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Ukrainians in Poland — new hopes, old fears

During the recent upheaval in Poland the vulnerable Ukrainian minority in that country was seized by both hope and fear. The Ukrainians shared the hope of other citizens that a genuine democratization was underway in the country; but they also had hopes more specifically their own — that the democratization would allow for the freer development of Ukrainian cultural and organizational life in Poland, and that it would weaken the authoritarian Soviet system as a whole and thus improve the situation in Ukraine. The Ukrainians had also their own particular fear, namely that the growth of Polish nationalism, which inevitably accompanied the strike movement, would make life for them as a national minority all the more difficult.

The Ukrainians are not exactly a force to be reckoned with in Poland. Estimates of their numerical strength range from 180,000 to 300,000, the most generous estimate being 500,000. They are not easy to count, because so many Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin have been totally assimilated to Polish nationality. "Hard core" Ukrainians, namely those who belong to Ukrainian organizations or subscribe to the Ukrainian press, number only ten to fifteen thousand. They are almost invisible among the thirty-five million Poles.

Historically, the Ukrainians (Lemkos) used to inhabit the south-eastern corner of what is now the Polish People's Republic. However, they were unceremoniously cleared out of the territory in 1948, during the so-called "Operation Vistula" against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The uprooted population was resettled either in the USSR or in the northern and western territories of the postwar Poland acquired from Germany. Today Ukrainians are scattered throughout Poland, in every major city, although the greatest concentration is still in

the north and west (Gdansk, Szczecin, Olsztyn, Wrocław, Koszalin). They were deprived of almost all cultural-national rights until June 1956, when the Ukrainian Societal-Cultural Society (USKT) was formed and the Ukrainian weekly *Nasha Slovo* established. Although since then Ukrainians in Poland have certainly fared better than Poles in Soviet Ukraine, they are clearly dissatisfied with their position. They have often vented their complaints about Polish

scattered in many different occupations and enterprises, but they also feared that any common action undertaken on their part might be used in the future as a pretext for further curbing Ukrainian national-cultural rights.

Ukrainians did, however, support the strike movement, in the hope that the democratization would effect them not simply as Polish citizens, but as Polish citizens of Ukrainian nationality. In particular, they looked forward to democratic



chauvinism, pressure to assimilate and the restrictions on Ukrainian cultural-organizational activities, in a series of documents that have been published in the West (see, most recently, *Ukrains'ka Slovo* Paris, 5 October 1980, and the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, Toronto, no. 9, 1980).

When the strikes broke out in Poland last summer the Ukrainian minority was in no position to assume an independent role. Not only were Ukrainians dispersed throughout the country and

elections to the executive of the USKT, which is presently comprised of people appointed by the state. Moreover, they greeted the events of August 1980 as a possible catalyst of change in Soviet Ukraine. For these reasons Ukrainians took part in strike actions along with their Polish co-workers, and at least one Ukrainian worked as a secretary in one of the more significant strike committees.

A disturbing element, however, was the rise of nationalism in the working class. The popular appeal of

Polish nationalism had already been augmented by the election and pilgrimage to Poland of Pope John Paul II. When the strikes broke out, with their unavoidable and understandable anti-Soviet undertones, nationalism reached a very high pitch among the masses of the Polish population. Although today's Polish nationalism is primarily directed against national oppression by Soviet Russia (as is, of course, Ukrainian nationalism), the Ukrainians in Poland fear it for they have in the past felt the sting of Polish pride on their own skins. The blind nationalism of the masses, they justifiably fear, might turn against them the way it turned against the Jews in a previous moment of crisis (1968) in recent Polish history.

Politically active Ukrainians in Poland therefore prefer to work more closely with the Polish intelligentsia rather than directly with the workers. They see the Polish oppositional elite as a possible ally in their struggle for the expansion of Ukrainian organizations, schools and periodicals. Thus the focus of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration has been the universities. At one Polish university an unofficial Ukrainian organization has entered into collaboration with a Polish oppositional group, and at another institution of higher learning a conscious Ukrainian who makes no secret of his nationality has been elected as a deputy to a new, independent trade union.

Intellectuals in the Polish opposition and the academic establishment have generally been sympathetic towards the Ukrainians. Polish scholars in the universities and Academy of Sciences have long been producing studies of Ukrainian history and literature that are more honest, more substantive and more appreciative of Ukrainian national aspirations than the works of their Soviet Ukrainian counterparts. Pro-

Ukrainian articles have also appeared in the Polish uncensored (i.e., "samizdat") press since 1976, particularly in the journal *Spotkania* (Encounters) put out by an unofficial Catholic youth group in Lublin. The Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KSS KOR) has yet to take up the cause of Ukrainian rights in Poland, but it has been looking for material on the Ukrainian question as a whole, to publish in its uncensored periodicals. Moreover, the two most prominent leaders of KSS KOR have interesting "Ukrainian connections": Adam

(Poland continued on page 3)

Emmanuel Rizdvo

Ukrainian brief wins respect

UCC delegation makes strong presentation

Representatives of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee presented a brief to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution on 27 November 1980. The Constitutional brief, which was written by members of the national executive of the Ukrainian Business and Professional Federation, focussed on the issues of the protection of minorities in an entrenched Charter of Rights, as well as the specific areas of language and cultural rights. [The text of the written presentation to the constitutional committee on pages 6-7 — ed.]

The Ukrainian Canadian Committee was represented by Professor Manoly Lupul from the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Professor Orest Rudzik from the University of Toronto and John Nowosed, the national president of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC). A fourth representative, Anthony Yermovich, a Vice-President of the UCC, also attended as part of the panel, but only as an observer.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee's appearance before the Constitutional Committee came in the lively question-and-answer



Dr. Manoly Lupul on Parliament Hill

session which followed the presentation. Professors Lupul and Rudzik responded with a great deal of skill to the questions of the parliamentarians; one prominent Canadian columnist, Allen Fotheringham, went so far as to call the presentation "brilliant" and lucidly argued. One exchange, in particular, between Liberal M.P. Bryce Meckasey and Professor Lupul, centered on the fundamental issue of language rights and highlighted the question which has caused so much debate and controversy during the past two decades in Quebec — the role of the anglophone minority:

Professor Lupul: Mr. Meckasey, the amendment as proposed would take away from Bill 101 what I consider to be a very unfortunate thing, and that is the desperate need, such a desperate need to secure the French language in Quebec, that there is no attention paid to the importance of being bilingual in Quebec.

Mr. Meckasey: Well, I agree with you.

Professor Lupul: I understand that desperate need now, after all I would have to disagree with you a little bit. I think, in your statement that the anglophone minority of Quebec has been as bilingual as you say.

Mr. Meckasey: The English speaking minority.

Professor Lupul: That is the people of Anglo-Celtic, that is in the sense they are called British ...

Mr. Meckasey: Statistically we are more bilingual than the French speaking Canadians of Quebec.

Professor Lupul: Well, that may very well be, after all that is kind of their province, they can be what they want to be.

Mr. Meckasey: It is also my province, I am sorry. I am talking minority now and I am surprised that you would suggest that I have no rights as a Quebecer to my province.

Professor Lupul: All I am saying is that anybody who is a minority should be able to speak to the majority in the majority's language. Surely.

A striking weakness of the constitutional committee's performance at the hearings was evident in their unfamiliarity with many of the issues which were raised by the UCC brief and in their inability to formulate probing questions to the proposals. Those members of the committee who directed questions to the brief — Hnetyshyn, Lewycky, Epp and Meckasey — continually asked either irrelevant questions or

were caught and corrected by the panel in their use of inaccurate and inappropriate terms pertaining to the second-class status of the "other ethnic groups." If the brief accomplished anything, it surely demonstrated to members of the committee that the Ukrainians in Canada are no longer willing to be considered as anything less than equal to the French minorities outside of Quebec, as well as the anglophone minority within Quebec, insofar as the right to have the Ukrainian language taught in the public school systems of Canada should be guaranteed within the new constitution.

In this respect, the UCC brief can be considered a small contribution toward raising the concerns of the "forgotten people" in the constitutional debate — those ethnocultural minorities other than the English and French. Unfortunately, the presentation of the brief carries only as much weight as there is political pressure behind it, and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee executive in Winnipeg remains abysmally weak in mobilizing

(Presentation cont'd page 10)

Inside: Marenychi review, Lennon tribute, Meister ...



Report from Madrid



Once again Red Army tanks are poised menacingly on the borders of a 'trouble spot' within the Soviet empire. Once again, the Kremlin is threatening to solve with brutal force what it has consistently failed to solve with central planning, party-blessed reforms, the not-so-secret police and rhetoric about "increasing productivity" and the "friendship of nations". And although one can only be alarmed by the spectre of violence that today haunts Eastern Europe, one also cannot help but be gripped by the excitement of events in Poland and their potential implications for that part of the world. The cracks in the Soviet monolith are obviously starting to widen, and whatever the immediate results of the current struggle for power, there is no doubt that Poland marks only the beginning of a period of inevitable change.

The rise of the resolutely independent trade union movement in Poland was naturally hailed in the West as victory for the forces of good (i.e., the people who brought Vietnam and Chile, and now bring you El Salvador) over the forces of evil (godless communism). The Western media in particular have taken great pleasure in reporting the showdown between the Polish working class and the Communist Party, showing an enthusiasm it is doubtful they would have if, say Italian, French, or (heaven forbid) Canadian workers were to show the same kind of mettle in a similar bid for power. But even their tone of glee has become increasingly subdued in recent weeks, as the potential repercussions of the Polish crisis begin to sink in on Western analysts. After all, if the situation doesn't stabilize soon, Poland will not be able to repay its huge debts to Western banks, and détente (which profits both sides) might collapse to the detriment of all the parties involved. Worse still, workers in other countries might just take their inspiration from their Polish brothers and sisters, therefore it is not surprising that Western commentators in recent weeks have been championing "moderation" and "moderate elements" — namely, the forces of compromise that eventually sell-out to the status quo in exchange for illusory concessions — within the Solidarity movement.

Be that as it may, one still wants to vigorously applaud at the sight of workers standing up to a so-called "worker's state" and the "leading role" of a party that claims to represent their interests. In fact, it is to be hoped that the "virus" currently infecting Poland will spread among the producers of wealth in every other industrial state in the world and prove to be the fashionable disease of the '80s. To that end, we can only encourage working people all over the world to not only support Solidarity financially, politically and morally, but also to follow their lead in seizing control over their individual lives and their collective destinies.

It is, of course, especially important that workers in the countries bordering Poland — East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania — support their rebellious neighbour. It is crucial that historical differences be buried at this critical moment in history so that all the oppressed people of the Soviet Union and East Europe can take up a common sword against their common enemy, the inhuman regime in Moscow. For although the Kremlin may have extremely difficult decisions to make in terms of how it ultimately resolves the crisis in Poland, there is really only one logical course of action for workers in the present circumstances. They must fall in behind a banner that calls for "Solidarity with the Poles." I.B.

In addition to the official sessions and speeches involving the 35 signatory countries, the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has a decided non-governmental aspect. About 40 unofficial groups have been here to try to direct the attention of the conference to the specific issues of human and national rights, especially as they relate to the Soviet Union and its satellites. Through seminars, press conferences, demonstrations and individual lobbying, these groups seek to persuade the delegations and press to intervene on behalf of individuals and movements that have been victimized by repressive measures of the state.

Perhaps the best known of the human rights lobbyists here are the Soviet dissidents expelled from the Soviet Union, particularly the Helsinki monitors. A press conference sponsored by the World Congress of Free Ukrainians featured four exiled members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. One of those expelled in 1979, Dr. Nina Strokata-Karavanska (a charter member of the Kiev Group), explained why she and her colleagues came to Madrid: "The members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group united themselves in accepting the Helsinki agreements a living document that could define everyday life in Europe... Having accepted and believed in the struggle to realize the accords, the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group have sadly ended up either in forced exile or in concentration camps. I urge the conference to take up the matter of the imprisoned Helsinki monitors of all nationalities."

Gen. Petro Grigorenko, a member of both the Moscow and Ukrainian Groups, echoed Dr. Strokata-Karavanska's appeal, saying that 28 of the 35 members of the Kiev Group were in prison or internal exile in Central Asia or Siberia. Moscow, Armenian, Georgian and Lithuanian Group members have suffered similar fates, he said.

A number of emigre groups are attending Madrid, stressing national self-determination for their homelands, a right guaranteed by the eighth principle of the Helsinki Agreement.

