


UKRAINIAN INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH

AND INFORMATION, INC.

**THE
UKRAINIAN
REPUBLIC
OF
JANUARY 22**



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OF JANUARY 22*

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THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC OF JANUARY 22

I

RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM AND UKRAINE — ITS GREATEST VICTIM.

The history of modern times knows two forms of colonialism: one is the oceanic empire, the chief representative of which is Great Britain whose colonies, scattered all over the globe, were united by ocean routes; the other is continental colonialism, with Russia as the main exponent of all its aspects. Germany strove to become an oceanic empire but the First World War put an end to those aspirations. Subsequently Germany endeavored to build a continental empire in the manner of Russia by means of an internal, totalitarian, terrorist dictatorship and the conquest of near and distant territories. The Second World War put a stop to these new aspirations.

The result of both wars was a gradual transformation of oceanic empires into communities of free and independent states. Only the continental empire of Russia with Moscow as its center, still remains, held together by a totalitarian political system, terror and the economic exploitation of enslaved national territories.

Various nations succumbed, and are still in the process of succumbing to this Russian co-

C O N T E N T S

- I. Russian imperialism and Ukraine — its greatest victim.
- II. The revolution of 1917: Russia, democratic and communist, rejects the idea of a federation of free nations.
- III. The Acts of January 22, 1918 and January 22, 1919, and their significance.
- IV. The Western nations and the United States in relation to the Ukrainian Republic.
- V. A half-century later.

lonialism, but the first and the greatest victim was Ukraine. The history of the second half of the seventeenth century and the entire eighteenth century is the history of Ukraine's struggle to defend her independence from Russia. The organization of a large coalition of European nations by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1656 — 1657), the alliance with Poland of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky (1658), the treaty with Turkey of Hetman Petro Doroshenko (1668), the alliance with Sweden of Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1709), — that legendary figure in Byron's and Hugo's poems — all these were stages in the stubborn Ukrainian struggle against Russian imperialism.

Although Ukraine was conquered the struggle continued into the nineteenth century. It was carried on by cadres of revolutionaries who formed underground political organizations; as a result Siberia and the Asiatic Steppes were filled with thousands of political exiles. Among them was the greatest poet of new Ukraine — her spiritual leader, Taras Shevchenko — whose strongest desire was that Ukraine one day would have her own „Washington with a new and just law”. (A monument to Shevchenko is to be erected in Washington, D. C. through an Act of Congress to commemorate the 150-th anniversary of his birth.)

The Tsarist „ukazy” of 1863 and 1876, with the exception of a few historic documents and belles-lettres, banned the Ukrainian printed word in the Russian Empire. Ukrainian writers, scholars and publicists could publish their works in the Ukrainian language only in Galicia, a small territory of Ukraine on the borders of the Austrian Empire where the regime was less strict, or in West Europe.

The revolution of 1905 for a short time offered Ukraine the possibility to conduct an

open struggle for autonomy. Press, science and literature experienced a brief rebirth. The reaction which suppressed the achievements of this revolution brought with it new limitations. It was the revolution of 1917 that finally and fully revealed Ukraine's indestructible desire for self-determination in her own and by her chosen free and democratic form.

II.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917: RUSSIA, DEMOCRATIC AND COMMUNIST, REJECTS THE IDEA OF A FEDERATION OF THE NATIONS.

The autonomous tendencies of Ukraine met with opposition from the Provisional Government, first under Minister-President Prince George Lvov, and later under Alexander Kerensky.

Democratic Russia had no intentions of giving up the colonies acquired by Tsarist Russia; she meant to adhere to the principle of the one and indivisible Russian Empire. The Ukrainian Parliament (The Tsentralna Rada) in Kiev, followed by other nations formerly under Tsarist Russia, took the initiative at the conference of Sept. 21-28, 1917 and demanded a reconstruction of the empire into a free alliance, a federation of autonomous republics. The Provisional Government of Kerensky rejected this demand.

