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NOTE: In the Number 4, Vol. II of our review an error occurred in the printing of the name of *Dr. Floyd A. Cave*, author of the article: "*Appasement of the USSR and the Rights of Small Nations.*" In making this correction we extend our apology to the author.—EDITOR.

IS SOVIET RUSSIA FOMENTING A NEW WAR?

Editorial

SOVIET tactics, whether at the meetings of the United Nations, during the Peace Conference in Paris, or at the meetings of the Big Four, are steadily becoming more confusing even to experienced politicians.

At one moment the Soviets follow a course of boycotting or terrorizing their opponents. At another they become stubbornly silent and they follow this with unexpected concessions and give the impression that they are a peace-loving power which is anxious to get along on the best terms with the other nations. Yet again and again they have returned on the very next day to their original tactics of boycotts and threats.

This attitude of the Soviet sphinx naturally attracts the attention of the statesmen and the press. Every peaceful word of the Soviet representatives is reported in the press in an optimistic manner because of the hope that it is a change for the better in international relations and then it is proved false almost at once. The enemies of the Red Kremlin profit by this to alarm the world with the danger of a new war to be started by the Soviets while fellow travelers and true communists glorify the USSR as the most peace-loving country in the world and berate their opponents.

Only a fundamental understanding of the Soviets derived from a close study of their policy for many years and of their clever political methods which have led to the enslavement by Moscow of the East European and Asiatic peoples, can guard a political critic from making dangerous mistakes as to the Soviet tactics which seem to change from day to day. These Soviet tactics are like those of a clever fox, which are ever changing, but they are fundamentally designed to bring the whole world under the domination of communism. At one time the clever fox acts aggressively and provocatively, and overnight he poses as weak and dangerous to no one. Now he appears as a gentle animal and then, when the occasion offers, he becomes a raging beast with his fangs bared, as he jumps on his prey.

The Soviets are rapacious like the fox but since they are compar-

actively weak, they cannot attack their prey directly but they strive to do it from the side from which it is least expected.

Is there any danger that the Soviets will start a war? Do the Bolsheviks want war? There is no immediate danger now but the Bolsheviks want war in the not so distant future.

The absence of danger now is due to the fact that the Bolsheviks are at this moment too weak to start a war of aggression against the democracies. They would lose such a war and therefore they will not start one now. Peace now they want and need.

There are many reasons for this, both domestic and international. First, despite their victory in World War II, the Soviets lost heavily in human lives and there was destroyed fifty percent of their industries, which were chiefly in Ukraine. They need several years to rebuild these industries, although they have already replaced some of them by the aid of plundered German factories, which they have dismantled and then set up anew beyond the Urals, where they are busy producing war material.

Secondly, despite the victorious war, the Soviets are badly shaken by internal dissensions. Millions of Soviet youth have had their eyes opened to the realities of the outside world and have consequently lost faith in the Soviet propaganda about the Soviet paradise. These young men, who served in the Red Army through a terrible war, no longer fear the Soviet police as do the ordinary Soviet citizens.

Thirdly, the war rekindled the smouldering aspirations for independence of the non-Russian peoples, under the leadership of the Ukrainians. To spur the war efforts of the Ukrainians against the Nazis, the Soviets gave them certain concessions, among them being the publication in Ukrainian of books and poems with a Ukrainian rather than a Soviet patriotic character. To-day all these concessions are being withdrawn and this is creating again a discontent and a growth of nationalism among the peoples living under Soviet tyranny. Representatives of the revolutionary movement among the Soviet-ruled peoples are creating an anti-Bolsheviks bloc, which has initiated a partisan movement of revolt not only in Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic states, but also among the peoples of the Caucasus and Turkestan.

All these reasons create an unfavorable situation for the Soviets to start a new war. Moreover, the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons antagonistic to the Soviets, are also an important factor in the Soviet reluctance to start a new war. Besides, the Soviets well realize that the industrial might of America with its atom bomb gives the

democracies such an overwhelming superiority that they do not even dare to start a war now.

The history of Russia shows that on the whole it has lost offensive wars and won defensive ones. It is only natural for a population that has been ruled by dictators for over eight hundred years to be unwilling to wage an aggressive war but to fight to the end in defense of its native land even under hated domination. The Soviets well understand this and therefore there is no danger of Soviet aggression in the next few years. The Red propagandists, however, try to make it appear that the Soviets are peace loving.

Do the Bolsheviks Want War?

Whether the Bolsheviks want a war in the future is a very different question from whether they want to start one now. They do want a war and are preparing for it on all fronts in the conviction that a war is inevitable and that it must end with the complete destruction of democracy throughout the world.

Lenin himself expounded the theory that every war among the capitalist countries must in the end turn into a civil war and thus be the prelude to the establishment of communism in the countries involved. Although the recent world war did not end that way, the Bolsheviks continue to believe that the *finis* of capitalist nations will start when they declare war on the Soviets. Even though such a war may be absolutely necessary for the Western nations, because of the lack of any other alternative, Soviet propaganda is bound to picture it as an imperialistic war, even though the democracies commence it to defend themselves and the rights of the peoples enslaved by Soviet aggression.

The Bolsheviks will not themselves declare such a war but they will create such international tension that it will be bound to break out. Already Bolshevik propaganda is attempting to foist communism upon the countries that have been depopulated by the last war. In their satellites they have already done so—by force. Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and even Czechoslovakia to-day are under the terroristic rule of the Soviet secret police and at the disposal of the Communist party.

Beyond the sphere of their direct control, in Italy, France and Spain, the Soviets are attempting to gain control of the governmental machinery by means half democratic and half forceful. Italy is the center of their organized anti-religious campaign. In France the Com-

munists are trying to get control of the government through the labor unions. In Spain they are supporting an underground movement. All this is done to gain control of western Europe, to communize Germany, and thereby to become the master of the whole of Europe.

Communist propaganda, definitely anti-American in character, is also widespread in Latin America and in countries which are supposed to be the good neighbors of the United States. The last presidential elections in Chile show clearly how their work is progressing. There are similar reports in the press of the growth of Soviet influence in Brazil and other Latin American countries, and all these indicate that Soviet propaganda is definitely not on the wane in that continent. To oppose the American pan-hemispherical plan of unity and a common front against the danger of communism, the Soviets are working out a pattern of action designed to weaken the American nations internally and to break up their united front against communism.

Naturally the United States of America are in the vanguard of this fight. The Soviets regard it as their potential enemy and are directing most of their attention to it, for they hope that at the outbreak of the war a paralysis of transportation and other key industries in America, will assure a speedy victory for themselves.

The American people measure the power of communism in this country by the number of votes that communist candidates receive in elections. In reality however this is entirely wrong. The Communists are too clever to reveal their true strength at the polls. On the whole they prefer to ignore the usual democratic processes used in electing men to governmental offices. That is why the number of enrolled members of the Communist Party is not fifty thousand, as the Communists are wont to claim, but about ten times of that number.

The infiltration of Communists into the ranks of organized labor is somewhat more dangerous. To be sure, the last CIO congress condemned this infiltration by a resolution but the delegates regarded by their fellow-members as Communists voted for the resolution. This is a good proof that the Communists are well aware of the danger of public opinion and that the people of the United States know what is going on in certain fields, as the Communist control of the maritime unions.

In those European countries where the Communists have gained power by assuming governmental posts, they usually reserve for themselves two ministries, those of education and internal affairs. The first gives them the control of the training of the youth. The second, under

the average continental system, puts them in charge of the preservation of public order and thus gives them some measure of protection in their communist activities. Here in the United States the Communists are devoting a large part of their attention to education and to transportation. The latter is one of the most highly developed fields in America and played a tremendous role in World War II. The former is an indication of what is happening in Europe.

Although the membership of the Communist Party is not large, it has at its disposal hundreds of thousands of "fellow travelers," well-intentioned but naive people who labor under the delusion that their activities are helping to serve the common man. Yet all they do is only to spread Communist influence.

The Soviets need time to rebuild their war-shattered industries, to forge new chains of slavery for the hapless people under their misrule and pacify the unruly elements. They need time to and more time to develop their propaganda activities in the Americas.

Time is what they need and that is why they drag on all conferences and negotiations in which they take part. That is why they talk about disarmament in the abstract and haggle over all details. They know that they need years or some years before they can by land and air face the democracies and before their propaganda and fifth column ideas can weaken the democracies internally to the point where no action against the Soviets is possible.

The Soviets will not start an immediate war. They want it in a few years and they are preparing it to-day by arming, by propaganda, by organizing and preparing millions of quislings throughout the world to be traitors to their respective countries. The Russians have always been convinced that they have a mission to "save" humanity. The Bolsheviks hope that they, after the defeat of the Nazis, can trade blows with the capitalist world and are preparing intensively for it.

They forget only that God, truth and human rights work slowly but unfailingly. Time is also on the side of human decency and civilization.



THE SOVIETS AND KHMELNITSKY

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

FRRIENDS and foes of Ukraine all bear witness to the ability of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the great hetman of the Zaporozhian Host during the middle of the seventeenth century. From that moment in December, 1647, when he appeared with a few trusted friends in the Zaporozhian Sich almost as a fugitive from the vengeance of the Poles until his death on August 6, 1657, he held the centre of the stage in Ukraine, Poland, and Moscow. Opinions may differ as to the wisdom of many of his acts, as to the necessity and purpose of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, when he signed a document committing the Kozak Host to co-operation with Moscow and as to the course of action which he would have taken, had he lived longer. Yet no one disputes the fact that it was he who reorganized the entire Ukraine, who first attempted on a grand scale to bring Ukraine into the great political arena of Europe, and who succeeded in making the Ukrainian problem a subject of diplomatic and military consideration in all the surrounding states.

There is no need here to review all the facts of those eventful ten years, as he won victory after victory, recovered from defeats caused by the treachery and indecision of his allies, and formulated his plans for still wider and wider foreign connections for Ukraine. His people remember him for his accomplishments and even the cruelly bitter comments of the Polish author Henryk Sienkiewicz in his novel *With Fire and Sword* cannot conceal the importance which he had in the events of the day.

Imperial Russia welcomed the Treaty of Pereyaslav as the means whereby she won preeminence over Poland in the long struggle between Warsaw and Moscow. Russian historians noted the opposition to the Treaty among the Orthodox clergy and the higher ranks of the officers of the Kozak Host, among the citizens of the towns, and in fact among all of those people who represented the thought and the intelligence of Ukraine. They were ready to accept all this and to credit Khmelnytsky with the dream of bringing the Kozaks under the control of Moscow with the deliberate purpose of increasing the glory and the power of the Russian Tsar. It made little difference whether the docu-

ments vindicated their case or not. The power of the Muscovite steam-roller had brought Little Russia under their control and they were willing to forget everything about Ukraine.

The case was different after the Russian Revolution. During the first twenty years, when the Kremlin was flirting with the idea of Ukrainization and was encouraging such scholars as Professor Hrushevsky to return to Kiev and resume his historical studies, there was abundant opportunity even in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for the truth to appear. It was possible then for the Ukrainians at home and abroad to learn something of the deeds and plans of their great hero. Then came the attacks on Professor Hrushevsky, his removal from the University and his tragic fate, which was shared by all the leading Ukrainian thinkers and writers, who had trusted in the promises of the Soviet Union.

There resulted a new evaluation of the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky which is an amazing revelation of the masterly and all-embracing historical knowledge of Comrade Stalin and the Communist Party. In the Large Soviet Encyclopedia which appeared in 1935, (Vol. 59, p. 816), there is a detailed study of the life of the great "traitor." "He was the vehement foe of the revolting Ukrainian peasantry." Every act of his career is interpreted from the Communist standpoint of the day.

We get a clear picture of the revolting acts of this representative of the higher Kozak officer class who had no interest in life except to secure from the Polish nobility a recognition of equality. Bourgeois-nationalist historians may argue that Khmelnytsky acted from a feeling of personal insult. Communist scholars know better. The interests of the Ukrainian peasantry were as opposed to the actions of the Kozak officers as they were to those of the Polish nobles. Conditions were so unendurable that a revolt of the oppressed people was beginning and Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his friends saw the opportunity and against the wishes of the people put themselves at the head of the movement with the avowed purpose of crushing it and securing money and power for themselves.

The article proceeds from this point of view, and condemns every act of Khmelnytsky. It accuses him of such dilatory actions that he forced the Tatars to the side of Poland. It is eloquent on the shameful Treaty of Zboriv and the still worse betrayal of the Ukrainian peasantry at the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. It declares that he deliberately remained in the Tatar camp at the time of Berestechko with the purpose of causing the death of Nechay and Bohun, the real leaders of the Ukrainian

people. It emphasizes the fact that Khmel'nitsky was deliberately helping the Polish nobles during the entire time.

Finally it comes to the Treaty of Pereyaslav. It is easy to explain this. Khmel'nitsky and his group realized that the weakened Poland was no longer able to support their power and so the Ukrainian feudal lords made peace with the Russians of the same class and so created over Ukraine the beginning of the colonial rule of the Russians. It is all very simple for Bohdan Khmel'nitsky "was not and could not be the leader of a revolution and he played in it the role of a betrayer of the revolting Kozak village masses, thus adding in the strengthening of the colonial rule of Russia over Ukraine and the yoke of serfdom."

So much for the Soviet scholarship of 1935, just one year after Professor Hrushevsky had finished his career as a victim of Soviet policy.

The scene now changes to 1944. In October, 1943, the Soviet government established the military order of Bohdan Khmel'nitsky to speak "of the immortality of the glorious military traditions of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people, who won for themselves freedom and national independence in union with the great Russian people." To support this thesis which was so useful during World War II and to aid in the task of bringing the Russian communist-dominated Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic into the United Nations, the Military Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Defence in Moscow brought out a pamphlet on the career of Bohdan Khmel'nitsky by Professor N. N. Petrovsky.

In this revised version of Khmel'nitsky's career, there is not a single one of the accusations that were made against him in the Large Soviet Encyclopedia of nine years before. He now appears as a true representative of the Ukrainian people, actuated only by the highest motives, devoted to their welfare and thinking only how he can join their fate to that of their Russian brothers. It is laudatory in the highest degree and pitched on the exigencies of the moment.

The background is now the tyranny of the Polish lords and the unanimity of the Kozaks, registered and unregistered alike, and the splendid manner in which the officers acted for the best interests of the men and families under their command. Every mission and letter between Khmel'nitsky and the Russians is recounted and every event in his life is interpreted in the same way. There is no longer any question of disloyalty or of treason to his people.

We can only cite a few instances. When he approached Lviv and besieged it in 1648, his motives were clear. "The siege of Lviv lasted

about two weeks, during which time the Ukrainian population of the city helped the besiegers in every way. Not wishing to storm the old Ukrainian city, so as not to cause its destruction, Khmelnytsky, taking a ransom from the Polish lords, returned to Zamist." In his return to Kiev, he was welcomed by the students and all classes of the population as "the leader and conqueror in the national war of liberation against the Polish nobility." The Treaty of Zboriv is no longer a shameful peace but it does "give improved conditions to the Ukrainian nobility, the Kozak officers, the higher Orthodox clergy, the registered Kozaks, and that part of the peasantry which entered into the increased register." It was clearly recognized by Khmelnytsky that this treaty was but one step in the great task of securing the independence of the entire people.

Nine years before Soviet scholars in speaking of the detention of Khmelnytsky in the Tatar camp at the time of the unfortunate battle of Berestechko declared that he had remained there voluntarily to injure his subordinates, the leaders of the uprising of the peasant masses. Now "the Tatars carried beside the Khan Khmelnytsky bound hand and foot. Only after several days could Khmelnytsky be freed from prison by paying a large sum of money which he secured from Chihirin."

So runs the new version of the tale, even to the end. Khmelnytsky showed his practical common sense even in the appointment of his weak son Yury to take his place as hetman. He understood "that if any one of the officers became hetman, there would inevitably arise a struggle for power between him and the other officers, and that this struggle undoubtedly would be used by the enemy to injure the Ukrainian people. At the same time Bohdan knew well, that his name, the name of Khmelnytsky, covered with the glory of the national war of liberation, would appear to the Ukrainian people as a symbol of the decisive struggle against the Polish-noble aggressors, a struggle for the union of the Ukrainian people with the Russian people."

Professor Petrovsky emphasizes most positively that Khmelnytsky was a friend of the Polish people. He was an irreconcilable enemy of the Polish magnates and feudal lords and was only too ready, if he could, to bring liberty to the common people of Poland who were likewise oppressed by their masters. He aided them at every turn and it was a tragedy that he could not achieve this goal also.

That is the official story of 1944, when the Soviet Union was making every effort to stir up popular feeling for the purpose of the World

War. It was the period when the attempt was being made to focus attention on the independence of the Ukrainian people as a prelude to their inclusion in the United Nations, where their so-called representatives would speak with the words of Moscow and do the bidding of their masters. It was the period when all the resources of Moscow were being directed to force the recognition by the democratic powers of a Polish government that would be formed on the same pattern and do the will of the same masters.

Since then, the war is ended and the iron curtain has been lowered over more and more of Europe. It may not be without significance that the first mention of the award of the Military Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky as given in the American press was to a Czech detachment fighting in the Red Army. History means nothing but the thread of Communist policy runs on a tortuous course.

The traitor of 1935 becomes the hero of 1944, when it suits the interests of the Kremlin. What assurance can there be, that there may not be another shift in policy which will restore the older point of view?

The war is over. The tragedy of Ukraine is still with us. There are still the displaced persons in the camps of Europe. There are still the millions who on one excuse or another have been deported to Siberia and the far north, where they are welcoming death as a release. There is still hunger and misery and fear in all Ukraine, whether it belonged to the old Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic or to the new lands that have voted themselves by Communist "persuasion" into the ranks of their oppressors.

Even so once more, we hear of the rise of Ukrainian nationalism. The Soviet press announces the liquidation of more of its trusted officials in Ukraine for falling under the spell of Professor Hrushevsky and his works. Once more we are told that those ideas which were welcomed in 1925 and condemned in 1935 and twisted in 1944 are coming back to disturb the peace, security and well-being of the masters of the Kremlin.

No one can be surprised. A nation which produced a Bohdan Khmelnytsky is not going to submit to absorption and annihilation without a struggle. The world is becoming aware that the Ukrainian people are still carrying on that same struggle for liberty and democracy that commenced with the spontaneous rise of the Kozaks and that seemed for a brief moment to be meeting with success under Khmelnytsky, and again in 1919 under the Ukrainian Republic. Despite all

the persecutions of the last years, the old spirit is not dead. The traditions of the people are still strong. Sooner or later the world will be forced to pay attention to the injustice that is being wrought today behind the iron curtain of the Soviet Union and when that day comes, the true spirit of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his people will shine forth.

There will then be no profit in the propaganda and the stories that are being spread by the masters of Communist totalitarianism. They will find it useless to rewrite history to please every whim of a dictator and they will learn by sad experience that it is impossible to alter facts with every decade.

In the meanwhile the Soviet handling and mishandling of the career of the great Ukrainian hetman throws into vivid relief their attempts to rewrite and reinterpret all the other figures of Ukrainian history and tradition. Khmelnytsky, Mazepa, Shevchenko and Franko and many others still remain in the memory of the people as they were in real life, despite the hectic work of pseudo-scholars and politicians. All these men and their forgotten colleagues, all breathe that spirit of liberty that stirs free men everywhere, and the more we recognize this, the sooner will the world come to see that Ukraine must be free to develop itself and to take its part in building up the better world of the future, and to express the true feelings of the great hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky.



A UKRAINIAN IDEOLOGY

By ISYDORE HLYNKA, PH.D.

*In the field they speak of freedom
Softly to the breezes.*

TARAS SHEVCHENKO.

THE world today is a bewildering maze of ideologies, and, as is natural, in this maze relatively few paths lead straight to the desired goal; more lead to the objective sought for only by a lengthy and circuitous route; many paths, alas, lead but to the blind alleys of disappointment and disillusionment.

Honest John Q. Citizen stands perplexed. In this age of democracy when the responsibility falls more and more upon the individual, he feels that he should and indeed must play his full part in the building of a better world. Yet he has neither the confidence in his modest background nor the audacity to decide to his own satisfaction on problems of his society on personal, community, national and international levels. As a result he tends to become cautious at first, then suspicious and finally aloof — a democratic casualty.

The average man definitely feels the need of some simple formula to guide him in making straight-forward decisions on the complex issues of the day. One person may seek direction from his church organization, another from some exclusive service club and still another from a social welfare agency or perhaps from a local brand of politics. Each of these institutions is based upon an ideology and each ideology, at its own level, can give to its adherents, in a greater or a lesser measure, a sense of fulfilment of their democratic responsibilities.

