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EDITOR'S NOTE: This year Ukrainians the world over are observing the 250th anniversary of HETMAN Ivan Mazepa's rise against Russia and his alliance with King Charles XII of Sweden. Therefore, to mark this important historical event, THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY is privileged to print several articles on Mazepa by authors who are known to be specialists on this subject.

THE KHRUSHCHEV VISIT

Editorial

At this stage after the visit of Khrushchev to this country, it is clearly not enough for those who opposed and protested the invitation to fall back on the validity of their original arguments. As an example, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America was one of the first national organizations to speak out against the invitation. At this point it has no cause to retract any of the arguments it advanced in opposition to the visit. On the contrary, the events that have and are taking place confirm further the soundness of its position. However, in analytically reconstructing the major events pertaining to this outstanding episode in our foreign policy, it is far more necessary to arrive at the meaning of all this in order to be prepared for the future.

Khrushchev's performance here obviously has in no way altered the stubborn facts of his long record of political criminality. Even before he arrived here, part of this record was being assembled through Congressional sources.¹ It is important to observe, however, that a few Americans are disposed to exonerate him of these crimes. Speaking before the Congress of Cultural Freedom in Basle, George F. Kennan held that Khrushchev "occupied a prominent place" among those who felt ashamed and humiliated by the brutalities of Stalin. In his paper Kennan emphasized that Killer K's so-called liberalization has "gone so far as to represent a highly significant departure from Stalinism and an essential alteration of the nature of the regime."² The objective American reader need only read the

¹ "The Crimes of Khrushchev," Parts 1 & 2, Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C., 1959.

² "Stalinism Is Held to Appall Premier," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1959.

first two papers of the quoted Congressional study to see how miserably wrong and misled Kennan is. This would be exceedingly profitable for those who follow Kennan's utterances and writings with a conspicuous unawareness of his uncanny record of consistent error. One may well ask how many others in this country arrived at like mind as a result of the Khrushchev visit? The depths of naivete are well nigh abysmal.

The Ukrainian Congress Committee stressed also the classical warning "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*" ("I fear the Greeks even bearing gifts"). This was done not only because of familiar communist duplicity and the long string of broken promises and treaties by the Russian Communists but also because of our knowledge of traditional Russian diplomatic and political techniques. The peace and friendship ("Мир и Дружба!") salute has for centuries been a deceitful technique employed by the imperialist Czars. From Ivan the Terrible's times to the present this verbal overture preceded in time the conquest of non-Russian lands piece by piece and the only friendship left was with slavery. The Allen-Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin performed a tremendous public service in this respect. Its full-page advertisement in papers throughout the country highlighted the sheer deceit of the Russian peace and friendship slogan.⁹ The twenty-two captive nations listed in the ad provide the measure of Russian peace and friendship.

Among other things, we brought out, too, that from the Russian viewpoint the visit itself was a cold war weapon; that we should not have submitted to Moscow's Berlin threat by extending the invitation; that in the long run the visit would not relax tensions but actually form the base for further Free World defeats in the cold war; and that we should maintain a strong and firm moral, political, and military position in our dealings with Moscow. The fear of possible hot war is also a standard Russian political weapon in the cold war. Khrushchev used it so effectively that many in this country behaved as though the issue was one of an invitation or war!

The plain fact is that by virtue of both traditional background and the numerous serious weaknesses in the present Communist empire, Moscow is least ready to engage in any global conflict. Its nuclear pretensions cannot eliminate these fundamental factors. The prime war that imperialist Russia has always waged is the propaganda and psychological type of war. And we agree entirely with

⁹ "Мир и Дружба!", *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 9, 1959.

Senator Thomas J. Dodd, the brilliant legislator from Connecticut, when with reference to the visitor, he said, "I think he has achieved a massive propaganda victory throughout the world." One of the ways by which Moscow achieved this victory is suggested by the *Pravda* report of September 24: "millions upon millions of Americans gave Khrushchev a joyous welcome." Evidently the visit failed also to change the color of the dealers in untruth.

The current wait-and-see attitude should not deter us from a rational assessment of the visit at this time. Doubtlessly, the effects and ramifications of the visit will have to be carefully traced in the future. But there is enough evidence at present time to demonstrate what these effects and ramifications are likely to be, should we continue our present course. A sober look at this evidence may be sufficient to divert us from this course. To evaluate this evidence properly and soundly requires a division of this whole problem into the following phases: (1) background, (2) Khrushchev's reasons for the visit, (3) our publicized reasons, (4) salient features of the visit, and (5) the future. This is the only way by which one can methodically and systematically assess this episode.

BACKGROUND TO THE VISIT

It would be foolhardy to view the invitation and visit out of the context of the past two years. Khrushchev's arrival here was the culmination of an effort initiated two years ago. It represents the fruitful product of the efforts made by Ambassador Menshikov and the subsequent inroads cultivated by Mikoyan and Kozlov. Regardless of the arguments offered pro and con the visit, the striking fact is that Moscow's stated objective was successfully realized with the invitation extended to Khrushchev. With an assist from the Berlin threat, the extended invitation constituted a cold war victory for Moscow. This fact one cannot argue away. And the objective was accomplished without really giving anything in return. Significantly, it was accomplished shortly after the death of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

There can be no doubt that had Dulles lived, no such invitation would have been issued. The forces which sought to oust Dulles a year ago, acquired the ally of death and won their first major battle in the invitation. The rather unwise statement issued by the Governors who returned from the Soviet Union served to help these forces.⁴ Among other things the statement avers that "We

⁴ "Text of the Governors' Report on Soviet Visit," *The New York Times*, August 1, 1959.

saw no indication that the Soviet people entertain any desire to abandon their system of government and economy, any more than our people intend to abandon their basic beliefs." Did the supposedly realistic Governors expect an invitation to a rebellion on their three-week sojourn? Indicating how little they understand the Soviet Union, America's official travelers state further that means must be devised "for the people of these two major nations to understand each other better in order to achieve permanent world peace." The statement reiterates the half-truth of "two nations" and conclusively shows the complete misunderstanding of our traveling officials as concerns the nature and composition of the Soviet Union. Yet, despite this gross unfamiliarity with the most elementary and essential facts, the Governors urged the President to invite Khrushchev here.

With some knowledge the Governors could have come to understand that the Soviet Union is as much a "nation" as the United States is an "empire." Actually the reverse is true. Essentials regarding the Soviet Union were sent by the chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee to each of the Governors planning to make the tour. By their action it is evident that they failed to profit from the elementary material sent to them at the beginning of June. Later, we learn from Governor Luther H. Hodges of North Carolina, one of the nine who made the tour, that they received a poor briefing from the State Department. Referring to their Russian hosts, he said, "We just weren't as well prepared as they were."⁸ A three hour briefing is hardly sufficient for the mission they mapped out for themselves. But the disturbing note here is that operating from scarce knowledge in this field, the Governors nevertheless lent their powerful influence before the invitation was extended.

