamic of the whole Slavic-Byzantine world. The secularization of Orthodox culture takes place considerably later compared with cultures in Western Christianity. It does not occur at the time of Humanism and the Renaissance, but practically at the end of the eighteenth century, for these cultural phenomena simply did not occur in the Orthodox world. Unfortunately, Ukrainian culture is not an exception to this. There are, however, at least two radical variants.

The first variant relates to differences in the structural model of ruling, with the Constantinople and Moscow types on one side, and the Kyїv model on the other. The symbiosis of the religious and secular power structures in the Constantinople–Moscow axis, the “Third Rome” concept, assured the continuity of the theocratic cultural model. However, in the Rus’–Ukraine context, Ukraine struggled from the beginning for its political and cultural independence. From the second half of the sixteenth century,
Ukraine’s Orthodox Church, as the “church of the people,” stood in opposition to the “church of the government,” be it the Roman Catholic Church or the imperial Russian Orthodox Church. This is why Ukrainian culture, in a condition of statelessness, avoided the serious dangers of Orthodox culture. Not having to live through the syndrome of “theocratic history,” it naturally placed the people in the center of its cultural evolution, that is, the individual and not the state.19

The second variant was conditioned by the specific historical and cultural context in which Ukraine entered modern history, forming its political self-awareness and identity. An Orthodox country was developing in the same state alongside a Catholic culture and, at the same time, it was subject to considerable Protestant influence. Out of the tense encounters between Ukraine and Poland in the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries, a “culture of dialogue” was born, which grew into one of the fundamental traits of Ukrainian civilization, a tradition of tolerance and pluralism.20 Although the first impulse for struggle was the defense of the Orthodox identity, the very concept of independence, which matured and widened the forms of struggle for it, also formed the independent character of Ukrainian identity in its Orthodox variant.21

In this sense, the permeation of European characteristics in Ukrainian identity cannot be explained exclusively as a Catholic component. This process really began before the formation of the “Uniate,” later called Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, in 1596. The peculiarity of Ukrainian cultural evolution lies in the fact that the Polish-Ukrainian experience turned religious diversity into a factor of integration, whereas in the Ukrainian-Russian cultural experience, a religious uniformity turned into a factor of estrangement.

Indeed, “the Eastern/Byzantine faith” was the matrix of Ukrainian culture, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the crucial formative period of its identity, Ukraine developed within the parameters of Poland. Ukrainian culture was in a tight, albeit conflicting, symbiosis with Polish culture. The multilingualism (Old Church Slavic, Ukrainian, Polish, Latin)22 of its literature at that time and the general multiculturalism of Ukraine were conducive to encounters between the codes of various civilizations in a common Ukrainian cultural space. The issue here is not of language alone. Many impulses wove themselves into the culture, which, in turn, had to react, to analyze, and to adapt itself under the influence of the moment. It had to defend and to choose. In a word, this culture was neither a passive recipient nor an aggressive opponent. It was a critical dialoguing partner.

Philosophers and Poets Articulating the Faith

A major protagonist in the cultural scene of Ukraine in the seventeenth century was the metropolitan/archbishop Petro Mohyla. He formed a totally new concept of Orthodoxy as religious culture in dialogue, open to the knowledge of another (Western) culture, in which he did not see an enemy or an opponent, but another form of knowledge, which enhanced Orthodox culture (see Jobert; Kortschmaryk; Nichyk; Ševčenko 1996, Sydorenko; Zhukovsky). Mohyla was not alone. He had a strong circle of like-minded
thinkers. In seventeenth-century Ukraine, Orthodoxy was not so much a religious doctrine as it was a way of viewing life and the human being. It defined the identity of a people, not of a state.\textsuperscript{23}

The year 1686 marked the death of the Polish-Ukrainian cultural model. The Ukrainian Church was forcefully subjugated to the Moscow patriarchate and thus became part of another system of values. This was no longer the system of values of a people in rebellion, which fights against enslavement. It was now a value system of an empire for which enslavement was a mode of existence and of further expansion, and where any form of protest was a challenge and a threat. From that moment, it began to loosen its ties to the whole complex of ethical values of the Ukrainian nation, and began to serve the imperial state system. In the Russian Empire of Peter I, with its Holy Synod, Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which had until that time been the choice of the people, changed into an instrument of law enforcement and of destruction of that people. The dialoguing nature of Ukrainian Orthodoxy was replaced by the dogmatic, repressive monoculture of Russian Orthodoxy. Ukrainian culture, saturated with European influences, represented an intolerable heresy for Russia.\textsuperscript{24}

Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s tragic Battle of Poltava in 1709 (attempting to break away from Russian rule with the help of the Swedes) brought an end to the possibility of an Orthodox symbiosis between Ukraine and Russia. These countries became enemies because their models of government, the republican and libertarian Ukrainian model and the imperial, repressive Russian one, became totally incompatible (see Krupnytsky; Mackiw; Manning; Ohloblyn; Siedina; Subtelny). At this precise time, the conflict between Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy became insoluble in all aspects of cultural life. \textit{The enforced Russification of Ukraine led to the estrangement of Ukrainian Orthodoxy from the institutional structure of the Orthodox Church, which became the church of the Empire.} It pushed Ukraine to search for a new cultural model, distanced from the Church-Slavonic culture and language, which halted the modernization of Ukraine and put obstacles in the path of its self-determination in the new historic era.

In the nineteenth-century Russian cultural universe, the government continued to be the main referee. It had a new retrospective of history, introduced by Nikolai Karamzin, who stressed that a new dimension of Rus’ as Russia completed the politically programmed sacral continuum of Russian history. Orthodoxy, as a civilizing mission, became the ideological justification of imperial expansion.

As counterweight, the main referee in the Ukrainian and Polish cultural and stateless world was \textit{the People}. Ukrainian literature broke away from the Church-Slavonic language and turned to the vernacular. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda (1722–1794) understood the depth of the destructive role of Russian Orthodoxy on human spirituality. Skovoroda, however, was a solitary dissident who consciously excluded himself from the “chain of Mankind.” In opposition to the hierarchal structure of the church, he put forth a persistent, lonely challenge, seeking the salvation of Orthodoxy as a faith, in a personal spiritual quest.

The leading Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861) first broke that “chain
of Mankind’s” servitude, by saying that only the fall of the empire and, with it, of the false “Byzantine God,” would allow for the rebirth of a true Christian faith as an internal spiritual dimension of the human being, a faith that transforms a man into “the image of God” into the “Gospel of Truth.”

*Christian* and *slave* are mutually exclusive categories. In Shevchenko’s poetry, we see a deadly duel between two gods, one of them the false Byzantine god of oppression, who turned his face away from his servants. Shevchenko used the term *Byzantine Sabaoth*. At that time, the patriotic expression *Russian God* was used officially. The emperor was, by law, either the *Christian ruler* or the *Orthodox tsar*. Thus, there were respectable precedents for Yanukovych in 2004 to be the *Orthodox candidate*. Indeed, “the Russian God” identity was assigned to him by the autocracy. This “Russian God” shared in the power of Russian conquests of Finno-Ugric, Baltic, and Caucasian peoples, from Ukraine all the way to the Asian steppes. He was “God, the General.” For Shevchenko this was a particularly poignant concept, enhanced by the painful experience of Ukrainian history.

The “Byzantine God” is the antipode of morality and mercy, and Shevchenko writes: “The Byzantine Sabaoth will betray you! / God will not betray, / he won’t absolve or punish / We’re not his slaves—we’re people.” (It should be noted that Sabaoth is the Hebrew God of armies.) The vengeful God of the Old Testament, God of the Army, God the General, this God of the Empire and of its penal machinery stands in direct confrontation with the authentic God of human spirituality. This is a juxtaposition of two churches. One is a bureaucratic institution at the service of the government, the other is a church of salutary Faith. Thus, to tear down the empire and to allow a free human being to emerge out of the slave is the only way to return to the principles of mercy and justice, sources of true Christianity.

A similar solution to this question is found, in fact, in Polish Romanticism. Due to this anti-Byzantine concept, Shevchenko decidedly turned the rudder of the Kyiv-Ukrainian theocentric model in the direction of the anthropocentric model. He contributed to bringing about the end of the “Byzantine” period of Ukrainian history, opening the way to the “National” period. Like Moses leading his people out of slavery, the poet also defended the liberty of all peoples, from Poland to the Caucasus, from Finland to Moldova (see Dziuba 1998; Eidel’man; Pachlovska; Shkandrij; Thompson). For Shevchenko, “people” [narod, nation] was the sacral idea of a Christian people, a spiritual substance, the emanation of Christ’s sacrifice, opposed to the antihuman mechanism of autocracies. The *Orthodoxy, which came to the service of the Russian empire, betrayed Christianity*. To find the true God, for Shevchenko, meant to return to the original values of Christianity as the religion that freed man from slavery and gave him the Word of the Bible, that primary Word, not a command of the “Orthodox tsar.”

The Ukrainian poet Ivan Franko (1856–1916) later called it the “fire-cloaked Word.” To Shevchenko, the Word, with which life began and with which man entered history, became his protagonist—“I’ll glorify these petty muted slaves / And, to protect them, / I will place the Word,” Shevchenko wrote. Ceasing to be a slave, man gains not only
faith, his heavenly home, but also his earthly home, his country, blessed by God.

When he stated: “I won’t go to Ukraine . . . [since] only ‘Little Russia’ is left there,” Shevchenko sharply underscored the incompatibility between Ukraine and the Russian concept of “Little Russia.” These are two antagonistic worlds. The first belongs to world history, to Christian civilization, the latter has come to naught and is a spiritually impoverished province, an administrative unit of the empire. As another poet, Ievhen Malaniuk (1897–1968), perceived it later, Shevchenko bound the fragments of Ukrainian historic life that had been cut apart by the “Little Russian history” with the persistence of opposition, of rebellion, of struggle for the human soul, which finds a way to liberate itself, first from spiritual, and then from political enslavement. The land itself will speak out with the rebellious people. This land will become Ukraine again only by insurrection: “The shackled people shall throw off their chains. Judgment will come. Dnipro and the mountains shall speak!” The true God will be on the side of the rebels against slavery: “Fight—and you shall conquer, / God will help you!” He addresses all the peoples of the Empire.

The poet and historian Mykola Kostomarov, founder of the “Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood” (1845–1846), felt a bond with the Poles, and provided an ethical document attesting to a radical solution of the historical conflict, in the name of regeneration for both nations (see Kozak; Luciani; Mokry). In both Ukrainian and Polish cultures in the nineteenth century, Christianity was the spiritual covenant of Christ, which saw in the weakest human being the Gospel of truth, and in this it differed distinctly from the authority of the politicized church. Like Polish romantics, who saw the state as a human creation and the people as a divine creation, Ukrainian romantics saw the rebirth of real Christianity in the downfall of the empire and in the rebirth of the people. In both the Polish and the Ukrainian traditions, freedom and the people hold the sacral dimensions, not the state.

The fall of the Russian Empire and the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state in 1917 represent the rebirth not of a church and faith, but of various churches and religions. True to its liberal creed, the newly independent Ukraine considered it its duty to ensure the freedom of spiritual self-expression of all people who live there. It is in that same period that the question of Ukraine and Europe arose again. In literature and history, in criticism and journalism, we see a strong emphasis on Ukraine belonging to Europe, whereas at that time, in Russia, anti-Western Eurasianism established itself as the dominant goal. For Ukraine, the European formula was clear and corresponded fully to its cultural traditions of independence and pluralism. At that time, Ukraine was actually the only country in the Slavic world, with an Orthodox majority, that saw its cultural roots in Europe and, as a result, chose the European path of development. As soon as the Ukrainian National Republic announced its choice, the scholar and poet Mykola Zerov formulated its cultural code in the call “Ad Fontes” [To the Sources, 1926], common to both Ukraine and Europe, to ancient Greek and Roman cultures, to humanism and the Renaissance.

During its short period of independence (Ukrainian People’s Republic, 1917–1920), the old Ukrainian Orthodoxy was reborn. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church was confirmed in 1921 and lasted until 1930 (on this subject, see Armstark; Bociurkiw 1986; Khomchuk). It was independent from the Moscow patriarchate and began to use the Ukrainian language (rather than Old Church Slavonic) in church life. It held itself to be the authentic Ukrainian church, a church of a free nation, such as it had been before 1686.

However, the persecution of the UAOC began almost immediately, well before the other Stalinist repressions. Even in those dramatic times of radical transformation, it had an active and constant opponent in the Kyïv seat of the Russian Orthodox Church. After 1922, even the ROC, headed by Patriarch Tikhon, was harassed. In 1927, Metropolitan Sergius, representing the ROC, officially declared its loyalty to the Soviet government. At the same time, the UAOC and other churches, which did not acknowledge the Moscow patriarchate, were cruelly persecuted. The split between the official church and the persecuted churches was obvious.

The gradual Soviet destruction of the Ukrainian churches, both the Orthodox and Greek Catholic, transformed the break between Ukrainian culture and the official version of Orthodoxy into an impassable chasm. The “approved” church of Soviet times in Ukraine was no church at all, and it became an additional instrument of Russification.

During the crisis of the Soviet regime and after the fall of the system, the question of identity of various cultures arose with renewed force. At the time of “Solidarność,” Polish Catholicism, with John Paul II as Roman pontiff in the Vatican, played a very major role in the liberation of Poland. However, the role of Orthodoxy was much more complicated, which led to estrangements of various circles, even of dissident intelligentsia, in both countries. For example, Ukrainian dissidents cultivated contacts with Andrei Sakharov, but not with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. After the fall of the Berlin wall, Russia reverted to using the traditional model of Orthodoxy as an instrument for reconstruction of the empire. At the same time, Ukraine began to rebuild its authentic multicultural and multireligious model with great difficulty.

It is precisely this multicultural, and thus European Ukraine, that came to the Maidan in November 2004. And, as was the case in earlier centuries, at the very core of this multiculturalism lay the Ukrainian idea of liberty.

**Between “Golden-Domed” Kyïv and “Impetuous Warsaw”: The Duel of Genghis Khan and Charlemagne**

During the Orange Revolution, the tent city blocked traffic in the center of Kyïv for two months, and a sign over one of the tents read: “Please excuse the temporary inconvenience. We are conducting Euro-renovations of our country.” This playful sentence raises a crucial question. Is Ukraine an ancient palace full of potential, which has survived a barbarian invasion, and now requires a thorough, modern “euro-remont,” a European-style makeover, to restore it to full life? Or will a cosmetic “euro-remont” prove inadequate, and will it be necessary to start rebuilding the foundations and the walls?
The Orange Revolution was not just limited to the result of an election; there was much more to it than that. At stake was a choice that transcended the time span of the election itself and was indeed a challenge to the future. On the political level, the gains of that revolution shall call for many critical evaluations or attempts to undo them. On the moral level, however, this revolution will last for a long time, possibly decades, accompanying a real and not just a declarative social evolution from posttotalitarianism to democracy. The relevance of this process will bear not only on Ukraine but also on Russia and the European Union, precisely because the Orange Revolution raised the issue of identity—the identity of Ukraine, the identity of Russia, and to a great extent, of Europe itself. The direction of integration within the borders of the Old Continent depends upon the identity of nations and cultures. In the next fifteen or twenty years, this process will bring a completely new geopolitical and geocultural map of Europe. If the European code of Ukrainian culture wins, a reintegration of Ukraine into the European space will take place, inasmuch as the European matrix will determine the formation of the national identity of Ukrainian culture. The opposite outcome would be self-evident and does not require supposition: Ukraine can exist only as part of the European continuum. Otherwise, it simply will not exist.

Today, the problem of identification represents the raw nerve of most of the integration crises in Europe itself and beyond its borders. Tensions are provoked by the dynamics of globalization processes, and as a result, any possible victory of the European choice in Ukraine would only be the beginning of a deep transformation, the outcome of which will depend on various factors. The first is the will of the Ukrainian people to make the spoils of their victory irreversible. After all, in addition to the Orange Maidan, there is also the Ukraine of the Blue Maidan, as the year 2007 showed, which may slowly, if at all, cease to be a post-Soviet plasma in the hands of visible and invisible posttotalitarian puppeteers. The second factor is the Russian evolution in the globalized world. It is Russia, after all, who now has the biggest problems of identity. In the same way as its economy is dangerously inflated by world oil prices, so its search for a new identity is dangerously tied to resuscitated nationalist and retaliatory myths. These myths pull it away from Western democracy and favor the proliferation of worldwide political instability. Finally, the third factor is the change in European identity, since Europe is still searching for its political and cultural role between the United States, Russia, and the new economic eastern giants—China and India.

In the ongoing reorganization of the European space, as well as of Ukrainian and Russian space, there will be many unknowns. Charlemagne and Genghis Khan bypassed each other in time. Today, however, they are making up for this in that geocultural space between Kyїv, Warsaw, and Moscow. Charlemagne once challenged the Second Rome, consciously seeking to separate himself from it within the parameters of another civilization. Today, the Third Rome challenges the empire of Charlemagne in the battle for souls and lands.

The terms of this conflict may change, but not its essence. It grows increasingly apparent that the *Limes Europae* will fall over the body of Ukraine, depending on the result of the struggle between the Moscow and Kyїv religious orthodoxies, and then
between a state-centered church and a Man-centered church. In this sense, the neutral
term *limes*, the borderline, may turn into the far-from-neutral term *finis*, the end. The
victory of Genghis Khan, the victory of the Eurasian model in Ukraine, would mean
not only the downfall of the democratic perspective but also the defeat of the Christian
world, of its ethical parameters, first and foremost.

The affinity of the Russian church with the state has brought about a dramatic
problem: the risk of losing its spiritual dimension. Today we see another troublesome
result: the loss of identity or the impossibility of finding identity in the new cultural
and political parameters of a globalized world, when identity issues appear even in
consolidated cultural contexts.

When the state ideology has been formed by the church, and the church has first
and foremost a *territorial dimension*, as it does in Orthodoxy, then, at the moment
that the state loses that imperial space, an identity crisis befalls the whole organism,
as is now happening in Russia. Orthodoxy is being exploited not only in the military
strategy of Russia, when priests bless the genocide of Chechnya, but also in the energy
strategy. Thus one can observe an interesting process. Globalization supposedly
consolidated and modernized the typical Ukrainian identity, pushing it decidedly in
the direction of the European choice. And, inversely, it shook up and pulled Russian
identity backward, forcing it to look for archetypal models of its statehood. This is,
understandably, a dangerous process. Disorientation in terms of bases of identification,
as a rule, is conducive to feeding various retaliatory ideologies, which easily acquire
xenophobic and/or racist characteristics.

"Eurasianism"

By way of illustration, let us examine two of the most widely held concepts of the
future of Russia, which we can refer to conditionally as “the expansionist syndrome”
and the “containment syndrome.” These concepts are mutually exclusive, although
they both form the cementing basis of the anti-Western discourse of Russia. The “ex-
pansionist syndrome” is embodied in Russian neo-Eurasianism, a very complicated
tendency, multifaceted and much more dangerous than it seemed at its beginning, on
the eve of the fall of the Soviet Union. The theory of Eurasianism has its roots in the
work of Nikolaj Danilevsky, *Russia and Europe* [Rossiia i Ievropa, 1869, printed in
1871] and the work of Konstantin Leontiev, *Byzantism and Slavism* [Vizantinizm i
Slavianstvo, 1875]. They claimed the superiority of Russian civilization over the West
European, and a revival of the Russian empire as a world power in the process of the
unavoidable collision of these opposite worlds.

There are three key aspects of historic Eurasianism that are particularly important
to neo-Eurasianism. (1) Historical Eurasianism revised the idea of Slavic origin of
Russian power, insisting on the thesis that Genghis Khan was “the first Eurasianist”
and proving that *translatio imperii* was the passing of power to Moscow not from
Constantinople, but from the Golden Horde. From this viewpoint, Moscow is not
so much “the Third Rome” as “the Second Sarai.” (2) Eurasianism was a response
not only to the fall of the Russian empire but also to the “decline of Europe,” as presented by Spengler. It was founded on the hypothesis that the East possesses the vital energy necessary to subjugate the West. (3) Eurasianism, infinite in its ideology, was the expression of the extreme left as well as the extreme forces of the right.41

Like the first Eurasianism, neo-Eurasianism was also a reaction to the fall of another empire, this time the Soviet empire (see Massaka; Pachlovska; Paradowski; Vandalkovskaia). The danger lies in the fact that it is much more populist, eclectic, and most aggressive, compared with the previous one. In reality, it is a matter of open racism. Neo-Eurasianism has a platform in common with racist theories of the past, which served as the source of Nazism.42 Today, on the ideological scale from national Bolshevism to Nazism, from the most conservative Orthodoxy to Islamic integralism and Fascist neopaganism, neo-Eurasianism represents quintessential Russian nationalism. In general, it is a mixture of various forms of nationalism, Orthodoxy and Marxism, juxtaposed with Atlantism and the West as such, as a form of civilization (on this subject, see Bratkiewicz; Ferrari; Kis’; Laqueur; and Lazari). The common denominator is the anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, sentiment as well as the inevitable corollary of anti-Semitism. Second to the “great American enemy,” stands the “great Israeli enemy.” The ideologue of neo-Eurasianism, the “ariosopher” (i.e., the “Arian philosopher”), is Alexander Dugin, author of innumerable books written in the style of intellectual shamanism. His exalted, mystifying narrative strategy strongly influences both the intellectual circles and the uneducated masses.

The strategy underlying this concept is that Eurasianism is the “conservative revolution” destined to save the world from Western decadence. It is also a new way of understanding history as “space,” not as “time,” that is a succession of events and their cause and effect connections. According to such geographic determinism, history is a geographic category. Russia is neither Europe nor Asia, but a specific geocultural, sacral creation: “Eurasia.” It is, therefore, not a country, not a state, but a continent, “our universal fatherland, our holy land, our most precious imperial inheritance.”43 It is the cradle of Indo-European peoples and, in general, the axle of world history. The matrix of Russian power is the empire of Ghengis Khan, which fulfilled the role of civilizing Europe. As Dugin (2004) expounds, the greatest patriots of Russia are Ghengis Khan’s children. “The sacred Eurasian empire,” the all-embracing and all-engrossing Russia, is the “organic, traditional” reality, opposed to modern, nonorganic Anglo-Atlantic reality. The Continental block has to fight with the Oceanic power. This is its historic mission. America, the sea power, the Leviathan, the mobile sea giant, the Atlantic thalassocratic power, personifies modernity, individuality, dynamism, and democracy. Russia is the behemoth, the continental telurocratic power, the immobile giant, the nomos or pastureland of the planet. This behemoth personifies tradition, collectivism, conservatism, hierarchy, and ideocracy. The mission of the Third Rome is to destroy America as the new Carthage. Russia announces its Endkampf, the eschatological final battle under the signs of the star and the swastika, against the Atlantic West.44 At the end of the world, the name of Russia is The Axe, which will cut down the tree of old History and will cut through a road to the “spiritual future of
the planet,” writes A. Dugin in a chapter with the somewhat sinister title “My Name Is Axe” (Dugin 2000).

For a long time, historiography defined neo-Eurasianism as an insignificant Fascist pseudoscience. In the meantime, neo-Eurasianism became the official doctrine of Russian state politics. An institutional and official organization of the movement was started in Russia and in neighboring countries that had favorable social foundations for it.

The strategic priority of today’s Russia, the building of “a common economic space” or of a Eurasian space, could recreate Soviet space. President Putin declared a Eurasian course for Russian politics. The neo-Eurasian movement has such powerful sponsors as the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the company the Gold of Russia (Massaka 176). An International Eurasian Movement has also been organized. In Ukraine, it found support in the paramilitary organization Brotherhood [Bratstvo], which became a member, as well as Nataliia Vitrenko’s Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine both of which are known for their openly anti-Ukrainian position.

The supposedly global scale of Eurasianism as an expansionist syndrome encounters another extremity, the encirclement syndrome, a sense of an imaginary siege of Russia, its isolation in a progressively tighter circle of “enemies.” This forms a mirror image, a picture reflecting the opposite of the neo-Eurasian geopolitical perspective of Russia. It discloses a certain systemic crisis of Russian identity. The only common element with Eurasianism is the anti-Western pathos.

Dmitrij Kondrashin offers a synthetic picture of this siege of Russia in the article “The Front Against Russia: the Direction of Aggression.” What is the Eurointegration of the countries of Eastern Europe and the expansion of the territory of democracy? It is actually an “eastern European vindication,” a treacherous plan for weakening Russian statehood, and excluding “Russia as sovereign state from the international community.” Russia’s destruction can be related to three basic projects. The first is that of “Osman Islam,” under the aegis of Turkey, which supposedly plans to tear away Russia’s Muslim zone of influence. From the north, Russia is threatened by the “Finno-Ugric” project, from the Baltic Sea to the Khanty Mansk, under the aegis of “Estonian vindicators” who wish to take away from Russia a part of the Karelian Republic, the Murmansk oblast, and other territories, and who provoke the Finno-Ugric minorities to subversive action.

The fiercest enemy of Russia is “Kyïvan Rus’,” alias Ukraine. This national project presents an alternative to the Kremlin. The futurological picture of Kyïv-centrism is really eschatological. The hope that president Yushchenko would align himself just with “Galician nationalism” was shattered. Instead, “the national project, realized by them in Ukraine, will not be a simple alternative to Russia, but Kyïv will become an alternative to the Kreml in Moscow in Russia,” and Kyïvan Rus’ “will become an alternative to the Russian state with the capital in Moscow.” What makes Kyïv so threatening? The fact that democratic, pro-European Ukraine consolidates Russian liberals, and strengthens the anti-Putin opposition by uniting it around the pro-European Kyïv. Kondrashin thinks that Kyïv will also be the gravitational center for 5 million
Russian migrants in Europe and for 15 million Russians in the post-Soviet space. In short, Kyïv will become “the center of gravity for the traditional Slavic regions of Russia,” as well as “the coordinating center for revolutionary reform” in the Russian Federation. What will facilitate this process will be the span of usage of the Russian language in Ukraine and the network of the attractive electronic mass media, which already covers “the whole Russian world” and a large part of Russia itself. This network is much more effective than the generally poor Russian news outlets. In other words, “‘Kyïvan Rus’ embodies the idea of a democratic Russian world without Moscow” (emphasis added).52

According to the fundamentalist Russian Orthodox press, not only Kyïv but also Constantinople is acting toward the ruination of Russia by favoring the creation of a Ukrainian Particular Church, by not stopping the Orange Revolution. In other words, a Byzantine history has come to a close (see Tiurenkov).53

Behind such concepts, one can detect Russia’s inability to adapt its national space to the dynamic changes in today’s world. It used to think and act exclusively in terms of colonization. Russia considers itself colonized because it has lost its colonies. It is used to taking away sovereignty from other peoples, and interprets the departure of these peoples from its sphere of influence as a threat to its own sovereignty. This is really political surrealism. It just underscores an inability to see world history and to detect within it the history of the Other through non-Russian optics. This is another characteristic of the mind-frame of the Russian Orthodox culture of dogmatism. In addition, the mythologizing of concrete historic realities proves that the study of Russian history is taking place on the level of paradigmatic anachronisms. Since the crux of such interpretations of Russian history is also the anachronistically interpreted Orthodoxy, all this only leads to a further weakening of society, estrangement of people from faith, and indifference to the moral dimensions of both history and the present.54

In his book, Opasnaia Rossiia [Dangerous Russia], the historian Iu. Afanasiev wrote the following about the Eurasian aspect of Russian mentality: “Russia is ravaged by the desert that is within us. And that danger comes from the east.” Russia’s salvation lies in “the Europeanization of Russian Asianism” (64, 66, 111).

In an article well-known and much despised in Russia, “The Tragedy of Central Europe,” Milan Kundera, the author of the “Europe stolen away” by Communism, wrote about Russia as of “another world” that can even attract by its mysteriousness, but that is frightening in its aggressive limitlessness and in its total foreignness toward European mentality. In the notion of Russia, Kundera unwillingly includes the whole Orthodox Slavic world, a territory he saw as hopelessly engulfed by Russia. One could fight the Soviet regime in Warsaw and Budapest, dying for Europe, he writes, but this would not be possible in Moscow or St. Petersburg.55

Not so in Kyïv. Long before the Orange Revolution, in the 1920s, Ukrainians were fighting for an independent state, emphasizing that this was also a fight for Europe. This struggle failed and came to be called the “Slain/Executed Renaissance.”56 It is hoped that the grand transformation begun by the Orange Revolution will not have such a tragic fate. At any rate, on November 28, 2004, when there was a threat of military
attack, the protesters in Kyïv and other cities continued their struggle for democracy. Expecting the rolling in of tanks, in full view of snipers, they were saying: “Yes!” to Europe. This was much harder than for the French to say “No!” to that same Europe in their referendum. That is why the philosopher André Glucksmann said in 2004 that it was Kyïv, not Paris, that became the capital of Europe, and that the real event of the year for Europe was not the French referendum but the Ukrainian revolution, a truly European revolution (Glucksmann 2005).57 Some British political scientists spoke of it as the most elegant revolution of modern times.

If, in the triangle among Kyïv, Warsaw, and Moscow, the duel between Charlemagne and Genghis Khan will be decided in favor of Charlemagne, Christianity as faith will be saved. If the system of cultural and ethical coordinates of Ukrainian Orthodoxy will allow democracy to take root, moving the Limes Europae to golden-domed Kyïv will permit the rebirth of the faith system of the “Byzantine world,” which in turn will place the human being in the center of its priorities. Then light will truly come from the East, not as a rhetorical formula, but as a dearly paid-for renaissance.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Christine Sochocky

Notes

1. *Finis Europae*: the end, the border, the frontier of Europe; or the end of Europe, the fall of its integral expanded model. In the near future, the meaning of this Latin phrase will depend on Ukraine’s final choice between civilizations: Europe or Eurasia.

2. Among the proofs offered was the tragic story of Yushchenko’s face, disfigured by poisoning. People were told that the changes on his face were a clear sign of his positively “satanic nature.” The Austrian journalist Isolde Kharim wrote of this in her article, “The Sign of Cain of His Enemies,” that the border between Europe and the barbarian world passes through the face of Yushchenko, “a person who is the embodiment of civilization” but carries on his face, disfigured by barbarians, “Cain’s sign of His Enemies” as a signal, a warning of danger (*Der Standard*, December 17, 2004).

3. This organization published a book with an emblematic title, *The Devils of the Orange Revolution* (Moscow, 2006), which clearly alludes to Dostoevsky’s *Devils*. Its Web site, www.otechestvo.org.ua, is one of the most anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western sites in its ideology. Other sites that offer anti-Ukrainian propaganda in the Orthodox vein include: www.anti-orange.com.ua; http://russian.kiev.ua (Russkaia Obshchina); http://za.zubr.in.ua (Za Ukrainu, Belorussiu, Rossiu); www.malorossia.org; www.dervaza.com (Vozrozhdenie Derzhavy); www.fondiv.ru (Fond Imperskogo Vozrozhdenia); and all the sites of www.rossija.info (Circle of Patriotic Resources). See specifically the Orthodox analytical site, www.pravaya.ru, an unusually aggressive Orthodox monarchist site, for its steadfast and strategic intent of cross-contamination of religious and political ideologemes. Leftist Web sites, such as the Crimean Krimskii levopatrioticheskii predvybornyi blok im. Bogdana Khmelnitskogo at www.edienie.kiev.ua (see also www.grach.crimea.com) and rightist sites, such as www.pravaya.ru, rely exclusively on the Moscow Patriarchate as their ideological referee. Most radical Web sites end up in outright Nazi propaganda, with its myth of the “White Man” (see, for example, SS—Slavianskii Sioiu [Slavic Union], Web site of the National-Socialist Movement, at www.demushkin.com, or Severnoe Bratstvo [Northern Brotherhood], at http://nordrus.org, a neopagan movement that, oddly enough, stresses the necessity of establishing a “Holy Rus”).

4. Among the slogans of these “Orthodox brotherhoods” were constant fusions of political
and religious aspects: “We are servants of God, but not of the European Union,” “NATO is Satan’s legion,” and so on. The word “rab” in Old Church Slavic meant both “servant” and “slave” of God. In Orthodox terminology, the word “rab” is used in terms of spiritual submissiveness.

5. Among the declarations of the Union of Orthodox Citizens is the following: “We are fighting for the faith, for Holy Rus’, for Novorossia, for Tavriia, and for Donbas” (Novyi Region—Krym, January 21, 2005, www.nr2.ru/14203.html). The declaration ends with the defiant words “Orthodoxy or death! We announce that the elders of the Russian Orthodox Church blessed the struggle for a Donetsk-Crimea-Novorossia Republic, to hold out till death.” In these words arises a particular geography, estranged from history. “Holy Rus’” is an ideological abstraction in the Orthodox tradition, Novorossia and Tavriia are nineteenth-century terms, when colonial Ukraine was administratively divided into gubernias of the Russian Empire.

6. From this point, the names of the churches will be referred to in acronyms: UOC KP for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyïv Patriarchate, UAOC for the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, UOC MP for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, UGCC for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, ROC for the Russian Orthodox Church.

7. “We, the representatives of various religions, are greeting the rebirth of spirituality which has united the entire Ukrainian people, and are praying together for peace, freedom and the unity of Ukraine. […] Whoever we might be, belonging to a certain region, party, religion, nationality or even race, cannot prevent us from being brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of one people” (For Truth, Unity, Peace and Freedom. An address from all religious groups to all citizens of Ukraine, Web site Maidan, December 24, 2004, http://maidan.org).


9. An interesting illustration of this may be seen in the text of the eulogy of Danyil Sysoev, the parish priest of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul, in Iasenevo, Moscow, Ex Oriente Lux, or Our Answer to the Vatican: The only true Christianity is Orthodoxy. The West is, by definition, apostasy. Ex Oriente Lux, Light from the East, that is, from Russia. The West is “the midnight darkness of humanism,” to which “Christ calls to respond with news of the light of Resurrection which has long ago died out in the sorrowful countries of the West.” Humanism and liberalism are the two main enemies of the Orthodox faith. “Vatican proselytizers” are “impious and loathsome men,” “who emerged out of the darkness, for they were the issue of the western land,” as the saintly Photius said about them back in the ninth century. Their “attack” is “a sign of weakness and degeneration.” The Eastern Church is in Eden itself and, for this reason, it must oppose the “false prophets” and “heretics” from the West, the traitorous Christianity of Europe and America (http://sysoev2.narod.ru/EXORIENTELUX.html).

10. The story of Pope John Paul II’s visit to Ukraine in June 2001 is emblematic. The Pope was greeted by millions of Ukrainians, believers and nonbelievers, Orthodox and Catholic. Meanwhile, in the Orthodox Churches of the Moscow Patriarchate, rituals of cleansing all traces of the “precursor of the Antichrist” were performed. The head of the UOC MP refused to meet with the pontiff, and Aleksei II said that this visit would further complicate relations between the two Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and between Moscow and the Vatican.

11. A population map of Ukraine illustrates this well: inhabitants who supported this ideology and showed the greatest “Orthodox” activity were usually working class, Bolshevik, and proletarian in spirit, in the most atheistic areas of Ukraine. These were the most Russified regions under the Russian Empire and then, in turn, the most Sovietized areas under the Communist regime. At the same time, statistics show that these areas had the lowest levels of education, the most inefficient health services, high indicators of criminality, of family distress, and of alcoholism. These are also the regions where one observes the deepest identity crisis. These aspects were discussed by the writers and scholars Catherine Wanner (1998) and Iaroslav Hrytsak (2004). Concerning the syndrome of “Donetsk Identity” see Pas’ko, Pas’ko, and Korzhov; Taranenko.
12. When asked about the benefits of integration with Russia, Yanukovych would answer that this way it would be possible to win more medals in the Olympic Games.


14. For this reason, one of the first steps taken by President Yushchenko, in March 2005, was the disbanding of the State Committee on Religious Matters.

15. Nihilists do not pity anyone or anything. They “play crime games,” they play at law transgressions because this is the only way to guarantee power and a high profile for themselves. “Demons play with ideas,” says Glucksmann (2002, 137).

16. Bulgaria and Croatia are exceptions to this scheme and warrant separate discussion.

17. From the medieval “gathering of lands” and “Moscow the Third Rome” of the time of Ivan the Terrible, through Pan-Slavism, Eurasianism, Communism, to the neo-Eurasianism and the “common economic space,” we see a constant remake of the same idea, which changes names but not substance, the idea of “Holy Rus’,” of the immanent grandeur of Russia, of “its universal destiny,” of “its service to all mankind” (Dostoevsky 70–74). The West is “dead power,” whereas Russia is “the future powers,” as Dostoevsky wrote in his A Writer’s Diary. All of them, Ivan the Terrible, Dostoevsky, Lev Gumilev, Gennady Ziuganov, Lenin, and Solzhenitsyn, were bound by the idea of the decaying West and of the exceptional historic path and the universal mission of Russia. Prince A. Kurbysky, P. Chaadaev, A. Herzen, and A. Sakharov were the pariahs of Russian history.

18. From the beginning, God had blessed the “holy Russian land,” and therefore working to change this status quo, to transform this land, would be not only unnecessary but sinful, as it would defy the will of God. No wonder that the Pan-Slavists referred to Russia not as “the land of law, but the land of truth.” Solzhenitsyn is convinced of the superiority of moral laws over laws of jurisprudence. Solzhenitsyn discusses this in his Kak nam obустроїть ‘Rossiïu (59).

19. Ievhen Malaniuk, in his Narysy z istoriï nashoï kul’tury, holds that Ukrainian Orthodoxy kept its anthropocentric content from the Middle Ages, a period that he calls “old-Kyïv Humanism,” precisely because of the systemic opposition of the civilization of Kyïv Rus’ to the Byzantine model.

20. The following authors also deal with this subject: Brogi Bercoff (2002), Graciotti (1996), Iakovenko (2003), Kłoczowski et al. 21. The historians S. Graciotti (2003), Z. Kohut, and I. Ševčenko provide much information on this issue (see also L. Vaccaro).

22. The poets at the court of Prince Konstantyn of Ostrih, such as Jan Dąbrowski, praised the victories of the Orthodox prince in epic poetry, in the Latin language (Iakovenko 2002). Meletii Smotrytsky and Chrysostoph Filaret (Marcin Broniewski), writing in Polish, defended the dignity of the Orthodox faith. Similarly, the poet Danylo Bratkovsky spoke against the Union in Polish. Ivan Velychkovsky in his “strange poems” playfully used old-Ukrainian language with poetic forms that were grounded in Latin, however the content of his poetry was Orthodox (see Axer; Brogi Bercoff 1996; and Martel).

23. The vibrant renaissance of the Kyïv Mohyla Academy and the Ostrih Academy in an independent Ukraine are not only symbolic but also emblematic. The growth of these institutions and their active role in the Europeanization of Ukrainian education attest to the strength of the internal continuum of culture. While in the seventeenth century, the Mohyla Academy chose the Latin language as a gateway to the world of knowledge, in the post-Soviet period its choice was English.

24. No wonder Peter I ordered the burning of “Lithuanian books.” Moreover, Peter I, and then Catherine II, forbade the use of the Ukrainian language, ordering everyone to speak “in a voice characteristic of Russian speech.” No wonder Ukrainian intellectuals and religious leaders such as Stefan Iavorsky and Feofan Prokopovych, although loyal servants of the Empire and of the Russian church leadership, were, nevertheless, always treated with suspicion. They
were perceived as “Latinizers,” and thus subversives. Prokopovych, a great innovator in the fields of poetry and history, wrote a trivial little poem, The Repentant Zaporozhets [Zaporozhets, kozak from Zaporizhzhia, center of Ukrainian Kozakdom, liquidated by Catherine II in 1775]. Censorship, the vigilant eye of the Empire, saw him primarily as a Ruthenian, not as an intellectual, and declared him a zaporozhets, and a disturber of order and a potential “traitor.” (Peter I said that all Ukrainian hetmans were traitors.) In his autocratic model, the very wish to be oneself, to claim one’s identity, represented betrayal. This spawned the Russian view of a Ukrainian as an enemy and/or a nationalist.

25. Out of these phrases from Shevchenko’s poems stems the disorienting Soviet perception of Shevchenko as an “atheist.” They misinterpret Shevchenko’s Testament: “When the Dnipro shall carry the enemy blood from Ukraine to the blue sea, then I will leave behind these mountains and furrows, leave everything, and rise to God Himself to pray. Until then, I know no God.”

26. The best research on this issue may be found in Ivan Dziuba’s articles and his book (2004, 2005), as well in the above-mentioned work by Malaniuk (see n. 19).

27. In “Soldatskaia Pamiatka” General Dragomirov called out to his soldiers, “Heroes! God is leading you, He is your General!” (quoted in Dziuba 2004, 63).

28. It is significant that Shevchenko, educated in the Western art culture at the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg, was almost repulsed by the sickly aesthetics of Orthodox Churches of the vast Russian provinces, referring to them in his diary as “disfigured, animal temples” (translated from Schodomynty, September 27, 1857) (T. Shevchenko, 201). To the poet, the Byzantine God with epaulettes seemed to be a pagan idol of oppression, of Barbarian times, without a shadow of mercy. The Byzantine liturgy provoked a similar aversion in him: “A total lack of any harmony and no shade of elegance” (translated from Schodomynty, March 23, 1857) (Shevchenko 216).

29. There were many who thought likewise, even among prominent Russians, from Chaudaev and Viazemskii to Herzen, a sworn enemy of Leo Tolstoy, who called Orthodoxy “a false Christian faith” (L. Tolstoy, O voine i o voennom dele [1902, 30]. The Russian Church declared anathema not only on Mazepa but also on the “cursed and disdainful Russian Judas, who with his spirit strangled everything holy [. . .] a base and bedeviled seducer” (quoted in Bogdanovich 461).

30. It is especially in Dziady by Adam Mickiewicz that one recognizes the inhuman and somewhat demonic dimension of power in Russia.

31. The largest minorities within Ukrainian territory, Poles, Russians, and Jews, were represented by particular ministries. All minorities, without exception, obtained the right to have their own schools, press, publishing houses, cultural institutions, and places of worship.

32. To delve deeper into the genealogy of this concept, it is essential to stress the role of Mykhailo Drahomanov, who was the first in the Orthodox-Slavic world to raise the issue of individual rights within a society, independent of national, religious, or linguistic affiliation. In the first part of the nineteenth century, Kostomarov spoke of a family of free peoples. In the second half of the century, Drahomanov broadened this view and foreshadowed “The United States of Europe.” In his works, he spoke ante litteram of a unification of the free nations of Europe into a democratic commonwealth. Russia could eventually join this commonwealth, but only when it freed itself from its imperialist dimension.

33. In the years 1933–1934, in Ukrainian territory, 75 to 80 percent of church structures were destroyed. In the Vinnitsia, Donetsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Khmelnytska oblasts, no churches were left. In the Luhansks, Poltava, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts, one church remained in each. By the end of 1937, Catholics of the Latin rite did not have any churches or priests. Baptist preachers were liquidated also, and all of their houses of prayer were closed. In 1937–1938, 200,000 priests were arrested and half of them killed. In 1946, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was annulled by means of a government-arranged “Synod” (Botsiurkiw 1996). It then went underground and survived in some measure for decades, under constant persecution (Isichenko 367–388).
34. In Ukraine, the term “Euro-renovation” describes renewal of apartments or houses; it is very desirable and is considered classy.

35. On the eve of the Orange Revolution, in November 2004, an international symposium dedicated to the problem of the reintegration of Ukraine into Europe took place in Milan (see Brogi Bercoff and Lami).

36. The problem persists as the parliamentary elections of March 26, 2006, and the events that followed them permitted retaliatory acts by antidemocratic forces. The liberal political elite was not sufficiently consolidated. At the same time, the sluggish post-Soviet economy, accompanied by multilayered corruption, may become a permanent obstacle, halting the concrete progress of Ukraine in the direction of integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. The September 30, 2007, elections ended, though, with a win by the democratic coalition.

37. As the First Rome spread across the world by means of its roads, the “Third Rome” plans to establish itself on the planet by means of “Orthodox gas pipelines.” “Now the time has come for the holy Orthodox Faith to spill out over the world through the network of Gazprom,” wrote Kirill Frolov in Natsional’nyi konsensus i ego protivniki on the “orthodox-analytical” site www.pravaya.ru on January 13, 2006. In January 2007, the Moscow patriarchate rewarded GAZPROM “for contributions to the friendship of fraternal Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples” just at the time when Moscow was blackmailing Minsk by withholding its gas supply. One year earlier, in January 2006, it had done the same to Kyïv.

38. Historical Eurasianism, which emerged in 1921 as a reaction to the fall of the empire, turned into a considerable intellectual and political movement among Russian postrevolutionary émigrés (the linguist Nikolai Trubetskoï, the economist Petr Savitsky, the theologian G. Frolovsky, the musicologist Petr Suvchinsky, the philosopher Lev Karsavin, and such sympathizers as the historian George Vernadsky and linguist Roman Jakobson). Such was the hegemonic, expansionist theory of an alternative configuration of Russia in the form of the reborn messianic world empire, with Moscow as the center of a grandiose Eurasian territory that includes Europe, China, India, and the Islamic world, as opposed to the “Euro-Atlantic triangle” of England, America, and Canada. Citing Dostoevsky, one of the “noble fathers” of Eurasianism, “the future of Europe belongs to Russia” (Dostoevsky 122).

39. N.S. Trubetskoï’s ideas are expressed in The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity (see also Gumilev; Hutsalo).

40. From here stem the invariants of Eurasianism, from the panmongolism of V. Soloviev, to literary works like “Skify,” by such authors as Ivanov-Razumnikov, Blok, Bely, Yesenin and others (see Lazari 1988; Nivat).

41. Some Eurasianists were Stalinists and/or Cheka agents in the West (such as P. Savitsky and S. Efрон, Marina Tsvetaeva’s husband). Others were Nazis (the ultramonarchist group “Balticum,” later known as “Consul,” the group of Russian Fascists in Khabrin headed by Rodzaievsky, and others). The link between Eurasianism and national-bolshevism (Agursky) has now been reestablished, although, at this time, these two trends, one pro-Putin, headed by A. Dugin and the other anti-Putin, led by E. Limonov, are in a delicate, conflicting relationship.

42. The neo-Eurasianists are quite familiar to the neo-Nazi movements in the West, such as the French “Nouvelle Droite.” On this subject see the works by the French theoretician of the “purity of the Arian race,” A. Gobinau, the geopolitical school of Karl Haushofer, the ideologue of “spiritual racism,” the Italian Julius Evola (Mikolejko).

43. The Eurasian meetings in Russia are held under the slogans “Russia is everything. All else is nothing!” “The Russian boot is sacred” and under black banners with bright yellow depictions of the face and the symbolic star of the “Knight of the Apocalypse.”

44. In the term “Einkampf” there is an ominous suggestion of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, and “Endlösung” reminds us of the Holocaust.

45. This is the preface [sic] to Dostoevsky’s work. In fact, Dostoevsky is actually viewed as “our contemporary.” See also Dugin (1997, 300).
46. The presidents of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia were invited to the forum “The Eurasian Integration: Tendencies in Contemporary Development and Challenges of Globalization,” which took place in Astana, at the Lev Gumilev University June 18, 2004. Gumilev was one of the inspiring minds of neo-Eurasianism.

47. The movement is supported by such publications as Literaturnaia gazeta, Sovetskaia Rossiia and on numerous other Web sites: http://evrazia.org; http://Eurasia.com.ru; http://arcto.ru; and http://rossia3.ru (the Union of Eurasian Youth), with various links to affiliated sites, from military to religious, under the symbolic name “The circle of patriotic resources” (www.rossija.info).

48. A. Dugin has a large following in the West, particularly in Italy, where he is referred to as “the prophet from the East,” and in France, where the Trotskyites and neo-Nazis of the Le Pen camp chose to stand under the flags of the Eurasian movement. André Glucksmann made an incisive analysis of the “Eurasian Europe” phenomenon after the referendum in which France voted against the European Constitution (May 29, 2005). He claims that the Paris–Berlin–Moscow axis constitutes a cynical betrayal of the basic values of European civilization (Glucksmann 2005).

49. See www.bratstvo.info. The ideology of the contemporary “Bratstvo” is actually a form of “Orthodox Fascism.” The manifesto of the “Orthodox Revolution” of the “Bratstvo” is a combination of national Bolshevik slogans with the Orthodox, together with a red flag and an image of Christ. In this manifesto, we find calls to defend the openly pro-Communist regimes of Belarus and Transdnistria, forming there “the structures of Orthodox resistance, a would-be Hesbolla.”

50. Dmitrii Kondrashin, www.regnum.ru, March 28, 2005. The analytical site “Regnum” was created by Modest Kolerov, one of the “gray cardinals” of Kremlin.

51. This strategy, D. Kondrashin thinks, has its origin in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s doctrine. Kondrashin blames the latter for creating the European Union, “the retaliatory European Reich,” which gave rise to the “multinational fascism of ‘civilized European nations.’” It is the result of the Balticization and Polonization of the European Union, which became a “center for the realization of American hegemony” and, supposedly, fosters the anti-Russian political attitude of the elites of the United States and of Great Britain together with the neo-Fascist forces of Europe and of Asia. The author paints a picture, terrifying to Russia, according to which the European Union is changing the date of the ending of World War II to the time of the Orange Revolution, which, in the eyes of Europe, marks the end of the Russian occupation of Eastern Europe. The mastermind of this “Fascism” is the “Brussels bureaucracy,” which stresses that Europe belongs to the “Judeo-Christian roots of Europe.” However, as far as neo-Fascism is concerned, its connection to the “Judeo-Masonic Conspiracy” against Russia has nothing to do with politics but perhaps more with some type of paranoia.

52. It is noteworthy that Russia is “returning” to Ukraine its primary historical dimension of Kyïvan Rus’. Should Ukraine reveal herself as “non-Russia,” Russia would lose Kyïvan Rus’. Again, we are back to Genghis Khan.

53. Under the title ‘The Heretical Metaphysics of ‘Orange Revolutions,’” Tiurenkov claims that the Orange Revolution actually began in 1054, the year of the split between the Eastern and Western churches. In point of fact, Washington and the Vatican have been plotting all along with Babylon, “the great deceiver sitting on many waters,” working for centuries to lead to this revolution. They were helped by Constantinople, which did not stop the Orange Revolution. Neither did it stop the events of 1917 and of 1991, which were seen as local and of temporary value. Armageddon came in 2004, when “the Russian sovereignty was finally denied the right of existence.” The Ukrainian scenario was labeled as heretical, because it was preparing the coming of the Anti-Christ, and, as a result, it is also a most illustrative model of the “tearing apart of Orthodox civilization.”

54. Despite countless restrictions and the growth of xenophobic movements, an opposition
is consolidating in Russia, and its presence is felt also on the Internet—Novaya Gazeta (www.novayagazeta.ru), Echo Moskvy (http://echo.msk.ru), Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal (http://ej.ru), Grani (http://grani.ru), Prava cheloveka v Rossii (http://hro.org), and Memorial (http://memo.ru). Of special interest is the informative, analytical site Sova (www.sova-center.ru), which deals with issues of nationalism and xenophobia in Russia, as well as with issues of the relationship between religion and society, “the rootlessness of liberal values, and lack of respect for human rights.” See also www.kasparov.ru. Youth movements have also appeared, such as “Pora” (modeled on the Ukrainian organization), “Zashchita,” “Idushchie bez Putina,” united into the “Student Opposition” (see the Web site of the Petersburg students, Idushchie bez Putina, www.noputin.com).


56. This description was taken from the title of Iurii Lavrinenko’s Rozstriliane vidrodzhennia, an anthology of literary works by leading Ukrainian poets, writers, and literary critics who were executed by the Soviet regime during its first two decades of rule. The book was published by Jerzy Giedroyć’s “Kultura” in Paris (1959).

57. Glucksmann (who is now an adviser to President Nicolas Sarkozy of France), had published in the Figaro a letter supportive of the Orange Revolution, “Freedom to the People of Kyiv,” signed by well-known intellectuals and politicians of Europe (Il Reformista, November 30, 2004). Glucksmann also initiated a joint letter from European politicians, “The Political Crisis in Kyiv,” which was published in numerous newspapers on April 17, 2007. He criticized the inconsistency of European politics toward Ukraine and called on Europe to support Ukraine’s desires for integration on the level on which it supported those of Poland, the Czech Republic, and the other countries of Eastern Europe.

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The status of religion in a state is conveniently measured by law. Consequently, this will be our chief approach. Law is an indicator not only, and sometimes not primarily, of the actual status of the matter that it regulates, but also of the consciousness and intention of the lawmakers. Insofar as it describes realities, law does so both directly, in describing how matters are actually regulated, and indirectly, in reflecting the concerns that guided the fashioning of the regulations. Constitutions and other fundamental laws are particularly susceptible to analysis as reflections of contemporaneous realities as well as of ideals. The ideals themselves, in turn, are reflections of the legal culture and consciousness of the legislators and of the society that they represent.

The relation between law and religion is not simply one of regulation and what is regulated. Religion lies near the heart of the origins of law as the social pursuit of morality and justice. Franz Wieacker sees the personalistic conception of law as having been fortified by the experience of a personal deity as it developed the dialectic of self-determination and responsibility, individual liberty and altruistic duty (Wieacker 20–22). Historically, the notion of human rights law originates in the development of Christian concepts of natural law (see Lauterpacht, 84–87). Even secular law embodies religious values.

To be sure, at least since the Enlightenment the attempt has been made to establish law as an independent system of norms with an extrareligious basis. In the nineteenth century, law was separated not only from religion, but in some cases also from morality. In our own time, the diversity and secularization of society have led some to view law as a surrogate for religiously based norms.

In the West, the functional relation between law and religion is viewed mainly in the context of freedom of conscience. The notion of special laws to regulate religion, as existed in the Soviet Union and persist in its successor states, is suspect. Religious freedom is seen as a primary human and civil right. The right to associate in religious groups is part of the freedom of association, and in a secular state there is no need to treat religious groups differently from other associations, at least those of a social or charitable nature.

Because religion has a social as well as a personal dimension, religious liberty
involves both group and individual rights. The European tradition balances individual and group rights, as well as rights and responsibilities (Glendon 13 and passim). In the words of Franz Wieacker, “...the continuous dialogue between theories of freedom and responsibility has remained the guiding theme of all European legal and political philosophy” (Wieacker 22).

What, then, are European standards of law with regard to religion? One must begin with at least a rough notion of what constitutes European law. According to Wieacker, the essential constants of European legal culture over the centuries have been personalism, legalism, and intellectualism (20–27). In their specific interactions, these elements distinguish European law from the legal traditions of, for example, China, India, or Africa. Wieacker does not follow the narrow view of the European legal tradition that would limit it to the Enlightenment values of France as embodied in the Code Napoléon and the modern states influenced by it, or even to a combination of continental civil law and English common law. His conception includes the North and South American emanations of common and civil law, areas of Asia and Africa influenced by European law, and, pertinent to this discussion, the socialist law of twentieth-century Eastern Europe (6–8). That, of course, may entail contradictions. Some of the Marxist notions underlying socialist law, such as the importance of an individual’s class origins, the dominance of state interests, or the nature of law as a weapon of class rule, comport ill with modern European concepts of individual freedom. Marxism, however, is itself a European philosophy, indeed, a product of the Enlightenment. In any case, under this broad standard, Ukrainian law falls clearly within the European ambit.

It is thus not necessary to “prove” the European nature of Ukrainian law by reference to West European influences, though that can certainly be done. Whether the law of Ukraine’s medieval predecessor state, Kyivan Rus’, originated in Byzantium, Scandinavia, Lithuania, or the East Slavic peoples themselves, it should certainly be regarded as European. Byzantine canon law carried on the tradition of Roman law. Under Polish rule, Ukrainians not only were regulated by, but participated in a legal system with Western roots. Feudalism, by contrast with the patrimonial system of Muscovy, introduced the concept of mutual obligations. Cities received the German Magdeburg law. In the nineteenth century Ukraine, as part of the Russian and Austrian empires, indirectly participated in the era of the great codifications. In the 1860s, Ukrainian lawyers benefited from the legal reforms of Russia (themselves influenced by French law) or, in Western Ukraine, from Austrian constitutionalism. In the latter region, an active Ukrainian bar developed during the interwar Second Polish Republic. Soviet law, too, was modeled on prerevolutionary Russian and West European law, and even its socialist elements must be regarded as European in origin. In short, Ukrainian legal culture has always been European.

Soviet legal treatment of religion, to be sure, did not measure up to what are commonly regarded as European standards. This was one of the most ideologically charged areas of Soviet law. The 1929 Law on Religious Associations specifically forbade various forms of the public practice of religion, contrary to modern European principles.
of freedom of conscience. Only in October 1990, on the eve of the Soviet collapse, was this law replaced with a relatively liberal statute, mirrored in the Ukrainian Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (LFCRO) of April 1991.

The legal status of religion is not, however, only a matter of the written law. Nor is it only a question of whether, or how, the law is enforced. More fundamental is the legal consciousness of legislators, lawyers, judges, law enforcement personnel, and the ordinary people who must in one way or another deal with legal regulation. It is here, in the realm of attitudes and beliefs that the question of legal status must be posed.

Naturally, the status of religion in a society is much more than a legal matter. It also concerns politics, society, culture, and history. For one thing, these factors form the context of law, without which its meaning is not clear. Thus, the same statute may have a certain effect in a West European context and quite a different effect in a Ukrainian context. This must be borne in mind in examining international norms. At the same time, political, social, cultural, and historical factors form the context of religious life. The legal treatment of religion cannot be properly understood in isolation from them.

In considering the status of religion in Ukraine, it is also well to keep in mind her geopolitical situation. Ukraine is surrounded by countries with very different approaches to law and religion. Russia’s laws privilege four chief religions, of which the Christian is represented by the Russian Orthodox Church. Both law and policy strongly favor that traditionally state-bound institution. Turkey is a Muslim country with a militantly secular legal and political order patterned on European principles. Adjoining countries of East Central Europe are generally characterized by a liberal democratic approach to their dominant Christian churches.

Ukraine’s situation with regard to religion should also be seen in historical perspective. While Western Europe is often regarded as secular and post-Christian, post-Soviet Ukraine has already experienced an extreme of secularism, and has been described as postatheist. Yet the Marxist critique of religion has left a distrust of established religion. The experience of state-sponsored Russian Orthodoxy has only compounded that attitude. It is therefore not surprising that millions of Ukrainians believe in God but are unwilling to join any traditional church. These historical factors set Ukrainians apart from West Europeans, whose experience, and thus expectations, are different.

**The Ukrainian Religious Landscape**

Before we examine Ukrainian law pertaining to religion, a brief survey of the Ukrainian religious landscape is in order. There is an entire spectrum of religiosity or religious belief: general spirituality, cultural adherence to a confession (which may exclude a belief in a god), belief in God, affiliation with a religious organization, full confessional adherence including membership in a local religious group, and full practice of a religion, both ritually and in everyday conduct.

Between 25 percent and 38 percent of the citizens of Ukraine are “not religious.” Between 61.8 percent and 75 percent describe themselves as “believers.” Thus, out
of 46 million people, roughly 30 to 35 million are religious believers. Between 14.8 percent and 25.6 percent believe in God but do not belong to any particular religion or church. About one-third (between 30.0 percent and 43.4 percent) consider themselves Orthodox Christians (Krindatch 2003, table 3.1 and 48–49). About 7–8 percent are Catholics (of both the Greek and Latin rite), and 2.0–2.5 percent belong to other faiths (Krindatch 49).1

A few comparisons will be instructive. While in Ukraine, 63–66 percent of the population has been found to “adhere to one religion or another,” in Russia this figure is 50 percent. While in Ukraine some 14 percent attend church services weekly, in Russia the corresponding figure is 3.6 percent (Krindatch 37). In comparison with the rest of Europe (East as well as West), this puts Ukraine roughly in the middle.

While the population of Ukraine is three times smaller than that of Russia, the total number of all local religious communities is greater than that in her neighbor. Thus, Ukraine has a density of religious infrastructure that is four times higher than in Russia—485 vs. 125 places of regular worship per million population (Krindatch 37–38).

Religious belief, practice, and density of infrastructure vary considerably, however, within Ukraine. The three Galician oblasts, for example, have a denser religious infrastructure than the Luhansk oblast (ibid., 50). In 1998, weekly church attendance was 44.1 percent in the Lviv and Ternopil oblasts in the extreme west of the country, but only 9.3 percent in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the east (ibid., table 3.2). In western Ukraine over 90 percent of the population believes in God; in Eastern Ukraine, only 55 percent (ibid., 50).

As would be expected, organized religious belief has grown rapidly since the liberalization of the late 1980s. From 1988 to 2003 there was a fourfold increase in the number of religious organizations.2 The number of denominations exceeds fifty.

More than 90 percent of religiously active citizens of Ukraine are Christian (US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2003). Most of them belong to one of three principal Orthodox churches. Of these, only the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP) under the Moscow Patriarchate, the successor (since 1990) to the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, has been considered canonical in the Orthodox world. There is some disagreement on their relative numbers. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate has been estimated to number 7.2 million faithful, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP) some 5.5 million, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) 0.33 million, for a total of 13 million (Chornomorets’ 10–11).3 Other Orthodox churches are the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. In one 1991 survey, it was found that 7 percent of the population consider themselves “simply Orthodox” (Krindatch 42).

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has been estimated as having 3.3 million faithful, though its own estimate is 4.5 million, and some have cited a figure of 5 million or more than 10 percent of the entire population. In April 2004 a survey by the Razumkov Center found that 6.4 percent of respondents identified themselves as Greek Catholic, which would suggest a total of about 3 million. Roman Catholics
(who use the name “Ukrainian Catholic Church”) may number about 840,000, though a Razumkov survey in April 2004 yielded 0.8 percent, suggesting a total of only 375,000. Another source would give them 0.7 percent of the population, corresponding to 330,000 adherents (Chornomoret’s’ 11).

“Traditional” Protestant churches in Ukraine—roughly speaking, those that have had a presence for over a century—include Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Lutherans, and Reformed. A number of “nontraditional” religious groups sprang up in Ukraine in the twentieth century due to missionary efforts originating in the United States: the Seventh Day Adventists, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), and the Pentecostals. Since independence, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, and other Protestant churches have appeared. Recent years have seen considerable activity on the part of evangelical and charismatic groups such as the Embassy of God, led by Sunday Adaleja, a Nigerian preacher whose followers have included Kyiv mayor Leonid Chernovetsky. The total number of adherents of all these groups, however, is probably not more than a million.5

The Ukrainian State Committee on Statistics estimated the number of Jews in 2001 as 103,600 (IRFR 2003), though estimates of 250,000 to 325,000 or 500,000 have also appeared. Most religiously active Jews are Orthodox, but Progressive (Reform) and Conservative (“Traditional”) congregations have also been founded. The Hasidic and Chabad Lubavitch movements have exhibited considerable vitality (IRFR 2001, 2002, 2003).

Ukraine’s Muslims are predominantly Sunni, and Crimean Tatar by ethnicity. Some 267,000, or 12 percent of the Crimean population, are Tatars and presumably Muslim. Muslims are also numerous in major cities, particularly Kyiv (IRFR 2001, 2002, 2003). There are around 457 registered Muslim communities, of which 320 are in the Crimea (IRFR 2006).

Finally, various new religions and “cults” are active in Ukraine, such as Krishna Consciousness and the neopagan Native Ukrainian National Faith or “RUNVira,” an export from the United States. In 2004, the Church of Scientology sought registration with the authorities. There are also relatively new groups of converts to the venerable Buddhist and Baha’i faiths.

International, European, and Ukrainian Law on Religion

International law can be seen as an emanation of European law in the broad sense outlined above. Originating on the Continent in the seventeenth century, in recent years it has been heavily influenced by Anglo-American traditions of individual rights and equal protection. Thus, in considering whether the treatment of religion by Ukrainian law meets European standards, it is appropriate to compare Ukrainian legislation with international as well as specifically European norms.

Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is proclaimed in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly Resolution 217A [III], UN Doc. A/811, December 10, 1948). The International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
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cal Rights (General Assembly Resolution 2200 [XXI] UN Doc. A/6316, December 16, 1966), states the following in Article 18:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. (art. 18, sec. 1)

Section 2 of this article prohibits coercion in matters of religion. Section 3 sets the customary limits: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”


On the European level, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1950 and accepted by Ukraine in 1997 with reservations) provides in Article 9:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. (art. 9, sec. 1)

The usual limitations apply:

Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of rights and freedoms of others. (art. 9, sec. 2)

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Official Journal C 364, December 18, 2000) contains virtually identical language in Article 10, Section 1:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

As is customary, rights are balanced by duties. The Charter’s Preamble states that “Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations.”

International law also promotes equal rights regardless of religion, and forbids discrimination on a religious or other basis. Thus, Article I of the United Nations Charter (June 26, 1945) provides that the organization’s purposes include “[T]o achieve international cooperation in . . . promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . .” (art. 1, sec. 3; see also art. 13, sec. 1 [b]).

Similarly, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, language, religion, color, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status (UDHR art. 2).

All rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration are subject to limits determined by law solely to secure recognition and respect for rights and freedoms of others, and the just requirements of morality, public order, and general order in a democratic society (art. 29, sec. 2). Furthermore, there is a provision on abuse of rights (a notion with which the Anglo-American jurist is not likely to be familiar): the rights and freedoms set out in the declaration are not to be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (art. 29, sec. 3).

The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that its own provisions are to be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (art. 2, sec. 1)

In a separate article, the ICCPR forbids discrimination in general. Individuals are equal before the law and enjoy equal protection of the law. Recapitulating the categories set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the covenant provides that the law shall prohibit discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (art. 26). As usual, the only limits are those prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or fundamental rights and freedoms of others) (art. 18, sec. 3).

In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution (res. 36/55 of November 25, 1981) proclaiming the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief. Fourteen years later, it issued the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (res. 50/183 of December 22, 1995).

Discrimination on the basis of religion and belief is among the types of discrimination prohibited by Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 22 further declares that “The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.”

Ukrainian law generally follows these standards. Article 35 of the Constitution (June 28, 1996) proclaims that “everyone” (not just “every citizen”) has the right to “freedom of worldview and religious confession [virosposvidannia].” This includes the right to confess any religion or none, to carry out, singly or collectively, religious cults or ritual ceremonies without obstruction, and to carry on religious activity (art. 35, sec. 1). The realization of this right can only be limited by law in the interests of public order, the health and morals of the population, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of other people (art. 35, sec. 2). It is perhaps significant that, in the latter clause, “people” and not “persons,” which might include organizations, is used.

Equality and nondiscrimination are guaranteed by Article 24: “Citizens have equal constitutional rights and freedoms and are equal before the law” (sec. 1). “No privileges or limitations on the basis of race, skin color, political, religious, or other convictions, sex, ethnic or social origin, property status, place of residence, or linguistic or other traits, are permitted” (art. 24, sec. 2).

Passed in the last months of the Soviet Union, when Ukraine had declared sovereignty (July 16, 1990) but not yet independence, the Ukrainian Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations of April 23, 1991, was based on the analogous Soviet Union law of October 1990. The law remained in force after independence was declared (August 24, 1991) and ratified by a popular referendum (December 1, 1991). In June 2002, the government submitted draft amendments to the LFCRO, forming a new version designated Draft Law No. 1285 on May 12, 2003). The independent All-Ukrainian Council of Churches (AUCC) has opposed the draft law. Its latest version was submitted in July 2006.

The LFCRO of 1991, with subsequent amendments, is conceptually different from the 1997 Russian Law on Religious Associations, which declares four privileged religions: Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam. It is also considered significantly more liberal than Belarus’s 2002 law on religion. A detailed European critique of the July 2006 draft was provided by the Advisory Council on Freedom of Religion or Belief of the OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Basically, the Advisory Council found that the draft law met the requirements of international instruments and best practice concerning freedom of religion or belief. Some provisions, however, were vague or unclear, and a number of provisions unduly restricted the autonomy of religious entities (Opinion No. REL-UKR/072/2006, Comments on the Draft Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations,” Warsaw, September 7, 2006).

The LFCRO as promulgated in 1991 proclaimed and defined freedom of conscience as follows:
Every citizen of Ukraine is guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience. This right includes the freedom to hold, accept, and change one’s religion or convictions by one’s own choice and the freedom, singly or together with others, to confess any religion or not to confess any, to perform religious cults, to openly express and freely disseminate one’s religious or atheistic convictions. (art. 3, sec. 1)

The next two sections of Article 3 forbid compulsion in matters of belief (art. 3, sec. 2), but recognize that parents or their surrogates have the right by mutual consent to bring up their children according to their own convictions and attitude toward religion (art. 3, sec. 3). The LFCRO also recognizes that citizens are equal before the law and have equal rights regardless of their attitude toward religion (art. 4, sec. 1).

The LFCRO concerns the rights not only of the individual but also of religious groups. Part II decrees that religious organizations in Ukraine are of the following types: communities, administrations and centers, monasteries, brotherhoods, mission societies, religious education institutions, and also associations comprising the above-mentioned religious organizations; the latter are represented by their centers (administrations) (art. 7, sec. 2). Religious communities have the right to be subordinate in canonical and organizational questions to any religious centers (administrations) active in Ukraine or beyond its borders, and to freely change that subordination (art. 8, sec. 2). In an important change from earlier Soviet law, there is no obligation to inform the state organs about the creation of a religious community (art. 8, sec. 3). A religious organization is a juridical person from the moment of registration of its charter (art. 13, sec. 1).

The property rights of religious organizations are dealt with in Part III (arts. 17–18). Reflecting general Ukrainian law, the right to own land is not included. Part IV details the rights of religious organizations and citizens related to the freedom of religious rites and ceremonies (art. 21), religious literature and objects (art. 22), charitable and cultural-educational activity (art. 23), international relations and contacts of religious organizations and individual believers (art. 24).

The LFCRO recognizes the supremacy of international law, and thus of European standards. Article 32 provides that if an international agreement to which Ukraine is a party establishes different rules from those established by the legislation on freedom of conscience and religious organizations, then the rules of the international agreement are to be applied.

While the laws of Ukraine generally meet European standards with regard to treatment of religion, a proper evaluation of the status of religion requires a closer look at Ukrainian law and its enforcement. We shall now take a brief look at law and practice in the key areas of religious minorities, tolerance, church and state, church and school, alternative military service, and the family.

**Religious Minorities**

The rights of religious minorities have attracted increasing attention in the field of international human rights. In Article 27, the ICCPR proclaims minority rights in the following language:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

Particular attention to the rights of religious minorities is reflected in the United Nations Declarations on Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) and on Religious Intolerance (1995), cited above. The Document of the Copenhagen meeting of the OSCE Conference on the Human Dimension (June 29, 1990) deals with the rights of minorities in art. 32; their religious rights are covered in art. 32.3.

The effect of the Ukrainian LFCRO on foreign-based religious minorities will be discussed below. In recent years the main difficulties concerning minority rights have not, however, concerned the laws, but their enforcement. Historically, the principal religious minorities in Ukraine have been Catholics, Protestants, and two ethnoreligious groups: the Jews and the Muslim Tatars.

While the Orthodox are a majority in Ukraine, in many parts of Western Ukraine they are in the minority in relation to Greek-Catholics, and some localities are evenly divided. It is thus difficult to characterize Catholic–Orthodox relations in terms of minority rights. In any case, nearly all the conflicts of the 1990s between the Orthodox and the Greek-Catholics over church property and parish allegiance in Western Ukraine have been resolved.

Throughout the Soviet period, “Protestant” groups or “sects” like the Evangelical Christians-Baptists and Pentecostals suffered persecution, and many members emigrated, particularly in the 1980s. With the advent of religious toleration, however, many of them have grown rapidly through evangelization and conversion. For the most part they were not impeded. Recently, however, some of these groups have complained of the activity of “antisect” organizations.

Although the Jewish minority in Ukraine is very small, anti-Semitism has remained a problem. Anti-Semitic articles have continued to appear in the press, most notoriously in the newspaper *Sil’s’ki visti* in 2002–2003. There have been attacks on places of worship as well as against individuals. It is sometimes difficult, however, to identify a specifically religious motive. A more subtle form of discrimination against the Jewish religious minority involves the fate of sometimes historic Christian and Jewish cemeteries and related symbols (IRFR 2006). Blocked or belated reopening of synagogues and other religious structures has also been reported, though in some cases the disputes are between different Jewish communities (U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, 2001). In a positive development, in 2003–2004 the Zhytomyr state archive returned seventeen Torah scrolls to the Jewish community.

Ukraine’s Muslims have experienced blocked or delayed registration of religious communities, for example at Kharkiv, and of Islamic schools, though Islamic universities (registered, however, as religious rather than educational institutions) do exist
in Kyïv and Donetsk (IRFR 2006). Difficulties with restitution of places of worship continue, as in the case of a historic mosque in Mykolaïv (ibid.). As in the Jewish case, there have been conflicts with regard to cemeteries (e.g., at Morske in the Crimea). Societal (not necessarily religiously based) discrimination against Muslims has been reported in recent years (IRFR 2003, 2006).

**Tolerance**

Apart from the treatment of religious minorities discussed above, in recent years religious intolerance has occurred primarily in two contexts: inter-Orthodox conflicts and foreign missionary efforts.

On June 2, 2006, representatives of churches and religious organizations signed a declaration on respect for religious feelings, symbols, and traditions (*Patriiarkan* 5/395, 2006, 29). Nevertheless, one Ukrainian observer writing in 2007 found that “In the last year and a half, the state of religious tolerance has worsened.” Several pro-Russian organizations have allegedly been the worst culprits, causing clashes in the Crimea, Volhynia, Chernihiv, and elsewhere, and trying to block visits by Patriarch Filaret of the UOC KP. According to this observer, they are all supported by certain hierarchs of the UOC MP. The mass media have allegedly participated in the intolerance too by, for example, attacking Kyïv’s mayor for his membership in a charismatic community. At the same time, there is still intolerance of religion as such, and of its presence in society (Antoshevs’kyi 2007).

A special test case of tolerance has been the situation of “nontraditional” religious groups and foreign missionaries. Widely regarded as a threat to the established churches as well as agents of Western (particularly American) influence, these groups typically engage in forms of proselytism that gain converts but also alienate a portion of the population. They are often well-financed, technologically adept, and sophisticated in their use of the media—qualities that make them particularly annoying to the relatively passive traditional churches.

According to Myroslav Marynovych, historically Russia has understood the Byzantine “symphony” between church and state as entailing the state’s obligation to protect the church from competition by other religions (Marynovych 213). However, international law pays little attention to the rights of majority religious communities to protect their traditions. In this respect, Eastern Europe (including Ukraine) finds itself in a position somewhere between the Western emphasis on individual human rights and the Islamic emphasis on the exclusive rights of a monolithic group. In Marynovych’s view, the East European is inclined to respect individual rights as long as the right of the community to preserve its traditions is respected too (220).

It has been argued that legal protectionism of traditional churches prevents them from learning to compete successfully in the religious “marketplace.” This possibly unfortunate metaphor, together with American insistence on pluralism and American financing of nontraditional religions, has helped to nourish an anti-Americanism uniting extreme left and right forces, including both Orthodox and Communists.
It must be remembered that the activity of missionaries need not impinge on the Orthodox (or Catholic) population. Statistics suggest that between a fifth and a quarter of Ukrainians may be unchurched believers (Krindatch 48). This means that there are around 9.6 million to 12 million persons whose conversion by missionaries could not be characterized as “soul-snatching.”

It is notable that while the Ukrainian Constitution grants freedom of conscience to “everyone,” the LFCRO refers to “every citizen.” Thus, it does not apply to foreign citizens doing missionary work in Ukraine. In December 1993, amendments to the LFCRO were passed that, according to Howard Biddulph, caused a “significant reduction of religious freedom” to citizens as well as noncitizens of Ukraine (Biddulph 338).

Despite these and other legal restrictions on the activities of “nonnative” (i.e., not Orthodox, Greek Catholic, or Jewish) religious organizations, there have been no recent reports of foreign religious workers encountering difficulties in obtaining visas, or interference or limitations on their activity (IRFR 2002, 2003, 2006). In 2002, in fact, 12,203 foreign religious workers were admitted, and in the first six months of 2003, 5,622 entered Ukraine with religious visas (IRFR 2003). More recently, however, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) have complained of discrimination, particularly in being denied a house of worship in Chernivtsi, Bukovyna. This was allegedly due to pressure from the UOC MP and the UOC KP (IRFR 2006).

The 2006 draft of a new LFCRO appears to have addressed some of the objections to the current law. A new Article 19 states three specific but separate grounds for termination of the activities of a mission (sec. 3). A new Article 23 guarantees believers and religious organizations the right to international contacts (sec. 1) and the rights to study abroad and to invite foreign persons to study in Ukraine (sec. 2). Section 3 clarifies the rights of foreign religious workers:

Foreigners and stateless persons legally staying in Ukraine may engage in preaching or other religious activities like citizens of Ukraine. They have no right to interfere with activities of religious organizations without their invitation or consent, to advocate religious intolerance in any form, insult human feelings related to their religious or other beliefs. (art. 23, sec. 3)

Special sections of Article 16, on registration documents, apply to foreigners. In Article 17, different registration procedures and timelines are prescribed for organizations and missions that practice “religions not represented in Ukraine.”

Church and State

Whether or not one considers the Byzantine, Russian, and Soviet conceptions of church–state relations to be part of the European legal and historical tradition, they are not favored by current West European standards. It is not adequate, however, to reduce these standards to the simple separation of church and state. Moreover, accord-
ing to Silvio Ferrari even the traditional classification of West European church–state systems into separation systems, concordatarian systems, and national-church systems is outdated. Instead, he points out a common pattern whose main elements are a neutral attitude of the state toward individuals, who are free to profess any religion they wish; the demarcation of a religious subsector within the public sector, where religious subjects collectively enjoy preferential treatment in relation to nonreligious subjects; and the confining of state interference with religious subjects to setting ground rules or to keeping the “playing field” level and its boundaries respected (Ferrari 421–422).

While generally speaking, Ukrainian law appears to fit into the European pattern thus defined, it is not clear whether this is the case with Ukrainian practice. As one would expect, the 1996 Constitution proclaims that the church and religious organizations are separate from the state, and the school is separate from the church. It further states that no religion may be recognized by the state as obligatory (art. 35, sec. 3). This does not, by itself, exclude the possibility of the state recognizing a given religion as primary or traditional, or of favoring religion in general.

In its General Provisions (Part I), the LFCRO sets out the basic principles on church–state relations in Ukraine. The church—that is, religious organizations—is separated from the state (art. 5, sec. 2). “All religions, confessions, and religious organizations are equal before the law. The establishment of any privileges or limitations of one religion, confession, or religious organization in relation to others is not permitted” (art. 5, sec. 5).

“Religious organizations have the right to participate in civic life, and also to use the media equally with civic associations” (art. 5, sec. 7). They may not, however, participate in the activity of political parties, give them financial aid, put forth candidates for office, or conduct agitation or financing of electoral campaigns of candidates to organs of state power. Clergy have the same right to participate in political life as other citizens (art. 5, sec. 8).

State control over enforcement of religious legislation is exercised by local councils of people’s deputies and their executive committees (art. 29). However, to ensure implementation of state policy on religion and church, a state organ is created for this purpose (art. 30). This is the State Committee on Religious Affairs.

The Soviet-era Council on Religious Affairs was disbanded on July 28, 1994. By 1995 it had been reconstituted as an agency within the Ministry of Culture. The State Committee on Religious Affairs (SCRA), as it came to be called, was dissolved by a presidential decree of April 22, 2005. Then, on August 18, 2005, it was replaced by the State Department on Religious Affairs, within the Ministry of Justice (Cabinet of Ministers, Resolution No. 770). Its powers were diminished, and what had been an agency of control became more of a watchdog of legality, mediator, and source of expert assistance. Recently, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych revived the SCRA and empowered it to deal with both religious and nationality affairs. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations opposed this move because experts believed that it would increase state control over religion and other aspects of social life (Antoshevs’kyi 2007).
While under the Soviet regime the registration requirement assured state control over religious organizations, current law does not require registration. It is practically necessary, however, for it provides the legal personality without which a religious community’s activity is very limited. The 2006 draft of the LFCRO details the rules on registration of religious organizations with the state authorities. Article 18 sets out six specific grounds for refusal to register a religious organization. These include contradiction between the objectives declared in the organization’s statutory documents and the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, as well as discrepancy of its doctrine and practice with Ukrainian legislation (sec. 1). The OSCE commentary on the draft has criticized this as well as other provisions (Opinion No. REL-UKR/072/2006, Comments on the Draft Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations,” Warsaw, September 7, 2006). Article 18 permits a repeat application for registration after the grounds for refusal have been eliminated (sec. 2), and provides that the organization may appeal the authorities’ refusal of registration in court (sec. 3).

The evolving draft of the LFCRO has been the subject of critiques by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO), which is composed of leaders of eighteen of the country’s largest Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities, representing over 90 percent of religious adherents (IRFR 2001, 2002). In October 2003, church leaders including representatives of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), and the Baptist Union appealed to the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly against proposed amendments to the LFCRO. Those amendments would have expanded the powers of the SCRA, tightened legalization procedures, allowed only a gradual return of confiscated church property, regulated access to schools and state institutions, and controlled the activities of foreign groups. The leaders feared a return of the special status formerly granted to the UOC MP (Luxmoore 2).

Members of the AUCCRO have been meeting periodically at a round table to discuss church–state issues. On April 13, 2005, in Kyiv, the AUCCRO called for “partnership” relations between the state and religious confessions (Patriarkhat 4/389, 2005, 27). At a meeting with the AUCCRO on June 14, 2005, President Yushchenko stated that Ukrainians must find the correct formula for partnership and unite their efforts where the people and society most need this (Patriarkhat 5/390, 2005, 27).

Recently the AUCCRO approved the new draft of the LFCRO, elaborated in a special commission of the Ministry of Justice. But the Party of Regions is reportedly preparing its own draft (Antoshevs’kyi 2007).

An issue that has tested the separation of church and state has been the support of more than one post-independence Ukrainian government for the unification of the country’s three Orthodox churches. In the 1990s, the regime of Leonid Kuchma supported the creation of a single UOC, pursuing two different scenarios. In the first scenario, the Russian Orthodox Church should grant autocephaly to the UOC MP, which would then be joined by the UOC KP and the UAOC. In the second scenario, all three would unite first, and then be recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate regardless of the Moscow Patriarchate’s opposition (Krindatch 66–67).
The Yushchenko government has urged the UOC KP and the UAOC (neither of which is generally recognized as a canonical Orthodox church) to pursue unity. In 2005, during a meeting with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I in Istanbul, the president stated that Ukrainian society was awaiting the creation of a single local (pomisna) Orthodox Church—though the question of unification was exclusively a church matter (Patriarchat 5/390, 2005, 26–27). When on July 27–28, 2006, President Yushchenko and parliamentary leaders discussing Ukraine’s political crisis inserted support for the creation of a single national Orthodox Church as No. 12 in their “Universal of National Unity,” Communist leader Petro Symomenko opposed it on the ground that it violated the constitutional separation of church and state. Yushchenko, however, considered it important for national unity (RISU, cited in the Ukrainian Weekly, August 6, 2006, 2). It has been reported that 80 percent of priests of the UOC MP would support Orthodox unification and autocephaly, that is, independence (Chornomorets’ 12). Ukrainian leaders are evidently balancing church–state separation and noninterference with the state interest in a spiritually united nation.11 According to some estimates, one consequence of unification would be the creation of the world’s second largest Orthodox Church.12

Are church–state relations in Ukraine such as to promote the growth of a civil society? Taking Ferrari’s criteria as a benchmark, one may observe that by and large the state has attempted to maintain a neutrality in the matter of religion; that religion has been accorded a privileged but fairly even subsector in the public square; and that with some exceptions, the state has restricted itself to maintaining an even religious playing field with secure boundaries. The exceptions, nevertheless, have been troubling, and recent trends toward favoritism and revived state control of religion are cause for concern.

Church and School

Article 35 of the Constitution of Ukraine declares the separation of church and school. Article 6 of the LFCRO reiterates this principle:

The state system of education in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the church (religious organizations) and is secular in nature. (art. 6, sec. 1)

Private religious education, of course, is permissible:

Citizens may study religious beliefs and acquire religious education individually or together with others, freely choosing their language of instruction. (art. 6, sec. 3)

More specifically,

In accord with their internal rules, religious organizations have the right to create educational institutions and groups for the religious education of children and adults, and also to carry on education in other forms, using for this purposes facilities that belong to them or which are provided for their use. (art. 6, sec. 4)
As is common in European constitutional documents, these rights are balanced by obligations:

Teachers of religious studies and religious preachers are obligated to educate their auditors in a spirit of tolerance and respect for citizens who do not confess a religion, and for the faithful of other religions. (art. 6, sec. 5)

In view of these principles, recent government initiatives to introduce spiritual-moral values into education have caused some controversy. The proposal to teach a course in “basic Christian ethics” in state schools has raised the question of whether ethics can be nonsectarian. The AUCCRO has set up a working group to deal with this issue. Lubomyr Cardinal Husar, who heads the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, has opined that state schools should not teach religious faith; rather, they should teach children about religion. On June 14, 2006, a commission of the Ministry of Education and Science confirmed the “conceptual bases of the subject of spiritual-moral direction” in schools. It recommended that instead of a single course on ethics, parents could choose for their children (1) basic philosophical ethics, (2) fundamentals of Christian ethics, or (3) fundamentals of religious ethics. Religious confessions were to prepare the course programs (Patriiarkhat, 5/395, 2006, 29–30).

At the same time, under the current education law religious communities still may not operate primary or secondary schools (IRFR 2006). Moreover, proposals to allow religious organizations to set up their own primary schools, and to assist them in obtaining land for the construction of religious buildings, have met with considerable opposition in the Party of Regions–dominated Parliament (Antoshevs’kyi 2007).

Conscientious Objection to Military Service

A test of both freedom of conscience and church independence from the state is the right of conscientious objection to the civic obligation of military service. This right has been enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, albeit in a manner granting deference to national legislation (Official Journal C 364, 18.12.2000): “The right to conscientious objection is recognized, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right” (art. 10, sec. 2).

Thus, nations are free to accommodate this right in different ways. The Ukrainian Constitution states that no one may be relieved of his responsibilities toward the state or refuse to obey the laws for reasons of religious convictions. It goes on to say, however, that if the performance of military service contradicts the religious convictions of a citizen, the performance of this obligation must be substituted by alternative (nonmilitary) service (art. 35, sec. 4).

The LFCRO states this principle in a manner leaving open the possibility that alternative service might not be limited to the military obligation: “No one may avoid performance of his constitutional obligations from motives of his religious convictions. The substitution of performance of one obligation by another by reason of one’s convictions is permitted only in cases provided for by the legislation of the Ukrainian SSR” (art. 4, sec. 3).
The Family

European legislation typically provides for the protection of the family as the basic social unit. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State” (art. 23, sec. 1). Section 2 declares the right of marriage, for which Section 3 requires the free and full consent of the marriage partners. Section 4 protects the rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution and, in case of dissolution, provides for the necessary protection of any children.


Concomitant to marriage is the right to conduct the religious upbringing of one’s children. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the liberty of parents and legal guardians “to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions” (art. 18, sec. 4).

Ukrainian law follows these principles. The Constitution provides that “The family, childhood, motherhood and fatherhood are protected by the state” (art. 51, sec. 5). The cabinet accordingly includes a Ministry of Family, Youth, and Sport.

The stresses and dislocations of the Soviet period as well as of the post-Soviet transition have had a disastrous effect on the Ukrainian family. Various social initiatives have arisen to try to restore this threatened institution.

At the same time, new challenges to the family have appeared. In a recent open letter, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, which includes Christian, Jewish, and Muslim representatives, condemned attempts by certain civic organizations to legislate same-sex marriage or register same-sex partnerships. The AUCCRO appealed to Parliament to enact a law clearly and unambiguously defining marriage as being between a man and a woman (Patriarkhat, 1/397, 2007, 27).

In evaluating the effect of Ukrainian law in the areas of minorities, tolerance, church and state, church and school, conscientious objection, and the family, it must always be kept in mind that the coincidence of law and practice varies from society to society. It is important to note not only the implementation of laws and statutes but also the degree to which the citizens have internalized the law, recognizing it as just and attempting to live by it. In particular, the attitude toward the law on the part of the elite is important. According to sociologist Wsevolod Isajiw, Ukraine’s elite is characterized by a cynical attitude and a habit of circumventing the law through informal networks (the “crony-débrouillard” system) (Isajiw 131). It thus appears that a common national identity, based on a consensus about what values and ethical and moral positions are to be reflected in the law and in public life, is lacking (see Trofimenko 144). This does not bode well for the future of Ukrainian democracy and civil society. It also means that an examination of Ukrainian law, while useful in measuring official attitudes toward religion against European standards, cannot give a complete picture of the place of religion in Ukrainian society.
Conclusion

To the extent that conformity of the laws to international and European models is a measure of the status of religion in Ukraine, one may conclude that it meets European standards. Ukraine’s legislation strikes a balance between individual and group rights, and rights and responsibilities, that is typically European. Also consonant with European tradition is the balancing of liberty with the protection of the cultural and religious values and patrimony of the nation. As noted above, however, Ukraine’s progress toward civil society has been uneven and remains incomplete. The danger of political manipulation and favoritism in church affairs remains.

It is legitimate to ask, nonetheless, whether European standards are properly seen as an external ideal. The European tradition is not, after all, exclusively West European, even if it is Western in a cultural sense. Moreover, these standards have always been a part of Ukraine’s heritage (see Procyk 159). That heritage is evident in her legal, social, political, and cultural life. It provides a firm basis for a European approach to the questions of religion in a modern state.

Notes

1. The Razumkov Center found in 2003 that 21.9 percent are nonbelievers and 75.2 percent are believers. A survey by the Ukrainian Sociology Service in November 2003 revealed that 16 percent are not religious, 14 percent undecided, and 70 percent religious; the latter figure comprised 40 percent church and 29 percent unchurched believers.


3. The Ukrainian Sociology Service reported in November 2003 that of believers, the UOC MP counted 37.8 percent, and the UOC KP 28.7 percent. In April 2004 the Razumkov Center estimated the three main churches’ proportion of the population as UOC MP 10.7 percent, UOC KP 14.8 percent, and UAOC 1.0 percent, for a total of 26.5 percent Orthodox. Note that this survey disputes the common notion that the UOC MP is the most numerous.

4. This distinction is of dubious value, but is noted here simply because it continues to be used in the sources.

5. In a 2004 survey the Razumkov Center found that “Protestants” numbered 0.9 percent of respondents, which would mean a total of 423,000 in Ukraine. Chornomoret estimates “Protestants” at 2.4 percent of the population for a total of 1,125,000; he notes, however, that they are more active than the Orthodox (Chornomoret’s 11).


7. The subjection of the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs to limitations necessary to protect public morals raises something of a conundrum. How can the protection of public morals limit religious expression, if the morals themselves are of religious origin? If, on the other hand, morals are not of religious origin, then what is their nature and content?


9. During the presidential elections of 2004, the press reported widely on alleged partisan
political activity by bishops and clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) favoring Viktor Yanukovych.

10. Article 16 sets out the “Documents to be Submitted for Registration of Religious Organizations and Missions of International and Foreign Religious and Inter-Religious Associations and Centers.” The Ministry of Justice and its local departments carry out registration (art. 16, sec. 1). A minimum of three registrants is required to register an organization. To register a religious society, one must submit an application to the raion or (for Kyïv and Sevastopol) the district Ministry of Justice office (sec. 2). To register a local religious association, one must submit an application to the Chief Department of the Ministry of Justice (in the Crimean Autonomous Republic), to the oblast department, or to the Kyïv or Sevastopol city Department of Justice (sec. 3). To register an all-Ukrainian religious association, one must submit an application to the Ministry of Justice (sec. 4). Article 17 covers the “Procedure and Timelines for State Registration of Religious Organizations and Missions of International and Foreign Religious and Inter-Religious Associations and Centers.”

11. For a discussion of religious liberty, church privilege or “recognition,” and discrimination in a comparative context including postauthoritarian, postsocialist, and post-Soviet societies, see Anderson (2003).

12. Russia’s Orthodox Church is estimated at 75 million. Ukraine’s would come to perhaps 16 million, that is, slightly larger than Romania’s.

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6

Missionaries and Pluralism

How the Law Changed the Religious Landscape in Ukraine

Catherine Wanner

Soviet Ukraine was called the “Bible Belt” of the Soviet Union, home to one of the largest Baptist communities in the world and to significant numbers of Pentecostal communities as well. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these communities benefited from relatively tolerant legislation toward nontraditional religious communities and from significant investment from Western missionary organizations. As a result, conversion to evangelical faiths has risen sharply. The appeal of these religious communities can be partly explained by their ability to create local ties of belonging at the same time that they make a place for individual congregations in global religious communities.

Many scholars, including myself, studying political and cultural change in the final years of Soviet rule focused on the rise of nationalism and the practices of nationalizing states. Yet, many failed to note that from the start a commitment to religious pluralism was incorporated into the very idea of the post-Soviet Ukrainian nation. This commitment was written into Ukrainian law at a minimum to accommodate the cohabitation of the various Orthodox churches and the Ukrainian Greek-rite Catholic Church, all of which claim to be indigenous national institutions and, combined, claim the allegiance of about 92 percent of the population.

The new state also granted a variety of rights and privileges to minority religious communities. Protestants are the largest group and constitute 2 percent of the population. Jews, Roman Catholics, and Muslim Crimean Tatars, each of whom constitute about 1 percent of the population, also benefited from this legislation. Yet, the presence of all of these minority communities is far greater than such official membership statistics would suggest. Their highly active members give these communities great visibility socially and significant influence politically. Protestant communities, in particular, sponsor a wide variety of congregational activities, charitable initiatives, and outreach programs that often attract attention beyond their own communities.

The historic religious pluralism in Ukraine, combined with an openness to foreign
religious organizations after the fall of the Soviet Union, became part of the bedrock of the new post-Soviet Ukrainian social order. This created an entirely different role for religion and religious communities as they evolved in Ukraine after 1991. The flourishing of religious communities has led to the creation of new social institutions (schools, charitable organizations, and the like) that have begun to reshape cultural values and political attitudes. These developments in the Ukrainian religious landscape distinguish Ukraine from other formerly socialist countries, and especially from its Orthodox neighbors, Russia and Belarus. If we understand nation-building as processes of differentiation, then religion, and even non-traditional religious communities, must be seen as catalysts creating some of the significant changes that are emerging in the social, cultural and political domains differentiating Ukraine from Russia and from other regions of the former Soviet Union.

Religion also distinguishes Ukraine from many northern European states that have institutionalized a privileged relationship between a particular church or churches and the state. Other European states have historically been aligned with a particular faith tradition, usually Catholicism, and this has yielded a similar, albeit nonofficial, “state–church” effect. The same cannot be said of Ukraine. It is also important to note that compared with many European societies, the levels of religious practice and belief are higher in Ukraine, even though no single religious institution currently enjoys a privileged relationship with the state. Rather, the combination of religiosity among the population and the institutionalization of religious pluralism liken Ukraine at this time far more to a North American model of church–state relations than to a European one (see Casanova 1996; Davie 2000). This could, of course, change but there is nothing to suggest that the legal and legislative measures taken to date to promote freedom of conscience and religious pluralism in Ukraine will be rescinded.

Protestant religious groups, and specifically charismatic, evangelical ones, have been key beneficiaries of this legal and bureaucratic openness to foreign religious organizations. In this chapter I offer an analysis as to what the implications are for identity, community membership, and cultural change more generally when individuals turn away from historically Ukrainian national denominations and join faith-based communities perceived as nontraditional and “foreign.” I argue that the relaxation of legal and bureaucratic restrictions on religious communities has allowed evangelical religious communities in Ukraine to prosper. These communities are introducing fundamentally new attributes of individual identity that challenge the symbiotic link among religion–nation–state as an organic unity. In its place they offer a religiously based sense of identity as a morally empowering choice that is primarily operative on local and global levels, and only secondarily on a national level.

The Religious Renaissance of the 1990s

Whether one speaks of the Revolution of 1905, the Revolution of 1917, or the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, each of these periods of political reform, widespread social change, and extensive moral questioning also led to the repositioning of the
Orthodox Church. Each period ushered in extensive legal reform that benefited minority religious communities. Given the historic partnership of the Orthodox Church and the state in this part of the world, these social and political crises powerfully affected Orthodox communities and were to some degree predicated on alienation from established religious authorities. In each instance, demands for political reform dovetailed into extensive legal reform concerning the status of minority religious organizations. Legal reform and the search for alternative moral communities led to a proliferation of new religious communities as often as it led to disillusionment with organized religion and the spread of secular worldviews.  

At these key historic junctures of political change, some individuals cast aside their religious heritage and chose to identify with another faith that carried different political and national implications. Those who converted to evangelicalism chose to construct identities, philosophies of life, and worldviews as self-conscious believers in a Western religious tradition. Like everyone else in the greater society, they were obliged to adapt to changing social and political realities but they chose to do so as members of religious communities that were often branded as “foreign.”

There are many reasons why a multitude of Protestant groups were drawn to Ukraine beyond its favorable legal climate to proselytize during the religious renaissance that flourished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soviet Ukraine was called the “Bible Belt” of the former Soviet Union because more Protestants lived in Ukraine than in any other republic. Some called themselves “Baptists” and others preferred the designation “Evangelical Christians,” but all traced their origins to the eighteenth century when Catherine II invited Germans to settle the rich agricultural lands of the Russian Empire. In addition, approximately 350,000 officially registered Pentecostals, or half of the total in the Soviet Union, resided in Soviet Ukraine. Baptist and Pentecostal communities in Soviet Ukraine espoused a literalistic reading of an inerrant Bible, a general suspicion of worldliness that resulted in strict codes of personal morality, and a belief in the imminent return of Jesus Christ. These communities provided a base from which evangelicalism could grow and spread once political conditions changed beginning in the late 1980s after the millennium commemoration of Christianity in Kyïvan Rus’. More recently, Charismatic and neo-Pentecostal churches have enjoyed considerable growth in Ukraine. These churches offer a charismatic means of expressive, even ecstatic worship to the observance of Pentecostal doctrine and a relaxation of ascetic prescriptions for individual behavior. The current mayor of Kyïv speaks openly of his Pentecostal conversion and affiliation. Charismatic Pentecostal communities in Ukraine, as in all other parts of the world, constitute the fastest growing sector of Christianity.

To illustrate the religious renaissance that began as the Soviet Union collapsed, consider the fact that by 1990 there were approximately 4,500 registered religious communities in Ukraine. A decade later there were nearly 20,000, one-quarter of which were Protestant (Johnstone and Mandryk 2001, 644–45). Religious growth has remained steady with over 1,000 religious communities registering annually in Ukraine. But growth has favored the Protestants. By 2000 the number of Protestant
churches nearly equaled that of Orthodox churches in the southeast of the country (Mitrokin 2001). By 2005, the total number of Protestant communities registered nationally in Ukraine rivaled that of the combined number of Orthodox communities (Marone 2005, 24). Global evangelical organizations envision making Ukraine a center of evangelical seminary training and publishing that will serve Protestants throughout the former Soviet Union. These staggering changes have largely taken root thanks to sweeping political and legal change that has allowed Western missionary organizations to offer extensive assistance to nascent evangelical communities in Ukraine to help them grow.

Religiosity in Ukraine

Orthodoxy, in Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, is widely considered the foundation of national traditions, aesthetic forms, and other elements of a unique sociocultural matrix. There are many factors that distinguish Ukraine’s religious traditions from its neighboring countries: the origins of Orthodoxy in Kyïvan Rus’; the cohabitation of Orthodox and Greek-Catholic religious traditions, both of which are considered national institutions; and Ukraine’s geopolitical location as a “borderland” among empires, which over time strengthened the multiethnic and multiconfessional aspects of the Ukrainian population. Perhaps most important of all, religious practice and the number of religious institutions have historically been higher in Ukraine than they have been in Russia (Tataryn 2001; Wanner 2004, 736).

Yet, it is important to note that sustained policies during the Soviet era to promote secularization have left their mark. As in other regions of Orthodox Eastern Europe, although the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians might declare themselves “Orthodox,” the nature of their commitment is often more cultural than it is religious. In other words, their embrace of Orthodoxy reflects the vital and long-standing role they recognize Orthodoxy to have played in the development of Ukrainian culture and nationhood, whereas commitments to practicing Orthodoxy as a religion are often nominal. In this respect, Ukraine broadly resembles the dominant pattern of attitudes toward state churches found in Europe. In Europe religious institutions are acknowledged to have played a pivotal role in defining a nation’s historical heritage, although their ability to shape cultural values today is limited and largely overshadowed by secular influences.

The three Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyïv-Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, all claim to represent the Ukrainian people and each one offers a different political vision based on the links it provides, either to Ukraine, to Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora, or to Russia, respectively. When a single church cannot dominate and influence political policy, de facto there are greater freedoms for other faiths to exist and for individuals to worship as they choose. A new space is opened up for nontraditional faiths and new religious movements to establish roots in Ukraine. The history of active religious participation and
confessional diversity in Ukraine has created a political and cultural climate that is more favorable to a variety of denominations, compared to most European countries and especially compared to Russia and Belarus. The lifting of most prohibitions on forms of assistance (financial, material, technical, and so on) that foreign religious organizations are allowed to offer coreligionists and others in Ukraine has greatly strengthened the presence of nontraditional religious communities. The result is that Ukraine has become one of the most active and competitive religious marketplaces in Europe, if not in the world.

Recent surveys note that religious institutions are the most trusted institutions in Ukraine, with almost half, or 47 percent, of all respondents claiming they trust the church and 45 percent claiming that religion should be part of political life. Forty-one percent of Ukrainians maintain that their president must be a religious person (Krindatch 2003, 37). Religion has returned to play a key part in the political projects of protesting or perpetuating new forms of inequality and challenging or establishing legitimacy for the emerging economic order in moral terms.

A clear indicator of the depth of religious sentiment in a particular region, according to missionary organizations, is the number of communities needed to support a single full-time missionary. This reveals how robust local communities are and how committed their membership is to evangelization. In the case of Ukraine, in spite of a less than enviable economic situation, it takes 6.4 communities to support a single missionary. This contrasts sharply to levels of support in evidence in surrounding countries: 16.9 for Russia; 92 for Belarus; 24.5 for Hungary; 57.4 for Slovakia; and 62.6 for Romania. Only Poland, which requires 9.7 communities to support a missionary, at all approximates the level of commitment to outreach that is exhibited by Ukrainians (Johnstone and Mandryk 2001, 750). Although the population of Ukraine is three times less than that of Russia, as of 2001 there were 914 Ukrainian evangelical missionaries, mostly serving in Russia, versus only 396 from Russia (ibid.). The goal of missionizing, of course, is to prompt individuals to convert.

Conversion to Evangelicalism

Conversion is a complex process culminating in religious change that gives life new meaning by changing the way an individual perceives reality and offering new intellectual and social tools to respond. Conversion is frequently a response to crisis, a coping strategy that enables an individual to overcome difficulties by reordering a relationship to higher, more powerful forces, and by creating relationships within a new community. Conversion can be a swift means to redefine concepts of self and other through cultural appropriation of new values and practices. This new collective identity and group membership are marked by subsequent behavior modifications as public manifestations of inner spiritual change.

By becoming an evangelical in post-Soviet Ukrainian society, one redefines fundamental cultural categories, such as familiar and foreign, space and time, power and agency, and gender and class. One rewrites autobiography into pre- and postconver-
sion periods, giving in to the frequent temptations to see signs retrospectively of the impending conversion in one’s deep past and thereby affirming the righteousness of the Christian life one has adopted. I have argued elsewhere that evangelical faiths derive a good bit of their appeal from propagating the possibility of making a break with the past in order to engage in moral renewal (Wanner 2003). Just as the Ukrainian nation was “born again” in 1991, conversion offers the believer an experience of rupture and renewal, holding out the promise of a new beginning in the short term and salvation in the long term.

One of the sources of confessional conflict in Ukraine today is that the Orthodox churches consider Orthodoxy a fundamental component of Ukrainian nationality; that is to say, a Ukrainian is by definition Orthodox. A significant exception is made for Ukrainian Greek-rite Catholics, who for historic reasons belong to a different albeit related national denomination. Because an Orthodox identity is geographically defined and automatically inherited, in the eyes of Orthodox clergy, there is no need for foreign missionaries. All Ukrainians have a religious identity, whether or not they choose to act on it.

This understanding of religiosity is dramatically different from the “born again” conscious experience of adult conversion upon which an evangelical identity is predicated. For evangelicals, anyone who has not been “saved” through repentance and conversion inspires proselytizing. Evangelicals actualize their faith by acting on the moral obligation to save the unsaved, to help church the unchurched. Conversion to any of the evangelical faiths constitutes a lifestyle change, with belief and behavior, family and community, ideally merging into one.

Evangelical communal life is characterized by a doctrine of “priesthood of the believer” and features extensive lay participation. For men and women alike congregational life often offers possibilities for assuming positions of responsibility, status, and prestige, which may or may not elude them in the secular world. The family is understood to be the core of a believer’s life and the dynamics of family life are superimposed on the congregational, national, and global levels. The family metaphor is reinforced by discursive practices. Believers use special greetings to address other believers and refer to each other as “brothers and sisters,” drawing on the assumption that fellow believers have similar levels of conviction and this binds them together in a family-like community. A commitment to strengthen family life is manifest in their condemnation of abortion, divorce and birth control.

When an individual converts to evangelicalism and departs from hereditary and national understandings of an Orthodox identity, however he or she understands and practices them, conflicts almost always arise between the convert and kin and neighbors. Dispensing with common cultural practices, such as drinking, smoking, and dancing, alienates the convert from his/her kin. These factors contributed, especially during the Soviet period, to widespread perceptions that evangelical communities were “sects,” in some way outside mainstream life. This perception was further enhanced by the faith-as-lifestyle orientation of evangelical doctrine and the extensive commitments to communal life official members are obliged to make, such as attending several
services every week, participating in the numerous activities the church sponsors, and tithing 10 percent of their income. The decision to become a practicing evangelical triggers a fundamental shift in perceptions of identity and prompts a reformulation of daily practices and social networks. For many converts, evangelicalism begins to overshadow, but not necessarily reject, the importance previously invested in other factors informing identity, such as profession or nationality.

National or Foreign Faith?

The role of religious organizations in fostering Russification, Ukrainization and, most significant of all, globalization is complex and multidirectional, which makes the popular perception in Ukraine of a choice between a national or foreign faith misleading. All religious communities are forced to negotiate the local or national contexts in which they situate themselves as well as to offer links to individuals, communities, and institutions beyond Ukrainian borders. The national Ukrainian churches have links to institutions and hierarchies located abroad, be it the Vatican, the Moscow Patriarchate, or diaspora communities. Although the choice to convert to an evangelical faith opens up access to new zones of contact, many of the imported doctrines and practices are rapidly adapted to local cultural mores and quickly take on a Ukrainian cast. Visiting foreign preachers, missionaries, and dignitaries simultaneously underline the global dimensions of religion today and serve to locate Ukraine within it. The isolation brought on by the Iron Curtain and a secular Soviet public sphere is rapidly replaced by the interconnections that international agencies, transnational religious communities, and mobile individual believers offer new converts.

Initially, evangelical missionary organizations sent clergy and lay leaders to Ukraine to assist in garnering converts and providing leadership for emerging communities. They also gave financial assistance at a critical moment to establish the necessary infrastructure to maintain the growth of these communities once they were established. Of course, the process of creating evangelical infrastructure reveals sharp power differentials that are fueled by money from the West coming to cash-strapped believers and communities in Ukraine. Therefore, the interconnectedness that this collaboration creates occurs against a background of stark inequality. Nonetheless, I do not wish to suggest that this renders Ukrainians powerless or passive.

Most international missionary agencies seek to establish a local presence that is staffed by local leaders as quickly as possible. Assistance is largely infrastructural in nature, driven by the goal of establishing and rapidly localizing and nationalizing the institutions created, to overcome the very cultural barriers that often impede conversion when proselytizing is done by foreigners. After centuries of colonial collaboration, missionary organizations, in word and often in practice, have come to recognize the importance of linguistic and cultural competence for effective missionizing. Therefore, they prioritize the development of local leadership to lead churches, seminaries, and Bible institutes, and local missionaries to evangelize other locals. Indeed, the total number of visitors coming to Ukraine “for religious purposes” has been in decline
since 2005, with more of the work now shouldered by Ukrainians missionizing other Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{13}

However, the interconnectedness to the West and to global Christian communities that foreign missionary assistance offers Ukraine, simultaneously serves to tie Ukraine to the former Soviet Union. Within the “near abroad,” other power differentials are operative that are conducive to making Ukraine a base for theological training for the entire former Soviet bloc. Nearly all Ukrainians have at least passive, if not total, fluency in Russian. With a population that possesses imperial “cultural capital,” and yet is not identified as imperial, Ukraine is an ideal location to train missionaries and clergy destined to serve in other parts of the former Soviet Union. There are now three evangelical seminaries in Kyiv alone, a Christian university in Donetsk, and a significant evangelical theological center in Odesa, which is also home to the largest Christian publishing house in Ukraine and the sponsor of a major initiative to chronicle on CD-ROM archival documents of the evangelical experience under Soviet rule. Each of these predominantly Russian-speaking institutions relies to some degree on foreigners to staff them but is nonetheless led by Ukrainians. Although other post-Soviet states might block foreign religious organizations from establishing a base within their borders, students simply come from all over the former Soviet Union to study in Ukraine. Thus, as evangelical initiatives tie Ukraine into a global community of believers, those same initiatives also reinforce Ukraine’s ties to other regions of the former Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, evangelical respect for and submission to authority goes beyond the divine realm to include secular state authorities. Their promotion of allegiance to the Ukrainian state, and patriotism more generally, is actively advocated on the local congregational level.\textsuperscript{14} It is the legal system of the Ukrainian state, after all, that allows new religious communities to function with considerably more ease in Ukraine than in many other states of the former Soviet Union. Great efforts are made to adapt texts, programs, hymns, and sermons to local linguistic preferences. Missionary organizations have learned that linguistic accommodation facilitates conversion and they make every effort to cater to local linguistic preferences. So, although Eurasian outreach efforts serve to reinforce a continued preference for Russian over Ukrainian, the same cannot be said of the congregational level. Congregations, like many other arenas of public dialogue in Ukraine, promote nonreciprocal bilingualism, meaning each person speaks the language s/he prefers with no obligation to accommodate another’s preference. This practice facilitates extensive cross-regional missionizing and visiting within Ukraine.

During Baptist and Pentecostal services, time is allotted for visitors from other congregations or those who have traveled to other congregations to individually stand and offer greetings, each expressing them in the language they prefer. Given the thousands of American missionaries who travel to Ukraine every year, as well as missionaries from Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands, many visitors speak English. Missionizing and issues of language choice underline the greater community to which evangelical believers are enjoined at the same time that believers in
comparatively small and isolated communities are exposed to practices and values embraced elsewhere.