Nevertheless, many people do not find a suitable ideology, or having found one they discover that it does not give them that practicality which they desire toward the solution of their problems. On the other hand, most useful ideologies have been obtained by people from rather interesting and perhaps least expected sources. One such concept is the topic of this dissertation. It is, of course, the Ukrainian ideology.

Ukrainian ideology as used in this article may be defined as *the desire and willingness on our part to concede to some forty-five million*

Ukrainian people the elementary right to an independent existence on their ethnographic territory. It is as simple as that — nothing more! It includes, of course, an interest in such phases of Ukrainian national life and culture as history, literature, language, music, art, manners and customs. On the North American continent this viewpoint is represented in general by the member organizations of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

On first thought one might wonder why this simple concept should be regarded as an ideology. However, it is precisely because the Ukrainian people hold liberty as an ultimate objective and place it on a pedestal as an ideal that a nobler meaning is conferred on our everyday concept of freedom. This, then, is the first attribute of a Ukrainian ideology. It seems that we in the democratic countries who enjoy liberty as a heritage tend to take it for granted. We can, therefore, do no better than to have a constant reminder of the ideological nature of this democratic heritage. And it is not strange that this reminder should come from a people whose age-long struggle for liberty has not yet been consummated. After all, it is the same liberty whether it illumines our own horizons or rises as a distant star in the Ukrainian skies.

Let us then, tentatively accept this ideology and follow step by step its application through its various phases.

* * *

In recent years the teaching of the Russian language has become widespread in American and Canadian universities. It has come about primarily because of the success of eighty million Russians in subjecting nearly one hundred and fifty million neighboring peoples to Russian rule and language. Some pundits argue that the teaching of Russian has, therefore, become a cultural necessity, while others contend that it is necessary for our advancement in the sciences. Be that as it may, it is suggested that as an alternate the Ukrainian language be given consideration by the discriminating student.

The Ukrainian language is spoken by the second largest Slavic racial group. Furthermore, philologists agree that Ukrainian is the key to the study of Slavic languages. The reason for its unique position lies in the dominant role played by the early Ukrainians in culture and learning. For those, therefore, who would like to study a representative Slavic language, Ukrainian is the language of choice. It has the further important advantage that it does not carry an undesirable connotation

and no one can impugn the motives of those who may for academic reasons desire to study Ukrainian.

* * *

Let us for a brief moment pause next to take a hurried glance at Ukrainian literature. The literature of a people is much more than a collection of their best books of prose and verse. It is a faithful record of their individual, family and social life; it is a chronicle of the experiences of men and women, their motives, their hopes and aspirations, and their disappointments; it is that interesting part of history which lies outside the scope of the historians. Literature, too, comprises especially in its poetry the subjective and objective philosophy of a people at its best.

Ukrainian literature is all these. Of all the literatures it carries perhaps the least ballast. It had to be thus. Ukrainians during a good portion of their history have been a subjugated people. As a result the growth of their literature was anything but encouraged. In fact, the Russians as a historic fact issued an edict declaring that the Ukrainian language did not exist and at the same time forbade, under threat of heavy penalty, writing in that language. The most famous victim who was deprived of the opportunity of exercising his genius by a ten-year sentence in a Russian forced labor camp of another era was Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's greatest name. Under conditions such as these every poem and every novel had to carry a deeper meaning and a more urgent message than would have been the case under happier circumstances.

Unfortunately, most of the Ukrainian classics are unknown in English translation. Surely here is a challenge to the dilettante, the writer and the publisher, the scholar and the student. What literature other than Ukrainian can offer such a story-book character as Shevchenko? Born a serf, he had a step-mother at the age of nine and was an orphan at twelve. He became a page to a nobleman and later, as he showed talent in painting, he was apprenticed to study. His friends raffled off a painting by a contemporary master, raised enough money and bought freedom for young Taras. His talent in writing then came to the fore, he championed the cause of his race, served ten years in Russian penal servitude and died prematurely to take his place among the immortals of this world. Or again, what literature has had such a strong influence on the history of a people? Just when the Russians had

almost succeeded in wiping out the last vestiges of Ukrainian national life, the Ukrainian resurgence and survival was brought about by the writers. And so we might go on but let adventure wait for those who seek it.

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In the field of Ukrainian history several good books are now available in the English language. Ukrainian history is, in the best Wellsian tradition, a story not of the rulers and conquerors nor yet so much of the Ukrainian state, but of the people and their common struggle for survival with the odds heavily against them. It represents, therefore, a distinct point of view rather than a mere chronicle of events. It is in this light that the mundane subject of history reaches its ideological level.

We learn from Ukrainian history that the western world will forever be beholden to the early Ukrainian Kiev state for having warded off the incessant Mongol-Tartar invasions which threatened to engulf Europe. While European civilization was thus given a chance to take root, flourish and blossom, the Kiev state fell — never fully to recover. Later the Ukrainian Kozaks continued to give the same unquestioning defence to Christian Europe on its most vulnerable frontier. In the second World War it was again the Ukraine which suffered the greatest loss in life and property.

We learn, too, that the Ukrainians have the oldest democratic tradition in modern history. Long before the absolute rule of monarchs was successfully challenged anywhere, the Ukrainian Kozaks had already developed a democratic state with elective offices, a system of administration and a judiciary. This political philosophy pervaded every aspect of Ukrainian cultural life. In history the democratic tradition is mirrored in the ethnic basis of Ukrainian historiography in contrast to the more common but less scientific approach based upon a political conglomerate called the state. For this reason those who study Ukrainian history for the first time find a point of view unfamiliar to them. Nevertheless, any student of history who is to evaluate the complex forces which have motivated organized society through the ages must include in his repertory a history with an ethnic basis.

* * *

Contemporary Ukraine, too, deserves the attention of thinking men and women. It is the ideological crossroads of the world and a

proving ground of Russian grand strategy. Here, for example, is a gigantic development of the concept of colonialism which has scarcely been noticed by the rest of the world.

We are, of course, all familiar with the colonial possessions of the European countries in Africa, Asia, Oceania and elsewhere. We know also of the development of the British Commonwealth of Nations, that unique association of free nations ideologically united through a crown. All these colonial ramifications, however, are characterized by a geographical remoteness from the parent country and hence by a separate identity. It is, therefore, possible for the rest of the world to see the relation of one to the other.

There is yet another type of colonial possession of which the historians and the politicians appear to have been almost completely unaware. It is the case of geographically contiguous colonies where a country overpowers and devours its neighbor. The boundary between the two is then obliterated and the rest of the world soon forgets. In fact colonial conquests of this type are often glorified by such euphemisms as "federation" and "union." Indeed the naive point out and unwittingly recommend the contiguous colonial system as a solution to the problems resulting from the crazy-quilt map of Europe. Let it, however, never be forgotten that successful unions can only be achieved on the basis of equality of the united parties.

The largest colonial empire of the latter type is, of course, the USSR. Until recently Russia held fifteen nominally recognized colonies within her borders. The largest of these colonies is the Ukraine with a population of the same approximate size as that of France or of the British Isles and an area second largest in Europe. The fate of this and other colonies of the same kind should be of vital interest to all in this rapidly contracting world.

Recently extremely interesting information has filtered through from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to the outside world. It reveals not only the admirable daring to challenge the Red Inquisition but also the extent of the movement for Ukrainian liberation. But more significant is the enthusiastic and general support given by the peoples of the other "republics." In fact, Ukraine represents the promise of realization of the democratic hopes and dreams of the colonial peoples of the USSR.

Finally, the strategic position of the Ukraine with respect to Russia, the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, Asia Minor and the Suez Canal make the Ukraine loom large in geopolitical considerations. A study of

the past and present of these people is, therefore, indispensable to an intelligent solution of some of the world's most difficult problems.

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The foregoing are but a few examples which could be multiplied and extended to other interests. They suffice, however, to illustrate that in each instance the Ukrainian ideology does give a preferred orientation. At this stage it is more important perhaps to note the basis of this ideology. It is not some foreign doctrine to be regarded with disdain or suspicion but on the contrary it is a universal principle exemplified in the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people. It is this principle which gives us faith and confidence that right will always triumph in the end.

This writer knows of many people, Anglo-Saxon, French, Ukrainian and others in all walks of life whose works testify to the fruits of the Ukrainian ideology. Workers and teachers, politicians and lecturers, writers and artists, ministers of the gospels and ministers of health have all found a fuller and a more purposeful life. May the Ukrainian ideology for us too, whatever our provenance, add a new gleam to the truth.

Ottawa, Canada.



UKRAINIAN SCHOLARLY RESEARCH AND THE WAR

By NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ

FREEDOM of scholarly research and study has been one of the freedoms for which man has fought for through the ages until the middle of the 19th century, when victory was finally achieved. Well nigh all civilized nations in their respective bills of rights specifically guarantee this particular freedom. This hard won victory, however, was lost by scholars in countries under totalitarian rule. In Nazi Germany every scholarly study had to be in keeping with the racial doctrines of Nazism and the extreme German nationalism. In the Soviet Union there is similarly no academic freedom, for the scholar must also hew to the line of historical-materialistic Marxism and to the aims of the Russian imperialism.

A Soviet scholar who does not follow the party line cannot have his works published. Or if the censor overlooks the deviation, he may have to subject himself to a public recantation of his ideas and even to a purge of himself and his family. Recently the Soviet press reported a purge of Ukrainian scholars for having introduced into their works published by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences "bourgeois views praising Ukraine's past and not emphasizing the common spirit of Ukrainian and Russian culture." Some of these scholars were further condemned for emphasizing the relationship between Ukrainian and Western European cultures, the existence of which has long been proved by Ukrainian academicians, free of either Soviet or Nazi repression.

It is only natural that the occupation by the Soviets and for a time by the Nazis had and will have a ruinous effect upon the development of Ukrainian scholarly research.

With the close of the recent war practically all the Ukrainian ethnographic territories found themselves under Kremlin rule. One consequence of this was that an unprecedented number of Ukrainian scholars found themselves outside the borders of their native land as refugees. These two facts today have a vital bearing on the development and fate of Ukrainian studies, on Ukrainian culture in general.

Today in Ukraine scholastic studies are being controlled by the Politburo, and only such works are being published which are in harmony with Marxism and Russian imperialism, even though they be based on completely false premises.

The Period Between the Two Wars

The prewar policies of the Politburo in regard to Ukrainian scholarship may be divided into: (1) a period of official tolerance ending about 1930; (2) a period of extreme repression of it. In the first period there existed in Soviet Ukraine a balance between humanistic studies and the sciences. While it continued gigantic progress was made in Ukrainian historical, literary, linguistic, art and law studies. Concurrently, scientific studies in Ukraine made similar progress. Of course, the humanistic scholars tried to avoid any extreme transgressions of the rules set forth by their masters. They passed over in silence the independent nature of the development of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. They avoided any mention of such things as the policies of the hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ivan Vyhovsky, and especially of Ivan Mazepa directed against Muscovy. They also omitted any references to the history of the Ukrainian church. Nonetheless, having paid lip service to the party line, they managed to publish their true scholarly viewpoints and conclusions. The great scholastic gains during 1923-29 of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, as well as of other academic institutions and universities in Ukraine, demonstrated the eager desire of its scholars to make up the retarded character of Ukrainian culture during the two hundred years of existence under Tsarism when the free development of the Ukrainian language and literature was banned.

These gains alarmed the Politburo. So a veritable St. Bartholemew's Eve for Ukrainian scholars took place in 1930. Most of its humanists, headed by Hrushevsky, were jailed or exiled. The institute for humanistic studies was shut down. The Kiev Academy was placed under Communist control. The rigorous precept now became: "Ukrainian culture must be Ukrainian only in form and language, but socialistic in essence." And since the sole exponent of socialism was Moscow, socialism in Ukraine became that which was dictated by the Politburo.

As a result research in Ukrainian history, language and literature well nigh disappeared during that period within the Kievan Academy of Sciences, and that which did appear was in a Russified form. Science,

necessary to the economic development of the USSR, became the main subject of the academic studies and they were published more and more in the Russian language. When the last world war broke out, the Kiev Academy had practically lost its Ukrainian character.

Ukrainian Scholarship Outside Ukraine Before the War

Soviet repression of Ukrainian studies after 1930 fortunately did not extend to Western Ukraine which was then under Poland, or to Ukrainian scholarship further west. The rise of an independent Ukrainian nation (1918-1920) awakened the ambition of the Ukrainian scholars, while the downfall of Tsarism restored to the Ukrainians many scholars who had hitherto been working for the Russians. The Treaty of Riga between the Soviets and the Poles (1921), left large sections of Ukraine together with the cultural center of Lviv, outside Soviet domination. The occupation by the Bolsheviks of Eastern Ukraine forced hundreds of valuable scholars beyond Ukraine's borders, and thereby enabled Ukrainian scholarly studies to make considerable progress between the two wars in such countries as Czechoslovakia, France and Germany.

Prior to the First World War most of the Ukrainian scientific and cultural studies were concentrated in the Shevchenko Scientific Society of Lviv. When this section of Ukraine fell under Polish rule, the institution suffered a decline on account of Polish oppression, as well as because of the flight of its academicians to other parts of Europe.

Those who remained behind devoted all their energies to the administration of an unusual institution—the Secret Ukrainian University in Lviv. Despite the constant ban upon it by the Polish authorities and the persecution by the Polish police, this university managed with the help of about 50 professors to graduate 1,500 students.

The persecution of Ukrainian studies by the Soviets following 1930 increased the role of Western Ukraine in this field. The Shevchenko Society now became the chief Ukrainian academic center throughout the world. At about the same time there was founded in Lviv another educational institute, sponsored by the Greek Catholic Church, namely the Greek Catholic Theological Academy, which began to develop into a true Ukrainian Catholic University. Thanks to the organizing ability of its rector, Rev. Dr. Joseph Slipiy, it managed to gather around itself almost all the best scholars of Western Ukraine.

After the first World War Prague became the most active center

of Ukrainian scholarly research outside of Ukraine. Thanks to President Masaryk there soon arose in Czechoslovakia a number of Ukrainian institutions of learning and sciences, such as the Ukrainian Free University, the Institute of Education, and the Agricultural Academy, while the Historical-Philological Society served as a center for the Ukrainian scholars in that country. After the death of Masaryk, academic studies in Prague greatly declined.

In the meanwhile the Ukrainian Educational Institute in Warsaw was founded by Ukrainian emigres from Eastern Ukraine with the help of the Polish government. Although the research and publishing activities of the institute profited the Polish government, still it issued a number of valuable works, among them a scholarly publication of the works of Shevchenko.

Founded by a group of scholars, who were followers of Hetman Paul Skoropadsky, the Ukrainian Institute in Berlin made no strides in the field of publications, but through its library and sponsored lectures it created a good picture in Germany of Ukrainian scholastic achievements.

Other Western European capitals did not have any Ukrainian scientific institutes but in their places individual Ukrainian scholars made notable progress, such as Eugene Onatsky in Rome and Elias Borschak in Paris. Their works, based on the archives of their particular countries, constitute a valuable contribution to Ukrainian scholarship up to the Second World War.

Many Ukrainian scholars were scattered throughout the other countries of the world, but none of them managed to make any particular impression as representatives of organized Ukrainian studies. This is particularly true of America and Canada, where despite the large number of Ukrainian immigrants no Ukrainian scientific center has been established.

Just before the war Ukrainian studies underwent a revival in Galicia. Educational publishing houses appeared and produced the *Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia* in three volumes, an *Atlas of Ukraine*, a *Geography of Ukraine*, *Statistical Yearbooks* and others. Materially aided by Metropolitan Andrew Sheptitsky excavations were conducted on the site of Halych, the ancient capital of Western Ukraine. The Shevchenko Scientific Society established a special group for research in modern Ukrainian history. Various provincial museums with their own publications were developed.

During the Second World War

In the autumn of 1939 Western Ukraine also found itself under Soviet rule. In a striking manner Ukrainian studies revived, as the Soviets refrained for the moment from combatting Ukrainian culture. On the contrary they transformed the Polish state university in Lviv into a Ukrainian one, and gave it the name of Ivan Franko. The Shevchenko Scientific Society they changed into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Kiev. Ukrainian scholars received posts in the higher institutions of learning, with the means of their livelihood safeguarded. Budding scholars found horizons of opportunity spread before them. But all this was just an illusion created for the Western Ukrainians during the first year, on the eve of the referendum which was to decide whether Western Ukraine was to belong to the Soviets. Subsequently matters took sharp turn for the worse, and became more in accord with the sort of life which the earlier Soviet-occupied Ukrainian lands had suffered for the past ten years. Within a year after the Bolshevik occupation a change for the worse had already taken place. Scholars were deported to distant parts. The publishing movement well nigh expired. The outbreak of the Soviet-German hostilities found Ukrainian studies in a precarious position.

The war caused terrible ruin not only to the resources of Ukraine but also to its scientific and educational institutions. The German invasion brought in its wake the complete destruction of Ukrainian cultural possessions in Soviet Ukraine. Some of them were transported by the Reds to the east. A section of the Academy of Sciences found itself in Ufa; other sections were removed further east, to Turkestan. The remnants were destroyed by the war. Leading scholars were harnessed by the Soviets to defense activity against the Nazi invaders.

Operating on the theory that the Slavs, as potential laborers in the envisioned great Reich, should have no higher education, the Germans put a stop to all their educational and scientific action. Educational institutions were either transferred to Germany or destroyed outright. Those which proved to be too difficult to transfer were put in under control of third rate scholars.

The Ukrainian scholars who remained found themselves in a very difficult position. They suffered from hunger. During the terrible winter of 1941-42 many of them perished from lack of food. Not only did the German occupation halt the progress of Ukrainian scholarship, but it wrecked a good deal of what had been previously accomplished.

Having endured such terrible times under the Nazis, practically all of the Ukrainian scholars had to leave Eastern Ukraine in order to avoid persecution by the Soviets, which had branded everyone who had stayed behind as a quisling, even those who had starved under the Nazi regime and who were guilty of no collaboration with the Germans.

In Western Ukraine Under German Occupation

The situation was somewhat different in the Western Ukrainian territories, particularly in the Polish Government General to which the Germans had attached Galicia. Here some possibilities of Ukrainian scholarly research remained, although at times in a half-conspiratorial state. Here the German authorities followed the same tactics they pursued in Poland. Their aim was to create a class of expert technicians for the German *Lebensraum*, and not to allow the creation of individual national cultures or of trained intellectual leaders.

In line with this policy the Germans shut down the higher institutions of learning in Galicia, beginning with the Ivan Franko University. They refused to allow the revival of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv. They put a stop to the publishing of any works. All former Soviet endowed museums, libraries and the like were shut down also. With some exceptions, however, there was no particular persecution of scholars or the plundering of cultural riches.

In line with their political aims the Germans established schools and courses to produce technically skilled workers. Some scientists obtained posts in them. In reality these technical schools became secret Ukrainian higher schools. The closed sections and commissions of the Shevchenko Scientific Society continued their activities nonetheless. The members met, ostensibly to attend lectures on scientific subjects, but actually to hear and discuss talks of a Ukrainian national character.

There was again a revival of Ukrainian studies when in the course of the slow German retreat from Ukraine in the summer of 1943 the majority of the Ukrainian scholars, who had not allowed themselves to be evacuated by the Bolsheviks into Russia, now quit Eastern Ukraine for Western Ukraine. Practically all of them found some sort of a position in Galicia. For one whole year Lviv was the capital of Ukrainian culture and science. During the winter of 1943-44 there was as a result the first genuine reunion between the scholars of Western and Soviet Ukraine, which had been separated for a score of years by the

iron curtain of the Soviet empire. At long last the scientific and cultural cordon, thrown up by the Bolsheviks at the Zbruch, had been broken.

Under Nazi Occupation Outside of Ukraine

The fate of Ukrainian scientific institutes established between the two world wars outside of Ukraine was however sorrowful. The Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw was liquidated by the Germans soon after their occupation of that capital and its contents removed to places unknown to this day.

The Ukrainian institute in Berlin remained active throughout the war, although it did not publish anything of any consequence. Its principal achievement was the publication in Leipzig of an excellent Ukrainian-German dictionary, compiled much earlier. Only a few score copies of it exist, for the bulk of them were destroyed during the Allied bombardment of that city.

Only the Ukrainian Free University in Prague managed to maintain a semblance of real life, despite the poor enrollment of students and difficulties created by the German forces of occupation. Its faculty was considerably strengthened by an influx of scholars from Western and Eastern Ukraine. Similar progress was made by the Agricultural Academy of Podebrady and the Historical Philological Institute of Prague. Some publications appeared during this period, including, for example, the wonderful *Monumenta Architectura Ucrainae* by Prof. W. Sichinsky.