It is hoped that the Governors and countless others in this country may have profited from the furore created by the Captive Nations Week Resolution.⁹ The passage of this Resolution by the Congress was undoubtedly an unexpected intrusion for the planners of the Khrushchev invitation. It couldn't have come at a better time. People throughout the country learned from it that the majority of captive nations is within the Soviet Union itself. The contrast of thought between the Resolution and the Governors' statement is so striking in contradiction that widespread discussion was inevitable.

⁸ "Hodges Scores U.S.," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1959.

⁹ The story of the Captive Nations Week Resolution appears on p. 206 of this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

The contents of the Resolution were used to argue against the Khrushchev visit, and in his article in the *Foreign Affairs* journal, Khrushchev himself showed his concern over growing American interest in the captive nations within the Soviet Union. With solid thought and reason, a good portion of the American populace expressed itself against the invitation by writing to the White House. It was an open secret in Washington that the overwhelming percentage of this mail was against the invitation. This mounted until the President was forced to appear on TV on the very eve of Khrushchev's visit to explain the decision that was taken. In the convenient context of a report of his European tour, the President spent most of his time on the invitation and ideas and ideals associated with our Declaration of Independence. "Fellow Americans," he said, "we venerate more widely than any other document, except only the Bible, the American Declaration of Independence."⁷ This opposition to the invitation augurs well for the future.

KHRUSHCHEV'S REASONS FOR THE VISIT

To have waged a campaign for this mediate objective for two years naturally suggests some powerful reasons underlying Khrushchev's motivation. The reasons for Khrushchev's burning desire to come here are not matters of mere speculation. Some of them appeared as part of his campaign these past two years, particularly after the *sputnik* shot. Reduced to their most essential forms, the reasons are five in number.

First, Khrushchev is still in the process of building up his own personal prestige both within the empire and in Russia proper. The invitation carried all the attributes of personal prestige, legitimacy, and respectability. Through it and as a result of the visit he will further entrench himself in Kremlin power and prove to be more acceptable to the more intellectual layers of the Russian power hierarchy. Second, this step toward "normalization" of relations was aimed at a summit meeting where Khrushchev will press for something tantamount to a Free World acquiescence to his empire. The captive nations are to be forgotten on the premissal sands of "peaceful coexistence" and "non-interference in the internal affairs of others." Objectively speaking, this reason represents a cardinal point in Russian Communist strategy and tactics. Allied to this is the third reason, namely America's abandonment of its own driving moral and political forces. The top-ranking commentator, David Lawrence,

⁷ "Eisenhower Text," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., Sept. 11, 1952.

wrote a penetrating article on this point before Khrushchev's arrival here.*

Another reason was to push further on Mikoyan's plea for trade. The opportunity to acquire certain necessary producer's goods here in order to realize some of his promises in the present Seven-Year Plan was uppermost in this regard. An appeal to those deceived by the groundless thesis of "understanding and amity through trade" was to do the trick. In addition, the reason to drive home the spurious parity of the Soviet Union with the United States also accounted for Khrushchev's penchant desire to come here. The two are not structurally or functionally comparable, but Czar Nikita was not to be outdone by previous Czars on the play of bluff and bluster, especially when he knows that most Americans still lack an appreciative knowledge of the Soviet Union. Related to his actual behavior here, these reasons are exceptionally well founded.

U. S. REASONS FOR VISIT

The reasons offered by the Administration for the invitation scarcely match the power of objective and direct intent found in Moscow's reasons. We were supposed to have two aims: (1) to permit Khrushchev to witness directly the material and spiritual power of America and (2) to afford occasions for an exchange of views and ideas. Behind the stated aims stalks the failure of the Geneva Conference with an awesome indication of a deep fear of war. Khrushchev, as it turned out, seized upon this fear to the full.

Now, plainly, we would be quite naive to believe that Khrushchev didn't already understand what the U.S. represents and possesses. Indeed, it hardly took Russian espionage and information sources long to understand what and where our atomic and missile secrets were. Moreover, if he should have had the opportunity to observe what he doubtlessly has already seen from the thousands of publications purchased by Moscow, it would be illusory to think that the experience would really relieve basic pressures in Berlin, the Middle East, Laos, India, Africa, and even in the United States. Surely, the international network of Russian Communism hasn't come to a stop or even met with momentary surcease.

As to the rationalization regarding an exchange of views and ideas, a summary of the chief features of his visit is adequate to prove the paucity of this alleged second aim. It will prove also

* "Khrushchev's Real Game," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., September 14, 1959.

that Khrushchev was fully motivated by the essential reasons given earlier. To the last analysis it will show that Moscow gained by the visit while we continue to lose ground in the permanent cold war.

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE VISIT

When one sets aside much of the chaff from the grain of the visit, the net result does not make a pretty picture. In Washington, at the National Press Club and in the chambers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and elsewhere, Khrushchev clearly demonstrated that he wasn't interested in any exchange of ideas. He brusquely avoided answering the most basic of questions and boorishly surged forward with his almost ludicrous propaganda. The transcript of the union dinner in San Francisco makes for choice reading. The upshot of that meeting, as Walter Reuther put it, was that Khrushchev accused the seven labor leaders of "peddling Mr. Dulles' line and then he began to abuse us."⁹ He must have gone far to abuse one of these toughened leaders.

Khrushchev's behavior certainly scotched the idea-exchange aim. It was evident from the very start that he was intent upon pushing his own propaganda and ferreting the spots of weakness in our nation. Throughout the trip he concentrated on war and peace and also the competitive struggle between capitalism and socialism. On the first, he certainly frightened quite a number of Americans who almost reached the point of kindness for the visitor or war. The second is a completely fictitious issue and not novel at that. The struggle is not between capitalism and so-called socialism, but one between freedom and totalitarian slavery. Nikita did everything possible to deflect our attention from the real issue. Up to the very last, when he made his TV appearance, he showed nothing but contempt for the intelligence and understanding of the American people. At the same time he played up to their emotions concerning the family, peace, and even God. A month before Mikoyan gave us an inkling into this theoretic when he urged Americans to pray for the success of the visit.¹⁰

Besides these untruths, half-truths, and *missilnik* threats, the wholesale disarmament proposal made by Khrushchev in the U. N. was a colossal hoax. Those who urged that it be given serious study and attention surely must have over-extended their courtesy gesture.

⁹ "Disputes at Union Dinner Reviewed," *The Washington Post*, September 22, 1959.

