


THE VOL. XVIII — NO. 4
WINTER, 1962

UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

EDITORIAL — MOSCOW ON TRIAL IN KARLSRUHE

„Що ємало з Бандерою?”
Die sensation aus **MOSKAU**
Phor Orchester
Ballett **MURDER**



THE COVER PICTURE:

„Was geschah mit Bandera?“ / “What Happened to Bandera?”

This question, in a whisper, was asked of the cover artist, backstage in Munich by a member of the advertised Ukrainian Soviet “*Chor, Orchester, Ballet.*” One wonders if the answer finally reached him: Bandera, outstanding Ukrainian political leader and freedom fighter, had been murdered. He was murdered in Munich, West Germany, on orders from Moscow, at the same time the Ukrainian Dance Company of Kiev was performing in that city.

It is typical of Soviet machinations that with one hand it should dispatch abroad a cultural ensemble—thereby seeking to demonstrate the vitality of Ukrainian culture under Moscow’s domination—and with the other bloodily strike down a leading Ukrainian patriot.

The truth, of course, is that Ukraine survives in spite of Moscow. Her culture and ideals live only in the hearts of her countrymen; Ukraine remains so long as one Ukrainian remains alive.

And so thought those Ukrainian emigres who posted their own stickers over the billboard posters: *Der Hauptstadt der Ukraine ist Kiew — nicht Moskau* — “The Capital of Ukraine is Kiev — not Moscow”!



This picture was taken by the cover artist in Munich along with many photos of the performers. The timing of the Bandera funeral and the above performance of the Ukrainian Dance Company of Kiev deeply impressed him. He has sought to depict this juxtaposition of events. Except for the Ukrainian copy in his art, the readers will notice that the subject matter is based on the billboard poster, appearing at left.

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MOSCOW ON TRIAL IN KARLSRUHE

Editorial

It is a monstrous fact that a foreign power (the Soviet Union) has deemed it necessary, with complete disregard of all human laws, to pass summary judgments in this country... Externally this murder trial has unfortunately proved that so-called coexistence and so-called socialist lawfulness by no means exclude so-called individual terrorism...

[From a statement of the West German Government after the Stashynsky trial, issued on October 19, 1962 in Bonn.]

On October 19, 1962, at the height of the Cuban crisis the German Supreme Court in Karlsruhe pronounced sentence upon an agent of the KGB (Soviet Security Police), Bogdan N. Stashynsky, for the murders of Stepan Bandera, head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and Dr. Lev. R. Rebet, outstanding Ukrainian nationalist writer. The sentence was comparatively light: eight years at hard labor for the murder of two men, although German criminal law provides a punishment of life imprisonment for a crime of that magnitude.

But the American press, wholly preoccupied with what was then believed to be an imminent invasion of Cuba, took little notice of the extraordinary trial that was held in Karlsruhe.

Yet this trial was significant from many points of view. It revealed the depth of Ukrainian-Russian antagonism. It brought to light the heinous methods used by the Soviet government in dealing with its real or potential enemies both within and without the Soviet empire. It served notice on the free world that nothing stops the Kremlin killers in attaining their political objectives. Last but not least, the trial revealed that the modern mode of Soviet assassination—the use of a noiseless pistol-like tube loaded with lethal potassium cyanide — has been used on men without detection, and that the killer, prior to his “disillusionment” with Soviet society and ideology, had been told that he would be trained in the English language in order to carry out similar assignments in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

On August 12, 1961, the day before the Kremlin erected the infamous wall in Berlin, a pair of fugitives from East Berlin escaped

to West Berlin and sought political asylum. They were identified as Bogdan N. Stashynsky and his German wife, Inge Pohl. In November, 1962, the West German Attorney General in Karlsruhe revealed that Stashynsky was a special agent of the KGB and that he had confessed to the murders of two prominent Ukrainian nationalist leaders: Stepan Bandera, who was murdered on October 15, 1959, and Dr. Lev R. Rebet, who was slain on October 12, 1957. Stashynsky admitted that both murders had been committed by him with a weapon of tubular form which was as thick as one's finger and which discharged a spray of cyanide.

BACKGROUND OF TRAITOR AND MURDERER

During a six-day trial Stashynsky revealed his background as a traitor to his people and a murderer who killed on the orders of the Soviet government. He said that he was born in a small village in Western Ukraine in 1931 and witnessed, as a child, the bloody war fought in Ukraine between the Nazis and the Bolsheviks, the ensuing guerrilla warfare of the Ukrainians against the Poles, and vice-versa, and then of the Ukrainians against both the Nazi and the Soviet forces. In 1950 he was snared into the Soviet espionage apparatus. He established his loyalty and devotion to the regime by carrying out an odious assignment given him by the Soviet secret police: he spied on and denounced his own family, his sister and her fiancé, for taking part in the underground Ukrainian anti-Soviet resistance organization. In sending his own countrymen and his family to the Soviet gallows and firing squads, he proved to be utterly ruthless, heartless and amoral. Eventually he was "awarded" the highest trust: enrollment into a secret school for murderers, which the Soviet government maintains as a normal and *bona fide* institutionalized establishment. After spending two years in an espionage school in Kiev, he was sent to Poland, where under an alias he spied on Ukrainians. Subsequently, he adopted the German name of Josef Lehmann and was sent to East Berlin for further training in spying and assassination.

Eventually he was ready for the final assignment: the killing of the two Ukrainian nationalist leaders, Dr. Rebet and Stepan Bandera, who were pointed out to him by a "man from Moscow" as "enemies of the Soviet regime" and "emigre meddlers and adventurers." He made several trips to West Germany, spying on Dr. Rebet and Bandera and on West German and U.S. troop locations as well. In this employment he had the assistance of Soviet diplomatic personnel and the Soviet and East German Communist intelligence

networks. After killing Dr. Rebet he returned to East Berlin, where he was warmly congratulated for a "mission well done." In 1958 he was sent to Rotterdam, where several dozen Ukrainian leaders from all parts of Europe gathered at the grave of Col. Eugene Konovalts on the 20th anniversary of his assassination, also by a Soviet agent. Stashynsky admitted that his KGB superior had suggested throwing a bomb into the group of mourners. As to why this was not done, Stashynsky was not definite. At the beginning of October, 1959, Stashynsky was notified that orders had come from "the highest authority in Moscow" for the "liquidation" of Bandera. Here, again, Stashynsky proved his mettle. Bandera was killed in a matter of seconds, and in a few hours the murderer was in East Berlin's Soviet enclosure of Karlshorst, where a Soviet general informed him that for his "commission of an important government task" he would be awarded the "Order of the Red Banner," to be conferred by General Alexander A. Shelepin, Chief of the KGB.

Furthermore, Stashynsky stated that on December 4 and 5, 1959, he reported to General Shelepin, who also was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and one of Khrushchev's closest lieutenants. Shelepin read a document to Stashynsky in the presence of Comrade "Alexei" and Georgi Aksentieiev, who in April, 1959, passed on the order to Stashynsky for the slaying of Bandera. This document was the lofty Soviet decoration, the "Order of the Red Banner," which was signed by Voroshilov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Georgadse, its secretary. Stashynsky said that the highest award was given to him in recognition of his deeds. On December 28, 1960, Stashynsky was given also a "testimonial" by the "Director of the Scientific Research Institute" in Moscow, which in reality is a special department of the KGB specializing in "scientific" liquidation of "enemies of the Soviet regime."

While the Western press virtually ignored the deaths of the two Ukrainian leaders (Dr. Rebet's demise was ascribed to a coronary attack, and although Bandera's autopsy revealed traces of cyanide, no authority bothered to investigate the manner of his death at the time), the Soviet propaganda machine went into high gear to "prove" that Bandera was killed by the Gehlen intelligence organization with the help of a rival Ukrainian nationalist group. In East Berlin the East German puppet regime staged a press conference at which a Soviet agent, Stefan Lippolz, laid the murder of Bandera to a Ukrainian emigre (who at the time of Bandera's death was in Rome,

it was proved). All this to obscure the actual perpetrator of the foul deeds—Moscow itself.

But Stashynsky, despite his loyalty and dedication to the regime and despite the successful commission of two major crimes, did not feel secure with his Communist protectors and superiors. After he and Inge Pohl were married, they were forced to live in Moscow under conditions which were tantamount to confinement. Stashynsky then realized that he was marked for "liquidation"; as its instrument, he knew too much of the two crimes conceived and organized by the Soviet government.

This turn of events disturbed the killer, especially because after the killing of Bandera he had been told in Moscow that he would be trained for "special operations" in England and the United States. He was to study Western customs and the English language and he had been told to read the book by German Admiral Canaris on Gestapo methods. But his courtship of Inge Pohl and the failure of KGB officers to dissuade him from marrying the German girl not only slowed down his training for "special operations" in the West, but apparently also created the suspicion in the KGB that he had become a dangerous liability. The West—whose laws he had so callously violated with the murders he had proficiently committed—now became his sanctuary.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT: THE REAL CULPRIT

Stashynsky openly stated that the order to kill Bandera came from the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government. General Shelepin, to repeat, was not only the Chief of the KGB but also a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The two agents who transmitted the assassination order to Stashynsky were "Alexei Alexeyevich" and "Georgi Aksentievich," both apparently high officials of the KGB. The decision to assassinate Bandera could not have been taken without the knowledge and approval of Khrushchev. At the trial in Karlsruhe it was pointed out by German specialists on Soviet affairs that in the time of Stalin any MVD "resident operator" could issue orders to liquidate "enemies of the people" in a given foreign country; but in this time of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" such a decision could have been taken only on the ministerial level. Thus there is little doubt that the Soviet government itself is the true perpetrator of the crimes which were carried out by Stashynsky. This point was well elaborated upon by Dr. Heinrich Jagusch, President of the Senate of the German Supreme Court, who accused the Soviet government,

“a member of the United Nations,” of carrying out terroristic acts on the territory of a sovereign state with which it maintains normal diplomatic relations.

UKRAINE: A MENACE TO THE RUSSIAN SLAVE EMPIRE

The orders to assassinate Stepan Bandera and Dr. Lev Rebet obviously originated in high-level policy of the Soviet government. An American reporter, commenting on the murders of Bandera and Rebet by Stashynsky, pointed out:

The murder of Bandera and Rebet was ordered by the Kremlin to get rid of two anti-Communist leaders in Europe who for years had been an embarrassing irritation to the Kremlin... The most persistent irritation of all came from the passionate Ukrainian nationalists. Though they had been fragmented and mutilated in their battles against occupiers from Austria, Poland, Germany and Russia, they still maintained a vigorous underground movement with headquarters in Munich...

Getting rid of Rebet and Bandera were major moves in Moscow's attempt to obliterate the Ukrainian nationalists. Stashynsky's assignment was cold-blooded assassination, but elaborate preparations were taken by Soviet intelligence to avoid the possibility of linking the murders to the Kremlin...

The murders of the Ukrainian leaders are no innovations in the Russian attempt to suppress the Ukrainian movement for freedom and independence. It was a Soviet agent who, on May 25, 1926, slew Simon Petlura on a Paris street. Petlura was the titular head of the Ukrainian National Republic in exile and a symbol of Ukraine's undying quest for freedom. In May, 1938, Col. Eugene Konovalts, head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), was killed in Rotterdam, Holland, when a Soviet agent, Valukh, slipped a time bomb in the pocket of his trench coat. The Kremlin has a long and impressive record of political killings and kidnappings.

One may ask: why does such a presumably powerful empire as the Soviet Union, brandishing its atomic missiles and other deadly weapons of annihilation, resort to such barbarous and gangster-like methods in dealing with its political opponents in foreign countries?

The answer to this rather simple question is also simple: the Soviet Union was built on and remains built on lies and deceit, and survives only by terror and persecution. The Ukrainians have been and will remain the most formidable enemies of the Soviet system and the Russian colonial empire until the day they see it vanquished and destroyed. The Kremlin leaders know this full well. They know the power and magnetism of nationalism and liberation, and for these reasons relentlessly persecute the Ukrainians.

¹ John L. Steele's article, *Life Magazine*, September 7, 1962.

Since early 1930 Bandera has symbolized Ukrainian nationalism. Just as in the past the Russian czars were obsessed with Ivan Mazepa, *hetman* of Ukraine, so today the present rulers of Communist Russian have been haunted by the likes of Petlura, Konovalets and Bandera. The Soviet Russians still fail to distinguish between men, who are mortal, and ideas, which, like freedom and human dignity, are deathless.

It is to be recalled that in the fall of 1959 when Nikita Khrushchev was visiting the United Nations in New York, mass protests and demonstrations were organized by various ethnic groups and organizations, among whom the Ukrainians were the most numerous. Khrushchev did not bother to hide his feelings. All these anti-Communist pickets, he said, should be "exterminated like termites." A few weeks later Bandera was murdered on the orders of the Soviet government.

The German court served the cause of universal freedom when in rendering final verdict on Stashynsky it placed the blame where it properly belongs: the lawless Soviet government.

The Hon. Charles J. Kersten, former member of the U.S. Congress and chairman of the Congressional Special Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, served as one of the attorneys at the Karlsruhe trial, representing Mrs. S. Bandera. He had this to say about the crimes:

The decision of the German High Court is a just and great victory of truth; it unmasked the Russian Communist Government as the real killer; the evidence at the trial clearly proves that it was the Soviet Government that selected Bandera as its victim because he was the symbol of national resistance to Russian rule in the non-Russian nation, Ukraine. The Russian Council of Ministers gave the order to kill!

Russian science made the cyanide poison-gun.

Russian police set up plans and put Stashynsky under its discipline to carry them out. The Russian Government approved Stashynsky's act and ennobled the murder by conferring a high State order on him.

On behalf of Mrs. Bandera we plan to accuse Khrushchev as the head of the Russian Government of this murder before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and to explore a possibility of having a suit of damages instituted on her behalf against the Russian Communist Government in the International Court at The Hague.

On trial in Karlsruhe was not a degenerate human being but the Soviet government itself, the real culprit and perpetrator of the crimes committed by its tool against freedom. The names of Bandera and Rebet will remain deathless because they served a deathless idea—the freedom and dignity of mankind.

HOW NOT TO TREAT THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

In January, 1962, a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives suddenly announced its intention to conduct hearings on the captive nations. To casual observers this announcement appeared as a self-motivated step of serious inquiry into the captive world. For those close to the subject, however, it basically represented a maneuver designed to deflect attention from the popular movement in this country for a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. In fact, it was freely predicted at the time that the hearings held by the subcommittee on Europe would provide further substantial evidence justifying the need for a special committee.

Such evidence is contained in the two publications released by the Foreign Affairs Committee toward the end of the year. Both the *Hearings* and the *Report on Hearings* readily fulfill the prediction that was made. Today, they constitute an additional, formidable reason for the necessary formation of a special committee.

Needless to say, it is somewhat of an unpleasant task to criticize the efforts of several friends who led the hearings. But this burden is lessened enormously by one's good faith in their undoubted desire to view this extremely important subject objectively and constructively. Such a view can only be well beyond the insular confines of jurisdictional prerogative and with selfless concern for the national security of our country. On the basis of the hearings held last year, this compact analysis aims to show in as objective a manner as possible the reasons why a special committee is needed now more than ever before.

Before we briefly consider the background to these hearings, from the very start it would do well for us to bear in mind certain guiding facts and perspectives. The first fact is that the hearings consumed in time parts of only ten days over a period of three months. They were held spottily in June, July and September, giving every indication of a dearth of testimonies and haphazard organization. Second, over 15 per cent of the testimonies given upheld the thesis of a special committee on the captive nations, which wasn't within

the purview of the hearings anyway. When one adds to this the approximately 15 per cent devoted in the hearings brochure to the operations of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, the coverage of the captive nations, as envisioned by the proponents of a special committee, becomes slim and superficial indeed. The short time invested, the misappropriation of this time, and a heavy dose of duplication in output, albeit in an artificially restricted area of inquiry—all this and more add up to a rather sorry performance on the captive nations.

Without question, there is some solid and instructive material in several of the recorded testimonies. This will be pointed out in the course of this analysis. Nevertheless, much of it is lost in the poor organization of the hearings; and for purposes of popular reading by the average citizen it can have little constructive effect. Moreover, it is evident that the majority of the private witnesses were quite unaware of the causes and reasons that led to staging the hearings in the first place. What on the whole has been produced strongly substantiates the many arguments advanced by the supporters of a special committee, many of whom had anticipated the maneuver in the late summer of 1961. Regrettable as it may seem, to their arguments one can now add the further point that an established special committee would undoubtedly prove to be of tremendous educational benefit even to some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

BACKGROUND TO THE HEARING

Essentially, the staging of these hearings has no significant meaning other than in terms of the whole background carved by the fight for a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. To put it bluntly and accurately, if there had been no such educational campaign for a special committee, there certainly would not have been any hearings on the captive nations—at this time and the manner in which they were conducted. Both in relation to the subject here and with regard to the continuing fight for such a committee, it is very important to know at least the bare outlines of this background.

Action for a special committee was initiated by Congressman Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania as early as August, 1960. H. Res. 626, calling for the establishment of a House Committee on Captive Nations, was introduced at that time by its original sponsor chiefly for the purpose of sounding out public interest in the measure.¹

¹ Flood, Daniel J., "Freedom," *Congressional Record*, August 25, 1960, pp. 16445-16466.

Congress was just about closing out its bobtail session; so there wasn't even the slightest possibility of realizing this measure then. On the other hand, the practical aim of obtaining a public consensus was fulfilled beyond expectations. In 1961, at the beginning of the 87th Congress, Congressman Flood reintroduced the measure as H. Res. 211, and a whole succession of colorful events was begun.²

It is not our purpose here to recount in detail the revealing developments that ensued. Once a special committee is established, the full story of this background will be in order. Only those facts that have a bearing on the Foreign Affairs hearings concern us here. And these facts are as follows. One, after public interest expressed itself intensely on the resolution, the House Rules Committee held hearings on it in May, 1961 and was about to take positive action. However, both the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the chairlady of the subcommittee on Europe requested an opportunity to appear before Rules. The request was granted, but the opportunity was not seized, and the stall and delaying tactics were on.

Supporters of a special committee were well aware of the sources of opposition to the resolution. One of these has been, of course, the Foreign Affairs Committee, which regards the resolution as an encroachment upon its jurisdiction. The other source is the Department of State. Its fears of public evidence, showing not only the defects of our foreign policies but also—and more fundamental—the limitations of knowledge and understanding of some of our officials with regard to the Soviet Union, have been generally appreciated. Thus, it was no surprise that a second maneuver was engineered to table the special committee resolutions in the Rules Committee. In the summer of 1961, such an attempt was made. It was voted down.

As shown in an editorial written by the author, two more maneuvers were to be encountered.³ Actually forming the third and fourth maneuvers respectively, the first was the involvement of the State Department; the second was the trumped-up hearings in Foreign Affairs. We need only be brief about the former.

After the tabling motion was defeated in Rules, steady public pressure caused the opposition to a special committee to invoke the opinion of the State Department on the issue—as though its opinion was not known! When the matter was brought up in Rules in August, 1961, some members demanded that the Department send

² Flood, Daniel J., "Russian Colonialism and Necessity of a Special Captive Nations Committee," *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, pp. 3284-3311.

³ Editorial written by L. E. Dobriansky, "The Rusk Letters," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1961, pp. 293-300.

its representative to appear in person before the committee. This idea was carried, but the Department chose to send a letter signed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. This was the first of the two now famous Rusk letters which immensely confirmed the position of the special committee advocates.⁴ Now State proved the need for a special committee with its two astonishing, blunderous letters.⁵

Following the backfiring results of the third maneuver, it was quite evident to all involved in this fight that a congressional white-wash would be the next step. Proponents of a special committee began to anticipate the hearing in Foreign Affairs with arguments such as these: (1) Foreign Affairs is ill-equipped by reasons of time, preoccupation and composition to undertake satisfactorily the tasks underscored by H. Res. 211 and three dozen other resolutions; (2) the captive nations subject requires a broader and more independent base of inquiry than Foreign Affairs can provide, even in the area of informed personnel (there are many members who are not on Foreign Affairs and, on the basis of experience and proven interest, have greater competence in this specialized field than do many Members in Foreign Affairs); and (3) because of these and other reasons, we can expect little in this most vital subject from this standing committee.⁶

With a knowledge of this background, anyone reading carefully the *Hearings* of Foreign Affairs and also its *Report on Hearings*—which significantly was issued on October 29, 1962, about a week prior to the congressional elections—cannot but be impressed by these arguments. Both documents support them thoroughly. Time and time again, even for these acutely limited hearings, members are recorded having to excuse themselves because of other commitments. In helter-skelter fashion, many witnesses appeared without prepared statements; and the disproportionate emphasis placed on Poland (because some members visited it recently), indicates the unbalanced proceedings that scarcely measure up to the sterling results of such previous select committees as the Katyn Massacre and the Kersten one. The contrasts are sharp and conclusive. Moreover, as one would expect, the questioning is slipshod, as though Public Law 480 and a couple of quick solutions to the captive nations problem were of conclusive concern; and the type of questions asked

⁴ "The Rusk Letters," *Congressional Record*, May 31, 1962, pp. 8854-56.

⁵ "State Proves the Necessity of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations," *Congressional Record*, March 7, 1962, pp. 3265-67.

⁶ "Why a Special Congressional Committee on Captive Nations?," *Congressional Record*, June 4, 1962, pp. 8899-8902; "Spotlight On Moscow's Imperial Colonialism . . .," *ibid.*, March 7, 1962, pp. 3248-3259.

shows that some previous knowledge is necessary for an effective treatment of the subject. In short, just like the State Department, the Foreign Affairs Committee has now openly confirmed the position of the special committee advocates.

WHAT VALUE CAPTIVE NATIONS?

Looking at this record of events, the average American interested in the security of his country might well ask himself, "In the eyes of some of our officials, of what value are the captive nations in the cold war?" This record indicates that their views and behavior attach little and light value to what is indeed our most powerful non-military weapon. The two documents of the Foreign Affairs Committee are now a part of this record. And it is for this additional reason that Congressman Flood has reintroduced again his measure to establish a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. His H. Res. 14 has of the time of this writing been joined by twenty-one other resolutions.

The first obvious underestimation of the value of captive nations to the interests of our country is the relegation of the subject to a subcommittee of the subcommittee of Europe in the Foreign Affairs Committee. The set-up of the *Hearings* has all the markings of a cellar investigation. I doubt that legislatively we could descend any lower than this. Apart from considerations of real self-interest, what a sad reflection this is on the idealism of our Nation—indeed, on the 87th Congress which followed the one responsible for the world eye-opening Captive Nations Week Resolution. For space, atoms, small business, export-import controls and a host of other limited material interests, we hardly hesitate to establish special committees; for a billion people in captivity we seem to be satisfied with the meanderings of a sub-subcommittee that in the course of it all appears to be confused about its own status.

In addition to the low value assigned to the captive nations subject, another major criticism is the treatment of this aggregate subject by a group concerned solely with Europe, and at that only part of it. One of the chief arguments for a special committee has been the need for Americans to see the family of captive nations as a whole, in its total aggregate form. This has been one of the most profitable lessons learned from the passage of the Captive Nations Week Resolution. It is this fact of including all the captive nations in one operational concept that frightened Khrushchev in July, 1959. But this lesson and this fact apparently have failed to rub off on some. The sub-subcommittee of Europe shows no understanding of this all-important innovation and, with due unproductive report, has pursued

the archaic channels of dealing with a minority of captive nations in Central Europe. Little wonder that its work, such as it is, has stimulated almost no interest either here or abroad.