Post-War Balance

In assessing the post-war balance of Ukrainian studies and research we find them in catastrophic condition. During the war the Soviets in order to win the favor of Ukrainians made certain concessions in this field. During its exile the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences prepared a series of works on Ukrainian history and literature. Although not satisfactory from viewpoint of an objective Ukrainian research-humanist, the textbooks published by the Academy on Ukrainian history and literature, did not at least collide too heavily with scholarly objectiveness. Ukrainian poets were allowed to play on the chords of Ukrainian national patriotism, although they had to stress Soviet patriotism also.

During the war, Ukrainian scientists Bohomolets and Palladin during their stay in Ufa made valuable discoveries in their respective

fields, particularly the former with his discovery of serum to lengthen human life to 150 years.

All these concessions to Ukrainian culture were a temporary measure adopted by the Politburo to win Ukrainian support during the war, and were speedily abandoned when Nazi Germany was defeated. In accordance with the usual practice of the Politburo, a purge was then immediately set into action against those scholars who had ventured to express their "nationalistic and bourgeois views" in the works published for them by Academy of Sciences. This was accompanied by the usual "recantations" and breast-beating.

The position of Ukrainian culture after the war became worse because it now encompassed Western and Carpatho-Ukraine as well.

Even the Ukrainian institutes of research and studies beyond Soviet rule found themselves under Soviet influence. Some of the Ukrainian institutes in Czechoslovakia transferred their activities westward, while some remained where they were. Among the latter was the Museum of the Ukrainian Struggle for Freedom, while among the former were the Ukrainian Free University and the Agricultural Academy in Podebrady. The library of the Scientific Institute in Berlin is today in the zone of Soviet military occupation.

Much harm has also been done to Ukrainian studies by the fact that such intellectual centers as Prague, Konenigsberg, and Vienna together with their libraries are also within the sphere of the Soviet zone of influence.

Ukrainian scholars have fled in great numbers to the west, for they feared the fate of their colleagues after 1930. Among these are not only those from Eastern Ukraine who had not accompanied the Bolsheviks in their eastward retreat, but also those of Western Ukraine and the lands beyond it who found themselves threatened with Soviet domination. Most of them finally landed in the American zone of occupation, the rest in the British and French zones.

Today this vast accumulation of scholars in Ukrainian humanistic and scientific fields of study is being dissipated through disuse in the various DP camps. Their return to Ukraine is blocked by the certainty of their liquidation in forced labor camps and the likes, and they are veritably lost souls, without the slightest chance to exercise their respective talents.

Nevertheless they have not given up hope. Rather than to sit back and languish they have established a series of scholarly institutions, particularly in the American zone in Germany.

The cultural center of the Ukrainian emigration today is Munich in Bavaria. It is the site of the revived Ukrainian Free University, which now has about 100 professors, teaching almost 1,500 students. Its rector is the well known archeologist, Prof. Vadim Scherbakivsky. Divided into two schools, one of Education and the other of Law, the university has been certified by the Bavarian authorities, although it receives no help from UNRRA.

In Munich there is also an international UNRRA-university, which has on its faculty ten Ukrainian professors and a student body of 600.

The Agricultural Academy formerly of Podebrady has renewed its existence in Regensburg. It is now called the Ukrainian Technico-Agricultural Institute, headed by Prof. Diminsky as its rector, with a faculty drawn from various parts of Ukraine.

The third Ukrainian emigré institute of learning is the Greek Catholic Seminary situated in Hirschberg in southern Bavaria. In effect it is an offshoot of the former Greek Catholic Academy of Lviv. Its rector is Prof. Dr. W. Laba. It receives UNRRA aid, and has about 60 students.

All the higher schools are under the direction of the Central Representative Body of Ukrainian Immigration, which has a cultural section headed by Prof. Dmytro Doroshenko.

No representative organization of Ukrainian scholars has been established in Ukraine itself, because both the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv are completely under Soviet control and consequently are not free to serve Ukrainian studies and research, especially since the Soviets are out to destroy Ukrainian national individuality, and transform it into a mere southern province of Russia, represented in the Kremlin by such persons as Manuilsky.

All this emphasizes the necessity for Ukrainian scholars beyond the borders of Ukraine to create a scientific society which can pursue studies and research unhindered and unaffected by any political pressure, until such time as there appears in Ukraine an order and government truly representative of the people and their culture.



IVAN MAZEPA, HETMAN OF UKRAINE

By MYKOLA ANDRUSIAK

IN comparison with other Ukrainian historical figures, Ivan Mazepa (1632-1709) is quite well known in other countries. The British Byron, the Russian Pushkin and the Pole Slowacki are among those who wrote about him. The Russian composer Tschaikovsky based an opera on his life. Yet outside of this appearance in literature little is known about him by the general public, even though historical studies and research are far more advanced than they were during the first half of the 18th century, when he was better known. Writers and composers have made of him a romantic figure, with the consequence that it is not generally realized that he was the father of the modern Ukrainian independence movement, the leader of a revolt of Ukraine against Moscow, and the ally of the heroic Charles XII of Sweden.

Authoritative works on the Swedish monarch by such historians as Voltaire or Adlerfeld, have been translated into English, and these represent Mazepa in a true light, but for some reason these books are not widely read and Mazepa is generally remembered only as a hero of romantic episodes.

Mazepa was a typical statesman of the the Baroque Period. He was descended from an old noble Kozak family, Mazepa-Kolodynsky. The ancestral seat was Mazepintsi near Bila Tserkva in Ukraine. The Mazepa family had always been closely attached to the knightly Kozak Host, even during those times when the Ukrainian nobility was allowing itself to become Polonized and was accepting Roman Catholicism in great numbers.

Members of the family took part in many of the bold sea forays by the Kozaks on the Crimean Tartar or Turkish seaports. At various times they joined the revolts against Poland. The father of Ivan, Stephen Mazepa, participated in the great uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky against Poland. Yet this did not prevent his son from seeking a royal career at the court of the Polish king, and then, subsequently, entering the Kozak order and rising to the post of Adjutant to Hetman Ivan Samiylovich, whom he eventually succeeded.

The mother of Ivan Mazepa was descended from the Ukrainian

noble-Kozak family of Mokievsky. When she became a widow, she entered a monastery in Kiev. In time she became Mother Superior but that did not prevent her from taking an active interest in the political affairs of her native land or from counselling her son, who was an unusually skilled diplomat. When during the critical periods of his hetmanship, Mazepa needed any moral support and spiritual consolation, he never hesitated to hurry to his mother at the monastery.

Mazepa received his education at the Jesuit college, where he excelled in Latin and acquired the mannerisms of the Baroque style of Jesuit upbringing. This cleared for him the road to the king's court and aided him in his future life. After passing through the diplomatic routine of the Polish court, Mazepa joined the Kozaks and became a supporter of Hetman Peter Doroshenko, who was aspiring to rid Ukraine of both the Muscovian and Polish protectorate and to ally himself with Turkey as the ruler of an independent state.

Under Doroshenko's influence, Mazepa became fired with the same ideal and consequently he joined the opposition to Doroshenko's opponent, Hetman Ivan Samiylovich, who collaborated with Muscovy although he cultivated the interests of Ukraine.

While journeying in 1674 to the Crimea on a mission for Doroshenko, young Mazepa fell into the hands of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, who were then supporters of Samiylovich. The Zaporozhians thereupon sent Mazeppa under guard as a gift to Samiylovich, and in this manner the young diplomat found himself in the latter's circle.

Yet despite his general policy Samiylovich, like other patriotic Ukrainians, was finding the Muscovite protectorate over Ukraine intolerable. So it was not long before the former prisoner became a boon companion of Samiylovich, especially since his former protector, Doroshenko, had voluntarily recognized the authority of Samiylovich and together with his followers entered his service.

The peace treaty of 1686 between Poland and Muscovy was a blow to Ukrainian aspirations for independence, as it legalized the partition by these two powers of Ukraine, which had been freed for awhile during Hetman Khmelnitsky's war with both of them. The Kozaks deeply resented this Muscovite perfidy, which in violation of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 now gave to Poland half of Ukraine. Mazepa resented it also, and from this stemmed his eventual tragic end.

In the troubled waters in Ukraine at the time the Muscovite Prince Golytsin fished with good success for himself. He had recently concluded an ill-advised and ill-fated expedition against the Crimean

Tartars. To deflect the Kremlin's wrath he, upon learning of Samiylovich's open dissatisfaction with the treaty, had the hetman arrested, and exiled, where eventually the captive Kozak leader died, while his son was executed by the Muscovites.

The Kozak General Council thereupon elected as Samiylovich's successor his former adjutant Mazepa. Moscow agreed to the election but only with the understanding that Ukrainian rights would continue to be curtailed. Mazepa saw that the gradual absorption of all power in Ukraine by Moscow required him to show outward loyalty to Moscow and at the same time make secret preparations for a war of liberation.

Accordingly it was full two years before Mazepa journeyed to Moscow to make the formal declaration of loyalty to its ruler. The moment he picked, however, was extremely inopportune. It coincided with the time Peter forced his sister Sophia to step down from the throne, and leave him as monarch. Those who had been associated with the former regime, including Golitsin, who was friendly to Mazepa, now fell into disfavor, and new persons came to the helm.

It was a critical period for Mazepa. Nevertheless through his personal charm and magnetism Mazepa managed to win the favor of the new Tsar. As a result Peter brushed aside all charges that Mazepa was at heart an advocate of Ukrainian independence. In fact he even referred these charges to Mazepa himself, so that the latter had the opportunity to settle accounts with his accusers, who were traitors to their country and to strengthen the discipline and loyalty of his followers.

Remembering the unsuccessful efforts of his former commander Doroshenko, Mazepa decided on a different policy and planned to strengthen Ukraine internally, economically and culturally, before coming to grips with Muscovy. Mazepa's overt loyalty to Muscovy, however, awakened opposition to him among the masses in Ukraine, as very few grasped the import of his diplomacy.

In the economic-social sphere, Mazepa endeavored to improve the conditions of the lesser Kozaks so that they would be strong enough to defend themselves against exploitation by the rich Kozak officials of high rank. That his efforts along this line were appreciated can be gleaned from the fact that an attempted revolt by a young Kozak adventurer, Petryk, failed.

Taking advantage of a period of peace, Mazepa initiated valuable advances in the field of culture, art, education, and in the building of churches and institutions of various sorts. He became a patron of the

church not only in Ukraine but in the Near East as well. To him there came for aid and counsel Orthodox ecclesiastics from such Balkan countries as Serbia and Bulgaria and also from Palestine and Syria.

Upon his death, it was revealed that during the twenty-two years period of his hetmanship, Mazepa had expended for religious purposes the sum of 2,340,000 ducats, of which 106,000 went to the Christians of Syria and Palestine. His capital, Baturin, was the mecca for many distinguished visitors from foreign lands who sought his counsel and aid.

In the field of education, Mazepa gave the Ukraine its first university. In 1631 the Kievan metropolitan Peter Mohyla had founded in the capital of Ukraine a Collegium which became the country's educational center. Mazepa expanded it into a real academy, known as the Mohyla-Mazepa Academy. He began the academic buildings with his own funds, but they were not completed during his lifetime until 1740, on account of his revolution against Muscovy. He did manage, however, to enrich the academy library and build its Epiphany Church.

Among those Ukrainian writers and scholars of his time who regarded Mazepa as their patron were Antin Radivylivsky, Athanasii Zarutsky, Dmytro Tuptalenko-Rostovsky, Stephen Yavorsky, and Theofan Prokopovich. The last three, unfortunately, went to Moscow to help build the Russian empire and spread educational work there.

Ukraine was already well along the road of economic, social and cultural progress, when a new storm broke over Eastern Europe in the form of the Northern War. It was set off by the young eagle of the north, Charles XII of Sweden. Mazepa decided to seize the moment to strike out for Ukrainian national freedom.

The war raged between Russia and Sweden along the shores of the Baltic Sea. To the aid of Russia came Denmark, Saxony, and Poland. With lightning speed Charles attacked Denmark and Saxony and forced them to sue for a separate peace. At Narva he defeated the Russian forces. Then turning his attention toward Poland he also defeated it, forced its king August II to abdicate, and ordered the Polish nobles to elect a new king in his place. Stanislaus Leszczynski was thus elected. This divided Poland into two camps, one favoring the Swedish side, and other the Russian side. The Polish internal conflict left its impact on Ukraine too, for here pro-Swedish elements began to suggest to Mazepa that it was a golden opportunity to free Ukraine of Russian domination.

The Zaporozhian Kozaks, a stronghold of Ukrainian democracy declared war on Russia, for they realized that the defeat of the Russians

would be in line with their interests now. The anti-Russian coalition was joined also by the Kozaks of Polish occupied Ukraine, whose leader, Semen Paliy, called upon Mazepa to unite their section of Ukraine with his.

All these urgings Mazepa accepted with seeming indifference, although he had already decided to join with the Swedes but he feared to disclose his plans prematurely lest they be betrayed. Despite all his precautions, this did take place, through the Advocate Judge General, V. Kotchubey, and Col. S. Iskra, both members of his staff. But the accusations they made against Mazepa were as usually ignored by Tsar Peter, for he still had great faith in the hetman, even at the time when Mazepa was already secretly negotiating with the Swedish king for an alliance and for a clarification of the post-war status of Ukraine as an independent state.

The heads of the Ukrainian traitors rolled to the ground at the very time when Mazepa was openly going over to the Swedish side. One can imagine the feelings of Peter when he finally realized the actual situation.

Undeclared in the North, Charles now made two cardinal blunders, probably from overconfidence. First he delayed too long in entering Ukraine. Secondly he left the main body of his forces under General Loewenhaupt in Byelorussia. Peter seized advantage of this situation immediately. By forced marches into Ukraine he captured the important city of Poltava, created confusion and dissension among the Ukrainians, and neutralized part of the Kozak forces.

The ensuing savage Russian destruction of Baturin, a veritable Lidice of that time, swept the country with fear. Its defense was under the command of Colonel Chechil, a Scotchman in Ukrainian service. The fate of Charles was sealed when his second army, the one he had left under Loewenhaupt, met Peter's forces and was soundly defeated.

In the spring of 1709 the Ukrainians and the Swedes attempted to recapture Poltava. To relieve the beleaguered Russian garrison, Peter rushed down with an army twice the size of the combined Ukrainian-Swedish forces. The good fortune which had attended Charles in Northern and Central Europe now completely deserted him. Peter won the battle of Poltava and the defeated forces had to flee for protection to Moldavia, then under Turkish rule. All Russian efforts to have these Kozaks repatriated were met with a flat refusal by Turkey. In this manner a Ukrainian army found itself outside the borders of Ukraine, and thus became the first group of Ukrainian political emigres.

The aging Mazepa found himself in exile also. His end was near. The elements themselves seemed to sorrow with the old Hetman, for as he lay dying a storm broke out. He stared at a chest containing state documents of his reign in Ukraine, and his last words were: "Guard well this chest." Thus he died in a foreign land although he had hoped to die in a liberated free Ukraine.

Mazepa was placed in a temporary resting place near Bender, a village of Vartnytsia; subsequently his body was transported to St. George's Cathedral in Galatz. Thus the world lost an unusual man, who has left his mark in the history not only of Eastern Europe but of world culture as well. This was the real Mazepa, whose true worth and character is so hard to discern in literature or operas.

Hetman Mazepa was a typical representative of the Baroque epoch. He was a man of unusual erudition, with a strong leaning toward literature and arts. With his command of Latin, his engaging ways, and his keen mind he continued to impress people, like his Swedish allies, up to the very eve of his death.

George Andrew Nordberg, a confidant of Charles, Gustav Adlerfeld, Charles' court historian, and M. Zederhelm, secretary of Charles' field headquarters, are among those who praise Mazepa in their writings as a man of a cosmopolitan outlook and a superior authority on Eastern European affairs.

Mazepa was an unusually gifted and skilled diplomat. The fact that he was able to hide his real aims from Peter until the last possible moment, is some criterion of this. The rage that Peter felt toward Mazepa, when the denouncement finally came, was no doubt due to the deeply injured pride of the Tsar when he realized that he who was sure that he was the greatest living monarch had been so completely deceived.

With the defeat of Mazepa, a wave of terrible persecution was inaugurated by the Russians against his followers. The Tsar's wrath fell on the Mazepa family too. By Tsarist decree the very memory of Mazepa was anathematized in all churches in the Russian Empire, even in the very churches of Ukraine which Mazepa had helped to build.

At a General Assembly the Kozaks elected as a successor to Mazepa, his former trusted chancellor, Philip Orlyk. In exile, Orlyk now became the leader of the party of Ukrainian independence, the so-called Maze-pinists. The first step of the young Hetman was to draft and proclaim the First Ukrainian Constitution (in 1711), written in freedom-loving spirit of the earlier *Magna Charta*.

The primary aim of the vengeful Russians was forcibly to repatriate the Mazepinists, but to no avail. Despite all their diplomatic representations through their embassy in Istanbul, the Russians were unable to prevail upon the Sultan to rescind the right of political asylum he had given to these champions of the Ukrainian cause.

Once a flash of hope appeared before the Mazepinists. Charles XII managed to persuade the Sultan to declare war upon Russia. Victory rode with the Swedish-Turkish alliance, for the Russian Tsar found himself and his army surrounded in an ambush near the Prut river. Only a last minute bribery of the Grand Vizier saved the Russians from the ignominy of defeat and the Tsar from being captured.

The Mazepinists now became the first Ukrainian political emigres. They gradually scattered throughout Turkey and all of Europe, everywhere propagating the justice of the Ukrainian cause.

At every step of the way they were hounded by Tsarist Russian agents, and those who were caught eventually found a lingering death in the Siberian wastes. Those who returned to the Russian enslaved Ukraine soon wished they had not done so, for they were punished for the "betrayal" of Mazepa.

The personality of Mazepa was indeed unusual and dynamic. It is no wonder that he became the subject of works of literature and music. In writing about this particular period in Ukrainian history, Voltaire characterized the people of Ukraine as men who have always striven for national freedom and Mazepa was the finest representative of Ukraine's aspirations and ideals.

The term "Mazepinist" was intended by the Russians, in their application of it to Ukrainian patriots, as one of derogation. The Ukrainians, however, never have considered it thus but have made it one of honor, just as once "beggar" was the symbol of the Dutch patriots revolting against the tyranny of Spain.

This, then, is a true picture of Mazepa as he really was over two hundred years ago. He was a character of compelling power, not because of any romantic incidents, but because of his resolute will to win for his people liberation and freedom.

THE OUTLAWING OF POLITICAL OUTLAWS

Illegalization of Communist Cells

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE answer to the question as to the need of outlawing political outlaws and declaring illegal Communist cells seems obvious. It rests upon the evident contrast between the two ideological orders of Western democratic society and of Marxist Communism. Western democratic usage is the precious product of centuries of slow, human enlightenment and painful attainment. Marxist Communism, the theoretical residue of an anti-rational and utopian hybridization, proposes a scientifically charted view of humanity that is diametrically opposed to it.

To be sure there have been many interpretations of Marxism, some demonstrating its extreme divergence from the accepted democratic postulates¹ while others stress its intimate conformity with them.² Despite these theoretical arguments, which in reality concern only a comparatively few people, the crucial point of the situation is the fact that although the objective validity of romantic Marxism, in the light of a century of history, has long been tried and found gravely wanting,³ the revolutionary spirit of Marxist doctrine, religiously supported by the animus of class hate and warfare, was in its Leninist and Stalinist amplifications, able to overturn both the government of Tsarist Russia and the following social democratic regime. It now is being projected into the democratic countries mainly in behalf of the opportunistic and imperialist designs of the socialist Fatherland, which is seeking as peacefully as possible to extend its territory and influence to glorify the "workers' " State. The nihilistic strain of this colossal effort, is seen in the ceaseless effort for power aggrandizement and centralization through the systematic capture of strategic instruments and agencies of governmental and cultural administration and diffusion. Toward this amoral end, any legitimate or illegitimate, moral or immoral, human or inhuman means may be employed, for the effort is guided by the axiom

¹ e. g., LaFarge, J. "Communism's Threat to Democracy."

² e. g., Kautsky, K., "Social Democracy vs. Communism."

³ "Ukraine in Mid-Twentieth Century" *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, v. 1, no. 4, pp. 330—341.

set forth by Stalin himself: "Tactics change according to the ebb and flow" — the clue to all the zigzag courses of the Communists whether high or low.

The Communist program reflects this opportunism, and likewise the axia of common verbal assent and momentary strategic conciliation with current antagonistic institutions by the proletarian leadership. To achieve the common verbal assent, lip-service is rapturously given with unquestioning resignation to the platitudes of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and negatively, by faithful abstention from reading anything that may substantially run counter to the "universal truths." The third and final axiom is the sportsmanlike activity of temporary accession, scheming infiltration, poisonous exudation, and then, given the occasion, the kill. As Lenin exhorted: "We have to use any ruse, dodges, tricks, cunning, unlawful method, concealment, veiling of truth" — the last word in the art of political chicanery and notoriety that outshines even the standard of ethics of the old Chicago underworld.