¹⁰ "Mikoyan Urges Prayer," *The New York Times*, August 30, 1959.

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Couve de Murville, ably showed in his U.N. address that disarmament plans are meaningless without a foundation of trust. Decades—indeed, centuries—of experience with conspiratorial Russians erode the very meaning of the term. In the present situation, logic itself demonstrates the hoax of Khrushchev's proposal. Arms are only a symptom of basic issues. Where for years now negotiations have failed on partial disarmament, how in common sense could we expect total disarmament? The Russian aim is to keep us talking while they proceed with their undercover work for world domination. The length such talks would take is suggested by the definitions that would have to be arrived at in relation to internal security forces. Such forces are armies in themselves within the various sectors of the Communist Empire. Moscow's other aim in this respect is one of long-term deflection, preoccupying our efforts in these fruitless channels at the cost of doing what should be done in the cold war.

The proud manner in which Khrushchev approached our business circles was revealed at the last Washington dinner. General David Sarnoff of RCA declared: "He's interested in peace at no price—on his terms."¹¹ In the area of trade as well as in politics, the Russian dictator maintained this position. Those who are familiar with the Moscow scene anticipated much of this: those who are not, doubtless gulped a good deal of the propaganda and showmanship displayed. "He's really a nice fellow," "He appears to be a good family man," "I don't believe all he dishes out, but a good deal of what he says must be true" are just some of the common statements one heard. They measure the propaganda inroads made by the visitor.

WHAT THEY'LL DO: WHAT WE MUST DO

Agreement on the removal of the Berlin threat was hailed by some as a concrete result of the Ike-Nik talks. To view it in this light suggests weakness. The Berlin threat has not been removed as such; the time elements for its resolution was vaguely agreed upon. Moreover, in the total picture of the visit this point appears almost incidental. What is of essence is the cold war exploitation of this visit by Moscow. And the Kremlin is already showing the way it seeks to exploit it.

One, while Khrushchev continues to pose as a peace-maker, Moscow's puppets in Europe and Asia will press on the fringes of

¹¹ "U.S.-Soviet Leaders Open Parley in an Atmosphere of Friendliness," *The Washington Post*, September 26, 1959.

the Free World. The notion of a China-USSR split is a planted illusion. There is no evidence to indicate that Moscow and Peiping are prepared to enter a mutual suicide pact. Two, continued U.S. support of firm allies will be viewed as our disinclination to cease the cold war. On this basis Moscow has already scored us for supporting Turkey in the U. N. and also for holding the CENTO session in Washington. Three, Moscow will continue no jamming of our VOA broadcasts so long as we really have nothing significant to say, a sort of self-neutralization. Fourth, it will further propagandize among the captive nations and the underdeveloped countries "the American triumph of Mr. Peace" and release captions such as this, "Millions of Americans Learning Truth for First Time." And fifth, by this clever maneuver in the cold war Moscow will even attempt to denigrate its opponents with assists from unwary Americans. In his home-coming Moscow speech, Khrushchev boldly stated: "These forces should be exposed, they must be shown to the world, publicly whipped, they must be subjected to the torments of Hades."¹²

These courses of action set by Moscow for the near future can be met effectively by us. With emphasis placed on "deeds not words" we can convert the invitation and visit to beneficial long-run account. The expected summit meeting must have an agenda covering the real basic issues, chiefly the captive nations. Systematic pressure must be applied for a marked expansion of the cultural exchange program on pain of curtailing it entirely. But the great, new dimension of our foreign policy and international interest is the majority non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. Since the passage of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, American interest in these nations has soared. By all means, let us understand the Russians; but also, and more so, let us begin to understand the non-Russian nations in the USSR. Even Khrushchev sensed this delicate point when he was here.

¹² "Report by Khrushchev in Moscow . . .," *The New York Times*, September 29, 1959.

THE CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RESOLUTION

By LEV E. DOBRINSKY

The Captive Nations Week Resolution, passed by the United States Congress last July, is now a vibrant part of living history. Its impact on international events was unmistakably shown by the reaction it produced in Moscow. Many were taken by surprise with this reaction, others viewed it as the expected. The Resolution and the Presidential Proclamation which is based upon it were immediately subjected to all sorts of analyses. Some held they were "bad;" a number favored them but contended that the timing was poor; and many hailed the event in every respect. Most commentators, analysts, and newsmen in this country never really grasped the full meaning and significance of these documents. Worse still, a number of them in their typical haste garbled up the facts leading to the passage of the Resolution.

In the judgment of this writer the world has not heard the last of these documents. Their deep importance is yet to be revealed in thought and action. Their influence will still be felt in many quarters of the world. Vested in them are possibilities and prospects which time itself will unravel and cause to be realized. Particularly here in the United States the potential developments suggested by the contents of these documents are so immense and promising that at this time a methodical exposition of all aspects surrounding this subject is clearly necessary. Because of its historical bearing, the subject deserves close documentation and study. An examination of the documents themselves, a description of the background to their realization, a systematic review of the chief events produced by them, and a brief analysis of the subject with an eye to its futural significance would be in order in any such study.

PUBLIC LAW 86-90 AND THE RESOLUTION

To appreciate the total meaning of the Resolution, it is obviously a *sine qua non* for one to read every clause in it. Unfortunately, too many who were quick to comment on it, failed to meet this requisite. Their comments plainly showed this. The Resolution is now Public Law 86-90, a law of the Land. It reads as follows:

Whereas the greatness of the United States is in large part attributable to its having been able, through the democratic process, to achieve a harmonious national unity of its people, even though they stem from the most diverse of racial, religious and ethnic backgrounds; and

Whereas this harmonious unification of the diverse elements of our free society has led the people of the United States to possess a warm understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of peoples everywhere and to recognize the natural interdependency of the peoples and nations of the world; and

Whereas the enslavement of a substantial part of the world's population by Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful coexistence between nations and constitutes a detriment to the natural bonds of understanding between the people of the United States and other peoples; and

Whereas since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which poses a dire threat to security of the United States and of all the free peoples of the world; and

Whereas the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others; and

Whereas these submerged nations look to the United States, as the citadel of human freedom, for leadership in bringing about their liberation and independence and in restoring to them the enjoyment of their Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other religious freedoms, and of their individual liberties; and

Whereas it is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and

Whereas the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace; and

Whereas it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such people through an appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and inviting the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities. The President is further authorized and requested to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world.