At a press conference organized by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, Viedas Sakelys, who escaped to Finland in July, 1980, described Lithuania as a colony of Moscow. His homeland, he explained, had been forcibly annexed by the Soviets as a result of the Soviet-Nazi Pact of 1939. The Soviet Union continues to enjoy the bitter fruits of that agreement. Sakelys called on the conference to support national self-determination and he urged the United Nations to take up the matter of the decolonization of Europe as it had done in Africa.

Latvian, Estonian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, Armenian and other groups have expressed similar sentiments. They range in numbers from more than fifty in the case of the Latvians, to one person (Ashe Seytmuratova) in the case of the Tatars. Many of the citizen lobby groups here come from the United States.

One of the largest, with nearly 30 workers in attendance at one time, is the Ad Hoc Citizens Committee for the Madrid Helsinki Review Meeting, an organization supported by the AFL-CIO. In addition to providing a forum for the many dissidents gathered in Madrid, the Ad Hoc Committee sponsored seminars on Afghanistan and the state of the Western Alliance. According to one of its organizers, Roman Kupchynsky, the committee focuses its efforts on informing public opinion in the West through the media covering the conference. The official delegations here operate under instructions from their respective governments. So he saw little sense in lobbying the delegates personally, a tactic other groups have used extensively.

The various groups here have claimed a certain success. Many believe that their presence has encouraged a firm stand on human rights by the West, particularly by the United States. The U.S. approach has included naming of specific individuals who have been persecuted by their governments for their Helsinki-related activities.

In his opening address, U.S. delegation chief Griffin Bell described Helsinki activists Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Scharansky, Mykola Riudenko

and Viktoras Petkus as victims of "brutal repression" in the Soviet Union. The tour named by Mr. Bell were selected to include respectively, a Russian, a Jew, a Ukrainian and a Lithuanian; four of the most active national groups in the Soviet Union.

At the end of the first week of the conference, U.S. co-chairman Max Kampelman attended a reception sponsored by the Ad Hoc Committee. There he acknowledged the impact of citizen groups on the conference and on the U.S. position. The activities of human rights groups in the West, he said, have changed the political atmosphere, making it impossible to ignore the issue. The strong presence of non-governmental groups in Madrid has provided the United States and the West with a base that made it easier to remain firm in the face of Soviet intransigence over the question of including a review of human rights compliance in the Conference Agenda.

Members of the Canadian delegation have also reacted favourably to the citizen groups lobbying in Madrid. Mr. Jesse Flis, one of the delegation, said that Canada shared many of the sentiments of the U.S. delegation. He said that the presence of the public groups had helped to "set the priorities" of the conference, specifically in its emphasis on human rights. He hoped that a united stand by the Western delegations would lead to release of the dissidents who were imprisoned for seeking Soviet compliance with the Accords.

While the officials at the Madrid conference have been busy discussing procedure and manoeuvring to score diplomatic points, the public groups have been working with a genuine sense of urgency. They feel that the welfare and the lives of the Soviet dissidents, and indeed, the entire national groups, rest on a favourable outcome of the Conference. Increasingly, they believe that many of the official delegations are coming to the same conclusion. Few of the groups have any illusions that real change will immediately accompany the Helsinki process. However, they do think that ideas pave the way for change, and that here in Madrid, the right ideas are being discussed by at least some of the participants.

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The rapid pace of political developments in Poland has alarmed the Soviet regime. In the space of a few short months a powerful independent trade union movement (Solidarity) has been formed, encompassing ten million of the country's thirteen million industrial workers. Poland's farmers are also following suit, in the train of students, cultural and scientific workers who earlier formed independent unions. Moreover there is even a flourishing independent press

The situation is extremely unstable, because the one-party form of government cannot tolerate the organization and articulation of social, political and cultural needs outside of the official institutions. However, the ruling Communist Party continues to concede to the demands of the population and is forced to deal with strong dissenting currents within its own ranks. One section of the party, for example, advocates the sharing of power with the Solidarity movement.

the sharing of power. The primary involvement of the state in the government appears to be less capable of ruling the country, the Solidarity movement is not yet capable of presenting a comprehensive and practical alternative. The newly organized workers, farmers, students and intellectuals are an enormous social force, but they have not yet crystallized into a political force. Representatives of Solidarity say that they want only to be good defenders of the workers' economic interests, but in a country where economic and political decision-making is fused, economic demands are ultimately resolved through political action.

We are witnessing a transitional period in Poland: the social power of the opposition will begin to crystallize into a range of political currents as the discussion about a comprehensive alternative to the current situation unfolds. All of these currents will be united in their opposition to the rule of the Communist Party, and its monopoly on political life as such. Were these the only contending forces, the discussion would proceed smoothly, the options would emerge and the status quo would certainly be overturned.

But the Communist Party's monopoly ultimately rests upon the economic and military might of Big Brother next door. The Soviet regime is doing everything it can, short of invading, to intimidate the Solidarity movement into passivity and to give Kania and Co. time to re-assert control. A threatened general strike of transport workers, for instance, led to an immediate warning from the Kremlin that it would jeopardize the military security of Poland and the Soviet Union. Similarly East European leaders, particularly Erich Honecker (of East Germany) and Gustav Blazek (the number two man in Czechoslovakia), ominously denounce the Polish insurgency and condemn revolutionary and anti-imperialist aims. The seriousness of the situation was made evident when General Secretary Kania and Prime Minister Pionkowski were summoned to Moscow on 30 October for a five hour meeting with Brezhnev. And on 5 December representatives of the seven Warsaw Pact countries met in Moscow to demonstrate public solidarity with the Kania government and to privately plan their military options should 'diplomatic' initiatives collapse. The Soviet government has made it clear that it will not hesitate to use military force. If the Polish population did not believe these warnings two weeks ago, the sensational and alarmist manner in which the Western media reported the Soviet threats may be changing their minds. It seems that the Soviet regime first convinced the Western media that it was ready to invade, and that the message from Western Europe of conveying this message then achieved the effect that the Soviet and official Polish media failed to create. It is noteworthy that the 9 December editions of *The Globe* and *Mail* carried reports of Solidarity leaders accusing the Western media sensationalizing the issue and unduly escalating tensions.

What would be the long-term costs of a Soviet intervention in Poland? First, it must be recognized that

the regime has every reason to avoid additional military burdens at this point in time. Over the past decade, the Soviet economy has experienced serious declines in its growth rates — industry is expanding at less than 4% per annum and labour productivity at less than 3% per annum. Moreover, there are serious and chronic problems in agriculture as is indicated by recurrent famines and the need to import large quantities of grain, especially upon imported wheat. More revealing yet is the fact that one Soviet economist recently estimated that between 15 and 20% of the country's GNP goes into defense spending.¹ Not only does this sector draw upon the most highly skilled segment of the labour force, it also consumes great quantities of food, clothing, and raw materials. In addition, the USSR has lost access to the best technology available. Commenting on the USSR's current economic difficulties, this economist noted that "a radical reduction in military outlays could be a real remedy. That is why when we economists discussed the situation in Moscow, we agreed that defence was badly needed to save the economy from collapse."² In other words, Brezhnev and his associates have the same ideas in a recent speech in the Kremlin:

Obviously, a long-term program of support for the tottering Polish economy, not to mention a full-scale invasion and military occupation, would impose great strains upon the battered Soviet economy and hardship upon an increasingly discontented working population. Furthermore, it would erode the already diminishing support the regime enjoys at home. Reading the Soviet press, one cannot fail to appreciate the care with which it cultivates an image of the

Soviet and East European economies with the Western powers. Peace on its western borders has also allowed the Soviets to concentrate upon the Sino-Soviet conflict and developments in the Middle East and Indochina — including the deployment of large numbers of troops, nuclear weapons, and military, technical and economic advisors. In short, the Polish crisis raises the spectre of direct military involvement on two fronts, increased scarcity of domestic resources, and the loss of valuable trade links with the European capitalist powers.

The deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union combined with the current Polish crisis, moves for a particularly dangerous mixture. Moscow realizes that the establishment of independent trade unions sets an extremely attractive precedent to workers in its own country, who are deprived of any means to defend their interests. The Polish population believes that the situation that a politically unstable Poland will bring will be hardship to Soviet workers and peasants, who must consequently feed and clothe their unruly and unproductive neighbours. Such sentiments were expressed in the past in relation to USSR's commitments in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, however, a large part of the population in the USSR (and Eastern Europe) wants to know the truth about developments in Poland, especially about the independent workers' and farmers' and students' unions. Moscow's very real concern about the possible spread of the 'Polish virus' can be seen in the complete lack of information about the situation in Poland in the Soviet press. In the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts, the Soviet government has intervention warranted renewed jamming, and the new restrictions upon travellers to and from Poland.

Another indication of the gravity of the situation is the fact that the Soviet government is voicing an increasing concern about the domestic economic problems, particularly the shortages of meat, milk and other food supplies this fall and winter. A public acknowledgement that such problems exist was the promotion in mid-October of a forty-nine year old agricultural specialist, Mikhail Gorbachov, to full membership in the ruling Politburo, making him by far the youngest member of the body.² In addition, at October's Central Committee Plenum, Brezhnev advised party, state and trade union officials to give greater attention to the people's welfare. Lending support to this position, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr Shcherbitsky, repeated and elaborated upon the same concerns in a speech in Kiev on 14 November.³ And at the recent plenum of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the routine demands for greater productivity and discipline took a back seat to calls for better food supplies and for the population, as well as for the stricter adherence of the official trade unions to overtime laws, safety regulations and other clauses of the Labour Code.⁴

Ultimately, the capacity of the Soviet government to act decisively in Poland depends upon the degree of support it enjoys from its own citizens—in the factories, on the farms and in the army. A movement inside the Soviet Union that supports the Polish workers, or indeed any action which weakens the government's capacity to act, would be a most encouraging addition to the growing movement of solidarity in Europe and North America. The name of the independent trade union movement in Poland is a formula for victory, especially if it is practiced by workers internationally.

Of course, one of the places to watch closely for the spread of the 'Polish virus' into the Soviet Union, is the Ukrainian republic. Sandwiched between Poland and Russia, Ukraine is extremely susceptible to political infection for a number of reasons:

(Invasion continued on page 10)



country's leaders as world peacemakers. This portrayal is coupled with an equally consistent presentation of the dangers of war on the borders of the Soviet and East European states. A military intervention of Poland, following hard on the heels of Soviet 'deliverance' of Afghanistan from imperialist aggression, would undoubtedly make many citizens question the official line on the sources of war and peace in this part of the world.

Thus, the Soviet regime hesitates to use military force in Poland because such actions will almost certainly destroy detente in Europe. Cultivated with great care over the last fifteen years, detente means important trade and technology exchanges for the

(continued from page 1)

Michnik (who took his mother's name) is the son of a former member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine; and Jacek Kuron has in the past organized relief expeditions to aid the resettled Ukrainian population in Poland (the victims of "Operation Vistula").

The regime also has people with "Ukrainian connections," but they are of another sort, says Mieczyslaw Jagielski, chief government negotiator at the Gdansk and Politburo member, is an ethnic Pole born in Kolomyia (now in the Ukrainian SSR). From what Jagielski told the Gdansk workers in August, it seems that he, and possibly his family, suffered at the hands of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and that is hardly the kind of experience that fosters pro-Ukrainian feelings. There is also Mieczyslaw Moczar, who has taken

advantage of the unrest in Poland to intrigue his way back into power. Ousted in 1971, this unsavory character regained his place in the Politburo on December 1980. Moczar's case is the reverse of Jagielski's. Whereas the latter is an ethnic Pole born in Ukraine, Moczar is an ethnic Ukrainian born in Poland (in Lodz, where his father was a railway worker). His name at birth, according to the *New York Times*, was "Moczar" and his real name, December 1980 was Mykola Demko, the very Polish-sounding "Mieczyslaw Moczar" being a later invention of his. Like most converts, he is a zealot. In 1968 he had "distinguished" himself by whipping up a virulently anti-Semitic Polish nationalism to help the Gomulka government ride out a serious crisis of confidence. Although he received many thanks from the public, taken together, they essentially reduced his steps to

anti-Semitism, he may very well pull a rabid Polish chauvinism out of his hat at a more appropriate time. In any case, Ukrainians in Poland can expect little sympathy from this former co-national.

inter-ethnic-nationalist. Moreover, according to one private report from Poland, the regime has used the recent strike movement to further constrict the rights of the Ukrainian minority. Because of open Ukrainian support for the strikes in Lublin, the authorities closed down the local branch of the USKT, in a move that paralleled a similar action taken in Gdansk ten years ago.