THE SUB-COMMITTEE HEARINGS

With these general facts in mind, let's take a close, running account of the hearings. Confusion prevails not only with reference to the graded value of the subject and concepts, not to speak of perspectives, but also in relation to the body's own status, the sequence of testimonies, the objectives of the hearings and a number of other items deserving of our attention here. On the matter of the sub-subcommittee's status, in one place it is asserted "that within the Foreign Affairs Committee we have established this permanent Sub-committee for the Captive Nations,"⁷ while in another place the assigned chairman of the sub-subcommittee states, "Mrs. Kelly is chairman of the European Subcommittee, and it is more of convenience, than anything else, that I am in this chair."⁸ By now the reader must be asking himself, "Who's who, what and where?" Well, after being told about an already established "permanent Subcommittee," in the report we find a recommendation for "the establishment of a special subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs."⁹ This may appear as progress in an ascent from cellar investigation, but with all this confusion, don't bank on it.

As to the objectives of the hearings, the reader doesn't meet up with a concrete definition of them until after having read over half of the hearings. Then he is told that the objectives are to determine what our relations are with the captive countries, what the conditions are in those countries, and what our policy should be in relation to them.¹⁰ Up to this point explanations vary from looking "into the present situation of the so-called captive nations of Europe" to "assuming to study the whole subject of the captive nations" to having the hearings "because so many Members had introduced resolutions on the captive nations." Really, if the sub-subcommittee members had bothered to read the *resolutions* for a special committee, they would have had a partial steering wheel from the start. The objectives of a special committee would be primarily informative and educational, but with legislative intent and in strict accord with the principles and judgments set forth in the Captive Nations Week

⁷ *Hearings*, p. 197.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁹ *Report on Hearings*, p. 17.

¹⁰ *Hearings*, p. 219.

Resolution. The whole subject of the captive nations would be treated as it should be.

Concerning the testimonies themselves, it is obviously not our purpose here to evaluate their content and worth. But they should be considered in terms of the strictures applied to the sub-subcom proceedings. Indeed, there are many strange statements in them that were passed by uncritically. The first oddity confronting the critical reader is the illogical sequence of the testimonies. The published hearings start with witnesses from the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, operational media dealing with some captive nations. Sound methodology dictates that you first establish *what is* and then you proceed to what is being done about it, but the cellar investigation had to proceed rapidly and seized upon anyone willing to testify in these hastily contrived circumstances. Even along the line of these ill-planned hearings we find the chairman appealing to a supporter of a special committee, "if you do have any suggestions or witnesses we would be glad to have you get in touch with Mr. Schupp..."¹¹ What a situation in contrast to the experiences of past select committees! Instead of a dearth of witnesses, special committee supporters can guarantee an overflow of witnesses—and this is no idle statement.

As pointed out earlier, the repetitive material would be enough to discourage an avid American reader—Poland, Public Law 480, sale of agricultural surplus, quick "workable solutions" and the like. The Loomis testimony on VOA operations covers much ground already cultivated in the 1958 hearings on the agency before another Foreign Affairs subcommittee.¹² Another VOA spokesman has this overall contribution to make, without any informed contest or challenge: "the interest of the average Soviet citizen as to the American way of life is insatiable. They are less interested in our form of government and democratic institutions."¹³ The ignorance of this statement is accepted wholesale, but this is understandable when throughout the hearings many of the questioners are under the illusion that the USSR is Russia. In the Radio Free Europe testimony which has many good points, one also finds some askewed conceptions, such as the identity of the captive nations concept with "the satellites" and Yugoslavia being a nation. Here, too, no informed, critical questioning, which in this task is just as vitally important as hearing, if not more so.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹² See *Review of United States Information Agency Operations, Hearings*, Washington, D.C., 1959, p. 206.

¹³ *Hearings*, p. 23.

The acute limitations from the questioning side are clearly shown in the responses to the testimonies upholding the need for a special committee. To cite a few among numerous examples, let's consider first the Bruce testimony. Congressman Bruce mentions the *Kersten Reports*: the chairman, showing a complete unfamiliarity with some twenty-seven reports, asks, "What year was *that report* made?"¹⁴ Another sub-subcom member asks, "I wonder if you have any ideas as to how a responsible government such as ours, dedicated to non-interference in the affairs of other nations, could go about the business of doing what our opponents are doing in constant world revolution."¹⁵ The premise in this statement is strange American doctrine. We know that imperial Moscow has used it for centuries to preserve its empire against intervening forces of freedom, but this writer has been unaware that we are so dedicated. Logically, if we are, then why these hearings, why continue to recognize the free Baltic legations; in short, why do many other things in relation to the captive nations, which by definition spell interference for freedom? Many other curious preconceptions tinge the questions of this particular member who, in the hearings, is constantly seeking a quick "workable solution."¹⁶ What an approach for the *complex* captive nations problem!

An excellent insight into the special committee issue can be obtained from reading the testimony of the Honorable William W. Scranton, now Governor of Pennsylvania. His arguments for a special committee are nowhere met by the sub-subcom. With past State Department experience, Mr. Scranton knows whereof he speaks. As concerns the captive nations, he emphasizes that the Department is "automatically inhibited" because "their work is with the so-called constitutional government of those captive nations."¹⁷ Apparently for the edification of the sub-subcom members who think the only European captive nations are in the so-called satellite area, Scranton points out his experience with Khrushchev at Camp David in connection with the Captive Nations Week Resolution: "I think anybody who was connected with this visit in any way will tell you that this particular resolution made more of an impression on Chairman Khrushchev and he invected against it at greater rate almost daily while he was here than any other single thing that America

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁶ E. g., *ibid.*, p. 170.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

was doing in the, quote—cold war—unquote.”¹⁸ Oddly enough, as shown in the hard-hitting Feighan statement and other testimonies, the meaning and significance of this resolution has made little impression on some of the sub-subcom members.

Several of the private testimonies are exceptionally good. It is a pity, however, that their potential impact was lost in this cellar investigation. The testimonies of Aleksander Kutt, Brutus Coste, Stanislaw Mikolaczyk and Dr. Jan Karski are of high quality and certainly deserving of a more serious use. On the questioning end we find the usual superficial queries about what specifically and hastily “could be done,”¹⁹ about “not going to war to do it,”²⁰ about there being “nothing in the form of overt action that we could do,”²¹ and about not winning “a physical victory over communism... because of nuclear warfare”²²—these and many more queries that suggest a lack of perspective and understanding on the whole problem of the cold war. If there is a single argument that alone justifies a special committee, it is the one stressing a concentration on *what* is in the captive nations, not what the quickie solutions might be.

The State Department statement, submitted by Mr. William R. Tyler, is hardly illuminating. It is a typical statement of well-worded vagaries and some exaggeration. For example, with reference to the fundamental subject of Soviet Russian colonialism, Mr. Tyler tells the sub-subcoms, “I do believe that sometimes people are unaware of the extent to which the United States has made an effort in the United Nations and elsewhere to publicize and draw attention to this.”²³ Unless he’s talking about subjective intentions, in the past ten years there have been only two or three overt actions by us in this respect. Under informed questioning, Mr. Tyler would be hard put to prove his groundless statement.

Some parts of these hearings make for comical reading. For example, one of the sub-subcoms holds that by relegating the vital captive nations subject to a cellar investigation, he has attached “a dignity” to the “Committee on European Affairs.”²⁴ In inverse ratio, what an indignity to the subject! Here are some more examples of sub-subcom comedy: “a select committee, the first thing they are going to have to talk about is foreign policy” (what self-indicting

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 118.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

fear!); "the State Department and this committee constantly are studying methods whereby they can hope to penetrate the Iron Curtain..." (who's kidding whom?); "The first thing you have to face up to is, what you going to do about these countries." (no, the first thing is enlightened knowledge); "if we work specifically to free the nations of Europe... we are interfering with the internal workings of those countries" (Moscow's favorite argument again). One can go on and on with these comedy errors. The biggest perhaps is the note of illusory self-satisfaction expressed by the chairman: "We have compiled a rather substantial record."²⁵

THE REPORT ON HEARINGS

Turning finally to the *Report*, the logical judgment that a weak edifice can never support a strong roof applies here thoroughly. As one should expect, the report is studded with contradictions, inaccuracies, misleading statements, and evidences of deficient perspective. These overbalance heavily some of its good points. Here, too, there is little cause for wonder when you know how all this came about and how it was conducted.

For a crass inaccuracy and also a contradiction, the reader is immediately struck by the map entitled "Captive Nations of Eastern Europe." An archaic historical note is given, "Boundaries as of January 1938." Now, are we talking about nations or changing states and imposed boundaries? With typical confusion, the two are combined here. However, if they mean what the caption says, then simple geography tells us that Eastern Europe does not end on the eastern borders of Poland and Rumania. Moreover, if the sub-subcoms had ever read Public Law 86-90, they would have learned that far more populous and even more important captive nations exist in the USSR. What little hope the peoples of these nations could expect from some of our legislators who presume to spell out U.S. foreign policy.

As for further contradictions, it is interesting to note that in the foreword a sentence was inserted to absolve the sub-subcom of any arbitrary delimitation of the captive nations to the group that was studied—"due to practical limitations of jurisdiction and time"²⁶ (in itself a noteworthy confession for a body "assuming to study the whole subject of the captive nations.")²⁷ Now, a report is certainly not written before the hearings, and a foreword is usually not written before the body of a report. Thus, it appears that since

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

²⁶ *Report*, p. vii.

²⁷ *Hearings*, p. 152.

both the hearings and the body of the report contradict outright this single sentence, someone had an afterthought following a review of the sharply critical Scranton and Feighan statements. In short, the sentence cannot be used as a saving excuse for the mal-performed hearings. Taking the sentence at its own face value, one may well ask, "Since when is the European sector of the USSR not a part of Europe, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of a committee dealing with European affairs?"

This foreword sentence is also contradicted by many historically misleading statements in the body of the report. For instance, it is stated that one of the objectives of the hearings was "To expose to the rest of the world that the Soviet Union has ruthlessly welded these captive nations into the Soviet colonial empire..."²⁸ Are the captive nations of Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and others which are parts of the USSR responsible for this? As Public Law 86-90 points out, it is Soviet Russia, the real imperialist power, and not the legalistic facade, the Soviet Union, which has ruthlessly welded the captive nations, both within and outside the USSR. On exposing any of this to the rest of the world, the sub-subcoms complain that even our official VOA failed to give news coverage to the hearings.²⁹ Considering the low quality of the hearings, VOA's apparent oversight may be construed as a service to the Nation. Disseminating inexcusable confusion is not exactly serviceable to the cause of world freedom.

Nonsensical, too, is the notion that the emergence of "European captive nations" began in 1939. The sub-subcom's special grouping of the Baltic nations "in the family of the European captive nations" is also an artificial device necessitated by a defective understanding of East European history. Where the sub-subcom criticizes the executive agencies for "a lack of knowledge, and confusion, behind the Iron Curtain about the U.S. position on the captive European nations," one can only say that it has strongly intensified this condition with these hearings. The report's recommendations for a dynamic U.S. policy in the U.N., expanded VOA facilities for captive nations broadcasts, and a congressional study of "other Communist-subjugated peoples" (by a special committee?) are, of course, creditable.

When one scans the report's appendix and its bibliography of the Kersten Committee hearings, he wonders whether the sub-subcoms had ever read these works. An objective comparison between the

²⁸ *Report*, p. 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Kersten products and what has been analyzed here would be enough to guarantee the creation of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations. Against the solid contributions of preceding Congresses that made possible the Katyn massacre inquiry, the Kersten investigation, and Public Law 86-90, the sub-subcom products of the 87th Congress are well nigh disgraceful. They confirm all the arguments on time, experience, specialized knowledge, and critical thought that have been advanced by the supporters of a special committee. The 88th Congress has an opportunity to eradicate this blot on America's growing understanding of the captive nations by creating the special committee.

THE USSR IN A TRUE LIGHT

By ENRIQUE MARTINEZ CODO

In reading the world press we find numerous articles and reports concerning the power, the enormous achievements, and the vast technological and scientific capabilities of the Soviet Union. Impregnated with Soviet propaganda lies, many of the authors writing on the USSR's participation in World War II point to the great capabilities of Soviet soldiers, praise the "unity" of the "Soviet" people, and glorify the communist military strategy.

But the real picture is quite different from that drawn by the members of the world press, whose views and ideas have been adversely affected by Soviet propaganda.

We have no intention of denying the individual heroism of the peoples of the USSR; no nation in the world has a monopoly on this particular human quality. We do intend, however, to show in this article that the widely propagated image of Soviet power and omnipotence constitutes but a great bluff and a cheap deceit which has spread alarmingly throughout the whole world.

In this article, we would like to present an analysis of the basic facts on:

1. The Soviet military victory in 1945;
2. The manpower and the "unity" of the "Soviet peoples";
3. Economic and industrial potential of the USSR; and
4. Military potential of the USSR as a threat to the free world.

Leaving aside the ideological problems of the Communist doctrine, we wish to consider individual incidents and items of reality, known everywhere except in the free West. In an attempt to shed much-needed light, we are treating the above-stated aspects of Soviet reality.

I. THE SOVIET MILITARY VISTORY IN 1945

Many factors contributed to the Soviet military victory over Germany in 1945. It should be noted at the outset, however, that despite their great numerical superiority in manpower and military material, the Soviet forces barely escaped total defeat in the first six months of the Eastern campaign. (The Germans initiated their

offensive with 3,200 tanks as against 15,000 Soviet tanks). German military reports give the following summary of losses suffered by the Soviet forces during the initial 180 days of fighting: 2,172,000 prisoners, 17,164 guns, 8,860 tanks, and 7,600 airplanes. Even though these figures seem high, they are probably true: Stalin himself stated in an official communique of June 23, 1943, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the German invasion, that the Soviet army had lost 30,000 tanks. Moreover, a Russian writer (Captain Sergei N. Kurnakov, in his work, *The Military Forces of Russia*, published by Lantaro Publishers, 1942) admitted that in the first five months of fighting (one month less than the six months period covered by the German report) the Red Army lost 7,500 tanks, 6,400 airplanes, and 12,900 guns (see p. 301 in the cited work).

It is a generally known fact that a great part of the Soviet forces concentrated on the German front consisted of Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and other non-Russian elements. Taking advantage of the situation, they surrendered *en masse* to the enemy of their own hated occupiers. The agents of the NKVD, who were aware of this voluntary mass-surrender, did not hesitate to liquidate those military leaders whom they suspected of such surrender. Such was the case of Generals Kryvonis, commander of the Kiev military district, and his staff, whose mutilated bodies were found in a mass grave along with thousands of bodies of Ukrainian civilians.

Unfortunately, the German political administration was unable, or rather unwilling, to take advantage of the fervent patriotism of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian nationalists. They were all oppressed by the iron hand of the Nazi *Reichskommissars*, who pursued the nonsensical racist policies of plunder, usurpation, and property seizures under the slogan of "Nur fuer Deutsche" (only for Germans) and who exterminated the local nationalists harboring strong anti-communist and anti-Russian feelings. The absurd racist policy gave rise to the guerrilla movement. Thus appeared the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which struggled vigorously against the German occupation forces. It is interesting to read the following in the personal diary of Dr. Goebbels:

April 29, 1942:

At the very outset the population of Ukraine was very much inclined to recognize the *Fuehrer* (Hitler) as the liberator of Europe, and it received the German *Wehrmacht* with warmth and sincerity. This attitude changed completely in the span of a few months. We were hitting the Russians, and especially the Ukrainians, over the heads in our well known manner. A blow on the head is not always a convincing argument to a Russian and so much less to a Ukrainian.

Also, famed General Guderian stated in his memoirs:

In a short period of time the *Reichskommissars* succeeded in extinguishing all feelings of amity toward the Germans and thus paved the way for the guerrilla or insurgent struggle.

What conclusion may be drawn from all this? The obvious one: the population of the Soviet Union fought against the Germans not because of love for Russia or for Communist ideology; it fought against the false and incongruous racist policies of Nazism which was unwilling to comprehend and still less to exploit the nationalism of the peoples enslaved by Communist Russia.

In examining the Soviet military successes, to be taken into account are a number of factors which bear no relation to the Soviet military potential, strategy or the individual capabilities of the Soviet leaders. Among others, these may be cited:

- a. Disturbing activity of the anti-German guerrillas in the rear of the German front;
- b. Intensive and systematic bombing of Germany by the Western Allies;
- c. Existence of a second front in western Europe; and
- d. Valuable and immense military aid extended to the Soviet Union by the Western Allies, especially the United States and Great Britain.

With regard to the last factor it is to be noted that during the four years of fighting the Red Army received from the United States and Great Britain a vast quantity of arms and military equipment, thus enabling it to recuperate from the losses suffered at the hands of the Germans. Through loans and Lend-Lease the Soviet Union received the following: 21,184 airplanes of all types; 12,076 tanks; 8,218 anti-aircraft guns; 13,633 machine-guns; 385,883 trucks; 51,503 jeeps; 35,170 motorcycles; 5,071 tractors; 1,981 locomotives; 105 submarine destroyers; 197 torpedo boats; 95 merchant ships; 14,500,000 pairs of shoes.

A brief inspection of the four above-mentioned factors prompts one to ask: What would have happened in 1941 if the Soviet Union had faced Germany alone, and if the latter had applied more far-seeing policies with respect to the nations enslaved by Moscow? Would the Soviet victories have been possible? Would the Soviet leaders have been able to boast—as they are doing now—of their “great” Socialist triumphs and superior Communist strategy?

II. MANPOWER AND “UNITY” OF “SOVIET PEOPLES”

If one consulted any standard textbook on geography, he would undoubtedly find the following data on the USSR: Area—22,404,000

sq. kilometers; population—208,000,000; capital—Moscow (pop.7,000,000). Having read that, his reaction naturally would be that there are more Russians than Americans and that in view of the forced centralization and communist indoctrination they are far more united than the Americans in the cold war struggle. But such a deduction would be fundamentally false. And the time has come for the West to become more interested in the real potential of Soviet manpower as well as its weaknesses.

It is true, according to the Soviet statistics, that the total number of people enslaved by Moscow has reached 208 million, but the facts that are generally omitted are that of the total population only 55 per cent are Russians and that of these only 40 per cent support the central government of the USSR. These percentages reduce the Russian population united under the Communist regime to approximately 115 million and 95 million, respectively. The question immediately arises: What of the rest of the population? The answer is simple: the rest of the population comprises non-Russian nations with strong feelings for national independence and a prevailing attitude which is both anti-communist and anti-Russian.

The Russian expansionist policies, from the days of Czarism up to present Marxo-Leninist times, have always been characterized by conquests of the neighboring countries through invasions, wars, repressions, and terror. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that these captive nations should frequently have taken advantage of the weaknesses of the totalitarian central government to assert their rights to freedom. Thus in 1917, during the period of anarchy in Czarist Russia, the captive nations proclaimed their independence and broke away from the Russian central regime. Finland did so on December 6, 1917; Ukraine on January 22, 1918; Lithuania on February 16, 1918; Estonia on February 24, 1918; Byelorussia on March 25, 1918; Azerbaijan, Armenia, Poland and Georgia in November, 1918; Latvia, also in the same year, and the Kuban became independent on December 5, 1918. These events, almost forgotten today, echoed throughout the world. These were acts which received the support of the Argentine Republic. Specifically, during the first term of Dr. Hipolito Irigoyen's presidency, the independence of these countries was recognized by a special decree, thus giving proof of Argentina's devotion to the ideals of freedom, equality, and self-determination. It is with a great deal of pleasure that we cite the recognition of Ukraine's independence by a decree of February 5, 1921, thanks to the efforts of the Argentine Minister in Paris, Dr. Marcelo T. de Alvear.

As a result of the independence proclamations by the individual nations and following the reorganization and consolidation of the Communist regime, the old Russian imperialism revived again, and the nations which had attained freedom and independence were again brought under the yoke of Russian domination. Poland and Finland were the sole exceptions. Some of these nations were subjugated by direct invasion, others reconquered through the application of more moderate means, but never without the threatening menace of Red Army bayonets. And in this area, history is explicitly clear and rich in evidence. No country in the world accepted Communism of its own free will, but yielded only under the pressure of military power. Thus it should not be surprising, that during the Nazi invasion, the nations enslaved by Moscow supported the Germans, who promised freedom to them.

The Soviet victory in 1945 again provided the opportunity for Moscow to annex the bordering countries in the face of the Western Powers' passivity and puzzling agreement. This was the reason for the appearance of movements of purely nationalist character which aimed at self-liberation and of the spreading guerrilla movement and sabotage activity (e.g. the UPA and OUN in Ukraine; the WIN in Poland; the BDPS in Lithuania, and so on). This is the major weakness of the Soviet Union — the eternal lack of certainty about its manpower potential, because this potential is always permeated by nationalist, separatist, anti-Communist, and anti-Russian attitudes.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

The consequences of World War II were detrimental to the manpower potential of the nations which make up the so-called Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It can be stated with certainty that the Soviet losses in manpower potential totaled 20 to 30 million people—as a cumulative result of the actual fighting, the famine, and the cruel political persecutions by the Communists. It is also true that the total population of the USSR is 208 million, while that of the United States is but 180 million. However, if we compare the natural increase of the respective populations during the past twenty years, we see the figures in a new light.

In 1939 the population of the USSR totaled 170 million; that of the United States was 121 million. But while the population of the United States has increased by 59 million, that of the Soviet Union has increased by only 38 million up to the present time, and this despite the newpost-war annexations of territories (parts of

Finland, East Prussia, Western and Carpatho-Ukraine, Moldavia). This fact explains the secret of the so-called reductions of Soviet military forces, which in reality are to be accounted for by a decline in recruitment over the 20 year period—a condition which has had an equally negative effect on the labor force required for Soviet agriculture and industry. In addition, it should be noted that, in comparison to the United States with regard to quality of manpower, the Soviet Union is in a much less favorable position.

Soviet propaganda is constantly screeching that its educational system is the best in the world and that their universities graduate more engineers annually than those of any other country of the word. But what the Soviet propaganda does not say is where these graduates of Soviet universities are employed. The answer to this question is readily found in the Soviet press. In *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (*Comsomol Truth*) of June 7, 1956, for example, one may read Khrushchev's complaint that a number of specialists who had completed their studies at the expense of the government could find no better jobs than "floor-scrubbers." Another Soviet periodical, *Sovietskaya Litva* (*Soviet Lithuania*) of November 14, 1956 says: "It is with a great deal of indignation that one must regard the vast number of university students who refuse to go to work." *Izvestia* of July 1, 1956 writes that 2,140 out of a total 6,500 graduates of special schools in Yaroslavl are loafing around without evincing any desire to work.

It would seem that the "great proletarian fatherland" is not as strongly united as it purports to be. Its weakness in this respect is merely emphasized by its propaganda boasting about its 208 million people (half of whom are non-Russians) and its tens of thousands of engineers, whose education in many cases seems to have ripened into disenchantment with the regime.

III. ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL

"In 1965 the Soviet Union will surpass the present level of industrial production in the United States with regard to the absolute production of some of the most important products."

Such are the words of Nikita Khrushchev, who uttered them in 1958 while initiating his first seven-year-plan. They are characteristic of Soviet propaganda, which is constantly juggling with words and slogans especially concocted to impress the West with the great economic and industrial potential of the Soviet Union. But Soviet propaganda is quite different from the reality, as even the West has begun to realize from the discrepancies between Soviet plans

bombastically announced and their end results. The nominations and appointments of Soviet directors and managers to posts in Siberia, who are later "rewarded" for their "achievements," are usually accompanied by loud fanfare. The case of Georgi Malenkov and his "victorious" battle for agrarian production, as well as the sweeping purges in the administrative cabinets of the Union republics, especially in Ukraine, for failures in production, serve as examples.

