

Photos by:  
Bohdan Kolos



# СТУДЕНТ

# STUDENT

# ETUDIANT

ГАЗЕТА  
УКРАЇНСЬКОГО  
СТУДЕНТСТВА  
КАНАДИ

Canada's Newspaper for Ukrainian Students

AUGUST 1974 Vol. 7 No. 29 25¢

For nearly three weeks various Canadians, individually and in groups, fasted in front of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Their common goal was to pressure the Soviet government through public opinion into improving Valentyn Moroz's prison conditions.

On July 1st, Valentyn Moroz began a hunger strike in his strict isolation cell in Vladimir Prison Camp #2. His condition is still unknown as we go to press.

Confirmation of Moroz's hunger strike came from various sources. As the first week passed, it became obvious that this man, now a symbol of intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union, would rather die than continue a sub-human existence.

The urgency for action was obvious and a group of five started a vigil in front of the Embassy. Lada Hirny, Andriy Bandera, Mykola Lypowecy, Andriy Semotiuk and Mykola Bidniak parked themselves in a van in front of the Embassy and stayed there day and night for the next three weeks.

Lypowecy, Bandera and Semotiuk were from the Committee for the Defence of Valentyn Moroz and brought the organized help of the Committee with them. Hirny and Bidniak, although not members of the Committee, joined the hunger strikers. A group of four full-time supporting workers in Ottawa helped to keep the machine rolling, while in Toronto the Committee's office was used to its full extent.

All of the original five were forced to hospital before giving up their hunger strike. For Hirny and Bandera it meant not eating for seventeen days.

In Winnipeg, a group of six fasted for eleven days before stopping, having felt that they had achieved some success.

The Soviet Embassy remained relatively quiet publicly but complained every day to the Department of External Affairs. They refused to discuss the Moroz case with the strikers in the presence of the media.

On four different occasions Andrei Sakharov was contacted by telephone. Sakharov, the father of the Soviet atomic bomb and presently the leading human rights advocate and dissident in Moscow, failed to provide further information about Moroz's state of health. He knew Moroz's strike had begun, but suggested that Moroz

## MOROZ DEMO

would be force-fed rather than allowed to die. Sakharov appealed to world statesmen to intervene on Moroz's behalf and specifically made a statement to Canadian parliamentarians asking that they take action.

A telephone call to the Vladimir prison produced only confused, frightened officials unable to cope with the situation.

The Ottawa hunger strike was successful in making Moroz's name a household word. In Ottawa especially, the strike was covered by all forms of media - radio, television and newspapers - to the point of possible oversaturation. The hunger strikers began to complain about the unprecedented amount of sensational coverage, because not enough was being said about Moroz, the man and his ideas. Only later did opinionated articles and editorials appear in support of Moroz. Such articles, notably by James Bayrs, a U of T political science professor, and George Woodcock, the leading literary critic in Canada, demonstrated the breadth of concern for Moroz.

All levels and segments of Canadian society showed their concern by adding their support. Over 3,000 telegrams were received by the Canadian government asking for action. The Canadian Jewish Congress, groups of Poles, Czechs, Estonians, Lithuanians, Hungarians, Italians, French, Swedes visited the van to show their solidarity with the strikers. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Amnesty International and leading members of the three main Canadian political parties, along with various other political splinter groups, visited and gave their support. Heinrich Boell, the German Nobel Prize winner for literature who received Alexander Solzhenitsyn upon his expulsion also sent a telegram of support and concern. Premiers Davis, Lougheed

cont. back page

# СТУДЕНТ

## STUDENT ETUDIANT

Our new address is "Student", 394 Bloor St. West, Toronto, Ontario. Phone no. 967-0640. Suite 4.

## Letters to the editor

August 14, 1974

Dear Editor,

It is common practice in United Front actions for the various groups involved to state their politics and the common ground on which they stand. It is also desirable to state the political position of any prisoner being defended. Why was this not done with the whole Moroz action leading up to and including the hunger protest and in Ottawa?

Was the hunger protest organized by the Committee for the Defence of Valentyn Moroz? We are told that the Committee voted against the hunger protest and was only "shamed" into participation after the action had already begun. But even during and after the action the hunger strikers themselves denied the role of the Committee, saying that they were merely a group of individuals who felt strongly about the issue.

If we Ukrainians were confused about the whole thing, the Canadian press certainly was not. They reported the action as one organized by the Moroz Committee and the public accepted it as such. Privately they answered the question "Who are these people?" with -- "A bunch of right-wing Ukrainians."