Since it was this writer who substantively provided and wrote these clauses, in addition to the basic ideas of the Resolution itself, he regards the following as the essential ideas of the measure: (1) the unity-in-diversity nature of our own Nation, (2) the farce of peaceful coexistence of nations with an existing Iron Curtain, (3) the belated recognition of the majority of the captive nations in the Soviet Union, (4) the awareness of Russian Communist imperialism and colonialism since 1918, and (5) the basic, determining position of the captive nations in our world-wide strategy against Moscow's cold war threat. These are the essential political views in the Resolution which are in complete accord with history and provide fundamental guidelines for American foreign policy. In order to interpret accurately the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's outbursts

against the Resolution, one must first comprehend perceptively the meaning of these ideas. Nikita the Sanguine, more than anyone else, fully and instinctively understood the pointedness of truth in the Resolution and responded accordingly. It not only disturbed his present plans of political-psychological ruse for the American people but also frightened him with its possibilities in the cold war which he has absolutely no intention of ending. For him to end the cold war is like taking a motor out of a car and expecting it to operate.

These fundamental ideas must be borne in mind if any sound analysis is to be made of the Resolution. Before one embarks on this analysis, he should draw certain evident comparative observations between the Congressional Resolution and the ensuing Presidential Proclamation. The Proclamation that was issued by President Eisenhower contains the following:

*Whereas many nations throughout the world have been made captive by the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism; and
 Whereas the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations have been deprived of their national independence and their individual liberties; and
 Whereas the citizens of the United States are linked by bonds of family and principle to those who love freedom and justice on every continent; and
 Whereas it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the peoples of the captive nations the support of the government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations for freedom and national independence; and*

Whereas by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a Proclamation designating the 3rd week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world:

Now, therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 19, 1959, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities and urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 17th day of July in the year of our Lord 1959 and of the Independence of the United States of America the 184th.

Now, a comparison between this document and the preceding one shows instantly the marks of historical devaluation, a supposedly softening tone, and some befogging of the issues and identities. The Proclamation was drafted and prepared in the Department of State. By professional bent the Department's members are addicted to diplomatic circumlocution and fringe expressions of the truth that obfuscate calling things by their right names. However, the Proclamation had to be aligned with the Resolution and the latitude for verbal sophistry and obfuscation was in this

case somewhat more restricted than is ordinarily the case. Nevertheless, many who read the Proclamation without bothering to scan the underlying Resolution wound up with the same platitudes and misconceptions about the captive nations. In short, they missed the crucial point of the whole event, including the reasons for Khrushchev's explosion.

It should be evident to the careful reader that certain sloppy and imprecise terms were introduced into the situation by the Proclamation. Soviet Communism is a meaningless abstraction without any objective foundation. The motivation for its use is the misleading desire not to implicate the Russian people for what Moscow does. Stubborn facts show that the imperialistic and colonial enterprise is peculiarly Russian, but, according to some, we are not to be guided by facts. Woodrow Wilson had no theoretical difficulties in differentiating between German imperialism and the German people and thus designating the first as our clear-cut enemy. Nor had Franklin D. Roosevelt with regard to Italian Fascism, German Nazism, and Japanese imperialism. Today, we are asked to pursue phantoms rather than be guided by historical experience and properly identify the enemy. The Resolution clearly identifies the enemy; the Proclamation fails to do this.

Another equally and purposely confusing term is "Soviet-dominated." The undiscriminating reader cannot but leave with the impression that this means dominated by the Soviet Union. If, in the light of the Resolution, this point were raised, the Department would defend itself by pointing out the general scope of the Proclamation which speaks of captive nations "throughout the world" and alludes to nations "on every continent." Briefly, guarding itself in this manner, it would hold that a meticulous reading of the Proclamation would indicate a complete conformity with the Resolution since all the captive nations are implied by these inconspicuous phrases. On this score, its defense is invulnerable. The drafters of the Proclamation could, moreover, argue that "Soviet-dominated" means dominated by Soviet Russia which, historically, is the case since 1918. In this, too, it squares off with the Resolution. Quite plainly, the letter of the law is met with, but the intention to crystallize the truth differs between the Resolution and the Proclamation. In the cold war, some fail to realize that tremendous capital gain can be obtained by properly exploiting the truth. Paradoxically, it is usually the same individuals who will protest violently against using the methods employed by the deceiving Russians. A proper exploitation of the truth means to face it squarely, precisely, and unqualifiedly. This, more than anything else, can destroy the de-

captive designs of Moscow. The Resolution does this, and the result proved it.

In spite of all this, the President deserves our highest praise and compliments in issuing, forthrightly and courageously, this historic Proclamation. His defense of the action taken grew bolder as the days went by. There aren't superlatives enough to praise adequately the act of leadership shown by the Congress on an extraordinarily bipartisan basis. In years to come, more so than now, the wisdom and vision of this act will be fully comprehended.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE RESOLUTION

The background to the Resolution is an interesting one. The idea was conceived a year ago when this writer was on the faculty of the National War College. Then, as now, he was increasingly concerned over the growing indifference in many American circles toward not only the status but also the strategic value of the captive nations. Then, as now, the chief thrust of Russian propaganda was in the direction of obtaining American accession to the vast empire built by the Russian Communists since 1918. When Mr. Khrushchev speaks of "peaceful coexistence," he means nothing more than American acquiescence to the permanent security of his empire. His two-fold purpose in obtaining this guarantee of the territorial integrity of his empire is to gain time for its consolidation, which would come easy with the broken wills of the captive nations, and to secure further his base for cold war operations in the open field of the Free World. This situation existed last year as, indeed, it exists today.

In planning any such resolution a ripe condition is necessary. The occasion presented itself with the Russian Communist murder of Imre Nagy. The writer prepared a Concurrent Resolution on Captive Nations' Days in which he interested Congressman Cretella of Connecticut. Mr. Cretella submitted it with a prefaced address on July 2, 1958.¹ Those who now call for a Captive Nations' Year might be reminded that this original resolution was designed to observe the independence and other historic days of the captive nations throughout the year. The aim was to keep the subject of national captivity steadfastly before the American public. When the resolution was considered by the House Judiciary Committee, its chairman broke a tie vote and cast his vote against it. One of the chief reasons given in opposition to the resolution was that it in-

¹ H. Con. Res. 347. *Congressional Record*, July 2, 1958, pp. 11791-11792.

volved too many days of observance. From a psychological point of view, this was a valid objection. Obviously, the alternative was to compress the observance within the span of a week.

This year two occasions arose for a propitious reintroduction of the idea, namely the Geneva Conference and the forthcoming visit of Vice President Nixon to Moscow. Both occasions were sufficiently close to our own Independence Day which carries its own symbolic weight. Making allowances for developments over the past year, the resolution was revised in both form and content but the essential political ideas were preserved. A comparison of the two resolutions will readily show this. The target period was, therefore, the week following the Fourth.