The debates over whether evangelical religious communities foster Russification miss the point that these communities are first and foremost globalizing agents. They are prominent domains, not only where frequent face-to-face contact among local members occurs but also where disparate people and places encounter one another. Occurrences abroad or in other regions among coreligionists are increasingly experienced at the local level. Anthony Giddens refers to this overall phenomenon of bringing people from disparate places together as the creation of “distanciated relations.” He claims that this is a unique and relatively recent dynamic of social life and a key characteristic of globalization. Giddens understands the reorganization of time and space as largely hinging on the stretching of social life to span great distances. He writes, “larger and larger numbers of people live in circumstances in which disembedded institutions, linking local practices with globalized social relations, organize major aspects of day-to-day life” (Giddens 1990, 79). Religious communities are laden with social relations that span great distances and provide a forum where the local and global interlock in powerful ways to shape the consciousness and identities of individual believers. Therefore, above all, evangelical communities are globalizing agents, bringing Ukrainian communities into contact with coreligionists in Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere and this dynamic also contributes to their growth.

Conclusion

The religious pluralism that has recently been institutionalized in Ukraine has led to a flourishing of religious activity. Religious communities offer competing visions of a desired moral order and a variety of transnational connections. They play a key role in articulating the type of commitments one should have to others and what the reciprocal obligations and expectations should be between a state and its citizenry. As the symbolic boundaries between religion, politics, and morality fluctuate, religion holds sway over believers—and politicians—in that it offers a repertoire of values and practices from which to foster collective action to realize a political worldview.

Sharp economic differences remain not only within formerly socialist societies but also between the European societies that experienced socialism and those that did not. Yet those differences remain largely misunderstood and are readily used to further structure the inequality between the “new” and “old” Europe. Evangelicalism provides a means by which believers can detach themselves from nations mired in economic distress and political turmoil and enter larger, supranational religious communities. In an era of globalizing cultural forms and increased flow of ideas and knowledge, the salience of residence in a fixed territory as an attribute of identity is eroding just as the connection between a culture as rooted in a particular place is fading. Evangelical knowledge is tied to doctrine. It is independent of a particular place or specific institution and as a result can be easily introduced and adapted to new contexts and new cultural environments. This basic dynamic holds whether one speaks of a religious
organization from Germany sending missionaries to Ukraine or a Ukrainian church sending missionaries to Germany.

The changes in the political power of organized religion, which took root before the collapse of the Soviet regime, challenge our previous assumptions about the nature of secularization in the former Soviet Union and our understandings of the ideological battles that were fought there. The brutally imposed secularism in the former Soviet Union has proved incomparably less tenacious than the gradual, voluntary secularism that has evolved in Western Europe. Soviet secularist policies attacked and inhibited overt religious practice in Ukraine and elsewhere. Often, however, these policies were unable to dislodge religious beliefs and religious sensibilities. In Europe, however, a steady proliferation of secular bases of knowledge prompted belief in metaphysical explanations to fade first, which led to gradually diminishing levels of religious practice. Today in many European countries religious practice is limited to rituals to mark life-changing rites of passage, such as marriage, death and baptism. In Ukraine, however, religion remains vibrant and is unlikely to recede as a force shaping the dynamics operative in this transformative period and as a factor influencing identity politics. Rather, it will continue to operate at multiple levels, forging intersections between the local and transnational and the political and cultural. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, religious institutions, and evangelical communities in particular, have proved themselves to be among the most adept at shaping individual and group identities in Ukraine by creating highly localized and eminently global communities where individuals can nonetheless feel a sense of belonging. These communities create unique motivations for transformation, personal as well as political, and foster allegiances to those who promise to actualize their aspirations for change.

Notes

I would like to thank the two editors of this volume for their comments on an earlier draft. As always, I wish to thank Svitlana Schlipchenko, Valentyna Pavlenko, and Olha Filippova. This chapter is taken from a larger study I have conducted that analyzes the appeal of evangelicalism in post-Soviet Ukraine. See Catherine Wanner (2007) for a more in-depth look at Soviet-era evangelical communities and how they have evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


2. For a complete statistical profile of religious affiliation in Ukraine, see www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71415.htm (accessed October 23, 2007).

3. Ibid.

4. For an analysis of some of the more public and overtly political initiatives sponsored by new evangelical churches in Ukraine, see Catherine Wanner (2007, esp. chapter 6).

5. This chapter was written prior to President Yushchenko’s public meetings with Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople to secure the unification and canonical recognition of Ukraine’s Orthodox churches into a national church independent of the Moscow Patriarchate. Even if a single Orthodox church emerges, this does not mean that religious pluralism in Ukraine will be curtailed. It takes legislated restrictions on selected religious institutions, the likes of which are demonstrated in the Russian 1997 law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” to make discrimination legally permissible to thwart pluralism.

6. For studies of how earlier periods of sweeping political change affected Protestant communities in Ukraine, see Coleman (2005), Zhuk (2004), and Savinskii (2001). The following
studies consider how the power and appeal of Orthodoxy were curtailed after the Revolution: Husband (2000) and Peris (1998).


8. For an analysis of the political ramifications the divergent statuses the Orthodox Churches have come to assume in Ukraine and Russia, see Tataryn (2001).

9. José Casanova (1998, 215) speculates that the religious landscape in Ukraine will become highly pluralistic and this pluralism will generate competition among denominations for adherents, which will yield active communities, and ultimately high levels of religious participation across the country.

10. Both surveys were posted by the Religious Information Service of Ukraine at www.risu.org.ua on March 31, 2004 and can also be found at www.socis.kiev.ua (accessed October 23, 2007).

11. One of the best studies of conversion is *Understanding Religious Conversion*, by Lewis Rambo.

12. This strategy proved tremendously successful in Latin America. Initially, North Americans missionized there with little success. After World War II, proselytizing shifted to locals’ evangelizing of other locals. Especially in Guatemala and Brazil, the result of this shift has been dramatic. Throughout the region, but in these two countries in particular, evangelicals are mounting a formidable challenge to the historic dominance of Catholicism.


14. For a discussion of the myriad ways this respect for authority translates into support for Ukrainian statehood, see Wanner (2007, esp. chapter 5).

15. Gediminas Lankauskas (2002) argues that in Lithuania, in spite of widespread nationalist sentiment, grounded in part in Catholicism, many young people are choosing evangelicalism, a faith that promotes values and practices seen as “modern” and “nontraditional.”

Bibliography


**Internet Sources**

The Future of Ukraine if Values Determine the Course

What Opinion Polls Disclose About Public Attitudes on Political and Economic Issues

Elehie Natalie Skoczylas

Since independence in 1991, events in Ukraine have been at times the subject of intense scrutiny, analysis, and interpretation, with a wide range of predictions offered about the country’s future course. Discussions on Ukraine’s future frequently present either/or scenarios—a market-driven or a centrally controlled economy, a presidential or a parliamentary system, a European or a Russian foreign policy orientation. Some discussions include references to the extent of public support for a policy and question public readiness to accept change. This article focuses on public perceptions—what attributes of a society the public in Ukraine considers as essential, which economic system is preferred, and how important it is for the public to participate in the country’s decision-making process. An analysis of these values and attitudes may shed light on what the public hopes for in terms of Ukraine’s future political and economic system and social structure.

In 1991, Ukraine’s emergence as a sovereign state was a sudden and nonviolent occurrence, notwithstanding the many years, if not centuries, of striving for independence and the many individuals who dedicated their lives to Ukraine’s right to self-determination. On August 24, 1991, the legislative branch proclaimed Ukraine an independent and sovereign state and on December 1, 1991, the public affirmed the legislative resolution in a national referendum. After the referendum, the existence of the Soviet Union was a moot question and international recognition of Ukraine followed almost immediately. Ukraine was accepted as a state in transformation, moving from authoritarian rule and a totalitarian system to a liberal democracy, modeled on the countries of Western Europe. The initial months of transition were auspicious—government officials retained their positions nationally and locally, diplomatic relations were established, and those with access to wealth assumed control over economic enterprises. The relatively smooth transference of power did not bode well for the country’s transformation process—those in positions of power under the Soviet sys-
tem were now managing the political and economic changes that required Ukraine to establish “a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office” (Lipset 27). In addition to free, fair, and regularly scheduled elections and orderly changes of power, this definition implies an economic system that secures and sustains democratic practices and a body of beliefs that is embraced by the elite and the public, a broad acceptance of values that underpin a democratic society (ibid., 31–63, 469–476).

This chapter seeks to define the prevailing sociopolitical and economic values in Ukraine on issues that traditionally are seen as attributes characteristic of liberal democracies. The approach is empirical, to look from the perspective of the public and to identify the constancy and the shifts in public attitudes toward human rights, economic system, and participatory democracy. The value of an empirical approach is that it allows us to present an objective portrayal of attitudes, to speak with the voice of the population that has been surveyed, or to talk about the perceptions of a group from which focus group participants have been selected. This, of course, assumes that the surveys and the focus groups adhered to methodological requirements, statistical and social science principles of opinion and communications research.

The Research Environment in Ukraine

There are no environmental impediments to conducting opinion research in Ukraine: in Kyïv and in most major cities there are firms and institutes doing opinion, communications, and market research; and the public has willingly participated in studies, responding to a wide range of questions on political, economic, and social issues. Results from opinion surveys frequently are reported and discussed in Ukraine’s domestic media and cited in political discussions. For example: in 1991, in the week preceding the vote on Ukraine’s independence, deputies in the Rada, Ukraine’s parliamentary body, received results of opinion surveys documenting broad public support for an independent and sovereign Ukraine; in 1993, when the government debated the removal of nuclear weapons, survey findings were disseminated showing that the public favored a nonnuclear status for Ukraine; and in 1996, while the Rada was deliberating on a new constitution, media reports mentioned broad public support for the adoption of a new constitution.

The introduction of exit polling in Ukraine in 1998 is illustrative of the ease with which innovative approaches have been accepted as an integral part of the country’s political process. Polling has been a part of Ukraine’s civic culture since independence, but an exit poll was a new experience for voters, elected officials, and interviewers. The conduct of an exit poll in Ukraine was first discussed in May 1997, in Washington, D.C., and on election day, March 29, 1998, 400 professional interviewers conducted interviews with a nationally representative sample of 10,000 voters as they were leaving the polling station; the responses were reported via telephone to Kyïv, where data
were tabulated, press releases prepared, and estimates of election results broadcast on
the first election night show on Studio 1+1. The first exit poll was an administrative
challenge with many unknowns—officials could stop the interviewing, voters could
refuse to respond, and there could be technical problems in the delivery of data to
Kyïv. The conduct of the exit poll was also a high risk for the Ukrainian organizations
participating in the project—the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Ukrainian
Media Club, the opinion research firm SOCIS, and the television station Studio 1+1.
Interviews for the 1998 exit poll were completed without incident, data were received
in Kyïv on election day, and poll estimates accurately predicted the election outcome.
The second exit poll, done for the first round of the 1999 presidential election, also
was completed without disturbance and accurately predicted the election results. Since
then, exit polls have been a part of Ukraine’s election process. Two factors contributed
to the acceptance of exit polls—the accuracy of predicting an election and the use of
exit poll data by politicians and journalists when discussing election results.¹

The following sections examine public attitudes toward human rights and personal
freedoms, privatization measures, elections, and a multiparty system. The selection
of issues was dictated by the availability of empirical data, by the issues examined in
surveys, exit polls, and focus group discussions. The data sources are surveys and focus
group discussions fielded in Ukraine, some as early as January 1992. The surveys and
the exit polls provide, with calculable degrees of certainty, quantified measurements
of perceptions of the surveyed population; focus groups yield qualitative information
indicative of views held by groups from which participants were selected. Each of the
surveys, exit polls, and focus groups cited in this article adhered to methodological
standards of social science research and, therefore, the data represent empirical evi-
dence on attitudes and behavior.² In discussing attitudes and values, the text replicates
words used in survey questions and the comments made by focus group participants;
inferences drawn from the empirical data are introduced as suppositions. An analysis
of survey data and of focus group records from different years records fluctuations in
public perceptions, documenting the shifts in public acceptance of democratic values,
and providing empirical documentation on Ukraine’s political culture.

Human Rights and Freedoms

In Ukraine, the public has been steadfast in its commitment to personal rights and
freedoms, seeing these as essential attributes of a democratic society and important
for Ukraine. Since independence, vast majorities of the public, three-fourth or more,
have agreed that it is important for Ukraine to have: freedom of speech, the right of
individuals to publicly express opinions, including criticisms of the government, and
a media free to report on events without government censorship; religious freedom,
the right to practice in a church of one’s choice; minority rights, including the right of
ethnic groups to self-expression and to form political associations; the right to private
property (see the following section on “Economic Values”); and free and fair elec-
tions, regularly scheduled with candidates competing in an open environment (see the
section on “Political Values” below). Large majorities of the public not only endorse
human rights and personal freedoms as important but also support legal guarantees
to protect these rights. For example, in 1996, during debates on the adoption of a new
constitution, a vast majority of the public agreed that there should be legal protection
for personal rights, such as the freedom of speech and religion, fair and free elections,
and ownership of private property. In a survey fielded in 2002, the public reaffirmed
their commitment to these rights.3

Although large majorities of the public have consistently upheld the importance of
the rights cited above, public support for the rights of minorities has been eroding: in
1996, during debates on the adoption of a new constitution, public support for minority
rights was 82 percent, but six years later, 2002, support declined to 72 percent.4 The
decreasing support for minority rights probably reflects public discussions on ethnic is-
sues that periodically surface in Ukraine, at times due to tensions between Russia and
Ukraine, but more often due to debates on language use and regional demands to make
Russian an official language in Ukraine. A decline in public support for minority rights
may be indicative of an emerging intolerance, a questioning of pluralism and acceptance
of majority rule as an absolute. Thomas Jefferson very eloquently pleaded the necessity
of having limits on majority rule and of protecting minority rights, concluding that a
violation of “this sacred principle . . . would be oppression” (Jefferson 332).5 Jefferson’s
concerns are as relevant today as they were in 1801, and his sacred principle may serve
as an excellent guide for politicians in all countries, including Ukraine.

The right to free association, to form civic and political groups without government
interference, has not been as highly valued as other personal rights, such as freedom
of speech and free and fair elections. Since independence, about half of the public has
said that it is important for individuals to have the right to form associations, civic
groups, unions, and political parties. This low level of support for free association
in part can be explained by a lack of experience with civic and nongovernmental
organizations. Individuals who are associated with a group, such as members of in-
dependent trade unions and community leaders, as would be expected, see the right
of free association as important for Ukraine’s development. What is troublesome is
that the number of nongovernmental and civic groups has grown notably in Ukraine
over the past decade, but there has been no corollary increase in public support for the
right to free association. This suggests that civic and nongovernmental organizations
have not made the public aware of their activities or have failed to communicate about
their contributions to Ukraine’s development.6

**Economic Values—Private Property, Privatization, and
Pace of Reforms**

In Ukraine, the public has been unwavering in its commitment to the right of citi-
zens to private property and has repeatedly expressed a preference for an economic
system driven by market forces, rejecting a centrally controlled, command economy.
However, support for privatization measures has eroded over the years, with most of
the public preferring gradual reforms and supporting only the introduction of small private businesses.

Since independence, the public has been committed to have private property as a cornerstone of Ukraine’s economy. In 1996, during debates on the adoption of Ukraine’s new constitution, there were heated debates whether the new constitution should have a provision guaranteeing the right to private property. At that time, the public was nearly unanimous in embracing this proposition (92 percent), eliciting the broadest and the most intense endorsement of the eight personal rights measured in a nationwide survey.7

In the initial months of independence, there were high expectations that a new economic order based on private property and a market economy would bring benefits to all. A month after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in January 1992, by a margin of three to one, a definite majority agreed that “ordinary people will benefit from the introduction of private property” (61 percent agreed and 18 percent disagreed). This positive assessment quickly evaporated, probably reflecting the deteriorating economic conditions. By late 1993, those who believed that privatization benefits ordinary people had a slight edge (48 percent to 40 percent), but by 2000, opinion was evenly split between those who said privatization does benefit ordinary people and those who said it does not. Negative views of privatization measures have been underscored in a 1994 survey that explored perceptions of the mafia and the Soviet nomenclature—three-fourths of the public agreed that privatization benefits mostly the mafia and former members of the Communist Party.8

Public support for privatization measures also has declined notably, paralleling the increasingly more negative assessment of who benefits from privatization. In the first few years of independence, large majorities favored privatization, but support declined to about half in 1996. Views on the pace of economic reforms also shifted dramatically, with a decline in support for fast-paced reforms. Only in the first year of independence did the public maintain that privatization measures should proceed as quickly as possible, while in the second year, opinion was evenly divided between rapid-paced and gradual reforms. Since then, the preference has been for gradual reform measures, and a third or fewer support fast-paced measures (in 2000, only 28 percent supported fast-paced reforms).9

In Ukraine, land is highly valued. Vast majorities (80 percent or more) have steadfastly maintained that citizens have the right to private ownership of land and have consistently supported legal guarantees to protect this right. But public opinion is almost evenly divided on the pace of privatizing farms: in a nationwide survey in 2000, as many wanted the introduction of private farms to be as rapid as possible as those who favored a slow and gradual approach (40 percent and 37 percent, respectively). However, definite majorities have consistently opposed privatization of land if a question has a direct or an indirect reference to the government, such as—“the state has begun the process to sell collective farms” or “if there is a transference of collective farms into private hands.” Data on land ownership and privatization underscore the quandary that the public confronts when expressing their values on economic issues: the public
wants to have the right to own land and favors privatization, but when reminded that the government would be taking action, the public opposes privatization. Public opinion is not inconsistent by supporting private ownership of land and opposing government measures to privatize, for a question that presumes some sort of government involvement, subsumes public distrust of and nonconfidence in the government.  

The public also has expressed reservations about treating land as a commodity. Only in the first year of independence, a slim majority agreed with the proposition that land should be bought and sold (57 percent agreed and 34 percent disagreed), but since 1993, definite majorities (from 57 percent to 61 percent) have opposed treating land as a commodity. Attitudes on land may reflect traditional values, such as that land should be inherited and not traded on an open market, but the more probable reason is concern that land would be subject to the same irregularities and illegalities that have made other economic sectors the private possession of oligarchs. In focus group discussions conducted in 1994, Ukrainian elites were unanimous that there was no office at the national level capable of handling the privatization of land and no local authorities that could oversee the process. These problems, though never measured in opinion surveys, probably have been the reasons why the public, while favoring private ownership of land, has not embraced land privatization measures and have not supported treating land as a commodity.

Public attitudes on economic issues need to be reviewed against the country’s economic conditions—unrelenting economic problems, a pervasive sense of economic insecurity and instability, and widespread corruption at all levels of economic activity, with no evidence that authorities are curbing the illegal behavior. In view of these conditions, it is remarkable that the public still embraces private property as the cornerstone of the country’s economy, prefers a market-driven economy, and favors gradual privatization measures. Without visible economic improvements and an increase of public confidence in the government, public support for privatization may erode even further, but it is highly unlikely that the public will abandon its commitment to the right to private property, including the right to own land. Lack of economic liberalization does not bode well for Ukraine’s future, not only for the country’s economic development but also for its political structure, for an economic system can limit if not derail political liberalization.

Political Values—Elections, Campaigns, and a Multiparty System

The Ukrainian public has very visibly demonstrated that the people want to be part of the decision making process in their country and to participate in determining their country’s fate, a commitment that has placed the public center stage internationally. The first time in December 1991, when the public voted in a national referendum and affirmed the Rada’s August 24 resolution that Ukraine is an independent and a sovereign state. Notwithstanding the many factors that contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union, it was the December referendum, a public vote, that dismantled the Soviet Union and bloodlessly altered the political map of Europe and the con-
figuration of the international community. The second time, thirteen years later, in 2004, the public in Ukraine again was center stage internationally, demanding a fair election. The world watched the unfolding of the Orange Revolution, December 2004, which politically was a corollary to the French Revolution—the French toppled the divine right of kings, and the Orange Revolution did the same to elected politicians, sending an unequivocal message that voting decisions of an electorate have to be honored and respected.

The public has highly valued the right to free and fair elections, recognizing these as essential for a democratic society and important for Ukraine. Consistently, at least three-fourths have said that it is necessary for Ukraine to have honest, regularly scheduled elections, with candidates freely competing from across the political spectrum. In the first years of independence, the public overall was critical of elections, with half or more doubting in the fairness of an election. The 1998 parliamentary election was given a much more positive assessment—a majority (57 percent) judged the election honest and only a fifth (17 percent) saw it as dishonest and the results fraudulent.¹²

The 2004 presidential election put to the test the public commitment to free and fair elections. The intimidation of voters and the widespread violations in the first round of the election, October 31, increased exponentially in the second round, November 21. The election results were clearly and unambiguously fraudulent and public outrage at the violations began as a demonstration that became the Orange Revolution. The British journalist Askold Krushelnycky, in Kyiv during the Orange Revolution, wrote that “By some mysterious social alchemy, the rally gradually evolved into something more powerful than a long-running protest. The mood changed from one of outrage and indignation into a commitment to resist and overcome” (Krushelnycky 11–12).

Prior to the elections, political commentators saw the 2004 presidential election as placing Ukraine at a crossroad, the voting to determine the future course of Ukraine—westward toward a democracy or eastward under Russian preeminence. What was not predicted was that the 2004 elections would demonstrate the power of a public, the success of Ukrainian voters to demand and have free and fair elections.¹³

Two years later, the 2006 parliamentary election proceeded in an orderly manner and without major problems. A vast majority of the public (86 percent) said they saw no violations in the conduct of the election.¹⁴

Voter turnout has been consistently high in each of the elections held in Ukraine since its independence in 1991. Nationwide, two-thirds or more of eligible voters cast a ballot on election day, but turnout differed by ethnicity, gender, and age, and particularly troublesome was the lower voter turnout among ethnic Russians and young adults, voters under thirty years old. The lower voter turnout of ethnic Russians may indicate that the country’s largest minority feels disconnected or alienated from Ukraine’s political processes. Failing to engage the ethnic Russians in political decision making may undermine what the public has so vocally embraced—the rights of minorities—and may even mar the unblemished record that Ukraine has had since independence, a multiethnic state with no violent ethnic conflicts. The lower voter turnout among the youngest age
cohorts may have a negative impact on Ukraine’s democratization process and does not bode well for economic reforms: voters between the ages of eighteen and thirty are the most committed to economic liberalization, and, by not voting, these young voters are denying support to candidates who advocate market reforms.\textsuperscript{15}

Political campaigns are very much a part of Ukraine’s election process, with candidates reaching out to voters to ensure the loyalty of the base and to increase the number of supporters. Nationwide surveys and exit polls have shown that in Ukraine, as in all democracies, there is a core of committed voters, those who know well in advance who will receive their vote. In both the 1998 parliamentary and the 1999 presidential election, among the active voters (those who vote on election day), about 40 percent knew well in advance for which candidate they would vote and a definite majority decided during the campaign. This timeline for decision making was characteristic of all educational groups, including the best educated. In contrast, in the 2006 parliamentary election, a large majority of active voters, 62 percent, was committed to a candidate well before the election. This high figure is worrisome, but probably does not presage a trend.\textsuperscript{16}

Prior to the 2006 election, nationwide surveys were conducted monthly, beginning October 2005, with fieldwork for the last preelection survey completed in early March 2006. The preelection surveys suggest that campaigning did matter in the 2006 election, notably for one political bloc. The surveys accurately predicted the outcome of the parliamentary election, except for the Tymoshenko Bloc, which received 22.27 percent of the national vote, well above the expected 14–17 percent (estimates based on preelection surveys). This discrepancy between votes received and votes predicted can be accounted for by the dates of fieldwork. The last preelection survey was fielded in the first days of March, before the very intensive campaigning by Yulia Tymoshenko. In the weeks preceding the election, she traveled extensively, appearing at rallies and meetings and spending more time responding to questions than giving speeches. She repeatedly pledged that her Bloc would not form an alliance with the Party of Regions, reminding audiences of the 2004 Orange Revolution, and her campaigning in the last few weeks before the election probably accounts for the higher number of votes received than had been forecast by the preelection surveys.\textsuperscript{17}

In Ukraine, the public and the elite overall have agreed on the importance of a multiparty system. In the first two years of independence, large majorities considered a multiparty system as an essential attribute of a democratic society (70 percent) and believed that it was important for Ukraine that “one can choose from several parties and candidates when voting” (62 percent). However, since 1994, support has declined and about half or fewer favor a multiparty system. The increasingly lower support for a multiparty system in large measure reflects public views on the purposes of political parties and opinions about party leaders. Political parties are recognized as having an overall ideological orientation and are placed on the left or the center-right of the political spectrum. However, beyond this overall ideological orientation, political parties are not seen as having distinct programs and the prevailing view is that parties form and exist to advance the personal interests of party leaders, to satisfy the egos
of individuals. These views were expressed as early as 1994 and again in 1999 by all age and educational groups in focus group discussions. The fragmentation of parties, specifically of the reform-oriented centrist ones, and the inability of party leaders to maintain coalitions undoubtedly have reinforced the image that a political party is formed and exists to serve a leader’s personal interests.  

Over the years, the centrist, reform-oriented parties and blocs appear to have squandered their fortunes. In 1992, the Ukrainian People’s Movement Rukh was the lead party, but its appeal declined, due in large measure to infighting over party leadership following the death of Viacheslav Chornovil. Since then, none of the factions of Rukh have regained the prominence the party enjoyed in 1992. Similarly, the breakup of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko undermined public support for and confidence in the pro-reform centrist parties. In the 2004 presidential election, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko presented themselves as national leaders, but they did not maintain their coalition and their popularity plummeted after Tymoshenko was dismissed as prime minister. Neither leader has been able to recoup popular standing. For example, in February 2005, when the two leaders presented a common front, each elicited an unprecedented high level of public trust—two-thirds of the public expressed confidence in them. Confidence levels dropped precipitously after Yushchenko dismissed Tymoshenko—in November 2005, fewer than half had confidence in Yushchenko (46 percent) and a slim majority in Tymoshenko (54 percent). The splintering of parties and the disassembling of blocs not only contributed to a decrease in public support for a multiparty system but also undermined public confidence in political leaders.

Although, as discussed above, the proliferation of political parties at election time has contributed to a decrease of public support for a multiparty system and has reinforced the public’s view that parties serve the egos of leaders, the much graver effect of the small parties is that they deny the electorate representation in the legislative branch, especially to voters who support centrist, reform-oriented parties.

In the 2006 election, parties with less than 3 percent of the national vote did not get seated in the Rada and, therefore, deputies in the Rada represent only 79.2 percent of the total votes cast—a fifth of active voters have no representation. If in a future national election forty-five parties register, as did in 2006, and if ten of the small parties get 2 percent of the national vote and another twenty-eight get 1 percent, then about a half, 48 percent, of the votes cast will be discarded; add to this an additional 4 percent who typically vote for no party (ballots in Ukraine include a choice of “support no political party or bloc”), then the deputies in this future Rada will represent only a half of the active voters. This worst-case scenario is presented not as a prediction, but to illustrate the negative effect of the small parties, which some call phantom parties or special interest groups, that register in a national election and present candidates for office.

The proliferation of parties also disproportionately deprives of representation voters who support proreform centrist parties. For example, taking all the votes cast in the 1998 parliamentary election, 51 percent voted for the centrist, reform-oriented parties, 44 percent for the left-of-center parties, and 5 percent for no party. The composition
of the Rada in 1998 was a mirror image of the profile of active voters—53 percent of the deputies were from parties on the left and 47 percent were from centrist, reform-oriented parties. Analysts of Ukraine’s political scene have predicted that a continued proliferation of parties is highly unlikely and that the 2006 postelection period will see the formation of alliances. There have been coalitions and alliances in the 2006 period, but none produced an effective coalition and to date no steps have been taken, either by decisions of political leaders or through regulatory norms, to curb the proliferation of parties at election time.21

The formation of coalitions in the Rada may also deny full representation of the public in the legislative branch. Coalitions may or may not bring together like-minded groups and may establish a power base that does not reflect the overall ideological orientation of active voters, those who cast a ballot on election day. One could argue that a coalition of parties is a personal decision of leaders and that voters are not committed ideologically, and, therefore, have no voice in the formation of alliances after an election. Even though the personality of party leaders is an important factor in an election, it is not an overriding consideration and records of voting behavior indicate that voters make an informed choice with a clear understanding of the overall ideological orientation of political parties. An analysis of voting behavior in the 1999 presidential election showed that in the first round of the 1999 election, Kuchma’s support came mainly from individuals who in 1998 voted for centrist, proreform parties, whereas Symonenko’s support came primarily from those who in 1998 voted for the Communist Party (Wagner and Skoczylas October, 1999, 12–13).

Since independence, membership in political parties has been in single digits, between 2 percent and 3 percent. Some observers have suggested that this low membership reflects a visceral dislike of political parties, the memories of seventy years of single-party rule, and thus the public’s unwillingness to embrace a multiparty system. This historical perspective is not supported by opinion research—focus group discussions and nationwide surveys have documented that large majorities of the public consider a multiparty system as important in a democracy and initially roughly as many favored a multiparty system in Ukraine. The erosion of support for Ukraine’s multiparty system, as already mentioned, reflects the poor performance of parties and the widely held perception that parties serve the egos of leaders. It is also likely that, to date, the objectives of political parties do not converge with the interests and concerns of the public.

The lack of a national political party system in Ukraine, the fragmentation of the proreform centrist parties, and the explosion of small parties just prior to an election do not give voters in Ukraine a fair chance to express their preferences. The public has voted the best they could in a deeply flawed multiparty system and in elections that, though vastly improved and regulated by laws in 2006, do not reinforce a critical concept of a democratic society—that elected officials represent identifiable constituencies. A free and fair election and a high voter turnout in Ukraine, as in any liberal democracy, cannot correct for an inadequate political party system and the limits on representation set by election norms and practices.22
International Orientation, Models for Development, and Preferred Foreign Policy

To determine what kind of society Ukrainians would like to live in and to measure this as objectively as possible, nationwide surveys and focus group discussions fielded in the 1990s explored what countries were seen as models for Ukraine’s political and economic development. Nationally recognized political leaders, professionals, and university students considered both the United States and West European countries as models for Ukraine, defining models as standards for Ukraine’s political and economic development. In the 1990s, the public selected primarily West European countries as models, with Germany and Sweden the most frequently named; the United States was named by one-in-ten and a few (2–6 percent) selected an East European country or Russia as a model for Ukraine. A small proportion of the public (about 10 percent) rejected the notion that any country can serve as a model for Ukraine’s development. Recognition of Western, highly developed countries as models for development is underscored by the broad acceptance of Western business practices. In 1998, an analysis of privatizing firms in Ukraine showed that successful firms had in place Western business practices, business and marketing plans, a market research office, and used the Internet and electronic communications; in contrast, firms lagging in performance lacked many of these features.23

While in terms of models for development, the public in Ukraine is Westward looking, in terms of foreign policy, the public favors a two-track approach—to become a part of the European community of nations and to maintain good relations with Russia. In the first two years of independence, a vast majority of the public believed that Ukraine’s security interests would best be served by an alliance with the West, the United States and Western Europe, but by 1994 the public wanted Ukraine to seek security guarantees from the West, specifically the United States, as well as from Russia. Similarly, the public, as well the elites, have favored a two-track approach in foreign policy, to maintain close relations with Russia and with other former Soviet Republics, as well as to pursue close relations with the West, in particular the European Union. Support for closer relations with Russia has increased over the years—initially a third favored entering into some sort of an association with Russia, but by 2000, a definite majority agreed that Ukraine should join Russia and Belarus and form a confederation. Some commentators on public opinion in Ukraine have observed that a dual-track approach, Europe and Russia, is unrealistic and would not serve Ukraine’s national interests. But in the view of the public, a dual approach may be the only option, dictated probably by a sense of affinity for Russia and a desire to become integrated into the West European community of nations.24

Opinion surveys suggest that the public does not believe that forming an association with Russia will in any way affect Ukraine’s entry into the European Union or place limits on Ukraine’s relations with Western countries. Russia is part of Ukraine’s reality, and public attitudes on foreign policy preferences undoubtedly reflect the geopolitical factor, the shared historical past, and, though each country is unique and distinct
culturally, the commonality of some cultural elements. Public support for a two-track foreign policy orientation—the West and Russia—underscores the complexity of making political choices in Ukraine: survey data and focus group discussions show that in terms of values, the public is oriented toward the politically stable and economically prosperous liberal democracies of Western Europe; but the historical antecedents, the economic connections, and the geopolitical factor link Ukraine and Russia. Ignoring these linkages may have deleterious affects on Ukraine’s economy, security, and political stability, and, at this time, a foreign policy that pursues closer relations with Europe and Russia may be the only viable option for Ukraine. Public preference for a two-track approach—a pro-European and pro-Russian foreign policy—undoubtedly is affected by public sensitivity to and affinity for Russia, but these issues have not been systematically examined and no data are available to determine the extent and importance of these factors in influencing opinions expressed by the public.

Does the Public See Ukraine as a Democracy?

Nationwide surveys have measured whether the public considers Ukraine a democracy, typically asking if, at the time of fieldwork, Ukraine is or is not a democracy (surveys that accepted volunteered responses, typically had a few who said that Ukraine was “becoming a democracy” or was “in the process of democratizing”). Since independence, by margins of about three to one, majorities have maintained that the country is not a democracy. The one exception to this widespread negative appraisal was in 2005, immediately after the Orange Revolution and the formation of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko government, when the view that Ukraine was not a democracy prevailed by a comparatively small margin (40 percent is not a democracy and 30 percent is a democracy, February 2005).25

This assessment of Ukraine, whether it is or is not a democracy, reflects the very low ratings given the government in the handling of social and economic issues. In defining a democracy, the two issues that have consistently been mentioned ahead of any others, have been the protection of human rights and the establishment of an economic system that provides economic opportunities for all citizens, secures basic living standards, and has safety nets for the needy, the pensioners, the unemployed, and children. Although there is broad agreement that in Ukraine some human rights are respected, such as religious freedom and the right of individuals to freely express their opinions, the public has given the government poor marks in handling two human rights issues—the rights of minorities and free speech for Ukraine’s domestic media. Many of the public are concerned that minority rights have not been adequately protected and believe that media are not free of government interference in reporting on events and developments. The public is also dissatisfied with Ukraine’s multiparty system, which it considers as important for a democracy; the public recognizes that ideologically, political parties span the political spectrum, but opinion data suggest that the public is disillusioned with the performance of political parties and lacks confidence in party leaders.26 As for economic issues, the public has consistently given
the government very poor ratings in addressing economic problems and in curbing corruption and other illegal activities in the economic sector.

Economic development is vital to Ukraine’s democratization process, and the public’s perception that economic well-being is a requisite of a democratic state is very much in line with political theories and reflects a historically proven relationship between stable democracies and economic prosperity. Seymour Lipset, writing in 1959, stressed that “democracy is related to the state of economic development. . . . From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation in which the mass of the population intelligently participate in politics and develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite results either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popular base dictatorship)” (Lipset 31).

In Ukraine, the understanding of democracy is also based on Greek philosophers. In defining the concept of democracy in focus groups in 1994, political leaders and professionals referred to the Greek origin of the term, discussed the philosophical precepts of democracy, and stressed the importance of personal rights and freedoms in a democratic state. The most frequently cited example of a modern democracy was the United States, which was lauded for creating a society that brought security, stability, and prosperity to all of its citizens. In setting priorities for Ukraine’s democratization process, opinions of the elites differed in the four cities: in Kyiv, there was agreement that social, economic, and political developments have to proceed in tandem; in Lviv, priority was given to two issues, economic reforms and the development of political parties; in Dnipropetrovsk, participants saw law and order and stability as priorities; and in Odesa, they considered economic development and political reform as equally important.

Analysis of opinion data show that support for political liberalization has become linked with support for economic reforms. In the initial years of independence, opinions on political and economic liberalization were largely distinct phenomena, but since the late 1990s, nationwide surveys have indicated a linkage between political and economic attitudes. Individuals who embrace democratic liberalization also support economic liberalization and identify with proreform centrist parties, whereas opponents of economic reforms are committed to a command economy and identify with parties on the left of the political spectrum. The relationship between economic and political values suggests that support for economic reforms is bolstered by political liberalization, and economic liberalization reinforces the process of democratization. Therefore, the lack of economic liberalization is troubling not only for economic reasons but also because it may impede, if not derail, the process of democratization.27

Conclusions

The public has been unwavering in its commitment to protect personal rights and freedoms, such as the right to free speech and religious freedom, but has been less resolute
on minority rights. Support for minority rights may shift in either direction, depending on how these rights are handled by national leaders and by media—whether conflicts and tensions relating to minorities are addressed in the context of the rights of minorities, the limits of majority rule, and the country’s national interests, or are discussed primarily as a political issue seeking to accommodate internal or external pressures and fueled by unacknowledged prejudices. The public has also been steadfast in supporting the right to private property, even though support for privatization measures has decreased notably, and today the public supports only the introduction of small businesses, an area of activity that is least likely to be exploited by oligarchs; without encouragement or visible successes of privatization, public support for privatization may erode even further, though it is highly unlikely that the public will abandon the right to private property.

Opinion surveys and focus group discussions indicate that the public and elites favor a liberal democracy in the classical sense, one that places the public at the center of power, and a political system that has free and fair elections, with voters selecting officials to govern for a limited amount of time. In Ukraine, the public has been uncompromising in its demand for free and fair elections and affirmed its commitment to this right in the Orange Revolution. A free and fair election presupposes that political parties have a base, reach out to voters to increase their support, articulate their objectives and programs, and compete in an election. A free and fair election also assumes that the profile of active voters is reflected in the composition of the legislative branch and that elected officials have an identifiable constituency. However, to date, political parties are not seen as organized units addressing the country’s sociopolitical and economic problems, the proliferation of parties at election time precludes an adequate representation of proreform voters in the legislative branch, and Ukraine’s election system for the Rada, Ukraine’s legislative branch, does not establish any linkages between constituencies and elected officials.

An analysis of public opinion in Ukraine would be remiss without considering the period immediately after World War I and the seven decades of communist rule. At the end of World War I, there were two parallel developments in Ukraine: the emergence of the Ukrainian National Republic and the formation of the Soviet Ukraine. The National Republic was modeled primarily on the West European democratic nation-states and began to be formed in 1917; on January 22, 1918, the republic’s government in Kyiv proclaimed de jure governance over all of the territory traditionally known as Ukraine, the eastern and the western regions. At the same time, on December 25, 1917, communists proclaimed the establishment of a Soviet Ukrainian state in Kharkiv, which was its capital until 1934. The life of the Ukrainian National Republic was short-lived, from 1917 to 1921. The Ukrainian Soviet government lasted until 1991, at first establishing total control over the eastern region, and after World War II annexing the western region, which had been divided between Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.

Prior to 1991, the public in Ukraine had only a few years of experience with liberal democracy and more than seven decades of Soviet rule. The values expressed by the
public in Ukraine since independence in 1991, have been contrary to the precepts of Marxism-Leninism, the official ideology of the Soviet period. It can be argued that the public ignored these teachings, that Marxism-Leninism never became a part of personal values. Even if one accepts this argument, what is impressive is how widespread and steadfast the public has been in support of liberal democratic values that are in direct contradiction to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. For example, since 1991, vast majorities of the public have consistently supported the right to freely practice a religion of one’s choice, to openly and publicly criticize the government, to own private property, and to allow political parties from across the political spectrum to openly compete in elections, rights that are abhorrent to Marxism-Leninism, an ideology that in the Soviet Ukraine was preached from childhood through adulthood. It is also debatable whether and to what extent the events of 1917–1922—specifically the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic—affect current public and elite attitudes, and whether the historical events of that period are a part of the worldview of individuals. Undoubtedly, memories of these years, as well as of the Soviet ideology and the oppressiveness of the Soviet regime, are part of family histories, part of the personal heritage of individuals. Opinion surveys on political and economic issues and on foreign policy orientation do not include questions that could shed light on whether and to what extent these historical antecedents affect attitudes; nor have any systematic studies been undertaken to examine whether and to what extent the teachings of Marxism-Leninism color public perceptions. However, personal memories are a critical component of how individuals see political and economic developments and how they relate to society and the world. Illustrative of the lasting nature of personal memories are survey data on religious affiliation: individuals identify with a church that was traditional to a region prior to the Soviet era, the residents in the eastern oblasts identify with the Orthodox Church, while those in the western oblasts, with the Eastern Rite Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

The focus on public opinion to understand the value system in Ukraine does not suggest that public opinion should dictate policies. Governing is also leadership and in a liberal democracy, leaders are required to balance competing principles—respect the opinion of a majority, protect the rights of minorities, and uphold the laws of the country—and to accomplish this while serving a country’s national interests. Data from public opinion surveys are an invaluable source of information and can ensure that public preferences and concerns are heard and, it is hoped, considered by the country’s leaders (assuming that the surveys are methodologically sound). Additionally, a broad dissemination of survey data can contribute to curbing an usurpation of power and advancing democratization and economic liberalization. Transforming states, including Ukraine, have no institutional, legal, or historical precedent to place limits on power, no system of checks and balances. If political power is concentrated in a few hands, those holding it may tend to interfere with economic freedoms; and conversely, if economic power is similarly concentrated, those holding it might restrict political freedoms and constrain political institutions. Developed democracies have an institutionalized system of decentralization and a division of authority, with legal
constraints on the exercise of political and economic power. But even in established democracies, the legal and institutional checks and balances are sometimes insufficient and what is essential is to have a public engaged in a country’s decision making. In Ukraine, dissemination of survey data and proactive civic groups concerned with policy issues can serve as advocates for the much needed reforms and act as constraints on undemocratic actions of leaders.

As for the future of Ukraine, public commitment to human rights, free and fair elections, safety nets for the disadvantaged, and private property, indicates that the public desires to live in a liberal democracy with a stable political system and a dynamic economy providing economic opportunities and economic security for ordinary citizens. The public sees as models for Ukraine’s development the established democracies of Western Europe who have a proven track record of protecting human rights and liberties and maintaining political stability, and an economy that secures a large and prosperous middle class. However, seeing West European countries as models or wanting to join the European Union does not imply that the public wants to become like one of the countries in the West. Moreover, the public favors developing closer relations with Russia. A question that asks if the future of Ukraine is eastward toward Russia or westward toward Europe poses a dichotomy that ignores the complexity of Ukraine, its geopolitical location, historical past, long-established economic ties, and cultural links. A more appropriate and relevant question is—in what kind of a state does the public in Ukraine want to live?

In Ukraine, survey data and focus group discussions show that the public desires to live in a liberal democratic state, where elected officials gain their positions in free and fair elections, are accountable to the public, and serve for a specified amount of time; the public wants a government that maintains friendly and cooperative relations with other countries, in particular with the European community of nations as well as with Russia; and the public would like to have a dynamic and prosperous economy, where the right to private property is protected, the state provides for safety nets, and there are economic opportunities for all. The public holds values that will make a liberal democracy in Ukraine sustainable and secure.

Notes

1. In 1998 and 1999, the lead analysts for the exit polls were from QEV Analytics, Steven Wagner and Elehie N. Skoczylas; since 1999, Ukrainian firms have managed all aspects of exit polls and in the 2006 parliamentary election, five firms conducted exit polls.

2. Surveys and exit polls had a structured questionnaire, a representative sample, trained interviewers, quality control measures, and a computer-based data file; each survey and exit poll used face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of adults, age eighteen and older, unless otherwise indicated. Focus groups used professional moderators, a moderators’ guide, a selection procedure to invite participants, and a verbatim record of discussions. Ukrainian firms handled all aspects of fieldwork and data processing.

For a discussion on values in transforming societies, see Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992, 330–371).

3. USIA Office of Research, Opinion Research Memorandum, M-62-93, March 23, 1993,


5. Jefferson, The Thomas Jefferson Reader, 332. Jefferson’s first inaugural address, March 4, 1801: “All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate which would be oppression.”


11. USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, Research Memorandum, M-130-93, June 4, 1993, by Skoczylas, 7; survey fielded October 26–November 20, 1992; sample size, 1,227.


13. For an excellent summary on judicial decisions on the violations in the 2004 presidential election, see Melnyk (2005).


17. Between October 2005 and the first week of March 2006, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation conducted monthly nationwide surveys and distributed results to the media.


20. Representation of identifiable constituencies by deputies in the Rada was seriously undermined in the 2006 election by the use of closed-list proportional representation; see Barca, Skoczylas, and Ingraham (2006, 28–29).

21. The formation of alliances is of concern to the public; nationwide surveys fielded prior to the 2006 parliamentary election showed that the public favored a coalition between Nasha Ukraina, the Tymoshenko Bloc, and the Socialist Party, but only a few wanted to see a coalition of the Party of Regions and Nasha Ukraina.


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**International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)**


**QEV Analytics**


Accountability for the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes became an issue for the Council of Europe after the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As numerous archives were released, it became clear that there were no essential differences between Communism and Nazism, as both used similar, criminally inhumane means to maintain power. Twenty million deaths resulted from political repression in the Soviet Union, and 1 million in the Communist states of Eastern Europe (Courtois 4). After new states with totalitarian communist pasts joined the Council of Europe, Resolution 1096 was adopted in 1996, containing measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems. Ten years later, in 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) passed Resolution 1481, on the need for international condemnation of the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes, which for the first time strongly condemned the crimes that they themselves had committed. Although most Central and East European states have distanced themselves from their former communist regimes and have condemned the grave human rights violations committed by them, in Ukraine the Communist Party continues to be legal and active; that party has not clearly dissociated itself from the crimes committed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the subsidiary Communist Party of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and it has failed to condemn them without ambiguity. The aim of this chapter is to examine the Council of Europe’s resolutions and the former communist European states’ practices in regard to accountability for communist rights abuses, as well as to analyze how Ukraine is coping with its totalitarian communist past.

The Council of Europe’s Condemnation of Totalitarian Communist Regimes

The position of the Council of Europe regarding totalitarian communist regimes changed: from recommendations to dismantle their heritage to condemnation of their
crimes. In its Resolution 1096 (1996), PACE was rather cautious as it concentrated only upon the goals of the transition process, namely, creating pluralist democracies, based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and diversity. The resolution stressed that the cause of justice should be served in dismantling the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems; otherwise, a democratic state would be no better than the totalitarian regime that it replaced. While the guilty should be prosecuted, they should first be given the right to due process and the right to be heard. The resolution formulated the basic principles of demilitarization, decentralization, demonopolization, and debureaucratization in restructuring the old legal and institutional systems. An equally important aspect of this process is the transformation of mentalities, as suggested in the resolution, with the main goals of eliminating fear of responsibility, disrespect for diversity, extreme nationalism, intolerance, racism, and xenophobia.

In the resolution, PACE welcomed the opening of secret service files for public examination in some former communist totalitarian countries, and stressed that lustration, introduced in several states to exclude persons from exercising governmental power, can be compatible with a democratic state under the rule of law if these persons cannot be trusted to exercise power in compliance with democratic principles: “The aim of lustration is not to punish people presumed guilty—this is the task of prosecutors using criminal law—but to protect the newly emerged democracy.” Furthermore, PACE recommended that employees discharged from their positions on the basis of lustration laws should not, in principle, lose their previously accrued financial rights. In exceptional cases, where the ruling elite of the former regime awarded itself pension rights higher than those of the ordinary population, these should be reduced to the ordinary level.

Calling on the countries concerned to comply with the suggested principles, this resolution was silent on the crimes of the totalitarian communist regimes themselves. Ten years later, it turned out that the fall of the totalitarian communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe had not been followed in every case by an international investigation of the crimes committed by those regimes. Moreover, the authors of these crimes have not been brought to trial by the international community, as was the case with the crimes of Nazism. As a result of a report on “The Need for International Condemnation of the Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes,” authored by Goran Lindblad, a member of the Swedish parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe, PACE passed Resolution 1481 on January 27, 2006, that for the first time strongly condemned the crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes.

The resolution enumerated massive violations of human rights committed by totalitarian communist regimes, which have included individual and collective assassinations and executions, deaths in concentration camps, starvation, deportations, torture, slave labor, and other forms of mass physical terror, persecution on ethnic and religious grounds, violation of freedom of conscience, thought, and expression, of freedom of the press, and also a lack of political pluralism. PACE expressed its certainty that public awareness of crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes is one of the preconditions for avoiding similar crimes in the future.

The resolution particularly emphasized its practical significance because “totalitarian
communist regimes are still active in some countries of the world and crimes continue to be committed.” Furthermore, PACE called on all Communist or post-Communist parties in its member states that had not yet done so to reassess the history of communism and their own past, to clearly distance themselves from the crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes, and to condemn them without ambiguity.

Although the resolution was adopted, a feeling of a lack of accomplishment remains. A collection of articles written by respected analysts and historians, *Le livre noir du communisme*, counts between 85 million and 100 million victims of communist regimes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and Cambodia, and these deaths, as Stephane Courtois argues in the introduction to the book, deserve the appellation “crimes against humanity”—the term most closely associated with Nazi-lead genocide (Courtois 4–10). Yet, “while it is impossible to imagine any political party with the word ‘Nazi’ in its name operating successfully anywhere in Europe, communist and former communist parties continue to exist and thrive” (Applebaum). Certainly, in order to condemn the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes, it would be logical to treat them like Nazi crimes: to organize a Nuremberg-style tribunal for the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes.

**European States’ Stand on Accountability for Human Rights Abuses by Former Communist Regimes**

The post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe have undertaken different approaches to the issue of coping with past human rights abuses, although they are all facing similar legacies of the past. In his study *Third Wave* (1991), Samuel Huntington argues that the process of democratization may be seen in terms of the interplay between governing and opposition groups along a continuum that produces three types of transition: transformation, when the elites took the initiative to bring about democracy; replacement, when the initiative rested with the opposition; and transplacement, when democratization came about through joint action on the part of both government and opposition (Kritz 1995a, 542). According to Huntington, Hungary and Bulgaria were transformations, Poland and Czechoslovakia transplacements, and East Germany was a case of replacement.

**Czechoslovakia**

In 1991, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) adopted the Screening (“Lustration”) Law, which banned members of the National Security Corps, residents, agents, collaborators of State Security, and party officials (Article 2) from exercising functions in the state administration, in the Czechoslovak Army, and other functions, as specified in Article 1 of the law, for a period of five years until January 30, 1996. Later, Parliament extended the law to the year 2000, overriding a veto by President Vaclav Havel. This law may have affected 300,000 people (Benda 42). After a complaint from the Trade Union Association of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, and the
Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions, however, the International Labor Organization, taking into account the conclusions made in the report of the committee, invited the government of the CSFR to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court of the CSFR for a ruling on Act No. 451/1991 (“Lustration Law”), with due consideration for the provisions of Convention No. 111 Regarding Protection against Discrimination on the Basis of Political Opinion. Subsequently, in November 1992, the Constitutional Court of the CSFR found the provisions of several articles of the Screening Law to be noncompliant with the Bill of Basic Rights and Freedoms. Thus, the Constitutional Court declared them illegal in that the law targeted “potential candidates for collaboration” (Kritz 1995b, 346).

After Czechoslovakia’s split into two countries, the Czech Republic continued lustration proceedings under the same law that existed in Czechoslovakia. By August 1993, 210,000 people had been screened, and some of them were banned from the exercise of functions in the state’s administration, in the Czech Army, in the Office of the President of the Czech Republic, and in some other offices (Kritz 1995a, 534). As L. Huyse states, however, it is extremely difficult to judge the real impact of the Czechoslovakian Screening Act, as it lasted only one year in its original form (Huyse 68).

In 1993, the Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime and Resistance to It was adopted in the Czech Republic, which declared the regime that was based on communist ideology and in force from February 25, 1948, to November 17, 1989, to be criminal, illegal, and contemptible (Article 2). The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was considered to be a criminal and contemptible organization. In response to a petition from a group of deputies from the Parliament of the Czech Republic requesting nullification of that act, the Constitutional Court confirmed the illegal nature of the political regime from 1948 to 1989 (Kritz 1995b, 369–374). According to Jan Obrman, the law on the illegality of the Communist Party could serve as a legal basis for the party’s liquidation in the future, similar to the legislation outlawing both the National Socialist German Workers’ Party and the propagation of Nazi ideology in Germany (Kritz 1995a, 590). This consequence of the aforementioned law, in addition to providing moral satisfaction for the victims, seems to be its main outcome. The importance of that law was stressed by President Havel: “[T]hrough this law, the freely elected parliament is telling all victims of communism that society values them and that they deserve respect” (Kritz 1995a, 592).

In Slovakia, the new government opposed the Lustration Law and, in January 1994, petitioned the Constitutional Court to overturn it. Though the Court rejected the petition, the law was not invoked before expiring at the end of 1996 (Ellis 183). In February 1996, the Slovak National Council adopted a new law declaring the former Communist regime “immoral” and “illegal.”

**Hungary**

Hungary was the first of the former communist countries to adopt a law that would result in criminal proceedings against former communist officials. It was the November 4,
1991, Law Concerning the Prosecutability of Offenses Committed Between December 21, 1944, and May 2, 1990, introduced by two deputies of the Hungarian-Democratic Forum, Peter Takacs and Zsolt Zetenyi. The bill called for the suspension of the statute of limitations for cases of treason, premeditated murder, and aggravated assault leading to death that had been committed between December 21, 1944, and May 2, 1990, as prosecutions of crimes in that time frame had not been possible previously for political reasons (Kritz 1995a, 648).

Arguments in favor of the law concerned the fact that the victims of the crimes committed by the communists were still living alongside torturers and murderers, which distorted the concept of right and wrong (Kritz 1995a, 650). The trials were not aimed against average citizens who might have become communist party members in order to obtain or to keep their jobs, but against those who were involved in torturing or killing innocent individuals. Yet the Constitutional Court unanimously overturned the law because it lifted the statute of limitations on cases involving treason, and the definition of treason had changed several times during the previous decade. The Court justified its decision by adhering to the principles of the rule of law: “Legal certainty based on objective and formal principles takes precedence over justice which is partial and subjective at all times” (Kritz 1995b, 629). This decision of the Court was viewed variously. Teitel provided important justification for the jurisdictional ruling when referring to homicide acts that were subject to the challenged legislation as a category of grave criminal offense: crimes against humanity. “Protection of the rule of law also implies adherence to fundamental international law norms such as the principle of the imprescriptibility of crimes against humanity. The failure to refer to any national or international precedents on this question is a glaring omission in the Hungarian constitutional court’s opinion” (Kritz 1995a, 659).

Subsequently, in March 1993, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law on “Procedures Concerning Certain Crimes Committed During the 1956 Revolution,” which was based on such international instruments as the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Civilians in the Time of War and Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the 1968 New York Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. In its prepromulgation review, the Constitutional Court upheld the main part of the law on the basis of the interpretation of Article 7 of the Constitution: “The legal system of Hungary shall respect the universally accepted rules of international law, and shall ensure, furthermore, the accord between the obligations assumed under international and domestic law.” The act was interpreted as ensuring the enforcement of “universally accepted rules of international law” (Kritz 1995a, 662).

As in other Central European states, a screening law was also adopted in Hungary. The Law on the Background Checks to be Conducted on Individuals Holding Certain Important Positions (Law No. 23 of March 8, 1994) included even more positions subject to verification. According to Edith Oltay, the purging of former agents from high-ranking state positions was necessary not only because of moral considerations but also because those occupying such positions were susceptible to blackmail. Thus,
it was likely to contribute to Hungary’s coming to terms with its past (Kritz 1995a, 667). The law subjected approximately 12,000 officials to a screening process by at least two committees, each consisting of three professional judges, which were to complete their work between July 1, 1994, and June 30, 2000. Information about public officials will be accessible to the public thirty years after the panel’s ruling, that is, in 2030 (Kritz 1995a, 664). After the Constitutional Court struck down several provisions of the 1994 law, Parliament enacted a new law in July 1996, which stipulates that all persons born before February 14, 1972, must be screened before taking an oath before the Parliament or the president. After two screening committees examined the records of approximately 600 officials born in April 1977, several deputies came under scrutiny for suspicion of past work as secret agents (Ellis 184).

**East Germany**

The decommunization of East Germany, which was different from other Central European States that dealt with their former regimes’ crimes domestically, was enacted to a great extent by West German laws and courts. According to the decision of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on “Human Rights and Democratization in Unified Germany,” some East Germans found the process unsatisfactory, largely because the system failed to prosecute the leaders of the corrupt and immoral East German regime (Kritz 1995a, 595).

One of the primary goals of the decommunization process in East Germany was the historical, political, and juridical reappraisal of the activities of the State Security Service (Stasi). On November 15, 1991, the united German Parliament adopted a law permitting citizens to see their files, and a month later, on December 20, the Act Concerning the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (“Stasi Records Act”) was approved. On January 2, 1992, the files were opened and anyone could obtain the contents of his Stasi file. These checks have resulted in the dismissal of thousands of judges, police officers, schoolteachers, and other public employees in eastern Germany who were once informers for the Stasi. However, according to Thomas R. Ronchon, it was hard to find a legal basis for prosecuting Stasi activities. Unlike the genocidal policies of the Nazi regime, the act of telling the secret police about the activities of a friend, a neighbor, or a colleague could not be declared a violation of international law. West German law made it punishable for East German agents to spy on West or East German citizens, but the five-year West German statute of limitations rendered prosecution under those terms nearly impossible. As a consequence, the government had to prosecute officials of the former regime for transgressions of East German law, rather than questioning the morality of those laws (Ronchon 32–35).

The moral consequences of opening the Stasi files were quite unpredictable. As pointed out in the report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on “Human Rights and Democratization in Unified Germany,” “[f]rom well-respected dissident Vera Wollenberger, who learned with horror that her own husband had be-
trayed her, to Gerhard Riege, a member of the Bonn parliament who hanged himself after it was reported that he had been a Stasi informer, countless lives have been profoundly affected.” Yet, who counted the number of lives affected by the activity of Stasi informers? Moreover, as Joachim Gauck pointed out, “[j]ust imagine what would have happened if the files had been kept secret: not only would it have been impossible to create a climate of trust, but the files could have been used to threaten and blackmail people” (Kritz 1995a, 609).

There were efforts in Germany to prosecute former president Erich Honecker and five other high-ranking Communist Party officials. The charges were based on three arguments: (1) that Honecker had exceeded his power under East German law; (2) that he broke international law including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and (3) that he violated basic human rights. By January 1993, however, a terminally ill Honecker was released from trial, and the Berlin Constitutional Court lifted the arrest order.

**Albania**

In Albania, the 1992 Law on Political Parties prohibited the creation of “any party or organization with an anti-national, chauvinistic, racist, totalitarian, Fascist, Stalinist, ‘Enverist’ or Communist, or Marxist-Leninist character, or any political party with an ethnic or religious basis” (Kritz 1995a, 723–727). The government brought charges against more than seventy former Communist officials between 1992 and 1994 (U.S. Department of State, 822). In December 1993, ten senior officials were fined the equivalent of $60,000 each, and sentenced to prison. The very important Law on Genocide and Crimes against Humanity Committed during the Communist Regime for Political, Ideological, and Religious Motives (“Genocide Law”) was adopted in 1995, prohibiting persons with ties to the regime prior to March 1991 from holding selected positions in the government, Parliament, judiciary, or mass media until the year 2002. In January 1996, Albania’s Constitutional Court upheld most provisions of the Genocide Law, as well as of the 1995 Law on the Verification of the Moral Character of Officials and Other Persons Connected with the Defense of the Democratic State (“Lustration Law”). As a result of the screening process, 139 candidates were banned from participating in the 1996 parliamentary elections. Democracy turned out to be very weak in Albania, however, and despite the screening results, the Socialist Party was returned to power in the June 1997 elections (Ellis 185–187).

**Bulgaria**

Bulgaria went a different way, and the Union of Democratic Forces regained power in the 1997 elections. A law that made mandatory the opening of all files on high government officials, and gave them one month to admit their past activities, was adopted in July 1997. It was upheld by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. But the Court also supported the claim of the opposition party’s deputies that the law could jeopardize
the ability of the president, vice president, and members of the Constitutional Court to function, and ruled that the files of individuals in those positions should not be opened (Ellis 189).

During PACE’s plenary session before voting on the 2006 Resolution on the “Need for International Condemnation of Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes,” Mr. Ivanov, a parliamentarian representing Bulgaria, announced that 800,000 Bulgarian citizens had been forced by the communists to change their names, and some 300,000 had had to flee Bulgaria. He also stressed that it was essential that the archives of the security services in communist countries be opened; otherwise, it would not be possible to understand the full extent of their crimes.4

**Romania**

In Romania, a nineteen-member commission headed by political researcher Vladimir Tismaneanu was created in March 2006 to “undeniably certify the communist crimes and restrictions, from the detention camps to the crimes related to abortions.” The commission reportedly found that between 500,000 and 2 million Romanians were killed, imprisoned or placed in labor camps by the communist regime. Presenting a report on Communist-era crimes before Parliament, Romania’s President Traian Basescu became one of the first East European leaders to formally condemn communism: “As the Romanian head of state, I clearly and categorically condemn the communist system in Romania, from its beginnings as a dictatorship during 1944–1947 and up to its fall, in December 1989.”5

**Russia**

With the exception of the Baltic states, where transition started as replacement and changed into transplacement, all of the former Soviet Union’s republics combined the elements of two or more transitions. The leader of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, and his policy on perestroika (economic reconstruction) and glasnost (openness), launched this transition, and it was continued by the democratic forces of the opposition in almost all of the former Soviet republics after the failed coup, which was organized by a group of Communist Party, military, and KGB officials. On August 25, 1991, President Boris Yeltsin issued decrees suspending the activity of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and confiscating its assets. Then a decree on November 6, 1991, converted these suspensions into a ban on the Communist Party. Receiving a petition from a group of people’s deputies, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation examined the constitutionality of the aforementioned decrees. After detective-like court hearings that took more than a year, the Court announced its decision. According to Robert Sharlet, this decision represented a compromise: it gave each side something and served as a mirror reflecting the disorderly, conflict-ridden politics of the transition period in Russia (Kritz 1995a, 749–750). The lawfulness of the ban on the central executive organs of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union/Russian Communist Party was confirmed, but the Party had the right to reestablish local branches of the Russian Communist Party.

Efforts to screen and purge former Communist Party officials and to adopt a lustration law failed in Russia. Moreover, some laws on state security that were enacted only complicated the implementation of lustration. One, the Law on Operative and Detective Activity, banned the public exposure of agents of the KGB (Kritz 1995a, 760). Similarly, the Law on Federal Security Organs of the Russian Federation protected the covert status of persons cooperating with “state security organs” (Art. 17). Such practices, which are quite antithetical to lustration, remain unparalleled in other Central and East European States.

The Baltic States

In Lithuania, the government issued a Decree Banning KGB Employees and Informers from Government Positions, and a Law on the Verification of Mandates of Those Deputies Accused of Consciously Collaborating with Special Services of Other States was adopted. Although these acts were implemented, and although the Temporary Commission of the Supreme Council investigated collaboration with the KGB and other secret services in Lithuania, absolute justice was not achieved. Many of the Lithuanian KGB files were removed to Russia, and not all of them were returned. Soon, replacement gave way to transplacement, and the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP), which was a successor to the banned Communist Party, won the parliamentary election of October 1992. But Lithuania’s ex-president and LDLP leader Algirdas Brazauskas, to his credit, did not run for president in 1997, on the basis that Lithuania deserved to have a president who had not been a Communist leader in the past. Such good will from former Communists, to exercise transitional justice and to come to terms with the past, would be the best solution for dealing with the legacy of the past.

In 1998, a new lustration law was enacted in Lithuania. At talks on the evening of July 22, 1998, however, Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius said that he supported President Valdas Adamkus’s opinion that the recently passed lustration law was “dubious from the point of view of constitution and international law.”

Latvia adopted the Declaration on Condemnation of the Totalitarian Communist Occupation Regime Implemented in Latvia by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on August 22, 1996, and condemned the actions of all those persons who participated in committing the crimes under that regime. The Seima of the Republic of Latvia charged the Cabinet of Ministers to establish a commission of experts to determine the number of victims of the Soviet Union’s totalitarian communist regime. Moreover, it called on the European Union Parliament to establish an international commission for assessing the crimes of the Soviet Union’s totalitarian communist regime.

Georgia and Moldova

The Georgian Parliament debated a draft law on lustration, envisaging the exclusion of former Communist Party functionaries and KGB agents from civil service, in
February 2007. The law was rejected by the ruling party, as the main list of ex-KGB agents was in Moscow and was unavailable to the Georgian authorities. In Moldova, a lustration law failed to pass as well.

Common Approaches

Thus, the practices of Central and East European states, although varied in their approaches to dealing with past human rights abuses, had much in common. Their actions confirm an international obligation to apply punishment for grave human rights violations by prior regimes, and are often based on such a duty. For example, in the Czech Republic’s Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime and Resistance to It, the Parliament declared the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to be responsible for the system of government in that country in the years 1948–1989, being “[a]ware of the obligation of the freely elected parliament to come to terms with the Communist regime” (Kritz 1995b, 367). Most post-Communist European states outlawed their communist parties and passed laws that provided for the screening and purging of people who sought public office. Although the compatibility of lustration laws with international human rights standards may be questioned, the obligation to come to terms with the past requires states to punish those guilty of human rights abuses. Because of the actions of the communist parties’ officials, as well as of the agents and collaborators of the secret services, a great number of innocent people became victims of communist regimes. Moreover, lustration laws may be justified as necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security and the economic well-being of the country. Former communist officials and secret service agents could not be trusted to carry out democratic reforms.

The Case of Ukraine

Unfortunately, impunity for grave human rights violations of a prior regime still exists in Ukraine, as the issue of justice for crimes committed under the rule of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its Ukrainian branch has not been closed. The Ukrainian government has not been as consistent as, for example, the Czech, Hungarian, and Lithuanian leadership. In the case of Ukraine, however, particularly valid arguments exist for dealing with the legacy of the past. Some actions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union/Ukraine constituted genocide and crimes against humanity.

One such action was the great famine (the Holodomor) of 1932–33, which was a crime of genocide committed against Ukrainians. It was organized by the CPSU, with the intent of eradicating Ukrainians as a national group. As Robert Conquest has shown, the Soviet authorities at first denied the existence of the famine, with the help of Soviet diplomats and Western journalists who had been deceived or corrupted by the Soviet authorities (Conquest 322–323). Internally, the Soviet press simply ignored the famine, but occasionally printed a refutation or rejection of some insolent foreign slander (ibid., 310). When the famine could no longer be hidden, some foreign govern-
ments and politicians took action, as when Congressman Hamilton Fish Jr. submitted a resolution (on May 28, 1934) to the United States Congress, registering the facts of the famine and recalling the American tradition of “taking cognizance” of such invasions of human rights, expressing sympathy and the hope that the Soviet Union would change its policies, and in the meantime admit American relief. It was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed (House Resolution 39a, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session).

In response to the man-made famine of 1932–33 in Ukraine, Ukrainians in Galicia (Halychyna) and neighboring territories held widespread acts of protest, which found expression in letters from the government of the Ukrainian National (People’s) Republic in exile and various organizations and parties, to the League of Nations, namely, to the head of the Council of the League of Nations, Mr. Mowinckel, and the head of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Mr. Voter (Mace 34). The League was asked to raise the painful question of the famine in Ukraine as “the very existence of a great nation is being threatened” (ibid., 36).

The Ukrainian émigré organizations in the West fought very actively to bring the facts to the attention of governments and the public. In Washington, for example, the files of the State Department were full of appeals to the U.S. administration to intervene in some way. They were always answered with the statement that the absence of any American state interest made this impractical (Conquest 311). As the United States at this time had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (until November 1933), and the State Department was under instruction to work to establish such relations, the reports of the famine were regarded by the administration as unhelpful. But the foreign diplomatic corps located in Moscow was not deceived. The British Embassy, for example, reported to London that conditions in the Kuban and in Ukraine were “appalling” (British Embassy dispatch, March 5, 1933). Yet, in general, the West kept silent, pretending not to notice. As the British writer George Orwell complained, “Huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving the deaths of millions of people, have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English russophiles” and ideological Sovietophiles. But it was not only a matter of Russophiles, but also of a large and influential body of Western thought (Conquest 321). According to Robert Conquest, the scandal was not that they justified Soviet actions, but that they refused to hear about them, that they were not prepared to face the evidence (ibid.).

It was not until 1988 that the ninety-ninth Congress of the United States created the Commission on the Ukraine Famine, headed by Dr. James E. Mace, to conduct a study of the 1932–33 famine in order to: (1) expand the world’s knowledge of the famine and (2) provide the American public with a better understanding of the Soviet system by revealing the Soviet role in Ukraine’s famine (Investigation of the Ukraine Famine V). In its executive summary, the commission formulated nineteen findings, one of which was: “Joseph Stalin and those around him committed genocide against Ukrainians in 1932–33” (Investigation of the Ukraine Famine VII).

There have been some attempts to organize “Nuremberg-style” tribunals for the crimes of the CPSU. Among the first steps in preparing for a trial was the creation
of an International Commission of inquiry into the 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine. The establishment of this commission was a result of the initiative of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, members of which approached a number of jurists and legal scholars in different nations, asking them to participate in an inquiry into the famine that had taken place in Ukraine during 1932–33. The Commission was formed on February 14, 1988, with seven commissioners: Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, formerly a British prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials; Prof. John P. Humphrey of Canada, formerly director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights; Prof. G. Levasseur of France, formerly a member of the Commission for the Revision of the French Penal Code; Prof. R. Levene of Argentina, formerly president of the Court of Appeals; Prof. C.T. Oliver, former U.S. assistant secretary of state and U.S. ambassador; Prof. J. Sundberg of Sweden, appointed president of the Commission of Inquiry; and Prof. J. Verhoeven of Belgium, appointed vice-president.

The Commission of Inquiry was established as an entirely independent, nongovernmental body. Under the Terms of Reference, adopted on February 14, 1988, the commission was to inquire and report upon:

1. The existence and extent of the famine,
2. The cause or causes of the famine,
3. The effect it had on Ukraine and its people, and
4. Recommendations regarding responsibility for the famine (International Commission of Inquiry 1).

In his opening statement, the counsel for the petitioner (the World Congress of Free Ukrainians), Mr. John Sopinka, Q.C., submitted the contention that in 1932–33, between 5 million and 10 million Ukrainians were starved to death as a result of a brutal enforcement of excessive grain-procurement quotas by the Soviet government. Mr. Sopinka asked the commission to find: (1) that the famine was deliberately caused as an instrument of state policy; (2) that the famine was an act of genocide; and (3) that Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, and others were responsible (International Commission of Inquiry 2).

As a result, it was established to the satisfaction of the commission that it is beyond doubt that Ukraine was severely affected by the famine in 1932–33, and that the Ukrainian and Soviet authorities were aware of the dire food shortages of the population. It was also indisputable that, although they were aware of the dramatic conditions in Ukraine, the Soviet authorities refrained from sending any relief until the summer of 1933. The commission concluded that the Soviet authorities had adopted various legal measures that amplified the disastrous effects of the famine by preventing the victims from finding any food at all or from leaving the region. It was confirmed that the Soviet authorities at the time had denied the existence of any famine in Ukraine, and that, against all evidence to the contrary, they “persisted in their denials for more than fifty years, with the exception of Khruschev’s private avowal” (International Commission of Inquiry 45–48).
Although the International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine was not a court, still less a criminal court, nonetheless, the commission, by its Terms of Reference, formulated recommendations regarding responsibility for the famine. During the debates, and particularly in the closing submission by W. Liber, Esq. as counsel for the petitioner, an accusation of genocide was made (International Commission of Inquiry 51).

In 1983, the government-in-exile of the Sovereign Ukraine (1917–20) presented an Accusation Act against the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarding the Great Famine of 1932/33 to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The court did not accept the petition, on the grounds that Ukraine did not exist then as an independent state. Now that Ukraine has achieved independence, the case of the artificially enforced great famine or the Holodomor is waiting to be pleaded.

Among the other crimes of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Soviet Union, there were numerous systematic and massive-scale acts of torture during interrogations in the 1930s–1960s, and hundreds of thousands of deaths resulting from beatings in NKVD, and later KGB, prisons. According to the statistics of the “Chrezvychainyi Komitet” [extraordinary committee], in 1918–19, more than 1,000 people were executed without trial every month. At the height of Stalin’s terror, more than 40,000 people were killed per month, and many more disappeared after imprisonment by those security agencies (Borets 222).

As N.M. Switucha asked justifiably, “why is it that Nazi concentration camps are regarded as a crime against humanity (which is right!), but Soviet concentration camps, that were scattered over the Siberian permafrost and tundras much longer than the Nazi camps, have not been universally condemned as a crime against humanity?” Millions of people were placed into forced labor in labor camps and remained in that status for many years.

Persecution on political, national, language, and religious grounds was a crime committed on a massive scale by the CPSU. While the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR formally provided for all internationally recognized human rights, there was little tolerance for actions and practices incompatible with the Communist Party’s ideology (Antonovych 110). Consequently, human rights were not observed. For example, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, organized in 1976 to promote the implementation of the Helsinki Accords in Ukraine, consisted of thirty-seven members, of whom twenty-five were imprisoned, two were exiled, six were banished, and one was incarcerated in a psychiatric institution (Verba and Yasen 10).

Persecution took many forms. One form was the prohibition against the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Whole parishes were repressed, bishops and priests were arrested, and churches were destroyed. In 1930, as a result of a political process in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, 32 bishops and nearly 10,000 priests were killed (Lyzanchuk 204). The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was also suppressed. Greek-Catholic priests, nuns, and bishops were either killed or incarcerated, and the pitiful remnants were finally forced to acquiesce to the liquidation of the Brest Church Union, in violation of canon law, in March 1946. Both the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and the
Ukrainian Greek-Catholic churches continued to exist in secret during the entire Soviet period, and were not legalized until after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the period of 1917–39, 8,000 churches were destroyed by Soviet authorities (ibid.).

The Communist government also tried to destroy the Ukrainian people by forcibly transferring hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to Siberia or to the Far East. Already before and during the 1932–33 famine, thousands of “dekulakized/dekurkulized peasants” were deported. As stated by Khrushchev as the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his report about the “cult of personality” at the 1956 CPSU Congress, Stalin intended to deport the whole Ukrainian nation, and Ukrainians managed to escape this lot only because there were too many of them, and there was no place to exile them (Avtorkhanov 80–81).

The CPSU may also be accused of the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear disaster, which Phil Reeves called “gambling with the planet.” The Communist Party should carry the burden of responsibility for the fact that on April 27, 1986—a full day after the top blew off Reactor Unit 4—children were still playing in the streets of Pripyat, a town created for the workers of the Chornobyl nuclear power station, and on May 1, 1986, millions of adults and children went on a May Day demonstration to greet Communist Party authorities who, meanwhile, were the first to evacuate their own children and grandchildren to safe zones immediately after the catastrophe.

It is worth mentioning that in Bulgaria, Grigor Stoitchkov, who was deputy prime minister from 1978 until 1989, and Lubomir Shindarov, who was deputy minister of public health from 1981 until 1989, were indicted in 1991 for failure to undertake necessary measures against the effects of nuclear radiation, which had permeated Bulgaria following the Chornobyl accident in 1986. They were convicted, and their conviction was upheld on appeal (Gross 97). Nothing of the kind happened in Ukraine, although the justification for such trials was much more weighty.

Therefore, the question remains: why have the crimes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its Ukrainian branch never been condemned universally as crimes against humanity? John Jaworsky gave the following reason for this situation:

After World War II it was (relatively) easy to identify the “winners” and the “losers”; after all, the political system responsible for establishing the Nazi concentration camp system was defeated. . . . However, the Soviet system was never decisively “defeated” in a way which allowed for a decisive “coming to terms” with what happened during the Stalinist years. . . . When the Soviet system finally collapsed, under the weight of the growing inefficiencies and internal contradictions which plagued the ailing Soviet state, you did not have clear-cut victors, with (relatively) clean hands, who wanted to prepare a full accounting of the abuses of the past. For a variety of reasons the new leaders of the post-Soviet states, and much of the post-Soviet public as well, did not want Nuremberg-style trials which would have provided such an accounting.12

As Ukraine has ratified the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, and the acts mentioned above do constitute crimes against humanity, as they violated elementary principles of
humanity, the argument that existing penal provisions defining the applicable statute of limitations were in effect at the time that the crimes were committed does not work in the case of Ukraine.

Attempts to Decommunize Ukraine

There have been several attempts to “decommunize” Ukraine. After the collapse of the August 24, 1991, military coup d’etat in Moscow (August 24, 1991), the Communist Party of Ukraine was accused of participation in that coup. The Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine issued a Decree (Ukaz) on the Temporary Suspension of the Activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine (August 26, 1991), having accused the Communist Party of participation in the coup. The financial assets and property of the Communist Party were frozen and taken over by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, pending a judicial investigation into their participation in the coup. Another decree concerned the property of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the territory of Ukraine (August 26, 1991).

After a petition from a group of people’s deputies, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine reviewed the aforementioned decrees, and ruled them unconstitutional in its December 27, 2001, decision. The Constitutional Court stated that the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was registered on July 22, 1991, as a public organization (“obiednannya hromadian”), was not a successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR. That is why this decision had no consequences concerning the property of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its structural part that functioned within the territory of Ukraine before July 22, 1991. That property was turned into state property according to the December 20, 1991, Law of Ukraine on Turning the Property of the Communist Party of Ukraine and CPSU into State Property (Zakon Ukrainy “Pro obernennia maina Kompartiï Ukraïny ta KPRS na derzhavnu vlasnist’”).

In general, the Ukrainian successor government to the previous Ukrainian Soviet government has never actually denied responsibility for redressing past violations. In 1991, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions in Ukraine. Imperfect as it may be, the very fact of its enactment is important. Notably, in 1997, the Supreme Court of Ukraine issued a book of the Ukrainian SSR’s normative legal acts on repression, and on the rehabilitation of those who were sentenced. This was the first time that these normative acts, departmental instructions, and clarifications, which were the legal basis for repression in the Soviet state, were presented in total [reabilitatsiia represovanykh]. Many books revealing the truth about the Holodomor of 1932–33 and other crimes of communism have appeared lately.13 Monuments to the victims of the terrorization and famine have been erected, while many statues of Lenin and other leaders of the Communist Party have been demolished, and streets named after Communist Party leaders have been renamed in many cities and villages.

After numerous calls by President Yushchenko on the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to
declare the Holodomor of 1932–33 an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people, the Law on the 1932–33 Holodomor in Ukraine was enacted on November 28, 2006. It states that the 1932–33 Holodomor was genocide against the Ukrainian people. In 2007, Ukraine was urging the sixty-first session of the UN General Assembly to recognize the Holodomor of 1932–33 in Ukraine as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian nation.

Yet the Ukrainian government has neither created a state commission to investigate human rights abuses of the past nor demanded accountability from the Communist Party or those of its officials who are responsible for crimes against humanity. Efforts to use secret police files in order to screen and purge those who were affiliated with the former secret service have failed so far in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government has not decisively followed the affirmative international legal obligation on states to investigate and to bring a prior regime to accountability for its grave human rights violations.

**Conclusion**

The practice of most Central and East European states confirms the existence of a duty to investigate and to bring a prior communist regime to accountability for grave human rights violations. This state practice demonstrates that criminal prosecution of the perpetrators, which has been the main official policy toward collaborators in West European countries after World War II, has received very little support in post-Communist European states. Instead, most post-Communist transitional states that follow the Council of Europe’s resolutions have used such measures of dealing with the past as lustration or disqualification of former party elites, of agents of the secret police and of their informers, as well as bans on former communist parties and condemnation of communist ideology, which is as evil as fascism.

The process of lustration was usually criticized by the international community and by many domestic forces as a political rather than judicial measure. But lustration laws have been justified as necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and the economic well-being of the country, since former Communist Party officials and agents of secret services may not be trusted to carry out democratic reforms. In particular, PACE Resolution 1096, on measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems, stresses that the aim of lustration is not to punish people presumed guilty but to protect the newly emerged democracies. Time has proved that the process of lustration has enhanced the growth of democratic institutions in transitional states. Those post-Soviet states that have introduced lustration are now all in the European Union, in contrast to countries like Ukraine, which have not finished dealing with their past.

PACE resolution 1481 (2006), on the need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes, called on all Communist or post-Communist parties that have not yet done so to reassess the history of communism in their own past, to clearly distance themselves from crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes, and to condemn them without ambiguity. In some post-Communist states, however, Communist parties continue to exist and thrive.
Ukraine has particularly valid grounds for coping with the legacy of the past, since crimes committed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the Ukrainian branch as a regional affiliate, constitute genocide and crimes against humanity. As Ukraine’s case illustrates, it is often impossible in transitional periods of political flux to put in place a comprehensive domestic process of coping with the past without the international community’s participation. The best results in solving the problems of transitional justice may be achieved through joint efforts of domestic and international instruments.

Notes


4. The material from this plenary session of PACE is available at www.clearharmony.net/articles/200601/31217.html.


6. This material, “Lithuanian President, Premier, Discuss Controversial Bills,” was e-mailed from list@infoukes.com to politics@infoukes.com (received July 1998).


8. Mr. Liber became a counsel for the petitioner after John Sopinka resigned when he was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

9. E-mail from jjaworsk@watarts.uwaterloo.ca (John Jaworsky) to politics@infoukes.com, “Dealing with the legacy of the past . . .” (received March 19, 1998).

10. In Ukrainian, the term “kurkul” is the equivalent of the Russian “kulak,” referring to rich farmers/peasants.

11. E-mail from asydorenko@toltec.astate.edu (Alexander Sydorenko) to announce@infoukes.com, “Lethal legacy” (received April 7, 1998).

12. None of the Communists in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has voted for this law.

Bibliography


Collective Memory as a Device for Constructing a New Gender Myth

Marian J. Rubchak

The past is simply a social construction shaped by concerns of the present.

Maurice Halbwachs

Surveying the Mythical Terrain

In Ukraine today one can hear a familiar refrain that might draw the attention of cultural historians. It goes something like this: “What do we want with feminist theorizing, especially its Western implant? Ours has been a feminist society since time immemorial.” Based upon the available evidence, it can fairly be suggested that the earliest horticultural societies, among them Ukraine, grew up around the cult of the Great Mother. Such a period of “mother right” existed in numerous protonations, Eastern and Western alike, in their clan and/or tribal developmental phase. Although we cannot go back in time to justify such views of a people’s past, we can assume their probability.

What has never been explained adequately is why the notion of female centrality (in Ukraine often confused with feminism) became so prominent a part of Ukraine’s “cultural archive” (to invoke the words of Foucault), why the concept of matriarchal empowerment was transformed into such a visible and persistent topos, and remains an important constituent of Ukrainian cultural memory. With each new reading of bygone days, the form of this topos metamorphoses, and although its content was emptied long ago, the tenacious matriarchal myth lives on to excite the Ukrainian imagination. It displays astonishing vigor and resiliency in its ability to survive and adapt to the vagaries of Ukraine’s historical fortunes, and to generate important discursive issues as the nation’s people seek to create and shape the world in which they live.

We are aware that myth is susceptible to various interpretations. All too often it is mistaken for mere fabrication. Contrary to such a judgment, Mircea Eliade considered myth a “living” thing that, by this very fact, “gives meaning and value to life. To understand the structure and function of myths . . . serves to clarify a stage in the history
of human thought” (2). In his *Das Mutterrecht* [Mother Right] Swiss anthropologist J.J. Bachofen argues along parallel lines: “Since the beginning of all development lies in myth, myth must form the starting point for any serious investigation of ancient history” (75).

It was Bachofen who in the nineteenth century first brought to the attention of the scholarly community the validity of the matriarchal myth as a universal historical phenomenon. His hypothetical evolutionary scheme began with humanity in a state of barbarism that invariably proceeded (as history allegedly attests) “teleologically” toward its maturity, or its most sophisticated stage known as patriarchy (69, ff.). Soon, Bachofen’s anthropological hypothesis of human development sparked a debate on the reality of ancient matriarchal societies, and two opposing schools of thought emerged. One school denied any existence of a matriarchal society, while the other insisted that it was—to one degree or another—a widespread phenomenon.

The archaeologist Marija Gimbutas (1989, xx; 1996, 34) rejected the universal premise of matriarchal societies, and argued instead that archaeological records can serve as persuasive evidence of the existence of ancient matriscic social orders only in certain parts of the world. Some of her excavated material remains bear imprints of early androcentric societies as well. Consequently, instead of an all but worldwide distribution of a prepatriarchal order of communal life that might represent either matriarchal rule or a matrilineal social order, she hypothesized the simultaneous existence of two parallel forms of early human organization. One was the *matristic-gyalian* structure of shared rule, material evidence of which was discovered in present-day Left-Bank Ukraine, although it was characteristic of societies in Western Europe as well. Other material remains bear witness to the presence of androcentric or patriarchal societies, a Neolithic culture reflecting male domination over women, such as the kind found in the middle and lower Volga basin.2

Inasmuch as matriarchal theory remains both imprecise and controversial, it will be useful here to consider the multiple significations attributed to the term “matriarchy” itself. Some theorists define it as female dominance, others a shared system of power, while still others simply refer to it by terms such as *matrilocal*, *matrifocal*, or *matrilinear*, without further elaboration. However we define it, Simon Pembroke maintains that: “It was an entire epoch, dominated and virtually contained by a feminist materialist principle to which a whole series of cosmic and terrestrial representations necessarily corresponded, and which the more spiritual period of masculine ascendancy [that] succeeded it had to combat for every step of its ascendancy” (1).

Extrapolating what is known about the structure of early horticultural societies in general, Gimbutas’s archaeological excavations, and the continuing discursive claims for a Ukrainian matriarchy, we can construct a plausible argument for the centrality of women in the preliterate Ukrainian social order. Communal affairs in Ukraine before recorded history were conducted around a clan’s center of gravity—the hearth. As its guardian, the matriarch, or “hearth mother,” occupied the most strategic position. Without her, no deliberations would be considered, no decisions affecting the clan could be reached. Somewhat akin to the ancient Greek triple goddess, the presiding
“hearth mother”—symbolizing the mystery of birth and death—was guardian of the past buried below, custodian of the present, and, as the “life source” of the clan and symbol of eternal rebirth, bearer of its future generations. In this preliterate phase of Ukrainian “becoming,” the matriarchal topos that emerged enshrined itself in the cultural archive of the people.

Proto-Ukrainian society, like others before recorded history, did not distinguish between public and private space, but as the various collective functions moved to a more public venue, the old kin-based collectivities were transformed into institutions that provided service to legitimized public ends. The destructured domestic realm was separated from the newly established public space, and the matriarch was displaced as the locus of proceedings and focus of solidarity; men and women began to inhabit separate worlds. A range of androcentric biases followed this realignment of power relations.

In due course, one of the ancient matriarch’s most visible embodiments became known as berehynia [guardian]. Originally, the term was associated with rusalky [water nymphs] who protected riverbanks [berehy], or wood sprites (naiads), representing countless dispersed concretizations of the “Great Mother,” guardian of the living earth and repository of all wisdom. We have no verification of when the term berehynia was applied to women initially, but likely not until the late nineteenth century.3

Perhaps the first reference related to the vestigial “woman power” in Ukraine appears in accounts of determined female resistance to the Eastern Orthodox faith, mandated by Volodymyr the Great in 988. Women are reputed to have viewed Orthodoxy as a misogynist confession, founded on the principle of masculine authority that denigrated women in dogma and rite. The intractable women—many of Kyïv’s elite female residents and peasants alike—preferred to cling to pagan beliefs that pushed the boundaries of any acceptable female behavior deviating from that sanctioned by the Church.

To illustrate the continuing heritage of empowered Ukrainian women I will trace a brief trajectory of selected wedding rituals, considered by ethnographers to be among the most important indicators of social values (Stcherbakiwskyj 325). To begin with, widespread premarital sex appears to have been the rule in early Ukraine (although some controversy about this exists), a convention that apparently did not prejudice a woman’s marriage prospects any more than it would impair those of a man. Ethnographic records contain descriptions of young people’s evening gatherings, known as vechornytsi, that often led to sex (Ponomarev 230–231; Vovk 228), and trial marriages also were not uncommon. They might begin as early as age fourteen to fifteen for girls and sixteen for boys (Ponomarev 228).

At the turn of the seventeenth century, with the Church’s mounting success in validating their sacral nature, marriage conventions became increasingly patriarchally oriented—a development beginning in the late sixteenth century. With the gradual transition from older matriarchal social structures to patriarchal forms of organization, women bore the brunt of the changes. They alone could guarantee the genealogy of children; so family honor (and, by extension, wealth conservation and property
preservation) mandated their respectability. To ensure the legitimacy of the line and
guarantee its virtue, sexually appropriate conduct meant female conjugal fidelity as
the sine qua non of marital unions. Thus a firm foundation of middle-class family
morality—a conceptual and political minefield of double standards—was laid. No
such restrictive ideology encumbered married men. Unmarried women continued to
exercise a high degree of freedom.

The Politics of Transmission

The matriarchal myth has generated a plurality of narratives in Europe. In many Western
European cultures the figure of a woman, maternal in appearance, symbolizes the spirit
of the collectivity. It does not refer to actual motherhood, but rather symbolizes the
eternal feminine. Mother Ireland is one such West European stereotype; this nation’s
past is peopled with legendary women. In the 1920s, the matriarchal legacy would be
used in one of its applications to justify a women’s movement in Germany as German
feminists began to look to it for support in their campaign for equal rights. “They
maintained that their female predecessors in an ancient Nordic utopia had enjoyed
full equality” (Rupp 365). Northern Italy (with its Etruscan roots) offers yet another
example of the Great Mother archetype. Some scholars claim that Italian beginnings
are rooted in ancient Lombardy, which in all likelihood was a matriarchal society. The
Etruscan predecessors of contemporary Italian women were known for their remarkable
freedom of action, as confirmed in the iconography and funerary monuments. They
also are said to have been literate and even educated (Cantorella 104). For its part,
the French female model represents a paradoxical paradigm: “In the French revolution
[her] symbols were ‘La Patrie,’ but with the representative figure that of a woman
giving birth to a baby,” and Marianne (as in Delacroix’s magnificent painting) leading
the revolutionary charge. Her prominently bared breasts invoke maternal functions,
which can be extended to the symbol of a mother giving birth to a newborn republic,
while the valorized leadership of a woman in the forefront of the French Revolution,
leading an angry mob to action, lends an aura of (socially constructed) masculinity.

Matriarchal signs abound throughout Ukraine as well, but they are configured and
interpreted in ways often unique to its people. Representations of an omnipresent Bere-
hynia are encoded in scholarship, the media, art, monuments, literature, sports teams,
musical groups, organizations, shops, and restaurants. The most stunning portrayal
of matriarchy that I have seen to date is a bas-relief in the museum of local culture,
in the old Cossack stronghold of Cherkasy. Chiseled into a marble wall marking the
entranceway, two gigantic stories high, it was carved during the Soviet era, in 1986. We
recall that Soviet women were depicted as having broken the gender barrier, at which
time the typical female figure assumed hard, semimale contours. Women were
depicted as virile, militant, muscular, superwomen of heroic stature. The specifically
Ukrainian counterpart of the ubiquitous New Woman differs dramatically from the
all-Soviet model. The bas relief under discussion is that of a female of monumental
proportions, yet “maternal” looking at the same time—voluptuous, with softly con-
toured, nurturing breasts, and an outsized navel (source of all human life), her arms outstretched (evoking Oranta, the Orthodox Praying Virgin) in an all-embracing gesture. Flying high is the tiny figure of a cosmonaut issuing from her head. Around her legs is ranged a group of “child-men” half her size, yet judging by their attire they embody typically mature male pursuits—scholarship, the military, politics, labor, and so on. Along with the characteristics of maternal protectiveness she personifies the Amazon-like strength of a powerful woman—the larger-than-life female as a force in a world of forces. “The woman is a force to be reckoned and valued.” All of this renders her the prototypical mother figure whose assertion of the primacy of life challenges the legitimacy of a social order (Soviet) founded on the idea of superhuman achievements (Lauter 47–50).

My primary aim here is to examine the current reinscription of the matriarchal topos in the cultural text of Ukrainian society, and delineate some of the sites of intersection between the ancient myth and current reality. I will include references to Western Europe, where gender differences are undergoing profound transformations. In her examination of three states—Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands, Birgit Pfau-Effinger concludes, for example, that Finland’s late transition from an egalitarian horticultural social order to an industrial society, with a well-defined middle class, resulted in a progressive attitude toward its women. In the 1950s, the principle of gender equality generally was being observed (Effinger 134, 148). Germany, notwithstanding its emphasis on the exalted status of women in its Nordic past, has a patriarchal history; in West Germany, as well as the Netherlands and their other European Union neighbors, the “housewife model” tends to predominate (ibid., 52, 59, 148). As for women’s movements, they emerged in Western Europe at different times, but by the 1960s–1970s it was becoming increasingly evident that women had found their voice.5

Meanwhile, Ukraine remained locked in a Communist system that perpetuated the fiction of women’s problems having become superfluous, hence there was no need for imported feminist nonsense. Then, the impossible happened—in 1991 the Soviet state collapsed, and in the fallout, Ukraine embarked upon its transition from a totalitarian system to an open society. Encouraging signs that the country might be prepared to “catch up” to its Western counterparts began to appear. Admittedly, at this stage only a tiny handful of committed women intellectuals exhibited any interest in purely women’s issues, but as so often happens in a social order that has lagged in its development in a certain area, it leapfrogs over early achievements elsewhere and accelerates its own progress. Increased East–West intellectual exchanges after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, and Western-sponsored meetings, seminars, workshops, and conferences, encouraged the emergence of women’s movements in post-Communist Ukraine. Simultaneously, in the opinion of Tatiana Zhurzhenko (42), the growing discursive impact of feminist and gender theories on Ukraine strengthened its European image, and its openness to the principles of global feminism.

The process began with a tacit acknowledgment in 1991 of Ukraine’s need to reestablish a connection to the West, when Solomea [Solomiia] Pavlychko published
an article titled “Do Ukrainian Literary Studies Need a Feminist School?” (1991, 10–15). Not only did the work reflect her personal interest in feminist theory as a methodological tool in literary studies, it was indispensable for further examining the social and national questions surrounding Ukrainian women. Early in 1993, a fledgling women’s enterprise created a mild sensation with its launch of the country’s self-styled “first truly feminist magazine,” titled P’iata Pora [The Fifth Season]. The inaugural issue opened with an interview given by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak (4–5), an American feminist. In her study on Ukrainian women’s movements, she delineated a fledgling feminist tradition in right-bank Ukraine going back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Her work raises certain questions such as: Can the early Ukrainian women’s movement be considered truly feminist? Did it conform to the West European model, which also had its beginnings in the nineteenth century? Tentatively speaking, the answer to both is yes, but this begs yet another question: Do Ukrainians view feminism and gender in the same way as their European counterparts? Consider for a moment the following photographic insert that accompanied Bohachevsky-Chomiak’s interview. It depicts a traditional-looking elderly Ukrainian woman, arms aloft, her right hand forming the national emblem of a trident. In her left hand she holds up two embroidered rushnyky [ceremonial cloths], symbols of the Ukrainian woman’s love of typical female pursuits (embroidery) and domestic activities. Alongside her is a young girl of about ten or eleven (her granddaughter?) the product of a different generation but, as the message on her banner denotes, firmly grounded in tradition. It reads: “God grant us unity,” illuminating the age-old dream of a unified Ukraine, free of foreign domination. Of course, it can also be interpreted as invoking feminist aspirations everywhere—equality, dignity, and women uniting in a common cause.

Let us consider another statement in the same “feminist” publication. “A woman must enhance her moral and intellectual capacities in order to raise her man to her own lofty level,” followed by the popular folk aphorism: “In every family the man stands for intellect, the woman its heart” (Matushek 6). Throughout the 1990s the media were peppered with such paradoxes.

Beginning in May 1994, Ukrainian readers were exposed to West European works in translation. Seemingly, a bridge (missing for seventy years) between the two parts of Europe was under construction at last. Serialized selections from the first West European work on the woman question to be translated into Ukrainian, Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, made their debut in the May issue of the magazine Ukraïna. Translations of other such Western works soon followed. Paradoxically, however, the serialized segments manifested the same kinds of incongruities that marked the word and image contradictions in P’iata Pora. The September segment was especially revealing (26–29); its photographic insert portrayed three young people—two men flanking a woman on either side as the trio leaned over a Kyïv city parapet. All wore business attire, but a gust of wind had whipped up the young lady’s skirt, exposing her shapely derriere. But, might the photograph actually have been designed to illustrate the debased feminine image, which Simone de Beauvoir so deplored?

That same year, the popular women’s magazine Ia Zhinka [I Am a Woman] (2–3),
carried an item titled “Our Parliament Has No Women,” reflecting the viewpoint of two male politicians. In answer to the question: “Why are there so few women in politics today?” Deputy Mykhailo Syrota ventured: “I believe that the time for women in politics has not yet come.” Why? “Today we are experiencing a gigantic power struggle that demands hair-trigger reactions and intense concentration, attributes that do not come naturally to women. When the situation stabilizes there will be time enough for women to engage politics.” The mayor of Cherkasy, Volodymyr Oliinyk, echoed this sentiment in the same issue (2–3): “Politics is not a home. It is a brutal man’s game, requiring subtle maneuvers, whereas those elegant delights in which women indulge, smiling charmingly all the while, can produce such a muddle. . . .” He did concede grudgingly: “Of course, in time women will come to politics, but the process ought not to be hastened by some artificial [women’s] movement.”

The large circulation of this women’s magazine (a “retread” of the Soviet-era publication entitled Radians’ka Zhinka [Soviet Woman]) renders it a major engineer of the female self-image. In 1995 the magazine celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary, and the November issue carried a number of congratulatory messages. One in particular caught my eye—a greeting from Hanna Bubnova: “We are delighted that irrespective of the tribulations in our daily lives, Zhinka (Ia [I] in the title had been dropped) retains the lovely, tender profile of a true berehynia,” she proclaimed enthusiastically (2). In his message, published in the same magazine, Deputy Oleksandr Moroz took the high moral ground with: “Women perpetuate the difficult but honorable mission of maintaining high moral standards, humanitarianism, patriotism, and respect for the family” (1).

As if to send an official signal that a channel for gender politics had finally opened up, for the first time in Ukrainian history its Parliament convened a special session, on July 12, 1995, to deliberate the status of women. Even as they appealed for greater justice, nine of the twenty female speakers who spoke to the issue characterized “authentic” Ukrainian womanhood as “irrevocably bound to sex-specific roles irrespective of any public achievement.” The term gender had not yet come into use in Ukraine. Pleas for equality, clothed in phrases like “allowing women to be women,” or making references to “woman-mother,” reverberated throughout the chamber. More than half linked their appeals to the need for joining women’s special needs to issues of children and families. These attitudes are not unique to Ukraine. As one observer of countries in the European Union noted: “Now that women have entered the labor market . . . the leitmotif of family policies at the turn of the twenty-first century is the reconciliation of professional activity with family life . . . [yet] men’s activities are never analyzed this way” (Segalen 352).

Paradoxes in presentations of women and men alike were unexpectedly ritualized by the deputy chair of the Human Rights Commission Serhii M. Kiiashko, at Parliamentary Hearings that I witnessed. Amid whispers and furtive gesticulations, this legislator approached the podium with a message from fellow male deputies. With a courtly flourish he proffered a bouquet of flowers as a male tribute to the women who serve both home and country—and his female colleagues. His gesture was complemented
by yet another chivalric ritual, the obligatory paean of praise that inevitably accom-
panies such acts: “Our esteemed women! On behalf of the male half of the Ukrainian
Parliament . . . As a token of our admiration we offer you these flowers.”

This spectacle brought to mind a remark once made by Maria Drach, an early
advocate of women’s rights. She referred to an old peasant ritual of bringing the fam-
ily horse, festooned with flowers, to pasture each spring and ceremoniously having
it prance around the field. The ceremony is known as “The Day of the Horse.” The
International Women’s Day on March 8 (introduced by V.I. Lenin in February 1917,
and as of 1965, a paid holiday in the Soviet Union; officially sponsored by the UN in
1975) must seem like just such a day for so many women in Ukraine. Each year, like
many of their counterparts in West European countries, they are honored with offerings
of floral tributes, but many revert to their daily drudgery as early as the same day, like
the tired old horse. Pondering this, I watched a female deputy busy herself with her
“womanly” task as she looked around the chamber for a vase. All such lapses aside,
these, and subsequent Parliamentary Hearings, to be discussed below, participation
in the World Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995, plus the spate of new official
documents and laws on gender equality produce the impression of a Western-oriented
society increasingly committed to the principles of global feminism. For all of their
underrepresentation, and restriction to largely token roles—to “women’s work” such
as welfare and family policies—women have come to politics in Ukraine. It is the
women, as Iryna Hrabovska notes, who are responsible for the law on Equal Rights
and Opportunities for both sexes, and the active promotion of various European val-
ues (79–80). When all is said and done, however, the nature of their political work
(typically female pursuits, as noted above) continues to offer ample testimony to the
fact that Ukrainian women “have always been and always will remain berehyni”
(79). As Tatiana Zhurzenko records: “The Ukrainian Government, bound by inter-
national obligations, was obliged to cooperate with women’s groups in developing
national programs . . . and to issue special reports.” Although all of this is supported
by Ukraine’s “European choice,” Zhurzenko explains, Ukrainian society is slow to
translate declarations into deeds (37).

In the mid-1990s, television—that ubiquitous fabricator of social stereotypes—
bigan increasingly to reflect the newsworthiness of women’s issues. One of its earli-
est talk shows was aired in three parts in 1995. The second segment, taped on July
28, was titled “Should a Woman Aspire to Leadership?” A most interesting moment
came in the form of a mini-drama enacted by a family of three: father, mother, and a
twenty-one-year-old son. The arrogant young man—already a committed misogynist—
scoffed at the idea of women in top-level public positions. The outspoken mother was
implacable in her opinion that a woman aspiring to more than a mid-level role in her
career (happily hers, she hastened to add) is unnatural. For his part, the father was
silent throughout the session, the very picture of an earnest, if passive, collaborator
in a matriarchal household.

Its undeniable gains notwithstanding, feminism in Ukraine continues as a much
misunderstood and frequently maligned theory. Tetiana Metioloiva provides a dramatic
example in a diatribe published in the newspaper Den’ on October 14, 1999. Titled “The Danger of Linking the Sexual and the Social,” it is directed at women seeking to exploit the political process to privilege their sex, as the author formulated it. She offers eloquent testimony to the general misunderstanding of the meaning of the term feminism, to say nothing of its objectives, with her contention that “feminism” is nothing more than a typical game of self-aggrandizement for women who can find no alternative path to self-fulfillment, women whose ambitions exceed their “natural” intellectual or erotic capabilities.

Although the women’s cause did continue to advance, albeit slowly, during the decade of the 1990s, the ubiquitous images of berehynia also gathered strength and visibility. On November 20, 1998, the newspaper Vechirnii Kyiv carried a piece about a Ukrainian farmer. The heading read: “Berehyni chy rabyni?” [Guardians or Slaves?].

In March 1999, the weekly newspaper Stolytsia featured an article by Liudmyla O. Zakresko that referred to the ancient goddess once more. It was titled “Berehyneiu buty ne lehko” [The role of a berehynia is not easy] and focused on a city council-woman who fulfilled the campaign promises without relinquishing her age-old identity of symbolic hearth mother. Her inspiring story raised two questions: Why were her accomplishments not portrayed as those of a public servant without reference to her womanhood? And why are more women not elected to political office? The answer is to be found in the way that females have been acculturated to a social environment that vastly undervalues their potential and their status in the social structure. A textual insert titled “In Lieu of an Afterword” reads:

When one meets such a bountiful Woman-Mother, Woman-Nation-Creator, overburdened with her own cares along with the challenges of administering large cities . . . one instinctively starts to speculate how shameful it is that we men choose to honor the Woman-Mother, Woman-Worker, Woman-Nation Creator only once a year. And one thinks to oneself why not return to those timeless national traditions so that we might truly look upon women as embodiments of the great Berehynia—goddess and guardian of the domestic hearth. When our women are once again berehyni, Ukraine will become the Berehynia of all humanity. (Zaresko 1)

Then, carried away by his own eloquence, the anonymous author magnanimously recommended that Women’s Day be celebrated every Friday to free women from their domestic drudgery for at least one day each week. After nearly a decade of attempts to foster public awareness of women’s problems, along comes this humanitarian proposing to turn back the clock on Ukraine’s historical evolution.

And what are we to make of the statement by one of the tiny minority of female deputies in Ukraine’s Parliament, Irina Bilousova (2–3), who, to the question “How would you characterize women in today’s Ukraine?” responded: “In our society the cultural stereotype Berehynia immediately comes to mind as guardian of the domestic hearth, and giver of life. These are sacred female roles. So they have been through the ages and so they shall remain.”

By 1999 multitudes of male well-wishers could be seen on the streets of Ukraine
on International Women’s Day as they headed wherever they were going bearing their floral gifts. But was true change in the offing? On March 6 of that year (newspapers take a holiday on and around March 8) the front page of Holos Ukrainy prominently featured messages from two male politicians. First, one from President Leonid Kuchma; its heading read: “To the berehyni of our people. My Felicitations to the Ukrainian Women on March 8.” Kuchma’s greeting was accompanied by good wishes from the then Speaker of the House of Parliament Oleksandr Tkachenko, entitled: “Berehyni of Our Eternal People.” One brief excerpt will suffice: “Woman-Mother, Woman-Wife, Berehynia of our people.” Neither the topos nor its myth, it seems, had lost their significance as cultural signs. In the same issue of the newspaper, we find three questions posed to five women, identified as parliamentary deputies. One in particular aptly elucidated traditional attitudes toward women that refused to disappear: Do official duties of female deputies leave them time for their domestic obligations? Answers differed, but all reflected the belief that women, regardless of their public roles, remained responsible not only for their customary domestic duties, but seeing to it that husbands were well fed and turned out for the day.

Let us consider for a moment what happens when an aggressive female politician does come to power, and simply acts on the premise that women are fully capable of playing the “man’s game.” I have in mind, of course, the twice-deposed premier and heroine of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution Yulia Tymoshenko. She is a hard-hitting reformer, who in the past (under Kuchma) successfully forced two corrupt politicians from office, and eventually was instrumental in unseating President Kuchma himself. Back in June 2000, she appeared with Kyïv city councilman Hryhorii Surkis in a televised debate, on the weekly talk show Tête-à-Tête, where she accused her protagonist of committing fraud by siphoning off huge profits from the energy sector. His efforts to unmask her as a dirty politician were unsuccessful. Coolly, in a professional manner (thus challenging his opening remark that he was disappointed at not finding a soft-spoken, charming, smiling woman with whom he might have a pleasant little debate), she consistently redirected their disputation to the issue of his misappropriation of public funds. Politics might well be a dirty, brutal “man’s game,” but that day Yulia Tymoshenko demonstrated how brilliantly a woman could play that hand. Having been tempered in this political fire, we can understand how she was able to play such a commanding role in the Orange Revolution some five years later. This charismatic firebrand, this “Marianne” of the Orange Revolution, assumed a leadership role of almost mythical proportions during those heady days in late 2004. Much of this was played out in Kyïv’s Independence Square, in sight of the symbolic Berehynia—a monument to Ukraine’s women—positioned atop a high pillar in the pose of the Orthodox Praying Virgin Oranta. In 2001, when Kuchma unveiled this monument he dubbed it Oranta-Berehynia, thereby elevating the ancient matriarchal archetype, referred to as the mother of the nation up until that day, to the exalted position of “mother of us all” (Rubchak). Yet, for all of the analogies to be made between this icon and Tymoshenko’s symbolic role of “mother of a renewed Ukrainian nation,” although the signs point to change, she has yet to become a role
model for the majority of young Ukrainian women or, for that matter, an advocate of feminism. One must look elsewhere for such leadership.10

On June 9, 2004 a second round of Parliamentary Hearings was convened to deliberate women’s issues. First deputy head of the Supreme Council [Verkhovna Rada], the unreconstructed Communist, Adam Martyniuk, chaired this session. He greeted everybody—still overwhelmingly women representing civic organizations and government offices—with the patronizing: “Greetings to Our Bewitching Guests. Today, consider yourselves free to discuss whatever comes to mind. You may even sing if you wish.”11 Curiously enough, only one lone woman—former professor of jurisprudence, Tamara Melnyk, who works on amendments on equal rights to Ukraine’s constitution—berated the chairman for his offensive remarks. Much of what was said that day echoed pronouncements heard during the first such parliamentary session in 1995. Perhaps the most regressive suggestion this time came from the male deputy, Leonid M. Chernovetsky, who proposed that women might look for solutions to their problems in electing suitable men to office to speak on their behalf. Clearly, berehynia was still very much in evidence.

**Dawn of the Fifth Season?**

The opening decade of the third millennium has brought mixed results in advancing the women’s cause. Progress is incontestable—seminars and retreats sponsored by public agencies and government ministries, public rhetoric on the need for change, textbooks featuring the woman question, multiplying literature and growing media attention to Western-style feminism, gender studies in academe, even public schools introducing gender studies into the classroom—but none has yielded the sought-after changes. How do advocates of women’s rights explain this? “It will require another generation or two before reality begins to intersect with theory” is a frequent response. I received a letter (undated) in 2003 from Tamara Melnyk, which may serve as an illustration of this situation. One line read “There are signs of recently renewed activity among the youth. Who is to say, perhaps this will bring some positive results.” Paradoxically, her cautious optimism came on the heels of the following selected samples from a survey taken by Gender Research Institute in Kyïv among university students in 2001 providing the following information:

Second year students considered the role of househusband demeaning. Men assuming women’s duties become effeminate while women in leadership roles take on masculine characteristics. Women’s organizations teem with hysterical unmarried women. Third year students: The woman must take charge of rearing offspring, otherwise she cannot truly call herself a mother. When a treaty needs signing and a man botches the job, send in a woman who can use her charm to apply the necessary correctives. There are so few females in parliament because most women understand that it is no place for them. Fourth year students: Women are obliged to spend so much time on their housekeeping duties that they must be steered toward a less demanding public life. Working as a secretary is monotonous, much like house-
work, so naturally women should fill these positions. Responses were fairly evenly distributed between male and female students. The sociological team concluded that stereotypes persist, that habits and attitudes instilled during childhood at home are manifested in adulthood. (Guz 13–27)

Television constitutes yet another potent engineer of cultural stereotypes. Just as in the West European media, where women are far more likely than men to be portrayed as sex objects, or used to sell products connected to the kitchen or bathroom (although this is changing), Ukrainian women too are cast in such roles, ones that trivialize or narrowly define them. What is more, they are likely to continue supporting such a gender-specific division of labor, justifying it as a fundamental aspect of their femininity.

As in any emerging state, Ukrainians are resurrecting their legendary matriarchal past to validate a national identity that already has been buffeted by numerous challenges. In its present incarnation, as we are aware, the topos of empowered womanhood is nothing more than a surrogate symbol for what allegedly it once represented. It is an illusory reality calculated to keep women content with a subordinate status that ties them to a socially constructed androcentric paradigm masquerading as the ideal feminine prototype. In addition, we have the model of women as beings capable of “doing it all.” Having interiorized such a self-perception, many women in Ukraine resist yielding any of their domestic and child-rearing responsibilities to men. Sadly, even when they do demonstrate that they “can do it all,” this is likely to prompt comments such as: “Women cannot cook soup with one hand and solve problems of national importance with the other” (kul’tura).