On Nov. 7, 1917 Kerensky's government fell. It was succeeded by the Communist regime of Lenin, which recognized the right of self-determination for Ukraine and which acknowledged the Ukrainian Republic in the Act of Dec. 17, 1917:

„We, the Soviet of People's Commissars, recognize the Ukrainian National Republic and its right to separate from Russia or to make an agreement with the Russian Republic for federative or other similar mutual relations between them. Everything that touches national rights and the national independence of the Ukrainian people, we, the Soviet of People's Commissars, accept clearly without limitations and unreservedly".¹⁾

But in reality the Communist Government was applying and perfecting its technique of conquering new colonies with the aid of interior subversion that served as a screen for foreign Russian military occupation.

The attempts of the Bolsheviks to establish their rule in the Ukraine through the medium of democratic elections met with failure time and again. The elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly at the close of Nov. 1917 gave the Bolsheviks 10% of all the votes in Ukraine, whereas the Ukrainian democratic parties had 75%. Even the All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Soviets in Kiev, organized under directives of Moscow on Dec. 17, gave its full vote of confidence to the Ukrainian Parliament — the Tsentralna Rada. At this conference of over 2,500 deputies the Bolshevik representatives numbered only 60 members.²⁾

Upon its defeat the Bolshevik faction moved from Kiev to Kharkov and formed the so-called

¹⁾ „Communist Takeover and Occupation of Ukraine". — Special Report No. 4 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives 83-rd Congress, Second Session, under Authority of H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438.

²⁾ The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920. A Study in Nationalism by John S. Reshetar, Jr. Princeton, N. J. Princeton University Press 1952. p. 93.

led Central Executive Committee with its so-called People's Secretariate. Under the pretence of helping this „Ukrainian" government Russia started a war with Ukraine.

This method perfected in Ukraine became the standard procedure of Communist Russia. The pseudo-independent government organized by Moscow removed the local democratic governments with the help of the Russian Army and proceeded to act as the puppets of Moscow.

On January 22, 1918, while engaged in the war with Red Russia, the Ukrainian Parliament — the Tsentralna Rada — proclaimed the Fourth Universal in Kiev and by this Act established the independent democratic republic of the Ukrainian people.

III.

THE ACTS OF JANUARY 22, 1918 AND JANUARY 22, 1919, AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE.

The Act of January 22, 1918 was the realization of Ukraine's right to self-determination. It was the rejection of Russian colonial imperialism in all its aspects: the White Tsarist, that of Kerensky's democratic Provisional Government, and the Red Communist. But this by no means embraces the entire meaning of the Act.

Ukraine fought not only for her independence from the colonialism of Moscow; she fought also for democratic freedom and against Muscovite despotism. In contrast to the dictatorship of a single party established in Moscow, the Act of January 22 proclaiming the Democratic Ukrainian Republic guaran-

ted freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, freedom to strike and freedom of person and domicile. All minorities were granted „national-personal” autonomy, and consequently the right of the individuals of each nationality were also affirmed.

The Act of the 22nd of January is the expression of Ukrainian individualism; freedom of the individual and a social order constructed on this basis stand in complete contradiction to Moscow collectivism where an authoritative Moloch-state devours its individual members.

But the Act of January 22 means still more. The West understands the principle of self-determination as involving the replacement of the rule of a foreign colonial power by local rule chosen by the people. The greatest colonial states of Europe — England and France — did not endeavor to assimilate their colonial peoples; they were satisfied by merely exploiting them economically. The conditions of Russian imperial colonialism are different, however. Russia does not confine herself only to economic exploitation, and the prevention of the development of a local leading class, but through the use of all possible means she strives also to assimilate ethnically the conquered nations. *Genocide in its full meaning and with all its implications is the ultimate goal of Russian imperialism.* Physical destruction of the populace by planned famine, firing squads, deportation to Siberia, colonization by foreign elements — all these are the means of total assimilation of the enslaved nations with the Russian, or, in the deceptive Moscow terminology, the Soviet nation.