The situation in Poland is still in flux, and it is too early to determine the outcome of events. Only time will tell if Ukrainians there will benefit from the general democratization as is hoped, or whether the rising Polish nationalism will turn against them — possibly

even being deliberately channelled by a regime in search of a scapegoat solution — as many Ukrainian activists in Poland fear.

The most likely course is the first, with indications being that the events of 1980 will prove in the long run to be a blessing for Ukrainians in Poland. At present Polish society is undergoing a profound transformation, and the political education of the population is increasingly popular. Participation in the transformation process, has already benefitted the Ukrainian minority living in Poland. Even if political life as we now know it in contemporary Poland were to be snuffed out tomorrow, the aspirations and lessons of the past and of the present would still remain, to re-emerge in the future. Moreover, it seems highly improbable that

the current trend towards democratization can, or will be reversed. Similarly, the emergence of Polish nationalism, acquiring a decidedly anti-Ukrainian edge, also does not seem to be very great. In contrast to 1968 or even 1976, the regime has so far abstained from blaming problems on the Jews ('Zionists'), let alone on the Ukrainians. The prospect of the numerically, politically, culturally and economically insignificant Ukrainian minority in Poland becoming the target of any popular or regime-inspired pogrom, seems almost ludicrous. This is especially so given the hegemony of authentically democratic ideas among the Polish intelligentsia today and the twenty-four Ukrainian statements in favour of the intellectual leadership of the Polish opposition.

Some plain talk about *realpolitik*: A Czechoslovakian dissident speaks

This is Part II of an interview with Dr. Hejdanek, a spokesman for Charter 77. The interview was conducted in Czechoslovakia, in the summer of 1980.

Student: What was your evaluation of the Helsinki Review Conference held in Belgrade in 1977-78 and what perspectives do you have on the upcoming Madrid Review Conference?

Hejdanek: Charter 77 began as a group which questioned the Czechoslovak government as to whether it was prepared to adhere to the provisions of the International Covenant on Human Rights contained in the Helsinki Final Act,¹ or not. The reaction of the Czechoslovak authorities to Charter 77 is their reply to our question. The lack of importance attached to these violations of the Helsinki Accords at the Belgrade Conference represents for us our doubts about the entire process to be undertaken at the upcoming Madrid conference. We wonder whether Western governments are prepared to take our cases seriously. We have presented arguments and made representations which represent, in our view, the future of Europe. We must now wait.

And we know that even if the situation in Western countries remains far better than in our own, there are situations in those countries which represent good arguments for governments of the Eastern bloc to show that Western governments are not fulfilling the Helsinki Agreement. Our only hope is that citizens of Western countries will pressure Western governments into making something of these Helsinki rights in their own countries, and into making strong representations at Madrid.

The USA has yet to ratify The International Covenant on Human Rights. Their record is still better than that of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but how is it possible that the International Covenants signed at Helsinki are still not part of the internal law of the United States, five years after the signing of those accords. The only conclusion which we can arrive at is that even the American government is not prepared to take the international agreements and covenants of Helsinki seriously. Thus, we cannot hold out a great deal of hope for Madrid. But, of course, it is not only the United States. There are countless other countries around the world where human rights are not realized and not taken seriously.

Student: Do you foresee a return to the Cold War atmosphere of previous years in Soviet-American relations, and as a result, a return to some of the more repressive forms of the Stalinist era in Eastern Europe? **Hejdanek:** I do not believe that the Soviet leaders wish to begin a new Cold War. Most of the unpopular activities of the Soviet leaders can be understood as a product of a long historical legacy — the result of the very bad political and sociological conditions which have existed in the past within Russia, including under the Tsarist regime. And the great toll of death and destruction which was visited upon the people of the USSR during the years of foreign intervention in the civil war of 1918-20, during the Second World War, as well as the paranoia of the Cold War, have distorted Soviet foreign policy. I don't want to excuse the Russians for all of the nonsense in which they perpetrate as being fact in their foreign propaganda. But I am convinced that it is within the capabilities of the Western World to negotiate with Soviet leaders and to arrange contacts with the Soviet bloc in such a manner that they will not provoke the worst political reactions of the Soviet regime, but encourage the Soviet leadership to make some changes in the direction of better mutual contacts with the rest of the world.

To make myself more clear on this point, take for instance, Afghanistan. It is a very good example. I am convinced that the great outcry throughout the Western World was not created by the fact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but because of a new political situation in the Middle East. The American government, in particular, saw it as a very good opportunity to direct attention from other issues which called into question American involvement in other countries around the world. These unclear, impure motives should be well-recognized within the total situation.

Of course, the Soviet intervention is very bad. We should be clear that these methods of Soviet foreign policy are deplorable. But there exist many interventions in other parts of the world, such as Latin America, which are worse — perhaps not so open — but which don't attract such attention among world public opinion. What took place in Chile following 1973,² the genocide practised against the native Indians of the Amazon basin by the Brazilian government, with the active support of American corporations,³ are just two examples. And if such situations are recognized by both sides as an opportunity for propaganda, then we have little hope for the future of mankind to be more just or peaceful than we are today. In my opinion, the more responsible side is the West. It has the greater confrontation and the exploitation of peoples around the world, because of the historical commitments of the western countries to the ideals of democracy.

Student: Why do you place such great responsibility on Western countries, when the Soviet Union appears at least equally guilty of provoking conflicts and military intervention around the world?

Hejdanek: Yes, but the Soviet Union is more restricted in its responses, because there exist internal political conflicts within the Soviet leadership which make it difficult to expect a reasonable response from them. Within the USSR, there is, of course no such thing as open discussion — therefore all political pressures are

internalized within the chambers of the Kremlin. The West can't enlist the attention of the average Soviet citizen to try to better understand the activities of Western countries. As the Americans continue to help such repressive governments as those in Chile and South Korea — despite the disastrous experience with supporting the corrupt regime in South Vietnam — it is difficult to distinguish the methods of the United States from those of the Soviet Union. Such actions only damage the prestige of America and other Western countries, and diminish those positive features of their societies which distinguish them from the Soviet bloc countries. That is why I believe that the responsibility of the Western countries is greater than that of the Soviet Union, because in the Western democracies one expects the citizens to see the reality of repression in all parts of the world and to have an understanding of the world not dictated by government propaganda. But unfortunately, too many of the recent statements and actions of the American government seem designed for their propaganda value. In contrast, the conceptions of many Western European governments are far more constructive and realistic in their response to the overall world situation.

Student: What is your view of the boycott of the Moscow Olympics by the United States and several other Western countries?

Hejdanek: I don't attach any great importance to the presence or non-presence of a particular nation's Olympic team at the Olympic Games. At best, a boycott could be only a kind of sideshow to really serious

quickly forward and to undertake the necessary reforms in their social and economic structures in such a way as to make them more progressive than Soviet society.

In my view, such a re-orientation in foreign policy of the Western industrialized nations towards such countries as China, India, Brazil Argentina and so on, would not be impossible. China, especially, is very important. If Western countries help China to advance in its social and economic development and not towards calculations designed for war — then it would be a real challenge to Soviet leaders to bring about fundamental reforms in their own society. But fundamental reforms within the existing structure of the Soviet Union will only be possible if the country is rid of the fear that they may be militarily destroyed.

Student: Do you believe then that the only available path to change within the Soviet Union is through reform, or can you foresee the viability of a successful revolutionary upheaval within the USSR?

Hejdanek: Reforms, yes — nothing more is possible. It is almost impossible to calculate the possibilities for revolution. Other calculations lead potentially to catastrophe, to nuclear destruction.

Of course, it is also a question whether such small changes are possible at all. There are many nations within the Soviet Union which do not wish to belong to that union.

We know from our experience in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the possibilities for reform currents within a communist party. Whereas few people had confidence in Dubcek⁴ and the Communist Party leadership at first, those who had been skeptical in January became quite open to the process begun by the "Prague Spring" within a few months. Of course, it is necessary to use different approaches than were used during the Dubcek period.

Personally I am oriented in my activities to working towards such incremental changes in the Soviet bloc on the basis of internal political sources, not as a result of pressure from outside. The application of pressure from outside the Soviet bloc, in the form of military threats or exaggerated propaganda, will only make the process of change work more slowly.

Student: In this you have a fundamentally different position than that held by your fellow Charter member Petr Uhl.⁵ do you not?

Hejdanek: In the beginning, he [Uhl] was very dogmatic. But as a result of many discussions, in the process of thinking through some of these problems which we face, he became more open-minded and less dogmatic in recognizing the special conditions in which we live in Czechoslovakia. Within the discussions of the Charter 77 group, he found that there was no reason to be as dogmatic as he had been previously and he became increasingly ready to evaluate the situation from various points of view.

He has recently indicated his desire to emigrate to the West should he be released from prison. I am afraid that should he emigrate, he will join some dogmatic circles with which some of his friends in the West are associated and he may lose that open-mindedness which he developed here during the past three years.

But as to the question of a major transformation occurring in Eastern Europe in the near future, I cannot foresee the likelihood of such events. In my view, it is better for change to occur over a period of time than in a sudden, cataclysmic way.

Student: What response do you think would be appropriate for the Western countries to make to the pattern of Soviet military intervention which began with Hungary, then Czechoslovakia, and which has most recently been demonstrated in Afghanistan?

Hejdanek: In the past, the response of the West, and especially the United States has not been applied systematically as a normal, constant pressure against the Soviet interventions, but only as a reaction to the events after the fact. For example, when the Soviet Union had already implemented its decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968, they telephoned Johnson⁶ and asked him whether the Americans were prepared to observe the terms of the Yalta Agreement.⁷ Johnson's reported answer was, yes, we still observe Yalta. When the Soviets marched into Czechoslovakia, there were only mild protests from the American government. Johnson should have reacted in a very different way then how he reacted in this situation.

The major thrust of Western policy should not be based on quick reaction, but on a long-range strategy in the political and economic spheres which would help countries such as China and India to construct and develop their countries along democratic lines. The most effective kind of pressure, the most effective response to the Soviet Union, lies not in military collaboration with these countries, but in helping them become wealthy and well-developed. I would envision such a policy as taking a similar form to that which was carried out in Japan after the Second World War — taking into account the weaknesses of the Japanese model and remembering that Japan is quite a different society than either India or China.

1. The International Covenant on Human Rights was an agreement signed by the signatories to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

2. Hejdanek appears to be referring to the large-scale executions of pro-Allende supporters in Chile following the military coup in 1973.

3. The genocide practised against native Indians in Brazil has been documented by Amnesty International and other international human rights groups.

4. Alexander Dubcek was leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party during the "Prague Spring" of 1968.

5. Petr Uhl was a prominent leader in the student movement during 1968. He was imprisoned in 1971 because of his membership in the Revolutionary Socialist Party, an organization sympathetic to the Fourth International. He was released in 1975, but was again re-arrested last year because of his involvement in VONS (Committee to Defend the Unjustly Persecuted).

6. U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969).

7. The Yalta Agreement, signed between the Allied Powers of the United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. in 1945 at Yalta in the Crimea, recognized the preponderant interest of the Soviet Union in much of Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia, and sanctioned the establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence in the nations which it occupied after World War II.



activity in attempting to apply pressure on the Soviet government to change its policies.

Student: In speaking about other "serious activity", are you including such matters as economic pressure, which could be applied by the West in the form of restrictions on trade between the countries of the Soviet trading bloc and those of the West?

Hejdanek: Perhaps. There are many diverse reactions which could be undertaken by Western nations, including the realm of trade. In my view the Olympic boycott has little real value, only propagandistic value. The boycott makes little sense, for it is not based on a rational conception of how Soviet foreign policy is determined, or the reasons for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The absence of a few sportsmen from the Olympic Games in Moscow may give an illusion of something being done, but it has a symbolic effect only.

I don't believe that the Soviet Union can be forced to change its internal and foreign policies by the West, but they might be convinced to change their course of action if, for instance, by the threat of concerted economic reaction by the Western countries. The Soviet state is technologically and scientifically unable to provide for the present needs of its economy, and aid from Western countries is quite necessary for the Soviet Union.

If the foreign policies of the Western countries towards the Third World were more reasonable and more far-sighted, then it would be possible to persuade some of the leading countries of the Third World to go

Inside contemporary Hungary: A traveller's first-hand account

Istvan Gyongyosy is a Hungarian student who recently spent several months travelling in East Europe. This is his personal account of life and dissent in Hungary.