On the other hand, it should be noted that in view of the impossibility of verification, Soviet propaganda is free to falsify the figures, and thus probably alters them within wide ranges, in order to accommodate its own interests. But even on the basis of official Soviet statistics it can be proven without difficulty that the so-called seven-year-plan of N. Khrushchev is but a utopia, a visionary ideal. At the same time, however, the plan is directed at the West, calculated to compel free world opinion to accept "peaceful coexistence" and "economic competition," which in turn would lead to the West's physical and moral disarmament—all in accordance with Lenin's dictum that every period of peace and armistice must be utilized for the preparation of new wars and conquests. And so while Khrushchev prattles about disarmament, his secret underground factories continue to produce arms and war material.

Generally speaking, the Soviet productive output is about 50-60 per cent of that of the United States, although the Soviet citizen is far from being able to enjoy 50-60 per cent of the well-being and living standard of the American citizen. The Soviet statistical data tell us of the wonderful industrial development, contending that since 1917 Soviet production has increased by 1,500 per cent, while American production has increased at a much lower rate. But Soviet propaganda keeps silent about the fact that an underdeveloped country can rapidly double or triple its industrial production. Thus the Soviet Union might easily double its production of automobiles (600,000 units) in one year, whereas the United States would have to increase its production by ten times the Soviet output to achieve a doubled rate (from the present 6 million to 12 million). (For details see the article by M. Pavliuk, "Can the USSR Surpass Europe and the USA Economically?", published in *Ucrania Libre*, No. 18/19. Ed.).

MANY SATELLITES, BUT POOR RAILROADS

Ruling a vast territory, the Soviet Union is dependent on its network of railways and roads as much as the West relies on its seaways. Countless Western visitors vouch for the fact that the

extent and quality of the Soviet network of railways and roads is far below the level of Western seaways. It is true that Soviet science and technology have succeeded in producing satellites and nuclear bombs with which to threaten the free world. But hardly anyone asks why Soviet industry is unable to erect its own cement plants, its own locomotives and engines, its own refrigerators, its own aluminum plants, etc. No one asks why so many refugees keep sending costly parcels once and twice a month to their relatives in the "great fatherland of the proletariat," parcels which contain drugs, clothing, and canned goods. Since the Soviet Union manages to maintain the largest military force in the world, to arm the forces of the satellite countries and those states which are ripe for Soviet subversion and infiltration, and to expend enormous efforts in the development of atomic potential and space exploration, the Soviet economy is clearly seen to be a wholly lopsided affair.

Thus the Soviet road network (counting all types of roads: concrete, stone, etc., and those under construction) totals 1,366,836 kilometers of which only a part can be used during the entire year. On the other hand, the network of roads in the United States (an area 2.33 times smaller than that of the USSR) totals 5,421,166 kilometers (four times that of the USSR), all of year-round use. And where the railway network of the Soviet Union constitutes 120,700 kilometers, that of the United States is 362,198 kilometers (three times larger).

PROPAGANDA AIMS

Mr. Khrushchev can blow his horn as loud as he pleases in proclaiming that by 1965 the Soviet Union will catch up with the United States in total production output. The statistical data, however, refute his boasting in every respect. Unfortunately, very few Western correspondents and specialists write about the real status of the Soviet economy, thereby permitting to go unmasked the Soviet propaganda which is trying to deceive the workers of the entire world with its false slogans of "socialist revival."

The following statistical tables for the year 1958 (coinciding with the announcement of Khrushchev's seven-year-plan) are presented in order to allow the reader to reach his own conclusions as to the chances of the Soviet Union to catch up and surpass the United States in the economical and industrial sectors.

TABLE I

Comparative Production of Articles of Long Range Consumption
(in millions)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Automobiles</i>	<i>TV Sets</i>	<i>Radio Sets</i>	<i>Refrigerators</i>	<i>Washing Machines</i>
USA (1960)	6,500	5,000	11,750	3,692	4,700
USSR (1952-1960) Inclusive	4,500	5,450	7,000	2,500	2,700

TABLE II

Comparison of Some Chief Productions for 1958

	<i>USA</i>	<i>USSR</i>	<i>Com. ratio</i> (USA=100%)
Automobiles (millions) -----	5.13	0.51	10 %
Steel (tons) -----	106.20	55.00	51.7%
Oil (tons) -----	353.60	113.00	31.9%
Cement (tons) -----	52.27	33.36	63.8%
Shoes (million pairs) -----	598.00	356.00	59.5%
Electric Energy (thousand mill. kilowatts) -----	724.00	233.00	32.1%
Steel (per capita) -----	0.70	0.25	35.5%
Steel (per sq. kil.) -----	15.50	2.30	17.0%
Shoes (per capita — pairs) -----	3.40	1.70	50.0%

**IV. THE MILITARY POTENTIAL AND ITS THREAT
TO THE FREE WORLD**

Despite the fact that the Soviet economic potential lags behind that of the United States or Western Europe, it nevertheless has a significance of its own. Fifty or seventy million tons of steel are assigned for definite purposes. We have already mentioned that the Soviet people do not enjoy even half of the comfort and the standard of living of the American or West European population; we have also shown by statistics that the annual American production of electric appliances is higher than that of the Soviet Union over a nine-year span. In reality, these fifty or seventy million tons of steel do not go into production of articles of peace-time application, for transport and industry of peaceful uses. Instead, they are transformed into tanks, guns, submarines, rockets, sputniks, and other armaments.

SUSPICIOUS DEMOBILIZATIONS

But someone may say: Are not the Russians engaged in demobilizing 1,210,000 soldiers? Are they not in favor of total disarmament? Here is a propagandistic trap that the Communists are setting up

throughout the world in order to accelerate the coming about of the world dictatorship of the proletariat. This peace offensive is no novelty in Russian politics, both Czarist and Communist. We need only recall that the famous Hague Conference of 1889 took place as a result of insinuations made by the Russian government; that in April of 1927, Rykov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, stated that his government is prepared to apply "drastic means to avoid the arms race"; that in November of the same year, Litvinov proposed his well-known plan of total disarmament, including the stoppage of war material production and the dissolution of all military staffs, etc.; that nowadays at the almost uninterrupted conferences in Geneva the Soviet representatives always propose "general unlimited disarmament." But little is said about the Soviet deceitful maneuverings and constant excuses which make impossible the real control of disarmament. Recently, Soviet propaganda organs announced that a demobilization has reduced the Soviet forces to 3,350,000 men. But in the meantime, at all public parades (May 1st, October Revolution) the Russians show off new weapons ranging from simple rifles to the most complex long-range ballistic missiles. This is indicative of the continuous military growth hiding behind the facade of modernization.

ENORMOUS MILITARY POWER

In 1954 Field Marshall Montgomery stated that the Red Army consisted of 175 line divisions, 40 conventional divisions, and 70 armored divisions, with 250 tanks per division. There was a total of 30,000 tanks in the entire army. At the same time the Red Fleet consisted of 400 submarines, 30 cruisers, and 150 destroyers. The Soviet air force had at its disposal 20,000 modern airplanes. This military force has diminished in manpower but not in military equipment. The decrease in manpower may more properly be ascribed to the consequences of the war (lower birthrate in the USSR), to the necessity of increasing the labor force in view of the new seven-year-plan to surpass American production by 1965, or to the completion of adjustment of Soviet military personnel to nuclear warfare, which requires a smaller number of men. At the same time there are some indications that the military power of the USSR has increased. For example, the old tank section, which consisted of three tanks, now has five tanks. Consequently, the number of tanks in a company has been increased from 10 to 16, and the armored divisions have increased their number of tanks from 250 to 400; this means that the total number of tanks in the Red Army has increased from

30,000 to 45,000. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is capable of forming so-called "parallel forces." This means simply that there are a number of military units which do not fall into regular army categories, such as DOSAAF (Voluntary Society of Aid to the Army, Air Force, and Navy), which trains its members along military lines; and the KGB (MVD), which maintains tanks and even airplanes and which also trains groups of Comsomols (members of the Communist youth organization) from early childhood. "The Comsomol character," wrote Rear Admiral Golubiov in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (*Comsomol Truth*) of March, 1952, "requires that its members study military subjects and that they assume leadership in work and in military mass sports."

TEACHINGS OF FRUNZE

It is a well-known fact that the teachings of Michael Frunze, one of the best theoreticians and tacticians of Soviet military strategy, is based on detailed studies of the formulation of Soviet military personnel. Reading between the lines, so to speak, we find the following information: "There is only one agreement that can prevail between our proletarian state and the rest of the bourgeois world, and that is an agreement to a long war, constant and hopeless until death; a war which requires stamina, discipline, endurance, and unity of will power. But the external form of conditions may allow for modifications: an open war could be catastrophic for us; therefore, it is necessary to look for peaceful coexistence between the warring sides. But this form does not change the fundamental status of conditions. It is necessary to understand and admit openly that mutual and parallel coexistence of our proletarian state with capitalist states for a long period of time is impossible."

Thereby the question: How long can this period of "peace" last?

THE PLAN OF MANUILSKY

Dimitri Manuilsky, another well-known Soviet theoretician, provides an adequate answer to this question: "Our opportunity will come in twenty or thirty years" (he spoke these words in 1931 at the school of political warfare in Leningrad). "We shall lull the bourgeois world to sleep by announcing a movement for peace, so necessary for mankind. And then the capitalist nations, stupid and degenerate, will rejoice in collaboration for their own doom."

Thus "peaceful coexistence" is but an armistice, a time trap set up for our own destruction. Peace and disarmament constitute the basic myths of Soviet propaganda.

Let us only recall the words of the "great teacher," Lenin: "We are not pacifists. We have always stated with assurance that it would be silly if the revolutionary proletariat procrastinated in inciting revolutionary wars which could be decisive for socialism." (*Diplomatic Dictionary*, published in 1952, XXIII, pp. 360-61.) G. Zhukov, chairman of cultural relations with countries abroad, wrote in the magazine *Arts*, Paris, of November 1959, that "peaceful co-existence is an interval. In other words, at this moment one speaks in a friendly tone, covering the true mien..."

This then is the real danger, the real threat and reality of our days. Khrushchev's horrifying phrase hangs over the free world: "Whether you like it or not, we shall bury you."

Will we react in time?

This is the paramount question of our era and of our survival.

THE LIBRARIES IN UKRAINE

By OSTAP TARNAWSKY

The libraries of any country are the records of the state of culture and civilization of that country. As a treasure house of cultural heritage and as a public institution with cultural and civilizing aims, a library reflects the intellectual values of a nation.

An important measure of any culture is the per capita ratio of books in the nation's libraries. According to the statistics of UNESCO, in 1954 there were, for every 1,000 inhabitants, 1,490 books in the public libraries in Sweden, 1,310 books in Denmark, 1,170 books in the United Kingdom, 1,120 books in Belgium, 1,060 books in Czechoslovakia, 1,030 books in Norway, 960 books in Finland, 880 books in the U.S.A., 790 books in Poland, 570 books in Canada, 200 books in Yugoslavia, 140 books in Japan, 9 books in Egypt.¹ In 1956, according to the Ukrainian encyclopedia published recently in Kiev, there were 351 books in the public libraries in Ukraine for every 100 inhabitants² (3,510 books for every 1,000 persons).

After the Second World War there was a remarkable growth of libraries in Ukraine. In 1957 Ukraine possessed 78,424 libraries of various types, with 257,175,550 books,³ one third of this number being rural libraries (27,734 rural libraries in 1956). In 1957 the libraries under the administration of the Ministry of Culture of the Ukrainian S.S.R. alone served 8,692,700 persons with 167,409,300 books.⁴ According to UNESCO statistics, the circulation of books per 1,000 inhabitants in 1954 was as follows: United Kingdom—7,270, Denmark—3,930, Sweden—3,230, Finland—2,180, U.S.A.—2,150, Canada—2,090, Czechoslovakia—1,900, Poland—1,880, Belgium—1,800, Norway—1,600, Japan—600, Yugoslavia—430, and Egypt—10.⁵ As the population of Ukraine consists of 40 million, the circulation

¹ "International Library Statistics," *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, XI (January, 1957) 16-17.

² *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia* (Kiev, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1960), I, 548-9.

³ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, I, 548.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "International Library Statistics," *op. cit.*, 16-17.

of books per 1,000 inhabitants in the libraries of the Ministry of Culture in Ukraine in 1957 was 4,185.

The libraries of Ukraine, like the country itself, have had a long and arduous history. The libraries had their beginning in the eleventh century when Ukraine, then Kievan Rus', was a great kingdom and an important cultural center in Eastern Europe. The first known library in Ukraine was that of the famous cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, founded by the eminent Ukrainian ruler, Yaroslav the Wise, in 1037.⁶ The libraries in Ukraine, as in Western Europe, originated in monasteries. One of the best known monastic libraries in Ukraine was the library of the *Pecherska Lavra* in Kiev, established early in the eleventh century.⁷ The ancient part of its collections was destroyed by fire in 1718. From the old Ukrainian chronicles we learn that Ukrainian princes and noblemen built up private libraries and often made gifts of books to monasteries and churches. Church brotherhoods also had their book collections. A valuable one was the collection of the Stavropegian Brotherhood in Lviv, established in the fifteenth century.⁸ This collection has remained to this day; at the present time it is a part of the Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in Lviv. In the seventeenth century a library was founded by a prominent clergyman and statesman, Petro Mohyla, at the Academy in Kiev.⁹ This was the first university library in Ukraine, and its collections were open to the faculty and students of this educational institution. A library was also founded by another prominent Ukrainian nobleman, Prince Constantine Ostrohsy, at the Academy in Ostroh.¹⁰ Several private libraries were owned by the clergy and by some wealthy families.

In addition to the Mohyla Academy Library in Kiev (it was reorganized in 1834 as the library of the University of Kiev), libraries open to faculty members and students were those of the universities of Lviv (established in 1784), of Kharkiv (1805), and of Chernivtsi (1830)¹¹ as well as the library of Odessa University, started in 1817.¹²

⁶ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, op. cit., I, 548.

⁷ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, op. cit., I, 548.

⁸ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (Munich: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1949), I, 1008.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, op. cit., I, 548.

¹² Paul L. Horecky. *Libraries and Bibliographic Centers in the Soviet Union*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1959), 131.

Early in the nineteenth century public libraries were established in the cities of Ukraine. Although designated for general use, these libraries have had many collections of valuable literature for study and research. Of especially great value was the public library of the Ukrainian capital city of Kiev, founded in 1866. The first public library in Ukraine was that of the harbor city of Odessa, called *Odesska Centralna Naukova Biblioteka*.¹³ Founded in 1829, it has occupied a beautiful building designed by a famous architect, F. Nestourch. The first librarian was A. Spada and the first catalog was prepared in French.¹⁴ In 1877 a public library was established in Kharkiv through the efforts of a Ukrainian historian, Dmytro Bahaley.¹⁵ Public libraries were established in such other Ukrainian cities as Katerynoslav, Poltava, Chernyhiv, Zhytomyr, Kamenets and Kherson. The functions of a public library in Lviv were performed by the library of the *Narodny Dim* (National Home), founded in 1849.¹⁶

The nineteenth century was notable for the spread of enlightenment throughout Ukraine. The Ukrainian cultural society, *Prosvita*, founded in 1868, became a center for popular education. This society began to organize popular libraries throughout the country. The first *Prosvita* library was established in Lviv in 1868. In 1906 a *Prosvita* library was established in Kiev through the efforts of Borys Hrinchenko, Ukrainian writer, scholar and author of the first scholarly dictionary of the Ukrainian language.¹⁷

Simultaneously, scientific and research libraries sprang up in Ukraine. The first scientific library was that of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, established in 1892. The first scientific library in Kiev, that of the Ukrainian Scientific Society, was founded by the prominent Ukrainian statesman and historian, Michael Hrushevsky, then the President of the Ukrainian National Republic. These two libraries, in Kiev and in Lviv, became the most important centers of Ukrainian cultural life in the twentieth century. The library of the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kiev became the foundation for the National Library of Ukraine, established during the period when Ukraine was an independent state (in 1919). After merging with other libraries in Kiev, the National Library grew to the level of

¹³ Margaret Burton. *Famous Libraries of the World; Their History, Collections and Administration* (London: Grafton, 1937), 359-367.

¹⁴ A. Tuneieva, "La Bibliotheque Publique d'Etat a Odessa," *Revue des Bibliotheques*, XXXVII (1928), 377-421.

¹⁵ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, op. cit., I, 1009-1011.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 1009.

¹⁷ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, op. cit., I, 1011.

the largest library in Ukraine and one of the largest in the world. It is known at the present time as the State Public Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁸ It is the largest institution of that type (academy libraries) in the whole Soviet Union and has about six million holdings.¹⁹ The library of the Shevchenko Scientific Society at Lviv, presently the Branch Library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, is the second largest library in Ukraine.²⁰ This library has about three million units.²¹

According to information contained in the *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, "libraries in the Soviet Union may be classified under the following six groups: State public libraries; libraries of the Academy of Sciences; autonomous special libraries; university libraries; mass libraries (school and children's libraries, rural libraries, soldiers' libraries, mobile libraries, etc.), and trade union libraries."²²

The most important are the state public libraries, libraries of the Academy of Sciences, special libraries and university libraries. The *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries* lists the following as the principal libraries of Ukraine:

State Public Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (Derzhavna Publichna Biblioteka Akademiyi Nauk Ukrainskoyi R.S.R.), Kiev, Volodymyrska 58.

Soviet Union Communist Party State Republican Library of the Ukrainian S.S.R. (Derzhavna Republikanska Biblioteka imeni Komunistychnoyi Partiyi Radianskoho Soyuzu), Kiev, Kirova 15.

Gorky Odessa State Scientific Library (Derzhavna Naukova Biblioteka imeni Gorkoho), Odessa, Pastera 19.

Korolenko Kharkiv State Scientific Library (Derzhavna Naukova Biblioteka imeni Korolenka), Kharkiv, Korolenka 18.

Gorky Central Scientific Library of Kharkiv University (Centralna Naukova Biblioteka Kharkivskoho Universytetu imeni Gorkoho), Kharkiv, Universytetska 28.²³

This list is not complete. Horecky's *Libraries and Bibliographic Centers in the Soviet Union* also names the following:

State Scientific and Medical Library of the Ministry of Health Protection of the Ukrainian S.S.R (Derzhavna Naukova i Medychna Biblioteka Ministerstva Okhorony Zdorovia Ukrainskoyi R.S.R.), Kharkiv.

¹⁸ Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, 139.

¹⁹ Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

²⁰ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, *op. cit.*, II, 125.

²¹ Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

²² "Library Organization in the Soviet Union," *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, VIII (May-June, 1954), 53.

²³ "List of the Principal Libraries in the U.S.S.R.," *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, XIV (March-April, 1960), 93.

Book Chamber of the Ukrainian S.S.R. (Knyzhkova Palata Ukrainskoyi R.S.R.) Kharkiv, Artema 31.

Scientific Library of the Shevchenko State University (Naukova Biblioteka Derzhavnoho Universytetu imeni Shevchenka), Kiev, Volodymyrska 58.

Scientific Medical Library (Naukova Medychna Biblioteka), Kiev, Gorkoho 19/21.

Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R. (Biblioteka Akademiyi Nauk Ukrainskoyi R.S.R.), Lviv, Stefanyka 2.

Scientific Library of the Franko State University (Naukova Biblioteka Derzhavnoho Universytetu imeni Franka), Lviv, Drahomanova 5.

Scientific Library of the Mechnikov State University (Naukova Biblioteka Derzhavnoho Universytetu imeni Mechnikova), Odessa, Chervonoyi Armiyi 24.

Branch Library of the State Scientific Library (Doneckyi Filial Derzhavnoyi Naukovoyi Biblioteky), Donetsk, Kurska 33.²⁴

The State Public Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in Kiev, one of the largest libraries in the world, is described by the *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries* as follows:

The library, by reason of its stock of books and the scope of its activities, is not only the largest in the (Ukrainian) Republic but one of the largest in the Soviet Union. It holds 12,5 million books, pamphlets, booklets, reviews, newspapers, maps, manuscripts and other publications.²⁵

More comprehensive information is to be found in *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*. The library in Kiev, according to this source, possesses almost 6 million books, 10.5 million periodicals, 200 thousand manuscripts, and almost 140 thousand musical publications.²⁶

The Library of the Academy of Sciences in Kiev acts as an international book exchange center for all science sections of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. According to the *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, at the end of August 1957, the library was conducting exchanges with 740 scientific establishments and libraries in 53 countries.²⁷ According to *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, in 1957 the library was conducting exchanges with 780 establishments and libraries in the Soviet Union and with 865 foreign libraries, receiving 15,836 books and periodicals, and sending out 19,772 publications of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.²⁸ The library has almost one million books in foreign languages.²⁹

²⁴ Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, 248-256.

²⁵ "Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, XII (May-June, 1958), 127.

²⁶ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, I, 550.

²⁷ "Library of the Academy of Sciences . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 127.

²⁸ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, I, 551.

²⁹ "Library of the Academy of Sciences . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 127.

The collections of this large library are rich and unique. *The UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries* provides the following information:

The library's collection of incunabula, to the number of almost 500,³⁰ comprises some unique works—Ukrainian incunabula, such as *Triod* and *Chasoslov* (Cracow, 1491), rare editions of West European printers of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and other valuable publications and manuscripts. The collections include the following unique editions: *Tractatus rationis et consciencie*, published by Gutenberg in 1460; Cicero's *De officiis* and *Paradoxa*, printed by Schoeffer, in Mainz in 1465; *Aristotelis de historia animalium* (1476); *Ars memorativa...* (1480); and *Li miraculi de la Madonna* (1499).³¹

The Library of the Academy of Sciences in Kiev holds a special value for Ukrainian culture. It contains the private collections of such Ukrainian scholars as Krymsky, Maslov, Halahan, Lazarevsky and Kostomarov. There are books published by the Ukrainian incunabula printer, Ivan Fedorov (*Apostol* of 1564 and of 1574, printed in Lviv); *Ostrohaska Bibliya* (1581); and a considerable number of first editions of Ukrainian literary and scientific classics (Shevchenko, Franko, Lesya Ukrainka, Kotsiubynsky, and others.) The library has manuscripts, such as the *Kievan Hlaholic Letters* of the tenth century, *Peresopnytske Evanhele* of the sixteenth century, and manifestoes issued by *Hetman Khmelnytsky*. Its collections include also autographs of works by Ivan Franko, Lesya Ukrainka, Michael Kotsiubynsky, Panas Myrny, Marko Vovchok, and others; there is also a complete autographed collection of works of the Ukrainian philosopher Hryhor Skovoroda and of the famous writer Mykola Hohol (Russian pronunciation: Gogol).³²

This great institution serves some 30,000 readers annually. It also undertakes highly specialized bibliographical work—the editing and publishing of bibliographical indexes with complete bibliographical descriptions, and the issuing of catalogues on the various parts of the library's collections of manuscripts and publications.³³ The library has been publishing reports on its activities since 1954.

The second largest Ukrainian library, that of the Academy of Sciences in Lviv, was established on the foundation of 84 libraries of this ancient cultural center.³⁴ The basis of its wealth was provided by the Library of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, with its unique collections of manuscripts and first editions of Ukrainian classics.³⁵

³⁰ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia* gives the number of incunabula as 522.