Ever since the time of Peter I, Russia conducted a ceaseless war against the Ukrainian spirit and its development; against the Ukra-

inian language, literature and entire culture. Tsarist „ukazy” banning the Ukrainian printed word were only some of the various steps in this assimilative program of genocide. *In its relentless persecution Communist Moscow used every method hitherto known in the history of colonial imperialism. In her war against Ukraine, Russia made use of planned famine (1932-1933) which took millions of victims. She did not hesitate to destroy by firing squads and slave labor camps an entire generation of Ukrainian writers, artists and scholars.*

January 22, 1918 not only marked the achievement of national independence, nor did it solely establish the democratic principle of freedom of the individual; it also permitted the creation of conditions necessary for the free development of Ukrainian culture. The Act was, in addition to everything else, an act of protest and defiance against Moscow's policy of Ukrainian annihilation.

The Act of January 22, 1918 attained its full import in the Act of January 22, 1919. As a result of World War I, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy disintegrated into its ethnic components. On Nov. 1, 1918, Galicia and North Bukovina, territories populated by Ukrainians, formed an independent West Ukrainian National Republic headed by the Ukrainian National Council and its State Secretariat. On Jan. 4, 1919, the National Council passed a resolution with respect to the union of the West Ukrainian Republic with the Ukrainian Republic, which had been formed in the former Russian — occupied territories of Ukraine. That part of Carpatho-Ukraine ruled by Hungary until 1918 also joined the new Ukrainian Democratic Republic.

On January 22, 1919, in a great all-national manifestation in historic St. Sophia Square in

Kiev, the union of all Ukrainian territories into one United Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed.

Thus the Act of January 22 is for Ukraine:

- a declaration of Ukrainian independence in opposition to national enslavement;
- a proclamation of the democratic freedoms in defiance of Russian political totalitarianism and economic communism;
- an assertion of national, cultural and spiritual self-determination in the fight against genocide;
- the establishment of the unification of all Ukrainian territories heretofore under foreign occupations into a single independent state.

From the perspective of time, the Acts of January 22, 1918 and January 22, 1919 marked the victory of Ukrainian principles which currently, as written in the charter of the United Nations, are the principles, accepted in the world by all Western nations, including the United States. Today these principles are being violated in Ukraine, in all national territories under the Soviets, and in the so-called satellite nations as well. Their restoration is often advocated by the free nations of the world, among them the United States when it annually declares January 22 the Day of Ukrainian Independence.

IV

THE WESTERN NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC.

For three years the Ukrainian Republic fought against the concentrated might of four imperialisms: the Red Russians advancing from the north and the east, the White Russians from the south, the Poles from the west, and the Roumanians from the southwest. *Due to tragic historical misjudgment the western democracies aided this new colonialism against the young Ukrainian democracy.*

Unfortunately the western states applied President Wilson's principle of self-determination of nations only to the so-called central states (Germany, Austria and Turkey) with which they were at war. As a consequence one of the noblest principles of the twentieth century was employed merely as an opportunist measure in war, a means of undermining the strength of the enemy from within. It was not applied to Russia, the state that already bore the name of the Prison of Nations. On the contrary the United States stubbornly supported the policy of one indivisible Russia against the will of the conquered nations. Only one exception was made: the United States acknowledged the independence of Armenia — and this only in order to incite the Armenians against their Turkish occupiers.

The second reason for the western nations' alignment on the side of Ukraine's colonial occupant was the lack of knowledge of the situation that prevailed in revolution-torn East

Europe. According to his biographer, Ray Stan-
nard Baker³⁾, President Wilson candidly ad-
mitted this to the future Czech president Ma-
saryk, and to his adviser Colonel House⁴⁾. The
well known contemporary publicist, George E.
Sokolsky, who was in St. Petersburg (now
Leningrad) at the time, in his reminiscences,
„Yanks in Russia During the Revolution”⁵⁾,
tells about the confusion in the American Intel-
ligence Service in the Russian capital. In ad-
dition to David R. Francis, the United States
Ambassador in Russia, there existed several
agencies, each in its own fashion carrying on
not only informational, but diplomatic service
as well for the United States. They oscillated
between the confidence of the President and
the directives of Colonel House. „None of the
Russians or the other Europeans could under-
stand the conduct of the Americans. They
seemed so disorderly, so undisciplined, so ir-
responsible.”