One of the more surprising phenomena of Eastern Europe is that despite the pervasive Soviet presence in the region since the Second World War, these countries have managed to retain, to a striking degree, their individual characters. What this reveals is that in spite of stringent external political pressures, in the long-run it is the national traditions and histories — and their continued development — which tend to predominate over the outside factor.

Travelling through Eastern Europe one cannot fail to notice sharp differences in everything from living conditions and the nature of social and cultural activity, to the basic moral attitudes and general outlook of people residing within the greater 'socialist camp'. Equally striking is the fact that when compared to the well-known dissident movements in the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia and even Romania and the German Democratic Republic, the situation of the dissident movement in present-day Hungary — once, the most explosive, destructive and far-reaching 'dissident' movement in postwar Europe, barely twenty-five years ago — is both less visible and less widely known than that of neighbouring countries.

I should note that although I recently had the opportunity to spend several months in Hungary, by no means did I obtain a complete overview of the situation of oppositionists there. Indeed, my experiences were more or less of a fragmentary nature, gained through an active social life among students and intellectuals in Budapest. Therefore, I can ultimately only speak from a personal point of view, but I do think that in many ways my experiences have general validity. When I first arrived in Budapest I asked one of my aunts about the 'dissident' movement in Hungary, to which she replied: "Dissidents in Hungary? Away from Hungary, perhaps, but not *in* it. After all, a 'dissident' is a person who emigrates to the West illegally." Thus, one of the first things I learned about the oppositionist current in my ancestral homeland was that the term 'dissident' was used there to describe people who had left the country

sent to Czech Premier Gustav Husak in protest of the judgement. The petitions were drawn up and collected so quickly that I know of one filmmaker who felt personally affronted that the petitions had been sent off by the time he learned of their existence.

In addition to such ad hoc actions, there are some regularly-organized activities as well. Starting in early 1979, a series of 'Monday night lectures' were held at various private apartments in Budapest. The topics of discussion — as well as the point of view from which they were approached — were such that could not be held in the usual public places — the young Artists' Club or the University Clubs. The series consisted of lectures by historians, writers and others on subjects ranging from Soviet political life in the 1930's, to Transylvanian-Magyar culture since 1920 and the situation of the Gypsy and Jewish minorities in Hungary. The lectures were well-attended by students, university professors and the ever present secret police informers. But nobody seemed to mind the fact that attendance was being monitored. Proceedings were relaxed and more or less unharassed, although job-related threats were levelled against at least one of the speakers in April of 1980. He subsequently cancelled out, only to be replaced by another qualified speaker. There is also a sporadic *samizdat* newsletter whose title translates roughly as "Reject File". Its self-professed aim is to publish material, mainly essays, that is not officially acceptable for publication. Most of this material also appears in the *Magyar Fuzetek*, (Hungarian Booklets) published in Paris and distributed quite widely through Hungary's intellectual circles. Despite all these activities there are no focal organizations similar to the human rights groups or free trade unions that can be found in other countries. Rather, the "movement" is made up of a wide range of intellectuals and students who group and regroup as the occasion and circumstances dictate.

A basic problem faced by the *ellenzék* is that it is only among intellectuals that the movement is known and/or supported. One of the major reasons for this is that most of the *ellenzék* are left-wing in their political orientation. They attack the government from the left for compromising with the U.S.S.R. and other "right-wing"

elements, for its corruption and its basically undemocratic nature. While the majority of the population also criticizes the regime for many of the same reasons, it does so from the right. Another reason for the limitations of the *ellenzék* movement is that the Kadar regime seems to be genuinely popular among Hungarians because of its pragmatism, and because first and foremost it really has worked to provide for a rise in living standards. Although the mass of the population certainly opposes the Soviet occupation of their country, as well as its sham democracy, it is afraid to openly object to the situation not only because it remembers 1956, but because it now has something to lose, namely the most tolerable environment in Eastern Europe. Most Hungarians simply cannot understand the efforts of those who actively try to show that the Kadar regime's attempts to raise the living standard amount to little more than an obvious ploy to make the population forget that they live in an occupied, corrupt, undemocratic and exploited country.

The Kadar regime, for its part, is not about to popularize the *ellenzék* by making martyrs of them, and thus they are probably the most unpersecuted dissidents in Eastern Europe. Most of them (the *ellenzék*) are employed. Many of them, like Gyorgy Szabo and Laszlo Rajk Jr., are even well-employed. If they should lose their jobs, as did the organizers of the three petitions on behalf of the Czechs, they can engage in "free occupations", i.e., translating, writing freelance articles, and doing other odd jobs — all within the boundaries of the law. Few people get totally blacklisted. If someone gets to be too troublesome, at worst, he might be asked to leave the country. George Konrad is one *ellenzék* who refused to do so, and as of last year he was still living peacefully in his home near Budapest.

Essentially, the police handle the *ellenzék* with velvet gloves. One friend who happened to acquire an apartment in a building situated next door to a government minister's villa, claimed he was not sure whether his apartment had been searched or not, although he seemed to feel that *samizdat* papers left on his desk were occasionally slightly rearranged upon his return from en

(Hungary continued page 11)



It is with considerable sadness that we note the passing of Volodymyr Koskovych and Koskovych house on 15 December 1980 — some four and one-half months into the fifth year of the famed Edmonton institution's existence. The ramshackle three-storey residence was finally sold after lingering on the real estate market since the very beginning of the Koskovych experience. In addition to serving as a home for a host of people and providing a sanctuary for wayward travellers and the incurably Ukrainian, Hotel Koskovych also provided a base of operations for a not insignificant chapter in the history of Ukrainian student life in Edmonton, and indeed in Canada as a whole. Besides housing the SUSK office for some two years, Koskovych also facilitated the rebirth of Student after it had wasted away in the East for a number of years.

Needless to say, its walls also witnessed a great many other comings and goings that we cannot go into at this point in time out of deference to the innocent and sometimes not so innocent parties involved. Suffice it to say that the house earned its reputation as a corrupter of youth and purveyor of dangerous ideas among today's generation of Ukrainian-Canadians. Not only that, Koskovych was actually proud of his notoriety within the Edmonton hromada.

As is the custom in this western part of Canada, Koskovych's death was commemorated by a wake that was attended by both family and friends. The house is survived by its many imitators at home and elsewhere, including Chorna Khmara — which now becomes the elder statesperson of co-op Ukrainian housing in Edmonton — Zoshka Kurva, Chervona Shkola (a new addition) and its recent Toronto clone, Dyke Pole. It was pre-deceased by several other offspring, Dim Kotsyk and Dim Polubotok among them. Friends of Koskovych have asked that in lieu of flowers, people send a donation to Student in Koskovych's name.

One of our agents has noticed something most curious about a literary evening recently held in Toronto to honour the work of the "poet and writer" Valentyn Moroz. Sponsored by the Cleveland and Toronto chapters of the Valentyn Moroz fan club, *Lytsariv Sviatoslava*, the evening allegedly took place on the 29th of November at 191 Lippincott — the same address used by SUSK executive! This strange "coincidence" has led some Western observers to speculate that either SUSK is using the *Lytsariv* as a front organization within the community (to wreak havoc and confusion and at the same time to comment on the absurdity of Ukrainian politics) or else as a trump card in their bid to overthrow Stetskoism. Others are taking a less interpretive line, however, saying that SUSK President Mike Maryn simply wanted to get some advice on a book he is said to be writing — *Report from the UCC Preserves* — and take in a little poetry. But we at the KGB are not fooled by these deceptions, knowing full well that the whole affair was just a smokescreen for a top secret meeting between SUSK and another "interested party" to discuss the possibilities of running a slate of student candidates for CKBY, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. As Greg Hamara was overheard remarking in a corridor, "If we can't have KYK we might as well just CKBY it."

Whoever said Ukrainians are prudish — on the contrary, we're quite sexually hip and liberated. Or at least that's the impression some people are getting from the advice that Julian Kozjak, Alberta's minister of consumer and corporate affairs, is giving to students complaining about the skyrocketing cost of rent in that province. In the words of the honourable MLA whose constituency embraces much of the university community, "Two people sharing (a bedroom) is not that bad a thing when you take a look at housing in this province and this country.... The doubling up concept is useful. It shouldn't be looked at askance.... I think we should learn to live together." Although he sounds somewhat unconvinced himself, we can only applaud his encouragement of co-habitation as a progressive step forward. After all, sleeping with a friend has other advantages besides the obvious one of saving money.

Musicians take note! Some people in Detroit, answering to the name Kemeiari, are interested in getting in touch with bands across Canada and the USA for an exchange of information. You can get a copy of their newsletter and a survey they have prepared by writing them at P.O. Box 184, Detroit, Michigan, 48212 USA, or by calling (313) 891-0661. (Our apologies to the Motor City group for taking so long in getting this information out to our readers.)

Always eager for news from overseas, Student collective members certainly read with a great deal of interest the November Information Bulletin (No. 42) that we received from the Italian headquarters of SUSTE, the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of Europe. Included was a copy of a report submitted by Volodymyr Lezczanenko, the former SUSTE President, upon the completion of his term of office in the spring of this year. Essentially, the veteran British-Ukrainian student activist set the record straight on a number of contentious issues, including SUSK-SUSTE relations in the period 1978-80, and everyone's favourite political football Student. Although we won't go into great detail concerning the specific contents of his report, we do want to congratulate Lezczanenko for his calm and well-argued defence of Student in the face of some very serious but completely unsubstantiated charges made by Messrs. Roman Zvanich and Roman Shuper, the latter being associated with the Munich-based paper, *Shiishk Peremohy*. Among Mr. Shuper's more absurd allegations was his utterly false assertion that Student has contacts with the KGB (perhaps he has misunderstood the humour of this column?) and receives money from Moscow to help defray the high costs of publishing a newspaper. Clearly, these two gentlemen who seem thoroughly convinced that Student is run by some Marxist conspiracy, must live on Mars and not on this planet earth. We therefore would like to invite both of them to drop in on Edmonton sometime for a friendly chat and possibly a few glasses of beer at a bar of their own choosing.

CANADA AT CONSTITUTION

The article which follows is an abridged version of one that appeared in the *Financial Post* on 29 November 1980 (page 9). Written by W.S. Ternopolsky, professor of law and president of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, it addresses fundamental questions which face us not only as Canadians, but as Canadians of Ukrainian heritage. Although the entrenchment of a Bill of Rights in any future Constitutional Document would not eradicate discrimination from Canada, it would at least provide some recourse through the judicial system. Without this right, individuals and minorities such as the Ukrainian Canadian community, are subject to the whims and desires of the majority — as expressed by its representatives in parliament and in provincial legislatures, and also as precised in the administration of laws and the protection of liberties. Thus, constitutional entrenchment of a Bill of Rights is a safeguard for rights and freedoms: not so much that it will prevent abuses, but that remedies will be provided should violations occur, thereby preserving the fundamental principles and beliefs that supposedly form the basis of a free, democratic society.

However, as Mr. Ternopolsky quite aptly points out, the proposed Canadian Bill of Rights will not perform this function. Given the rudimentary nature of those things it is designed to protect, should not this proposed Bill of Rights contain the scope and the substantive definitions and powers, to effect such protection?

...Unfortunately, it would appear that having decided to override the objection of at least six provinces to patriation end to a Charter of Rights, Trudeau has decided not to propose the version that his government submitted to the provinces for their discussion in July, 1980, but rather the version that was achieved after the summer debates of the federal-provincial continuing committee of officials. The provincial representatives on this committee were the Deputy Attorneys-General, that is, the chief Crown prosecutors of each province. What resulted was a Bill of Rights that any Crown prosecutor could be proud of, that is, one that will probably never be applied to override either legislative or administrative acts in contravention of it.

Before discussing the deficiencies of the charter as proposed, it is important to set out, at least briefly, why a new Bill of rights is necessary. The two main reasons are: the seeming impotence of the existing Canadian Bill of Rights, and the fact that this bill does not apply to the provinces.

The Supreme Court of Canada has never overridden its 1970 decision in the famous case *Regina v. Drybones*, that any act of Parliament which is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights is inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. But ever since then the Supreme Court has failed to find any such inconsistencies and has failed to extend the overriding principle to administrative or police action in order to hold them inoperative when exercised in contravention of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

As far as the provinces are concerned, although all 10 have antidiscrimination statutes, only Saskatchewan, Alberta and Quebec have bills of rights which cover the political civil liberties (fundamental freedoms), and only Quebec has provisions guaranteeing the legal civil liberties (protection against abuse in the administration of justice)... There is absolutely no constitutional limitation on seven of the provinces from restricting fundamental freedoms, and on nine of them from restricting legal civil liberties.