These fundamental axia, underlie contemporary Soviet policy, both internal, in what has already been done, and external, in the realm of its foreign policy. They furnish the indissoluble link between the Kremlin and the "foreign" Party organizations, or cells, of this vast network throughout the world. They make use of the many varied motives of their adherents abroad, perhaps their unquenchable gullibility for those "long" promises of a heavenlike future in which politicians and idealistically self-anointed reformers as a general rule are so free, or chronic restlessness with existing conditions, which makes men believe that any change is better than none, or ambition to catapult themselves by a swift political overturn to the top with all its accompanying opportunities for personal expression and authority, or financial reward for service to any disruptive group, diabolical or holy, or self-popularization through audible or decorative identification even with generally distasteful movements, or, finally, simply maladjusted vision and intellectual maladroitness. Any or all of these motives may establish and augment affectionate attachments on the part of individuals, even for dear "Mother Russia." So long as any institutional pattern restricts the play of these time-worn human vanities, personal frustration ensues, and all possible conspiracies are formed. In a real sense, then, the axia, set forth by the Soviet police state, provide both potentially and actually the effusively religious means for individual self-realization, in democratic areas where a modicum of questionable tolerance for various types of political expression has been extant, and in varying degrees benefit the

Soviet international interests, while simultaneously working against the democracies with potentially dangerous ramifications.

All this can be learned from a long series of books, ranging from the works of Marx to the recent work, "Behind the Iron Curtain," by George Moored. The meaning of all this can be learned by considering the essential character of the Soviet Union, the citadel of worldwide communist operations, the relationship of the diverse national communist organs to this base, the techniques employed by them in advancing Soviet interests, and finally the arguments for and against declaring illegal the communist activity in the democratic countries, which had been done before World War II by eighteen governments.

The Red "Dynamic" State

Before examining the real nature of the Soviet state, it is appropriate to indicate briefly some features of the changing world scene to which Soviet policy must be adjusted. Foremost is the indisputable fact that this period of history, like the 14th century and 4th and 5th centuries A.D., is one of cultural transition. This rapid change is evident as it impinges poignantly and inescapably even upon individual lives. In the economic realm the changing relationships of labor, capital, and government, manifest a demand for social security in the face of technologic and business dynamics.⁴ Side by side with these economic adjustments are the various political changes observable throughout the world, which reveal in varying degrees and found a re-assertion of statism, a growing recognition of the need for moderate governmental intervention, plans for global unification along with diverse nationalistic upsurges, militarism, and similar movements.⁵ The general cultural situation, therefore, is characterized by an expanding organic orientation on the part of human beings toward the corporate life of the national and international communities, a single process which operates in the two most important general areas of modern political life and demands, by virtue of increasing economic and political interdependency, as technological facts well demonstrate, a sense of communal responsibility on the part of intra-national and national groups with a maximum of individual freedom, as regards either persons or nations.⁶ In consequence, then, the frictions that are unavoidably created both in the national and international areas by this transition provide, depending on

⁴ See Fisher, A.G.B., "Economic Progress and Social Security."

⁵ See Burnham, J., "The Managerial Revolution."

⁶ See Northrop, F.S.C., "The Meeting of East and West."

the adequacy of institutional safeguards, an opportunity for those disruptive agencies which are bent upon the seizure and exploitation of power for their own questionable temporal objectives. It is only in this setting that the Soviet Union and its worldwide communist network can be properly considered.

Discussions on the Soviet Union, whether in literary or oral form, usually tend toward what may be fairly called an excessive fragmentization of content or a misplaced concreteness that nullifies the worth of any such intellectual endeavor. To depict the efficiency of its workers in any line of economic operation, or the extension of literacy, or the establishment of health clinics, or its verbal glorification of the worker and his needs, or the magnificence of a hydro-electric dam, or the exquisiteness of its national choirs and some musical compositions, or the uniqueness of some scientific discovery, and then, after a detailed elaboration of each or all, to conclude that these are the practical achievements of the glorious socialist state which show its intrinsic character is a mode of reasoning comparable to a correlative depiction of the behavioral similarities of a man and a dog, ending with the conclusion that there is little substantial difference between them. The most relevant question as to whether these cultural manifestations, and vastly more, could occur in a different political context, such as that of Western democracy, never seems to arise. Both the Imperial German and National Socialist states were graced on a higher level of quality and quantity by similar achievements, and yet their respective existences were in the end found intolerable to international amity and comity. Consequently, if these cultural achievements are not due to the particular political pattern of the Soviet Union and can be attributed basically, to the native talents and resourcefulness of its peoples which, given a considerably freer environment, would undoubtedly produce more extensive and superior results, then what is precisely the nature of the Soviet state?

In large measure, but in a more exaggerated form, the U.S.S.R. occupies a position in the cultural evolution of mankind similar to that of Imperial and later Nazi Germany and Japan, all foremost representatives of the dynastic state. This appellation, strictly speaking, of course applies most accurately to Imperial Germany and Japan where family lineage determined accession to the monarchical crown: yet, with pardonable leeway, it can be applied to the late Nazi state and the present Soviet regime on the basis of personal monarchical rule, as seen in Hitler and Father Stalin,⁷ and succession to it lies exclusively in the line of the

⁷ Hindus, M., "The Cossacks," p. 225.

established ideological family, whether national socialist or communist. Moreover, as in the case of Imperial Germany⁸ and Japan, but retaining with far more exacting and calculating exploitation the barbarically feudalistic characteristics of any dynastic state, the Soviet Union has capitalized on the material advances made in the liberal democratic countries, such as England and the United States, through the economic and cultural process of technologic overhaul, as witness the employment of foreign engineers and machinery in the U.S.S.R. during the 30's. So in the institutional pattern of the ideologized dynastic Soviet state, as earlier in Germany and Japan, there is a combination of Western-conceived technology and barbarian feudal politics, a situation that Dr. Oscar Lange probably had in mind in his characterization of the Soviet Union as an "industrial serfdom."⁹

The institutional system of a dynastic state, in contrast to that of a liberal democratic society where observance of constitutional law and parliamentary legislation is genuine and sacred, is an indeterminate composition of political practice and usage, depending on the extent of popular recalcitrance and resistance to the laws of absolute rule. As a result, it may include all sorts of crooked political manipulation, coercion, and barbarity, always rationalized away by the "utter necessity of the situation." Thus in enumerating some of the most important paraphernalia for efficient and shrewd rule in the Soviet dynastic state, we can profit by recalling historical parallels in the dynastic states of the past, from the recent Nazi state to those of ancient times.

The first characteristic is the centralization of political and economic power, usually after some initial predatory exploits resulting in the arbitrary seizure of government as in the case of the Bolsheviks in 1917,¹⁰ by which the determination of life or death of any constituent at the hands of the ruling élite is immensely facilitated. The acme of such power concentration is exemplified in an unsurpassed way by the completely monopolistic Soviet communist dynasty which puts 17th century Colbertian France to shame. A second vehicle for comprehensive dynastic rule is the cultivation of mass idolatry for some personality. The ubiquity of posters of Stalin throughout Eastern Europe today and the unending ritualistic veneration of his fatherly exploits explain the psychological usefulness of such a vehicle in benumbingly impressing upon the populace the greatness of its leader. In this respect, dynastic

⁸ Veblen, T., "Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution."

⁹ *The Call*, April 13, 1940.

¹⁰ See Dan, Theodore, "Continuation of Martov's 'History of the Russian Social Democracy'."

Nazidom ran a poor second. A third vital piece of the dynastic system is such a system of apologetics as the trinity of Marx-Lenin-Stalin with which all followers in good standing must demonstrate rigid intellectual acquiescence in devout respect for the priceless truths of their teachings. Ideological deviation, of course, is heretical and tantamount to intellectual sabotage that must be thoroughly extirpated to preserve the purity of the basic scriptural accounts, somewhat in the fashion of old feudal Spain and again, to be sure, Nazi Germany. The rampant fallacies of philosophical Marxism, if the question of objective truth is of any importance when "intellectual robotry" is involved, as here, have been well exposed,¹¹ but this, as we have seen, is of no importance in the practical field of political opportunism, despite its obvious utility in the advancement of intellectual pretensions. Yet the tone of Soviet philosophy may be noted, inasmuch as it serves as the *raison d'être* for other dynastic devices, and as best summed up by Nicholas Berdyaev, himself a former Marxist and later a Russian Orthodox theologian:

"Soviet philosophy is a philosophy of titanism. The titan in it is not the individual but the social whole. Everything is contrived not by enlightenment of thought, not by the light of reason, but by the exaltation of the will, the revolutionary titanic will . . . Therefore, revolutionary communist ethics are inevitably merciless to the living concrete man, to one's neighbor. The individual man is regarded merely as a brick necessary for the construction of communist society."

A mania of its historical destiny and the eternal uprightness of the socialist Fatherland constitute additional weapons in dynastic Soviet politics that proved psychologically most effective, in another form, in the patriotic tenacity of modern Germany. Communist literature is replete with such political romanticism,¹² but we might cite, quite appropriately for the record and in view of his recent headline appearances, the stirring statement of Mr. Manuilsky, the Charlie McCarthy representative of the Ukrainian plot of "Animal Farm," at the Comintern convention in Moscow in 1935, to the effect that the Soviet Union is designed "to serve the interests of the world proletarian revolution."

If these are the basic features of the Soviet dynastic state, all else constitute in a real sense the superstructure of dynastic application and enforcement, the integral parts of the police organism. Among these is the denial of morality unless useful for sheer expediency. As Yaroslavsky phrased it: "Whatever helps the proletarian revolution and the

¹¹ See McFadden, C.J., "The Philosophy of Communism: also, Berdyaev, N., "The Origin of Russian Communism."

¹² See "Stalin's Kampf," ed. by M. R. Werner; also Stalin, J., "Foundations of Leninism."

Communist party is ethical." Or as Preobrazhenski, co-author of the "ABC of Communism" and Lenin's intimate friend, construed it: "The worker's state finds lying very necessary and useful in its foreign policy. Therefore, the attitude of the working class and the Communist party to the open recognition of the right to lie is quite different from that of the Western European Socialists, those God-fearing petit bourgeois." As though to confirm this, Stalin, speaking on morality versus diplomacy, asserts: "Words must have no relation to action — otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron." Consequently we have the ceaseless lies about the economic paradise of the Soviet workers, despite approximately accurate and detailed statistical facts to the contrary,¹³ a trait conspicuously absent in the pro-Soviet literature that usually wallows, instead, in isolated illustration and gracefully vague generalities. Ralph Ingersoll, certainly not an unfriendly person toward the U.S.S.R., upon his return from there before the Union entered the war, summarized the economic situation as follows: "A dishwasher in an American hash-house would not trade his life for that of the average Soviet workman." The same applies to the numerous wide divergences between words and deeds as concerns the Soviet constitution, which in Chapter X, Article 126, significantly qualifies and conditions all its idealistic provisions by specifically declaring that the Communist Party shall "form the directing nucleus of all organizations of the toilers." In the foreign field the record of Soviet promises is a sordid one,¹⁴ and characteristic of the unprincipled behavior so falsely attached to the late Nazi regime alone.

The general picture of Soviet dynastic operations may be completed by mention of its police activities for which historical parallels would have to be sought back in the days of Ivan the Terrible and, earlier still, among the Asiatic Khans. The thoroughness of these activities receives spirited approval in the words of Lenin: "Three-quarters of mankind may die, provided the remaining one-quarter become Communists." Maintaining and managing this vast Soviet Alcatraz is the MVD, formerly known successively as the Cheka, the GPU, and then the NKVD, an organization, consisting, whatever its title, of millions of privileged lackeys and informers with their own military machine.

¹³ Gordon, Many, "Workers Before and After Lenin."

¹⁴ See Chamberlin, William H., "America: Partner in World Rule," Ch. 8. Excellent also for its empirico-logical evaluation of the countless myths entertained in America about the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. Also see Dallin, David J., "Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-42."

Under its astutely murderous control the periodical purges are carried on, as in the cases of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky and countless others. It conducts extensive genocidal undertakings, as the slaughter of 10,000 Polish officers in Katyn forest, it liquidates political opposition, as for example in the murder of the Polish socialist Jews, Ehrlich and Alter, among countless others, and it brutally deports families and scatters them in the wastes of northern Siberia to face certain death. Finally, it sponsors an elaborate concentration camp system to further the state's systematic program of human enslavement.

When we stop to review these facets of the dynastic state, as witnessed in the Soviet Union and beginning now in the Soviet's Balkan satrapies, as well as in the history of all dynastic states, we cannot help but perceive the irreconcilable contrast between dynastic government and liberal democracy. Its contempt for trial by jury, its adulation of personal absolute leadership, its ruling by edicts and decrees, its opposition to a liberal competition of ideas, its ideological eschatology in the form of historical destiny, and its unending fabrications to shield and confuse, all these, buttressed by terroristic enforcement in a vast police system, far more efficient, extensive, and ruthless than that of Metternich, stand in sharp contrast and at insoluble variance with the institutions of Western democracy. As the history of the very recent past shows, there can be no middle ground of compromise, if permanent peace is any consideration. The intrinsic aggressiveness of the dynastic state, as history so well shows, forbids it. In the case of the Soviet dynastic state this disruptive element is augmented by the attraction of its ideological deception.

The logical climax to this entire discussion of the nature of the Soviet Union, the base of a worldwide quisling system, is the death penalty imposed upon anyone seeking to migrate from the workers' paradise without official permission which, in reality, is meagerly offered only to the pets of the regime. Why this extreme prohibition against human mobility if the attraction of the socialist Fatherland is so assured by its good works, as many apologists would have us believe? Why the perilous escapes to the West on the part of the Kravchenkos, Gouzenkos, Tchernavins, and Krivitskies, and no similar movement in reverse? The obvious answer to these all-important questions will not be found in the abstract output of an ecclesiastical Dean perched comfortably at Canterbury, but rather in such informatively and statistically detailed works as Dallin's "The Real Soviet Russia," in which the

best account of contemporary Soviet practices is provided without any comparable counterpart in the usual plush of pro-Soviet literature. For a dynastic state, such as the Soviet Union, which is "long" on economic promises at the same time that its standard of living is just above that of China and India, one can well conclude, in the light of the above sociologic treatment, with Msgr. Fulton Sheen, that "there is only an accidental difference between fascism, nazism, and communism, only the difference between burglary, larceny, and stealing." They are all representatives of the same species—the dynastic state.

Outward Cellular Proliferation of the Red Dynastic State

After this survey of the essential characteristics of a dynastic state as the Soviet Union and its governmental pattern based on these three fundamental axia, namely, arbitrary seizure and centralized consolidation of power, common verbal assent, and where obstacles momentarily persist, temporary opportunistic yielding, we are in a position to view more perspectively the support given to this state by its cells throughout the world. The link between the Soviet Union and communist parties throughout the world was officially maintained before the spring of 1943 by the Comintern which was then ostensibly abolished. To be deluded by the official abolition of this agency and to conclude, therefore, that no such link now exists, suggests an ignorance of communist tactics, which change with the ebb and flow, and for obvious historical facts. Concerning the first brand of ignorance, evidence in whatever field you select, be it religious policy, multinational policy, foreign policy etc. of the Soviet government, abounds in illustration of the sacred Soviet "principle of political zig-zaggery." In the light of such evidence is there then any experiential basis for trust in the official acts of an opportunist state? The second form of ignorance concerns events themselves. For example, the American Communist party withdrew from the Comintern several years before its ostensible dissolution; yet, in the light of its numerous actions, viz., its support of the Soviet-Nazi pact by sabotaging American defense preparations in 1939-41, its apologies for the Soviet invasion of Finland, its playing here the Soviet game in China, its late reversal of its criticism of Wallace's Madison Square Garden speech after Pravda showed the party line to be followed, and its ousting of Browder from its higher councils after a critical article was written by Duclos in transmission-belt contact with the Kremlin, can any one be so naive as to overlook the operational pattern? Or take the "Agitator's Notebook," issued by the mother party

in the Union to all the party organizations in the world on the average of once every ten days, to keep the latter "properly informed" on Soviet interests in the world at large. Or observe the consultative trips undertaken by the French Thorez, the Italian Togliatti, the Yugoslavian Tito and so forth, to the inner sanctum of world communism. We can proceed still further, but the general drift is obvious. As Stalin teaches — "Words are one thing, actions another."

The reality of the unseen Comintern is found in the dual policy pursued by the Soviet Union, specifically a "closed-door" for Eastern Europe and an "open-door" for its agents in the rest of the world. The general program embracing all the cells and, in spite of all superficial shifts of tactics necessitated by changing circumstances, is fundamentally one of "intensive revolution" in the non-Soviet areas. Instead of a frontal attack, operations from the rear, through capitalized opportunities, form the core of present-day communist activity, with the benefit of such proletarian virtues as dialectical faith, patience, hard and persistent work, and servile obedience.

In a previous article the directions of this pursuit, bearing on "intensive revolution," were clearly explained.¹⁵ What Ukraine has experienced for the past twenty-eight years in its servile position within the dominion of the dynastic Red state is being undergone by others today, to be sure in varying degrees, depending mainly on geographical location and institutional resistancy. The Ukrainian experience, ranging from the destruction of its democratic struggle by a strange combination of enemies¹⁶ at the end of the teens to the present, has certainly not ceased. The best indication of this is provided by the Ukrainian refugees in western Europe. Here is a part of the general testimony written from the experiences of Miss Emma Birkett:

"The period from October, 1939, until June, 1941 (the period when Russia and Germany were on the same side) will forever remain in the memory of the Western Ukrainians as that of their greatest sufferings. Executions combined with mass deportations into the depths of the Soviet Union filled the whole population with terror. Many political leaders, essentially nationally-minded, were deported into Asia and soon died in exile. Today these people, of whom there are millions, are scattered all over Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Holland, Poland, Roumania and the Balkans."¹⁷

It seems rather mystifying that millions of human beings, not only Ukrainians, but also the Baltic peoples, Poles, Serbs, Croats, Jews and

¹⁵ *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1946, v. 2, no. 2.

¹⁶ Margolin, A.D., "From A Political Diary."

¹⁷ *London Weekly Review*, Sept. 6, 1945.

so forth, should be in flight from the blessings of the workers' states, and at that, only westward. Thousands of Jews and many more thousands of Ukrainians and Poles continue, insofar as they are able, to flee from the Soviet paradise,¹⁸ while those already in displaced persons camps, such as at a Jewish refugee camp near Munich, demonstrate their intense displeasure with the extended fruits of proletarian happiness by stoning Soviet repatriation commissions.¹⁹ Evidently, the so-called facts in pro-Soviet literature do not jibe with such indicative human behavior.

Before embarking upon the final section of this thesis, it would be profitable to mention briefly the areas that of late have featured prominently in this extension of the Soviet political tentacles. In unhappy Greece, since the British-aided rebuff of the communist-dominated EAM-ELAS movement, aiming at the return of the Salonika region to the future Macedonian state, thereby placing it within the Soviet sphere and tantamount to the establishment of a Soviet foothold in the Mediterranean, the situation has remained gravely unstable due mainly to the marauding adventures of communist bands, supported by neighboring foreign sources and engaged in indiscriminate genocide.²⁰ In ravaged Poland, since the prefabricated institution of the present government through the Polish Committee of National Liberation, a motley mixture of communists such as Boleslav Bierut, fellow travelers like Edward Osobka-Morawski, and reactionary opportunists as General Rola-Zymerski, receiver of French munition bribes, and Jan Grubecki, organizer of anti-Semitic uprisings, the entrenched group has been seizing every means, from the reopening of German concentration camps, such as at Oswiecim, and the murder of political opponents, such as Rjeszow Kojder of the Polish Peasants party, to wholesale arrests of moderate socialists as Boleslaw Galaj,²¹ to make secure its Soviet-delivered power against any Peasant Party opposition. In Romania, the same picture presents itself in the Soviet-sponsored government of Petru Groza, which is likewise exploiting advantageously any means to consolidate minority communist gains against Juliu Maniu's National Peasant party.²² Bulgaria shows similar developments since the muzzling of democratic leaders such as Ghitcheff, Buroff and Mushanoff, and these are highlighted by the harangues of George Dimitrov, communist

¹⁸ John MacCormac, *New York Times*, June 6, 1946.

¹⁹ U.P. release, London, May 19.

²⁰ Salonika, AP. release, Nov. 16, 1946.

²¹ Warsaw, U.P. release, Nov. 29, 1946.