³¹ "Library of the Academy of Sciences..." *op. cit.*, p. 127.

³² *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, I, 551.

³³ "Library of the Academy of Sciences..." *op. cit.*, p. 128.

³⁴ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, I, 549.

³⁵ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, *op. cit.*, I, 1010.

The library's collections include original editions of such famous European printers as Aldus, Elzevir, and Etienne, as well as the Ukrainian incunabula of Ivan Fedorov. The library in Lviv boasts some three million books, periodicals, manuscripts, and other library materials, unique private collections of Vozniak, Terletsky, Didushytsky, and others.³⁶

The State Scientific Library in Kharkiv originated as a public library in 1886. At the present time, according to *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*,³⁷ it has over three million books and other library materials, including some incunabula and first editions of Ukrainian classics. The library possesses the first book printed in the printing shop of the monastery of the *Pecherska Lavra* in Kiev (*Authologion*, 1619), and Fedorov's *Apostol* (1574), as well as the first edition of Shevchenko's *Haydamaky* (1841).³⁸

The State Scientific Library in Odessa originated as the first public library in Ukraine, in 1829. According to *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, on January 1, 1959, the library had 2,200,000 books and other library materials.³⁹ Among these are almost 10,000 rare books and incunabula of the fifteenth century. This library supervises six provincial libraries in southern Ukraine, supplying them with lists of recommended reading, primarily agriculture and technology.⁴⁰

Founded in 1866, the Public Library of Kiev was transformed into the State Republic Library—named for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This is a science and research institution, especially in the fields of sociology, politics, and economics. During the last war the library was ruined and its collections were destroyed. Since the war it has been rebuilt at a cost of more than 4,500,000 rubles, while its collection has grown to over 500,000 books. This library has the status of a central library in Ukraine, and since 1954 has received single legal deposit copies. The library is engaged in foreign exchange.⁴¹ Horecky furnishes this picture of the new building of this library:

The new building houses three reading rooms seating anywhere from sixty-eight to two hundred and sixteen readers and with its pillars and flights of marble stairs, stucco ceilings, crystal chandeliers, and silk curtains seems to epitomize the ornate of neo-classic style.⁴²

³⁶ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, op. cit., I, 549.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 550.

³⁸ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, op. cit., I, 550.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Paul L. Horecky, op. cit., p. 94.

⁴¹ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, op. cit., I, 551.

⁴² Paul L. Horecky, op. cit., p. 93.

The Scientific Library of the State University in Odessa was established in 1817 as a library of the famous Richelieu Lyceum. In 1959 it had amassed 1,500,000 books. It also has a unique collection of incunabula, for instance: the *Chronicon mundi* of Hartmann Schedel (1493), Fedorov's *Ostrohske Evanheliye* (1581), and the *Sluzhebnyk* of Petro Mohyla printed at *Pecherska Lavra*; it includes private collections, such as that of Ukrainian writer Hryhorovych. This library also takes part in international exchange.⁴³

There are other scientific libraries in Ukraine. The State Historical Library of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in Kiev was established in 1939 as a historical center of Ukraine. Destroyed during the Second World War, it was rebuilt in 1952. Its collections are growing very rapidly; in January 1959 it had 339,214 volumes.⁴⁴

The university libraries in Ukraine act as scientific and research centers. They possess a great number of valuable scientific materials. The Scientific Library of the Ivan Franko State University in Lviv, for instance, has about 800,000 items,⁴⁵ and has been a scientific and research center not only for Ukraine, but other countries of Eastern Europe as well.

Ukraine also possesses a highly developed network of medical libraries. According to UNESCO, on January 1, 1954, Ukraine had over 1,000 medical libraries with 5.5 million works, and there were 834 hospital libraries containing 600, 000 publications used by 94,000 medical workers.⁴⁶ The medical library network in Ukraine is one of the most developed in the Soviet Union. Horecky states that "in 1957, according to official sources, it consisted of 1,713 medical libraries with 7,675,000 units".⁴⁷ The most prominent are the Republic Medical Research Library in Kiev and the State Medical Research Library in Kharkiv, with a collection of over 500,000 units. The Kharkiv Medical Library publishes medical bibliographies, in copies by the thousands, reviews of foreign literature, and lists of medical accessions. In 1955 the "Bibliographic Guide and Index to the Contributions of the Kharkiv State Medical Research Library" was printed in 1,500 copies. This library has also experimented with book-mobiles, sending them to conferences of physicians.

Ukraine also has a network of smaller medical libraries. Horecky traces the characteristics of that network:

⁴³ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, op. cit., I, 552.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 550.

⁴⁵ Paul L. Horecky, op. cit., p. 231.

⁴⁶ "Medical Libraries in the Ukrainian S.S.R." *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, IX (April, 1955), 85.

⁴⁷ Paul L. Horecky, op. cit., p. 122.

In addition, Ukraine has about forty smaller medical libraries attached to research institutes. Twenty-four libraries of large provincial medical establishments averaged—at last report—40,000 holdings each, and served an average of 1,432 readers per year. The collections of district medical libraries in Ukraine—which are associated with smaller hospitals, sanatoria, etc.—averaged 2,000 to 3,000 volumes and the number of readers served per year was about thirty-five.⁴⁸

The center of Ukrainian medical libraries is the one in Kiev. Its collections consist of 500,000 volumes of medical literature, 30 per cent of them in foreign languages. It issues a bulletin with abstracts and prepares translations of foreign literature.⁴⁹

The Central Scientific Agricultural Library in Kharkiv is another center of agricultural libraries in the country. This library is under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture. Its collections consist of 300,000 volumes of agricultural literature.⁵⁰

In addition, there is a developed network of technical libraries in Ukraine. According to *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*,⁵¹ in 1957 there were 3,346 technical libraries in Ukraine, with 9.5 million volumes. Of importance are the following Ukrainian technical libraries; the Central Scientific Technical Library in Kharkiv (established in 1897), the Scientific Technical Library in Kiev, and the Library of the Politechnical Institute in Lviv.

The State public libraries, as stated in the *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*,⁵² include a great number of national (like the State Public Library in Kiev), provincial, regional, and municipal libraries. Collections of more than 100,000 volumes are possessed by the libraries in the following Ukrainian cities and towns: Dnepropetrovsk (the City Library, established in 1877 as the Citizens' Library); Kher-son (the City Library, established in 1872); Poltava, and Chernyhiv.⁵³

Many university libraries have collections of more than 100,000 volumes. In Kiev, in addition to the already mentioned university libraries, collections of over 100,000 volumes are possessed by the libraries at: the Industrial Institute, the Agricultural Institute, the Commercial Institute, the Technical Institute, the Medical Institute, the Cooperative Institute, and the Meteorological Institute. Similarly sized university libraries are to be found in Kharkiv, Odes-

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁴⁹ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, I, 552.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 552-3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² "Library Organization in the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁵³ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, *op. cit.*, I, 1012.

sa, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Kamianets, Nizhyn, Poltava, Yuzivka, Chernivtsi, and Chernyhiv.⁵⁴

In recent decades special libraries for children have been established in Ukraine. In 1958 there were 1,157 special children's libraries in Ukraine; their collections exceeded 20 million volumes.⁵⁵ The largest of these—the largest children's library not only in Ukraine but in the entire Soviet Union as well— was the Special Children's Library in Kiev. Its collection in 1949, as stated in the *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, was 135,000 volumes. This library has 19 rooms, including a large reading room with 200 seats. From its headquarters spreads a network of circulating libraries, which numbered 96 in 1950.⁵⁶

The status of the special children's libraries in Ukraine is characterized by the following comparison made by Paul Horecky: "The volume of special children's libraries is suggested by the fact that Leningrad (population 3,182,000) has sixteen and Kharkiv (population 877,000) has thirty-one".⁵⁷

Also to be found in Ukraine is a broad network of school, rural and factory libraries (the latter are known as Trade Union libraries). These are active in diffusing culture and combatting illiteracy; they also supply the population with literature prepared by the government and by the Party. After the Second World War a circulating service provided by mobile libraries was started in Ukraine. According to *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, the state "mass" (public) libraries of Ukraine served in 1958 1,449,800 persons with 37,948 mobile libraries, processing some 17,732,400 books.⁵⁸

Some valuable collections of Ukrainian books are stored by libraries outside Ukraine. The Leningrad Public Library, according to Paul Horecky, has a substantial number of publications in the Ukrainian language; among them are the first *Ostromyr Gospel*, which is the first dated document (1056-1057) in the old Ukrainian language of Kievan Rus' and the ancient *Chronicle of Nestor* (1377), the first history of Ukraine.⁵⁹

The attention paid by the Soviet Union government and by the Communist Party to libraries is emphasized in *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*:

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 1013.

⁵⁵ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, I, 553.

⁵⁶ "The Library Organization in the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁵⁷ Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁵⁸ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, I, 553.

⁵⁹ Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government have always protected the growth of libraries. In a decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party *About Library Criticism and Bibliography* (1940) the library was designated as an important tool of Communist propaganda and Communist education.⁶⁰

The public library system in Ukraine, as is true of the entire Soviet Union, is centralized and controlled by the Communist Party. Thomas J. Whitby brings out the following characteristics of the status of libraries in the U.S.S.R.:

The mass, or what we would call the public, library network is controlled and directed on its highest level by the Ministry of Culture of the U.S.S.R., located in Moscow; in the several Soviet republics by the respective ministries of culture; and locally by the regional and district cultural departments... Structurally, the entire system is hierarchical, the apex of it being in Moscow and the base of it stretching out to every village and hamlet in the country.⁶¹

Ukraine has almost eighty thousand libraries, of which a large number are public libraries. They play an important role in carrying out the official government policy, and serve as agencies of communication for the State and for the Party.⁶²

The libraries in the U.S.S.R. are not only instruments for carrying out the policy of the Communist Party; they are also controlled and directed by the Communist Party. This is also the picture in Ukraine. In over-all organization, goals and practices the libraries in Ukraine follow a course that derives its inspiration and motivation from Moscow. This dependence of all libraries in the Soviet Union on Moscow is characterized by the activity of the All-Union Book Chamber of the U.S.S.R. This institution was founded in Petrograd, in May, 1917; with the transfer of the capital, it was moved to Moscow. By 1936, when it was named the All-Union Book Chamber, it had become the bibliographic center of the entire U.S.S.R., with subordinate branches established in various republics, including Ukraine. The preparation of catalogue cards for printed matter in the non-Russian languages of the U.S.S.R. is the responsibility of the republic book chambers. "The first to engage in such a program," according to Paul Horecky, "was the Ukrainian Book Chamber which began to print and distribute catalogue cards in 1927."⁶³ In the Ukrainian S.S.R. cards are issued in two series: annotated for mass li-

⁶⁰ *Ukrainska Radyanska Encyclopedia, op. cit.*, I, 548.

⁶¹ Thomas J. Whitby, "Libraries and Bibliographical Projects in the Communist Bloc," *Library Quarterly*, XXVIII, (October, 1958), 278.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 279.

⁶³ Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

braries, in three sets for (a) municipal and district, (b) village, and (c) children's libraries); and annotated for major libraries.⁶⁴

The All-Union Book Chamber in Moscow with its subordinate republic book chambers is a powerful tool of dictatorial power in the field of libraries in the U.S.S.R.:

The All-Union Book Chamber of the U.S.S.R. receives all the printed works in the U.S.S.R. for copyright deposit purposes. It redistributes these specimen copies to the most important libraries of the country, and to the central libraries of the various federal republics. The All-Union Book Chamber also compiles statistics of everything printed in the country: books, periodicals, newspapers, musical scores, drawings, etc., published in the whole of the U.S.S.R., in the different federal republics, in the various branches of knowledge.⁶⁵

The dynamic setup of the libraries in the U.S.S.R. is marked by growing ties of control and censorship exercised by the Communist Party. The Soviet library is, first of all, a cultural and educational institution carrying out the tasks of Communist education of the broad masses of readers.⁶⁶ Many limitations are imposed in using the library collections in the Soviet Union. "Foreign literature," according to Whitby, "inimical to Communism and to the Soviet Union receives particular treatment; it is kept in special collections and is not listed in public catalogues."⁶⁷

The libraries in Ukraine are tied down by the centralized policy exercised by the Soviet government from Moscow. Since 1936, when the All-Union Book Chamber was established in Moscow, all independent bibliographical work in Ukraine, together with the Ukrainian bibliographical periodical *Bibliolohichni Visti*, published in Kiev, has ceased, and all the library and bibliographical activity has been centralized in the Book Chamber of the Ukrainian S.S.R.—a subordinate branch of the All-Union Book Chamber in Moscow. All bibliographical work in Ukraine is planned by this powerful institution; if it does not provide all bibliographical work, it certainly does control it. For example, the State Public Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R., according to Whitby, has published a Union catalogue of foreign journals for the period 1945-1954, indicating holdings of thirty-six institutions located in Kiev.⁶⁸ At the same time the Kievan Public Library is one of the recipients

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ N. Kucharkov, "Copyright Deposit and Related Services; the All-Union Book Chamber of the U.S.S.R.," *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries*, XI (January, 1957), 4.

⁶⁶ Thomas J. Whitby, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

of legal deposit copies pursuant to the decree of the Council of Ministries of the U.S.S.R., dated September 29, 1948. The other recipients in Ukraine are Korolenko's State Library in Kharkiv and the Library of the Branch of the Lenin Museum in Lviv.⁶⁹

The libraries in Ukraine are proteges of the government and of the Communist Party. In addition to the free of charge copies of every book printed in the Soviet Union received by the three above-mentioned libraries in Ukraine from the All-Union Book Chamber in Moscow, many Ukrainian libraries receive free copies of books published in the Ukrainian S.S.R. from the Ukrainian Book Chamber in Kiev. All public libraries receive government funds for their activities. Whitby characterizes the goals of the libraries in the Soviet bloc as being a reflection of the Soviet aims modified to satisfy the national requirements.⁷⁰

In the present situation, the libraries in Ukraine, as everywhere in the U.S.S.R., have a political function in the process of "building Communism." The libraries not only receive all books prepared by the Communist Party and Soviet government, but they have the duty to press every citizen to read them. The picture of this indoctrinary activity of the Soviet library is to be found in an article in the librarian monthly, *Bibliotekar*. To compel all the inhabitants of Odessa to read books from the libraries, the City Council, together with librarians and Party men, prepared a list of those citizens who did not use the libraries' facilities. For those citizens special mobile libraries have been organized to carry out the order of the Central Committee of the Communist Party that every family receive and read books from the libraries.⁷¹

Librarians in the Soviet Union are specially trained to perform this function in accordance with the decisions of the Communist Party. Under a special program librarians are trained for the broad network of libraries in Ukraine. The State Library Institute in Kharkiv (on a University level) trains specialists for the field of bibliography; several technicums prepare libraries for the public libraries. The Kharkiv Institute, established in 1935 as the Ukrainian Library Institute, and renamed in 1947, has the following chairs: Marxism-Leninism, history, literature, foreign languages, library science, bibliography, library collections and catalogues, cultural

⁶⁹ Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-172.

⁷⁰ Thomas J. Whitby, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280.

⁷¹ O. Mamrenko, "To increase the number of readers" (*Shchoby chytateley bylo bolshe*), *Bibliotekar*, XII (December, 1961), pp. 29-30.

work, school and children's libraries, pedagogy, and physical education.⁷²

The greatest emphasis, however, is placed on the requirements of the Party and of the government. As stated by Whitby:

The librarian in this dynamic setup is an intermediary between the state and the people, responding in specific ways to the directives of the leaders of the state and elaborating in full the program that the citizenry is urged to follow. For this dual role he has been carefully groomed by the library school.⁷³

The library network in Ukraine, with a large number of libraries and trained librarians, thus is a powerful intellectual resource. At the present time it is fully controlled by the Soviet government and by the ruling Communist party. Were it to be democratized, it could become a powerful resource for the progress of civilization, as well as a genuine center for international communication towards a better understanding of all mankind.

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⁷² Paul L. Horecky, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁷³ Thomas J. Whitby, "Soviet Librarian Today," *ALA Bulletin*, VIII (June 1959), p. 489.

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THE STATE OF IDEL-URAL

By DR. A. KARATAY

Every year in July in the United States "Captive Nations Week" is observed in order to remind the people of the U.S. and the free world of the plight of the peoples, numbering over 200 million, who are living under the Soviet Communist regime. Of the 220 million population of the Soviet Union (in 1962) nearly 30 million of them are Moslems, predominantly of Turkic origin. They are the Uzbeks (more than 7 million), Tatars (about 6 million), Kazakhs (5 million), Turkmen (1.3 million), Bashkirs (1 million), Kirghiz (about 1.2 million) and many other Turkic peoples of smaller numbers; some of them are non-Moslems, like the Chuvashes (1.5 million) and the Yakuts (some 300,000). The many Turkic peoples in the Caucasus (the Kumyks, Balkars and Karachaens) were decimated after World War II by means of deportations.

In the region of the Middle Volga and the southern Ural Mountains along the Ural River (or Yayik) the population is predominantly non-Russian and consists in the main of Moslem-Turkic peoples known as the Kazan Tatars (Kazan Turks) and Bashkirs. The Chuvashes, a Turkic people, are not Moslems; the Finno-Ugrian peoples, Cheremishes (Udmurts) and Mari (Ar) are strongly "Tatarized"; and there are also the Mordvines of Finnish origin. Of the 15 million total population in this region the Russians are in a minority with 7 million. Before 1917 the proportion of the Turkic and Finnish peoples was still higher, probably about 60%.

Although these non-Russian people have their own names, they also have a common thousand-year history. In the time of the Khanate of Kazan (1437-1552), for example, the Tatars, Cheremishes, and Chuvashes were very closely bound together. After the Russian conquest of Kazan (1552) they all came under Russian Czarist domination and were subjected to exploitation by the Czarist government.

Since any sort of political activity for these non-Russians was prohibited, and because of adverse economic and social conditions, it was impossible for them to create national organizations. Only after the Revolution of 1905 were the first attempts at political

organization made, such as the "Ittifak" (Alliance) of the Moslems of Russia. But political activity on a broad scale sprang up after the February Revolution (1917), marked especially by the All-Russian Congress of Moslems in Moscow, May 1-11, 1917, where 900 delegates discussed many problems of cultural and political nature and where provisions were approved for the further political development of the Moslem-Turkic peoples of Russia.

At this time the idea of the establishment of a Moslem-Turkic state embracing the Middle Volga and the Ural River region gained popular support. This state was to be called the "State of Idel-Ural" (*Idel-Ural Shtaty*); "Idel" is the name of the Volga River (Atal in Chuvash, and Idel among all other Turkic peoples), while the Ural is a river in the southern Ural Mountains which flows into the Caspian Sea.

This "State of Idel-Ural" was to encompass the region of the Middle Volga from the mouth of the Oka River up to the Samara River and the Ural River, and the southern area of the Ural Mountains along with some parts of Western Siberia. The formation of this state was proposed by the National Assembly of Kazan Tatars in Ufa in the session of November 29, 1917. But the Bolshevik Revolution prevented the realization of such a national state of the Kazan Turks. The Bolsheviks did attempt to create an "Idel-Ural State" on a Soviet basis, but gave this up in favor of a "Tatar Soviet Republic," a caricature of the "Idel-Ural State."

The idea of the "Idel-Ural State" remains alive among the political refugees and among the native population of the Middle Volga-Ural regions. Since the peoples in the Middle Volga-Ural regions have no way to express themselves on this matter it is left to the political refugees to promote the creation of free, democratic states, autonomous or fully independent, as was freely expressed and resolved at the Tatar National Assembly in Ufa, November 1917.

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The Soviet Union is a multi-national state, as was Czarist imperial Russia, aptly called the "prison of peoples." The Moslems have been oppressed under both regimes. The Moslem-Turkic peoples of the USSR inhabit the Middle Volga (Idel) and Ural regions, Western Siberia, Turkestan and the Caucasus, i. e. all border regions of the Soviet Union. These Moslem lands are very important economically and strategically: Turkestan with its cotton and Azerbaijan and Idel-Ural with their oil are mainstays of the Soviet economy. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and, to some extent, Kirgizstan border on the "capitalist" world (Iran and Afghanistan), while

huge Red China is the next-door neighbor of the USSR, starting with Turkestan in the direction of the Altai Mountains. (If we remember that the province of Sinkiang — Eastern Turkestan — has a predominantly Turkic population — it is referred to by the Russians as the Uygurs — this area also possesses political and cultural significance).

The variety of the ethnographical map of the USSR is a result of the historical development of Russia, or more precisely, of the insatiable expansionist lust of Russians for the past four centuries. Three-fifths of all the territories of the USSR were once "Turkic lands." There were "Turkic Empires," like the Golden Horde (1240 to 1480); there were smaller kingdoms, like the Khanate of the Crimea (1440-1783), the Khanate of Kazan (1437-1552), the Nogay Horde and the Khanate of Siberia. Turkestan once had several Khanates, like Bukhara, Khiva, and Khokand. Bukhara and Khiva were autonomous states under Czarist Russia, losing their sovereignty with the Bolshevik takeover in 1920.

Russian encroachment on the "Turkic lands" began in 1552 with the conquest of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible and was completed with the conquest of Turkestan in 1885. Despite the totality of the oppression—economic, social, political and religious—the Kazan Tatars were able to preserve their nationality and their religion. When the oppression was somewhat relaxed, they developed very quickly as a nation and even assumed the role of leadership among all the Moslem-Turkic peoples of Russia.

The "Tatar people" of the Middle Volga region (today's "Tatarstan") are descendants of the Volga Bulgars, a Turkic people who came to this region from the lower reaches of the Don in the seventh century A. D. They soon became sedentary, intermingling to some degree with the autochthon Finnic peoples. Because of the very favorable geographic position of the territory they occupied, they became traders. With the Volga (Idel) and the Kama Rivers being main trade routes between Scandinavia and the Moslem countries, the city of Bulgar grew into an important trade center. As a result of the intercourse with the Moslems in Turkestan (Khwarezm and Baghdad) the Bulgars embraced the Moslem religion at the beginning of the 10th century, and subsequently the Bulgar land on the Volga (Idel) became a classical Moslem country, with a high level of civilization. The great city of Bulgar became a very important commercial center of Eastern Europe; merchants from Turkestan, the Caucasus, Russia, Scandinavia, and even from the Byzantine Empire met together here. In turn, Bulgar tradesmen traveled to remote countries. (After the construction of the Volga dam

for the hydroelectric power station near Kuybyshev—in 1950—the remains of the city of Bulgar were inundated by water, and thus the last monument of the Volga Bulgars disappeared.)

Later many Kipchak tribes (also of Turkic origin) wandered from Western Siberia into the Middle Volga region and interbred with the Bulgars, resulting in the people known as the Kazan Tatars (Kazan Turks). The name “Tatar” was given the people by the Russians after the Mongol-Tatar invasion in 1241 and the “Tatar domination” over Russia from 1240 to 1480. Thus the name “Tatar” became attached to the Moslems of the Middle Volga, although until recent times they preferred to be called “Mussulmen” (Moslem) rather than “Tatar.” After the establishment of the Tatar Autonomous Republic in 1920, “Tatar” became the official name of this Turkic people of the Middle Volga region as well as of all those who originate from this territory and speak “Kazan-Tatar.” They number more than 5 million in the Soviet Union; only 1.5 million live in Tatarstan proper.