...The proposed charter provides for the following categories of rights: fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, non-discrimination rights and language rights... With respect to [mobility rights and non-discrimination rights], the mobility rights provision (section six) would, in addition to protecting the right of every citizen "to remain in and leave Canada", include the right to move freely from province to province taking up residence or a job. Section 15 would protect "the right to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the law without discrimination."

Apart from the fact that protection of both of these rights is an international obligation upon all 11 governments in Canada (arising out of the ratification by Canada in 1976 of the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights), can anyone imagine these two protections not being included in any future constitutional instrument?

Three of the remaining 11 substantive provisions deal with the "democratic

rights". Two of these are already in the BNA Act — providing for an annual session of Parliament and elections at least every five years. The third is a clause providing for universal franchise....

Section two of the charter provides for "the fundamental freedoms". There is no question but that an overriding Bill of Rights could result in the judiciary holding that an act of a legislature is inoperative because it contravenes one of these freedoms. However, in assessing the impact of this, two points should be noted.

The first is that since our democratic system of government operates through the rule of the majority...without a Bill of Rights the only protection for minorities, especially dissenters, is the good will of the majority....

The second is that, in any case, experience in a country with a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights, such as the U.S., shows that it is very rare for any state legislation to be found

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The language question is one of the many tough constitutional debate. Here are some lyrical and comical problems, as expressed by Vancouver poet Ger...

English and French are 2 of the major international languages of imperialism, and as such they are here to stay. Naturally they are at war with each other, but they're as cosy together as an apple core in an empty cigarette package — the Canadian sandwich. The redistribution of power and wealth in this country will be at the expense of French and English language and culture. We will create a Canadian language and culture free from U.S. and European domination by encouraging the dozens — hundreds? — of indigenous and immigrant languages being brought in, all over our north quarter of the world. At present, these languages are being destroyed, as they were in the U.S.; or they are used as instruments of alienation, to keep different cultures apart, as in Europe. I suggest that

schools te of their students couple of English languages every place languages have in every world. At own langu to say, ourselves especially

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- i. That section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom be deleted.
- ii. That the following be added as section 15(3) under "Non-discrimination Rights": "Everyone has the right to preserve and develop their cultural and linguistic heritage."
- iii. That section 23(1) be amended as follows: "Citizens of Canada shall have their children receive their primary and secondary school instruction in the language of the majority of the population of the province in which they reside and in any other language(s) in accordance with the expressed desire of parents in any area of the province in which the number of children of such citizens is sufficient to warrant the provision out of public funds. The minority language educational facilities in that area."
- iv. That section 23(2) be deleted.

1. Most Canadians of Ukrainian origin undoubtedly endorse wholeheartedly the need for a new constitution, one which would more accurately reflect the cultural diversity of the Canadian people. The Ukrainian Canadian Committee supports the entrenchment of fundamental human rights and freedoms in our constitution in order to ensure fair treatment for all peoples and individuals in Canada.

2. We do not believe however, that the proposed Constitution adequately addresses itself either to the reality of Canada's cultural diversity or to the protection of our rights and freedoms. The proposed Act was formulated without consultation with the Canadian people. It completely ignores the recommendations put forth to the federal government by representatives of the Ukrainian-Canadian community and other ethnocultural communities during the past decade.

3. As Canadians of Ukrainian origin, we have played a fundamental role in the building of the Canadian nation. In the opening up of acres of land to cultivation in the Canadian West and in the building of the railroads and factories of our country, Ukrainian Canadians have shown that they are one of the many peoples who have contributed to the founding of the Canadian nation as we know it today.

4. Ukrainian Canadians strongly believe that they are entitled to the same rights as any other group in Canada. We do not wish ever to see the experience of the First World War repeated, when over 8,000 Ukrainian Canadians were interned by the Canadian government as "enemy aliens" under the arbitrary authority of the War Measures Act. We do not wish to see our language rights trampled upon again, as they were during World War I, when legislation was passed by provincial legislatures of the western provinces which proscribed the teaching of the Ukrainian language — together with all languages other than English — in the schools of the Prairie provinces. We do not wish to see the continuation of discriminatory clauses in our constitution, clauses which have relegated Canadians of origins other than Anglo-Celtic or French to a lesser status in a country in which they are allegedly to be "equal" citizens, too.

5. We are opposed to the present wording of section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, which "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits as are generally accepted in a free and democratic society with a parliamentary system of government." In our view, this clause allows too much leeway in allowing the suspension of the Charter "subject only to such

reasonable limits as are generally accepted in a free and democratic society with a parliamentary system of government." The internment of Ukrainian Canadians during the First World War was carried out by a government which apparently felt that it was acting in a manner consistent with the principles "generally accepted" by Canadian society at that time. This unjust and arbitrary treatment of Canadian citizens was repeated again during the Second World War in the case of the Japanese Canadians. Even the most fundamental principles of our justice system — the right of habeas corpus and the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty — were arbitrarily suspended in the internment of Canadians who were allegedly "dangerous" enemy aliens. It is our view that the limitations clause in section 1 of the Charter is so broad in its application that it would do nothing to prevent a repetition of this kind of systematic abuse of those fundamental rights which the proposed Constitution is supposed to protect, and we would therefore

Our official presentation to the constitutional committee

UCC BRIEF ON BEHALF

recommend that section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms be deleted.

6. We are also most concerned that the proposed Constitution does not explicitly recognize that Canada is a country which is diverse culturally and linguistically. Since October 1971 a policy supported by all parties in Parliament has defined Canada's identity as "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework." In the proposed Constitution there is much attention (as they should be) to English-French bilingualism. It is, however, one part of a policy with two dimensions, the other being multiculturalism. To us, this slighting of one part of a single policy is a serious deficiency in the proposed Constitution.

7. As early as 1972 the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, chaired by Senator Gilles L. Milgat and the Hon. Mark MacGuigan, recommended as follows: "The preamble to the Constitution should formally recognize that Canada is a multicultural country" (Recommendation 27). In 1977, in the debate on the Immigration Bill, an amendment which added "the multicultural nature of Canada" to its "federal and bilingual character" was defeated in the House of Commons, even though the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, a body advisory to the Minister of State (Multiculturalism), had specifically recommended a similar amendment — the recognition in the Bill of "the federal, bilingual and multicultural character of Canada."

8. In *A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federation*, a document released by the Government of Canada prior to the publication of its Constitutional Amendment Bill in June 1978, we find the following clear statement of the government's commitment to the enhancement of Canada's mosaic of cultures in any renewal of the Canadian federation:

For more than a century, people of other ethnic origins have come to Canada and settled beside those of British and French ancestry. A large number of them have joined the English-

speaking majority and others the French-speaking majority, without in the process losing their individuality.

With the sheer weight of their numbers, it is natural that the French and British cultures occupy a major place in Canada. But there is no question of having only one or two official cultures; Canadian society must promote cultural diversity, clearly and explicitly.

This diversity will only be protected if we ensure that Canadians of all ethnic origins have equal opportunities and full protection against discrimination.

Our French and British traditions have not been weakened by the multicultural character of our society. On the contrary, by good fortune this increasing diversity has helped to reduce the old rivalry between them. They have also been invigorated and revitalized in all fields — from the arts and sciences to economics and politics. Our two principal cultures will in no way be diminished by the determination of new communities to preserve their own cultural heritage.

We must therefore do more to develop and enhance all the elements of the Canadian mosaic. We must also significantly increase exchanges between our cultures, so that every Canadian has the chance to discover, appreciate and respect the heritage of his fellow-citizens.

9. While the term "multiculturalism" was not explicitly mentioned in the Constitutional Amendment Bill which followed, the Hon. Marc Lalonde, in an address to the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism on 27 October 1978, declared:

...this new Constitution will be written for Canadians and it must faithfully reflect the reality of Canada today. Since this country is bilingual and multicultural, the Constitution will recognize the fact without ambiguity. I can tell you without

hesitation, solely "multiculturalism"

It is therefore the Constitution nowhere to

10. There is culturalism constitution could not a of the prov the Consti diversity. To ignore provinces a of province matter of E rights. With partial rest second co be made o discrimination the right to linguistic h

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invalid on these grounds and almost never an act of Congress. What the American experience clearly shows is that the greatest role of the courts, in the application of a Bill of Rights comes with respect to supervision, not of legislative acts, but of administrative and police action.

It is in the field of the legal civil liberties that a Bill of Rights finds greatest application. The contravention here is not so much in the laws, as in their administration... It would be impossible for a legislature to cover every conceivable combination of circumstances that arises in the course of police action.

Even if it were possible to cover every... combination..., the legislatures cannot sit in judgement to see whether the action of the police conformed to such law. Only the courts can do this... That kind of discretion cannot be pinned down too precisely in criminal codes: there has to be the broad discretion granted through a Bill of Rights.

Having concluded then, that there is

a need for an overriding Bill of Rights, it is necessary to decide whether the proposed charter will accomplish this. That assessment has to be made in the light of three main criteria: (1) constitutional status; (2) content; and (3) measures of enforcement.

If a Bill of Rights must clearly be a part of the basic constitutional text in order to convince our judiciary that it is to have overriding effect, then to that extent the charter is a major step forward.

However, even though constitutional status would, *prima facie*, give overriding power, that is so only if the actual words so provide. Unfortunately this is one of the two major flaws in the charter. In the first place, the provision which purports to give it paramountcy, section 25, provides that paramountcy only with respect to "any law that is inconsistent." No reference is made to any administrative or police action. And yet, if the police, in contravention of the Charter of Rights, refuse to permit a person to contact his lawyer, the contravention arises not from a 'law' which is inconsistent, but an action...

Furthermore, section one of the proposed charter provides that all the rights and freedoms therein "guaranteed" are subject only to such reasonable limits as are generally accepted in a free and democratic society with a parliamentary system of government." This provides too wide an exception. Although such international bills of rights as the European Convention on Human Rights, to which all the West European countries, including

Britain, are subject or the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, to which Canada, as well as Britain are subject, do provide for limitations clauses, these are more narrowly framed:

- They are only those which are "prescribed by law."
- Those which are proved to be "necessary" in a free and democratic society.
- They do not apply to the legal civil liberties during normal times. Even in times of emergency, when legal civil liberties might be limited there are certain nonderogable rights, such as that not to be subjected to cruel or unusual treatment or punishment.

In all these ways section one falls below the international standards.... Most of the actions in our history which are looked upon as infringements of human rights were certainly at least, "generally accepted" at the time, if not overwhelmingly so. In view of section one, it is impossible to contemplate any limitation being placed upon our legislatures or upon Parliament by the proposed charter.

Finally, if a Bill of Rights is to be truly effective, there has to be a means of enforcement. Although one might expect that our judiciary would not acknowledge that there is a right without a remedy, this did in fact occur in 1975 in the case of *Alegria v. Hogan*.... Hogan requested the opportunity to speak to his lawyer [prior to taking a breathalyzer test]. The police denied him the right and threatened to charge him under the Criminal Code, for failing or refusing,

without reasonable excuse, to take the breathalyzer. Hogan took it.

...Although all the members of the Supreme Court agreed that this action of the police was not in accordance with the Bill of Rights, the majority held that since no remedy was provided, and since... the American judicially-developed rule to exclude evidence obtained in contravention of the Bill of Rights was not applicable, they would then apply the Anglo-Canadian judicially developed rule to the effect that evidence, even if illegally obtained is admissible if relevant.

Clearly, a new Charter of Rights has to address the issue of a remedy. Instead, the proposed charter, in section 26, provides that "no provision of this charter... affects the laws respecting the admissibility of evidence."... If our politicians do not want to create cynicism about the sincerity of those who enact such a Bill of Rights, then S. 26 has to be replaced with a clause providing that courts may grant whatever remedy or order is deemed necessary in order to best further the purposes and principles of the charter.

...In conclusion, one must declare that it would be a tragedy if what is clearly intended to be a step forward would fail because of failure to adopt a few amendments. And yet these amendments are crucial. So, to the issue of whether we do or do not need an overriding Bill of Rights, the answer must be clear "yes." In response to a question whether the proposed charter should be adopted, the answer is "yes, certainly, but only if..."

AN SPEECH

the many thorny issues raised by the lyrical and controversial thoughts about power poet Gerry Gilbert.

schools teach the home languages of their students — end that all students be required to learn a couple of languages other than English or French. The Native languages speak from the hearts of every place in this land. The 'foreign' languages are the family ties we have in every place in the rest of the world. At present, we don't know our own languages. So we have nothing to say. All we can do is listen to ourselves being had, on every front, especially the 49th parallel.