And so the questions arise: "What is the Moroz Committee?" "What are its politics?" The action itself would seem to indicate that it is broadly conservative, appealing to the older generation and allied to the right wing. The participation of Diefenbaker, Yuzyk, the Church fathers and older people point to this. Not everyone identifies with this block. But more serious reservations expressed by individuals towards the Committee and their hesitation to participate are above all a product of the refusal of the Committee to disassociate itself from the politics of the extreme right wing, notably those of OUN-b.

Individuals and groups who hold socialist opinions and would have liked to participate in the protest felt they could not support an action closely tied to the apron and purse strings of an extreme right-wing party. For anyone who takes his liberal or left-wing principles seriously this diffidence is understandable in view of a confused situation and a potentially compromising involvement.

Such a political clarification is an important matter and one hopes that the Committee will soon do this if it hopes to include the participation of student and worker groups in further actions. In order that similar actions may not be jeopardized in the future, we suggest that a

careful statement defining the nature of the commitment be made before an action is undertaken.

A human rights action can only be respected if it is unaligned with party politics, and if this non-alignment is reflected in the membership composition and financial independence of an organizing Committee. (A public accounting of funds?)

Would the Moroz Committee, for instance, be willing to defend a dissenter like Shumuk, whose stand is clearly that of the humanitarian, the man who struggled for democracy and human rights. He is a man who has been imprisoned both for his membership in the Communist Party and for his participation in OUN's struggle and who now criticizes the ideology, the history and practice of both.

He would seem to be the ideal candidate for a human rights committee -- unfortunately for Shumuk, he strongly attacks OUN. And in this case, one suspects, a human rights position does not apply.

Unless the disassociation from the right-wing parties is made, the impression will remain that the Committee has something to hide.

S. Kovalenko  
T. Tkachuk  
M. Vynnychuk

### МОВНИ ЗАВВАЖЕННЯ

/До статті Ю. Джуравця/

Ю. Джуравець /"Студент", лютий 1974/ без сумніву має чимало слушності в багатьох своїх твердженнях щодо нашої літературної мови, як теж щодо мови галичан. Ці довгий час жили відірвані від Східної України й не "освоїлись" з деякими словами чи висловами, прийнятими в нашій літературній мові, і вважають їх російськими або пришеlejцями з російської мови.

Все ж таки з деякими твердженнями Ю. Джуравця важко погодитись, бо їх ніяк не можна підтягти під філологічне розуміння.

1. Не можна визнаувати засвоєння чужих слів у нашій мові за їхнім оригінальним походженням, але з якою мовою безпосередньо вони до нас прийшли? Наприклад, звичайне слово **петрушка** відбуло свою дорогу до нашої мови з латинської через німецько-польську, а від нас помянувало до російської. Тож ніхто не каже в нас, що "петрушка" це латинське слово. Так само, коли на Україні вживають, скажімо, слова **болт** /наше - засув, прогонці, сворінг/, то воно в даному випадку вникається до нашої мови не з англійської, але з російської. Тим то звичайно кажемо, що це російське слово або під впливом російської мови, хоч саме слово англійське.

2. Розвиток нашої термінології, природний і притаманний нашій мові, був насильно обірваний на переломі 20-х і 30-х рр. нашого століття, а наших мовознавців знищено за "мовний націоналізм", тобто за самотуність української мови. І це треба мати на думці, коли говоримо про сучасну мову на Україні.

Мовна політика Москви йде за тим, щоб нашу мову якнайбільше уподібнити до російської з кожного погляду. Сялою заводять російську

*In the last issue, we offered readers a comment on the WACL executive meeting in Guatemala. Here is a closer look at the Guatemalan body politic, taken from the pages of that radical rag, The Guardian (April 3, 1974):*

CENTRAL AMERICAN JOURNEY IV: Guatemala City

## In the shadow of the death squad

THERE ARE no political prisoners in Guatemala. They are shot before there is time to register them in that category. The current estimate is that 10,000 have "disappeared" since General Carlos Arana Osorio took over as president in 1970, but official figures are impossible to come by.

In the town, families are often too frightened to visit the morgue. In the countryside, the disappearance of peasants passes unnoticed, but the archive of the local newspaper has yards of space devoted to cuttings about those who have disappeared. It has become a familiar pattern, part of the Guatemalan "way of life."