France and England began to have some
understanding, mainly of the strategic signi-
ficance of Ukraine in the war with Germany.
There was a time they were inclined toward
recognizing the Ukrainian state and they endeav-
ored to influence America in this direction.
Several American diplomats also called Wa-
shington's attention to the events in Ukraine.
In a cablegram dated Dec. 6, 1917, Maddin
Summers, American Consul General in Mos-
cow, reported to the Secretary of State Robert

³⁾ „Woodrow Wilson” Life and Letters... Garden
City, N. J. Page and Co. 1927-39 (8 volumes) —
Volume 8, page 323.

⁴⁾ Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Co-
lonel House. Houghton Mifflin Co., N. Y., 1928,
Volume 3, page 386.

⁵⁾ Journal American, N. Y. July 15, 1962.

Lansing,⁶⁾ that he had sent Mr. Poole to Ros-
tow with orders to inform the State Depart-
ment about all that was happening in the south.
Summers himself asked Lansing to „...give
careful consideration to his (Mr. Poole's) te-
legrams as the Don and Ukrainian sections
are chiefly deciding factors in restoring peace
in Russia.” (v. 2, page 590).

The American Ambassador in England,
Walter Hines Page, forwarded to Lansing the
résolutions of the Allied Council of Dec. 23,
1917. Here among other things it was stated
that the Allies must immediately establish rela-
tions with Ukraine and the Cossacks, which
supply the Allies with the necessary resources
for Roumania. Sharp, the U. S. Ambassador
in France, informed Lansing about the Anglo-
French conference in Paris on Dec. 26, 1917
in which the two agreed upon their separate
spheres of interest. Roumania and Ukraine
were the concern of France, the Caucasus and
Iran of England. Sharp advised Lansing to ap-
point representative in political and financial
affairs to Jassy, Odessa, and Tiflis, without
publicizing their official position. On Dec. 29,
1917, Ambassador Page in London received
a confidential memorandum on Allied policy
in Russia, prepared by the English Foreign
Office and approved by the French Premier
Clemenceau, to be forwarded to the American
Government. Among other things this docu-
ment stated:

„But we feel it is necessary to keep in touch,
as much as it is possible, with the Ukraine, the
Cossacks, Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus, etc.,

⁶⁾ On the basis of „United States, Department
of State, Foreign Relations of the U. S. Diplomatic
Papers.” 1918, Russia (3 Volumes); 1919, Russia;
The Lansing Papers. 1914-1920, (2, Volumes);
Paris Peace Conference, 1919, (13 Volumes).

because these various semi-autonomous provinces represent a very large portion of the strenght of Russia. In particular we feel bound to befriend the Ukraine since upon the Ukraine depends the feeding of the Roumanians to whom we are bound by every obligation of honor."

On Jan. 9, 1918 American Ambassador Francis wrote Lansing that France intended to recognize Ukraine, and that the French government had made this known to England and Italy and had advised simultaneous recognition. Jusserand, the French Ambassador in Washington, gave Lansing still more explicit information. Jusserand wrote in a memorandum of Jan. 7, 1918:

"In informing me that it is maintaining with the Secretariat of the Rada of Ukraine *de facto* relations further accentuated by the recent appointment of Gen. Tabouis as Commissioner of the French Republic to that country, my government adds that the turn of events in Russia and the reports it has received about Austro-German activities in Kiev led it to the conclusion that it could not defer any longer taking a more clearly defined attitude toward Ukraine. Gen. Tabouis is therefore to be instructed to notify the Ukrainian Government that the French Government is glad actually to recognize it as an independent government. I am directed and herby have the honor to communicate the foregoing to Your Excellency and to inquire whether the U. S. Government would be inclined to take a similar step with the Ukrainian Government."