Remember, the next time you tune in (or turn in) to the U.S. (or U.K. or French) soft (but hardening) sell (here's — Johnny!) — remember what Hitler said: "All great world-shaking events have been brought about not by written matter, but by the spoken word!" It would be world-shaking if Canadians could talk themselves into Canada.

Gerry Gilbert

12. Thus, if the Government of Canada can invade provincial rights in education on behalf of one minority in Quebec and another in the other provinces, we would submit that it can do the same for other ethnocultural minorities whose linguistic and cultural needs are equally pressing. In a place like Edmonton, there are classrooms in the public schools in which the languages of instruction, besides English, are Cree, French, German, Hebrew and Ukrainian — classes which are conducted on a bilingual basis. We would submit that if a Canadian constitution is to guarantee minority language rights in provincial educational systems, that guarantee should not be confined to one linguistic combination but embrace all that are viable through the following modified provision of section 23 (1) of the proposed Constitution:

Citizens of Canada shall have their children receive their primary and secondary school instruction in the language of the majority of the

(3) In guaranteeing the possibility of numerous bilingual combinations without endangering English outside Quebec or French inside Quebec, a basic equality of linguistic status (though not of course of linguistic usage), so essential in a viable multicultural society, is ensured. Ensured also is a stronger place for the main bilingual combination — English-French — for we are utterly convinced that English-French bilingualism in most parts of Canada (and almost certainly in all parts west of the Ottawa valley) can only benefit from the presence of other linguistic dualities which have a living demographic base. What is needed is an amended section 23 (1) which will ensure language rights in education to all groups who are prepared for opportunities which are all too often arbitrarily denied.

14. Canada is not dead must never become what one historian once described it: the "Austro-Hungary of the New World, with its two official peoples and its multitude of permitted one" (W. Kilbourn, *The Making of the Nation*, 1965, p. 123). We cannot find words to describe the tragedy of a society in which all individuals are equal but some are more equal than others, all cultures are important but some implicitly carry "official" status, all languages are valuable but school instruction in only some is guaranteed, all peoples are permitted but some are more welcome than others.

15. French Canada, in its struggle for cultural survival and development, has relied heavily on the educational system. So must all other ethnocultural minorities who are seriously interested in their own survival. The Ukrainian Canadian Committee fears that the school systems must begin to serve the needs of Canada's Ukrainian community — not just in terms of culture but language as well — but only when the right to a bilingual education is broadly guaranteed will this begin to happen. And the place to begin is in the Constitution Act, our country's proposed new constitution.

16. Finally, we would like to say something about the one million French Canadians outside the province of Quebec who find themselves in our midst. While most are undoubtedly well disposed toward the proposed Constitution, many are equally uncomfortable with the linguistic-educational provision of section 23 (1). It is exclusive; outside Quebec, only the French are singled out for salvation, as if the survival of a group were alone threatened. In these circumstances, they are concerned (very reasonably) not to harvest the bitter and frequently ugly results of disaffection which usually accompany privileged minority status. Section 23 (1), if proceeded with, will not cool the hot coals of bigotry in Western Canada and elsewhere which, it appears to us, are just waiting to be fanned. Should this happen, everyone seriously interested in bilingual education will undoubtedly suffer and all bilingual classrooms will be the ultimate victims.

17. If Canada is to have a new constitution, we want it to be one with which we as Canadians of Ukrainian descent can also identify proudly. A new constitution is like a new house. In it there must be room for the whole family. We are part of the Canadian family and have been so for almost a century. In our new constitutional house there must not only be room for all of us, but we must enter it through the front door together — culturally equal and, at least in the provincial classrooms of the new nation, linguistically equal.

ALF OF UKRAINIANS

hesitation that the Government itself has absolutely no objection to inserting the word "multiculturalism" in the text of the Constitution.

It is therefore truly disheartening that in the proposed Constitution the term "multiculturalism" is again nowhere to be found.

10. There are those who would argue that "multiculturalism" will be placed into the preamble after the constitution is patriated. The provinces, they say, could not agree upon a preamble and so it was because of the provinces and not the federal government that the Constitution did not recognize Canada's cultural diversity. The strength of this argument may be gauged to ignore the equally divided wishes of the same provinces and unilaterally invaded the well-known area of provincial jurisdiction, namely, education, in the matter of English-French minority language education rights. With a preamble now apparently out of reach, partial restitution for slighting "multiculturalism" is the second co-ordinate of a single government policy can be made by adding the following under "Non-discrimination Rights" as section 15 (3): "Everyone has the right to preserve and develop their cultural and linguistic heritage."

11. The Ukrainian Canadian Committee is truly pleased with sections 16-22, which refer to English and French as the official languages of Canada with "equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of Parliament and government of Canada." French Canadians in all parts of Canada must be able to speak to the Government of Canada in French if it is to be their government and national unity is to prevail. National unity, on the other hand, can only suffer from the unilateral invasion of the provincial sphere of education jurisdiction by the federal government on behalf of a single minority in each Canadian province. To us, all cultural and linguistic minorities live or die together. To us, among cultural and linguistic minorities there can only be equals — at least in law.

population of the province in which they reside and in any other language(s) in accordance with the expressed desire of parents in any area of the province in which the number of children of such citizens is sufficient to warrant the provision out of public funds of minority language educational facilities in that area.

The above amendment renders section 23 (2) unnecessary and it should therefore be deleted.

13. The suggested changes would have three main advantages:

(1) In omitting reference to "first language learned and still understood" all Canadian citizens outside Quebec who wish their children to learn French would have that right without being members of the "French linguistic minority population." Under the present clause, while a non-French Canadian in western Canada, for example, could send his children to a bilingual class, he would not have the right to do so.

(2) In omitting reference to "the linguistic minority population" in Quebec, the primacy of French in that province is secured, without denying anyone the right to acquire a second or third language of their choice. To us, this is very important, for it anything is clear after two decades of debate and discussion, it is that unilateral English-speaking residents in Quebec must become bilingual. Yet the proposed Constitution actually guarantees them the right to remain unilingual English in a province where 80 per cent of the population is of French origin.

The original clause also carries the unfortunate implication that all other ethnocultural minorities are of little consequence in Quebec. While they must certainly learn French (because of its primacy) and they should surely know English (because they live on what is essentially an English-speaking continent), they should also have the right to learn their ancestral language and become trilingual (because they live in a multicultural country which values its cultural and linguistic diversity).



An Unqualified Winner....

Trio Marenychi
Melodiya
33-C-60-12037-38

- 1) Tysha navkruihu
- 2) Chom by ne pryshov
- 3) O pid vyshneiu
- 4) Misalsi i ziron'ky
- 5) Lyubly
- 6) Maky chervani

- 1) O! u haju pry Dunaiu
- 2) Sydzu la kraj vikorichka
- 3) Posylala mene maty
- 4) Vzhe sonitsa nyzhenko
- 5) Nese Halia vodu
- 6) Bodaj sie kohut znydy

Antonyina Marenych — vocals, bass guitar, melodica, percussion
Svetlana Marenych — vocals, melodica, percussion
Valerii Marenych — vocals, guitar, percussion

POET TRIO MARENYCH

Contrary to popular belief, reviewers seldom derive malicious pleasure from criticizing musical endeavours or in raking anyone over the coals for lack of taste, talent, creativity, or foresight. Incredible as it may sound, the process can often be a painful one. Responsible critique comes with the reviewer's turf, as does laudatory praise — when appropriate. Pursuit of objectivity aside, the task in the end is reduced to personal preferences. N.B.: reviewers claim to speak for no one but themselves.

Having said all that, I embark on this particular column — the last **RET SENDS YA** for 1980 — running the risk of being accused of either bias or saving the best until the end. So be it. Without apologies then — with delight, even — I'll conclude the year with an album that rates as the best Ukrainian musical effort of 1980. With no reservations whatsoever, that honor goes to **TRIO MARENYCH** and the group's debut Melodiya release **POET TRIO MARENYCH**.

It happens rarely. But when the moment occurs, it's a reviewer's and music lover's dream come true: an album so good that it borders on the flawless. One that gets better with repeated listenings. **TRIO MARENYCH** has effected just such a musical coup, and has done so with remarkable simplicity and class. Relying almost exclusively on acoustic instrumentation and mellow vocal harmonies hitherto unparalleled, **TRIO MARENYCH** has securely established itself as a leading proponent of stylized contemporary Ukrainian folk music. The group's occasional forays beyond the realm of *narodna muzyka* only serve to further illustrate its tremendous talent and future potential.

Hailing from the Volyn area of Ukraine, this team of sister, brother and wife gained a degree of notoriety with Soviet officialdom when **TRIO MARENYCH** gave an outspoken impromptu performance at **VOLODYMYR IVASIUK's** funeral in Lviv last year. The defiant display may account partially for the limited availability of the group's album, both in North American and in Soviet Ukraine. Nonetheless, taped copies of the album mysteriously have been making their way across the continent via the "Ukrainian underground communications network" and **TRIO MARENYCH** already has a large and well-deserved following.

There's no ready-made classification for **TRIO MARENYCH's** music. The influence of early 1980's North American folk music, in the vein of the **KINGSTON TRIO** and **PETER, PAUL and MARY**, is clearly in evidence. The approach is readily adaptable to stylized Ukrainian folk music. In fact, Ukrainian-Canadian groups such as **TRIO OSIN**, **KALYNA TRIO**, and the **VODOHRAJ QUARTET** to some extent, have already dabbled in the genre, but never with the finesse displayed by **TRIO MARENYCH**. Instrumentally, the style relies heavily on acoustic guitar accompaniment. And to no disappointment, **VALERII MARENYCH** handles this end with dextrous virtuosity. Whether it be a delicately finger-picked lead line or a basic strummed rhythm pattern, his technique is unobtrusive, deceptively simple, and serves to carry the music. Additional instrumental coloration is effectively provided by **ANTONYINA** and **SVETLANA MARENYCH's** beautiful melodica work. The melodica instrument too seldom used today, often being dismissed outright as a mere child's plaything. But its violin-like resonance adds a haunting gypsy quality to **TRIO MARENYCH's** music, most notably in the folk standard *Nese Halia vodu*. Percussion-wise, the use of tambourines, maracas, congas, and bongo drums gently but persistently underscore the group's svelte sound.

Undoubtedly, the real highlight of the **TRIO MARENYCH** album is the vocal work. The group presents a definitive example of that rare quality known as *zispivnist* — confluent polyphony, mellowness and believability. The standard and not-so-standard three-part harmonies employed by **TRIO MARENYCH** are essential to conveying the soul and spirit of their songs. Whether it's the folk hymn *O! Bodaj sie kohut znydy*, the intrinsic sadness of *Nese Halia vodu*, the plaintive cry of the guilt-ridden 'other' woman in *Vzhe sonitsa nyzhenko*, the heart-breaking loneliness of lost love in *O! u haju pry Dunaiu*, or the impassioned urgency of *Lyubly*, **TRIO MARENYCH** delivers each with equal conviction. The rapid harmonic progressions and key changes in *Posylala mene maty* and *Tysha navkruihu* punctuate the group's powerful arrangements, while the vocal acrobatics of *Lyubly* leave the listener virtually amazed. **VALERII MARENYCH's** scat-like bass line in *O! pid vyshneiu* is delightfully reminiscent of the 1950's hit "Mr. Bessman"; guaranteed to put a smile on your face. The album's musical arrangements are outstanding. They incorporate

(Ret Sends Ya continued on page 10)

John Lennon (1940-1980)



Since you left me, I'm so alone.
Now you're coming, you're coming home...
It won't be long, yeh, yeh.
—It Won't Be Long
God is a concept
By which we measure
Our pain...
You just have to carry on.
The dream is over.

—God

The tragic and senseless death of John Lennon at the age of forty, shocked and saddened millions of popular music lovers around the world. His provocative wit, his musical inventiveness, his challenging lyrics and his lyrical sincerity, will be missed by all of us.

We note his passing on the culture pages of *Student* because just as his genius inspired countless number of young people all over the world, so it also moved a generation of Ukrainian youth, in Ukraine and abroad. Although everyone has a favourite Beatles or Lennon song, surely "Back in the U.S.S.R." — with its mockingly ironic refrain, "You don't know how lucky you are, boy" — has special significance for most Ukrainian rock fans. One wonders at how many parties the popular cut from the White Album was played — often repeatedly — as we danced and sang along with the lyrics, "The Ukraine girls really knock me out, they leave the West behind." That Lennon was aware the Soviet Union was not one gigantic and amorphous Russian monolith, but a conglomerate of many nations and peoples, is indeed an indication of his sensitivity and his intelligence. For in this simple act of 'naming' he revealed he understood more about the Soviet Union than such giants of the media as the *New York Times* and *Time* magazine, who more often than not lump all Soviet citizens together into one grey Russian mass.