For several reasons the writer sought the cooperation of Senator Douglas but insisted from the start that the measure must be bipartisan. He recommended Senator Javits of New York to cosponsor it in the Senate and indicated that a similar bipartisan basis would be formed in the House. The cooperation extended was exemplary and most encouraging. It underwent some changes in style and wording, but the substance throughout remained intact. This writer had even to redress a few of these stylistic changes in order to preserve the meaning of the resolution.

On June 22 Senator Douglas introduced the resolution which became known as S. J. Res. 111.² Senator Javits of New York joined with him. It was originally planned to have the resolution on the table in the Senate for two days. However, in order to permit extensive cosponsorship the period was lengthened to a week. In this time the writer employed facilities to inform the majority of Senators of the resolution and this opportunity for their cosponsoring it. In addition, the committee of which he is chairman swung into action to alert all interested organizations and groups of what was transpiring. In the meantime, on June 23, Congressman Bentley of Michigan introduced a parallel measure in the House, numbered as H. J. Res. 435. By the end of this week in June the Senate measure was being cosponsored by Senators Moss, Bush, Lausche, Scott, Hartke, Green, Dodd, Humphrey, Hart, Neuberger, Keating, Young of North Dakota, Engle, Curtis, Langer, Morse, and Case of New Jersey.

Once this action was completed, increasing attention was given to it by individuals and groups who communicated with the legislators and expressed their support of the measure. Because of the shortness of time, after the resolution was referred to the Senate

² *Congressional Record*, June 22, 1959, pp. 10359-10360.

Judiciary Committee, it was decided to amend the observance period to the third week in July. The decision was made to allow time for the preparation of ceremonies in the event that the measure passed the Congress and the President issued a proclamation. Concerning the time coincidence with the Nixon visit, Senator Douglas was perfectly correct in stating that this was unpremeditated. However, as far as this writer was concerned, it really made no difference whether the week would be proclaimed immediately after the Fourth or in the third week. Due to the new elements contained in the resolution, Khrushchev would have exploded before Nixon's visit as well as during it.

The resolution was unanimously passed by voice vote in the Senate on July 6. In large measure, Senator Eastland, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was responsible for this expedition. He cannot be thanked too graciously for his foresight and solid support. On this, the vicious and nonsensical comments on the Senator's role by Walter Lippmann, who curiously on one day wrote favorably about the resolution and later strongly opposed it, need not be taken seriously. With the momentum increasing in tempo, the sturdy House Majority Leader, Congressman McCormack, then entered into the picture to facilitate the passage of the measure in the House. Meanwhile, Congressman Feighan, on July 8, introduced H. J. Res. 459 to parallel the amended measure of the Senate.³ The Congressman from Ohio told the House that in our so-called negotiations with Moscow on Berlin and other issues, it is "nothing short of amazing that the subjugation of the captive millions throughout the Communist empire has not even been mentioned."

The role played by Congressman McCormack was crucial to the passage of the resolution in the House. His efforts, too, cannot be praised enough. When he presented it on July 9, he declared that "this is a very important resolution that will have tremendous effect on the minds of men and women everywhere throughout the world who are subjected to Communist dictation and who desire to be free under their own law."⁴ Congressman Bentley, a sponsor of the resolution, joined with the House Majority Leader to see its passage through. Congressmen Judd, Walter and others spoke eloquently in favor of its passage. The measure was unanimously passed by voice vote on July 9. Despite the limited comments of some observers, it is difficult to see how any right-thinking American could possibly object to the contents of this resolution. The speed

³ *Congressional Record*, July 8, 1959, pp. 11849-11850.

⁴ *Congressional Record*, July 9, 1959, pp. 11948-11950.

with which it passed Congress in itself attested to the solid contents of the Resolution.

As indicated above, on July 17, the President issued his Proclamation. Events moved swiftly the following week. Church ceremonies were held in many cities and on July 23 Mr. George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO stated: "The observance of 'Captive Nations' Week' by the American people has provoked Mr. Khrushchev to more bluster and to still louder threats. This outburst by the Soviet dictator is only a demonstration of the inherent weakness of his sprawling slave empire." At one of the President's News Conferences the question was raised as to whether Mr. Nixon had a strike against him before his departure for Moscow. The President answered in part: "Well, no. I wouldn't think of it in that way . . . I don't think there is any specific relationship between the two things." ⁵ The fact is that there was a very definite relationship. However, it is significant that the following Sunday, the President joined in prayer for the oppressed nations at a Presbyterian Church in Gettysburg, Pa. The minister, the Rev. Robert A. MacAskill keyed his sermon to the Proclamation and rightly declared: "Communism is doomed. It is doomed because it denies the divine origin of humanity and the authority of God. The verdict is already pronounced."⁶

This writer sent a telegram to the President which in part was referred to by David Lawrence whose column lauded day after day both the Resolution and the Proclamation.⁷ The first paragraph of the message read: "As the originator of the Captive Nations Week idea and resolution, I cannot adequately express in words our profound gratitude for your well-worded Proclamation and also for your personal participation in a prayerful observance of the Week in Gettysburg, Pa." It should be emphasized that Mr. Lawrence was one of the few commentators who grasped the full import of the Resolution. His articles make for worthwhile reading on this vital subject. Later, there were others, too, who developed its significance. The following month, for example, George E. Sokolsky wrote an article on "The Captive Nations" in which he said: "Nevertheless, it has been characteristic of Russian history that what the Russians take, they never give up willingly. Russia has been like a rolling snowball, gathering size as it rolled on and on." He rightly

⁵ Transcript of News Conference, UPI, July 22, 1959, No. 1.

⁶ *The Washington Post*, Monday, July 27, 1959, p. 1.

⁷ David Lawrence, "U.S. People and Khrushchev," *Washington Star*, August 6, 1959.

observed further "that all Russians smile when they see Americans. It looks more like a belly-laugh watching the fools part with their money."⁸

THE MUSCOVITE REACTION

Were the Resolution and the Proclamation embarrassing to the Vice President? Was this operational move ill-timed? Was it an unfair provocation directed at colonial and imperialistic Moscow? These were questions raised when the violent reaction set in from Moscow. To each of these questions, the writer answers in the negative. But before substantiating our answers, it is necessary to review the type of reaction produced by the two historic documents.