A similar opinion was voiced by Grant-Smith, the American Chargé d'affair in Denmark, in a telegram to the State Department dated Jan. 14, 1918. He called attention to the fact that failure to maintain direct contact with

the Bolsheviks in Russia, with Finland and Ukraine, gives the Austro-German elements a free hand in these countries, Therefore he advised the government of the United States to enter into relations with these governments.

The State Department's answer to all these suggestions was that "...this government is giving careful consideration to the whole situation, but as yet has reached no determination as to acknowledging separate governments in Russia". (Acting Secretary of State Polk to the French Ambassador, Washington, Jan. 11, 1918).

Further events proved that the friendly attitude of France and England toward the Ukrainian Republic was „a policy of exploratory opportunism prompted by military considerations”⁷⁾.

In 1917-1918 Ukraine was useful in the war against Germany and Austria. After the defeat of these nations the picture changed. In 1919 England helped reactionary Russian imperialism under the command of General Denikin, while France permitted a Polish army, formed on her territory, under General Haller, to attack Ukraine from the west, rendering it impossible for Ukraine to continue to wage war successfully against the Bolsheviks. The official American policy was now openly in favor of the one, indivisible Russia and against the peoples enslaved by her. The State Department of the United States apparently had fallen victim to the suggestions of primitive propaganda. Secretary Lansing's letter of instruction to the American Mission to Negotiate Peace (Oct. 20, 1919) stated as follows: „On the basis of past investigations the Department is disposed to regard the Ukrainian separatist

7) John Reshetar, op-cit. p. 101.

movement as largely the result of Austrian and German propaganda seeking the disruption of Russia."

This misjudgment and the policy adopted as consequence undermined Ukrainian resistance to communism, weakened the Ukrainian Army, and aided Moscow in her ultimate victory. The western powers helped the most dangerous enemy of the Free World to stand firmly on its feet. Only one apprehensive voice was heard in the background of this misconception — that of Prime Minister Lloyd George directed toward Frank I. Polk, Chief of the American Mission to Negotiate Peace in Paris. In a letter to Lansing dated Nov. 29, 1919 Polk reported this conversation. He stated that Lloyd George was of the opinion that a united Russia would be a menace to Europe, and therefore he thought that Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, and Finland — possibly even Siberia — should be independent.⁸⁾

The Congress of the United States seemed to have been better informed at the time than the Administration. A resolution of Dec. 13, 1919 of the House of Representatives (H. R. 369) recommended that the Peace Mission affirms the right of all Ukrainian territories formerly under Austria-Hungary and Russia to freedom, independence and self-determination on the basis of the principles proclaimed by President Wilson on Jan. 8, 1918. This resolution was lost amid a welter of red tape. The House of Representatives passed a bill on Sept. 16, 1919 (La Guardia H. R. 9316) proposing an appropriation of \$ 15,000 from the Federal Treasury as a salary for the Ameri-

can Consul in the Ukrainian Republic. The Senate similarly showed some understanding of the Ukrainian situation in the discussion of Senator King's bill concerning the creation of the so-called Russian Legion in which „No man shall be enlisted (in it) until he has furnished satisfactory evidence that he will faithfully and loyally serve the cause of the United States and the cause of united and independent Russia." (From text of resolution on the Russian Legion). A number of Senators among them Wadsworth, McCumber, Brangee, and Lodge, protested against the inclusion of such a clause. Senator Lodge's argument was: „I should leave out ‚and the cause of united and independent Russia' because we do not know anything about it." Others pointed out that events in Eastern Europe seemed to indicate that „United Russia" did not exist, that there were nations who did not wish to belong to „United Russia". As a result of these debates the clause was deleted. This resolution also disappeared in the Foreign Relations Committee.