People who insist upon reifying an ancient myth as justification for their denigration of women cannot authentically “recreate” themselves to conform to the imperatives of the very different world in which they live today, and as such are destined to continue existing in bad faith. Lviv scholar of gender issues, Oksana Kis, summed it up succinctly with her observation that the widespread valorization of berehynia serves as a narcotic; it has produced a self-delusional ideology that provides a retreat from a reality in which women are demeaned, without rights or respect, without that all-important woman’s voice (2003).

Notwithstanding the difficulties I have outlined, encouraging signs of change also are evident. Ukraine has produced an intellectual elite that is beginning to appreciate both the difficulties and the urgency of achieving a gender-equal society. On the organizational level, as is the case in Western Europe (although numbers differ), twenty-four Ukrainian women’s organizations have come together to exchange ideas, and seek solutions to common problems. Although essentialist thinking might still inform their activities, they have found a “woman’s voice” and common ground for cooperation. Activities in gender centers continue, and educational institutions have joined the cause. Governmental initiatives, which already have led to constitutional amendments on gender equality, are among some of the most important measures adopted to rid society of the most blatant forms of sex discrimination.

A major breakthrough was observed in the proceedings of the Third Parliamentary
Hearings on women’s issues, titled “Equal Rights and Opportunities in Ukraine. Realities and Perspectives,” convened on November 21, 2006. It was testimony to the progress (at least in public pronouncements) evident since the two previous hearings. Divided into morning and afternoon sessions, the proceedings focused on violence against women and promotion of equal rights. Many more men also were in attendance. Except for a single lapse, when one female participant resurrected the tired old canard of woman’s moral superiority as the source of her empowerment and dedicated her allotted time to portraying the natural role of woman as wife and mother, the speakers addressed political issues and social problems besetting both genders. Unlike what transpired during the first two hearings (discussed above), the term “gender” also was much in use this time, and participants articulated unequivocally their support for the West European model of gender parity.

All three sessions were an outgrowth of determined efforts by a small group of dedicated women who insisted that initially such Parliamentary Hearings must take place, and then give way to practical applications. Over the past decade, these women have developed ties with lawmakers in Western countries, studied, translated, and published their legislation on equal rights, and applied pressure on the Ministry of Family, Youth, and Sport to support change. Owing to their efforts, even prior to the Third Parliamentary Hearings, in January 2006, Ukraine’s legislators approved an amendment to the constitution aimed at eliminating discrimination on the basis of sex; it was adopted on March 14, 2007. As is generally known, in Western Europe the equality principle was embodied in Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which the founding members of the European Community signed in March 1957, but equality was dictated from the top, and men established its rules for women. Progress there also has been slow. Swanee Hunt, director of the Women and Public Policy Program at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, encapsulated the West European achievements thus: “Although women have made significant strides professionally over the last century, politics remains a man’s world.” Women have taken leadership, she reminds us, as social reformers and entrepreneurs. To be sure, a handful of women have broken through the gender barriers, but most of the brightest and best eschew politics (Hunt). To a considerable extent, this describes Ukraine and its legislation. There is as yet scant evidence of genuine concern for women’s rights spreading beyond the Ministry of Family, Youth, and Sports to other parts of the parliamentary structure, notwithstanding all retreats, seminars, and workshops designed to raise the legislators’ consciousness. Women remain severely underrepresented in government throughout the world. Ukraine is no exception. For the present, its fifth season remains little more than a whimsical dream.

Notes

1. In 1865 J.F. McLennan, in *Primitive Marriage* asserted the existence of a matrilineal organization (noted in Cantorella 4). In 1877 L.H. Morgan published *Ancient Society*, where he formulated a hypothesis of human development according to which all societies passed to a higher sphere through the matrilineal line.
2. Ukrainian matriarchy is associated with material remains of the Trypillian culture, which evolved between the Dniester and Dnipro rivers. Conversely, Russian patriarchy is identified with the kurgan (word for “barrow”—mounds of earth covering mortuary houses of prominent males) culture in the upper Volga region.

3. Ukrainian culture continues to reflect the fact that the berehynia (by any other name) archetype or topos had its origins in an ancient collective mind. In recent times, misreadings of the now highly stylized archaic representations of the Great Goddess have assigned direct links between the name berehynia and the ancient Earth Mother. These symbols now appear on items like votive towels, Ukrainian Easter eggs, and so on.

4. Eva Cantorella is somewhat skeptical of the matriarchal thesis. We must recall that she wrote during the 1980s, a decade of intense debates around the existence of ancient matriarchal societies. References to empowered women are not new, however. In the fifth century B.C., Herodotus wrote about the Etruscan women’s remarkable freedoms, and in the fourth century B.C., Greek historian Theopompus is said to have expressed shock at their scandalous conduct; they liked to drink, exercise in the nude with the men, and wear symbols of citizenship and rank, just like the males.

5. Testifying to the uneven development of women’s rights in Europe is the fact that French women were not enfranchised until 1944. Meanwhile, Left Bank (on the left side of the Dnipro river) Ukrainian women, as part of the Russian Empire, won the right to vote in 1917. Finland was even earlier. In 1907 it became the first country in the world to enfranchise its women. There is an interesting parallel to be observed between Ukraine and Finland—each was late coming to industrialization, each lacked a well-developed bourgeoisie early on, women in each participated in political decision making and public administration (albeit for different reasons) earlier than most in Europe yet, although they share information on a regular basis, when it comes to women’s rights, their paths diverge.


7. The rhyme is lost in the translation.

8. Friday was a day of rest for women in ancient Ukraine, which they established informally by engaging secretly in a work slowdown, and in some cases a stoppage. Men made an elaborate show of “not knowing” for fear of legitimating these actions.

9. Certain parallels between the militancy of Marianne and Tymoshenko are clear—Marianne, symbolic leader of the revolutionary charge in France, and Tymoshenko, symbol of revolutionary leadership in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.

10. The most tireless include Tamara Melnyk, Larysa Kobylianska, and Svetliana Dorohobysh.

11. Among those present was Oksana Bilozir, a favorite pop singer and head of a university department for popular music. We can assume that Martyniuk’s ill-considered remarks were occasioned by her presence. Accessed from the Internet, www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3763/is_200309ai_n9281367/pg_5.

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II
Reflecting Identities
The Literary Paradigm
10

Mirrors, Windows, and Maps

The Topology of Cultural Identification in Contemporary Ukrainian Literature

Maria Zubrytska

With our feet and heart in Ukraine, our heads in Europe,
with our arms we can embrace all the Slavic lands . . .
It is precisely our literature that should open the window to Europe.

Mykhailo Drahomanov

Any literature seems to be a book with an abundance of doors and windows that are ready to be opened for different interdisciplinary approaches, such as literature and philosophy issues, literature and cultural studies, literature and politics. When we are talking about “literature and identity” issues we mean the discussion around the question of literature and identity from a large number of angles and bringing together researchers dealing with different aspects of the theme. One particular aim in this direction is to bring two rather different strands of research together, research on the interaction between literature and national and regional communities on the one hand, and the research on the interaction of literary texts within the community of texts on the other. The question of identity is understood as covering individual identity in relation to national, regional, and cultural narratives, the collective identity of communities as defined and constructed in literature, and finally the identity of texts themselves.

The primary focus of this forum of the chapters in this section is an attempt to consider the sociopolitical and cultural aspects of the rich and multifaceted transformations of national identity in Ukrainian literature by narrating and mapping from the perspectives of local/global, territorial/networkable, non-Western/Western, national/cosmopolitan, individual/collective, immediate/mediated, etc. Any topology of national identity draws specific attention to literary discourse, which takes various forms at different times and places, and is closely connected to the changes in the general map of political and sociocultural life. National identity not only seems to appear to
us in the mirror of the literature, but actually manifests itself on the textual map. One could say that every national literature serves as a mirror of reality, and its reflections have specific characteristics. These reflections can be entirely accurate, they can have various shades of distortion, and they are also always influenced by the mood, personality, and maturity of the beholder. Looking in a mirror, one sees oneself. Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century gives a rich illustrative material for mirror images (see the chapter in this volume by Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych). At the same time, in the twentieth century the metaphor of “literature as a mirror,” widespread in classical literature, was often modified in unexpected ways or was transformed into the metaphor of “literature as a window,” with an evident phenomenological perspective. Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century could be a model of such metaphoric modifications and transformations.

The majority of texts by Ukrainian writers of the last century reveal a very close correlation between the mirror/window metaphors as an important means of vision of national/European identities (see the chapter in this volume by Ola Hnatiuk). If one sees oneself in a mirror, in a window one sees the world of others, or Otherness. It should be noted that the metaphors of the mirror and the window are ontological: they help us understand much more deeply the metamorphosis of national and universal spirit as well as the organic interconnectedness of such spirits. At the same time, the correlation of the mirror/window metaphors, which reflects national/European identities in Ukrainian literature, often reveals a division or split in the national ontology. The open literary discussion on national/European identity held in Kyiv in 1925 is the best example of such an ontological category. This was the first attempt at public discussion by Ukrainian writers on the problems of national, and particularly cultural identity of Ukrainians. From the point of view of politically engaged authors, who believed in the Revolution and its ideas, literature should be a mirror of social reality and should not be under the influence of European literature or culture. From the other point of view, which was deeply rooted in Ukrainian literary tradition and was strongly represented in the works of such intellectuals of the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895), Ivan Franko (1856–1916), and Lesia Ukrainka (1871–1913), literature definitely should be a window onto the world, particularly onto Europe, and its culture, since Ukrainian literature and culture represents one of its multilateral dimensions. This idea was articulated and well argued by one of the most Europe-oriented poets and translators, the prominent Ukrainian literary critic Mykola Zerov (1890–1937), and by the leading Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvylovy (1893–1933). They created a new map of European culture without any artificial political borders, and which included Ukrainian literature and culture. They also defined the contours of Ukrainian national identity, which was given a European shape. It was a symbolic opening or obliteration of borders that also entailed a strong isolation of varieties and dissimilarities, which opposed unification. In other words, it was an intellectual expression of the natural phenomenon of a European culture in terms of unity in diversity.

Beginning in 1925, and continuing to the present time, this literary discussion on the
identity of Ukrainian culture, the discourse on national/European identity in Ukraine, has been mainly focused on the traditional dilemma: the mirror/window vision of national identity as one of the projections of the eternal tension between the particular and the universal, the local and the global, the interior and the exterior. Ukrainian literature of the last century reflects a cultural model with a clear binary opposition: own/alien, safe/unsafe, close/open, near/far, etc. There is no doubt that Europe, as a historical, political, economic, and sociocultural entity, in the eyes of Ukrainians and in the mirror of Ukrainian literature is “own, safe, close,” in the intellectual sense, but at the same time, in real life is temporary for political reasons, and sometimes even alien. Despite the apparent gravitation to the near/far Europe as a model of a happy, harmonious, civilized society, Ukrainian writers often realize and articulate their fear concerning possible negative consequences that this kind of civilization might lead to. Criticism is directed at Europe’s over-individualization, of its pragmatic way of thinking, and its nihilism as spiritual vacuity. The best illustration of such criticism against egoistic attitudes and other social and moral maladies can be found in Iurii Lypa’s (1900–1944) works, which are representative of Western Ukrainian literature of the 1930s. It should be noted that such voices are still quite strong in contemporary Ukrainian literary discourse.

In the case of Ukrainian political and sociocultural circumstances, national identity has been mapped in terms of the literary mythology created by famous writers and literary scholars. The central point was to start building a new image of Ukraine in writing, to construct the image of an independent country both before and after the colonial period. Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century participated in the collective project of creating national freedom, with writing as the ultimate medium. A number of Ukrainian writers and poets asserted that Ukrainian culture has been and will always be an organic part of the European one, regardless of official designation. Ukrainian literature played an active part in shaping the discourse of national identity, as well as in transforming colonial and postcolonial Ukraine into an independent European country. A complex discursive formation of national identity in Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century is designed by full textual articulation of the European inspirations and intentions of the Ukrainian elite as a cultural object as well as cultural landscape. Metaphorically speaking, European discourse and the issue of national identity, its construction by narrating and mapping, became the center of gravity for the majority of Ukrainian writers of the twentieth century. As Michael M. Naydan states: “In that later state of relatively unfettered freedom, Ukraine experienced a reinvigorated gravitation toward the West that continues to gather momentum to the present day. It is a gravitation described by many, from poets like Viktor Neborak to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, often with the word povernennia, a return to Ukraine’s true identity, a return to enlightened Europe and Ukraine’s European roots” (see his chapter in this volume).

This cultural cartography of the vision of Ukraine as a part of European civilization has been formed in the literature as well as in arts as a rhetoric. As Marko Pavlyshyn mentioned: “The rhetoric of Ruslana, then, is one of several systems of messages
that circulate in the Ukrainian information space, advocating the construction of a new kind of national identity, based not on the possession of cultural attributes whose acquisition may not come easily to all, but on the wish to belong to a community that cherishes a cultural heritage and confidently assumes a right to equal presence with others in the culturally heterogeneous world” (see his chapter in this volume). The literary and cultural construction of national identity was no longer seen as a mirror—a direct representation of the world—it was rather to be seen as the art of mapping a possible virtual world by means of written texts, a specific map-making process for a new national space within the space of fictional works. Ukrainian authors attempted to remap reality by providing a reverse image of the country, its history and culture. In this complex image-making process, remembering and forgetting, erasing and rewriting, including and excluding, constructing and reconstructing are intertwined. Faced with the impossibility of changing reality, where lies triumph over truth, Ukrainian writers, who considered themselves to be part of tradition and the bearers of intellectual and moral values, constitute the national identity in textual terms as well as create a specific topos, a symbolic timeless space where alternative history and spiritual rebirth are possible. That is why many articles by Ukrainian writers and literary scholars of the twentieth century (e.g., Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Mykola Zerov, Mykola Khvylov) are a good illustration of an interdisciplinary approach with a fusion of literary and cultural history, political and social thoughts, biography and autobiography, memoir and oral lore.

This topological discussion of national identity as reflected in Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century will be based on semiotic (Yuri Lotman and Vladimir Toporov) and phenomenological (Paul Recoeur) approaches. From the semiotic point of view, the metaphor of a mirror functions as self-evaluation and self-identification. Quite illustrative would be Yuri Lotman’s semiotic analysis of the palindrome in cultural terms. Palindromic symmetry is of an enantiomorphic type, that is, mirror symmetry where as a matter of fact no part can be superimposed on the other. From this Lotman derives a dialogic concept of the palindrome, where the left and right sides are recognized as similar yet different. Lotman also translates this concept into cultural terms (e.g., “cultural communities like ‘occident’ and ‘orient’ become enantiomorphic pairs with an operating functional asymmetry”). Such a dialogic conceptualization of the palindrome’s generic structure can be taken as a project in cultural dialogue operating under conditions of cultural hybridity or cultural in-betweenness which are characteristic features of Ukraine as a bridge between East and West. This could also apply to different phases within a culture, which can be understood as engaging in mutual dialogue, before and after a revolutionary turning point.

Over the course of the last century, Ukrainian literature, despite political and social circumstances, has been shaping and building its national identity as an organic part of a European identity. The exterior expansion of Ukraine was a strong factor in interior integration, and was able to raise various identity complexes. The role of Ukrainian literature as a mirror of reality has been transformed into a more efficient and more potent one, which could metaphorically be called “the window to the world,” and
has brought a new life into the Ukrainian identity. This has been a challenge for the existing political regime, but at the same time it is an opportunity for the intellectual aspirations of the Ukrainian elite, which has been trying in this way to show its intellectual resistance to the existing political regime and to create a substitute for real life with the help of literature. One could say that, in the mirror of European cultural narration, Ukrainian literature represents a pattern of lost opportunities, forgotten or historically fragmented heritage, and unexpressed messages. Currently, however, Ukrainian writers are beginning to rewrite the world not in the mirror, but beyond the windows, and to create a new version of national modernity or a new topology of national identity, this time in accordance with their understanding of their dreams and their needs. Such writers as Iurii [Yuri] Andrukhovych had created a new map of a new Europe, or actually their “own Europe.” The joint 2001 project by Ukrainian writer Yuri Andrukhovych and Polish writer Andrzej Stasiuk My Europe is a brilliant attempt to express their own inner vision, their own intellectual and geopolitical map, as well as their own topology of their national/European identity. The main goal of that project was to analyze all the differences that existed at that one moment, everything that was oppressed, rejected, colonized, and denied across all such places of European territory, of the European map. From my point of view, such a project is not a new kind of literary utopia, but rather a means of implementing a specific and pragmatic strategy, which can also be rather flexible and effective in principle. It can then reflect a purely pragmatic desire by the elites to agree, with the help of literature as a magic mirror/window, on their vision and the moods of their readers, in order to be able to influence such a mood later. These can be quite optimistic and realistic projects indeed.

References

Cultural Perceptions, Mirror Images, and Western Identification in New Ukrainian Drama

Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych

Cultural Perceptions and Choices

Over the course of the last several centuries, Ukrainian culture has been strongly influenced by historical and political factors, which have reflected both a Western and an Eastern pull. In the twentieth century in particular, despite the changing political situations, there was an ongoing desire or temptation for Ukrainians to renew ties with Western Europe. However, during the Russian imperial and Soviet periods, history provided a lengthy consignment to the Russian sphere of influence, in reality creating a “containment” for most of Ukraine. Nevertheless, from time to time, these two poles have been supplemented by a third, less visible option, which suggested its own, or a “nativist” approach.

Together, a discourse on all three options has contributed toward the current Ukrainian social climate, which reflects a specific attitude or ethos in respect to many issues, including the acceptance of many ethnic cultures in Ukraine. Despite the backdrop of some disastrous historical events during the last century, when the two strong pulls of the neighboring powers actually brought Ukraine close to complete annihilation, there is now almost a calm acceptance of ethnic differences in Ukraine. Recent Ukrainian drama appears to lack any significant intolerance of individuals of other nationalities, or of their stereotypes. Such stereotypes usually represent perceptions of difference between oneself and others, and often depend on individual and/or group cultural associations and perceptions; these often allow some differences to be tolerated or even admired, and others to be spurned and rebuffed.

We will examine here how such national or ethnic stereotypes and symbols manifest themselves in new Ukrainian drama, and review the claim that the genre of drama serves as a significant sensor, or even a relevant illuminating medium, on this subject. First, the issue of European-Russian cultural polarity will be presented on the background of both Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian literature. In particular, examples of stereotypes of Ukrainians versus other nationalities or ethnicities will be discussed in terms of
their reflections in the mirror and window of the most recent Ukrainian drama. At the same time, predominant references to the Western/European cultural world will be discussed, as they disclose certain self-identification statements or choices.

For this study, close to 120 Ukrainian-language, post-1990 plays were examined; 46 of these were included in one of five anthologies of current Ukrainian drama, while others were published in periodicals, some in desktop-type publications for theater directors, others as individual or collected plays by an author, and about a dozen were made available to this author in manuscript form. Although Russian-language plays are also written, published, and staged in contemporary Ukraine, only Ukrainian-language works are discussed here.

During the Soviet period, with the officially required “appeal to the masses,” the individual was mostly marginalized. The concept of individual identity was not important, and was limited to creating a new Soviet identity, which quite often blended with a dominant Russian element. The role and group identity of non-Russians in the USSR was slowly to be either molded to match “the center,” or be otherwise marginalized. These nationalities soon became the Other, at best. At the same time, Western or “European” characteristics were discouraged.

In such a climate, some parts of Ukraine (especially those which had been under Soviet rule for seventy years, rather than forty-five years) were assigned by the regime the role of subaltern in their own land, a land perceived as a no-place, an atopia (Auge 77–78). A new group identity was expected in Soviet-ruled nations, based on the Soviet model (and by extension, the Russian model), with very little substance of the previous native, i.e. non-Russian, identity. During that period, Ukraine’s own qualities were progressively buried or spurned, and as a result the country was blended into the “mass totalitarian culture.” We know from many political observers that any destabilization of personal and/or national history and identity leads to a void in terms of that individual and national identity, and that what follows is a “decolonized amnesia,” “an intentional voiding or evacuation of a formerly subjugate mind,” as Stephen Watt explains (73). The character Herod, appearing in a contemporary Ukrainian play, blames Ukrainians for tending to disown their history, because: “змія непам’яті впустила отруту у їхні серця] [a snake of unmemory has infused poison into their hearts]” (O. Klymenko, Vertep 15).

In the current, post-Soviet period, it has become clear that Ukraine is a specific place, and that the former suspicion of it as an atopia has ceased: “Ukraine has stopped being a place which does not exist” (Makov 16). But another issue has arisen for Ukrainians in terms of cultural identity. Taras Kuzio summarized this quite succinctly: “National collective self-consciousness requires, at the very least, a minimum reception of ‘Others’ beyond one’s recognized borders” (Kuzio 239). As Ukraine finds itself now facing members of the European Union, or “Europe” and its culture, on the western side, Russia is very much present to the northeast. These two possibilities (Europe-centered and Russia-centered) appear to represent Ukraine’s primary viable options, with the third choice (Ukraine-centered) being discussed primarily by academics and writers.
Opinions about Ukraine’s three choices and their merits have persisted since the
nineteenth century. Roman Szporluk describes Ukrainian intellectual discussions in the
1840s–60s, which often stressed Ukraine’s earlier historical ties to Western Europe:

Gradually, the “European” theme became dominant in Ukrainian discourses on the
nature of Ukrainian distinctiveness from Russia. The thesis that the Ukrainians’
historical ties to “Europe” distinguished them from the Russian became an article
of faith in Ukrainian national ideology. (Szporluk 73)

This trend of leaning towards Europe and away from Russia continued until the
end of the nineteenth century. Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj points out that in 1894 the Ukrainian
poet Pavlo Hrabovsky (1864–1902), realizing that Ukraine faced a choice, proposed
choosing “Europeanism on a Ukrainian foundation primarily in terms of culture” (Il-
nytzkyj 315). While there were some interim messianic claims that Ukraine represents
a synthesis of East and West, in the early 1930s, another leading Ukrainian writer,
Mykola Khvylovsky, issued a stronger call regarding the cultural direction to be followed:
“Away from Moscow,” with an appeal to turn back toward Ukrainian cultural roots.
To him, modernism stood for Europeanism (Pavlychko 1997, 201).

However, after World War II, the settlement at Yalta contained Ukraine within
Moscow’s complete control and influence. While Western Europe was uniting after
World War II, and the European Movement at the Hague Congress in 1949 established
The Council of Europe, this was supposedly intended only for the democracies of
Europe, not for those nations under the rule of totalitarianism (at least for the time
being). When the Soviet countries were finally freed from that totalitarianism, and the
European Union accepted Poland and Slovakia in 2004, the new wall moved a little
eastward, stopping right at Ukraine’s western borders.

One may well ask whether Ukrainians should have a voice as to which pole is as-
signed to influence them, and is this a choice for Ukrainians to make for themselves?
During the early post-Soviet years, Ukrainians thought that the choice was theirs. Even
for the first post-Soviet president, Leonid Kravchuk, and his Foreign Minister Anatoly
Zlenko, “rejoining Europe’ and distancing Ukraine as much as possible from the Rus-
sian ‘Other’ was Ukraine’s strategic priority” (Kuzio 249). While the next administration
was not so openly pro-European, it did not receive much encouragement to join the
western part of Europe, despite the fact that many observers continued to stress Europe’s
present cultural diversity (Daun 269). On the eve of the Orange Revolution, Viktor
Yushchenko wrote “Ukraine, a nation of 48 million, was always an organic participant
in the historical European journey.” A few months later, as Ukraine’s new President,
he made it quite clear that he intends to lead his country back towards Europe and the
West (Yushchenko 2005b), and he was quite specific about his position: “We are not
neighbors of Europe, we are a part of Europe. We are Europe.”

Such a clear stand brings out another issue in Ukraine’s self-identification. For
over a century, Ukrainians have debated not whether Europe or Russia represents their
true cultural magnet, but whether they should be more Europe-centered or Ukraine-
centered, i.e. the so-called modernist and nativist polarities (Ilnytzkyj 315). Since
the year 2000, more and more writers and scholars see a possibility for the third, or Ukrainian choice. Ola Hnatiuk sees a common sharing of cultural identities between the two poles, in the form of a classic three-circle overlap, which allows the middle circle (representing Ukrainian identity, flanked by the Western European and Russian) to be primarily on its own (2003b, 46). A similar conclusion (supporting the third option) was reached by Alexander Motyl, who suggested that in terms of isolation and integration, “Ukraine could just be itself,” and “could finally define itself in terms of itself” (9). One may view the appearance of the singer Ruslana and her “Wild Dances” (based on primeval Ukrainian ethnic dances and rituals) just a few years ago as a voice for both options, “choosing to be oneself” against a European background, by turning for inspiration to one’s roots and participating in a European competition. However, the most popular Ukrainian writer today, Iurii Andrukhovych, in his very strong identification with Europe (or a Europe), even went as far as to call it his own, or rather “his own version of Europe (“My Europe”), as Marko Pavlyshyn pointed out (see his chapter “Choosing a Europe” in this volume). In an autobiographical narrative, Andrukhovych illustrates how the two world wars (as well as the Russian and German polarities) affected two earlier generations of his own family (Andrukhovych).

Ukraine has made its “European” choice clear, as President Yushchenko has expressed many times, including in February 2005 (Yushchenko 2005a, 1). The European Union, by accepting some countries while ignoring others, actually causes a political separation in Europe. The excluded nations may nevertheless continue to perceive a cultural unity with the countries in the Union, and may also continue either to strive towards that unity or to ignore it.

Drama as a Mirror

It has been noted that in Eastern Europe, “under repressive regimes, it was the poet and writer who became the center of political discourse” (Rudolph ix). For decades or even centuries, for some Slavic literatures such as the Polish or Ukrainian, the genre of drama as staged in the theater was often the only vehicle for official use of one’s own language (Filipowicz 8). Literature, however, especially the genre of drama, is a natural vehicle for expression of self-identification, as well as for one’s perceptions of others. Drama, as text alone, may serve as a very sensitive instrument, which can detect and mirror society’s deep and painful experiences or dilemmas. Drama may also reflect shifts in how these experiences are appraised, be it on an individual, national, or universal level. Benjamin Bennet even claims that drama is “the memory and the conscience of literature,” a “ritual recollection of the truth” (60). Such evaluations and depictions of experience may be found in many examples of recent Ukrainian drama, as this narrative form of discourse reflects how Ukrainians see themselves and the world since they regained independence in 1991.

Ukrainian drama has a long history of suppressed texts and unstaged, or rarely staged, plays. Despite the historical events of the twentieth century, which proved rather unfortunate for Ukraine, Ukrainian drama somehow managed, on and off, to
find its own voice during even rather short periods of flowering, if only in several particularly worthy examples. If one were to choose just one Ukrainian twentieth-century play, Mykola Kulish’s *Sonata Pathétique* (1930) may still stand as one of the most significant Slavic or European plays of the century, even though it could not be staged in Ukraine for many decades. This play is deeply Ukrainian in its narrative, mythos, and topos, and at the same time it is highly European in its total metaphor, as well as in its structure and style.¹⁹

While today’s Ukrainian theater (with the exception of large national theaters) does not enjoy substantial financial backing from the government, the drama texts themselves are not controlled by government, either politically or stylistically, in terms of content or form. What is more important now, for theaters directly, and for many authors indirectly, is how the audiences and the reading public accept their plays. It is therefore more likely that in these plays more mainstream (overt and/or covert) points of view will be reflected, rather than extreme points of view. The general reading public or theater audience often prefers to read or see either situations typical of their lives or situations they hope to experience, i.e., either mirror or dream-vision types of situations. The texts of contemporary Ukrainian drama may therefore provide a sensitive reflection of cultural perceptions and stereotypes existing in Ukraine now.

Whatever literary approach or theory we choose to employ for the interpretation of mirrors and images, Freudian or Lacanian (that is, the rational search for individual self-consciousness, or the objectivization of the subject), such theories assist in acquiring a substantive understanding of what is reflected in a literary work. While it may be that we are in the era of “After Theory” (as Terry Eagleton suggests), there may still be multiple approaches to the interpretation of literature, as long as these approaches help point to certain important truths and values in a literary work. In this case, we are interested in observing how current plays depict or reflect Ukrainians, their world, and their relationship with the Western world.

The post-1990 plays discussed here provide sufficient examples to serve as cultural identity windows/mirrors. They reveal/reflect the perceptions of individual or national identities in terms of culture, based on how the protagonists see themselves and/or how they view others. Such an identification may be made while looking only at Ukrainian culture, or at other cultures, either through a window or in a mirror, which provides a better focus for one’s own reflection, and then becomes more distinct to the reader or viewer.

**Post-Soviet and Postcolonial Ukrainian Drama and Its Protagonists**

It is particularly striking that current Ukrainian literature, and especially drama, does not feature earlier Soviet-era negative stereotypes, the xenophobia toward the West, and even towards Central Europe, or toward Ukraine’s many ethnicities today. Now we find mostly a rather frank demonstration of casual personal acceptance or non-acceptance of individuals based on their own merit. When authors portray non-Ukrainians, a certain inclusiveness is apparent, especially in terms of respect for individuals and
for western nationalities. Recent Ukrainian dramatic works depict a mostly relaxed interethnic or intercultural relationship and, most of the time, an unprejudiced treatment of non-Ukrainians. There is a certain pattern in Ukrainian drama in its focus on individuals, as was so strikingly exhibited in the periods immediately following World War I, then World War II, and following the fall of the Soviet Union. In the twentieth century, there were two periods of growth in Ukrainian drama, when notable attention was paid to the dilemmas of the individual. The first period occurred immediately after World War I, during the years of Ukraine’s independence (1917–1919). Such playwrights as Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Mykola Kulish, in particular, depicted individuals facing new historical realities and making related personal choices. Then, during the dominance of Socialist Realism, such discourses were not allowed, and the collective became the norm. However, during World War II, several Ukrainian playwrights escaped from the Soviet Union to the West. There, they responded with a series of plays expressing tenets of existentialism, heralding and/or echoing both Sartre and Ionesco, discussing the universal dilemma of the postwar human condition (as in Eaghor Kostetzky’s [Ihor Kostetsky’s] very postmodern Spokusy Nesviatoho Antona [Temptations of the Non-Saintly Anthony, 1946] and Diistvo pro velyku liudyntu [A Play About a Great Man, 1948]). The third such period for Ukrainian drama took place following the demise of the USSR. In the plays that followed, the focus again was on the identity of the individual in the post-Soviet world.

Since the early 1990s, Ukrainian drama has reflected the previously marginalized Ukrainian population’s obvious need to identify and assert itself. Perhaps the first part of this process is still ongoing, and the assertion stage has not been attained. In similar historical situations, a desire may surface to rectify the injustices of the past by blaming the “occupying power,” or a neighbor, or a former enemy, and a tendency might develop to delve too extensively into the past. In 1991 a leading Ukrainian poet, Lina Kostenko, claimed that Ukrainian drama is not well known in the West because of a specific Ukrainian need to portray suffering (Kostenko 332). Since 1990, however, in new Ukrainian drama, Ukrainians do not depict historical losses, and instead appear to look at their Western European and Russian neighbors without many grudges about the past. In most plays, Ukrainians are not depicted as victims of history. No victim complex is manifested. This is healthy indeed. Since Ukrainians no longer need to react to foreign rulers, foreigners, or non-Ukrainians, they are thus able to accept them with a more natural and matter-of-fact approach. On the whole, and contrary to Lina Kostenko’s above assessment of the earlier period, Ukrainian plays have a tendency to show that, if blame had, or has, to be placed for any historical misfortunes and great losses, Ukrainians often seem to choose to blame themselves. Perhaps this is a typical Ukrainian reaction. For example, in plays about the Holodomor, which was a Soviet government-planned famine-genocide, there is very little blame placed on the non-Ukrainians who implemented the famine, while at the same time there are more explicit expressions of self-blame for tolerating it (Onyshkevych 2003b).

Although Edward Said coined the term “disinherited” in reference to postcolonial societies, it is also a very applicable characterization of Ukrainian society, following
seven decades of Soviet rule. During the Soviet period, certain themes were not allowed in literature, and particularly in drama (since on the stage they might have had a more direct and wide appeal to “the masses”). Foremost among these undesirable topics were historical events dealing with Ukraine’s independence, with particular aspects of Ukrainian culture, with Western culture and individuals, as well as with positive representations of specific individuals in the West (unless they were leaning strongly to the Left).

The first years of post-Soviet independence were really transitional, and some scholars even classified Ukraine as a “hijacked country without a cultural policy” (Grabowicz 324). Still, Ukrainian plays written since 1990 often depict the strong need of an individual to search for identity; at the same time, a definite pluralistic acceptance of the individuality of others is quite apparent. Over time, with the increase in individual and national assertiveness, numerous elements have created situations that have lead to new attitudes towards the outside world.

In the presentation of non-Ukrainian individuals and elements in contemporary Ukrainian drama, one may observe two specific manifestations. First, an emphasis on the character of the individual rather than the stereotype is obvious; the same attitude is observed in depictions of nationalities or countries. Second, a universal Western (i.e., primarily European) backdrop is predominant, as are references to Western individuals and their works.

Of particular interest now is the fact that young playwrights, who are free to choose to depict the lives of well-known Western individuals, often do so as if opening a window to the West or to a common past. There are new plays specifically about Honoré de Balzac and his wife Ewelina Hanska, from Ukraine, as well as plays about Isadora Duncan, and Edith Piaf. In many plays, Ukraine’s closest western neighbors are selected as protagonists or dramatis personae: the Polish King Władysław IV, or the Czech writers Havel and Čapek. Some plays include only comments about the lives of leading European or Western writers, composers, and other personalities, such as Edith Cavell and Jean Cocteau. These individuals are often portrayed as either exemplary or very creative in facing life’s normal vicissitudes and problems, and are presented by the playwrights without any of the previous Soviet xenophobia towards Westerners. Many of these individuals (such as Byron or Cavell) were determined and daring in practicing what they believed, including equal opportunities for women (Duncan). The playwright Valerii Herasymchuk, in an introduction to his plays about well-known figures (mostly from Western Europe), even notes that he intended to depict the lives of great individuals, a type which is lacking today.

In some plays, one may also detect a certain desire to distance the reader from historical situations that brought misfortune to Ukraine. In Volodymyr Klymenko’s play Bohdan (2000), we see that the Polish King Władysław IV (who died two weeks before war broke out between Poland and Ukraine), officially an enemy of Ukraine, is provided with an opportunity to present his personal motivations and feelings so that the reader is made to understand his position as that of a Polish individual and leader, who shaped his historical dealings with Ukraine in that role. King Władysław, close
to his death, was able to judge his own life’s deeds, and described to sympathetic ears his self-analysis as an unplanned glimpse into a mirror:

Те дзеркало то розум
Твій твоя свідомість
[ . . . ]
розбив я теє дзеркало

That mirror is your reasoning
Your consciousness
[ . . . ]
I shattered that mirror

(V. Klymenko 4)

In most of the plays referred to here, Western protagonists are portrayed by the playwrights with an ease expected of those who write about their own environment and culture; there are also moods or expressions with a touch of nostalgia for a type of mirror to the past, or for opportunities lost. There are no shocking or incomprehensible cultural acts facing the protagonists. It is as if these plays represent a family album of long-lost relatives to be remembered, perhaps emulated, and cherished now (very much in the style of Ukrainian émigré drama of the mid-1940s, particularly the plays of Jurii Kosach). In general, in contemporary Ukrainian plays, there are more references to well-known Western individuals than to Russian or Soviet ones. There are only a few plays about famous Russian figures. Among them is a play by Valerii Herasymchuk about Chekhov (2003), albeit in his relationships with Ukraine and Ukrainians. Sofiia Maidanska’s play Betrayal (Zrada), depicts how devious and cruel Catherine II was, and how she (and her advisor Potemkin) mistreated Ukrainians, limited their freedom, and in 1775 liquidated the Ukrainian kozaks of the Zaporozhian Host. The third play is by Irena Koval, a Ukrainian-American now residing in Kyїv. The play is about Leo Tolstoy and his wife: The Pagan Saints (Pohans’ki sviati). Since it deals with the two Tolstoys in a slightly critical manner (a mixture of irony, parody, history, and metafiction), it shows them disrobed of their fame, and focuses on their human weaknesses; not surprisingly, some Ukrainians bristle at such a dethroning of Russian “saints.” In several plays, when Russian characters occasionally make derogatory comments about Ukrainians, as in Viktor Lysiuk’s Dzvinytsia (The Belfry), they usually speak from a position of some power, whether legal or Mafia-type.

There are also many plays and sketches (especially those by Les Poderviansky and Bohdan Zholdak) which illustrate a certain undesirable Russian influence on Ukrainians in terms of values, ethics, behavior, or language. The linguistic influence, as represented by surzhyk (an ungrammatical mix of Ukrainian and Russian) has come to symbolize a type of degradation of Ukrainian culture as a whole. While several playwrights over the last decade have incorporated surzhyk as couleur locale, Les Poderviansky, in particular, has made a point of demonstrating how the spread of the roughest language, vocabulary, and behavior is picked up by the least educated stratum of Ukrainians, who appear/pretend to be Russian. Recently, it has become very common to provide Russian or surzhyk sentences or words not in Russian, but in a Ukrainian transcription. Poderviansky, in his sketch “Katsapy” (Ruskies) (43–48),
which, as he admits in the subtitle, is “dedicated to the nationality question,” includes
a scene where a man describes his experience in one of the Baltic states:

Миша: В них, в Прібалтіє, блядь, на уліцах всьо не по-нашому напісано. А
спросі що-небудь, так он сначала так посмотріт, а потом по-своєму щось тири-
пити. По-русські ніхуя не понімає. (46)

Misha: In the Baltics, damn, on the streets, there are no signs in our language. You
ask about anything, at first they’ll give you such a look, and then follow it with some
blah-blah in their own tongue. They don’t understand a fucking thing in Russian.

However, when a youngster asks who lives on the other shore, Misha gets an unhappy
reply from his father, that it is the *katsaps*. The author indicates that while the least
educated class has picked up Russian phrases and curse words, during emotional moments
these people consider themselves non-Russian. There is a large dose of self-blame here,
blaming Ukrainians for copying the worst aspects of others, and thus self-propagating a
negative stereotype of themselves. The playwrights seem to intentionally provide mo-
mments when such individuals appear to act like someone from the group with/in power
(i.e., pretend to be Russian), and then get a slight glimpse of themselves in a mirror.

In some plays, Russian characters make insulting remarks about the Ukrainian lan-
guage, much in the style of earlier periods when Ukraine was either under the Russian or
Polish rule. In Iaroslav Vereschak’s *Bezhluzda komediia. Platni posluhy* [A Senseless
Comedy. Paid Services], even a beggar complains to the man she is panhandling from
about his use of the Ukrainian language: “по-человечески не можешь [can’t you speak
in a human tongue?]” (14), a phrase that had been endlessly employed during the Soviet
period. In another play, Tetiana Ivashchenko’s *Taïna Buttia* [Mystery of Life], a Polish
character in turn objects to the poet Ivan Franko’s use of the Ukrainian language in his
poetry. Other Ukrainian characters still express pain at official tsarist proclamations
and the negation of the existence of the Ukrainian nation and language (see excerpt
below from Olena Klymenko’s play). Overall, in the plays discussed, the derogatory
references made about Ukrainians by non-Ukrainians are set mostly in periods prior
to the end of the twentieth century. These negative comments are expressed, or noted,
almost “for the record,” with no rebuttals or name-calling returned by the Ukrainian
characters. It is like an admission about what hurt or still hurts; however, the message
seems to be that deeds from the past are not to be judged now.

Several plays also depict particular past hardships suffered by ethnic or religious
minorities. This is most poignantly demonstrated in Neda Nezhdana’s *Mil’ion
parashutykiv* [A Million Little Parachutes]: a young woman is notified that she will
receive a one-million dollar inheritance from a distant relative if she can live through
the events of one day as described in a diary by a young Jewish woman, who knew
that she would be shot the next day by the Nazis, on October 16, 1941, in Paris. The
instruction stipulates that the present-day young woman is to imagine that she is the
victim-to-be. The play, with a first-person depiction of events, serves as a means of
exposing a different generation to what the victims of the Nazi ethnic cleansing of
“Others” were facing, specifically during the Holocaust. It is significant again that, while Jewish suffering and genocide is depicted in such plays, there is just one recent Ukrainian play about the great Ukrainian genocide, the Holodomor famine of 1932–33, and there are only two plays about the Chornobyl disaster.31

There is also a rather unusual presentation of non-Ukrainian characters in a play by Olena Klymenko “Dyvna i povchal'na istoriia Kaspara Hauzera, shcho bula zihrama trupoiu italiis'kykh aktoriv u slavnomu misti Niurnberzi naperedodni Rizdva 1836 roku” [An Unusual and Instructive Story about Kaspar Hauser, as it was Performed by a Group of Italian Actors in the Famous City of Nürnberg on Christmas Eve in 1836]. This setting includes veiled references to Germans and Russians in their imperial modes. However, the references are not to the year depicted, nor to preceding times, but rather to the future:

Каспар: Мовчать . . . І не бачать, сліпі, що не хочуть бачити, очі мої, очі—попіл засипає Німеччину, білий попіл. Горе країні, що вбиває своїх поетів! Над Нюрнбергом і Мюнхеном, Дахау і Берліном сіється білий згаслий попіл. (141)

Kaspar: They are silent . . . And the blind do not see what they don’t want to see, my eyes, my eyes—ashes are covering Germany, white ashes. . . . Woe to the land that kills its own poets! Above Nürnberg and Munich, Dachau and Berlin, extinguished white ashes are spread. . . .

The mention of ashes refers to the Holocaust, as well as to ethnic cleansing (especially the Dachau concentration camp),32 as a city councilor exclaims: “Я завжди казав, що чужоземці доведуть до загибелі наше славне місто. Чужинців—геть з Нюрнберга! [I’ve always said that foreigners will lead our famous city to ruin. Get the foreigners out of Nürnberg!]” (O. Klymenko 1998, 137). The reference to the white ashes may also allude to Iurii Klen’s long poem, “Popil Imperii” [Ashes of Empires] (1946), about events during both world wars in Ukraine, and the destruction caused by both the Russian/Communist and Nazi forces.

In the above play by O. Klymenko, among several references to future ethnic discrimination is another episode which literally takes place in Germany, but actually refers to the days of the Russian Empire and its official proclamations limiting the use of the Ukrainian language and even denying its existence.33 In this artistic transposition of time and place, the protagonist, Kaspar, corrects a character, telling him that he just sang a Ukrainian song, not a German one. The latter replies:

Запам’ятай: нема цього, як його . . . українського народу. Є малоросійське населення з мелодічними напевами. Фернштейн?? (O. Klymenko 129)

Remember this: there is no, what is it called . . . Ukrainian people. There is only the Little Russian population with its melodious tunes. Understood?

By dislocating events from the Russian Empire/Soviet Union to Germany and depicting them as future events, the author seems to comment that it does not matter
which particular country expressed xenophobia and was involved in ethnic cleansing or genocide; their deeds made them equal in their sins. The “killing of one’s own poets” refers to the play’s protagonist Kaspar, and it also refers to Soviet times (since the killing of Ukrainian poets during the Nazi period\textsuperscript{34} was performed strictly by Germans, who thus were not killing their “own poets”). It is significant that no judgmental comments are made by other characters or by the author, only painful statements of painful facts that will take place in the twentieth century. The intermingling of Nazi and Communist crimes almost places the blame on humanity as such, rather than on a particular nation. Again, this attitude towards foreign villains appears to be in step with the approach, not only towards countries but also towards individuals, of minimal prejudgment based on nationality or religion, thus avoiding any stereotyping.

Ukrainian Protagonists

Post-Soviet Ukrainian drama does not depict Ukrainians as victims of historical situations, nor as glorified and perfect human beings. In contemporary Ukrainian plays, Ukrainians are often criticized more harshly than non-Ukrainians. The most extreme example of this may be found in Valerii Shevchuk’s \textit{Kinet\textsuperscript{s}' viku [End of the Century}]. The play deals with seven sisters who are actually victims of a history that divides and estranges them politically; they are now fated to live together in their old family home (a type of cultural and political containment). At the end of the twentieth century, with their individual families destroyed (six of them have lost their husbands and children), living under one roof becomes quite a challenge, since they all have different personal tastes and political leanings. They are united only in their love for their youngest sibling, a brother. And it is only in his dream that the sisters and all their dead family members, including the parents and grandparents, sit together for a family photo, like a real family. The author does not excuse the sisters’ behavior, nor does he preach; he only paints a picture, presents a literary photograph. The actual photograph, which includes the dead who have come back for the occasion, represents a type of mirror of the past that is to be protected. The brother explains to one of the aunts, who collaborated with the Communists and Russians and likes to stress her former ties to power:

\begin{quote}
. . . we are fragments of a family shattered by life, by time, and by your beloved regime. And as long as we all stay together, our ship shall not sink, but if we become dispersed, it will be the end of us all. (71)
\end{quote}

In most of the plays discussed, Ukrainian playwrights do not hesitate to criticize their own compatriots. Some writers also depict the negative traits of Ukrainians (or their descendants) living abroad. In the play by Oleksandr Irvanets, \textit{Elektrychka na Velykden' [A Shuttle at Easter-Time]}, a young tourist from America is shown as rather naïve, or lacking street smarts, when she rides a post-Soviet train in Ukraine with four ex-cons, and believes that she might be saved by the American president. The writer also makes fun of her speech, exposing her archaic émigré vocabulary and
phraseology. The play also criticizes the Soviet and post-Soviet train crew, who fear the ex-cons on the train, and ignore the terrorizing of the passengers.

Iaroslav Vereshchak’s Bezhluzda komediia and Oleksandr Irvanets’s Brekhun z Lytovs’koi ploshchi [Liar from the Lithuanian Square] depict negative characters of Ukrainian origin. They criticize post-Soviet reality, former political dissidents, and prefer to talk to strangers in Russian (even when they travel outside the country); only at the end of the play do the authors disclose that these characters are Ukrainian. Most short dramatic sketches by Les Poderviansky, such as Heroi nashoho chasu [Hero of Our Time], and by Bohdan Zholdak, such as Holodna krov [Famished Blood], are about lower-class, uneducated characters with rather low ethical standards, who use ungrammatical surzhyk.

While many post-Soviet Ukrainian plays do portray non-Ukrainians, such characters often appear in two types of situations. The first category usually includes non-Ukrainians referring to Ukrainians in a stereotypical manner (which is rarely complimentary), with the author often somehow taking the side of the former, even providing some justification for their negative attitude towards Ukrainians. Very often, non-Ukrainians in Ukraine are depicted more in terms of inclusiveness than as stereotyped “foreigners.” In the second situation, if any negative characteristics of non-Ukrainians are apparent, they are usually class-related, that is, still in the Soviet manner. We see this in the plays by Valerii Herasymchuk, especially in his portrayal of various Russian petty officials, or in Poderviansky’s satirical dramatic sketches of man-on-the-street characters, in both cases representing individuals with power.

A number of Ukrainian plays include negative characters who appear to be non-Ukrainian, but later prove to be Ukrainian. In the plays and sketches by Vereshchak, Irvanets, and Poderviansky, the portrayal of these characters often relies on the use of surzhyk in their speech. For Ukrainians, such depictions may represent a healthy self-criticism, or else a perceived lack of national self-identity, as seen through the eyes of others, or in a mirror. However, there is no evidence of national self-hatred or self-condemnation, only statement of fact. What is also significant in these plays is that when minor characters are neither Ukrainian nor Russian (e.g., Gypsies), they usually speak in Russian and express nostalgia for the Soviet period. Such depictions are also found in Oleh Mosiichuk’s Sl’ozy Bozhoï Materi [The Tears of the Mother of God], where a family is torn apart ideologically by historical events: one son becomes a Communist activist, begins to address his parents only in Russian, and soon throws them out of their own house.

In contrast to the above plays, which give a rather negative coloration to such characters with no self-identity, there are many plays about more positive historical and cultural Ukrainian personalities: the leading poet Taras Shevchenko, the writer Ivan Franko and his wife Olha, the poetess Lesia Ukrainka, the military leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the opera singer Solomiia Krushelnytska, the Ukrainian Catholic archbishop Andrei Sheptytsky. They are all presented against the background of the very “European” (i.e., pre-Soviet, non-proletarian) intelligentsia of their time, and are positioned within the European milieu of their day.
After the Soviet era, such protagonists are found more and more often in Ukrainian drama. Despite the political limitations imposed by Soviet censors, some of the above personalities would have been acceptable in that era, had they been presented as protagonists in a "politically correct" relationship with Russia and Russians. For example, Hetman Khmelnytsky’s 1654 Treaty with Russia had to be interpreted as a union (not just a treaty of cooperation) of Ukraine and Russia; the national poet, Taras Shevchenko, had to be shown as modeling himself and his works on his Russian friends and their ideas. However, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who waged a war against Russia that ended in disaster at the battle of Poltava (1709), had to be completely ignored during Soviet times. Since 1990, however, Mazepa has inspired at least four plays, which present him as a national hero. Obviously, many other Ukrainian personalities could not be considered for a play written during the Soviet period; for example, the Ukrainian, Eastern-rite Catholic leader, Archbishop Andrei Sheptytsky was an undesirable character as a protagonist, as were Ukrainian émigrés living in the West. Only recently have some plays been written about émigrés who were previously community or political leaders, as well as writers and scholars; some had their novels rendered in dramatized form.

Many Ukrainian plays today show their protagonists to be quite comfortable against a European or Western cultural backdrop, or in proximity to the West. These include plays by the following: Ivan Andrusiak, Nataliia Chechel, Neda Nezhdana, Volodymyr Dibrova, Olena Klymenko, Lesia Demska, Bohdan Zholdak, Luidzhi Neroka, and V. Herasymchuk. Their plays employ countless archetypes, intertextual references and quotations from well-known writers and works (Heidegger, Ionesco, Balzac, Shakespeare, Borges, Joyce, Derrida, Arthur Miller, Henry Miller, Hesse, Fromm, and the Marquis de Sade), and in this manner show the protagonists to be at home in Western and occasionally Eastern (Indian or Japanese) cultures, thus demonstrating cultural interconnectedness (Onyshkevych 2003a, 334–35). While these plays also mention several Polish personalities, such as Jan Potocki, Jerzy Grotowski, and King Władysław IV, from the Russian side we see only Chekhov and Tolstoy. European and American personalities (such as Fromm and the two Millers) and elements surface in a matter-of-fact manner, signaling that these references are also part of the readers’ world. This is the world that younger playwrights now choose to portray or examine. Although occasionally such mentions appear to be simple name-dropping, this is significant as well. In other cases, the selection of names is not random; it refers indirectly to issues raised by these particular Western authors (e.g., issues of loneliness and the absurdity of life are suggested at when Hesse’s Steppenwolf is mentioned).

This comfortable identification with Western culture is made more obvious when a character in a play suggests that the most remote, easternmost Ukrainian cities are actually not part of this culture. In a play set in Kharkiv (a northeastern city in Ukraine), the character wonders how those people found out about Kant (Zholdak 180). At times, references to Western personalities of old also seem to reveal a touch of nostalgia for pre-Soviet days, perhaps even for the nationally pluralistic coexistence within the Austro-Hungarian empire, which may be retrospectively
idealized too much by some Ukrainians. Some authors, particularly Lesia Demska (in Tak ne bude [It’s Not Going to Be Like That] and Povernennia u nikudy [Return to Nowhere]), purposely provide nondescript national settings for their plays, or give their protagonists such German or French names as “Richard,” “Wagner,” “Leo,” or “René,” as if to demonstrate the universality of many well-known Western European dramatic conflicts, plots, or characters, which also include or represent Ukrainian ones. For example, in the abovementioned play by Olena Klymenko, An Unusual and Instructive Story about Kaspar Hauser, which takes place in Germany, the protagonist is given rather mysterious origins: he is either Napoleon’s illegitimate son, or the son of the king of Sicily and Sardinia, or someone from Saxony, who nevertheless appears in the middle of Europe with undefined Ukrainian ties. When he stands up for the rights of the Ukrainian language (as quoted above), there is a hint that he might have also had Ukrainian origins. The many suspicions regarding Kaspar’s identity actually make his nationality of secondary importance, and what is primary is that he blends into the general middle-European story, which includes Ukrainian issues.

There are also numerous instances of reliance on various elements of Western culture. The above play, set in Nürnberg, is rather appropriately inspired by a German author, as evident in the play’s subtitle, A Christmas Hoffmanniana in Two Acts (O. Klymenko 109). Another play, by Oleksandr Irvanets, which deals with events of the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine (Luskunchyk—2004 [The Nutcracker—2004]), utilizes elements of Hoffman’s “Nutcracker” as a metaphor for a protagonist facing political change, or at least increased understanding of a more Ukrainian, or even Western culture. There is a discussion between one of the heavily protected and heavily armed Russian-speaking military guards and a Ukrainian girl participating in the political event, who approaches him with flowers, an orange, and some nuts, calling him a Nutcracker and later asking him whether he has read the story by Hoffman. The guard replies that he does not read Ukrainian (thinking that the question was about a Ukrainian author).

Some of the senior playwrights, however, depict a cause-and-effect situation in which post-Soviet politics affects individuals, as well as whole families. The most prolific contemporary Ukrainian writer, Valerii Shevchuk, and his play End of the Century, mentioned above, illustrate this most poignantly. By describing the seven sisters with their individual faults (each sister representing a different characteristic) and their inability to get along, the author comments not only on this dysfunctional family, but also on society and its post-Soviet values. While six of the sisters are fairly close in their moral and ethical values, the one who became a Communist differs from them significantly. Not only has she renounced her family’s Ukrainian language, but also at the end of the Soviet period she continues to be ready to denounce one of her sisters (who has already been sentenced twice for her “anti-Soviet activity”). Except for their one brother, who represents a window to the future, these sisters retain almost no hope. The sisters also stand for many in Ukraine who are unable to deal with political and social problems against the background of recent historical events. Again, however, no blame is placed on history, which serves only to explain past events in the
characters’ lives. The author expects the family to pull together in order to survive. In 2004, less than a half-a-dozen years after this play was written, the slogan of the Orange Revolution sweeping all of Ukraine expressed a similar idea, though in a more positive formulation: “Razom nas bahato. Nas ne podolaty! [Together we are many. We shall not be overcome].”

Ethical, moral, and other issues are also reflected in current Ukrainian drama. Power is still associated with the Russian or Soviet side. Irvanets’s *The Nutcracker* illustrates this through a more recent situation, when two major camps faced each other during the Orange Revolution. In the play, the military guards from the predominantly Russian-speaking Crimea (which was mostly opposed to the Orange Revolution and still under a more Russian or Soviet influence) continue to claim that strength means power. They do not understand why the young Ukrainians are ready to risk their lives for a Ukraine with a Ukrainian character:

\begin{verbatim}
Він: Какая правда, Лєся, какая правда?
Правда за тєм, у ково сіла.\footnote{18}
\end{verbatim}

*He: Truth, Lesia, what type of truth?*  
*Whoever has power, he represents truth.*

Another more typically European element in current Ukrainian drama is the mostly mild, but still specific and gradually more assertive appearance of feminism, which has to fight its way today. It represents, perhaps, a slow return to a softer, pre-Soviet, Ukrainian attitude that reflected women’s equality. Although there are several parodies of feminism in the new Ukrainian plays, there are also attempts to return to the issue seriously, and to *represent* and *present* women seriously (Hutcheon 141).

It continues a certain tradition demonstrated by the leading Ukrainian playwrights of the 1920s and 1930s (Mykola Kulish and Volodymyr Vynnychenko), as well as the playwrights who wrote during and immediately after World War II (such as Eaghor Kostetzky, Iurii Kosach, and Liudmyla Kovalenko). In these earlier plays, the female protagonists were on an equal footing with their male counterparts; they were depicted as more focused than men, possessing more leadership qualities, and serving as examples of true, existential self-expression. While most new plays try to treat women as equal to men (or even provide women with stronger personalities, as in Irvanets’s *Luskunchyk*—2004), some of the over-thirty-five generation of writers today continue the Soviet-style subliminal downgrading of women, as in *The Last Gasp of the Matriarchy*. Shevchuk, in his *End of the Century*, not only indirectly degrades women by having them represent various national shortcomings, but also shows the women as unable to manage by themselves and having to rely on their brother. One of the seven sisters expresses this quite clearly, depicting the passive role expected of women, who had to wait patiently to be chosen by men for marriage.

During the 1930s and 1940s, when Kulish, Vynnychenko, Kostetzky, Kosach, and Kovalenko portrayed gender equality, this might have been slightly premature even
for some parts of the Western world, which has now largely achieved an egalitarian attitude to both genders. However, the representations of the Soviet-like downgrading of women in contemporary Ukrainian plays, even when they are very rare, still signify a step backward in this respect.

**Conclusion**

The under-thirty-five generation of contemporary Ukrainian playwrights from all parts of Ukraine seems to look through a window at the outside world, mostly Western Europe, without xenophobia and without seeking redress for their neighbors’ historical trespasses. There are also some demonstrations of nostalgia for the world that was, imperfect as it may have been for Ukrainians during most of the twentieth century. In current plays, one does not notice Ukrainians expressing any desire to distance themselves from, or blame, those who ruled Ukraine of old or during the Soviet period. This attitude underlines the need for some type of a mirror in order to see oneself as one truly is, to find one’s own group or national identity, which would be reflected in the eyes of others. Such a mirror may also serve as a window onto the Western cultural world, a world that Ukraine once shared and wishes to continue to share.

The results of the discussion surfacing for a century and a half among Ukrainians about cultural polarities—be it Western Europe or Russia, or one’s own “nativism”—are that the European pole is definitely dominant. However, there is another identification with Europe: in contemporary Ukrainian drama, it may be found in expressions of feeling and shared pain with other nationalities, when Ukrainians seem to be looking through a window, but actually are facing a mirror. The scenes depicting the national concerns of the dying Polish King Władysław IV, the national as well as the universal pain felt by the poet Kaspar in Nürnberg in 1836, and the individual pain felt by the young Jewish woman about to be killed in Paris in 1941, all represent an identification with and sharing of a common European identity and history. By sharing the pain seen through a window, the Ukrainian protagonists participate in the common image itself, and at the same time demonstrate no negative stereotypical cultural perceptions of “others.”

The cultural history of Soviet Ukraine clearly illustrates Walter Rodney’s observation, that “To be colonized is to be removed from history” (225). George M. Gugelberger expanded the sentiment thus: “Postcolonial writing, then, is the slow, painful, and highly complex means of fighting one’s way into European-made history” (Gugelberger 582). Although this statement originally referred to non-European colonial entities, it may apply to Ukraine equally well, after the Soviet period that so rudely interrupted Ukrainian self-expression in literature seven decades earlier. Now the characters in the plays appear to be undergoing self-examination, often seeing their own negative characteristics in a mirror. The plays of the last fifteen years also illustrate a slow attempt by Ukrainians to make a choice in terms of the above three possibilities: to reclaim their place, either within the future context of the European window, or on their own. This discourse finds its narrative in the form of drama, as
individual and group identities are reflected against the backdrop and the options that history has provided.

Notes

1. Some pertinent issues concerning multiculturalism in Ukraine are discussed by Basiuk (31–48).
2. These anthologies are Vereshchak 2000b; Miroshnychenko 1998, 2003, 2004; and a collection of experimental plays staged by the Ivan Franko Theater in Kyïv, Nasha Drama.
3. Gradually, most of these plays are being published in periodicals. A list of forty-nine Ukrainian-language plays and six Russian-language plays, with details about their publication or manuscript form, are in Table 17.1, “Aspects of Identity: Ukrainian Plays of the 1990s” in Onyshkevych 2003a (343–45).
4. Russian-language plays will be analyzed in a separate study. Many playwrights who live in Ukraine and have chosen to write in Russian, rather than in Ukrainian, may present or reflect a different self-expression and world-view than their Ukrainian-language colleagues.
5. Tamara Hundorova articulates the totality of that prescript’s impact and implication. She discusses the Soviet style as one of a “mass totalitarian culture,” as well as the official state culture (57).
6. Although Auge defines a non-place (non-lieu in French) as temporary, particularly in reference to the solitude of the modern world and unintegrated individuals, the definition may be applicable to other situations, as well as to the countries of the former USSR. He notes: “If a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity will be a non-place” (77–78).
7. It was supported by the leading Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Antonovych, who is reputed to have said in 1884 that Ukrainians should read more Western European literature, as it is richer in ideas than Russian literature. Ihor Chornovol cites the reminiscences about this by S. Iehunova-Shcherbyna, “Pam’ıati V. B. Antonovycha (storinka spomyniv).” Syn Ukraïny: 5: 376 (qtd. in Chornovol 10).
8. Oleksandr Halenko discusses some of these ideas, which have appeared since the end of the nineteenth century through the mid-1920s (especially those by Viacheslav Lypynsky), as well as later (Halenko 28).
11. It is significant that the present Ukrainian government, in its plans for working towards joining the European Union, has created a deputy prime minister post for European integration (Oleh Rybachuk was the first appointee). President Yushchenko’s Web site, under the heading of “Priorities,” listed eight elements, including “European Choice” (Yushchenko Feb. 27, 2005a, 1).
13. With these “Wild Dances,” Ruslana won the 2004 First Prize in the Eurovision competition. See Marko Pavlyshyn’s chapter in this volume.
14. Pavlyshyn refers here to Andrukhovych and Stasiuk’s Moia ievropa (2001), in which two authors, one Polish and one Ukrainian, depict their relationship with the same geographic region.
15. The president’s web page summarizes his interview in The Times (London) on Feb. 2, 2005: “President Yushchenko told The Times that he was committed to a three-year reform
program already agreed with Brussels, aimed at putting Ukraine—the largest country wholly in Europe—on the path to Western-style democracy. He insisted that as soon as the reforms were completed, he wanted to start official entry talks to join the EU” (Yushchenko 2005a, 2).

“European choice for Ukraine is more than a mere geographical term. In the first place, we have chosen civilized European model of development, which allows achieving progress in all spheres of social and public life.” State Council for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine (Yushchenko 2005a).

16. The Embassy of Ukraine in Washington has provided data from a poll taken by the Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies in Kyïv, which shows that 84.9 % of respondents feel that Ukraine may be called a European country in terms of geography, and 60.6 % feel that it may be such in terms of history. Economic and social/civic aspects are perceived to be two important issues responsible for keeping Ukraine from being designated as European now (Embassy of Ukraine, News, Oct. 4, 2005, Issue 2).

17. Halina Filipowicz notes that in eighteenth-century Poland, then under Russian rule, “theatre was the only institution where Polish was used officially.” This was often the case for the Ukrainian theater as well during Russian and Soviet rule, which had stated or implied restrictions, allowing the staging of Ukrainian plays only with ethnographic, or rural, settings and content.

18. Bennet further states: “Drama, I insist, is the church of literature, the collective ceremonial thinking of a crucially human thought that torments us by defeating in logic its own theoretical formulations” (60).

19. *Sonata Pathétique* deals with the inner dreams, conflicts, and self-identification of its protagonists on the background of historical events in Ukraine in 1917–1919. Philosophically, it demonstrates tenets of existentialism. Stylistically, the play employs three-part split personalities, who serve as characters and self-analyzers, as well as depersonalized commentators on events. Kulish employs the alienation effect in having the protagonists switch their comments from first to third person singular. As the protagonist seems to be observing himself from the side, his thoughts and speech become depersonalized, and in his self-analysis he stops using “I” and begins to describe himself in the third person singular as “he.” *Sonata Pathétique* is the first Western play to be structured completely in parallel to a musical composition (Ludwig von Beethoven’s sonata of the same name, op. 13).

During the Soviet period, the play was prohibited just before opening night, but was allowed to run in a censored variant for several months in two theaters in Russia. *Sonata Pathétique* was followed by almost five decades of very few literary and dramatic chef d’oeuvres on the Ukrainian stage east of the Berlin Wall. Significantly, that period also represents a new era of repression of the Ukrainian language, which was gradually made to fit Soviet ideology. If we accept Roland Barthes’s interpretation of the relationship between language and power, linguistic usage also reflects how individuals see their country and the world. With the political, stylistic, linguistic, and cultural official Soviet restriction on self-expression, it followed that there were few opportunities for Ukrainians to reach out and touch the world, in the hope of some interaction.

20. Nadiia Miroshnychenko summarized it as follows: “In Soviet society, with the theater being completely state controlled, Ukrainian dramaturgy was enclosed within the triangle: theater-government-audience. The government was interested in influencing the audience by means of the theater, and therefore supported only contemporary drama which served as a conduit for a certain ideology” (Miroshnychenko 2003b, 426).

21. Among these plays are the following: *Onore, a de Bal’zak? [Honoré, and Where Is Balzac?]* (about Honoré de Balzac) by Oleh Mykolaichuk-Nyzovets and Neda Nezhdana, and *Tantsi honcharnoho kola [Dances of a Potter’s Wheel]* (about Isadora Duncan) by Lidiiia Chupis; Edith Piaf appears in Oleh Mykolaichuk-Nyzovets’s play *Asso ta Piaf, abo shche odyn tost za Mermoza! [Asso and Piaf, or One More Toast to Mermose!]*.
22. King Władysław IV has an important role in Volodymyr Klymenko’s play Bohdan, while Capek and Havel appear in Valerii Herasymchuk’s plays Okovy dlia Chekhova [Handcuffs for Chekhov] and V obleži Salamandr [Under A Siege by Salamanders], respectively.

23. For example, Bohdan Zholtak’s play Holodna krov mentions Heidegger, Eric Fromm, Carl Jung, James Joyce, Arthur Miller, Henry Miller, and the Marquis de Sade.

24. Valerii Herasymchuk, P’iesy pro velkykh [Plays about Great People], 2. Individual plays in his collection are about Molière, Socrates, Alfred Nobel, Hemingway, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Beethoven, Paganini, or Capek. Among them are also plays about two Ukrainians: the Eastern Rite Catholic Metropolitan Archbishop Andrei Sheptytsky and the filmmaker Oleksandr Dovzhenko.

25. As in Zumii za khvist skhopytu biseniatko [Dare to Catch the Little Devil by its Tail] (1995), by Tetiana Ivashchenko; Na vystuptsiakh [At the Edge of the World] (1991) by Kateryna Demchuk; Zhytтя na tr’okh [Life for Three] by Lidiiia Chupis; or Dyvna i povchal’na istoriya Kaspara Hauzera, shcho bula zihrana trupoiu italiis’kyh aktoriv u slavnomu misti niurnberzi naperedodni Rizdva 1836 roku [An Unusual and Instructive Story about Kaspar Hauser, as it was Performed by a Group of Italian Actors in the Famous City of Nürnberg on Christmas Eve in 1836] by Olena Klymenko. The latter play was first published in 1998, though it was probably written earlier.

26. Valerii Herasymchuk, Okovy dlia Chekhova (143–70).

27. This play has a different title in its English version. The Ukrainian version, which was staged in Kyїv, was under the title Lev i Levystsa.

28. Among these writers are Valerii Shevchuk, Oleksandr Irvanets, Viktor Lysiuk, Iaroslav Vereshchak, and many others.

29. “Katsapy” was a specific reference to Russians in the previous centuries (referring to beards worn by Russians in the eighteenth century); it is now used as a mocking or derogatory term.

30. The play consists of biographical excerpts about the Ukrainian poet Ivan Franko, his wife, and his infatuation with several women.

31. The genocidal famine resulted in 5 to 10 million victims, mostly Ukrainian farmers. Since Mykola Rudenko’s “Khrest” (1977, published in Baltimore, USA), in the post-Soviet period only Oleksandr Ocheretnyi’s Traheditia v domi (1999) was written and published in Ukraine. The single staged play dealing with Chornobyl is Polyn [Wormwood] by Viktor Lysiuk. There is also supposed to be another play by Olena Klymenko, Kovcheh [Ark] from 1986.

32. While Munich and Berlin are associated with the Nazi movement, Nürnberg /Nuremberg refers to the city where Nazi trials were held. The Dachau concentration camp was one of the biggest Nazi camps after 1933, with gas chambers and a crematorium. Many thousands of Jews, Gypsies, Ukrainians (although many were listed as “Soviet” or Polish citizens), and other Slavs, as well as some Germans, were held there, and many of them were killed there.

33. The references are to the Valuev circular of 1863 and the Ems ukase of 1876 containing various restrictions on the use of the Ukrainian language in publications, in schools, and in theaters.

34. The most representative example is the execution of Olena Telih, the Head of the Ukrainian Writers Union, who, together with the editorial staff of the Union’s periodical, was shot by the Nazis in Babyн Iar in Kyїv, on February 21, 1941.

35. Such characters also appear in Vereshchak’s Bezhluzda komediia, Irvanets’s Elektrychka na Velykden’, most of Poderviansky’s short dramatic sketches Heroi nashoho chasu, Zholtak’s Holodna krov and Shevchuk’s Kinets’ viku.

36. This is representative of the Soviet claim that Russian is an “international language” not only in the Soviet Union, but also in foreign countries. While bringing goods for sale to Poland, a Ukrainian protagonist refuses to speak Ukrainian to another Ukrainian, preferring “the human language,” i.e., Russian. Another element of Soviet policy surfaces here, when the female protagonist indicates that it was only after the political perestroika that her former husband confessed to her that he was Ukrainian.
37. Mosiichuk’s play Sl’ozy Bozhoï Materi (2004) is based on the 1934 novel Mariia by Ulas Samchuk, who immigrated to Canada after World War II.

38. Such a setting or milieu was used as a backdrop for events in plays by Sofiia Maidanska, Kateryna Demchuk, B. Melnychuk, Valerii Herasytmchuk, Neda Nezhdana, and Iaroslav Iarosh.

39. Besides Valerii Shevchuk’s Drama smertel’noi tini, there are plays about Hetman Mazepa by O. Pasichnyk, Serhii Nosan, and L.I. Storozenko.

40. There is even a play about the Ukrainian-American literary scholar Volodymyr Zhyla from Texas: Bohdana Derii, Syla orlynokryla [Eagle-Winged Strength] (2003). Mykhailo Mulyk’s Pam’iat’ sertsia [A Heart Remembers] (2000) deals with Ukrainian community and military leaders fighting the Soviets in the mid-1940s (Volodymyr Kubijovyč, Dmytro Palić et al.). There is also a drama version of the novel Mariia by Ulas Samchuk (see fn37).

41. Polish leaders find particular mention in V. Klymenko’s Bohdan (about Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and historical events in the mid-seventeenth century).

42. An exception may be seen in works by Volodymyr Dibrova, who has lived in the United States since the early 1990s, and thus, perhaps, does not represent the typical writer in Ukraine today. In his play Poetyka zastillia [Poetics at a Table Set for A Party] (1996), Dibrova mentions Lermontov, Pushkin, Maiakovsky, and Bulgakov, as well as Mozart, Rilke, von Gogh, and Buddha.

43. The guard comes from the mostly Russian-speaking Crimea area of Ukraine.

44. There may be some indication that Ukrainians are acquainted with the Hoffman story through reading, while someone from a strictly Russian culture would know it rather from the ballet by the same name. The author admits that this association must have come to him rather subconsciously (correspondence with Oleksandr Irvanets from September 19, 2005).

45. Quoted above: “As long as we all stay together, our ship shall not sink, but if we disperse, it will be the end of us all” (Shevchuk 1999, 71).

46. Irvanets, like many other playwrights, often provides Russian phrases in a Ukrainian phonetic transcription.

47. Many issues of feminism in Ukraine (especially since the nineteenth century) are discussed by Solomiia Pavlychko, 2002. Among them is her 1993 article “Posttotalitarna kul’tura iak nosii znevahy do zhinok” [“Posttotalitarian Culture as a Carrier of Indignity to Women”], 57–65.

48. Linda Hutcheon points out the presence of many variants of feminisms (in the plural form), “Postmodernism and feminisms,” 141.

49. For their texts, as well as a discussion of these plays, see my introductory articles and commentaries to individual plays in the following anthologies on modern Ukrainian drama, as well as drama of the Ukrainian diaspora: Antolohiia Modernoï Ukraïns’koï Dramy [An Anthology of Modern Ukrainian Drama] and Blyzniata shche zustrinut’sia. Dramaturhiia Ukraïns’koï Diaspory [The Twins Shall Meet Again. Plays of the Ukrainian Diaspora].

50. Particularly in Liudmyla Kovalenko’s The Heroine Dies in the First Act (1948).

51. Oleh Mykolaichuk-Nyzovets, Ostannii zoik matriarkhatu. A leading character in this comedy is a female general, whom the enemy forces abduct and impregnate in an attempt to prevent her from leading her army, making fun of her condition in the process.

52. Although most of the playwrights are from Kyïv, many are from other parts of Ukraine (Onyshkevych 2003b, 343–45).

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In his essay “At the Crossroads of the Century,” Ukrainian literary scholar Mykola Ilnytsky concludes that “the development of Ukrainian poetry in the twentieth century has testified to the European orientation of Ukrainian culture, which has made it possible for it to preserve its identity despite political pressure from various countries” (Ilnytsky 72). Before its independence in 1991 and the more recent Orange Revolution, Ukraine had been for most of its modern history under the rule of politically more powerful neighbors—the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland, Tsarist Russia, and the Soviet Union. Under the rule of the relatively benign Austro-Hungarian Empire, Western Ukrainian writers had immediate interlocutors in their German-speaking neighbors and a natural window to literary and cultural developments in Europe. Soviet rule later was to slam that window shut. The highly repressive Tsarist and Soviet colonizations of Ukraine led to the establishment of what Ukrainian literary scholar John Fizer aptly has coined “coercive intertextuality,” a process that induced indigenous Ukrainian literati to take a subservient role and to extol the language and culture of the colonizers.1 Mykola Khvylovy’s call under Soviet rule to look toward the West for literary models during the Ukrainian Literary Discussion of 1925–1928 ended with his suicide in 1933, shortly before the Stalinist terror inevitably would have engulfed him. Émigré literary critic Iurii Lavrinenko was later to term this wave of persecutions of Ukrainian literati and other intellectuals the “executed renaissance,”2 which eradicated several hundred of Ukraine’s cultural elite.

Khvylovy’s aesthetic call for openness to Western literary influence, as an alternative to a coercive Russian one, was ultimately perceived by Stalin’s regime as an inexcusable political transgression. It was, in fact, a totally principled position in unprincipled times, one that expressed the logic of the enlightened slave who thirsted for personal and intellectual freedom in opposition to the brutal might of the unenlightened master. Many of Khvylovy’s contemporaries like the Neoclassicist poets Mykola Zerov, Maksym Rylsky and Mykhailo Drai-Khmara took that call to introduce European literature and the literature of antiquity to Ukrainian culture through their extensive translation activities. Thus the early 1920s comprised the zenith of Ukrainian literary
culture’s European orientation—until Stalin chose to crush it with arrests and executions. Khvylový’s impassioned democratic plea, quashed by Soviet authoritarianism for nearly six decades, was reborn during the days of Gorbachev’s perestroika. In that later state of relatively unfettered freedom, Ukraine experienced a reinvigorated gravitation toward the West that continues to gather momentum to the present day. It is a gravitation described by many, from poets like Viktor Neborak to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, often with the word povernennia, a return to Ukraine’s true identity, a return to enlightened Europe and Ukraine’s European roots. Thus the democratic politics of the Orange Revolution began to catch up with the cultural process of povernennia-return, which was largely stimulated by the Ukrainian literary and cultural underground of the mid-to-late 1980s.3

Since the time of the great bard Taras Shevchenko in the middle of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian poetry has had a special role in Ukrainian culture. It has represented a voice of opposition and a rallying cry for Ukrainian self-awareness and self-identity. Poets like Ivan Franko became civic leaders at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The liberal Writers of the Sixties [Steshydesiatyky]4 such as Ivan Drach, who tried to engender democratic change within the system, and dissident poets such as Vasyl Stus, who was incarcerated and eventually killed by it, were children of Khrushchev’s Thaw, which whet their appetite for freedom of expression. Drach survived Brezhnev’s reactionary backlash, later to become a major player in the RUKH movement and in the Ukrainian politics of independence. He and his contemporaries such as Mykola Zhulynsky and Ivan Dziuba staunchly supported the new emerging writers. Stus was murdered by the GULAG in 1985, but remained a powerful symbol of resistance and a rallying point against the system. Since the Soviet Union was an exceedingly insular state that maintained strict media control over all aspects of intellectual life, Ukrainian writers of the 1960s and 1970s were only able to read many banned authors in samizdat form instead of the literature prescribed by the state. Even the works of great, though politically suspect, Russian poets like Osip Mandelstam, Boris Pasternak, and Marina Tsvetaeva were banned in the Soviet Union until they were partially rehabilitated in the 1960s. One should take note that all three of these innovative Russian poets in their attitude and writings were closely linked to European literature, from the literature of antiquity to that of their contemporaries such as Rainer-Marie Rilke. These and other banned authors were, of course, read in samizdat and had an impact on Soviet-period poets even before they were officially permitted to be published. Thus in public life, coercive intertextuality predominated in the period of high Socialist Realism as well as during and after the Thaw—as a result of the state’s restrictions on the published word.

The Ukrainian Writers of the Sixties, while a significant cultural and political phenomenon, were largely unable to promote an overt Western orientation in their poetry since that would have been a sign of antipathy to the state and have been politically suspect. They did, however, attract significant attention and galvanize support from the reading public to pave the way for future developments. Addition-
ally, Ukrainian poets in the 1960s to the early 1980s had little personal contact with Western writers. Few foreign authors visited the USSR, especially Ukraine on the periphery of the Soviet Empire, and Ukrainian poets were rarely if ever permitted to travel to the “capitalist” countries of the “decadent” West. Only officially acceptable Soviet Russian poets like Evgeny Evtushenko and Andrei Voznesensky were allowed to travel to the Western world during the peak of the Cold War, and they did so largely as tokens. Some of the first Ukrainian poets to visit the United States included Ivan Drach, Vitaly Korotych, and Mykola Vinhranovsky in the 1980s. I recall a reading by Vinhranovsky at Rutgers University in Newark where the visibly shaken poet was forced to begin with an ode to Lenin. We in the audience all understood it was meant for the two men dressed in ill-fitting black suits sent by the embassy to accompany him. Thus Soviet travel restrictions limited contacts for Ukrainian poets with their Western counterparts, thereby limiting the possibility for a more visible Western orientation.

The emergence of the Ukrainian underground into aboveground life in the mid-to-late 1980s marked the opening of Pandora’s Box in the process of the restoration and return of a truly free Ukrainian literary culture. Prior to that time, poets, artists and other intellectuals met in the back rooms of cafes and at carefully guarded gatherings in private apartments. It culminated in large-scale events like the Bu-Ba-Bu literary performance group’s multimedia Chrysler Imperial “happening” that sold out the Lviv Opera House for several days in 1992. Besides dramatic readings by the three Bu-Ba-Bu authors (Yuri Andrukhovych, Oleksandr Irvanets, and Viktor Neborak), the event had a rock-opera atmosphere and included performances by rock bands, singers, orchestras, choirs, extensive costume and stage designs, and many other visual effects. I myself was fortunate to have attended a reading by Bu-Ba-Bu and others to a packed house at the Lviv Philharmonic during the World Congress of Ukrainian Studies in 1993. Significantly, with striking and innovative approaches to poetry as performance, the young generation of poets was able to attract a large, young Ukrainian audience in a way that had never before been possible under the Soviet regime.

The process of reestablishing Ukrainian linguistic and cultural identity and the popularization of a new, vibrant literature marked the beginning of the process of reintegration with Europe and of Ukrainization. The process has been twofold. The first aspect of it comprised the ritual obliteration of traditional Ukrainian cultural identity through parody and satire, and the second involved the reestablishment of a new Ukrainian identity in the modern world through the exploration of literary and mass European and Third World cultures. With the advent of Gorbachev’s perestroika and later Ukrainian independence in 1991, Ukrainian poets for the first time had the opportunity to travel abroad to Europe and North America in a steady stream, many at first just to earn honoraria to support themselves under difficult post-independence economic conditions. Additionally, with virtually open borders, many Ukrainian émigré writers like Bohdan Boychuk and Bohdan Rubchak from the New York Group of poets traveled to Ukraine and established
contacts with their Ukrainian counterparts. A mutual interpenetration and influence began, as well as an active publication process to introduce émigré authors and to restore previously banned writers, many from the “executed renaissance,” to the Ukrainian reading public.

The Bu-Ba-Bu Generation of writers particularly focused on creating a new sense of literary identity by breaking with the traditional icons of the Ukrainian past, by, in fact, playfully mocking them, and by focusing on aesthetic freedom as their primary concern. They rejected the rigidly nationalistic canonical approach to their Ukrainian literary antecedents, the aesthetically bereft Socialist Realist content of much of Soviet Ukrainian literature, and even their immediate predecessors in the literary establishment—the Writers of the Sixties, who, although treated as heroes within traditionalist Ukrainian culture, were perceived as old-fashioned and too programmatically nationalistic for the modern aesthetic of the younger generation. These new writers focused, too, on a new, freer Ukrainian language that broke both Soviet and nationalistic taboos. They provided forces of energy for a society in a state of at least partial entropy in the mid-1980s which, in the latter part of the decade, suffered from post-Chornobyl shock and a total loss of confidence in those who governed them. They ignited a spark to build a larger fire of cultural change through the spirit of Rabelaisian carnival.

The predisposition to change in language comprises one of the vital forces in cultural development, and language innovation has been one of the primary legacies of the Bu-Ba-Bu Generation. A prime example would be a poem like Viktor Neborak’s “Bubon,” which functioned as a kind of anthem for the Bu-Ba-Bu Generation. It is brief enough to quote in its entirety:

Бубон
(сонет виголошений Літаючою Головою)

—Малюйте БАБУ голу БУ
gуБАми дивиться доБА
БУ дифірамБАм БУ таБУ
вам зуби вставить БУБАБУ
росте поезія з горБА
в горбі з грошима боротьБА
tа БУнтом БУ-де БУБАБУ
від азБУк голова слаБА
ГуБАми виБУхає БАрд
чим світ сичить - кричить театр
зіграєш вірш якого варт
потрапиш в рай (чи на Монмартр)
БУ смерті і безсмертю БУ
і БУ і БА і БУБАБУ

(Neborak 116)
A Drum-Tympanum
(a sonnet uttered by the Flying Head)

—Paint a BABE naked BLUE
with lips the day looks BA
BU in dithyraMBs BU taBOO
put your teeth in BUBABU
poetry grows from hunchBAck work
a BAttle with money in the hump
and BUBABU will BE reBELLion
Your head’s feeble from the alphaBETs
the BArd bursts with his labia lips
what the world hisses with the theater screams
you’ll play a poem that’s worth it all
you’ll end up in Paradise (or Paris)
BU to death to eternity BU
and BU and BA and BUBABU”

(Neborak 117)

The poem’s title “Bubon,” according to C. H. Andrusyshen’s Ukrainian-English Dictionary (44) can be translated as “drum,” “ear-drum,” “tympanum,” and “naughty boy.” While the language of the poem playfully imitates the sound of a snare drum in Neborak’s reading of it, he obviously has virtually all of the above meanings in mind. He is a “naughty boy” for the double-entendric readings of lines. “Maliute BABU holu BU,” for example, can be read as the innocuous “Paint a light blue snowman” as well as “Paint a BABE naked BU.” This kind of paronomastically oriented double-meaningedness of words, phrases, and images is prevalent throughout much of the writing of Neborak and the other Bu-Ba-Bu Generation writers. This kind of writing has created a disconnect from the older generation of Ukrainians, who, for the most part, have rejected such linguistic transgressions and overt sexuality in literature, but, at the same time, it has created a sense of connectedness for younger Ukrainians seeking self-definition and a less rigid notion of their identity.

The Bu-Ba-Bu Generation also focused on holding the icons of its forefathers up to humorous scrutiny. Oleksandr Irvanets provides one of the best examples in his parody of Volodymyr Sosiura’s wildly popular in its time but quite sentimental poem “Love Ukraine” [“Liubit’ Ukraïnu”], which was turned into a patriotic song to rally Ukrainians against the Nazi invaders.10 In Irvanets’s rendition:

ЛЮБІТЬ

Любіть Оклахому! Вночі і в обід,
Як неньку і дедді достоту.
Любіть Індіану. Ї так само любіть
Північну й Південну Дакоту.
Любіть Алабаму в загравах пожеж,
Любіть її радощі й біди.
Айову любіть. Каліфорнію теж.
І пальми крислаті Флоріди.

Дівчино, хай око твоє голуье,
Та не за фізичнії вади,
Коханий любити не встане тебе,
Коли ти не любиш Невади.

Юначе! Ти мусиш любити стократ
Сильніше, ніж любиш кохану,
Колумбію-округ і Джорджю-штат,
Монтану і Луїзіану.

Любити не зможеш ти штатів других,
Коли ти не любиш по-братськи
Полів Арізони й таких дорогих
Просторів Аляски й Небраски.

Любов цю, сильнішу, ніж потяг до вульв,
Плекай у душі незникому.
Вірджінію-штат, як Вірджінію Вулф,
Люби. І люби - Оклахому!... 

**LOVE! (Dedicated to V.M. Sosiura)**

Love Oklahoma! At night and at supper,
Like your mom and your dad quite equal.
Love Indiana. And the very same way
Love Northern and Southern Dakota!

Love Alabama in the red glow of fires,
Love her in joy in misfortune.
Be sure to love Iowa. And California, too.
And the branchy palms of Florida.

Teenybopper! It’s not for your eyes so blue,
And not for your physical defects,
If you stop loving Nevada
Your love will stop loving you too.

Hey guy! You have to love a hundred times
Stronger than you love your Love,
The District of Columbia and Georgia the state,
Montana along with Louisiana.
You can’t love any other states
If you don’t brotherly love
The Arizona fields and the charming
Alaskan Nebraskan wide open space.

This love is stronger than the lure for the vulva,
Cultivate the eternal in your soul.
Love Virginia the state like you do Virginia the Woolf.
And be sure to love—Oklahoma! . . . (641)

Parody, of course, is one of the highest forms of praise—especially since the
object of parody must be a universally recognized cultural icon worthy of irrever-
ence. Besides the mocking of overt nationalism, the poem also transgresses sexual
taboo—particularly the rhyme in the last strophe of “vulvas” [vul’v] with Virginia
Woolf (Vulf). The poem, as could be expected, delighted the younger reading public
and became an object of ire for the more conservative older generation.

The third BuBaBu member and designated Patriarch of the group Yuri Andruk-
hovych also partakes in carnivalesque buffoonery in his literary works. His poem
“Jamaica the Cossack” [“Kozak Iamaika,” for example, fuses his (and Ukrainian youth
culture’s) love for reggae music with the notion of Ukrainian cossackdom:

КОЗАК ЯМАЙКА

о скільки конику-брата в наших чудесях на світі
dивився б допоки крики очей не вип’ють
а мало
по сей бік багама-мама
по той бік пальми гаїті
і вежі фрітауна бачу як вийду вночі з бунгало
і так мені з того гризько що вицвіли всі шаровари
якого лисого чорта з яких попідземних фаун
та й зрадили нас у битві морські косарі корсари
а батько ж хотіли взяти отой блаженний фрітаун
а там тринадцять костьолів і вічна війна з амуром
а ще тринадцять бездень де срібло-золото коморне
dівчата немов ліани нечутно ростуть за муром
і хочеться їм любитись а їх зодягли у чорне

кружка тепер сивуху надвоє з піратом діком
кажу йому схаменися кажу покайся паскудо
невже коли ти європа то вже не єси чоловіком
якого хріна продався за тринадцять гнилих ескудо
а дік то химерна штучка плекає папугу путу
плеще мене позаплічно заламує руки в горі
оце тобі лицар з лугу осьо тобі зелепуту
to be or not to be каже і булькає I’m sorry
невільницю каже маю зі шкірою мов какао
купи сизокрилий орле маркотно ж без господині
город засівати не конче прицмокує так лукаво
gород на ній проростає
тютюн ананаси дині
наплодиш каже козацтва припнеш усіх до коша
tільки я ярму не дається шия моя душа
tа вже його і не чую плюю на плюгаву супліку
конiku мій невірниківі апостоле мій хома
піду на зорю вечірню
зріжу цукрову сопілку
сяду над океаном
tа вже мене і нема

(Luchuk and Naydan 624)

JAMAICA THE COSSACK

oh how many tough miracles are out there my stallion my brother
i’d gaze at them until ravens drink up my eyes but still’d want more
on this side is bahama mama on the other the palms of haiti
at night stepping out of the bungalow i see the towers of freetown

and it makes me feel so frustrated that our sharovars have faded
what the hell for, out of which underground faunas
these mowers-corsaires betrayed us in the battle
when father wanted to take that blessed place, freetown

there they have thirteen churches and an eternal war with cupid
and also thirteen abysses where silver and gold are hidden
young girls there are like vines growing quietly behind the walls
they’re dying to make love but they’ve been dressed in black

and now i drink moonshine together with dick the pirate
i tell him come to your senses, repent i tell him you bastard
is it really that if you’re european you don’t have to be a man
why the fuck have you sold yourself for thirty rotten escudos
and dick he’s a weird one he strokes a piebald parrot
pats me on the shoulder wrings hands up high
here’s a knight errant for you here’s all that green stuff
to be or not to be he says and burps i’m sorry

he says i have a slave girl with skin the color of cocoa
buy her oh my grey eagle it’s tough without a woman
no need to plant a garden he adds chuckling slyly
a garden grows out of her body with tobacco pineapples melons
you’ll make a lot of little cossacks take all of them into your host
however my neck my soul does not yield to a yoke

but i don’t even hear him i spit on his miserable entreat ing
my stallion my unfaithful one my thomas the apostle
i will go out at sunset
make a flute out of sugar cane
sit down by the ocean
and now i am no more

—Translated by Vitaly Chernetsky (625)

As Oleksandr Hrytsenko writes in his article on Cossacks in popular culture in the book Narysy ukraïns’koï populiarnoi kul’ tury, “in mass consciousness the concept of a Ukrainian nation and Cossackhood are virtually synonymous” (Hrytsenko 288). He comments on the attempts by the writers of the sixties to revive the Cossack past in historical novels; in films like Borys Ivchenko’s The Lost Letter [Propala hramota, 1972] and Oleksandr Rou’s Christmas Eve [Nich pered Rizdovm, 1961], based on Gogol’s early stories; and in a subsequent return to the theme of Cossacks in the late 1970s and 1980s with works such as Lina Kostenko’s Marusia Churai [1979] and “A Duma about the Three Non-Azov Brothers” [“Duma pro brativ neazovs’kykh,” 1987], Pavlo Zahrebelny’s novel I, Bohdan (Ia, Bohdan; 1983), and Valerii Shevchuk’s Three Leaves Beyond the Window (Try lystky za viknom, 1986) (Hrytsenko 302–3). Hrytsenko notes a particular “real flood of ‘Cossack’ publications” from scholarly works to historical novels in the time of perestroika (303). Thus it is no wonder the younger generation of writers found a need to escape from this kind of oversaturation, having first been bombarded with decades of Socialist Realism and then with a burgeoning nationalist historical realism. The younger generation, in fact, despite its own strong Ukrainian cultural roots, saw little aesthetic difference between the two.

One should take note that mocking the Ukrainian Cossack past is nothing new for a modern Ukrainian literature, which one could say was born of the depiction of Cossack buffoonery in Ivan Kotliarevsky’s mock-epic Eneïda [1798]. The buffoonery in that particular work made the Cossacks appear as quaint, harmless drunkards to the new
Russian ruling class settling in Ukraine; yet when presented in this innocuous way, it codified and provided a model for the transformation of Ukrainian into a full-fledged, modern literary language.

Other writers outside of Bu-Ba-Bu have also taken similar stances against petrified icons of the Ukrainian past. Observe, for instance, the phenomenon of the Lviv poet Nazar Honchar from the arriere-garde Lu-Ho-Sad literary group, whose shtick as a poet is to be a walking parody of a Cossack. He wears a Cossack scalplock, which gives his routines a particularly comic effect. In the poem “Self-Portrait in a Frying Pan” he combines a meditation on the quintessential Ukrainian staple—varenky, potato dumplings, with an associative link to higher Ukrainian literary culture:

**АВТОПОРТРЕТ У ПАТЕЛЬНІ**

Схиливши над пательнею,  
їм варенники,  
З’їв—  
Пательня масна—  
На дні— я.  
І що ж там крізь мене видно?  
Згадалося “Intermezzo” Коцюбинського.  
Ви читали?

(Luchuk and Naydan 668)

**SELF-PORTRAIT IN A FRYING PAN**

I bend over a frying pan  
and eat fried potato dumplings.  
I eat them up—  
the pan’s greasy—  
at the bottom you can see— me.  
And what else can you see besides me?  
I remember Kotsiubinsky’s “Intermezzo.”  
Have you ever read it?

(669)

In the next to last line he is referring to a short story by the outstanding Ukrainian prose writer Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky (1864–1913), the author of the famous novella turned into a film *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors* (*Tini zabutykh predkiv* [1911]). In another poem he combines a parody of the Lemko-born Ukrainian poet Bohdan Ihor Antonych’s predilection for plant imagery with his own Cossack hairstyle and one of the archetypal plant-world emblems of Ukraine—the sunflower:
A DREAM
(WITH ANTONYCH AT THE HEAD OF THE BED)

they jeered at me
they tormented me
oh-oh-oh

as bald as a mirror
I grew angry:
there’s no sun
in your eyes why?

problems itched the crown of my head
a scalplock
grew
on me
from the tiny white flowers
and from the tiny white flowers
a sunflower grew

(671)

Antonych is, in fact, one of the primary indigenous influences on many of the Bu-Ba-Bu Generation poets, both for the literary quality of his poetry from the 1920s and
1930s and for the constant appeal in his essays for the right to an aesthetic without an overtly nationalistic content—an art’s for art’s sake position that Lidia Stefanowska discusses in detail in her 1999 Harvard Ph.D. dissertation on Antonych. Perhaps the most articulate expression of his position is in his speech “The Poet’s Stance” [“Stanovyschke poeta”], which he gave at a literary awards presentation on January 31, 1935:

In the era of the flowering of Symbolism—the most significant prewar movement in literature, in 1896 Briusov gave three Commandments ‘To a Young Poet. . . . ’ In those “three Commandments” the entire program of the artists of that time is contained: to create for the future, for the eternal, sub specie aeternitatis, extreme individualism, and a service to art for its own sake. Today poets stand at all three points in an opposite position: to create for contemporaneity, to create for reality, to subordinate the individuality of the creator of art to certain ideas, a doctrine, a program, to a certain group, to certain practical goals, to subordinate art for those very same factors. (Antonych 513–14)

In that same essay Antonych further writes:

Let me quote the words of Proust from his Temps retrouvé: “Barres said that the artist should serve first of all the glory of his homeland. However, he serves it only by being an artist, that is, on condition that in the moments when he investigates the rules of art, when he completes his studies and discoveries, which are as subtle as in science, in these moments he does not think about anything else, even his homeland, but only about the truth he is facing.” (Antonych 514)

In his article “National Art” [“Natsional’ne mystetsvo”], Antonych articulates the intrinsic nature of the writer in any national culture—an argument directed against the ultranationalists of his time: “The artist is ‘national’ when he identifies himself with a certain nation and feels the concordance of his psyche with the collective psychology of his nation. If this feeling is honest, it will certainly find an expression—even involuntary—in the artist’s work” (467–76). Thus it is no surprise that Antonych served as an ideal model for Bu-Ba-Bu and many of the new writers of the perestroika and post-independence periods. Having been born a Lemko in Poland, Antonych freely chose Ukrainian as the language of his literary discourse, but he did not want to be coerced into taking the anti-aesthetic stance of the more narrow-minded nationalists of his time.

There was a particular proliferation of literary groups in the late 1980s and 1990s in Ukraine as well as literary almanacs and new journals, all of which in many ways mirrored and extended the processes of the literary renaissance of the 1920s that had been prematurely crushed by Stalin’s crackdown and purges. The philologist-poet Iurko Pozaiak of the Kyïvan literary group The Lost Certificate [Propala hramota] is particularly notable for his linguistic play reminiscent of the Russian Futurist poet Velimir Khlebnikov as well as for his use of nontraditional Ukrainian poetic forms such as his “Alcohaiku” (“Alkokhoku”). See, for example,
It seems just recently
We sat down for a drink,
And outside it’s already autumn. (653)

Or the final verse of that particular cycle:

Always that awful dream—
Champagne and hootch
Plus vermouth and warm beer. (653)

Yuri Andrukhovych verbalizes the role that alcohol played among his generation of writers and artists in an introduction to The Flying Head: “ritual alcoholism was a way of life for us back then” (Neborak 2005, 22). He further observes: “We had to drink in a nice way, easily and cheerfully, without getting plastered at dreadful tables and losing our physical and astral forms. Alcohol was fun, not an obligation or an addiction. Hence its different metaphysics. It was a festive substance” (22).

Much of the playfulness of the Bu-Ba-Bu Generation also managed to interpenetrate other fields, especially art and music. Note particularly the parodic caricatures of contemporary Ukrainian writers and cultural figures by Lviv artist Iurko Kokh that playfully mock Cossack and Ukrainian dress and styles from Ukraine’s historical and cultural past. Many of these can be seen in the special sixth issue of the almanac Chetver, which is entitled Chrysler Imperial [Kraisler Imperial, 1996]. Figure 12.1 is a caricature of Ukrainian writer Yuri Andrukhovych from that issue.

Kokh turns Andrukhovych into a turn-of-the-century Hapsburgian-period dandy with his stylization. The issue functions as a kind of who’s who in Ukrainian culture at the time of its publication and even includes parodies of political figures such as the former president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma.

Another example would be the unique icon-like “angels” painted by Iurii [Yuri] Izdryk as illustrations for Yuri Andrukhovych’s Exotic Birds and Plants [Ekzotychni ptakhy i roslyny, 1997] that blend the notion of the sacred with the profane. An illustration of one of the “angels” can be seen in Figure 12.2.

This particular “exotic bird” bears a strong resemblance to the writer Izdryk himself, whose works of art are quite interesting in their own right for their colorful and often hybrid nature. Numerous examples could also be taken from the theater of the past two decades, where nudity, profanity, and previously banned themes have
all become commonplace. All these examples reveal that the younger generation has been striving to shake a stodgy, insular Ukrainian culture and bring it up to par with other modern Western nations.

Many of the writings of the Bu-Ba-Bu Generation have also crossed generic boundaries and have entered into popular culture, particularly rock music. The Lviv band Jeremiah’s Cry [Plach Ieremii] has performed and recorded, among others, Viktor Neborak’s “Flying Head” [“Litaiucha holova”]; Petro Midianka’s “Hi, there, Mr. Warhol” [“Servus, pane Vorhol”] with its existentially nationally focused question “Andy Warhol, are you a Rusyn or a Khokhol?”; and Nazar Honchar’s “Ode to a Bed or Lullabye to Myself” [“Oda do lizhka abo kolyskova dlia sebe”], with its catchy refrain of “do you sleep English?”/”schlaufen sie deutsch?” Neborak himself has recorded his own poetry-rock cassette “NEBOrok” (reissued as a CD in 2003 by Atlantik Music Artist Agency) that also appealed to a large audience across the border in Poland. Neborak’s 1990 collection The Flying Head, in fact, contains numerous poems based on Western forms including rock and rap music.

Translations of foreign poets have been steadily appearing in Ukrainian journals and publishing houses since the mid-1980s. Even before then, a number of foreign authors unavailable in the Soviet Union in Russian were available in Polish translations, which many Western Ukrainian poets were able to read. The Ukrainian poets of today now regularly travel to give readings in Ukraine’s neighboring Slavic countries. Many, too, have traveled to the other parts of Europe and the United States on grants and as writers-in-residence, and their works are being published in translation in virtually every language of the continent. The multilingual writers, who can communicate in the native tongues of their European neighbors, such as Yuri Andrukhovych (German, English, Polish, and Russian) and Oksana Zabuzhko (English, Polish, and Russian) have, understandably, had the most frequent invitations as ambassadors of Ukrainian culture abroad. And the younger generation of writers is largely growing up with second language skills (usually English, German, Russian, or French), which naturally opens up possibilities for future interaction. New Ukrainian poetry, in all its manifestations, from the avant-garde to the traditional, is finding a new audience in translation and new interlocutors. This, of course, is a natural process and one that bodes well for future developments, precisely because it is a non-coercive one. There is room for a wide array of poets from more traditionalist ones such as Natalka Bilotserkivets and Oleh Lysheha to the innovative Bu-Ba-Bu Generation avant-garde, including its immediate literary offspring such as the poetically anarchistic Kharkiv poet Serhii Zhadan. While Ukrainian poets have been, in the words of Oksana Zabuzhko, “freed from the obligation ‘to save the nation’” (Zabuzhko 87), they have done much to support the ideals of the Orange Revolution and to guarantee the absence of coercive intertextuality that might have been reimposed on them. They also continue to serve as cultural ambassadors to a world that now more readily recognizes Ukraine’s existence. And this ultimately, more than at any other time in the history of modern Ukraine, gives them the opportunity to shape their own identity, one that is inexorably linked to a larger European and Western world.
Notes

1. Fizer used the term in a paper he delivered at a conference at Yale University on Russian-Ukrainian literary relations in 1985 under the title “Against Coercive Intertextuality.” He was kind enough to share a copy of the paper with me. For the best analysis of Russo-Ukrainian literary relations in an historical context, see Shkandrij 2001.

2. For a detailed analysis of the Literary Discussion see Shkandrij 1992. The title of Lavrinenko’s pathbreaking anthology was The Executed Renaissance [Rozstriliane vidrodzhennia, 1959]. See also Luckyj 1956: revised ed. 1990.


4. The term “shestydesiatnyky” became theappellation to designate the Ukrainian writers who emerged in the 1960s following the Thaw. Many of them were young poets who searched for new forms and who rejected the stifling tenets of conformist Socialist Realism. Some of the leading members included Vasyl Symonenko, Mykola Vinhranovsky, Lina Kostenko, Ivan Dziuba, and VasyI Stus. The term is translated into English in a variety of ways including “Sixties,” “Writers of the Sixties,” or “Poets of the Sixties.” Bohdan Kravtsov compiled a volume of sixty of the Poets of the Sixties under the title Sixty Poets of the Sixties (Shistdesiat poetiv shistdesiatykh rokiv, Munich, 1967).

5. A program of “cultural infiltration” run by the U.S. State Department was in effect during the Cold War, which brought authors such as Edward Albee, John Steinbeck, John Updike, and others to the USSR. However, contacts with these visiting writers were greatly restricted and controlled.

6. The name of the group is formed from the first syllable of the Ukrainian words for bufoonery [bufonada], puppet show farce [balahan], and burlesque [burlesk]. For a good discussion of the Bu-Ba-Bu phenomenon see Andryczyk.

7. For detailed account of the Chrysler Imperial happening, see Hrycak.

8. I deal in part with the impact of Bu-Ba-Bu on Ukrainian literary culture in my 2005 article, in which I also include several poetry translations and one prose translation of the three authors.

9. Translations from Ukrainian in this chapter are mine unless designated otherwise.

10. For Sosiura’s original see Luchuk and Naydan, 216–17.

11. The name of the group comes from the first syllable of each member’s last name: Ivan Luchuk, Nazar Honchar, and Roman Sadlovsky. The name also suggests the words “meadow” [luh] and “orchard/garden” [sad] with a linking vowel between. Honchar (b. 1964) is the author of The Law of Universal Twinkling [Zakon vsesvitn’oho merekhtinnia], which was included in The Poetic Arrière-Garde [Poetychnyi ar’iergard, 1996] anthology of Luhosad. The other two members of the group, Luchuk (b. 1965) and Sadlovsky (b. 1964), are also known for their contributions in the form of palindromes in the case of the former and for visual poetry. Honchar’s most recent collection is titled ABOUTmeNEWS (PROMeneVIST’, 2004).

References


The debate about Ukrainian culture’s orientation changed in regard to subject and discourse after Ukraine gained its independence in 1991. This significant shift occurred primarily between 1997 and 1999. At the turn of the twenty-first century the debate on orientation came to divide Ukrainian intellectuals. This was due to the political and social atmosphere in Ukraine after President Kuchma’s second term, according to my preliminary hypothesis. The diversity of cultural and intellectual life previously seen in the late 1980s to the early 1990s was replaced by a simpler picture. Intellectual circles became highly polarized. Some of them attempted to dominate the debate by making use of an old device of Soviet propaganda: a black-and-white picture allows the exclusion of “the ugly” and the search for an “internal enemy,” who is blamed for one’s lack of success. The old oppositions of modernizers vs. traditionalists and East vs. West proved applicable to this new situation.

It is customary to speak of two main political and cultural orientations in Ukraine, or even two poles: the European or pro-Western, and the pro-Eastern, which most participants in the debate regard as equivalent to pro-Russian. The nature of this division has been discussed many times over the last ten years by researchers, journalists, and other experts. Every general schema, however, particularly regarding the East-West division, tends to stereotype. In actuality, neither the pro-Eastern orientation nor the pro-Western is homogeneous. One can distinguish many different attitudes or ideologies within the so-called pro-Western cultural orientation. There also exist other orientations, which cannot be defined as either pro-Eastern or pro-Western, such as one of the most popular approaches, the nativist. I define nativism in the Ukrainian case as opposing the fear of acculturation and assimilation and advocating the re-establishment of old values. It differs from traditionalism, and from chauvinism. Ukrainian nativism is hostile not as much toward Russian culture (the threat of Russification), as toward Western (modernized) patterns. Of course, Ukrainian nativist discourse is far from homogeneous. Within it, one can distinguish several directions,
among them neopaganist, millenarist, anti-occidental, and neoslavophilic. They are often neatly intertwined with other outlooks. In this chapter, I will trace the appearance and proliferation of nativist discourse in the mid-1990s, and, more precisely, I will discuss the new face of this orientation as it was revealed during the 1990s debates among Ukrainian writers born around 1960.

My earlier investigations have shown that there are links between the traditionalist and modernist approaches, as is apparent in the debates on Ukrainian cultural identity between writers of the so-called Zhytomyr and Stanislaviv Literary Schools (Hnatiuk 2003, 126–28). Here I will focus on several _minorum gentium_ writers and literary critics and their comments on works by better-known authors. Their considerations have a generalizing character, and are closely related to the old issue of the Europeanization or westernization of Ukrainian culture, as well as to the effort to (re)construct Ukrainian cultural identity. I will show that, while the nativist arguments are very well known from nineteenth-century Russian and Ukrainian debates, and can be recognized as typical of traditionalists or of populists (_narodnyky_), the origins of these arguments are rather unexpected: they are rooted in Soviet propaganda discourse.

Arguments made by critics and writers during the past decade often refer to a discussion that began over one hundred years ago between the _narodnyky_ and the “modernists,” a discussion that—with some interruptions—has continued to the present day. One hundred years ago, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, during an era of Ukrainian nation-building, the issue of modernization was very strongly linked to the idea of the desirability of “Europeanization” or “westernization” of one’s own culture. “Europeanization” (or modernization, in sociological terms) usually means acculturation, that is, the process of cultural mixing or borrowing that occurs between individuals and groups representing different cultural systems. Ukrainian _narodnyky_ declined the project of modernization, which had reached Ukraine in Russian form during the nineteenth century. However, they were not anti-occidentalists _per se_. Mykola Riabchuk claims that they were “westernizers despite themselves” (Riabchuk 66–102). Ukrainian _narodnyky_ differed from their Russian counterparts in their attitude toward Western culture. However, their contemporary heirs are, in fact, both anti-modernizers and anti-occidentalists. Despite their claims of fidelity to Ukrainian nineteenth-century tradition, their anti-Western orientation instead resembles that of the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles, or _pochvenniki_.

In the late 1990s, the East-West controversy became one of the main subjects of literary debate. This was not true five years earlier, in the late 1980s to early 1990s, which was a period of great fertility of themes, figures, and approaches. At that point, the literary debate was particularly intense, with the onset of a certain cultural reevaluation, combined with a rehabilitative process—both real and metaphoric—of the cultural works of art repressed by the previous regime. This was all accompanied by an extraordinary vitality in literary life; it was at this time that young writers, as well as writers who had previously been banned or censored in Ukraine, were publishing their works for the first time. Over a period of just a few years, many writers of different generations who were opposed to official Soviet socialist culture entered the
literary scene. As Ernest Gellner (316) wrote, the effect of this kind of concentration, which would normally be distributed over a much greater period of time, is such that it becomes impossible to dissect, and any attempt to do so would be artificial and pedantic. Thus, substantially different attitudes can sometimes coexist within the same time frame, something that would be impossible under different circumstances.

In that time period, the variety of literary phenomena was so huge that it seemed improbable that the heated discussions about literature could boil down to issues from the past, including the one-hundred-year-old opposition between modernists and traditionalists, or “westernizers” and new narodnyky (neoslavophiles). But this did indeed happen; the controversies of modernization and Europeanization were once again picked up and made the central point of the debate. It turned out that these issues were very contemporary and relevant. In the late 1990s to early 2000s, this discussion was held in several arenas, ranging from journalistic discourse, publishing and literary criticism, to scholarly research. The fact that contemporary intellectual elites have picked up aspects of this century-old discussion should not be perceived as unnatural; this discussion was simply interrupted by Stalinist repression. However, no matter how important the central issue may be, the greater picture should not be distorted by treating other critical issues as subordinate. Issues such as the need for de-Sovietization of the culture, and the debate concerning state policy in culture, have been replaced by a “safer” controversy. The complex problem of modernization and Europeanization has become simplified into an East-West polarization.

There is another way in which today’s debate about cultural identity resembles that of a century ago. Those who stress the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture and oppose foreign influence are more inclined to be extremist in their perception of reality, as compared to those who favor modernization. The fact that supporters of traditionalism refer so readily to the opposition of extremes is surprising, considering that in the early 1990s, when faced with the choice first posed in 1925 by Khvylovy as “Europe or Prosvita” [Europe or enlightenment], the common answer was “Europe!” In the period of perestroika, the notion of Prosvita, expanded by Khvylovy to include mass literature as propagated chiefly by the Communist Party, had a clearly negative connotation. Over a period of just a few years, however, a significant change occurred, namely that the concept of Prosvita gained a positive connotation within a nativist group of intellectuals. This group succeeded in introducing into contemporary discussion a category regarded as secondary by the rest of the participants in Ukrainian literary life: the one-hundred-year-old opposition between occidentalism and narodnytstvo [populism] (also known as pochvennichestvo in Russian, or gruntivstvo in Ukrainian). Paradoxically, toward the end of the 1990s this opposition was imposed by the writers who identified themselves with this nativist group. Eventually, other participants in the discussion started to use it as well. It was a “return” of old categories, which are inadequate not only for Ukrainian culture, as demonstrated by Riabchuk, but also for the contemporary situation at the end of the twentieth century. The debates about postmodernism that were still so heated in the middle of the previous decade began to lose momentum, and the circle of supporters of that trend diminished. Some leading writers,
considered to be postmodernists, gradually changed their orientation to traditionalist. Voices claiming that postmodernism was a threat to Ukrainian culture became louder. The concurrence between the appearance of a new generation sharply criticizing its predecessors, and of this phenomenon does not seem to be purely accidental. The decentralization of literary life also had significance here, and the emergence of new literary phenomena on the periphery, as compared to the previous situation, attracted the attention of the entire literary public. This focus on certain “marginal” writers was probably painful for the “center,” as well as for other “peripheries,” particularly since these authors gained popularity abroad as well.