But then Lennon and the Beatles always did distinguish themselves from the rest of that great tribe of 60's rock musicians, with both their depth of insight and their breadth of vision. That they viewed everything from a global perspective is evident in the fact that they released some of their early songs in German, chanced singing in French — a always an act of courage on the part of most English-speaking people — and introduced Eastern music and spirituality to the Western world. And although it is true that they were to a large extent the creation of a multinational music industry whose goals are somewhat different from the ideals of art, the Beatles, and especially Lennon, always managed to get their own message across to people, even when it ran counter to the interests of the status quo. We salute their truly internationalist spirit, for it preached love, tolerance of differences and mutual understanding in a world clouded by racism, hostility and petty rivalry. The loss of John Lennon, that British working class hero, was a loss for world culture.

Finally, we extend our heartfelt feelings of sympathy to Lennon's widow, Yoko Ono, who bears the greatest burden of the grief which we can only experience from a distance. We hope the strength and comfort that Lennon found in her will sustain her in this period of sorrow, and that her art will heal the wounds inflicted on her by the cruel fate imposed by the assassin's bullets.

Dr. Doremy Fasola's classical review



For those interested in rare Ukrainian music that dates back before the 19th century, a few discs have appeared in recent years which begin, at least partially, to fill the gap in terms of what is available. This review will deal exclusively with choral music.

Ruski i ukrainski pesnopenia XVI-XVII vek/Russian and Ukrainian Chants 16th - 17th Century. Bulgarian A Capella Choir "Svetoslav Obretenov," Georgii Robev - conductor. Balkanton BXA 1333.

The title of this disc is partially a misnomer in that, with the exception of the "Blazhenna" and "Paschal Stiches" — composed in Muscovy in the mid 17th century — all other works are by composers who are Ukrainian, or of Ukrainian provenance. The first cut is "Reduisia, radost tolu vospievai," an example of 16th-17th century Ukrainian chant. The unknown composer has created an exalted atmosphere as befits a panegyric. S. Pekelytsky's "Song of the Cherubim" is an eight part composition in the *partesnyi* style of the 17th century. There follows the Adagio and Fugue

(the last movements) of Maksym Berezovsky's spiritual concerto "Ne overzhy mene vo vremie stesoty." Spiritual concertos reached a very high degree of development in the hands of M. Berezovsky, and his contemporaries D. Bortniansky and A. Vedel. Most frequently these were settings for four-part chorus and solo renditions of psalm (or a part of it). "Blazhenna" by Zhukov is an example of *strochnyi* style. Here several melodic lines (*stroki*) are performed simultaneously.

Another panegyric chant, this time of secular character, is "Na vossiedinenie Ukraine s Rossiei" from the latter half of the 17th century. There follows the abovementioned "Paschal Stiches." "Snechala dnes poutru reno" is a remarkable example of a secular choral concerto on a very high professional level. Here is a twelve voice rendering of "the morning after the night before." The album concludes with music for the first part of a Ukrainian *vertap*, a Nativity folk drama.

Unlike some Russian and Polish recordings of similar material the pronunciation of Church Slavonic follows the Ukrainian pattern rather than the Russian. Consequently, Ukrainian listeners will have an

easier time following the texts. The pronunciation of the Ukrainian texts (*vertap*) in particular, is almost flawless. As for the interpretation, it is as good as one could ever hope for. G. Robev displays a profound understanding of the choral music of this period. He has perfect control of an outstanding chorus, and the result is a flawless interpretation. In short — a very valuable addition to the library of any choral music lover, and of baroque Ukrainian composition in particular.

Liturgichni khorove/Liturgical Chants Male Chamber Choir, Mikhail Milkov - conductor. Balkanton BXA 1104 (also available on Monitor MFS 743).

This is a fine collection of Russian, Ukrainian and Bulgarian ecclesiastical music. It features such liturgical chants as A. Arkhangelsky's "Utoi bolezni," G. Lomakin's "Tabe polem," Dubinsky's "Otche nash" (the Lord's prayer), G. Lvovsky's "Song of the Cherubim," and D. Khristov's *Khvelite imia Gospodne*, and Liubimov's "Blazhen muzh" (Ps. 1).

(Meister continued on page 11)

The winter cycle of rituals

The days grow shorter with each passing day. The sun is losing his ability to warm the earth. *Baba-Zyma* and *Did-Moroz* have come, flying over the land on the cold north wind bringing with them the snow and frost. *Baba Zyma* is in joyful bliss at having defeated the sun. During this time the people begin their preparations for the winter cycle of rituals and customs relating to the Ukrainian folk calendar.

The most important of the ritual festivities celebrated by the people during the winter cycle are *Kollada* and *Malanka-Vasyli*. These traditions have been passed down to us through time from the pre-Christian era of our people. Although Christianity has done much to try to absorb and change the focus of the traditions and beliefs of our ancestors, many of these deep-rooted traditions and beliefs have survived the onslaught and modifications of the church.

Originally the celebration of the festivals of *Kollada* and *Malanka-Vasyli* revolved around celebrations of the Sun's ascent towards summer — the Winter Solstice, signalling the rebirth of the Sun. These festivals took place at the end of December and in the first part of January with the lengthening of daylight, or the conquest over darkness and the grim winter goddess — *Baba-Zyma*. The church succeeded in changing the focus of the festival *Kollada* from the rebirth of the Sun to the birth of Christ, or *Rizdvo*, towards the end of the eleventh century.

There is much debate over the origin of the word *Kollada*. Essentially, there are three basic theories as to the roots of its inception. One is that *Kollade* comes from the words *Kolo Sontsia*, meaning near or beside the sun, or the sun deity *Svaroh*. Another theory is that *Kollada* is the name of the deity of winter festivals and peace. There are written references to a temple existing in Kiev honouring this deity during the early Kievan-Rus period of our history. The third theory is that the word *Kollada* came from the Greco-Roman word *Calendai-Calendae*. This is to have come about from the influence that the Greek and Roman colonies had in the fourth to the ninth centuries, when they had settlements in the Black Sea area.

Kollada has a double meaning in the Ukrainian language. First as I've already indicated, it means "the festival period." Also, *Kollade* is used in the context we usually associate with it, namely the carols we sing through the period of *Rizdvo*. *Kollyedy* have their basis in pre-history, forming part of the tradition of oral literature that our people are so rich in. Many of these *Kollyedy* portray the cosmogonic views of our people and contain deep mystical meanings, despite the substitution of the names of Christ, the Virgin Mary, St. Peter, etc., for those of the pre-Christian deities. In 1993 the church formally sanctioned the use of *Kollyady* as songs to commemorate the birth of Christ.

Kollada begins with *Bahata Kytia* (now known as *Sviat Vechir*) and continues through to *Malanka*. It is a time to get together with family, and to engage in social interaction within the community. It is also a period of mysticism and prophecy. People try to foretell the future using various methods, attempting to auger how the next harvest will turn out; divining prospects for the breeding cattle in the forthcoming year; and generally trying to determine what the fate of the household will be. Traditionally, girls try to

foretell if they will marry, and who the lucky young man will be. *Kutia*, as a food made to honour the Sun God *Svaroh*, plays a major role in all ceremonies that take place during *Kollada*.

The other major symbol of *Kollada* is the *Didukh* (a sheaf of wheat), which means "old man." The *Didukh* represents the deity *Perun*, who is the god of thunder but also represents the souls of our ancestors; they live in the kernels of grain and return to the earth in the ceremony when the *Didukh* is burned on *Vasyli* (New Years Day).

Also within the Sun Circle of the Winter Cycle of celebrations is the festival of *Shchedroho Boha* (the generous god), which later took on the name of *Malanka-Shchedrivka*. Of the New Year festivals, *Melanke-Shchedrivka* and *Vasyli* are recognized as expressions of ancient pre-Christian beliefs, containing elements of the complete year's ritual cycle — winter, spring, summer and fall.

The cosmogonic legend of *Melenke* is one of the legends that has survived the purges by the church with the acceptance of Christianity in Kievan Rus. Until the acceptance of Christ and his doctrine, our people believed in *Praboha-Vsederzhytelia*, who had four sons and a daughter. Our mother earth was the daughter, who answered to the name *Lada*. The first of the sons was *Ad-Had*, and he was regarded as the serpent, the devil, the king of the underworld, and the enemy of his family. *Iar-larlyo* was the second son, and the third was *Rai*, whose name was later changed to *Ivan*. *Lad-Myr* was the fourth son and he later became known as *Dmytro*.

Praboha-Vsederzhytel's daughter *Lada* in turn had two children, a son, *Rado-Kniaz-Misiats* and a daughter *Vesna-Maianu*, who was later called by the people *Mylena-Mylenka*. The people gave her this name because she was always happy for the world was always covered with green leaves and flowers. Not surprisingly, *Ad-Had* the serpent, hated her for this. One day while *Rado-Kniaz* was away hunting, *Ad-Had* came and kidnapped *Mylenka*, taking her to his home in the nether-world. *Lada* was deeply saddened by this event, and in her sadness the earth became cold and covered with snow and ice. However, *Bezylichuk-Vasyli* came to her rescue, and they later were married. *Mylenka* then became the symbol of Spring for when she returned the snows receded and flowers bloomed once again.

On *Malanka* preparations are made similar to *Bahata Kytia* (*Sviat Vechir*), with fortune telling and divining accompanying this mystical night. People sing *shchedrivky*, dance, play games and generally enjoy making merry. In some parts of Ukraine the ritual called *Kozia* is also acted out, and sometimes fires are lit around the village to purify the earth. The *pich* (oven) is an important symbol during this night, and it is not used for cooking on this special occasion. Whitewashed and cleaned in preparation, the *pich* represents *Malanka* who goes out to dance the night away with *Vasyli*.

But it is impossible to mention all the rituals and beliefs practised by our ancestors through the centuries during this festive time of year. Indeed, it would take volumes to simply describe all the facets of the winter cycle. Thus, one final thought will have to suffice as a conclusion to this brief summary: "Veselykh Sviat i Shchashlyvoho Novoho Roku."

KOLUMN-EYKA



Social Responsibility in Choreography

The title of this article is not expected to attract a large number of readers. But it was consciously chosen because it immediately states the subject of this article, which is intended for those people who, while enjoying Ukrainian dancing, also ask themselves the following question: "Just how long can we continue to pack concert halls with practising Ukrainians, half-na-piv Ukrainians and appreciators of 'cute ethnics' with the same old thing done over and over again?"

For the 1980's, this is a question of grave consequence. Those patrons who attend often and faithfully the concerts of Canada's major Ukrainian dance troupes must surely be getting bored with the frivolous choreography that they have been presented with to this point in time. We have been choreographing primarily peasant, agrarian dance themes for our largely urban audiences. Although they are charming and necessary, they have unfortunately remained more historical than relevant to our present Canadian-Ukrainian society.

In a word, our choreography is becoming redundant. How many macho-centric, hero-worshipping stories can our audiences endure about Oleksa Dovbush or victorious *Kozaky*? How many more mothers will stand to see their daughters either ignored or used to merely fill the spaces on stage between displays of prowess by the athletic, show-stealing boys? How many more romantic or sentimental themes can we present on stage about a folk existence that has all but passed from the earth, without saying something about its failings instead of always depicting its pastoral charms.

The fact of the matter is this: Ukrainian-Canadian choreographers are simply showing far too little social responsibility. We just re-arrange steps into different combinations, while our themes remain unchanged. We seem blissfully unaware that part of our job is to instruct and challenge our audience at the same time we delight it. In Ukraine, it is the artists who have always reflected and inspired our people's soul — not the soldiers and diplomats, who have consistently screwed things up. In Canada also, let us not forget this social consciousness of the artist, i.e., the historic responsibility we have to enlighten the people we entertain.

So let's get moving! Let's broaden our minds so that we can teach lessons of universal significance, which is what *Shevchenko* is touted for having done. Let's not restrict ourselves to the tired old themes of boy-girl, mother-son, mother-daughter, soldier-enemy, priest-parishoner, etc. Instead, let's perform stories about the crippled man left at home while *Kozaky* go off to battle; the invalid mother helped by a kindly Jewish tavern-keeper; the starving peasant too weak to dance; and *Dovbush's* mystical right-hand man. Let's explore such sensitive themes as alcoholism's destructive effects, and the tragedy of suicide which is so common in Ukrainian peasant society. Or on a lighter note, showcase children's games, and the wealth of our folk rituals and traditions. In order to accomplish this, we must make the effort to research Ukrainian-language sources, take courses in Ukrainian folklore and history, and be prepared to put up with a little flak from those who misunderstand such motivations.