²² *New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1946.

leader of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front, warning the people in the recent trumped-up elections to support the Front — “It is worth reminding them of Draja Mikhailovitch’s fate.”²³ In Yugoslavia the same drab pattern of political bullying is evident, following most closely the bloody model of the Soviet Union, with Rankovitch’s UDB paralleling the MVD, absolutist barbarism expressed in tones suggestive of Lenin and Stalin, and so forth.²⁴ In Italy, somewhat hampered by direct Western interests, Togliatti’s communist forces are playing for time at the moment, but the situation there, in contrast to the circumstances surrounding the positions of communist organizations elsewhere in the West, will probably eventuate to the advantage of the communists should three factors substantially influence future Italian developments, namely, retarded economic rehabilitation from the havoc of war, altered Western interest, even through preoccupation elsewhere, and the breaking down of the present democratic machinery by traditional inexperience and neglect.

Cellular communist activity extends also, through either “national organizations” or Soviet embassies, into Egypt, India, Iceland, and several Latin American countries, but it is in China, by virtue of proximity, that it has boldly surged forward, due to the havoc of war and close Soviet support. The purposive rot disseminated in the United States on the difference of communism in China from that of the U.S.S.R., has made some inroad into fact-starved minds. Yet, let us consider the adulations of Stalin by the communist Chinese delegate, Wang Min, at the Communist International congress in 1935:

“Our party is true to the teachings of the man who, after Lenin’s death, has further developed the theory and tactics of Marxism-Leninism; of the man who after Lenin’s death, has further developed the theory and tactics of Marxism-Leninism; of the man who has theoretically elaborated the basic strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution—to the teaching of the great Stalin.”

This is indicative, but additional facts, not uncommon to tactics of communist movements elsewhere, point in the same direction — the Kremlin.²⁵ In the Far Eastern area, though unfortunately little publicity has been given to Inner Mongolia, it is known that that strategic geographical region has fallen securely into Soviet hands which are

²³ Sofia, P.P. release, Oct. 26, 1946.

²⁴ C.S. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1946.

²⁵ G. T. Fitch’s letter to the *New York Times*, Oct. 13, 1946.

now in a position to cut off easily Marshal Chiang from his Manchurian province.

In the United States, the Communists are acting in accordance with the same axia, although circumstances emphasize the third, the need for temporary conciliation.

But in their tactics, they manifest the same traits of ideological religiosity as their counterparts elsewhere, a fact that denotes the solidarity of the cellular extension. Thus the quasi-military and regimented character of these American cells, ranging from the Communist Party to the most innocuously-titled organization fronts, is discerned by the consistency in their subservient subscription to the zigzagging "Party line" set by the Kremlin through its various government-controlled organs. This in itself provides a *posteriori* proof of the first and only allegiance of these groups. Secondly, the axiom of arbitrary seizure of power is, as for the present it necessarily must be, only theoretically upheld by the American membership, as also by the French, English and others, through their unqualified acceptance of the Communist Manifesto, which explicitly allows and calls for it, of the authoritarian teachings of Lenin and Stalin, and of the undemocratic manner in which the mother party usurped power in Russia and the satellite "national" parties did elsewhere. Of course, to relieve or fend off this valid indictment against them, the domestic communists apologize that they seek power through the accepted democratic channels. This very deceptive apology is in reality a confession that at the moment they have no other alternative and is in substance extraneous to the indictment. In point of fact they have seen fit to speak in terms of peaceful acquisition of power in order to escape the indictment. This is like saying that Hitler would have preferred to achieve his ends peacefully rather than through war. Such professions merely hide the fact that they would seize power, if they had the opportunity. Thoughts, after all, are the precursors of deeds. The thoughts nourished by American communists are best depicted in the self-explanatory words of their own leader, William Z. Foster:²⁶

"Under the dictatorship, all the capitalist parties—Republican, Democratic,, Progressive, Socialist—would be liquidated, the communist Party functioning alone as the Party of the toiling masses."

Moreover, in the same work, Comrade Foster in a spirited manner paints for America, after the "inevitable" revolution by which, accord-

²⁶ Toward A Soviet America, p. 275.

ing to him, the "workers" (more appropriately, the self-delegated representatives of the workers — the Communist party) will have finally seized power, the following: "The American Soviet government will be organized along the broad lines of the Russian Soviets." This, too, answers for itself. Finally, as concerns this momentous mission, the sacred blessings of Father Stalin are not wanting: "It is necessary that the American Communist party should be capable of meeting the moment of crisis, fully equipped to take direction of future class wars in the United States. You must prepare for that, comrades, with all your strength and by every means. You must beget real revolutionary cadres and leaders of the proletariat who will be capable of leading the millions of American workers toward the revolutionary class wars."

Before his expulsion from the higher councils, Earl Browder at least upheld this second axiom as unadulterated loyalty demands of any son of destiny:

"It is the high mission of the Communist Political Association to prove that Americans do not lag far behind this great historical trend, to worthily represent in our own country this science, Marxism, which is universal as the knowledge of astronomy, as practical as radar, as international as human culture and progress."

The final axiom, that of momentary accession simultaneous with systematic internal maceration, is of necessity religiously pursued by the American communists, employing as fronts all sorts of naive "liberals" and "progressives" and participating, always in behalf of "popular benefit," in all public affairs, ranging from milk fund campaigns to the proper course for American foreign policy. It is undeniable common knowledge that Party members and fellow-travelers work hard and long for the ultimate cause in whatever organizations they establish under innocent names or infiltrate into sooner or later control. Again ex-Comrade Browder sets the pace, in this instance as concerns religion: "It is significant that the Communist party, more than any other group, has been able to achieve successful united fronts with church groups on the most important issues of the day. This is not due to any compromise on our part with religion as such. In going among the religious masses we are for the first time able to bring our anti-religious ideas to them." The direction of communist cooperation is unmistakable, and they have already established or are in a position to influence a long list of societies often headed by non-Communist Americans.

The gyratory fluctuations of these quisling groups in attempting

to follow the zigzagging "Party line" set up at their Mecca are commonplace, the most recent being the switch of love by the Communist party from Jewish aspirations in Palestine to the Arab position.²⁷ What is significant, however, in substantiation of a sector of this thesis, is the manner in which the American communists are finding their place in the over-all strategy of "intensive revolution," as determined by their aggressive dynastic masters. John Roy Carlson, whom the communists praised loudly for his previous work in 1943, "Under Cover," states in his recent volume, "The Plotters," that they, the communists, whom he rightly bunches with the Ku Klux Klan, the Christian Front and similar groups, "are aping the nationalists in one piece of strategy: they are taking on a consciously native coloration." In reality, such imitation is natural, when the Daily Worker expounds, "Communist parties are rooted in the soil of their native lands. . . . Be a true American by becoming a Communist," it is aping similar mouthpieces in Ukraine, Poland, Yugoslavia, China and other countries where communist organizations herald the "intensive revolution."

The Opportune Necessity for Illegalization

This intrinsic relationship between the world-wide communist cells and the Red dynastic Soviet state, with all its gory manifestations of political debauchery, seems explicit. The essential validity of it can be witnessed by the ease with which new data, disclosures, and testimonials fall neatly into their respective places within this organic interpretation. Note the disclosures of Louis F. Budenz, an ex-Party man, on the liaison operations of Eisler, the permanent disappearance of Julia Stewart Poyntz, the murder of Ignace Maria Reiss. To be able to prove these facts directly as the results of communist espionage and murder is obviously impossible in view of the secretiveness and apparent spontaneity with which they are usually perpetrated. For the reasonable fixing of responsibility, the criteria are rather the essential compatibility of these facts with the basic nature of communist activity as shown empirically within and without the Soviet Union, viz. the murder of the Ukrainian Konovoletz in Rotterdam, Trotsky in Mexico, etc., and the specific relations existing between the victims and accused agents and communist affairs. The factor of probability, then, weighs heavily in the obvious direction. But more important for the validity of the thesis here advanced is the admission of a Russian Embassy code

²⁷ Congress Weekly, American Jewish Congress, "The 'Jewish' Line of American Communism", Nov. 15, 1946.

clerk, Igor Gouzenko, whom the Canadian authorities at first ignored until they saw that he was being closely followed:

"To many Soviet people abroad it is clear that the Communist Party in democratic countries has changed long ago from a political party into an agency net of the Soviet government, into a fifth column in these countries to meet war, into an instrument in the hands of the Soviet government for creating unrest, provocations etc."²⁸

Final consideration, then, must briefly be given to the reasons for immediate measures to declare illegal communist cells and to enforce it adequately. This can be done expeditiously by setting out the opposed reasons and showing their fallacy:

(1) "After all, this is a democracy, and everyone has a right to his own opinion." This smacks of the same type of thinking that characterizes the advocacy of infantile expressionism. It fails to distinguish between license and genuine democratic freedom, it ignores the clear evidence that the Stalinist regime and its supporters have as a matter of policy flouted each of these basic tenets of democratic Western freedom. J. Edgar Hoover from his experiences with American communism calls for "a force which holds within its power the ability to expose the hypocrisy and ruthlessness of this foreign 'ism' which has crept into our national life — an 'ism' built and supported by dishonor, deceit, tyranny and deliberate policy of falsehood." That force is a scrupulously enforced illegalization which will somewhat belatedly destroy the shield of "Red-baiting" pleas behind which communists have been able to operate.

(2) "Granted that they must be squelched for self-security, yet would not declaring them illegal drive them underground to our disadvantage? The plausibility of this position is obvious, but the same argument can be advanced against any legal decree, against banditry, monopolies etc. We do have such law and enforce them. Moreover, so much is known of the American Communists that they could be at once seized and convicted under the criminal code of the United States, title 18, which outlaws the advocacy of overthrow of the government by force. Finally, the increasing skill of the F.B.I. and other police agencies in suppression of criminal groups can be applied to underground communists. Upon such arrest, trial and conviction, deportation to any country of the person's own choosing, should he be allowed to enter, should be considered before formal domestic detention.

²⁸ Written statement submitted to the Canadian police, Oct. 10, 1946.

(3) "Communist ideas should be allowed to compete with democratic ideas, and if the latter are solid, the relative weakness of the former would preclude acceptance by any right-thinking person." This argument emanates from the belief that the Communists aim to triumph through ideas. Was it because of the superiority of the idea of Leninist communism that the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia? Is the same true today in Poland, Yugoslavia and similar countries? In France today, where the communists have attracted large votes recently by espousing a democratically-tintured program with a New Dealish flavor rather than their true program, will it be because of this or the fact that they control the largest labor organization and might control, by virtue of their deceptive policy, the key Cabinet posts of the interior, which manages the police, and foreign affairs that the groundwork for power seizure is laid? The answers are obvious. There is no question of a comparative evaluation of ideas; there is a struggle to secure strategic control of the political and economic machinery.

(4) "Begin to outlaw communist political activity and you will have begun to outlaw other forms of activity." This is a logical but foolish position. Public sentiment demands the suppression of such bodies as the Columbians and the Ku Klux Klan which preach the overthrow of the government. The Communists do the same more shrewdly. It is a question of national security and does not involve a drive toward indiscriminate victimization, as the Communists have done wherever they have the power.

The rebuttal of the foremost arguments advanced against the formal "outlawing of political outlaws," emphasize the positive reasons for a militant democracy in this age of so-called ideological warfare. They are: (1) a militant affirmation of the basic principles of Western Civilization; (2) an attack on Communist allegiance to a foreign state and veritable treason to America and for its campaign of systematic disruption and confusion within our own community, rather than a sincere desire for reform; (3) a moral strengthening of our foreign policy against the designs of contemporary dynastic states; and lastly (4) a definite insurance against organized fifth columns in the event of future international eruptions. The slightest reflection will show the numerous parallels between Red Fascism and Nazi Fascism, ranging from internal dictatorship to quisling cells in foreign countries. We paid heavily to learn belatedly of the nature of the latter: are we to double this cost by learning too late of the nature of the former which

is far more menacing in its cellular extension? This is not a note of helpless alarm, but rather a call for rational reaction to the present ugly state of the world, so that in this period of transition, the problems of economic disturbance, social injustices, and moral lassitude may be solved not by the modern Red reversion to feudalistic barbarism but rather by democratic reform for the strengthening and enriching of our basic Greco-Hebraic-Christian values which have developed civilization throughout the centuries.



MEMORANDUM ON THE UKRAINIAN SITUATION TO THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

From the UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Our Duty

AT this crucial period in world history, when the ardent hopes of mankind for a lasting peace based on the just principles of the Atlantic Charter are focused on the Paris Peace Conference, it is the solemn obligation of public spirited bodies dedicated to the world-wide peace effort to make known to their national representatives in particular and to the Conference in general any particular information and views they may possess which may prove to be of value to the Conference in its appraisal of the issues and problems facing it and in its endeavors to settle them in an equitable manner, thereby laying the groundwork for a just and enduring peace.

Accordingly, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, a nationally representative body of Americans of Ukrainian extraction, including their leading institutions, churches and organizations, a body with a fine war record and now dedicated to the promotion of the peace effort, feels duty-bound to offer to the American and other democratically-minded national delegates to the Conference the benefit of its special knowledge and views concerning the land of the origin or birth of its members, Ukraine.

Ukraine Misrepresented at Conference

What particularly prompts Americans of Ukrainian descent to express through this Ukrainian Congress Committee memorandum their views in this connection is the undeniable fact that Ukraine has no true representatives at the Conference.

To be sure, the Soviet Ukraine delegation attending the Conference professes to represent the Ukrainian people in their native land. Still anyone acquainted with the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state, where there is a total lack of freedom of expression as well as of all other freedoms, and where all power is centered in the Communist Party, embracing a bare 5% of the total Soviet population and rigidly

controlled by Moscow—realizes very well that under such conditions there is not and cannot be any true Ukrainian representation at the Conference, despite the Soviet assertions to the contrary. In reality, the handpicked Soviet Ukraine representatives at the Conference are representatives not of the Ukrainian people but merely of the Soviet regime ruling Ukraine. For that matter, Manuilsky himself has always been associated with Soviet Russian expansionist interests, to the extent that in the peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 he served not on the Ukrainian but on the Russian delegation.

Still another reason of consequence behind this memorandum is that although Americans of Ukrainian origin heartily welcome the admittance of Ukraine into the United Nations Organization, yet they and other true friends of Ukraine are deeply distressed over the fact that on account of Soviet misrepresentations at the Conference and elsewhere Ukraine has been made to appear in the eyes of the world in an ill light, as a mere satellite of the totalitarian Moscow regime, slavishly heeding its slightest wishes and whims, even to the extent of opposing the patently fair and sincere peace proposals of America and the other democracies.

There would be no such illusions about Ukraine, however, if she were a sovereign nation, free and independent of foreign dictation. Ukraine would then clearly demonstrate her independent character, one in keeping with her traditional freedom loving and democratic qualities and in harmony with those of America and the other democracies.

Importance of Ukraine to World Peace

In presenting this memorandum, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America well realizes that the Ukrainian national problem as such is not on the agenda of the Conference. Still it respectfully desires to point out that irrespective of this deplorable fact, the problem of this submerged nation, as it has aptly been called, is one of the most vital in the pursuit of lasting peace.

For example, the hidden struggle for eventual supremacy over this expansive, rich and productive land between the Central Powers and Tsarist Russian regime was one of the principal causes of the outbreak of World War I. Moreover, the overt ambitions of Hitler for its grain, mineral, hydro-electric, and "lebensraum" value, was one of the direct causes of World War II. Likewise the centuries-old struggle of the

Ukrainian people to rid themselves of foreign domination, steadily becoming stronger each year, and manifested at this precise moment by a strong underground movement throughout Ukraine, is bound to affect the shape of things to come in Europe. To ignore the Ukrainian issue, therefore, is to make a grave mistake, at least from the viewpoint of establishing lasting peace in Europe.

If, as is the case, representatives of the Soviet Union refuse to permit for obvious reasons any deliberations on the Ukrainian problem at the current and subsequent peace conferences, on the alleged ground that it is an "internal Soviet problem," but actually because they fear the consequences of such an airing of it, it would seem to the undersigned committee that the least that can be done by those sincerely seeking enduring peace would be to consider the implications of the problem themselves.

The Centuries-Old Struggle for Freedom

In considering the problem, however, they should bear in mind that the problem, in essence the national struggle for independence, is of no recent origin. Ukrainian national sentiments and aspirations have always gravitated toward the ideal of a free and independent Ukraine. For centuries that has been their supreme ideal and for centuries they have fought and bled and sacrificed in its cause.

At times they were successful. Thus, resurrecting the glories of their mighty and highly cultured Kievan state, Rus-Ukraine, of the 10-13th centuries, and also of the subsequent and redoubtable Kozak Republic which their world famous warriors of that name set up in the 17th century, the Ukrainian people rose upon the collapse of the Tsarist Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires and established two republics, one in the Dnieper (Eastern) Ukraine and the other in Western Ukraine. Of their own volition and by their own free will, the Ukrainian people united these two republics (January 22, 1919) into one, indivisible and democratic Ukrainian National Republic, which both England and France, among others, recognized *de facto*. Nonetheless, although established by the free will of the people and on the basis of the right of national self-determination, this united and democratic Ukrainian republic, lacking food, supplies and war material and scourged by typhus, was finally beaten down by the superior forces of enemy predatory powers and in the end was partitioned by Russia, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

During the ensuing period of alien misrule in Ukraine, lasting from the first to the second world war, the Ukrainian people were exposed to unprecedented national extermination and economic exploitation. Nevertheless, the rule by terror and force did not quell their resistance against the foreign occupants of their native land and time and again—by appeals to international tribunals, by fierce underground action, by passive resistance—they demonstrated in no uncertain terms that they never have and never will abandon their natural and historical right to national independence.

At all times they were on the alert to seize the slightest opportunity to strike out for their liberties, even if it were on a bare fragment of Ukrainian ethnographic territories. Thus, when boundaries began to change with kaleidoscopic rapidity a year or two before the outbreak of the recent war, Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed (March, 1939) its independence. But Hungarian troops, with the express approval of Germany and Italy, invaded the country, overcame the valiant resistance of its embattled defenders, and annexed the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic to Hungary.

Democracy, the Hope of Ukrainians

When World War II broke out, with the Soviets then in an unholy alliance with Nazi Germany, hope rose in the Ukrainian people that out of the war there would emerge some opportunity for them to strike out for their freedom. Traditionally-democratic, they looked forward with hope toward the democracies to give them at least some moral support in their national aspirations. For awhile, prospects of gaining such support did not appear too dark for them. Thus, at the first of the three national congresses sponsored thus far by the undersigned committee, held in Washington, May, 1940, twenty United States Senators and Congressmen vouched for the justice of the Ukrainian cause and espoused the centuries-old ideal of a free and independent Ukraine.

Eventually, unfortunately, events took a different turn. Nazi Germany suddenly attacked its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, and the latter automatically became an ally of the democracies. Much as they abhorred Soviet misrule, which had torn families apart and which had decimated their population by many millions, through deliberately-fostered famines, executions, purges and forced labor camps, the Ukrainians were nonetheless outraged to find their native albeit foreign

Their Great Role in Defeat of Nazis

misruled land invaded, plundered, ruined and defiled by another totalitarian power, Nazi Germany.

Through sheer necessity of making a common cause with those who have always sorely oppressed them, the Ukrainian people rose against the foul Nazi invaders and in the armed forces and in the ranks of the partisans, they played a leading role in driving the Nazi out of Ukraine, westward on and on to their final debacle. In performing this stupendous feat, the Ukrainian suffered the most of any people in the loss of human lives and property, destruction and damage. The so-called Russian victory, as more than one neutral observer has pointed out, was actually Ukraine's victory, and it was not Russia but Ukraine who paid the bill.

Here, too, it should be noted, the Ukrainians attempted to seize one slim opportunity of establishing an independent Ukrainian state. In June, 1941, when the Bolsheviks were retreating before the Nazis, the Ukrainians seized L'viv and adjoining territory, set up a provisional government, and proclaimed the re-establishment of an independent Ukrainian republic. German military might, however, soon killed this abortive attempt at Ukrainian independence by arresting all of its leaders and masses of other patriots, shooting some of them on sight and imprisoning the others in concentration camps for the duration of the war.

And so, although throughout the entire war the Ukrainians fought valiantly in the cause of freedom and democracy, and in the final victory their price was the greatest, today they find themselves nevertheless in national thralldom under the Soviet yoke.

Under Soviet Yoke

This is true not only of the vast majority of them, that is of some thirty-five million Ukrainians of Eastern Ukraine who before the war were already under Soviet rule, but also of those seven or eight million of them who prior to the war were under Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, and who are now also under Soviet domination. The pre-war Polish-ruled Western Ukrainians, it is worth noting, were arbitrarily handed over to the Soviets by virtue of the Curzon line decision reached at the Yalta conference, without any plebiscite whatsoever, without the slightest consultation of their wishes in the matter, whether they pre-

ferred foreign rule or, what undoubtedly would have been the case if they had been consulted, they would have preferred their own, free and independent Ukrainian state, for them and for their kin throughout all of Ukraine.