The Center and the Peripheries

Let us trace the development of a phenomenon that accompanied the decentralization of literary life in Ukraine: the success of one group of writers, and the rebellion or fronde of another group. A single literary organization, the Union of Ukrainian Writers, had existed in Ukraine up until the late 1980s and early 1990s, and then numerous literary groups representing unofficial literary life emerged. These included Bu-Ba-Bu, the Lviv group Luhosad [Meadow Orchard, actually the first syllables of the members’ names: Luchuk, Honchar and Sadlovsky], the Kyïv group Propala Hramota [Lost Document, the name of a Gogol short story], the Zhytomyr group centered around Avzeh [Indeed] magazine, and the Kharkiv group Chervona Fira [Red Wagon]. These groups, which were rather diverse in their programs and artistic approaches, had one thing in common: distaste for official cultural life. At first, this was not a protest against the Writers’ Union (some of the writers in these groups had just recently been accepted as members of the Union of Ukrainian Writers). The young writers from those “informal” groups, as they were labeled at the time, did not so much oppose major cultural activities as strive to create an alternative to official culture. It was only later, about a year after Ukrainian Independence, that these writers began to manifest a considerable dislike for the Writers’ Union as an institution symbolizing the enslavement of Ukrainian culture. Serious accusations were leveled, as for example in the title of Ievhen Pashkovsky’s address in 1992: “Literatura iak zlochyn” [Literature as a crime]. In the mid-1990s, a polarization occurred within the writers’ circles which were called “independent,” or more often “informal.” The roots of their negative attitude toward the official cultural situation were the same, but the paths of the two new camps now diverged. Some of the writers, such as Pashkovsky and Viacheslav Medvid, who at first firmly rejected the possibility of any cooperation with the circles of established writers from the Union of Ukrainian Writers, decided just a few years later that such cooperation was not only needed, but crucial; they joined the Union of Ukrainian Writers, assenting to the hierarchy of values adopted in official cultural life, even accepting the Shevchenko State Literary Award, sharply criticized by many writers from this generation. These writers, considering the Writers’ Union to be completely discredited, left it and in 1997 founded the Association of Ukrainian Writers (AUP), a trade-union-type organization whose objective was the protection
of writers’ interests. Although neither of the two associations had a literary program, the Writers’ Union, as evidenced by the attitudes of its members, was associated with traditionalism and nativism, while the AUP had a pro-Western orientation. Thus it was in the mid-1990s that a division between the informal literary groups that had first emerged at the end of the 1980s became noticeable. To a considerable degree, this situation resulted from the groups’ relative success.

Writers labeled in the mid-1990s as the “Zhytomyr School” (Pashkovsky, Medvid, Volodymyr Danylenko, Mykola Zakusylo, and others) were well known, but did not gain in popularity. Their works were not translated into foreign languages (later it was claimed that these works were untranslatable because of their original Ukrainian soul, while works which were translated into foreign languages were not truly Ukrainian, only Ukrainophone—“ukraïns’komovni”). “Zhytomyr School” writers did not have grants from foreign foundations in Ukraine, nor did they participate in international conferences and cultural events. In contrast, the Bu-Ba-Bu group achieved great literary and media popularity, featuring such writers as Yuri Andrukhovych, Oleksandr Irvanets, and Viktor Neborak, all of whom were linked more or less to Lviv and Halychyna [Galicia]. They were well known in Ukraine, and their works (especially Andrukhovych’s) were translated into foreign languages. They were invited to participate in various events abroad. (In 1995, however, this group gradually began to fall apart, and its members went down their separate literary paths.) At the same time, some writers from a younger generation, as well as some coevals, accused Bu-Ba-Bu members of the carnivalization of Ukrainian literature, and coined the term bubabism as a synonym for infantile and epigonic literature (Zborovska 1998) and for postmodernism, which is treated with hostility as being part of a liberal ideology (Kvit 1998).

In their discourse on shaping cultural identity, modernizers such as Andrukhovych use a different language than the nativists, and appeal to different values. Their statements carry entirely different connotations. While both modernizers and nativists use one common term, postmodernism, their understanding and evaluation of it diverges. Their mapping of literary Ukraine also differs. The nativists concentrate on Kyїv (although they live in Kyїv, they prefer to appeal to Zhytomyr as a symbol of pure Ukrainian culture), and delineate the culture very clearly. Their vision is center-oriented. The modernizers, in contrast, avoid borders; their vision is polycentric. If they distinguish any territory, it is a more regional one.

The Stanislaviv Phenomenon

The label “Stanislaviv phenomenon,” which was applied to the local writers grouped around the almanac Chetver [Thursday] under the leadership of Andrukhovych and Izdryk, surfaced around 1991 and became increasingly popular by the middle of the 1990s, reaching its peak in 1997–98. According to the participants, by that time it was no longer just “the Stanislaviv phenomenon,” but the “legendary phenomenon” or the “legendary writers.” Some literary critics began to place the phenomenon on the literary map of Ukraine.¹⁰ That is when the Mala Ukraїns’ka Entsyklopediia Aktual’noї
**Literature** [Little Encyclopedia of Current Ukrainian Literature] was published—a peculiar manifesto of this circle that went beyond strictly literary boundaries. It was a cross between an anthology and a true encyclopedia with brief articles on contemporary Ukrainian writers and concepts. The authors of the *Little Encyclopedia* have tried to change the literary canon by imposing their own patterns—new texts and a new interpretation of the Ukrainian literary process.\(^{11}\)

Among the literary critics outside the *Chetver* almanac circle, its popularity produced irritation rather than interest. Unfavorable reviews of the *Little Encyclopedia* provide proof of this irritation, both on the part of peers, such as Ihor Bondar-Tereshchenko (16–18), Ievhen Baran (2000), and Andrii Kokotiukha (1999), as well as of the older generation (Hryhorii Shton, Bohdan Boychuk). For them *Little Encyclopedia* with its imposing of a new literary canon would change their recognized position. They answered with accusations: of cosmopolitanism (Baran, Shton), *ignorance* (Boychuk), or even irresponsibility. None of them had treated the *Little Encyclopedia* as an invitation to discuss the problem, namely the coexistence of two different canons: the Soviet and the patriotic one, and the need for creating a new, modern one.

The *fronde* was started already in 1997 by Ievhen Baran, a prolific critic from Ivano-Frankivsk. After the publication of the *Encyclopedia*, he stated that “there is no Stanislaviv phenomenon, just as there is no Ukrainian city by the name of Stanislaviv” (2000, 108). According to this critic, the *Little Encyclopedia* was somewhat interesting, but on the whole was rather harmful, because “if no more [works of this type] appear, the literary process of the 1990s will be assessed through the cosmopolitanism of Ieshkiliev-Andrukhovych as partly positive, but in that particular case as terribly primitive” (106). In the same review, Baran states that the Stanislaviv phenomenon is a myth created for purely local benefit.\(^{12}\) The reader’s attention must be called to Baran’s characteristic accusations of cosmopolitanism. Considering the usage present in all post-Communist countries, this constitutes a reference to the language of propaganda and anti-Semitism.

The neatly phrased negation of the phenomenon itself calls for further comment. Stanislaviv is the old name of a town and it is used to this very day in Polish. The name was changed for Ivano-Frankivsk in 1961. The purpose of this change was clear—to erase the *signum* of the old Polish tradition from the Galicia region—and it was part of the Sovietization program for this region. Nevertheless the name *Stanislaviv* or *Stanislav* is still used in Ukraine by a small circle of people deeply connected with this town who attach significance to the town’s multicultural past. This is not always accompanied by an acceptance of Polish culture; users of the old name are more likely to refer positively to Austro-Hungarian times than to the Second Republic of Poland. In the eyes of these intellectuals, the Austro-Hungarian past of Stanislaviv (and the entire Halychyna/Galicia region) is a sign that Ukraine belongs to Central European history (Hnatiuk 2003, 184–230). When Baran writes that “there is no Stanislaviv phenomenon, just as there is no Ukrainian city by the name of Stanislaviv,” he opts for sterilization of the present and the past, and the removal of any foreign elements. He also rejects the European history of that city and of the entire region of Halychyna.
Translating the meaning of this statement into the language of social-anthropological concepts, this is counter-acculturation, a categorical rejection of foreign cultural patterns and an opposition to any attempts to introduce them into the mother culture.

**How Does a Literary School Emerge?**

Despite Baran’s comments, a counterbalance to this phenomenon exists. In the mid-1990s, before the appearance of the *Little Encyclopedia*, a few rather large anthologies were published which were to play a similar role as literary manifestos, usually for a particular generation. The Smoloskyp publishing house printed *Molode Vyno* [Young Wine], *Teksty* [Texts], and *Imennyk* [Noun]; Medvid’s own anthology was published (1995), as was a peculiar manifesto called *Ukraїna irredenta*, edited by Serhiі Kvit (1997). In addition, over the course of just the year 1997, several anthologies of contemporary Ukrainian prose were published, in particular a three-volume anthology, the literary project of Ukrainian TV channel 1+1 (at that time a relatively independent, and therefore very popular, channel; only beginning in 1999 was it influenced by the Kuchma regime). Volodymyr Danylenko headed the project, although at the time he appeared to be a very marginal figure in Ukrainian literary life. The subtitle of the anthology volume *Vecheria na dvanadtsiat’ person* [Dinner for Twelve People], which features a selection of texts by authors connected in one way or another with Zhytomyr, contains the phrase “the Zhytomyr School of prose,” defined on the book’s cover as “a laboratory of contemporary Ukrainian prose, where experiments are conducted to counteract foreign cultural aggression.” On the surface, this seems to be just one of many anthologies; however, its significance in the development of events on the literary scene was enormous, and not only for literary reasons, i.e. as a proclamation of the Zhytomyr School of prose. It played a huge role in altering the essence of the discourse.

Danylenko begins the foreword to this work (1: 5) by comparing the birth of the Zhytomyr School of prose to the phenomenon of Provence or Latin American literature. In the eyes of the editor of that anthology, Valerii Shevchuk, Ievhen Kontsevych, and translator Borys Ten became the “fathers” of this School, while Ievhen Pashkovsky, Mykola Zakusylo, and Viacheslav Medvid were their worthy successors. In his foreword, Danylenko pits the “First world” against Ukraine, cosmopolitanism against the national spirit, modernism against traditionalism, and the “Halychyna School” against the “Zhytomyr School.” Beneath this discussion, which is seemingly about contemporary literature, glares a dislike of the “alien,” the “other,” to whom the author attributes all evil, all actions damaging to the Ukrainian culture and nation before the destruction of the Soviet Union. According to Danylenko, this is the source of all illness and lack of moral principle, and can be traced to the ideas of the Russian Slavophiles. So how does that author define this “us,” as opposed to the hostile “alien”? “We” is defined in a very narrow way, in short, as the “Zhytomyr School.”

A defining feature of this “School” might be traditionalism; at least, this word [традиціоналізм] appears in the foreword a few times, and always in a positive con-
text. At the same time, the author just as often, and just as positively, uses the word “experiment” [експеримент]. But in the literary context, “experiment” is an antonym to traditionalism. For Danylenko, however, “experimentation” or experiments presently underway, lead to serious concerns:

In healthy nations on the borderline between resistance to traditionalism and the expansion of aggressive cultures, a mutant has always developed, which, formally speaking, becomes like the culture of the aggressor, but remains within the spirit of its own culture. In contemporary Ukrainian prose, it is the Zhytomyr School that took upon itself such a line of resistance; there the confrontation between foreign-language cultural expansion and Ukrainian traditionalism comes very close. (1: 7; italic added)

Thus any further attempt to clarify what this “us” means is fruitless, since “us” exists only in opposition to the enemy; it is, as the author says, a “mutant” which takes its form from the enemy, but is filled with a different, healthy spirit. This constitutes a stage in building one’s own identity through conflict with the “other.” On an irrational basis, this conflict lifts “us” above the “other,” maintaining this “us” in a state of war with the surrounding world, because only such a war guarantees the integrity of this “us.” Among the best-recognized enemy formations of “us” are modernity and rationalism, and in culture these are postmodernism and formalism. Danylenko places the “soul” in opposition to the “mind,” clearly having little regard for the mind. He indicates that the “Halychyna School” is guided solely by the mind. These are echoes of a discussion that has been underway for two centuries already and concerns the heritage of the Enlightenment that is discarded by the traditionalists. This issue has produced a huge reverberation among Russian Slavophiles and contemporary neoslavophiles, in their accusations of rationalism and soullessness in Westernizers and the West. The inclination to view problems in radical extremes, characteristic of the ideology of the New Right, unveils itself here with great clarity.

The East-West Controversy and the Language of Propaganda

In stereotyping this problem, Danylenko links the West with the mind, and the East with the soul. It is not difficult to detect where he places the Zhytomyr School in this binary opposition: “as far as the ‘East-West’ vector goes, the Zhytomyr School is more eastern than western” (10, italic added). Let us note that this is the first such open stance favoring the eastern option in Ukrainian culture since 1991.

The experience that provided the uniting factor for this “School”—the only one mentioned in the foreword—was something that the author described as the “Chornobyl factor.” He has in mind not so much the Chornobyl catastrophe, or the social effects of this disaster, but Chornobyl as a sign of the end of days, the “beginning of the apocalypse.” If we add the phrase “world of ruins” that he mentions slightly earlier in his text, then it turns out that the author treats the “new order” that emerged from the collapse of the Empire as the apocalyptic “final times.” This makes it pos-
sible to view Danylenko’s text against the background of the integral traditionalism represented by the general views of René Guénon. The style of Danylenko’s thinking can be placed within the realm of nationalism in its aggressive form. He erases the differences between literature and ideology, regarding aesthetics as a secondary feature that does not determine the essence of the “spirit” but that is infected by the disease of postmodernism.

After providing a rather chaotic description of the “Zhytomyr School”—a description which is not very helpful even to a person convinced of the school’s existence, since its internal cohesion is presented as shaped by a hostile outside world—Danylenko moves on to the “Halychyna School” as its extreme opposite. Just as with the “Zhytomyr School,” our literary historian assumes the existence of the “Halychyna School” as a certainty, although it is he himself who seems to have first introduced both of these concepts in opposition to one another. While the “Zhytomyr School” is presented in the anthology as a positive phenomenon, the writers from Halychyna are portrayed as a factor that is destructive of Ukrainian culture. When dealing with the “Halychyna School,” the author points to two figures who, in his opinion, are central: Iurii Yuri Vynnychuk and Iurii Andrukhovych. These two perform “the organizational polarizing roles of an ideologist and a sterilizer; the ideologist carries out the sublimation of regional values and creates around them a Halychyna-centered coloring, while the sterilizer, by applying aesthetic copies from foreign literature, castrates the national spirit. And so, in the Halychyna School, one end is Halychyna-centric, and the other is Europe-centric” (8).

Both citations (7 and 8) contain references to laboratory work and have clear military connotations. While the objective of the Zhytomyr “lab” is defensive in nature, the goal of its “Halychyna” counterpart is aggression. These references lead us straight to the Soviet propaganda language of the Cold War, which spoke of various hidden and masked enemies on the inside, performing very specific roles, and of the duty to uncover and neutralize them. In applying this type of speech, Danylenko addresses the reader using the language of hate. Its sources were precisely recognized and ironically described by Kostiantyn Moskalets:

Academician Danylenko will receive the St. George’s Cross from the hands of the dear and beloved First Secretary, while gulag prisoners Andrukhovych, Izdryk and Vynnychuk (“a ferocious ideologist of Halychyna regionalism”—that is how the new history of Ukrainian literature will describe him) will be smoking fags on the freshly cut stump of a Siberian cedar during their break from work. (17)

Most critics applauded the appearance of the Dinner for Twelve People anthology. Characteristically, the SPU’s (Union of Writers in Ukraine) weekly Literaturna Ukraïna [Literary Ukraine] published sizeable texts devoted to Danylenko’s anthology in two consecutive issues. This was the beginning of the “reunion” between the post-Communist establishment in the Union of Writers, and formerly non-official writers. From then on, it became fashionable to speak of the existence of two Schools in new Ukrainian literature. Articles were published in all of the more important liter-
ary journals and in many newspapers which stressed this polarization, although, as mentioned above, before the appearance of this anthology different descriptions had been used to point to the existence of this division.

Towards Organic, or True, National Literature

I will focus on one very characteristic publication. In his 1998 article in Literaturna Ukraina entitled “Kanon ta prystrast’” [The canon and the Passion], Serhii Kvit discussed the series “Modern Ukrainian literature,” which at that point consisted of six published books. Kvit focused on three of them, those written by Andrukhovych, Pavlyshyn and Luckyj (Lutsky). A reference to the ideological discourse underway appears in this article in a rather unexpected place—not when discussing Andrukhovych’s prose, but in examining the Ukrainian translation of George Luckyj’s book Between Gogol and Shevchenko. Kvit, who is a literary historian and the chief editor of the journal Ukrainian Problems for the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, considers Luckyj’s book to have “extensively addressed the problem of cultural dualism and choice, or using the more updated terminology, postmodernism and narodnytstvo” (1998, 6). Kvit proceeds to present the series on contemporary Ukrainian literature in opposition to the three anthologies published as the literary project of the 1+1 Channel, and he expresses his satisfaction that the notion of the “Zhytomyr School of prose” was entering literary thought as a legitimate concept. He does not object to the ideological aura around the Dinner for Twelve People anthology. The author notes, however, the presence of bubabism, postmodernism and liberalism in the three books discussed. His criticism of “non-organic style” (meaning artificial and not national), and of the surrender to ideology of which Andrukhovych is accused, appears relatively insignificant in comparison to his condemnation of Marko Pavlyshyn, an Australian researcher who, in Kvit’s view, applies a new postcolonial methodology, “ergo, a new type of totalitarianism,” in his studies devoted to contemporary Ukrainian literature. In Kvit’s opinion, postmodernism is an ideology that constitutes an extreme threat to Ukrainian culture.

It is worth taking a closer look at the way in which he tries to add credibility to his statements and to the values that he invokes. Disregarding the reader’s potential concerns about the random use of different concepts and notions (postmodernism, totalitarianism), the author states the following: “And what is postmodernism? Perhaps only the word ‘democracy’ is equivalent in its degree of haziness and lack of clarity.” Then, fighting the two “ideologies” simultaneously, the author offers several short sentences that are evocative of Biblical style: “This [postmodernism and democracy] is the new Tower of Babel. It can be brought to ruin only by self-definition. The soul lives with a sense of terror. Art as passion belongs to eternity, art incorporated in styles, art itself is eternity” (Kvit 1998, 6). In the paragraphs that follow, the author returns to his normal style of long, usually rather complicated sentences. Hence, the paragraph cited stands in clear contrast to the rest of the text. The sentences create the impression of being out of context and unrelated. In this way, the author tries to
imitate a prophetic style, to create a sense of apocalypse, as well as a perspective on eternity. In the same paragraph, the critic calls upon Dmytro Dontsov’s authority, and that is why it is not difficult to discern his message of voluntarism, that is, his treating the will as superior to the intellect and emotions. The text communicates a sense of renewal of one’s own cultural tradition, and opposition to modern culture as something alien, as is typical of the nativist approach. The pathos used by the author to defend Romanticism, his prophetic pose, and his appeal to Dontsov’s authority leave no doubt as to the source of his attitude: this is revolutionary conservatism, which is hostile toward modernity and close to fascism.

Kvit reduces the dispute about contemporary Ukrainian literature’s status to the opposition between postmodernism and narodnytstvo, pushing new problems into old frames. In this way, the dispute between artistic circles, or between “regions,” is transformed into an ideological controversy. It is precisely at this point—the rejection of the modernization project—that Kvit’s nativism meets with Danylenko’s counter-acculturation attitude.

In May 1999, at a seminar for creative young people organized by the Smoloskyp publishing house in the town of Irpin, Ivan Andrusiak from the Stanislaviv group the “New Degeneration” led a roundtable discussion entitled “The Literary Press in Ukraine: ‘occidentalists’ and ‘gruntivtsi’” (the latter signifying contemporary populists who are trying to create an organic style, rooted in Ukrainian soil). Andrusiak, who belongs to the circle of young writers connected to Smoloskyp, which is hardly friendly towards “postmodernist experiments,” considered it his duty to present the ideological division that exists in new Ukrainian literature. There is no doubt that it was the Dinner for Twelve People anthology that provided the source for such a perception of the literary map of Ukraine. The dispute between these circles of writers, which can be considered a collision of traditionalist and modernist attitudes, took on a shape different from its initial one, however.

Let us recapitulate. At first, the differences between the writers’ circles were depicted only from an ideological point of view. Later, as illustrated by Kvit’s review, the discourse shifted to the arena of cultural formations, labeled postmodernist and “narodnyk.” The debate organized by Smoloskyp shifted this still further, in time as well as space, namely to the nineteenth century and to Russia (as I have mentioned, gruntivtsi as a notion appeared only in this debate, and it is a term modeled on its Russian nineteenth-century equivalent, pochvenniki). It was in the nineteenth century that the dispute between Slavophiles and occidentalists, or—if Slavophilism is to be perceived in a wider view—between pochvenniki and occidentalists, constituted a controversy that was of fundamental importance for Russian culture. The very few Ukrainian Slavophiles and the numerous narodnyky differed in substance from their Russian counterparts, in that their activities had no anti-Western thrust. Openness to a few select patterns of western European culture was a significant part of their program. There were no genuine Ukrainian occidentalists in existence at the time: the nationalist agenda came before one of modernization. Thus, contemporary references to the controversy between the Slavophiles, or pochvenniki, and the occidentalists as part of the Ukrainian national tradition are an unconscious use
of a conceptual cliché taken from Russian culture. Paradoxically, standing for tradition and originality, for the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture, for *Ukraine irredenta*, as Kvit named the phenomenon, has led to a rather unsophisticated imitation of Russian patterns in the debate over the East-West issue.

We may conclude from this analysis that it was the anthology *Dinner for Twelve People*, not so much its texts but the manner in which the editor placed them within an ideological framework, that played a special role in polarizing the writers’ circles, with the mass media helping to popularize this project by introducing it to a wide audience. The TV 1+1 program presenters, among them Kostiantyn Rodyk and Iurii Makarov, actively participated in propagating the project as well as the ideas of its editor. The TV program was repeated a number of times, making it possible to speak of the existence of two Schools in Ukrainian literature: the Zhytomyr School and the Halychyna School, with a focus on the former as a School of “national and not regional significance.”19 A few years later, on the fifth anniversary of TV channel 1+1, the anthologies edited by Danylenko were mentioned again as a great cultural achievement (see Lobanovskaia).

Initially, the division in contemporary Ukrainian literature into camps of occidentalists and *gruntivtsi*, or postmodernists and *narodnyky*, or (to use more accurate terminology) modernizers and nativists, was an artificial creation. The milieu was not homogeneous. However, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s these writers belonged if not to the underground, then to unofficial culture. This milieu had common aims and presented much the same attitudes (Hnatiuk 2003, 61–120). Ten years later, this milieu was polarized into two groups. The first recommended itself as the public defender of “true Ukrainian tradition.” The second was labeled (although not on its own initiative, of course) as “westernizing” and was accused of attempting to destroy Ukrainian tradition. Nevertheless, such a division has indeed occurred. At the end of the 1990s, modernizers began to refer to themselves in the nativists’ terms, as “westernizers,” and this was a significant victory for the nativists. They managed to shift the modernizers to a marginal position. Moreover, they succeeded in labeling the modernizers in old Soviet propaganda terms as “internal enemies.”

As I have shown, the language used by two of the authors examined here (Danylenko and Baran) is fully dependent on the language of anti-Western Communist propaganda. The third author, Kvit, appeals to the ideology of integral nationalism, which exalts one’s own nation, mythicizes its past and history, and demonizes its enemies. The use of clichés and stereotypes has become a very common phenomenon in current Ukrainian literary discourse, but very few participants in literary life have noticed it and recognized the origins of such language. I would call this phenomenon a post-totalitarian syndrome (in contrast to the postcolonial syndrome posited by Riabchuk).

Conclusions

So far, the authors who played a central role in the debate on Ukrainian cultural identity in the mid-1990s have been treated by other participants in the debate, especially by the modernizers, as marginal. Most Ukrainian scholars and writers were convinced
that contemporary Ukrainian intellectuals would simply return to a Western orientation after the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence. This really did happen for a while, in the early 1990s, when the rhetoric of returning to Europe dominated identity discourse. By the end of 1990s, however, this changed.

As I have demonstrated, the marginal figures, *minorum gentium* writers, mostly “nativists,” played a crucial role in changing the type of discourse (although *Literaturna Ukraïna* and some of the *shestydesiatnyky*, or the “sixties generation,” also played a role in pushing back the modernizers). By the second half of 1990s, the nativist approach towards Ukrainian culture had become mainstream in the identity debate. It could be termed “a retreat from European identity.” One can recognize in this phenomenon an echo of Kuchma’s words, “no one is waiting for us in Europe,” and in the slogan “seeking a ‘third way.’” In fact, this “third way” was a path towards isolation, which would allow Ukraine to be pushed back towards authoritarianism.

It turned out that the nativists provided good support for Kuchma’s regime. They pointed at the external enemy, the West, and in particular the United States. They also unmasked the internal enemy, the “westernizers” who wanted to modernize their culture and country, and therefore were potentially dangerous for that regime. However, the change in the political situation after the presidential elections and the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004 revealed that Ukrainian society had strong hopes for European integration. On December 15, Iurii Andrukhovych gave a speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council in Strasbourg that expressed such a hope, and the desire he voiced was supported by many EU members: Europe would not be whole without Ukraine.

**Notes**

1. An earlier version of this chapter was presented during the 2001/2002 academic year at two seminars organized by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto.

2. I provide a general review of the different approaches to this problem in *Farewell to Empire. Ukrainian Debates on Identity*, particularly in chapter 5, “Between east and west” (231–84). In my essay, “Neither in the East, nor in the West” (Hnatiuk 2005), I have suggested that a new approach towards the issue of Ukraine’s cultural and national orientation should be developed, because the old scheme no longer works.

3. I treat this notion of discourse as the practice of imposing meanings in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault 2002). In other words, I regard the literary text (in this case, essays, literary criticism, and interviews with writers) as part of a larger framework of texts and practices. Most of the authors to whom I refer in my paper believe that they are resisting domination while yielding to it, or that they are supporting their own domination. I search in texts for articulated hierarchies of value and for connections between the text and its wider context (mainly ideological). I also trace the direct or indirect impact of the text on intellectual debates, and especially on shifts in meaning (or, as Foucault termed it, the political unconscious behind the text).

4. For further discussion of this issue, see Hnatiuk 2003, 128–29.

5. A comparison of some aspects of identity discourse at the turn of the nineteenth and the turn of the twentieth centuries can be found in Pavlychko 2002, 653–62.

6. On the Ukrainian Literary Discussion, especially on Khvylový’s pamphlets, see Shkandrij 1992; see also Shkandrij 1986 and 2001. The bibliography on this issue is so
extensive that it is not possible to list even the major papers here; see the bibliographies in Shkandrij’s books.

7. Russian *pochva* means soil; *pochvennichesstvo* was a nineteenth-century socio-literary movement connected with Slavophilism; a *pochvennik* believed in the power of native soil as an inspiration for organic writing (based on *narod* and native soil and treated by these writers as the opposite of literary works based on elitist culture).

8. Ukrainian *gruntivtsi* is a direct translation of the Russian notion of *pochvenniki*. It appeared only in the mid-1990s during the debate analyzed here.


12. “A man usually does not have enough money. If one calls this lack of money a ‘phenomenon,’ then how poor must his soul be!” (109).

13. Originally, *Ukraine Irredenta* was the title of Iulian Bachynsky’s manifesto of the Ukrainian independence movement, published in 1895. The title was based on the name of the Italian independence movement in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (*Italia irredenta*). Kvit’s book presented fifteen Ukrainian intellectuals who, in Kvit’s opinion, were the new face of independent Ukrainian literature.

14. During the first half of the 1990s, V. Danylenko lived in Zhytomyr. He was a postgraduate student at the Institute of Literature in Kyïv and the editor of the independent Zhytomyr almanac *Avzhezh* [Indeed]. After 1995, he moved to Kyïv, where he worked as the Associate Editor of *Slovo i chas* [Word and Time], the Academy of Sciences’ journal of literary studies. He received public recognition as the editor of the anthology. Afterwards, he headed other significant TV projects, like the programs *Koronatsiia slova* [Coronation of the Word] and *Zolotyi Babai* [The Golden Sprite]. At one point he worked as a journalist for ICTV (a TV channel founded before the parliamentary elections of 2002 in order to help win those elections; Viktor Pinchuk, Kuchma’s son-in-law, was its owner).

15. Zhytomyr is the capital of the Zhytomyrska Oblast, part of historical Polissia, 130 km (80 miles) northwest of Kyïv. The Polissia region is considered to be the site of the most archaic culture in Ukraine. This provided a reason for treating Polissia (and Zhytomyr) as more “authentic,” more “organic,” more “Ukrainian” than other, more urbanized regions.

16. It was not possible to find any earlier examples of the use of these notions in literary publications, nor in any books published. It seems quite certain that these designations did not yet exist prior to 1995. The literary discussions at that time focused on the literary circles in different cities around newly established journals and almanacs.


18. Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) was a Ukrainian politician, critic, journalist, and publisher, as well as the creator of the ideology of Ukrainian integral nationalism.

19. This quote by Kostiantyn Rodyk is from the book cover of *Dinner for Twelve People*.

References


Back to the Golden Age

The Discourse of Nostalgia in Galicia in the 1990s

Lidia Stefanowska

On 18 August 2000, a group of Lviv citizens gathered to celebrate the 170th anniversary of the birth of Franz Joseph I. The event included an academic seminar and an artistic performance. The seminar participants signed a petition urging the oblast and city administrations to support their initiative to erect a monument to the emperor. The petition stated: “This monument should become a very special symbol, a testimony to our choosing Europe and to our will to coexist in the circle of free and independent nations of Central Europe.” Both the celebration and the petition indicate nostalgia (called “separatism” by some observers) for the Galician Arcadia of the early twentieth century, when all the nations inhabiting this area lived in harmony under the enlightened rule of Franz Joseph I. Such nostalgia for the “Golden Age” in Galicia appeared shortly after Ukraine became an independent state. A few years of Kyiv’s ambiguous cultural and economic policy were enough to turn the Galicians’ enthusiasm of the first years of independence into a mood of total disappointment.

At the beginning the situation was different. After independence was gained, nationalist leaders launched a “nationalizing” project, an effort to convert a nationalist ideology into an institutionalized national culture, so as to incorporate the heterogeneous population found within the borders of the nascent state into a newly defined Ukrainian nation. This nationalizing effort, however, faced several obstacles. First, out of all the former Soviet republics, Ukraine has the largest Russian diaspora (approximately eight million ethnic Russians out of its national population of forty-nine million) and faces daily clamor from Russian nationalists demanding protection for the Russians (even though they are now Ukrainian citizens) from “Ukrainian cultural oppression.” Second, in Soviet times, one-third to one-half of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine have been effectively “Russified” or “denationalized,” as is evidenced by the widespread use of Russian as the primary language of daily communication. Finally, because independence came to Ukraine without the upheaval of revolution, many Soviet structures and institutions—and especially their cadres—still remain very much in place. All of this has provoked an intense debate about the meaning of contemporary
Ukrainian identity, and today this debate is undoubtedly the most important one in the social, cultural, and political discourse in Ukraine. The responses and modes of actualization and articulation of this issue are various: from European and democratically cosmopolitan to Slavophile and chauvinist, even xenophobic. Also at stake is the issue of autonomy, or even outright separatism, in Western Ukraine—a once highly taboo subject now openly discussed in mainstream Ukrainian publications.

A closer look at this process indicates that articulating and negotiating the new identity involves cultivating a sense of belonging, the emergence of a longing for a “mala batkivshchyna” (small, i.e., regional homeland), as well as a narrative of identity that stems from individual experiences cast as collective experience within the boundaries not only of a particular state, but also of a particular region of Ukraine and its particular dominant historical identity.

Certain scholars, notably George Grabowicz, Iaroslav (Yaroslav) Hrytsak, and Marko Pavlyshyn, have already provided an outline of some manifestations of the renewal strategy for the construction of a new kind of Ukrainian identity. They discuss, for example, the process of substitution and compensation in the diction of contemporary Ukraine. On the one hand, this is represented by a simple reversal of “plusses” and “minuses”: those formerly vilified now are idolized (for example, some poets from the generation of the 1960s (shestydesiatnyky) left literature for politics and became parliamentary deputies). On the other hand, the verities of the communist past are replaced by equally rigid beliefs and icons of different origins (for example the widespread belief that Velesova knyha is the oldest Ukrainian written monument, even though many scholars have demonstrated the falseness of that opinion). This pattern, however, is not at all unique. It is now occurring, to some extent, in all postcommunist societies. Yet this type of renewal strategy contains features that are troubling. One is the tendency to compensate for the previous colonial state of implied inferiority by uncritically stressing national roots and the national past. This phenomenon is evident, for instance, in Volodymyr Danylenko’s misleading thesis that contemporary Ukrainian literature is split into two conflicting “schools”: the Zhytomyr and the Galician.

Danylenko’s claim is deceptive, as we cannot talk about “conflicting literary schools,” but rather about two different ideologies and types of cultural orientation among the writers he has in mind. Some of the writers whom he describes as members of the Zhytomyr school coined this term first of all in order to attack the Galician writers (mainly those gathered around the journal Chetver—the so called Stanyslaviv phenomenon). Thus, on the one hand, we have writers whose self-image is nativist and for whom such terms as “roots,” “motherland,” and “ancestors” play an essential aesthetic role. On the other hand, we have a number of Western Ukrainian writers who have proclaimed their affinity with nontraditional Ukrainian cultural paradigms and contexts. By definition the Zhytomyr writers reject the “alien bodies,” as they call them (i.e., Western influences, formalism), which, in their opinion, predominate in the work of the Galician writers.

Perhaps this diversity in cultural orientation, which has shaped the various perceptions of the Self, the Other, and Belonging, can be explained by the particular historical
circumstances that have produced different collective attachments and animosities in contemporary Ukraine. To date there has been no consensus about what it means to be Ukrainian, about the essential features of Ukraine’s recent past, the main characteristics of the nation, and the chief needs of the immediate future. The Kyïv magazine Knysnyk Review conducted a survey in June 2002 about what it means to be a Ukrainian writer, but found no single common view. The fragmentation of outlooks proceeds from the Ukrainian historical experience and the variety of historical identities. A lively, dynamic struggle of ideas is taking place. It is not always a pretty picture, but at least the discourse is vigorous.

My argument finds its support in a database prepared by a group of sociologists and historians in Lviv (a summary of their fieldwork in the regions of Lviv and Donetsk—polar extremes both geographically and historically) that shows there is no coherent cultural and political orientation in contemporary Ukraine and that the country is divided into western and eastern parts. Although the conceptual framework of the east-west dichotomy has become a commonplace in studies of contemporary Ukraine, the existence of pro-Western and pro-NATO sentiments in Ukraine’s western regions but not among Russian speakers of the Ukrainian east is a fact that has significantly marked contemporary political and cultural discourse. Since Valerii Khmelko’s study, conducted during the 1994 presidential and parliamentary election, most researchers have focused mainly on the correlation between linguistic practice and political opinions. They found that the western regions of Ukraine tend to elect moderate nationalists and liberals, while eastern regions elect communists or members of oligarch parties. Some scholars, such as Hrytsak, while using the above-mentioned database, have partly amended this view by stating that the language/nationality indicator is a less important determinant of mass attitudes than the region where one lives.

Using the same survey, sociologist Viktoriia Sereda concludes that the results of nation-forging processes in Ukraine seem not to have been as successful as they first appeared after the 1999 presidential elections. In her view, “the notions of a common past (or a common national identity), as well as people’s current political preferences and their vision of Ukraine’s future, still differ greatly in both regions.” She claims that the interviews conducted in the Lviv and Donetsk regions prove that the inhabitants of these respective areas have different answers to the question of what it means to be Ukrainian. Sereda argues that government policy on Ukraine’s identity is ambiguous and does not follow the nationalist pattern of resistance to Soviet-minded people. For instance, instead of institutionalizing traditional Ukrainian national holidays (accepted in the western regions) countrywide, the government is trying to turn the old Soviet holidays into Ukrainian ones and to eradicate the conflict between Soviet historical memory and new Ukrainian loyalty. The official historical myth seems to be as ambivalent as is Ukraine’s “multi-vectorized” foreign policy. The combination of Ukrainian patriotic slogans with old Soviet military songs was present everywhere at the 1999 staged mass celebration of Victory Day. Old Soviet holidays such as 23 February (Red Army Day—renamed Defenders of the Motherland Day), 8 March (Women’s Day), 1 May, 9 May (Victory Day), and 7 November (October
Revolution Day—renamed Day of Social Harmony) are still celebrated as Ukrainian state holidays. At the same time, there has been little concern about reframing Soviet holidays into ones acceptable to Western Ukrainians. As a result, there has been growing social disillusionment and the rise of nostalgia in Ukraine. On one hand, there is nostalgia for Soviet times; on the other—nostalgia for the Golden Age of Habsburg rule in Galicia. I would like to focus on the latter.

Nostalgia (from nostos “return home” and algia “longing”) is a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed. Nostalgia is a sentiment of loss and displacement, but it is also a romance with one’s own fantasy. “I realized,” writes Svetlana Boym in her book *The Future of Nostalgia*, “that nostalgia goes beyond individual psychology. At first glance, nostalgia is a longing for a place, but actually it is a yearning for a different time—the time of our childhood, the slower rhythms of our dreams.”

Hybrid forms of nostalgia appeared in Ukraine as early as the mid-1990s. They can be seen in the various “memory outbreaks” that occurred as people explored the black holes and blank spots in Ukrainian history. The issue of redefining the Ukrainian literary canon emerged. There was a great deal of euphoria about the past. Critical revelations of the crimes of the Stalin period, the 1932–1933 famine, and the so-called “executed renaissance” generation, as well as the gradual lifting of censorship unleashed an onslaught of previously unknown historical documents, letters, and personal memoirs. As a result, the transformation of writers, literary critics and journalists into historians has become widespread. There has been a strong pull toward documentary prose, reportage, essays, and letters to the editor, interviews, and articles about the past. The umbrella category for this contemporary concern is nostalgia, which gives rise to the search for a usable past. That search focuses on tradition and continuity and bonds.

Outbreaks of nostalgia in Western Ukraine can also be perceived in recent debates about regional autonomy. See, for example, the emotion behind such publications as the journal *I* and polemics in the Lviv newspaper *Postup*. In 2002 Taras Vozniak, the editor of *I*, diagnosed and propagated these federalist views to a wide audience in a special issue of *I* titled “Federatyvna Respublika Ukraina.” He writes: “Ментально советизована та русифікована ‘українська’ номенклатура з владного центру шаленими темпами продовжує багатосторонню неоколонізацію України.”

[The “Ukrainian” nomenklatura of the capital—with its Sovietized and Russified mentality—is contributing to the neo-colonization of Ukraine [by Russia], which is proceeding at a ferocious pace].

“Науві бачи час визнати поразку ілюзорної спроби українізації її величезних територій та міст. Вони так і залишаться обтяженими обтягнути чимось незнищену советою” [It is high time to admit the defeat of the illusory attempt at Ukrainization of its large territories and cities. They will remain burdened with something indestructibly Soviet]. A similar view is expressed in Orest Drul’s article, “Україна vs. україність [Ukraine vs. Ukrainianness],” where he asserts: “Існуючі тенденції вказують на швидке здійснення мрій поколінь українських націоналістів—формування єдиної політичної української нації, але від цих мрій у такій нації залишиться
Existing tendencies indicate the rapid realization of the dream of many generations of Ukrainian nationalists—the creation of a unitary Ukrainian political nation, but the only thing that will remain from these dreams in such a nation is perhaps the name and the territory of habitation. Was it for such a Ukraine that ‘our grandfathers’ were prepared to ‘martyr themselves’?10

We find many similar quotations in this issue of I. They reflect the profound stress experienced by a large part of the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia. Ten years of official “Ukrainization” policy were enough to make them understand that the “soborna Ukraina” (i.e., Ukraine as union if its “tsarist,” “Austro-Hungarian,” and other previously “occupied” regions) does not fit the dreams of many generations of the Galicians. According to the authors of Federatyvna Respublika Ukraina, this frustration was caused by a decade of vague official policy which had three main characteristics: 1) an intensive denationalization or, as Mykola Riabchuk calls it, “creolization” of a large part of western Ukraine’s inhabitants; 2) an ambivalent and self-contradictory attitude toward culture; and 3) a form of centralization that legitimizes the inadequate distribution of money from the capital to the regions. No wonder that a part of the Western Ukrainians have responded by trying to create a new, autonomist pattern of self-identity through preserving the existing “old and true” Ukrainian-language identity, which they locate in different geographic and temporal dimensions (for example, in the Golden Age of the Habsburg period of Galician history).

All the authors in this issue of I express the opinion that from the time of the Galicia-Volhynian state, Western Ukraine has continuously participated in European civilization. The most striking visual expression of this “invented tradition” of Western Ukrainian history can be observed in the art of Volodymyr (Vlodko) Kostyrko, who has promoted the view that “Galicia has belonged to the Latin, occidental civilization since the time it was Christianized.”11

For this reason, Kostyrko writes in Ukrainian using the Latin alphabet instead of the Cyrillic. In June 2002 he organized in Lviv an exhibition of his own paintings at the Lviv Gallery of Art called Ares and Eros. The historical allusions in his paintings can be easily decoded. In the picture “The Past and the Future,” for example, the Past is depicted as a medieval knight, and the Future as a terrorist wearing a mask and a coat of arms of Galicia on his arm. At the bottom of the picture we can read: “Минуле Галичини не дозволяє майбутньому стати абияким.” [Galicia’s past does not allow its future to become just any kind]. Another painting titled “Independence Gained and Defended Through Struggle with Kyїv” portrays three baroque angels who hold a Galician crown whose ribbons are inscribed with the names of the three princes of the Rostyslavych dynasty: Riuryk, Volodar, and Vasylko. These names refer to an important historic event. At the conference of Rus’ princes in Liubech in 1097, the princes recognized each other’s hereditary rights to the lands they held, and Galicia became the Rostyslavych princes’ legacy.

It appears that Kostyrko’s goal is to create a pantheon of national heroes in a new canon of works on Galician history. This new canon of works is meant to represent
an alternative Galician historical tradition in which Galicia belongs to Europe, as opposed to the Russian, imperialist perception of Ukraine’s history, where Ukraine for centuries has been linked with the “brotherly Russian people.” Moreover, in 2003, every Saturday from May to October the Lviv newspaper *Postup* published the column “Spravzhnia istoriia korolivstva Halychyny” [A True History of the Galician Kingdom], edited by Roland Perfetsky (obviously a pseudonym), where we encounter the same point of view.

The “Galician project” appears to be an attempt at a new kind of discourse that articulates the new borders of “its own” community (“svoia spil’nota”) in opposition to the eastern Ukrainian community, perceived as the Other. A different and separate Galician history is articulated as one of the main elements in the process of legitimizing the special, autonomous status of Western Ukraine.12

Some observers see the growing demands for regional autonomy in this area as an attempt at building some kind of Galician/Western-Ukrainian identity. And as indicated above, the reevaluation of historical tradition plays the most important role in this process.

The general context within which the idea of a distinct history of Galicia is constructed is that of Europe, and of Central Europe in particular. Often a “true” pattern of Ukrainian identity is located in the Golden Age of the Habsburg period of Galician history. The idea that Galicia belongs to Central Europe appeared as early as 1997, in the journal *I* (no. 9). It was examined extensively in the literary journal *Potiah* 76, which began publishing in 2002. The journals’s title refers to the No. 76 train that runs from Chernivtsi to Przemyśl (Poland) and symbolically unites Austria-Hungary, Ukraine, and Poland. That idea played a key role in the choice of writers represented in the first issue: Jewish writers from Chernivtsi (Rosa Auslander, Paul Celan), writers from Stanyslaviv (Iurii Andrukhovych, Taras Prokhasko), from Lviv (Viktor Neborak, Iurii [Yuri] Vynnychuk), and from Poland (Andrzej Stasiuk, Joanna Wichowska).

Andrukhovych also frequently stresses traditional ties to Central Europe in his essays.13 He focuses mainly on Western Ukraine, particularly on the city of Ivano-Frankivsk (for which he uses the old name Stanyslaviv) and the city of Lviv. His seemingly limited geographical approach deals with larger issues, however: Galicia in the European context, the Ukrainian mentality, and Ukrainian identity and its cultural orientation. Like Mykola Khvylovy, Dmytro Dontsov, and Mykola Zerov, Andrukhovych raises the question of whether Ukraine’s cultural orientation should be eastern (i.e., Russian) or Western. He also discusses what the role of the writer in contemporary Ukrainian society should be and wonders whether the term “Central Europe” is still legitimate. His search has led him to create his own, private myths of Stanyslaviv, Galicia, and Europe. Although such myths exist only in his imagination, some claim that his essays are a manifesto of Western Ukrainian separatism.14

Biographies of members of his family and his descriptions of places serve as a vehicle of the Andrukhovych narrative. The genre of *essai* by definition draws on autobiographical discourse. In his essay “Erts-herts-perts” and particularly in *Moia Ievropa,*
Andrukhovych depicts the history of his own family, starting with his German grandfather, who at the beginning of the twentieth century left Czechoslovakia and settled down in Stanyslaviv. The autobiographical elements are not limited to the narrative about his family, but also serve as a pretext for depicting Andrukhovych’s own “small homeland”—Western Ukraine—and the golden age of its Austro-Hungarian past. In the essay “Erts-herts-perts,” for example, he directly defends imperial Austria:

Для мене [захист небіжки Австрії] починається зі ствердження, що саме завдяки їй у безмежному мовно-національному різноманітті світу збережено український складник . . . Вона змушену була обрати для себе свободу і плюралізм, даючи притулок практично всім . . . Вона зберегла нам архітектуру—інакшу, різну, зберегла інакші міста).

For me [the defense of the late Austria] begins with the acknowledgement that it is precisely thanks to her, that in the boundless linguistic and national diversity of the world the Ukrainian component has been preserved . . . She was forced to embrace freedom and pluralism for herself, giving refuge practically to everyone . . . She preserved architecture for us—a different, distinct one, she preserved cities that were different. 15

Andrukhovych values the Galician multicultural tradition, whereby Galicia can be called the “small homeland” not only of Ukrainians but also of other nations—Jews, Germans, and Poles. Owing to its geographic location, many different influences, cultures and religions intersected in Galicia. Thus a fundamental issue for Galicia’s residents was self-identification. This idyllic vision, however, has its darker side. In reality there was nothing resembling a “harmonic coexistence” of many nations, but rather the existence of national ghettos that did not maintain mutual relations. The Ukrainians of Galicia identified themselves with Europe, and the wave of nationalism in their region swiftly realized their political and cultural separateness from the other nations living in the area. As a result, many view Galicia as the center of the Ukrainian national revival, both past and present. Andrukhovych’s nostalgia, nevertheless, is not only a longing for the peaceful coexistence of many different Galician ethnic groups and religions, but also a longing for the time when “my city created one state not with Tambov and Tashkent, but with Venice and Vienna!” (Andrukhovych 1999, 8).16

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a psychological trauma for the dwellers of Central Europe. Although Galicia consequently became a part of Poland, then of the USSR, and finally a part of independent Ukraine, its residents have preserved an awareness of being different. It is no wonder that in response to all of the social, political, and economic crises that emerged after Ukraine’s independence, demands for regional autonomy in Galicia have grown. At the same time, this Galician otherness was perpetuated in the eastern regions, where Western Ukrainians were often perceived as enemies—“banderivtsi,” “zakhidniaky,” or “natsionalisty” [“Bandera’s men,” “Westerners” or “Nationalists”—who wanted to rule all of Ukraine. Andrukhovych articulates this ambivalent position when he writes that from the perspective of Polissia region, Galicia does not exist:
З перспективи, наприклад, Полісся Галичини не існує, точніше, вона є, але цей факт нічого не вартий. Галичина це не-Україна, якийсь такий географічний доважок, польська галюцинація.

From the perspective of Polissia, for example, Galicia does not exist. Or, to be exact, it does, but this fact is meaningless. Galicia is non-Ukraine; it is some kind of geographic add-on, a Polish hallucination.17

This is an excerpt from his essay with the significant title “Chas i mistse, abo moia ostanna terytoriia” [Time and Place, or My Last Territory]. Here we can see that Andrukhovych’s nostalgia is finally transformed into a desperate apologia for the “small homeland” to which he belongs. He identifies with its past, its tradition, its history, and its culture. Everything is familiar there, and only there does he know who is he and what values to cherish. Although in his first accounts from the West he expressed a critical attitude toward his compatriots, describing their ignorance, provincialism, lack of good taste and so on, later Andrukhovych began to defend “his own fragment of land,” his “ostannia terytoriia” [last territory]. In fact, the defense of his “last territory” has turned into a self-defense. His nostalgic mythmaking represents a project for the future, for the imagined homeland that makes us free, allows for daydreaming, and resists external pressures against all odds. For these reasons Andrukhovych’s longing for a mythical Galicia should be considered not only as a response to the demands of western Ukrainian autonomists, but also as a phenomenon embedded in the worldwide nostalgia in a time of globalism.

Nostalgia is a symptom of our age. It becomes clear that throughout the world the processes of globalization encourage stronger local attachments. In this context nostalgia might be perceived as a defense mechanism against the postmodern absence of values, and the frustration brought about by chaotic everyday life. Hence nostalgia is an affective yearning for a community with a collective memory, a longing for continuity in a fragmented world. The nostalgist desires to obliterate conventional history and turn it into private or collective mythology. Nostalgia demonstrates a crisis of the idea of universality, the crisis of the kind of thinking that supports a centralist and authoritarian paradigm of culture. At the same time nostalgia can be dangerous, because it is a promise to rebuild the ideal home that lies at the core of many powerful ideologies of today, and because it tends to confuse the actual home with the imaginary one.18

It is interesting that the renaissance of the term “Central Europe” in Western Ukraine has taken place at a time when it actually has lost its meaning and popularity in Poland and the Czech Republic. Yet it can be understood in the context of the search for the new Ukrainian identity in the post-Soviet era: classifying Galicia (or the entire Western Ukraine) as part of the Central European community distinctly opposes grouping it with the “East Europeans,” opposes an association with Russian or Soviet mentality. Galicia, according to its inhabitants, means something completely different than the latter: “Galicjanin to wybór. To europejski Ukrainiec, człowiek wykształcony, otwarty na kulturę zachodnią. Galicjanin kocha Europę” [To be Galician is a choice. It means being a European Ukrainian, an educated, open to Western culture. A Galician loves Europe], asserts Yaroslav [Iaroslav]
Hrytsak, who at the same time emphasizes that he opposes those who use regional Galician otherness for spreading the mood of separatism. Hrytsak continues,

In recent years this stand has even led the Lviv young people to demand autonomy for Galicia. Young Galicians think the only chance of entering Europe is by separating from Kyïv . . . There is a continuous domestic cultural war among various tendencies, regions, and generations about what Ukrainness means, what is the norm and what is an aberration. Who will win is not obvious—what is important and makes me optimistic is that these discussions aren’t about to end and that no one group will emerge the victor. It creates an opportunity for one to be Ukrainian in a style other than that of Lviv . . . Integration still remains our main issue.”

Yet Galician self-identification exists not only in the form chosen by Kostyrko or Andrukhovych and not only in the circles of the Lviv intellectuals and artists. A sociological survey conducted in 2003 in Lviv revealed that 32 percent of respondents answered that their primary self-identification was as Ukrainians, but at the same time 41 percent of the respondents “identified themselves mainly” as Lviviannya, (residents of Lviv), and 21 percent as Halychany (Galicians). Moreover, 40 percent of Galicians declared a readiness to fight for their separateness (11 percent for autonomy, 29 percent for independence) if officials from Kyïv continued the process of integration with Russia.

The “Galician project,” however, is a double-edged sword. The Galicians’ feeling of superiority, their awareness of living in the only “true” part of Ukraine is not a good sign for the integration processes and the search for a new national identity in Ukraine. It is therefore hardly a surprise that the whole notion of “Galician separatism” was sharply criticized by the authors of the “Austro-Hungarian” issue of the Moloda Ukraïna. Articles by Andrii Kokotiukha, Mykhailo Brynykh, Oleh Kochevykh, Oleksandr Maslak, and others are extremely aggressive in tone. The main idea put forward by the issue of Moloda Ukraïna is that Galician separatism is the mental product of parochial Galicians who suffer from low self-esteem and have a bone to pick with Greater Ukraine. These Galicians are greedy, haughty, and obnoxious. And because Galician separatism suits the Russian purpose well, Russia actively supports it, which makes these separatists traitors and possibly not even Ukrainians. Andrii Kokotiukha writes that, unlike Jews, these Galicians “do not know how to be grateful.” The only author not to take this anti-Galician stance is Oleh Khavych, who takes the idea of a Galician republic seriously.

It was only logical that some politicians would play the separatist card during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections. In this case, however, the main players were not the Galicians but rather the southeastern regions of Ukraine. On 29 October 2004,
the so-called All-Ukrainian Congress of People’s Deputies of Local Councils took place in Siverskodonetsk, Luhansk oblast. The bulk of the delegates were politicians from eastern and southern Ukraine who voted for Viktor Yanukovych. Among those present was Yanukovych himself along with a surprise guest from Russia—the mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov.

The participants of the congress discussed the text of their ultimatum to the Right Bank regions of Ukraine, which was as follows: if Western Ukraine and Kyïv do not stop their protest actions and do not accept Yanukovych as the president-elect, the eastern and southern regions will demand some drastic changes in the state structure of Ukraine. The most radical proposal came from a representative of Donetsk region, Borys Kolesnikov, who spoke of the need to hold a referendum that would deliver a vote of non-confidence to the present Ukrainian authorities, abolish the existing unitary state, and create a new Ukrainian federal republic instead, with Kharkiv as the capital. Kolesnikov called the latter step “a restoration of historical justice,” in view of the fact that Kharkiv was the first capital of Soviet Ukraine. According to its organizers, some four thousand delegates from southeastern regions took part in this congress. The questions debated included conducting referenda that would demand creating regional autonomies.24

The Yushchenko camp saw this outburst of separatism as a ploy—an attempt to hide crimes committed by some of the oligarchs. Speaking at Independence Square in Kyïv, Viktor Yushchenko called the idea of creating the so-called Southeastern Autonomy, advanced by the governors of Donetsk, Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts, an attempt to avoid responsibility for rigging the presidential elections in their regions. The idea of “autonomization” of Ukraine was also condemned by the outgoing president, Leonid Kuchma, who stated that it violated the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.

In the end the whole idea was discarded, since even Yanukovych’s electorate did not want the breakup of Ukraine. The nonviolent mass civil protest known as the Orange Revolution ended with the swearing-in of Viktor Yushchenko as the new president. It exceeded the dreams and expectations of its organizers and made a lasting impression all over the world. One of its main achievements was the redefinition of such notions as “Ukrainian people” and “Ukrainian patriotism.” The concept of a “political nation” is key to the understanding of these events, since their outcome was the forging of a national identity based on citizenship rather than ethnicity or regional loyalties. It is noteworthy that Yushchenko consistently appealed to “Ukrainians of all nationalities.” He chose not to privilege certain linguistic, religious, or historical traditions over others. Instead he held out the promise of a new Ukraine for all its citizens who want to live in a free and democratic state.

Notes


2. Velesova Knyha [The Book of Veles] supposedly discovered in 1917—is a compilation of pagan chronicles written before the ninth century in pre-Slavonic language [allegedly—Ed.]
and later “translated” and published by several authors (most recently by Alexander Asov). In 1960, however, Dr. Zhukovskaya announced *Velesova knyha* to be a fraud.


4. This survey was conducted by scholars at the Institute for Historical Research, Lviv National University, and the University of Michigan in 1994 and 1999 (unpublished).


9. Ibid., p. 5.

10. Orest Drul’, “Ukraina vs ukrains’kosti,” *I*, no. 23 (2002): 171. One must remember that many of the authors in “Federatyvna Respublika Ukraina” are the descendants of UPA soldiers; their fathers died fighting for the freedom of Ukraine in good faith, yet to date have not received the status of veterans in the independent motherland.


14. See, for example, the commentary of Oleh Khavych from Chernivtsi: “Proekt west-ukraina.eu,” *Postup*, no. 166 (824), 1–7 November 2001, 2.


16.”Жоли моя місто належало до єдиного державного утворення не з Тамбовом і Ташкентом, а з Венецією та Вієнною!”

17. Andrukhovych, “Chas i mistse, abo moia ostatnii terytoriia,” in *Dezorientatsiia na mistsevosti*. 118


24. For example, at a forum of Crimean legislators held on 28 October 2004, there was discussion of a referendum regarding the secession of the peninsula from Ukraine.

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15
Symbols of Transformation
The Reflection of Ukraine’s “Identity Shift” in Four Ukrainian Novels of the 1990s
Marko Robert Stech

The exact nature of a relationship between the psychology of an artist and the content and form of that individual’s artistic creation will undoubtedly continue to elude scientific attempts at a precise definition and exhaustive description and explanation. After all, in order to fully comprehend the laws and mechanisms of the creative process, science would first have to demarcate the boundaries (if such definable boundaries actually exist) at which the “self” ends and “the Other” begins, the “non-self” that Iurko Hudz, one of the authors discussed later in this chapter, may have had in mind while choosing to name his novel _Not-Us_ [Ne-My, 1998]. Science would also have to adequately grasp the essence of the process whereby the “self” becomes conscious of itself and of “the Other,” thus, in effect, demanding that the object of its research, the human consciousness, act simultaneously as an independent and “objective” instrument for the study of its own nature and capabilities. And yet in spite of the clear impossibility of this task, the human mind will not be dissuaded from grappling with these questions, just as man will never suspend his seemingly futile search for a discernible meaning of his existence and activity.

One of the undeniable aspects of a relationship between a work of art and the personality of its author is that, from a psychological point of view, the product of one’s creative activity represents a mirror of sorts in which the artist’s psyche finds its partial reflection. A literary text, for instance, unavoidably contains an imprint of its author’s conscious and unconscious ideas, fears, hopes, beliefs, associations, and customary responses to life’s challenges. At the same time, in order to be accepted and understood by others, the text must transcend the boundaries of idiosyncratic personal features and to reach into the realms of collective contents, one of such realms being a national cultural paradigm.

In fact, what has been said here about the interrelationship between an individual work of art and the “self” of its creator could, to a certain extent, be extrapolated and applied to national cultures and the collective creative output of individuals working
within them. In particular, at times of transition and at turning points in the history and cultural evolution of a nation, the works of its artists, writers, philosophers, and social and political thinkers, as a rule, reflect the processes of reassessment and reinterpretation of the national cultural and sociopolitical identity, the nation’s “collective self,” so to speak, a concept more ephemeral and difficult to define than an identity of a single individual, but, nonetheless, discernible against the background of the nation’s historical development. Thus, just as an individual artist can perceive key aspects of his “self” encoded in his text or painting, so, it seems, can a national polity see, study, and interpret the processes of its cultural and historical evolution as reflected in a composite “mirror” of artifacts, texts, ideas, and performances produced by individual creators functioning within the national cultural context.

A quintessential study of the subliminal psychic processes associated with transitions between key stages in life and a detailed examination of the corresponding unconsciously generated symbols can be found in Carl Jung’s pioneering *Symbols of Transformation.* Among the most important archetypal patterns discussed there is the motif of death and resurrection, representing symbolically a psychic process of change, when shifts in existential conditions or the demands of the aging process and/or psychic growth compel individuals to fundamentally revise their sense of identity, life strategies, rational ideas, and emotional responses to life. Saturated with a great wealth of mythological and literary material from a variety of cultures and, thus, attempting to reflect the universally human experience, this book (and the subsequent studies by Jung and his followers) can shed much light on the problem of how and to what extent contents and form of artistic and literary creations mirror their authors’ existential and psychological conditions. And again, one is tempted to extrapolate these ideas and examine such processes in collective contexts, in particular, in the realm of a national culture.

It is by no means a coincidence, for example, that the motifs of death and resurrection as well as other symbols of transformation cropped up with great frequency in the Ukrainian literature of the 1990s, that is, during the crucial decade of reinterpretation and reevaluation of the Ukrainian national identity and identities of individual Ukrainians as a result of the paradigm shift caused by the fall of the Soviet Union with its totalitarian and repressive (but stable and familiar) sociopolitical system, and the reemergence of the independent Ukrainian state in 1991. A closer look at various interpretations and treatments of these symbols in four Ukrainian novels written in the mid-1990s reveals a considerable complexity of this “identity shift” and the growing pains experienced by Ukrainians on their path to the formation of their new post-Soviet self-image.

**Yuri (Iurii) Andrukhovych**

Paradoxically, it is because of the nebulous personal characteristics of its main protagonist, Stakh Perfetsky, that Yuri Andrukhovych’s novel *Perverzion* [Perverziia, 1996] can be particularly useful for the analysis of the transformation symbols re-
reflecting Ukraine’s “identity shift” in the 1990s. As such, this text will be examined in detail and will serve as the basis for the subsequent discussion of the works by other writers. Andrukhovych intentionally deprives his hero of a well-defined individual “self,” implying that he is a composite character who embodies a host of collective traits. After all Perfetsky “had countless faces and countless names” (Andrukhovych 2005, 8) or, more precisely, “all together he had forty names, and not one of them was real, for no one knew his real name, not even he himself” (ibid., 154), while the text informs readers unfamiliar with number symbolism that forty is a symbol of an infinite quantity.

One could interpret such an indefinite nature of Perfetsky’s personality as a metaphor for a universal identity crisis of Western man at the end of the twentieth century, and in particular, a severe identity problem in the post-Soviet sociopolitical space. However, the author’s insistent denial to endow Perfetsky with a “personal self” brings to mind a statement by the German actor of the first half of the twentieth century, Werner Kraus, who claimed that he became an actor in order “not to be himself,” but to “function in the world of ‘as if.’” Commenting on Kraus’s provocative statement, Eaghor G. Kostetsky [Ihor Kostetsky] wrote: “Here perhaps lies the very essence of the wisdom of art, and not only of the art of the theater. Nature delimited too narrow a space for man within the shell of his physical body. To be something beyond oneself—this is what is required from man by the Creator of his spirit” (Kostetsky 63). And the tradition of the theater suggests a different interpretation of Perfetsky’s estrangement from his identity, hinting that he represents a theatrical mask, a marionette—not only in the psychological sense but also as a philosophical concept. It is precisely the “collective” dimension of the “mask,” which contains in its symbolic representation numerous individual “selves” with their particular psychologies and fates, that allows Perfetsky to embody processes more universal and wide-ranging than existential dilemmas of a single individual.

In general, the analogy between Andrukhovych’s prose and the theater comes naturally. His novels often exhibit “dramatic” qualities typical of stage productions or toy with theatrical motifs and techniques: from incorporating theatrical performances into the fabric of his texts (such as the opera Orpheus in Venice in Perverzion or staged military coup in Recreations [Rekreatsii, 1992]) to building entire plots based on the principles of the “life-is-a-theater” philosophy (Shakespeare’s famous “all the world’s a stage”).3 After all, Perfetsky is a quintessential example of a “stage player” who “eternally changes his appearance” (Andrukhovych 2005, 9) and for whom life itself is a string of performances and mystifications treated not only as the means of artistic expression (such as, for example, his flight above the rooftops of Lviv as part of a performance entitled “A Young Poet in the Claws of the Delta Glider” [ibid.]), but as an inherent part of everyday life. He “constantly dreams to begin everything from the beginning” (ibid., 313) (to start a “new role,” so to speak); he seems unable to react seriously to even the most extraordinary and dangerous situations, but immediately finds his natural place on stage after accidentally becoming part of an opera performance; and, finally, his disappearance at the end of the novel (whether a result
of a suicide or his next mystification) represents an obvious attempt at manipulating reality and his own life.

All of this indicates that Perfetsky is a promoter of the “life-is-a-theater” philosophy, a worldview that presumes the existence of a dynamic interrelationship between the realm of artistic creativity (the semi-imaginary “as if” reality that, nonetheless, exists in a certain very concrete sense) and the sphere of everyday life, customarily considered by the overwhelming majority of people as the only true reality. This concept does not contradict the essence of the artist’s individual self, but rather, by closely intertwining the personality of the author with the dimension of his creative work as well as the world of his readers/spectators, it blurs the boundaries between individual human lives and selves. This kind of overlapping and intermixing of the “actual” and the “artistic” can be seen as a programmatic principle of Andrukhovych’s novels, reinforced by the fact that the main protagonists of his trilogy, comprised of Recreations, The Moscoviad [Moskoviiada, 1993], and Perverzion, are writers and “stage players” (often resembling Andrukhovych) whose lives continually balance on the border between normal daily activities and the imaginary “as if” world of their artistic creation. In fact, Recreations, The Moscoviad, and Perverzion are, in many ways, autobiographical works, containing numerous personal and group motifs, inside jokes, and hidden allusions, and the author as well as the world of the new wave of Ukrainian writers constitute intrinsic part of the novels’ virtual reality. In that sense, this trilogy is, in fact, about the new Ukrainian literature of the 1980s and 1990s as it depicts the evolution (not always intentional or conscious) of some of its main ideas and trends, and, in a wider sense, it deals with the processes of self-reflection and self-determination of the new Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Perfetsky’s role as a “theatrical mask,” whose function is to model collective rather than individual processes, is confirmed by the “lifelessness” of this character as an individual, an absence of some membrable human features. Apart from unconvincing (and unoriginal) moral vacillations as to whether he should transgress against the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” and, in order to save himself, shoot from a sniper’s rifle a mysterious man who appears to be following him, and apart from some modicum of fear and concern he exhibits in the face of the threat of being assassinated by the shadowy characters who are targeting him, nothing seems to shake Perfetsky out of the state of indifferent, lethargic passivity. Even his obsessive and passionate Dionysian infatuation with Ada Tsytryna (incidentally, he appears to be unable to have sex with a woman unless he drinks a bottle of vodka, or, at least, large quantities of wine) suddenly and totally disappears at the end of the novel. But all this is rather natural if we accept that he is not a “living” character, but a complex of certain psychological and cultural features associated with the pertinent behavioral mechanisms; he is, as it were, a prototype of a Bu-Ba-Bist, exhibiting both positive and negative aspects of this collective sociocultural (since it represents the mindset of a sizable component of Andrukhovych’s generation), and not individual phenomenon.

He is also a “mask” in a still more universal sense of being a “shell” of a person that assimilates and embodies in human form the dynamic contents of an archetype.
Thus, he mirrors with his semivoluntary and involuntary thoughts and actions suprapersonal, collective tendencies, while on an individual level, not only socially conditioned patterns of behavior, but even seemingly private and intimate thoughts and feelings represent something external and foreign to him, something that he does not control, but that “happens to him” without the participation of his will and without any significant attempt on his part to comprehend and consciously process these experiences. In accordance with the nature of a “theatrical mask,” Perfetsky conforms to a certain universal model of thought, perception, and behavior, a particular myth of human fate.

Which myth is that? The text of the novel hints at the myth of Orpheus since Perfetsky is repeatedly identified with this mythical musician. Influenced by his Orphic role models, the poets Rainer Maria Rilke and Bohdan Ihor Antonych, Andrukhovych would surely be pleased if his protagonist and, by extension, he himself became associated with Orpheus’s spiritual legacy and were considered contemporary inheritors of the hero’s enchanted lyre. However, apart from a pleasant voice (as we are told) and some singing talent, Perfetsky exhibits practically no Orphic characteristics, and in particular, he does not seem to possess any features of the mature Orpheus who returned from the Underworld, having failed to retrieve his wife Eurydice, but having gained transcendent knowledge of the depths that belongs only to those who managed to enter the Kingdom of the Dead and return from there alive, that is, who “died,” but overcame their death and were “reborn.”

Perfetsky conforms more closely to the general characteristics of Dionysus, Orpheus’s powerful predecessor and, at the same time, his antipode; after all, although Orphism was a more civilized and sophisticated offshoot of the Dionysian cult, in the majority of its concepts and rituals, it fundamentally departed from the Dionysian tradition, as reflected in the Orphics’s highly ascetic lifestyle and their philosophical and moral teachings most eloquently expressed in the thoroughly Orphic writings of Plato. In Perfetsky’s case, his preference for the Dionysian, rather than the Orphic model is clearly evident not only in his adherence to the “cult of wine” (his strong dependence on alcohol) and his readiness to blindly surrender to the power of natural instincts (contrary to the principles of the Orphic ascetic rituals of purification), but primarily in his fundamental (as seen from his actions) belief in the wisdom of intoxicated creativity and inspiration as opposed to the self-disciplined and conscious “drinking the waters of Mnemosyne” (Edinger 164), the river of memory, that is, willfully attempting to remember the soul’s divine origins. (In this sense, a much more properly Orphic work in the Ukrainian literature of the 1990s is Iurii [Yuri] Izdryk’s Wozzeck [2006].) Perfetsky consistently chooses the Dionysian path of forgetting his “self” in the state of drunken identification with his instinctual impulses and seeks out the comfort of the “motherly embrace” of the unconscious. This fact finds its confirmation also in the choice of the city in which the main part of the plot takes place: Venice, the “Queen of the Seas,” a city built on water and separated from the firm land of Europe, is a mother-symbol in the Western culture.

However, there is an even more exact equivalent of the mythical pattern that Per-
Perfetsky is “performing” for us on the stage of the post-carnival Venice than the Dionysian one. It is embodied in Puer Aeternus, the god of life, death, and resurrection, the symbol of eternal youth, whom Ovid identifies (among others) with Iacchus, the divine child born out of a furrow of a freshly ploughed field or at night during the mystery cult of the Mother Goddess and associated with the Eleusinian mysteries (Jung 340 ff.). Often linked to Dionysus and Eros, Puer Aeternus, similar to the related figures of Tammuz, Attis, and Adonis, dies young, murdered (often on behest of his mother) or killed in a ritualistic sacrifice. He is a god-redeemer who searches for the truth, awakens consciousness, and brings change and transformation, and most probably the majority of Western Ukrainian intellectuals during the times of transition in the late 1980s unconsciously associated the young voices of the Bu-Ba-Bu poets and the spirit of the Bu-Ba-Bu phenomenon with many features of this rebellious youthful god.

The name Puer Aeternus not only denotes this mythical divine entity but also is used in medical psychological terminology to describe cases in which an unresolved mother complex keeps a person for too long in adolescent psychology and the youthful stage of emotional development. Apart from sharing certain general traits of this eternally young god, common symptoms of this psychological state include many behavioral patterns and emotional tendencies that are exhibited (at times, in hyperbolic proportions) by Perfetsky, such as Don Juanism, as an expression of the individual’s unconscious search for an idealized mother image in all women (or homosexual tendencies as an extreme expression of faithfulness to one’s mother [von Franz 1]); narcissism that often leads to both megalomania and, at the same time, inferiority complex combined with a feeling of being a hidden and misunderstood genius; the inability to form intimate relationships with people, and in particular to commit to mature love and marriage ties; difficulties in adapting to social norms and conventions as a result of a rebellious asocial individualism (often linked to a tendency for intellectual perfectionism, which may hint at conscious or unconscious reasons why Andrukhovych chose to name his hero the way he did); disregard and even disdain for everyday life’s problems and obligations, which, at times, borders on self-destructive irresponsibility; a particular predilection for flying (let us recall Perfetsky’s flight over the rooftops of Lviv), mountain-climbing, and so on.

In her study of this psychological syndrome, Marie-Louise von Franz explores the consequences of the activation of the Puer Aeternus archetype, including extreme manifestations perceptible, for instance, in certain aspects of the Nazi movement. On a personal level, the carriers of these particular psychological characteristics, as a rule, may preserve their youthful worldview and lifestyle only to a certain point in time, at which, just like the god himself, they are compelled to “die.” In their case, this does not actually mean a physical death (although von Franz documents cases in which those who refused to accept the necessity of radical change were brought by external and/or internal circumstances to a serious mental crisis or even physical demise), but a psychological and spiritual process of a radical reevaluation and transformation of their attitudes toward life, required particularly at the time of their midlife crises. The symbolic “death” is associated with the necessity to change the youthful ego-oriented
and ego-building attitudes in order to be “resurrected” and grow into a mature stage of emotional development. On one’s ability to genuinely experience this process of “death” and “resurrection” (which, in the context of Andrukhovych’s novel boils down to the question of whether Perfetsky actually died and whether he was or will be reborn) depend the contents and quality of the rest of one’s existence. On an archetypal level, this process is symbolically described by such images and concepts as the mythical “night sea journey,” Jonah’s imprisonment in the belly of a whale, Christ’s descent into Hell before His resurrection, and similar motifs that could be summed up by a biblical passage: “Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit” (John 12:24).

On a collective level, entire societies and peoples, in certain historical circumstances, also face the necessity to reevaluate their ways of life and change so radically that these transformations may be described as their collective symbolic “death” and “resurrection.” One can venture to say with little hesitation that the people of Ukraine in general, and the Ukrainian intelligentsia in particular, found themselves in such a situation in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, and, to a considerable extent, their struggle to create a new sense of identity and complete their transformation into a new stage of their national existence remains not entirely resolved even today. At this level, a study of the process of transformation undergone by Perfetsky as representative of the post-Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia can shed light on a collective identity problem of a society that abandoned the absurd, but familiar and well-established Soviet reality and has had considerable difficulties finding its foothold in new forms of social and national life. Moreover, the resolution of the Puer Aeternus complex represents an even more universal problem since, as von Franz claims, this archetype is one of the primary psychological “constellations” of the twentieth-century Western society (and, as we can judge from current cultural developments, of the twenty-first century as well), and it determines a considerable part of Western man’s system of collective intellectual, emotional, and moral values, invisibly shaping the thoughts, feelings, preferences, and actions of virtually all of us. On that level, the resolution or lack thereof of this problem will affect the future of Western civilization as a whole.

Like the god Puer Aeternus, Perfetsky “dies” at the end of the novel, having, as it seems, committed suicide. This is the only logical conclusion to Perverzion because the motif of an approaching end, of death and of unerring, almost consciously willful striving toward it permeates the entire plot; “death” seems to represent a magnet that attracts and guides Perfetsky from the beginning of the text to its conclusion, a self-destructive tendency that, on an archetypal level, might prove to be life-saving according to the paradoxical biblical maxim: “For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it” (Matthew 16:25). This is a personal drive, but, at the same time, a process shaped by forces more powerful than the will of the ego, and Perfetsky clearly recognizes this fact by admitting: “I don’t know what all this was about. I had to end up in Venice. . . . It’s difficult for me to think up any explanations” (Andrukhovych 2005, 34).

One aspect of the symbolism of Venice in European literatures is its metaphorical
representation as a gateway to the Underworld, where one finds oneself, having crossed the waters of the lagoon, as if they were waters of the Styx. Still at the beginning of the twentieth century (for example, in Thomas Mann’s *Death in Venice*), it was an individual gondolier who served as the ferryman transporting a person (soul) through this watery divide. Later, in the works of such authors as Daphne DuMaurier (“Don’t Look Now,” and other stories) or, for that matter, Andrukhovych, this individual “Choronzon” was replaced by a mechanical vaporetto, but the result of such a journey remains fundamentally the same: those who cross the Venetian lagoon arrive in the city that is half real and half fantastical, the city of phantoms (just like those that, at the end of *Perverzion*, as in a Hollywood horror movie, fly away in a “lengthy cavalcade,” following Mavropule, who turned into a pillar of fire, and disappear “in the darkness among the unknown constellations” [Andrukhovych 2005, 268]), and the invisible Cerberus almost never allows them to return to the world whence they came.

Against the background of this tradition, should Perfetsky’s (and Andrukhovych’s as well perhaps) journey to Venice be considered as an ordeal forced upon him by higher and external (historical, archetypal, karmic?) forces, partly embodied in the mysterious figure of Monsignore, and should he be considered a victim of these forces and his own passive surrender to them? Or does he manage to “fool” those who seek his demise and, after his staged suicide, to escape somewhere where he could continue his youthful existence? Or perhaps this journey is, after all, an instinctual, or even conscious imitation of Orpheus’s search for Eurydice (Ada? his anima) who represents his own undiscovered soul? Or is this primarily an intellectual and artistic journey retracing the steps of Andrukhovych’s famous European predecessors in an attempt to lay claim to Ukrainian literature’s rightful place in the European literary canon? (Incidentally, Andrukhovych’s ironically playful parodies of certain motifs from Mann’s *Death in Venice*, such as Dr. Riesenbock’s erotic interest in a boy playing soccer, can serve as an example of various intertextual motifs in *Perverzion*.) Almost certainly, any response to the above questions will confirm the fact that Perfetsky’s journey to Venice has less to do with this character’s individual fate than with a complex of wider issues. The real background and sense of this journey is a collective one, and its final outcome has been, to a large degree, predetermined.

Has Perfetsky jumped to his death from a window of his hotel to the waters of a Venetian canal? Or has he, as per the claim of the book’s “editor” (Andrukhovych), left his room and, unnoticed, departed for an unspecified destination? In principle, this is not so very important. After all, we are dealing here with the death of a “theatrical mask,” a character who never actually dies, but rather changes his name, appearance, or a historical epoch in order to continue his journey through an endless array of metamorphoses and human fates. What is important is not the form and nature, but the quality of Perfetsky’s “death,” the extent and depth of his transformation. Is his disappearance, after he gave up his forty names “with the exception of a single one,” which he left for himself “for eschatological reasons” (Andrukhovych 2005, 296–97), equivalent to, if not the actual new beginning, then at least the end of what has been up till now?
At first glance, it seems that it would have to be that way because Perverzion represents a culmination and end of a certain process on a number of different levels and the “death” of Perfetsky is logical, for example, in the context of Andrukhovych’s evolution as a novelist. Both formally and thematically, Perverzion was a turning point and an end of a certain stage of development, embodied in the trilogy of his early novels. From a formal point of view, the experimental and youthfully undisciplined texts of Recreations and The Moscoviad find a synthesis in the boldly multifaceted, but, nonetheless, coherent structure of Perverzion. Stylistic and formal solutions employed by the author resulted in a remarkable tour de force that, technically, represents one of the more interesting texts in the Ukrainian literature of the 1990s. However, at the same time, it seems to be a dead end because, as Marko Pavlyshyn has aptly pointed out, it is hard to imagine that Andrukhovych could have written another novel in that key (Bilotserkivets and Pavlyshyn 22).

Thematically, Perverzion also represents a logical continuation and the final chord of the trilogy. In simplified terms, after a ritualistic attempt to cast off the burden of the repressive political system and cultural provincialism of Soviet Ukraine in Recreations and after the confrontation with the legacy of the Soviet empire in The Moscoviad, in Perverzion, Andrukhovych makes a decisive move toward the West. After all Perfetsky’s journey represented “a dogged, unceasing, and unerring push to the West,” and, remarkably, “not a single step to the East!” (Andrukhovych 2005, 13)—although how he could accomplish the feat of getting from Munich to Venice this way (as Venice is east of Munich) remains a mystery. On the one hand, Perverzion describes a quest of a modern “East European barbarian” to “conquer” the civilized Western Europe and leave upon it his unique personal mark. On the other hand, it is a rather humble attempt to “return” to Europe after several decades of involuntary absence (after Andrukhovych’s native region of eastern Galicia, formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, later, Poland, was occupied by the Soviets in 1939 and later incorporated into the Soviet Union) and to insist on the Ukrainian literature’s right to belong to the mainstream European culture. In this light, his trilogy represents a programmatic quest for “cultural self-determination” in relation to the three dominant cultural traditions (the Soviet Ukrainian, the imperial Russian/Soviet, and the West European) that shaped the world outlook and “cultural consciousness” not only of Andrukhovych and his Bu-Ba-Bu friends but also of the entire generation of Ukrainians and, in some sense, East Europeans in general. In his trilogy, the author, in essence, tries to carve out a “space” for his cultural activity and that of his like-minded Ukrainian intellectuals by trying to demarcate the “territory” of his “creative world” in relation to external cultural influences, rather than some internal (to a lesser or greater degree, self-sufficient) system of ideas and values.

Incidentally, one of the consequences of this youthful extroversion (in the Jungian sense of this term, namely, as the principle of forming one’s notions and understanding of the world and oneself based on external, rather than internal factors, ideas, and influences—an attitude particularly relevant to the youthful stage of ego development and identity formation) is the author’s superficial treatment of his material in all three
novels, including *Perverzion*. Although Andrukhovych began his literary career as a poet and despite the fact that he is an inventive stylist, *Perverzion* (with the exception of several successfully rendered scenes, such as, in my opinion, a scene in the Munich apartment) can be criticized for lacking “poetry” in the sense suggested by Bruno Schulz that “poetry happens when short circuits of sense occur between words, a sudden regeneration of the primeval myths” (Schulz 372). Under the surface of a dynamic, witty, occasionally dramatic plot one perceives a void, an absence of inner substance that would connect the characters, events, objects, and, finally, words with the deeper levels of meaning and relevance. In spite of incorporating into the plot mysterious monsignors, assassins, secret orders, and psychedelic banquets, in spite of introducing various subtexts whether through the symbolic use of numbers, tacit intertextual motifs, or direct quotations from his own works and the texts by other authors, and in spite of the narrator’s claim that Perfetsky was “altogether devoted to mystery” (Andrukhovych 2005, 312), the novel does not create a sense of mystery, but rather of its surrogate: mystification.

An external (and superficial) reflection of the absence of “short circuits of sense between words” is an underdevelopment (not according to the canon of traditional [particularly, Soviet] Ukrainian prose, but rather European standards to which Andrukhovych aspires) of the fabric of literary and cultural symbols and motifs that would connect the deeper strata of the text through a system of links, allusions, and associations; through, so to speak, an “underground labyrinth of meanings.” A notable exception from this general rule is an interesting and multifaceted treatment of the fish symbolism in the text.

Perfetsky himself is associated with the fish in a number of scenes and contexts, such as, for example, when he faints during the ritual sacrifice of a fish in the Munich apartment and this “identification” with a “sacrificial victim” can be considered his initial “death.” Later, after his “death in Venice,” “for some reason everyone without exception,” who stumbles upon him in various corners of the world, “turn their attention to the fact that he has a silver ring in the form of a fish” (Andrukhovych 2005, 314). Andrukhovych does not hide the fact that this, among other things, is a reference to the horoscope and the sign of the Fishes under which he himself was born, and this tells us more about his relation to his protagonist and about Perfetsky than the various psychological characteristics described in the text; this not only indicates a close link between Perfetsky and Andrukhovych (not necessarily in a literally autobiographical way, but on an archetypal level based on astrology), but also points to one of the few constant features of this “theatrical mask”: his strong dependence on certain “constellations” of circumstances and events, as well as suprapersonal (including cosmic) forces and influences that determine who he is and who he can be, regardless of his personal preferences, will, or control. The fish was a symbol of Christ; it was also associated with Orpheus who was referred to as “the Fisher of Men,” and with the youthful god Ichthys (son of the goddess Atargatis) who was the Sacred Fish. In all of these instances, the fish indicates a predetermined role of a victim in the cosmic ritualistic sacrifice. Moreover, the fish motif depicts Perfetsky’s unenviable situation
in the “social fabric” of the novel as it is metaphorically depicted in Dr. Riesenbock’s aquarium games when small fishes are being fed to larger ones, which, in turn, are consumed by still bigger fishes, and, in the end, the largest fish is killed. Venice too, seen from an airplane, from which Dr. Casalegro’s ashes are ritually thrown into the wind, has the form of a fish and represents, as it were, an earthly reflection and equivalent of the celestial constellation that, astrologically, determines the Eon of the Fishes in which we live and that is soon to be over (just like the “carnival” discussed at the unorthodox Venetian conference must end), and this again projects the fish symbolism, the motif of the end of a cycle (i.e., the symbolic death and resurrection), and certain events described in *Perverzion* into the cosmic dimension.

Regrettably, Andrukhyvych’s interesting treatment of the fish symbolism is an exception in the novel, and the reader rarely has an opportunity to admire a similarly multifaceted fabric of imaginative and meaningful associations. Most of the cultural allusions in the novel create an impression of superficiality and, at times, arbitrariness as if they found their way into the text by chance, without a clear underlying reason. The Epilogue too leaves one with a feeling of incompleteness in the author’s treatment of the “archetypal model” embodied by Perfetsky. Almost all sporadic news about him after his “death in Venice” indicate that his “suicide” was fake, designed as an escape tactic, and that, having undergone no real transformation, he tries to continue to do the same things he did earlier, including an array of “old tricks”: from riding “along the cable stretched between the top of the bell tower of Santa Maria del Fiore and the loggia of one of the neighboring buildings” in Florence to visiting “a tavern with prominently endowed toplesswaitresses” (Andrukhyvych 2005, 313). Such an apparent absence of a significant transformation indicates that both on the formal/stylistic level and the level of its “archetypal theme,” *Perverzion* represents a dead end and that the question of whether Perfetsky really died and whether he will be reborn does not find an adequate resolution. A new attitude and the appropriately transformed hero do not materialize despite the fact that Perfetsky (and Andrukhyvych) understands the “hopelessness” of his situation and realizes that his current behavior and way of life must come to an end because of the shift in external circumstances, symbolized, among others, by the “end of the carnival,” which was introduced in *Recreations* as the “feast that is always with us.”

Apart from harking back to Andrukhyvych’s personal experience of the Bu-Ba-Bu period with its Bakhtinian carnivalesque spirit, this “carnival” also refers psychologically to the first celebratory years of Ukrainian independence and, in the entire Eastern Europe, to the fall of Communism, dissolution of the Soviet empire, and sudden opening of people’s way to “freedom and prosperity” of the democratic world. In this collective sense, “the end of the carnival” represents a point at which the people’s euphoria brought about by this external “victory” progressively transformed into a fear of the price one had to pay for the newly acquired “freedom.” Paradoxically, for Ukrainian writers and intelligentsia, who for decades longed or even actively fought for “freedom,” this proved to be the fear of the “abyss of personal responsibility” this freedom opened up in their hearts and minds. Psychologically, the “Perfetsky
model” described in *Perverzion* seems to reflect a reaction of those for whom the need for so radical a transformation that it could be likened to a symbolic “death” and “resurrection” proved too difficult and threatening. It seems to reflect an attitude adopted by the majority of Ukrainians in the early to mid-1990s who, while going through the motions and “simulating” change, continued to live and think according to the old patterns.

**Valerii Shevchuk**

Since this study is concerned with the examination of processes and symbols reflecting the formation of a collective, rather than individual identity, certain themes that have not been fully developed or “resolved” in the works of one author, can be picked up by others and continued in their texts. When describing Perfetsky’s semifantastic journey to Venice, Andrukhovych addressed a more universal problem, as evidenced by the wide proliferation of analogous themes and symbols in the works of other Ukrainian writers in the 1990s. For example, it is remarkable how often the motifs of death and/or end of an important stage in life or national history were addressed at that time by the writers belonging to the “Zhytomyr school.” In addition, this theme attracted not only writers belonging to a specific age category, which could indicate personal psychological experiences, such as an unconscious impact of the midlife crisis. The theme of death and resurrection can be found in the works of younger and older writers alike. For example, the novel *The Eye of the Abyss* [Oko privy, 1996] written approximately at the same time as *Perverzion* by Valerii Shevchuk, one of Ukraine’s most accomplished contemporary writers whose literary career spans more than four decades, describes a strikingly analogous story of a trip to a distant island, located, seemingly, at the world’s end. It is a story of a sixteenth-century artist, Mykhailo Vasylevych, who sets out on a journey to the swamps of the uncivilized Polissia region in search of a miracle-worker who could help him (as the artist hopes) regain his lost creative powers. Similarly to Perfetsky’s “dogged and unerring push” to Venice that results in his “death,” Mykhailo Vasylevych’s journey also leads to the Underworld (including the “underworld of the unconscious psyche”), but it is more deliberate and associated with a conscious realization of his inevitable “death” and a clearly comprehended hope for a “rebirth.” The main protagonist forthrightly compares his experience to the mythical “death and rebirth” of the prophet Jonah: “and I saw a long, red tunnel . . . and I felt tempted to go into it, as I had ventured on this journey in its time. It seemed to me that at the end of the tunnel I would find a windowless, doorless chamber where I would be able to commune with God, as had Jonah” (Shevchuk 141). Only after dangerous trials and tribulations, during which perish all of his traveling companions (who also personify parts of his “self”), the protagonist of *The Eye of the Abyss* manages to return to his familiar world and regain his creative abilities, but in a different sphere of activity: having abandoned his former vocation of calligrapher and illuminator of the Bible, and having become a storyteller who describes his perilous journey and reveals the truth about the false miracle-worker.
As in *Perverzion*, the issue of the protagonist’s “death” and his possible “resurrection” is addressed in the Epilogue, but Shevchuk’s treatment of this theme is more controlled and “complete” than Andrukhovych’s, corresponding to all stages of the archetypal model. Unlike his younger colleague, Shevchuk was clearly well aware of what he was doing and what effect he was trying to achieve. However, an absence of some perceptible fundamental change in the tone and style of his narrative after the protagonist’s alleged “rebirth” casts a shadow of doubt on the authenticity of his transformation. One is left with the impression that the plot in the Epilogue develops somewhat artificially, based on the author’s conscious choice and his philosophical and moral convictions, rather than as a result of an authentic artistic and emotional process. This impression of a didactic and not entirely believable “resolution” is somewhat similar to the feeling left by Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Epilogue in his *Crime and Punishment*, in which Raskolnikov’s change of heart is not adequately reflected in the fabric of the text. Dostoevsky and Shevchuk’s texts contain rhetorical (and thus, superficial) descriptions of the “resurrection” and the reader is faced with an uneasy choice, whether to believe or not to believe the authors that a fundamental psychological change has actually taken place.

In terms of our current analysis of the symbols that reflect the processes of transforming the collective identity of Ukrainians in the 1990s, Shevchuk’s solution seems to suggest a willful and purely intellectual choice of a new identity in accordance with one’s declared political and moral position, but raises the question of how authentic and thorough the acceptance of this new identity is on an emotional or visceral level.

**Yuri [Iurii] Izdryk and Iurko Hudz**

A logical continuation of the development of the motif of “death and resurrection” in the Ukrainian literature of the 1990s, related to and expanding upon the treatments found in the novels by Andrukhovych and Shevchuk, can be found in two experimental literary texts: Yuri Izdryk’s intellectually and stylistically sophisticated *Wozzeck* and Iurko Hudz’s hauntingly poetic and eclectic *Not-Us*. The term “continuation” is used here not in its usual strict sense, which presupposes a linear chronological progression whereby the author of the later work consciously reacts to the ideas expressed by his predecessors and builds upon them in order to reach the next (higher) stage of the given theme’s evolution. In fact, such a linear progression would have been impossible in our case because *Wozzeck* was written approximately at the same time as *Perverzion* and The Eye of the Abyss, while fragments of *Not-Us* were published in the literary journal *Svito-vyd* as early as 1992. What is meant here is the representation (and, on some level, perhaps even the shaping) of unconscious psychic “constellations” that reflect in the creative works of individual authors underlying collective patterns and contents. This phenomenon is not determined by the laws of linear chronology and is not dependent on the conscious exchange of ideas; individual writers function in it not so much as creators, but as “witnesses” whose works “document” suprapersonal phenomena and processes.
To a large extent, the plot of Wozzeck begins exactly where Perverzion left off: with the “death of the self” in the sense of a complete annihilation of what we usually consider to be the normal functioning of a human organism and psyche. Illness and extreme mental stress bordering on insanity bring Izdryk’s protagonist down to the physiological level of a vegetative biological organism, and only from this point of departure a slow and painful process of self-identification and self-determination begins, a search for some meaningful patterns of one’s perceptions and behavior during which the conventional understanding of one’s self completely loses its meaning. After a futile search “for the ‘I’ in the depths of your skull cavity,” in the various strata of brain tissue, descending into the “dura matter and the arachnoid,” and progressing further, “where you could no longer do without lenses or microscopes” and where “neurons, synapses, axons and dendrites move into view, and later still—nuclei, cell membranes and mitochondria,” but where “the cursed ‘I’ is nowhere to be seen,” and finally, after examining “protons, electrons and neutrinos” and the whole array of subatomic particles, getting to the level of “the one great indivisible and nonexistent Nothing—the glittering likeness of pure energy that stands at the foundation of all things and all worlds” (Izdryk 9–10), the normal notion of a single personal “self” disintegrates. The narrator-protagonist interchangeably appears under the appellations “he,” “I,” “you,” and/or “That One,” embodying a very fluid and indeterminate “identity”—a model that, according to most theories of depth psychology, conforms much more closely to the actual structure of the human psyche than an “ego-centered” notion of a single, well-defined and stable human “self.” The road to one’s “self” in Izdryk’s novel (albeit never so conveniently and clearly defined as in conventional literary texts) leads through dreams, hallucinations, painstaking attempts to find a thread of sense in a ceaseless and seemingly chaotic stream of experiences, perceptions, and feelings; through the Orphic practice of attempting to “recall the divine genealogy of a human being” (chapters: “Here Come the Heroes” or “Genealogy [Here They Come Again]”), that is, to reach the depths of our beings that have little to do with our fleeting and superficial “egos”; and through this painfully uncharted process, full of suffering and even defined by suffering, a new reality is created, which, at times, confuses the reader because of its irrationality and strangeness; at times, it shocks one because of unexpected cold-blooded brutality, but, in the end, one is left with a powerful impression of an authentic, uncompromisingly honest human effort. Whether or not the hero/heroes of Wozzeck will actually manage to find or create his/their new identity, one feels that his/their quest represents a feasible path toward true transformation (equivalent to death and resurrection), toward self-determination and, simultaneously, becoming “something beyond oneself.”

In a somewhat similar way, in one of the first scenes of Not-Us, the protagonist (or rather one of the protagonists) loses consciousness as a result of which he cannot “remember his own name and the name of the settlement and street where he was supposed to return.” He examines papers (his novel) found in his briefcase, “expecting to find among them his home address and his name,” but in “these handwritten notes” that “clump together and create one continuous stream [of the text] without any meaningful
intervals,” only “some old names of places and people” can be deciphered. “In order to remember himself he lacked some most important link, some inner impulse that transcends all names and words, someone’s call, touch, recognition” (Hudz 102: 24). Similarly to Wozzeck, much of the action in Not-Us takes place in a psychiatric hospital since Hudz’s novel also represents a process of searching for one’s “self” from the point of view of an individual who has lost his grip on reality and for whom his earlier mental “system of coordinates,” functional for an average person, is no longer valid. Consequently, the motif of a suicide (the Ukrainian word samohubstvo etymologically means both “killing” and “losing oneself) plays a central role in Hudz’s prose.

In contrast to the highly introverted Wozzeck, where the protagonist(s) delves so deeply into his being that he reaches the point after which he is no longer himself, the protagonists of Not-Us go the opposite way by, paradoxically, searching for their “selves” outside of their personalities, by establishing connections and at times even identifying themselves with the bodies and minds of other people, in particular with their living and dead relatives; they not only deeply experience the presence of their spirits, but they imagine their thoughts and feelings and identify with them, for brief moments actually “becoming” these individuals. Such a phenomenon of “losing oneself” in other people can be seen as a form of “death” following which a person becomes “a soul without a body.” “I have an impression as if I recently died . . . [as if] I crossed that invisible barrier which had been blocking my way and had not allowed the fragments and parts of my chaotic life to unite into one single whole.” The restoration (resurrection) of one’s “self” begins with the “Word,” understood virtually in the Biblical sense because the “body” of the text, the fabric of sentences and words, the accumulation of thoughts, memories, and impressions of various kinds (from sophisticated meditations on existential dilemmas to standard proclamations about the fate of the Ukrainian nation) form a new carrier and embodiment of self, a “new body” for human consciousness and personality (“I have to regain my body; I have to return to the text that was rescued by someone from the state of unconsciousness”). The initial “death” (“loss of oneself”) in Not-Us is invariably connected with the formation and realization of an identity broader and more universal than an individual ego, with becoming “something beyond oneself.”
Wozzeck and Not-Us are very different texts from the point of view of both contents and form. In some sense, they seem to represent polar opposites: starting with various literary sensibilities (reflected in Hudz’s neomodern and folklore-based poetic prose and Izdryk’s intellectual and ironic postmodern urban narratives), to the opposite perspectives from which the authors approach their texts and the world: a deeply introverted perspective in the case of Izdryk and a generally extroverted one for Hudz. However, from the psychological point of view, they seem to represent one and the same stage in the psychic development of an individual and, by extension, a collective: the “death” of an outdated, no longer useful “self,” with its system of perceptions and way of life, and the beginnings of the formation of a new identity and new ways of thinking and behaving.

In contrast to Andrukhovych’s Perverzion (where the treatment of the archetypal motif of death and resurrection is incomplete and, in essence, no “resurrection” takes place) and Shevchuk’s Eye of the Abyss (where the authenticity of the “rebirth” is questionable), Izdryk’s Wozzeck and Hudz’s Not-Us indicate that an authentic and profound shift in the individual and collective sense of identity actually took place in Ukraine in the mid-1990s. To a large extent, Izdryk and Hudz can be counted among the first representatives of the post-Soviet Ukrainian cultural identity. This is evidenced not only by their own prose works, but, more important, by the fact that Izdryk’s “experiments with language” and the thoroughly “European” spirit of his texts as well as Hudz’s distinctly Ukrainian poetic style and his programmatic concept of “reconquering Ukrainian cultural space” in a manner symbolically resembling the Spanish Reconquista seem to have inspired two important trends in contemporary Ukrainian prose. The majority of Ukraine’s best writers of the twenty-first century, without being overt followers or imitators of Izdryk or Hudz, have, in one way or another, continued the creative search initiated by these two writers. This search for the Ukrainian literature’s unique new “voice” is based on innovative explorations of the paths opened by Izdryk and Hudz: either through assimilating and transforming European literary models in novel ways, or by revitalizing the sources of Ukrainian national tradition (or, more precisely, by some combination of both). This particular path of collective creative development promises not only to shape the Ukrainian literature of the future but also to redefine the sense of national and sociocultural identity of Ukrainians in general.

Notes

1. Originally published in 1912, the book was revised in 1952 and later published in English as volume 5 of Jung’s collected works.
2. According to a verbal statement by the translator of Perverzion, Michael M. Naydan, the peculiar English spelling of the title was partly inspired by Yuri Sherekh’s review of Andrukhovych’s novel (Sherekh 123).
3. From the beginning of its existence, the group “Bu-Ba-Bu,” which included Andrukhovych, Viktor Neborak, and Oleksandr Irvanets, and whose name stands for “burlesque,” balahan (a term denoting both a booth for theatrical performance and a state of disorder), and “buffoonery,” was not only focused on a strictly literary activity, but was heavily involved
in organizing performances and “happenings” and staging all sorts of provocations. Inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin’s theories concerning the carnivalesque spirit in culture, the Bu-Ba-Bu members believed that their mission was: “to deride the most sacred ideas in order to rescue them from ossification and death” (Andrukhovych 1991, 7). The apex of their “performance art” was the staging in the majestic Lviv Opera Theatre in 1992 of a “poeso-opera,” Chrysler Imperial.

4. Orpheus himself, according to legends, became a “priest of Dionysus and in his priesthood grew into such a state of identification with the god that he suffered Dionysus’ fate of dismemberment” (Edinger 157).

5. This is a rather curious error, taking into account that Andrukhovych is a self-proclaimed enthusiast of maps and geography.

6. To some extent, the “Zhytomyr school” of the 1980s and 1990s (not to be confused with the association of poets established under this name in 2000) whose representatives originally hailed from the Zhytomyr region in northern Ukraine, formed a counterbalance to the West Ukrainian “Stanislav phenomenon” centered in and around the city of Ivano-Frankivsk. Considered by Volodymyr Ieshkiliev as representatives of the “NM [neomodern] discourse” in contemporary Ukrainian literature (Ieshkiliev 50), the writers of the “Zhytomyr school” were often in opposition to their pro-Western and postmodern colleagues from Galicia. Of the four writers featured in this essay, Andrukhovych and Izdryk belong to the “Stanislav phenomenon,” while Shevchuk and Hudz were associated with the “Zhytomyr school.”

7. The theme of a search for “the Other” among the members of one’s family also finds its reflection in the novel’s title. “Ne-My” means not only “Not-Us” (the Other) but constitutes the first four letters of Nemylnia, a village in the Zhytomyr region where Hudz was born and where his family lives. All translations from Not-Us are mine.

8. Izdryk followed Wozzeck with Double Leon (Podviinyi Leon) 2000 and the shocking and stylistically brilliant AM™ (2005), while Hudz wrote Isykhia: The Book of Happiness (Isykhia: Knyha shchastia, 2001) and The Charming of Invisible Wings (Zamovliannia nevydymykh kryl, 2002). Unfortunately, Hudz’s creative potential was never fully realized owing to his tragic death in 2002.

9. In his chapter in this volume on the choice of “a Europe” by the new wave of Ukrainian writers, while referring to Andrukhovych as a “Europhile,” Marko Pavlyshyn unequivocally calls Izdryk “not a Europhile, but a European” (see his chapter in this volume).

References


Choosing a Europe
Andrukhovych, Izdryk, and the New Ukrainian Literature

Marko Pavlyshyn

In Ukraine as elsewhere, the passing of the Soviet era caused many writers to lose their cultural bearings. As the writing community realized that the production of apologias for the politico-social status quo was not required in a new situation where high culture was not monopolized by the state, nor funded by it, many of its members fell silent. The most powerful poet, Vasyl Stus, had died in the Gulag, and no poetic voice of equal strength was in evidence. The most accomplished and independent novelist, Valerii Shevchuk, had reached the apogee of his aesthetic power in the final moments when Aesopian language had still had a social function. The passing of political unfreedom deprived him of the context in which, through allegory and understatement, he had achieved masterpieces of subversive expression. Several writers signaled their break with Soviet tradition by exploring new themes and testing untried formal and stylistic techniques, but also by proclaiming their affinity with nontraditional cultural paradigms and contexts. One such context was “Europe”—more precisely, the complex of contemporary thought and high culture that originated in Western Europe and was perceived to hold sway in the non-Soviet parts of the world.

Controversial, convention-challenging discoveries or appropriations of a cultural or intellectual “Europe,” coupled with a polemical attitude to more traditional cultural patterns, had accompanied previous periods of modernization in Ukrainian culture. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries poets of the “Young Muse” circle had deliberately signaled their sense of common purpose and method with other European fin-de-siècle movements, provoking tumultuous protests from the realist and populist literary mainstream. In the Literary Discussion, the great debate of the 1920s concerning the future of Soviet Ukrainian culture, the preeminent advocate of revolutionary Ukrainianization Mykola Khvylovy identified Europe with the ideal of progress itself, deriding as provincial, backward and undereducated those who defended a more homegrown model of socialist cultural development.

The construction of a similar opposition between a cultural system perceived as
outdated, unproductive and otherwise defective, and a “Europe” representing culture in an advanced and admirable form, proved useful to many young writers who, in the late 1980s, set about finding alternatives to Soviet cultural models. I suggest in the following that some of those who thus appropriated “Europe” did little more than claim authority at the expense of a former cultural elite; others sought to incorporate into the post-Soviet identity which they proposed for themselves and their society values that they apprehended as European; and others still took their participation in a cultural Europe as a given and set about deliberating on the knottiest of Europe’s unanswered questions without further ado.

The most visible of these seekers of alternatives in the late 1980s were a triad of young poets and happening artists who adopted the group name “Bu-Ba-Bu” (for the first syllables of the words “burlesque,” balahan [a term designating both a booth for a theatre show, and a state of disorder] and “buffoonery.”) Their chief spokesman, the self-styled “patriarch” of Bu-Ba-Bu Iurii (Yuri) Andrukhovych (b. 1960), framed their provocations theoretically as carnival in the Bakhtinian sense, designed to revitalize a flagging culture by subjecting its tired gods to laughter: “Carnival . . . juggles hierarchical values, it turns the world upon its head, it provokes the most sacred ideas in order to rescue them from ossification and death.” Bu-Ba-Bu overlapped, in part, with what came to be called the “Ivano-Frankivsk phenomenon”: the concentration in the regional city of Ivano-Frankivsk in Western Ukraine of several creative young people determined to produce cultural artifacts that differed radically, both from the norms of official Soviet writing, and from the traditions and values of the Ukrainian literary canon. This canon, in the view of the most erudite of the Ivano-Frankivsk writer-critics Volodymyr Ieshkiliev, was entrapped in a “TR [testamentary and rustic] discourse,” while the Ivano-Frankivsk circle and others like them represented “NM [neomodern]” and “PM [postmodern]” discourses. To emphasize the distance between themselves and the cultural context of TR discourse, the adepts of NM and PM discourses enacted provocations whose purported aim was to shock and disturb their audiences. Such was the case with the staging in the Lviv opera house in 1992 of the so-called poeso-opera Chrysler imperial, where the breaking of cultural taboos was interspersed with an explicitness concerning sexual matters that at the time was novel.

Another, more intellectual and more explicitly “European,” challenge to TR discourse was the invocation of a grid of cultural references that was at the time unfamiliar to society at large, and the representatives of TR discourse in particular. The cultural grid that the Ivano-Frankivsk community presented as its own was that of West European intellectual high culture, including its poststructuralist representatives. These figured in glossaries and compendia after the postmodern fashion of the time, at least two of which were produced in Ivano-Frankivsk. One, edited by Iurii (Yuri) Izdryk, appeared in 1992 as issue 3 of the journal Chetver (Thursday). In it, alongside much arcane and whimsical material on cabbalistic and demonological, as well as theological and philosophical topics, were references to Herodotus, Hegel, Hölderlin and Heidegger, Lucian and Leibnitz, Casanova and Camus, Rabelais, Rilke
and Remarque, Shelley and Keats, Thales, Plato, Nietzsche, Georg Trakl and Freud. The other Ivano-Frankivsk compendium, called *Mala Ukraïns’ka Entsiklopediia Aktual’noï Literatury* (Small Ukrainian Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Literature, 1998) or *MUEAL*, was a joint project of Leshkilev and Andrukhovych. In addition to biographical and critical entries on the members of the Ivano-Frankivsk circle and their friends, as well as entries on theoretical concepts and cultural phenomena, *MUEAL* contained articles on Barthes, Bakhtin, Borges, Warhol, Heidegger, Derrida, Eco, Nietzsche, and Foucault. The display of these potent European names was not without ostentation. It signified the freedom of those who invoked them to move in an elite intellectual space. In this respect the naming of notable figures of the European intellectual canon resembled a widespread post-Soviet phenomenon of everyday life: the display of European-made consumer items (or items made elsewhere, but satisfying imagined criteria of “European” quality). Such European or quasi-European products and procedures have been organized in popular parlance, through the addition of the prefix _ievro-_, (Euro-) to the names of familiar things, into a distinct category. Thus, _ievrokukhnia_ and _ievrovanna_ are, respectively, a well-renovated kitchen and bathroom, and _ievroremont_ is the process of renovating an interior to a high standard. As a leading representative of Ukraine’s small but expanding cultural studies community has remarked, drawing upon Baudrillard’s remarks on the signification coded into consumer practices, what is at play here is a process of allusion to a lifestyle ideal imagined as the opposite of the Soviet realities of queues, shortages and shoddy goods: the “Euro-quality” of a thing arises when it is “inserted into another, non-European (or, more precisely, not-quite-European) context, where it arouses associations of high social status and of Europe as utopia.”4

Such claims to Europeanness are not without their contradictions. Appropriation of European attributes and diligent demonstration of the extent to which European values and attitudes have been incorporated into everyday life or into high culture imply rejection of a value that is central to the European tradition, especially in its modern phase from the Enlightenment onward: authenticity, and with it individualism. Authenticity finds expression in the correspondence of inner and outer, of essence and accident, of belief and behavior, all of which are abandoned or overlooked when value is seen to reside above all in approximation to an external norm.

In his well-known book *The Anxiety of Influence* Harold Bloom sees in the accomplishment of authenticity the reward of enduring or “strong” poets; the danger that they struggle to overcome, often in vain, is that of influence—of being deprived of complete selfhood by the power of predecessors. To assert their authentic voice and their “priority in divination,”5 Bloom observes, strong poets duel constantly with those who shaped the poetic landscape before them. Strong poets negotiate their anxiety about succeeding in their struggle for self-authentication against the resistance of the preexistent voices of canonical poets by means of strategies not unlike those envisaged in Freud’s thoughts on repression: strong poets forget their predecessors, or misconstrue them. This creative misreading, Bloom believes, is a symptom of the anxiety of influence.
In Ivano-Frankivsk phenomenon it is possible to discern an anxiety analogous to the one described by Bloom. Representatives of the Ivano-Frankivsk phenomenon are anxious lest they be influenced by TR discourse. They fear that the romantic and realistic traditions of Ukrainian letters, shored up by the idiom of Socialist Realism, may render originality, indeed creativity itself, impossible. As Ieshkiliev puts it,

a feature of TR discourse in Ukrainian literature is the “anthology principle” under which a corpus of operative texts has emerged that is sanctified by the tradition of popular education and toward which the expression of any critical attitude is prohibited: Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko and, in Soviet and post-Soviet times, Andrii Malysylko, Oles Honchar, Ievhen Hutsal and others. The “anthology principle” significantly narrows the field for creative experimentation by TR writers and renders practically impossible the existence within TR discourse of serious literary criticism. . . . TR discourse favours a didactic, schoolbook pragmatism and integrates into itself practically nothing of the semiotic, conceptual or formal advances of twentieth-century literary practice. A reason for this is the specifically rustic mind-set of TR literati, whose world-view is circumscribed by the horizon of the “terrain of village cares” (Heidegger). . . . [T]he cyclic rustic world view characteristic of TR discourse, bound by the symbols and rituals of the annual agricultural cycle, rejects qualitatively new or different forms of thought (where difference is conceived of as a philosophical category). A consequence of such cyclicity of sign and image is the autarchic quality of the textual practices of TR discourse that leads to their progressive degeneration.6

There are numerous rhetorical and stylistic symptoms of anxiety in this text: its hyperbole, mockery, unsubstantiated accusations and general tone of aggression. And yet, this very passage which so vigorously opposes the influence of a canon viewed as domestic and retrograde expresses approval for a different kind of influence: that which, presumably, is evident in discourse that has assimilated “the semiotic, conceptual or formal advances of twentieth-century literary practice.”