Not being acquainted with the situation in East Europe Congress accepted the position which today is the official American policy — the policy of non-commitment in opposition to the State Department, which then stood for a united and independent Russia.

⁸⁾ 66th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, 813, page 126.

V

A HALF-CENTURY LATER.

After almost fifty years the situation became clearer. The apprehensions of Lloyd George concerning the possible menace of a united Russia appeared to be insufficiently strong. United Russia emerged as a menace not only to Europe, but to the entire world including America. On the one side is the Free World; on the other the most powerful colonial empire ever known in the history of mankind, with Moscow in command; such are the frontiers of modern history. In 1917-1919 three conceptions of a united and indivisible Russia competed with one another, each of the three backed by one or another world power: the reactionary White Russian conception represented by Tsarist generals and aristocratic emigrants; Kerensky's democratic conception of Russia, and the Communist conception. Of these three the last became austere reality. It wages a ceaseless and inexorable cold — and in some places (Korea, Viet-Nam) a shooting — war with the Free World.

In this situation the problem of the enslaved nations once more becomes immediate and pressing. Still it appears that full comprehension of this problem develops but slowly in comparison with the headlong rush of current events. America's division of East-European peoples into two categories — the higher and the lower — may serve as an example. The so-called satellite nations conquered by Moscow after the Second World War belongs to the first group; the second and lower group including Ukraine, consists of the nations that reconst-

ructed or created their own states 1917-1918 but were then reoccupied by Russia. In order not to confuse these two groups, separate scientific, scholarly, and informative organizations have been created.

Such a separation of nations into a higher and a lower order was officially confirmed in the statement of Secretary Dean Rusk in a letter to Rep. Howard W. Smith, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, on August 27, 1961: „The United States Government's position is weakened by any action which confuses the rights of formerly independent peoples or nations with the status of areas, such as Ukraine, Armenia, or Georgia, which are traditional parts of the Soviet Union. Reference to these latter areas, places the United States Government in the undesirable position of seeming to advocate the dismemberment of an historical state...”

Various factors have contributed to slow down the process of American understanding of the problems of the peoples of the USSR. One of them is force of habit, that causes European and American politicians, scholars and journalists to stubbornly continue to indentify the term Russian with the entire Soviet Union, even though Moscow itself limits it to the Russian Federation in the strict meaning of the term. Here then is a paradox: the Free World in the midst of a cold war with an empire under the dictatorship of Moscow, instead of taking advantage of the chinks in its armor, admitted even by Moscow, insists on treating the enemy as a national monolith. And this at a time when so much is said and planned about psychological warfare.

Another factor closely related to the one just described is a psychological complex fixed in the American subconscious... Russia was an

ally of the United States in the Pacific against the mutual enemy Japan. Russia was also an ally in both World Wars in Europe. The complex of Russia as ally is deeply rooted, and even at this late hour statesmen are reluctant to open their eyes and awaken from the dream in which Russia appears as a benevolent, wise, great, and powerful nation.

Still another factor contributing toward coolness and even opposition to Ukrainian independence are false analogies which Americans may apply in their judgment of the situation in East Europe. In such cases Ukraine may be compared to the secessionist South, while Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and their Tsarist predecessors are thought of as so many Russian Lincolns... The relationship of Moscow to the so-called federated nations such as Ukraine, Belo-Russia, and the others may seem to resemble in the American mind the relations between the American States of the Union with full autonomy subject only to few common federal affairs.

All these several factors may be reduced to one fundamental difficulty which existed to an even greater degree in 1917-1918. *To put it bluntly, Americans (and Europeans) suffer from faulty information and inadequate knowledge of the true situation in the USSR.*

This is amply confirmed by the objective English Kremlinologist quarterly „Survey” in its edition dedicated to this subject.⁹⁾ The conclusion is as follows: the lack of comprehension of the significance of the USSR in the West is the result of misconceptions and misinformation not only on the part of the general

⁹⁾ „The Western Image of the Soviet Union, 1917-1962’, — Survey, a Journal of Soviet and Eastern European Studies, No. 41, April 1962. 200 pp.

public but on the part of the Soviet experts (Sovietologues) themselves. All the powers interested in preserving intact the monstrous colonial empire of Moscow made use of the ignorance and the lack of actual information. It was a useful technique for the old regime Tsarist imperialists, for Kerensky’s democratic imperialists, and it still serves present Communist imperialism.