Reports from reliable sources penetrating the "iron curtain" of Soviet censorship, clearly indicate that in Western Ukraine itself the Red commissars are conducting a ruthless campaign either to exterminate Ukrainian national consciousness and life or make it pervert itself completely to the pattern of Soviet Russian ideology.

In this the Soviets are following the familiar pattern of their policy in pre-war Soviet Ukraine namely, rule by terror, which began to reach its present proportions back in 1930 when Stalin himself publicly declared that Ukrainian nationalism for the Reds "constitutes a grave danger."

Following this pattern of Soviet policy in Eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shut down or destroyed Western Ukrainian national institutions, while patriotic and democratic Ukrainians, irrespective of their station in life, both the educated and the unlettered, any and all who have espoused the cause of Ukrainian freedom, are being liquidated summarily. Horrible stories emanate from Ukraine as to the mistreatment by the NKVD of patriotic Ukrainian elements there.

The Tragic Plight of the DPs

If there be any doubt in the minds of anyone concerning the accuracy of the charges made above, let them but consider for the moment the tragic plight of the Ukrainian displaced persons. Much as these DPs love their native land and long to return to it, they simply refuse to do so. In fact, quite a number of them have committed suicide rather than to permit themselves to be returned to Soviet rule. And they were not collaborationists. On the contrary, they hated the Nazis for all the horrible cruelties wreaked upon them and their kind, and for all the devastation caused to their land by the Nazis. Moreover, the vast majority of them had been driven into Germany during the war as slave labor.

On the other hand, from bitter personal experience the Ukrainian DPs know what totalitarian rule of Moscow in Ukraine means. Knowing all this, they well realize what fate awaits them once the Soviets get cause they believe in Ukrainian national and religious freedom, and them in their clutches. Simply because they are anti-totalitarian, be-

also because during their current period of displacement they have been able to see the democratic processes at work, the Ukrainian DPs well realize that once they return to the USSR they will be marked men and women, hounded at every step, sent to concentration camps, or to do forced labor, or to the barren and frozen wastes of Siberia, or placed "pod stienkoo," i.e. against the wall, and shot.

Aside from that, they know from the stories told them by repatriated DPs who have managed to escape from the Soviet paradise and have returned to Western Europe, that very few of such repatriates ever see their native land, village or town. It is quite clear by now that the Soviet authorities are systematically sending the repatriates by trainloads in sealed box cars directly to Siberia, there to work under forced labor conditions in the scattered war industries of the Soviet Union. It is reliably reported that since the end of the war more than one-half million Ukrainians have been thus deported. Meanwhile, non-Ukrainians, such as the Russians, are being brought regularly into Ukraine to fill up the places left void, by the evacuation of the Ukrainians, that is of both the DPs as well as those who managed to remain in Ukraine throughout the war. This practice, it should be noted, is in keeping with the traditional Moscow policy of denationalizing Ukraine and artificially creating one super-Soviet nation, just as the Nazis attempted to create one super-German race.

Red Persecution of Religion in Ukraine

In keeping with this policy, the Soviets have also been attempting to destroy the traditionally deep faith of the Ukrainian people. At first they attempted to do this by the notorious godless campaigns, the destruction and desecration of churches, the banning of religious services, and in general by brutally persecuting religion at every step. When that failed, and the last war brought a revival of faith even among those who for reasons of expediency had deserted it, the Soviets inaugurated a policy of having religion serve the ends of the State. With this in mind, they first revived the Russian Orthodox Church and appointed a Kremlin puppet as its patriarch, who within recent times has made it quite clear that religion within Soviet boundaries must subordinate itself to the interests of the state solely. The Soviets then dissolved the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which came into life during the first world war, and forced its communicants to enter the Russian church led by the Moscow patriarch.

Thereupon the Soviets proceeded to do likewise with the Ukrainian Uniate (or Greek) Catholic Church. Its bishops were arrested and imprisoned, where several of them died. Hundreds of priests suffered a similar fate. Scores of them were executed. Meanwhile the faithful were terrorized in a like manner. Thereupon, with all the bishops and others of the militant opposition in jail or in their graves, several apostate priests who had been released from jail for just this purpose were placed by the Soviet authorities at the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Finally, last spring, the Moscow radio reported that the Ukrainian Catholic Church had "broken off" its connection with Rome and had become a part of the Russian Orthodox Church. In this manner, then, the atheistic rulers of Kremlin have obtained full control of the Ukrainian Church—Orthodox as well as Catholic—within the Soviet borders, and now they are using it as an instrument of the state, an instrument of further persecution and denationalization of the Ukrainian people.

Such then is the plight of the Ukrainian people, of those who have suffered the most and sacrificed the most in the recent war against Fascism and Nazism, of those whose heroic deeds are emblazoned on the pages of the free press throughout the world.

Militant Ukrainian Underground Movement

Let it not be supposed, however, that the Ukrainians are accepting their plight in any meek manner. On the contrary, in keeping with their undying revolutionary spirit, they are combatting their oppressors at every step. Free press and other reports of a reliable nature, particularly American, British, and French, tell of a strong underground movement throughout Ukraine. There are also constant press reports concerning the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—UPA for short—which during the war first fought against the Germans, then against both enemies and finally now is concentrating against the Reds. Its supreme goal is Ukrainian national freedom.

The combination of these elements, Soviet denial of freedom to Ukrainians and persecution and the Ukrainian counter-action against them of a militant nature in the cause of national freedom, has made Ukraine today a veritable tinder-box of Eastern Europe, endangering the possibility of lasting peace there.

Free Ukraine as a Stabilizing Factor in Europe Indisputable Facts

The ideal and most just solution of the Ukrainian national problem, of course, would be to allow the well over 40 million Ukrainian people to reassert their centuries-old liberty loving traditions and re-establish their own free republic. Self-sufficient economically, possessing all the necessary national, cultural and political attributes for the formation of their own state, the Ukrainian people could become through the medium of their own sovereign state a stabilizing factor in European affairs. For one thing, an independent Ukrainian state, not the fiction of one that it is at present under the Soviet regime, would nullify Russia proper as a disturber of peace. Even without Ukraine, Russia would still be a self-sufficient and prosperous nation, except that its war potential would be greatly cut down, thereby assuring for herself and her people as well as the rest of the world, a peaceful and progressive existence.

Since under present conditions, it is hardly within the realm of the barest of possibilities that the Soviet regime would ever permit any such just solution of the Ukrainian problem, the very least that can be done would be to establish an international court of human rights, somewhat on the order of the recent Australian proposal, but one with wider jurisdiction, one that would encompass the Ukrainians under the Soviets also. The proposed court would constitute a court of appeal to which the oppressed and the enslaved could turn for succor when their basic human rights were being abused or violated. Although the Soviet representatives are bound to oppose this proposal, the principles underlying it are certainly worth fighting for at the Peace Conference.

Aside from all this, it is worth noting, as already has been by competent observers of the international scene, that the Ukrainian national problem is closely linked with the triumph of democracy and individual liberty in the Soviet Union as a whole. If and when this triumph is achieved, when the highest officials of Ukraine, as of all Soviet republics, are responsible not to a small Communist clique in Moscow, but to the Ukrainian people, when Ukraine is actually, not only nominally, able to conclude treaties with foreign powers, to control its military forces, to form its trade and cultural contacts as it may choose, then much of the present apprehension about possible trends in Soviet policy will automatically disappear.

In a word, a free and independent Ukraine, no longer subject to dictation from Moscow, united with other peoples of Eastern Europe only by voluntary bonds of mutual economic interests, is an indispensable element in a free Europe and in a free world.

Indisputable Facts

In conclusion, the undersigned committee desires to underscore the following indisputable and historic facts:

1. Whenever the Ukrainian people have had the opportunity to freely express their wishes, they have invariably manifested their desire for their sovereign national rights and self-government.

2. The Atlantic Charter clearly and unmistakably lays down as a principle the right of a people to determine their political destiny. The United Nations, including the Soviet Union, made this principle the basis of their war objective.

3. The Ukrainian people desire unity of all Ukrainian ethnographic territories in a free and independent and democratic Ukrainian state.

4. The Ukrainian people desire equality of treatment. They believe that in the present post-war settlements their inalienable rights to an independent free state in a free Europe should be granted serious consideration and that the Ukrainian national problem should be included in any just and permanent settlement of Europe.

Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Personally submitted by

STEPHEN SHUMEYKO, *President*



THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA

By WALTER DUSHNYCK, B.A., M.A.

THE Ukrainian people, generously supporting the Russian Revolution in March, 1917, quickly found that the road to freedom was hardly one of roses. Even in the first weeks of the general upheaval that swept over all the territories of the Russian Empire, the newly-established revolutionary regime in Petrograd took the attitude that the Ukrainian problem should be completely avoided as a factor in Russian political life. This was true of all the major Russian political parties, including even the most radical—the Bolshevik which, though theoretically proclaiming in its program the equality of all non-Russian peoples of the Empire, actually was firmly set against their nationalist aspirations. This was true especially in the case of Ukraine, since it played a decisive role in the entire economic life of Russia. The prospect of losing it to a hostile nationalist government, was wholly unacceptable.

Yet the spontaneity of the Ukrainian movement manifest in the numerous political and semi-political and military organizations that mushroomed throughout Ukraine, convinced the Russian government that further procrastination as to a decision upon Ukraine would prove detrimental to its interests. The more adamant the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was in its demands, the more amenable and ready to grant political concessions the Provisional Government in Petrograd became.

1. The Ukrainian Demands and the Russian Answer

Both the All-Ukrainian National Congress and the First Military Congress urged the *Rada* to begin immediate negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government. On May 26, 1917, a special delegation was chosen by the Central *Rada* to go to Petrograd to present to the Provisional Government demands for the autonomy of Ukraine. The delegation was composed of members of the *Rada* and of the Ukrainian Military Committee.

The Ukrainians presented the following demands to the Provisional Government:

1. The autonomy of Ukraine.
2. Participation of Ukraine in peace negotiations, particularly with reference to the question of Eastern Galicia.
3. The creation of a Ukrainian Commissariat within the Provisional Government and the Central *Rada*.
4. The appointment of a Russian special commissar to the Central *Rada* to serve the same purpose.
5. The appointment of Ukrainian regiments and the Ukrainization of mixed troops on Ukrainian soil.
6. The appointment of Ukrainians to the state administration, courts and churches.
7. Ukrainization of all schools in Ukraine.
8. The inclusion of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in the budget of the Russian Provisional Government.
9. The liberation of all Ukrainian political prisoners, including those from Eastern Galicia, particularly the Archbishop of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Metropolitan Sheptytsky.¹)

On May 31, 1917, the Ukrainian delegation was given its first official audience by the Provisional Government. A special Russian commission was created under the acting Minister of the Interior Shepkin to discuss the matter and draw up a plan for its solution.²

The Russians were ready to grant some local autonomy for non-Russian peoples, but no full political autonomy. They insisted that the Constitutional Assembly should decide the question of autonomy for Ukraine. They consented to the Ukrainization of the army within certain limits. The official language of Ukraine must remain Russian, the Provisional Government said, but it consented to the use of Ukrainian in the lower Ukrainian schools.

The Provisional Government, however, refused to recognize the Ukrainian Central *Rada* on the ground that it was an "illegal organization" and avoided the issue by reserving the question of Ukrainian autonomy for the Constitutional Assembly. The Russian argument that only the Constitutional Assembly could decide the autonomy of Ukraine, was ridiculed by the Ukrainians. Only three months earlier the Provisional Government had approved a constitution for the Finns and issued encouraging proclamations to the Georgians and the Poles.

¹ He died on November 1, 1944, after the re-occupation of Western Ukraine by the Soviet troops.

² *Viestnik Vremennogo Pravitelstva*, June 2, 1917.

2. The Ukrainian Reaction to the Russian Attitude

The negative answer of the Provisional Government aroused indignation throughout Ukraine. It contributed towards the stirring up of Ukrainian nationalism for a final and complete separation of Ukraine from Russia.

The Ukrainian peasants answered the Provisional Government by supporting the Central *Rada* and its policy. The First National Ukrainian Peasant Congress, held in Kiev June 10-15, 1917, adopted the following resolutions:³

1. The support of the Central *Rada* and its policy toward the Provisional Government.
2. The creation of a Russian federated state with an autonomous Ukraine.
3. The demand that all local self-administrative bodies in Ukraine should be Ukrainized.
4. The right for Ukraine to participate in the forthcoming Peace Conference.

The Congress then sent a telegram to the Provisional Government regarding its negative answer to the demands of the Ukrainian delegates in Petrograd. The Provisional Government was unyielding:⁴

The Provisional Government does not consider it possible to satisfy the demands of the Central *Rada* because it feels that all questions concerning the autonomy of Ukraine and other nationalities must be decided by the Constitutional Assembly.

On June 18-23, 1917, the Second Ukrainian Military Congress was convened in Kiev despite the ban of War Minister Kerensky. Two thousands delegates gathered, representing from 1,390,000 to 1,500,000 Ukrainian soldiers.⁵

The Russians in Ukraine meanwhile organized their own forces. On June 17, at the session of the Committee of Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party in Kiev, Gregory Piatakov (executed in one of Stalin's "purges" in 1937) declared:⁶

We will support the Ukrainians in their protest against all circular interdictions of the Government, as (it) happened with the Ukrainian Military Congress. But generally we will not support the Ukrainians insofar as their movement is not compatible with the aims of the proletariat. Russia

³ Khrystiuk, P. *Ukrainska Revolutsia*, vol. I., p. 67; *Nova Rada*, No. 52. Cited by 1917 *god na Kievshynie*, p. 92.

⁴ Doroshenko, D. *Istoria Ukrainy*, Vol. I., p. 87.

⁵ Khrystiuk, op. cit., I., p. 70.

⁶ 1917 *god na Kievshynie*, pp. 104-105.

could not exist without the Ukrainian sugar industry. The same could be said about coal (Donbas), bread (black soil) etc . . . Lenin proposed the referendum only as far as the separation of Ukraine is concerned. But, being in favor of a local autonomy, we will oppose the convocation of a *Soym* (parliament) because it could establish custom and, therefore, it would be harmful to the proletariat. As far as the army is concerned, we will support the formation of a territorial but not a national army.

On June 23, 1917, the Second Ukrainian Military Congress passed resolutions summarized as follows:⁷

1. The Congress demanded immediate recognition of the Central *Rada* by the Provisional Government.

2. It proposed to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* not to refer any longer to the Provisional Government and immediately to initiate the organization of the country in cooperation with the national minorities.

3. It urged the Central *Rada* to convoke a territorial assembly of Ukraine to draw up plans for the autonomy of Ukraine.

The Second Ukrainian Military Congress also resolved to continue the Ukrainization of the army and elected a committee of soldiers' deputies to the Central *Rada*.

3. The First Universal of the Central Rada. The General Secretariat of Ukraine

On June 23, 1917, the Central *Rada* issued its First *Universal*,⁸ a lengthy document of which the following were the highlights:⁹

1. The *Universal* declared the Central *Rada* to be the representative organ of the Ukrainian nation.

2. It declared the Ukraine should be free, and that, although separation from Russia was not advocated, the status of Ukraine should be established on a constitutional basis by the Ukrainian National Territorial Assembly.

3. It denounced the negative and uncompromising attitude of the Russian Provisional Government.

4. It declared that "from today we will organize our own life."

- a) It announced that henceforth all local, district and provincial administrations must be in the hands of Ukrainians or national minorities not hostile to Ukraine.

- b) It proclaimed that the Ukrainian National Assembly will draft a fundamental law, subject to the approval of the All-Russian Constitutional Assembly.

⁷ Khrystiuk, op. cit. I., p. 72.

⁸ Bohdan Khmelnytsky during the war of liberation against Poland in 1648-1649, frequently issued proclamations and instructions which he called *universals*. The later Ukrainian *hetmans* followed his example. The Central *Rada* adopted the word as a title for its official proclamations.

⁹ Khrystiuk, op. cit. I., p. 72.

c) It imposed a special national tax, effective July 1, 1917, for the benefit of the Central *Rada*.

d) It announced that it would move immediately to reach an understanding with the national minorities.

Although general in form, the First *Universal* was acclaimed as the first definite pronouncement of the Central *Rada* for putting responsibility for achieving autonomy on itself. In view of this it was decided that a more workable executive body than the Little *Rada* (the inner council within the Central *Rada*) was needed. Therefore, the General Secretariat was created at a secret session of the Central *Rada* on June 28, 1917, to act as a cabinet for the *Rada*. It was composed as follows:¹⁰

Premier and Minister of Interior—Volodymyr Vynnychenko (Social-Democrat)
 Minister of National Minorities—Sergey Yefremiv (Soc-federalist)
 Minister of Finance—Prof. F. A. Baranovsky (non-partisan)
 Minister of Agriculture—Boris Martos (Social-Democrat)
 Minister of Commerce—M. Stasiuk (non-partisan)
 Minister of National Defense—Simon Petliura (Social-Democrat)
 Minister of Justice—Valerian Sadovsky (Social-Democrat)
 Minister of Education—I. Steshenko (Social-Democrat)
 General Secretary—Paul Khrystiuk (Social-Revolutionary).

The creation of this cabinet virtually marked the completion of the Ukrainian government. Ukraine now had a legislative body and an executive one. Other departments were organized later.

The Russian reaction to the promulgation of the First *Universal* and to the creation of the General Secretariat was found. Russian revolutionaries and graybeards alike were shocked by the swift growth of the Ukrainian movement. The Russian bolsheviks in Kiev attacked the Central *Rada* for its "bourgeois nationalism and separatism." The All-Russian Congress of Cossacks, passed a resolution against the *Universal*, announcing that "we will support categorically the Provisional Government in its policy regarding Ukraine."¹¹ The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies in Petrograd, although favoring autonomy for Ukraine in principle, also expressed opposition to the *Universal*.¹²

The Provisional Government, taking official cognizance of the overwhelming support tendered the *Universal* in Ukraine, "decided on June 28, 1917, to issue a proclamation to the Ukrainian people and to

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 77.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 83.

¹² Ibid., p. 84.

explain the dangers of the resolution proclaimed by the Ukrainian Central Rada." ¹³

The next day, June 29, the Provisional Government published in its official organ, the *Viestnik*, a long proclamation to the Ukrainian people signed by Prime Minister Prince Lvov. This proclamation, however, did not bring the desired reaction from the Ukrainian people. It only promised what an aroused people already had seized for themselves. Accustomed to the wordy pronouncements of both the Provisional and Tsarist Governments the Ukrainians saw the worthlessness of this lengthy document. They had made specific demands, such as the autonomy of Ukraine, the Ukrainization of the army, and the use of the Ukrainian language in the schools and courts. The Provisional Government had once again evaded such issues by referring everything to the future Constitutional Assembly.

4. The Ukrainian Agreement with the National Minorities

On July 2, 1917, the Central Rada held a conference with the representatives of Russia, Jewish, Polish and other parties and organizations.¹⁴ An agreement was reached whereby the Central Rada promised to guarantee the right of language, schools and religion of every minority in exchange for their support in the struggle for autonomy against the Provisional Government.¹⁵ The minorities generally supported the Rada because they felt they could obtain more concessions from a Ukrainian government than from the Russian. For example, the Jewish Social-Democratic Party which met on July 12, 1917, resolved:

1. That the Central Rada and the General Secretariat are the autonomous organ of Ukraine, and, therefore, should be approved by the Provisional Government.

2. That the autonomy of Ukraine should be recognized and protection of national minorities must be guaranteed.

3. That a Council of National Minorities within the Russian Provisional Government must be created.

4. That a budget for national minorities must be provided for by the Provisional Government.

After this agreement was reached, the national minorities sent their representatives to the Central Rada in number as follows: The Russian Social-Revolutionary Party—20; the Russian Social-Democratic Party—

¹³ *Viestnik Vremennogo Pravitelstva*, June 28, 1917.

¹⁴ Doroshenko, op. cit., I, p. 99.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 100, 1917 god na Kievshynie, pp. 127-128.