"You became used to it quite quickly," one man told me. "That's the terrifying part." He has often received threatening letters and twice had to leave the country. "My brother has been threatened since the elections and does not leave home for the moment."

These are not guerrillas, or men notably Left in their political opinions, but people who in Britain would be regarded as pillars of society. For the threat from the Left in Guatemala, or the hope of radical change, has now all but disappeared. The only surviving guerrilla leader of the significant armed groups that affected Guatemalan politics in the 1960s, Cesar

Montes, is holed up in the hills somewhere, hiding his time.

The violence in Guatemala today comes from the Government, and no one doubts that most of the killings are done by the army -- under various disguises. The latest is the "death squad," a phenomenon which has appeared elsewhere in Latin America, notably in Brazil. It first appeared in Guatemala in January, with an announcement that it would operate "against all delinquents." Within two weeks it had claimed 15 victims, and on each body it had left a visiting card.

In the town, kidnappings are common. If the victim is

prominent enough, and if the newspapers get to hear of it in time, the Government may be forced to admit that the army or the police does indeed hold a prisoner. The Opposition here had hoped that the election campaign would be reasonably free from terror, but the Christian Democrat candidate for the position of mayor of the town of Zacapa "disappeared" in December. When a substitute Christian Democrat candidate eventually won the election, he had to flee for safety to the capital. Just before the election three of his student supporters were liquidated.

Richard Gott

## Letters—

### Always Welcome

Українська мебельна фірма

РОЧЕСТЕР

зафундувала СУСК-ові

друкарську мшинуку.

ДЯКУЄМО!

термінологію в нашу мову, як технічну, військово-географічну тощо? Отже й тому маємо: льотчик /літун/, снаряд /стрілюю/, взвод /чота/, землероб /хлібороб/, Ровно /Рівне/, Врест /Берестя/, Белград /Београд/ і т.д. і т.д. Тому й зрозуміле, що слово **літун** розуміють на Україні в другому значенні. Однак, коли заглянути до "Словника української мови" /Київ - 1973/, то під словом "літун" подане його первісне значення /"льотчик", а вже на другому місці інше. Подібно й щодо слова "космос" там сказано: "Те саме, що **всесвіт**". Отже, можна так розглядати багато лексик, яка виявляє іншу розвинутою тенденцію в нашій мові, а яка тепер неможлива в Україні. Проте, немає чого журитися, що в сучасній Україні не розуміють от хоч би спортової термінології /кошиківка, відбиванка тощо/. Засвоїти її собі це тільки питання часу. Адже, для прикладу, чеки у свій час радикально віджили свою мову від чужих напливів, як ніхто зі слов'ян, завівши чимало неологізмів.

З Певне, можна й сказати "говорити по телефону", але це теж напевне, що так сказати це не в душі української мови. Покликуючись на кнївського професора, мовляв, ми "говоримо

язиком", а не "телефоном", автор ніби вважає це доказом правильності "говорити по телефону". Ну, ми ж кажемо "йти дорогою", "дивитись віконцем", "говорити загадками" тощо й тощо. За згаданим професором можна б твердити, що ми "їдемо югами", а не "дорогою", що ми "дивимось очима", а не "віконцем", "говоримо язиком", а не "загадками"... Так висловувати не поважно. Кожна мова має свої ідіоми! Мабуть автор не збагнув, чому кнївський професор саме так висловився. Нині багато чого говорять на Україні, та це ще не доказ правильності того чи того.

Слідкуючи за мовознавчою літературою, за намаганнями протиставитись огріхам проти літературної мови на Україні, можна там бачити безуспішність одних намагань, бо така мовка політика. З одного боку ми бачимо Білодіда /а то й Бєлодеда!/, який обстоє, скажімо слово "землероб" /ніби українець може "робити земля"!, а з другого - роблять нагику, от хоч би, на Анто-ненка-Давидовича, бо й він зачепив питання букви "г".

Тож, беручи собі за аргумент сучасну мовну практику на Україні, треба пам'ятати тамешні природні умовини для української літературної мови:

Антін В. Івахнюк

## just ads

Just after the First World War, Karl Kraus published a book entitled *The Last Days of Mankind*. It was composed largely of extracts from the daily press.

"Homin" and "Smakh" will get the compilers they deserve. Leave them alone. Come and take over STUDENT.

But have the decency to announce yourself - write SUSK at: 394 Bloor St. West, Suite 4, Toronto, Ontario. Or phone: (416) 967-0640.