The Resolution and the Proclamation struck as a lightning bolt in Moscow. Khrushchev precipitously decried the Resolution and viewed as vague Nixon's aim in coming to Moscow. In Warsaw at the time he rather foolishly railed, "The only enslaved peoples are in the capitalistic countries."⁹ The blunt speciousness of this statement is sufficient to indicate the complete bankruptcy of his position. A report from Warsaw that the "proclamation of this week as Captive Nations Week in the United States had hit a raw nerve here" couldn't have been more aptly stated.¹⁰ Radio Moscow screeched and *Pravda* chimed in with a half-page blast against the United States. Great perturbation was displayed over the "coincidence in the timing" of the Proclamation and Nixon's visit. Moscow viewed the Resolution as a "new provocative anti-Soviet campaign". One begins to wonder who is hysterical when he reads these cries of pain and Khrushchev's further spasm that this "hysterical campaign" of "petty provocation" proves that "panic-stricken monopolists . . . are losing the faculty of controlling their own actions."¹¹

To this writer, such evidences of Russian political behavior are typical and normal. They confirm a historically based interpretation that once the grizzly Bear is cornered, he'll howl and bellow but his fear is paralyzing. Peoples and nations who have bordered Russia for centuries, like the Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians and others, know this truth best. Khrushchev's tirade at the Soviet-Polish Friendship Rally in Moscow that Captive Nations Week was a "direct interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs" is an old Russian technique to deflect any world interest

⁸ *These Days . . . "The Captive Nations,"* August 19, 1959.

⁹ *The New York Times*, July 22, p. 1.

¹⁰ *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1959.

¹¹ *The Washington Post*, July 24, p. A8.

in the imperial and colonial spoils of Moscow.¹² Actually, the affairs of the Soviet Union *per se* are no more internal than those of a jailer incarcerating independent, innocent citizens. Khrushchev knows this all too well, and he fears it morbidly. In fact, as the UPI dispatch well observed, "At the end of his 40-minute speech, as if unable to get the subject off his mind, Khrushchev returned to the 'enslaved peoples' theme." Truly, the marks of a worried tyrant! Such mouthings as "It would be a good idea if Nixon, who has just landed, would come and have a look at the 'enslaved people' gathered at this stadium," are even politically childish. Indeed, his captive audience may well have been doubly captive.

The profound effectiveness of the Resolution and the Proclamation is further seen by the Russian puppet opposition to it. The puppet Czech regime, for example, lodged its protest against Captive Nations Week, dubbing it "a new American provocation and a hostile act."¹³ Other puppets reacted similarly. Needless to say, puppets could hardly react differently.

Further enlightening evidence of the deep penetration made by the Resolution and Proclamation was furnished in the Nixon-Khrushchev exchanges. The Bear just kept whining with pain, showing to the world his weakest organs. Before the television cameras, Khrushchev again cried, "I cannot go on without saying it—if you would not take such a decision (Mr. Eisenhower's proclamation of Captive Peoples Week) . . . your trip would be excellent." Then the professed atheist blurted, "why this was necessary God only knows. What happened?"¹⁴ The answer to his question is quite obvious. The American people are not as naive as he presumes them to be. The theatrics of controlled cultural exchanges, international cocktail parties, futile talkathons and other superficialities do not blind the American people to the real issues. Without this Captive Nations Week event and its impact, Moscow would have kept on deceiving itself on this score.

The additional exchange at Khrushchev's villa even makes for comical reading. The New Class host suggested that Nixon "take a boat ride on the Moskva River so you can see how our slaves live."¹⁵ To which Nixon "(chuckling)" said: "Yes, the captives." Later, when they were in the boat, "crowds gathered around and Mr. Khrushchev each time pointed to them and said 'captive people.'

¹² UPI, Press Dispatch, Moscow, July 23, 1959.

¹³ AP, Prague, July 24, 1959.

¹⁴ Reuters, Moscow, July 24, 1959.

¹⁵ AP, Ernest Barcella's notes, Moscow, July 26, 1959.

They replied, 'No, no, peace and friendship' . . . Mr. Khrushchev poked Mr. Nixon in the ribs in good humor and said: 'Here are your captives. You can see how happy they are.' " These and other occurrences clearly add up to a troubled mind. The Vice President doubtless was aware of the old Potemkin Village trick which Khrushchev played on him with these selected crowds.

So deeply had the Resolution—Proclamation pierced Moscow's most sensitive chord that lesser lights joined in the Bear's whining chorus. When Nixon met the minister of agriculture, Mr. Matskevitch, this old MVD functionary immediately launched into the Captive Nations Week subject. "The Soviet people," he exclaimed, "were surprised and alarmed that the Senate passed the captive people's resolution." ¹⁶ Of course, there is no real entity such as "the Soviet people" to be alarmed about anything. The alarm was sounded in the Kremlin alone. It is interesting to note, also, that reference to the Resolution is in terms of "captive peoples," although the Resolution precisely speaks of nations, emphatically including those in the Soviet Union. In the area of foreign consumption, this important distinction is one that Moscow consistently seeks to avoid. About this time, too, *Pravda* again assailed the United States for the Resolution, calling it "a coarse, dirty venture of American imperialists." Also significant is the fact that when Nixon prepared for his Siberian tour, Khrushchev made a flying trip to always restless Ukraine to deliver a self-assuring address.

U. S. REACTION TO THE REACTION

The reaction on the part of some of our officials to this Muscovite reaction appeared to be one of puzzlement. As one report had it, "United States officials are somewhat puzzled and slightly annoyed, but also amused, by Soviet irritation over President Eisenhower's proclamation of Captive Nations Week." ¹⁷ To this writer, it is not surprising that they were puzzled because very little study and imagination have been exercised by our Government with regard to the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. This, above all, was the new and most vital element in the Resolution which stunned Moscow.

At another news conference, the President gave his reaction in response to a question on timing. This reaction is most important for us to note. The President said: "I said frequently that the United States would never believe and never accept the idea that

¹⁶ *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., July 25, p. A-3.

¹⁷ AP, July 23, 1959.

a true peace had been established in the world until every single nation had the right to express its own views about its own destiny, and said the United States would always use whatever peaceful methods were available to it to bring about this opportunity."¹⁸ These are extremely powerful words that deserve every measure of careful implementation in deed, especially as concerns the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. This can be done with the most minimum of risks of a hot global war.

In the Senate, the most eloquent reaction to the reaction was expressed by Senator Keating of New York. "Mr. President," he stated, "the finest testimonial possible to the importance and effectiveness of Captive Nations Week is to be found in the yelps of anguish emanating from Premier Khrushchev and other Red leaders. We have hit the Communists where it hurts them and their blithering rejoinders about interference in their internal affairs merely points up what a tender spot the plight of the enslaved peoples is in their wall of iron."¹⁹ Much of the same was expressed by private American citizens. For example, Francis B. Stevens, formerly with the State Department, wrote in the following vein: "For Mr. Nixon, the trip has been even more revealing. He has seen two very sensitive Soviet nerves exposed, as evidenced by Khrushchev's massive abuse of the American interest in the fate of the captive peoples, within and outside the Soviet Union, and the livid rage of the Soviet press at the U.S. standard of living displayed at the American Exhibition."²⁰ The Vice President seemed to sense this when, in reply to Matskevitch's troubled observation, he uttered: "We will have differences from time to time. We disagree with your comments on this resolution."