12; the Jewish Social Democratic Revolutionary Party—9; the All-Russian Jewish Bund—13; the Jewish Zionist Organizations—13; the United Jewish Workers' Party—48; the National Polish Party—2; the Polish Democratic Center—5; the Polish Socialist Party—14; the Socialist Polish Organizations—4; the Moldavians—4; the Germans and Tartars—3; the Greeks, White Ruthenians, Czechs, Bulgarians and Mennonites—one from each group. The *Rada* totaled more than 800 members in July, 1917.¹⁶

5. The Provisional Government Retreats before Ukraine

In view of this solidification of the Ukrainian movement against Russia, the Provisional Government was faced with two alternatives: either to fight or give in. Some members of the Provisional Government, such as Shakhovsky, Mannilov, Shingarov and Stepanov, urged the first step.¹⁷ They demanded that the Central *Rada* be dispersed and that the members of the General Secretariat be arrested. The liberal faction, including Prince Lvov, Kerensky, Nekrasov, Tseretelli and Tereschenko (who was of Ukrainian birth), insisted on compromise. In the end the latter group had its way, and the Provisional Government sent a delegation of three ministers to Kiev. They were Kerensky, then War and Navy Minister; Tereschenko, Foreign Minister; and Tseretelli, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

The Ukrainian Military Committee prepared the following *maximum* demands for the Provisional Government:

1. The promulgation of a law providing for the Ukrainization of the army stationed in Ukraine.
2. The substitution of Ukrainians for Russians in the military and war administration posts on Ukrainian soil.
3. The transfer of the Ukrainized units from other fronts to the Ukrainian front.

Its *minimum* demands were: 1. The immediate Ukrainization of seventeen reserve regiments in Ukraine, 2. The transfer of the Twenty-First Ukrainian Regiment from Riga to Ukraine.¹⁸

In the morning session Professor Hrushevsky, President of the Central *Rada*, and Vynnychenko, Premier of the General Secretariat,

¹⁶ The exact figure is in dispute. The Russian Zolotarev in his *Iz istoriyi Ukrainy Central'noy Rady*, pp. 7-8, estimates the total at 847; Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Annex 31, p. 137, places it at 822, and *1917 god na Kievshchynie*, p. 141, gives the total of Ukrainians alone as 658.

¹⁷ Miliukov, Paul. *Istoriya Vtoroy Russkoy Revolyutsiyi*, Sophia, 1921. Vol. I., p. 236.

¹⁸ *Literaturno-Naukovy Vistnyk*, XII. Lviv, 1923, Cited by *1917 god na Kievshchynie*, p. 191.

presented a plan for the autonomy of Ukraine which was rejected by the Russians.¹⁹ The conference met again in the afternoon, this time with the Ukrainian Military Committee participating, and the Russians presented this compromise offer:²⁰

1. That the General Secretariat be responsible to the Provisional Government as well as to the Central *Rada*.
2. That the Ukrainians hold in abeyance their demands for autonomy until the convocation of the Constitutional Assembly.
3. That separate Ukrainian regiments might be formed but that they could not become a territorial army, and that the high command must remain in Russian hands.

The Ukrainians promptly rejected the Russian offer. After a brief recess, the third and final session convened, this time with the representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian parties in Kiev, soldiers' and workers' deputies. The following compromise was reached:²¹

1. The Provisional Government recognized the Central *Rada* and its executive body, the General Secretariat, as the official organs of the Ukrainian people.
2. The Central *Rada* was to withhold its demands for autonomy until the Constitutional Assembly.
3. The Armed forces on Ukrainian soil and at the front were permitted to be Ukrainized but the high command was to be in Russian hands.

On July 13, 1917, the Central *Rada* approved the agreement with the Provisional Government. Members of the Ukrainian Military Committee bitterly opposed the agreement.

The Provisional Government met to discuss the agreement upon the return of the delegation. Against the acceptance of the agreement were the reactionary members of the Provisional Government, such as Mannilov, Shakhovsky, Shingarov, etc. When their protests were rejected, they resigned.²²

On July 16, 1917, the Provisional Government issued a declaration which may be summarized as follows:²³

1. The Provisional Government had decided to appoint a General Secretariat, the composition of which was to be decided both by the Provisional Government and the Central *Rada*.
2. It agreed to meet all national and social problems of the Ukrainian people.

¹⁹ 1917 god na Kievshynie, pp. 142-143.

²⁰ Doroshenko, op. cit., I., p. 1111.

²¹ Ibid., p. 112.

²² Ibid., p. 114, Miliukov, op. cit., I., p. 236, writes that the ministers resigned because their party, the "Ka-dets" believed that the time for autonomy was not ripe.

²³ Doroshenko, op. cit., I., p. 114, Khrystiuk, op. cit., I. p. 93.

3. It agreed to the Ukrainization of the army, permitting Ukrainians to have their representatives in the Russian War Ministry, the General Staff and the High Command of the Russian Army. This declaration was signed by the three ministers who visited Kiev: Kerensky, Tereschenko and Tsetelli.

6. The Second Universal and the Constitution of Ukraine

On the same day, July 16, 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* issued its Second *Universal* which still is condemned by the Ukrainian nationalists because it abandoned the demand of separation of Ukraine from Russia. However, it followed the Kiev agreement with the Provisional Government to the letter.

Neither the declaration of the Provisional Government nor the Second *Universal* of the Central *Rada* satisfied the Ukrainian people, then in full revolutionary process. There was nothing anywhere in these two wordy documents defining the territorial limits of Ukraine, the authority of the Central *Rada* and the General Secretariat. Nothing was said of Eastern Galicia, as old and historically Ukrainian as the rest of Ukraine.

Secondly, the documents had little legal value, according to Khrystiuk. Although measures were mentioned in connection with the establishment of the autonomy, the procedure was omitted, thereby making the agreement valueless if Ukraine should later attempt to hold the Provisional Government to it. The agreement served only to restrain the rising spirit of the Ukrainian nationalism, as agreed upon by Khrystiuk and Doroshenko.

On July 29, 1917, the Constitutional Committee of the Central *Rada* completed the new constitution of Ukraine. A special delegation of the Central *Rada* went to Petrograd to present the constitution to the Provisional Government. This constitution, called the *Statute of the Higher Administration of Ukraine* and containing twenty-one paragraphs, was approved by the Central *Rada*, but before the Provisional Government could do likewise, two events occurred that shook the government: the overwhelming defeat of the Russian Imperial Army in Eastern Galicia and Bessarabia;²⁴ and the first Bolshevik uprising in St. Petersburg.

²⁴ According to Doroshenko, op. cit., I. p. 118, Ukrainian forces played a prominent part in the ill-fated Russian offensive against German and Austro-Hungarian armies, notably the 6th, 17th and 41st Ukrainized corps. The Ukrainized 155th Division lost three-fourths of its men. Its heroism was mentioned in the Russian press. The Russian High Command lauded the 6th Corps in a telegram to the Ukrainian Military Committee.

Despite the fear of the Russians that this constitution would enable Ukraine to separate herself from Russia, it did not destroy Russian authority in Ukraine. Besides containing no mention of the frontiers of Ukraine, it also limited the authority of the General Secretariat (Paragraph 7) by providing that non-elective posts would be filled by the appointees of the Secretariat. This prevented the General Secretariat from controlling the provincial and districts commissars.

Thus it may be seen that the constitution was very moderate compared with the demands of the extreme nationalists. Nationalist Ukrainians today criticize the conservatism of the Central *Rada* at a time when it was supreme in Ukraine because the Russian government was collapsing and the Russian armies were being annihilated. They argue that had the Ukrainians declared their independence then, it is doubtful if the Russian Government could have resisted effectively. Then with the Bolshevik Revolution overthrowing the Provisional Government, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* would have been in a much stronger position.

7. The Last Attempt of the Provisional Government to Break the Autonomy of Ukraine

The Provisional Government flatly rejected the constitution of the Central *Rada*. In a new declaration called the *Temporary Instruction for the General Secretariat of the Provisional Government in Ukraine*, and signed by Premier Kerensky and Justice Minister Zarudny,²⁵ the Provisional Government completely disregarded the authority of the Central *Rada* and violated the Kiev agreement.

The Ukrainians were amazed by the blunt Russian "instruction" to the General Secretariat and the sweeping manner with which it dismissed the Central *Rada* and the new constitution. The chief grievances of the Ukrainians were:²⁶

1. That the Provisional Government attempted to regard the General Secretariat, a creation of the Central *Rada*, as more important than the *Rada* itself. The Ukrainians realized that Ukrainian democracy was inspired by the Central *Rada* and was dependent upon it; consequently, to permit the Provisional Government to disregard it would have been a blow at the most vital organ of the Ukrainian movement.

2. That the Provisional Government described the General Secretariat

²⁵ Khrystiuk, op. cit., I. pp. 114-115, Doroshenko, op. cit., I. pp. 128129.

²⁶ Khrystiuk, op. cit., I. pp. 115-116.

as its official organ in Ukraine and not as the Central *Rada*'s in violation of the Kiev agreement.

3. That even the General Secretariat was not supreme because the Provisional Government reserved for itself the right to issue orders directly to provincial and district governments in Ukraine during "emergencies."

4. That the authority of the General Secretariat was emasculated by the failure of the Provisional Government to agree to the appointment of Ukrainian ministers of war, transport, post and telegraph, justice and food.

5. And the Provisional Government limited the authority of the General Secretariat to only five of the eleven Ukrainian provinces.

Nonetheless the General Secretariat, trying to avoid open conflict with Russia at any cost, agreed by a slight majority to accept the "instruction." The main argument for the acceptance by the Secretariat of this "instruction" as expressed by Premier Vynnychenko, was the fact that the Provisional Government did recognize the principle of autonomy of Ukraine.

But the Central *Rada* passed a strong resolution, declaring that the Provisional Government's "instruction" disregarded Ukrainian democracy, that it was dictated solely by Russian imperialistic motives, that it forbade the creation of a legal parliament in Ukraine, etc. The *Rada* demanded that the Provisional Government recognize the General Secretariat as created by the Central *Rada* and that the Provisional Government prepare to call Ukrainian and Russian Constitutional Assemblies.²⁷

Despite the difficulties on all sides and the collapse of the front, Ukrainian organizations once more moved ahead toward obtaining full autonomy.

The Second Ukrainian Congress of Peasants' Deputies met in Kiev from September 15-18, 1917, and resolved to redouble efforts towards the autonomy of Ukraine. On September 21-28, 1917, the first Congress of the Peoples of Eastern Europe gathered together in Kiev under the aegis of the Central *Rada*. Ukrainians, Georgians, Tartars, Latvians, Lithuanians, Jews, White Ruthenians, Estonians, Moldavians, Don Cossacks and Buriats from Mongolia attended.²⁸ The chief purpose of the Congress was to prepare for the establishment of a Russian federated state with political autonomy for every non-Russian people. The Congress passed resolutions supporting the Central *Rada* in its struggle for autonomy.

But events moved swiftly. The Russian army was disintegrating.

²⁷ Khrystiuk, op. cit., I. pp. 115-116.

²⁸ Ibid. II., p. 24.

Ukraine decided to work fast in organizing her autonomy in order to forestall anarchy.

On October 23, 1917, the Central *Rada* introduced a resolution to call a Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly. On October 30, the Provisional Government received a report from the prosecutor in Kiev on the "high treason" of Ukrainian leaders against the Russian state. Rumors were heard in Kiev that the Provisional Government would arrest all members of the General Secretariat. The Central *Rada* believing that it was not engaged in treasonable activities, decided to send three Ukrainian ministers of the Secretariat to Petrograd.

When they arrived in Petrograd, the Bolshevik Revolution had broken out on November 7, 1917. The Provisional Government was fighting its last battle, and a new day had dawned not only in the history of Russia, but of Ukraine as well.

Epilogue

From that day on the Ukrainian movement had to struggle with the Bolshevik Revolutionary government instead of the Kerensky regime. In the course of a few weeks, Ukraine organized troops, issued the famous Third *Universal* on November 20, 1917, declaring the full autonomy of Ukraine. By the end of December autonomous Ukraine was engaged in war with Red Russia.

During 1918 the following outstanding events took place in Ukraine: On January 22, 1918 the Central *Rada* in its Fourth *Universal* proclaimed the complete independence of Ukraine, and on February 9, 1918, an independent Ukraine concluded a separate peace with Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. In April 1918, the Central *Rada* was overthrown by *hetman* Paul Skoropadsky who, together with the Germans, was ousted from Ukraine by the five-man Directorate of Simon Petliura in November, 1918.

On January 22, 1919, Western and Eastern Ukraine were united to form the Ukrainian National Republic. Throughout the year the young Ukrainian democratic republic waged a bitter war on three fronts against the Soviets, the Allied-supported White Russians of Denikin, and the Poles.

By the spring of 1920, the Ukrainian government was destroyed, its leaders had fled or had been killed, and although there were several more courageous but suicidal uprisings, Ukraine as a free state ceased

to exist—her territories being incorporated into Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

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LITTLE MYRON

By IVAN FRANKO

Translated by STEPHEN SHUMEYKO

I

LITTLE MYRON is a queer child. Father is very proud of him and claims that he is very bright, but then, a father is a partial judge, especially Myron's father, a man well advanced in years, who had almost lost hope of ever having a child. Such a man, naturally enough, could have any sort of an offspring and yet consider it the most beautiful and clever in the whole world.

The neighbors used to whisper that Myron "is not like other children." When he walks he swings his arms in a peculiar way and whispers to himself. In the company of other children he is shy and awkward, and if ever he ventures to say something, it is enough to cause the elders to shrug their shoulders.

"Vasile," Myron said to another little boy. "How much can you count?"

"Who, me? How much should I? Five, seven, fifketeen . . ."

"Fifketeen? Ha-ha-ha! And how much is fifketeen?"

"How much should it be? I don't know."

"It means nothing at all. Come, let's sit down and count together."

Vasile sat down, and Myron began to count, striking the stick against the ground at each number: one, two, three, four . . .

Vasile listened for a while, then rose and scampered away. Just then old Ryabina passed by, coughing and breathing wheezily. Myron did not even notice him. The old man stopped and began to listen . . . Myron reached up to four hundred . . .

"Why you foolish child," exclaimed the old man in his somewhat nasal voice. "What are you doing?"

Startled by this sudden interruption, Myron turned his frightened eyes at the ancient.

"Don't you realize that you're beating the holy earth? Don't you know the earth is our mother? Here, give me that stick!"

Myron gave his stick to him, without the least idea what the old man wanted of him. The latter flung the stick deep into the nettles.

Myron nearly burst out crying, not so much because of the loss of the stick, as because the old man had interrupted his counting.

"Go home and say the Lord's Prayer instead of doing such mischief," the old man snorted angrily, and shuffled away, muttering to himself. Myron watched him till he was out of sight, still wondering what the old man wanted of him, and what wrong he had done.

II

Little Myron loved to roam in the green flower-covered valleys, among the wide-leaved burdocks, the scented anthimis, and the fragrant clover. Nearby there was a brook with high steep banks and gurgling fords which ran through the pasture. Its clay bottom was covered by soft water-weeds that looked like skeins of green silk. Here by this brook, a most idyllic place, Myron loved to sit for many hours, hidden in the deep grass. He would look into the splashing water, at the swaying water-weeds, and the little fishes that from time to time emerged from their hiding places in search of prey, sometimes darting upwards until their gills broke through the surface and gulped down a little air, then swiftly fleeing to their hiding-place as if they had just stolen something very precious. The sun would beat down strongly from a cloudless, deep-blue sky, but since the wide leaves above him guarded him from sun burn, Myron felt only a delicious sense of warmth and happiness. His little grey eyes looked eagerly at the world, and his forehead would become wrinkled with childish concentration as thoughts stirred in his young mind.

"That sun above me—why is it so small, when father told me it was very big? Maybe the hole in the sky is too little to let the whole sun show itself."

But then another thought struck him.

"But how can that be? When the sun sets the hole is there, and when it rises, it still is there. Does the hole travel through the sky with the sun?"

This was too much for him to comprehend, and he promised himself that as soon as he reached home he would ask his father about the peep hole of the sun.

"Myron ! Myron!" That was mother.

Myron jumped to his feet and ran down to the ford in order to cross the brook. Suddenly he stopped in his tracks. He had crossed here many times before, without the least hesitation, but now he saw some-

thing that made him pause. He was standing directly facing the sun, and instead of seeing the shallow bottom with its pebbles and water-weeds, as he always had, he now saw instead—a deep blue bottomless pit. He did not know as yet that this was just the reflection of the smiling sky above, so he stopped in wonderment. How could he ever cross such a great depth? And from where did it appear so suddenly? He stooped and began to examine it more closely. It remained the same, except that near the bank he could see the familiar pebbles and hear the melodious gurgling of the water. He turned his back to the sun and looked into the water; now everything was all right, the abyss had vanished and the ford was shallow as before. This discovery calmed and yet surprised him. He began to turn around back and forth, experimenting with this strange vision, somehow made happy by it. And as for his mother's call—he had forgotten all about it.

Little Myron stood there for a long while, turning this way and that way, yet not daring to cross the brook. He could not get over the feeling that this shallow stony ford would suddenly open, and a deep blue abyss would appear between the banks, into which he would fall and disappear like a pebble thrown into a deep, dark well. Who knows how long he would have stood there if there hadn't appeared a neighbor, Martin, who with rake and pitchfork was hurrying to his hay.

"Why are you standing here? Your mother is calling you. Why don't you go home?"

"I want to go home, but I'm afraid."

"Of what?"

"Of this, look!" And Myron pointed at the bottomless pit in the water. Martin, however, didn't understand.

"What's there about it to be afraid of? It's very shallow."

"Shallow?" said Myron unbelievably. "But look at the big hole!"

"Hole? What sort of a hole?" said Martin, and without taking off his shoes, crossed the brook, hardly wetting them. The example encouraged Myron and he too crossed the ford and ran home quickly.

"What a foolish child! Five years old and he's afraid to cross such a shallow brook!" the neighbor testily exclaimed and hurried on his way.

III

In summer, when the grown-ups were out in the fields, little Myron remained at home, but not in the house itself. There were too many things in it that frightened him; the shadowy corners, the wide

chimney with its cavernous black interior, and the wooden hook fastened to the ceiling window which acted as a ventilator in wintertime for smoke from burning pine splinters that illuminated the house. Myron played outside therefore, gathering flowers and plucking their petals one by one, building houses out of sticks and chips that lay strewn about in the woodshed, or sunning himself on the abutment of the front wall of the dwelling and there listening to the chirping of the birds in the apple trees and gazing at the blue sky. He felt happy doing this, but soon his sunny features would become clouded as various thoughts entered his mind.

"What makes a person see the sky above, or the flowers, or daddy and mother?" he would ask himself. "With what do I hear? I can hear the call of the kite and the cackling of hens. But how?"

It seems to him that it is the mouth that enables him to see and hear. He opens his mouth: yes, just as he thought, he sees all and hears all . . .

"But wait, maybe it's the eyes?"

He closed his eyes. Oh! He can't see a thing. He opens them: he sees and hears. He closes them again: now he cannot see but still hears.

"Oh, so that's it! With my eyes I see. But with what do I hear?" Again he opens and closes his mouth, with no effect upon his hearing. He does likewise with his eyes, with the same result. A sudden idea strikes him. Suppose he should close his ears with his fingers. Then what? He sticks his fingers into his ears, and hears a dull continuous noise. What is that? What is this new noise that has replaced the call of the kite and the cackling of hens in his ears? He removes his fingers from his ears. In place of that noise he now hears the kite and the hens. He experiments again, with the same result.

"How come?" puzzles little Myron. "Ah, now I know. With my ears I hear the cackling, but with my fingers I hear that noise. Of course!" And to assure himself that his reasoning is correct, he goes through the whole process again.

When at noon the reapers returned home for lunch, Myron ran out to greet his father.

"Daddy! Daddy! I know something!"

"What do you know, my child?"

"I know that a person sees with his eyes."

His father smiled indulgently.

"With his ears he hears the cackling, and with his fingers a noise."

"How is that?"

"Well, when I don't stick my fingers into my ears, I hear the hen cackling, but when I do, then I hear a funny kind of a noise."

The father roared with laughter at this, while mother glancing severely at her offspring, waved her finger reprovingly at him and said:

"Hush, you scamp! You're getting old enough to marry soon, and yet you talk such nonsense. Why don't you ever think a little before coming out with such tommyrot? Mind you, a person hears everything with his ears."

"But why doesn't a person hear the cackling and this funny noise together?" asked Myron. "When his ears are not shut, he hears the cackling, but when he shuts them with his fingers, then he hears that funny noise. Just try it yourself." And to encourage his mother, he stuck his fingers in his ears.

His mother, however, made no attempt to follow his example; and though she continued to scold Myron, it was evident she could not find an answer to his question.

IV

Myron's greatest trouble was, as his mother complained, his inability to think the right way. He simply couldn't, that's all! No matter what he said there would usually be something wrong with it, and each time his mother or some one else would scold him for it.

"You big dunce, why don't you think before you speak, then you won't flounder around so much."

Despite all his efforts, however, poor little Myron simply could not think up something clever to say. And so the poor boy came to the conclusion that he could not think.