The Russian government under Catherine II found it useful to employ the Kazan Tatars as mediators in its trade with the Siberian and Turkestan Moslem peoples. For this purpose a suburb with a Tatar population was built near Orenburg (today Chkalov) with the name Saidov-posad (in Tatar: Kargaly), and a “Spiritual Assembly of Moslems” was created in 1789. A “Mufti” was appointed by the Ministry of the Interior and all Moslems in Russia were put under his jurisdiction. Mosques were allowed to be built again and the religious persecution of the Kazan Tatars abated. As a consequence the Tatars were able in a short time to develop an intensive trade activity in Central Asia among the steppe nomads, the Kazakhs and the Kirghizes (at this time commonly called “Kirghiz-kaisaks”). This led to the economic revival of the Kazan Tatars, which in turn led to the social and cultural revival of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The Kazan Tatars (or Kazan Turks) numbered some 3.5 million in 1889; they lived in the districts of Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, Nizhni-Novgorod, Simbirsk and Penza, as well as in Western Siberia. They were probably the first Turkic people to adopt western ways in their economic and cultural activities. With the growth of the Tatar bourgeoisie in Kazan, Orenburg, Ufa, Troitsk, Moscow, St. Petersburg and almost all the important trade centers of Russia, great progress was made by a movement for modern education originated by Ismail Bey Gasprinsky of the Crimea. Known as “Djadidism” (Innovation), this movement was supported by all classes among the Kazan Turks save a small group called the “Kadimists,” who were partisans of the “Old System.” The “Djadid” movement pro-

gressed markedly after the Revolution of 1905, and had triumphed nearly everywhere by the time of the February Revolution, 1917.

"Djadidism" among the Kazan Tatars was in reality a movement for national rebirth. It succeeded: when the Revolution broke out, the Kazan Tatars had become a nation possessing a common, developed literary language, a national literature, and national aims and expectations. They were closely bound together by tradition, national culture and above all, their religion, Islam. The city of Kazan had become a great cultural center with publishing house, theatres and its famous "Medreses" (Colleges). Scholars-theologians, writers, poets, and lawyers lived there. It was also the commercial and business center of the Kazan Tatars.

The Kazan Turkic (Tatar) language and literature spread among the Bashkirs, the Kazan-Kirghizes and even to Turkestan through the dedication of Tatar "teachers" (*muallims*) and through Tatar books and periodicals. Illiteracy among the Kazan Tatars decreased; by 1917 some 35% of the men and 20% of the women could read and write. That this was no mean achievement is to be seen from the fact that the Russian government would not contribute a penny to the Tatar-Moslem schools; all educational expenses were borne by the Tatars themselves.

The Moslems in Czarist Russia were subjected to severe discrimination. As *inorodtsy* (of an origin and religion other than Russian) they did not enjoy equal religious and economic rights with the Russians. Military service, taxes, and all sorts of duties were required from the Tatars, but no privileges of any kind were extended them in return. Their *mullas* (priests) were not accorded the status of the *pops* (Russian priests), who enjoyed many prerogatives (exemption from military service, many taxes, etc.) while a Tatar *mulla* was considered to be a simple peasant (*krestianin*). Government posts were inaccessible to the Tatars; entrance into the secondary schools or universities was difficult. The Kazan Tatars were not allowed to buy real estate in Turkestan; they could not settle down for good; they were not allowed to establish commercial societies, banks, and so on.

Although the Kazan Tatars and Bashkirs were allowed to enter the cadet schools and did enjoy the privilege of serving as officers in the Imperial Army, they could rise to high rank only by special imperial *ukase* (order). Consequently despite the great number of common Tatar soldiers there were only a few Tatar generals and admirals prior to the Revolution, and even these had been "Russified" and hence were of little value to their brother Tatars. So long as he preserved his Moslem religion a Tatar could not be appointed

a professor to the University, thus an academic career was barred to the Kazan Tatars, as well as to all Moslem subjects in Russia.

The Russian government did not look favorably upon the establishment of Tatar schools, for it adhered to the principle that "the most dangerous thing for Russia is a well-educated Tatar." Restrictions and discrimination of all sorts existed right up to the Revolution of 1917. The Tatars and Moslems were restricted also in their voting rights in the elections for the *Duma* (Russian Parliament); some of them—the Kirghizes, the Kazakhs and a majority of the Uzbeks—were not allowed to vote at all. Since the Tatars could send but a very small number of deputies to the *Duma* the opportunities to improve their lot were slight. The Kazan Tatars could not possess their own political parties, but were allowed some welfare societies and cooperative activities. Even their spiritual head, the Mufti, would be appointed by the Ministry of Interior without consulting the Moslems.

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Under these harsh circumstances the Kazan Tatars greeted the Revolution of 1917 with enthusiasm. The weak point of all the Turkic-Moslem peoples in Russia, however, was their political inexperience. There were, of course, some politicians and a few members of the *Duma*, and some outstanding personalities (in Kazan: Ayaz Ishaki, Sadri Maksudi, Hadi Atlasi and Alimdjan Barudi; in Azerbaijan: Rezulzade Emin Bey and Toptchybashev; and in the Crimea: Tchelebi-Kjihan and Djafer Seyidahmet). But their lack of party organizations had precluded maximum effectiveness in their national cause. What is clear is that the Turkic-Moslem peoples from the very beginning supported the Socialist parties in Russia, especially the Socialist—Revolutionaries (Es-Er's); the socialist program seemed to be more promising insofar as the expectations of the Moslems in regard to their national rights were concerned.

The Russian Revolution stimulated the masses of the Moslems; for the most part they could not, of course, understand the meaning of the Russian Revolution, but everyone sensed that "the old days were gone" and that the "waves of the Revolution" had engulfed them, too.

In March 15-17, 1917, a "Moslem Conference" was held in Petrograd. In attendance were the members of the Moslem faction in the *Duma* (some 12 deputies) and some outstanding local personalities. Plans were made for the organization in Petrograd of a "Provisional Central Bureau of Russian Moslems" whose primary duty was the

calling of an "All-Russian Moslem Congress." Moslems throughout Russia responded to the call.

The Congress was held in Moscow, May 1-11, 1917, with nearly 900 delegates from all parts of Russia participating. Discussed were cultural and educational matters, religious organization, the form of government (in Russia and on national territories), and the Moslem military organization. Concerning the form of government the majority of the Congress (446 to 271) adopted the resolution that "Russia should be a democratic republic, based on the national-territorial-federal" principle; i. e. the principle of "territorial autonomy" was accepted. But for those nations without sufficient majorities in their territories, like the Middle Volga region, the principle of "national-cultural autonomy" was recommended.

The Congress' general attitude to the problems of war and peace tallied with that of the Russian Socialists: peace without any annexations or indemnities. The Congress elected a Mufti for the Moslems of Inner Russia and Western Siberia (Alimdjan Barudi of Kazan) and six *Kadies* (members of the Religious Board). A fifteen-member "National Central Council" (*Shura*) of Russian Moslems was elected by the Congress.

The National Central Council, whose seat was in Petrograd, had to unite the Moslems of Russia under one political flag and to guide them until the Constituent Assembly (*Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*) would meet to solve Russia's major problems. President of the Council was Tsalikov Ahmed, a Menshevik by political conviction. The Council's organ, *Izvestia*, reported in Russian and in Tatar all the activities and decisions of the Moslem organizations. But the position of this Council became more and more awkward. Despite the resolution adopted at the Congress in Moscow that "all local organizations must obey all the directives of the Central Council in Petrograd," the local organizations soon took their own course. The Bashkirs, especially, would not collaborate with the Kazan Tatars, and thus the movement of Bashkir separatism started.

The Bashkirs wished to be independent of other peoples, to be free of the "wardship" (or, as they called it, the "imperialism") of the Kazan Tatars. Because there were slight differences between the Tatars and the Bashkirs with regard to their languages and cultural aspirations, the unification of these two peoples had nearly been completed. Nevertheless, the "First Bashkir Congress," held in Orenburg in 1917, elected a Bashkir Central Council composed of thirteen persons. Thus the appeal of the First All-Russian Moslem Congress in Moscow for the unity of the Russian Moslems

did not prove effective. Nearly every Moslem nation began to act on its own.

A second All-Russian Moslem Congress (held in Kazan July 21-31, 1917) was in reality not all-embracing because of the absence of delegations from Azerbaijan, Turkestan, and the Bashkirs. The participants came principally from Inner Russia and Western Siberia. A Congress of Moslem Clergy and a Moslem Military Congress convened at the same time. Of great significance was the resolution to create the All-Russian Central Military Council, also known as the *Harbi Shura*, as the central instrumentality of all Moslem military units. According to this decision the Moslem soldiers in the Russian Army were to be immediately organized into separate units. In a short time there were several thousand Tatar units under Tatar officers; these were considered to represent a real force on which all "nationalistic organizations" could count in case of necessity. They were centered in Kazan and Ufa.

Of even greater significance was the decision on the "National and Cultural Autonomy of the Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia," accepted by a joint session of the three Congresses, July 22, 1917. It was resolved:

- 1) To begin immediately, without awaiting the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the implementation of cultural and national self-determination;

- 2) To authorize the Second All-Russian Congress of Moslems, now in session in Kazan, to draw up a detailed proposal on the organization of organs of self-determination.

Thus on July 22, 1917, the national and cultural autonomy of the Kazan Tatars (Kazan Turks), the Moslems of Inner Russia and those of Siberia was proclaimed. This historical moment was greeted with wild enthusiasm by all participants of the three Congresses.

The formulation of national and cultural autonomy was drafted by Sadri Maksudi Bey (Maksudov), a former member of the second and third *Dumas* and recognized leader of the Kazan Tatars who had been educated at the Sorbonne. In his work Maksudov drew heavily on the rights of the minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Prior to the calling of the National Assembly a "Provisional National Administration" (*Milli Idare*), or "Collegium for Implementing the National and Cultural Autonomy," was elected, consisting of three departments: Religious, Educational, and Financial. Maksudov served as Chairman of this Collegium, which organized local organs in territories with overwhelming Moslem populations. The

seat of the Collegium was in Ufa, where a "Spiritual Council-Assembly" of Kazan Tatars already existed.

All the resolutions of the three Congresses in Kazan were forwarded to the Provisional Government in Petrograd, under Kerensky, which did not evince any reaction. *Izvestia*, organ of the Russian Social-Democrats (Bolsheviks), did print these decisions of the Moslems; but no account appeared in any other Russian paper.

Despite this tacit disapproval of the Provisional Government, *Harbi Shura* (the Military Council) in Kazan started to create Moslem national units. In a short time there were considerable forces in Kazan, Ufa, and other places inhabited by Tatars. These Moslem units checked the looting of garrison soldiers inflamed by Bolshevik propaganda in the Middle Volga towns in the fall of 1917. Besides guaranteeing the safety and security of the population, these units hindered for a time the Bolshevization of these districts.

The Collegium for Implementing the National and Cultural Autonomy set up elective procedures and local organizations in the various *gubernias* (districts): Kazan Ufa, Orenburg, Samara (now Kuybyshev), Astrakhan, Perm, Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk), Vyatka, Saratov, Penza, Nizhniy-Novgorod, Tambov, Tobolsk, Tomsk, and the Ural region. These *gubernias* were required to create a "Moslem Provincial Council" (*Shura*); for every 5,000 people (male and female) a deputy was to be elected to this council.

Elections to the "National Assembly" were held in September, 1917; for every 20,000 people (male and female), over 20 years old, a deputy was chosen. In all, 120 deputies were elected. The National Assembly of Moslems of "Inner Russia and Siberia" held its sessions in Ufa, beginning in November, with Sadri Maksudi Bey (Maksudov) as Speaker of the House.

Three Collegiums (departments or *Nezarets*) were set up by the Assembly: one on religious affairs, with Mufti Galimdjani Barudi as chairman; another on education, and the third on fiscal matters. A national constitution was discussed and adopted.

In spite of the Bolshevik *coup d'état* (October 25, 1917) in Petrograd, the Tatar National Assembly functioned as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred. The Tatar deputies, with few exceptions, were of the opinion that Bolshevism would not last long, as it was just a temporary phenomenon of the Revolution. (This opinion was shared by most of the Russian politicians at the time.) The presence of the Tatar units in Ufa permitted the National Assembly to continue its sessions; the "Red Guards" in Ufa were too weak to interfere in the affairs of the local Moslems. The Tatar *Harbi*

Shura in Kazan declared its neutrality in the struggle between the Reds and the partisans of the Provisional Government.

With regard to the problems of the national government there were two opposing factions in the National Assembly in Ufa. One group, called "the Turkists" because they numbered many personalities with "Turkistic ideals," wanted merely an autonomy on a cultural basis, without specific "state organizations." The other group which wished to set up a government on some exactly defined territory, was known as the "territorialists." It was led by a young intellectual, Galimdjan Sheref, and supported by leftists like Galindjan Ibrahimov. In favor of cultural autonomy were the Speaker, Sadri Maksudi, and many distinguished members of the House, like Hadi Atlasi and Ayaz Ishaki. It was the youth and the "leftists" who desired "territorial autonomy," "a separate state." Galimdjan Sheref prepared a map of the projected state which was based on ethnographical statistics provided in the main by the Religious Administration. Sheref and his colleagues proposed the name, "The Idel-Ural State" (*Shtat*), which would include the territory on the Middle Volga, the Ural (Yayik) River and some parts of Western Siberia.

According to the statistics of the Religious Assembly of 1889, the number of communities under the Mufti in Ufa was 4,254, with 3,456,400 inhabitants. In 1917 on the same territory there must have been at least 5 million Tatars and Bashkirs. In addition there were many Chuvashes, closely related to the Tatars but who were non-Moslems (part Christian and part "Shaman"); and many Finno-Ugrian peoples, like the Udmurts (Cheremishes), Mari (Ar) and Mordvines. The Cheremishes and Ars were strongly "Tatarized." Despite being Christians they were all counted as *Inorodtsy*, and having lived long centuries together with the Tatars (more exactly, under Tatar domination), they were very close to the Kazan Tatars and could easily have lived under the same state organization. Galimdjan Sheref and his colleagues, on the other hand, were not willing to accept too many non-Moslems in their projected "Idel-Ural State."

After some discussion, the Tatar National Assembly in its session of November 29, 1917, passed the following decision on the question of the "Idel-Ural State":

- 1) Taking into consideration that the greater part of the Turk-Tatar nation is living on the territory between the South Ural Mountains and the Middle Volga, and also considering the national and economic interests of the Turko-Tatars and of other peoples living there, the National Assembly of the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia

and Western Siberia finds it necessary to organize an autonomous State.

2) The territory of this State, which is to be called the "Idel-Ural State" (Idel-Volga), shall include: the whole province (*gubernia*) of Kazan, (the whole) province of Ufa, the western part of the province of Orenburg, with a Turko-Tatar population, as well as the province adjacent to the Ufa and Samara provinces inhabited by Turko-Tatars, the southern part of the province of Perm, inhabited by Turko-Tatars and Cheremishes, part of the Simbirsk province, adjacent to the Kazan province and inhabited by Turko-Tatar Moslems, and also part of the province of Samara, adjacent to the provinces of Kazan and Ufa, inhabited by Turko-Tatars.

3) The Idel-Ural State shall be a democratic Republic, and together with other States shall form part of the Russian Federalist Republic.

4) The Parliament (Assembly) of the Idel-Ural State shall be the sole legislative body, and shall be elected on the basis of a general, direct, equal, secret and proportional voting system.

The National Assembly resolved at the same session (November 27, 1917) to create a "Collegium for Implementing the Idel-Ural State," consisting of eight members and four candidates. This Collegium was to be completed with representatives of the other nationalities making up the State. A conference of all nationalities was to be held in Ufa; the Collegium was to work in the city of Kazan and to be active until the election of the Provisional Government of the Idel-Ural State. After this decision was made and its members elected, the Collegium for Implementing the Idel-Ural State started functioning in Kazan.

In Kazan a Provisional Committee was set up, with Galimdjian Sheref as chairman, Salah Atnagulov as secretary and Fatih Muhammedyarov as treasurer. Created in Ufa was a "Committee on Territorial Autonomy," charged with the task of popularizing such a state as the Idel-Ural State in the cities, towns and villages. Approved by the General Conference of Moslems in Ufa, this committee consisted of three elected members: Gumer Almuhametov, Sagitzan Sabitov and Bashmakov.

On January 16th the Collegium completed its work in Ufa and, as had been arranged, then went to Kazan. A permanent Committee was elected: Ilyas Alkin as chairman; his deputy, Galimdjian Sheref; the treasurer, Salah Atnagulov; the first secretary, Fatih Muhammedyarov, and the second, Fatih Seyfi. Starting January 29, 1918, Chuvash and Cheremish (Udmurt) delegates took part in the work of the Collegium.

Since the power in Kazan was in Bolshevik hands and a Socialist Moslem Committee had been organized, the Collegium was exposed to Bolshevik pressures. Some members were affected by this propaganda, Salah Atnagulov and Fatih Seyfi among them. Quite possibly the deputy-chairman, Galimdjan Sheref, also was persuaded to adopt the Soviet line, which plumped for the "Sovietization of the Idel-Ural State." On March 10th (1918) a telegram was received by the Presidium of the National Assembly in Ufa, stating that in a few days the Collegium was to decide about proclaiming the "Idel-Ural State" on a Soviet basis, as a state of "working masses," and as "an autonomous part of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic."

This telegram caused great surprise and indignation in Ufa. Sadri Maksudi Bey, as Speaker of the Assembly (then in recess) and as Chairman of the National Collegium, and Ibrahim Ahtyamov, as deputy president, joined in sending an answer to the Kazan Committee:

"The Kazan Committee has been elected by the National Assembly for special limited purposes, connected solely with the implementing of the Idel-Ural State, and specifically to arrange a Conference of all parties and nationalities on the projected state, to design its borders and to report on the principles on which this state should be founded. The Committee has no right whatsoever to trespass the limits set forth by the National Assembly, and cannot assume any initiative on the proclamation of the 'Idel-Ural State,' a right which belongs wholly to the National Assembly. Especially the decision of the Committee to organize the projected state on the Soviet basis is the greatest contradiction with the considerations of the National Assembly.

"We do protest against these inadmissible trespasses by the Collegium in Kazan on the orders of the National Assembly. All responsibility shall rest with the Collegium and not only tangible but also moral responsibility before the bar of history and that of the nation. We are not willing to take over any responsibility in these matters; we leave it to the Collegium to bear all consequences of such a decision.

Ufa, February 27, 1917 (March 12)."

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In the face of this communication the members of the Collegium balked at proclaiming a Soviet Idel-Ural State, especially in the presence of over 10,000 Turko-Tatar soldiers under the command of the Moslem Military Council (*Harbi Shura*), which in turn followed the orders of the National Collegium (*Milli Idare*) in Ufa.

Moreover, the Soviet administration in Kazan was still weak and unable to carry out any decision it might take. (For some time there was a dual rule in Kazan, the Soviets on the one side and *Harbi Shura* supported by the Tatar population on the other.)

Bolshevik agents and some "Red" Tatars, like Yakubov and Mirseyit Sultan Galiev, intensified their propaganda among the Tatar soldiers. Under the existing conditions their efforts met with increasing success. The Bolsheviks declared the demobilization of the soldiers and urged them to go home; also, some of the Tatars and Bashkirs were won over to the cause of the Reds. Thus the Moslem units in Kazan, Ufa, and other places, numbering in all about 20,000 men, slowly began to dissolve. Still, before March of 1918 there was a considerable force in Kazan, and the "Sovietization" of Tatar territory remained in question. But the Revolution in Russia was speedily gaining momentum along Bolshevik paths, so that effective resistance to the "Sovietization" of the Middle Volga region shortly became impossible.

After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Red Guards on January 5, 1918, it became obvious that the Bolsheviks would not tolerate any other form of government save the Soviet under the Communist Party's dictatorship. All national institutions began to be suppressed. In March 1918 in Kazan the Moslem Military Council succumbed to Bolshevik pressure, and the Tatars' last attempt to organize a national republic in Kazan (known as the "Zabulatchnaya Respublika") was liquidated by Red forces sent from Moscow.

The National Assembly with its departments was dissolved in April 1918; only the religious department was allowed to continue its activities under, of course, Soviet control. Thus the Soviet regime was installed on the whole territory of the Middle Volga region and the area near the Urals, on which the Tatar nationalities had attempted to establish a national state. Their goal has been pursued ever since by the political refugees from the Soviet Union. The Tatar and Bashkir "Republics" of today are at best caricatures of genuine Republics, camouflaged for the Soviet policy of colonialism.

AN APPARENT QUIRK OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The Ukrainians and the people of the other nations enslaved by the Soviet Union and their friends have often wondered at the apparent blindness of the government of the United States and especially the State Department in refusing to give them at least moral support in their struggle to free themselves and to build up their own independent national life. They have seen the State Department exert all its influence against the commemoration of the Captive Nations Week, even though it was passed and approved by both Congress and the President and in the same way they have seen the stubborn opposition of the State Department to the establishment of a permanent Committee of Congress on the Captive Nations. They have seen the contrast between these actions and the energy of the same State Department in supporting and assisting the newly liberated and underdeveloped nations of Africa and at the same time they have witnessed the refusal of the United States to give any support to the efforts of the people of Katanga to build up their own country, while the United States lent all possible assistance to the United Nations to put down any movement for independence anywhere in the Congo or in fact anywhere else, while at the same time it was endeavoring to put pressure on Portugal to give up its holdings in Angola.

All this is a confusing picture and there is good reason for many people to assume that it is all the work of Russia-firsters in high administrative circles, people who believe that come what may, Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, must be preserved as a distinct entity in the world, whether it is in the interests of the United States or not. Again and again the government of the United States seems to be blind to its own interests and advantages and determined to give support and comfort to its worst enemy which has sworn to bury it as Khrushchev has declared on more than one occasion. They have seen the United States, founded on the then revolutionary principles of liberty and personal freedom, act in direct opposition to the principles of the founding fathers and the signers of the Declaration of Independence, often with the most bitter results.

There are undoubtedly certain malign forces operating to bring about these results but they are by no means as strong as they may appear. They have rather profited by certain tendencies that have long been apparent in American national and international relations and these have had a more powerful effect on the world situation as the United States has emerged on the centre of the international stage and its opinions and judgments have come to be of almost predominant interest, especially in the free world. This was certainly not true in the nineteenth century when the United States in recognizing the independence of the Christian states of the Balkans as they emerged from the old Ottoman Empire was able to adapt its course to the acceptance of the new states by the concert of Europe. Now the decisions of the United States are final and the country cannot wait to see what Europe is going to do, for Europe itself is shaping its course all too often to please the United States.

The American attitude toward many international problems has been shaped by causes that were perfectly valid at an earlier period of its existence. Yet in the general search for historical continuity, these considerations have been applied in situations where they have no logical or even moral application and the result has been a blurring of American thought in State Department circles with the resulting injury to the general picture of the United States abroad.

We must remember that prior to the American Revolution there were few bonds between the thirteen colonies scattered along the Atlantic seaboard from New Hampshire to Georgia. Each of these had its own royal charter and its own royal governor and the general policy of Great Britain until the culmination of the wars against the French in America was to maintain and if possible intensify this sense of isolation. It was only in the last decades before the Revolution that the thirteen colonies combined sufficiently to send a joint American agent to London for common purposes and the most outstanding of these men was Benjamin Franklin who was later to do the main part of the work in securing French assistance for the revolting colonies and the new nation.