STUDENT will publish  
a special issue on  
THE HISTORY OF UKRAINIANS  
IN CANADA

We would appreciate any pertinent information, especially on neglected and little-known matters (e.g. concentration camps, labour history, the CP). We also request the loan of photographs and documents.

Phone: EM 4-5036

FIRCHUK TEXTILES LTD.

Parcels to Europe

658 Queen St. W., Toronto 3, Ont.



\*\*

HAMILTON BRANCH

Phone: 549-2005

293 Ottawa Street N., Hamilton, Ontario.

# review

Danylo Shumuk, *ZA SKHIDNIM OBRIEM*

(Paris-Baltimore, 1974)


After an internal debate lasting some seven months, OUN-m decided to go ahead with the publication of Shumuk's memoirs. The decision was taken in spite of the possibility that certain sections of the book had been tampered with by the KGB (e.g. the meeting between Shumuk and Horbovyj is said to have been an impossibility). It is precisely around the question of the book's authenticity that the debate has centred until now (with the OUN-b replying through Dyadychenko's recent article in *Homin*).

The book, however, hangs together as a whole; the main thread running through it is Shumuk's gradual disillusionment with the ideology and practice of the nationalists during and immediately after World War II.

Shumuk's own stand is very much in line with that of the democratic human rights movement. Evil people - he concludes - will sully even the purest ideals. Our efforts at the moment should be channelled toward making politics more democratic, raising the level of political culture among the mass of Ukrainians and opposing

the excesses of ideology which have led to an arrest in critical thinking and opened the way for wanton cruelty and baseness. An ideology based on Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Dostov does not readily obtain support and should be dropped as an anachronism.

None of this is new or incredible - much stronger attacks have



Даніло Шумук

been made on OUN as a whole by its own members. In fact, Shumuk merely reiterates the conclusions reached by the nationalists after they had been exposed to the reality in Central and Eastern Ukraine. The discussions they had with these people led to a reassessment of their programme at the 3rd OUN Conference in 1943.

This experience is presented in a more comprehensive way and is better documented in Lev Shankovsky's *Pokhidni Hrupy OUN* (Munich 1958). The value of Shumuk's book lies in its personal nature as comment and evaluation. It will certainly provide cannon fodder for all sides in an old debate.

The pathos of the last lines of the book points to Shumuk's realization that his non-alignment will find him few friends and will lead to his being viewed as a crank by all concerned:

"Your ideas, Danylo, your struggle and your suffering are completely unnecessary to anyone; you will die and no one will have a good word for you - some will even condemn you. And you will be condemned not only by your enemies and by strangers, but even by those close to you, by relatives and former friends, and some will simply call you a failure who couldn't make a good job of his life.

- I know, Slavko, I know it, but I cannot and will not do otherwise". Mykola Dubchak

# In Response to M. Vynnychuk

"Every epoch dreams its successor."

— Michelet

Vynnychuk's article in the last issue of *STUDENT* reaches out to the problem of Ukrainian emigré politics, but fails to grasp it firmly. "The Decay of a Tradition" is largely a subjectively oriented response to the question at hand; it suffers from a lack of grounding in the historical and social experience of the nationalist movement.

I, too, will make my subjective disposition toward this political experience quite clear, but this can only be fully explained in the context of the objective political practice of the Ukrainian nationalists and the historical experience that has projected them toward decay and demise.

Today's youth finds little to attract it in the political organs of the various nationalist factions, be they the Bandera or Melnyk group, or the "Dviykari". And today's youth is the most politicized generation since the Second World War. Why do these youth steer clear of the nationalist line? The answer can be found in the history and practice of these currents.

## In Western Ukraine

As far as political programme is concerned, Ukrainian nationalism in the 30's finds its origin in the reaction of left social-democratic parties of the early 20th century in Ukraine. The strategy adopted by these groups in the revolutionary period failed to establish an independent Ukrainian state. The worker- and peasant-based parties led by leftist Ukrainian intellectuals, most particularly the participants in the Central Rada and the Petliura government, were unable to seize upon the massive social crisis of the declining imperialist powers and to forge a successful and enduring revolution of national liberation.

Western Ukraine consequently remained under Polish state domination, while the East bank was swept away in the October Revolution and the ensuing civil war.

As far as a mass base is concerned, the nationalist movement sought it primarily in the peasantry of Western Ukraine, the origins of most of our parents. Their leadership core was drawn from nationalist intellectuals and students, whose social origins are to be found in the petit-bourgeois and clerical strata of the urban population.

The Ukrainian nationalist movement solidified organizationally in 1929 under the name of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Its programme rejected the socialist currents of the early part of the century and leaned heavily on the example and ideology of Western European fascism. The latter became an

even more powerful pole of attraction as fascists seized power in Italy and Germany, propagating the ideas of "the nation above all" and emulating the virtues of will, obedience and faith over those of democracy and rationality. (Mednycky points this out clearly in the last issue's article "Integral Nationalism". However, he fails to characterize this ideology in motion within the Ukrainian historical experience.)

It would be scientifically incorrect to characterize the OUN as fascist. It is certainly appropriate, though, to examine the impact of fascist ideology on the movement. Its influence is clearly visible.

## The Second World War

As the war unfolded on the Eastern front, the Ukrainian nationalist movement encountered a series of contradictions in social-political practice that did not square with its ideology and programme. The OUN and the Western Ukrainian peasantry experienced in the most brutal manner the advance of the Nazi armies. The Nazis exploited the legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainian people for justice and national equality by paying lip-service to these aims.

At the same time, the Nazi administration apparatus (Reichskommissariat) ordered political repressions, mass murders and deportations to the factories of the Reich. This experience, amongst others, provoked a split in the OUN into a Melnyk (original leader) and Bandera (the "radical" alternative) factions. Melnyk wanted to maintain a greater degree of collaboration with the German state; Bandera counselled reliance on "vlasni sily" (our own resources).

The next encounter with complexity occurred in 1941 with the organization of OUN missions to eastern Ukraine. Both factions dispatched units to cities in the east in order to mobilize support for their struggle. These units (pokhidni hrupy) were confronted with a population whose world-view, whose aspirations had been most affected by 20 years of Soviet rule. Possessing a healthy hatred for the Stalinist system, the workers and peasants of Eastern Ukraine included social and political rights in their concept of a just society. The goal of "an independent Ukraine, and we'll worry about the social system after we have our own flag" was simply not enough. These pressures (and revelations) upon the nationalist units found their concrete expression in the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN in 1943, when a growing left-wing current pushed through a social programme for the organization and endorsed statements rejecting fascism, the ideal of the heroic leader (vozhd') and stating open support for democracy in the fullest sense. Vynnychuk does not err

when he says that this programme "reads almost point by point like the manifesto of the Vietcong liberation front."

The most developed expression of the left turn of the OUN can be seen in the politics of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the guerrilla army. Arising in the forests of north-western Ukraine in 1943, the UPA represents the pinnacle of the nationalist movement, both in terms of programme and practice.

The famous UPA ideologues, Petro Poltava and Osyyp Diakiv-Hornovyy, hammered out the critical points of the nationalist programme in their articles and pamphlets. Among their statements were the following: the Ukrainian nationalist movement does not struggle against the Russian people; it struggles against the Russian social and political elite (Hornovyy, *The Idea and the Deed*, pp. 153-67); the Ukrainian vanguard seeks equality with and the liberation of all oppressed nations (*ibid.*, pp. 99-135); the future society must be classless, free of all exploitation and oppression of national groups (P. Poltava, "Konceptcia Ukrainsoy Revolutsii").

Those who attacked the Marxists and the TUSM left-wing leadership at last year's CESUS congress in Toronto on these same issues should do a bit of basic reading. They'll find that history teaches lessons more valuable than the instructions they got from the OUN political heavies upstairs.

The process of the Ukrainian question in actual struggle threw up these and other contradictions in the nationalists' strategy of national liberation. The war years produced a political current in the OUN that had in fact been rejected at the organization's founding in 1929 (there were, of course, differences between the left wings of both periods).

The left wing progressively differentiated itself until the 1950's, its emigré representatives maintaining the primary link with the embattled UPA in Ukraine. (Read Poltava's debates with Bandera in the early fifties for a closer look). The history of the left wing in emigration can be traced in the political circles of Maystrenko and Bahrianyj and the revolutionary newspaper "Vpered".

## In the free world of McCarthyism

The Ukrainian emigration to the west was integrated as part of the labour market, receiving, as all emigrant groups do, the most meagre returns for its labour. The community was overwhelmingly

working-class, and was bestowed with the appropriate social insecurity by the powers-that-be (scorned as "aliens", "fascists", etc., afforded little protection of their right to jobs and fair wages).

That social insecurity was a malleable basis for sudden right- or left-wing radicalization. The political leadership was quick to establish community institutions that would raise nationally conscious Ukrainians, that would assist the Ukrainian struggle internationally.

On the following point, Vynnychuk has little to say. It is of prime importance for the understanding of our community's politics today: the right wing of the nationalist movement in emigration achieved hegemony over the community not so much because of factors internal to the Ukrainian nationalist community (the struggle between left and right), but because the political process in North American society, with far more powerful organs at its disposal, threw the mass Ukrainian base behind that right wing. That political process was McCarthyism; the group which rode to hegemony on its tide was the "Banderivtsi".

Like all other immigrant communities, our group fell into the process of cultural and political assimilation. What does this mean? The average Ukrainian worker read the daily paper, listened to radio, later watched TV, and spent eight hours a day in a factory. And the politics of the fifties, the ideology streaming through the North American press and media, through the labour leaderships, was the anti-communist ideology of McCarthyism.

The McCarthy witch-hunt legitimized the crudest anti-communist currents within Ukrainian nationalism. The latter's politics were endorsed by the ruling political powers in North America and bolstered within the Ukrainian community by all the channels that reached the daily life of the Ukrainian immigrant. (Captive Nations Week proclamations, for example, have fulfilled this function.)

The left vs. right debate was brought to an abrupt resolution by the political climate of the time. The newspaper "Vpered" folded, as did almost every left-wing paper and journal in North America.

In 1959, the Association for the Liberation of Ukraine organized rallies to denounce and mark as traitors all those who supported the Ukrainian struggle from a left-wing perspective (see *On Trial Before the Ukrainian Emigration: "National Communism", Khylovism and its Propagators'* New York, Publication of the United Committee, 1959, in Ukrainian). The principal targets were Bahrianyj and Maystrenko, labelled as traitors, splitters of the community, carriers of ideas "Alien to the Ukrainian people".

The Bandera-OUN thus rode to dominance in the community on the wave of Cold War anti-communism. Professional politicians exploited the Ukrainian question as an anti-communist tool against those who struggled for social justice in the West.

The Ukrainian right wing, in mutually parasitic relationship, received the endorsement of the continental powers (Nixon's Captive Nations Week proclamation, politicians duping Ukrainians to vote for them by talking about the international communist conspiracy).

Along come the sixties, the hippies, the commies and the plot to fluoridate our drinking water . . .

The decade of the sixties saw a new rise in revolutionary movements, east and west. Vietnam took on America, Ireland struggled against the British ruling class, African movements erupted against Portuguese colonialism.



The radicalization of youth in the West resulted from a combination of these international processes with ideological and social crises 'at home'. In North American the process of radicalization expressed itself in the Vietnam rallies and demonstrations, the university strikes, the Québecois nationalist movement, the revolt of America's black peoples. This politicization again differentiated itself into a hardened-left wing (in the vast majority allying itself with the non-Stalinist left) and a stratum which turned to nihilism, hard drugs and mysticism. The latter group was a product of the demoralization of radicalized youth at the turn of the seventies.

In the early seventies, inflation and unemployment sparked the renewed radicalization of workers fighting for their living standards and political rights (France 1968, Greece 1973, Spain - the Basques, the British miners' strike of 1974).

The Soviet and East European countries also streamed into this upsurge. After post-war reconstruction, the economy of the USSR went into a slowdown in growth rate (1954); this resulted in aggravated social tensions (lack of consumer goods, low wages, rising prices) and workers' strikes (Kiev Hydroelectric Station in 1969 over housing conditions, Kiev machine building plant of 10,000 in May 1973 over cuts in wage premiums). At the same time, the national question in the non-Russian republics and the issue of democratic rights became focal points for dissident intellectual activity.

**The radicalization of Ukrainian youth in the West**

The Ukrainian left as we know it in the West was the combined product of the general youth radicalization and the rise of radicalization in the Soviet Ukraine.

Ukrainian youth underwent a socialization which stamped national identity prominently upon them. They were streamed, organizationally, into anti-communist politics around the Ukrainian question without taking the time (or having much opportunity) to make a more independent choice as to the means of defending the Ukrainian struggle. Two processes hastened that choice for one section of Ukrainian youth. The radicalization in the North American schools brought us into contact with radicals. Many were literally surprised to learn that not all radicals are KGB agents, and that the issues they fight for are just. Secondly, those who became involved in the issue of Ukrainian political prisoners (particularly the Moroz case) decided to investigate the politics of those whom they were defending. Many were genuinely surprised to learn that not all Ukrainian dissidents are right-wing

nationalists, and that the issues they fight for (national equality, social justice) are the same as those of national liberation movements elsewhere.

**Why we reject the nationalist leadership**

Those who parade the spectre of "communist infiltrators" before us have apparently been living in total isolation for the past twenty years. Those who shout the slogan "Ukrainian truth" at us should find out the truth about the struggle in Ukraine.

The youth of today possess a keen sense of justice and have put their bodies in the streets many times to show it. That sense of justice arises in reaction to oppression and injustice *everywhere*. It is a consistent application, not a selective one. That is

where we differ with the nationalist leadership. That is why we reject it.

The Spanish regime under Franco assassinated Basque revolutionaries, fighters for the national liberation of their people. ABN, headed by Yaroslav Stets'ko, holds conferences with Sanchez Bella, Spanish Minister of Information (1971 ABN-EFC Conference, Brussels).

The Ukrainian nationalists say "Freedom for Ukraine!", "Democracy for the Ukrainian people!", "National Equality!" But they look at the struggle of the Québecois, the IRA, the African revolutionaries and say "Communist Infiltrators!"

The nationalists call for the independence of Ukraine. Yet that same conference seated General Vanuxem, former commander of French troops in Vietnam and Algeria.



A quasi-fascist regime in Chile, in the pay of American corporate interests, assassinates thousands of leftists and workers in the Santiago soccer stadium. The WACL Conference in Washington in April 1974 (World Anti-Communist League, of which ABN is a member), called, no doubt, to discuss the issue of political prisoners, seated a Senator who is a member of the Chilean junta. The speech to this conference was entitled "The Salvation of Freedom in Chile".

And the Ukrainian nationalists ask why we are leftists, why we are consistent radicals, why we have nothing to do with their brand of politicking. These "patriots" did not even have the courage to denounce President Nixon, who last year sat behind closed doors with Brezhnev, negotiating the suppression of popular movements from Vietnam to Ukraine.

Yaroslav Stets'ko and Co. enlist the "support" of this international gang of dictators' and butchers. Dictators like Franco, butchers like those of the Chilean junta. Whose interests does this relationship serve?

Certainly not the interests of the Ukrainian people! Let Stets'ko explain to the people who support this ABN operation what he's trying to do.

And why don't all those who are associated with such "politrucking", like Askold Lozynsky, newly "elected" head of U.S. TUSM, lay their cards on the table? To campaign against the spectre of communism in the Ukrainian community is as easy as rolling out of a wedding. Explaining your own politics, before the members of TUSM (including those recruited a day before your election) will not be so easy.

Some of the self-styled ideologues of Ukrainian nationalism have found it appropriate to hack away at this "phenomenon of leftism" in the community: the newspaper "America", Roman Rakhmany, the press organs of the OUN-Banderrivtsi, to name a few.

Yet they command ever-decreasing respect among Ukrainian youth. That is what Vynnychuk means in "The Decay of a Tradition". Let them enter the debate in a more intelligent manner, one which shows that they did in fact live through the many political crises of the past.

Let our history be discussed as it was written by all who made it, not just as it has been re-written and stamped with nationalist orthodoxy.

And, if indeed we are to "revive the democratic traditions in the Ukrainian community", as Vynnychuk has stated, then let the discussion take place in open, public forums. We Indians want to choose the chiefs.

Taras Lehkyj



LEADERS OF THE JUNTA saluting after Santiago church service in honor of Chilean 'Independence Day.'

2315 Bloor St. W.  
Toronto, Ontario  
769-2714

**HUMBER SPORTS**

Specializing in Soccer, Volleyball  
Bicycles, Hockey & Tennis

10% Student Discount with Student Card

2216 Bloor St. W.  
766-8338

**PARKDALE**

Choice Quality Fresh Meats, Poultry  
&  
Delicatessen

John & Olga Dozorsky





cont. from front page

and Schreyer sent messages of concern to the federal government. This response came as a result of the human rights issue and constituted a strictly humanitarian appeal of the Moroz case.

Within the Ukrainian community, the cause was popularized by various branches of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and by Ukrainian churches. Two Ukrainian clergymen, Father Byce from Niagara Falls and Rev. I. Syrotynsky from Toronto, fasted with the hunger strikers. Seven other Ukrainian-Canadians, as well as two Quebecois from outside Hull, Que. and an English-Canadian from Toronto joined the five original hunger strikers at the van for various lengths of time.

The federal Liberal government reversed its position on the Moroz case by deciding to make further representations. Mitchell Sharp, then Minister of State for External Affairs, had previously refused to do anything further about Valentyn Moroz. But pressure from the Liberal caucus and debate in Cabinet produced a complete change of policy. In fact, Prime Minister Trudeau raised the Moroz case when the Soviet Ambassador came to congratulate the PM on his election victory.

The protests did not finish with the ones in Ottawa and Winnipeg. In Washington, DC, a similar strike was initiated and followed through.

There are three publications which contain Moroz's works in English: a Canadian-published collection of his works, Report from the Beria Reserve translated by John Kolasky; Boomerang published in the USA by Smoloskyp and a few essays included in the British-published Ferment in the Ukraine.

In many ways the hunger strikes in Canada, the mobilization of the Ukrainian community and the growth of awareness about Moroz can be called a success but the most important issue - Moroz's life - remains unresolved.



Bohdan Kolos

### ПРИЇЗД ДМИТРА ГНАТЮКА ДО КАНАДИ

У зв'язку з концертним турне Дмитра Гнатюка в Канаді, яке відбудеться у жовтні й листопаді ц.р., Комітет Оборони Валентина Мороза звернувся до українського громадянства із закликом бойкотувати всі виступи. Комітет **мотивує** своє становище тим, що Гнатюк - представник режиму, який ув'язнює українських політичних дисидентів /Гнатюка обрано до Ради Національностей при Верховній Раді СРСР/. У своєму зверненні до громадянства, Комітет зазначає, що протестна акція звернена "не проти особи чи мистецтва Д. Гнатюка, а проти режиму, який його вислав і якого він репрезентує." В тому часі, коли відбуватимуться концерти, Комітет закликає громадянство влаштовувати віча в оброні ув'язнених українських діячів культури.

Як відомо, можливість бойкоту викликала controverсію. Гнатюк здобув собі велику прихильність серед канадських українців: дехто, відчувачи ширю симпатію до нього і бажачи уникнути прикрих непорозумін, твердить, що "не слід мішати культуру й політику".

Якщо відкинути це становище як нереальне, то все ж треба признати, що бойкот дійсно міг би мати погані наслідки. Ця тактика апелює до еміграційної ексклюзивності, до тенденції захоплюватися демонстративним і голосливим протестом, який не приносить жодної користі на довгу мету.

Це не означає, що бойкот неминуче відбудеться саме в цьому дусі. Але те, що у зверненні Комітету протиставлено Мороза /оборонця української культури/ і Гнатюка /представника гнобителів цієї культури/ - не може не викликати застерезення. Мороз і Гнатюк - це постаті рішуче неспівмірні. Мороз належить до найвидатніших українських мислителів свого покоління: він допоміг здефініювати українство для сучасності; Гнатюка у найгіршому випадку можна уважати вислужником режиму, який нічим не відрізняється від багатьох тисяч йому подібних. Іншими словами, Мороз - дійсна особистість; Гнатюк - сфабрикована. Через те, Мороз залишається тим, ким він є, незважаючи на перекручення своїх і чужих, а Гнатюка можна представити ким завгодно: мистцем світового значення /у радянській версії/ або небезпечним співробітником КДБ, приїзд якого має скомпromітувати п-во Колесників /у тутешніх поголосках/. Отже небезпека бойкоту полягає в тому, що він має тенденцію стирати дійсні різниці між людьми, між справжньою й фальшивою культурою, як також створювати ілюзію успіху, тоді коли ніщо істотне не змінилось.

М. Юркевич




UKRAINIAN CANADIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' UNION  
СОЮЗ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО СТУДЕНТСТВА КАНАДИ

15th Annual Susk Congress

When: August 29 - September 2, 1974

Where: St. Andrew's College  
University of Manitoba  
Winnipeg, Manitoba



You will return to earth with my message.  
It is a video tape, sealed in a container  
by the door where you entered. You will  
play it over your world-wide visi-screens.

Clip and mail this subscription form to  
"STUDENT" Editorial Board  
394 Bloor St. West,  
Suite 4,  
Toronto, Ontario.  
M5S 1X4

Subscription paid by

cheque  
money order

Subscription rates:

1 year (12 issues regardless of possible irregularities in printing)  
individual subscribers \$2.50  
to institutions \$5.00

Name .....  
Address .....  
Date .....