But in all justice it must be admitted that in time, the matter of the Ukrainian desire for independence ceased to appear to the rest of the world as a surprise; and no self-respecting statesman today believes in the myth, formerly accepted by the State Department, that the Ukrainian problem was an offspring of an Austro-German intrigue. Communist Moscow itself was forced to take into consideration the Ukrainian’s drive toward independence, and the so-called independent Ukrainian Socialist Republic was a concession made in order to pacify them and to appease modern anti-colonial attitudes. But this quasi-independent Ukrainian Republic, with her quasi-independent delegation to the United Nations still serves by its very existence to remind the world of the Ukrainian problem.

In the world forum of the United Nations highly responsible statesmen appear in the role of defenders of Ukrainian independence. Prime Minister Diefenbaker of Canada in answer to Khrushchev’s statement that countries should establish systems... of their own free will and choosing posed the question:

„What of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia? What of the freedom loving Ukrainians and other Eastern European peoples?” In his speech of Nov. 22, 1961, in Toronto, Diefenbaker maintained that the peoples of Ukraine and other Baltic countries or other Eastern European

countries, of Transcaucasia and Central Asia „were never given an opportunity to choose freedom. They are still being denied the right by the USSR, which the USSR contends should be right of all peoples”¹⁰⁾

In a memorandum delivered to the United Nations on Nov. 25, 1961. Adlai Stevenson U. S. Ambassador to the U. N., declared: „We are told that the peoples of the Soviet Union enjoy the right of self-determination. Indeed, the Soviet regime at its inception issued a Declaration of Rights which proclaimed „the rights of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states”.

„How did this right work in practice? An independent Ukrainian Republic was recognized by the Bolsheviks in 1917, but in 1917 they established a rival republic in Kharkov. In July 1923, with the help of the Red Army, a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established and incorporated into the USSR.”

The United States Congress annually opens the Day of Ukrainian Independence — the 22nd of January — with religious service and with declarations of Senators and Representatives advocating freedom for Ukraine. These declarations are included in the Congressional Records. It would take too much room here to quote the growing number of friends of Ukrainian Independence in Congress. We will cite only one characteristic passage from the speech of the Hon. Thomas J. Dodd, a Connecticut Senator:

„...on January 22 the Ukrainian people proclaimed their independence, thus breaking the

¹⁰⁾ cit. from an interview from March 22, 1962, printed in the Ukrainian News Weekly (Edmonton, Canada) and reprinted in the Ukrainian Bulletin, New York, Apr. 15, 1962.

shackles of centuries of foreign domination. We can well imagine their hopes and dreams as they embarked on what they thought would be new era of peaceful progress.

„But we know of the tragic end of these hopes, for the Ukrainians were destined to become the first victims of the horror of Communist aggression. Their lot was to be, not freedom and independence but mass murder, planned famine, purges, and mass deportations.

„There were some in the world who voiced outrage at the atrocities committed in the Ukraine, and who saw the dread portents which these crimes held for the whole family of man. But the general response of free men was feeble and ineffective, and has continued so for decades.

„The day that was meant to represent independence and rebirth serves now to remind us of the perpetuation of injustice and the passing of another year of subjugation for 40 million Ukrainians.”¹¹⁾

Each year on the Day of Ukrainian Independence when the Ukrainian flag flies side by side with the Stars and Stripes from City Halls throughout America the world is reminded of the events of January 22, 1918 and January 22, 1919.

¹¹⁾ Congr. Record of the 86th Congress, First Session 1959, page 3.

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