It can never be overemphasized that the Revolution found the thirteen colonies thirteen independent entities bound together in a common cause and led by men of outstanding vision. Under the old Articles of Confederation, the first document of union under which the Revolution was fought, the independence of the states was strongly stressed and after the war was over, the bonds forged in the war were so loosened by local interests that it seemed at some moments as if all central administration would be lost. It was really the cession of the so-called western lands by the different states to the

central government that proved the decisive factor in paving the way for the Constitution and the establishment of a strong government.

In the early decades the advocates of union had to maintain a watchful eye against movements that would split the country. Even during the Revolution, Ethan Allen, the leader of the Green Mountain Boys of Vermont, in his opposition to control by New York, seemed to have had moments when he schemed to make Vermont a part of Canada to vent his personal hatreds. After the Revolution difficulties connected with the navigation of the Mississippi led to a series of intrigues on the part of political adventurers west of the Alleghenies to bring the territory under the control of either Spain or France, whichever was dominant at the moment in New Orleans and the name of Aaron Burr, a former Vice-President of the United States, was rightly or wrongly closely connected with these intrigues, once he had fallen into disfavor and disrepute. Still later, during the War of 1812, there were loud rumors at the Hartford Convention that New England would secede if the war continued and while these proved unfounded and almost comic, the way was opened for the more serious threats put out by the Southern states, culminating in the open secession of the South, the formation of the Confederate States of America with the stars and bars, and the long and serious Civil War from 1861 to 1865 which resulted in the Northern victory and the forcing of the South back into the Union.

Thus the consolidation of the United States within its continental boundaries was not only a complicated national question but it involved the securing of international recognition and sharp negotiations especially with Great Britain, France, Spain and Russia. It required almost a century before the leading questions were settled and by that time and especially after the Civil War, the word "secession" acquired an ugly and ominous connotation which under other circumstances has now been applied to situations which are very different from those which occurred during the American development.

On the other hand, during that same century, the United States does not seem to have played a major role in the carving up of New Spain and the creation of the national boundaries in South America. Washington was always ready to recognize any of the states that secured independence. American desires were satisfied when the Monroe Doctrine with British tacit approval declared that the desire of the United States was to bar the return of European colonialism and it was almost a century later before the United States even dreamed of interfering or seriously counseling the other countries as to their policies or internal affairs. In other words, the United

States maintained a relative indifference and neutrality in South American disputes, so long as Europe did not interfere. This was very different from the situation in North America.

Likewise in Europe. There were many ardent supporters of the Greek struggle for independence but they were never able to influence Congress to take any strong stand one way or the other. American recognition followed that of Europe and the visits of the leading revolutionists as Louis Kossuth and Garibaldi brought forth only personal expressions of sympathy, ardent speeches, and some personal financial contributions but no national or governmental action. Sympathy and help seemed almost the property of certain Protestant religious organizations and even as late as 1890 the Senate refused to confirm the appointment of Eugene Schuyler as Assistant Secretary of State because he was regarded as too pro-Russian and had been too closely involved in the affairs of the Balkan states.

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The Spanish-American War of 1898 gave the United States a new position in the world and involved it in the political as well as the commercial rivalries of the Eastern Hemisphere, particularly in Asia. By the victory over Spain, the United States acquired the control of the Philippine Islands and had to put down a revolt of the Filipinos. Then almost immediately it had to contribute troops to an allied force which marched on Peking to rescue all the foreign diplomats in China from the attacks of anti-foreign Chinese mobs, loosely grouped as the Boxers, who were threatening to murder all white men in China as well as the Chinese Christians.

In the negotiations which followed, John Hay, the American Secretary of State, was able to arrange for the so-called "open door" in China as well as to secure the consent of the European powers to maintain the "administrative entity" of China, which was seriously menaced by the demands of the European powers for treaty ports where they had practically sovereign rights. The United States had never secured any of these enclaves which bade fair to include ultimately all the Chinese seaports, as they were opened to the foreign trade and he also secured promises from Russia and Japan to evacuate Manchuria. Hay had been as a young man the private secretary of President Lincoln and in his later negotiations he stressed the unity of China in the same way as Lincoln had that of the United States. There is considerable evidence that Hay was thinking only of the seaports and paid little attention to the intrusions of Russia along the entire interior borders of China.

At the same time as Secretary of State also under President Theodore Roosevelt, Hay negotiated a treaty with Colombia for the building of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Later Colombia rejected this treaty and then in 1903 Panama declared its independence, signed a treaty with the new republic and started to build the Canal. The recognition of Panama was a clear recognition of the right of the people to revolt and declare their independence from an unsympathetic dominant power but the policy of President Roosevelt was hotly attacked by his political opponents, including the majority of the Democratic Party, who called it mere imperialism. Yet in the long run the independence of Panama won the approval of the vast majority of the American population.

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During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson made a strenuous effort to keep the country neutral but he was unsuccessful, thanks to the German submarine campaign and the arguments of Theodore Roosevelt and many eastern Republican leaders who called for American intervention. After the Russian Revolution and the fall of the czar, Wilson issued his Fourteen Points and these became one of the most widely known documents of the war.

The Fourteen Points issued after the Bolshevik assumption of power and Zinoviev's demands for peace without annexations and indemnities and his call for complete independence of all disputed areas held by Great Britain and France was a strange collection of ideas which were interpreted in various ways by the previously oppressed peoples struggling for independence. As they seemed to many Americans of the day and especially to the admirers of former President Theodore Roosevelt, and as they read today in the light of the history of the last half century, they seem rather the expression of Woodrow Wilson's personal philosophy than a serious guide to the settlement of the questions that had been raised by a World War in which the United States was deeply involved, for they often seem to lack all clarity, particularly in their attempts to be concrete.

This was almost inevitable in view of Wilson's upbringing and range of interests. Woodrow Wilson was born before the Civil War in the southern state of North Carolina and lived his early life during the period of the war and reconstruction. Later as Professor of American Constitutional History and President of Princeton University, he became a distinguished scholar but at no time expressed himself extensively on events in Europe. He was opposed as President to American use of its power to strengthen its own position at the expense of smaller countries and as the war went on, he became

convinced that the only satisfactory ending would be the formation of a League of Nations which could calmly settle all disputed points without starting partisan or unilateral action.

The Fourteen Points are rather an expose of this philosophy than a concrete settlement of problems which scarcely interested Wilson himself and he scarcely showed himself aware of the existence of a European political system and ideology which differed in important ways from that which he knew and could apply at home. We notice this in the few points that have to do with the settlement of the boundary problems. The thirteenth point calls for the setting up of "an independent Polish State" including "the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea." This is the only new state suggested, because in the tenth point "The peoples of Austria-Hungary whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development"—not a word about independence. The same reservation is made in the twelfth point for the autonomous development of the other nationalities under Turkish rule.

The sixth point dealing with Russia is a real sermon. Wilson apparently assumed that all the disorder in Russia after the Revolution was the work of foreign intrigue and he took no notice of those states as Ukraine which had already declared their independence. He wrote simply: "The evacuation of Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing, and more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire."

In the course of the summer of 1918, largely through his friendship with Thomas G. Masaryk, the distinguished Czech leader, President Wilson was induced to recognize the independence of the nations included in Austria-Hungary and to accept the various National Committees operating in the Allied territories as *de facto* governments pending the end of the war. He never took any note of the struggle for freedom in Russia and with the exception of Finland and Poland, he opposed any "dismemberment" of Russia, whoever were the sponsors. Even in the case of Poland, the Peace Conference declined to give Poland an eastern boundary until the setting up of a free and democratic government in Russia. The United States

did not recognize the Rumanian occupation of Bessarabia or any of the other settlements that were made either in Europe or Asia.

When President Harding was elected, the efforts at liberation were declining under Soviet pressure but the new President did take note that the anti-Communist regimes in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were in control in those countries and he recognized them as independent states, the only peoples in the Russian prison of nations that succeeded even temporarily in securing American recognition. On the other had neither President Harding, Coolidge nor Hoover recognized the Soviet government in Moscow, although they did not forbid all commercial contacts.

When Franklin Delano Roosevelt became President, he actively set himself to establish friendship with Moscow and especially with Stalin, "good old Uncle Joe." When Stalin divided Poland with Hitler and also swallowed up the three Baltic republics, Roosevelt treated it as a minor peccadillo and while he did not recognize the seizure of the Baltic States, to win Stalin's support, he did not insist on the admission of the republics to the proposed United Nations organization and later allowed Stalin to seize the states that had been liberated in 1918 and impose upon them Communist rule by falsifying elections and doing all that Moscow had done in its suppression of the independent states which had revolted against Russian rule in 1917 and 1918.

By the time that the movement for the granting of independence to the former colonies commenced, the United States policy had moved far from that conception of self-determination that had been implied in the ideas of President Wilson, even though he had not appreciated its importance as a vital factor in the struggle for democracy. Great Britain to end the Moslem-Hindu communal fighting had separated India and Pakistan and so the United States recognized both but it expressed no opinion as to whether there were other nations submerged in the population of India. The situation was even more glaring in the case of Indonesia, where the population in many of the other islands rebelled against their control by the Java-based central government which was largely either neutralist or tinged with Communistic ideas. The United States maintained firmly the theory that Indonesia was all of the former Netherland East Indies and even in the past year has insisted that the Papuans in West New Guinea, a completely different race, should be forced under Indonesian rule.

The application of this same idea in Africa has produced startling results. At the height of the colonial empires of Great Britain and France almost every seaport and harbor fell to one or the other

of the two powers and the interior of the continent was largely subdivided in accordance with the ease of access to one or another of the harbors without any regard for the wishes of the population. Any tendency to bring together peoples of like stock has been denounced as tribalism and declared inconsistent with the wishes of the population, and so the boundaries of the new countries admitted to the United Nations as independent states are almost as a rule those which were drawn in the capitals of Europe at a time when the interior of Africa was almost entirely unexplored by white men of any nationality.

It was in this way that the chaos in the former Belgian Congo started. With an inadequate number of trained natives, the Belgian government created a severely unitary state out of widely differing tribes living under very different geographical conditions but all bound together by the Belgian overlordship. When the population of Katanga which was the centre of large mining installations which could have outlets to the east as well as to the west tried to object and to maintain good relations with the former administrators, it was declared in secession and the United Nations resorted to an international force to put down the movement, dubbing all the supporters of Tshombe "white mercenaries" and trying to limit their influence or expel them from the country. No one ventured to express any opinion as to whether the entire population wanted to remain together and it seems at present as if the United Nations is going to have its way by the most undemocratic methods.

We can be almost positive that the countries created in this manner will not develop peacefully, as ambitious rulers come into power and endeavor to assert their will over other countries with cognate and related populations or the governments will tend to fall apart as the various sections of the population become more conscious of their traditional heritage. Yet the tactics adopted by the United Nations largely with the backing of the United States will render any peaceful reorganization of the continent to suit the various peoples very difficult, if not impossible.

At the same time that there are increasing signs of Communist infiltration into the new countries, the failure of the free world and especially of the United States to find effective means for helping the Hungarian insurgents, for destroying the Berlin wall or for ousting Moscow from its beachhead in Cuba becomes distressing to the hopes of a new upsurge of freedom. Moscow can always threaten a nuclear war to shatter civilization beyond repair and it has no scruples about doing it. Yet the State Department obstinately insists that the Soviet Union is a "monolithic Russia" and in this it goes beyond

even the claims of the Kremlin which at least pays lip service to the independent Soviet republics of Ukraine, etc.. Yet even this is too strong for much of American thinking which has not progressed beyond the theory of containment of Communism and is hoping against hope for some moral reform from within.

That can only come when the way is found to extend freedom behind the Iron Curtain and exploit the undoubted rifts in the Communist world and its component parts and the oppressed populations. Consciously or unconsciously the real meaning of self-determination made itself felt during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has completely destroyed Western colonialism as is shown by the vast number of new states, but it has not yet affected the stern and ruthless control of the Kremlin. It will have its effect there but only when the United States will recognize clearly again the principles by which it itself was established and will apply at least as much thought to spreading these abroad as in the futile attempt to reduce those tensions that are being stirred up by an aggressive dictatorship. When the United States does that, we may begin to expect positive results and a new old spirit throughout the world.

COMMUNISTS EXPLOIT UNESCO AS PROPAGANDA FORUM OF RUSSIAN COLONIALISM

By ANATHOLE W. BEDRIY

Several months ago, the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization published in Paris a scandalous book entitled *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*, by I.P. Tsamerian and S.L. Ronin. It is replete with lies, misstatements, falsehoods and distortions of historical facts on Ukraine and other non-Russian nations enslaved in the USSR. UNESCO, however, approved this worthless material which actually propagates Soviet Russian colonialism.

All the non-Communist representatives in UNESCO should be made aware of the nature of this book and should be asked to respond appropriately.

1. The first chapter on "the Status of Minority Nationalities in Czarist Russia" minimizes the colonialist nature of the Russian empire. What the authors call "Russia" was actually the colonial empire of Czarist Russia within which the subjugated nations waged a continuous liberation struggle against the Russian oppressors. Russians were numerically in the minority and the ethnic Russian national territory was much smaller than that of the subjugated nations.

The economic and cultural development of Russia came about as a result of systematic genocide practiced against the nations and their uttermost economic exploitation accompanied by destruction of their national cultures. The authors conceal the enslavement of nations, some of which were culturally in the past much more advanced than Russia itself e.g., Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Byelorussia, Lithuania). It is misleading to speak about "the peripheral territories of the Empire" (pp. 18,19, a.o.) when the subjugated areas are larger than Russia itself.

It is false to contend that in the Czarist empire the Russian people were subjugated, because they were the masters. Lenin stated in 1916 that even the lowest classes of the Russian people were in a better position than the higher classes of the non-Russian nations. (See his *Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism*.) Simi-

larly, it is not true that any Russian class was kindly disposed to the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples subjugated in the Czarist empire. When Ukraine was striving for national independence and its own system of life, Lenin issued in 1917 a manifesto to his troops, which were preparing to invade Ukraine, calling: "Your victory over the yellow-blue (national flag of Ukraine—ED.) rabble means bread for your starving women and children. Get it with your bayonets!" Karl Radek, a prominent Bolshevik, seconded him: "If you want to eat, cry: 'death to the (Ukrainian Central) *Rada*!'" On December 24, 1918 the Soviet Russian government issued a decree: "... by virtue of the nullification of the Brest Litovsk treaty, Ukraine is no longer recognized by the Soviet Government of the Russian Republic..." In 1919 a leading Bolshevik, Manuilsky, compared the Communist regime in Ukraine to a typical colonial administration. A Bolshevik commission resolved:

The establishment of the proletarian dictatorship in Ukraine—because of the small number of proletarians there, the absence of corruption among the peasant masses, the insignificant influence of the Communist Party, and because of a too strongly developed professional insurgent movement and national struggle—is possible only by means of Soviet Russia and the Russian Communist Party.

At the beginning of 1917 the Bolshevik party contained only a few score Ukrainians. In July 1918 the Communist Party of Ukraine was only 7 per cent Ukrainian (315); in other words, one Communist for each 100,000 Ukrainians. In 1922 only 18 per cent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were non-Russians.

It is the big lie to argue: "... the revolutionary struggle of the working masses of the Russian people against Czarism and the exploiting classes for social and political emancipation was bound to merge with the national liberation struggle of the non-Russian peoples." (p. 22) Not even in one nation (outside Russia proper) did such merging occur. This fact was clearly verified by Stalin. (See *Pravda* of December 28, 1919.) In *The National Question in Our Program* (1903), Lenin stated that he did not favor the disintegration of the Czarist empire into independent states of the subjugated nations but the overthrow of the former Czarist regime only. Piatakov, a chief Bolshevik leader, in 1917 said bluntly: "On the whole we must not support the Ukrainians because their movement is not convenient for the proletariat" (*Istoria KP (b) U*, 1933, v. II, Kiev). I.P. Trainin, a Bolshevik writer, in his article "K postanovke natsionalnogo voprosa" (*Vlast Sovetov*, No. 5, 1923) showed that the Bolshevik cadres in the non-Russian countries of the former Czarist

empire were composed almost exclusively of the Russians living there. The main proof of Bolshevik hostility toward the national liberation struggle of the non-Russian peoples is the fact that all these nations proclaimed their independence without any participation or support of the Bolsheviks and that each of these nations was conquered by Russian Communist forces after a bloody and prolonged war. Not one non-Russian nation was proclaimed a Soviet republic by its nationals without the support of Russian bayonets. Thus the statement in the book—"After the October Revolution... the immense majority of the oppressed peoples set free by the revolution, far from seeking to break away from revolutionary Russia, spontaneously joined forces with the working masses of the formerly privileged Russian people to build a multi-national socialist State..."—is a 100 per cent lie.

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2. In the second chapter on "The October Revolution and the Affirmation of the Principle of National and Racial Equality in Soviet Constitutional Law" there appear several Communist myths which show the colonialist nature of the Soviet system. The constant use of the phrase "peoples of Russia" indicates that Soviet Russian imperialists extend the name "Russia" to areas populated by the non-Russian nations.

The "Declaration of Rights of the Exploited Masses," drawn up by Lenin, is actually a colonialist document stating that the Soviets wished to transform the former Russian Empire... into a federative state, not into independent national states. It is a principle of predetermined rejection of dismemberment of the empire into independent nations. Thus the phrase "fraternal union of Soviet Republics freely associated" is a fiction.

The contention that independent Soviet republics were set up side by side with the RSFSR (the Republics of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, etc.) on the one hand shows that they were set up by Soviet Russian colonialists by force of arms. On the other hand it is false to contend that those republics were really independent and sovereign, because they were ruled from Moscow from the beginning and did not in any measure reflect the will of the native peoples. Lenin labelled the Brest Litovsk Treaty which recognized the independence of Ukraine "a phase of extreme departure from patriotism," thus showing his disapproval of the existence of the independent Ukrainian state. For him "Whether Ukraine shall be a separate state or not is a question of far inferior importance" ("Elections to the Constituent Assembly and Proletarian

Dictatorship," 1919). The famous ultimatum of December 17, 1917, sent by the Soviet of People's Commissars of Russia to the Ukrainian National Government, strongly disproves any Soviet contention that the Bolsheviks reckoned with the free will of the non-Russian nations. The same was true of all the other nations, conquered by Soviet Russian forces.

Another big lie is the statement: "In 1922, in accordance with the freely expressed will of their peoples, the independent Soviet Republics grouped themselves... in a single state: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (p. 27). Never did those people freely vote for the creation of the Soviet Union, nor did they in any other way indicate their approval thereof. The Soviet Union was created solely upon the decision of Soviet Russian leaders and the act was supported freely only by the majority of the Russian people.

The authors clearly assert that in 1922 Communists established one single state on the territory of many nations. Thus the talk about sovereign independent Soviet republics is completely unfounded and baseless. The outstanding Soviet theoretician, N. Popov, stated in 1923:

...there could not have been any talk about economic and military independence of Soviet Republics. Such independence did not exist even for a single day, either for Georgia or for Ukraine.

Stalin declared in a report to the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) in March 1921 that:

...only the Russian SFSR was an independent state; all other Soviet republics were in no position to exist independently and had to unite with it.

The statement: "The triumph of socialism... has made possible the abolition of all actual inequality between the Soviet nations in the cultural field..." (p.28) is very revealing of the colonialist policy. It means liquidation of non-Russian cultures or their subordination to the Russian culture. It is well-known that the Russian language is made the primary and dominant language in all non-Russian nations conquered by the Russians. In the literary field, for example, Soviet Russian rulers eliminated 448 Ukrainian writers who did not conform to dictates from Moscow. The Soviet policy of "right to education" resulted in the liquidation of all Ukrainian non-Communist educational institutions, including the free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, all parochial schools, liberal non-Communist grammar and secondary schools, Christian seminaries, the abolishment of all non-Communist professional organizations and disbanding of the famous "*Prosvita*" societies (popular educational institution).

The book states: "The principle of national and racial equality of citizens of the USSR is fully applied in the electoral sphere. All citizens have equal electoral rights and are equally eligible for election to all organs of the State..." (p. 29). This nonsense is refuted by the fact that Soviet authorities do not allow even *one* person to be elected to any state organ without the approval and support of the all-mighty Communist Party. For example, in Ukraine, under Soviet rule, all political parties were destroyed by force, even the two small independent Communist Parties. Tens of thousands of politically minded non-Communists were shot outright or deported. The least expression of political opinion not in conformity with the policy of the Communist Party is persecuted most severely and immediately suppressed by brutal methods.

The same applies to any of the freedoms guaranteed by articles 125 and 126 of the Soviet Constitution (speech, press, assembly, street processions and demonstrations, freedom to unite in various organizations). The smallest unauthorized public speech is prosecuted most severely. There does not and cannot exist any press which can spread other than Communist ideas. After the conquest of the non-Russian nations the Russians liquidated all periodical publications and publishing houses which were not Communist-dominated. Any assembly which is not organized by Communists or by state authorities can never take place legally; it will immediately be dispersed by the all-powerful police. Since there are only Communist-supported organizations, this demonstrates there is no freedom to unite in organizations.

There does not exist any freedom of conscience or of worship, because all Churches, except the Russian Orthodox Church, which is obedient to the rulers' dictates, are persecuted and systematically liquidated. In Ukraine alone 217 bishops and 27,000 priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church were deprived of the means of carrying out their spiritual duties. Simultaneously 42,000 church personnel were arrested and repressed. Of those 25 bishops and 1,215 priests were executed. In the same manner the Ukrainian Catholic Church was liquidated: 2 Apostolic Visitators, 11 bishops, 1,500 lay priests, 450 monks, and 760 nuns were killed or deported. The present great martyr is the persecuted Metropolitan Joseph Slipy.*

* Metropolitan Joseph Slipy was suddenly released after 18 years of imprisonment in the Soviet Union and allowed to come to Rome on February 9, 1963.

3. In the third chapter on "Equality of Racial and National Rights in the Political Field" the various lies and misstatements are repeated. Then on page 35 the authors actually express the fact that the People's Commissariat of Nationalities (*Narkomnat*) was the instrument for the re-establishment of the former Russian empire: "*Narkomnat* played a very important role during the first years of the revolution as the centre directing the political organization involved in the creation of the various national Soviet structures within the territory of the former Russian Empire." Its final stage was the establishment of the "multi-national federal State—the USSR."

The authors' hypocrisy is best revealed in the contention that "On December 25, 1917, the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, voicing the will of the masses of the Ukrainian people, proclaimed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and expressed the necessity of establishing close federal links between Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia" (p. 36). It is the foundation of the Soviet constitution for Ukraine and the legal argument for unity with Russia.

What actually happened? On December 17, 1917 there convened in Kiev the Congress of Peasants', Workers' and Soldiers' Representatives of Ukraine. Out of about 2,500 delegates the Bolshevik faction was able to control about 150. The Congress fully supported the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as the sole sovereign representative of the Ukrainian people. The Bolshevik group then left the Congress and moved to Kharkiv, where it called itself "the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets" and proclaimed the establishment of the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Much later, at the time when the First Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine was held at Moscow in July 1918, only 315 out of its 4,400 members were acknowledged Ukrainians (7 per cent) or in other words, one Communist for each 100,000 Ukrainians. This minute gathering called itself "the will of the Ukrainian people."

The real free voice of the Ukrainian people was expressed in at least 328 revolts organized in Ukraine against the Russian Communist invaders in 1919 alone, in the three-year long war between the Ukrainian national army and the Russian Red Army, the almost unanimous support by the Ukrainian people of the Act proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine on January 22, 1918, the Soviet Russian reign of terror which brought about the murder of 25,000 Ukrainians during the so-called "war communism." In 1929 Russian authorities in Ukraine executed or deported into concentration camps in the Russian SFSR 30,000 members of the "Union for the Libera-

tion of Ukraine." The same story was repeated in other nations invaded by Soviet Russian forces.