One time, for example, the whole family was seated around the table, having their dinner. Mother had just served some appetizing cabbage soup. Myron swallowed one or two spoonfuls, and suddenly realized that a hush had fallen upon all those present, so intent were they on their eating. Aha! He thought. Here's a fine chance for me to say something clever. But what could he say? That obviously required some thought; otherwise he was liable to say something that would cause others to laugh and his mother to scold him. So he began to think, so intently that the spoon he was carrying to his mouth suddenly froze in the air together with his hand. His eyes took on a faraway expression, and then fastened themselves on a picture of Virgin Mary hanging on the wall opposite him. Only his lips moved, as if he was whispering.

The servants noticed this and glanced significantly at one another,

while the maid whispered to old Ivan: "Watch him come out with something foolish."

"I wonder," little Myron began deliberately, "why the Holy Mother looks and looks, but still does not eat any soup."

Poor Myron! Despite his best efforts, he could not say something brighter. Perhaps that was because he was taught to think "like other people."

Smiles, laughter, his mother's scoldings including "you dunce of the 18th sort"—was enough to make Myron cry.

"Can I help it if I can't think like others?" he asked, wiping his tears away.

V

What will happen to Myron? What sort of a flower will grow out of this bud? It is not hard to foretell. There are enough such strange types in our villages. They stand out already at an early age, by their walk, appearance, words, and acts. And when such a child is forced to spend all his time in a crowded peasant hut, without any chance of getting an education, of learning anything, when his parents from the very start hammer into his head to think and act "like other people," then all his originality and native ability become stifled and from sheer disuse atrophied; and thus our Myron is liable to grow up into a poor lout of a farmer; worse yet, unable to direct his individuality and talents into channels of constructive work, he is liable to use them for purposes that are evil, and thereby become a criminal or a charlatan.

If, on the other hand, such a child happens to have loving parents who are not too poor, and who will sacrifice even their last penny for his education, then—what then? Do you think such a child's fate will be a better one, in the common sense of the word? Not at all. In school he will pursue knowledge with great eagerness, imbibe it as a sick man would fresh air, and then upon his graduation ardently propagate knowledge and high ideals among the ignorant and downtrodden . . . For this, however, he will become very familiar with prison walls,* undergo all manner of abuse from his fellow men, and end up by perishing in poverty, friendliness and alone in some forsaken spot; or carry out from prison some disease that will hurry him to his death in double-quick time; or losing faith in truth and ideals, turn to liquor and become a drunken sot. Poor little Myron! . . .

* The lot of the teacher of his people was not happy under the repressive political systems of Austria-Hungary and Russia. Franko himself was arrested and imprisoned three times for his work for the Ukrainian people in Western Ukraine.

BOOK REVIEWS

ACTA INNOCENTI PP. III. (1198-1216) A Registris Vaticanis aliisque eruit, introductione auxit, notisque illustravit P. Theodosius Haluscynskyj OSBM. Roma 1944. Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis xxxii+674.

At a time when Kremlin is systematically attempting to destroy Catholicism of the Eastern rite in Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine and Yugoslavia, in Rome the gigantic work of codifying the canonical law of the Eastern Church is proceeding at an accelerated pace. The codification has been going for a number of years and it is being directed by Cardinal Massimi. Already in 1938 communications were sent to all eastern rite churches informing them of the proposed codification and asking them for their opinions on it.

The Congregation of the Eastern Church was especially interested in gaining the cooperation in this connection of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In response, Metropolitan Andrew Sheptitsky dispatched to the Congregation his opinion based on a special report prepared for him by the Theological Academy in Lviv.

The views of the various sections of the Eastern Church became a basis for further research on the subject, for in the course of centuries the church has produced an interesting assortment of local church laws. This factor has to receive serious consideration at the Vatican if the new code of laws is to meet the needs of all the eastern church provinces, which the Holy See hopes to unify under its aegis.

What is bound to be of great help to the codification going on in Rome is a great tome embracing various papers and documents of Pope Innocent III, prepared by a Ukrainian Basilian monk, Rev. Theodosius Haluscynskyj, D.D.

The reason why the Pope's codification commission is devoting its attention to the period of Pope Innocent III can be found in the fact that during that period (1198-1216) Rome had established cordial relations with well nigh all the Eastern churches, several of which actually entered into a union with it. The handling then of various church affairs called for an adjudication of various canonical issues. Some definite juridical practice had to be set up. One of the most important, Ecumenical Councils, the IV Lateran Council (1215), even

adopted several important measures concerning the relations of the Uniate churches with the Apostolic See and between the eastern and western churches in those places where they existed close to one another.

During the pontificate of Innocent III and for the first time following the break of Ukraine with Rome, determined efforts were made by the latter to bring about a reunion with that portion of Ukraine which was then known as the Galician-Volhynian State. Thus in 1207 the Pope sent his envoy, Cardinal Gregory, to Ukraine for the purpose of effecting a reunion. In 1215, as a result of the Hungarian occupation, the same Pope had direct access to the Ukrainian Church and he went to the extent of inviting the bishops of Ukraine to attend the Fourth Lateran Council.

Rev. Haluscynskyj's volume on Innocent III is obviously a result of much labor. He has not only collected in it all of the documents of the Pope, which are bound to be of considerable aid to the Codification Commission, but he has also prefaced them with a scholarly introduction and exhaustive bibliography.

The bibliography includes all of the more important historical works covering the period up to Innocent III, as well as the more important monographs of all the peoples of the Western, Greek and Slav worlds. Naturally there is no lack in it of Ukrainian works written respecting that time.

A special section of the volume deals with historical outlines of all the peoples of the Eastern Church, who during the pontificate of Innocent III were in contact with him for one reason or another. Among them is a historical outline of the Armenian nation at the turn of the 13th century, as well as the tragic period in Byzantine history during the time of the so-called Latin Empire in Constantinople. The author takes the reader through the free Balkan countries until he finally reaches Western Ukraine during the time of the formation by Prince Roman Mstyslav of the Galician-Volhynian State.

Rev. Haluscynskyj's book is a fine piece of work. He reveals wide perspective in the historical section and fine thoroughness in the compilation of his source material. The volume is bound to have more lasting value than a mere aid to the Papal Codification Commission. The Holy Congregation of the Eastern Church is to be commended for making possible the publication of this work.

N. D. CZUBATYJ

THE GREAT RETREAT: the growth and decline of communism in Russia, by Nicholas S. Timasheff, New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1946, pp. 470.

The very title of this remarkably scholarly work itself suggests the historical picture depicted by Professor Timasheff of the disillusioning non-realization of numerous idealistic communistic aspirations nurtured propagandistically by Soviet leadership prior to the thirties, marked by an unavoidable recourse to brusque authoritarian administration and substantial modification, of earlier contemplated reforms in the economic and political arenas. Although the paramount stress rests upon an historical delineation of the foremost forces leading up to the revolution and after, the author nonetheless demonstrates keen analytical power in his comparative evaluation of the many explanations that have been elaborated upon in print concerning the social, political, and economic phenomena in the two respective periods.

The organization of this book is admirably set forth in sharp contrast to that of any other work in English purporting to convey an accurate understanding of the manifold experiences undergone by the peoples of the Soviet Union, and not solely those of Russia, which the author's title would seem erroneously to indicate. In a genuine sense it was logically rendered inevitable in order to conform with the author's major thesis, namely that the hopeful formulation of high-sounding plans for a radical transformation of society in willful disregard of the cumulative changes and tendencies of its integral historical past spells disappointment that can be relieved only in some interminable degree by rationalized re-annexation with some vital parts of the institutional past. Consequently, a well-grounded description of the leading economic and political developments antedating the Revolution is offered within the scope of what the author classifies as a "dynamic view", which quite satisfactorily debunks the vulgar misconception that not until the Soviet had arrived upon the official scene, had technologic modernization of Europe. Moreover, this indispensable background forms the basis for the author's commendable technique of achieving the highest possible objectivity by pursuing genetically the historical events that ensued later, accompanied by cool appraisal and considerable referential support in the appendices. As a result, his descriptive and evaluatory accounts of the peculiar position of the "dark horse" communist party, the special circumstances surrounding its unexpected victory to power, the instrumental neces-

sity for the dictatorship toward ends of bureaucratic enforcement in a planned society, the incalculable hardships and real costs incurred in the mad pursuit of unrealizable short-run economic ends, and the eventually purposive rediscovery of the Fatherland, all with their respective impacts upon the institutional apparatus of family, school, church, and social classes, provide the anxious reader with a veritable mine of reliably valuable information upon which to form an empirically-founded understanding of the *Great Experiment*.

It is indeed unfortunate that this highly commendable book has not received as much publicity and public acceptance as it should. But that seems to be the destiny of all long-run valuable contributions to human understanding which are honestly devoid of romantic specularity and questionable novelty. In parts the treatment is weak, as for instance on the multi-national issue where the author seems to assume a ready desire on the part of non-Russian nationals to operate harmoniously with their Russian neighbors in a more wholesome framework of political organization, especially after their cruel experiences of the recent past and present. Yet, on the whole, the work powerfully validates the author's final stated position as concerns the world at large that "if the advanced countries fail to solve the major problems of the postwar world—that of collective security and of full employment—a 'time of trouble' may emerge and in its course the challenge of Communism, not as it really exists, but as distorted by ignorance of false pretenses, may besome a major threat . . . International revolution is not dead, but rather in a state of suspended animation."

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

DEFEAT IN VICTORY. Jan Ciechanowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States During the War Years. Doubleday & Comapny. New York, 1947. 397 pp.

Jan Ciechanowski, the author of *Defeat in Victory*, has timed the publication of his revealing account of events that led to the subjugation of his country well. The story, arranged in a well-balanced manner, authenticates what has long been accepted as the truth, namely, that Poland, just like Yugoslavia, has been let down by the Allied powers, who in 1939 had gone to war against the Nazi Germany in order to honor their pledge to defend Polish independence. The book dramati-

cally details the Polish tragedy which has been enacted behind the close curtains in London, Moscow and Washington.

The author relates that as long ago as 1940, the Polish cause had had full support of the British government. He witnessed the exchange of warm handshaking between Winston Churchill and General Sikorski. It was "Winnie" who emotionally exclaimed: "We are comrades in life and in death. We shall conquer together or die together." And many Poles did die in the fjords of Narvik, in the sandy beaches of Dieppe and in other far-flung sections of the Allied front.

Sent to Washington as Poland's last Ambassador, Mr. Ciechanowski was overwhelmed by the late President Roosevelt's strong sympathy for the Polish cause.

The Soviet government under its chief, Stalin, was extremely generous, offering innumerable promises and guarantees. Stalin declared that he wanted a "strong and independent Poland." Of course these declaration were made at a time when Soviet armies were being constantly pushed back by the seemingly invincible German *Wehrmacht*. The Soviets unequivocally relinquished all claims to Ukrainian and White Ruthenian territories, which were part of the Polish state, and which the Soviets had obtained following the Hitler-Stalin deal in 1939.

But in 1943 things began to change. The Russians took the offensive not only on the Eastern front, but also in the diplomatic field. Several thousand Polish war prisoners who were to be released by the Soviets, never saw freedom. Some 10,000 Polish officers who were to be transferred to the Middle East, disappeared suddenly, only to be found later in a common grave in the Katyn Wood.

In 1944, during Stanislaw Mikolajczyk's visit to Washington, Mr. Ciechanowski heard the late President Roosevelt remonstrate about the "unreasonableness" of Poles in refusing to face the fact that there were "five times more Russians than Poles" in the territory known as "east of the Curzon Line." But it was in Moscow that the Poles learned about the final decision as to Poland's eastern boundary. On October 12, 1944, when on President Roosevelt's insistence Mikolajczyk met with Stalin, Churchill, Eden and Harriman, the cards were laid down. The Polish Premier was told that for the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union the Curzon Line had long been accepted by the American government as a just solution of the problem. When Mikolajczyk further protested, Molotov came out bluntly with the whole story. Writes Mr. Ciechanowski:

"At this point Molotov made a surprising statement. He said that he saw it was necessary to remind those present that, at Teheran President Roosevelt had expressed his complete agreement with the Curzon line as the Polish-Soviet frontier, and regarded it as a just solution, and the President had merely added that, for the time being, he preferred that his agreement on this point should not be made public. He (Molotov), then turned to Churchill and Harriman, and challenged them to deny his statement. They did not do so."

At Yalta, however, both the United States and Great Britain had sanctioned Russia's seizure of Western Ukraine and part of White Ruthenia, and had recognized a Lublin group of Polish communists as "representative government." Later on there were no protests when "free und unfettered elections" promised at Yalta were postponed indefinitely.

The rest of the book is devoted to the further appeasement of the Soviet Union regarding Poland which culminated in a complete abandonment of the Polish government-in-exile.

Mr. Ciechanowski's book is a splendid record of an Ambassador and patriot of Poland who witnessed the destruction of his country. In presenting his account of the inside diplomatic story of the betrayal of Poland, he has done a service to history.

From the Ukrainian point of view, Mr. Ciechanowski would certainly have done a great service to the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations had he explained that the Russian claims on the eastern part of pre-war Poland had no more logical basis than the claims of any other nation. He should have emphatically stated that although the Polish element was in the minority in that territory, neither were there Russians, to the contrary-Russian propaganda. It seems that the case of Poland would have been thrown a far different light if her leaders had come to the realization that their timid approach to the Ukrainian question could only be to the advantage of one and only one power: the Soviet Union.

However, *Defeat in Victory* has its prime significance in the fact that it exposes our utterly amoral and cynical "realism" in world politics. We have paid a huge price in our sacrifice of our moral principles for an illusory "unity" of the Big Three.

The author of *Defeat in Victory* concludes his extraordinary account with the despairing judgment that the United Nation, under the guidance of the Soviet Union, has been "reduced to the role of guard over a huge international prison, in which previously free nations find themselves locked up."

The book should be read by all those who are interested in the fate of small nations, because the case of Poland, just as the case of Yugoslavia and of the Baltic States, is only another instance of betrayal of Christianity for the benefit of Soviet communism.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

A GUIDE TO THE SOVIET UNION. By William M. Mandel. 1946. The Dial Press. New York. xiii + 511 pp.

"This book is a factual description of the Soviet Union of today . . . It is not an eyewitness account, but a documented study." In such words the author informs the reader about the genesis of his work and at once reveals its severe limitations. Mr. Mandel undertakes to give us a "factual" description of the Soviet state on the basis of materials published on the subject of the Soviet Union. The question arises whether it is altogether possible to do a serious study of a country without visiting it. Could a book resting on a mass of conflicting literature serve as a "guide" to the studying of the Soviet Union?

Inasmuch as the Soviet Union today is a hermetically sealed country, any possibility of a free exchange of men seeking to learn facts is excluded. Moreover, even those who have visited Russia and profess to have acquired an adequate knowledge of the latter, are somehow timid in expressing their supposedly authoritative views on the subject, the reason for this simply being that no one over had the opportunity to study Soviet life comprehensively.

Outside of such reports, the writer interested in the Soviet Union has to resort to those sources furnished by the official government agencies. He cannot use any semi-official or private statements or declarations, because none such are to be found in the Soviet Union despite the fact that historically it is self-evident that the Soviet regime had and has still considerable opposition, the leaders of which having their various followings, each with detailed programs and plans. On such a basis the term "factual description" immediately loses validity.

Such considerations are particularly necessary in a review of Mr. Mandel's book, *A Guide to the Soviet Union*. Whatever degree of success he might have attained in his attempt was at once doomed in that the author exclusively uses the official publications of the Soviet Union. He completely ignores other sources which certainly would have contributed towards a correcting of the one-sided picture which is drawn.

As a result there is what is dangerously near to an out-and-out Soviet self-portrait.

Thus Mr. Mandel is found emphasizing that the state which up to the Revolution of 1917 was an empire today is not only a full union of federated states, in reality independent nations, but even a "Soviet League of Nations." Of course, the author of this new liberal policy becomes Stalin. He gave existence to the new nations, such as Ukraine, and is helping the other nations on the path toward their independence. The author stresses in an authoritative manner that before 1917 Ukraine not only was not recognized but its name, its language as well was banned. Now, we would be told, Ukraine has all the characteristics of an independent state, federated with other such independent republics in a union.

Only a few months ago we read in the press about the vast purges in the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, ordered by the Politburo in Moscow and executed by its tested agents in Ukraine. How can one believe that Ukraine is a really free republic when its official are being purged upon order from Moscow? Why is it that the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev was "purged" because its professors and academicians recounted the past of the Ukrainian people following the historical school of the greatest historian of Ukraine, Michael Hrushevsky?

Had Mr. Mandel consulted other sources, he certainly would have given strong ground to believe that the majority of the Ukrainians are bitterly opposed to the Stalinist regime. He would have learned about the vast Ukrainian underground, known as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Then perhaps he would have been more cautious in classifying the Soviet Union as a federation, much less a league of free and independent Soviet peoples.

The author ought to see Lviv personally, the capital of Western Ukraine, which up to 1939 never was under Russian authority. Russians did not constitute even half a percent of its population. Today, after two years of Soviet domination, it is 70 percent Russian.

He goes on further, picturing Ukraine as a great world power because of her natural resources, culture of the people, etc. But in reality Ukraine could only be such upon ridding herself of alien Russian domination. Following the communist official viewpoint literally on Ukraine, Mr. Mandel parted totally from existing realities, thus presenting an entirely false picture of Ukraine.

There is a staggering amount of evidence that the same is true

of other non-Russian peoples, who, according to Soviet constitution, enjoy full independence and sovereignty, which they supposedly exercise over their national territories.

Mr. Mandel's analysis of Soviet workers and their standard of living faithfully continues to follow the same official party line. In publishing his book, the author seems to have performed a splendid service to the Soviet Union by conjuring up a vision that is a delight to the Soviet official. Yet an impartial reader would undoubtedly be grievously led astray should he follow this "guide" to knowledge of the Soviet Union and her peoples oppressed by the Kremlin dictatorship.

N. D. CZUBATYJ

UKRAINIAN AUTHORS—READER, Published by Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1946, Winnipeg, Canada, v+193 pp. Foreword by Prof. G. W. Simson.

The teaching of Slav languages in the United States and Canada has become an actual problem for two reasons. The first reason hinges on the obviously increased importance of the Slav peoples after World War II. Phenomena of economic, political, as well as, of a cultural nature render it a veritable necessity that the Anglo-Saxons learn the languages of these peoples with whom they shall have to live in peace or perhaps meet in eventual conflict. Of course, the learning of the Russian language would take first place in order of priority, but certainly not the only one to be learned.

The second reason revolves on the fact that in the territorial areas of the United States and of Canada, live numerous groups of the Slav people, such as the Ukrainians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Russians and so forth, the children of whom understandably use in practical life the English language, but nevertheless nurture the language of their parents and forefathers. Normally, as a matter of fact, they learn their respective Slav language from their parents within the domestic environment, and in many cases, even deepen their understanding and sharpen their skill in the language through formal course training elsewhere.

The Ukrainian immigration over the course of years has tended to concentrate in the eastern sections of the United States and in the western prairie region of Canada. In these areas the Ukrainian language has been incorporated into the curriculum of many a normal, as well as secondary, school where the student is taught the tongue in addition

to the other accepted courses. On the university level the first chair in the Ukrainian language and literature was established at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada. In recent years, lectures on Ukrainian literature have been given by Professor Clarence A. Manning at Columbia University in New York. Presently, plans are being formulated for the establishment of several more chairs in the study of Ukrainian language and literature in the Canadian universities of Edmonton and Winnipeg.

The foremost handicap in the effective teaching of both Ukrainian language and literature has been the unfortunate lack of an adequate textbook suitable to students who vary widely in their acquaintance with these subject. Because of this situation, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee undertook to create a special section devoted to the preparation of Ukrainian handbooks. As a result, the first contribution of this group is the work under review, the product of a collective effort on the part of several experienced contributors.

The book consists of three parts: (1) the selected texts of prominent Ukrainian writers, (2) literary biographical notes to each text, and finally, (3) a vocabulary of rare words. The many texts are very carefully selected with a view of respect toward the psychological principles of linguistic learning, progressively arranged from the simple to the more complex. Thus the first part of the selections clings more to the elementary, but develops into the stage of such masterful prose as that of Marko Vovchok and of Ukrainian poetry as represented by Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko and others. The textual section ends with the dramatical work, *Natalka Poltavka*, by Ivan Kotlarevsky. A practical question may be raised as to the selection of this last text in view of the many lingual impurities injected there by characters humorously reflecting Russian influence, and might well prove unnecessarily difficult and even useless to the student of best Ukrainian.

The literary biographical notes are short and sufficiently instructive for the student. The vocabulary also manifests an adequacy of words for the reader to understand with minimum difficulty the numerous choice passages of these selections. In these and other respects the Ukrainian Canadian Committee is to be complimented for the opportune production of this work which assuredly can become highly useful not only in Canada but also in the United States.

NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ

