



SHEVCHENKO SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY, INC.
НАУКОВЕ ТОВАРИСТВО ІМ. ШЕВЧЕНКА В ЗДА
302-304 WEST 13TH STREET, NEW YORK 14, N.Y.

PAPERS ДОПОВІДІ

Ч. 32
No.

Terrence J. Barragy

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA AND THE PROPOSED RUSSIAN
INVASION OF LATIN AMERICA IN 1787

Shevchenko Scientific Society

New York, N.Y.

1969

Editor

PROF. ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI, Ph.D.

**This paper may be reproduced,
provided the source is cited.**

Price \$1.00

*FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA AND
THE PROPOSED RUSSIAN INVASION
OF LATIN AMERICA IN 1787*

Printed in U.S.A.

"Svoboda", 81-83 Grand Street, Jersey City, N.J. 07303

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA AND THE PROPOSED RUSSIAN INVASION OF LATIN AMERICA IN 1787

By TERRENCE J. BARRAGY

Although Russian activities in Alaska and California have been widely studied, portions of the earliest Russian plans for expansion into the American hemisphere have gone largely unnoticed. In 1940 the leading Soviet historian on Latin America, V. Miroshevskii, published for the first time information concerning plans for a Russian invasion of South America in the year 1787. He stated that Catherine II, Empress of Russia from 1762 to 1796, made these invasion plans with Francisco de Miranda, a Venezuelan dedicated to the liberation of his people through the destruction of the Spanish Empire in South America. In 1946 a book by Miroshevskii entitled *Emancipation Movements In The Spanish American Colonies From Their Conquest To The War of Independence (1492-1810)* (Moscow: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR., Institute of History) was published posthumously on the same subject, and in 1958 the most important chapter of this book was published in Spanish in the *Academia Nacional de la Historia, Caracas, Boletín*. Miroshevskii's works, which attempt to show that Catherine II aided Miranda in his plans for the liberation of South America purely because of her humanitarian interest in the South American people, have remained almost completely unknown in the United States; the few people familiar with them have largely rejected them as nothing more than Soviet propaganda. A careful examination of available facts, however, reveals that Miroshevskii probably offers the best explanation for Miranda's activities in Russia. Miroshevskii's ideas are worthy of examination, because if they are true, they shed new light on Catherine's imperialistic ambitions.

I

Francisco de Miranda was born in Caracas on April 5, 1750. He first grew to importance at 31 years of age when, while a lieute-

nant colonel in the Spanish Army, he fought with the Americans against the British during the Revolutionary war, obtaining supplies and money which enabled the French fleet to blockade the English Army at Yorktown. Since he despised Spanish tyranny in South America, however, he soon turned against Spain. He began traveling throughout the world in search of someone to aid him in his plans for the liberation of South America; during these travels he became acquainted with almost every great personage of his age. He arrived in Russia in 1786 and there, according to Miroshchinskii, formulated plans with Catherine II for the Russian invasion of South America, to be carried out in 1787. When these plans were postponed by Turkey's declaration of war upon Russia, Miranda continued his travels throughout Europe. In 1792, he joined the French Révolution and fought in several important battles as a general in the French forces, although he later became a political rival of Napoleon Bonaparte and was banished from France. In his later years he served for a time as generalissimo of the newly-formed Republic of Venezuela. After being defeated by the Spanish forces, he was betrayed by an officer under his command, the later famous Simón Bolívar, and thrown into prison. He died in a Spanish prison at Cádiz in the year 1816.

Most of the biographies of Miranda state that Catherine II was attracted to him because of his education, charm and polish as an accomplished courtier; some of them even suggest that there was a love affair. The facts were obscure until Miroshchinskii wrote in 1940 that:

a series of circumstances make it possible to state with certainty that the protection which was granted to Miranda by the Russian Empress was not her attraction to him, but that it was motivated by ideas fully practical in kind which were linked above all with the problem of the Russian expansion into America.¹

Probably the best work on Miranda in Russia before the publication of Miroshchinskii's article in 1940 in "Le Général Miranda En Russie," by G. Lozinski. This article, published in *Le Monde Slave* in 1933, has been ignored or overlooked by Miranda's biographers. Lozinski reveals the confidential discussions which Miranda had with Catherine and her ministers concerning his planned invasion of South America. He shows that Catherine had every reason to

¹ V. Miroshchinskii, "Catherine the Second and Francisco Miranda," *Historian-Marxist*, Bk. No. 2-78 (Moscow, 1940), p. 128. Translated from the Russian.

give Miranda support for his project, as Miranda could then cause trouble for the Spanish government. He points out that Spain was at this time in the orbit of France, despised by Catherine because of its active opposition to her so-called "Greek Project," which planned to drive the Turks out of Europe and install her grandson as ruler in Constantinople.² Thus, without knowing that a definite plan existed between the two for the invasion of South America, as Miroshevskii had not yet published this information, Lozinski gives basically the same reason as Miroshevskii for Catherine's interest in Miranda. He also skillfully counters the argument that a love affair existed between Catherine and Miranda:

One can follow the Venezuelan traveler step by step, and determine the nature and length of his meeting with Catherine, which always took place in the presence of a third person. One can object that Miranda could have omitted more interesting meetings. However, he is so frank in giving an account of his amorous experiences, and he describes them so precisely... that he could not have failed to allude to them. A thing which may seem strange to some, is that Catherine felt for the handsome 'Mexican' a completely platonic sympathy...³

Lozinski's conclusion is that "The journal of Miranda is explicit, not a single detail permits us to suppose that the Venezuelan could have been a rival for Mamonov."⁴

I have quoted Lozinski at length because of the great importance of his statement. As we trace the relationship of Miranda and Catherine over its months and years, it will become evident that there are only two plausible explanations for the relationship. One argument, held by many, is that it was a love affair, but an objective examination of the large amount of available evidence would seem to indicate that Lozinski's opinion is accurate. The other argument is that of Miroshevskii.

II

Miranda was introduced to Catherine in Kiev on February 14th (25 Feb., N. S.), 1787, and the Empress seemed to be immediately interested in and attracted to him. In his diary, Miranda specifically mentions several occasions during the month of February when he discussed South America with the Empress. His detailed diary clear-

² G. Lozinski, "Le Général Miranda En Russie," *Le Monde Slave* (March, 1933), p. 188. Translated from the French.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189. Count Alexander Dimitriev-Mamonov was Catherine's official favorite in 1787.

ly reveals Catherine's growing interest in him. In the entry for February 16, Miranda mentions that he knew Catherine had informed Count Cobenzl, the Austrian Ambassador, that according to information she had received, Miranda was "a real person and most cultivated," and that that was the sort of person she liked. On March 29th, Miranda received an offer from Catherine to remain in Russia. In answer to this great honor he replied that his situation rendered it impossible for him to remain in Russia. He then informed Catherine's representatives, under an oath of secrecy, of his plans to invade and liberate South America, so that the Empress might "do whatever should appear to her to be just."⁵

In order to understand Catherine's favorable response to this information, it is necessary to remember not only her imperialistic outlook but also the means at her disposal to aid such an invasion plan. In February, 1787, she had received the offer of an English seaman named James Trevenen for sending to the Pacific a Russian fleet under his command to carry on trade in the North Pacific. Having sailed with Captain Cook, Trevenen, whose plan and background will be described later, was one of the few men familiar with the Pacific and capable of guiding a Russian fleet to South America with certainty. By combining Trevenen's offer with a proposed expedition of Captain G. Mulovskii to the Pacific, which she had launched in December, 1786, Catherine had everything necessary for an invasion of South America when she received information of Miranda's invasion plans at the end of March. As Miranda proposed to lead a popular uprising against the Spanish rulers, a great number of troops and ships were not necessary for his project.

On March 31st, before he had received Catherine's answer to his invasion plan idea, Miranda was informed by Mamonov that if he attempted to leave Russia, Mamonov would detain him by force as he feared that Miranda might be burned by the inquisition if he returned to Spain. Miranda states: "In truth, I do not know what to think of all this plot although the future will tell."⁶

On April 5, Miranda spoke of his affairs with Mamonov; on the 8th, it seems, Prince Potemkin tried to dissuade Miranda from attempting to carry out his liberation plans and from attempting to

⁵ A. Grisanti, *Miranda Y La Emperatriz Catalina Le Grande* (Caracas, 1928), p. 21. Translated from the Spanish.

⁶ *Fragments From An XVIIIth Century Diary: The Travels And Adventures of Don Francisco de Miranda*, trans. Jordan Herbert Stabler (Caracas, 1931), p. 97.

obtain English aid. The desire of the Empress to prevent Miranda from obtaining English aid for his plans would seem to be the true explanation of Mamonov's statement on March 31st. There can be no doubt that Miranda had informed Mamonov in their conversation of March 29th of his intention to travel to England in order to obtain aid from that country. On April 12th Miranda informed Mamonov of the reasons he had refused Catherine's offer to remain in Russia. In return Mamonov informed Miranda that the Empress approved of his way of thinking and that she would protect him throughout the world.⁷ Mamonov stated that "as she did not know the *place* (Venezuela?) she was not able to give me counsel as to the execution (of the plans)?... but that later she would tell me more in regard to the matter."⁸

On April 20th Miranda went to speak to Mamonov. Miranda requested a letter of credit for 10,000 rubles in order to aid him in bringing his affairs, i. e., invasion plans, to a satisfactory conclusion. Mamonov advised him to speak to Potemkin and have him arrange it with Catherine.⁹ The next day Miranda spoke to Potemkin about the money and the Prince assured him that he would arrange for it. Miranda then spoke with Potemkin about his affairs and with Count Bezborodko, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning letters of introduction for Miranda to the Russian Ministers in foreign countries. Miranda then stated: "I explained everything to him [concerning the letters] asking him particularly to keep the secret — to which he replied that everything would be strictly observed."¹⁰ Miranda left Kiev for Moscow on May 2.

Although Miranda is very secretive in his diary concerning his conversations with the Russian Ministers about his South American plans, the evidence available makes it probable that the plans between Catherine and Miranda concerning the invasion of South America were agreed upon in the month of April, during the conversations I have mentioned above. By the beginning of April, Catherine

⁷ Why, according to Mamonov, Catherine was willing to allow Miranda to leave Russia on April 12, when she had been so strongly opposed to his departure a short time earlier, is a difficult question to answer. The most probable explanation is that Mamonov was following Catherine's instructions to stall Miranda for about a week to give her time to decide definitely whether or not to aid Miranda. Catherine knew Miranda could not leave Russia until she gave him money.

⁸ Stabler, p. 100. Words in parentheses are Stabler's.

⁹ *Archivo Del General Miranda*, ed. Vicente Davila (Caracas, 1929), II, 309.

¹⁰ Stabler, p. 102.

rine had accepted the offer of James Trevenen to lead an expedition to the Pacific, and thus, she was able to make Miranda a definite offer of aid during that month.

In June, as Trevenen was traveling toward St. Petersburg, Miranda had completed his visit to Moscow and was traveling to the same city. Miranda arrived at his destination on June 14th. Toward the end of June, Mulovskii's ships, which had been constructed in Archangel, began sailing south to Kronstadt, where they arrived at the end of August or early September.¹¹

On July 8th, Miranda traveled to the Russian naval base of Kronstadt, where he met Admiral Greig, one of the heroes of the famous naval battle of Chesme (1770). Greig, was, at that time, serving as Governor of Kronstadt, and as Admiral in command of the Russian Navy. On July 10th, Miranda ate in the house of Admiral Greig. One of the men present was Count P. Golovkin (spelled in the diary "Galowkin"), whom Miranda describes as "a young volunteer who is to embark on the expedition which is to leave at the orders of the Captain of the navy Moulousky [Mulovskii]." ¹² Count Golovkin could not have been an important man in the expedition, however, as he did not become a naval lieutenant until 1789. On July 11 Catherine returned to Tsarskoe Selo, outside St. Petersburg, from her seven months' tour of Southern Russia.

Catherine's tour of the south with its military overtones had caused widespread alarm in the Turkish Empire, and to a lesser extent in Europe. It was evident to the Turks that the Russian Empress intended soon to make further inroads into their Empire.

On July 16th, Miranda traveled to Tsarskoe Selo, where Count Bezborodko informed him of certain letters which the Minister had received from the Spanish officials in St. Petersburg. At this time not only the Spanish legation in St. Petersburg, but also those representing France and Italy, began to show open signs of hostility toward Miranda, especially in reference to his habit of wearing the uniform of a Spanish colonel. The Spanish minister had been ordered to observe all of Miranda's actions if he arrived in St. Petersburg. Catherine's plans of concealment had been skillfully handled, as it is certain from studying the reports of the Spanish Ministers in St. Petersburg regarding Miranda that the Spanish possessed no information concerning the plans of Catherine and Miranda for the de-

¹¹ C. V. Penrose, *A Memoir Of James Trevenen*, eds. Christopher Lloyd and R. C. Anderson (London, 1959), p. 111.

¹² *Archivo Del General Miranda*, II, 405.

struction of the Spanish Empire in South America. In July, several insulting letters passed between Miranda and the Spanish Legation. Feeling sure of Catherine's protection, the Count was able to answer the Spanish officials in a most insulting manner. Soon a demand was made to Count Bezborodko that Miranda be handed over to the Spanish authorities. Using her diplomatic skills, Catherine avoided this demand and concealed the true reasons for her interest in Miranda.¹³ Miranda, being an essential part of her plans for the invasion of South America, had to be protected even at the possible cost of the presently peaceful relations between Russia and the Bourbon countries of Spain, Italy and France.

Russo-Turkish relations suffered further deterioration when on or about August 5th the Turkish Sultan read a manifesto to the Turkish people stating that the annexation of the Crimea must be avenged, and the territory returned to Turkey. To add emphasis to his statements he ordered the imprisonment of the Russian envoy in Constantinople. Being aware that war with Turkey was inevitable, Catherine realized that her plans with Miranda would have to be postponed. In 1928, Grisanti, in his book, *Miranda y La Emperatriz Catalina La Grande*, stated that he had recently secured information indicating that certain letters referring to Miranda had been forged by the Russian Government. It is possible that the Empress determined not only to protect Miranda in his travels through Europe, but also to completely camouflage her true dealings with him in order to render it possible to put their plans into execution at some later date. G. Lozinski discovered the apparent forgeries several years after Grisanti. While he is not as specific about the letters as Grisanti, he states that they were forged because of the dispute which Miranda had with the Spanish officials in St. Petersburg in July. The important thing is that the letters with the forged dates are not proof that Miranda intended to leave Russia after the discussion of his invasion plans with Catherine in April. He only made definite plans to leave Russia in July after the actions of the Sultan made it evident that his invasion plans with Catherine would have to be delayed.

Early in August, the Spanish officials again demanded that Miranda be turned over to them, and were again refused. The Empress ordered the preparation of further and even stronger letters of introduction for Miranda to her ministers. Miranda was to inform Catherine if he needed anything further. He was also guaranteed

¹³ Diarial entry of Miranda for July 19. As found in Grisanti, pp. 27-28.

a warm reception and an advantageous position if he should ever choose to return to Russia. Shortly after this (the exact date is somewhat in dispute), Miranda received a letter from Count Bezborodko in which he was told that the Empress, being convinced of his "zeal for her service" and being ready to serve him at his convenience, now permitted him to wear the uniform of a Russian colonel.¹⁴ On or about August 8th Miranda was provided with two different letters of introduction to various Russian ministers in foreign countries. One of these letters was the one supposedly composed in Kiev on April 22. The above are the three letters claimed by Grisanti (on p. 90 of his work) to be forged. He states that the two letters of introduction, one of which was dated Kiev, April 22nd, were actually written in St. Petersburg around August 8th, and that the letter permitting Miranda to wear the uniform of a Russian colonel was written on about August 20th. On August 9th, Miranda received a passport and notice of the deposit in an English bank of a letter of credit for two thousand ducats. On August 10th, when Miranda said that he needed two thousand pounds, he was told that he would be provided with as much money as he desired.¹⁵ On the same day he received 500 ducats, which Catherine presented to him from her private treasury. In discussing a sum of 10,000 rubles which Miranda had requested from Count Bezborodko, G. Lozinski states:

One is permitted to presume that the 10,000 rubles which were given to him represented a sort of payment on account in anticipation of the services he would render to Russia, in case of his return; this hypothesis does not exclude the one advanced above, that the Russian Government regarded with a favorable eye the plans of Miranda against Spain in South America.¹⁶

After acknowledging a receipt of letters of credit for the two thousand pounds he had requested on August 10, Miranda attended a farewell dinner in the famous Hermitage, and then sailed from Russia on September 7 (18 Sept. N.S.), 1787.

Meanwhile, on September 12th (23 Sept. N.S.), 1787, the Turkish Sultan declared war on Russia. As the number of trained and experienced Russian seamen was small, this Turkish move brought about a temporary post-ponement of the Russian plans concerning South America. Catherine, unprepared for a war with Turkey, could

¹⁴ W. S. Robertson, *The Life of Miranda* (Chapel Hill, 1929), I, 78.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹⁶ G. Lozinski, p. 209.

not spare the seamen assigned to the expeditions of Mulovskii and Trevenen, and orders officially postponing the expeditions were issued on October 29, 1787.¹⁷

III

Catherine's plans for the invasion of South America in 1787 developed from her plans for penetration into Alaska. After speaking with the fur traders Shelikhov and Golikov, Catherine asked Jacobi, the governor general of Siberia, "his opinion as to the best means of establishing the Russian domination of the islands of the eastern ocean, and on the coast of America." In answer Jacobi "approved the proposed dispatch of a fleet from the Baltic to protect navigation in the Pacific. . ." ¹⁸

The fleet mentioned above was created by Catherine's order in late December, 1786. Krotkov's history gives Catherine's instructions to Captain G. Mulovskii. He was to make a list of all islands between Mastmai Island (in N. Pacific) and Cape Lopatka, the southern tip of Kamchatka, and annex them to Russia. From Japan he was to sail eastward between 30 and 40 degrees North as far as 170 degrees West, annexing anything not already claimed by any European power. Next he was to go on between 40 and 50 degrees North to the American Coast. From Nootka Harbor he was to link up with Bering's discoveries in Alaska.¹⁹

Bancroft states that "Mulovskii's vessels were to separate upon arrival in the northern Pacific, one division to go to the American coast, under his command, and the other to proceed to the Kurile Islands. . ." ²⁰ According to Miroshevskii, Catherine's decree described the purpose of Mulovskii's expedition to be "in order to protect our rights on lands discovered by Russian seamen." ²¹ Miroshevskii reports the expedition as comprising four frigates and one transport ship.²²

In relating the situation in the Northern Pacific, Miroshevskii clearly reveals Catherine's original aim in establishing the Mulovskii expedition:

¹⁷ C. V. Penrose, p. 113.

¹⁸ H. H. Bancroft, *The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft* (San Francisco, 1886), XXXIII, 307.

¹⁹ A. Krotkov, *Povsednevnaia Zapis Zamyetchatelnykh Sobytiĭ v Russkom Flote* (St. Petersburg, 1893), pp. 522-523.

²⁰ Bancroft, XXXIII, 307.

²¹ Miroshevskii, p. 129.

²² *Ibid.*

During those times Spain had in American waters only four big warships and four frigates for the protection of her extensive possessions from numerous enemies who were constantly ready for attack. Taking into consideration these circumstances, the assignment to the Billings expedition of the ships under Mulovskii, which were all newly constructed and excellently armed, represented in itself a convincing factor which should have sharply changed the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean in favor of Russia.²³

Mulovskii was chosen to lead the expedition apparently for two reasons. First, he was the son of the Minister of the Marine, Count Chernyshev, who was one of the most important men in Russia. In his diary Miranda mentions two occasions on which he met Count Chernyshev. On February 14th, the day he first met Catherine, he was seated next to the Count at a dinner held by Catherine. He states that the Count looked after him "with much attention." He had tea with Chernyshev on June 29th in St. Petersburg. Second, Mulovskii was one of the most talented officers in the Russian Navy. His later actions in the war with Sweden revealed him as probably the most outstanding Russian officer in the Navy. In the Battle of Hogland (July 17, 1789) he was the only Russian officer who did not flee before the Swedish fleet. Both he and Trevenen were awarded the 4th order of St. George for their part in the engagement.

Whereas the Mulovskii expedition was assigned before Catherine encountered Miranda, she approved the expedition of Trevenen after she had knowledge of Miranda's plans to librate South America. Trevenen's plan, which was submitted to Catherine in February, 1787, cannot be described in detail here, as it is several pages in length. He states that three ships should be employed, one of 500 tons, and two of 300 tons each. They ought to "sail from Europe in the month of September, will touch at some Spanish or Portuguese part of South America, and after having doubled Cape Horn, will proceed to some of the islands in the South Sea for the same purpose."²⁴

Sources indicate that this part of Trevenen's plan was not altered by the Empress. Cape Horn was the quickest route to Kamchatka, and although it was more dangerous than the passage around the Cape of Good Hope, Trevenen had twice traversed it with Captain Cook; he assured Catherine that he could pass through the stormy

²³ *Ibid.* For the first part of this quotation Miroshvskii cites Robertson, I, 102. The eight Spanish ships mentioned were located both in the West Indies and on the west coast of South America.

²⁴ C. V. Penrose, p. 91.

waters without danger. Mulovskii was to take the safer passage around the Cape of Good Hope.

The original purpose of the expeditions of Mulovskii and Trevenen has been described in some detail because it appears that Catherine intended to employ these two expeditions for the invasion of South America. It is now necessary to describe the part Miranda seemingly played in these two expeditions. Before meeting Miranda in Kiev in February, 1787, and hearing of his plans to invade and liberate South America, Catherine had intended to move only into North America; now, apparently, she saw a chance for great gains to the Russian Empire. Unknown to Miranda, who was firmly convinced of her humanitarian sentiments, she evidently saw in him a very capable tool for possible expansion into South America. Her true sentiments in regard to Miranda are described by Miroshchinskii:

At the very time of the climax of all these preparations there appeared before the view of the Empress, Miranda. This [i. e., Miranda] was a valuable find for the Tsarist Government. If the Russian infiltration into America should provoke a conflict with the court in Madrid then Russia could attempt to inflict a blow into the most sensitive area of Spain by fanning the flames of rebellion in her colonies. Like many of her contemporaries Catherine II was convinced that it would be sufficient for Miranda to appear in Spanish America, not even backed by large armed forces, in order to bring Spanish domination in the colonies to an end.²⁵

On June 20 (2nd July N.S.), 1787, shortly after Miranda's arrival in St. Petersburg, Catherine received a report from her ambassador in Madrid, S. S. Zinoviev, a man who was known as a deep thinker and careful evaluator of situations. He informed her that the people in South America were highly excited and embittered, and completely ready to revolt.²⁶

This report must have undoubtedly strengthened Catherine's convictions to use Miranda to further her imperialistic plans. Having definitely determined to use Miranda, Catherine laid final plans for sending him with a Russian expedition to invade South America:

It was planned that in 1787 Miranda was to depart with one of the Russian expeditions (of Mulovskii or Trevenen) into the Pacific Ocean, in which case Kamchatka would have been his base of operation in the struggle for the independence of Spanish America.²⁷

²⁵ Miroshchinskii, pp. 129-130.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, footnote, p. 130.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

According to Miroshevskii, Catherine had a threefold reason for using Miranda. First, she felt that if her imperialistic ventures concerning the Turkish Empire should bring about a conflict with Spain, she could use Miranda to fan the flames of revolt in Spain's Colonial Empire in South America, thus hitting the Spanish in their most vulnerable area.²⁸ Second, with the powerful countries of Turkey, England, Prussia, Spain and France in a state of serious unrest owing to the imperialistic gestures of Russia and her ally Austria toward Turkey, the possibility of a general European war was very great. Thus Miranda's value in the eyes of Catherine was doubled, as he could be used against Spain and her allies if such a war should break out.²⁹ Third, having been informed by Zinoviev that "the Russians could crush Spanish America in one try, since the American people were ready for revolution,"³⁰ Catherine saw at least the possibility for imperial gains in South America. It seems probable that a woman with almost unbounded imperialistic desires and a love for revolutionary imperialistic schemes such as the Oriental Project could not but desire to establish Russian power in South America. While her immediate aim was to use Miranda as a weapon against Spain and her allies, then, Catherine's secondary aim was a desire to increase her imperialistic gains on the American continent. I do not contend that Russian troops and naval forces could have succeeded in holding even a portion of South America, but only that the Empress and Francisco de Miranda made plans to invade South America in the year 1787.

Miranda, being constantly under the threat of Spanish plots to kidnap him and return him to Spain, would have been unwise to include any incriminating evidence in his diary concerning his plans with Catherine to destroy Spain's colonial empire in South America. As Miroshevskii says, "From the moment of his entering into the French Republican Army [i. e., after breaking off all contact with Catherine] Miranda attempted to cover his private relations with the Tsarist Government with a cloak of deepest secrecy."³¹

IV

Although the Russian plan to invade South America is not revealed in Volume II of Miranda's diary, and although it cannot be accepted solely on the evidence presented in Miroshevskii's works,

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, footnote, p. 129.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, footnote, p. 130.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

it is strongly suggested by a series of letters written after Miranda's departure from Russia. After leaving Russia on September 7 (18 Sept., N.S.), 1787, Miranda traveled to Stockholm, where he lodged in the house of the Russian Minister. He was still in Stockholm on Oct. 29, when the expeditions of Trevenen and Mulovskii were postponed by Catherine's order. After leaving Stockholm in November, Miranda traveled through Europe, finally ending his tour on June 18, 1789, with his arrival in London.

The letters we are concerned with were largely written by Miranda's English friends during his stay in England, which lasted from 1789 to 1792. The most significant was written by Thomas Pownall, the ex-governor of Massachusetts, to Miranda on April 30, 1790. In this letter, Pownall advises Miranda to demand from Pitt a definite decision in regard to proposed English aid for the invasion of South America because of Miranda's need to give "a decisive answer" to the offers of aid "from XXX" who at that time was extending protection to Miranda. Although Pownall discreetly omits Catherine's name in the letter, there can be no doubt as to who is meant by "XXX". Robertson, in his comment upon the letter, replaces the "XXX" with the words "august Russian protector."³² The letter continues:

I cannot finish this letter without saying that at the same time that I fear to see the flattering prospect we had in View, crossed by a cold dark blast — I can get [yet] raise to my mind's Eye another prospect of better hopes; and fancy that I see it coming forward into the horizon of affairs — When I place myself on the Shores of Kamscatsky I can almost stretch forth a hand of friendly assistance to Mexico so as to touch any beginning of efforts toward Emancipation. . .³³

The "prospect. . . crossed by a cold dark blast" refers to Miranda's dealings with Pitt, which Pownall rightly fears will not result in Pitt's aiding Miranda in an invasion of South America. The statement "another prospect of better hopes" probably refers to Miranda's invasion plans with Catherine. The reference to Kamchatka would seem to link Miranda with the expeditions of Mulovskii and Trevenen, since they were the only Kamchatka-based expeditions at that time which had ships actually capable of reaching South America.

It seems clear, therefore, that Miranda discussed with Pownall the details of his plans with Catherine to invade South America. In

³² Robertson, I, 106.

³³ *Archivo Del General Miranda*, VI, 45.

a letter of May 9, 1790, Pownall advised Miranda to use more than ordinary caution in his "communications and connexions with Russia,"³⁴ and on August 21, 1790, he wrote Miranda offering him advice in regard to Miranda's continued negotiations with Pitt concerning South America. "Do not make any quarrel with the only power [England], (taking all in all) that can ever take up your measure and putt it into execution If you can risque the waiting *the month* and talks of, without losing your first and great Friend, Wait that Month at least with patience." Pownall further advised, "If you cannot risque the waiting that month — tell them so and break off all negotiation with them. . ."³⁵

This letter is important because it reveals that in August of 1790 the Russian Government was urging Miranda to accept its offer to aid him in his desire to invade South America. It also reveals that although Pownall felt that England offered Miranda the best chance for putting his liberation plans into execution, he advised Miranda that if he were unsuccessful in stalling the Russian Government for a month, he should break off negotiations with the English Government and accept the Russian offer. In a postscript at the bottom of the letter, Pownall elaborates upon this point. He states that if Miranda cannot obtain the type of English aid he desires, then "you have nothing left to do but to go *directly* to your Great and Generous Friend and explain to her with disguise without reserve the Reasons which have detained you so long in England. . ."

In a letter written in November of 1790, Vorontsov, the Russian Ambassador to England, advises Miranda that a Madame Pohempol, who is leaving in several days for Russia by sea, could carry his "packet" to Count Bezborodko. The letter states that this method of communication with Count Bezborodko is the most reliable means as it is not subject to any leak.³⁶

In April, 1791, the Anglo-Russian hostility which had been smoldering for several years came to a head in the so-called "Ochakov Crisis," and for a few days the two countries seemed on the point of war. The immediate crisis passed while Miranda continued his contacts with the Russian Government.

In a letter of August 2, 1791, Miranda's friend Joseph Smith asked Miranda "How goes on the affairs with Russia?"³⁷ The state-

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

ment serves to show that Pownall was not the only one of Miranda's friends aware of his dealing with Catherine.

A letter of Pownall to Miranda dated September 20, 1791, points out that Pitt no longer had any use for Miranda and had refused to aid him in an invasion of South America. It reveals that because of this Miranda was planning to leave England.³⁸

A more valuable letter is that of Pownall to Miranda dated November 13, 1791, which refers to Prince Potemkin's death. Miranda's "situation in his friendship" makes Pownall "regret, that you was prevented, by the trumpery negotiation in this country, from being at Petersbourg when he was there."³⁹ Pownall continues:

I can also, in my fears for my friend [Miranda], feel many alarms how this Event may affect the Empress and under the sense I have of these, while I condole with you, I wish for you, as I should for Miss M. observe I say *I wish*, I do not presume *to advise*, that you were now at Petersbourg.⁴⁰

Pownall states further: "I cannot entertain any hopes of good coming from your negotiation with... [refers to the English Government] yet I cannot cease to wish and should be glad to know. I should also be glad to see some dawings [dawnings] of better fate, in the line of Russia."⁴¹ Although there is additional proof available, these letters alone strongly indicate that a plan existed between Miranda and Catherine II concerning a planned Russian invasion of South America.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.

³⁹ Refers to Pontemkin's visit during the summer of 1791. At that time peace had been signed with Sweden and the fighting with Turkey had ceased, with the peace negotiations being worked out.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-141.

Printing Shop's Technical Supervisor — Anatole Domaratzky.
Linotypists — Mykola Popovych, Roman Ferencevych. Imposer
— Wolodymyr Kalinowsky. Printer — Roman Padkowsky.
Svoboda — 81-83 Grand Street, Jersey City, N.J. 07303

ISSUES OF "PAPERS" PUBLISHED:

1. **Bohachevsky Daniel, J. U. Dr.:** Problems of Ukrainian Learning Abroad. (In Ukrainian)
Lew Vasyl, Ph. D., Prof.: Folklore in the Almanac "Rusalka Dnistrova" (In Ukrainian). (1958)
2. **Ostapiak Mykola, Prof.:** Isolating the Virus of Asian Influenza from Samples of Gargling the Throat and Autopsy Material (In Ukrainian). (1958)
3. **Smal-Stocki Roman, Ph. D., Prof.:** The Impact of the "Sputnik" on the English Language of the U.S.A. (1958)
4. **Bohachevsky Daniel, J. U. Dr.:** The Ideological Fundamentals of "The November Awakening" (In Ukrainian). (1959)
5. **Jaszczun Vasyl, Ph. D.:** Religious and Moral-Ethical Tenets of Taras Shevchenko (In Ukrainian). (1959)
6. **Smal-Stocki Roman, Ph. D., Prof.:** J.S.C. De Radius, an Unknown Fore-runner of Comparative Slavic Literature. (1959)
7. **Nazarko Ireneus, OSBM, Ph. D.:** Metropolitan Julian Sas-Kuilovsky (1826—1900). (1959)
8. **Smal-Stocki Roman, Ph. D., Prof.:** Shevchenko and the Jews. (1959)
9. **Mackiw Theodore, Ph. D., Prof.:** Mazepa (1632-1709) in Contemporary German Sources. (1959)
10. **Vytanovych Ilja, Ph. D., Prof.:** Social and Economic Tendencies in State Policies of Ivan Mazepa (In Ukrainian). (1959)
11. **Luciw Luke, Ph. D.:** Academician Prof. Stephen Smal-Stockyj (In Ukrainian)
Wozniak Michael, Acad., Prof.: Stephen Smal-Stockyj and Franko (In Ukrainian). 1959)
12. **Manning Clarence A., Ph. D., Prof.:** The Role of Mazepa in Eastern Europe. (1960)
13. **Kamenetsky Ihor, Ph.D.:** Origins of the New British Imperialism. (1960)
14. **Krawciw Bohdan:** Fedkovych in the Latest Literary Publications (In Ukrainian). (1961)
15. **Pavlovych Petro:** The Shevchenko Heritage and M. Kotsiubynsky (In Ukrainian). 1961)
16. **Smal-Stocki Roman, Ph. D., Prof.:** Discrimination and Bias in Two UNESCO Publications (1961).

17. **Pap Michael S., Ph.D., Prof.:** Ukraine's Struggle for Sovereignty, 1917-1918. (1961)
18. **Smal-Stocki Roman, Ph. D., Prof.:** The Hetman Mazepa Traditions of the Ukrainian National Government of 1917-23. (In Ukrainian). (1961)
19. **Lysiak Roman, M.D.:** Role of Non-Tyroxine Protein-Bound Iodine in Idiopathic Erythema Multiforme. (1961)
20. **Kovaliuk Jeanette-Yaroslava, B.A.:** Shevchenko and Pan-Slavic Ideas. (1962)
21. **Holiat Roman S., Dr.:** Short History of the Ukrainian Free University (1964)
22. **Sokolysyn Alexander, Dr.:** The Appearance of the Apostol and the Primer 390 Years Ago in Lviv — Western Ukraine (In Ukrainian). (1964).
23. **Collection of Papers, honoring Prof. C. A. Manning** (1964).
24. **Smal-Stocki Roman, Ph. D., Prof.:** Beginning of Fight for Rebirth of Ukrainian Statehood. (1967).
25. **Ostapiak Mykola, Prof.:** The Synthesis of Prof. Volodymyr Brygider's Scientific Work. (In Ukrainian). (1968).
26. **Kysilewskyj Constantine, Ph. D., Prof.:** Peculiarities of the Shashkevych's Language. (In Ukrainian). (1968).
27. **Hordinsky Bohdan Z., Dr.:** Terpenes in the treatment of Cholelithiasis and Hypercholesterolemia. (1968).
28. **Smal-Stocki Roman, Ph. D., Prof.:** George Washington, Traditions in Ukraine. (1968).
29. **Caplenko Wasyl, Prof.:** Academic Achievements of Prof. P. Kovaliv. (1969).
30. **Tkaczuk Ivan Very Rev.:** Scholarly-Theological Activities of Prof. P. Kovaliv and his Participation in Religious and Public Life. (In Ukrainian). (1969).
31. **Kovaliv Pantaleymon, Ph.D., Prof.:** Certain Characteristics of Word-Building in the Ukrainian Language. (In Ukrainian). (1969).