Let's get rocking. The 80's is the decade in which we can open up our minds and hearts, show some courage, and create art on stage that will give all people in Canada something more constructive than the simple recognition of the existence of Ukrainians in Canada. Let's encourage and stimulate our *hromada*, so that it will vibrantly, positively, and creatively grow to meet the future, instead of always living in the past.

Demjan Hohol



Myrna Kostash's new book

Long Way From Home

Nena Jocio

Long Way From Home is a creative portrait that successfully captures the mood of Canadian youth during the turbulent sixties. Like their counterparts and comrades around the globe, the young people of Canada become aware of the issues within their own country, as well as those in the vast world beyond.

Kostash's style of narration, which blends poetic reportage with factual research, helps the reader to understand the struggles of the sixties generation. She probes the individual lives of the people who shared strong feelings and similar convictions about the war in Vietnam, nuclear proliferation, American imperialism, racism and other issues of the day. The reader

becomes involved in the numerous actions initiated by Canadian youth to improve student, worker, native, ethnic, and general civil rights in Canada.

According to Kostash, the revolutionary spirit of the times was not an imaginary phenomenon, but a widespread feeling among university and high school students. She argues that developments such as the formation of the FLQ and the rising consciousness of the notion of a "Quebec aux Quebecois", were some of the direct results of progressive interventions in the labour force and educational systems. The women's movement also began in the sixties, but really blossomed into maturity in the seventies.

Although there were many positive steps taken toward social change, Kostash notes that there were also defeatist elements within the movement, which often was clouded by an atmosphere of failure. She is particularly critical of the counterculture, claiming that the "immoral" experiences offered by this movement eventually undermined the progressive forces and encouraged disunity, lack of commitment and complete disorganization.

She observes that the women's rights movement shared the same problems and met with a similar fate. Although

(Review continued page 10)

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Book Review

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there was some sympathetic talk about equal rights, Kostash contends that much of it was mere lip-service on the part of mostly macho and chauvinistic men. The men simply failed to understand the grievances of the women who struggled alongside them and worked towards similar goals. The irony lies in the fact that while women had to justify their equality according to Marx, the elements of the 'patriarchal' society within the activist organizations still remained intact throughout the sixties.

Although there were many small and spontaneously-formed organizations scattered across the country, Kostash identifies the main unifying force behind the youth movement as being SUPA. Students for United Peace Action.

SUPA's committed efforts against the war in Vietnam met with considerable success. However, the well-intentioned devotion of many SUPA activists towards community volunteer work and community development, soon led to deviations from SUPA's basic ideological orientation. Attempts to share funds proved unsuccessful, leading to the rapid bureaucratization of SUPA; and as the organization received its financial backing from the government, it was ultimately tied to the state purse-strings. In time, SUPA lost its radical zeal.

Like the rest of Canadian society, SUPA was also strongly influenced by events in the U.S.A., and by radical American organizations such as the SDS, the parent counterpart of

SUPA. Kostash's capacity for irony is especially evident in the parallels she draws between American imperialism and the American radical movements of the sixties. Canadian activists could not escape this, as it infected even the most progressive political currents. Kostash cites Abby Hoffman's arrogant and misinformed remarks while addressing a rally in Edmonton, as a perfect example of the American chauvinism that emanated from the most radical circles.

Although she acknowledges there were many defeats on numerous fronts for the idealistic youth of the sixties, Kostash contends the youth generation's greatest achievement was the freeing of the university from direct corporate influence in the area of funding. This eventually led to a growth period in education, with heavy emphasis being placed on the humanities and

the arts in Canadian post-secondary institutions.

Long Way From Home is informed by a critical awareness about the sixties, which are more often than not either dismissed or idealized. One can only hope that today's generation of young people will be able to learn from the failures and the dreams of the sixties generation, and roll the wheel of progress a little bit further down the road of history. In the concluding words of Ms. Kostash: "And so we had been ridiculous with love, with joy, with the first free labour of our young lives. We should be so ridiculous again." To that, one can only say Amen!

(Myrna Kostash is a freelance writer and journalist living in Edmonton. Her first book, *All of Baba's Children*, is now available in paperback, having gone through two hardcover editions. *Long Way From Home* is published by the James Lorimer Co.)

Rights

continued from page 1

the Ukrainian community in an effective way behind the positions outlined in the brief. Rumours abound that other Ukrainian organizations may seek to appear before the committee to give their view of the issues, and any hope for a show of unity among Ukrainians (for once!) may dissolve into the habitual splintering on political matters. And if Ukrainian Canadians are not willing to support what has been recognized as a thoughtful and well-argued brief put forward by the UCC, then one must seriously question whether the UCC any longer has viability as a political co-ordinating body of Ukrainian Canadian organizations.

Meister

continued from page 8

Of special interest are D. Bortniansky's "Dostoynno iest" and "Slave vo vysnynik Bohu," and A. Vedel's "Pokaiania." The works of Bortniansky (1751-1825) are well known to anyone interested in Ukrainian liturgical music. They are in the repertoire of not only church choirs, but even secular ones. Aside from the Bulgarian pronunciation of Church Slavonic which may seem just a bit unusual to anyone familiar with the Ukrainian variety, it is an exemplary reading of these works. Our choirs which have these compositions in their repertoire would do well to study this interpretation — in a word, it is outstanding.

The piece *da resistance* of this disc, however, is A. Vedel's (1767-1806) "pokaiania." This *slichera* is first sung at Lauds (Ukraine) of the Sunday of the Publican and Pharisee. As in all his compositions, A. Vedel creates an intimate correspondence between the text and his music. In many instances the latter draws freely on Ukrainian folkloric material. Direct borrowings are rare, but only a person steeped in Ukrainian folk music could have composed this work. The atmosphere alternates between melancholy (awareness of one's sinfulness) that borders on despair (at meriting forgiveness), but ends on a hopeful note that with divine assistance true repentance, and ultimately salvation, is possible. The emotional range of "Pokaiania" is broad, and one need not be an orthodox Christian to feel its powerful impact.

Judging from these and other discs, Bulgaria appears to be a source of liturgical music in Eastern Europe well worth watching. The artistic level is uniformly very high, but, most important, these singers and their conductors obviously have a profound understanding of and feeling for ecclesiastical music.

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Ret Sends Ya

rhythmic variation, effective syncopation, and a readiness to part company with tradition. Eight of the album's twelve songs are *narodni pismi* which emerge with a refreshing relevance through TRIO MARENCHY's carefully-crafted interpretations.

All-in-all, TRIO MARENCHY is superb. Keep an eye out for the album; it may be difficult to find given recent copyright agreements with the Soviet Union. But when you locate the album, the trouble you've gone through will be well worth your while. Should you decide to purchase only one album of Ukrainian music this year, this is it... On the RET SENDS YA 4 STAR RATING SCALE... TRIO MARENCHY scores a well-deserved

RANDOM NOTES... Come the new year, several bands of renown will be making debut appearances far beyond their home territories. Chicago's PROMIN is slated for a tentative performance in Edmonton on Saturday 7 February, complete with light show and special effects. TREMBITA travels to Vancouver 17 January for Malanka. And Edmonton's DUMKA is confirmed in Toronto for Saturday 14 February, followed by an appearance in Victoria on Saturday 21 February. Entertainment *par excellence* for all.

ON THE SOUNDSCAPE — One of the greatest problems facing North American Ukrainian musical ensembles today is the lack of exposure for their product. There's a lamentable absence of media outlets on which their music can be aired regularly and thereby become known with the record-buying public. Toronto and Winnipeg both have daily Ukrainian radio broadcasts which devote some time to promoting North American produced Ukrainian musical content. Latest to join the ranks is Edmonton. Veteran broadcaster ROMAN ONUFRIUCHUK is now hosting a Ukrainian radio program Monday through Friday between 5:30 and 7:00 pm on the city's new multi-cultural station CKER. The bilingual show has a large following and makes extensive use of albums produced by Ukrainian artists on the North American continent, as well as showcasing those from Europe and Australia. If you happen to be a musician with an album in need of professional on-air promotion in western Canada, you can get in touch with the Ukrainian voice of Edmonton by contacting the Ukrainian programme at the following address:

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—Hungary— —Fears in Poland—

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outing. Cases of mental abuse of oppositionists in psychiatric institutions are practically unheard of in Hungary, as is the use of torture or physical violence.

The *ellenzeki* have failed on their part, to take advantage of the genuine popular revolts that have on occasion arisen within Hungary. Although the public response to the enormous price rises in August of 1979 was generally muted, it did include a little-known act of sabotage — a major explosion in a typewriter factory — as well as bomb scares in downtown Budapest offices. The latter caused the evacuation of hundreds of workers. Of course, all of these events remained unreported in the official press, as did another incident involving a piece of bread spread with lead being placed in the hand of a monument to Lenin (at the giant industrial complex at Chepel) with the note "this is what you have given us" hung around it.

One area in which the *ellenzeki* could have gained wider support, is in their protest against the cultural genocide being conducted by the Ceausescu regime against the Hungarian minority in Rumania. However, this opportunity has now been successfully eclipsed by the government's decision to publish articles, such as writer Gyula Ilyes New Year's 1979 piece in the daily *Megyar Nemzet*, protesting the same situation.

The resulting neglect and cynicism on the part of the general population and of the government, leads to a strange cynicism among the *ellenzeki* themselves. They see little hope for change in their own country other than the population sinking even deeper into the materialistic mire of consumerism. The *ellenzeki* seem to continue more out of a sense of necessity than anything else, believing that even if there is little hope for concrete change, *someone* has to represent loftier ideals and rally for their maintenance.

(e) The national oppression of the Ukrainian people undermines the social base of the central Russian government.

(b) There are continual and substantial movements of Ukrainians and Poles across the borders because the changing of boundaries after the Second World War divided many families (there are over 300,000 Ukrainians living in Poland).

(c) Polish politics and culture have for some time existed in a relatively freer climate compared to the one in Ukraine, and have exerted an influence on Ukrainian thought. For instance, many young people subscribe to periodicals from Poland and follow cultural and political processes there as closely as possible. Similarly, Ukrainian periodicals published in Poland are read with great interest across the border because they are more informative and controversial than Soviet Ukrainian publications.

(d) The idea of an independent trade union movement is not entirely foreign to the Soviet Ukrainian oppositional movement. There have been two sustained attempts to form such, the most significant being the creation of unions in USSR, the Free Trade Union Association of Workers (FTUAW) in February 1978. Of its 200 members, over half are from Ukraine. Moreover, the leader of the FTUAW, Vladimir Klebanov, is a miner from Makayeva in the Donbas region.

Other developments also suggest that Ukraine is a logical candidate for infection. In April this year, members of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement (an underground oppositional group) appealed to Ukrainian workers to support the independent trade union movement and called for the release of Klebanov from the psychiatric prison hospital where he has been detained for his organizing activities. The appeal of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement stated that "Only through these independent unions can you defend your interests as workers. Fight for strict adherence to the

continued from page 3

labour code, demand higher wages and refuse to work Saturdays, which lengthen your 41 hour week... It is your sacred duty to defend yourselves against the state's brutal exploitation of your labour."

Furthermore there are historical precedents for such independent working class action, such as the underground committees which organized the June 1962 general strike in Novocherkassk in the Donbas and the formation of the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union in Western Ukraine in 1959.

It is indeed very difficult to gauge the consciousness of the people of Ukraine, their knowledge of the events in Poland, and their capacity to respond to them. One thing that is certain, however, is that Ukrainians and East Europeans alike, are aware that Soviet might is the ace up Kania's sleeve. Only the solidarity of working people in countries neighbouring Poland can trump this card, and therefore every effort must be made to encourage it.

Footnotes:

1. Igor Birman 'The Way to Slow the Arms Race' *Washington Post*, 27 October p. 15.
2. A. Austin 'Brezhnev Welcomes New Missile Parley', *New York Times*, 28 October, p. 4.
3. Brezhnev hints Food Shortage Grows *Washington Post*, 22 October, p. 1.
4. *Radianska Ukraina*, 16 November, pp. 1-2.
5. *Radianska Ukraina*, 6 November, p. 3.
6. *Dilaloh*, no. 5, December 1980.



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