What the authors call "establishing close federal links between Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia" founded on "voluntary association of equal Republics... on a free and equal basis" (p.36) in reality was radically different. According to Order No. 1,020 of June 19, 1919, issued by the Soviet *Russian* Revolutionary War Council, full control over armed forces in the *Ukrainian* Soviet Socialist Republic was given to the command of the *Russian* Soviet Republic. The *Ukrainian* Soviet Republic, which ceased to exist on April 14, 1918, was regenerated in Moscow, early in 1919, and the actual rule over it was given to Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship, who had *never* been in Ukraine before. In a treaty of December 28, 1920, concluded *on orders from Lenin*, the Ukrainian SSR transferred its most important ministries—war, navy, Supreme Council of people's economy, foreign trade, finance, labor, communication, post and telegraphs—to the Russian SFSR. On February 22, 1922 the Ukrainian SSR surrendered formally to the Russian SFSR on orders of the Russian CP (b) all its rights in the sphere of foreign relations. During the early years of its existence the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR usually had one or two Ukrainians out of 14 or 15 members.

It should be stressed that the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was completely dominated by the Communist Party. But this party was in turn fully controlled by the government of the Russian SFSR, and real Ukrainians had virtually no voice in it. The First Congress of the CP (b) Ukraine (held in Moscow) resolved: "Communists of Ukraine in all of their activities must support the realization... of the policy of the Russian CP." Russian Communists directed by Lenin made it clear they would never agree to the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party, controlled by Ukrainians, who would act independently of the RCP. On April 1, 1922, out of 54,818 members in the CP(b)U 53.6 per cent were Russians but only 11 per cent (or 6,054) were acknowledged Ukrainians. Among the 463 persons holding the highest posts in the Party in Ukraine only 20.9 per cent were Ukrainians. Thus a minority of 23.6 per cent of non-Ukrainians exercised 79.1 per cent of the political power. According to Rakovsky in 1923 only 2.37 per cent of the CP(b)U were real Ukrainians. The 8th Congress of the Russian CP(b) decreed: "Central Committees of Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian communists have the rights of district committees in the Party and are completely subordinated to the Central Committee of the RCP."

The authors maintain: "The right freely to secede from the USSR is the supreme constitutional guarantee of the union republics' sovereignty..." (p. 42). The absurdity of this statement is easily revealed by the same constitution of the USSR. First, every change in union-republics' constitutions dealing with substantial state matters must be ratified by organs of the Soviet Union, which therefore would never permit the decision of any republic to secede from the Union. Second, all the vital governmental organs of the republics are completely controlled by the Union government, because even constitutionally the republics have renounced major portions of their theoretical sovereignty to the union government. Similarly, all political sovereignty of the union governments is in the hands of the Communist Party, which is ruled from the capital of the Union by the same men who rule over the government of the Union.

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4. In the last two chapters the authors endeavor to show the progress and well-being of the various nations enslaved in the Soviet Union. To refute these stories it is sufficient merely to point to the following facts as examples of the real life of these nations. The Don Cossack people, not mentioned in the book at all, were almost completely exterminated during Communist Russian captivity. The number of the massacred ran into the tens of thousands.

In 1921 the Bolsheviks organized in Kirghizia an artificial famine, which took the lives of around one million natives. During three days in March 1918 Bolsheviks killed 3,000 Azerbaijanians in Baku alone. In 1920 more than half a million Azerbaijanians were shot, exiled, or deported. In 1922 Turkestan lost in defense of its land approximately 700,000 men. Soviet Russians razed to the ground 120 villages during the war. According to authoritative Turkestanian sources they lost six million people (1.5 million in consequence of Soviet terrorism and the rest in consequence of economic exploitation, deportations, and police methods). The Turkestanian city of Khokand was reduced to ashes and tens of thousands of its population were slaughtered en masse.

In 1932-1933, as the result of a man-made famine organized by the Russian on orders from Stalin, around six million Ukrainians lost their lives. During the so-called Yezhov trials tens of thousands of Ukrainians were shot. In 1937-38 Russians massacred in Vynnytsia alone 12,000 to 15,000 innocent Ukrainians. In 1941 they shot around 10,000 Ukrainian political prisoners in Western Ukraine, 13,000 in Odessa, 7,000 in Vynnytsia, etc. In the period of collectivization (1932-33) around one million Ukrainians were sent to concentration

camps in the Russian SFSR. Another million followed in 1937-38, and a third of a million more after the Second World War. The demographic statistics of genocide in all non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union are horrifying. So is the terrific destruction of the cultures of these enslaved nations, which requires volumes to be shown in full.

During and after World War II Soviet Russians deported or liquidated whole nationalities: 405,000 Volga Germans, 259,000 Crimean Tatars, 130,000 Kalmyks and 74,000 Ingushes. In June 1941 they deported 200,000 persons from the Baltic States: the total now approaches 700,000.

These few facts show clearly that Soviet arguments about the rights and freedoms of the nations within the Soviet Union are completely false and reveal the desperate desire of the Soviet authorities to cover up the brutal Russian colonialism and the innumerable crimes against the subjugated nations.

And such a book of misstatements of historical facts has received the official approval of UNESCO!

BOOK REVIEWS

UKRAINA V DOBI DYREKTORIYI U.N.R. (Ukraine during the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic). Vol. 1. By Matthew Stachiw, L.L.D.; Shevchenko Scientific Society, Ukrainian Studies Series, Vol. X. Published by the Ukrainian Scientific-Historical Library in Scranton, Pa., U.S.A. Pp. 272.

Dr. Matthew Stachiw has published another volume in the series of his basic works on the history of Ukrainian statehood. This volume is dedicated to the period of the Directorate. But this, happily, is only a beginning, other volumes, devoted to this important period of modern Ukrainian history, are yet to come.

In this first volume all actions of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic from November 15, 1918 until January 12, 1919, are discussed and evaluated thoroughly. The author obviously invested a great deal of effort and work tracing all the essential events and ascertaining some of the dates, disputable until now.

Examining the origins of the uprising against *Hetman* Pavlo Skoropadsky, the author depicts with complete objectivity the Ukrainian National Union, which was conducting this revolt. Few people know that for a long while there existed an implicit faith in the ranks of the National Union that it would be possible to come to an agreement with the *Hetman* about the creation of a purely Ukrainian coalition government, made up of the most important and most influential parties of that time. However, all attempts at negotiations on this matter were unsuccessful. When the Ukrainian National Union announced the convocation of a Ukrainian National Congress in Kiev for November 17, 1918, the Muscovite majority of the *Hetman* government decided to ban it. Ukrainian members of the government, who constituted an insignificant minority, resigned in protest against the banning of the Ukrainian National Congress. In response to this action *Hetman* Pavlo Skoropadsky dissolved the whole government of F. Lyzohub, and on the same day announced the creation of a new government, headed by S. Gerbel, a Russian.

On November 14, 1918 the *Hetman* announced his decree on the restoration of the Russian empire on a federal basis and Gerbel, the new prime minister, declared that he would begin to work without delay toward the reestablishment of "one Russia" on a federal principle.

After this act the Ukrainian National Union had no choice but to rise in armed revolt against the *Hetman* and his regime.

The armed forces of the Ukrainian National Union quickly broke the resistance of the *Hetmanite* troops and took possession of Kiev. On December 14, 1918 *Hetman* Pavlo Skoropadsky abdicated. His last government promptly resigned in favor of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic (U.N.R.). The Directorate, consisting of five members, was elected by the Ukrainian National Union. The Directorate included: Volodymyr Vynnychenko (chairman),

Simon Petlura (commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces), Fedir Shvets, Panas Andrievsky and Andrey Makarenko.

After the occupation of Kiev, the Directorate of the U.N.R. quickly took over all of Ukraine. At the beginning, the Muscovite Communists were surprised and dismayed by the success of the Directorate. But soon enough they organized an armed expedition into Ukraine, this time with the city of Kharkiv as the objective, preparing at the same time a Bolshevik government for Ukraine to be seated in Kharkiv.

Dr. M. Stachiw fully demonstrates that in the light of lawful democratic doctrine the Directorate had the right and the responsibility to defend democratic ways and the independence of Ukraine since it was the representative of the will of the Ukrainian nation. The opposite was true of *Hetman Skoropadsky*, who was installed in his office by the German occupational authorities, simultaneously forcibly dispersing the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and imprisoning the legal Ukrainian government.

The first manifesto of the Directorate of the U.N.R. to the Ukrainian people was issued on November 15, 1918. The members of the Directorate did not divide the authority among themselves, with the exception of Simon Petlura, who was entrusted with military matters. For quite a long while it did not form a government but ruled by itself. Only on December 26, 1918 did the Directorate of the U.N.R. issue an extensive proclamation, touching on all problems of national life, and this is why Dr. Stachiw considers it as a "provisional constitution." This Declaration announced the convocation of the "Congress of All Working People of Ukraine." Furthermore, it called for the creation of a new government—"the Council of People's Ministers."

On the same day, December 26, 1918, the Directorate announced the formation of a new government headed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky. Together with the premier, it consisted of 20 ministers.

At the time of the formation of the new government the Muscovite Communists already had started war, and were advancing toward Kharkiv. Although at this time the armed forces of the Directorate of the U.N.R. were considerable, they were not powerful enough to fight successfully against the Red enemy from the North all along the vast expanses of the borders with Muscovy.

The Corps of the Ukrainian *Sich* Riflemen (*Korpus Ukrainskykh Sichovykh Striltsiv*) under the command of Colonel Eugene Konovalts constituted the core of the military power. The Zaporozhian Division operated in the south-eastern region of Left-Bank Ukraine. Other large military units were in the process of formation.

The administrative machinery was set up in such a manner that the Directorate nominated regional and county commissars who, in turn, selected their assistants.

In general, the situation in Ukraine at that time was a very difficult one. The administrative apparatus as well as other fields of public service suffered from a shortage of educated, professional men. There were only a few political parties, with scanty membership. The most popular among the Ukrainian masses were the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries; the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party was favored by the working class. There were also the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists and the Ukrainian Party of Independent Socialists. Other groups existed, but these were too small to play any important role in the political life of Ukraine of that time. A separate place

among the Ukrainian parties belongs to the Ukrainian Party of Peasant-Democrats. Among members of this party were: the Shemet brothers, V. Andriyevsky and Mykola Mikhnovsky. At the time of the Directorate uprising this party supported the revolt against the *Hetman* but in the course of subsequent events the influence of this party upon the political developments was checked by the so-called Socialist bloc, that is, by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Socialist-Democrats. There were also non-Ukrainian political parties: Russian and Jewish. The only one to take an active part in the government of the Directorate of the U.N.R. was the Jewish political group of Social-Democrats with Zionist tendencies (*Poaley Zion*). The Minister for Jewish Affairs in the Chekhivsky government was A. Revutsky.

The first political moves of the Directorate and its government coincided with the revolution in Germany. It seemed to the Ukrainian political leaders of that time that this German revolution could have a deciding influence on the developing structure of international relations. This factor, therefore impeded decision-making on the part of the revolutionary government in internal and external policy.

For the reaction of some of the Ukrainian political groups to all these happenings it is enough to mention the following: (1) in the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries there was formed a group of so-called *Borotbists*, who called for acceptance of communist ideas and who subsequently joined the Communists; (2) in the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party a faction (the so-called Independent Ukrainian Social-Democrats) advocated communist views and later it, too, joined the Communists.

These were difficult and complicated times for the Ukrainian democracy of that period. But it kept its independent, national positions and defended them to the last.

Dr. M. Stachiw presents all these happenings objectively, as a historical researcher should, making use of all possible sources, even the communist. As all his previous works in the field of Ukrainian statehood, this latest work honors Ukrainian independent thought.

VASYL MUDRY

RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Walter Kolarz. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1961, p. 518. \$12.50.

This book by Walter Kolarz is an authoritative and impressive sequel of a series of highly informative and scholarly works which the author has penned and which deal with the Soviet Union, especially its ethnic and nationality policies and Soviet Russian colonialism. Among these books mention ought to be made of *Russia and Her Colonies* (1952), indisputably one of the best books written on the subject thus far.

Religion in the Soviet Union does not attempt to deal with theology in the present-day Soviet Russian empire. In compiling the vast and rich material which he secured from a number of authoritative sources, Mr. Kolarz sought to present an impartial picture of the religious life in the USSR. He has succeeded superbly in bringing to light a new class of the oppressed people in the Soviet empire—the believers in God.

The author went to great lengths to gather his material. He interviewed a great number of religious leaders of all the Churches which were known to exist in the USSR; he consulted many archives and libraries, and he dis-

cussed the religious life behind the Soviet Russian Iron Curtain with many people who have escaped the communist persecution.

As a result, he dwells on the Russian Orthodox Church as the largest religious body in the USSR, and on the sustained effort of the Soviet government to eradicate religion completely in the present Soviet Russian empire. He also points out most vividly the failure of Soviet anti-religious propaganda, despite its virulence and relentlessness.

In a chapter on the "Fight for National Orthodox Churches," Mr. Kolarz discusses the Georgian Church, the Estonian Orthodox Church, the Latvian Orthodox Church, the Byelorussian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church. There is no doubt that the author's knowledge of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is wide and unbiased. He describes this Church as a Ukrainian nationalist church whose aim was to make itself completely independent, and as such it became a powerful instrument of Ukrainian national rebirth. The Soviet government has resorted to harsh and brutal methods by liquidating some 3,000 Ukrainian Orthodox clergy and over 30 bishops and archbishops. The author also dwells extensively on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Western Ukraine under the Polish rule from 1920-1939 and the attempts of the Orthodox Ukrainians to restore the Ukrainian Orthodox Church during the German occupation of Ukraine in 1941-1944. The present Russian Orthodox Church authorities are totally attuned to the policies of the regime, including its attitude toward Ukraine. He then proceeds to point out that the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church flourishes in the United States and Canada and that the rebirth of Ukrainian Autocephaly would be assured under more favorable conditions, inasmuch as Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence from Moscow will ever remain a goal of Ukrainian nationalism.

The trial and martyrdom of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is extensively treated by Mr. Kolarz in the chapter on "Eastern Catholics." "Indeed, there are few religious groups in the whole of the Soviet Union which have been so ruthlessly persecuted as the Ukrainian Greek Catholics or Uniates," he writes. The author depicts the growth and development of the Ukrainian Catholic Church under Metropolitan Sheptytsky, whom the author characterizes as one of the greatest Catholic advocates of church unity between the East and West. Metropolitan Sheptytsky indeed was a powerful factor in the movement of reconciliation between the Orthodox East and the Catholic West. Pope Pius X granted Sheptytsky the powers of a Patriarch and canonical jurisdiction over all Eastern Rite Catholics in the whole of widespread Russia. The author disputes the view advanced by some anti-Ukrainian writers that Sheptytsky was a local Eastern Galician figure. Ukrainian nationalism in Sheptytsky, he points out, was a by-product of his stature as an outstanding personality of the Church.

Author Kolarz also gives a graphic description of the destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine by the Soviet government in 1945-1946, and of the role played by the emissaries of the Soviet government and the three Ukrainian apostate priests, one of whom, Rev. G. Kostelnik, was subsequently assassinated by the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists).

After the death of Stalin, Mr. Kolarz maintains, there began a resurgence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine which continues to this day. The "Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Catacombs," or as Mr. Kolarz calls it, the "Crypto-Catholic" Church, exists in Ukraine today, which

may be one of the reasons why Khrushchev's government is still holding Metropolitan Joseph Slipy prisoner, the last survivor of ten Ukrainian Catholic Bishops whom the Soviet government incarcerated in 1945.* Finally, the author touches on the flourishing Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States, Canada and elsewhere in the free world, which is "yet another promise that it will return one day to Ukraine itself."

Mr. Kolarz describes also the activities of the various Protestant denominations and sects, such as the Calvinists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentacostalists, Stundists, Mennonites, and the like, all of whom were active not only in Ukraine but also among Ukrainians scattered throughout the Soviet empire.

A substantial part of Mr. Kolarz's scholarly book is devoted to other religions in the Soviet Union as well: the secularization of Soviet Jewry and the persecution of Islam and Buddhism and other non-Christian religions as well.

An instructive part of the presentation in Mr. Kolarz's book is a detailed table of "The Peoples of the Soviet Union and Their Religious Beliefs," which provides a clear picture of the ethnic and religious composition of the Soviet Union. (In reporting the total population of Ukraine Mr. Kolarz gives a figure of 36,981,000, which is appreciably below the number of 45,000,000 accepted by the Ukrainian non-Soviet sources. In Asia alone there are over 6 million Ukrainians who were either deported from Ukraine or assigned to various administrative posts.)

What is the future of religion in the Soviet Union? We know for certain that the present Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev cannot cope with the religious situation. While they desire very much to be accepted by the West as a civilized society, the Soviet leaders relentlessly press the eradication of all religions within the scope of the USSR. *Komsomol vs. Khrystos* is the main propaganda line of the Soviet regime. The survival of religion in the USSR will depend in a large measure on the ability of the West to demonstrate the vitality and resourcefulness of its civilization. The inability of the West to live up to its higher moral standards and its tendency to condone communist persecution of religion will assuredly not ease the religious plight of the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain.

Religion in the Soviet Union by Walter Kolarz is unquestionably an outstanding work. At a time when Khrushchev openly calls on his Communists to wipe out religion among the subjugated peoples of the USSR, this book is a reliable and accurate source on the religious life in the USSR. The peoples of the Soviet Union cannot regain national freedom without regaining their religious freedom, inasmuch as they are so closely interwoven as to be interdependent.

This book is highly recommended to all students of Soviet affairs as it will enrich everyone's knowledge of one of the most important facets of Soviet Russian communism: its obsessed abhorrence of religion and its fear-crazed brutal persecution of the worship of God.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

* Metropolitan Joseph Slipy was released from 18 years enslavement in the Soviet Union and allowed to leave the USSR. He arrived in Rome on February 9, 1963.

THE NEW FRONTIER OF WAR, Political Warfare, Present and Future. By William Kintner with Joseph Z. Kornfeder. Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1962, pp. 362.

It is most regrettable, to say the least, that an otherwise creditable work dedicated to the need for a political warfare build-up by the United States should be so completely amiss on such basic subjects as the authentic make-up of the Soviet Union, the real nature of the enemy, the historical background of Russian cold war operations, and certain substantiating evidence provided by the captive nations week efforts. There can be no question about the high value of the work regarding the essence of political warfare, its detailed accounts of Moscow's cold war successes, and the sound interpretations given on cold war phenomena as such, but the overall contribution is seriously undermined by the glaring defects found in the mentioned fundamental areas.

After carefully examining this book, a well informed reader may readily ask, "How could it be that keen insights into the operations of political warfare as carried on by both Moscow and Peiping abruptly stop short of a balanced analysis of these fundamental subjects?" A natural question of this kind cannot but bring into further question the validity of the authors' operational analyses. This would of course be most unfortunate. It is quite evident that both writers of this work have spent the greater part of their intellectual energies in tracing and analyzing the operational trends, strategies and tactics of what they call "international communism" than in seeking the historical causes of the present threat and examining in depth the so-called ideology of Moscow and Peiping. Well-balanced perspectives formed in these precincts of intellectual inquiry would undoubtedly strengthen the fine operational analysis provided in this work.

Turning first to the authors' working conception of the Soviet Union, when one notices throughout that the USSR is misconstrued as Russia and such grossly inaccurate statements as "The U.S.S.R. was born in the First World War..." (p.150), he begins to wonder about the accuracy and validity of the work in general. The authors needlessly place themselves in this extremely vulnerable position. Here and there, they indicate some awareness of the determinative fact that the USSR is not a national entity, but this shows up so crudely and ineptly that obvious uncertainty of such knowledge is the mark of their treatment.

A few examples of this general observation will suffice. We are told, for instance, that "The minorities problem of Soviet Russia or Communist China cannot be viewed in isolation from the colonial problem presenting itself in other parts of the globe" (p.324). In part this is correct; but, clearly, a distorted conception of the problem is indicated. The problem is not one of minorities but of captive non-Russian nations; it is not in Soviet Russia or the R.S.F.S.R. but in the Soviet Union; and it can scarcely be likened to any such problem in Red China. Moreover, the quote on the next two papers from Barghoorn's unreliable book on *Soviet Russian Nationalism* about splitting Russia is virtually worthless. The confusion on this score is compounded by the fact that earlier a footnote quoting Edward Crankshaw in the 1956 *London Observer* is tacked on to indicate some understanding of the multi-national complex of the USSR (p.14). Yet what Crankshaw has to say is consistently contradicted by the authors' own concepts and understanding throughout the work.

Equally indiscriminating and uncritical are the authors' persistent imputations of Marxism to the so-called doctrinal position of both Moscow and

Peiping. Earlier in the work, the reader is told that it is essential for a Communist to believe in Marxism to maintain the integrity of his personality, but later numerous references are made to it as a tool of ideological deception. Which is it, a canon of faith or a deceptive tool manipulated by a self-knowing deceiver? Aside from this consideration, the interpretations given to Marxism are found gravely wanting. For example, in one place it is stated that "The vanguard elite of Marx and Lenin aims at ruling all society" (p. 31). Now, in the context of Marxian thought, particularly in its doctrine of the proletariat, there is no concept of the vanguard elite as one does, indeed, find in the totalitarian Russian thought of Lenin. In short, this and other conceptual misconstructions just muddy up our understanding of the real nature of the central enemy. And that is the Soviet Russian imperio-colonial system which has been successfully concealed by deceptive communist ideology.

The third weak area abounding this cold war operations analysis is the political Russian background of cold war management. As in the preceding cases, this demands historical perspective and perception. To make a statement such as this—"Soviet military doctrine is governed by over-all communist doctrine as it has evolved from Marx to Khrushchev" (p. 145)—is well nigh incredible. What Marx has to do with Soviet military doctrine in terms of government is a mystery. Actually, one can obtain from Marx, in his political and military articles, a keen insight into this doctrine because its broad outlines are substantially the same as those developed in Czarist Russia, an aggressor against the values of Western civilization which Marxian humanism upheld. What is called Soviet Russian political warfare today is essentially the type of warfare developed by the Czars of Russia in their empire-building enterprise over centuries.

One cannot disagree with the statement that "It is fundamental to an understanding of communist doctrine to recognize that they regard conflict as an 'organic whole'" (p. 146), but this organic view is not peculiarly "communist"; rather, it is a centuries-based view of imperial Russian expansionism. The evidence on this is overwhelming. Poor historical perspective is also shown by the writers when they uncritically assert, "As long as the Communist rule the U.S.S.R., the dangers of nuclear, limited, and guerrilla wars with the United States will remain" (p. 158). Continued totalitarian Russian rule in this empire would guarantee the same; it need not be just "communist."

It is evident that the writers gained little, if anything, from the lessons taught by Khrushchev's behavior toward the Captive Nations Week Resolution and its pointed aim at the real enemy. However, despite this and the other criticisms, this work is a solid addition to our growing literature on political warfare. Its chapters on China, Southeast Asia, and Latin America are exceptionally well done. Against an accurate background in Russian imperial history and with more analytic grasp of typical Russian cold war activity, the material offered here would be enormously more meaningful.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL DESPAIR: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology. By Fritz R. Stern, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1961.