Indeed, texts associated with the Ivano-Frankivsk phenomenon sometimes display a craving to be influenced by nonindigenous traditions and, indeed, a markedly non-Bloomian anxiety lest the extent of this influence prove insufficient. MUEAL pays homage to the classics of European modern and postmodern cultural production and post-structuralist thought by granting them space on its pages. MUEAL affects an easy familiarity toward them, as though the neighborhood of Barthes with Bondar-Tereschenko, Sartre with Sapeliak, and Foucault with Fufalko were the most natural thing in the world. Yet the texts that purport to inform the interested reader about the heroes of the new canon are couched in the exclusive code of unelucidated jargon. Ieshkiliev’s article on Foucault may serve as an example:

Characteristic of the episteme of the Renaissance is the condition of language as a “thing among things,” while in the episteme of the present language becomes a thing-in-itself, imposing its will upon the world of things and constructing in it new hierarchies of meaning (discourses). This last situation, Foucault believes, destroys the capacity of the human being to protect his or her essential world, his or her **per-**
sonal discourse ("people die, structures remain"). Thus Foucault effectively denies the possibility of protecting a personal encyclopaedia and a personal register of values under conditions of a linguistic metagestalt ("dictatorship of language").

If there is an intended audience for this text that stands outside the circle of the initiated, then the rhetorical design of the text upon this audience is not benign. The audience is to be startled, puzzled, and made to feel frustrated and inadequate in the face of the imaginary speaker, who demonstrates superiority over it through command over an arcane and demanding discourse to which the audience has no access. The implicit nonelite audience, indeed, is relegated to the same low level as the explicitly denigrated mouthpieces of TR discourse.

Were we to follow Bloom in comparing textual strategies to operations of the human psyche as observed by Freud, we should be hard pressed to overlook the analogy between the behavior of the speaker implied in Ieshkiliev’s text, and exhibitionism. Exhibitionism involves the derivation of excitement and sexual pleasure, not so much from the actual display of the virile member, as from the contemplation of the discomfiture of the unsuspecting victim. What is more, according to Freud, "the compulsion to exhibit . . . is also closely dependent on the castration complex: it is a means of constantly insisting upon the integrity of the subject’s own (male) genitals and it reiterates his infantile satisfaction at the absence of a penis in those of women." The behavior results from an aberrant prolongation of immaturity. Similarly, we might well see in the emphatic display of European post-structuralist erudition the reflex of a furtive anxiety about the efficacy of this provocatively displayed possession. Ieshkiliev can name and in this sense “possess” Foucault and Derrida. His text suggests open satisfaction at the thought that the majority of the potential audience does not so “possess” them. Yet it remains an open question whether such possession imparts the equivalent of potency—the acknowledged capacity to generate works that have a life within Ukrainian high culture. Preferring the influence of modern and postmodern Europe over that of nativist tradition is no antidote to cultural anxiety.

For a phenomenon that depended so heavily on provocation, Bu-Ba-Bu had a surprisingly long lifespan. This longevity could be attributed partly to the talent of its members, partly to the need in the culture for a counterweight to tradition, and partly to the skill of the trio at self-promotion and self-recycling. But by the mid-1990s the members of Bu-Ba-Bu had ceased to generate new work in their original avant-gardist style, reflecting instead, often no less nostalgically than ironically, upon their movement’s past glories. In 1995 Andrukhovych and the other two Bu-Ba-Bu writers, Oleksandr Irvanets and Viktor Neborak, published an anthology dedicated to their collective centenary. (The arithmetical justification for this unexpected anniversary lay in the fact that, in 1994, Andrukhovych had turned thirty-four, while Irvanets and Neborak had both reached the age of thirty-three.) The sixth issue of Chetver, dated 1995 and published in 1996, was titled Chrysler Imperial in nostalgic homage to the scandalous opera that had been staged a scant three years earlier. Among the materials collected in Chetver, no. 6, was Andrukhovych’s essay “Ave, Chrysler,” written as
early as 1993, which reflected upon Bu-Ba-Bu as a phase in the lives of its creators and acknowledged the need to move on:

And yet, something changed. The river began to change its course. . . .

It seems that youth has passed. We followed its passage very slowly, drinking it to the last drop as if it were the costliest potion in the world. . . .

In its place arises that typically European question: What next? What is it that lies beyond the Chrysler’s last stop and denies entry to the limousines of youth? And what will remain of Bu-Ba-Bu if its limousine is taken away?

I do not know. We are so protean that it is impossible to predict all of our future mutations.9

Andrukhovych gave no reason for considering “What next?” to be a typically European question. Given his view, to which we shall return presently, that form and order are a particularly European preoccupation, it is plausible that he should have regarded the linear narrative with its progression from event to event as a genre expressive of something essential to European culture. However that might be, Andrukhovych’s answer to his “European” question—the answer articulated in his works of the second half of the 1990s—was, simply, “Europe.” Beyond Bu-Ba-Bu and its rejection of the traditional local cultural values articulated in TR discourse there would be explicit affirmation of a particular set of values linked to a particular kind of Europe. In his works Andrukhovych began to foreground the theme of constructing a self through identification with a cherished cultural community. This community, in some cases best called the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in others Central Europe, was only partly attested by Andrukhovych’s experiences as a traveler and a turn-of-the-millennium intellectual. To a greater degree it was the product of historical imagination, myth and nostalgic yearning. With Central Europe’s best-known émigré Milan Kundera, whom he succeeded in 2001 as a recipient of the University of Vienna’s Herder Prize, Andrukhovych might have proclaimed, “Central Europe is not a state: it is a culture or a fate. Its borders are imaginary and must be redrawn with each new historical situation.”10

Andrukhovych’s choice of this Europe was very different from Ieshkiliev’s manifesto-like and anxious proclamation of fealty to the Europe of Foucault and Derrida. It was characterized by a calm, respectful, almost reverent attitude grounded in details of personal experience, in family memory and in reading. It gave rise to some of Andrukhovych’s most distinguished writing. After the novel Perverziia [Perversion, 1996] Andrukhovych wrote very little fiction, concentrating instead on essays and travelogues, many of which were subsequently gathered in collections titled Dezorientatsiia na mistsevosti [Disorientation as to Place, 1999] and Moia ievropa [My Europe, 2001], the latter also containing texts by the Polish writer Andzhei Stasiuk.

Andrukhovych’s chosen Europe is defined as much by difference from what he regards as non-Europe as it is through its intrinsic qualities. As one critic observed, the title word “disorientation” can productively be read as “dis-Orientation.”11 The point is not so much that Andrukhovych does not know where he is, but rather that
he knows he does not wish to be in the Orient. Andrukhovych emphatically turns away from the East, which for him is, first and foremost, almost the whole of the former Soviet Union. The Soviet and post-Soviet East appears in Andrukhovych’s opus as a hostile continent which includes not only Moscow, rendered as grotesque and demonic in the novel Moskoviiada [The Moscoviad, 1993], but also Kyїv, which Andrukhovych described—libeled, as some claimed—as lifeless for all its metropolitan business, inhuman for all its scurrying masses, and redeemed only by pockets of intellectual and cultural soul-mates who would be isolated even from each other were it not for the metro lines. Oksana Zabuzhko, a poet, philosopher, prose writer, and Andrukhovych’s almost exact contemporary, leapt to Kyїv’s defense, lauding the city as Julio Cortázar had lauded Paris (“To be nothing in this city, which is everything, is a thousand times better than the opposite”) and celebrating its multifariousness (“not a planet, but a galaxy comprising innumerable separate Kyїvs”). But in this latter feature, a virtue in Zabuzhko’s judgment, Andrukhovych would discern the cardinal vice of formlessness that, in turn, stands in the way of human individuation:

Form, or rather the lack of it—that is the name of all our misfortunes. . . . The absence of form is a return to the condition of the brute. It is the eternal greyness of being that one escapes through the suicide’s rope. . . . Our total destruction of nature betrays our incapacity to cope with the landscape and results in our destroying ourselves.

How and why did this happen? Against a background of strident formlessness we labour at a new myth, shouting about our Europeanness, marshalling strange racial, anthropological and geographical arguments, reaching back to the Trypillians, the agricultural Scythians, to pagan times or, alternatively, to Christianity. We point to the Easter egg and the dough horse. Yes, we used to have it, that sense of form. Long ago.

Perhaps the reason lies in our vulnerability to the East?

The geographical equivalent of such formlessness is the steppe, endless, throwing up no limits or obstacles, and therefore open to boundless despotism. For Andrukhovych it is akin to the Asia that Count Metternich claimed to espy through the eastern windows of his Vienna palace.

The antithesis of this Orient is Europe. A particular kind of landscape, but also the way in which people have been formed by this landscape and then have shaped it in its turn are notable features of the Europe that Andrukhovych chooses. For him, space determines being. Like the German theorist of cultural pluralism Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) with whom his name is now so felicitously linked, Andrukhovych connects landscape and climate to cultural type. “The European person,” Andrukhovych reflects,

. . . was created by mountains and forests. Here nature prompted being to strive for discreteness, variety and completeness of form. . . . The European person was created by inheritance. You enter the world among towers and gardens that are countless centuries old. You are powerless to spoil anything here, even if you wanted to do so very much. All this architecture has been copied from the landscape, all of its
makers are known to you by name. This is a victory over the vanity of vanities, these co-ordinates of duration and gradualism signify certain absolute values, among which is the human personality, distinct, sole and unrepeatable.

The communist regime by the will of history (or was it history?) could conquer the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians. But it was always regarded in these countries as a temporary and absurd misunderstanding, so much at odds was it with these squares, arches, cathedrals, belfries, parks and gardens.15

The Europe that Andrukhovych chooses is, patently, not the Europe of Brussels and Strasbourg, of commerce and trade, of the bureaucracies of the European Union; not the Europe which real post-Soviet Central and East European states strain to join. Andrukhovych chooses not to recognize this Europe, let alone acknowledge that its reality is remote from the high cultural dream, presided over, perhaps, by Rilke, that is the Europe of his mind’s eye. Andrukhovych chooses a Europe that allows him to view his native landscape—the foothills of the Carpathians—and his favorite city, Lviv with its Habsburg history, as part of a continuum that stretches to Venice and Munich, encompassing much that is picturesque and visually comfortable. The physical existence of the landscape appears to render this Europe tangible, but as a cultural object it is the fruit of selective vision, nostalgic introspection and imagination. It is Andrukhovych who creates his own Europe, not the composite reality of contemporary Europe that impinges upon— influences—him. His choice of a Europe implies withdrawal into an aesthetic, artificial realm that offers the reader no socio-political challenges or exhortations.

Andrukhovych is quite aware of the limitations that his choice implies. Sometimes he defends them, adopting an aestheticist position that values the artist’s loyalty to objects of observation and articulating a fear of the danger that ideology presents to his art:

At the mention of language and words I seem already to cross the boundary of what is permitted and fall into the world of unstable abstractions, and this seems highly undesirable, for then I might begin to speak also of the ruins of souls and of virtue, of the ruins of love and the ruins of hatred, of the ruins of faith and the ruins of expectations.

Then I would be forced to moralize (in fact, I have begun to do so already), to break into open windows and doors, to create nervous drafts in these corridors between the past and the future.

Instead of this I would prefer to look a little more closely at objects and things, at what is tactile, I am sometimes reminded of my childhood idea of becoming an archaeologist, I write lists in verse about refuse tips and ruined habitations, about basements and attics crammed with the bric-à-brac of the Middle Ages—excuse me, of Central Europe.16

Yet Andrukhovych signals in this very passage his recognition of the fact that renunciation of the political is an ephemeral ideal. Among the objects that attract him as an artist are habitations that he describes as “ruined,” conceeding thereby that they are
no mere objects of disinterested contemplation, but products of a history from whose narration human suffering and loss cannot be excluded. It comes as no surprise, then, that Andrukhovych’s part of My Europe ends with stories of the narrator’s own family, all of them entwined with the wars, persecutions, migrations and violent deaths that characterized Central Europe in the twentieth century. The celebration of an ideal Europe of Andrukhovych’s own subjective making has been augmented here by a more nuanced response to Europe as a location of history and therefore of pain.

Different in trajectory, but not dissimilar in outcome is the choice of Europe by another member of the Ivano-Frankivsk circle, Andrukhovych’s friend Yuri Izdryk (b. 1962), editor of the aforementioned journal Chetver and author, among other works, of a complex and linguistically eclectic short-novel-length prose text titled Votstsek (1996).

The title alludes to a series of European predecessors: Johann Christian Woyzeck, a soldier who in 1821 murdered his common-law wife out of jealousy; the dramatic fragment Woyzeck, written by the German playwright and radical journalist Georg Büchner (1813–1836) on the basis of Woyzeck’s medical file (the fragment was not published until 1879, and was first staged in 1913); and the twelve-tone opera Wozzeck (1925) that Alban Berg based on Büchner’s drama. Izdryk retains the name of the central character, making him an emotionally troubled resident of some post-Soviet West Ukrainian city. He also retains elements of the plot (a love that comes to an end; a senseless crime) and the overall atmosphere. In Izdryk’s Votstsek, as in the earlier works that invoke the Woyzeck plot, anguish mixes with black humor as the central character progressively loses his grip upon a disordered and unintelligible world. Votstsek, who as narrator also figures under the appellations “he,” “I,” “you,” and “That One,” is represented as suffering. He suffers because he can come to terms neither with the disturbed nature of his consciousness, nor with his conscience. To represent this double failure Izdryk makes connections to two traditions of European thought: that of Cartesian and Kantian epistemological rationalism, and of existentialism. With some virtuosity, the text acknowledges the skepticism that poststructuralism imposes upon the insights that once might have seemed to flow from the exploration of such avenues of thought. Yet—and here Bloom would recognize the “strength” of Izdryk as an “author”—the text, by a remarkable feat of control over the general architecture of the work and its logic, contrives not to become yet another demonstration of the relativity and indeterminacy of all possible statements. Instead, it establishes an authorial position (for all its confessed skepticism regarding authorship) that is finely balanced between relativity and indeterminacy on the one hand, and Christian theism on the other. Each side of this binary opposition negates the other, yet each emerges with equal validity from the world-view system of the text. It is a tribute to Izdryk’s skill as a writer that this exercise in intellectual acrobatics is accomplished in a text that remains engaging and readable.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to repeat the detailed analysis in which the foregoing observations are grounded, but to draw attention to the role that the European intellectual tradition is made to play in Izdryk’s construction. No less than
Andrukhovych, who derives the principle and value of individuation from the European landscape, which, being parcelled, is easily compassed by the mind, Izdryk is impressed by the notion of the autonomous subject. But he finds its philosophical champions unconvincing. Very early in *Votstsek*, Izdryk mocks Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” and Kant’s radically isolated subject of cognition by taking the reader on a vain quest for the elusive seat of subjective consciousness, visualized as a journey into the brain and into the ever smaller particles of the matter that comprise it:

In the quest for your own “I,” in your attempts to crystallize out this elusive substance (a prerequisite for any encounter between the first and second persons) you always come up against the purely technical limitations of internal optical magnification, of good old neurophysiological blow-up.

It was, after all, quite predictable and logical that, as you looked for the “I” in the depths of your skull cavity, your gaze should first have surveyed the whole of the brain, that unfamiliar and untouched planet, uninhabited and comfortless, whose immobile, even imperturbable surface gave no hint of turbulent processes inside. . . . After roaming about its desert surface for a while and inspecting without much enthusiasm all these convolutions and hemispheres, these thalamuses and hypothalamuses, these hypophyses etc, you began your descent into the dura mater and the arachnoid, ever deeper and downward. You sampled this tender soil at the most disparate points and your analyses became increasingly painstaking, detailed and complete. At the stage where you could no longer do without lenses or microscopes, neurones, synapses, axons and dendrites hove into view, and later still—nucleuses, cell membranes and mitochondriae. Here life was in full swing, but the cursed “I” was nowhere to be seen. Stubbornly you advanced into the depths of matter, and soon you had before you strange molecules which you smashed to pieces with the determination of an infant getting to the guts of a new toy. Later still, armed no longer with optical instruments but with various bizarre contraptions—Wilson chambers, electron guns, Doppler accelerators and Foucault’s pendulums—you examined atoms and, once again, nucleuses, then protons, electrons and neutrinos, you performed impossible three-particle operations (two nucleuses and a muon) using Coulomb’s law, also two-particle and one-particle operations, but of course all this was wasted effort and vain hope, for somewhere past the last threshold you came up against the one great indivisible and nonexistent Nothing—the glittering likeness of pure energy that stood at the foundation of all things and all worlds and finally the whole Universe.

It was time to look around and ask, “But isn’t this a mirage?”

The quest for the “I” retreated into the background. It became tiresome and uninteresting.18

The other European intellectual tradition that Izdryk makes his own in *Votstsek* is that of existentialism. Heidegger, in particular, looms large here and elsewhere in his work. In Izdryk’s *Chetver* encyclopaedia, in contrast to the bouquet of the expected heroes of poststructuralism in Ieshkiliev’s *MUeAL*, only one European thinker is represented—Heidegger. The entry itself, instead of being an expository text about the philosopher, consists of the translation of a sizeable excerpt from Heidegger’s lecture of 1946, “Wozu Dichter?” (What Are Poets For?).19
rodic gestures toward Heidegger and toward “What Are Poets For” in particular. In his lecture Heidegger analyzed minutely one of the late poems of Rilke, especially those of its lines which refer to the ways in which human beings, on the one hand, and plants and animals, on the other, are “waged” by Nature and for their part acquiesce in this wager (“Wagnis”) through an act of their will. Heidegger’s discussion is long, subtle and painstaking. Izdryk’s irreverent quip in response is brief and brutal: “People are OK, God bless them. As for things—you can put up with them, too. But plants and animals are sometimes intolerable” (13). Another parody is at the level of style. Heidegger is famously etymological in his writing, seeking to connect concepts to words in what he takes to be their primordial meanings. Izdryk is also constantly on the lookout for effects that the Ukrainian language produces—as a phonetic system. What he discovers and rejoices in, however, are not additional, enriching, intensifying meanings, but word-plays, structural ambiguities in Ukrainian syntax, accidental and meaningless repetitions of sounds or syllables. Language for Izdryk is not, as it is for Heidegger, an archive containing evidence of the primordial human grasp of Being, but rather the opposite: a system whose internal order is imperfectly rational and threatens to break down, destroying the illusion of connection between words, meaning, and the world.

Parody upon Heidegger notwithstanding, Izdryk’s Votstsek acknowledges the irreducible seriousness of the problems raised by the fact of the human being’s location in a world. The world as a venue for physical and mental agony and a place where the human being (whether “I,” “he,” “That One,” or “you”) cannot be comfortable; and the self, however tortured and fragmented, as responsible for action and as questing, tragically, for an authentic Being-with-another—these are the main motifs and issues in Votstsek that are inherited from the existentialist tradition. Izdryk’s novel takes them both seriously and not seriously. Responsibility for action is a case in point. The central character, Votstsek, performs actions that cause pain to others. Yet the novel does not help its reader to pass judgment upon him. Votstsek locks his wife and child away in a basement and keeps them there for months until they are released by the police. These actions of Izdryk’s constitute, “in the opinion of the authorities, an illegal imprisonment of his family.” But to Votstsek’s mind they represent the sole chance of protecting his wife and son “from the menace of a decadent, evil, lascivious world.” What is more, from the perspective constructed by the novel it is not even clear whether these actions correspond to events that in the novel’s fictional world are to be taken as “real,” or to events that take place in Votstsek’s dreams. The novel’s structure is at pains to point out that its readers cannot know which of its passages belong to Votstsek’s dream world, and which to his “really” lived life. A full chapter is dedicated to the narration of a morning during which Votstsek makes several attempts to come out of sleep into full waking consciousness. The attempts are serially thwarted as Votstsek realizes that he has dreamt each successive awakening. The chapter ends with a “real” awakening whose status, however, remains dubious: “perhaps that treacherous dream has lasted to this day.” If Votstsek’s legally reprehensible action took place in a dream, any common-sense notion of responsibility becomes absurd—but what can, with confidence, be proclaimed to be not a dream?
Izdryk’s *Votstsek*, then, both draws upon and mocks the European intellectual tradition in a manner worthy of what Andrukhovych on the back cover of his friend’s book calls “all this (pardon the expression) ‘postmodernism.’” Put in another way, *Votstsek* engages with some of the big questions of European secular philosophy since the seventeenth century but, far from being able to answer them, cannot get beyond questioning the terms in which they are phrased. This predicament vis-à-vis the European canon is eloquently articulated in the chapter “Genealogy (Here They Come Again).” Elsewhere a genealogy might be an opportunity for homage to precursors and influencers, but not in *Votstsek*. Here genealogy proves to be devoid of meaning, and the very names that have a place in it lose their recognizable form and disintegrate into random words:

As for the genealogy, we shall begin with Adenauer, the only luminary who remained after Heidegger’s ignominious flight. Adenauer, our infinite father, universal and multilingual, emerged from the dark unknown and disappeared into the darkness, leaving us his descendants and the melody of his name: “Add . . . ‘er . . . now . . . .”

Heidegger’s flight here is probably best read, not as an allusion to his possible coquetry with National Socialism, but as an allegory of the defeat of a philosophical Europe, and the coming in glory of Adenauer is an acknowledgment of the reality of the contemporary Europe that Andrukhovych so steadfastly overlooks. Adenauer, the “father” of the German postwar economic miracle, the partner of de Gaulle in the invention of the economic Europe that has gradually displaced all other possible Europes, is also the “father” of the “tribe” among whose members the text enumerates the younger generation of Ukrainian writers, lightly and wittily disguising their names. Neither Andrukhovych nor Izdryk are excluded from this list. Part of this Adenauerian heritage is the postmodern loss of faith in meaning and in humanist values. *Votstsek* deplores this heritage, yet acknowledges that it is doomed to share it. Towards the end of the novel the voice of the fractured central figure finds a formula for converting this experience into literary form: “That One found ways of annihilating literally all aspects of the text, of forcing the beautiful up against the ugly, of transforming the sublime into the ridiculous, of disguising tragedy as farce . . . . Nothing would be known with certainty . . . . Even the protagonist would disappear in the end into the jungle of his own self-indulgent gibberish.”

And yet, if doubt is universal, then doubt itself is doubtful, and through this double negation the possibility of faith is restored. A leap of faith into God—yet another maneuver for which there are impeccable European precedents—becomes entirely possible, and each of the two chapters of *Votstsek* ends with the central character reciting the Lord’s Prayer. Lest this statement appear too affirmative, however, the text of the prayer is represented graphically as breaking up towards the end into disconnected syllables and, finally, letters. There remain in *Votstsek* two European alternatives, each as plausible and as implausible as the other: theist faith, and nihilism as the ultimate consequence of reason’s radical critique of its own foundations.
Both Andrukhovych and Izdryk choose a Europe, and the choice for each of them is no easy matter. Both engage with Europe, each in his own way savoring its blandishments and suffering its impositions. Both recognize that they are not of the East, Andrukhovych through explicit declaration, Izdryk through silence concerning it. Andrukhovych struggles to preserve the joy of seduction by Europe, to retain it as a familiar and beloved Other. In his efforts to remain detached—a tourist, a Europhile—he admires, enthuses, describes, classifies, and interprets. Yet, in the end, he acknowledges that he cannot but be involved. Europe is his, warts and all—not only its rococo palaces, but also its genocides. Izdryk, less ambivalent, has no comparable detachment. Europe’s great problems are his problems. He is not a Europhile, but a European.

Notes


7. MUEAL, 114.


22. Ibid., 67.

23. Ibid., 61.

24. Ibid., 28.

25. Ibid., 94–95.

References


Since the end of the past millennium, contemporary Ukrainian prose, particularly the novel, has shown a variety of new qualities that betoken an emerging trend, a new period of Ukrainian literary development. These qualities are not dramatically different from what came before. They are, rather, an evolutionary development of the cultural atmosphere in Ukraine in the first decade of independence. The intoxicating euphoria and agonizing disillusionment of the first taste of cultural independence in the early 1990s produced a set of topics, themes, approaches, and techniques in Ukrainian literature that still remain an important part of the creative landscape. But just as surely, changes are apparent, arising not only from the inevitable “aging” of the artists, writers, performers, and their creative ideas but also from the arrival of a new generation of creative writers. The works of this new generation bring a different, if not entirely fresh, perspective on the important cultural issues and questions of the day.

Ukrainian literature greeted national independence with a variety of styles, genres, themes, and intellectual poses. Some writers, particularly those from the Bu-Ba-Bu literary school led by Iurii (Yuri) Andrukhovych, amused their readers with the playful spirit of postmodernism, largely in tune with like-minded writers in Europe. Others, among them Iurii (Yuri) Izdryk and Ievhen Pashkovsky appealed to Ukraine’s intellectual readers with very minute examinations of philosophical, psychological, and patriotic issues. Among these latter writers, European cultural models were not particularly valued and even, on occasion, were rejected with hostility. Still others, such as Oksana Zabuzhko or Ievhenia Kononenko, approached a narrower range of intellectual themes, particularly questions of women’s identity, with the familiar styles and approaches common in Europe and North America. These qualities of the literature of the 1990s have received a fair share of critical attention, as the chapters in this volume can attest. The younger writers of the first decade of the third millennium have yet to establish their place in the literary canon, and it is necessarily premature to make bold pronouncements about the direction in which their writing and that of
their colleagues will develop. The only certainty about Ukrainian writing today is that the field has grown to a maturity, diversity, and stability where any kind of writing is possible. Nevertheless, the observations that follow, though formulated tentatively and based on the very limited scope of only four works, may help to illuminate some of the dynamic forces affecting literature in Ukraine today.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the second wave of post-independence Ukrainian literature is its distinct appeal to a youthful, socially conscious but culturally “hip” audience of specifically Ukrainian readers. For Serhii Zhadan, Anatolii Dnistrovy, Iryna Karpa, Liubko Deresh, and a sizable circle of their friends and colleagues, the intended audience for their works is clearly somewhat different from what it was for some of their older counterparts in the 1990s, such as Andrukhovych and Zabuzhko. In a North American demographic context these two target audiences might be distinguished as Generation X and Generation Y. This generational divide is a paradigm that will be used in this study to inform and illuminate the examination of specific features in two books each by Serhii Zhadan and Anatolii Dnistrovy. Both were born in 1974, as opposed to Andrukhovych and Zabuzhko, who were both born in 1960. The thematic issues that characterize the work of the younger writers include a focus on collective identities, on socially deviant behavior, and a search for permanent, stable values. On aesthetic and formal issues, the works of the younger writers are distinguished by a greater reliance on the familiar techniques of realism: objective or at least consistent narration, sequential exposition, and deliberate attention to setting.

The most important quality that distinguishes the younger writers from their predecessors is the retreat from individualism. As corporate human resource specialists writing for daily newspapers and the Internet continually attest, Gen Xs are the ambitious, independent, and introspective products of a dangerous world in which their Darwinian survival skills were honed. Gen Ys are self-confident extroverts who thrive in social interaction and seek balance between recreation and productivity, as they were programmed to do by their pampered upbringing. Among the older authors, individualism was very pronounced. Zabuzhko’s heroines are all extremely self-centered and racked with angst. Whether it be playing tennis or attending a school reunion, they can never connect with the “other” because there is no “other” in their world, only a reflection of themselves in the eyes of another. Sometimes it is not even a reflection that Zabuzhko’s protagonist sees, but quite literally her own self on the television screen. Andrukhovych’s protagonists are similar. No matter how large the group they party with, and whether that happens in Venice or Chortopil, his heroes have no group identity or loyalty: everything in the world belongs to each one of them alone, even his friend’s wife or his poetry.

In Zhadan’s works the world is very different. Serhii, the protagonist of the stories in Big Mak, is constantly in search of companionship. He maintains contact and remains loyal to his friends even in situations where that is costly or otherwise undesirable. For example, in the story titled “Desiat’ sposobiv ubyty Dzhona Lenona” [Ten Ways to Kill John Lennon], Serhii first befriends a somewhat unpleasant character (the John Lennon look-alike) and together they befriend an almost catatonic character referred
to only as “the Hindu.” The substance of the story consists largely of the protagonist’s realization that he must abandon both newfound friends despite his largely charitable inclinations. The story ends with a singular and symbolic development: the protagonist finds a cell phone and takes it. When the phone’s owner calls and demands its return, Serhii chooses to avoid any possible confrontation and throws the phone in a trashcan. He later hears the cell phone ringing in the trashcan. Like the insistent ring of the cell phone, the need and desire for friendship and human interaction is a call that Zhadan’s heroes find irresistible but ultimately unfulfilling. Even if the consequences of such interaction are predictably undesirable, the urge for community, the unquenchable thirst to answer the phone, cannot be denied. Furthermore, in Zhadan’s thematic universe, it should not be resisted because it represents the basic goodness of humanity.

In the collection’s first story, “Berlin, iały my vtratyly” [The Berlin That We Lost] the protagonist travels with his friends Sylvie and Gašper from Vienna to Berlin. Interwoven among the various story lines here is one tied together by the giving of small gifts. Serhii helps a girl stranded at a nightclub without a way home by having the bartender call her a taxi. The bartender makes the call and gives Serhii condoms, which are apparently being distributed to patrons for free as a policy of the establishment. Serhii reciprocates by giving the bartender a book of matches advertising a hip-hop radio station in Vienna. A few pages later, Serhii and Sylvie are buying food in a small grocery store next to the home of the sculptor whom they intend to visit. When they mention the sculptor to the storeowner, he smiles and gives Sylvie some loose candies along with her change. Serhii reciprocates by giving the storeowner the condom he received from the bartender. Near the end of the story, when Serhii is boarding a train back to Vienna, Sylvie gives him some of these candies for the road. Finally, when Serhii reaches Vienna, he encounters a woman drug addict in the subway asking him for morphine. In the closing sentence of the story, he gives her the candies.

The chain of small gifts that binds this story together is a good example of Zhadan’s thematic preoccupation with the need to establish human connections. These gifts, the simple tokens of human friendship and bonding, are insubstantial, just simple acts of momentary whimsy. They arise out of mundane interactions, chance meetings between ordinary people, and they have no lasting consequences. Still, they are a product and a symbol of an intrinsic benevolence that Zhadan clearly associates with the human condition. In the pervasive chaos and absurdity of existence that Zhadan postulates, benevolence may be impractical and even pointless, but it is an abiding need among members of the species.

In the story entitled “Kol’orovi nutroshchi narodnoho avtomobilia” [The Colorful Interior of a People’s Automobile (i.e., Volkswagen)] Serhii is traveling by bus on a very rainy day. At a rest stop, Serhii gets off the bus and makes a phone call with his calling card. As he returns to the bus in the driving, soaking rain, he hears someone call out to him. He stops, turns around, and waits as a rest-stop employee oh, so very slowly walks out to him—both of them getting thoroughly soaked in the meantime—only to return the telephone calling card that Serhii had purposely left by the telephone because all its value had been used up. Zhadan’s narration of the scene
focuses on the inconvenience Serhii experiences and the impatient anger it provokes in him. He sees himself through the eyes of his fellow passengers on the bus, who are dry and comfortable while he is cold and wet. In his own mind, he even belittles the good will of the station employee, calling him a boy scout. Even the return of the card is not entirely amiable:

мужик нарешті доповзає до мене, незадоволено крутить головою, потому важко відсапується і простягає мою телефонну картку, котру я залишив в автоматі, ви забули, каже, відмовляється й гребе назад, дякую—кричу я йому навздогін і ховаю картку до кишені, не можу ж я йому справді сказати, що вона вже нечинна. (Zhadan 2003, 131)

So this bumpkin finally crawls over to me, rolls his head like he’s the victim here, breathing hard from his great effort, and holds out my phone card, which I had left by the phone, saying here’s your card which you left by the phone and ‘cause of which I had to slog through this god damn downpour. Hellish weather, he says trying to take the edge off. Yeah, I yell after him, shoving the card into my pocket. I can’t tell him—can I?—that the card’s useless, it’s all used up.

Benevolence is not measured by its practical value or even by its unqualified goodness. It is a value unto itself.

The small acts of benevolence that characterize Zhadan’s stories in Big Mak find a somewhat different manifestation in his novel Depesh mod [Depeche Mode]. Here the plot itself centers on a collective, that is, a group of young men who engage in a variety of socially undesirable activities, but whose group loyalty is strong. The pretext for the plot in this novel involves finding a member of the group named Sasha Karburator [Carburetor] whose stepfather has died. He needs to be told so that he can attend the funeral. Sasha, when he is eventually found, is predictably uninterested in his ne’er-do-well stepfather, but the boys have gone to great lengths to find him. This effort emphasizes not only their own sense of camaraderie but a general appreciation for kinship, even if only schematic. This appreciation of familial or friendly bonds between characters is reflected at various points in the story. A policeman named Mykola Ivanovych sees in the boys the same trouble that led to the death of his own son. A tramcar driver who has almost run over one of the boys, Sobaka, on the tracks, sits down and drinks vodka with him. The boys befriend an invalid at a suburban train station and listen to his old phonograph with him. Serhii, the autobiographical first-person narrator, grows philosophical about this episode with the invalid:

я сиджу зараз тут—на цьому вокзалі, поруч із незнайомим мені інвалідом, слухаю гімнічі, в принципі, пісні, але є в цьому щось правильне, саме так все й має бути ... радість і спокій тримаються саме на великому логічному поєднанні тисяч ніколи не потрібних, аномальних шизофренічних штук, які, сполучившись у щось єдне, дають тобі, врешті-решт, повне уявлення про те, що таке щастя, що таке життя, і головне—що таке смерть. (Zhadan 2004, 207)
I’m sitting right here in this train station next to this cripple whom I don’t know, listening to this basically shitty retro—but there’s something right about this. This is how things should be. Happiness and equilibrium depend on precisely this logical unification of thousands of unwanted, anomalous, schizophrenic individual pieces, which, joined into a single whole, give you, at long last, a complete idea of what joy is, of what life is and, what’s most important, of what death is.

A similar narratorial pronouncement describes the joys of sleeping with Marusia, who is something of a shared girlfriend for the boys:

Ми напивались в її пантовій квартирі, кричали на її балконі з видом на муніципалітет, дивились її відео, а потім засинали в її ліжку, інколи навіть без неї. Мені в цьому випадку навіть не стільки секс подобався, скільки сама можливість прокинутись бодай із кимось, не самому, не сам на сам зі своїм похміллям і своїми кривавими сновидіннями, прокидатись із кимось—це завжди прикольніше, навіть якщо це Маруся, яка не пам’ятає, як тебе звати і що ти з нею вчора робив. (Zhadan 2004, 126)

We’d get drunk in her classy apartment, yelling from her balcony, watching her videos, and then go to sleep in her bed, sometimes even without her. For me, it wasn’t even so much the sex that I liked, as it was just the chance to wake up next to somebody, anybody, not alone, not just you and your hangover and your bloody nightmares. Waking up with somebody is always cool, even if it’s just Marusia, who doesn’t remember what your name is and what you did to her last night.

Where earlier, in Big Mak, Zhadan had shown human interaction against a background of human insignificance and existential absurdity, in Depesh mod the background is far more ominous and sinister. Malice, aggression, injury, and violence accompany the boys wherever they go. The invalid with the phonograph, whom the narrator described as the hub in a complex web of joy, is rousted by the police and his phonograph broken. When Sobaka, rushing to his defense, punches a policeman, he is himself so brutally beaten by the police, first on the platform and then at the police station, that he ends up in a mental hospital, from which he is eventually discharged into the army by a despairing and callous doctor. Throughout the novel the boys presume that all authority figures are vindictive and malicious, even though many turn out otherwise. Conversely, revulsion at the boys’ behavior, coupled with despair over poor social conditions, leads to callousness among those who interact with the boys. The hospital workers merely try to get rid of their patients. An ambulance driver drops Sobaka off in the middle of the street to avoid having his vehicle soiled. The boys encounter some real enemies, too. A drug dealer shoots at them, after they disparage the quality of his marijuana. The Adidas-track-suit-wearing thugs threaten Vasia and Moriak when the boys try to sell vodka on their “turf” at the Kharkiv train station. Later Vasia has to jump off a moving train to avoid what he deems to be the sexual aggression of an Azeri train conductor.

These all-too-real social ills distinguish the Ukrainian setting of Depesh mod from the Germany and Austria of Big Mak. In the later novel, the West plays a smaller but
nevertheless tangible role: it is another opportunity for human contact, for communica-
tion that will redeem the youngsters and save them from the absurdities and evils of
the postcommunist world. But in two important scenes of failed communication we
discover that the West offers no hope. In the first, an American evangelical preacher
ironically named Johnson & Johnson (Dzhonson-i-Dzhonson) arrives in Kharkiv to
preach salvation to the Ukrainian masses. Kakao, one of the core group of friends,
is hanging around with some musicians who have been hired to provide entertain-
ment at the evangelical show. Zhadan presents this subplot in two episodes. First,
Kakao is delighted to be accepted among the musicians, particularly an unnamed
young Ukrainian always referred to as Little Chuck Berry who is telling stories of
his sexual exploits. Kakao feels comfortable in this company until he is asked to tell
an anecdote himself. Saved from embarrassment by the call for the musicians to go
out on stage, Kakao hovers backstage and has an extraordinary encounter. Johnson
& Johnson himself, making his way out onto the stage, stops and asks him his name.
Kakao is thunderstruck and speechless in awe. The moment passes, and the preacher
goes on stage, but Kakao is forever transformed by the realization that he has been
spoken to by a person who was wearing a gold-plated Rolex. Zhadan accentuates the
theme of false encounter with a merciless caricature of the preacher and his transla-
tor. While the preacher offers a familiar evangelical story of Christian hope about an
accident victim who finds salvation and physical recovery in her devotion to Christ,
the incompetent but inventive translator turns the story into one about an unredeemed
alcoholic prostitute. The show ends with a flourish, however, as Little Chuck Berry
launches into a truly inspired guitar riff that allows the spectators to leave satisfied
and Kakao to feel uplifted again. At the end of the novel, in a section called Epilogue
3, one of the preacher’s bodyguards tells Kakao to empty his pockets, from which
emerges the gold-plated Rolex.

Zhadan’s depiction of this encounter with the West is not just a failure to com-
 municate but also an elaborate denunciation of individualism. From the guitarist’s
enigmatic tales of manhood to the materialist hypocrisy of the preacher’s message
(punctuated by his trademark name) and the translator’s paranoid mistranslation,
everything here speaks to the aggressiveness and cynicism of values based on the
primacy of the self. Even the guitarist’s wonderful playing, which moves Kakao and
the audience as a whole, is a sham, since the feelings it conveys are not genuine. The
end result of this cultural interaction between East and West is only the strengthening
of negative values: materialism and theft.

A similar missed connection characterizes the second episode of East–West contact,
the one that gives the work its title. Hoping to learn where Sasha might be, three of the
boys search for Kakao at the apartment of Hosha, where they do find Kakao, appar-
ently Hosha’s homosexual partner. Here Vasia and Serhii spend the day smoking pot
and listening to a radio broadcast about the Irish rock band Depeche Mode. This entire
episode focuses on simple relations between characters. The chaotic apartment evokes
a feeling of nostalgia in the narrator, who expresses a longing for a sense of normalcy
and for parental attention. The radio show then turns to a retrospective on the rock band
and in particular, it’s singer David Gahan. Here Zhadan turns on his parodic skills. The announcer, reading a text he says has been prepared by a correspondent in London, spews a stream of nonsense and pure invention about the singer with special attention to his difficult childhood. Eventually the announcer interrupts himself and begins to correct obvious errors in the text he is reading, but his substitutions are only marginally more accurate than the mistranslations and fabrications of the putative London correspondent. The resulting false, commercialized portrait of the rock performer, emphasizing his marginal status, is completely lost on the Kharkiv teens, who, like the translator for Johnson & Johnson, hear something completely different from what has actually been said.

Finally the announcer breaks away from the comic text and invites listeners to call in and offer their own views and comments. Despite his marijuana-induced incoherence and bewilderment, Vasia writes down the number. He makes the call and is soon talking to the announcer on air. Their conversation is another of Zhadan’s trademark dialogues of narcotic stupor, and it is also another instance of failed communication. Vasia’s spontaneous response to the invitation to call the station, the narrator’s explanation of their search for Sasha, and even the announcer’s confessions about mixing liquor and drugs are all markers of a sincere desire to establish a link with another human being. But the attempts at communication in Depesh mod, like the acts of kindness in Big Mak, are doomed to failure. The need to communicate throughout the novel is very real, but in reality, this communication cannot take place. When the boys finally find Sasha, they deliberately choose not to tell him that his stepfather has died.

The novels of Anatolii Dnistrovy resemble Zhadan’s Depesh mod in their focus on the underworld of youth culture. Both authors devote a great deal of attention to drugs and popular music. Dnistrovy’s works are particularly distinguished by their focus on extreme violence, criminality, and sex. For his characters, as for Zhadan’s, the establishment and maintenance of relations with others is of central importance. In the earlier of his two novels, Misto upovil’nënoi ëiï [City of Slowed Action], this theme is presented against a background of a youth gang and one of its members who is trying to escape its clutches. In his later novel, Patetychnyi blud [Pathetic Error], the social circle consists of university students in a dormitory. In both, the central character is a young man who is torn between a variety of personal commitments, represented by his relationships with specific individuals. The core dilemma in the lives of Dnistrovy’s young characters is the choice between conformism and self-fulfillment. But the actual parameters of this dilemma appear to be malleable. Dnistrovy’s heroes have difficulty identifying the value system that defines their present and future choices. Thus personal loyalties become a handy substitute for thoughtful choices in making complex personal and ethical decisions.

The protagonist of Misto upovil’nënoi ëiï, Oleh Zuiev, called “the professor” by his gang friends, faces a number of difficult choices simultaneously. As his nickname suggests, Oleh is something of an intellectual, which makes him stand out among his colleagues. In his personal decisions he must continually choose between loyalty to his friends and his own intellectual and career interests. The violence of his gang buddies is often frightening to him, but his loyalty to them on a personal level is difficult to set aside. Dnistrovy uses every opportunity to highlight the power of personal attachment.
Among the gang members, loyalty means defending one another from outsiders and revenging injuries to one of the gang members. It also means respecting the authority of the gang leader and the internal dynamics of the group, despite any private reservations. But personal attachments cause conflicts in the group. Oleh is attracted to Roma, whom Tiulia, the gang leader and an extremely violent fellow, does not share with anyone. The relation between Oleh and Roma deepens after Oleh comforts her when she is scared and sick. After that Oleh lives in a characteristic Dnistrov dualism. His feelings for Roma are in conflict with his loyalty to the group. But this dualism is multiplied in many directions. Dnistrov, who has a particular flair for erotic narrative, uses sexual attraction as another arena in which to test personal loyalties. In the first section of the novel, Oleh has two sexual partners, his “lowbrow” girlfriend, Roma, who ties him to his gang but also puts him in conflict with its leader, and his “highbrow” girlfriend, Inha, through whom he enjoys contact with her intellectual family and a general sense of social propriety. But the girls also differ in their feelings toward him; Roma enjoys sex with Oleh but has no loyalty to him. Inha is proper and boring, but devoted.

The crudeness of human relationships among the youths in Dnistrov’s novels (the situation in Patetychnyi blud is somewhat less violent, but the relationships between the sexes are the same) is likely not an attempt to satisfy a potential Hollywood scriptwriter searching for plots with lots of sex and violence. Dnistrov deliberately reduces the choices facing his characters. Group loyalty, fear, and sex are basic human drives, no different in post-Soviet Ukraine than they were when the Scythians roamed this territory. Violence is a brutal but inescapable mechanism of social organization. Sex is carnal, a satiation of basic human instinct. Fear is palpable and debilitating and, like courage, it is a physiological, not mental condition. Dnistrov sees the social world of his young characters as a return to the world of a caveman, an image he develops consciously in the third chapter of Misto upovil’nenoi dii, where the gang meets in an underground, cave-like hideout in the basement of an unfinished construction site, which is accessible only through a hole in the floor.

Alongside this primitive, savage world there exists in Dnistrov’s novel another one, where parents throw birthday parties for seven-year-old girls, where friends discuss Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theories on the upbringing of children, where students read and analyze the poetry of Dante and Ievhen Malaniuk. In this world, personal relationships are no less important than they are in the primitive world of the youths, but here they have a civilized sheen. Sex is no less carnal in this world than in the primitive one, but here girlfriends bring boyfriends home to their parents, and mothers want to see their daughters successfully, if not happily, married. Violence is rare and sex can be restrained. Oleh avoids sex with his university girlfriend, Olia when he suspects he is infected with venereal disease. Group loyalty is reduced to vague notions of national pride. Simple, boring relationships can be built on a game of chess or some exceptionally tasty home-baking.

Dnistrov’s novels are based on the notion of a conflict between these two worlds, the boring, civilized, cultured world of adults and the exciting, violent, and primitive world of his young heroes. In the simplest sense, his works are a kind of social Bil-
dungsroman where the hero on the verge of maturity vacillates between his primitive violent past and a civilized but drab future. It is to Dnistrovy’s considerable credit that he elaborates this somewhat simplistic dualism into story lines that offer insightful commentary on social conditions in contemporary Ukraine. In effect, his two novels, like Zhadan’s two texts, are extended depictions of social decay.

The presentation and the parameters of social decay in Zhadan and Dnistrovy differ considerably. Dnistrovy’s Misto upovil’nenoï diï and Patetychnyi blud are essentially neorealist works, depicting a very recognizable world in which the physical setting, living conditions, and range of characters are all more or less familiar. The novel’s urban landscapes (Nizhyn in both works, plus the initial unnamed west Ukrainian city in the first half of Misto upovil’nenoï diï) include a recognizable uninspired Soviet-style architectural space as well as a claustrophobic atmosphere of provincial ennui. The university and its environs, particularly the high-rise dormitory of the later novel, offer a suitably drab backdrop for the characters in the story. Social life at an institution of higher learning becomes a synecdoche for society at large. Yet it is not only the chaos and irresponsibility of university students that characterize this world. Dnistrovy is careful also to show the despair and self-delusion that characterize the adult world. The trip that Vitalii makes with Dasha to the seashore in Patetychnyi blud or Oleh’s encounter with Olia’s parents in the earlier novel demonstrate that the normal world to which the youngsters should aspire offers no hope. There is no system of social values that can fill the void established in their youth.

Whether in the tightly bound social world of the young or the loosely but officially defined ties of the adult world, in Dnistrovy’s novels social problems are tied to the absence of a higher system of values. Dnistrovy often underscores the intellectual and creative talents of his protagonists and other characters in the novels, but these talents find no appropriate channel for expression or social acceptance. The only exception is rock music, which forms the backbone of the social life of Dnistrovy’s young characters, particularly in his second novel. But among the students music is merely an opportunity for socializing. Like the gang structure in the earlier novel, it merely reinforces the collective identity of the students. It does not offer a set of values. For Dnistrovy, these values lie in intellectual interests and in creative, particularly literary, engagement. Throughout his novels, social and personal situations are measured through comparisons to literary or historical figures and events. The first person narrative itself, its colorful language and articulate tone, underscore the disconnection between the crude simplicity of the characters’ lives and the aesthetic and intellectual context in which they are being presented. Dnistrovy’s image of post-Soviet Ukrainian society hinges on its failure to establish a higher sense of its own identity and purpose. For in a world where group loyalties and stable social structures are more important than individual aspirations, it is vital that the values of the society at large reflect the highest potential achievements of its members.

Like Dnistrovy, Zhadan sees a basic failure in the capacity of Ukrainian society to generate useful social values. His approach, however, unlike Dnistrovy’s, is not intellectual and aesthetic but moral and symbolic. Zhadan’s works are built on an
accrual of significant juxtapositions, rather than on a narrative continuity. His works are a string of beads without much of a thread. They are mostly a sequence of images. Coupled with the narcotic stupefaction of many of his dramatic dialogues, this quality results in the creation of highly symbolic images and situations that function as iconic summaries of the ideas he is presenting. We have already encountered these symbols in Zhadan’s works. The gift giving and telephone card in *Big Mak*, and Sobaka’s attempted rescue of the invalid with the phonograph in *Depesh mod* are examples of this technique. The accumulation of these images is the chief mechanism of thematic control that Zhadan utilizes in his works. The reader does not rationally grasp the significance of Zhadan’s stories but intuits it through these symbolic images.

In *Depesh mod*, Zhadan advances any number of images that reflect the social dysfunctionality at the center of his attention. One of these images neatly captures a number of his thematic vectors. When the boys enter the house of the gypsy to buy drugs, the narrator is struck by the sight of a fish on the windowsill:

Suddenly I see this big fish on the windowsill, I don’t even know what kind of fish it is—I never knew how to tell fish apart, there are just fish and frogs. In any case the little latch window is open and there’s a couple of bees flying around it, circling lazily. Where’d they come from in this weather—so sleepy and not at all aggressive—although maybe that’s the way it’s supposed to be? In any case, they’re landing on the body of the fish, crawling all over it. I come up closer and try to turn over the carcass and suddenly pull back my hand. The insides of the fish are completely devoured by these voracious beasts of prey; there’s a whole swarm of them in there and when I touch the corpse they fly out of there and start circling it. After a while they calm down and crawl back in. What filth! I think, a dead fish, a dead gypsy fish, devoured from the inside, what horror!

Iurik walks in with a package of dope, sees me next to the fish and he too can’t tear himself away from it. The bees crawl back inside and there’s something so chilling about this, that we all—me, Vasia, Chapai, Iurik, and even Jesus on his crucifix, sticking out from under his shirt—we’re all staring intently at the devoured gypsy fish, and we can’t turn our attention away from it.
This fish is one of the clearest and most obvious images of social decay in Zhadan’s novel. Its initially enticing exterior and putrid substance are without a doubt intended as an iconic representation of the society his novel depicts. But the image raises another significant association. Zhadan has sprinkled references to religion and to the Christian understanding of redemption throughout the novel. Johnson & Johnson is selling repentance, not toothpaste, although he does it with a Rolex on his wrist. In Zhadan’s world, assorted acts of human kindness and charity, from gift giving to saving invalids from the police, are part of a pattern of innate human goodness that society either cannot accept or cannot capitalize into a state of redemption. The faults Zhadan observes and depicts are not only the product of decades of Soviet misrule and the misguided materialism of the West: they are an inherited blemish on the moral fabric of Ukraine’s society. Zhadan does not explore the possibility of redemption in his works, but clearly it involves a reestablishment of moral underpinnings in society.

As we can see in just these two writers and their two works, the landscape of Ukrainian literature has been undergoing significant changes in the past decade. The euphoric celebration of the freedom of the individual that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union has given way to a somber and measured assessment of the social order. The special attention that Ukrainian literature gave to examining Ukraine’s place on the map of Europe—asking why Ukraine was not more like the West—has given way to a concerted effort to come to terms with the uniqueness of Ukrainian society and identity, not beyond the reach of Western influences and contacts but no longer seen exclusively in that context. Bold experimentation with modernist, postmodernist, and post-postmodernist playfulness and innovation in literary form and style has given way to some more traditional aesthetic constructions that still bring new ideas to literary technique but no longer challenge the value of everything that came before them. Of course, four books by two writers are not yet a trend, let alone a literary movement. The tendencies to retreat from the ideas and techniques of the previous generation of writers are evident among those writers themselves, notably in the recent works of Yuri Andrukhovych himself. The X generation has turned its gaze inward and is slowly maturing and discovering itself in a mirror image labeled “Y.”

Note

1. Among English-language studies of Ukrainian prose in the 1990s, Marko Andryczyk’s (2005) dissertation deserves particular attention.

References

Women’s Literary Discourse and National Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Maria G. Rewakowicz

A literary work, if it is to be read as literature, Jonathan Culler states in his book *The Literary in Theory*, has to be taken as in some way exemplary.

This structure of exemplarity has been important to the relationship of literature to the problem of identity, which has been so central to recent theory. Is the self something given or something made, and should it be conceived in individual or in social terms? Literature has always been concerned with such questions, and literary works offer a range of implicit models of how identity is formed. (33–34)

My goal in this investigation is to examine such implicit models in belletristic works by women authors in post-Soviet Ukraine and to apply Culler’s notion of exemplarity to works of criticism produced by female literary scholars since 1991. I claim that these two different genres (which in some cases intersect to form hybrid forms) equally elucidate the connection between literary production and identity construction. Within that framework, women’s discourse in post-Soviet Ukraine is instructive for two reasons: first, it is remarkably vibrant (quantitatively and qualitatively) and no longer marginal, as was the case under the Soviet regime; and second, it provides a particularly interesting case for studying the complexity of national identity formation in the post-independence period.

After outlining the current situation in literary scholarship and the role women critics play in academic quarters, I will introduce the most representative women writers and poets and show how they approach identity questions in their texts. First, I pinpoint those areas of literary scholarship in Ukraine that clearly benefited from the application of feminist theory and sketch its impact on identity formation. There are two schools of gender studies, one in Kyïv and another in Kharkiv, and I will briefly discuss their stands vis-à-vis the project of national identity construction. Second, I focus on a few women writers whose works constitute the most representative “implicit models” (as Culler puts it) of how identity issues are framed and played out. In this way, I hope to elucidate the direction assumed by women’s literary discourse(s) in the past decade and half in Ukraine.
Post-Independence Reading Strategies

In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet empire, a radical paradigm shift occurred both on the level of production of literary texts and on the level of literary scholarship. This shift, mainly a consequence of a collapse of communist ideology, brought about enormous opportunities for open-minded scholars to reassess their understanding of the social role of the literary work and to revisit the established canon of Ukrainian literature. Yet, the transition from highly ideological interpretations and outdated methodologies to more innovative and theoretically interesting readings has been rather slow and not always reliable, with one exception; namely, a group of women literary critics who introduced feminist theory and psychoanalysis as viable interpretative alternatives. Solomiia Pavlychko, Tamara Hundorova, Vira Aheieva, and Nila Zborovska, to name just a few, have had a considerable impact on rethinking and reinterpreting old canons. In fact, their propositions constitute the most interesting reading strategies in the post-independence period, especially for Ukrainian modernism and women authors. In addition to analyzing Ukrainian classics, they turn their attention to the new literature, which scholars of more conservative proclivity rarely take up.

In many ways the attractiveness of feminist theory and gender studies for women scholars in Ukraine stems from a profound need to find new ways of interpreting literary texts after many years of stagnation and ideological constraints under the Soviet regime. The growing intellectual exchange between Ukrainian female scholars and their Western counterparts following the collapse of the Soviet Union spurred an increased awareness of the problems facing women in independent Ukraine. This dialogue, including support from the West in the form of grants and fellowships, presented Ukrainian feminists with an opportunity to pursue not only their own scholarly projects but also a new social agenda for women in post-Soviet Ukraine. This is true especially for Solomiia Pavlychko, whose interest in feminist discourse, as attested by her book Feminizm, published in 2002, goes well beyond the confines of literary criticism.1

The process of identity formation is invariably a political activity, informed by historical thinking about ethnicity, empire, and linguistic and cultural differentiation. It is also a socially constructed undertaking promoted by concrete persons in specifiable contexts. Pavlychko’s pioneering efforts to introduce feminist theory into Ukrainian literary scholarship as one of many possible methodological strategies cannot be overstated. Her contribution in this regard has never been questioned and since her untimely death in 1999 it has become an object of intense veneration among her feminist colleagues.2 And even though Ukraine has its own quite strong feminist tradition going back to the second half of the nineteenth century (see Bohachevsky-Chomiak), the acceptance and advancement of the contemporary Western feminist project has been a fairly new phenomenon, which has its beginnings in the early 1990s.

The greatest achievement of feminist literary scholars in Ukraine has to do with their calling into question the established canon, not only because it was ideologically biased, that is, promoting communist propaganda (in this respect they were not alone),
but also because it clearly reflected a patriarchal mode of thinking. Their interpretative return to classic male authors such as Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko stemmed from the desire to remove the clichés attached to them (for instance, Shevchenko as a revolutionary democrat and Franko as a tireless worker for the good of common folk—“kameniar” [stonecutter]) and to read them through the prism of psychoanalysis or pure aestheticism (see Hundorova 1996, 2006; Zabuzhko 1997). Those women writers already recognized as firmly belonging to the canon were given a new look. Marko Vovchok, Olha Kobylianska, and especially Lesia Ukrainka were praised not for their call for social justice, as was often the case under the Soviet regime, but for their feminist agenda and stand as new women in Ukrainian letters. For example, Vovchok (Mariia Vilinska, 1833–1907) was never portrayed in Soviet literary histories as the Ukrainian equivalent of George Sand; she was praised for her depiction of the hardship suffered by peasant women. Vovchok’s concentration on women’s fates and their underlying desire to be independent was frequently overlooked, while her own turbulent biography, which included numerous romantic affairs and was marked by a financial independence owing to her literary work, was hardly emphasized.3 It is also worth mentioning that a special friendship between Kobylianska and Ukrainka, as I will indicate below, was a particularly fascinating area of study for Pavlychko and Hundorova.

In addition to classic authors, feminist critics turned their attention to figures often perceived as marginal in the established canon. For example, Aheieva (2003b) discusses a number of women authors who are not widely known but who, according to the critic, played a very important role in the development of modernist premises in Ukrainian literature. This proposition is important because it widens the focus of feminist modernist credentials beyond the standard icons of Kobylianska and Ukrainka. In the same category I would place Pavlychko’s study on Ahatanhel Krymsky, a poet, writer, and scholar of Middle East languages whose fin de siècle prose work Andrii Lahovs’ky touches on issues of homosexuality (Pavlychko 2000).

Revisiting the canon was by far the most important task faced by female critics, but there were other innovations as well. Nila Zborovska’s experimentation with the genre of literary criticism itself deserves attention and I will return to this question later. On the organizational level, these feminists were quite successful in founding a new Center of Gender Studies in Kyiv and publishing, however briefly, an electronic journal Vydnokola. Pavlychko, as editor-in-chief of the publishing house Osnovy made sure that important works of Western feminism, such as Simone de Beauvoir’s monumental Second Sex, were translated and published in Ukrainian.

Centers of Gender Studies

The feminist discourse in Ukrainian literary scholarship revealed itself most conspicuously in the area of canon reexamination. National identity as an issue within the same parameters comes to the forefront only insofar as the Kyiv Center of Gender Studies is compared with the Kharkiv Center of Gender Studies. Both centers were founded
in the 1990s and both have enjoyed prominence because of the efforts of their leading personalities. In Kharkiv, the leaders are Irina Zherebkinina and her husband Sergei Zherebkin; in Kyïv, Solomiia Pavlychko, together with Tamara Hundorova, Vira Aheieva, and Nila Zborovska. The differences between these two schools stem not only from their distinct interpretations of Ukraine’s post-Soviet realities and its national agenda but also from their contrastive applications of feminist theory. The Kharkiv Center foregrounds the philosophical and sociological aspects of feminism and only occasionally ventures into the literary sphere, whereas the Kyïv Center concerns itself predominantly with literary criticism and the development of new feminist methodologies for the interpretation of Ukrainian classics. One should also bear in mind the fact (and it is not without significance) that the Kharkiv investigations are overwhelmingly in Russian whereas the Kyïv contributions are largely in Ukrainian.

However, I do not want to leave an impression that national identity is solely determined by the language factor. In fact, on other occasions I argue that national self-identification goes well beyond the issues of language (see Rewakowicz). A case in point is Andrey Kurkov, who lives in Kyïv and considers himself a Ukrainian writer but writes almost exclusively in Russian. But as far as the Kharkiv Center is concerned, the use of the Russian language goes hand in hand with a very specific cultural identification, which is clearly divorced from the project of state-and nation-building endeavors in Ukraine. When one closely examines the writings of Irina Zherebkinina and Sergei Zherebkin, one is struck by the absence of connectedness (territorial or linguistic) to things Ukrainian. Although they do take up Ukrainian subjects, they do so from without rather than within. The fact that Kharkiv is at least territorially part of Ukraine seems to be intentionally overlooked. Their perspective on the women’s movement in Ukraine and the related gender problematic is clearly an outside perspective. Thus, one can conclude that even the civic model of nationalism (which marginalizes ethnic “blood-and-soil” claims) is too much for them to bear. Vitaly Chernetsky (2002) puts it forthrightly:

In the work of the Kharkiv school, one finds a curious slippage between a sustained feminist analytical project and the strategic use of feminist terminology for invectives against the Ukrainian state and the national culture, which the school apparently views as coextensive. Similarly to many other ex-Soviet russophones, the Kharkiv gender studies school authors seem not to have done the work of mourning for the disintegrated Russian empire, and find themselves arrested in melancholic longing for the unified russophone cultural space. They refuse to approach the Ukrainian language as a means of communication and regard its use as an aggressive imposition of external power. Indeed, by way of refusing to subscribe to a Ukrainian identity, apparently not only linguistically but of any kind, members of the Kharkiv school offer a bizarre latter-day confirmation of Fanon’s insight: a colonial subject comes to experience the metropoly as the norm and him/herself as the Other.4

Irina Zherebkina’s first contribution to Ukrainian feminist scholarship appeared in 1996 as a monograph titled: Zhenskoe politicheskoe bessoznatel’noe: Problema gendera i zhenskoe dvizhenie v Ukraine [Women’s Political Unconscious: The Problem
of Gender and the Women’s Movement in Ukraine]. It is hard not to see this work as a response to the work published a year earlier by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Bilym po bilomu: Zhinki v hromadians’komu zhytti Ukrainy, 1884–1939*, which constituted the author’s Ukrainian version of the previously published *Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884–1939*. Zherebkin’s project, thematically and theoretically much wider in scope than Bohachevsky-Chomiak’s undertaking, strikes us as a hodgepodge of contemporary feminist theory, literary criticism, and historical and sociopolitical ruminations all woven together in a rather disjointed manner. She clearly benefits from Bohachevsky-Chomiak’s meticulous research (judging by the number of endnotes) but disagrees with the latter with respect to the efficacy of presenting the women’s movement in Ukraine as simultaneously feminist and nationalist. Zherebkin underscores the fact that women’s organizations in contemporary Ukraine are in most part neoconservative and by and large hostile to the feminist agenda (35). She also ascribes to them a preoccupation with nationalist ideology and an attempt to construe the Other (in this case: Russia) as the enemy (51). To Zherebkin feminism and nationalism exclude each other, even though, as Kumari Jayawardena indicated in her book on feminism and nationalism in the Third World, these two ideologies go hand in hand in communities with colonial and semicolonial status (Jayawardena 1–3). In other words, combining the struggles for national and women’s liberation is not a Ukrainian invention but a paradigm for all those subjected to imperialist powers.

However, Zherebkin’s contention that an overall hostility to feminist discourse comes not just from male quarters but from women’s organizations as well has some validity. Solomiia Pavlychko also underscored the fact that in order to be accepted by society many leaders of women’s organizations in Ukraine emphatically insist that they are “not feminist” (see, e.g., Pavlychko 2002c, 189). This reality often forces women scholars to take up defensive postures whenever debates about the efficacy of feminism and/or gender studies arise. I am referring here especially to a series of publications in the journal *Krytyka* in 1999 (Aheieva 1999b; Taran 1999; Zborovska 1999a, 1999c). and in 2001. Nevertheless, despite the struggle to maintain its authority in literary and cultural scholarship, the feminist voice in Ukraine is heard and increasingly finds its way to the pages of numerous periodicals, both scholarly and popular.

To sum up the differences between the two feminist schools in the post-independence period one has to emphasize that the whole discourse on feminism coming out of the Kharkiv Center has the appearance of being neutral and unmarked, even though its main proponents do not particularly mask their partiality with regard to the issues of nationalism in present-day Ukraine. The Kyïv Center, on the other hand, seems to have a national bias only because the Kharkiv school so completely lacks it. Under normal circumstances, that is, without postcolonial impediments, all one could say about the Kyïv Gender Center is that it functions the way it should; namely, producing interesting works of literary scholarship and trying new methodologies and theories. In other words, my contention is that the connection between feminist discourse and identity formation within the bounds of Ukrainian literary scholarship is contextual rather than inherent.
Four Women Critics and Their Feminist Take

The actual critical texts put forth by the literary scholars of the Kyïv Center are striking for their breadth of feminist approaches, from feminist critique to psychoanalytical studies of female subjectivity, at the heart of which lies a desire to shake up the conservatism of the academy by introducing controversial topics. Solomiia Pavlychko’s talent in that respect was unprecedented.8 Her monograph *Dyskurs modernizmu v ukraïnskii literaturi* [Discourse of Modernism in Ukrainian Literature], which came out in 1997, followed by a second edition in 1999, signaled an unorthodox approach to defining this movement in Ukrainian literature. First, she excluded the actual literary texts from her consideration, focusing instead on the literary discourse around those texts. Second, she placed the special relationship between Olha Kobylianska and Lesia Ukraïnka at the center of the Ukrainian modernist discourse (implying that the lesbian subtext of their correspondence was considered quite shocking and unconventional at the time, even though this particular point had been made earlier by Ihor Kostetsky (Kostetzky) in his lengthy introduction to the Ukrainian rendition of Stefan George [Kostetsky, vol. 1, 149]).

Another important work by Pavlychko, her previously mentioned study on Krymsky, *Natsionalizm, seksual’nist’, orientalizm: Skladnyi svit Ahatanhela Kryms’koho* [Nationalism, Sexuality, Orientalism: Ahatanhel Krymsky’s Complex World] also foregrounds issues of sexuality in general and homosexuality in particular.9 This work is striking for the critic’s attempt to view Krymsky’s oeuvre in its totality. He is presented not just as a poet and writer but also as a scholar and political thinker. In fact, the most fascinating part of her study (chapter 3) deals with Krymsky’s views on nationalism and issues of identity. Her detailed description of the writer’s evolution as he came to terms with his own national identity could not but have a reverberation in post-Soviet realities. Moreover, by studying Krymsky’s output Pavlychko redefined the Ukrainian fin de siècle, mainly in terms of who the major players were in that particular period.

Pavlychko’s direct contribution to feminism consists of a number of articles published at various times and in various periodical and book publications, collected post-humously in the already mentioned *Feminizm*. This anthology, edited by Vira Aheieva, sketches Pavlychko’s interest in feminism both as a methodological tool to be applied in studying literary works and as an intellectual space, indispensable for discussing social and national concerns of Ukrainian women. For example, her 1995–1996 article “Progress on Hold: The Conservative Faces of Women in Ukraine” indicates that the critic readily ventured outside literary quarters in order to voice her alarm about job discrimination and the marginal role women play in Ukrainian politics.

Tamara Hundorova’s critical oeuvre is not by and large defined by feminism. Her scholarly interests, as her publications attest, have a much wider scope (see especially Hundorova 1997, 2005). But her *Femina Melancholica: Stat’i kul’tura v gendernii utopii Ol’hy Kobylians’koï* [Femina Melancholica: Sex and Culture in Olha Kobylianska’s Gender Utopia, 2002] constitutes an exception. In it Hundorova returns to
and further elaborates Pavlychko’s argument about the centrality of discourse on sexuality and gender in early Ukrainian modernism and the role Kobylianska and Ukrainka played in introducing these subjects into Ukrainian letters. Yet she insists on the constructed nature of their quasi-lesbian correspondence and places it in a Platonic context, a marked difference from Pavlychko’s approach.

Hundorova selects the most important events and relationships in Kobylianska’s life and juxtaposes them against the writer’s output according to a carefully designed thematic framework. Nationalism, feminism, sexuality, androgyny, and gender are all foregrounded not only because Kobylianska herself takes up these issues, but also because her personal drama unfolds along the same fault lines. As a result Femina Melancholica is not so much a literary biography as it is a contemplation of Kobylianska’s multiple identities: a Ukrainian with a German upbringing, a feminist, an accomplished writer, a new woman who nonetheless longs to marry. All these identities, Hundorova argues, are rooted in liminality and each displays its own “rites du passage.” She argues, moreover, that Kobylianska’s main contribution lies in the creation of a new cultural paradigm in Ukrainian literature, a paradigm that uniquely blends feminism, nationalism, and modernism. Moreover, placing Kobylianska’s oeuvre in the context of a European modernist paradigm, Hundorova reveals the extent to which the issues taken up by the writer were on a par with the concerns of other modernists of the fin de siècle era, regardless of their nationality.

Another scholar of the Kyiv gender school, Vira Aheieva, has published a number of important works of criticism (Aheieva 1994, 1999a, 2003), but I would like to focus on her achievements as an editor, a role not always eagerly sought by other feminist critics. She is the editor at the Fakt Publishing House of the series “Text Plus Context” that issues Ukrainian classics and provides a contextual background for them in the form of little-known or entirely new critical essays. Thus, she edited a book on Marko Vovchok—Try doli [Three Fates, 2002]—which presents not only Vovchok’s short stories written originally in Ukrainian, but also the writer’s texts written originally in Russian. Try doli examines the role Vovchok played in Ukrainian, Russian, and French literary circles through a number of essays by Pavlychko, Ksenya Kiebuzinski, Mykola Zerov, Viktor Petrov-Domontovych, and Aheieva herself. In a similar fashion she prepared an edition of Lesia Ukrainka’s Lisova pisnia in a volume entitled ïm promovliaty dusha moïa bude: “Lisova pisnia” Lesi Ukrayïnky taïi interpretatsiï [My Soul Will Talk to Them: Lesia Ukrainka’s Forest Song and Its Interpretations, 2002]. These critical editions of Ukrainian classics play an important role in school curricula, invariably affecting the understanding of the changing nature of literary canons and indirectly impacting the formation of national identity among students. Presenting them with new readings of old classics can foster a new appreciation of national culture. Aheieva’s role in that respect is indeed worth mentioning. Moreover, she is also responsible for editing two collections of essays on feminism and gender studies: Gender i kul’tura [Gender and Culture, 2001] and Genderna perspektyna [Gender Perspectives, 2004]. These collections provide a variety of interpretations from a feminist and gender perspective and include contributions both from the West and Ukraine.
The most intriguing contribution to the feminist literary discourse in post-Soviet Ukraine comes from Nila Zborovska. She experiments with various genres and, moreover, presents herself both as a literary critic and a writer. For example, her *Feministychni rozdumy: na karnavali mertvykh potsilunkiv* [Feminist Reflections: At the Carnival of Dead Kisses], published in 1999, is an interesting hybrid comprised of literary criticism and something that could be labeled “fictionalized memoirs.” It is not an attempt on her part to emulate what the French feminists coined as *écriture feminine* or *parler femme*. Rather, it is a conscious effort to break the conventions and the horizon of expectation when it comes to literary criticism. As Rita Felski succinctly put it, genre “provides the cultural matrix against which the significance of the individual text can be measured” (83).

*Feministychni rozdumy* is neatly divided into two parts: the first is devoted to literary criticism and the second constitutes a hodgepodge of letters, literary rumors and reflections, a novella, and short stories, all making up a narrative that most closely resembles the genre of memoirs. Zborovska’s memoirs, however, are anything but straightforward. They are fragmented, fictionalized, and clearly dispense with chronology. She even creates a separate persona for her idiosyncratic narrative, Marïia Ilnytska, in order to emphasize yet another approach to literary and feminist issues. But despite the intentional bifurcation of the authorial self, Zborovska wants her reader to regard this particular work as an indissoluble whole.

Zborovska, the critic, practices what Elaine Showalter labels “feminist critique” and “gynocritics.” In other words, she gives feminist readings of works by male authors and critiques works written by women. The former practice prevails. She deals with novels by such contemporary male writers as Iurii [Yuri] Andrukhovych, Ievhen Pashkovsky, and Oles Ulianenko. She also presents interesting interpretations of Ivan Nechui-Levytsky and Todos Osmachka as well as explicates misogynist tendencies in Yuriy Tarnawsky’s dramatic works. As for “gynocritics,” Zborovska concentrates for the most part on Oksana Zabuzhko’s texts. Two other women to whom she pays some attention are Milena Rudnytska and Lesia Ukraïinka. Zborovska, the writer, delivers examples of well-constructed feminist writings. I use the word “constructed” in the sense that these narratives are to a large extent programmatic and evince issues typically problematized by feminists: for instance, mother–daughter relations, career vs. motherhood, equality, relationships, and even dealing with breast cancer. Undoubtedly, the hybridization of genre has allowed Zborovska to open up new territories for feminist exploration.

**Women’s Voices in Belles Lettres**

The link between feminism and national identity in works of literature by contemporary Ukrainian female writers is subtle but, at the same time, pervasive. By and large, women authors do not champion nationalist concerns, but a preoccupation with identities—national, gender, and class—is certainly there. The most celebrated female writer in present-day Ukraine, Oksana Zabuzhko, in her novel *Pol’ovi doslidzhennia*
z ukrains’koho seksu [Field Research in Ukrainian Sex, 1996] skillfully stresses the parallels between the national and the personal, focusing with equal passion on both feminine and masculine points of view. The failed masculinity of Zabuzhko’s male protagonist moves in tandem with Ukraine’s impotence as a nation. In this sense Pol’ovi doslidzhennia goes beyond purely feminist concerns. Zabuzhko’s feminism projects itself more as a vehicle to engender a discursive space in which both national and feminist issues are taken up rather than as any attempt on her part to produce a typical feminist novel.

Often perceived as Zabuzhko’s disciple, Svitlana Pyrkalo intimates her own vision of society’s inner workings with regard to the position of women in contemporary Ukraine. Her short novel Zelena Marharyta [Green Margarita, 2001], in comparison with Zabuzhko’s Pol’ovi doslidzhennia, approaches feminist and national identity issues with humor and casualness. Pyrkalo’s offhand and fragmentary manner of narration, quite in line with postmodernist premises, helps her to debunk the entrenched gender stereotypes as well as allows her to parody the trivialities found in a number of women’s magazines. Consider for a moment the following ad titles: “A Debate: How to Become a Star, a Textbook for a Businesswoman”; “The Best Makeup Foundation for Brains: Now in a New Container”; “Man as a Particularly Useful Creature”; “The Mobile Telephone as a Measure of Sexual Dignity,” to mention just a few. They all point to Pyrkalo’s penchant for playfulness and to her mastery of handling controversial issues in a very unimposing way. At the same time, Pyrkalo’s protagonist, Maryna, a self-proclaimed feminist, when faced with a choice either to go abroad to study or stay in Ukraine, chooses the latter, tacitly acknowledging the importance of the sense of national belonging in a postcolonial setting (on this issue, see Vynohorodska).

Pyrkalo’s second novel Ne dumai pro chervone [Don’t Think About Red, 2004] presents a different scenario, however. Here the main protagonist, Pavlina, actually leaves Ukraine for England in order to take up a position as a BBC journalist. Putting aside the motivation for that decision, what is worth mentioning is that despite a number of acquaintances and colleagues, and despite having a satisfying job, Pavlina feels lonely in England without her Ukrainian friends. In the end she convinces one of her close male friends from Kyïv to join her in London so that she can have a companion, someone of the same background to converse with.

Another woman author, Natalka Sniadanko, also presents a female protagonist with a connection to the West, that is, to Europe. Sniadanko’s novel Kolektsiia prystrastei [Collection of Passions, 2001] in a humorous and ironic way portrays Olesia’s love relationships with men of different ethnic backgrounds, thus inextricably linking the personal with the national. The main protagonist, who ends up in Germany first as an au pair and then as a student, dates men of other-than-Ukrainian background. Yet having experienced relationships with Russian, Italian, and German men, she returns to her native Lviv and settles for a Ukrainian. The issue of national identity is intentionally woven into sexual relationships, as if the author wanted to underscore the fact that there is a direct correlation between ethnicity and the way carnal pleasures are experienced.

In the realm of poetry, Ukrainian female authors, especially those of the younger
generation, shy away from a direct thematization of questions pertaining to nationalism or national identity. But implicit, interiorized responses both to feminist and national concerns are certainly there. For example, the poetry of Marianna Kiianovska foregrounds female self-sufficiency and autonomy and avoids a thematic representation of woman as mother. Any inference of woman’s auxiliary role in a society is not only kept out of her poetic vocabulary but also viewed as incompatible with Being: “Є я і ти, і є тривання Бога” [There is I, there is you, and there is the permanence of God] (Kiianovska 29). Kiianovska’s lyrical heroine does not reject love or relationships, but makes them subordinate to her own subjectivity.

Mar’iana Savka, on the other hand, ironically deconstructs the patriarchal myths of women yearning to give themselves to “real” men. She also reminds her readers of the ways in which women are not understood because they remain “unread,” so to say:

усе була жінка
відкрита на першій сторінці
відтак не прочитана (71)

Woman has always been
Opened on the first page
And left unread

Liudmyla Taran, a poet representing an older generation of female writers, who is especially active in shaping feminist discourse in post-Soviet Ukraine, goes even further. She experiments with gender reversals, assumes the male gaze and contemplates female sexuality from a mostly desirous male perspective. She uncovers and simultaneously debunks the male tendency to treat the female body as an object, yet does not reject the possibility of a real dialogue between the sexes:

Жінки—це інші. Стережися
Очей замислених і млосних:
Вони у погляді твоєму
Жадають бачити себе.

Але й ви, чоловіки,—такі самі!—
Додала ти, сміючись і прикликаючи мене. (Kolektsiia kokhanok 36)

Women are the Other. Protect
Your pensive and luscious eyes:
In your gaze, they
Desire to see themselves.

But you, men—are the same!—
You added, laughing and calling me.
These are just a few examples of female poetic voices and their need to address some of the concerns relating to women’s role and place in a transitional society such as post-Soviet Ukraine. What is most striking and needs to be emphasized is the sheer number of those voices. Never before in Ukrainian literary history has there been such a number of talented female writers, poets, and intellectuals producing so many interesting and diverse works. Despite the prevalent misogynist rhetoric coming from contemporary male authors, women of letters in present-day Ukraine have managed to carve an influential space for themselves. What they have to say is not always approved of but is heard nonetheless. This is no small achievement. The voice of women in contemporary literature constitutes an island of progressive attitudes and ideas in an otherwise vast ocean of artificially engineered myths and stereotypes confining women to narrowly formulated prospects. But there is a notable shift, and at least in belles lettres this island is growing bigger and the ocean is shrinking.

**Autobiographical Turn and Hybrid Genres**

Much of the recent criticism about texts produced by female authors underscores its autobiographical bias. Autobiography as a literary genre was quite widespread among feminist writers in the 1970s and 1980s. Some examples of women’s confessional writings include: Kate Millett’s *Flying* (1974) and *Sita* (1977), Anja Meulenbelt’s *The Shame is Over* (1980), Alice Koller’s *An Unknown Woman* (1982), and Ann Oakley’s *Taking It Like a Woman* (1984), to name just a few. These pioneering feminist confessions were full of elements that deliberately problematized the distinction between autobiography and fiction. They were all very much influenced by the women’s liberation movement in general and reflective of women’s changing perception of self. Rita Felski, for example, thinking of reasons for this blurring of genres in feminist literature, comes to the conclusion: “Feminist confession exemplifies the intersection between the autobiographical imperative to communicate the truth of unique individuality, and the feminist concern with the representative and intersubjective elements of women’s experience” (93).

In contemporary Ukrainian literature, the trend toward an autobiographical approach in fiction as well as a penchant for hybrid genres is best represented by the writings of Oksana Zabuzhko and Nila Zborovska. Zborovska’s *Feministichni rozdumy*, published in 1999, three years after the appearance of *Pol’ovi doslidzhennia*, constitutes an elaborately constructed reaction to the stormy aftermath fomented by Zabuzhko’s bestseller. Not only does she provide her own critical evaluation of *Pol’ovi doslidzhennia*, but she also deciphers, at times wickedly, the prototypes of Zabuzhko’s protagonists via a series of “literary rumors” whose function it is (among other things) to present a deliberately excursive, behind-the-scenes background for the novel’s emergence. But even more unexpected is Zborovska’s open mystification, which allows her to playfully emulate Zabuzhko’s exhibitionism. This idiosyncratic metanarrativization of the female intellectual’s contemporary experience would not have been possible had Zborovska adhered to a strictly scholarly exposition.
Zabuzhko’s *Pol’ovi doslidzhennia* came to prominence as a work of fiction. The writer deliberately strove to minimize autobiographical elements. Yet, no matter how emphatically its author would like us to forget the novel’s autobiographical underpinnings, they surface nonetheless. In fact, Zabuzhko herself injects a considerable dose of ambiguity. For example, her ironic introductory note (“Vid avtora”) playfully considers the possibility of potential lawsuits from people who read a Xerox version and happened to be implicated in the novel. This strategy only reinforces the perception that perhaps not all the characters and events are truly fictional. Otherwise, why would anyone want to challenge her in court? On the other hand, she diligently reminds the reader that a novel is a work of fiction and a seeming factual resemblance is a mere coincidence. In spite of that, Zabuzhko makes her central protagonist bear the name Oksana, thus signaling the text’s autobiographical bias through name identification. Moreover, her heroine (not unlike the author herself) is a poet, an intellectual, a Fulbright scholar in the United States, and visiting professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Her male character, introduced in the novel as Mykola K., turns out to be the artist Mykola Kumanovsky, as Zborovska eagerly explicates in her *Feministychni rozdumy*. Clearly, Zabuzhko delights in this intricate play of identities in which it is implied that the author might be both creator and subject matter of the literary text.

The novel’s thematic scope is anything but new. It foregrounds the writer attempting to turn her experience into literature (not unlike Kate Millett’s *Sita* of 1977). But it is also a typical story of “boy meets girl” with all the ensuing consequences—a stormy relationship culminating in an even stormier breakup. Yet Zabuzhko convincingly manages to conflate her personal drama with that of her nation. This dynamic interaction between the personal and the sociopolitical/national gives the novel some gravitas, but it also reminds us of previous attempts of this sort undertaken by the prominent Ukrainian feminists Olha Kobylianska and Lesia Ukrainka. It goes without saying that, notwithstanding these parallels, Zabuzhko’s feminism is of a different kind. Hers is the case of all-out and unmediated self-exposure, writing her body and authorial self out in such a way that it becomes a cathartic and transformative experience. This moment of transcendence (or self-therapy) can only be achieved through confession, which is nothing else but a subgenre of autobiography.

The confessional character of *Pol’ovi doslidzhennia* cannot be denied. It is precisely this authorial openness that has stirred reactions and made the novel such a compelling subject for interpretation. Zabuzhko’s confession foregrounds the private to the point of sounding clinical: a forceful penetration, painful intercourse, menstruation—all is revealed and reflected upon. The narrative is structured like a lecture to the imaginary, yet very present, audience. The author’s frequent use of the salutation: “Ladies and gentlemen” underscores her willingness to tell all, including the most excruciatingly painful details. It is not the sexual scenes as such that raise eyebrows, but the protagonist’s extreme forthrightness about female physiology and carnal pleasures (or displeasures).

While Zabuzhko undoubtedly problematizes the distinction between autobiography and fiction in *Pol’ovi doslidzhennia*, as well as presents her own unique account of
woman’s experience, “the shift toward a conception of communal identity” (using Felski’s words) is conspicuously absent. One does not easily discern solidarity with women’s lot in general. Zabuzhko’s character is too special a person: an exceptional woman seeking an exceptional man, dreaming of an exceptional child (a hint of eugenics is simply unmistakable here). This elitist bias permeates the novel and makes the heroine’s rather commonplace experience, a crisis caused by the lover’s departure, anything but common. Despite the personal drama, the protagonist’s voice exudes power, strength, and determination, attributes traditionally associated with male discourse. There can be no doubt as to who is the active agent in the novel (the heroine’s lover is silenced and reduced to a passive object) and who wants to be in control. On the other hand, the protagonist’s masculinized demeanor clashes with her longing—some would say an old-fashioned longing—to form a union with a man whom she perceives worthy of her attention and worthy of fathering her child. This entails dependence rather than freedom and equality, not to mention that it excessively foregrounds the rift between humans of the opposite sex, a divide which feminists have tried to neutralize and overcome for quite some time.

What is new in Zabuzhko is not so much her thematic scope and flexibility as her boldness in subverting the form. Unlike the feminists of the 1970s, she weds fiction and autobiography not in order to express her solidarity with the women’s liberation movement, but in order to come up with a convenient channel to convey contradictory premises. Pol’ovi doslidzhennia manifests both failure and victory. Its heroine fails to form a meaningful relationship, but its author is catapulted to fame following the novel’s publication. The notorious controversy surrounding Pol’ovi doslidzhennia (which is a blessing for any publicity campaign) came about in large part because of Zabuzhko’s well-thought-out and feigned unwillingness to discuss the autobiographical provenance of the novel. In fact, this work thrives mainly because of its unacknowledged hybridity. It is precisely this hybridity of genre that allows Zabuzhko to skillfully debunk both the male- and female-dominated discourses.

Zborovska’s Feministychni rozdumy champions hybridity as well, but its effects function differently than those in Zabuzhko’s work. Her account lacks Zabuzhko’s spontaneity; it is at times too constructed and explicatory, although structurally quite inventive and considerably more polyphonic than Zabuzhko’s tale. The second part of Feministychni rozdumy, written by Zborovska’s alter ego, Mariia Ilnytska, includes—among others—a story “Dzvinka,” which looks at parenthood and the tragedy of losing a child both from a female and male perspective. In this short story one can discern a subtle polemic that Zborovska carries out with Zabuzhko’s way of representing female sexuality. Gone are the painful intercourse of Pol’ovi doslidzhennia and the allusions to the oppressive nature of sexual experience. “Dzvinka” admits the possibility of carnal delights—if not their celebration—between man and woman. However, this story is also important because it provides a link to Zborovska’s work of fiction entitled Ukraïns’ka Rekonkista [The Ukrainian Reconquista, 2003]. This antinovel, as Zborovska insists, is not without a hint of the author’s own personal struggles, including the depiction of her exceptionally close relationship with her grandmother, but it
is not as transparently autobiographical as was the case with Zabuzhko. *Ukraïns’ka Rekonkista* by and large unfolds as a story about a woman in search of her identity as a wife, daughter, mother, and intellectual, but the idea of national rebirth also figures quite prominently. The heroine faces a variety of choices that directly point to the issues of self-identification. When faced with the dilemma of staying or leaving Ukraine, she chooses to stay. Unlike her ex-husband who immigrates to the United States, Dzvinka, the protagonist, is determined to build her life in her own country, because only there does she feel she can realize her intellectual potential.

In *Feministychni rozdumy*, Zborovska brings a new dimension to literary criticism, namely a personal touch, her own individual self, which interacts and implicitly engages in polemics with the objects of her criticism. She continues to embed elements from her personal life in her subsequent psychoanalytical study of Lesia Ukraïnka. It is not a coincidence that this work is entitled *Moia Lesia Ukraïnka* [My Lesia Ukraïnka, 2002]. It begins by telling the critic’s own personal story that mysteriously connects her with Ukraïnka through the fact that her grandmother was born on the day Lesia Ukraïnka died. Unlike her colleague, Aheieva, Zborovska devotes as much space to the analysis of Ukraïnka’s biography as she does to the readings of the latter’s works. In a way, *Moia Lesia Ukraïnka* challenges the premises of Ukrainian literary scholarship by expanding the boundaries of analysis to include the personal and the subjective.

I have focused intensely on the autobiographical tendency and on hybridity in Zabuzhko’s and Zborovska’s works mainly because of their pioneering efforts in these areas. However, there are other female writers who also succumb to autobiography’s seductive possibilities. For example, Pyrkalo’s second novel, *Ne dumai pro chervone*, openly draws on the author’s own experience as a BBC journalist. The protagonist, like Pyrkalo herself, lives and works in London. It is left to the reader’s imagination to sort out what is fiction and what is real.

We find yet another approach in Ievheniia Kononenko’s latest work *Bez muzhyka* [Without a Man, 2005]. The author of two successful novels *Imitatsiia* [Imitation, 2001] and *Zrada* [Betrayal, 2002], as well as numerous short stories, decided to come up with a straightforward autobiography. That is, by design it is not autobiography parading as fiction. However, in an interview with Liudmyla Taran, the author of *Bez muzhyka* demonstrates that her autobiography is not so straightforward after all, as she openly declares that the genre of autobiography gives her an opportunity to play with the audience, to actually tell lies (see Kononenko 2006, 150). She further asserts her right not to be truthful even though the mode of narrative is confessional. In other words, she clearly debunks the premise of the confessional approach, fashionable in feminist writings, especially when female sexuality is concerned.

**Europe as Home? A Conclusion**

In 1989 when Natalka Bilotserkivets published an untitled poem with the now well-known line, “we will not die in Paris, now I know it for sure,”17 which openly echoed and paraphrased Cesar Vallejo’s famous line, “I will die in Paris,” she in a
way expressed her generation’s despair over the long-kept divide with regard to the Western cultural heritage and over the provincialism imposed by the Soviet authorities, as well as a deep, implicit longing to be culturally part of Europe. The overall pessimistic tone of the poem would indicate that the poet did not harbor any hope for a different turn of events. And yet, some ten years later, the younger generation of Ukrainian poets and writers made Europe if not their home (though in a few cases that too), then certainly a point of destination and/or reference. The generation that reached their adolescence under independent rule seemingly does not suffer from the complexes of those who grew up under Soviet communist ideology. Travel to cities in Western Europe is common, as is the sense of personal freedom to create wherever possible, without any obligation toward the homeland. Paradoxically, however, these younger literati do not dispense with the feeling of belonging. To the contrary, their identities as Ukrainians congeal more notably when juxtaposed against the European paradigm.

In the novel Ne dumai pro chervone Svitlana Pyrkalo’s protagonist Pavlina shares to some extent the author’s own experience as a London-based journalist covering stories about Ukraine for the BBC. As mentioned earlier, there are obvious autobiographical parallels between the heroine and Pyrkalo, but what is particularly striking about the story as it unfolds is the ease with which Pavlina, the main protagonist, adapts to the host country, England. Of course, it helps that she is fluent in English, intelligent, and articulate. One might expect that the cultural differences between Ukraine (with the Soviet legacy still being quite pervasive) and a Western country such as England would undermine the adjustment, but it never happens. Pavlina seems to fit in without any problem; in some situations she even outsmarts her local male and female friends. Yes, she might miss her Kyïv friends, but she feels as much at home in London as in Kyïv. The contrast between Bilotserkivets’s poetic contemplation about a Europe that seems to be unreachable and Pyrkalo’s experience as a successful journalist in London could not be more pronounced.

Natalka Sniadanko in her novel Kolektsiia prystrastei also insists on a European connection for her heroine Olesia from Lviv. Unlike Pyrkalo’s Pavlina, Olesia, a student at Lviv University, leaves for Germany to work as an au pair with a young German family. After a year, having learned the language well, instead of going back to her hometown she decides to stay in Western Europe and study at a university. Of course, being a student without much money for support is not as easy as being a journalist. Yet Olesia makes the most of her European experience, mainly because she immerses herself exclusively in a foreign milieu, in which, again, she does not necessarily feel inferior. The mere fact that she is from Eastern Europe does not prevent her from having meaningful interactions with her foreign peers. But Germany is for her only a temporary abode. After a series of romantic affairs the protagonist returns home and marries a local man. Interestingly, when Sniadanko sets her heroine on a trip to Western Europe she cannot but intertextually refer (ironically it seems) to Bilotserkivets’s nostalgic line “We will not die in Paris”: “Who among us, overly confident, young and utterly naïve, did not dream of dying under the Mirabeau bridge in Paris, London’s Tower,
or at least under the ruins of the Berlin Wall?” Again, what seemed impossible in the 1980s became a reality in the post-independence period.

Still younger than Pyrkalo and Sniadanko, Irena Karpa (born in 1981) is cultivating her literary image as a young female rebel, ignoring rules and etiquette. Her prose is deliberately outrageous, full of expletives but also full of language experiments, and therefore not as straightforward as is that of Pyrkalo and Sniadanko. It seems that Karpa, too, cannot resist having a European connection in her works. She generously intersperses her narratives with English words and phrases, and emphasizes her protagonists’ ease and cosmopolitanism. In her novella *Poliuvannia v Helsinki* [Hunting in Helsinki, 2004] Karpa makes her female protagonist play with the notion of what it means to be a European. On the one hand, at one point the heroine ironically states: “Now we can start writing a new book: HOW WE LOST EUROPE,” on the other, she clearly indicates that she feels quite at home there, or to be more precise, in Helsinki: “We were walking down Helsinki’s streets to the hostel at night. It felt as if I had been walking here like this my whole life.” Karpa appropriates Europe not just in a geographical sense, but, more important, in a psychological one. Europe is no longer something unreachable out there, but interior personal experience in the here and now.

Even though Ievheniia Kononenko is closer in age to Bilotserkivets than to the three young female authors discussed above, her European orientation and experience put her firmly in their company. All three of her recent novels (*Imitatsiia, Zrada, Nostal’hiia*) depict relationships between Ukrainian women and foreign men. Her writing must be rooted, at least to some extent, in her personal experience, because in *Bez muzhyka* Kononenko openly reveals her three-year relationship with a non-Ukrainian man and her consequent frequent trips abroad. She had an opportunity to stay in the West, but knew that it would mean the end of her writing career and she did not want to sacrifice her ability to create for everyday comforts. But, as she herself admits, this experience allowed her to see Europe and life there from within rather than without. After all, she lived there for some time and was not just a tourist.

If one looks at women’s literary discourse in post-Soviet Ukraine in its totality, that is, at criticism and belles lettres alike, one is struck by its overall Western orientation. This orientation is not just thematic, but entails many sources of inspiration—from theoretical to literary—and it implies a general awareness of one’s own place and belonging within a society. The female critics I discussed earlier in many ways revolutionized literary scholarship by making it subjective, on the one hand (Zborovska), and theoretically challenging, on the other (especially Hundorova). Employing feminist, psychoanalytic, and phenomenological approaches and being at home within the parameters of what is perceived as poststructuralism, these female scholars introduced novel modes of reading and literary analysis, and reinterpreted quite a few classic works and authors of Ukrainian literature.

The issue of national identity in Ukrainian literature figures rather strongly in the post-independence period, in large part because of the discourse around two literary schools, one called the Zhytomyr School and the other one the Stanyslaviv (or Galician)
School, the former perceived as anti-Western or “nativist” and the latter as Western or postmodern (see Ola Hnatiuk’s chapter in this volume). However, regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with this classification, it must be emphasized that the key authors representing the respective schools are all men and therefore they overwhelmingly project a male perspective. A similar divide, that is, between those striving for modernization (read: the West) and those looking for native sources of inspiration, simply does not exist in texts produced by female writers in post-Soviet Ukraine. Women’s oeuvre, as indicated above, is uniformly pro-Western and progressively minded in terms of advancing a just society—a society in which the welfare of women as well as of all citizens steadily and surely improves. Would one then be surprised if it were a female leader who would stir Ukraine’s fortune toward the reintegration with Europe? Judging by the vanguard efforts of women authors in the past decade, all is in the realm of the conceivable.

Notes

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1. *Feminizm* is a compilation of Pavlychko’s articles written on feminism between 1991 and 1999. It also compiles all the interviews and talks she gave to various newspapers, journals, and other media. Unfortunately, the editor of this anthology, Vira Aheieva, limits the bibliographical information to publication dates and does not provide the original sources of the reprinted material.

2. See, for example, Vira Aheieva (2001a, 248–61), which was later reprinted as an introduction to Pavlychko’s *Feminizm* (2002a, 5–16). See also Oksana Zabuzhko (2003, 25).


4. This English translation is Chernetsky’s. The original text reads: “У працях цієї школи знаходимо дивне зісковзування від феміністичного літературного проекту у стратегічне вживання феміністичної термінології у випадках проти української державної політики та національної культури, які для харків’ян, здається, є практично синонімічними. Схоже на те, що, як багато і інших пострадянських русофів, представники харківської ґендерної школи не здійснили ‘праці трауру’ (the work of mourning) по Російській імперії, і перебувають у стані меланхолійної ностальгії за об’єднаним російськомовним культурним простором. Вони відмовляються від підходу до української мови як засобу спілкування і вважають її вживання агресивним нав’язуванням чужої, зовнішньої влади. Відмовляючись від української тожсамості, не тільки мовної, але й будь-якої, представники харківської школи підтверджують спостереження Фанона, що колонійський суб’єкт відчуває метрополію нормою, а себе самого—Іншим.” See also Chernetsky (2007, 240).


6. For example, such major journals and magazines as *Slovо i chas* (nos. 8–9, 1996 and no. 11, 1997), *Art-Line* (March 1998), *I* (no. 17, 2000 and no. 23, 2003) devoted special issues to feminism.

7. It is interesting to observe that whereas Chernetsky contemplated the output of the Kharkiv Center as part of a Ukrainian discourse on feminism, two years later Stefaniia Andrusiv
excluded it completely from consideration on the grounds that the Center does not view itself as belonging to the Ukrainian intellectual space (Andrusiv 53).

8. For example, her elucidation of queer aspects in Ukrainian literature stands out in the context of post-Soviet literary criticism.

9. This especially refers to Pavlychko’s novel Andrii Lahovs’kyi and autobiographical elements found there.

10. Some other important works in this series edited by Aheieva are: Don Zhuan u svitovomu konteksti (2002a) and Proza pro zhytтя inshykh: Iurii Kosach—teksty, interpretatsii, kommentari (2003a).

11. Milena Rudnytska (1892–1976), journalist, politician, and civic activist, became the most vocal leader of the women’s movement in Western Ukraine during the interwar period. She authored a book entitled Ukrains’ka diisnist i zavdannia zhinochoho rukhu [The Ukrainian Reality and the Tasks of the Women’s Movement, 1934].

12. All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.

13. This bias is especially evident in critical writings by Liudmyla Taran (2005, 2006). See also Nila Zborovska (2005).

14. This is made especially clear in her polemical exchange with George Grabowicz [Hryhori Hrabovych] in krytyka.

15. Zborovska herself underscores this aspect of the novel: “Ми маємо тут невідомий досі нашій літературі яскравий зразок напрочуд відвертої жіночої сповіданості” [We have here a striking example, unknown until now, of a surprisingly open female confession]. See her Feministychni rozdumy (116).

16. Zborovska’s latest literary endeavor also draws heavily on psychoanalysis. In fact, it is the first attempt at a psychoanalytical reading of Ukrainian modern literature (Zborovska 2006).

17. In the original: “ми помрем не в Парижі тепер я напевно це знаю” (Bilotserkivets 59).


19. The original reads: “Можна починати нову книжку: ЯК МИ ВТРАТИЛИ ЄВРОПУ” (Karpa 224).

20. The original reads: “Йдемо до хостелю нічними Гельсінками. Так ніби все життя тут ходила” (Karpa 231).

References


III

Manifesting Culture
Language, Media, and the Arts
Some fifty years ago, when writing about the formation of Modern Standard Ukrainian in the nineteenth century and its impact on the political and intellectual history of the Ukrainian people, George Y. Shevelov (1980, 155) summarized his analysis as follows:

Contrary to the opinion that languages, to assert themselves, require cultural centers created by economic and political development, modern literary Ukrainian has been the work of a group of men of letters (primarily Ševčenko and Kuliš) as a manifestation of the poetic spirit... the Ukrainian literary language offers the “miracle” of a linguistic development that has given birth to a political movement. The linguistic work of Ševčenko and Kuliš prepared the way for the rise of political parties, states, armies, for wars, struggles and conflicts. Lovers of paradoxes may say that a poet created a language and that the language created a nation.¹

An analogous “miracle” repeated itself recently: if the decisive blow to the Soviet Union was delivered by the Ukrainian referendum for independence on December 1, 1991, it should not be forgotten that the scene had been set by a widespread democratic movement triggered in the late 1980s by the Shevchenko Society for the Ukrainian Language. The language question again paved the way to political demands. In the following years, language continued to be a momentous factor on the political scene, influencing the voters’ electoral preferences (see Wakoulenko 5). Even if the importance attached to this subject in society has been diminishing recently (although at a slow pace), it still plays a significant role in politics; moreover, some politicians periodically try to revive it (playing on the Russian/Ukrainian polarity) in order to stimulate otherwise vanishing support from their followers. Alongside the inescapable issue of the relative official status of the country’s two most widely spoken languages, the controversy focuses on what exactly Standard Ukrainian should look like, which occasionally becomes a matter of public debate that goes far beyond academic circles.

This situation is rooted in the history of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian
language. Drawing upon Einar Haugen’s (16–26) already classic fourfold distinction between *selection of norm, codification of form, implementation, and elaboration of function* in language planning, Halyna Iavorska (156) dates the first two phases for Ukrainian between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, when Ukrainian ethnic territory was divided between the Russian and the Austrian (Austro-Hungarian after 1868) empires. Accordingly, not one, but two (quasi-) standards emerged during that time, which differed, apart from dialectal basis, in their functional scope. Whereas the Ukrainian language in the Russia-ruled territory repeatedly suffered from governmental restrictions and could develop only by fits and starts in the domain of literature (where, in fact, it made considerable progress), the situation was quite different for the Ukrainian language under Austria, where authorities were inclined to accept and even promote its use in education, administration, law, public life, and the periodical press. Moreover, the Westerners could profit from contact with other Slavs of the Austrian Empire, whereby their national renascence was integrated into the Central European course of events (cf. Moser 2004, 108–112 et passim). Thus Western Ukraine, although unable to boast of many masterpieces of the literary style commensurate with those coming from the other part of the country, managed to develop a diversified standard apt to fulfill the entirety of modern language’s social functions. Larysa Masenko (2004, 13) is therefore quite right when she notes: “It was in Lviv and Chernivtsi that the formation of modern business, scientific and journalistic Ukrainian commenced.”

Thus, if any serious attempt to understand current linguistic problems in Ukraine requires retrospection as far back as the first half of the nineteenth century (cf. Iavorska 154), the analysis of this period must take into consideration the coexistence at that time of two varieties of the standard language. For all its importance, the issue is rather insufficiently studied, having belonged to the category of “prohibited” topics during the Soviet era (cf. Masenko 2004, 13). In the 1950s, a politically motivated dogma about the so-called dialect of Poltava and Kyiv as the basis of the Ukrainian national language was established (cf. Bulakhovsky 1954), aiming, first of all to downplay the West Ukrainian contribution to its formation. Although the patent absurdity of its main thesis (one would look in vain for a dialect with such a name in any handbook on Ukrainian dialectology) made most scholars switch over to the less irritating term “dialects of the Central Dnipro area” by the beginning of the 1960s (cf. Iermolenko 2005, 6), the underlying intention remained unchanged for a long time. Of course, the situation has evolved by now, and the issue of regional varieties of Ukrainian may be openly discussed: in a study by Ivan Matviias (1998), one finds not only both of the main varieties, but no less than nine subvarieties of Standard Ukrainian. Nevertheless, trustworthy data available on this subject continue to be very restricted, especially with respect to the processes that took place in the twentieth century.

The turning point for the Ukrainian language came with World War I and the subsequent years of struggle for national independence (until 1920). On the one hand, these events led to an unprecedented intensification of contacts between the Easterners and the Westerners; on the other hand, it made possible the formal establishment
of Ukrainian as the official language of state (cf. Smal-Stotsky 34–37). While none of the successive Ukrainian governments of that period managed to last for long, and the general atmosphere of wartime and political turmoil was not propitious for language planning, the positive attainments in the actual introduction of Ukrainian in a number of new fields were to have lasting effects. The essence of these changes was well expressed by Shevelov:

... in the years of the struggle for independence, it was the development of the Ukrainian language in the former Russian Ukraine that proved to be crucial for not only that part of the country, but for the entire Ukraine. There actual independence lasted for longest, the status of the Ukrainian language changed most radically, and the dynamics of its expansion were the most striking. None of the language changes was completed at the time the independent Ukraine fell... Nevertheless, they could not be immediately extinguished, and to a great extent they determined the zig-zags in the ensuing language policy within the Ukrainian S.S.R., as well as the vicissitudes of the Ukrainian language in the parts of Ukraine occupied by Poland, Romania, and Czecho-Slovakia. (1986, 142–143)

Although the achievements in corpus planning were much more modest than those gained in status planning, it should be noted that the first ever official spelling rules for Ukrainian (compiled under Ivan Ohiienko’s guidance) were adopted in 1919, which may be seen as the beginning of the process of Haugen’s implementation (cf. Iavorska 156). These rules, with slight changes, continued to be valid in Soviet Ukraine until the end of the 1920s. Besides orthography, many other aspects of the Ukrainian standard were developing a new dimension, including lexicography, terminology, and stylistics. The common aspiration was to settle on a standard that would be acceptable for all Ukrainians, both within and outside the Soviet Union. A remark by Oleksa Syniavsky (1923, 41), on the occasion of the publication of his Poradnyk ukraïns’koï movy [Guide to Ukrainian] in Germany, reveals the general spirit of those efforts: “The whole of my Guide, as a reference book on Standard Ukrainian, was based on the idea that it is necessary to attain, as far as possible, a uniformity in the literary language.” In other words, it was well recognized, according to Mykola Hladki (158), that “a resultant for All-Ukrainian standard language” had to be found.

The prescriptive rules set at the time did have a tangible effect. In his study devoted to the language of contemporary Ukrainian fiction, Hladki wrote:

Our observations ... prove that substantial progress can be seen even in the language of literary works between 1925 and 1926, and then 1927, and so on, especially if we consider the language of the literary production of 1929 as the criterion. (158)

The year 1929 was singled out because at that point the new Ukrainian spelling rules came into force, which Hladki regarded as the main factor allowing the claim that the language of Ukrainian literature had set out on “the path of its normal development” (ibid.). The rules in question were the result of three years’ work by a commission appointed by the government of Soviet Ukraine, which counted among its members
not only leading scholars (including Syniavsky, who practically had the last word) but also prominent Communist functionaries. Before the adoption of the rules, an Orthographic Conference was convened in Kharkiv in 1927, with the participation of representatives from Western Ukraine. According to Shevelov (1987, 138), the most difficult problem it faced was the necessity of combining two different spelling traditions, the Eastern and the Western. The points that remained unsettled during its sessions were the uses of $h$ vs. $g$ and $l$ vs. $l'$ in the rendition of words of foreign origin (the Eastern tradition preferred the first variant in each case, the Western the second one). In Shevelov’s (1987, 139) opinion, Syniavsky was wrong in treating this discrepancy “as being chiefly a West European tradition vs. a Byzantine one,” for the choice was rather “dictated by Russian or Polish mediation.” With all due respect to Shevelov, one cannot but observe that these two mediations are not quite homologous, as the first one implies a transition from Latin to Cyrillic script in the mediating language (Russian), with its subsequent reinterpretation in Ukrainian, while the second one left the task of transliteration as such to the latter.

Members of the commission found themselves facing a particular instance of a broader choice that the Ukrainian elite had to make. One of the most popular writers of the period, Mykola Khvylovy (390, 463–476), formulated it as the opposition of two “psychological categories”: “Europe” and “Prosvita” (a Ukrainian word originally meaning “education of the people,” which was also used in a derogatory sense as “primitive pedagogism”). Whereas Europe’s symbol, for Khvylovy (468), was Goethe’s Dr. Faust, “Prosvita” was identified with “cultural epigonism” (469–476), that is, a complete lack of intellectual independence. Khvylovy’s (426) own choice was definitely for Europe, whence, in particular, his famous urge to move “away from Moscow” (571–575). In the linguistic field, this meant rejecting Russian mediacy in the adaptation of foreign words (with all of its historically conditioned inconsistencies) and directly addressing the source languages. Of course, this approach was more familiar to West Ukrainians, who had a long experience of direct contact with other European languages within the Austrian Empire, so that many people in Eastern and Central Ukraine thought they had to do with a “Galician” practice. In reality, this was not quite true, as the new rules departed from the West Ukrainian tradition in the treatment of words of Greek origin: the Greek γ was transcribed as $h$, and not as $g$, according to the older West Ukrainian usage, patterned on the Polish, German, and—speaking generically—Latin way of its rendition. Seen from this angle, the new rules appear not to be a compromise (unsatisfactory for both parties concerned) (cf. Shevelov 1987, 139), but rather a consistent application of one underlying principle, consonant—accidentally or not—with another literary catchword of the time: Mykola Zerov’s (262) answer to Khvylovy’s question “Whither are you going?”—“Ad fontes!”

The new spelling rules were approved by the People’s Commissar for Education, Mykola Skrypnyk, on September 6, 1928. They were reinforced by the 1930 publication of a new, revised edition of Hryhorii Holoskevych’s Spelling Dictionary, conceived as an official reference authority. As these rules were short-lived (supplanted in 1933 by a new spelling code, closer to Russian), assessments of
their value are often contradictory and accompanied by many “ifs,” which can be reduced to one common denominator: if the changes in the Communist Party’s political course had not put an end to the independent development of the Ukrainian language (within the policy of so-called Ukrainianization, officially pursued from 1925 to 1932) (cf. Shevelov 1987, 145). The political motives behind the revision of the 1928 spelling code were as clear as a bell. In a notice accompanying the new version of the code Volodymyr Zatonsky left no doubt regarding the real reasons behind the abolition of the previous rules:

The Ukrainian Spelling sanctioned by M. Skrypnyk on the September 6, 1928, was directed toward an artificial isolation of the Ukrainian language from the language spoken by the multimillion masses of workers and peasants, toward an artificial separation of Ukrainian from Russian. (3)

Andrii Khvylia, the actual engineer of the amendments, came up with one more argument, which reverted to the opposition between Europe and Russia, but in a sense quite different from Khvylovy’s:

The spelling approved by M. Skrypnyk on September 6, 1928, patterned the development of the Ukrainian language on the Polish and Czech bourgeois culture. This erected a barrier between Ukrainian and Russian, and impeded the mastery of literacy by the wide working masses. (Khvylia 5)

Zatonsky’s and Khvylia’s reasoning did not even come close to any kind of linguistic analysis (which would have been difficult for either of them, as they were by no means specialists in the field). Zatonsky’s first point, especially, was very weak from the scholarly point of view. It was quite convincingly disproved by Artem Moskalenko:

The first argument, “artificial isolation of the Ukrainian language from the language spoken by the multimillion masses of workers and peasants,” does not pertain, in the first place, to the spelling system as such; it pertains, and only in some measure, to the grammatical and lexical normalization of Standard Ukrainian. In the second place, one could reproach the authors of the second version of the Ukrainian spelling for substantiating some spelling rules by archaic dialectal pronunciation, which was, at the time, residually proper to the language both of the workers and, especially, of the peasants, rather than for artificial isolation from the workers’ and peasants’ language. (42–43)

Moskalenko, however, largely agreed with Zatonsky on the second point:

The second argument, “artificial isolation of Ukrainian from Russian,” was better-founded. There were indeed, both during the Orthographic Conference and in the approved spelling, some attempts to depart from the common ways of spelling normalization in Standard Russian and Ukrainian. This was manifest in the 1928 Ukrainian spelling, first and foremost in the rendition of loan words. The grammatical normalization of Standard Ukrainian was more deeply marked by this than the spelling system. (43)
The grammatical divergencies that Moskalenko mentions chiefly concerned the
gender of loan words. In Russian, the overall tendency was to determine gender de-
pending on the phonetic structure of the word in the source language, by pigeonhol-
ing it together with native Russian words pronounced in a similar way, so that, for
example, the French feminine noun *palissade* became masculine: *palisad*, due to its
phonetic resemblance to native masculine nouns like *sad*, “orchard” and others. The
1928 Ukrainian spelling, however, prescribed that the original gender of loan words
should be maintained, with the corresponding feminine ending -a, added to them if
necessary (→ *palisada*). Again, the same principle was operative in Polish, but the new
Ukrainian spelling was more coherent, and did not repeat the Polish exceptions to the
rule: in Holoskevych’s dictionary, borrowings from French such as *adresa, desanta,*
gavota, parola, vinegreta were all feminine, while their Polish counterparts (*adres,*
desant, gawot, parol, winegret) are masculine, as in Russian (cf. Piddubna 2003, 68).
Another important difference was that loan words ending in -o, such as avto, biuro,
depo, kino, pal’to, and so on, indeclinable in Russian, were to be declined the same
way as neuter nouns (of the type *pero, vikno*) in Ukrainian (as they were in Polish). Was
Khvylia’s claim true, then, that the 1928 orthography was drawing Ukrainian closer
to Polish and Czech? Taken literally, it is absurd, as the three languages concerned
use different scripts, and their grammatical structure is far from interchangeable. On
the other hand, the orthography’s general bias did resemble what the Czechs and the
Poles had done in order to reestablish their languages in the whole diversity of com-
municative functions, and to free them from foreign influences. It was indeed not ac-
cidental that the Polish, Czech, and Serbian experiences had been explicitly referred
to by Ukrainianization proponents as the path to follow while elaborating Ukrainian
scientific terminology (cf. Kholodny 93).