There were a few newspapers, commentators and others who criticized the Resolution—Proclamation. Curiously enough, some used the very same spurious points which punctuated the Muscovite reaction. An editorial in *The Washington Post*, titled "Irritating the Bear," advanced arguments on poor timing, peaceful coexistence, the exclusive alternative of war, and embarrassment to the Vice President.²¹ A number of these arguments grace Moscow's propaganda portfolio. Popular reaction in Washington to this writer's reply to the editorial was extremely encouraging and comforting.²² Another of these few examples was the article by Henry N. Taylor in the

¹⁸ UPI, Transcript of News Conference, July 29, No. 20.

¹⁹ *Congressional Record*, July 23, 1959, p. 12885.

²⁰ *U.S. News & World Report*, August 10, 1959, p. 39.

²¹ *The Washington Post*, editorial, "Irritating the Bear," July 24, 1959.

²² *The Washington Post*, editorial page, July 29, 1959.

Scripps-Howard newspapers. He, like Khrushchev in a recent article, questioned the inclusion of Ukraine, Georgia and other non-Russian nations in the Resolution.²² Failing to understand the basic importance of this inclusion, not to speak of the purpose of the Resolution, the author reveals his own pitiful lack of knowledge concerning East European history when he makes the supposedly determining point that these areas were taken over by the Czars, "some as far back as 75 years before Nikolai Lenin." Compared with the popular American reaction to this whole development, these few critical sources stand out like sore thumbs.

THE PURPOSE AND MEANING OF THE RESOLUTION

The above documented review of events demonstrates sufficiently the undeniable impact and effectiveness of the Resolution. The timing of the Resolution couldn't have been better, though by happenstance the Week coincided with Nixon's visit. Had the observance been two weeks before, the Muscovite reaction would have been the same. Pavlov's dog wasn't trained in Russia without purpose. Moreover, the Resolution was in no way embarrassing to Nixon. On the contrary, it provided him with a God-sent opportunity which, for reasons of his own, he took only partial advantage of. Spurred by what he witnessed, he did decide to visit the only captive nation of his tour, namely Poland. While in the USSR, his tour never went beyond the territorial bounds of Russia. It is an open secret that Nixon was not allowed by Moscow to travel in the captive non-Russian countries within the Soviet Union. Had he travelled in Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and elsewhere, one wonders whether the reception wouldn't have surpassed his Polish experience. Moscow didn't take any chances. Should the President finally decide to visit the USSR this fall, it will be interesting to see if the same restriction will apply. Then, too, the President himself saw no embarrassment to Nixon. Really, in short, the parties that were embarrassed and showed it angrily were the Muscovite captors.

On the subject of embarrassments, that caused the Rumanian Legation here, which was concerned with the Rumanian exposition in New York, or to the Polish Embassy and its fake celebration of the 15th anniversary of the "Manifesto of Independence," our concern couldn't be less. When Czech Russian puppets in the diplomatic

²² Henry N. Taylor, "We Preach: Do Nothing—United States Gives Lip-service," July 27, 1959.

colony denounce the Resolution—Proclamation as “a gratuitous insult,” it is abundant enough to know from whom it comes.²⁴

Reflecting accurately and impeccably the history of Russian Communist imperialism these past forty-one years, the Resolution lists those nations as captive which have, directly or indirectly, fallen under the foreign domination of Moscow. Obviously, the basic criterion is the destruction of national independence. In this fundamental sense the Russian nation cannot be construed as captive. There is no doubt that in the sense of a search for surcease from domestic totalitarian tyranny there are many Russian captives. But with equal doubtlessness, they weren't the ones in Khrushchev's packed stadium or on the Moskva River. It goes without saying that we should always hold out to these individual captives the hope for democratic rights and liberties. But the best and most efficacious way to further this hope is by striving to cut the institutional nexus between Russian colonial imperialism and domestic Russian totalitarianism. The one feeds on the other. This nexus has existed for centuries and is the key to Russian imperial power, whether under the Whites or the Reds. About the domestic end of this nexus, one of our commentators couldn't have stated it more effectively when she wrote recently: “One of our problems in dealing with the Soviet Union is that we forget the Russian people's long conditioning to autocratic government and their legacy of ignorance. In 1901, Henry Adams, on his first trip to Russia, wrote of his amazement at the primitiveness and passiveness of the Russian masses. He called them a 'tenth century people.' By now they have leaped across centuries in technical progress, but they have lacked bridges to individual freedom or representative government.” Lest we forget, a genuine and non-sentimentalistic friendship with any people presupposes first a true, realistic awareness of their state of being.

With these necessary points in mind, let us see wherein the historical significance of both the Resolution and the Proclamation lies. For the first time, our Government has taken official cognizance of the tremendously important fact that the Soviet Union itself is an empire. By these documents we have shown for the first time that we are fully aware of the captive status of all the non-Russian nations in the USSR. Indeed, for the first time we have faced the fact that the majority of captive nations are in the Soviet Union and Asia. Historically, the nations in Central Europe, such as Poland, Hungary and others, would never have become captive to

²⁴ Fred Theroux, “That 'Captive Nations Week' Has Many Diplomats Puzzled,” *The Sunday Star, Washington, D.C.*, July 26, 1959, p. C-3.

Russia if other non-Russian nations, like Ukraine, Georgia, Turkestan and others, had not fallen under the imperialist and colonial domination of Soviet Russia. This is a stubborn truth we cannot escape. It is an elemental historical truth that these documents confirm. It is this confirmation that rocked Khrushchev.

Unfamiliar with East European and Central Asian history, many of our commentators interpreted the Resolution—Proclamation to mean only an observance for the captive nations in Central Europe. Had they bothered to read the documents, they would have understood that our freedom appeal was and is being made to *all* captive nations. The appeal of freedom does not arbitrarily stop at the borders of the Soviet Union. Those who think so are pursuing an illusion. What American with a sense of justice would deny the opportunity for national freedom and independence to the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Turkestan and others? When Khrushchev wails about interference in "internal Soviet affairs," his cries are as specious as when he bellows about our interference in the so-called Peoples Democracies in Central Europe. For him, when any country comes under Moscow's imperialist and colonial domination, it then becomes an "internal affair." The truth is that affairs concerning national freedom aspirations both within the Soviet Union or any other part of Moscow's far-flung empire are essentially international affairs.

It was not particularly enlightening for some of our Governors who recently visited the Soviet Union to speak of it as a nation. Even those in the Kremlin hesitate to speak in this vein internally. When basic, elementary truths escape us, how much value can be assigned to the conclusions and recommendations made by these touring Governors? It is patently evident that the legalistic facade of the Soviet Union befogged their understanding of the foremost issues within this substrate empire.