To trace the political behavior of a nation on the basis of its cultural problems and aspirations is a difficult and risky undertaking. There could hardly be a more elusive topic, or one more wide open to value judgment and

the error of over-generalization. The author of *The Politics of Cultural Despair* successfully avoids these traps. On the whole he presents a well balanced description and evaluation of the three exponents of Germanic ideas: Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck. Their background, the environment in which they lived and wrote, is sketched, and the influence which they exercised on the better-educated part of the German society, is traced and analyzed.

Mr. Stern draws a cultural picture of Germany in its transition period from a state of division into a nation-state. He notices correctly that a new political and economic integration of Germans within the framework of the Second Empire did not coincide with a meaningful cultural and social integration. Consequently, these aspects of Imperial Germany were permeated by a feeling of estrangement between the leading classes and the masses, while the cultural life, even though gilded on the surface, was formalistic and barren at the root. The traditional beacons of cultural progress and social leadership, church, nobility, and the court, were on the decline. The newer and more dynamic forces represented by business, industry, and the labor movement failed to fill the vacuum. The above-mentioned German writers noticed these conditions and devastatingly criticized them. They rejected the traditional institutions and the dominant classes of the past for their selfish greed and their alienation from the people. Yet de Lagarde, Langbehn, and Moeller were nonetheless equally hostile to the new rising forces of liberalism, industrialization, international trade, science, and socialism. In the individualism promoted by liberalism they saw an egotistical disruption of the community spirit, in socialism they suspected an undermining of national unity, and in science and industry they sensed a strangulation of creativity. In all of the new forces they saw a danger of contamination with cosmopolitanism which could undermine German national identity and self-fulfillment.

Being particularly concerned with racial and cultural purity, Lagarde, Langbehn, and Moeller preached the establishment of a Germanic Empire which would increase the sense of unity among the Germans and racially related neighbor peoples. According to their reasoning, such a Germanic Empire would be better able to protect "das Volk" from foreign pressures and penetrations, and it could halt alienating urbanization by providing living space at the expense of the eastern neighbors (de Lagarde, Moeller).

This extreme concern about national purity and national unity, as well as the antagonism to liberalism and the influence of the "moneyed classes," explains, according to Mr. Stern, why de Lagarde and Langbehn turned against the Jews. The Jews, particularly at this time, played an important role in German economic and cultural life without surrendering completely their ethnic and religious identity. They also promoted liberalism which helped to break the shackles of their legal and social limitations imposed on them by the retreating feudal order.

In the final analysis, the Jews were not acceptable in the future Germanic Empire for the same reason as the Slavs, namely because of their non-Germanic ethnic origin. Lagarde demanded a complete colonization of non-German parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as Russian Poland, the Balkans and a "sizable strip of the Black Sea Coast." Russia had either to consent to this expansion or to face war. The non-German peoples were to be transferred to a "definitely assigned area where they could live and die in regulated oblivion." (p.68) Moeller had similar eastern expansionist plans for the "new

Germany," but he hoped to achieve them in accommodation with Russia and in opposition to the "decadent West," approaching in his conception the idea of the German "Geopolitical School."

All three of these men believed that by revolutionary internal and external changes their racially related neighbors would become transformed into a creative, harmonious community where everybody would know his place, and where the development of the individual would coincide with the well-being of the society. In political terms, the coming Empire would be headed by a natural leader and an elite unbiased by partisan considerations, all dedicated to the interests of the nation as a whole.

Mr. Stern points out the influence of Lagarde's and Langbehn's ideas on the Pan-Germanic societies and *Burschenschaften* at the end of the nineteenth century, as well as the impact of their writings on such Nazi personalities as Hitler, Goebbels, Rosenberg, and Ernst Krieck, the Nazi theoretician in education, as well as Christoph Stading, the National-Socialist historian. The undecided and somewhat belated reaction of moderate, well educated and influential Germans against the rising dangers of Nazism is explained by reference to the ideas of these German writers, the ideas which the Nazis hoped to put into reality. In comparison with Wilhelmine Junkers and businessmen who lost the war, the Social-Democrats who signed a humiliating treaty, and the Communists who represented the danger of a civil war, the Germanic myth appealed to many Germans as a welcome alternative to a final national regeneration. The lack of political experience and individual political responsibility among the Germans was another factor contributing to this fatal attitude.

The book is written in a lively style, and the ideas of the Germanic writers covered are made more three-dimensional by being related to the biographical sketches of the authors and to the general cultural, social, and political milieu of Germany in their time.

The reader may be skeptical, however, on the point of emphasis which Mr. Stern gives to the correlation between the ideas of those writers and their personal experiences, including their isolation from society. Mr. Stern himself points out that their isolation from society was voluntary and resulted from some already preconceived ideas about what an ideal society should be. Further, the isolation and the personal experience do not give us a conclusive explanation of why the mentioned writers and ideologists decided to find their peace of mind in a Germanic community, when their urge for belonging could also have been satisfied in either a socialist community or a cosmopolitan community.

Another point of criticism which may be brought up is the author's treatment of the ideal of Germanic expansion. He acquaints us with some theories defended by de Lagarde, Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck, but he does not try to compare and contrast them with the Nazi plans in this connection. Even though he stresses some geopolitical considerations of Moeller and his personal contact with Hitler, he completely ignores the German geo-political school which was very active during the Weimar period and which undoubtedly had ideological links with the Germanic ideologists as well as with the Nazi leaders.

All in all, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* is an enlightening and solidly documented book of great value to those who would like to trace the ideological roots behind the most dramatic political phases of modern Germany.

Central Michigan University

IHOR KAMENETSKY

POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1932-1939. By Bohdan B. Budurowycz. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1963, pp. xiii + 229.

This is a very careful study of Polish-Soviet relations between 1932 and 1939 but it is equally important to recognize the limitations which the author set for his study. Thus he says in the Preface (p. 9), "The purpose of the present study is to trace the course of Polish-Soviet relations from the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the two nations in July, 1932, until the fourth partition of Poland in September, 1939, and to assess the nature of that relationship. Poland's dealings with countries other than the Soviet Union have been treated only in so far as they affected its relations with the USSR. References to the domestic policies of either country have been omitted unless they had an immediate bearing upon the subject implied in the title; consequently, no attempt has been made to discuss in any detail the problem of the non-Polish national groups in eastern Poland or the activities of the Communist Party of Poland, but the reader is referred in the footnotes and in the bibliography to the copious literature on these subjects."

The book thus is limited to a study of the methods by which Marshal Pilsudski and his foreign minister, Col. Jozef Beck, tried to maintain Poland's independent position between a steadily more aggressive Nazi Germany and an intriguing USSR which aimed to present Poland to the world as a tool of the Nazis and of the Western imperialists and warmongers, while at the same time it was seeking every opportunity to throw Soviet troops into "Polish" Wilno and "Polish" Lviv, while the Western powers, especially France under the Third Republic, saw in Stalin their only means of protection from Hitlerian aggression. As the author says (p. 194), Beck was deceived into thinking that the basic interests of the two powers were too antagonistic to let them combine against Poland as they did finally in 1939, much to the chagrin of the Western diplomats in Moscow who were as entirely unprepared as was Beck for this denouement. Yet it was confidently expected in the Balkans from the time when Hitler, after encouraging the population of Carpatho-Ukraine to declare its independence, threw it to the Hungarians and checked decisively any Polish aspirations in that quarter. Incidentally Poland was in almost the same position in which it was in the eighteenth century at the time of the earlier partitions.

In all this the position of Ukraine was of profound importance, although the author scarcely alludes to it, except in a reference of an English diplomat (p. 151) that Poland "would almost certainly be compelled, if she supported an independence movement in Soviet Ukraine, to contemplate the grant of wide autonomous powers to her own Ukrainian minority. This ...she has no intention of doing." Here was the tragedy of the old Poland as well as of the renewed state.

At the time of Poland's leadership in eastern Europe, the *Rzeczpospolita* was a combination of Poles, Lithuanians, Bylorussians and Ukrainians but when the Ukrainian gentry became in large part Polonized and accepted the Latin rite, a process started which led to the revolt of the Kozaks and *Hetman Khmelnytsky*, and the alliance of Pereyaslav with the Czar of Moscow. Later *Hetman Vyhovsky* in the Union of Hadyach tried to correct this but his efforts were opposed both by the more anti-Polish Kozaks and the Polish *szlachta*. In 1918, Marshal Pilsudski had some glimmerings of an idea of recreating that state but he was unable to overcome those elements that insisted upon continued Polish control of Eastern Galicia and so not only his hopes but those of Petliura and the Ukrainians were rendered futile and on the other hand it never became

possible to satisfy even the modest legitimate demands of the Western Ukrainians. Thus there ensued a running sore, even though only a negligible proportion of Western Ukrainians would have preferred Soviet control in view of the character of Stalin's and Communist tyranny and concentration camps. It was this problem outside of the scope of the book that influenced both Beck and the opposition parties, while, as events showed, Stalin was only waiting to dismember and swallow not only Poland and Rumania but the small Baltic republics, a policy in which he was almost abetted by the willingness of the Western powers and the free world in general to identify any opposition to Soviet aggression as a sign of open or hidden Fascism.

It is a careful and fair study but it is a study only of one aspect of Eastern European developments and it needs to be read with an appreciation of the folly of those statesmen who in 1917 and 1918 were so intent on the unity of Russia that they failed to realize the opportunity given to them by the fall of the czars as well as the other empires to endeavor to set up a truly democratic system which could develop under peaceful conditions. Poland checked the Soviet advance in 1920 but Western indifference and pacifism and Polish temperamental defects and errors nullified the victory. That is the sad story and the world will pay bitterly until it can find a way to correct the mistakes made at the end of World War I as well as those that came after World War II.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

VELYCH SHEVCHENKA. (*The Greatness of Shevchenko*). By Yar Slavutych. Winnipeg, Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences. Literature, No. 7, 1961. 30 pages. \$.50.

"Shevchenko's inspired poems aroused Ukraine 'lulled to sleep by her enemies,' and as he said, revealed to her the glorious past of her sons, drew attention to the horrors of nineteenth-century serfdom and predicated for her a great and free future. Thus, Shevchenko began the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation," (p. 5) Slavutych aptly proclaims in his brief but valuable work.

Many authors wrote about Taras Shevchenko, but Slavutych, as a poet and scholar himself, gives a brief, lucid and thoughtful evaluation of the greatest Ukrainian poet-laureate, painter, prophet and national hero. Shevchenko appeared at a time when Ukraine, as a nation, was seemingly buried.

"From the Moldavian to the Finn, everyone was silent." And here, the son of a destitute serf, an ardent defender of human rights, and "a prince in the realm of the spirit" challenged the might of the largest Empire in the world.

"Rise up and break your chains!"

Slavutych finds Shevchenko's greatness not only in his national lyric poetry which sparked the struggle for Ukrainian independence, but also in ideals dear to all humanity. He gives a subtle analysis of Shevchenko's artistry, music, verbal euphony, depth of feeling and thought, and stylistic variation. Shevchenko's contribution to the refinement of the Ukrainian literary language is permanent. Together with *Taras Shevchenko: The Man and Symbol*, by W. K. Matthews, Winnipeg: UVAN, 1961. Slavutych's monograph is a worthy addition to the *Shevchenkiana* on this continent.

University of Cincinnati

JOHN P. PAULS

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT," series of articles by Everett S. Allen. *New Bedford Standard-Times*, New Bedford, Mass., June 25, 1962.

Eight illuminating articles are devoted in this series to major defects in our State Department. The writer is a prominent journalist and the recipient of many awards for his writings. This eye-opening series has been published in booklet form, copies of which are available at the Bedford paper.

In the first article of the series, titled "Censors Can't Hide Gains by Reds," the writer concentrates on the action undertaken in this country for the formation of a Special House Committee on Captive Nations. The blunderous Rusk letter of 1961 is discussed. "Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky," writes Mr. Allen, "has publicly challenged Rusk to produce any comprehensive study dealing, for example, with Soviet Russian economic colonialism within the Soviet Union." There has been no reply to this as yet.

"CHINA'S BATTLELINE OF FREEDOM," article by Lev E. Dobriansky. *Central Daily News*, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, September 1-2, 1962.

An article written for this journal in the spring of 1962 was translated *in toto* into Chinese and published in the *Central Daily News*. The *News* is the largest newspaper organ in the Republic of China.

Comments received from Chinese correspondents have been most encouraging. The article emphasized the strategic strength of Free China in the power complex of Asian affairs. On the basis of the author's experiences in Taiwan it stressed also the growing knowledge and appreciation of the Free Chinese leaders of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR.

"U.S.S.R. LIP SERVICE, COEXISTENCE, AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTIONS," a commentary. *Foreign Intelligence Digest*, Washington, D.C., May 25, 1962.

An excellent account of the continued persecution of Metropolitan Slipy, Metropolitan of Ukrainian Catholics in Western Ukraine, is given in this international digest, which is managed and edited by Major General C. A. Willoughby. General Willoughby was Chief of Intelligence of General MacArthur's staff during World War II.

The commentary traces in detail the persecution of Archbishop Slipy since his arrest on April 11, 1945. It clearly shows the hypocrisy of Moscow when it comes to "freedom of religion" in the USSR. The genocide of the Ukrainian Catholic Church since World War II is accurately described. As the editor rightly states, "Metropolitan Slipy is a symbol of human fortitude and endurance."

"REPLY TO KHRUSHCHEV ON CUBA—A SPECIAL HOUSE COMMITTEE ON CAPTIVE NATIONS," address by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., September 19, 1962,

Weeks before the Cuban crisis came to a head, Congressman Flood of Pennsylvania delivered a ringing address in the House of Representatives, calling for positive action on Cuba. Weeks before the President defined, for the first time, the Cuban people as captive, the Pennsylvania legislator, reiterating what has been said in the Captive Nations Week observances since 1960, declared "Cuba is indeed a captive nation." With foresight and candor, Congressman Flood called for the immediate formation of a Special House Committee on Captive Nations to show the critical circumstances surrounding Cuba and to go beyond this into all the captive nations in Moscow's far-flung empire. How our actions lag far behind logic, reason, and understanding!

"JFK, ROCKY MAKE PLEDGES TO UKRAINIANS," a report. *N. Y. Journal-American*, New York, October 14, 1962.

Hundreds of participants and hundred of messages poured into the Eighth Triennial Convention of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, which was held in October, 1962, at the Hotel Commodore in New York City. This report singles out the message sent by President Kennedy and the address delivered by Governor Rockefeller at the convention banquet.

In his telegram to the delegates President Kennedy assured them that "the United States strongly supports the just aspirations and rights of all peoples to national independence." This is a most significant presidential message because the convention was known to highlight the emancipation of the captive nations, particularly Ukraine and the other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR.

Governor Rockefeller's address "warned that if the U.S. fails to provide leadership for the enslaved peoples of the world, 'our own freedom' would be jeopardized." The Governor's address also pointed to the leadership being given by Republicans in the House for the creation of a Special Committee on Captive Nations to "spread the truth about the status of people of White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia and Turkestan."

These and other features of the convention were also reported in the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *New York Times*, the *Daily News*, the *Staats-Zeitung und Herold*, and *La Prensa*.

"COSSACKS AT PLAY," a commentary. *Newsweek*, New York, December 31, 1962.

Whoever wrote this commentary on the recent film *Taras Bulba* must have certain obsessions of his own. Gogol is absurdly represented as being obsessed by a "passionated Ukrainian nationalism" and his mind was an unbalanced one—so states the ostensibly balanced mind behind this somewhat comical piece. As the balanced mind sees it, "Gogol celebrated the atrocities perpetrated by the Cossack brotherhood in the name of a free Ukraine." As though, one might observe, atrocities weren't rife throughout the world then—not to speak of our times.

Polish history also comes in for a "balanced" appraisal. According to the commentator, "most Polish history is obscure." If this be so, then one would

be justified in regarding all history as being obscure. In short, what a literary atrocity is committed in this respectable periodical. All points of evidence have led to a rather favorable popular reaction to the film—this, notwithstanding such a fantastic write-up.

"FAKED PHOTOS IN GOLDEN STATE," by Drew Pearson. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., November 2, 1962.

Comments made by this columnist must always be taken with cautious reservation and at considerable discount. However, in this account of the gubernatorial struggle in California, some interesting material is furnished on Nixon's apology to Khrushchev for Congress' passage of the Captive Nations Week Resolution. And much of it is quite valid and accurate. In Nixon's own book one finds his blunders on this openly disclosed.

But, as expected in some degree, the columnist's story of his meeting with Khrushchev on this does not square with known facts. He relates, "Naturally I knew about the resolution," Khrushchev said, "but did not plan to mention it since Nixon was our guest. However, much to my surprise, Nixon mentioned it himself and said that Congress was foolish to have passed the resolution." "Do you mean to say that members of Congress are fools?" Khrushchev said he asked Nixon. "Oh, this is just a private conversation between us," Nixon said quickly."

What Khrushchev told Pearson (if he told him this) is plainly contradicted by the fact that even before Nixon's plane landed in Moscow, the Russian colonialist was railing against the resolution in a stadium speech. This is just one among many facts belying this account. If Khrushchev actually said this, then the columnist was taken for an uninformed fool. On the other hand, Nixon did perform badly. There can be no question about this.

"HIS TONGUE WILL NOT BRING ROCKEFELLER TO KIEV," by T. Bulba, Jr. *Izvestia*, Moscow, USSR, January 24, 1963.

The Potemkin Village of Soviet Ukrainian independence is shown best when mythical characters, such as Taras Bulba, Jr., are commandeered by Moscow to berate those who speak in behalf of genuine Ukrainian independence. The celebrations in the United States of the 45th Anniversary of Ukraine's independence have significantly tapped the sorest spot in Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. The attacks against American leaders for observing this anniversary have never been more vicious.

As one should expect, Governor Rockefeller, Senator Scott and others are the objects here of Russian spleen. The usual drivel about Rockefeller's millions, the dangerous disease of anti-communism and so forth makes for entertaining reading. This and other vicious articles given further evidence of the deep weakness existing in the artificial structure of the USSR.

"CLOAK-AND-DAGGER TRIAL IN WEST GERMANY," a report. *New York Herald Tribune*, New York, October 8, 1962.

Extensive reporting was given in the Free World press on the unusual trial held in Karlsruhe, Germany on the murders of Prof. Lev Rebet and Ukrainian Nationalist Leader Stepan Bandera. The murderer on trial was Bog-

dan N. Stashynsky, self-confessed agent of the Soviet KGB.

The story leading up to Stashynsky's flight to West Germany and his spectacular confession is given in accurate detail here. The West German court not only sentenced the confessed murderer to hard labor but also indicted the Soviet government for its perpetration of the assassinations on sovereign German soil. The case has tremendous potentialities for the Free World, particularly the United States, in the cold war.

Numerous other publications carried the story of the trial. "Red Faces Bonn Trial in Spray Gun Deaths" reports the *New York Daily News* of Oct. 8; "Red Agent Starts Trial for Murder" is the caption in the *N.Y. World Telegram and the Sun*; and so with *The New York Times*, the *N.Y. Journal-American*, the *New York Post*, the *Jersey Journal* and many other papers throughout the country. The important question now is, "Do we have the sense to capitalize on these facts in the cold war?"

"IMPRISONED 18 YEARS, PRELATE LEAVES RUSSIA," a report. *The Tablet*, New York, February 14, 1963.

It is interesting to note how in a few months one important event after another has brought out the crucial issue of captive Ukraine. In this section alone, these events are recorded: President Kennedy, Governor Rockefeller and others at the Ukrainian Congress Committee convention; the Stashynsky trial in Germany; Moscow's tirade against Americans celebrating the 45th Anniversary of Ukraine's independence; and now, the fourth, the release of Archbishop Joseph Slipy of Lviv, the Metropolitan of Ukrainian Catholics in Western Ukraine.

An excellent account is given here of Archbishop Slipy's imprisonment in Soviet Russian concentration camps for the past eighteen years. He is depicted as probably "the greatest living martyr" of the Church. The report also goes on to show the extent of Soviet Russian genocide as applied to the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Although the report holds that the secret arrival of the Archbishop in Rome does not suggest the existence of any agreement between the Holy See and Moscow, analysts on the USSR are nevertheless relating this event to the Stashynsky trial and a softening-up tactic applied by Moscow in its relations with the Vatican. There can be no doubt that Moscow hopes to offset the Stashynsky smudge with this "benevolent" act.

"JAN. 22ND PROCLAIMED UKRAINIAN DAY," a report. *The Belfield News and Badlands Settler*, Belfield, North Dakota, January 24, 1963.

On the first page of this newspaper, Ukrainian Day is headlined and an interesting report follows on the background of the fight for Ukrainian independence. "The young Ukrainian State was recognized by a number of governments, including that of Soviet Russia," it states. The long report continues on to another page, giving the major episodes of Ukraine's unyielding struggle against Soviet Russian domination.

What has appeared repeatedly in this journal is methodically set forth as major truths in this unusual report. The genocide of the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches, the Rebet and Bandera assassinations, the Captive Nations Week Resolution and many other important events are cited. The people of North Dakota cannot but become somewhat skeptical about our government's capacity to handle the cold war thrusts of Moscow.

"U THANT AND THE CAPTIVE NATIONS," an editorial. *Altoona Mirror*, Altoona, Pa., December 8, 1962.

This long editorial strongly criticizes the United Nations Secretary General U Thant for his recent views on the attitude of the United States and other major free world nations toward the Soviet Union. The Secretary General believes we have no sufficient appreciation of the significance of the Kremlin's turn away from Stalinism. In many of his addresses U Thant has been playing neutralist tunes.

Citing several other factors that the Secretary General seems to be unaware of, the editors hammer away on the captive nations. "Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, professor of economics at Georgetown University and author of the Captive Nations Week resolution," they write, "recently said our own government's attitude toward these captive nations of the Soviet 'suggests a poor state of knowledge, interpretation and vision which is appalling at this perilous juncture of our history.'" Over a third of the editorial is devoted to the need of exposing Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, for the benefit of people like the Secretary General.

"POPE WELCOMES ARCHBISHOP, RED PRISONER FOR 18 YEARS," a report. *The Catholic News*, New York, N.Y., February 14, 1963.

When colonial Moscow released Archbishop Joseph Slipy, the papers of the world carried the news. All Catholic agencies reported the significant event. This particular report was one the most comprehensive, describing the background to the event and all relevant aspects associated with it.

Pope John XXIII heralded the Metropolitan's release in these words: "Yesterday evening We received from Eastern Europe a stirring consolation for which We humbly thank the Lord." The full implications of this secret arrival are yet to be spelled out in the area of Moscow's cold war policy toward the Vatican and the Free World. That there are softening implications of a 'deceptive sort, there can be no doubt. The question is to what extent they will succeed.

"UKRAINIANS AND SELF-DETERMINATION," article by Walter Dushnyck. *Sudeten Bulletin*, Munich, Germany, December 1962.

This is a concise and well-written article dealing with Ukraine and the principle of national self-determination. The author is a widely respected writer on East European problems. In this article he sharply rebuts the position taken by another writer whose earlier piece in the same periodical contains some strange notions about Khrushchev, a "Ukrainian," protecting the Ukrainian minority in Czecho-Slovakia.

It is with comparative ease that the writer establishes Khrushchev's Russian identity. He then assembles his historical arguments to demolish the other notion that the Ukrainian minority in Czecho-Slovakia enjoys special treatment because of "Big Brother Nikita." Speaking of this minority, as he puts it, "their persecution in Czechoslovakia was even more severe because of the prolonged activities of the Ukrainian underground resistance movement on the Polish-Czech border."

L. E. D.

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
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