If one ignores external conjuncture and tries to view the 1928 rules from a purely
linguistic angle, they appear, according to Vasyl Nimchuk (22), to be “a really univer-
sal Ukrainian spelling, based on genuinely scholarly principles, without any political,
‘ideological’ tinge.” For Shevelov (1987, 140), they were too good to be true, that is,
“utopian” and, accordingly, “doomed to failure,” but on pedagogical rather than lin-
guistic grounds, as they required “relearning all foreign words” (ibid., 145). Mykhailo
Zhovtobriukh specified the main causes of annoyance with these rules:

> In the first place, the spelling rules for foreign words were found to be unacceptable.
> To master them, it was necessary to know the origin of these words, to know when
> the letters *g* and *h* are used in the respective source language, whether they belong
to old or new borrowings, and so on, which is often beyond the competence even
of persons with higher education. But most important, the spelling of foreign words
ran counter to their usual pronunciation in Soviet Ukraine. (59)

The issue of the actual reception of the new rules remains enigmatic. Ivan Ohi-
enko’s well-known account of the publication of Ovsii Iziumov’s (1931) *Spelling
Dictionary* is indicative in this respect. According to Ohiienko (319–320), that dic-
tionary came out in reply to widespread protests (“perhaps instigated,” as he admits)
from “the organized Ukrainian teachers’ community,” which was dissatisfied with the intricacies of the new spelling rules for loan words. After the dictionary appeared, he claims, two spellings came to coexist, namely, the overcomplicated “governmental” one and the “teachers’ spelling,” based “on the Academy’s initial system.” In reality, the differences between Holoskevych’s and Iziumov’s dictionaries are so negligible that no person of sound mind would have seen in them any kind of essential opposition. One can only conjecture that Ohienko, himself a staunch opponent of the 1928 rules, either indulged in wishful thinking or relied too much on hearsay. The same lack of certainty is characteristic of versions of the story provided by many others.

Shevelov (1987, 140), however, an eyewitness to the events, also attests that the new rules were “highly unpopular” from the very start, while Zhovtobriukh (59) says they “provoked discontent, especially among teachers and pressmen.” In view of all these testimonies, it remains unclear how this “inadequate” spelling managed to survive several decades in the Ukrainian emigration circles (cf. Ohienko 323), and especially why it was so eagerly picked up again by many intellectuals in Ukraine in the 1990s, after the constraints on language usage had softened. This is especially astonishing if one considers that ever since 1933, a very different approach to spelling, reduplicating the Russian system wherever possible, has been officially enjoined in the country.

Beyond spelling, serious progress was made in the 1920s and early 1930s in other domains of corpus planning. One should first mention the boom in terminological and lexicographical publications (cf. Kulchytska 78–80, 85–86, 90–94, 157–162, 164–166, 171, 173–176, 180–182, 190–192, 194–195, 199–200, 203, 204, 206–207, 211–214), as well as the appearance of numerous practical guides to Ukrainian usage. Within these corpus planning activities, two distinct trends crystallized, which might be labeled as the Kyïv and the Kharkiv schools (cf. Shevelov 1987, 144). The former, according to Shevelov (1986, 141, 160; 1987, 144), was oriented toward “the principles of historical and ethnographic romanticism” and embodied a “romantic-populist attitude,” trying to put into practice an “extremely puristic” approach to the formation of the standard language. Although Shevelov (1986, 141) admits that the same practices were characteristic of the language renascence efforts of many European nationalities (Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Lithuanians, Latvians, and others), he attached the European attribute not to the Kyïv school, but to the Kharkiv school, whose “moderate” purism was “synthetic,” inasmuch as it implied a combination of “native rural” elements and “urban European” ones. The preferences of the general public, according to Shevelov (1987, 143–144), lay with this “urban” language.

Both schools, however, were like-minded with respect to the necessity “to purge Ukrainian of excessive patterning on Russian,” just as the Czech language had been purged of Germanisms, Bulgarian of Turkicisms, or Romanian of Slavicisms (cf. Shevelov 1987, 143). Besides falling back on dialectal vocabulary (both Eastern and Western), this entailed an openness to the standard usage proper to Galicia and Bukovyna, where the stylistic differentiation achieved during the Austrian period had been “accompanied by an increase in borrowings from other languages, with Polish playing the role of either the main source or the intermediary in this process” (Masenko 2004, 14). This new attitude
(which contrasted with the Eastern Ukrainians’ reluctance regarding “Galicianisms” in the preceding decades) was apparent, for example, in the following considerations by Andrii Nikovsky, one of the most active lexicographers of the period:

The question of the influence of the “language of Galicia”... once so live and acute in our press, is now subsiding in the Central-Eastern Ukraine. Previously, the situation was such that because of Galician phrases, a reader of Ukrainian books could find himself annoyingly distressed by drastic words and become antagonistic to reading in Ukrainian. Now, when there are Ukrainian schools, Ukrainian institutions, there is more press, and plenty of dictionaries, the achievements of the Galician literary language should not be rejected. On the contrary, they should be welcomed and applied for general use, as material well worked out... very often to the point, and conveying West European influences.6 (1927, xv)

Nikovsky’s own Ukrainian–Russian Dictionary (1926) contained only 131 words or word meanings labeled “Galician,” as well as 28 “Western” and 6 “Hutsulian.” This vocabulary is chiefly ethnographic,7 while on the other hand, many obvious Europeanisms coming via Galicia are not provided with any label.8 This trend was bolstered in Holoskevych’s (1930)9 and Iziumov’s (1931) spelling dictionaries. The lack of labels seems to indicate that the lexicographers wished to integrate Galician words into the standard vocabulary.

After 1933, however, with the abolition of the 1928 orthography, things changed radically. From that time on, international (or European) terms were considered acceptable only if they were present in Russian as well. As for Galician words (both “ethnographic” and European, especially those coming from or mediated by Polish), they suffered the consequences of a new “active hostility to all things Galician” (Shevelov 1987, 164), and were purged from the dictionaries published in Soviet Ukraine. The second half of the 1930s became the heyday of Russianisms. Ideologically, their introduction was substantiated by the need to do away with the “self-isolation” of Ukrainian and to draw it closer—in the spirit of “proletarian internationalism”—to the languages of other nations, particularly those of the Soviet Union, of course, but “theoretically” those of other parts of the world as well. The West Ukrainian linguist Roman Smal-Stotsky reacted to a rather bizarre discussion of the subject between Khvylia and Skrypnyk (the latter tried to fence off the international words by claiming that they are in reality not international, but sheer Europeanisms, not known elsewhere in the world) in his own manner, maintaining that neither of the two opponents was aware of what internationalism or Europeanism meant in linguistics. According to Smal-Stotsky (110), the basic principle was that “the properly international meanings gain a place for themselves within languages in national forms.” Taking the example of analogically built terms in different languages, such as Ukrainian khmaroder, vystava, German Wolkenkratzer, Ausstellung, English skyscraper, exposition, and so on, he insisted that:

We see how the genuine European spirit, an embryo of the international spirit, manifests itself in several languages and propagates for the sole reason that it is understandable in words to the speakers and the hearers. (Smal-Stotsky 110)
This criterion ceased to be valid in the Soviet context: the saturation of Ukrainian with Russian words aimed now at making the Russian language as such more understandable to Ukrainians. This was particularly evident in scientific terminology, in which the bulk of “divergent” native Ukrainian words were replaced by borrowings or calques from Russian, but common vocabulary was also involved in this process. A new Russian–Ukrainian Dictionary, compiled by Illia Kyrychenko and colleagues (1937) and published under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences, was a true mirror of the new situation. According to Shevelov (1987, 166), it “almost ideally reflected the ideological requirements” of the time and contained words “taken directly from the Russian, with the necessary phonetic substitutions,” as well as “semantic adaptations” of Ukrainian words through establishing bi-univocal relations between Russian and Ukrainian terms and ignoring any divergencies in the synonymic relations proper to the two languages. The Russianisms imposed during this period on Standard Ukrainian have been preserved in many dictionaries; although there has been a continuous flow of publications of that type since 1937. The case of the relatively new Russian–Ukrainian Dictionary by Svitlana Iermolenko and colleagues (1996) is quite revealing in this respect, as this work, roughly of the same size as its 1937 analogue, arose within the Academy of Sciences as well. Table 19.1 reproduces the examples of Russian interference in the 1937 dictionary cited by Shevelov, presented alongside their respective translations from the 1996 dictionary.

The two dictionaries are, of course, not identical. One of Shevelov’s reproofs toward the 1937 dictionary, namely, its disregard for Ukrainian synonymy and its tendency always to pick out words closest to Russian, does not apply to the same extent to the 1996 dictionary, although the latter’s compilers did not include, for example, obiistia (quite different from Russian) as a possible translation for dvor, or the commonly used new word vantazhivka as a translation for gruzovik. But four out of six sheer Russianisms cited by Shevelov do reappear in the 1996 dictionary. This ratio approximately reflects the overall situation in lexicography.

Additional efforts to draw Ukrainian closer to Russian were part of editorial practice in the 1930s. Shevelov bears witness to what was happening at the time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian Words</th>
<th>Ukrainian Equivalents in 1937</th>
<th>Ukrainian Equivalents in 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>chuzhak “alien”</td>
<td>chuzhak</td>
<td>chuzhynets’, chuzhak, zakhozhyni, zabroda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dvor “yard”</td>
<td>dvir</td>
<td>dvir, podviriia, dvoryshche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gruzovik “truck”</td>
<td>hruzovyk</td>
<td>vantazhnyi avtomobil’, hruzovyk, vahovoz, vahoviz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prigorod “suburb”</td>
<td>pryhorod</td>
<td>pryhorod, peredmistia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rybak “fisherman”</td>
<td>rybalka</td>
<td>rybalka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rybolov “fisherman”</td>
<td>rybak</td>
<td>rybalka, rybolov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rysisty “trotting”</td>
<td>rysystyi</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19.1

Russianisms in Russian–Ukrainian Dictionaries of 1937 and 1996
I, for one, saw lists of prohibited words that the style editors of [the party central organ] Komunist sent to all periodicals. The lists contained two columns. The first was titled “Words not to be used,” and the second bore the heading “Words to be used.” The words in the second column were closer to Russian ones than those in the first. Although the lists were never published, they were taken as binding. (Shevelov 1987, 168)

Similar restrictive measures with regard to “undesirable” Ukrainian vocabulary continued until the late 1980s. The writer and journalist Serhii Plachynda (21), a man who had spent four decades working in the publishing industry, observed in 1989 that dialectal words were “tabooed in the press and even in fiction” (of course, specific Galician words, among others, were considered dialectal). He then goes on to spell out: “Most editors are very much on guard not to admit a single dialectal word, even in the speech of a literary character.” Accordingly, plenty of dialectal words (or those labeled “dialectal”) were left out of the eleven-volume Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language edited by Ivan Bilodid (1970–1980), the highest authority on matters of standard vocabulary in the late Soviet period.

Besides spelling, vocabulary, and terminology, the new line in politics, introduced in 1933, left an imprint on Ukrainian morphology, syntax, and even orthoepy (cf. Shevelov 1987, 156–157). As far as the spelling of foreign words is concerned, not more than half a dozen of them remained unaffected, for example, adress “address,” poshta “post,” Evropa “Europe” (ibid., 165) (the latter was later modified to Evropa, as in Russian). Neuter nouns of foreign origin in -o became indeclinable, with the single exception of pal’to “overcoat”; the gender of loan words was remodeled on the Russian one (again, with very few exceptions, as in words of Greek origin such as heneza “genesis,” kryza “crisis,” oaza “oasis,” teza “thesis”; cf. Russian genezis, krizis, oazis, tezis). The use of the vocative case (nonexistent in Russian) was discouraged; some case endings were substituted by more Russian-like ones (in particular, the new genitive singular of feminine nouns ending in a consonant of the type sil’ “salt”: soli instead of the traditional soly); the dual number was completely dropped. In syntax, locative constructions of the Russian type u mene holova bolyt’ “I have a headache” were propagated to the detriment of the traditional dative or accusative ones (meni/ mene holova bolyt’); furthermore, the passive voice with verbs in -sia (not typical for Ukrainian) pervaded written texts. As late as 1969, the official orthoepic recommendation not to palatalize consonants before i alternating with o was changed to its opposite (hard pronunciation of consonants before i is unknown in Russian).

Of course, all these measures, being of comparatively minor importance, did not modify the essential character of the Ukrainian language (cf. ibid., 174), which remained, even in its Soviet variety, quite distinct from Russian. They were conceived rather as a complement to status planning that established a hierarchy of languages, in which all “serious talk” was done in Russian and only afterward—if ever—translated into Ukrainian. Within this arrangement, it was convenient and laborsaving to design a Ukrainian Newspeak that would automatically replicate the original Russian messages inclusive of their linguistic structure. Accordingly, as time went on, more and more
specific Ukrainian words and expression that had no direct equivalents in Russian were declared “colloquial” or “dialectal,” and thus ousted from the standard language. As a result, the officially prescribed Ukrainian language was increasingly evolving into an idle duplicate of Russian, incapable of conveying any original messages, and performing, at best, a decorative function. In a way, Haugen’s “elaboration” stage turned out to be a gradual disfigurement from one point of view, and a mere superfluity from another point of view, because the outcome of this work did not really count. Iavorska (2000, 157) faithfully reflects this situation when she writes that Ukrainian “reached a high level of standardization and codification in the postwar years and until 1989,” on the one hand, while “the established and codified norms proved to be separated from living usage,” on the other hand. In fact, whatever Ukrainian printed production appeared at the time that was considered worth reading (be it Oleksander Ilchenko’s prose or Mykola Lukash’s translations of European classics), it typically clashed with the “official line” on the linguistic side.

Indeed, after 1933, a continuous tension existed between the official standard and the Ukrainian linguistic community’s real expressive needs, which occasionally came to the surface even in the press. Iurii Ianovsky’s 1937 (!)10 newspaper article titled “The People’s Tongue,” for example, was an outspoken démarche against what he called the “impoverishment” of the language (cf. Shevelov 1987, 171–172). Borys Antonenko-Davydovych’s crusade against Russianisms in the 1960s (cf. Moser 2000, 197–198) provides another example, and his book Iak my hovorymo [Our Way to Say It] (Antonenko-Davydovych 1970) became a symbol of the yearning to cultivate usage, which would be different from the official cant. In reality, there was a tacit compromise between both trends to which the communist authorities acquiesced. Language-nurturing endeavors by the partisans of unadulterated Ukrainian were tolerated to some extent, as long as they remained within a “Prosvita”-like framework and did not encroach on the principle of the Russian standard as the ultimate reference point looming behind the Ukrainian standard.

It would be unfair to say that these efforts had no effect at all. After the havoc of the 1930s, the Ukrainian language recuperated little by little during the relatively tranquil four decades from 1950 onward. The progress it made was palpable. Plachynda related his own impressions about how he was confronted, all at once after an interval of forty years, with the ordinary written language of the late 1940s:

I was reading the old newspapers . . . in dismay: so meager was the manner of writing we had practiced! How primitive the language of our leaders’ speeches had been! And what kind of scanty, humdrum vocabulary had the press been full of: clichés, calques, reiterations, stock phrases, vapid neologisms. And now? Our journalistic, business and colloquial Ukrainian has improved unrecognizably. (Plachynda 5)

Yet for all that, dissatisfaction with the state and with the status of the Ukrainian language continued to be widely felt. With the political liberalization of the late 1980s (during Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost period), calls for change became so frequent and audible that it was impossible to ignore them any longer. As a result,
the death throes of the Soviet regime included a linguistic dimension: Article 2 of the Languages Law, passed in 1989, defined Ukrainian as the only state language of the Ukrainian Republic (cf. Materialy 1991, 3), while the official orthography had been modified a little earlier to reintroduce the controversial letter ґ (= g) into the alphabet (cf. Ukrain's'kyi pravopys 1990, 20). However, both of these measures were rather half-hearted, as Article 4 of the same Languages Law granted Russian the status of “language of interethnic communication” (Materialy, 4), whereas the rules for the use of ґ were formulated in a rather inconsistent way, taking as a guideline—in practice—the presence of words with the sound [g] in dialectal usage. As a follow-up to these decisions, a “State Program of fostering Ukrainian and other languages” was approved in 1991 (cf. ibid., 14–47), which was supposed to ensure their effective implementation. With very few exceptions, it proved to be a complete failure. Of course, due to the collapse of the Soviet system, this program became outdated very soon, but it is remarkable that the government of independent Ukraine, instead of reinforcing the program preferred not to engage at all in any serious language-planning efforts. One explanation of this inactivity—verging on sabotage—lies at the surface. Evoking Stalin’s well-known maxim, “the cadres decide all,” Vasyl Horbachuk aptly observed:

[quoted text]

Behind this largely extrinsic factor, however, there is a deeper reason for the state’s inability to intervene. The very political choice to lean on continuity between the former Soviet and the new independent Ukraine entailed a conservation of the former’s intellectual and cultural legacy. A clash between the new goals for the future and the old means used to attain them was inevitable. Oksana Zabuzhko (46) expressed it aphoristically: ‘‘Europe’ does not graft onto the bankrupt ‘Prosvita.’’”

Applied to linguistic matters, this means that “the question logically arose regarding the revision of the Ukrainian linguistic norms codified during the Soviet period” (Masenko 2004, 83), which primarily concerned improvements in spelling. The work of the Academy of Sciences Orthographical Commission, convened in 1988, is an eloquent example of the real state of affairs. The rules adopted in 1989/90 were so unsatisfactory that they had to be amended again in 1993 (cf. Ukrain’s’kyi pravopys 1993). Still, since no one was truly pleased even with this new version, the commission continued with its work. But when a project of comparatively far-reaching changes (going in the direction of the 1928 rules) was presented (cf. Ukrain’s’kyi pravopys 1999), it encountered obdurate opposition. Larysa Masenko describes the situation as follows:

Since the advocates of the Soviet language policy have retained their influence in academic establishment circles to the present day, during the discussion they managed to discredit and to block the approval of the project of a new version of Ukrainian spelling that would meet the demands of the time. (Masenko 2004, 85)
Simultaneously, an aggressive propaganda campaign erupted in the press, reminiscent of Soviet times in its style. It looked so well coordinated that the presence of a mastermind in government circles could be very plausibly presumed. Although the lines of argumentation against the newly proposed spelling were typically very incompetent, the vehemence of their campaign compensated for it; Roman Tryfonov’s (2005) review of the Kharkiv local media offers a good example in this respect. Lack of understanding of the logic underlying the spelling reform was in fact characteristic not only of newspaper publications but also of some works supposedly written in a more scholarly vein. For example, the archaeologist Petro Tolochko (10), an adversary of any departure whatsoever from late Soviet-era rules, did not hesitate to exhibit his own linguistic ignorance when he tried to rebut the use of $t$ instead of $f$ in foreign words such as katedra, Aton, Atanasii, Teodosii by appealing to the absurdity of its eventual appearance in Fridrikh, Faust, Faberzhe, Fedir. Apparently, he altogether missed the point at issue: the presence of $\thetah$ (Greek $\theta$) or $\phi$ in the source languages.

Nevertheless, both the reformative 1999 project and the conservative 2003 one, conceived as its alternative (cf. Ukraïns’kyi pravopys 2003), failed to gain sufficient support for approval. As a result, the provisional status of the officially valid rules left much room for individual initiative. Halyna Iavorska states:

New handbooks and dictionaries (especially orthographic and terminological ones) that have appeared during recent years sometimes contradict each other and are reminiscent of ideological programs rather than of a code of established linguistic rules. (153)

In particular, due to the unclear situation regarding the use of $r$ ($g$), a number of publications have appeared, trying to extend the rather meager list of about 250 words (including derivatives) with this letter in the Academy’s spelling dictionary (cf. Holovashchuk et al. 1994). Among them, two attempts deserve special mention. Mykhailo Panochko’s (1993) reference list of words with $r$ ($g$) had a very limited first edition (200 copies) and was subsequently reproduced in the Shliakh Peremohy newspaper. An anonymous, pirated edition of 100,000 copies followed shortly after.\textsuperscript{11} The revised 1999 version of this booklet comprised no less than 2,067 words. Oleksander Ponomariv’s (1997) publication was smaller in size (approximately 500 words), but it also contained a list of words of Greek origin in which $r$ ($g$) is out of place. Both authors obviously had some problems with the choice of the right letter, and their recommendations are occasionally incorrect (e.g., tomagavk for “tomahawk”).

Another point of tension between the reformative and conservative lines concerns vocabulary. Olha Muromtseva (23) had every reason to speak of “an actively running process of reinstating the words that were tendentiously expunged from Ukrainian usage or removed to the periphery of the vocabulary, labeled as archaic, dialectal, bookish, and so on.” This tendency is also present in the field of scientific terminology, which is passing through a period of revival after several decades of neglect
under the Soviet regime. In some publications, this attitude is programmatic. For example, the editorial note accompanying Nina Shylo’s (212) Russian–Ukrainian terminological dictionary says point-blank: “Lexical calques and transliterations from Russian have been excluded from the aggregate of modern terms; instead, many genuine Ukrainian terms have been restored.” Indeed, it would have been unthinkable to see, for example, Russian diametr, disk, podshipnik “bearing,” and pylesos “vacuum cleaner” rendered by Ukrainian poperechnyk, kruzhalo, val’nytsia, and porokhotiah, respectively, in any dictionary printed after 1933 in Soviet Ukraine.

Interestingly enough, in some cases, the editorial practice has also become the opposite of what it had been. Halyna Iavorska (173–174) cites some examples of typical corrections made by the editors of a scholarly journal, concerning primarily logical connectors (see Table 19.2 above).

Although the original variants were by no means incorrect, and the crossed-out words are indeed no Russianisms, the underlying intention is quite obvious: the editors wished to break the bi-univocal correspondence they felt between the Ukrainian text and its eventual Russian translation. Iavorska (173) is therefore not sincere when she tries to explain away their attitude with an elusive “for some reason.” One has here a clear instance of the desire to undo the results of the Soviet Russianizing interference with the Ukrainian standard.

Certainly, the conservative side’s reaction to these attempts is very negative, and Tolochko (12) is a typical example: “The Ukrainian language, is being abnormally snarled up by a campaign-like introduction of Galician dialect words of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (as a rule, Germanisms and Polonisms) into its vocabulary.”

It is curious that Iavorska (162), taking up Shevelov’s distinction of the Kyїv and Kharkiv schools, tries to portray the conflict between the reformers and the conservatives as an opposition between ‘Romanticist’ and “European” linguistic consciences, respectively. Hence “Europeanness” in her version is roughly equivalent to Khvylia’s (Russian-mediated) “internationalism.” In reality, even the majority of antireformers instead associate “Europeanness” with the other party’s stance. Iermolenko’s appraisal of the current situation is quite correct:

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**Table 19.2**

**Typical Style Editors’ Corrections in 1992–1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changed to</th>
<th>Changed from</th>
<th>Russian Equivalents</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aby</td>
<td>shchob</td>
<td>chtoby</td>
<td>“in order to”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a todi</td>
<td>pizinische, potim</td>
<td>pozhe, potom</td>
<td>“later”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bo</td>
<td>oskil’ky, tomu shcho</td>
<td>poskol’ku, potomu chto khot’</td>
<td>“because”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bodaj</td>
<td>khoch</td>
<td>nevozmozhno</td>
<td>“at least”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hodi</td>
<td>nemozhlyvo</td>
<td>takzhe, tozhe</td>
<td>“too”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i sobi</td>
<td>takozh, tezh</td>
<td>po moemu mneniu</td>
<td>“in my opinion”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jak na mene</td>
<td>na moju dumku</td>
<td>chrezvychaino</td>
<td>“extraordinarily”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naprochud</td>
<td>nadzvychaino</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As for the pronunciation and spelling of loan words, we stress the use of forms like mit, eter, arytmetyka, ortohrafiia, and Evropa instead of the codified ones, mif, efir, aryfmetyka, orfohrafiia, ievropa; the former sometimes appear in literary and journalistic usage to underscore the “Europeanness” of the publication in question, its proximity to the Western diaspora’s Ukrainian. (Iermolenko 1999, 223)

Hermann Bieder (24) is therefore closer to the truth when, in distinguishing “two diametrically opposed trends” on the question of the further development of Standard Ukrainian, he qualifies the reformers as “national, pro-Western,” and their opponents as “conservative, pro-Russian” (although it is less certain that the former are really “dominating” the scene, as he claims). However, this latter point of the relative strength of both parties is not really as important as the opponents themselves might think, for the very interrelationship between standard and living usage has changed. Formerly, a preestablished standard was supposed to regulate usage and had the absolute backing of controlling organs. In the years following independence, the official grip on language has slackened. Leading periodicals such as І, Krytyka, Suchasnist’, and so on, could openly opt for spelling different from the one approved by the Academy, and the same is true of a number of publishing houses. Furthermore, many books printed by Ukrainians in the diaspora, which are mostly in compliance with the 1933 rules, have found their way into libraries in Ukraine, while some were reissued in Ukraine in the original form (including the influential Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva). The STB all-national television channel laid out its own principles of language usage in a separate book (cf. Demska-Kulchytska et al. 2006). Thus, competing usages promoted from several sides are trying to appeal to the bulk of speakers through their intrinsic qualities, and to assert themselves thereby as standard-establishing.

The new status of Ukrainian as the language of serious discourse induced an upsurge in word-formation processes, reflected in several dictionaries of neologisms (cf. Mazuryk 2002; Neliuba 2004; Neliuba and Neliuba 2007), which attest to the activation of some properly Ukrainian word-building affixes.12

Interesting developments are detectable in the use of argots and slangs. Some twenty-five years ago, Shevelov (1983, 219) wrote that the genuine Ukrainian argots had become extinct, whereas slang innovations were almost exclusively borrowed from Russian. In his view, this was a symptom of the extinction of Ukrainian itself, which was increasingly turning into a vulgarized substitute of the expanding Russian language, and so did not need any slang of its own. Two recently published dictionaries of Ukrainian slang (cf. Kondratiuk 2006; Stavytska 2003) still contain plenty of words that come from Russian,13 but include just as many purely Ukrainian ones.14 Thus, it seems that in this respect, the situation is being reversed too.

In sum, quite a few signs of the gradual recovery of the Ukrainian language are apparent. Overall, this process is following the steps of other European languages that overcame their postcolonial difficulties earlier. Significantly, examples from language situations in other European countries (Belgium, Croatia, former Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Spain, etc.) keep popping up in the ongoing discussion of the problems of bilingualism and language policy in Ukraine (cf., e.g., Masenko 1999,
Regardless of the relative official status of Ukrainian and Russian, the fact remains that the former has largely (although not entirely) emancipated itself from the pressure of the latter and is setting out on its own course of development. There are grounds to believe that the current—historically conditioned—“usage vs. standard” friction will be resolved by dint of a European-like compromise, in which, instead of preconceived dogmas, a pragmatic approach will prevail, allowing a mutual adjustment of the conflicting stances, while leaving enough room for variability within the standard, which is crucial for the development of any living language.

Notes

1. This text was published earlier in French (cf. Shevelov 1956, 81–83).
2. In the foreword to a 1960 collection of dialectological studies, the two terms were treated as synonymous (cf. Brakhnov et al. 1960, 3).
3. Hence the tendency to indicate the first sources of loan words in Hryhorii Holoskevych’s (1930) Spelling Dictionary, meant to be a complement to the new spelling rules, even where there were obvious traces of Polish mediation (cf. Piddubna 2003, 68–69). All in all, Holoskevych qualified only ten lexemes as being of Polish origin (cf. ibid., 64).
4. This was a clear exaggeration on Shevelov’s part.
7. In the first group, one finds a clear majority of words taken from living dialects (such as afyny “blackberries,” aridnyk “devil,” babaruna “ladybird,” bana “gloom,” gaida “(bag) pipe(s),” gazda “farmer,” nianio “father,” nim “earlier than,” nits “nothing,” ripnyk “oiler,” varuvaty “to guard,” vivertysa “squirrel,” vsteklyna “rabies,” etc.), although some “bookish” terms (hereziia “heresy,” hurahan “hurricane,” obava “misgivings,” isyrkul “district,” uriadok “regulation,” vidchyt “lecture,” vydil “committee”) also appear next to them. The second group, with the single exception of kurator “churchwarden,” is still more dominated by dialectal vocabulary (such as koda “shock (of hair),” kukuts “New Year bread,” rodychi “parents,” etc.). Finally, the third group comprises exotic terms used by the Carpathian mountaineers (staryi—literally “old”—for bear, stochnyk “wood carver,” tsyhan—literally “Gypsy”—for smith, etc.). My thanks go to Viktoriia Piddubna for providing me with these data.
10. In that year, the punitive measures under Stalin’s rule reached their absolute peak.
References


The area known as Galicia (Halyčyna) has always functioned as a bridge between Central-Eastern and Eastern Europe. From the perspective of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, it has been constantly regarded as the “most European” genuinely East Slavic region, primarily for two reasons: first, it was part of the Austrian Empire between 1772 and 1918 (Austro-Hungarian since 1867), and second, it was not incorporated into the Soviet Union until World War II. Moreover, Galicia is known as the traditional stronghold of a separate Ukrainian national consciousness and of widespread use of the Ukrainian language. Hence, Galicia and the Galicians, as well as the Galician variety of Ukrainian, have always served as favorite targets for anti-Ukrainian and anti-European attacks. The present study demonstrates that this remains unchanged today, despite the fact that virtually all anti-Galician stereotypical attitudes, especially those concerning language, are based on false or at least questionable assumptions. Some of these stereotypes are widespread and occur even beyond the types of sources presented below. First, despite certain local peculiarities, the Galician variety of the Ukrainian language, as it comes into play in the linguistic discussions of today, is not “a Galician dialect” by origin. In reality, its most important source is the literary language that developed in the Ukrainian-speaking territories of the Russian Empire and that was adopted in Galicia under the influence of the most notable Ukrainian writers of the nineteenth century, Taras Ševčenko and Pantelejmon Kulič, beginning in the 1860s (Moser 2008, 2009). Second, it is true that Galician Ukrainian is characterized by various loan elements, but it is a fact that not only Modern Standard Ukrainian but also other languages, including Russian, feature a sizable number of various foreign elements at all linguistic levels as well. Third, some authors try to characterize recent efforts to introduce some changes into the orthography of Modern Standard
Ukrainian as Galician by provenance. Yet even truly “Galician” orthographies, such as the “Želexivka” (the orthography designed by Jevhen Želexivs’kyj for his Ukrainian-German dictionary of 1886) included non-Galician models to a considerable extent. And the so-called Xarkiv orthography of 1928 and 1929 (cf. Vakulenko’s chapter in this volume), which many Ukrainians of the diaspora still adhere to and which indeed serves as an important point of reference within the recent discourse on the reform of Ukrainian orthography, was only the result of a quite reasonable Galician–non-Galician compromise, abandoned in 1933 at the peak of Stalinist terror in Ukraine. As a matter of fact, many peculiarities of the Galician variety of Ukrainian were best preserved in the Ukrainian diaspora, especially in North America, after Galicia was annexed by the Soviet Union. In Soviet Ukraine, Galician Ukrainian was persecuted and supplanted by a more Russianized Soviet variety of Ukrainian. Still, the Ukrainian language as such has remained more vital in Galicia than in any other area of Ukraine. Most likely, this is the reason why some contemporaries, especially those who still question the right of the Modern Standard Ukrainian Language to exist, have developed a particularly negative attitude toward Galicia and Galician Ukrainian.

Anti-Galician Sources on the Internet

Philologists studying the history of Slavic languages are perfectly aware of the fact that their field has always been an object of politically motivated debate and manipulation. By its very nature, the history of a language is part of a broader historical narrative. Scholarly and nonscholarly interpretations concerning the emergence and development of the Ukrainian language have been extremely varied over the years.

For instance, when N.M. Pašaeva published a book in 2001 on the history of the “Russian movement in Galicia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,” with the publishers of the renowned Public Historical State Library [Государственная Публичная Историческая Библиотека] in Moscow, most readers would certainly have expected a history of Galician Russophiles. Surprisingly, however, the book is devoted to the history of the Galician “Ruthenian” (“Ukrainian”) awakening, which is presented as “a complex phenomenon of the fatherland’s history” [сложный феномен отечественной истории] (Pašaeva 3) from a clearly Russian perspective.2

Although Pašaeva’s work contains few innovative elements and suffers from numerous substantial shortcomings, it is still part of the scholarly discourse. A Google search for the author’s name (Н.М. Пашаева) quickly demonstrates that, regardless of Pašaeva’s own intentions, her work has still another meaning outside the academic world: the Web site http://ukrstor.com/paszaewa.html, one of the first results, contains links to the book and to two more of Pašaeva’s articles, on the Galician Russophile Ivan Naumovyč and the Russophile organization Halyc’ko-Rus’ka Matycja. In addition, in an emblem located right above these links, one can read: “Русская Галиция oder Ukraine über alles” and find the names “Головацкий, Наумович, Франко, Драгоманов, Добрянский” (http://ukrstor.com/paszaewa.html, the emblem was removed by October 2008—M.M.).
The message is obvious: according to certain Russian chauvinist traditions, Galicia is viewed as one of the ancient Russian lands, whereas “Ukrainian nationalist” Galicia is stigmatized as the quite recent result of an Austro-German—or Polish—or Jewish—at any rate, foreign-born, anti-Russian intrigue. Languages are not only the medium of such absurd propaganda but also their objects, in many cases. In regard to the debates on the role of Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine, this obviously holds true for both languages. It is remarkable that the particular role of the Galician variant of the Ukrainian language has been strongly (re)emphasized since 1991 within the discussions on Ukrainian.

This chapter will demonstrate that the Galician variant of the Ukrainian language is still one of the favorite targets not only of an anti-Galician but also of a more general anti-Ukrainian, and eventually anti-European, discourse. Being interested in current attitudes toward the Galician variety of Ukrainian, I recently conducted extensive Google searches for the expressions “галицький язык” (in Russian) and “галицька мова” (in Ukrainian), both meaning “Galician language” (on March 20, July 2, and July 4, 2007, with some proofreadings between July 11 and July 20, 2007). Of course, these electronic searches can only be regarded as an initial stage of this subproject. Yet they provide a good impression of the prevailing attitudes toward Galician Ukrainian in today’s most important general information source, the Internet. Moreover, they provide access not only to the different views of various “experts” but also to the current opinions of numerous “nonexperts” who appear as participants in various Internet forums and blogs and adopt the “experts’” attitudes to some extent in their own way. Some of these sources are very likely to disappear from the Internet within the next months or years. Yet, as a mirror for certain linguistic ideologies, which prove to be still alive at the turn of the twenty-first century, they deserve to be studied, regardless of their intellectual level, which quite often appears to be very low.

Although the present chapter is part of my project, “One thousand years of Ukrainian language history in Galicia,” the more unconventional approaches to the history of Galician Ukrainian encountered in the sources used here will be largely excluded from the present analysis, first due to limited space, and second in accordance with the topic of this volume. Still, it should be mentioned that, apart from the quite banal discourse on the alleged linguistic unity in Kyivian Rus’ and the long-lasting linguistic unity of “Little Russian,” “Ruthenian,” and Russian afterward, at least some of the tendentious scholarly sources do contain interesting information on the history of the Ukrainian language in the nineteenth century. Yet most interpretations of these materials in extremely Ukrainophobic works (such as Karevin 2006 or Uljanov 1966/1996/2003) are merely absurd, so that only a careful examination can make these publications useful as additional sources for the study of the Ukrainian language’s history. Then they can help overcome certain shortcomings of modern Ukrainianist philology, which usually pays too little attention to phenomena such as the Galician Russophile movement, or the contradictory attitude toward Ukrainian observed in some central figures of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian movement, such as Pantelejmon Kuliš and many others (cf. also Moser 2009).
For my analysis, I viewed the first 150–200 entries under both the Russian and the Ukrainian expressions. Altogether the more relevant sources in this sampling comprise about 1,000 printed pages. The documents vary widely in length (from one printed page to about fifty) and in intellectual level. Among them, we find various text types: chapters from scholarly and nonscholarly books, as well as articles from scholarly and nonscholarly journals, newspaper articles, Internet articles, various Weblogs, and Internet forums. Most documents originate from Ukrainian sources, and others from Russian ones. Very few authors from other countries appear in these forums. In the results of these Google searches, anti-Ukrainian and anti-Galician views clearly prevail, especially in the search results for Russian “галицький язык.” Not surprisingly, the texts written in Russian tend to be of an anti-Galician orientation much more often than those written in Ukrainian, although this is indeed only a tendency. Quite frequently, anti-Galician texts are located on sites that are explicitly devoted to certain political interests, such as “Я–Anti-Orange” [I am anti-Orange], “Единое отечество” [United fatherland], or “Единая Русь” [United Rus’]. The Russian language clearly dominates blogs of this kind, whereas contributions in Ukrainian are usually introduced by bloggers who oppose anti-Galician statements. As a matter of fact, unanimously positive assessments of the Galician variant of Ukrainian and its historical role appear very rarely, for instance, on the few Ukrainian sites that are explicitly devoted to peculiarities of Galician Ukrainian (e.g., “Fish” 2003 or “L’vivs’ka gvara” 2007). They occur in some apologetic sources from which I will quote at the end of this study, and in some scholarly articles (including my own).

Some anti-Galician sources are characterized by a particularly hateful attitude toward speakers of Galician Ukrainian, that is, the Galician Ukrainians and the North American diaspora, whereby the latter is usually viewed as an important stronghold of “Galician Ukrainianness.” There is virtually no anti-Galician or anti-Ukrainian stereotype that would not appear in these sources, and many of them clearly violate all rules of good taste. In particular, this holds for some of the forums, where people hiding behind their nicknames strongly confirm all the widely debated disadvantages of the anonymity of the cyberspace. Most of the steadily repeated traditional stigmatizations of Galician Ukrainians as “banderovcy” (or “bandérovcy”) [“people who are followers of Stepan Bandera,” a leading ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism and organizer of the Ukrainian resistance against the Nazi, as well as the Soviet, regimes]—and “zapadency” (or “zapadéncy”) [“Westernizers (viewed in a negative light)”] have been well-known at least since Stalin’s times. In the worst sources, the Galicians of Galicia and of the diaspora are accused of being traditional sympathizers of the Nazi ideology (cf. Geraščenko 2007); most often, this occurs in texts whose authors clearly adhere to a totalitarian, antidemocratic, anti-Western (and often anti-Semitic) ideology themselves. Other authors, trying to appeal to the Germanophobic emotions that are still widespread in anti-Western circles in post-Soviet countries, remind readers of Camp Talerhof near Graz, where Galician Russophiles were imprisoned during the last years of the Austrian monarchy (Anisimova 2000). Another rhetorical device that is well-known from Stalinist discourse and appears in the blogs, is the comparison of
targeted groups to various animals. Clearly, most of the labels used in anti-Galician discourse are, above all, the expression of certain intellectual deficiencies. The only interesting label, “Ukrainian Croatians” [українські хорвати], seems to be quite uncommon, appearing in only a single source (Baulin 2007).

**Negative Labels for Galician Ukrainian**

When an assessment is based on insufficient knowledge, various superficial labels are often used as substitutes for sound argument. This holds true for assessments of languages or varieties of languages.

**Not Ukrainian**

In many anti-Galician sources, Galician Ukrainian is placed in opposition to “real” Ukrainian and depicted as virtually non-Ukrainian. “Maskal’” (2007), for example, writes about the “Galician . . . not the Ukrainian” language, and adds that it differs from “real Ukrainian” “in pronunciation (intonation of words and sentences) and in the use of Polish words.” According to this widespread, anti-Galician and anti-Ukrainian myth, it is not “real Ukrainian,” but “the Galician language” that has been imposed on all Ukrainians since at least 1991.6

**Dialect and Mixed Language**

Most authors merely identify the Galician variant of Ukrainian as an entity that they call “the Galician dialect” [галицький диалект (Poliščuk 2003) or на галицьком наречні (Enals-Pilugina 2007)] or “the so-called Galician dialect” [так называемое галицкое наречие] (Macuka 2004). Skvorcov (2007) writes more concretely about “the Galician urbanistic [why not urban/городской?—M.M.] dialect, generously ‘enriched’ by Polonisms and diaspora Americanisms” [галицький урбанистичний диалект, милостиво “обогащений” полонизмами и диаспорними американцями].7 Others call Galician Ukrainian a “Westernizing Polish dialect” [западенско (!—М.М.)-польское наречие] (“Dreamer” 2007), and still others refer to it as “the Polish-Galician language” [Польско-Галицький язык] (Ivanov 2007). Related labels such as “Galician Suržyk” [галицький СУРЖИК (sic!, with capitals)] (Kornilov 2000), “Ukrainian-Polish ‘Suržyk’” [на українсько-польському суржике] (Macuka 2004) or, more aggressively, “dirty Suržyk” (Anonymous 2007a),8 “Polish-Galician jargon” [польско-галицький жаргон] (Vadžra 2007a or Kolesnikov 2002), “Polish-Hutsulian mixture . . . with absurd dialectisms” [Польско-гуцульський микс . . . нелепые диалектизмы] (Jurčenko 2007), and “hybrid language—neither Polish . . . nor Ukrainian” (“Šturman” 2005)9 also put the emphasis on the “mixed” or “dialectal” character of Galician Ukrainian. So did a nicknamed contributor for a blog on Viktor Janukovyč’s personal information server—whose absurd text was, however, deleted from the server between July
2 and July 11, 2007: He called Galician Ukrainian “a Polonized Roman-Galician dialect” (“Vladimir” 2007), whereas another blogger speaks about “the Galician Romanian-Polish language” [на галицької румъяно-польської мове] (“Kharkov” 2007), and still another is certain that “the ‘Ukrainian’ language” is also “Lithuanized” (“Anticommunist” 2007a). Probably the most absurd label of this sort, which reflects the general xenophobic attitude of the anti-Galician discourse, is offered by “Margo” (2007), who introduces the term “this Polish-German-Yiddish Galician dialect” [эта польско-немецко-идишская галицька говирка], while referring not to Galician Ukrainian in particular, but to the contemporary Ukrainian standard language in general. Others decide to describe the Galician dialect as something ridiculous, while confessing that they have never come upon authentic examples of it.

The Alien Language of the Diaspora

In some sources, Galician Ukrainian is primarily characterized as the language of the alien, North American Ukrainian diaspora. One blogger calls Galician Ukrainian a “Western dialect,” which is nothing but the “dialect of the American and Canadian diaspora, who thinks that all of Ukraine should talk like that” (“Al.” 2006). Poliščuk (2003) even tries to show that the “Galician dialect” of the North American diaspora is characterized by more Russian elements than the Ukrainian language in Ukraine. In a particularly hateful article, he accuses the North American diaspora of traditionally preferring this “dialect” to “literary Ukrainian.”

The Artificial Language

If it is not the “Polish,” “Roman,” “Romanian,” “German,” “Yiddish,” “American,” “Canadian,” or “dialectal” character of Galician Ukrainian that is attacked, then its allegedly “artificial” character is stressed. Some participants of various forums do not hesitate to call it “newspeak” [новояз] (“Myslyvec’” 2007), or more expressively, “artificial Galician newspeak” [искусственный галицкий новояз] (“Enals-Pilugina” 2007), in complete ignorance of the original meaning of the term. Referring to historical myths created by certain anti-Ukrainian ideologists (cf. Karevin 2006), one blogger argues that it is “the tragedy of Ukraine” that “two Ukrainian languages” compete with one another, first “the Polonized Galician invention that was hastily made by Hruševs’kyj and his fellows,” and second “the vernacular of Central and Eastern Ukraine propagated by Hruševskyj’s teacher Nečuj-Levyc’kyj” (“nickpro” 2006). Geraščenko 2007, a particularly aggressive author, speaks about “the new Galician literary language that was hastily created on the basis of the Polonized Galician dialect by the activists of the Ukrainian movement in full accordance with the Austrian politics of separatism,” and rhetorically uses the genuinely Polish form of the adjective “литерацька” [literary] in order to underline the allegedly alien character of this language.
The Nonexistent “Language”

One of the most paradoxical attitudes toward Galician Ukrainian, which is a well-known component of the general anti-Ukrainian discourse used since the nineteenth century, is offered in a forum by another particularly aggressive person hiding behind the nickname “Ivanov.” He describes Ukrainian in general and Galician Ukrainian in particular as “a nonexistent language in a nonexistent state” (“Ivanov” 2006), which comes quite close to the wording of the Valuev circular of 1863 with its paradoxical limitation of the use of a language “that never existed, does not exist and cannot exist.” The same view is offered by another contributor, who tries to present himself as a polyglot but suffers a painful defeat while trying to write a few words in Polish: “Ja wiem Rossijski i rozumie Polski. Ja movie—cholopy, chodzcie iz Krymu do dupy! Ja nie wiem jezyka Ukrainskiego. Jego nie ma. Jego nie ma. To nie jest jakiej sie jezyk” [I know Russian and understand Polish—I say, peasants, go from the Crimea to my ass! I do not know the Ukrainian language. It does not exist. This is not a language at all] (“Micha” 2007). Still another device that was often used in the past is the use of quotation marks for Galician Ukrainian in particular, and Ukrainian in general. Certain authors, such as Smolin (2007), speak of “the invention of a separate ‘Ukrainian’ language” [изобретение особого “украинского” языка], and subsequently refer to it only as “the language” [язык], again in quotation marks. Ljapunov (2006) writes about the “‘Ukrainian’ scholarly language” [“украинский” научный язык]. Still others refer to Ukrainian as “the so-called state language” or “the state language named Ukrainian” [так называемой “державной мовы,” or “державным языком под названием украинского] (Baulin 2007), or simply “the state languge” [державная мова or abbreviated “держмова”] (ibid.). Some authors write about the “Little Russian language” [малороссийский язык] that was named “Ukrainian” at the beginning of the twentieth century (Baulin 2004), about the “Little Russian dialect” [На малорусском наречии] (“Vpixatinec” 2004), or even about the “West Russian literary language” [западнорусский письменный язык] (“Anticommunist” 2007a) that was abandoned for the sake of an “absolutely artificial” [абсолютно искусственный] “Ukrainian-Ruthenian’ language” [“украинсько-руського” (sic, in Ukrainian and in quotation marks) ЯЗЫКА (sic, in Russian, with capital letters)] (“Vpixatinec” 2004). Yet many refer to it in Ukrainian as “the mother tongue” [рідна мова] (“Astakhov” 2007) or just as “the language” [мова] (Baulin 2007; Geraščenko 2007) within a Russian text.17

The Language and Its Speakers

As usual, some of the most tasteless derogatory “glottonyms” aim at characterizing a language by hateful stereotypes that the authors associate with its speakers. “Ivanov” calls Galician Ukrainian “the language of Galician cattle” [мовою галичанського бидла] (“Ivanov” 2006a), or merely the “cattle nonsense” [на быдлячей тарабарщине] (“Ivanov” 2006b).18 A “congenial” participant of another forum asserts that “the Ukrainian language is not a language, but the sounds of animals . . . of the Jewish-
Polish [!—M.M.] cattle from Galicia” (“Voin” 2007). The pejorative derivational variant “галичанский,” which is formed from галичанин (inhabitant of Galicia), is widely used in the anti-Galician sources. Baulin 2007 writes about the widespread “Westernizing pronunciation” [zapadenskoe (!—M.M.) произношение], and complains that Ukrainian pupils have already begun “to pronounce g in the Galician manner” [по-галичански (!—M.M.) “г”-кать” (sic!, the author clearly means “g.”)] whereas even speakers of Russian in Ukraine pronounce it “softly” [(!— M.M.)]. Of course, Baulin expresses his sympathy for the people from the Donbas region and the Crimea who do not want to learn “the Galician mother-tongue of the Ukrainian diaspora” [они не хотят учить “рідну галичанську мову” української диаспори]. Like so many others, he is convinced that, in the schools of Ukraine, it is the “Galicians’ language” [ззык галичан] that is being taught at the moment, and that “the language of 10% of the population” is being imposed on the rest. This particularly annoys him because, according to him, it is Galician that is “the least developed and most archaic” [на самом неразвитом, архаичном языке!] among the five East Slavic languages [!!!—M.M.] that he finds in Ukraine (the others are Russian, “Little Russian,” “Polta-vian,” and “Rusyn”). Moreover, referring to the fact that Galicia is an economically weak region of Ukraine, Baulin does not hesitate to write about Galician Ukrainian as “a beggars’ language” [язык нищеты]. In another particularly tasteless contribution that aims in the same direction, the Galician variant of Ukrainian is not only called a “Western Ukrainian dialect from Ternopil’ and Lviv” [западноукраинский диалект (Тернопольско-Львовский)], but also “partly the language of the day laborers of the last century” and “partly the language of the war criminals (the Bandera people) who have settled in Canada and America” (“Tania” 2006).

“Glottonyms” Derived from Swearwords

The last category among the derogatory glottonyms applied to Galician Ukrainian and to Ukrainian in general is based on mere swearwords. One of them is “дерьмова” or “галичанська дерьмова,” which is derived from Russian дерьмо “dirt, mud, smut” and can be interpreted as a tasteless parody of “держмова”21 (Anonymous 2007a).22 Another one is “дупомова,” which is derived from дупа, “ass” (Anonymous 2007b).23 A blogger with the strange nickname “Ukrainian patriot” [“Украинский патриот”] manages to combine all of the most tasteless derogatory labels within one entry:

... the “language” [Ukrainian “mova” in the Russian text—M.M.] does not exist beyond the sphere of the radio and the TV, some idiot decided to declare a dead language the state language [“гомударственным” could be either a typing error or an allusion to “homo-”—M.M. :))] ... as long as I have been alive and traveling through all of Ukraine (Luhansk, Doneck, Kyjiv, the Crimea, Xarkiv, Odesa, Xerson), I have not heard alive “the language” [Ukrainian “mova” in the Russian text—M.M.], but only our beloved mother tongue, the Russian language, was around. . . . maybe in Bandera’s land in the wild hit bunkers [the word is taken from Polish schron, “bunker”] far in the woods and mountains “the language” even exists, but in what
way are these wild places related to Ukraine? . . . so that the people’s language, Russian, should be the state language, and not the “der’mova,” the language of the peasants and of the bulls.24

**Modern Standard Ukrainian—a Galician Project?**

Interestingly, virtually all anti-Galician authors claim that, since 1991, Galician Ukrainian has been imposed on the rest of Ukraine. According to them, Ukrainian nationalists (the “conscious Ukrainians,” cf. also the formation “свідомити,” from Ukrainian свідомий, as used by “анб” 2006 and “Тания” 2006) regard it as the best (“exclusively conscious”) variety of Ukrainian.25 Hence, they spread the myth that, after 1991, it was only the Galician Ukrainians and the North-American emigrants who began reorganizing the functionality, orthography, and the very structure of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine. In particular, the suggestions that were made for the orthographic reforms are characterized as “the appearance of a stubbornness that is traditional in Galicia” [проявление традиционного для Галичины упрямства] (Kornilov 2000), because the Galicians are allegedly unable to realize that Galicia is only one of Ukraine’s regions. Based on that attitude, other writers do not hesitate to write about the emergence of a “Galician” or, in another version, “Great Galician imperialism” (!) [галицький імперіализм ор великогалицький імперіализм] (Jurčenko 2007).

To be sure, within this strange narrative it is the Galicians who are allegedly spoiling Ševčenko’s language (Jurčenko 2007), which is described as “real Ukrainian” or, as others put it in closer conformity with their view of the world, real “Little Russian.” In the forums, some participants would even explicitly assert what some anti-Ukrainian authors state only implicitly: For them, eventually nothing but Russian can be the “real Ukrainian” language [] (“Anticommunist” 2007b).

One component of the anti-Galician myth asserts that, since 1991, the Galicians have been taking revenge for what the Bolsheviks did to them in 1933, preventing the Galicians from imposing their language on the rest of Ukraine for the first time. A lot of anti-Galician authors would agree with Macuka (2004) or Skvorcov (2007) that, since 1991, the “Ukrainian Westernizers” [українці-западники] have done their best to pass off “the so-called Galician dialect” as “the Ukrainian language” and to force the rest of Ukraine to accept it. According to this view, Ukrainians from the North American diaspora joined this effort, which was nothing but revenge (Kornilov 2000).26 Now, the Galicians even want to punish those who do not speak like them, especially speakers of Ukrainian-Russian “Suržyk,” although according to the anti-Galician faction, the Galician language is the real “Suržyk,” and the Ukrainian-Russian mixture that is commonly referred to as “Suržyk” is the genuine “Little Russian dialect” [малорусське наречие], spoken by far more people than “the Galician language” (Kornilov 2000).27 Continuing in this vein, Andrej Vadžra, one of the authors who try to present themselves as serious scholars, claims that Ukraine is not characterized by bilingualism, but by trilingualism, with Russian, the “Little Russian dialect”
(“Suržyk”), and the Ukrainian literary language functioning as the three main languages of the country. The Ukrainian literary language, according to him, is nothing but a variety of Galician Ukrainian, and is only spoken by “a handful of trained ‘conscious Ukrainians.’” Subsequently, this variety of Ukrainian is linked to the ideology of the Orange Revolution; therefore, Vadžra 2007 calls it “orangeoid.”

Within the framework of this puzzling discourse, the Modern Ukrainian Standard Language itself ultimately appears to be “not real Ukrainian,” but a variant of Galician Ukrainian (Gerašćenko 2007). Many anti-Galician authors would agree with Sokolov (2007), who asserts that “the real Ukrainian (Little Russian language),” as it is represented in Kvitka’s and Ševčenko’s works, significantly differs from “the Ukrainian literary language, as it was formed in Galicia.” The latter is an “artificial creation, it appeared under a strong German and Polish influence” and became the Modern Ukrainian Standard Language. The creators of this language allegedly took as their basis “the Galician dialect, which was most heavily soiled by Polish and German words” [галицьке нареччя, найбільше засорене польськими і німецькими словами] (Kolesnikov 2002), whereas elements of the genuine Ukrainian dialects were accepted only with utmost caution. Skvorcov (2007) even feels motivated to warn that “the Ukrainian language itself will soon not be Slavic anymore,” if the influence of the Galicians from Galicia and from the diaspora continues. As the final outcome, he expects “an entirely West European macaronic mixture” [вполне западноевропейскую макароническую помесь].

As a consequence, some ardent anti-Ukrainians even assert that, despite their alleged command of true Ukrainian, they do not know and do not want to know the Modern Ukrainian Standard Language, because they are sure that it is nothing but Galician by origin. Some are convinced that only Galicians can understand this language (Anonymous 2007), while others “do not use this language as a matter of principle” and regard it as “a hostile language” (“Ivanov” 2006a). “Margo” (2007) claims that she does not reply to any messages that she gets in Ukrainian, and—probably guided by wishful thinking—asserts that she has even forced firms from Lviv to switch to “the human language” [человеческий язык, an often-used label for Russian as opposed to Ukrainian].

“Enals-Pilugina” (2007) asserts that “the Kobzar’s descendants” do not want to speak Ukrainian because the modern Ukrainian language is “a mixture of the Galician-Polish dialect and the newspeak that was invented in the 19th century.” Of course, based on the interpretation of “Ukrainian” and “Galician” as two separate languages, the unity of the Ukrainian state is openly questioned in some forums, too.

Most of the sources we have been dealing with up to now confirm the opinion of “Viter” that Galician matters, including the Galician variety of Ukrainian, have unfortunately become the object of a true “information war” (“Viter” 2006). Yet it is not only openly anti-Ukrainian authors who warn against the allegedly growing influence of the Galician variety of Ukrainian and the North American diaspora’s impact in Ukraine. One of the most prominent intellectuals who joined this anti-Galician discourse to a certain degree was Petro Toločko, a renowned ar-
archaeologist from the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences. In his leaflet “Who or What Endangers the Ukrainian Language?” (published in 1998), Toločko referred to the anti-Galician discourse of Ukrainian authors such as Ivan Nečuj-Levyckyj and others, and reasserted, without any tempering, that the Ukrainian language has been “soiled” by “the Galician dialect” (later he refers to the same idiom as “the Galician language”), that “the Galician dialect” is “entirely Polonized,” and that up to the end of the twentieth century, “two literary languages,” the “Dnipro” literary language and the “Galician” literary language, have coexisted (Toločko 1998). According to Toločko’s absurd claim, the “Galician” “orthography” was created in the nineteenth century on the basis of “Latin or Polish” models, and the Galicians did not want to adopt “the phonetic language” [sic!]. Toločko continues to write that, whereas the “Dnipro” literary language has proceeded far ahead in its development during the twentieth century, the “Galician” literary language (“in its diaspora variant”) remained stuck in its position since the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. In this same leaflet, Toločko rejects the alleged attempt of the North American diaspora to influence the development of Ukrainian in post-Soviet Ukraine. Toločko’s linguistic arguments extend to some lexical items, but focus mainly on some elements that are usually regarded as matters for “orthographic” discussion in the Ukrainian context, although in reality they mean much more, namely, various approaches to the crucial question of what exactly Standard Ukrainian should look like (Vakulenko, in this volume).  

What Is the Galician Language?

It is Toločko’s (1998) leaflet that ultimately confirms what we have hitherto observed in virtually all of the sources that we have analyzed up to now: apparently, anti-Galician polemicists usually fail to understand the historical and the current roles of Galician Ukrainian, and demonstrate a very poor understanding of its structure and its very essence. No anti-Galician author from our sources asked the innocent, crucial questions that are posed in a forum by “Avangard” 2006 (in Ukrainian, from Moscow):

What is the Galician language? Some say that it is a dialect of Ukrainian, others call it a real language of its own? . . . What elements make it different from the Ukrainian literary language? I have in mind above all grammatical, orthoepic, and orthographic ones. Is there any linguistic sketch on this question? I will be grateful for any information on this topic (“Avangard” 2006).

Even in the non-Ukrainophbic forum that “Avangard” turned to, no sound answer has been offered so far. All one can learn is that “the Galician language contains a lot of Polish words,” and that it would be “more correct to write about ‘the Galician dialect of the Ukrainian language’” (“Igor” 2006) or about “the Galician dialect of Ukrainian + Galician Surżyk” (“Senk” 2006, 2006a).

From a linguistic point of view, it is clear that “the Galician Ukrainian dialect,”
as so many authors call it without hesitation, has never existed as such. Instead, linguists account for certain southwestern Ukrainian dialects that are spoken in Galicia and share some crucial linguistic qualities. Yet what the anti-Galician authors really discuss in their texts actually does not belong to the sphere of dialects at all. Their attack is directed toward the Modern Ukrainian Standard Language in its Galician variant. As anticipated in the introduction, however, this variety is neither based on “the Galician dialect” nor on the southwestern Ukrainian dialects from Galicia, but on the literary form of Ukrainian, as adopted primarily from writers such as Taras Ševčenko and Pantelejmon Kuliš between the 1860s and 1870s (cf. Moser 2007, 221; 232–237). Of course, the Galician variant of the Modern Ukrainian Standard Language incorporates certain dialectal elements from the Galician area, too. Yet, it is not a dialect as such.

Thus, it is nothing but absurd for Jurčenko 2007 to quote the sentence “Та вліли мі вујко, бі-м патрував го. Та власнов руков дав му фаяку . . .” and try to assure his readers, based on a particularly ill-minded sort of rhetoric, that “this is the colloquial language that exists in reality and is still common in the Ivano-Frankivsk region,” and that, moreover, this is the language that is now being imposed by the Galicians on the rest of Ukraine. One of the correct responses to such assertions is offered by a non–anti-Galician participant of a forum on “Galician imperialism,” who encourages those who constantly attack the alleged Galician linguistic expansionism to “give examples, where absurd Galician dialectal elements are really imposed as the norm of the actively used Ukrainian language” (“Dybil” 2006); as might be expected, no convincing answer has been posted so far. Obviously, “Angilov” (2005), who offers a parody of the general anti-Galician and anti-Ukrainian discourse and its steadily repeated stereotypes, is perfectly right when he comes to the conclusion that they ultimately originate “in the Soviet arsenal.” Apart from the wide use of the traditional images of internal and external enemies, this also holds for the view of the Ukrainian language as the “‘Westernizing’ Galician language” [навязывание украинского, в действительности же—“западенского” Галицкого языка]. Attacks on Galician Ukrainian are, in fact, most often just a part of a general anti-Ukrainian and eventually an anti-European program that aims at the destruction of a separate, non-Russian Ukrainian identity, and is pursued in the name of pan-Russian concepts, such as “the united people,” “the common roots,” “the common history,” “the common language” (“Angilov” 2005). Another author, Ihor Losiv (1998) (cf. also Hrabovskyj 2005), correctly writes about various anti-Galician intellectual “phantoms” that are widespread among anti-Ukrainian authors. He correctly points out that, in this discourse, the Galicians are usually assigned the role of the Western, Catholic, or simply alien tempters of the Ukrainian people, of an alien, “non-Ukrainian” force that tore the Ukrainians away from the pan-Russian unity. Yet, as Losiv states, the creators of this myth are unable to explain how the “Galician seed” could ultimately spread throughout Ukraine, and they stubbornly ignore the fact that Ukrainians from outside Galicia have been struggling for the maintenance of a separate Ukrainian identity, too. In essence, it actually turns out
that in the typical anti-Galician discourse, virtually everything that is depicted as Galician is just Ukrainian.46

As regards the Ukrainian language in particular, anti-Galician attitudes often result from the observation that the Galicians were the first to realize that the sphere of the Ukrainian literary language should not be limited to belles lettres in the long run, but that a full-fledged, standard language should be developed (Moser 2007, 10–13; 2009). The Galicians not only had the opportunity to make a serious contribution to the development of such a truly polyfunctional standard language in the Austrian Empire, they also made good use of it and started their efficient work on Ukrainian terminology and functional style. On the other hand, it is true that the Ukrainians under the Russian Empire suffered under the Valuev circular of 1863 and the Ukaz of Bad Ems of 1876, which limited the use of Ukrainian in the Russian Empire. But it is also true that, beginning with Pantelejmon Kuliš (Moser 2009), many leading Ukrainian intellectuals from the Russian Empire, and later from the Soviet Union, failed to recognize the significance of the Galician efforts, while their reservations, which were often based on a certain arrogance, were usually not convincing.

Despite all of the anti-Galician attitudes, the Galician impact on the Ukrainian language has in fact been quite powerful, at least since the turn of the twentieth century (Shevelov 1966). Beginning at least with Stalin’s rule, however, Soviet stigmatization of the Galicians as “bourgeois nationalists” or “banderovcy,” along with the extremely restrictive and Russian-oriented Soviet language policy, as symbolized by the strictly imposed “orthographic” reforms of 1933 and 1946 (cf. Vakulenko, in this volume), helped weaken this process for decades. Yet it has never been “the Galician dialect” that has contributed to the development of Modern Standard Ukrainian; it has always been the Galician variant of the Modern Ukrainian Standard Language. In the post-Soviet era, it is again not “the Galician dialect” that has come into play, but the Galician variant of Modern Standard Ukrainian, as it has been partly preserved and developed in Galicia and within the Galician diaspora, particularly in North America. In the end, there is nothing amazing about the fact that the Galician variant of Ukrainian is now in fact playing a certain role in the general development of Ukrainian again. Given the broad functionality of Ukrainian in Galicia, as opposed to most other regions of Ukraine, it is not very likely that any anti-Galician, anti-Ukrainian, and ultimately anti-European attitudes, as encountered in the sources we have been dealing with, will stop that process in the nearest future.

Notes

1. Since this is an article on linguistics, the conventional linguistic transliteration will be used, rather than the U.S. Library of Congress transliteration.

2. As a reminder: geographically, “Rus’” in its more general meaning initially referred to all territories of Kyjivan Rus’ (in a narrower sense it meant just the Kyjiv-Perejaslav region). Russian русский, “Russian,” is derived from “Rus’,” and some people argue that it has two meanings: (1) “belonging to Russia,” (2) “belonging to ’Rus’.” Russian chauvinists, as well as representatives of the “Russophile” (or “Muscophile”) movement, which found many adherents
in Galicia in the second half of the nineteenth century, denied any substantial difference between the two meanings and believed that everything belonging to “Rus” is just “Russian” in the sense of “all-Russian” (comprising all East Slavs). But apart from the many other shortcomings of that interpretation, it is obvious that the non-Russophile “Rusyny” (“Rusyns” or “Ruthenians”) of Galicia explicitly distanced themselves from the “Great Russians” (or “Muscovites”), yet identified with the “Malorossijane” [Little Russians] of the Russian Empire when they continued to refer to their own matters as русский/руський, and so on [Ruthenian]. Hence, whereas their term can be adopted into modern Ukrainian as русский, it is certainly a mistake to merely translate it into Russian as русский. In order to be clearly identified, Galician “Rusyny” and the “Malorossijane” of the Russian Empire adopted the name “Ukrainians” during the last decades of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twentieth century.

3. The project “One thousand years of Ukrainian language history in Galicia” was awarded the START-prize by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in 2005. The project focuses on the interrelations between internal and external language histories in an area that has always played a significant role in the history of the Ukrainian language in general.

4. The historical aspects have been analyzed in a study to be published in a conference volume in Weimar/Germany in January 2009.

5. Cf. “‘Язык высшего порядка,’ надо полагать, предназначен для людей высшего сорта, белокурых галицких арийцев’ and some more straightforward attacks.

6. Even pro-Ukrainian participants of certain forums, who explicitly distance themselves from that absurd assertion, may argue that Galicians cannot be forced to speak “normal Ukrainian,” whereas inhabitants of Poltava cannot be forced to speak “with a Galician accent” (“Dybil” 2006).

7. “Anticommunist” (2007) is certain that “‘Ukrainian’ is a Polonized Old Russian language, yet not Polish” (“Украинский” это ополяченный старорусский язык, но не польский).

8. “Вы же, твари, не знаете ни языка, ни дерьмовы! Трендите на грязном суржике. Бидлюки хохломовні!"

9. “Вот и получается язык-гибрид—и не польский (так как надо напрягаться и учить язык), и не украинский (который многие галичане, похоже, не знают).”

10. “Базикают Романо-галицким ополяченным диалектом.”

11. “Наверное ‘украинский’ язык еще и олитовченый, кто его знает, вы филолог вам виднее.”

12. “Как-то где-то я наткнулась на образцы галицкого наречия: абсолютно ничего не поняла. Посмеялась, а сохранить не додумалась. Но иногда для дебатов было бы неплохо знать настоящие, а не придуманные некими панами слова “народного языка.” Может, кто-то сталкивался в жизни с нелитратурной [sic!] мовой? (Я, честно говоря, много лет живя на Украине, нет!) Тогда, пожалуйста, приведите примеры! (Какие-нибудь характерные словечки, фразы)” (“IĖĖ” 2005). The anti-Galician character of this contribution is only clear from the fact that it is located on the site “Ja–Anti-Orange.” In general, one may laugh about (not at) a dialect and sincerely value it.

13. Adopted from George Orwell’s novel “1984,” the term “newspeak” was applied to the language of Communist propaganda in the Eastern Bloc.


15. “В полном соответствии с австрийской политикой разделения деятельности украинского движения спэшно сочинили ’нову галицьку литерарную мову’ на основе полонизированного галицкого говора.”

16. “... давайте еще полиберальничаем и сами начнем говорить на несуществующем языке в несуществующем государстве. Традиционный вопрос, вам это надо?”
17. “Некоторые национально-объединенные деятели попытаются принизить наше коробление мовы.”

18. “[...] цвет титульной нации-галычане говорят на быдлой тарарышке, которая не имеет никакого отношения к украинской мове это ж факт, не требующий доказательств” (“Ivanov” 2006b).

19. “Украинская мова—это не язык, это крики животных (мышанье, гавканье, хрюканье, карканье)—жидопольский язык! из Гальчины.”

20. “Назвывается именно западноукраинский диалект (Тернопольско-Львовский) и отчасти диалект провластимозетских заробитчан и военных преступников (бандеровцев), что осели в частности в Канаде и Америке.”

21. “Вы же, товари [!]—М.М., не знаете ни языка [obviously, Russian is meant here], ни дерьмовы! [...] А що стосується м’якої Г, то це—чисто ’галичанський’ діалект тієї же дерьмови! Ви¬ безродні жидюта [!!!—М.М.], які нічого не вміють, крім обливання лайном сусіда, який розумінний за вас. У западньому діалекті м’яка Г часто замінює нашу Д, наприклад—г’їва¬дівка. І ви ще хочете сказати, що це гавкотіння і є українсько¬винна—українсько¬смішність.bez родні жидята—карканье (“Ivanov” 2006b).

22. “ДУПОМОВА В СВИНАРНИКЕ [...] Ведь мова является жлобства основой. Её насаждает мутантный урод. От той дупомовы нас сильно тошнило [...] Терпеть эту мерзость уже нет силы, От мовы желудок и ногу свело. [...] Всё больше свинарник смердит дупомовой. Что делать, не знает несчастный народ, Руина, разруха—всё это не ново. Все это устроил нам галицкий сброд.”

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24. “[...] мова не существует за пределами радио и тв, какоц [!]—М.М.—идиот надумал мертвую мову гомударственном щемлёнком [obviously, Russian is meant here] сколько живу и бываю по всей Украине (Луганск, Донецк, Киев, Крым, Харьков, Одесса, Херсон) , не слышал вживую мову кругом наш родной и любимый русский язык [obviously, Russian is meant here] может там на бандеровщине и есть мова в диких забитых схронах далеко в лесах и горах, но какое отношение имеют те дикие места к Украине? [...] так что государственным должен [!]—М.М.—быть язык народа—русский язык, а не сельцовская дерьмомова бычачья” (“Ukrainskij patriot” 2005).


30. “[...] литературный украинский язык в том виде, в каком он был образован в Галиции, весьма существенно отличался от собственно украинского (малорусского) языка, от языка Квитки и Шевченко, и представлял собой искусственное создание, возникшее под сильным немецким и польским влиянием.”
31. “Разве Галицький язык понятен полтавчанину или харьковчанину, или Галицькі пляски близки серцю сумчанина, или одесские путки понятны галичанину!”

32. “[... ] що українську мову, підкреслюю УКРАНСЬКУ, а не ГАЛИЧАНСЬКУ розумію мабуть краще за тебе, але не використовую 11 принципово. При цьому залишую право використовувати 11 для кого вона є рідна. Для мене, завдяки таким як ти ‘укропатріотам,’ після твоєго помаранчевого цирку, українська мова є моєю ворою, знає своє потрібно лише для того, щоб пообіцяти й найбільш ефективно боротись з ворогом на його території [... ]” [all orthographic peculiarities originate from the source—М.М.]


34. “Почему же потомки [sic!] Кобзаря до сих пор не желают говорить на украинском? Да потому, что он в своем современном виде—смесь галицко-польского наречия и новозяя, придуманного в 19 веке.”


38. Toločko’s work is full of serious shortcomings; a sound response, which is also available on the Internet, was published by Andrij Hornjatkevyč in 2000.


40. “Приведите примеры, где ‘Навязываются (в том числе и телевидением) галицкие неелевые диалектизмы, в качестве нормы живого украинского языка.’”

41. Yet these anti-Ukrainian authors are not necessarily Russian, as stated by “Angilov.”

42. “Я конечно же—о туповатых, упрямых с предательским характером, до смешного влюбленных в сало, с языком, которому вроде вовсе и нет—народной на русский, мало на что самостоятельное способных—украинщах [...]. Так российскими журналистами-политологами был придуман, а точнее и не придуман вовсе, а всего лишь взят из советского арсенала, образ врага, виноватого во всех невзгодах и бедах и российского и украинского народа—Запад во главе с США, и их украинско-фашистские прихвостни—вояки УПА-галичан—бандеровцы, украинские, в советское время буржуазные, а сейчас (то же самое) просто—националисты и другие движения, которые уж если не за Россию—значит за США. А также навязывание украинского, в действительности же—‘западенского’ Галицкого языка. [... ] Маскируясь притягательными лозунгами, вроде—‘единный народ,’ ‘общие корни,’ ‘общая история,’ ‘общий язык,’ ‘исконно (навеки) вместе,’ ‘нельзя разорвать единый народ’ и т.п. аналогеты российского империализма пытаются отнять у украинцев право на государственность, язык, территорию, и даже веру—собственную церковь” (“Angilov” 2005).

43. Yet these anti-Ukrainian authors are not necessarily Russian, as stated by Losiv.

44. “Складові (а де-неде центральною) частиною цього міфа є галицький міф, який тісно пов’язаний з ідеєю ‘всемирного заговора’ проти Росії, коли весь безлад в російській політиці і житті пояснюється діяльністю зарубіжних ворожих сил. Галичаня в межах цієї психополітичної конструкції розглядаються як західні, католицькі, чужі решті України.
‘искусители’ українського народу, ‘изобретатели’ українського націоналізму і навіть зовсім не українці, які на думку багатьох росіян, мали бути налаштовані проросійські
за визначенням’ (Losiv 1998).
45. “Творцям міфу про ‘галицьку заразу’ важко признатися самим собі, що ніколи не проросло б галицьке зернятко по всій країні, якби не було для цього благодатного грунту, психологічного, мовного, політичного, культурного, якби Велика Україна не визнавала Галичину своєю органічною частиною, не визнавала б такою на якомусь глибинному підсвідомому рівні, незважаючи на навіювані (досить цілеспрямовано!) побутові штампи—‘бандрівці’ і ‘западенці.’ . . . Між тим, і до теперішнього часу в російській періодії панує думка: якби не галичани, то не було б проблем з Малоросією, чи з УССР, чи з південно-західним краєм, чи ‘прекрасним югом Росії.’ І чому не згадують (якщо знають), що навіть тоді, коли Галичина перебувала за межами Великої України, проблеми з українцями все одно були . . . А якщо б вдумливий дослідник звернув увагу на український дисидентський рух 60-х, 70-х років, то помітив би серед репресованих українських громадських діячів, письменників, вчених, студентів дуже велику кількість тих, хто народився і виховувався на сході України. Та значно простіше і приємніше ‘списувати’ все на Галичину” (Losiv 1998).
46. “Все, що російська свідомість схильна кваліфікувати як галицьке, по суті є просто українським . . . Галичину неможливо відділити від України, як і Україну від Галичини” (Losiv 1998).

References


Criticism and Confidence

Reshaping the Linguistic Marketplace in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Laada Bilaniuk

During my field research stays in Ukraine since its independence in 1991, I was frequently struck by the critical evaluations of language quality that I witnessed in everyday life and in my interviews. “His language is horrible, he is crippling the Ukrainian language!” “They think they know how to speak Russian, but that’s not really Russian.” People were also self-deprecating regarding their own language, expressing insecurity about their linguistic skills. While language choice—Ukrainian or Russian—had been the focus of controversy in the establishment of institutional policies in the newly independent state, judgments of the quality of language had become common in public discourse. Language quality, particularly perceived purity and correctness, was discursively linked to social legitimacy and authority. Through assessments of language quality, people shaped the social value of linguistic forms, and thus engaged in the reshaping of a linguistic marketplace that was destabilized with the fall of Soviet power in the late 1980s (Bilaniuk 2005).

This chapter examines the role of judgments of language quality in shaping the linguistic marketplace, and hence the linguistic-cultural definition of Ukraine. The construction of independent nationhood in Ukraine after the fall of Soviet power entailed intense struggles over the values of languages, as Ukrainian was declared the state language, disrupting the previously established hierarchy in which Russian was the language of power and Ukrainian had low status. Alongside the debates over language choice, language quality emerged as a key factor in the discursive ascription of social authority. The ethnographic and survey data presented here show that stances of confidence or insecurity in language quality to a great extent maintain the previously established linguistic hierarchy. However, there is also evidence that people construct their ethnic allegiance and strive to redefine symbolic values through their judgments of language quality.

After Ukraine’s independence in 1991, institutional measures aimed to establish a new linguistic regime with Ukrainian as a language of power and prestige were in
tension with the previously established regime in which Russian was dominant and Ukrainian had low status. This tension was evident in competing language ideologies. I use “language ideology” to mean the system of linkages between social values and particular linguistic forms (Woolard 1998). A “linguistic marketplace,” as originally conceptualized by Bourdieu (1991), is a social arena where a particular language ideology dominates and people tacitly accept the ascription of different degrees of social power to particular linguistic forms, and the symbolic domination that this entails (ibid.). In a stable marketplace the established linguistic values are maintained by state institutions and by each person’s habitus, the complex of predispositions inculcated through upbringing and life experiences (Bourdieu 1977a, 1977b, 1991). Linguistic habitus can be understood as deeply ingrained language ideology that is not subject to conscious scrutiny.

How can the values of linguistic forms change? Inasmuch as Bourdieu’s main concern was to uncover the mechanisms by which a legitimated language is maintained, he accorded little attention to the potential for transformation, and left little room for people’s agency and resistance. As Woolard (1985), Irvine (1989), and Gal (1993) have demonstrated, more attention needs to be paid to the complexities and ambiguities of linguistic practices that exist within and alongside a dominant linguistic marketplace. The case of Ukraine after the fall of Soviet power, examined here, presents a vivid example of a system in which both linguistic and social values have been shifting. The Ukrainian language, which had been marginalized and denigrated relative to Russian, has become increasingly used in public urban contexts and by political and cultural leaders, some of whom had themselves been marginalized in the Soviet system. Ukrainian has not lost all of its connotations of low prestige and backwardness, and in many contexts Russian retains the prestige and power that it had in the Soviet Union. In choices of language use and in debates about language, the previously dominant discourses clash with new discourses and practices elevating Ukrainian. This clash of embodied ideologies has raised awareness of the processes by which linguistic and social forms are linked, processes that in more stable times take place largely below the threshold of awareness.

In the analysis I present here, I unpack the totalizing concept of linguistic habitus, to argue that it can include the forces of competing symbolic value systems. In their actions and attitudes, people can at the same time enact aspects of a tacitly accepted dominant system, and be agents of change. I examine two key psychological stances that are components of habitus: criticism and confidence. Bourdieu writes of these stances (linguistic insecurity versus self-assurance) and the resulting behaviors that accompany them (self-correction and self-silencing versus fluency and ease of self-expression) as reflections of class divisions and embodiments of a hegemonic social order (Bourdieu 1977b, 655–658; 1991, 52, 60, 81ff.). I study these stances in relation to the changing linguistic marketplace in Ukraine, through people’s judgments of the quality of their own and others’ language on both the micro and macro levels, as evident in individual statements and patterns of survey responses.

The relationship between acts of criticism and confidence and the value of lan-
languages has been noted in a wide array of research and theoretical writings. Milroy and Milroy argue that throughout history, linguistic criticisms have been key in shaping and maintaining the English standard, forming a “complaint tradition” (1991, 29–54). Also key in maintaining a prestige language are acts of hypercorrection, which involve self-critique, censorship of one’s words, and insecurity in the value of one’s language, as shown by Labov (1966). In cases where language varieties in a given marketplace correlate with ethnic identities, the perceived purity of languages often becomes the central trope for evaluation (Hill and Hill 1980; Jernudd and Shapiro 1989). Purity, nativeness, and skill are often thought to correlate with social status, authority, and cultural authenticity. Where the political status of a group is contested and a standard language is poorly institutionalized, people are more likely to be insecure about the quality of their language. For example, Jaffe has shown that Corsican speakers censor themselves and feel intimidated in the face of language experts, whose criticism of linguistic errors is felt to be culturally inauthenticating (Jaffe 1999, 8, 125, 155, 202). In Catalonia, Pujolar found that native Castilian speakers were insecure about their command of Catalan, but they resented the implicit criticism inherent in Castilian responses to their Catalan speech (Pujolar 2001, 220–221, 233, 241). And among Germans in Hungary, where generational differences in language attitudes reflected changes in the political economy of language, the postwar generation was embarrassed by the imperfections of their German, while among the older generation the use of nonlocal standard German forms was criticized as putting on airs (Gal 1993, 353).

As these examples show, linguistic judgments and the correlating psychological stances of linguistic confidence or insecurity play a significant role in the construction of language categories and their values. Acts of self-censorship and “being at a loss for words” are embodiments of submission to a dominant linguistic regime, while criticism of standard use and support of nonstandard local values can constitute resistance to such a regime (Woolard 1985). Evaluations also contribute to the ideological processes of iconization and erasure that shape language categories and their values (Gal and Irvine 1995; Irvine 2001; Irvine and Gal 2000). Iconization is the process through which linguistic differences come to be seen as iconic of the social distinctions that they index, as if a language variety portrayed the essence of a given social group. For example, speakers judged to speak Ukrainian poorly are sometimes seen as poor representatives of Ukrainian culture and lacking in social authority. Aspects of linguistic diversity that do not take on social significance through iconization are subject to the process of erasure, which entails hiding or ignoring linguistic differences, such as in the imagination of a labeled language as homogeneous (Irvine 2001, 33). In my research I found that people’s lack of confidence in their quality of speech contributed to erasure by discounting regional and social linguistic variation as inadequate competence. Criticism of language, for example the statement that someone’s speech isn’t really “good Russian,” disrupted the process of erasure by highlighting previously ignored differences that had been ideologically lumped together as simply “speaking Russian.”

The hegemonic ideology of “natural languages” has remained in place while the
values of different manifestations of Ukrainian and Russian are contested. In keeping with Herderian nationalist ideologies prevalent elsewhere in Europe, languages are seen as discrete units that are “natural” correlates of national/ethnic identities, an ideology that is propagated through both scholarly and folk practices (Gal and Irvine 1995; Silverstein 2000). In Ukraine, linguistic practices are measured against idealized Ukrainian and Russian languages that are seen as manifestations of national identity, “culturedness,” and a “high cultural level.”

After independence, differences were brought to light that were previously subject to erasure, as people disagreed over the very definitions of legitimate Ukrainian and Russian (in particular “good” Ukrainian and Russian). Through this process, the ideology of national language units has remained the organizing principle of struggles over symbolic values. Much as in the United States a Standard English language is naturalized such that “its possession becomes a measure of (good old American) freedom” (Silverstein 1996, 295–296), in Ukraine the possession of “pure” and “literary” (literaturna) language(s) is a measure of “culturedness.” Culturedness is discursively constructed as a universal value that confers social legitimacy. Wielding language well, and more important, being judged by oneself and others as wielding language well, is key to having social authority.

**Judgments of Language in Historical Context**

Rapid sociolinguistic change was put into motion when Ukrainian was declared the state language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1989, replacing Russian, which had up to then been the de facto state language and the dominant language in practice. The 1989 Law on Languages was followed by the declaration of independence of Ukraine in 1991, and the ratification of the country’s constitution in 1996, which reaffirmed the status of Ukrainian as the sole state language. The legislation disrupted the Soviet-era processes through which Ukrainian had for many people come to be iconic of rurality and backwardness, compared to Russian, which was iconic of urban high culture and power. Reactions to these changes were mixed, and language issues became hotly contested.³

Legal and institutional policies had a complex and uneven impact on language use in everyday life. Those who wanted to support the rise in status of Ukrainian had to contend with historically shaped predispositions (both their own and others’) to treat Ukrainian as inferior. Those who preferred that Russian retain its privileged status over Ukrainian had to contend with the legislated high status of Ukrainian that was becoming increasingly embodied in formal and informal public use, previously the domain of Russian.

People who were skeptical of the legitimacy of an independent Ukraine sometimes expressed their skepticism by questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian language. This attitude was rooted in a history of domination of Ukrainian territories by non-Ukrainian regimes. The Russian tsarist rule of the central and eastern Ukrainian lands was particularly harsh, when edicts were issued in the mid- to late 1800s that directly
restricted public use of the Ukrainian language. The existence of Ukrainian was denied altogether or explained away as a dialect of Polish or Russian, much as Corsican was considered a dialect of French or Italian (Jaffe 1999, 135).

In the 1920s under the Soviet system, the official ideology held that national differences would die out once communism was achieved, but first it was deemed necessary to gain the support of various nationalities that had found the Russifying tsarist policies oppressive. This led to the short-lived policies of “indigenization,” which supported the development of non-Russian languages, including Ukrainian (Shevelov 1989; Smith 1998). Local empowerment threatened centralized Russian control, and the 1930s saw the return of policies promoting Russian, and the purging of many non-Russian cultural leaders who had supported indigenization (usually by execution or exile to prison camps in Siberia). Like people, many distinctive words and grammatical forms in Ukrainian were outlawed as embodiments of destructive bourgeois nationalism (Drinov and Sabaldyr 1934). Dictionaries and grammars of Ukrainian were edited to make them more similar to Russian (Kocherha and Kulyk 1994). These Soviet interventions into the structures of the language provide the basis for criticism of the authenticity of the Ukrainian that is codified in dictionaries, taught in schools, and widely used today (Karavanskyi 1994). In Belarus, Belarusian faces similar challenges (Woolhiser 2001).

The Russian tsarist and later, Soviet, regimes in central and eastern Ukraine were much harsher than the regimes controlling western Ukraine, where there were relatively fewer restrictions on Ukrainian language. Significant regional differences in contemporary language politics are due to the fact that this region experienced a much shorter history of Russian language domination than the rest of the country. The greater part of West Ukrainian regions was largely ruled by Poland from the fourteenth century until the partition of Poland in the late eighteenth century, when control was taken over by Austria. After World War I and a brief period of Ukrainian independence (1917–1919), Poland again came into control of the West Ukrainian regions until after World War II, when they were joined to the rest of Ukraine under Soviet rule. Under Poland and Austria, Ukrainian was subordinated to Polish and German, but nevertheless literary Ukrainian developed relatively freely there. The western population thus had a more established history of Ukrainian as a publicly prestigious urban language, and so there was more resistance to the imposition of Russian under Soviet rule and a quicker resurgence of Ukrainian use after Ukraine’s independence in 1991.

Under the Soviet regime, Russian was both forcefully imposed and attractive to people for the privileges associated with it. Not only was it politically problematic not to know and use Russian (except for the rural population), but Russian fluency was required for access to good education and decent jobs. In urban areas, Ukrainian was used in folkloric venues and at home, where it helped maintain potential spheres of resistance to the dominance of Russian. Domestic use continued even as there was a widely held view that Ukrainian would die out as Russian ascended to its presumed destiny as a world language. This ideology was frequently mentioned in interviews I conducted in 1992, but less so in later years. The greater importance accorded to
Russian was also manifest in education, where Russian language was generally accorded more time than Ukrainian, Russian had better teaching materials, and Russian language teachers were paid higher salaries than Ukrainian language teachers.

Rural inhabitants moving to cities strove to become more urban and “cultured” by adopting Russian. In the process, they mixed standard Ukrainian and Russian forms, resulting in ways of speaking that, to established urbanites, signified limited education and low social status (Bilaniuk 1997). The mixed language varieties came to be known as *surzhyk*. The label cemented the ideological distinction between “good, pure” Ukrainian spoken by “cultured” educated people, and the stigmatized language of the “uncultured” lower classes. Mixed language-*surzhyk* varieties flourished in city neighborhoods where urbanizing peasants were concentrated. Their children spoke *surzhyk* at home, in their neighborhood, and with village relatives, but the goal was to learn standard Russian to get a good job and move up in social standing.

The legislation making Ukrainian the state language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1989 was one of the first steps toward independence, and it echoed similar moves in the other republics. In 1991 the majority of the population, even in Russophone regions, supported the declaration of Ukraine’s independence, but people had different visions of what independent Ukraine should be, and language use became hotly debated everywhere. Many Russophones wanted Russian to have official state language status alongside Ukrainian, and argued that it is unwise to devote resources to change the language situation in a dire economy, particularly to give up a language of wider communication and higher prestige in favor of a language of more limited influence like Ukrainian.

In the years since independence, the use of Ukrainian in institutions, the media, and urban public spaces has grown. Recent anecdotal evidence even suggests that speaking Ukrainian well is increasingly considered “cool.” But overall, Russian has retained a very strong presence, especially in the media and in public urban spaces in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Southeastern Ukraine has a relatively larger proportion of ethnic Russians as well as ethnic Ukrainians who consider their native language to be Russian. In contrast, in western Ukraine, where the vast majority of people identify themselves as ethnic Ukrainian and where the language developed more freely prior to the Soviet period, Ukrainian came to predominate very soon after independence in 1991.

Kyiv, the capital of the country, is in the center geographically as well as in the spectrum of language practices. It embodies the tension between the Ukrainian-dominant west and Russian-dominant east. Kyiv was a focus of intense Russification during the Soviet era, and before independence it was rare to hear Ukrainian in public in this city. After 1991, Kyiv came under scrutiny concerning implementation of laws promoting the official status of Ukrainian. In the first years of the 2000s, Russian was still spoken by the majority of people in public, but Ukrainian had developed a significant presence, in public talk, in signage, and in institutional use. In a 2002 survey of 450 people representative of Kyiv’s adult population, on average respondents stated that they heard 36 percent of the people on the streets of Kyiv speaking Ukrainian.
Nonaccommodating bilingual conversations, where each person speaks his/her own language without accommodating to the interlocutor, have become common in Kyїv, and there is a general expectation that everyone should be at least passively bilingual. In 2002, bilingualism was also becoming increasingly important in television programs where co-hosts carried on dual-language conversations, and guests could speak either language (Bilaniuk 2004). The normalization of nonaccommodating bilingual interactions could potentially lead to the reduction of ethnolinguistic tensions between Ukrainophones and Russophones by creating a context where everyone could speak their preferred language. At the same time, this practice contributes to the essentialization of ethnolinguistic categories and linguistic purity, since everyone is expected to “be true to themselves” by speaking their “native language” without an “accent.” Criticism of language quality becomes all the more important in negotiating the social value of linguistic products as language choice becomes less significant.

Criticism: Forging the Link Between Linguistic and Social Authority

After independence, discussing linguistic purity and correctness became a prime locus for discussing other values, such as social authority, “culturedness,” and cultural authenticity. The attention toward purity and correctness was initially a response to the awkwardness of having a low-prestige language, often stereotyped as a “peasant language,” become a state language. If Ukrainian were to become a prestigious language, it could only be a “pure” Ukrainian. One academic whom I interviewed in Lviv in 1995 compared it to King’s English, arguing that we needed a “King’s Ukrainian.” Mixtures of Ukrainian and Russian were relegated to low status because of their indexical relationship to low-status speakers, and also through an ideology that depicted them as embodiments of ethnic shame and the desire to give up Ukrainian for Russian. On the basis of perceived purity, people could separate a valuable variety of Ukrainian from debased forms, and dissociate it from its low-prestige connotations by denying that it was spoken by people who were not well-educated and had little social power.

After independence, the term surzhyk became broadly used as a negative label. It was no longer limited to the regularized syncretic forms that developed among urbanizing villagers, but was also used to criticize someone who occasionally borrowed a term from Russian into Ukrainian, or who was perceived to be speaking with an accent (Bilaniuk 1997, 2004, 2005). Surzhyk was cited as evidence of moral degradation, as stated in the 1994 “linguistic self-help” book titled Anty-Surzhyk: “Today the word ‘surzhyk’ has begun to be used in a wider sense, as the name for a person’s degraded, impoverished spiritual world . . . . Crippled language dulls a person, demoting their thought to the primitive” (Serbenska 1994, 6). Writers have used surzhyk to portray the low education and low class of their characters (e.g., Les Podereviansky, Bohdan Zholdak, and Valerii Shevchuk). No longer strictly linked to urbanized peasants, the term surzhyk became more widely deployed as a weapon in the symbolic struggle for correctness and social power.

Some of my interviewees asserted that most people did not speak true Ukrainian,
but that the language of the masses was polluted, that it was *surzhyk*. At times people evaluated their own language in this way, exhibiting low confidence in their knowledge and relinquishing their claim of control of “true” Ukrainian in favor of others who had cultivated expertise. The ideology of purist exclusivity supported the construction of a prestigious Ukrainian that was associated with high education and membership in the Ukrainian intelligentsia, in keeping with Bourdieu’s argument that the value of a linguistic form is reinforced by its rarity and exclusivity (Bourdieu 1991, 55–56).

The broadening of the meanings of the term *surzhyk* entailed the erasure of differences between the languages of very different groups, an erasure that was motivated by an ideology of purism. Urban Russophone speakers attempting Ukrainian speech for the first time were lumped with urbanized villagers whose native language was a nonstandard Ukrainian-Russian mixture. Both of these groups, along with others judged to be users of nonstandard language, were seen as speakers of *surzhyk*, unified by the fact of their deviation from an idealized standard (Bilaniuk 2004).

Despite some of the critics’ pro-Ukrainian intentions, criticism often undermined the authority of speakers of Ukrainian. What exactly got considered pure and impure was debatable. West Ukrainian varieties that had fewer Russian elements than eastern varieties were criticized as having Polish, German, or other influence. Some people denied that pure Ukrainian existed at all as a way of shedding doubt on the authority of the newly independent Ukrainian state. The line was sometimes blurred between purist exclusivity that sought to distinguish a prestigious variety of Ukrainian, and the hypercriticism that negated the legitimacy of this language altogether.

As the newly elevated state language, Ukrainian was the most frequent focus of criticism, but in the climate of heightened awareness of standards, Russian language also became an object of critique. People in Ukraine for the most part speak Russian with a Ukrainian accent, regardless of ethnic background, unless they have spent time in Russia. This was the basis for assertions that the Russian language of Ukraine is also “impure” (e.g., Zhukova 1995, 5). For example, in an online discussion on the Russian BBC Web site during the political turmoil of autumn 2004, a man from Ukraine wrote that “Nobody questions the importance of Russian language as the language of international communication, but that nobody in Ukraine speaks the language of Pushkin and Tolstoy—that is a fact. What is used is *surzhyk*, which Russians [from Ukraine] find out immediately upon arriving in Russia” (BBC 2004). His statement was challenged by a man writing from Israel (likely an emigrant), who asserted that “in Ukraine very many people speak reasonably good Russian—not worse than the average Russian of Russia—and very many people speak various kinds of ‘surzhyks’ instead of literary Ukrainian language, which is how they call those ‘surzhyks’ of theirs.” The statements of these two men were an attack and counterattack in the struggle over symbolic values, a struggle that transcended national borders.11

The most frequent objects of linguistic criticism were politicians, highlighting the link between linguistic and political authority. Politicians were deemed responsible for the dire economic situation after the Soviet system disintegrated, and the corrupt nature of their language was taken as further proof of their corrupt or inadequate na-
tute as leaders. The focus of criticisms of Ukrainian fell on political leaders who had previously been part of the Soviet government. Their overnight transformation from members of the Communist Party into supporters of Ukrainian nationhood led to doubts about their true beliefs, and language was taken as a shibboleth of the authenticity of their support for independence. Successful Soviet politicians had been schooled and carried out their work mostly in Russian, and if they knew Ukrainian at all, it was from home life or childhood visits to village grandparents, resulting in limited professional vocabulary and nonstandard dialect forms. The minority who wielded standard Ukrainian well were either from Western Ukraine (stereotyped as a hotbed of nationalism), or they were from “nationally conscious” families (those who made a point of cultivating Ukrainian language and culture even in Soviet times).

The awkward or nonstandard Ukrainian speech of many politicians in the early post-Soviet years was publicized through televised parliamentary sessions, which helped propagate the stereotype of Parliament as a repository of “bad Ukrainian.” One of several publications specifically targeting linguistic impurities featured a picture of the Parliament building alongside Vierka Serdiuchka, the famous character performed by crossdressing comedian Andrii Danylko, whose hallmark act revolves around the use of surzhyk.12 The lengthy title of this book, published in 2000, was Let us avoid Russianisms in Ukrainian language! A short dictionary-antisurzhyk for deputies of the High Council and for everyone who wants their Ukrainian language to not resemble the language of Vierka Serdiuchka (Hnatkevych 2000).

Parliament deputies who chose to speak only Russian were stereotyped as communists attempting to hide their backward rural origins, and their language was also criticized as a means of undermining their authority:

Many Ukrainians do not venture to speak Ukrainian with each other because they believe that their Ukrainian language is polluted. They use Russian, mistakenly believing that their Russian is perfectly pure. In reality they only use Russian words, but their language bears little resemblance to Russian. It is embarrassing to listen to some “Russophone” left deputies with last names ending in “-enko” [typically indicative of ethnic Ukrainians—L.B.], who for political reasons only speak out in Russian, but from their pronunciation, intonation, and their fricative h sound instead of the plosive g, even a league away one can catch the scent of their backwater Ukrainian village roots [za verstvu vidhonyt’ hlukhym ukraïns’kym selom]. (Hnatkevych 2000, 7)

The implication is that these deputies should speak Ukrainian since they already exhibit standard Ukrainian phonological features, and that by speaking Ukrainian they would be speaking more “purely” and have more cultural authenticity and authority. This critique is double-edged, however, for the supposed “real” origins of the Russophone transgressors are identified in a disparaging manner, using a term meaning “remote” or “backwater” that implies backwardness. It is not clear from this quote whether speaking Ukrainian would remedy the lowly social capital of such origins or not.
In the eyes of his critics, Leonid Kuchma, president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2004, epitomized the linkage between linguistic degradation and political and social corruption. Language had been a central issue in Kuchma’s presidency, in part, because in his campaign he had promised to make Russian the second official language of Ukraine. Kuchma originated from a north Ukrainian village, but his education and political career had been in the Russophone urban East. Once Kuchma was elected (and subsequently reelected to a second term), he never did make Russian official and proceeded to increase and standardize his Ukrainian. Even so, his public uses of Ukrainian were peppered with Russianisms (in pronunciation, syntax, and lexicon). The “impure” nature of his Ukrainian language was in part due to the nonstandard language spoken in his native village in northern Ukraine, which contained elements of both Ukrainian and Russian standards (Serhii Plokhy, personal communication). Due to the prevailing purist attitudes that decried surzhyk-like impurity in any form, his origins did not alleviate criticism of Kuchma’s language.

In the year 2000, audiotapes were made public that had allegedly been recorded secretly by a presidential security guard in Kuchma’s office. The tapes claimed to link Kuchma to the murder of journalist Georgii Gongadze, who had been critical of the government. The tapes also presumably portrayed the president speaking an expletive-rich nonstandard language—a surzhyk—in his private meetings with other government officials. President Kuchma’s linguistically “impure” private language (allegedly captured in the recording) was taken to be indexical of his “true” corrupt identity by his critics, his linguistic impurity specifically cited as evidence of moral shortcomings (Leonovych 2001, 2). This judgment reflects an ideology linking linguistic and moral impurity. The frequent expletives were taken as additional proof that with language mixing come other degradations.

President Kuchma stayed in power despite the tape scandal and calls for his ouster, and he made efforts to claim some Ukrainian cultural authority by authoring a 513-page book, in Russian, explaining why “Ukraine Is Not Russia” (the book’s title). Kuchma’s support of Ukrainian as the only state language even though he did not wield it well, his use of a Ukrainian-Russian hybrid language in private government meetings, and his choice of Russian for writing his book reveal the complexity of the intersection of linguistic forms and social power in the changing linguistic marketplace.

In 2004 president Kuchma’s chosen successor, Viktor Yanukovych, campaigned on the promise (also made, but unfulfilled by Kuchma) that he would make Russian a second official language in Ukraine. Yanukovych, who was also favored by neighboring Russia, was from the eastern Donetsk region where Russian continues to predominate in urban areas. Widespread election fraud and the declaration of Yanukovych as the supposed winner of the November 2004 elections led to massive public protests, eventually leading to the nullification of the fraudulent results and scheduling of another round of voting that led to the win of his opponent, Viktor Yushchenko. Yanukovych’s linguistic shortcomings were pointed out in the heated debates during the political turmoil, including his spelling mistakes in filling out the documents to register as a presidential candidate, and his use of nonstandard lexicon. One Internet discussion
participant described him as a “semiliterate former Soviet Communist Party member with a criminal biography,” concisely linking his linguistic, political, and moral failings (BBC 2004). A prominent Ukrainian writer challenged Yanukovych’s suitability for president by arguing that “it is difficult for him even to speak—not only Ukrainian, but even his native Russian” (Andrukhovych 2004).

Politicians who usually spoke Ukrainian were also criticized for not speaking Russian well enough. While during the fall 2004 turmoil I did not encounter criticisms of the language of pro-Western opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, his language was criticized in 2002, when he was campaigning for his party’s representation in Parliament. Yushchenko’s pro-Western policies did not appeal to those who would prefer that Ukraine have tighter ties with Russia. In a campaign appearance in Crimea (a region with some autonomy within Ukraine, in which Russian, Ukrainian, and Tatar are official languages), after asking the preference of the university student audience, Yushchenko spoke in Russian. His efforts to connect with the Russophone Crimeans were ridiculed in a Russian news article (Semenova 2002). The journalist listed a couple of instances of improper word stress, and mentioned that students tittered at his mistakes. A professor who also spoke at the meeting was described as speaking Russian much better than Yushchenko. The implication was clear that someone who made linguistic mistakes in Russian was not fit for political office and certainly could not have authority in a Russophone area. This article can be seen as an effort to resist the growing political power of native Ukrainian speakers by devaluing their linguistic capital, especially if it got in the way of their Russian, which was implicitly presented as the ultimate standard of value.

Politicians were not the only ones whose language was criticized. Anyone claiming social authority could be a target. In my interviews people from various walks of life, even those with little education, criticized the language of people and institutions that in stable situations are the arbiters of language quality: the media, the education system, the social elite. Through these criticisms people voiced their disagreements about who the “elite” should or should not be and questioned the authority of institutions that were charged with instituting a new linguistic regime. Conflicting ideologies played out in interactions as people judged whether or not a given instantiation of language was worthy or not, and whether or not they wanted it and its speaker to be considered worthy. Cumulatively, such judgments added up to a sense of the value and authority of a given language in society, which had broad ramifications in shaping political and economic relationships.

**Regional Trends in Criticism and Confidence**

The evidence presented above shows that the purity of Ukrainian and Russian speech was actively evaluated in everyday interactions, media, and political discourse in post-Soviet Ukraine. The social and political bases for these practices were further revealed in survey data collected from 936 university students during my field research in 1994–95. While I do not have more recent comparable data to assess changes, these
data are useful as an early snapshot of some of the attitudinal tendencies that have been shaping language politics in Ukraine.

I designed the survey to examine the relationship between language ideology, identity, and social politics, with questions asking for evaluations of language quality and linguistic self-confidence.14 The questionnaire data, while not representative of the complex processes of linguistic interaction, provide a broad angle from which to examine attitudinal trends in the construction of social divisions and linguistic values. Here I consider how in their expressions of linguistic criticism and confidence, people both recreated aspects of the preexisting language regime and also acted as agents in the establishment of new symbolic values. The marketplace encompassed contradictory forces shaping the values of its linguistic products.

I conducted my research in the cities and surrounding regions of Lviv, Kyïv, and Dnipropetrovsk, which represent the three general areas: West, Center, and East, which differ in history, demographics, and prevailing language ideologies as discussed above. I base this analysis on the answers of university-level students (mean age = nineteen years, 51 percent female, 49 percent male) whom I surveyed in various social science and natural science classes in each of the three cities. I arranged surveying sessions by approaching administrators and faculty. The attitude trends found among the university students are robust, echoed by very similar trends found among 703 high school students surveyed (data not examined here).

All of the respondents included in this analysis were in the process of obtaining a university education, a position of some social prestige. However, the social instability of the post-Soviet period meant that the economic future of many was uncertain. Just as the value of linguistic products was being renegotiated, so the value of educational and other social capital was in flux.

For this study, I include respondents who designated either Ukrainian (64 percent) or Russian (29 percent) when asked to list their native language on a blank line, comprising 93 percent of my sample, distributed regionally as shown in Table 21.1. I use the self-designation of native language as an axis of comparison for the following analysis, and so I exclude the other 7 percent of respondents who designated a combination of languages or different native language. In comparing responses of self-designated native language groups, my goal is not to reify linguistic categories, but rather to show tendencies in attitudes that reflect allegiances to the concepts of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native Language:</th>
<th>Lviv</th>
<th>Kyïv</th>
<th>Dnipropetrovsk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>318 (85%)</td>
<td>136 (61%)</td>
<td>145 (43%)</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>43 (11%)</td>
<td>69 (31%)</td>
<td>161 (48%)</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14 (4%)</td>
<td>19 (8%)</td>
<td>31 (9%)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in Region</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Ukrainian” and “Russian.” Studies have shown that choice of native language does not necessarily represent proficiency, but rather one’s ideological affinity to a given category of language and identity (Arel 2002). As a shorthand I will refer to the two ideologically defined groups as Ukrainophones and Russophones, but these terms as I use them do not necessarily describe actual usage.

Evaluations of a Speaker’s Ukrainian Language Quality

To assess how critical or positive respondents were regarding a given labeled language, I asked respondents to “Give a general evaluation of how people speak Ukrainian where you live (the locality or city),” by choosing from five answers: (5) very well or purely, (4) rather well, (3) average, (2) rather badly, or (1) very badly. Only the descriptions were listed on the survey form; corresponding numeric values for each response are listed here as they were used for the analysis of mean responses. I also asked the same question regarding Russian language, and I analyze the answers further below.

The description of the highest evaluation, “very well or purely,” requires clarification: the designation of “purely” [chysto] was included in the survey to link the classification scheme to the pervasive discourse that equates skilled speaking with “purity.” In interviews and participant observation I had frequently encountered “speaking purely” equated with “speaking well.” An implied negative counterpart could be “speaking surzhik,” but I did not list this term on the survey form due to its colloquial nature. The discourse that posits linguistic purity as a requirement for good speech has continued to be overwhelmingly dominant in Ukraine since independence, and it underlies this analysis. But as the social and political context changes, other discourses may emerge in which an imagined purity is not linked with linguistic excellence or other positive values.

In Figures 21.1–21.4, solid black lines indicate the mean evaluations of respondents who identified their native language as “Ukrainian,” and dashed lines show the mean evaluations of respondents who identified their native language as “Russian.” Diamonds plot the 95 percent confidence intervals. Horizontal lines across the graph indicate the overall nationwide mean for each native language group.

Figure 21.1 shows how respondents evaluated the Ukrainian language around them. The overall mean rating by Ukrainophones was 3.49, halfway between “average” and “rather well,” while that of ethnic Russophones was 2.76, a bit below “average.” Among Ukrainophones there was great regional variation, with a high score in Lviv and lower scores in Kyïv and Dnipropetrovsk. The responses of Russophones showed a clear trend of decreasing evaluations from West to East. In Kyïv the differences in average evaluations between the two native language groups were not statistically significant, while in Lviv and Dnipropetrovsk this difference was very significant, with mean ratings of Russophones lower than those of Ukrainophones.

According to the survey, university students in the West as a whole thought that Ukrainian there was spoken above average to rather well, while in the Center and East students evaluated the quality of Ukrainian as average to below average. This trend
echoes historical patterns, in which the Ukrainian language developed more freely as an urban prestigious language in the West and was marginalized and repressed more severely in the Center and East. As ethnographic examples demonstrate, evaluations of quality frequently go hand in hand with evaluations of authority and legitimacy. Lack of familiarity and acceptance of Ukrainian as a prestigious language helps explain the lower evaluations of Ukrainian in the Center and East. In contrast, the relatively high evaluations of the quality of Ukrainian in the West reflect familiarity with Ukrainian as a prestigious urban language, and support of the value of this language as it is embodied locally in practice. The fact that Russophones in Lviv evaluate Ukrainian highly as well (albeit lower than Ukrainophones) indicates a degree of acceptance of the social authority of people using this language in their city.

In Kyiv, with the mean evaluations of the quality of Ukrainian around “average,” there was comparatively less support than in the West for the authority of people speaking this language. People of both native language groups responded similarly. In Dnipropetrovsk, however, there was clear ethnolinguistic tension as Russophones rejected the legitimacy of Ukrainian used in their city as compared with Ukrainophone respondents. Russophones evaluated Ukrainian language more critically despite their typically more limited proficiency in this language (see Figure 21.4 on page 352). It was not so much an issue of discerning correctness as a political statement. By rating the quality of the language in the region lower, Russophones discredited the authority of Ukrainian speakers there, reinforcing the lower status of this language. This status did not go unchallenged: the higher ratings of Ukrainophones showed their ethnolinguistic allegiance in language evaluations. In interactions, the ethnolinguistic tension was
revealed in commentary about speakers’ qualifications based on their language, as was evident in the interactions I observed.

**Evaluations of Russian Language Quality**

Figure 21.2 presents evaluations of Russian language in Ukraine. Among Ukrainophones the mean evaluation of Russian (3.35) was relatively close to the evaluation of Ukrainian (3.49), while among Russophones the mean rating of Russian (3.87) was much higher than that of Ukrainian (2.76). In the Center and East, Russophone respondents were more confident about their native language than Ukrainophones were of theirs. Although Russian language in Ukraine is often criticized for having a nonstandard phonology (sharing some similarities with the language varieties spoken in southern Russia), in their answers Russophones were clearly choosing to assert the value, and by extension, the authority, of their language as practiced in Ukraine. In the West, Russophones rated the quality of the two languages as roughly equal, while Ukrainophones rated Ukrainian more highly, asserting the value and authority of their language.

**Evaluations of Understanding of One’s Native Language**

Figures 21.3 and 21.4 show how people evaluated their understanding of Ukrainian and Russian languages, given the choices “excellent, good, average, or bad.” It is
necessary to recognize that understanding, often referred to as passive competence, is not a straightforward skill unaffected by ideology. Claiming to understand can be shaped by political and cultural attitudes, as Haugen (1972) demonstrated in his study of semicomunication in Scandinavia.

The data presented in Figure 21.3 show that Russophones claimed to understand their native language close to “excellently,” with regional mean scores of 3.79, 3.83, and 3.84 from West to East, respectively. This in itself is not surprising, until we contrast it to the responses of Ukrainophones. While there is little difference between the mean ratings of Russophones (3.79) and Ukrainophones (3.78) in the West, Ukrainophones in the Center (3.56) and East (3.30) were significantly less confident about their understanding of their own native language. While in part this was a result of proficiencies fostered by predominant regional linguistic practices, it was also indicative of linguistic insecurity. This linguistic insecurity was fostered by a system in which Ukrainian language education was allocated less time in school with lower-paid teachers than Russian language education, in the context of a dominant ideology that there is a single prestige standard accessible only through education.

The ability to understand could also be presented as symbolic capital in itself, as argued by an online discussion participant: “Inhabitants of Moscow and Peter [St. Petersburg] don’t understand even elementary Ukrainian or Belarusian, even though the latter groups understand Russian, and with some effort also Polish, and Czech, and Slovak (even if they did not study them specially). So go figure who indeed is a
‘nationalist’ and ‘internationalist’ and whose ‘language’ is closer to pan-Slavic roots . . .” (BBC 2004). This argument is an effort to accord more value to Ukrainian and Belarusian by presenting understanding as an inherent power of someone wielding those languages. In line with an ideology valorizing ancientness, this argument also contributes to the portrayal of these languages as more deeply historically rooted than Russian. The ideology of this statement conflicts with the lower confidence I found among Ukrainophones in rating their understanding of their own language, as indicated by the data in Figure 21.3.

Understanding is shaped not only by formal linguistic knowledge but also by whether or not a language and its culture are esteemed as useful and attractive, as also demonstrated by Haugen (1972). Native Ukrainian and Belarusian speakers may understand Russian and other Slavic languages in interactions because they want to and need to, due to the social and economic advantages conferred by Russian, while at the same time being insecure about their linguistic proficiency in their own language. Russian speakers, in wielding the language of power (particularly in Soviet times), may have felt less need to try to understand other Slavic languages.

**Evaluations of Understanding of the Other Major Language**

Finally, in Figure 21.4, we see how Ukrainophones evaluated their understanding of Russian, and how Russophones evaluated their understanding of Ukrainian. There
was no difference between the two native language groups in Lviv, but the difference became increasingly significant more toward the East. It is interesting to note that evaluations of understanding of the other group’s language were patterned very similarly to evaluations of the quality of that language (shown in Figures 21.1 and 21.2). Where claimed understanding was lower, evaluations of quality also tended to be lower. Why would people be more critical of a language they understand less well? These stances make sense according to Haugen’s logic. While reported understanding can reflect knowledge and confidence, it can also reflect whether or not there is desire to understand. Low evaluations of understanding coupled with low evaluations of language quality could reflect a generally lower valuation of a given language as it is practiced in a region: if it is not “good language,” not a language of consequence, then it is not worth understanding.

The relative scores of language quality and understanding showed that Russian—the Soviet-era language of power—still had a stronger position than Ukrainian. The differences between self-designated native language groups presented a point of tension that challenged the dominance of Russian: Ukrainophones were more positive about the value of Ukrainian used around them and more confident in their understanding of it than Russophones. In these stances they resisted a regime that would ascribe less value and power to them in using their language.

Conclusions

This chapter explores the role of evaluations of language quality in shaping values in Ukraine’s linguistic marketplace in a time of sociopolitical turbulence. Evaluating a person’s language is an ascription of social position, and this applies to self-evaluation as well: “The sense of the value of one’s own linguistic products is a fundamental dimension of the sense of knowing the place which one occupies in the social space” (Bourdieu 1991, 82). When a linguistic marketplace is disrupted, it is in the competing expressions of these senses of value that a new linguistic regime, and the relative positioning of its subjects, is renegotiated. Bourdieu’s primary interest in exploring the relationship between language and power lay in revealing the modes through which the linguistic marketplace operates subtly and below the surface to limit capacities for social transformation in stable societies. For change in a linguistic marketplace to occur, there must be change in habitus, the set of inculcated predispositions that leads people to use and judge language in certain ways. In Bourdieu’s conceptualization, habitus is unified and resilient, a product of lifelong inculcation through everyday experiences reinforced by institutions. Institutional changes such as legislation regulating language in education and the media can redefine language status instantaneously, but their relationship to changes in people’s actions, conscious attitudes, and unconscious predispositions is not clear.

To shed some light on the dynamics of changing linguistic values in the unstable system in Ukraine, here I examined expressions of judgment of language quality and skill, both through ethnographic observations and a survey. While the choice between
Ukrainian or Russian languages was the most obvious issue in language politics in Ukraine, I was drawn to focus on the judgments of language quality due to their frequency in public discourse. As I have shown here, these judgments were often directly traceable to efforts to support or discredit the authority of a speaker and his/her language. In voicing judgments, people exerted their agency, enacting desires for a particular sociolinguistic situation, whether upholding the established privilege of Russian, or challenging it in favor of Ukrainian. While people disagreed over the values of particular linguistic forms, the hegemonic ideology of the necessity of discrete unitary national languages was upheld as the discourse focused on assessing the value and purity of particular labeled languages.

Survey data revealed another dimension of linguistic judgments. While the survey data are from a limited sample of university students from 1995, relatively early in Ukraine’s independence, they revealed the underlying tendencies that have continued to shape the language situation. Consistent with the ethnographic examples, the survey answers showed ethnolinguistic allegiance, with people giving relatively higher evaluations for “their own” language, and being more critical of the other language even while claiming relatively lower proficiency in it. Also, comparison of ethnic groups revealed that, overall, people identifying more closely with Russian language were both more confident of its quality and their own knowledge of it, while those identifying more closely with Ukrainian were less confident. The confidence of Russophones and relative insecurity of Ukrainophones reflected the preexisting system, in which Russian was the established language of power and prestige and Ukrainian was widely regarded as a lower quality “peasant language.” Institutional practices reinforced this confidence, as there was more time allocated to teaching Russian, Russian-language education was better funded and of higher quality (with higher paid, better-trained teachers), and Russian language knowledge gave access to better jobs. While there is now more institutional support for Ukrainian, Russian language still dominates in many areas (e.g., see Hrebeniuk 2007 on Luhansk schools). The stances documented in the survey show that we must view people’s ideologies in a less cohesive way. Particularly during times of transition, people can have inclinations in judging linguistic forms that support conflicting linguistic regimes.

In expressing their judgments, people voiced conscious and unconscious inclinations, making them both active agents and subjects of the social power of languages. In my data it is impossible to determine people’s level of strategic awareness. The interaction between conscious and unconscious inclinations in language attitudes, particularly when these conflict, is something that bears closer scrutiny in future research.

While the disruption of a preexisting order made the struggles over language values more vivid, the everyday acts of criticism and confidence are key in maintaining and reinforcing a linguistic regime, in Ukraine as elsewhere (Gal 1993; Jaffe 1999; Milroy and Milroy 1991; Pujolar 2001). Conflicts over values are inherent in any marketplace; only they are less visible, and less effective in causing change, if a stable system of institutional and social control is in place maintaining a language of power.
In 2002 I found evidence that overt linguistic conflicts were being submerged, through the practice of nonaccommodating bilingual conversations in which each interlocutor is expected to speak whichever language he/she is most comfortable with, without choosing a single common language for the interaction (Bilaniuk 2005). Such dual-language conversations, which have been practiced by some married couples for many years, were increasingly the accepted mode of interaction in public life in Kyïï and in televised interactions (particularly in news interviews, talk shows, and game shows). This form of bilingual nonaccommodation is also common in Czech–Slovak interactions (Nábělková 2007). This practice may depoliticize language choice by making both languages acceptable in any context, and it may eliminate some of the impetus for attempting to speak one’s nonnative language. It remains to be seen whether overt criticism of language quality will subside in this context, as ethnolinguistic tensions are defused, or become more acute, as everyone is expected to speak in their “native” tongue—thus essentializing the connection between ethnic identity and native language.

Notes

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1. My findings are based on ethnographic research carried out in Ukraine in October–August 1992, November 1994–November 1995, May 2000, and May–August 2002, with additional material from newspapers, Internet postings, and interactions with Ukrainian colleagues at conferences through 2007.

2. I examined the issues of language ideology, purism, and social power in Ukraine in the book Contested Tongues (Bilaniuk 2005). This chapter addresses a facet of these issues from another angle, through analysis of survey data and additional ethnographic findings.

3. For a more extensive examination of the history of language politics in Ukraine, see Bilaniuk (2005).

4. I conducted structured recorded interviews with 100 people in 1991–92. These interviews included people from various regions of Ukraine at a Kyïï hospital, people approached while traveling in the western region of Ivano-Frankivsk, residents in an apartment building in the central-eastern city of Zaporizhzhia, researchers and other staff at a natural science institute in Kyïï, and other people I encountered in Kyïï. I also conducted informal interviews in Lviv and Dnipropetrovsk in 1994–95, and in Kyïï 1994–95 and 2002.

5. Based on the author’s fieldwork in 2000 and 2002, and also in personal communication with young adults from the central Ukrainian industrial city of Kryvyi Rih visiting the United States in 2007; also related to me by Maria Rewakowicz from her personal communications with Ukrainian colleagues.

6. According to the 2001 census, Russians constituted 3.6 percent and ethnic Ukrainians 94.8 percent of the population of the Lviv region, a change from the 1989 census, which documented 7.2 percent Russians and 90.4 percent Ukrainians. Exceptions to the trend of
Ukrainian-language dominance in Lviv included the Institute of Physical Culture, whose director bemoaned that the world of sport had been thoroughly Russified, and that this had changed little by 1995 even in Lviv. In the Dnipropetrovsk region, the 2001 census showed 17.6 percent ethnic Russians, down from 24.2 percent in the 1989 census. The changes in ethnic composition were likely due both to migration and changing preferences in ethnic identification (Arel 2002).

7. In 2002 I worked with Hanna Zalizniak of the Kyïv City Hromadska Dumka Center for Sociological Research to organize this survey, which included a question asking respondents to identify the percentage of people on the streets of Kyïv speaking Ukrainian.

8. Nonaccommodating bilingualism may also be referred to as “nonreciprocal bilingualism,” as proposed by Gal (1979).

9. This logic was evident in a conference discussion in 2007 about the “impure” speech of a woman with higher education: a Ukrainian scholar commented that this woman must have received her education through distance learning (zaochno) since it was inconceivable to her that someone “regularly” educated would continue to speak that way. This discussion occurred at the international symposium on “Trasianka and Surzhyk: Products of Byelorussian-Russian and Ukrainian-Russian language contact,” held at the University of Oldenburg, Germany in June 2007. My thanks to Niklas Bernsand for drawing my attention to this comment in subsequent discussions.

10. All translations are my own.

11. In addition to the statements critiquing the quality of Russian and Ukrainian language spoken in Ukraine, the online discussion debated the value of the two languages more generally. The debate was initiated in response to a public letter by twelve prominent Ukrainian writers who referred to the Russian language used in Ukraine as “the language of [low quality] pop and criminality” [iazyk popsy i blatniaka].

12. The spelling “Vierka Serdiuchka” is rendered according to the Library of Congress transliteration of the Cyrillic script. The artist also uses the Roman rendering “Verka Serduchka.”

13. In one case in 1995, I witnessed a Russophone professor criticize his colleague who had just given a talk in Ukrainian, stating that her language was surzhyk, and not good Ukrainian. In my estimation, her Ukrainian language was standard, with just a slight east Ukrainian accent that is typical of Ukrainian speakers of the region. The Russophone professor’s eagerness to demean the value of his colleague’s presentation was all the more notable since he did not speak Ukrainian himself, saying that he did not try because he knows he cannot speak it well. This event occurred at an educational institution in a southeastern city where at the time it was rare to hear anything but Russian in public. The presentation delivered in Ukrainian, while in line with the new language law, challenged the status quo at that institution. The Russophone professor relied on his confidence in his own established authority to fend off the potential impact of institutional actions that would intrude on his (Russian) linguistic capital. In his criticisms he attempted to diminish both his colleague’s authority and that of the Ukrainian spoken in his region. He was not opposed to Ukrainian altogether, as he complimented me for speaking “true Ukrainian.” He could value my Ukrainian, which differed from the local variety (I have a western diasporic accent, modified somewhat during my fieldwork in Ukraine), since it did not threaten the status of his own language. However, he was used to considering the variety of Ukrainian around him as low. It was local speakers of this variety that were coming to the fore to enact the language law elevating the status of Ukrainian, using it in institutional spaces where only Russian had previously prevailed, disrupting the basis for the iconization of Ukrainian as a lowly peasant language.

14. See Bilaniuk (2003) for more information on the sampling procedure, survey design, and analysis of a matched-guise test that was administered along with the survey.

15. This was part of the same discussion mentioned earlier, on the quality of the Russian and Ukrainian spoken in Ukraine (see note 11). The post was signed by “Spiria, USA,” likely
an emigrant (he discusses emigrants elsewhere in his message). The quote included here was in Russian, which was almost exclusively the language of the discussion forum, with just the word “language” in Ukrainian, set off in quotes (“mova”).

References


Linguistic Strategies of Imperial Appropriation

Why Ukraine Is Absent from World Film History

Yuri Shevchuk

The idea of this chapter emerged from a close reading of the texts written in Ukrainian, Russian, and English that, in their entirety or part, dealt with Ukrainian filmmaking, starting with the late nineteenth century up until today. The process of Ukraine’s cultural decolonization that follows its political independence from Russia has been slow and conflicted not least because a long history of imperial appropriation has affected and continues to affect the very way Ukrainians think of themselves but also the way Europe and the rest of the world see Ukraine. Imperial appropriation means such a discursive presentation of the colonized that their culture, history, language, and other identity traits either disappear completely or merge with the respective aspects of the hegemonic imperial identity. The imperial appropriation seeks to deprive a colonized people of a sense of their authenticity and, with it, of the will to exist as a separate self-sustained and self-reproducing culture. Alongside literature, historiography, film, and other domains of human creativity involved in the production of ideologies of domination, language has been a central tool of the imperial appropriation of the colonized. This study is an attempt to understand some of the linguistic strategies used to cause the “dissolution” of Ukraine as a culture and its cinema in particular within the Russian discourse, and as a result make Ukraine hard to spot today on the cultural map of Europe.

First, I propose a typology of narratives on Ukraine, which the reader interested in Ukrainian film and culture is bound to encounter. This will be followed by an analysis of some of the most frequent appropriation strategies applied to various identity designators (spelling, lexical semantics, and lexical distribution), whether direct or implicit. Central in this analysis is the “identity seme,” the component of the semantic structure that ties the word’s referent to a specific culture as its marker. I also discuss how the concept of “homeland” have been redefined to replace the original identity of the colonized with the imperial identity centered on Russian culture and negating Ukrainian distinctiveness.
Typology of Narratives on Ukraine

The repertoire of linguistic devices and the way each of them is used to present a colonized culture as part of a colonial empire depends on the characteristics of the text or narrative on Ukraine as its topos. Narratives on Ukraine or any similarly situated postcolonial nation can be of three types, each determined by how Ukraine is conceived of as a cultural identity. The *imperial master narrative* is generated by the colonizer; in the case of Ukraine, it has been most often the Russian imperial center. Such a *primary narrative* regards Ukraine as an inseparable part, whether political, geographic, economic, historical, psychological, cultural, or linguistic, of Russia. The idea of Ukrainian otherness in all these aspects is rejected, and instead the concept of Ukraine’s unity with the empire is advanced in a variety of forms. A detailed, perceptive, if not always indisputable, but invariably thought-provoking analysis of these forms, articulated over more than two hundred years by Russian literature has been done by Marko Pavlyshyn, Ewa Thompson, Myroslav Shkandrij, Vitaly Chernetsky, and others.

A *counternarrative of resistance* is created by the colonized as a response to the assimilationist policies of the imperial center. The collective authors of this *secondary narrative* type are the Ukrainians who are or become aware of their identity and seek to regain their appropriated cultural and political agency through ideologies of political independence and belief in their very own historical destiny. Initially it is the colonized, who create narratives of resistance, though subsequently these narratives can be carried on by noncolonial others who ally themselves with the colonized. There is also a *tertiary narrative*. It originates in the countries situated outside the sphere of influence of the Russian imperial center. The tertiary narrative is more often than not derived from either the primary or the secondary narrative, the latter has increasingly been the case after the implosion of the Soviet Union.

Elements of various levels of language structure can be activated for the purposes of imperial appropriation: spelling, phonomorphological, lexicosemantic, and the level of text (discourse). All languages that cater to these three narrative types (Russian, Ukrainian, English, French, German, etc.), can be manipulated in order to either deny the colonized their separate identity or recognize and take it for granted. There is no neat correlation between a given narrative type and the specific language used to write it. Though Russian is the principal language of the Soviet imperial master narrative, Ukrainian, English, French, and other languages have been also actively used as its vehicles. There is a massive body of Ukrainian language literature in all spheres of knowledge actively advancing Russian/Soviet imperial ideology.

The secondary narrative has been articulated first and foremost in the language of the colonized, in this case in Ukrainian. At the same time, other languages, including Russian, have also been used as a tool of resistance. Since independence, Russian has become a regular medium to articulate the cultural and political project of Ukrainian liberation. Scores of Western publications on Ukraine, which appeared in such Ukrainian studies centers as the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Harvard Ukrainian
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Research Institute, the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the University of Toronto, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, the Shevchenko Scientific Society in France (Sarcelles) as well as in America, ever since their inception before Ukraine’s independence, have also generated texts of the secondary narrative type.

The linguistic strategies of imperial appropriation I shall now discuss are: (1) orthographic assimilation, (2) change in lexical semantics, and (3) appropriation by omission. Each is found in all three narrative types on Ukraine, including even the secondary narratives of resistance ostensibly intended to stake out a Ukrainian identity that is different from Russian, but often and subconsciously subject to the inertia of colonial self-perception. Each of these strategies can, with modifications, be deployed in any language. My observations are primarily focused on Ukrainian, Russian, English, and to a lesser extent French and Italian.

Type One: Spelling as An Appropriation Device

Appropriation by spelling is a consistent privileging of the Russian version of Ukrainian proper names of people, cities, rivers, or of common names designating specifically Ukrainian cultural phenomena. It can be argued that every language comprises a special vocabulary group, which has one important feature in common, I shall term it the identity seme. It is a component of the word’s meaning that links its referent to a specific national culture. The seme colors the otherwise culture-nonspecific referential meaning. The identity seme signifies that a given referent is a creation of a particular culture, and beyond this culture ceases to exist as such, and becomes something else.

In many cases, the form of the word acts as the vehicle of the identity seme (congee, kielbasa, borshch, bossa nova) in others, it is the signified that becomes the vehicle of the identity seme (e.g., American historical terms such as Prohibition, Abolition). The change of vehicle, whether the signifier (as in borshch, ale, kielbasa) or the signified (as in Prohibition, art nouveau, Bauhaus) breaks the linkage with the specific culture and opens up the possibilities for reinterpreting the word in terms of either another national culture (Pol. golombki → Ukr. holubtsi [stuffed cabbage rolls]; Yid. blintzes → Russ. blinchiki [pancakes] or in culture-neutral terms (Ukr. / Yid. borshch → culture-neutral beetroot soup, Span. gaspacho → culture-neutral tomato soup). The change of the word form (spelling) and the cultural reinterpretation it allows have been widely used as a basis for the linguistic appropriation of the colonized by the colonizer. In our case, these are respectively Ukrainian and Russian cultures. Non-Ukrainian language primary narratives almost always Russify Ukrainian proper names and similar culture-specific designators. Thus the poets Ievhen Hrebinka becomes Evgenii Grebionka, Dmytro Pavlychko—Dmitrii Pavlychko, Serhii Zhadan—Sergei Zhadan. An uninformed reader is given the impression that these are the names of Russians and not Ukrainians.

Once appropriated by the empire, the colonized was then presented to the rest of
the world and, ironically, to the very periphery wherefrom they originated, exclusively under a Russified, not their original Ukrainian, name, as if they were indeed Russian. In an important sense, the loss of their original names caused the loss of their cultural authenticity, they ceased to exist for their indigenous culture—their appropriation thus came full circle. The situation was entirely different when Russian cultural figures resettled to Ukraine. This change did not result in their Ukrainianization. Quite the opposite, they remained loyal to their Russian culture and often acted as agents of Russification, as conduits of Russian assimilationist cultural, linguistic, and ideological influences.

A typical example of how Ukrainian films are presented in Western tertiary narratives is the director Oleksander Dovzhenko. Although his identity is indisputably Ukrainian for everybody who knows the facts of his biography, Dovzhenko continues to be considered in Russia and in most of the world as Russian, at least insomuch as Russianness is suggested by the Russified spelling of his first name Aleksandr and the translated or dubbed intertitles, scenarios, and dialogues of his films. Because of this, the imperial appropriation through spelling has created a tradition of its own that appears impossible to break even to some publishers and writers who contest and reject the imperial narrative.5

A similar spelling approach has been almost uniformly applied by Western scholars to the entire body of Ukrainian film legacy. In Dovzhenko’s film Arsenal, the Ukrainian soldier/worker Tymish sports a Russian name Timosh (Kenez 56), just as the actor who interprets his part Semen Svashenko becomes Semion (Youngblood 2007, 26). Vance Kepley, Jr. transliterates the names of Ukrainian protagonists using both the Russian, for example, Nikolai Khvylovy (instead of Ukr. Mykola Khvylovy), Faust Lopatinsky (instead of Ukr. Favst Lopatynsky [29]), and original Ukrainian forms, for example, Pavlo (in Dovzhenko’s film Zvenyhora instead of the expected Russ. Pavel). The same is practiced by film historians in France and Italy, both of Soviet and post-Soviet periods (Passek 307–312; Schnitzer 380–383). The history of Soviet and Russian cinema by Giovanni Buttavafa refers to all Ukrainian films by the Russian titles as if they were the original ones: Teni zabytykh predkov [Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors], Vecer na kanune Ivana Kupala (Veche—Eng. translit.) [Night Before the St. John’s Feast], Belaja ptica s cernoj otmetinoj (Belaia ptitsa s chernoi otmetinoi—Eng. Translit.) [White Bird with a Black Mark]. Likewise the names of all Ukrainian filmmakers are given in Russian not Ukrainian (Buttafava 115, 137). A notable recent exception from the rule is the French film scholar Lubomir Hosejko whose Histoire du cinémaj ucrainien (in our classification an example of the secondary narrative), consistently uses original Ukrainian names and titles (Hosejko).

A simple Internet search on a Ukrainian film subject reveals the massive extent to which Ukrainian culture is presented as if it were part of Russian culture. A good illustration is the treatment Dovzhenko’s favorite actor Mykola Zakharovych Nademsky is given on the Internet today. A Google search has revealed a total of fifty-six results for the original Ukrainian spelling of the actor Mykola Nademsky, zero results for his extended name, patronymic and surname: Mykola Zakharovych Nademsky. For
the Russian spelling of his name Nikolai Nademsky there were about 2,330 results. Even ignoring the fortyfold numeric difference between the Ukrainian and Russian linguistic packaging of the individual (the discrepancy can be in part explained by the high frequency of the Russian name Nikolai (as in Nikolai Gogol, Nikolai Turgenev)—one can hardly ignore an important qualitative moment in this picture. All fifty-odd references with the Ukrainian name originate either from the Ukrainian corner of the World Wide Web, that is, they represent a small community of scholars, specialists in the field of Ukrainian culture and film or authors with knowledge of the Ukrainian language (secondary narrative type). Internet sites on world cinema typically use the actor’s name transcribed from its Russified spelling.

Embracing the Colonizer

Spelling assimilation has been actively practiced in the Ukrainian-language primary as well as secondary narratives, with the important difference that it is not Ukrainian but Russian culture that becomes the object of assimilation (Ukrainianization). Ukrainians have had a long tradition of fully assimilating Russian proper names, above all anthroponyms, simply by replacing them with their Ukrainian equivalents and presenting their Russian bearers as Ukrainian, for example, Russ. Sergei becomes Serhii, likewise Nikolai—Mykola, Ol’ga—Ol’ha, Nadezhda—Nadiia. Thus an uninformed reader appears in no position to tell apart the national identities of Ukrainians and Russians in texts that deal with both cultures. By this simple linguistic device the two identities become one, merge into the identity that has historically been dominant—Russian. Paradoxically or predictably, the colonized appears to be embracing the colonizer, as it were, by their own will merging with the latter. Such a total Ukrainianization of names has not been applied to other cultures and seems to have been reserved for Russian names. The current Ukrainian orthography provides for a measure, though not complete, of phonomorphological assimilation of non-Russian Slavic names, for example, Pol. Slowacki becomes Ukr. Slovats’kyi, however Pol. Juliusz does not become Ukr. Iulii and the name of the Polish poet in Ukrainian still sounds Polish: Juliusz Slovats’kyi. It follows the same teleology of appropriation of the colonized by the colonizer even though it may seem that the empire dissolves within its colony. The past and current practice of translating Russian proper names into Ukrainian, whereby Russ. Aleksandr Pushkin becomes Ukr. Oleksandr Pushkin, and respectively Mikhail Lermontov—Mykhailo Lermontov, and so on, suggests the idea of sameness not only between these pairs of names but also between their respective languages and more generally—their cultures. As a result, the Ukrainian identity is presented as something not really different from the Great Russian identity.

The effects of this practice can be better appreciated against a wider historical context of Ukrainian–Russian cultural “interaction.” What may seem like a regular exchange between two cultures, in the reality of the colonial situation, has always been the relationship of domination over and assimilation of the colonized. Ukrainian-Russian cultural “exchange” has invariably favored the colonizer. Ukrainian authors,
film directors, actors, or other cultural figures who went to work in Russia, became Russified not only in fact but in name as well. In their work, they switched to Russian and were “provided” credentials of Russian cultural figures with the obligatory assimilation of their names. Their Ukrainian origin, cultural background, psychology, and other distinctive identity traits would be ignored or reduced to a footnote of no consequence. Ukrainians Mykola Hohol would become the great Russian writer Nikolai Gogol; Davyd Buriak became the father of Russian futurism David Buriak; Oleksander Dovzhenko—the Russian film director Aleksandr Dovzhenko; Ihor Savchenko—the Russian film director Igor Savchenko; and on and on ad infinitum.

Type Two: Altering Lexical Semantics

A geographic name such as Ukraine, Poland, Russia, or England is an identity designator for its respective cultural collectivity—of Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, and English. In their turn, each of these nations views one of them as the name they identify with. At the same time, all other names are something they identify against or in distinction to. Identity designators can refer to the country of origin directly (the examples above). Direct designators can be both nouns and adjectives derived from them, for example, Ukr. Україна (Ukraine) → ukrains’kyi (Ukrainian) → ukrainka (a Ukrainian woman), ukrainstvo (Ukrainians, Ukrainianness). The country of origin can be implied, for example, motherland, fatherland, homeland, native (as in native land, native language, native culture, native cinema), and understood only from the context in which the implicit identity designators are used.

Both explicit and implicit identity designators have been a battlefield between the colonizer and the colonized over their exclusive interpretation. The toponym Ukraine exemplifies this struggle in a number of aspects—word usage, meaning, and etymology. As regards its usage, the Russian imperial regime proscribed this word and instead favored Malorossiia [Little Russia], iugo-zapadnyi krai [South Western Land]. Common was also the use of the local identity designators that presented a specific area as part of a larger imperial whole and not of Ukraine. Thus southern parts of Ukraine (Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv) were customarily referred to as Novorossiia [New Russia]. The adjective Russ. ukrainskii (Ukrainian) was similarly shunned in favor of Malorossiiskii (Little Russian) or Iuzhno-rossiiskii (South Russian).

With the collapse of the Russian dynastic empire in 1905–1917, the policy of proscribing the Russian words for Ukraine, Ukrainian stopped being enforced. In the Soviet period, the struggle shifted to the area of lexical collocability. At issue were the attributes that were allowed to modify the noun Україна and those that were not. Since the toponym Ukraine, when used alone, was open to interpretation and could be used by practically any political ideology, the Soviet narrative early in the day started attaching to it the attribute Sovyet (Russ. Sovetskaia Ukraina/Ukr. Radians’ka Ukraina). By the same token, its use without any attributes, was increasingly avoided as if to preclude
its association with the ideology of Ukrainian national independence. The attribute Russ. sovietkaia/Ukr. radians’ka was attached to all other identity designators that, if used alone, could suggest the idea of a self-sufficient Ukrainian identity.

This tendency is manifest in names of Soviet-era periodic publications that were obliged to include the adjective “Soviet,” for example, the all-Ukrainian Communist Party daily Ukr. Radiants’ka Ukraïna [Soviet Ukraine], other dailies Ukr. Radiants’ka Volyn’ [Soviet Volyn], Ukr. Radiants’ka Bukovyna [Soviet Bukovyna], and countless others. By the same logic the collocations vil’na Ukraïna [a free Ukraine], nezalezhna Ukraïna [an independent Ukraine], and particularly samostiina Ukraïna[ an independent Ukraine] became linguistic taboos associated with Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. With this peculiarly construed meaning attached to the name Ukraïna by the Soviet regime, Oleksander Dovzhenko’s 1943 documentary film (Russian language) title Bitva za nashu sovetskuiu Ukrainu [Battle for Our Soviet Ukraine] seems to have been preordained.

Today there is increasing contestation in the secondary narrative type of what, until recently, has been generally “accepted” etymology of the name Ukraïna [Ukraine], as meaning the “borderland,” from the Russ. preposition u (near, by) + krai (edge, border). This explanation of the word’s meaning made Ukraine, quite within the imperial logic, a periphery, a wild frontier in need of the civilizing and order-creating imperial center. It does not explain how those in the Ukrainian ethnic community who use this toponym as a self-identifier, with it, also chose the imperial optics of seeing their country not as the center of their universe but as the borderland of another nation, the Russian empire. This etymology, very much in use today, is being increasingly subjected to critical revision, more often motivated by resistance to the inertia of imperial appropriation than based on compelling scholarly data. Secondary narratives offer such alternative meanings as “land,” “homeland,” “country,” and others. Irrespective of whether or not these very different etymologies of Ukraïna are grounded in fact, they reveal how this identity designator is at the center of contestation that allows a new self-asserting vision of the Ukrainian identity.

That Sweet Word “Homeland”

Each nationality is based on identification with its real or imagined homeland. In every language, the concept of homeland is signified by a group of synonyms that are identity designators by implication; the country they refer to remains a nameless territory considered to be one’s own, while its name can only be gleaned from the context. In Russian and Ukrainian, these words are: the nouns Russ. otechestvo [fatherland], rodina [homeland], strana [country] and the Ukr. bat’kivshchyna, vitchyzna, kraïna with the adjectives derived from the two former nouns and meaning “native”—Russ. rodnoi, otechestvennyi and Ukr. ridnyi, vitchyznianyi. The original referent of the Ukr. “bat’kivshchyna” [fatherland] should be coterminous with the territory of Ukraine. It has remained so in the Ukrainian diaspora unaffected by Soviet influences. Acting out Karl Marx’s motto “the proletariat has no fatherland,” the Russian Bolsheviks
replaced it with their concept of fatherland, whereby the true fatherland of the world’s proletariat was “the Soviet Union (the Russian dynastic empire turned into a socialist empire), the first workers’ and peasants’ state in the history of humanity.” Ukrainians were gradually trained to think of the Soviet Union, not Ukraine, as their fatherland. An emblematic case of this appropriation through semantic reconfiguring was Soviet Ukrainian director Leonid [Lev] Lukov’s feature film Bat’kivshchyna moia, komsomol [My Fatherland, Komsomol] (1929) in whose title the traditional concept is indeed replaced by the Soviet one.19

These designators (Ukr. bat’kivshchyna/vitchyzna and Russ. otechestvo/rodina) came to be increasingly used in the Soviet times to replace the original Ukrainian concept of fatherland by the Soviet one, coterminous with the empire (USSR). The Russian and Ukrainian words for “fatherland” referred not to the Russian Federation and Ukraine, respectively, but both to the new, one and the same Soviet motherland—the Soviet Union. The results of such a semantic reformatting were very markedly different for the colonizer and the colonized. The colonizer came to understand and use the nouns Russ. otechestvo and rodnina and their cognate adjectives the Russ. otechestvennyi and rodnoi as synonymous with Russia and Russian, respectively, just as their Soviet correlates the noun USSR and the adjective Soviet were understood as synonyms for Russia and Russian, respectively.

For the colonized Ukrainians such semantic shift caused their own native land to disappear in the imperial Soviet “motherland.” By this logic the Ukrainian expression vitchyzna now referred to the Soviet Union and not to Ukraine. Thus, from the original fatherland, Ukraine was reduced to a mere province (a Soviet republic) or—the Ukraine.20

The adjective vitchyznianyi is a very curious case of semantic manipulation. In the context of Ukrainian film history, Soviet Ukrainian authors often refer to things both Russian and Ukrainian, whether films, themes, actors, directors, inventors, and so on, as “our own” using one and the same word vitchyznianyi (from the Russian borrowing vitchyzna “fatherland”) (Buriak 11–12). The Ukrainian adjective is a semantic, if not morphological, calque of the Russian otechestvennyi (from otechestvo “fatherland” → otets “father”). Vitchyznianyi/otchestvennyi loosely correspond to the English adjective home as in the home industry). That the word is an innovation introduced into Ukrainian from Russian with a specifically Russian idea of what is one’s own as opposed to foreign is manifest in its etymology.

It is derived from the noun vitchyzna [fatherland], a relatively recent borrowing that, with the exception of the adjective vitchyznianyi, has no direct derivational correlates in the Ukrainian vocabulary. The academic eleven-volume Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language illustrates its usage by relatively late examples from I. Nekhoda (1947) and A. Malyshko (1956) (Slovnyk vol. 1, 690). The noun vitchyzna was borrowed from Russian despite the fact that Ukrainian had had its own cognate term bat’kivshchyna derived from bat’ko [father] meaning the same [fatherland] and, according to the same lexicographic source, going as far back as the eighteenth century.21

The Ukrainian bat’kivshchyna is extensively connected within its indigenous
lexical system through its root *bat’ko* [father] which has a multitude of derivatives. However, the noun *bat’kivshchyna* had a serious flaw; it could not be used to derive an *otechestvenyi*-type adjective of implicit identity designation to be decoded only from the context. It is possible that this “shortcoming” necessitated the introduction into Ukrainian of the word *vitchyzna* by calquing the Russian *otechestvo*, Russ. *otets* → Ukr. *otets’, Russ. *otchyzna* → Ukr. *vitchyzna*. The much-needed adjective *vitchyznianyi* was then derived from *vitchyzna*, yet again following the Russian pattern.

The authoritative *Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language* published by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, provides the word *vitchyznianyi* with the following description: “created in one’s own state; not foreign” (Slovnik vol. 1, 690). The collocation of this adjective with the noun *viina* [war] gets a special lexicographic treatment that gives it an interpretation based on the premise that the Russian colonial empire is the homeland for Ukrainians. Thus, *Vitchyzniana viina*, is “a war for the liberty and independence of one’s own country against occupiers” (ibid.). There are only two wars referred to by the collocation *vitchyzniana viina* in Soviet Ukrainian history books—the Russian war with Napoleon of 1812 (*Ukr. Vitchyzniana viina 1812 roku* or Russ. *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda*) and the Soviet war with Nazi Germany, the so-called Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 (*Ukr. Velyka Vitchyzniana viina* or Russ. *Velikaia otechestvennaia voina*). Both these expressions suggest that Ukrainians fought for their country in 1812 and 1941–1945, even though their state did not exist in those years, unless one considers Russian empire and the USSR to be Ukrainian states.

In contrastive linguistics, the adjective *otechestvennyi/vitchyznianyi* is classified as a nonequivalent item, that is, a word that structures its meaning in a culture-specific, cognitively unique manner. Its segmentation of reality finds no comparable reproduction in another language. Its translation or, to be more precise, interpretation depends on both its immediate and extended context, for example, *otechestvennyi kinematograf* should be translated as Russian cinema, *otechestvennoe kinoproduktstvo*—as home filmmaking; *otechestvennaia voina*—as patriotic war; *otechestvennaia literatura*—as Russian literature. The adjective *otechestvennyi* and its Ukrainian equivalent *vitchyznianyi* should have the area of reference exactly identical to those of the English adjectives “Russian” and “Ukrainian,” respectively. In the reality of colonial discourse, they are not identical either by their referential meaning or by their ideological implications.

*Otechestvennyi* refers to Russia and what is Russian by implication, to everything that falls under the ideological concept of *otechestvo* [fatherland], but not under the geographical area of ethnic Russia. The word has often replaced the adjective *Ukrainian*, which is exclusive of Russia. Whereas *Ukrainian* allows no semantic equivocation as to the cultural attribution of the concept it modifies, the adjective *Ukr. vitchyznianyi (Russ. otechestvennyi)* does not have its independent semantics and derives its meaning from two types of context: horizontal and vertical. The horizontal context is the immediate textual surrounding of the word. When the adjective is used in the context of, say, Ukrainian, Georgian, or Belarusian cultures, it should refer
respectively to each of them and be concretized in translation as Ukrainian, Georgian, or Belarusian, respectively.

The vertical context is the history of its usage and the conceptual, sentimental, and other associations that emerge as a result. Its inherently Russian origin and its past strong association with the concept of Russian imperial territoriality causes it to be linked to Russianness first and foremost in the mind of the Russian speaker in situations when the adjective is taken out of context. Otechestvennyi is not used in reference to American, English, French, or even Polish—cultures that are outside the Russian colonial realm. It is emblematic that this peculiar imperial designator can be used in reference to and in self-reference by the cultures that are still soundly within the Russian colonial hegemony, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan. The recently published statistics on the language balance in Ukraine reveal the tendencies of increasing Russian cultural hegemony in the country in such strategic spheres as mass media, filmmaking, the Internet, book publishing, business, services, entertainment, and show-business.24

Every time vitchyznianyi/otechestvennyi was used in reference to members of a non-Russian ethnic community of the Soviet domain, their idea of their own country either disappeared or appeared as part of the Russian empire, in other words this semantically “tempered with” identity designator made it problematic for the colonized to articulate their own concept of the homeland. The adjective that, at first glance, shares the same referent with its contextual synonyms Ukrainian, Belarusian, Georgian, Kazakh, and so on, in the reality of imperial discourse subverts the intended meaning of these words, extending its referential sphere onto the subjects that are logically outside these national designations. Thus to classify Oleksander Dovzhenko as russkii rezhiser is problematic even in the primary narrative type, while to classify him as otechestvennyi rezhiser has been the colonial norm. Once he is otechestvennyi, then by implication he is also russkii, and, consequently, he sports a Russian first name too—Aleksandr.25

Type Three: Appropriation by Omission

The appropriation of the colonized can be effected at the level of discourse, when the colonized is presented as something that has no distinguishing features of its own, by inclusion in the text that deals with Russian culture. Appropriation by omission occurs when the non-Russian identity of the subject is omitted from the text. An illustration of this is Jay Leyda’s book Kino. A History of Russian and Soviet Cinema. Contrary to the expectation created by its title, Leyda does not discuss other Soviet cinemas that are not Russian, that is, film schools such as Ukrainian, Georgian, Belarusian, Kazakh, and so on, as separate categories. He uses “Soviet” not as an umbrella term but only as a synonym of “Russian.” The non-Russian cinemas are omitted from Leyda’s tertiary narrative, while the films they produced are subsumed under the general category of Russian cinema. Neither the book’s table of contents nor the subject index has headings for Ukraine, Georgia, or Kazakhstan. Leyda enumerates some of

The reader is left unawares that not all of these films are Russian. Sergey Paradzhanov, the Armenian-Georgian director of the now cult picture Shadows of Our Forgotten Ancestors, risking a ban on his film refused to have it dubbed from Ukrainian into Russian. Prior to February 2008, the film could be acquired in North America only in a washed out copy transferred onto a VHS cassette. Subverting Paradzhanov’s intention, it features subtitles where Ukraine-specific cultural designators, including proper names, are translated into English from Russian. The DVD with a new widescreen transfer of the film released in North America by the Kino International in February of 2008 carries a blurb on its box that treats the story of the film within the context of “Russian regional history” even though the part of Ukraine (the Carpathian Mountains) where it unfolds in the nineteenth century became part of the Soviet territory only towards the end of World War II. As with so many other non-Russian Soviet colonial subjects, the imperial logic proved stronger than even the message the film’s creator wanted to send. Armenian by ethnicity, Tbilisi-born Paradzhanov himself is by far better known to the world under the Russified version of his original name Sarkis Parajanian. Appropriation by omission often goes together with spelling assimilation and altered lexical semantics. The multivolume dictionary, not incidentally entitled Novoe naia istoriia otechestvennogo kino 1986–2000 [A Newest History of Our Film] treats Ukrainian, Georgian, Azeri, and other non-Russian filmmakers as part of Russian film history.26

The British film scholar Graham Roberts, in his essay on the Ukrainian filmmaker Kira Muratova, “The Meaning of Death: Kira Muratova’s Cinema of the Absurd,” glosses over the fact that Muratova spent her entire creative life (from 1961 to the present) in Odesa, Ukraine (Roberts 144–160). That she is universally considered (including by herself) to be a Russian auteur does not change this fact. Even if a scholar, as Roberts writes, is primarily interested in “her place in the context of Russian and European culture,” to remain blind to Muratova’s immediate context of Ukrainian culture—whether loved, reviled, or ignored by her—means to limit the space of inquiry and its outcomes to the framework preset by the imperial discourse.

Appropriation by omission occurs irrespective of what the artists subjected to it consider themselves culturally. The Brit David Gillespie, who approaches Muratova as “. . . [undoubtedly t]he major female director in Russian cinema” while allowing that “[m]ost of her films were produced in Ukraine” (Gillespie 92), presents another Ukrainian filmmaker Viacheslav Kryshtofovych as only Russian (ibid., 97). However, Kryshtofovych spoke of his cultural identity as follows: “I received a mainly Russian education, but I have always considered myself to be a Ukrainian. It’s difficult to explain, but, except for my work as a student, I have never before chosen specifically Ukrainian material for my projects. All my films have been made in the Russian language, but I do believe you can find a piece of my Ukrainian soul in each of them.”27
These strategies characterize the relationship of the imperial culture with Ukraine as its colony and never involve noncolonial cultures that come into contact with Russia: Polish, English, French, Italian, and other proper names do not get translated into Russian, with the exception of instances that have a tradition of usage, such as biblical names or names of kings and popes.28

Conclusion

In a recently published book *East European Cinemas*, one of the contributors, Dina Iordanova, bemoans a stunning and embarrassing editorial oversight: “. . . there was no entry on the [sic] Ukraine. Nor was there one on Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and any other of the former Soviet republics . . .” (Imre 230). This omission appears not so much an editor’s oversight as the result of a certain way of thinking or linguistic segmentation of the post-Soviet space as essentially part of the Russian cultural dominion. It once again proves that the described strategies of imperial appropriation continue to be reproduced today where not only Ukraine but also other former Soviet colonies are concerned. The persistence with which the world remains ignorant of Ukraine’s past and present contribution to filmmaking is greatly a function of the effectiveness of these strategies. Having originated in the imperial center, over decades, they have been adopted and internalized by the colonized and the rest of the world to such an extent that the latter reproduce and perpetuate them often unintentionally. In an important sense, these strategies condition narratives on Ukraine, whether of the primary, secondary, or tertiary type, in such a manner as to preempt the emergence of Ukrainian culture as self-sufficient, independent, and authentic.

Notes

1. Other colonies, classical, such as India, Cuba, and the Congo; hidden, such as Ireland; or internal, such as the Native Americans in the United States and Canada, have also used their respective imperial languages to create narratives of resistance.

2. The bilingual Ukrainian–Russian national publications, such as the daily *Den’* and *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, the Russian language Ukrainian Internet sites www.obkom.net.ua and www.grani.kiev.ua, bilingual www2.pravda.com.ua and www.telekritika.kiev.ua, to name but a few, all use Russian to generate the narratives of resistance.

3. For example, the English noun *money* has a culture-neutral referent signified by the Ukrainian equivalent *hroshi*, the French *argent*, the Russian *den’gi*, the Italian *soldi*, and so on. Concretized for every respective culture these nouns become *dollar* for the United States, Australia, and Canada, *pound sterling* for the United Kingdom, *hryvnia* for Ukraine, *euro* for France, *rubl’* for Russia. The “identity seme” is isolated in the opposition of two kinds (1) culture-neutral vs. culture-specific (*hroshi* vs. *hryvnia*); (2) culture-specific vs. culture-specific (*hryvnia* vs. *dollar*). In both, the result of such an opposition will be the “identity seme” interpreted as “Ukrainian.” Likewise the pair *den’gi* vs. *rubl’* suggests the same seme but already interpreted as “Russian,” *den’gi* vs. *funt sterlingov*—as “British,” *den’gi* vs. *zloty*—as “Polish.”

4. Within the paradigm of national currency names, *franc* replaced by *euro* can still be used as currency, but it is no more specific to the French identity only. Words can comprise the “identity seme” in a variety of ways. The most common one is due to the cultural specificity...
of the referent, examples thereof are: (1) names of national dishes and drinks, borschch (Ukr. beetroot soup), kielbasa (Pol. sausage), congee (Chinese rice gruel eaten for breakfast); musical instruments, bandoneon (Argentina), bandura (Ukraine), dances, polka (Poland), foxtrot (United States), samba (Brazil), and so on; (2) terms for national historical phenomena, hetman (Ukr. military leader of the country), tsar (Russ. king), Prohibition (ban on sale and consumption of alcohol in the United States), and so on; (3) proper names of people and places, for example, Ukr. Petro Mohyla, Russ. Aleksei Tolstoy, Pol. Adam Mickiewicz.

5. George Liber, author of the Dovzhenko biography published by the prestigious British Film Institute, titled his solidly researched monograph Alexander Dovzhenko: A Life in Soviet Film (Liber). The same spelling that ignores the original name form Oleksander is used earlier in the book prepared by Marco Carynnyk—Alexander Dovzhenko: Poet As Filmmaker: Selected Writings (Carynnyk). Whether the choice of spelling (Alexander) is informed by the tradition of established Russian (primary narrative) or, more likely in this case, Western (tertiary narrative) usage, is of no importance for the purpose of this study. Despite the fact that both books rest on the premise that Dovzhenko is a Ukrainian film director and writer, linguistic form has its own logic and creates its own optics, whereby the Soviet director Alexander Dovzhenko is perceived as a Russian and not a Ukrainian director.

6. The same author refers to the main protagonist in Mark Donskoy’s 1943 film Rainbow by her original Ukrainian name Olena, rather than using its Russian equivalent Elena (Kenez 177).

7. On another occasion, the same author clearly points out one such salient instance of appropriation by spelling in relation to the actress Natalia Lysenko, a Ukrainian born in Kherson (see Youngblood 1999, 53).

8. Among the sources are the Ukrainian Hollywood Trident Association, the brama.com (one of the largest Ukrainian content portals on the Internet, George Liber, the U.S. expert on Ukrainian history and Dovzhenko, Ray Uzyvshyn, who wrote a Ph.D. dissertation on Dovzhenko, or more obscure Web sites such as www.filmmreference.com or www.foto-marlin.ch, which seem to feature Mykola Nademsky rather than Nikolai Nademsky by accident rather than intentionally (they present other Ukrainians as Russians with Russian names).

9. Examples of these are: www.imdb.com, movies.uk.msn.com, slantmagazine.com, sensesofcinema.com; and commercial sites such as as amazon.com, ebay.com, kino.com, and others. It appears in English, French (amazon.fr), German (zelluloid.de), Dutch (biosagenda.nl), Danish (laserdisken.dk), Japanese (amazon.co.jp), Chinese (dy.yesho.com), and others. This comparison suggests that the primary narrative type on Ukraine dominates the World Wide Web and that the tertiary narratives favor the colonial linguistic practices and continue to ignore those of the secondary narratives of resistance.

10. A proper name, unlike a common name, singles out its referent as one of a kind and unique compared not only to other referents (cf. Gerard Manley Hopkins and a poet/Jesuit priest) but also to other languages that often have their own equivalents. A simple comparison reveals this unique culture-identifying function of anthroponyms (cf. Eng. Peter, Span. Pedro, Ital. Pietro, Fr. Pierre, Russ. Piotr, Ukr. Petro). Each of them is unique to its respective culture. The semantic structure of each contains the “identity seme.” The Russian-Ukrainian name-swapping subverts this unique nomination and deprives the colonized of what could, in a noncolonial situation, have been their very own means of self-identification.

11. The Russian dynastic colonial empire followed the logic of classical European imperial powers: England with its colonies in New England, Spain and its colonies in the Americas and Asia, collectively known as Nueva España, and France with its North American acquisitions a.k.a. la Nouvelle France.

12. The policy was given an official articulation by the Valuev Decree (1863) and the Ems Decree (1876). In a characteristic treatment of this identity names, the Russian words for Ukraine or Ukrainian [Ukraine and ukrainskii] are either used with the qualification the “the so-called”
According to Paul Magocsi, the Ems Decree that forbade public use of Ukrainian was never officially repealed, and starting with the revolution of 1905 neither was it enforced (Magocsi 380).

14. In a curious semantic development the adjective samostiînyi ‘independent’ and its cognate nouns samostiînist’ ‘independence,’ samostiînyk ‘a champion of independence,’ in the Soviet discourse, lost their neutral connotation and was given a clearly derogatory flavor. Their collocations with other words became derogatory clichés, for example, samostiîna Ukraina “independent Ukraine,” samostiînyts’ke boloto “independentist cesspool” used in reference to organized Ukrainian immigrant groups in the West advocating an independent Ukraine. This new derogatory semantics proved so useful that the expression samostiîna Ukraina was borrowed into Russian usage. Today both the noun samostiînist’ and the adjective samostiînyi have not fully shed the imperial stigma of derogation. They are all too often avoided in favor of their emotively neutral synonyms nezalezhnist’ and nezalezhnyi. The adjective samostiînyi in Russian continues to be used as a political swearword. A vivid example of this usage is the self-explanatory book title Samostiîna Ukraina: istoki predatels’tva [An Independent Ukraine: The Sources of Treason] by A.K. Glivakovsky. For details, see www.knigoprovod.ru/?topic_id=23;book_id=248. Russian imperial discourse resorts to borrowing an identity designator and using it unchanged in its original form as a slur. The Ukrainian adjective nezalezhnyi even though it is neutral in Ukrainian is used in Russian as such a slur, for example, “ . . . postulat o nezalezhnoi i samostiinoi Ukraini . . . eto cho-to iz razriada nauchnoi fantastiki . . . ” [the postulate about free and independent Ukraine is something taken from science fiction] at http://groups.rambler.ru/groups/rambler.news.ukraine/1603522.2.html. This pattern of slur-production through unchanged borrowing is known in other languages, for example, the nouns Polak and Yid, the American English derogatory names for a Pole and a Jew, respectively.

15. The title of the daily newspaper of the Lviv Regional Communist Party Committee Za vil’nu Ukrainu [For a Free Ukraine] was the proverbial exception that proved the rule.

16. Orest Subtelny starts his Ukraine. A History, translated into Ukrainian and repeatedly reprinted in Ukraine, with just such etymological reproduction “Ukraine means borderland” (Subtelny 3). Anna Reid, author of Borderland: A Journey through the History of the Ukraine puts the same idea in the title and the synopsis, “The word ‘Ukraine’ means ‘borderland’ and for most of its history the lands that make up present-day Ukraine have been a collection of other countries’ border regions” (Reid 1997). The amazon.co.uk description of her book is “An extremely vivid history of the Ukraine, a politically and culturally rich collection of borderlands” (www.amazon.co.uk/Borderland-Journey-Through-History-Ukraine/dp/1842127225). A Google search under the heading “Ukraine means borderland” reveals the massive influence this etymology commands on the Internet—88,300 results.

17. Reacting to Reid’s book title, O. Zuk writes, “Unfortunately the author did not get the basic premise correct. Ukraine does not mean borderland. The oldest use of the word found in written text is in the 10th [sic] century chronicle of Slovo o Polke Ihoria [sic]. The term Ukraine is used as meaning within the kingdom, at the heart of the kingdom. The opposite of what the author writes. Borderland would mean Okraina, this is the difference between in and out” (www.amazon.com/Borderland-Journey-Through-History-Ukraine/dp/customer-reviews/0813337925).

18. A popular articulation of an alternative interpretation of what the toponym Ukraiîna means is the article by V. Skliarenko “Where Does the Name Ukraine Originate From?” [Zvidky pokhodyt’ nazva Ukraina?] published in early 1991, before Ukraine became independent from Russia (Skliarenko).

19. The pioneering film director Dziga Vertov actively engaged in a conceptual redefinition
of “homeland” for all the peoples of the Soviet Union along the colonial lines in his romantically charged narrative documentary One Fifth of the World.

20. The same technique of semantic reconfiguring is manifest in the appeals by the French imperial administration to the insurgent Algerians in Gillo Pontecorvo’s film The Battle of Algiers (1966). Trying to dissuade the colonized from taking part in the rebellion, the colonial administration evokes France, not Algeria, as the fatherland of the Algerian.

21. The Ukrainian linguist Ievhen Tymchenko dates batˈkivshchyna in the meaning “fatherland” to the eighteenth century (Tymchenko 61).

22. Some of the derivatives of batˈko are: batˈk’y (parents), batˈkivˈk’yi (fatherly), batˈkivstvo (fatherhood), bezbatchenko (a person with no loyalty to the fatherland), po-batˈkivˈk’y (like a father), batiusˈkha (form of address or reference to an Orthodox priest), batenˈko (dimin. of batˈko), batechko (dimin. of batˈko), po-batˈkovi (patronymic), batˈia (dimin. father), batˈkuvaty (to curse mentioning somebody’s father), batˈkovbyvetsˈ (father-killer), and so on.

23. The adjective vitˈchyznianyi could have been the first to appear in Ukrainian, whereas the noun vitˈchyzna that should be expected to be its derivational base, was reproduced later by analogy. This issue needs a separate study.


25. Today, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian discourse continues to actively use the adjective otechestvennyi as a tool of imperial appropriation. In March 2007, the Entsiklopediia otechestvennoi multiplikatsii [Encyclopedia of Our Animated Filmmaking] was published in Moscow by Algoritm-Kniga Publishers. This 816-page volume with more than 1,000 biographic entries includes in the realm of Russian/Soviet animated filmmaking—all subsumed in the adjective otechestvennyi—filmmakers from Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. The Ukrainian National film portal Kino-Kolo quotes some seventy names of animated film directors, scriptwriters, cinematographers, composers, artistic designers, actors, producers, and so on, presented in this encyclopedia.

26. The ranks of Russian filmmakers thus are expanded by the Georgians Tengiz Abuladze, Veriko Andzhaparidze, Aleksandr Atanesian, Lomer Akhvlediani, Teimuraz Babluani, Lana Gogoberidze; the Belarusians Ales Adamovich, Viktor Dashuk; the Armenians Boris Airapetian, Karen Gevorkian, Ruben Gevorkiants, the Kazakhs Ardash Amirkulov, Serik Arympov; the Latvians Via Artmane, Ianis Streich, Andrис Lapinsh, Ivars Seletsksis, the Lithuanians Sharunas Bartas, Ingeborha Dapkuaitė, Vitautas Zhalakievichus; the Estonians Arvo Ikho, Mark-Toomas Soosaar, Kalie Kiysk, the Tadzhiks Valeri Khadkov, Davlatnazar Khudonazarov, the Moldovan Valeriu Zheregı, the Uzbek Elïer Ishmukhamedov; and the Ukrainians Borislav Brondukov, Sergey Bukovsky, Grigorii Gladii, Viktor Gres, Mykhail Ilienko, Yuri Ilienko, Aleksandra Svenskaia, Viacheslav Krivtsofoviç. This is by far an incomplete list of non-Russian figures appropriated by the Russian film history. Whereas non-Eastern Slavic names in the list preserve their original form, for example, Moldovan Valeriu Zheregı does not become Russian Valeriı̆ Zheregı, Ukrainian anthroponyms are all invariably Russified, first names always and family names where possible, for example, Serhii Bukovskˈyi becomes Sergey Bukovskiy, Hryhorii Hladii—Gregorii Gladii, Mykhailo Ilienko—Mikhail Ilˈenko, and Oleksandra Svenskaia—Aleksandra Svenskaia.


28. For example, Fr. Louis XV ⇒ Russ. Liudovik XV; Eng. King James II ⇒ Russ. Korol’ Yakov II; Ital. Giovanni Paulo II ⇒ Russ. Ioan Pavel II.

References


Ukraine’s Changing Communicative Space

Destination Europe or the Soviet Past?

Marta Dyczok

Introduction and Theoretical Context

The collapse of communism in Europe triggered many new debates and new approaches among scholars, analysts, and politicians. What is Europe? Where are its boundaries? How can the enduring power of national identity be explained in the postmodern era when the nation was meant to be fading into oblivion? How and why do collective identities change? What role do the media and communications technology play in the process of social and political change? How are supranational identities created? Is there a European public sphere?

Amid all that has been written, the work of a number of scholars, or more specifically their ideas, stand out. Numerous new useful analytical and conceptual tools have been put forth for understanding/explaining relations between media, society, and power and the process of identity change. Common starting points are Habermas’s discussion of the “public sphere” (Habermas 1989) and Anderson’s classic study Imagined Communities (1983), where he demonstrates how important the press was in forging national identities in the nineteenth century. More recent scholarship converges in “soft constructivism,” with more or less a consensus emerging that there are no hegemonically defined identity categories, but rather that identities are fluctuating, relational, and situational constructs (Somers 1994).

Discussions about a European identity were occurring throughout the post–World War II era, well before the end of the Cold War. One dimension of the discussion was what role the media might play in constructing a common cultural identity. For example, in 1984 the European Commission issued a Green Paper titled “Television Without Frontiers,” where it asserted,

Information is a decisive, perhaps the only decisive factor in European unification . . . European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as a European identity. A European identity will
only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. At present, information via the mass media is controlled at the national level.¹

Commentators at the time and since noted the simplicity of this perspective (Schlesinger 1994).

Once the communist regimes began tumbling, the deliberations turned also to re-defining Europe. An early example was a special issue of the journal Daedalus titled, “Eastern Europe . . . Central Europe . . . Europe,”² where scholars from both sides of the crumbling iron curtain exchanged their ideas in print. These debates continue to the present, and touch on issues of inclusion (Evtukhov 2003), identity definition (Bruter 2003), cosmopolitanism (Rumford 2005), and a European public sphere (Dahl gren 2000; Downey and Koenig 2006; Schlesinger 1999).

The resurgence of interest in national identities that corresponded to the collapse of communism 1989–1991 also prompted new thinking on the nation, empire, borders, and identity (von Hagen 2004). One of the most widely cited studies is Brubaker’s Nationalism Reframed (1996), although the applicability of his concepts to contemporary Ukraine has been challenged (Kulyk 2001). Other well-known works include Walker Connor’s Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (1994), Ronald Grigor Suny’s The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1993), Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s Dynamics of Contention: Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (2000). Michael Keating’s Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (2001), as well as an edited collection of articles After Empire (Barkey and von Hagen 1997), which looks at empire from a comparative perspective. A controversial, yet innovative, proposal for labeling the space that was once called the Soviet Union, comes from Columbia University historian Mark von Hagen, who has proposed the term “Eurasia” as an antiparadigm (von Hagen 2004).

Around the same time, an entire literature appeared on the relationship between communications and globalization (Giddens 1990; Tomlinson 1994). After McLuhan’s “global village” (McLuhan 1962; McLuhan and Fiore 1968), among the most often cited became Castells’s ideas of a “media space,” as well as his concepts of “information age” and “network society” (Castells 1996–1998, 2000, 2004). He wrote that, the fundamental crisis of democracy in the Information Age was caused by “the convergent effects of the crisis of traditional political systems and the dramatically increased pervasiveness of the new media” (Castells 1997, 312). Slightly earlier, French sociologist Bourdieu and his followers began presenting arguments that the idea of “field” is a useful conceptual tool with which to analyze social relations in general, and media in particular (Benson and Neveu 2005; Bourdieu 1977; Couldry 2003). Bourdieu suggested that a useful way to deal with identity categories and identity change was to incorporate an examination of social interaction, institutional structure, and subjective meaning into the analysis.

Building on Bourdieu’s ideas, Jennifer Todd recently argued that, “We need to recognize not just the complex and varying meanings of these categories and their
lack of fixed or foundational status, but also their social ‘embeddedness’ and their personal ‘anchorage,’ which allow change or stasis to occur out of phase with other variables, and to affect them in turn” (Todd 2005, 433). For this she finds Bourdieu’s idea of habitus useful. When looking at factors causing change in collective identity categories, she suggests, “In a society structured throughout by a key set of power relations, radical change in these relations will also cast in doubt the oppositional elements of the collective identity category and their interrelations with other elements. . . . Then individuals are forced to re-sort the elements of their identity” (ibid., 439).

This seems a useful way of looking at the processes of identity change occurring in Ukraine. Gorbachev and glasnost unleashed a set of forces that undermined and ultimately destroyed existing Soviet power structures. With that came a shift in categories of collective identity: when the Soviet Union imploded, a Soviet identity category disappeared, forcing former Soviet citizens to find new ways of self-definition. New questions arose, with which both politicians and scholars grapple: what do these new identities entail? How are national identities being constructed and what does it mean to be Ukrainian today? To what degree are individuals drawing on embedded identity components from the pre-Communist era, and to what degree elements of the Soviet identity continue to exist in subaltern forms? Which supranational identity do Ukrainians aspire to—a European, Atlantic-centered one, or looking north toward Russia, identifying with entities ambiguously labeled Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Vashanov 2005), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), (Alekseyev and Mikhailov 2000; Zhelein 2002, 15), or perhaps Eurasia? What role were media playing in the shaping of these new identities? Is the digital divide significant in this process? Harvard University’s Pippa Norris writes,

> Politics and relations among individuals in societies across the world are being transformed by new technologies for targeting individuals and sophisticated methods for shaping personal messages. The new technologies challenge boundaries of many kinds—between news, information, entertainment and advertising; between media, with the arrival of the World Wide Web; and even between nations. (Norris 2000, iii)

How does this affect Ukrainians, and how can answers to these questions be quantified?

**Media and Identity in Ukraine**

Ukraine’s identity is still very much in the process of change. There continues to be a lack of consensus in society over not only national identity but also supranational identity: is Ukraine part of Europe or leaning more toward Russia or Eurasia? The diverse perspectives demonstrate divergences in political culture. Scholars have been debating issues of identity, language, and culture for over a decade with little consensus emerging. Many adopt the binary scheme of depicting Ukraine defined by divisions of East and West, some drawing on various political science or postcolonial
conceptual schemes (Arel 1995; Barrington and Heron 2004; Fournier 2002; Hrytsak 2002; Kuzio 2002; Pavlyuk 2007; Riabchuk 2001a; Shulman 2005; Wilson 1998). For the most part, the mass media have been overlooked by these analysts, which is unfortunate since they constitute an important institution that provides an insight into the process of change. This chapter suggests that media not so much shape identity, as constructivists suggest, but rather that the media reflect the various changes and conflicts in collective categories of identity in Ukraine, and the continued ambiguity of this process (Curran 2000). Bourdieu’s ideas are useful for explaining this development. Power structures changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this precipitated a change in self-identification and collective categories of identity among inhabitants of the Soviet Union, including Ukrainians. Since identity categories are complex and multiple (gender, class, ethnicity, region, etc.), the process whereby they transform are intricate. The media and communications sphere are an institution of power, Castells would argue a key power institution, and thus central to the process of change (1997, 312–317).

When Ukraine declared independence on August 24, 1991, it had few attributes of statehood and no control over the main levers of power on its territory. The currency was the Soviet ruble, the military was the Red Army, and mass media were part of the centrally controlled Soviet communications network. All of these were controlled by elites in Moscow, not Kyiv. Among the first steps the newly independent Ukraine took was to introduce its own currency and create its own armed forces (Dyczok 2000). However, it took a number of years before Ukraine created its own communicative space, and this occurred during the tenure of the second president, Leonid Kuchma. Upon becoming president, Kuchma embarked on an ambitious program of economic reform, a large part of which involved creating a market economy (Kravchuk 2003). As part of this process, Ukraine’s media space also underwent privatization. The year 1995 was crucial. Kuchma took two important steps toward creating a Ukrainian communications sphere: the TV broadcast signals were taken over from Russia and put under Ukrainian control (Mashchenko 1998) and two of the three national TV stations were transferred to private hands. Thus two channels, Studio 1+1 and INTER3 were born, and they have been leaders in Ukraine’s broadcast space from the outset.

Founders of the two private stations with national broadcast reach, however, had different conceptions about what sort of TV stations they wanted to create, which illustrates the diverse visions of identity and orientation that existed in Ukraine in the mid-1990s. Studio 1+1 came together through the efforts of three individuals: Oleksandr Rodniansky, a Kyiv-born filmmaker who had spent the late 1980s working in Germany, Vadym Rabinovych, a somewhat controversial early Ukrainian businessman, and U.S. billionaire Ronald Lauder. Their vision was very much Western and European oriented. “It [the channel] was supposed to be substantively Ukrainian, and as such was meant to play a role in social change in the country,” recounts Ol’ha Herasymyuk (2004), one of the station’s big stars and early employees. From the beginning it broadcast
only in the Ukrainian language, and projected a hip, youthful image from the screen, initially broadcasting Western films. Rodniansky’s experience of having lived in West Germany for a few years, Rabinovych’s intuitive understanding of the importance of advertising, and Lauder’s desire to create an East European media holding combined to create a new kind of TV station for Ukraine. The channel reaches approximately 98.7 percent of the country’s urban inhabitants, and has consistently been in either first or second place in the ratings. Recent data show that the largest audience share is women ages four to forty-four.

The creators of INTER had very different ideas about television. Ievhen Pluzhnikov, Kyïv businessman, key member of the powerful Kyïv clan, and SDPU(o) party, was the main actor in creating INTER. He looked to the Ukrainian state and Russia for partners, bringing in the State Property Fund Russian TV company, ORT, as investment partners. He thought of the TV station as both a political instrument and a business, and from the beginning was oriented on the Russian market. The channel broadcast in the Russian language, and until 2005 a high percentage of programming was produced in Russia, most notably the news. INTER used the show VREMYA, the traditional Soviet, then Russian, evening news, as their main evening news program until 2001. The channel has the best technical broadcast reach in the country, reaching an estimated 99.4 percent of urban audiences, and has consistently been a leader in the ratings, most often in first place. According to one market research firm, in recent years, mainly people over forty-five have watched this channel. These two very different visions of contemporary Ukraine coexisted in the country’s communicative space, with each channel attracting large audiences and achieving commercial success within a few years, and continued even as censorship intensified in the wake of the Kuchmagate crisis (Dyczok 2006).

A third vision existed on the state-owned UT1, the First National Ukrainian Channel, which to a large extent retained its Soviet-era flavor, staff, and programming. Until reforms that followed after the Orange Revolution of 2004, the channel largely envisioned its role as serving the state rather than the public, continuing Soviet traditions. This channel has generally failed to do well in the ratings except for the short time it was under new management following the Orange Revolution.

Thus, a look at the transformation of the national television stations in Ukraine illustrates divergent visions by elites and the diverse preferences of Ukrainian viewers. Two very different, new TV stations were created with different supranational orientations, one Western and the other Russian, catering both to those who prefer European, Western, and Western-style programming, and those who like to tune in to Russian shows and news.

Both channels have been successful in that they have both consistently attracted large audiences and have been neck and neck in the ratings. This suggests that changes in institutional structures, in this case the creation of new, privately owned TV channels, coincided with shifting perceptions of subjective meaning, and arguably had an impact on changing social interaction via the media.

As Ukraine’s communicative space continues to grow and expand into new media
such as the Internet, a new issue has become problematic—the much discussed digital divide. Although the Internet first appeared in Ukraine in 1992 (Bebyk and Sydorenko 1998), usage did not grow significantly until after 2000, and although rates of usage are increasing quickly, the starting point was rather low. Some have suggested that the Internet played a major role in social change, namely, the Orange Revolution in 2004 (Prytula 2006), and although it was certainly a significant factor, the assertion seems an exaggeration. Less than 12 percent of the population had regular Internet access at the time, and studies show that the majority of Internet users were young urban professionals. This group includes residents of major cities such as Donetsk, which voted overwhelmingly for Yanukovych. As such, Ukraine’s network society resembles that of Russia, where a small portion of the population is well connected, even globally connected, whereas the majority of people are completely disconnected (Rantanen 2005). Therefore, it is difficult to speak about Ukraine as a network society but rather one characterized by a fragmented series of networks.

A Few Highlights from 2007

The continued variety in the collective categories of Ukrainians is visible in the spring of 2007, the time of this writing. Three examples will illustrate how some Ukrainians are increasing links with European institutional structures, and for others perceptions of identity categories remain tied with the Soviet past, while for still others a hybrid identity is emerging. This section will explore these developments by looking at three unrelated events from the spring of 2007, all of which explore identity issues in different ways: the Eurovision song contest, the way in which media chose to commemorate the anniversary of 1945’s VE Day, and the spring political crisis.

Eurovision 2007

For a number of years Ukraine has been participating in the somewhat bombastic European music extravaganza, *Eurovision*. Invented in 1956 by the European Broadcast Union, it is now the longest running television show in the world. Ukraine joined in 2003, while Leonid Kuchma was the country’s president. This suggests that even the semiauthoritarian elite had elements interested in becoming integrated into the European broadcast space, a version of a European public sphere, the critiques of the contest itself, and the rather loose criteria of Europeanness, which allow Israel and Turkey to participate notwithstanding.

A look at Ukraine’s Eurovision engagement provides an interesting perspective through which to view identity change and continuity, both at the institutional level and in terms of shifting meanings and social interaction. Ukraine won the top prize in 2004 with “Wild Dances” by Ruslana in 2004. According to the contest rules, the winner hosts the next competition, which meant that the 2005 Eurovision extravaganza was to be held in Kyiv, hosted by the Ukrainian broadcaster UT1. In one of those historic coincidences, this turned out to be the period of enthusiasm that followed the dramatic
events of the 2004 Orange Revolution. Heavy-handed state censorship had been lifted and efforts were under way to reform the media sector, create a public broadcaster, and generally improve state–media relations (Dyczok 2005). One of the revolution’s most active leaders, Taras Stetskiv, was charged with the responsibility of reforming the state broadcasting company, UT1, and preparing the Eurovision 2005 contest, which was perceived as a new calling card for Ukraine in Europe. These preparations were the result of both a newly found political will and the external stimulus of being a Eurovision member, and resulted in changes in the previously stodgy state broadcaster. Technology was upgraded in order to meet the demands of the other European broadcasters who would be relying on Ukraine for the main TV feed; journalistic standards were upgraded. In short, more changes occurred within those few months of 2005 than had been introduced in all the years since 1991.18

However, it was the 2007 Eurovision contest that sparked tremendous debate in Ukraine and beyond. Ukraine’s contestant that year was a surzhyk-speaking, nineteen-three-year-old drag queen, Vierka Serdiuchka, aka Andrii Danylko. He placed second with his song, “Dancing,” during which he repeated “Russia goodbye/Lasha Tumbai” a few times.20 This song caused a huge controversy. At one level, debates emerged about Ukraine’s identity and how it is presented to the world through popular culture, with a large diversity of views coming forth. Serdiuchka was a popular character on Ukrainian TV but controversial for his/her depictions of Ukrainian identity (Roulard 2007). After Eurovision, these expanded to how Ukraine can or should interact with Europe, and what sort of image was being presented. Views ranged from the seasoned Ruslana noting, “You cannot get Europe’s attention with ballet,”21 to TV personality Olha Herasymiuk complimenting him as “a brilliant showman . . . a sparkling combination of what we have in life, in society, in culture. Danylko makes fun of many things. . . . But I think a healthy nation can laugh at itself.”22 Longtime cultural and political player Mykola Zhulynsky admitted being “completely embarrassed as I watched the final of this year’s Eurovision. I never thought that such a personality could represent Ukraine,” while rock legend Oleh Skrypka, who lived and performed in Paris for many years, expressed an opinion that is much more in keeping with West European commentary when he said,

Eurovision—is a kind of cultural perversion. It slams people over the head, and publicity of such events insults the dignity of many people. It does not bring culture to the masses, but rather the opposite. . . . It is very difficult to comment on Eurovision because it is a rather absurd situation.23

Similar opinions have been circulating in Western Europe for years. In 1998 the Financial Times ran an article with the long title, “The Triumph of the Naff: Television Eurovision Song Contest: It’s rather like a family Christmas: everyone loathes it but nobody has the guts to cancel it.”24

At a completely different level, the two little words “Russia goodbye” sung tongue-in-cheek by the usually apolitical performer, caused an uproar in Russia and speculation in the European media. The conservative British paper, the Daily Telegraph ran a story with the provocative headline: “Drag queen starts Eurovision ‘Cold
commenting on Russia’s reaction to Danylko’s choice of song. The lyrics of Serdiuchka’s song, “Dancing,” appear, at first sight, to be almost meaningless. But for many Russians, they constitute a direct assault by a wayward neighbor on Moscow itself. At the root of the indignation is a refrain that appears to exhort the audience to sing “Russia goodbye,” wrote Adrian Blomfield from Moscow. (Danylko’s response was to deny that he had sung “Russia goodbye,” but rather “Lasha tumbai,” which, according to him, means churned butter in Mongolian.) “The more conspiratorial even see a hidden meaning in Serdiuchka’s German accent—apparently an attempt to compare Russia to the Nazis,” Blomfield reported. (The dancers wore Nazi-like uniforms and were goose-stepping Nazi style.) Danylko suffered serious professional consequences in Russia after his Eurovision performance. He went from being hugely popular to being blacklisted. In a few short months he went from being a household name in Russia, famous for depicting a post-Soviet train conductress with a Ukrainian flavor on his hit TV show “SV”, to being censored in August 2007. Negative comments first appeared on the Russian ORT TV channel show hosted by Andrei Malakhov, and this led to calls for boycotts in the Russian blogosphere. Once rumors of conflict with the ORT TV channel aired on Malakhov’s show, Danylko was edited out of the televised version of the popular annual pop show “Slavianskyi Bazar.” On August 1, 2007 it became public that he was being blocked from appearing on Russian television. According to the organizers of “Slavianskyi Bazar,” “Serdiuchka is not on any [Russian] channel now because Kostiantyn Ernst went to the Kremlin and personally convinced the authorities to make sure that Andrii Danylko will not be in our country anymore.”

Apart from being yet another indicator of the growing lack of tolerance in Putin’s Russia, one analyst suggests that this is the result of a drifting apart of post-Soviet Ukrainian and Russian identities, that there is increasingly less common ground between common Ukrainians and Russians (Khineyko 2007). It could also be interpreted that with changes in institutional structure, subjective meanings are also changing, as Bourdieu suggests. What Danylko meant with his song is open to interpretation, but seems part of the process of changing identities, and might be seen in the same vein as Todd’s commentary on “different ways of constructing identity categories—the meanings of these cannot be read through official discourse—there are many ways to ‘Be Irish’ or to ‘be Basque’ quite different from official views, they may not be adequately represented by politicized contest in the public sphere” (Todd 2005, 429, 438). Perhaps this is Danylko’s way of “being Ukrainian.” This example demonstrates how the media are important vehicles for the debates surrounding representation of Ukrainian identity both domestically and internationally, and the existence of this discourse suggests a dynamism and openness that was previously missing.

**The Media’s 2007 Depiction of the 1945 End of World War II**

Another illustration of how media reveal the diversity and debates on identity can be seen in the way in which the end of World War II was depicted in Ukraine’s media in
2007. This demonstrates the staying power of Soviet identity in Ukraine. Differences in Soviet and Western celebrations of the victory over the Axis powers began as far back as May 1945, when the allies could not agree on which day to designate for Victory Day, and these differences continued through the entire postwar era (Judt 2005; Overy 1998). As the Cold War deepened, both sides developed practices of commemoration that included a glamorization of the conflict, each respective country highlighting its accomplishments. A large part of this was the narrative as told through film and later, television. For example, Hollywood produced *Hogan’s Heroes* and the Soviet Union created the indestructible spy, Colonel Max Otto von Stirlitz in the *Seventeen Moments of Spring*. Historians would describe this as constructing a historical memory through mass media representation.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the states that emerged from the USSR began to reevaluate the historical narrative that Soviet historians had produced—the reclaiming of history and rewriting of textbooks was in fact a large part of the glasnost phenomenon. In the Baltic States this process has moved along most quickly. The three small states that have also progressed quickly towards European institutions have also produced new narratives of World War II that depict the Soviet Union as an aggressor against them, despite the tensions this has caused with their Russian minority populations and Moscow. None of them attended the grand fiftieth anniversary celebrations of VE Day in Moscow in 1995, and in the spring of 2007, Estonia took the step of moving from the center of town a Soviet-era monument of a statue of a soldier (the monument had a sign in Russian). Parliament made the decision that statue was a symbol of Soviet occupation, and proceeded with the removal despite protests from Moscow and local Russians.

In Ukraine the situation is a lot more mixed, in large part due to the more complex pre-communist history the country had experienced. Yet the Soviet historical narrative depicted Ukrainian partisans (Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia, UPA), who had fought against both the Nazis and the Soviet Union, as enemies of the Motherland and fascist collaborators. Soviet post–World War II films were rather black and white in designating heroes and villains.

What is interesting is how the grand narrative is being revised in Ukraine in the post Soviet years. Although there has been much debate among historians and throughout the media, this remains a very sensitive and controversial subject. Red Army veterans tend to be pillars of the Communist Party in Ukraine’s electorate, while UPA veterans and their descendants have been active in pro-independence moves since the mid-1980s. After 1991 they have been asking that their contribution to Ukraine’s independence drive be recognized as well as requesting veteran status and compensation.

Throughout the 1990s and even the early 2000s, these issues were debated in academic circles and on the streets during commemorative days. When Yushchenko became president he called on all sides to work together to come to an understanding and consensus on the past. Yet in 2007, there was a surprising reversion to a nostalgic Soviet-style commemoration of the event of VE Day and a curious lack of debate or critical analysis. All of the TV stations were broadcasting Soviet-era movies.
about the war—in the words of political scientist Volodymyr Kulyk, “The schedule of all TV stations was filled with Soviet films and songs, and this pushed out almost all other programming.”\(^\text{38}\) What he also noted was that many viewers did not seem to notice that they were not receiving an objective picture of the war. Kulyk lamented, “Being so used to Soviet lies, after the shock of Gorbachev’s glasnost, she (a viewer) does not expect the truth from the media, and thus does not notice that many things are missing from the celebratory stories.”\(^\text{39}\) His explanation was that in part this was due to the political tensions that existed in the country, and he blamed journalists and TV producers for not fulfilling their media tasks.

Journalist Roman Chaika commented on this phenomenon in a more direct way in his article on the popular Web site Ohliadach, where he expressed his frustration with the omnipresent Russian media and cultural product in Ukraine’s capital, Kyïv. “What forces a Kyïvite to be in the information-propaganda space of Moscow and the Kremlin?” he wrote in frustration after popping into a café in central Kyïv for lunch. Confronted with the TV blaring, tuned to the Russian channel RTR, he posed the questions, “Why are all the Ukrainian channels once again broadcasting Stalinist agit-prop in prime time, for half of the month of May?”\(^\text{40}\) Why do they continue to broadcast lies about UPA and Nuremberg on TRK Ukraina?”\(^\text{41}\)

He noted that there was much discussion about this circulating on the Internet, a sign of an active network society, yet expressed disillusionment with the generation that followed his. Looking back at 1989, when anything associated with the Soviet Union and Stalin was reviled, he said the youth then did everything they could to disassociate themselves from the status quo, whether it was wearing forbidden jeans or listening to the denounced music of Pink Floyd or U2. Today’s generation wears T-shirts with the retro USSR logo.\(^\text{42}\) An article on the media Web site Telekritika noted the same trend, with Andrii Kokotiukha writing about the growing popularity of media products with Soviet-era themes, such as the new Channel 1+1 series, Death to Spies (Smert’ Shpionam—SMERSH—the infamous Soviet counterintelligence agency).\(^\text{43}\) What he failed to notice was that he had slipped into the mentality that Chaika and Kulyk comment on, when he wrote, “They capture not imagined ‘enemies of the people’ but real enemy spies.”\(^\text{44}\) Kokotiukha had adopted the Soviet perspective on “us” and “them,” unconsciously presenting the Soviet historical construct uncritically. This phenomenon suggests that identity change is not unidirectional or linear, and at times contradictory.

**The Spring 2007 Political Crisis**

Yet another series of events that shed light on changing identity in Ukraine are the developments that began on April 2, 2007, when President Yushchenko issued a decree dismissing Parliament and calling for new elections.\(^\text{45}\) A look at the mass media provides interesting insight into the ongoing political standoff in Ukraine. Because the country finally has a relatively free media, the behavior of the various political actors is reasonably visible. Their actions toward media, in turn, reveal the divergence in political values that is at the heart of the crisis.\(^\text{46}\)
From their actions, it seems that Yushchenko and Yanukovych have very different ideas about the relationship between the media and the state. Since becoming president, Yushchenko has adopted a liberal approach to media policy, with minimal state intervention beyond general regulatory measures and overseeing a slow process of removing the state from media ownership. He has allowed media to write, print, broadcast, and post whatever they wish, and this has allowed freedom of speech to flourish for the first time in the country’s recent history. Despite facing constant criticism from the media, Yushchenko has not taken any steps to reintroduce state-sponsored censorship; this is the behavior of a democratic leader. Where Yushchenko falls short is in doing little to introduce or facilitate structural changes that would help consolidate these gains.

Prime Minister Yanukovych and his coalition partners are taking advantage of this and gradually moving to reestablish control—the creeping coup. Their behavior toward media suggests that their political culture remains stuck in pre-2004 semiauthoritarianism. A telling incident occurred shortly after the Party of Regions began its political comeback. On July 12, 2006, only a few months after the elections, Party of Regions lawmaker Oleh Kalashnikov attacked two journalists just outside Parliament. The journalists, Marharyta Sytnyk and Volodymyr Novosad from STB television, had the audacity to film him near the Verkhovna Rada. Despite a major outcry from journalists, Kalashnikov faced no consequences—he continues to sit in Parliament and make statements about the importance of constitutional government and the rule of law.47

Since the Kalashnikov incident, attacks on the media, some physical, have increased. A recent example took place on March 30, 2007, when Crimean journalists Olena Mekhanyk and Oleksandr Khomenko from the Chornomorskaia TV station were attacked as they filmed coalition supporters boarding trains headed for Kyïv.48 Kuchma-era tactics such as legal actions, harassment, and other forms of intimidation have been on the rise. The pioneering Ukraïns’ka pravda Web site has been sued six times over the past six months by parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Moroz.49 Renat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest man and an influential member of the Party of Regions, recently launched legal action against the popular Web site obozrevatel, after its reporter Tetiana Chornovil found some old neighbors from Akhmetov’s hometown of Oktiabrske and published a series of stories about his youth.50

The Yanukovych team has also slowly been trying to reestablish structural control over the media. After the 2006 parliamentary elections, the majority coalition (the Communists, Socialists, and Party of Regions) appointed its own loyalists, Eduard Prutnyk and Ihor Chaban, to head the State Committee for TV and Radio Broadcasting.51 On March 20, 2007, the state-controlled Ukrainian National Television Channel 1 canceled its only political debate program, “Toloka.” This came one day after Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine leader Viacheslav Kyrylenko were guests on the show and had positive comments from 80 percent of callers.52 There was also a coup attempt in the parliamentary Freedom of Speech Committee, which is led by a Tymoshenko ally and lawmaker Andrii Shevchenko. Part of the committee met without him and elected Party of Regions lawmaker Olena Bondarenko acting head on April 26.53
Two important international dimensions are interesting to note. For the first time in Ukraine’s recent history, all political elites began appealing to Western public opinion, despite renewing pressures on media at home. Yanukovych has made a point of meeting regularly with Western diplomats stationed in Kyiv as well as making statements in Western newspapers. Socialist leader and presidential opponent Oleksandr Moroz published his thoughts on the crisis in the pages of the International Herald Tribune, not Izvestia. This is a huge change from 2004, when their focus was on Moscow.

Equally important, the tone of Western reporting on Yanukovych and the coalition has changed, too. On April 22, 2007, a Sunday Telegraph article described the Ukrainian prime minister as “a former weight lifter and onetime racing driver,” who speaks “in the soft baritone that accompanies his deceptively mild manner” when he explains that “the Ukrainian people have an old democratic tradition.” No mention was made of his criminal record, the well-reported falsification of the 2004 election, or the creeping coup d’état that precipitated the current crisis.

The struggle between these two political blocs and their very different political cultures is likely to be ongoing. The degree and nature of state intervention into the work of the media will remain an important indicator of just how far democratic consolidation has progressed in Ukraine.

Conclusion

The contradictory evidence presented here suggests that the process of identity shift is complex, as many theorists have argued. The media in Ukraine reflect the diversity of opinion and perspective, as well as the fluidity of collective identity categories, as they change in response to changing power structures, institutional realignments, and adaptation of values. Change can be stimulated by external factors, such as the Eurovision contests of 2004 and 2005, and the upcoming 2012 Euro Football Finals to be held in Ukraine and Poland. Analysts are already noting the promise of change and improvement in areas such as the railway system, which are upgrading now to meet the anticipated transport needs.

On the other hand, subaltern categories of Soviet identity seem surprisingly persistent, and not only among the generation of pensioners. The role of media, including new media such as the Internet, is difficult to quantify, but should be regarded as part of the larger changes occurring, rather than through a narrow media lens. This chapter has suggested that looking at media developments provides insight into how society is changing, and that the media reflect rather than shape public opinion. Despite the coming down of artificial political barriers between East and West, Ukrainians are still struggling with answers to the questions of what trends in national and supranational identity will eventually evolve. New technology is affecting these processes, but the country is a very good example of the digital divide, where part of the population is globally connected while the majority is completely disconnected, even domestically. More traditional political, cultural, and economic means, both domestic and international, such as elections and music contests, are likely to continue shaping
these processes for the foreseeable future. In some ways, this is not too different from processes of changing, fluid identity that are visible in many European countries as they grapple with issues of European integration, migration, and changing global cultural patterns.

Notes

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4. For the official history of the channel, see www.1plus1.net/info.

5. For the official history of the channel, see www.inter.ua/ua/about.html.

6. This chapter uses these examples of change in national TV broadcasters to illustrate the changes in media and the communicative space more generally. For a summary of their ratings see the Telekritika Web site, www.telekritika.com.ua.


10. Interview with Mustafin, Kyiv, September 26, 2006. Originally, ORT owned 30 percent, the maximum foreign ownership allowed under Ukrainian legislation, the State Property Fund owned 25 percent, and Pluzhnikov owned the rest. When the SPF had no funds to invest in the company, they handed their shares over to Pluzhnikov.


13. For the official history of the channel, see www.1tv.com.ua.


15. Ukraine became a participant in 2003, and the show attracts anywhere from 100 million to 600 million viewers worldwide. See www.bbc.co.uk/radio2/eurovision/2007/.

16. It should be noted that Russia also participates in this contest. For a larger discussion see Laura Spierdijk and Michel Vellekoop (2006).


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


30. Kostiantyn Ernst is the CEO of Russian ORT TV.


36. It was divided among the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires until World War I, then partitioned between four states: the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the interwar period. Because of their lack of statehood, during the World War II, Ukrainians were forced to fight in various military formations on both sides of the struggle. Nationalist-minded leaders created the Ukrainian underground army (UPA) whose aim was to create a Ukrainian state, and despite fielding the largest counterinsurgency ever against the Soviet Union, it was ultimately unsuccessful. After World War II ethnolinguistic Ukrainian territories were united for the first time in modern history, ironically by Stalin, but UPA continued its activities until the early 1950s.


39. Ibid.


41. TRK Ukraina is a TV station owned by Renat Akhmetov who is one of the key figures in the Party of Regions.


44. Ibid.

46. These ideas were originally presented in Dyczok (2007).


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On May 15, 2004 Ruslana Lyzhychko, a singer from Ukraine, won the 49th Eurovision Song Contest, a globally televised competition among musical acts representing countries whose national broadcasting organizations are members of the European Broadcasting Union (“Rules”). Notwithstanding frequently ironic media commentary concerning the competition’s musical standards and the partisanship displayed in some countries’ voting behavior, the Eurovision Song Contest is widely popular. The audience in 2004 was estimated to be 100 million, and almost 4.3 million viewers participated in the televoting (“Record Numbers”). The Contest implies an idea of Europe not limited by membership in the European Union, nor even by location within the traditional geographical borders of the European continent: the thirty-six participants in 2004 included countries that were not on the EU accession timetable (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus), as well as Middle Eastern countries (Turkey and Israel). The contest thus confronts a large number of television viewers with questions of the delimitation of Europe and of the grounds on which a European identity may be claimed.1

It might be expected that in countries that are newcomers to the European Song Contest participation would trigger debates concerning the newcomer’s relationship to Europe, and therefore to other neighbors, partners and interlocutors—debates that are also about the national identity of the new participant. In the case of Ukraine, which was represented in the Contest for the first time in 2003, such a discussion was intensified in 2004 by Ruslana’s success. Media commentary and internet chat speculated at various levels of sophistication on the impact of the Ruslana phenomenon, not only on the prospects for Ukraine’s integration into Europe, but also on the nature and strength of the forms of national self-identification among residents of Ukraine. In doing so, these responses to Ruslana took their place in a tradition that includes the debates on the desirability of a Western orientation for a modern Ukrainian culture at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and again in the 1920s. They also echoed the motifs of much Western scholarship on Ukraine, which has sought to choose between models of Ukraine as essentially cohesive or, alternatively, as
polarized between two orientations, one Ukrainian and pro-European, the other
pro-Russian and Eurasian.  

The following reflections address the Ruslana phenomenon as an implicit intervention in this ongoing discussion. The convenience of adopting a rhetorical perspective for this inquiry lies in the fact that such an approach compels simultaneous attention to the three components of the rhetorical situation: the vehicle of communication (the “speech”—in this case, the verbal and nonverbal components of Ruslana’s performance, as well as her subsequent interpretation of it for the media); the “orator,” conceived of as seeking to persuade an audience to adopt an attitude favorable to certain interests; and the audience to which the speech is addressed, imagined as a body empowered to determine the issue at stake in a way favorable or otherwise to the interests represented by the speaker. In the case of Ruslana’s performance at the Eurovision contest, as in most cases where a rhetorical model is superimposed upon a cultural artifact, only the “speech”—the artifact itself—is readily available for analysis. The interests on whose behalf the orator pleads, on the other hand, and the values and predispositions of the implied audience, need to be inferred from the speech. The Ruslana phenomenon, we shall demonstrate, articulates arguments in favor of conferring upon Ukrainian culture the dignity of presence in Europe and the world equally with the cultures of other modern nations. Different aspects of these arguments address the component parts of Ruslana’s audience in different ways.

Ruslana’s “Wild Dances” performance alluded musically and visually to the folklore of the Hutsuls, indigenes of the Ukrainian part of the Carpathian Mountains. Much of the global reportage of her Eurovision victory interpreted her act as incorporating elements of this ethno-cultural heritage into a contemporary musical and showbiz idiom. But the connection between Ruslana and folklore was not one that she cultivated from the beginning of her career. Ruslana Lyzhychko, born in Lviv in 1973, attended the school attached to the Lviv Conservatory in the piano class and studied choral conducting at the Lviv State Institute for Higher Musical Education, graduating in 1995. Her success as a popular singer commenced in 1993, when she received a commendation for her performance at the Chervona Ruta festival in Donetsk. She proceeded to collect grand prizes at the Ukrainian television festival “Melodiia-94” and the Slavic Bazaar-96 festival in Vitebsk. In 1994 she cofounded, with her producer and future husband Oleksandr Ksenofontov, the recording studio Luxen that specialized in high-quality advertising for the electronic media. Ruslana embarked on a series of musical projects, some connected to broader cultural agendas. The “Dzvinkyi viter” [Resonant Wind] project (1996–1998) included a concert celebrating 500 years since the European Renaissance. Performed in the Lviv Opera House and at Olesko Castle with a rock group, symphony orchestra and choir, the concert anticipated Ruslana’s 1998–1999 project, “Tour of the Castles of Ukraine,” proceeds from which supported the restoration of historical monuments. In 1998 Ruslana commenced the “Myt’ vesny” [Moment of Spring] project that involved, in addition to the publication of two albums, the production of the video clip “Svitanok” [Dawn] in which Ruslana first invoked the theme of the Carpathians. This was fully developed in the large-budget
clip “Znaiu ia” [I know, 2002], with its Carpathian panoramas shot from helicopters and its crowd scenes featuring Hutsuls in folk costume, and in the album that followed, “Dyki tantsi” [Wild Dances].

The deliberate use of folk elements within a musical idiom that was not itself based in folklore was no innovation of Ruslana’s, but a venerable feature of art music and popular music in general, and in Ukraine in particular. A directory of Ukrainian popular music from the 1950s to 2004 that listed 315 groups and performers made reference in 46 entries to the musicians’ utilization of folk material. The nature of the appropriation varied. Many performers were identified as reproducing folksongs in contemporary arrangements (e.g., Vatra, Trio Marenychi, Medobory, Mariika Burmaka, Rosava), a few as seeking authenticity through imitation of folk sources recorded in the course of field research (Andriïvskyi uzviz, Alla Kudlai, Pysanka), some as representing folk rock in at least part of their repertoire (Hodzadva, Berezen, Bunker Io), others as combining folk with jazz rock (Braty Blizu, Dzhaz eksprompt, Kobza, Enver Izmairlov with his Crimean Tatar sources), and others still as producing folk punk (Dzhemiks, Nostalghia za mezozoiem, Republika). While these musicians in some instances achieved recognition throughout Ukraine or in the whole of the Soviet or post-Soviet realm, as well as in the limited market constituted by Ukrainian diaspora communities, none reached an audience that was even comparable to Ruslana’s at the time of her Eurovision victory and immediately afterwards.

Ruslana’s performance at the Eurovision grand final had a television audience so huge and diverse that it would be difficult to generalize about its reactions. Part of this audience consisted of potential televoters in the participating countries other than Ukraine (Eurovision rules exclude viewers from voting for the act representing the country in which they vote). By participating in the competition, Ruslana undertook to perform for this audience in a way that, in the first instance, would persuade it that her act was worthy of the highest score. At the same time, her performance sustains interpretation as an appeal to this audience to modify its perception of, and attitude toward, the country Ruslana was representing. Non-voting viewers in Ukraine, however, were the most important audience as far as any identity-shaping rhetoric was concerned. The large number of responses to Ruslana’s victory in the Ukrainian media and in electronic forums necessarily remains only a sample of the reaction of the domestic audience as a whole. In the absence of systematic opinion research it is not possible to make sustainable statements about the ways in which the Ruslana phenomenon influenced its audience. It is, however, possible to analyze Ruslana’s performance in such a way as to clarify the nature of the audience that it presupposes and the ways in which it sets about acting upon that audience.

Every part of Ruslana’s Eurovision performance is rhetorically relevant: the music, the dance movements of the singer and her five accompanying dancers, the special effects, and the words of the song, “Wild Dances,” quoted below in the bilingual (English and Ukrainian) text as actually performed at the Eurovision grand final:
Just maybe I’m crazy.
The world spins round and round and round.
Shydy-rydy dai, shydy-rydy dana. (2x)

I want you to want me
As I dance round and round.
Shydy-rydy dai, shydy-rydy dana. (2x)

Forever and ever—
Go, go, go, wild dancers!

*Refrain:*
Dai-na, dai-na, wanna be loved,
Dai-na, dai-na, gonna take my wild chances,
Dai-na, dai-na, freedom above
Dai-na, dai-na-da, I’m wild ‘n’ dancing.

Гей!

Напевно даремно
Була я надто чемна
Shydy-rydy dai, shydy-rydy dana. (2x)

Для тебе, для себе
Застелю ціле небо.

Гей!
Shydy dai, shydy-rydy dana. (2x)

Без жалю запалю.7
Go, go, go, wild dancers!

[Refrain]

Dance forever! Come and be mine!
Dance together till the end of time!
Dance together!
Go, go, go, wild dancers!

Students of pop music disagree over whether the words of a pop song play a major part in the song’s overall impact on its listeners (Griffiths 40–41). Given the likelihood that only a small minority of the many Eurovision viewers heard “Wild Dances” more than once or outside of the context of dozens of other competing performances,
and given the emphasis in Ruslana’s performance on visual and musical effects, it is likely that awareness of the text of the song was not acute among members of the world-wide audience of the Eurovision Song Contest. On the other hand, it is plausible to assume that the audience of fans at home, exposed to intense media repetition of “Wild Dances” in the wake of its Eurovision success, came to be relatively familiar with the text, even though the bulk of it was in English.

There are two significant components of the song’s textual rhetoric for the “global” listener: the construction of the character of the song’s lyrical “I” as attractive and deserving emulation; and the affirmation, thereby, of the human qualities and social attitudes manifested in that character. The “I” of the song is a woman who dances as the words of the song articulate her feelings and thoughts. The dancer’s spinning movement causes her to experience alienating psychic sensations (“the world spins round and round and round”) and to entertain doubts about her purchase on reality (“just maybe I’m crazy”). Yet this state of consciousness is not deplored, but approved: “Freedom above,” the dancer exclaims, celebrating her condition by interpreting it as the expression of one of the most revered ideals of the European philosophical and political tradition.

The lyrical “I” also identifies herself as “wild”: her condition is one of pre-civilizational naturalness, perhaps of noble savagery. In this wildness, and especially in its visual equivalent, the female body partly revealed in its “primitive” attire, there is an element of accommodation to what Edward Said in his reflections on Flaubert recognized as the image of the Oriental as feminized and eroticized, and thereby rendered the object of (Western, masculine) desire for sexual domination as pars pro toto for colonial domination in general (186–90; 207–8). But Ruslana’s lyrical “I” enacts a refutation of the Orientalist stereotype. By association with the wild beast, she has strength, and it is strength that inflects her attitude toward love. In the English-language part of the text the lyrical “I” runs no risk of becoming vulnerable through dependence on the reciprocal feeling of another. Rather, her wish is to be the object of the other’s sexual desire (“I want you to want me”). It is the potential lover, the “you,” who is to be the dependent party in this asymmetrical love, while the “I” retains freedom and control.

The part of the lyrics that is accessible, because it is in English, to a broad, culturally varied audience, makes an argument affirming civilizational values firmly associated with the European Enlightenment tradition. The song invites its listeners to identify or re-identify with a character who embodies freedom that flows from the autonomy of the subject’s consciousness and expresses itself through control of that subject’s destiny. This emancipatory argument is given a contemporary edge by its superimposition over a feminist grid: the autonomy celebrated here is that of a woman who has outgrown emotional dependence.

Related to the song’s argument about freedom is its celebration, in its English-language sections, of present pleasure. The identity of the lyrical “I” is not revealed to the global Anglophone audience except as participating in the giddy, exciting present of the dance, to the exclusion of considerations of before and after. The
argumentation of “Wild Dances” that addresses the general audience, then, fits comfortably with the combination of individualism and hedonism that many would see as paradigmatic for the life-practices of contemporary Western societies. In this respect, Ruslana’s performance at Eurovision is a profession of civilizational faith: for the general listener, “Wild Dances” is a proclamation of solidarity with the prevailing values, beliefs and practices of the civilizationally dominant West. It is a claim to belong to a modern global community conceptualized as Western in its fundamental features.

These claims to membership in a global world are also addressed to Ruslana’s domestic audience, but the argumentation of “Wild Dances” for listeners attuned to the Ukrainian cultural context contains important additional elements. To start with, the tone of the utterances that the lyrical “I” makes in Ukrainian is different from that of the parts sung in English. Contradicting the triumphal autonomism of the English-language text, the Ukrainian voice introduces the notion of altruistic and mutual passion (“Dlia tebe, dla sebe / zasteliu tsile nebo [For you, for me / I’ll make the heavens a bed]”). Departing from an exclusive focus on present experience, the Ukrainian-language text introduces narrative. There a past comes into view in which the heroine was “nadto chemna [too well-behaved],” suggesting not only an earlier time of innocence and chastity, but also adherence to a code of “chemnist’” [polite behavior] with distinctly old-world, middle-class connotations. Alluding to motifs familiar to the imagination of Romanticism (the grandeur of nature and its capacity to reflect the transcendental; yearning as a consequence of the deferral of happiness), the Ukrainian-speaking lyrical “I” projects the consummation of the love bond into the future and positions it against the sublime background of the firmament.

What rhetorical purpose may be attributed to this invocation in the Ukrainian text of a nostalgic model of femininity, of a Romantic narrative of emancipation from social constraint through idealized erotic fulfillment? Implicit in the difference of this Ukrainian-language discourse from that of the English-language parts of the song is the assumption that the Ukrainophone audience is still accustomed to an essentially Romantic framework for its emotional transactions. Thus, the brash individualism of dominance that is celebrated in the “international” text of the song is inflected for consumption by an audience imagined as more traditionalist and sentimental in its pre-dispositions. Viewed with an eye to its potential persuasive force, “Wild Dances” may be seen to propose to its domestic audience that the assertive and forceful emancipation celebrated by the song as a whole has a predecessor in, and is not so very different from, a Romantic emancipation that is more familiar and therefore acceptable.

The diction of the song alternates between two languages and a third kind of linguistic material: repetitions of variations on the incantation “shydy-rydy dana.” For the Ukrainophone audience, these sounds carry associations with the musical culture of the Hutsuls, natives of the Carpathian Mountains who maintained a pre-industrial lifestyle well into the twentieth century. The meaning of these refrains is as obscure to contemporary Ukrainians as it is to the global audience, but the sounds are easily recognized as ethnographic quotations that introduce into the song an element of the
archaic and the pre-civilizational, underscoring the positive value of “wildness” as an expression of the natural, on the one hand, and the heady, liberating quality of the dance on the other. All of these connections are emphasized, as we shall presently show, by costume and music.

An additional dimension of the rhetoric of Ruslana’s song that addresses the Ukrainophone audience concerns the issue of language choice. Decisions by speakers in various life situations to speak one language in preference to another are known to have considerable social meaning. Particular language choices may reproduce or challenge prevailing power arrangements (Berger xiv–xv), empowering or disempowering their speakers (Survilla 202). For Ukrainian audiences, the alternation between three language codes in “Wild Dances” constructs a cluster of arguments about identity. Switching between languages is common in songs sung at the Eurovision contest (as are performances in English only or the singer’s native language only). In the case of “Wild Dances,” the use of both English and Ukrainian functions as a demonstration of the singer’s loyalty to her native language, on the one hand, and of global cultural competence, on the other. The song demonstrates its capacity to participate in an international event according to the event’s expectations and rules, even though Ruslana herself, as distinct from her performer persona, was not a speaker of English. That the argument embodied in using the two languages was understood and approved by many in Ruslana’s domestic audience is suggested by numerous contributions to a pre-Eurovision forum dedicated to the issue of “the language of the song” on Ruslana’s web site. “National specificity” was so important for one discussant that he felt that “singing in English only would be wrong,” while conceding a few days later that “English is an international language, it’s an opening to Europe—a window, if you will” (“Ruslana Forums”). Ruslana herself claimed that she included Ukrainian text in her Eurovision performance “as a matter of principle” (Lyzhychko), linking her use of Ukrainian to the rhetoric of authenticity that her public relations apparatus utilized—her web site, for example, proclaimed in 2004 that “Ruslana is not an artificially created image. She is real” (“Biohrafiia”). But, for all that Ruslana stressed the primacy of her Ukrainian identity in media interviews at home and abroad, her Eurovision song enacted the possibility that a cultural artifact, and therefore its maker and its recipients, might function at several cultural levels simultaneously: the global, the national, and the regional.

Given this de facto creed of cultural pluralism, it is significant that “Wild Dances,” like Ruslana’s oeuvre as a whole, pays no regard to bilingualism and cultural polycentricity as they actually exist in early twenty-first century Ukraine, where the phenomenon of Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism is widespread, Russian-language print and electronic media outweigh their Ukrainian-language counterparts, and Ukrainian-language popular music competes with a dominant Russian-language music scene based in part in the Russian Federation, and in part in Ukraine itself. The absence of Russian from the otherwise polyvalent sphere of culturally relevant activity as projected by Ruslana is, of course, an argument. It shows the audience that not only the Ukrainian language, but even obscure incantations associated with a region of
Ukraine, can function successfully within the system of contemporary international culture, while offering no judgment about the role that Russian might play.

The politics of such silence is subtle. It avoids confrontation, the definition of in-groups and out-groups, and the division of the cultural world into friends and enemies. In this respect Ruslana’s implicit political rhetoric differed markedly from that of the protest rock of the late 1980s, which challenged its audiences to defend Ukrainian culture just as emphatically as it excoriated the Soviet regime. Because of its resentment toward the cultural practices of large numbers of Ukrainians whom it saw as victims of cultural Russification, Ukrainian protest rock appealed in the main to those who were already committed to Ukrainian culture. Ruslana, on the other hand, dealt tactfully in her public statements with the question of her relationship to Russian culture and Russia itself, taking pains to show that she considered the Russian Federation to be another European country, no more and no less: “we are working hard to prepare for a major European concert tour, which will include cities in Russia” (Kapustin). She formulated her reasons for touring the northern neighbor, not in terms of the mythological topoi of brotherly peoples and common Slavic roots, but of a businesslike desire to respond to the wishes of an audience: “I know for a fact that in Russia people are very fond of Ukrainian songs” (Chmylikova). In short, Ruslana avoided affirming old colonial hierarchies in her utterances concerning things Russian, but placed no political obstacles in the way of appreciation of her music by the Russophone section of her potential audience, thus allowing it the opportunity of initiating or deepening an identification with Ukrainian culture.

In Ruslana’s invocation of the culture of the Hutsuls the role of words is surpassed by that of music, dance and costume. The choreography of “Wild Dances” used dance steps derived from Hutsul dance. The trembita, a Hutsul folk wind instrument, featured prominently at the opening of the routine. Kuhykannia, a Hutsul method of throwing the voice to carry long distances in the mountains, played a role in the musical structure. Without diminishing the contemporary quality of “Wild Dances” as a musical and popular culture event, these motifs invoked old folkloric traditions associated with the Carpathian Mountains and argued for the archaic and therefore authentic quality of the sources from which Ruslana’s performance was said to derive its inspiration. In this combination of the contemporary with the archaic lies the nub of the song’s argument concerning the nature of human identity. According to this argument, human beings can and do exist simultaneously in several contexts, some of which might be particular and local, others global; some might emphasize presence in the contemporary world, others in a temporal continuum that embraces both the archaic and the modern. Competence within the context of global popular culture by no means contradicts participation in the context of Hutsul culture. Presence in the global context is evidence of the vitality and contemporary relevance of the unique life ways of the Carpathians, while the capacity of ancient Hutsul ways to be incorporated into a cultural form responding to present-day tastes and interests serves to remind the viewer that contemporary culture is nothing if not eclectic and hybrid. The audience for Ruslana’s “Wild Dances” is enticed to recognize modern human
identity as multipolar, associating the sense of self with not one but many contexts and communities, including universal humanity, on the one hand, and the particular national community defined by culture, on the other.

Such a rhetoric is not new. It is reminiscent of the earliest form of cultural nationalism as articulated in the 1780s by Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder retreated from the radical atomism of the Enlightenment and, in particular, from the view that the essence of humanity resides solely in the autonomy of the individual, expressed in that individual’s capacity independently to exercise the power of reason. Herder pressed his contemporaries to recognize the importance of interpersonal relations to the constitution of the human, in particular of the communication of knowledge that societies accumulated and that generations transmitted to each other through tradition. Parallel to Herder’s recognition and celebration of the unity of humanity was his vision of this universal humanity as a system of discrete but interrelated and intercommunicating cultures, differentiated from each other, for “everywhere . . . we find human beings possessing and exercising the right to form themselves into the kind of humanity that they themselves have recognized” (29: 218; pt. 3, bk. 15, I).

The vocation of humankind Herder conceived of as a quest for “humanity and happiness in this particular place, to this particular degree, as this particular link, and no other, of the chain of development that stretches through the whole human race” (28: 349; pt. 2, bk. 9, I). The “links” in the chain of humanity in Herder’s model were individuals, but also peoples—groups that derived their sense of identity and coherence through their association with the place where they lived and the way in which they lived. Herder’s was no nostalgic project extolling the archaic or idealizing the pre-modern or the parochial. His plea was for the progress of the whole of humanity, achieved through the progress of all of its component peoples, each in its own way dignified, and each contributing to humanity its particular experience and genius.

Broadly speaking, the Ruslana phenomenon two centuries later constituted an argument that was not dissimilar to Herder’s. Its goal could be perceived as the generation of a new sense of cohesion for a cultural community, and the justification, by demonstrating the dignity of that community, of its claim to an equal place in the broader community of humanity, to which it can make unique and valuable contributions. The context in which, according to Ruslana, the Ukrainian cultural community was to secure its development, was Europe. Participation in the Eurovision contest was in itself the exercise of a right to figure in the European context. Repeatedly, Ruslana claimed that she saw herself as deliberately asserting that right, pushing her way into Europe while maintaining intact and authentic the culture with which she associated herself. “We tried to carry our idea into Europe while protecting as much as possible the color of the Ukrainian text,” she told an interviewer (Koskin). Yet the incursion into Europe was not to be imagined as undertaken empty-handed. Ruslana effectively promoted the image of her songs as supplying an old and exhausted Europe with new energy, originality, recovered archaic authenticity, vitality, and even eros. The respected Ukrainian weekly Dzerkalo tyzhnia observed in an article titled “Wild
In the process of promoting [“Wild Dances”] Ruslana was at her best. She managed to remain sincere and enthusiastic to the end—and that, you'll agree, is infectious. Choking with excitement, she told romantic stories about going alone into the mountains, into remote villages where to this day television is unknown (I can imagine the astonishment of the European who discovered that such a wilderness exists in the very center of Europe), where the truly archaic has survived, where they work leather by hand and craft quaint trinkets over the long winter evenings, where there is an abandoned observatory—the very one where she set up her mobile studio and composed the album. There it is, the “life as art” that Grandma Europe has long been sighing for. There it is, real enthusiasm and naturalness, a primeval closeness to the earth and no less primeval a mysticism. This is where it springs from—this wildness, this energy, this strength. (Shchotkina)

Ruslana herself was no less eloquent, interpreting her cultural role as analogous to that of enthusiastic Romantic collectors and transmitters of the treasures of folklore. According to her account, the Lviv-born singer’s first visit to the Carpathians was revelatory: “my enthusiasm for this culture began to sparkle like a waterfall in the sun. I was so absorbed by it that it became my own. That’s why I’ve been able to communicate this culture: I’m fantastically in love with it [. . .]. I think it gives me strength and vitality—there’s something unique and special preserved in those mountains, something we can’t explain, but only apprehend with our hearts” (Koskin).

For all of Ruslana’s invocation of the archaic and primordial qualities of the culture she aimed to share with the rest of Europe, her system of argument contained no reference to history, that staple of Romantic cultural identity-building. The reason for this may be seen as related to her much-reported discontent with Ukraine being associated in the mind of the West chiefly with the Chornobyl nuclear disaster. Ruslana avoided seeking identity in history, because this would almost inevitably mean grounding identity in experiences of suffering and victimhood, and running the risk of contaminating collective identity with ressentiment toward the historical perpetrators and their contemporary heirs. The cultural community for whom Ruslana made herself an advocate had no room for images of the Other as enemy. Its object was to grow through inclusiveness, welcoming all who were attracted to it.

More explicit than Ruslana’s refusal of history was her rejection of the Soviet model of folklore. Ruslana promoted ethnos as a vibrant and productive component of the multifaceted cultural reality of the present, contradicting Soviet-era identification of ethnicity and its symbols with pre-modernity. Among the vehicles of cultural homogenization and control in the Soviet Union and its European satellites was the professionalization of ethnicity through the creation of privileged cultural enclaves in which traditional music, dance, arts and crafts, and even national literatures were allegedly cultivated, but in fact controlled by the state, refashioned through an overlay of Soviet ideology and nineteenth-century aesthetics, and consigned to slow extinction.
through loss of connection to the cultural needs of an increasingly urban and modern society (Kurkela 94–96). In such an environment it became difficult to use folk material without parody or condescension, and without making a connection between folklore and cultural backwardness. The Ukrainian term *sharovarshchyna*, derived from the name of the broad and brightly colored trousers favored by the Zaporozhian Cossacks, came to be applied to forms of cultural production where folklore was exploited in a coarse, exaggerated, or superficial way, confirming the prevailing stereotype of the ethnically specific as outdated and quaint. *Sharovarshchyna* embodies an attitude toward cultural roots that Ruslana emphatically rejected: “We turned to ethnos, not to *sharovarshchyna* [. . .]. I am a contemporary singer with ethnic interests who has seen [ethnic material] through fresh eyes. There may well be traditional views of Hutsul culture that are dear to some highland officials. But we’ve done something innovative—something bold and unforeseen” (Koskin).

Visually, Ruslana went to considerable lengths to distance herself and her group of performers from symptoms of *sharovarshchyna*. Indeed, the general appearance of the costumes used in “Wild Dances” scarcely alluded to Ukrainian ethnographic realities at all, and it is doubtful that the international media, which univocally reported on the Carpathian look of the performance, would have done so without prompting. The costumes were in various shades of black, with capes, leather, furs, whips, tattoos, and metal studs much in evidence, not to mention bare flesh exposed at midriff and knee. The relationship to the traditional clothes of the Hutsuls, where wool and sheepskin predominate, and white and red are the main colors, was not immediately apparent. Traditionally dressed Hutsuls had appeared in some of Ruslana’s clips, but in the case of “Wild Dances,” an act largely intended for the international audience of the Eurovision contest, costume served to render the performance more familiar by invoking well-known popular-culture images. In a somewhat sarcastic report *The Independent* recognized Ruslana’s allusions to the television serial “Xena the Warrior Princess” and commented on the eroticized tone of the performance, referring to Ruslana’s “post-operative trans-sexual dancers” (Gold). *The Times* was alert to the sadomasochistic dimensions of the performance, coyly remarking on its use of leather, fur, and whips (“Ukrainian Singer Ruslana”). At the simplest level, then, the costumery of the Ruslana ensemble signaled participation in one of the most widespread practices of contemporary global popular culture: the sexualization of cultural products in the interests of enhancing their market appeal. The costumes joined the other strategies deployed by Ruslana to assert presence in the cultural mainstream.

But the costumes also contributed to the song’s arguments about emancipation and power. The invocation of the contemporary popular-culture figure of the “tough girl” (Inness 4–5) reinforced the image of the lyrical “I” as forceful and dominant, and asserted distance from the stereotypes of woman as victim, mother or protec-tress familiar in Ukrainian culture. “In these clothes,” Ruslana confided, “we felt ourselves to be true Amazons—at once sexual and warlike” (Lyzhychko). As for the sadomasochistic attributes with which the costumes were replete, these may be read as serving the argument of presenting as object of identification a self defined
by power and by rejection of the status of victim. After all, “escape from both the practice and legacies of hierarchy” (Simon 132) has been regarded as one of the significant functions of sadomasochism.

At home such a radical revision of cherished ethnographic symbols caused controversy. Not all Ukrainian commentators were as forgiving as the reader of L’vivs’ka hazeta who wished Ruslana success in spite of detecting in her dancers “a hybrid of the Hutsul, the Cossack and the sadomasochist with his whip” (“Ievrobachennia”). Addressing a Ukrainian cultural system imagined as more conservative than that of the international audience, Ruslana’s publicity promoted the visuals of “Wild Dances” as reflecting the values of Romantic ethnography. Just as the music of “Wild Dances” was publicized as the fruit of Ruslana’s own ethnomusicological research in the Carpathians (Piatochkin), so the costumes were explained as the outcomes of the meticulous collection and study of ethnographic data: “With the help of ethnographers we analyzed the materials gathered during my expeditions to the Carpathians—photographs of Hutsul ornaments, jewelry and weapons. The results were creations unique down to the last button. The television image will never convey such a plethora of minute original details, attributes and decorations” (Lyzhychko). Evidently, the ploy was successful: many internet discussants conversant with Ukrainian culture noted in passing the connection of Ruslana’s imagery to global popular culture, but gave considerable weight to the Romantic homage they believed Ruslana paid in “Wild Dances” to primordial native cultural sources. One eloquent exegete believed “Wild Dances” to be “an attempt to touch the soul of the people, which has always been in harmony with the universe. Consciously or not, Ruslana has brought to life a deep, strange layer of genetic memory [ . . . ] that is able, ultimately, to explode with revelation: yes, I am a Ukrainian, these are my land, my mountains, my people” (Koval).

All in all, a number of the persuasive mechanisms in the argumentative system of the Ruslana phenomenon were directed toward convincing the audience, both domestic and general, that “Wild Dances” was the consequence of a deliberate fusion of modern music and imagery, but also values and world-views, on the one hand, and inspiration from authentic ethnic sources, on the other. The strategy involved the rescue of the ethnographic from the embrace of sharovarshchyna and the relegitimation of cultural distinctiveness as a viable feature of the modern, culturally plural, globalized world. It sought to persuade those viewers of Eurovision who were less than familiar with Ukraine to recognize the country as a vibrant, energetic, untrammeled place at the frontier of Europe, yet within it. Moreover, it sought to postulate Ukraine, not as a grateful recipient of European high culture, but as a generous giver to a flagging Old Europe of new stimuli and energies. As far as the Ukrainian audience was concerned, on the other hand, the Ruslana phenomenon was a challenge to regard as natural the participation of Ukraine in Europe; to reimagine the national self not as a victim or passive object of the processes driving the continent, but as a positive contributor to an open and multifarious contemporary European culture; and to recognize that there is no contradiction between participation in the modern global world and emphatic national self-identification. Ruslana’s victory in Eurovision 2004 added greatly to the
persuasive force of these arguments. One commentator, evidently convinced, discovered in Ruslana’s victory nothing less than an antidote to what he called the “national inferiority complex” and a pointer toward a “new Ukrainian dream” (Kniazhytsky).

Some commentators recognized in the Ruslana phenomenon a new opportunity for the development of a robust national identity for Ukraine. As one parliamentarian put it, “The new nation has acquired new symbols that embody its success on the international arena: [the footballer] Andriy Shevchenko, Ruslana Lyzhychko, [boxing champions] the Klychko brothers. It does not matter what language they speak, where they were born or where they currently work. What is important is that they identify themselves as Ukrainian” (Feldman). The invocation of a triad of popular cultural heroes is not accidental in the Ukrainian context, given the central role, actual and symbolic, that three poets and writers, Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, and Lesia Ukraïnka, had played in the evolution of Ukrainian national identity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The earlier triad had manifested the role of high culture in imagining and promoting the idea of Ukraine as a modern nation—an idea that, once accepted by a national elite, could be generalized downward into mass society through education and national mobilization. Central to the national identity associated with Shevchenko, Franko, and Lesia Ukraïnka was the motif of struggle against injustice generally, and the injustice of colonialism in particular. This identity was asserted against the will of rulers conceived of as foreign and illegitimate, and against the inertia of the yet-to-be-converted. It was the identity of selfless devotees committed to the onerous task of constructing a nation in their own image. Perhaps inevitably, therefore, it was defensive, combative, and jealously protective of its symbols, the first among which was the Ukrainian language. By contrast, Andriy Shevchenko, Ruslana, and the Klychko brothers embodied not collective striving for a distant goal, but success already achieved and recognized outside the national community. The members of the old cultural trinity were unthinkable except through their connection to the Ukrainian language and high literary culture; the new triad represented the opportunity for a collective identity that was culturally polymorph (the Klychko brothers, for all their emphatic identification with Ukraine, speak Russian more readily than Ukrainian) and potentially more inclusive.

The rhetoric of Ruslana, then, is one of several systems of messages that circulate in the Ukrainian information space, advocating the construction of a new kind of national identity, based not on the possession of cultural attributes whose acquisition may not come easily to all, but on the wish to belong to a community that cherishes a cultural heritage and confidently assumes a right to equal presence with others in the culturally heterogeneous contemporary world.

Notes

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1. Surprisingly, the question of the role of the Eurovision Song Contest in the evolution of national identities, or a European identity, has attracted little scholarly notice. For highly specialized sociological studies of the voting patterns in Eurovision Song Contests as indices of political affinities between European states, and of power relations between them, see Yair as well as Yair and Maman.

2. Among the scholars whose analyses emphasize an East-West cultural and political polarization of Ukraine are Arel, Wilson, and Shulman. Those who attach less weight to it include Chudowsky and Kuzio.

3. For an exhaustive account of the technical aspects of the rhetorical functioning of literary works, see Lausberg. Studies of the rhetorical dimensions of popular culture include Brummet and Root.

4. This summary of Ruslana’s career is based on “Ruslana Lyzhychko: Spivachka. Biohrofiia,” “Biohrofiia: Ruslana Lyzhychko,” and “Klub shanuval’nykiv chaifu.”

5. For historical accounts of the relationship between folk music and professional music of various kinds in Ukraine, see Istoriia ukrain’s’koï muzïky (2: 38–99; 3: 36–87; 4: 78–104 and 124–41).

6. The text follows the bilingual version of “Wild Dances” as presented on the web page “Ruslana: Ukrainian Song ‘Wild Dances,’” but reproduces the Ukrainian parts of the text in Cyrillic. The lines that appeared in an English-only version on the Eurovision web site, but were not sung at the contest, have not been included. The division into stanzas and a refrain, and the punctuation, have been added.

7. “Hei! / Surely I was too well behaved / For no good reason. / Shydy-rydy dai, shydy-rydy dana (2x) / For you, for me / I’ll make the heavens a bed. / Hei! / Shydy dai, shydy-rydy dana (2x). / I’ll set [it] alight with no regrets”.

This and all subsequent translations are the author’s.

8. For accounts of Ukrainian popular music of the late 1980s and early 1990s, see Bahry and Wanner.

References


Throughout the twentieth century the goal of international recognition remained an idée fixe for the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Artists were often urged to find ways of bringing the country’s unique traditions, sensibility, and worldview to the European cultural high table. The post-independence generation also subscribes to this goal. But that was most successfully accomplished by the first, arguably the least self-conscious, generation—and the one that was most closely integrated with West European culture. Before discussing the art scene since 1991, it is useful to examine the impact of the historical avant-garde (c. 1908–30) on the European mainstream, since the achievements of this earlier generation serve as a beacon for many contemporaries.

The Legacy of the Historical Avant-Garde

The great artistic revolution that unfolded in Paris, Munich, Berlin, and other cities in the century’s first decades enlisted many Ukrainians. Since the 1990s, this history has been the focus of some successful exhibitions in the West, where the highlighting of the “Eastern” contribution to the international avant-garde has stimulated an appreciation of Ukrainian art and culture. The legacy of this avant-garde, a multifaceted phenomenon that differed from the “Western” and was also differentiated internally, continues to influence and inspire contemporary artists.¹

The Ukrainian contribution to the Ecole de Paris has attracted the attention of scholars.² Several major exhibitions have been devoted to it, and its achievements have been described in publications such as Muzeinyi pereulok [Museum Alley], a new periodical of the National Art Museum of Ukraine (NAMU) that began appearing in Kyiv in 2004. These initiatives are part of a wider project to recover neglected aspects of the Ukrainian contribution to European cultural life, and are analogous to recent Projects that describe Russian, Italian, Spanish, Polish, and Jewish members of the Ecole de Paris. In 2000, the Lviv Art Gallery held exhibitions devoted to Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian artists who worked in Paris in the century’s first half.³ In the same year, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) organized a Parisian exhibition devoted to artists of Ukrainian descent in modern French art between 1900
and 1960. NAMU has held exhibitions devoted to the Ukrainian avant-garde, Alexander Archipenko, Mykhailo Boichuk, and other figures.

Artists from Ukraine who lived in prewar Paris included some great names such as Alexander Archipenko, Alexandra Exter, Mykhailo Boichuk, David (Davyd) Burliuk, and Wladimir Baranoff-Rossiné (Baranov). Numerous students were sent to France and Germany to complete their education. In the years 1908–14, there were so many Ukrainian artists in Paris that they had their own club called the “Cercle des Ukrainiens à Paris” situated in the Latin Quarter at 14 rue Thouin, which housed a library with periodicals from Ukraine. Archipenko was an active member, sang in the choir and conducted tours of Paris salons. Figures who only visited Western Europe briefly still made a large impact on the international avant-garde. Mykola Bazhan has recalled that in 1913 Vladimir (Volodymyr) Tatlin found himself in Germany with a Ukrainian orchestra of bandura players, pretending to be a blind performer. The kaiser himself expressed an interest in his playing and singing. Later in Paris, Picasso was also thrilled by the performance and invited Tatlin to his studio. Here the “blind” man opened his eyes in enthusiastic appreciation of Picasso’s art and reputedly offered to work as an assistant (washing brushes and preparing canvases), but was refused. Since Archipenko was creating his early constructivist forms in Paris at the time, it is not unlikely that Tatlin was influenced by them. After returning from Paris, he began to make his own, now famous counter-reliefs in 1914–15.

Munich, Berlin, Geneva, and other cities also attracted artists, among them Vadim Meller, Burliuk, and Archipenko. After 1922, the works of Tatlin, Malevich, and Exter had a strong resonance in Germany. Malevich was in Berlin in 1927, and Boichuk visited the Bauhaus in 1926–27. The latter’s Art and Ceramics Institute, created in 1928 in Mezhyhiria near Kyïv, was partly modeled after the Bauhaus. Numerous artists from Lviv in Western Ukraine also worked in Archipenko’s Berlin studio in the early 1920s before moving on to Paris.

Many of these artists made major contributions to other avant-gardes, including the French, German, Russian, and Jewish. Nonetheless, several of the most prominent figures identified themselves as Ukrainians (e.g., Burliuk and Malevich) or linked their work to a Ukrainian inspiration (e.g., Sonia Delauney, Alexandra Exter, Archipenko, and Tatlin). In fact, although discussions of the “Eastern” avant-garde have usually conceptualized influences as flowing exclusively from west to east (from Paris, Munich, Berlin, and Vienna) and from north to south (from St. Petersburg and Moscow to Ukraine), it often goes unrecognized that Kyïv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and the Kherson area gave birth to a pioneering, democratizing, antiestablishment impetus partly as the expression of a marginalized identity.

Kyïv and the careers of Meller and Exter can serve as an example. The two artists were fellow students at the Kyïv Art School in the early years of the twentieth century. Meller then attended the Geneva Art School and the Munich Academy of Arts before moving to Paris, where he exhibited in the Salon des Indépendants and the Salon d’Automne. With his Spanish wife, Carmen, he traveled through Spain before returning to Kyïv in 1914. Exter appeared regularly in Paris after complet-
ing the Kyïv Art School. She studied in Carlo Delvall’s studio in the Académie de la Grande Chaumièrè in Paris (1909). Through Serhii Yastrebtsov, with whom she had entered the Kyïv Art School and who wrote French poetry under the pseudonym Serge Ferat, she was introduced to Guillaume Apollinaire’s circle. Joining forces with Picasso, Braque, and Léger, she began exploring cubism. In the winter of 1911–12 she met Sonia Delauney and was affected by the latter’s chromatic futurism. From Paris Exter then brought back to Kyïv works for Oleksandr Bohomazov, the Burliuk brothers, and others to see. In 1914 she produced the first monograph on Picasso. The interaction of the Kyïv futurists then generated some of the first avant-garde activities within the Russian empire. Exter, Bohomazov, and David Burliuk were influential in teaching and publicizing the new art. The Kyïv avant-gardists presented themselves in the November 1908 Link (Zveno or Lanka) exhibition, where the main contributors were the Burliuk brothers, Bohomazov, Exter, and Baranov (Baranoff-Rossiné), and exhibited alongside artists from Russia in Moscow and St. Petersburg. During the years of war (1914–18) and revolution (1917 until 1922), when Kyïv was largely cut off from Western Europe and Russia, a strong indigenous avant-garde developed. Meller, Exter, and Bohomazov created a unique constructivist style in both painting and set design. In 1918 the first two began designing costumes for Bronislava Nijinska’s Dance Movement Studio and other drama theaters. In the mid-twenties Meller went on to work with Les Kurbas’s innovative Berezil Theater in Kharkiv, and developed a school of set design that made important contributions to Ukrainian theater and film. At this time influences flowed west. Meller’s talent was recognized at the Exposition Internationale des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes in Paris in 1925, where he received the gold medal for his model of Les Kurbas’s production of The Union Secretary [Sekretar profspilky]. Exter, who taught at her own studio in Kyïv (1916–20) and at the Higher Art-Technical Studios in Moscow (1921–22), emigrated to Paris in 1924, where she opened another personal studio, exhibited at the Exposition Internationale des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes, and taught at Fernand Léger’s Académie d’Art Moderne. Meller and Exter influenced art in other cities not only through their own work, but indirectly through the outstanding painters and stage designers they trained, among whom were Nisson Shifrin, Isaak Rabinovich, Isaak Rabichev, Borys Aronson, Solomon Nikritin, and Oleksandr Tyshler.

Recent recognition of these achievements has brought greater awareness of the Ukrainian avant-garde, although Meller, in particular, still suffers neglect. In 1994 Sotheby’s sold his costume sketches for the 1920s production of Gas, but attributed them mistakenly to Exter. A forgery of his Light Blue Dancer, made for Nijinska’s ballet Mephisto, was also offered for sale in 1994 shortly after the original had been exhibited in Toulouse and enterprising forgers had made a copy. Exter’s reputation was secured by the move to Paris, where she spread her “Eastern” influence. Like many avant-gardists, she drew upon local folk sources, blending cubism, constructivism, and primitivism in her theater design, costumes, and art. In Kyïv she discovered and supported “naive” artists such as Hanna Sobachko, a peasant woman artist, and women artists from the village of Verbivka near Kyïv, who embroidered scarves and
towels, and wove rugs, often using Malevich’s suprematist designs. Her interest in brightly colored folk murals, embroideries, and Easter eggs was shared by a number of artists, including Bohomazov. On March 31, 1918, at the opening of an exhibition of the decorative works of Ievheniia Prybylska and Hanna Sobachko in Kyiv she gave a talk in which she ascribed the colors, rhythms, and silhouettes of decorative forms, and the love of color in “young” Slavic nations to ancient icons. She linked Western experimentation with the rhythms and movements in popular ornamentation: symmetry, complex ornamentation, and freshness of color were in her view typical qualities of Ukrainian folk art such as kilims, embroidery, textiles, and paintings.11

Artists from Ukraine made important contributions to the international avant-garde in two main areas. First, they rekindled the already existing interest in primitivism, filtering it through an awareness of their own folk art and the icon. Second, they infused the avant-garde with a love of color, texture, and movement. Exter and Sonia Delauney (who was also originally from Ukraine)12 are credited with transforming the muted grays and browns of Western cubism and introducing bright colors into modern design. Although criticized by Léger for her exuberant palette, Exter insisted that this was the “Eastern” contribution to cubism. Archipenko was one of the first modern artists to paint sculptures. The postwar arrival in Paris of Oleksa Hryshchenko, Baranoff-Rossiné, and Mykola Andriienko added to this influence of “Eastern” colorists.

Primitivism stimulated Archipenko’s interest in ancient art and monumental forms. His paternal grandfather had been an icon painter, and his father an inventor and a professor of engineering at the University of Kyiv. At an early age the artist became interested in the relationship between mathematics and art, and in the Byzantine artistic tradition. He also studied at the Kyiv Art School, and in 1906, held his first one-man show in Ukraine before traveling to Moscow, and in 1908, at the age of twenty, moving to Paris. The Parisian years (1908–21) were his most productive. In 1909, he began making revolutionary sculptures, which he exhibited in the Salon des Indépendants (in 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914) and the Salon d’Automne (in 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1919). In 1912, he opened his own art studio in Montparnasse, where he worked alongside Modigliani, Gaudier-Brzeska, and others. Abstract, transparent, and painted sculptures were among his many innovations. He made Medrano 1 (1912), the first sculpture in various painted materials (wood, glass, metal sheet, wire), created reliefs called “sculpto-peintures,” which were generally made of painted plaster, and produced the first modern sculptures formed with negative space (concaves and voids that created implied volumes). He called for a renewal of “ancient polychromy which is far richer than the contemporary noncolored sculpture,”13 and in 1913, exhibited the highly colored sculpture Pierrot at Der Sturm Gallery in Berlin. Boxing (1914) was one of the most abstract modern sculptures done up to that date. In 1919–21 he exhibited his works in various European cities: Geneva, Zurich, Paris, London, Brussels, Athens, Berlin, and Munich. His large one-man show in the Venice Biennale Exhibition was ridiculed in the Telegrafo Livorno of June 11, 1920, and Cardinal La Fontaine, the Patriarch of Venice, advised the faithful not to attend. In 1921, he opened his own art school in Berlin, and then in 1923 moved to the United States.
Like other avant-gardists, Archipenko did not try to copy forms in nature but to apprehend them spiritually and to capture their essence. The charm of his works, wrote Apollinaire, comes from an effortless sense of inward order, one based on an awareness of ancient art: Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek, Scythian, Byzantine, and Greek. In his student days the artist had taken part in archaeological expeditions, and some critics maintain that his early works, for example, Woman and Suzanna (1909–10), explore the simple but powerful expressiveness of monumental stone statues that can be found in the steppe and date back to ancient times. Archipenko, acknowledging the influence of these statues, recalled that as a small child he played on one of them during the day, but was terrified of it at night and avoided passing it. The same statue now stands in front of Kyiv’s NAMU. The interest in ancient art probably explains his fascination with cosmic dynamism, his sense of a unity between the highest and lowest forms, between solar systems and the cells of organisms. Art for him reflected the forces of the universe and crystallized intuitively sensed forms. Apollinaire felt that this aspect of his work reflected the presence of ancient belief systems.

David Burliuk, the driving force behind many of the early avant-garde exhibitions in the Russian empire, was also fascinated with primitivism. He attended the Royal Academy of Arts in Munich (1902–3) and the Académie Fernand Cormon in Paris (1904–5), gave countless lectures on the new art, including in Exter’s Kyiv studio, and exhibited continually, both in the empire and in West European venues such as the Neue Kunstlervereinigung (New Artists’ Association) exhibition in Munich (1910), the Paul Cassirer Gallery in Berlin (1911), and the famous “Der Blaue Reiter” exhibition in Munich (1912), whose almanac of the same name included his article “Die ‘Wilden’ Russlands.” After the revolution, he brought his family across Siberia to Vladivostok and Japan before emigrating to the United States in 1922.

Partly as a result of his connections with Exter and Kandinsky (who spent part of his childhood in Odesa), the groundbreaking Izdebsky salons took place in Ukraine. The first, which exhibited many Westerners, opened in Odesa (from December 4, 1909, to January 24, 1910) and Kyiv (from February 12, until March 14, 1910), before traveling to St. Petersburg and Riga. The second, which included scores of paintings by Exter, Burliuk, Konchalovsky, Lentulov, Tatlin, Larionov, Goncharova, and Kandinsky, opened in Odesa (February 6–April 3, 1911) and then traveled to Mykolaiv (Nikolaev) and Kherson. It made an enormous impression because it constituted the public manifestation of an indigenous avant-garde movement within the empire’s borders.

Burliuk’s avant-gardism can also be linked to his Ukrainian identity. He always underlined his connection with the land and his Cossack lineage. Both inspired his vision of the new beauty and shaped his futurism. Like Archipenko, David and his brother Vladimir (Volodymyr) were involved in archaeological digs in the Crimea. The Scythian artifacts they unearthed in the fifty burial mounds and the monumental stone statues they collected influenced their “primitivism.” David extolled a “wild, new beauty” that he associated with the forceful, simple, and direct as expressed in ancient Scythian forms and in folk creativity. He mythologized his southern steppe
homeland. It was for him “Hylaea” from the Greek word for the area around the Dnipro. The term, which was the first one used by the futurists grouped around him to identify themselves, conjured up Herculean strength (in Herodotus’s history it is the setting for some of the feats performed by Hercules), Cossack daring and energy, natural richness and abundance.

Burliuk was fascinated by the powerful hidden energies within nature. He seemed to have believed in invisible realms outside the normal sphere of perception that artists could access if they developed their sense perceptions. The painterly expression of this intuitive apprehension of things can be found in his steppe landscapes, which appear to pulsate with the energy generated by the interaction of countless fragments. The impression produced by these works is of an endlessly multiplying, bountiful natural world, whose continuous self-constitution, dissolution, and reconstitution can only be intuited by the human mind.

The restoration of icons conducted in the early twentieth century proved conclusively that they had originally been brightly colored. This came as a revelation to many and an inspiration to avant-gardists who indicated their deep connection to ancient traditions. Since the late nineteenth century, excitement had also been generated by the restoration of frescoes in some of the most ancient Ukrainian churches, such as St. Sophia and St. Michael’s Church of the Golden Dome, which dated back to the eleventh century. In the years 1907–9, Mykhalio Boichuk brought awareness of this art to Paris, where he organized a studio in which young Ukrainian and Polish artists experimented with a neo-Byzantine style, combining influences from Ukrainian icon and folk art, and the fresco art of the Italian quattrocento (the so-called primitives). The group’s exhibition was reviewed by Apollinaire, the French critic and poet who was himself of Polish background and had Ukrainian sympathies. He wrote favorably of the Zaporozhians, producing a version of the famous “Letter of the Zaporozhians to the Sultan” in French.

Oleksa Hryshchenko (Alexis Gritchenko), who arrived in Paris after the revolution, also had a strong interest in the icon. He had specialized in biology in Kyïv and Moscow universities, but also studied art in these cities and became involved in the avant-garde. During a brief stay in Paris in 1911, he met Andre Lhote, Archipenko, and Le Fauconnier, and developed an interest in cubism. He also took a trip to Italy to study the early Renaissance. In analyzing the Italian art of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the icons of ancient Rus’, he found that the old masters applied “cubist” solutions to problems of space and color. In this way he linked the contemporary avant-garde to the icon and to the “primitives” of the early Renaissance. Hryshchenko was convinced that a full understanding of the icon had only become possible with the appearance of modern art. Like Andre Benois and Aleksandr (Oleksandr) Shevchenko, he found formal similarities between ancient icons, Matisse, and Picasso. Although the debate on the icon had been stimulated around 1910 by the final refutation of its darkness, the icon’s formal, painterly qualities (as opposed to its religious importance or Christian symbolism) had never been investigated in the way that Hryshchenko did in his two monographs, O sviaziakh russkoi zhivopisi s Vizantiei i Zapadom [On
Hryshchenko played a prominent role in the Moscow avant-garde, both as a painter and theorist because he was able to reconcile the Western and Eastern avant-gardes, and to explain their common concerns and interests. Unfortunately, his importance was never recognized in the Soviet Union, partly because his avant-gardism was painterly and not political, and partly because he was branded as a traitor when he left the country. As a result, his canvases were cut up and given to students in Moscow’s Vkhutemas to practice upon, and his name removed from art history. Between 1919 and 1921 Hryshchenko lived in Istanbul, painting hundreds of watercolors, then he moved to France, where he exhibited in leading Parisian art galleries and at the Salon des Tuileries and Salon d’Automne and became known for his streams of oriental color.

Ukrainians also made contributions to other art forms, notably the cinema. In the twenties and thirties, both Oleksandr Dovzhenko and Ivan Kavaleridze produced avant-garde films in Ukraine, while Ievhen Slavchenko (Eugene Deslaw) made a reputation as an avant-garde filmmaker in Paris. He emigrated as part of the exodus that followed the defeat of the Ukrainian National Republic and studied in Paris at the Ecole Technique Photo-Cinema. In 1927, he assisted Abel Gance in making the early French film epic, *Napoléon*. His abstract and experimental films include *La Marche des Machines* (1928), *La Nuit Électrique* (1930), *Montparnasse* (1931), *Négatifs* (1932), and *Robots* (1932). He worked with Boris Kaufmann (collaborator on *La Marche des Machines*), Alfred Zinnemann (the photographer on *La Marche des Machines*), Luis Bunuel, and Marcel Carné (his assistants on *Montparnasse*). Until 1930 he corresponded with the futurist journal *Nova generatsiia* [New Generation] and with Oleksandr (Oleksander) Dovzhenko, whom he met in Paris in 1930 at Oleksa Hlushchenko’s studio. Deslaw is considered part of the French avant-garde’s second wave, which included Fernand Léger, Rene Claire, Henri Chaumet, Man Ray, and Germain Dulak.

Characterizing the Ukrainian Avant-Garde

Why were so many artists from Ukraine influential in the international avant-garde? They had come from various milieus, all of which cannot be surveyed, but a glance at Kyïv is revealing because the city was an incubator of new trends and radiated its influence and style in the years 1908–30. Artists in Kyïv felt the sudden shock of the new at this time. Radical transformations were occurring in the city during the century’s first decades: population migration and growth, industrialization and
modernization. Kyïv was the first city within the empire and the second in Europe to have an electric tramway (streetcar), a vehicle that figures strongly in Bohomazov’s futurist paintings, where it symbolizes movement and modernity’s galvanizing impact on urban life. The arrival of modernity, combined with the rediscovery of a rich and vibrant indigenous folk culture, seems to have provided the initial creative spark for the Kyïv avant-garde.

Another factor was the rich diversity among local artists. The Kyïv Art School, which from 1901 to 1920 produced many great talents, accepted Jewish students in substantial numbers, sometimes in opposition to the government’s desires. From 1901 to 1920, almost half the school’s students were of Jewish background. The resulting mix of talented and ambitious artists from different backgrounds helped to generate an innovative, creative atmosphere. The artistic ferment during the revolutionary years and the twenties was supported by the Ukrainian government (the UNR—Ukrainian National Republic, 1917–20), which created the Ukrainian Academy of Arts in 1917–18, bringing together talented professors, such as Vasyl Krychevsky, Yuri [Iurii] Narbut, Abram Manevych, and Mykhailo Boichuk, and many gifted students. The institution, which went through two name changes under Soviet rule, continued to support innovation throughout the twenties. In 1928, when avant-gardists were being persecuted in Moscow and Leningrad, the Kyïv Art Institute (as it was then named) provided them with a refuge. Malevich, Tatlin, Bohomazov, Boichuk, and Palmov were on the teaching faculty. The connections forged at the institute between these artists stimulated creativity. The UNR government also created the Kultur-Lige, a large Jewish organization responsible for all aspects of Jewish cultural life. Its artistic section was particularly successful. From 1918, Jewish students who had come through academic institutions such as the Kyïv Art School, along with artists who were escaping from revolutionary events in Russia, combined to make the Kyïv Kultur-Lige into one of the most dynamic centers of the Jewish avant-garde in the world. These factors all contributed to blossoming of the avant-garde in the city.

Moreover, it often goes unrecognized that Ukraine has long been a meeting ground of cultural influences. Already in the seventeenth century a distinct Western culture had arisen there, which was baroque, Latin, and relatively cosmopolitan. Ukrainian Orthodox, Polish Catholic, Jewish rabbinical, and later Hassidic cultures rubbed shoulders and interacted over many generations. In the nineteenth century, Russian imperial culture exerted its influence. As a result, twentieth-century members of the avant-garde in Ukraine, who were of varied origins, were conditioned to confront and even welcome novelty. They mixed different influences and imagery in their art with a high degree of comfort. It is also sometimes forgotten that there had been substantial contacts with Western art in the prewar decades, and that the Viennese and Munich Secessions, which made a strong impact in Ukraine, had prepared the ground for the avant-garde. The different expressions of modernity in Paris, Munich, Berlin, and Vienna were directly accessible to Ukrainians, and, as a consequence, they developed their own versions of European movements, and were early, active participants in the creation of a new art.
Although it was a varied and dynamic movement, some features of this historical avant-garde are worth isolating because they have been picked up and developed by contemporaries, and because they relate to the present discourse concerning national identity in art. Ukrainian artists were strongly focused on skill and craftsmanship (Bohomazov, for example, saw artists more as superior craftsmen). Nakov refers to Bohomazov’s “modestie artisanale” as differing from the more politically motivated constructivism that developed in the late twenties, which aimed at complete mastery of materials and the environment. A similar concern with artisanal craftsmanship motivated Boichuk, Archipenko, and Vasyl Ermilov. In addition, the work of the Ukrainian avant-garde as a whole was less haunted by a sense of metaphysical angst, less concerned with grand philosophical constructions or extravagant world-changing theories, and more focused on the pursuit of inner harmony. This perhaps explains their focus on the study of color and the energy of materials. In 1914, Bohomazov wrote “The Art of Painting,” an unpublished text that became a manual of instruction at the Kyïv Art Institute. It expressed the view that art was the distinct rhythm of its constitutive elements, of forms regulated by a complex inner logic. Like Archipenko and Burliuk, he was fascinated by the hidden energy within matter. He saw the world as dynamic, constantly in movement and transformation. For him all forms changed as they impinged upon one another. Myroslava Mudrak has written that the artist instructed his students to “penetrate the pulsating features of their environment to draw out its qualitative and quantitative living movement,” and relates his idea of “internal agitation” to Archipenko’s attempts to capture real motion in painting. Bohomazov’s conviction that sensation was “a physical, tactile and material sensibility” and should dictate an artist’s method aligns him with other Ukrainian avant-gardists who focused on the real world, the surrounding human and natural environment, and on the sensations of the painter.

Primitivism (which usually meant folk art, ancient art, or the icon) was a major inspiration. Gombrich has argued that throughout history the primitive has been extolled as a reaction to kitsch in art, to what a particular generation perceives as sugary and insipid. It has been valued for its bracing, invigorating, antidotal effect. Both folk art and the rediscovery of the icon played this role of challenging established tastes. They helped to overturn the idea, widespread in the late nineteenth century, that Western art had been making steady progress after the setback of the Middle Ages, and that this progress essentially meant moving away from the “clumsy and ugly manner of the Byzantines,” through the “skilful, but still hard and angular style of the quattrocento,” to the polish and sophistication of the Renaissance. The Ukrainian and Russian avant-gardists rejected this view, championed the beauty of the icon and the quattrocento, and confounded contemporary “realist” tastes. There were, however, differences of emphasis. The Boichuk school concentrated on careful, balanced compositions and quiet colors, aiming at the portrayal of characters in a state of grace. In this respect it differed from Burliuk, whose reworking of the icon reveled in the “crude” and “grotesque,” and who was inspired more by popular lubok (broadsheet) prints and signboard art, with their strong, shocking colors and simple lines.
Ukrainians were often concerned with discoveries that were of local provenance or inspiration. They explored folk roots and found novelty in marginalized art forms, such as hand-painted signboards, amateur carvings, embroideries, and popular icons. By validating local crafts, they implicitly challenged the division between high and low genres, or between applied art and easel painting. This democratic impulse often turned into a validation of national cultural traditions. It guided not only artists who were of Ukrainian origin but also those who were of Jewish origin. Inspired by the contemporary rediscovery of folk creativity in Ukraine, the Kultur-Lige artists searched Jewish folk and traditional art for national forms, much as Boichuk’s students explored Ukrainian icons and folk art. This convergence of aims explains the presence within Boichuk’s school of many Jewish artists.

Ukrainians drew inspiration from physical processes occurring in living organisms. Their focus on the earth and the natural world made them different from those Italian and Russian futurists who glorified the city and technology as forces capable of overcoming chaos and nature. Even Malevich later in life hesitated between the urban and rural, particularly when in 1928–30 he again found himself in Kyiv. Malevich, Burliuk, Palmov, Bohomazov, and Boichuk—all seem in the twenties to have rebelled against the tendency to glorify the urban, the mechanical, and the depersonalized, presenting the natural world as an alternative ideal. Although some constructivists and production artists were interested, at least for a time, in the mechanized collective, there was considerable resistance to this aesthetic in Kyiv and even more so among Ukrainian avant-gardists living in the West.

The interest in mysticism (an inheritance from Russian modernism and the Russian Silver Age) seems in the case of most Ukrainian avant-gardists to have been rooted not in metaphysical or political abstraction but in the observation of nature. If the artist was to develop a new, universal consciousness, they appeared to be saying, it would have to be done through a greater awareness of physical processes. Images of the steppe, for example, served as metaphors for nature, and beyond this for the cosmos. For Burliuk and Malevich, among others, the steppe represented animation, the interaction of numerous life forms, the life process sensed rather than understood. It also represented nature’s vastness, abundance, profusion, and power. Not the power of the machine, but that of nature, fascinated Ukrainians. This might also explain why the work of some artists—Boichuk, Hryshchenko, Baranoff-Rossiné, and Bohomazov among them—has a softer, more organic appearance than that of many other avant-gardists, as though dictated by natural growth, and appears less interested in superimposing an observer’s dissecting analysis. The sculptures of Archipenko and Tatlin are also not inspired by the machine aesthetic but by an intuitively sensed inner harmony, or by an awareness of the “natural” possibilities of materials. Tatlin’s monument to the Third International has often been interpreted as the communist answer to the Tower of Babel, a propagandistic, militant, visionary political statement. It has never been suggested that the construction is like the splayed form of the bandura, a gracefully constructed, elegant, and simultaneously functional instrument. This second way of grasping the work allows it to be seen not so much as a call to a visionary, unattainable future, but more as a tribute to human inge-
nuity and skills that are rooted in a long artisanal tradition. The tower leads nowhere: it signifies balance, artistry, and achievement.

Some of these dominant traits, particularly the passion for color; the romance with primitivism and energy; the focus on the national, or ancient past; the fascination with nature; and the concern with inner harmony and personal lyricism, are strongly evident in the art of contemporaries. The distinct accent that Ukrainians brought to international art in the early twentieth century is the legacy upon which today’s artists are building. The biographies of these famous forerunners, their art, and theorizing serve as models or departure points for many of today’s creators.

After contact with the West was broken in the twenties, Ukrainians were allowed to participate only in “all-Soviet” exhibitions, and any references to national characteristics were denounced. In the thirties, waves of arrests removed many of the best artists and forced others to conform to a mandatory, so-called Socialist-Realist style. After World War II, a generation of artists emigrated to various countries around the globe. Some made names for themselves in European art. A number settled in France, among them Ivanna Nyzhnyk-Wynnykiv, Yuri Kulhytsky, Mykola Krychevsky, Andrii Solohub, and Themistocle Wirsta. Most of this generation was drawn to Western trends, and aspired to an antimimetic art. In the 1960s, they found themselves strongly influenced by abstract art, industrial design, and new developments in the technologies of mass production. Often they painted in a semiabstract manner, breaking forms down into their constitutive elements. Although many continued to draw inspiration from Ukrainian subject matter, the traditional imagery, whether landscapes or portraits of Cossacks and village girls, was refracted into simplified, angular shapes, and dissected into flat, two-dimensional planes. Without entirely abandoning representation, painting shifted emphasis to an awareness of the picture’s surface. This style was consonant with developments in modern architectural and industrial design. A love of order and balance is evident both in the rhythmic organization of most works and in the use of color consonances that aim at producing an uplifting, meditative, and spiritual mood. Rhythmic organization often suggests a sublime architecture, the presence of a universal design even in the smallest particulars, and in this way produces a serene sensibility.

Beginning in the late sixties, a number of prominent artists from Ukraine arrived in Western Europe and some settled there permanently. Omelian Mazuryk arrived in Paris from Poland in 1968. He combined expressionism and Byzantine icon traditions. Feodosii Humeniuk, Ivan Ostafiichuk, and Volodymyr Makarenko (Makar) produced stylized, symbolic forms. The latter, who emigrated to Paris in 1980, has acknowledged the influence of icon painting and Italian frescoes on his work, and that his painterly aim was to achieve an effect of peace and serenity. Anton Solomukha (Solomoukha) moved to Paris, while Vitalii Sazonov and Volodymyr Strelnikov settled in Munich. They used this abstracted style to explore visual analogies for spiritual moods and personal experiences. The dissident generation of the sixties and seventies in Ukraine, perhaps best represented by Alla Horska and Opanas Zalyvakha, worked in an analogous manner.
The Present Scene

After the declaration of independence in 1991, this cultural interaction between Ukraine and Western Europe increase markedly, and artists were finally able to openly reexamine their country’s connection with artistic movements that had affected all of Europe and to reassimilate the achievements of past generations. Over the past fifteen years, galleries and museums have mounted numerous exhibitions, not only of the already-mentioned avant-garde and modernism but also of medieval and baroque art, icons, folk traditions, underground and dissident art, and new experimental trends. A concerted effort has been made to recontextualize the artistic “map” of Ukraine by rewriting the place of the country’s artists within Europe, and of Europe within the work of these artists. The retrospective exhibitions have reintroduced their own “European” figures to the public (Archipenko, Burliuk, Malevich, Hryshchenko) and given them canonical status. At the same time, some banned or neglected artists from the late Soviet period received mainstream, or even canonical status. Ivan Marchuk, Viacheslav Medvid, and Oleksandr Dubovyk are now viewed as representing some of the best achievements of preindependence decades. They have all exhibited abroad in the 1990s.

Artistic modernism and avant-gardism in Ukraine have been described as “interrupted projects.” They were compelled to move underground after the 1920s, resurfaced briefly in the 1960s, and fully reemerged as part of mainstream art only after independence. One of the interesting features of the art of the 1990s is the simultaneous injection into the artistic ferment of various periods: the historical avant-garde, the sixties, and the contemporary. After 1991, many in the artistic and literary communities demonstratively rejected all forms of realism and populism, considering them compromised by association with the Soviet regime. Numerous younger artists and writers embraced postmodernism as a “hallmark of high culture and orientation towards European values.”28 However, these post-independence years soon also revealed a significant and growing tension between those who aspired to ground their art in the national heritage—however broadly conceived—and those who deconstructed mythologies or who were drawn to artistic experimentation for its own sake. Today members of the first camp often include those conscious of their roles and responsibilities as representatives of the nation. They feel the need and the responsibility to explore their own culture, to examine, for example, the connection between folk and elite values, or continuities between the historical past and the present. This sometimes leads them to adopt a more widely comprehensible idiom—a strategy that tends to make them more popular with the mainstream viewer. Those in the second camp tend to embrace more easily the idea of multiple discourses, to turn more readily to the ironic juxtaposition of different tendencies, and to the exploration of modern technologies. They have sometimes been accused of grafting Western ideas, theories, and methodologies onto local soil in a way that produces not meaning but chaos.29

Liubomyr Medvid, chair of the Department of Monumental and Decorative Art in the Lviv Academy of Arts, is an example of the first camp. He urges Ukrainian art to
follow its own path and avoid Western vogues. Like most academic-minded artists in Ukraine, he tends to espouse the idea of Ukraine’s uniqueness and its potential for original artistic production, and he therefore encourages the exploration of the country’s historical and spiritual riches, which in his mind are linked to Egypt and Byzantium as much as to Eastern Slavdom, and which he associates with forms of perception and insights that are religious and mystical. This kind of approach to art is usually not comfortable with the demystificatory tone of much work inspired by postmodernism. Medvid takes the role of intuition seriously and resists tendencies to view personality or culture as a collage, or an interaction of seemingly random influences. He looks with nostalgia to the motivation that guided earlier modernists, particularly the patriotic generation of the sixties that tried to plumb the mysterious depths of national spirituality. He also takes seriously the development of technical skills, whether they involve the production of mosaics, frescoes, or figurative paintings.

The motivation to recreate and reinvent the national tradition, to search for Ukraine’s genius loci, sometimes jostles uncomfortably with the call to dethrone the false gods of the past and to grasp new creative possibilities. This tension between these two poles characterizes art journals such as *Muzeinyi pereulok* and *Obrazovtorche mystetstvo* [Representational Art], and *Rodovid* [Genealogy]. Because they consciously strive to recreate the genealogy of national traditions and values, they give preference to those artists who explore links to the country’s history, mythology, cultural traditions, or natural environment. They have featured experimental artists who work in a representational manner. Among them are older figures such as Mykola Storozhenko, Mykola Mazur, Andrii Antoniuk, Oleksandr Zholud, Borys Plaksii, Viktor Hontariv, and Roman Romanyshyn, and younger ones such as Liudmyla and Bohdan Mazur, Olha and Ihor Ierofeiev (Yerofeiev), and Oleksandr and Juliiia Borodai. There have been attempts to explore links to the art produced on the territory of Ukraine in both the distant past, including Trypillian (4,500 B.C. to 2,000 B.C.) and Scythian (800 B.C. to 200 A.D.) times, and in more recent centuries, such as the medieval and the early modern (baroque) periods. The books published by Rodovid give an indication of current interests. There are volumes on *Folk Icons* (2001), *Embroidery of the Cossack Elite* (2001), *Ukrainian Antiquities in Private Collections: Folk Art of the Hutsul and Pokuttia Regions* (2002), *Painted Wood: Naïve Art of the Ukrainian Village* (2003), and *Ukrainian Icons: 13th–18th Centuries* (2003). To a lesser extent there has been an interest in spreading a better understanding of the other traditions that have existed on Ukrainian territory, among them the Jewish, Polish, and Russian. The enormously rich and diverse artistic heritage that the country possesses has inspired exhibitions and publications, but, unlike the situation in the early decades of the previous century, these explorations have not as yet coalesced into major schools or tendencies in the new art.

Understandably focused on reconceptualizing the past, the leading journals have sometimes been less welcoming to the postmodern. The head of the National Association of Artists of Ukraine, Volodymyr Chepelyk, stated in a speech of March 22, 2005, reprinted in *Obrazovtorche mystetstvo* (the association’s official organ since 1991)
that his membership wants to “defend our traditional artistic culture from various in-
fluxes and from pollution, . . . to strengthen the progress of the nation [natsiopostup]
in art.” The speech is full of comments about the need to “defend the traditional
flow of our ancient culture, so that Ukrainian art does not lose its specificity and
originality in the world art space.” His comments about the historical avant-garde
are particularly negative:

If you do not work in the spirit of an art that a hundred years ago was called the
avant-garde, you are not an artist of the contemporary art and time, but if you are a
talented drawer [rysuvalnyk] and a realist painter who has mastered devices devel-
oped by great predecessors over thousands of years, then you have no place among
artists who belong to the new contemporary tendencies. The most contemporary
today are the conceptuallists, and if they are interested in the human being at all, it
is only in those details that lie below the belt. It is these organs and their functions
that they research with the diligence of medics in their artistic works.

As the first part of this essay shows, such an assessment of the avant-garde fails
to understand its connection to ancient art and Ukrainian tradition. Chepelyk’s scur-
rilous comments on contemporary avant-gardists reveal how much twentieth-century
art history still needs to be assimilated in artistic circles. The style of this speech, its
method of reasoning, and its dichotomizing of good and bad, patriotic and unpatriotic,
healthy and unhealthy, mirror Soviet rhetoric and style argumentation. The fears it
voices concerning Western trends are an almost literal repetition of statements made
by conservative Soviet critics in the 1920s and 1930s. Ironically, Chepelyk’s com-
ments, made in the afterglow of the Orange Revolution, closely resemble speeches
made by Soviet leaders who were determined that their organization had the right to
reward, approve, administer, and guide art.

Postmodernism, however, informs the work of many artists. It maintains a
particularly lively presence outside the main galleries and publications, and has a
strong following among the young. This situation parallels the one that exists in the
literary sphere. Playful, parodic, and erotic drawings, for example, those of Iurko
Koch and Iurii [Yuri] Izdryk, have illustrated the more risqué and less widely dis-
tributed literary almanacs such as Chetver [Thursday] or circulated in the rock- and
rap-inspired subculture.

Most art journals follow a policy that is much less tendentious than Chepelyk’s
speech implies. Some established artists have made reputations pursuing radical
experiments that recall the “historical” avant-garde of 1910–30. Anatolii Kryvolap’s
abstract works explore color harmonies in a bright, vivid palette—a strong feature of
contemporary art that links it to earlier innovators. His works of the nineties recall the
fauvists in the merging of painting with the decorative panneau, and in unexpected and
shocking color contrasts. Kryvolap’s style has been defined as simultaneously “brutal
and refined.” Mykhailo Brozhol hearkens back to Cezanne, and to the juxtaposition
of simple, everyday objects that characterized the early avant-garde. The younger
generation includes Valerii Skrypka (now in the United States) and Volodymyr Radko,
who paint enigmatic and allegorical forms in which the atmosphere of Byzantine icons mixes with surrealism and the absurd; Anton Skorubsky Kandinsky (now in the United States), a great grandson of the famous abstract artist, who produces playful, gently mocking forms of national symbols; and Taras Polataiko (now in Canada), who has made a reputation with his visually memorable, provocative, and sometimes shocking conceptual art. In fact, a generation of artists has now appeared who cross borders frequently, live and work both in Ukraine and abroad, and exhibit internationally. They work with an increasing awareness of international trends, institutional structures, and market practices, but at the same time have an understanding of the creative possibilities offered by artistic developments in Ukraine. This combination may, as it did for the first wave of avant-gardists, produce the spark required for much greater successes.

Most recently, a new trend has given rise to experiments inspired by the computer age, by fascination with the media, and by the world of commercial and political advertising. It has produced numerous installations, such as those by Viktor Sydorenko and Mykola Zhuravel, which have been praised for their inventiveness. The latter’s Apiary (2005) was submitted as Ukraine’s entry to the Venice Biennale for 2007. It is a series of beehives that has been described as resembling “something halfway between pagan sculptures and a centrifuge for endurance testing, between a blown up walnut and a children’s slide. Simultaneously extraterrestrial and very familiar, close to the essence of man and yet mysterious.” The artist himself comes from a long line of beekeepers, a profession that is held in reverence in Ukraine. He was inspired to work on the project when he discovered that in 1910 there were 1.6 million bee colonies in Ukraine. The exhibition is true to the Ukrainian avant-garde tradition in the way it presents natural processes as mysterious, even magical, and time-honored skills as startlingly novel and fascinating. The relationship with nature is collaborative: bees are enlisted in the physical creation of art works. Lest the symbolism of community, harmony, and the vision of utopia be missed, the artist has asserted: “People are like bees. The apiary is Ukraine.”

As might be expected, Ukraine’s sudden and belated exposure to the world of globalized technocapitalism has resulted in a fascination with marketing, branding, mediatized representation, and media culture. Young artists have often taken a refreshingly disrespectful and demystificatory look at the construction of identities through the media and modern technologies. This is a particularly important phenomenon for Ukrainians, whose identity has long been marginalized or submerged. Many artists consider the construction of their national identity in today’s European and international imagination an important task. The politics of recognition in the wider world is closely related to the politics of recognition within the country itself, where the Soviet legacy and the pressures of the Russian identity are still felt. Because Ukrainians perceive their own culture as still in many ways embattled, existing in an enclave, and struggling to generate positive images of its own identity, the ability to influence the mediasphere is often assigned a high priority. Not surprisingly, therefore, artists have been encouraged to explore issues bearing upon cultural identity, to make an impact
on media-sensitive events such as the Venice Biennale. For the same reasons, the reception of touring exhibitions, or Ukrainian entries in international film festivals is keenly scrutinized. The national image-consciousness is closely related to the public obsession with mediatized political events (notably the international reception of the Orange Revolution), successes in globally televised shows such as the Eurovision song contest (which Ruslana Lyzhychko won in 2004), and the destinies of sport stars (e.g., Oksana Baiul, Andrii Shevchenko, the Klychko brothers). A controversial exhibition, titled “Brand ‘Ukrainian,’” dealing with this subject took place at the National University of Kyïv-Mohyla Academy in 2001–2. It explored the interconnectedness between art and advertising, particularly the manner in which a desire for an art with a distinct national “brand” could be manipulated using techniques developed in the commercial world. The centerpiece of the exhibition, an enormous portrait of Taras Shevchenko reputedly painted by David Burliuk in 1924, drew enormous media coverage and citizens of Kyïv were exhorted to view the portrait of the national poet, “sacred for every Ukrainian.”

Leonid Kuchma, the country’s president at the time, and many prominent politicians felt called upon to visit the exhibition. However, the Shevchenko painting appears to have been a forgery, an elaborate hoax perpetrated by the skillful media manipulation of people working in the world of advertising. It was accomplished with all the chutzpah characteristic of Burliuk, and thus perhaps represented a gesture of admiration toward the futurist artist, but its target was an obsession with returning treasures from the national heritage and with establishing the Ukrainian patriotism of famous sons, even the most wayward. This ironic view of the national identity as a brand was also a wry comment on the essays in the catalogue of the Venice Biennale 2001 entry, which in gushing tones heralded the country’s “new wave” art as an answer across the generations to the “futurist prophets” of the early twentieth century.

A comparison with the early twentieth century is instructive. The focus for contemporary artistic activities is no longer Paris, but various European, North American, and other cities around the world. The artistic universe has become more fragmented, more variegated, and, for those who wish to be commercially successful, more closely interwoven with the mass media. An awareness of multiple perspectives predominates. However, the imperative of making an impression in Europe remains. Even Chepelyk devoted a large section of his speech to the importance of presenting Ukrainian art throughout Europe, “from Warsaw, Bratislava, Budapest, and Berlin to the numerous museums and galleries of France, Italy, Spain, and America. This is the entry of the Ukrainian art intellect into the contemporary art space.” The model he appears to be working with is that of a goods exporter, not, as was the case in the historical avant-garde, of co-creators and co-explorers of new ideas.

Certain themes in the work of contemporaries span the generations, and reach back into the work of the earlier avant-garde. In light of the above negative comments concerning the avant-garde, these continuities are probably conditioned by a desire or an unconscious manifestation of a tendency to trace the contours of a Ukrainian sensibility. They are evident in a love of color and bold experimentation, which today, as has been
the case in the past, is often identified with wildness, energy, and the drive for personal freedom. Another continuity is a reverence for primitivism, which is identified with the powerful and still productive messages encoded in ancient art and folklore. And one might also see a respect for nature and its still unfathomed secrets, which is identified with sensitivity toward the environment and the search for spiritual harmony. In recent years the international successes of exhibitions such as those devoted to Scythian art, modernism, and the avant-garde have played an important role in elevating and complicating the image of Ukrainian culture in the European mind. The country’s growing contact with museums and galleries around the world will no doubt produce further groundbreaking exhibitions. Many aspects of Ukraine’s art—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—still deserve “discovering,” recontextualizing, and revisiting.

It would be incorrect, however, to leave the impression that all art is polarized between those who search for a national tradition and the postmodernists who “play with archetypes” (the title of a 2004 exhibition) with the intention of debunking them. Many artists, perhaps most, find themselves comfortably situated somewhere between these poles of national root-tracing and a playful mockery of this process. In any case, whether they wish to acknowledge it or not, their work has evolved out of a national environment and background. Petro Bevza, Oleksii Lytvynenko, and Petro Lebedynets have successfully exhibited together in several West European cities. Their work purposely avoids any didacticism or literary references, but draws the viewer into contemplating landscapes that depict open spaces, or into the attraction of color bouquets. Dmytro Stetsko’s works suggest the weathered surfaces and indecipherable hieroglyphics of ancient paintings. The effect of the image’s aged appearance, as in Skrypka’s paintings, is to draw the viewer into “some barely remembered past” that has survived the passage of time “with some difficulty.” The work of these artists—as of most of the innovative artists the country has produced—transmits a Ukrainian sensibility through its sometimes tantalizing allusions to the past and the nation’s present encounter with the Western world. In this context, it is worth recalling the words of Bohdan-Ihor Antonych, a prewar poet who is much admired by the contemporary avant-garde generation. In a speech given in 1935 he reminded listeners that, although the poet serves the glory of his homeland, he does so only by being an artist, that is, on condition that in the moments when he investigates the rules of art, when he completes his studies and discoveries, which are as subtle as in science, in these moments he does not think about anything else, even his homeland, but only about the truth he is facing.

There are manifold tensions in the work of contemporary artists: between the traditional, the modernist, and the postmodernist; between the intuitive and the ironic. They are often fed by the discourse of national identity and debates concerning Ukraine’s relations with Europe. These tensions have, nonetheless, been productive and have provided rich stimulus for artists and writers. The conflicts they have generated are not unlike those that agitated proponents of the old and new during similar “revolutionary”
decades, particularly in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The dilemma posed by the need to choose between the local-national and European-international was central to the great Literary Discussion of the 1920s—the last great open debate before Stalinism effectively shut the door on dialogue with the outside world. It also framed debates in the postwar emigration. As the example of the historical avant-garde shows, such ferment can lead to the creation of great art. The tensions that have surfaced in present debates indicate that Ukrainian art is effectively catching up with its own history, drawing strength from the achievements of earlier generations, and striking out in new directions.

Notes


5. The bandura is Ukraine’s national instrument. It was popular from the sixteenth century, when wandering minstrels used it to accompany the singing of epic ballads. The instrument has between thirty-two and fifty-five strings and combines features of the lute and harp.


7. The Mezhyhiria Art and Ceramics School was created in 1921–22. It was renamed the Mezhyhiria Art and Ceramics Technical in 1923, the Mezhyhiria Art and Ceramics Institute in 1928, and the Ukrainian Technological Institute of Ceramics and Glass in 1931.


9. The Moscow theater director, Aleksandr Tairov, who was born in Ukraine, declared during the third trip of his Kamernyi Teatr to Germany in 1930 that the “influence is from East to West and not the opposite” (quoted in Koliazin 174). On the flow from north to south, Krusanov speaks of the “advance of the left into the provinces” but also admits that between January 1915 and February 1917 there were over ninety various futurist events outside Moscow and Petersbur
and about sixty in the two cities (*Russkii avangard*, vol. 2, bk. 2, 9). His book is constructed as a study of the dissemination of futurist ideas from the two capitals to the provinces. It shows no interest in local or indigenous agency, even though he admits that from October 1917 until the Spring of 1922 Ukraine, the Crimea and Southern Russia were cut off from “the center of the country” (ibid., 75). When he does turn to Ukraine, he focuses heavily on the activities of Russians and Russian-language publications, even though their activities in the twenties were marginal as compared with those of the Ukrainians.

12. Sonia Delauney (Terk-Delauney) was born in the Ukrainian town of Hradzhyshk near Poltava, but after the age of five was raised by an uncle in St. Petersburg. Her memoirs, written late in life, begin by acknowledging the profound effect of her childhood in Ukraine on her work. They provide a rhapsodic account of these early years. Susak has written that Delauney “painted Paris in the colors of her childhood” (2000, 98). She studied in the academy of fine arts in Karlsruhe before moving in 1905 to Paris, where she married the French artist Robert Delaunay in 1910. She imitated the patchwork-quilt style of peasant women and was best known for her instinctive color sense and her refusal to accept facile distinction between the fine arts and applied or decorative arts. She was known for her passion for robust primary colors, her amazing work with fabric, fashion, textile and costume design, and her color rhythms, called “orphism” by Apollinaire.

18. It is possible that Archipenko provided him with a “copy” of the legendary letter and information about Ukrainian history.
19. Among them were Exter, Meller, Kavaleridze, Archipenko, Bohomazov, Abram Manevych, Anton Pevzner (Antoine Pevsner), Aristarkh Lentulov, Isaak Rabinovich, Aleksandr (Oleksandr) Tyshler, Mark (Moisei) Epshtein, Solomon Nikritin, Issakhar-Ber Rybak, and Anatolii Petrytsky.
20. The Ukrainian State Academy of Arts was created in 1917. It was renamed the Kyiv Institute of Plastic Arts in 1922, then renamed the Kyiv Art Institute in 1924.
21. Remarkable graphic art was produced for the Kultur-Lige’s publications in the years 1918–22. El Lissitzky in these years illustrated about ten Yiddish publications, while Issakhar-Ber Rybak worked as a book illustrator and a decorator for Jewish theaters. In 1923, Rybak published in Berlin an album of lithographs depicting Jewish types in Ukraine. A number of artists from the Kyiv Kultur-Lige emigrated to Europe in the twenties, including Rybak, Manevych, and Aronson. Rybak became prominent in the Ecole de Paris. Manevych and Aronson soon moved on to the United States, where the latter designed more than a hundred stage sets. For the Kyiv Kultur-Lige artists, see Hillel Kazovsky, *the Artists of the kultur-Lige* (Jerusalem: Gesharim; Moscow: Mosty kultury, 2003); Ie. Kotliar, and V. Susak, “Ievreis’ke mystetstvo: tradytsiia i novyi chas,” in *Narysy z istoriï ta kul’tury ievreïv Ukraïny*, ed. Leonid Finberh and Volodymyr Liubchenko (Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2005), 300–329; and Dmitrii Gorbachev and Aleksandr Pavlov, “Ievreiskie khudozhniki v Kieve (pervaia tret’ XX veka),” *Egypets* 6 (2000): 290–337.
23. Ibid., 18, 21.
25. Ibid., 138–139.
27. The *lubok* print was a cheap popular print that was often painted by hand in vivid colors. It was popular from the fifteenth century. The term appears to derive from the name for a panel made of bark from the linden tree, which was used for inscriptions or painting.
29. Attempts have been made to manipulate this cultural discourse into a clash between “modernists” and “nativists,” as Ola Hnatiuk has shown in her “Nativists vs. Westernizers: Problems of Cultural Identity in Ukrainian Literature of the 1990s” in this volume.
31. Ibid., 19.
32. Ibid.
33. For a discussion of these see Michael M. Naydan, “Ukrainian Avant-Garde Poetry Today: Bu-Ba-Bu and Others,” in this volume.
36. Ibid.

**References**


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There is a wonderful quip attributed to Oscar Wilde stating, “The one duty we owe history is to rewrite it.” All historical writing is a form of personal and collective vision, and by the very fact of being personal, it is a revision. When it becomes collective it enters the realm of legend and ripens for another future revision. What follows is my account of what happened in the critical years 1986–1995, the years of perestroika/perebudova and the first four to five years of independence when certain directions were instigated in the music field—especially in Kyiv, then in Lviv and Odesa—that held some promise. But as T.S. Eliot wrote in his great poem East Coker, “In my beginning is my end.” The period did not bear all the anticipated fruits. This chapter will give a bit of a history of that period, the important steps that were taken, and why some of the promises were fulfilled and others are still waiting to bear fruit. The final paragraph or two will put forward what may need to happen before real progress is achieved. I experienced much of this firsthand; I was present at the end of one epoch and the beginning of the new.

In one of my articles I wrote: “Only two voices from the chorus of Ukrainian culture have received international recognition and acceptance: the sculptor Alexander Archipenko and filmmaker Alexander (Oleksandr) Dovzhenko. Some also know the inimitable poetry of Taras Shevchenko. The rest is a murmur, still undifferentiated from the powerful chant of Soviet Russia” (Baley 1976, Violin Music 2). That was written in 1976. Since then, some things have changed significantly. Ukraine is now on the map; Ukrainian musicians are working all over the globe; brain drain, the best and the brightest leaving the country for economic reasons (so significant a problem in the 1990s), has stabilized; among Ukrainian large ensembles, the National Symphony Orchestra of Ukraine has become a respected recording ensemble; the number of soloists (although most are living abroad) has increased significantly; and among composers, we can now add a few contenders for the third and fourth names in the hall of fame: the belated recognition of Boris (Borys) Liatsoshynsky and the genuine global career of Valentin (Valentyn) Silvestrov; a contemporary composer known well beyond the borders of Ukraine. The subject of this chapter is to show what has changed and why, and what has not.
My serious relationship with Ukraine and its music began in 1972 when I started a correspondence first with Valentin Silvestrov and, shortly after, with Leonid Hrabovsky. After my return visit to Kyiv and Lviv in 1973 I wrote my article, “The Kiev Avant-garde: A Retrospective in Midstream,” which was first published in English, and then in German. From 1975 to 1985, I wrote about, promoted, and performed the new Ukrainian music in the United States and Canada. Suddenly, when perestroika began (and glasnost became the chic catchword) it became possible to invite composers and performers as individuals and not only in carefully monitored groups. This was a radical change among many others.

In 1989–90 there were many discussions about what should be done now. It was my position, seconded by the distinguished composer Ivan Karabyts, that an international festival was needed to raise awareness of what Ukraine had accomplished so far in the area of composition. At the same time, the festival would showcase the country’s various performing ensembles. Some recent Ukrainian music was beginning to receive serious attention but most of it was still flying under the radar. What music did receive recognition was still lumped together with Russian works. What was completely new was the simple fact that each republic could now act unilaterally to produce music festivals and invite guests as it pleased. Previously, everything had to be done through Moscow. After many meetings, a final decision to go ahead with such a festival was made at a meeting of the Composers’ Union of Ukraine in Kyiv, where such composers as Yevhen (Ievhen) Stankovych, Myroslav Skoryk, Valentin (Valentyn) Bibik, Lesia Dychko, Ivan Karabyts, and Volodymyr Symonenko agreed that our first such festival be in early fall 1990.

One of the more important elements of glasnost was normalization of relations between the Ukrainian diaspora in the West and Soviet Ukraine. Cultural exchanges became normal; professionals in all fields could travel back and forth, exchange ideas, promote events, set up conferences, and publish with relative impunity. These were extremely exciting times. Each side appeared eager to get to know the other as in a newly initiated romance, when all doubts are suspended and belief in the future appears to be boundless.

**Kyiv Music Fest 1990**

The Composers’ Union of Ukraine intended the 1990 Kyiv Music Fest (originally Kiev) to be an annual event. The decision to have a festival occurred the minute Ukraine declared its sovereignty (a step prior to independence), and autonomy meant that the Composers’ Union of Ukraine could now inaugurate a festival without asking Moscow for permission. At first, it was suggested that it be a biennial. Karabyts and I felt strongly, however, that it should be annual, since the main purposes of the festival were to raise awareness of Ukraine in the world community, introduce Ukrainian music to international audiences, and redevelop Kyiv as the great cultural center of Eastern Europe. The first festival, Kyiv Music Fest ’90, concentrated on the music of Ukrainians living in the West. That theme was more fully developed in April 1991 by
a festival in Lviv devoted exclusively to such composers. The repertoire of the 1990 *Kyïv Music Fest* consisted mostly of music by Ukrainian composers: those in Ukraine and a number from the diaspora, among them George Fiala, Harry Kulish, William Pura, Ihor Sovenytsky, Marian Kouzan, Virko Baley, Larysa Kuzmenko, and Aristid Wirsta. It was at this festival that the New York-based ensemble CONTINUUM appeared in Ukraine for the first time. An added special event of *Kyïv Music Fest* 1990 was the Ukrainian premiere of Yuri (Iurii) Illienko’s new film *Swan Lake. The Zone*. The film had received its world premiere at the Cannes Film Festival a few months earlier and was awarded two prizes: the International Critics Prize (FIPRESCI) “for its dramatic power and visual splendor in style in treating a strong social and psychological theme” and Le Prix de la Jeunesse Etranger.

**Ukrainian Music at the Time of Independence**

At the time of independence, several Ukrainian musicians already held international promise. Among soloists, seven names were internationally known before independence: the soprano Bela Rudenko, the baritone Anatoly Kocherga (Kocherha), the pianists Alexander Slobodyanik (Slobodianyk) and Mykola Suk, violinists Oleh Krysa and Yuri Mazurkevich (Mazurkevych), and cellist Maria Chaikovska. Five of them are still very active (Kocherga, Suk, Krysa, Mazurkevich, and Chaikovska), and five now live in the West (Kocherga, Suk, Krysa, Mazurkevich, and Slobodyanik), while Chaikovska lives in Moscow, but all keep close contact with Ukraine. Of chamber ensembles, the best known were the Lysenko String Quartet, which did a fair amount of touring in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, and the Kyïv Chamber Orchestra. The two best symphonic organizations were also in Kyïv: the National Symphony and the Shevchenko Opera Orchestra. Unfortunately, there was no first-class opera company; the Shevchenko Opera, even with the best orchestra in Ukraine and some excellent singers, had a reputation for mediocre productions. The primary strength of Ukrainian music at that time lay with its composers. As in literature, the 1960s played a crucial role. The so-called Kiev Avant-garde became the watchword and thrust Ukrainian contemporary music onto the world stage. Early figures were Valentin Silvestrov, Leonid Hrabovsky, Vitaly Hodziatsky, Valentin Bibik (Bibyk), Volodymyr Huba, and Vitaly Patsera, who were later joined by Volodymyr Zahortsev and Yevhen Stankovych. Simultaneously, a new style—more traditional and closely tied to “new folklorism”—was advanced by Myroslav Skoryk and his student, Karabyts. By 1991 Ukrainian music was recognized as an important addition to the international music scene. Of the names listed, two have become principal influences on composers working in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century: Valentin Silvestrov and Yevhen Stankovych.

Of these two, Silvestrov has achieved close to iconic stature, especially in Europe, where concerts and even festivals devoted to his music have become common. The gradual acceptance of Silvestrov’s music by the music world took a number of years, but was in large part assured by his Symphony No. 5, in which his earlier experiments
are synthesized. The result is a rich and eloquent musical language that encompasses all the resources of contemporary thinking. In this symphony Silvestrov for the first time fully explores the domain of the coda, which becomes a “post-symphony,” and the work is a coda to the entire history of this form; here the coda loses its epilogic character and becomes the core of the work. The coda contains a symphony, one that does not partake of dialectical development but explores the composition’s “afterlife.” It is as if we had a fragment of the symphony, complete in itself and no less powerful than the hands of Auguste Rodin’s “La Cathédrale,” the only visible fragment of a body. In this symphony, and often in the works that followed into the late 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, Silvestrov explored the concept of memory as a dramatic device. One is, in effect, experiencing the future of an event long gone, a continual reliving of a memory freshly re-remembered. This “metaphorical style,” as Silvestrov calls it, offers music as a “postlude” to the existing musical tradition, a music that comprises verbal and pictorial imagery.

The peculiar history of Ukrainian culture, nationhood, and ethnicity helps one better understand the music of Ukrainian composers such as Silvestrov and others discussed here. Ukraine’s cultural development might be described as “nonlinear,” a common characteristic among societies whose culture was shaped vastly by shifting political realities. Unlike Russian culture, which was able to be handed down and developed from one generation to the next, Ukrainian culture has only emerged sporadically to insist upon its identity, while otherwise forced to subsume itself in the societies and political systems that historically controlled its social and economic life. As a result, Ukrainian culture has in a sense lived in a diaspora in its own homeland. The nonlinearity and discontinuity of Ukrainian cultural development have affected the Ukrainian artistic mentality and produced a way of thinking that often defies the logic of Western music. Its music expresses a dream state, the passive resistance of a vulnerable people. In dreams anything can happen. Silvestrov’s mature pieces (and the music of many other Ukrainian composers) have in them a quality of passive strength. It is often antirational (not irrational). Oleksandr (Alexander) Dovzhenko, asked about what he was thinking when he made a particular film, replied “I wasn’t thinking, I was feeling.” This produces a kind of stasis: metaphorical motion trapped in immobility. This nonlinearity is central to the “mythopoetic realism” invented by Dovzhenko, and similar to the poetic realism found in many twentieth-century South American writers, where a hyperbolic atmosphere dominates and events that are strange and fantastic somehow seem quite natural. Silvestrov’s and Hrabovsky’s music is full of such twist and turns. To a greater or lesser degree, most of the composers discussed in this article share this “mythopoetic realism.” This idea is also pertinent to subversive or resistance movements even within the dominant cultures.

Yevhen Stankovych’s music, also full of “mythopoetic” metaphors, was always marked by a striking dramatic temperament, emotionally unfettered, openly passionate, and supported by a full command of modern techniques (without allowing any single one to predominate). While his technique is contemporary, folkloric themes of Ukraine’s cultural groups are foregrounded in his works. Stankovych’s uniqueness
lies in his pronounced affinity for the vernacular, in his painting of folk motifs with orchestral color, and his reproduction of the distinct characteristics of folk song, and in multilayered polyphony. A composer, he believes, cannot create music in isolation from his culture, and he works to convey that cultural context to his audience. Stankovych’s elaborate polyphonic textures and meditative lyricism, so central in his symphonic and chamber symphonies, are reminiscent of the strict and exuberant polyphonic style of Baroque music, while the full-bodied, quasi-expressionistic melodies, with an obvious postromantic coloring, give the music warmth and expressiveness. His music is remarkable in many respects, showing his emotional freedom, consummate technical mastery, flexibility of form, and an edge-to-edge dispersal of energies.

The example of Silvestrov and Stankovych, as well as that of Karabyts, Skoryk, and Hrabovsky, has brought forth a new generation (Volodymyr Runchak, Alexander Shchetynsky, Alexander Gugel, and Alexander Ginsburg, as well as Volodymyr Zubytzky, Yuri (Iurii) Laniuk, Liudmyla Iurina, Halyna Ovcharenko, and others), who developed more fully in the first years after independence.

**Kyïv Music Fest 1991**

Things really developed momentum as we prepared for *Kyïv Music Fest* 1991. The question of independence was consuming the country as well as international communities of the diaspora. Independence suddenly seemed closer to hand than anyone suspected. *Kyïv Music Fest* 1991 occurred in a newly independent Ukraine.

Festivals, like journeys, are unpredictable, never what one expects. Together with great highs and unexpected discoveries, one is subject to frustrations and disappointments. Although the majority of the concerts took place as planned, the opening had to be changed due to a scheduling conflict with the conclusion of the fiftieth anniversary commemoration of Babyn Yar. A few of the foreign guests did not receive their visas on time, and a few canceled at the last moment. All that was normal and expected. But, given the scope and scale of the event it was remarkable how much of what was planned did occur.

The Second International Ukrainian Music Festival, now better known as *Kyïv Music Fest* 1991, was held October 5–12, 1991. The *Kyïv Music Fest* 1991 program was grander in scope than that of the first. In addition, it marked the year’s celebrations of anniversaries of Mozart and Prokofiev. The best performing artists of Ukraine had been invited to participate in the festival. These included seven symphony orchestras (the State Symphony Orchestra of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Radio and Television Symphony Orchestra, the Symphony Orchestra of the Kyïv Opera Theater of T.H. Shevchenko, the Dnipropetrovsk Symphony Orchestra, Lvïv Philharmonic Orchestra, Kyïv State Children’s Music Theater Symphony Orchestra, Ukrainian National Popular Music Orchestra) and the Kyïv Chamber Orchestra, Kyïv Camerata, various choral and instrumental ensembles, and soloists.

One benefit of such an international event is the broad cross-section of the international community it represents. This gives foreign artists an opportunity to meet
the Ukrainian community and experience its music and culture, and gives the local population a chance to meet and exchange ideas with those working at the forefront of music. Many problems remain in producing the festival, and the most challenging is finance. Most artists were happy to contribute their services, but expected to have their expenses paid. The Festival Committee was able to provide everything needed in Kyïv, but airfare from the United States or Western Europe was a problem. Hard currency was needed for this, and the number of invitations extended was therefore limited. Nevertheless, many were able to come. Among the participants were: from the United States—Donald Erb, composer, Miles Anderson, trombonist, David Eaton, conductor (music director of New York City Symphony); from France—Michel Beroff, pianist, Delphine Kollot, soprano, Michel Liapleni, baritone, Chamber Chorus of the City of Seintes; from Canada—Luba and Ireneus Zuk, duo-pianists; from Armenia—Avet Terteryan, composer; from Azerbaijan—Faradzh Karayev, composer; from Russia—Georgii Dmitriev, composer; from Turkmenistan—Chary Nurymov, composer; from Poland—Roman Rewakowicz, conductor and composer; from the Netherlands—Otto Ketting, composer.

While hundreds of works were performed during the festival, among the highlights was the premiere of Yevhen Stankovych’s Requiem (Kaddish) for tenor, bass, chorus, and orchestra on poems by Dmytro Pavlychko, part of the fiftieth anniversary commemoration of the tragedy of Babyn Yar. This work was performed three times, first on October 5 at Babyn Yar, and then twice at the Shevchenko Opera and Ballet Theater. The performers were the Symphony Orchestra of Kyïv Shevchenko Opera and Ballet, Volodymyr Kozhukhar, music director and conductor, the State Chorus “Dumka,” Ievhen Savchuk, music director and conductor, Stepan Fitsych, tenor, Mykola Shopsha, bass. This eighty-minute work was well received by the full house in attendance.

The Ukrainian premiere of Donald Erb’s Trombone Concerto, performed by trombonist Miles Anderson with the Lviv Philharmonic under Virko Baley, proved to be the most intriguing piece of the festival for the Kyïv audiences. Anderson’s performance was sensational. His mastery of the many avant-garde techniques that the piece requires made a powerful impression on listeners: as one composer told me after the performance, “We have never heard a player like him.”

Another work that provoked a tumultuous response was the Ukrainian premiere of Symphony No. 3 by Armenian composer Avet Terterian. The performance was by the former State Academic Symphony Orchestra of the Ukrainian SSR, now called the National Symphony Orchestra of Ukraine, Igor (Ihor) Blazhkov, music director, although Volodymyr Sirenko conducted the concert at which this piece was performed. The symphony is a primordial hymn to the glory of sound. It is a powerful and evocative work, whose additional appeal is the composer’s use of two Armenian folk instruments, the zurna and duduk, which were performed by specially imported soloists Araik Bakhtykian and Armen Kazarian. In spite of having to perform Prokofiev’s Piano Concerto No. 4 on an inferior piano, the French pianist Michel Beroff demonstrated his usual elegant and refined pianism. Other important events were
the Ukrainian premiere of Leonid Hrabovsky’s *La Mer*, and performances of seminal works by Myroslav Skoryk, Levko Kolodub, Lesia Dychko, Valentin Silvestrov, Ivan Karabyts, and Valentin Bibik.

Unquestionably, one of the focal points of the festival was the inauguration of the Iwanna and Marian Kots Composition Competition. This competition was to be held over three consecutive festivals, this first occasion to be a retrospective competition open to all composers living within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Each composer could submit one symphonic work written between the years 1960 and 1990. The jury included co-chairs Donald Erb (United States) and Georgii Dmitriev (Russia) and members Avet Terterian (Armenia), Faradzh Karayev (Azerbaijan), Chary Nurymov (Turkmenistan), and Viacheslav Blimov (Ukraine). The executive coordinator of the Composition Competition was Virko Baley. Probably as a consequence of the novelty of such an event, only twelve works were submitted. The preliminary jury chose six of the works to be performed during a final competition round. The final vote was taken by the jury on the closing day of the concert; and the following were tied for first place: Levko Kolodub for Symphony No. 3, *In the Style of the Ukrainian Baroque* (1980) and Myroslav Skoryk for Concerto for Orchestra, *Carpathian* (1972). Each winner received $1,750. There was no second place award, but tied for third place were Volodymyr Zubytsky for his Symphony No. 2, *Concertanta* (1979) and Oleksii Skrypnyk for his Symphony (1988). Each received $750.

The jury also inaugurated and awarded four special “Kyїv Music Fest ’91 Prizes” to the following composers: Yevhen Stankovych, Valentin Silvestrov, Ivan Karabyts, and Valentin Bibik. These cash prizes were to have recording and publication contracts attached to them, but the promise of French Erato Records to release a representative part of the winning compositions on CD did not materialize.

**Kyїv Music Fest: Continuation and Impact**

When the Italian composer Rossini was asked what were the three most important things a singer needs, he replied: “a voice, a voice, and a voice.” What are the three things that this festival needs? The answer: “hard currency, hard currency, and hard currency.” *Kyїv Music Fest* 1991 showed tremendous potential for disseminating Ukrainian culture and educating Ukrainians about the cutting edge of musical developments around the world. However, it needed financing that the government was then unable or unwilling to supply. What are the monies needed for? Primarily to pay for transportation for visiting artists, proper recording equipment and supplies to document the festival, to make recordings available to radio stations the world over, and to conduct public relations and marketing. *Kyїv Music Fest* has the potential of becoming a window to the West for many countries of the former Soviet Union, and thus an important conduit—a role that Moscow was once supposed to play, but did only rarely. I believe that the most immediate need is to ensure that important world-class composers, conductors, and performing ensembles would begin to see Ukraine and its festival as an important venue for their activities, change that will break down
the isolation of Ukraine. Lack of contact and lack of firsthand knowledge must be overcome, and individuals, organizations, and businesses can help to achieve this. The model that I invoked was that of the International Festival of Contemporary Music’s “Warsaw Autumn,” which put Polish music on the international map and was instrumental in promoting the “Polish School” in contemporary music. For many years it was the main festival of international standing of this type in Central and Eastern Europe. It too was born in a year of crises, 1956, when Władysław Gomułka instituted the “Polish road to socialism”—with an emphasis on Polish culture. Music, theater, art, and film were suddenly free to flourish unimpeded. In 1956 the “Warsaw Autumn” was initiated by two composers, Tadeusz Baird and Kazimierz Serocki, and was officially established by the Governing Board of the Polish Composers Union. The aim was clear: to present new music from Poland and around the world. It did this on a world-class level and the government invested significant resources to make it happen with maximum effect.

Festivals, by their very nature, cause sensory overload. They are also a wonderful substitute for a mind-expanding drug, since they force the participant into new mindsets that an ordinary diet of weekly concerts, theater, and museum visits cannot. Kyiv Music Fest 1992 was such an event, and the feeling in Kyiv was that it, the festival of the land, had become a major cultural event in Kyiv and, by extension, in the rest of Ukraine. In many ways, the third Kyiv Music Fest reached an apex that promised much more than in the end it could deliver.

Right after the completion of the second Kyiv Music Fest, with the help of Roman Rewakowicz and U-Art Agency in Warsaw, I began negotiations with the directors of the “Warsaw Autumn” Festival to have Kyiv Music Fest be represented in the forthcoming “Warsaw Autumn” ’92. An agreement was reached that I would bring the Kyiv Shevchenko Opera and Ballet Orchestra, with Oleh Krysa as violin soloist, and perform two concerts. This worked out especially well as the “Warsaw Autumn” was scheduled for September 18–27, 1992, and Kyiv Music Fest 1992 was to start on October 3. The first program was devoted to Valentin Silvestrov’s masterpiece, Symphony No. 5 (1980), and took place in the beautiful Protestant Evangelical Church. The second performance occurred at the National Philharmonic Concert Hall, where the program included the world premiere of Leonid Hrabovsky’s Vorzel, Virko Bailey’s Violin Concerto No. 1, and the Polish premiere of an important monument of American symphonic music, Harmonielehre (1984–85) by John Adams. All works were then performed again as part of the Kyiv Music Fest 1992.13

The Kyiv Shevchenko Opera and Ballet Orchestra played an important role in this festival. Its music director, Volodymyr Kozhukh, agreed to prepare the orchestra for three of the seven symphony evenings, although he conducted only the closing concert. The other orchestras and chamber ensembles that took part were the State Symphony Orchestra of Television and Radio, Volodymyr Sirenko, conductor; Tchaikovsky Kyiv State Conservatory Symphony Orchestra, Mykola Diadiura, conductor; Dnipropetrovsk Symphony Orchestra, Viacheslav Blinov, conductor; Zaporizhzhia Symphony Orchestra, Viacheslav Redia, conductor; Symphony Orchestra of Kyiv State
Children’s Music Theater, Ihor Palkin, conductor; Kyïv Chamber Orchestra, Roman Kofman, conductor; Ukrainian Composers’ Union Chamber Orchestra, Volodymyr Runchak, conductor; the Kyïv Camerata, Valerii Matiukhin, conductor; and Chamber Orchestra of Lviv “Dolia,” Myroslav Skoryk, music director.

The opening concert was played to a full house. The attendance for the whole festival was extraordinary, with no event attracting less than 70 percent of capacity. Before the concert began there were words of welcome and the reading of letters from President Leonid Kravchuk and the world-renowned violinist-conductor Yehudi Menuhin. While it is impossible in this space to give details of each and every concert, it is important to note that each and every concert was reviewed—and most of them within three days of the event—unheard of alacrity in Ukraine before then. All in all, over twenty articles, interviews, and reviews appeared in the Kyïv papers alone. This in itself points to a significant change in attitude toward art as news.

What were some of the highlights of the festival and various guests who arrived and participated? In the opening concert, Ivan Karabyts’s Molytva Kateryny [Kateryna’s Prayer] for narrator, children’s chorus, and orchestra to the words by Kateryna Motrych, who also was the narrator, stirred a strong emotional response in the audience. The work is dedicated to the memory of the Ukrainian Famine of 1933 and introduced to the festival the theme of the Iwanna and Marian Kots Composition Competition. I conducted John Adam’s Harmonielehre, which was unquestionably one of the important and highly successful works of the festival. The Kyïv Chamber Orchestra concert, conducted by Roman Kofman, showed the ensemble to be back on its feet after a few years of disorganization. It gave the Ukrainian premiere of Myroslav Skoryk’s Diptych for strings and an exciting performance of Leonard Bernstein’s Serenade. A very popular concert was the performance of Rossini’s Stabat Mater with the combined choruses of “Dumka,” Ievhen Savchuk, director, and the Chamber Chorus of the City of Seintes (France), Michel Piapleni, director. For me, as well as for the Russian composer, Andre Eshpai, with whom I attended a special performance, the chamber choir “Kyïv,” under the direction of Mykola Hobdych, was a revelation. This is the first Ukrainian chamber chorus that I have ever heard sing to a world standard. The young conductor Mykola Diadiura led the Kyïv Conservatory Symphony Orchestra in a varied program that included the Piano Concerto of Alfred Schnittke, the solo part performed (by memory) by Yan Zun Kim of South Korea. But Diadiura’s conducting of Tchaikovsky’s Francesca da Rimini brought the house down. The Kyïv Conservatory Orchestra is a goldmine. Roman Kofman has developed it into a first-rate ensemble (those who are interested in exploring their professionalism should try to find a Melodiya release of their performance of Valentin Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5;14 it is exemplary). Luba and Ireneus Zuk (from Canada) gave a successful piano duo recital. Juliana Osinchuk (from United States) made her Kyïv debut in the performance of Lowell Liebermann’s Piano Concerto No. 2. But undeniably, it was the debut of Theodore Kuchar conducting the Suite from Porgy and Bess by George Gershwin that caused the biggest performing sensation. Kuchar’s energetic conducting and charismatic stage presence brought the audience to its feet. The suite was then played a second time—and could have been repeated a
third time. The important by-product of his Ukrainian debut was his establishment of a relationship with what became known as the National Symphony Orchestra. Within a few years, he became its music director and began to make recordings for the Hong Kong-based international label NAXOS.

The closing concert introduced to the Kyiv audience two movements from *Lokale Musik* by the German composer Walter Zimmermann, who was also one of the judges of the Kots Competition. It was a highly controversial piece, very original in its concept and one that (in the end) won the audiences over. Maria (Maryna) Chaikovska gave a fine performance of Edward Elgar’s *Concerto* for Violoncello, and Oleh Krysa the first performance in Kyiv of Virko Baley’s *Violin Concerto No. 1, quasi una fantasia*. Other guests included the Finnish clarinetist Pekka Ahonen, the pianists Sorin Melinde (Spain) and Eric Ferrand N’Kaouna (France), and saxophonist Michael Leonard (United States).

A good portion of the 1992 festival was devoted to music by Ukrainian composers. In addition to those already listed, such important works as Silvestrov’s *Symphony No. 5* (a very important landmark in Ukrainian symphony), the premiere of Leonid Hrabovsky’s controversial elegy in memory of Boris Liatoshynsky *Vorzel*, Lesia Dychko’s new *Mass*, and compositions by Oleh Kyva, Hanna Havrylets, Alexander (Oleksandr) Shchetynsky, Iakiv Hubanov, Ihor Shcherbakov, Iurii Laniuk, Iryna Kyrylina, Oleksandr Gugel, Liudmyla Iurina, Oleksandr Grinberg, Mykhailo Starytsky, Maryna Denysenko, Vadym Zhuravytsky, and other talented young composers. Unfortunately, there were a few casualties: Levko Kolodub withdrew the projected premiere of his Symphony No. 5 (due to a creative disagreement with conductor), Stankovych’s new work was postponed due to the sudden illness of a key soloist, and no works were performed by such composers as Volodymyr Zahortsev, Vitalii Hodziatsky, and Borys Buievsky.

Certainly, one of the main events of the festival was the Composition Competition sponsored by the Americans Iwanna and Marian Kots. The preliminary jury selected six compositions, which were performed on two evenings. The first evening, October 6, the Dnipropetrovsk Symphony Orchestra under the direction of music director Viacheslav Blinov performed the first three works by Volodymyr Runchak, Valentin Bibik, and John Anthony Lennon (United States), and at the end of the evening they gave an excellent performance of Rachmaninov’s *The Isle of the Dead*. The following evening, the State Radio and Television Orchestra under the direction of Volodymyr Sirenko performed the remaining three compositions by Halyna Ovcharenko, Gennady Liashenko, and Zbigniew Baginski (Poland). The jury, which consisted of Walter Zimmermann (Germany), Theodore Kuchar (Australia), Myroslav Skoryk (Ukraine), and myself as nonvoting coordinator, decided, after much deliberation and with a split vote, not to award a first prize. The second prize ($3,000) was split between Valentin Bibik for *Lamentation and Prayer* for orchestra and Zbigniew Baginski from Poland for *Tren* [Threnody] for chorus and orchestra, and honorable mention to a composer younger than thirty, Halyna Ovcharenko, for *Burnt Malva* for narrator, chorus, and orchestra ($500). One vote for third prize was also given to Gennady Liashenko for
Symphony *Pro memoria*. All works submitted for the competition were dedicated to the victims of the Holodomor (the genocide famine) of 1933.

The *Kyïv Music Fest* has now become an event. To a great extent, its success is due to the tireless efforts on its behalf of Ivan Karabyts. As his partner in this endeavor (we are, in a sense, codirectors), I may be prejudiced, but the success of the event, its growth, and structural development is due to his tenacity and willingness to take risks. For example, only three weeks before the festival of 1992 was to begin, much of the funding was still to be delivered. Karabyts chose to press ahead with the festival. The decision to go ahead in the face of such fiscal danger is nothing short of heroic. But this also proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the event, as well as the problem of so many other similar cultural programs that Ukraine desperately needed to develop. Funding in the future would often not come through and programs had to be modified at the last minute.

We all were well aware that the next two years would be of critical importance. It could, with proper financial and artistic leadership, become a world-class event. It could bring to Ukraine the kind of recognition that only the arts attract. It could also become an important source of auxiliary revenue. Instead, *Kyïv Music Fest* 1993, 1994, and 1995 essentially did not grow, but retained the same format. Guest composers still included at least one name of genuine international reputation, but almost exclusively from the United States (the composer Bernard Rands, British-American, in 1993; composer John Corigliano, American, in 1994; composer George Crumb (all three Pulitzer Prize winners), and the ensemble California E.A.R. Unit in 1995, American). On the other hand, no European composer of equal standing, with the exception of Walter Zimmermann in 1992, ever attended any of the festivals—which may mean that they were not invited. When one examines the program from 1996 on, the bulk of all new music was by Ukrainian composers. The guest star of the 1996 festival was the return of the ensemble CONTINUUM. *Kyïv Music Fest* became something that was not originally intended: a plenum devoted to Ukrainian works, with a few non-Ukrainians thrown in, and a few non-Ukrainian performers to fill out the required international heading.

**Other Music Festivals**

At this point, one needs to mention that in 1994 Kyïv became host to the *International Competition for Young Pianists in Memory of Vladimir Horowitz*. This too promised to become an important event; although far from negligible, it has failed up to now to achieve appropriate status on the world stage.

In 1995 two other festivals appeared on the musical map of Ukraine: *Kontrasty: International Festival of Contemporary Music* in Lviv and *Two Days and Two Nights of New Music/2D2N* in Odesa. *Kontrasty* was put together by the Lviv Branch of the Ukrainian Composers’ Union, Volodymyr Syvokhip, director, with Alexander Shchetynsky and Yuri Laniuk, with Roman Rewakowicz and Iarema Iakubiak (Yarema Yakubiak) as artistic committee. *Two Days and Two Nights* is the brainchild
of the composer and the festival’s artistic director Karmella Tsepkolenko and is organized by the Association of New Music, the Ukrainian branch of the International Society of Contemporary Music (ISCM), Oleksandr Perepelytsia, director. 2D2N is unique in that it is a forty-eight-hour event of continuous concerts, a nonstop musical spectacle that has attracted a large number of composers and performers and artists of various kinds. It is also unique in that it aims to integrate music with other arts and looks toward finding a synthesis. In many ways, the two new festivals took upon themselves to do what Kyiv Music Fest failed to deliver: a more rounded presentation of late twentieth-century music from Europe and other parts of the world. Lviv’s Kontrasty is more traditionally arranged; one to two concerts a day spread over eight to ten days. Naturally, it also established a connection with Poland, with a number of Polish performers, composers, and ensembles participating. 2D2N also places an emphasis on pedagogy, with classes and master classes preceding the festival. It does live up to the notion of being an “international” festival, in that many more composers and performers from abroad are represented. However, over the years, due to lack of funding and necessary state and private support, it too fell short of being able to invite enough composers, ensembles, and soloists of true international standing. One will rarely, and in many cases never, find such prestigious names as IRCAM, Ensemble Moderne, the Juilliard or Alban Berg String Quartets, Pierre Boulez, Louis Andriessen, Salvatore Sciarrino, John Adams, Harrison Birtwhistle, Tan Dun, Kronos Quartet, Schoenberg Ensemble, or any of the major European or North American orchestras participating.

Concluding Remarks

At the end of 1996, Ukraine fell into a complete disarray from which it is still waiting to recover (the Orange Revolution having solved little so far in this field). So, what is the present state of music? The report, although far from satisfactory, is not all negative. First of all, almost all institutions have survived. The various philharmonics, opera companies, and chamber orchestras continue to perform. At least two larger ensembles have reached a level of excellence on par with West European institutions: The National Symphony Orchestra of Kyiv and the Lviv Virtuosi. Of particular note is the remarkable recording legacy that the orchestra has produced in the past fifteen years, especially for NAXOS. The orchestra is now counted as one of the important recording ensembles in the world. The National Symphony Orchestra is now recording for various companies, but principally NAXOS. Under the past music director, Theodore Kuchar, the orchestra recorded for NAXOS a number of Ukrainian works, including the complete symphonies of Boris Liatoshynsky, and works by Yevhen Stankovych as well as many other composers. More recently, they appeared on the prestigious German label ECM in a recording of Valentin Silvestrov’s Requiem for Larissa. What the orchestra needs is to work with world-class conductors from Europe or America (such as Riccardo Muti, Lorin Maazel, or Esa-Pekka Salonen). In July 2007, the New York Philharmonic hired a relative unknown, Alan Gilbert, as
its new music director. But the New York Philharmonic is an iconic institution: it can carry a young conductor and hope he becomes the next Leonard Bernstein. A little-known orchestra, such as Kyïv’s National Symphony, needs a world-class conductor to raise it to the next level and give it visibility. Unfortunately, there is still a powerful bias against hiring anyone from outside the closed national circle. What a renowned conductor would bring to the orchestra is not only auxiliary benefits, such as recording contracts of standard repertoire and class-A tours, but additional funding—as both the government and private enterprises would need to step in and increase financial support. There are a number of smaller, diverse ensembles that form and re-form and continue to enrich cultural life (two of the better ones are the Kyïv Chamber Orchestra and the Kyïv Camerata). The three festivals, Kyïv Music Fest, Kontrasty, and Two Days and Two Nights still exist and the fact that they manage to continue, and in the case of 2D2N, grow, shows vitality and willingness to persist. Yet it is important to remember that most international festivals base their success on their ability to attract an international audience. Otherwise they risk becoming local events within an international silence of irrelevance.

An individual may overstep the limitations of his/her time and wait for postmortem recognition; a group essentially cannot. A group is always a prisoner of its time, since it can only move as a collective in real time. Its success depends on the collective’s ability to reflect, surprise, and satisfy the present ideological time’s requirements. If you want to find out how “the people” felt and what they thought about forty years ago, watch the art of its time: film. It will tell you all you need to know about the collective, both of the masses and the elite. A state wishing to promote and advertise its creative resources must have its “product” be competitive with the current international musical standards.

After the late 1950s, the Soviet Union created some notable cultural achievements in music, film, and poetry. But, it was essentially the art of a certain kind of denial: finding a way to say “no” to political and social censorship. In a recent interview, the Malaysian documentary filmmaker Amir Muhummad stated, “I don’t know how I could work in a society without censorship. When you are in a society where you find yourself having to use layered speech, it forces you to concentrate on what you want most to say and how to say it” (Coover 12). Ukraine now faces another kind of censorship: fear of the future, fear of the unknown and fear of developing new models. It is afraid to step out of its well-worn, indeed outworn shoes. It needs to create a new inner life. Inner life is not given, it needs to reinhabit oneself. Only existence is given.

On the other hand, from the standpoint of solo performing, things have improved very much. The number of Ukrainian singers and instrumentalists born and trained in Ukraine (and other countries as well) has grown impressively. The senior conductor Roman Kofman, music director of the Kyïv Chamber Orchestra and artistic director and principal conductor of the Beethovenhalle Orchestra Bonn Germany, has a brisk and important European career and appears with many major orchestras and on major recording labels; Volodymyr Sirenko, music director of the National Symphony
Orchestra of Ukraine is beginning to make a European reputation for himself as well; Kirill Karabits, son of the composer Ivan Karabyts, has just been named principal conductor of the Bournemouth Symphony Orchestra in England. Among the singers are: Misha Didyk, Vladimir Grishko (Volodymyr Hryshko), and Igor (Ihor) Borko (tenors), Anatoly Kocherga (baritone), Oksana Sitnitska and Julia Griniuk (mezzo-sopranos), Olga Pasichnyk, Valentina Stepova, Maria Guleghina, Oksana Krovytska, and Anna Shafajinskaia (sopranos), Vitalij Kowaljow, among many others; among the pianists are Valentina Lisitsa (Lysytsia), Vitalij Kuprij, Ethella Chupryk, Alexei Grynyuk (Hryniuk), Olga Dudnik Olha Dydnyk), Alexei Koltakov, Ievgenii Kostrytsky, Viacheslav Sidorenko (Sydorenko), Tanya Ursova, Sergei Salov (Montreal Competition first prize in 2004), Viktoria Yermolyeva (Iermolyieva). Alexander Gavrylyuk (Havryliuk), Volodymyr Vynnytsky, Konstantin Lifschitz, and others; among violinists, Pavlo Beznosiuk, Valeriy Sokolov, Larissa Abramova, Solomiya Ivakhiv, and Ostap Shutko; among cellists, Natalia Khoma. It is too early to predict which ones will be raised to iconic status, but it is more than possible that some of them have a good chance of becoming household names in the near future.

So what would make that happen? At least culturally speaking, what Ukraine now needs is a commitment similar to Poland’s 1956 effort to elevate Polish consciousness to worldwide level. Only through culture can one persuade the rest of the world to really care whether or not Ukraine exists. The festivals still remain an excellent way to promote Ukraine and its musical culture. But to do their magic, they need to showcase, in addition to local talent, internationally recognized names that will attract the peripatetic music lover. All international and successful festivals are part of an infrastructure that contains travel agencies, hotels, restaurants, and public relations firms all working together with the artistic directors to make the events an irresistible musical magnet. But it can only happen in Ukraine with the active and aggressive financial and political participation of the Ukrainian government and its cultural ministries. Toward that end a healthy budget must be allocated. Unfortunately, that may not be possible in the near future. Patience and perseverance will be needed to sustain what has developed and to slowly expand its international ambitions until government and private patronage develop sufficiently to take it to the next (essential) level.

Notes

1. Russian perestroika is perebudova in Ukrainian. The Russian term is by now in common usage in most languages.

2. The problem of transliterating from Ukrainian to English is that there are a number of different variants, including a Russian rendition of Ukrainian names, since Soviet passports were in Russian, thus many musicians are known internationally in that version. Persons interested in further researching the personalities and cities listed here are advised to check out the other spellings as well: Boris Liatsoshynsky (Borys Liatsoshinsky, Lyatoshynsky), Valentyn Silvestrov (Valentyn Sylvestrov), Valentyn Bibik (Valentyn Bibyk), Vitaly Hodziatsky (Hondzyatsky, Godziatsky), Leonid Hrabovsky (Grabovsky), Oleh Krysa (Oleg Krisa), Volodymyr Huba (Vladimir Guba), Yakiv Hubanov (Yakov Gubanov), Kyiv, Kyiv (Kiev), Kharkiv (Kharkov), Lviv (Lvov), Iuri (Yuri) or Ievhen (Yevhen), as well as other names.
3. For a more in-depth study of what led to the emergence of twentieth-century Ukrainian music, the reader is directed to two articles by Virko Baley, “The Kiev Avant-garde: A Retrospective in Midstream” and “Return of a Native,” available at www.virkobaley.com.

4. It was published in *Numus-West* in June 1974, and then translated and reprinted in the highly influential German journal *Melos, Neue Zeitschrift Für Musik*. This article, devoted exclusively to new Ukrainian music, was the first such to appear in Western journals. It has been the source for a number of other articles written since then by American, English, German, and French writers when confronted by the “unknown” Ukrainian music. Yevhen Stankovych informed me in a conversation, that the article was given to him by the Composers’ Union, and he was asked to determine whether the article was “friendly” or not; and thus, whether I was to be welcomed or barred from further direct contact with Ukrainian composers. Understanding full well the implication of such a question, he gave it a positive review, thus allowing me to continue with my research.

5. Some significant highlights: on May 12, 1986, the Nevada Symphony Orchestra gave the world premiere of Valentin Silvestrov’s *Postludium* for piano and orchestra, Elissa Stutz, pianist. On November 10, 2006, the same orchestra performed the United States premiere of Leonid Hrabovsky’s *La Mer*, for narrator, chamber chorus, and large symphony orchestra. The next two concerts were hugely important: on April 11, 1987, the New York-based ensemble CONTINUUM presented at Alice Tully Hall, Lincoln Center, the first ever concert of new Ukrainian chamber and chamber orchestra music in the United States or Canada organized and performed by a non-Ukrainian organization. The four composers represented were Levko Kolodub, Leonid Hrabovsky, Valentin Silvestrov, and Valentin Bibik. What is doubly important is that one of them was commissioned to compose a new work for that event and paid for it! The composer was Leonid Hrabovsky. The *New York Times* reviewed the event in extremely positive terms. CONTINUUM’s Joel Sachs and Cheryl Seltzer then decided that they wanted to give another such concert, but one dedicated to a single composer: Valentin Silvestrov (to celebrate his fiftieth birthday). The concert, given on April 9, 1988, was a huge success.

6. When Yuri Illienko’s film *Well for the Thirsty* was released “from prison” (in other words, allowed to be shown), Leonid Hrabovsky told me that I absolutely must see it, that it is a masterpiece. They were showing it in Moscow. I then spent two days at the Dovzhenko film studio looking at most of his films and after that a number of other films by other directors. Illienko informed me that he and the poet Ivan Drach were coming to Canada for a showing of the film and that the San Francisco Film Festival was going to show it together with other Soviet films. I agreed to help him with the tour and managed to persuade a number of other Ukrainian communities to host both of them. Thus began a relationship that spawned a company called Video Ukraine, Inc. that together with Kobza, a Canadian company based in Toronto, produced Illienko’s next film, based on a scenario by Sergei Paradjanov (Paradzhanov), *Swan Lake. The Zone*.

7. Of all the Soviet composers who emerged on the international scene in the mid-sixties, the Ukrainian Leonid Hrabovsky has the reputation of being the most adventurous, outrageous, and, at the same time, most interested in formal experimentation. Hrabovsky’s attitude toward art could be viewed in Susan Sontag’s phrase “the imaginary landscape of the will.” His is a highly conceptual mind, for whom form and style (which is the examination of content) are methods of representation, reminiscent of Paul Valery’s statement that “ . . . form for anyone else is ‘content’ for me.” With him one has the feeling that the composer is an alchemist turning baser metals into gold. Style for Hrabovsky is an image of the world, an exceedingly concrete image, something one uses with total consciousness. His more recent works exhibit an interest in a complex synthesis of various styles (polystylistics), a system that may be described as stylistic modulation. There is something “cinematic” in the work—montage-like, with many dissolves and overlays—with an equally cinematic fascination with surface textures and association of aural images.
8. Hodziatsky’s style of aggressive athleticism, rhythmic elasticity, and emotional intensity are mixed with sudden and resplendent means. It is as if Prokofiev went on to become a twelve-tone (or freely atonal) composer. In 1964 he created four hilariously witty magnetic-tape musique concrete pieces titled simply Four Electronic Studies: *Nuansi* [Nuances], *Emansipirovanney chemodan* [The Emancipated Suitcase], *Realizatsiya 29/1*, and *Antiforte piano*. Different objects were used as sound sources, from kitchen utensils to different parts of the piano. The pieces have tremendous energy and a good deal of humor, especially the two middle movements. These were also the first pieces by a Ukrainian composer, and one of the first by a Soviet, to work with electronic means. Since then Hodziatsky has worked slowly but steadily, producing works of individuated originality, from the 1974 Piano Sonata, through the 1990 revision of *Stabilis* for chamber orchestra, to the more recent Woodwind Quintet (1996). As his art matured it placed greater emphasis on the long line, emotional stability, and attractive colors. He is a composer who never abandoned his basic modernist aesthetic.

9. Of the Ukrainian composers who came into prominence in the 1970s (Silvestrov, Stankovych, Hrabovsky, Kolodub, Skoryk, Karabyts, Huba, Zahortsev, and Hodziatsky), Valentin Bibik is one of the more interesting and original. His death from a brain tumor in 2003 in Tel Aviv, Israel, where he was living at the time, was a tragic loss to Ukrainian music. Bibik’s musical language is rooted in melody, a strong tradition in Slavic music, while the harmonic language is essentially based on polytonal combinations of triads, layered so that each line has its own harmonic life. Each line, in turn, is often laced with diatonic passages. Valentin Bibik’s art is one that attempts to maximize the coloristic and formal dimensions of each musical gesture being portrayed; it makes use of a wide range of techniques, including massive canons, tone clusters, and simultaneous employment of multiple tempi, as exemplified in two of his best known works, Symphony No. 4 (1976) and Symphony No. 7 (1982). The result is a style that exhibits the contrasting of immobility and motion, of quietude and tempestuous outbreaks, of contemplation and activity.

10. The “generation of the sixties” in Ukraine produced two distinct styles: music of a highly abstract nature that grew out of the experience of the European avant-garde (the so-called Kiev avant-garde) and music that can be described as “the new folklorism,” the precursor of “new romanticism,” a movement that reached its full development in the 1980s. The reliance on ethnographic sources as a base for a national artistic movement attracted the young Skoryk. His music from the mid-1960s through the seventies is very much wedded to folklore, especially that of the Ukrainian Carpathian Mountains area. With the Violin Concerto No. 1 (1969), Partitas Nos. 1, 2 and 3, Concerto for Orchestra *Carpathian*, and the Cello Concerto (1984) Skoryk fully realized his style of building a work from short melismas (derived by synthesizing idiomatic folk rhythms and melodic gestures) that tend be a succession of asymmetrical phrases, which expand by means of troping. In such works his voice speaks with a clarity, originality, and emotional richness that place him in the front ranks of late twentieth-century Ukrainian composers. In the 1990s, Skoryk began extensively utilizing various pop elements, first attempted in his Partita No. 5, in *modo retro* for piano in 1975.

11. With his Symphony No. 2 (1977) and Symphony No. 3 for Strings (1978), Ivan Karabyts established his mature style. Karabyts’s musical language is a cross-section of tendencies, yet his experience is rooted in, and protected by, tonality, no matter how extended and elusive it may at times seem. We hear the influence of classical-romantic elements (neoromanticism), an expanded tonal system that borrows freely from chromatic (freely atonal), harmonic, and modic orientations, which he shapes into various subsystems, governed by a predominantly classical (Apollonian) outlook. As a composer centered in the great renaissance of polyphony that this twentieth century has seen, Karabyts thinks and feels harmonic movement polyphonically. In his works, every musical idea fits into a musical tapestry in which the interplay of melodies is woven by use of contrapuntal devices, some of them fleeting. For Karabyts, the components
of such a tapestry always have thematic significance: even the pedal tones “sing.” He does not challenge himself with seeking out new technical methods, but, rather, in works such as Concerto for Orchestra No. 3, Symphony No. 3 for Strings and Concerto-Triptych (1996), reflects these artistic preferences filtered through his personal worldview. His death in 2001 was a serious loss to Ukrainian music.

12. The festival included more than twenty-two concerts: seven symphonic, nine chamber, and three choral, as well as concerts with special themes, such as “An Evening of the Contemporary Quartet,” “An Evening of Piano Duets,” and so on. The festival concerts presented the music of composers from many countries—the United States, Canada, England, France, Japan, Brazil, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. A significant part of the program consisted of the music of approximately fifty Ukrainian composers.

13. Kyiv Music Fest 1992 attempted to organize the activities (three main concerts a day, on a few occasions, four) into a pattern that the audience could quickly remember. The opening concert, preceded by an outdoor concert of wind music, took place in the Shevchenko Theater of Opera and Ballet on a specially constructed stage that turned the opera house into an acceptable concert hall. Beginning with Sunday, October 4, the following pattern became established: at noon, a concert given by the International Youth Music Forum devoted to the music of young composers; at 4:00 p.m. a concert of chamber music, and at 7:00 p.m. a concert of symphonic music. On two evenings parallel events would take place at the 7:00 p.m. hour; these were devoted to various forms of pop music. Two symphonic evenings, October 6 and 7, were devoted to the Iwanna and Marian Kots International Composition Competition.


15. Both Alexander Shchetynsky, originally from Kharkiv where he studied with Valentin Bibik and now residing in Kyiv, and Yuri Laniuk in Lviv, are two of the more important composers to reach maturity and develop some international standing in the postindependence world. Shchetynsky has been slowly and steadily building a serious reputation in Europe. As I wrote in The New Grove Dictionary (2000, vol. 23, 234–244), “His style is essentially that of a structuralist, relying on a synthesis of a variety of modernist techniques and exploring in each piece a particular musical metaphor. This method explains his reliance on pieces with descriptive titles.” Yuri Laniuk is a very important Lviv-based composer. His music falls into a kind of modernistic neoromanticism. Many of his works use voice (solo and chorus) and have a strong mystical aura. He is a practitioner of an especially Eastern variety of meditative minimalism.

16. Karmella Tsepolenko’s music combines many contemporary techniques. One of her musical characteristics (not so usual in Ukrainian music) is wit and lightness. Her success as an organizer of a unique international festival with a formidable reputation places her among the important music personalities in Ukraine.

17. One should add at this point, that although the established composers are doing well, not many younger composers are making a name for themselves or developing promising careers and some kind of standing in Europe. The development of an international career is a matter of luck and support, but the following musicians seem to work regularly and professionally: Zoltan Almashi, Oleksandr Shymko, Liubava Sydorenko, Bohdan Kryvopust, Olena Protopopova, Yevhen (Ievhen) Orkin, Olexiy (Oleksii) Boytenko (Boitenko), and Oleg (Oleh) Bezborodko. The most favored style appears to be mainly neoromantic and eclectic, with occasional minimalism (Shymko) and serialism (Kryvopust). As stated before, the two big influences are Stankovych and Silvestrov. On the other hand, certain ensembles large and small are performing at a fairly high level: Kyiv Camerata (Valerii Matiukhin), Ricochet (Serhi Pilyutikov’), National Symphony Orchestra (Volodymyr Sirenko), National Philharmonic Orchestra (Mykola Diadiura), chamber choir “Kyiv” (Mykola Hobdych), Uzhhorod Chamber choir “Cantus” (Emil Sokacz), and others.
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About the Translator

Christine Sochocky pursued graduate study in comparative literature and then in library science, earning a Ph.D. at the University of Pittsburgh. She has taught French language and literature at La Roche College and translated several scholarly studies and short stories (from the Ukrainian, English, and French). She has published articles on issues of post-Soviet librarianship. She now resides in Toronto, Canada.