Khrushchev recognized the psychological blow that the Resolution and Proclamation represented. For too long he has boasted of the allegedly rapid strides made by Moscow in economic development, in military prowess, in scientific achievements, in cultural betterment and the like. He has compared these with those of our Nation. But one need only ask whether these inflated accomplishments would have been possible without the captive resources of Ukraine, Turkestan, Georgia and other rich non-Russian nations subjugated within the Soviet Union. If the United States were an empire extending itself northward and southward, it would parasitically avail itself of resources that would make our achievements

unsurpassable. Fortunately, we are not that kind of a nation. The plain fact is that without the rich resources of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, Russia itself would be a second or third rate power.

The well-founded perspective laid down in the Resolution and the Proclamation truthfully devalues the boasts and bluff of Khrushchev's comparisons with the real achievements of our Nation. This is what troubles Khrushchev most. On the basis of this historical perspective, the economic, scientific and other comparisons made between the substrate empire and our Nation are out of real context. Psychologically and politically, it is hardly comforting for Khrushchev and his propaganda apparatus to have the world know that Russia's strength, such as it is, is parasitically built on captive resources both within and outside the Soviet Union. Yet this is the moving truth which we have scarcely tapped. The Resolution and the Proclamation it called into being have in themselves begun to tap it.

The editorial in *The New York Times* was only partly correct when it stated that the "real purpose of this Captive Nations Week observation, therefore, is to keep the plight of the peoples freshly in our minds."²⁸ Emphasizing actually the less important aspects of the issue, it continued, "It may help them to know that we have not forgotten them. It ought to help us, in the moral sense, if we continue to remember." All this is true but the greater purpose was to accentuate again the strategic political and military value of all the captive nations, both within and outside the Soviet Union and, necessarily, taken as an aggregate. In the cold war, as well as in any hot war, they possess the highest priority on our scale of national interest because their enemy, the imperialism and colonialism of Moscow, is our enemy. Without them, Russia would be small, harmless, and clumsy. Made consistently insecure about its captive millions, Moscow would not push as vigorously its borderland policy in Iraq, Iran and elsewhere; and such organizations as the Central Treaty Organization, which has replaced the old Baghdad Pact, would not be under the same pressures.²⁹ Trouble shooters, like Vladimir Y. Semichastny, the defamer of Pasternak, would be sent to areas like Azerbaijan to try to deal with the Moslemic country's "bourgeois ideology."³⁰ It is Moscow's policy anyway to place Russians in the second secretaryship of the party in the captive non-

²⁸ *The New York Times*, editorial on "Captive Nations Week," July 20, 1959.

²⁹ AP, Ankara, Turkey, August 20, 1959.

³⁰ *The New York Times*, August 15, 1959.

Russian republica. For our national interest and the goal of world freedom, these and countless other results would manifest Moscow's basic insecurity which we could insure by preventing it from ever thinking that we would accede in any circumstances to the permanent captivity of the over twenty enslaved nations.

Senator Javits of New York furnished certain appropriate and striking comments on the Resolution. He said in the Senate, "Laid bare, communism is seen to be imperialism by force—but with better propaganda technicians."²⁰ Cutting through all the non-essentials, the Senator struck at the root of the issue by declaring, "We in the West have no fear of such a free expression. Khrushchev can answer this challenge only by allowing free elections under U.N. auspices for self-determination in the captive nations." Senator Scott of Pennsylvania also put his finger on the basic issue when he observed, "If Mr. Khrushchev says we meddled, then my answer to him is that, in my judgment, it is proper to ask questions of a jailor as to who is in the jail and why they are there."²¹

KHRUSHCHEV'S MANIFESTO IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS JOURNAL

The so-called article by Khrushchev in the advance October issue of *Foreign Affairs* is more of a Muscovite Cold War Manifesto than anything else. It abounds with worn-out, trite propaganda generalities which no more deal with the real issues of the struggle than does a Russian *lunik*. The supposed competition between capitalism and socialism, for example, is no more real than that between capitalism and mercantilism in our day. With unsurprising naivete the editors of this journal afforded the Moscow tyrant an advance medium for his propaganda in preparation for his visit to this country.

Mention is made here of this "article" because it has special pertinence to our subject. Khrushchev offers further excellent confirmation of our thesis on his troubled mind by hammering away again at the Captive Nations Resolution. It is evident that he was preparing to meet questions in this country that will deal with the non-Russian nations in the USSR. His method will be use of the *non sequitur* in the "article" and the exhibition of non-Russians whom he was assembling for his entourage. The latter technique will be like the one used by the ten USSR writers who visited Washington in August. It was reported then that Alexandre B. Chakovsky, editor-in-chief of the *Foreign Literature Magazine* complained about the

²⁰ *Congressional Record*, July 23, 1959, p. 12937.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12929.

Captive Nations Resolution and "pointedly indicated two or three fellow writers visiting from the Georgian and Lithuanian Soviet Republics as contented representatives of the 'captive nations.'"³⁰ Khrushchev will try this same old patent medicine man trick when he will undoubtedly point to the Don Cossack writer, Mikhail A. Sholokhov, as a "contented" Cossack. It wasn't without political purpose that he visited the writer in Cossackia—one of the nations mentioned in the Resolution—and invited him on his tour of America. Judging by the names on the official party list, there will be other puppets put on similar display to discredit the captive designation of these non-Russian nations. The deceptive exhibit would "prove" as much as President Eisenhower would if he were to display a Foster or Browder abroad as the personification of communism in America.

In the euphemistic article Khrushchev says, "The authors of the resolution call for the 'liberation' of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and even a certain 'Ural area.' " He continues: "this ill-starred resolution was regarded by the Soviet people as an act of provocation" with which, democratically, he concurs. Then the pay-off paragraph: "It would be interesting to see, incidentally, how the authors of this resolution would have reacted if the parliament of Mexico, for instance, had passed a resolution demanding that Texas, Arizona, and California be 'liberated from American slavery.' Apparently they have never pondered such a question, which is very regrettable. Sometimes comparisons help to understand the essence of a matter."³¹

Comparisons certainly do help to understand and a few here will demonstrate the emptiness of Khrushchev's troubled statements. First, taking the initial statement above, it is as accurate as Khrushchev's, or his writer's, understanding of American history. The Resolution does not speak of any Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan; it mentions Turkestan, the whole Moslemic nation which the Russians sought to divide and bury back in the twenties. Also, that certain 'Ural area' is Idel-Ural, also made up of Moslems who Moscow fears greatly in the event of any upheaval. The second statement is, of course, just spurious identification of the peoples in the Soviet Union with the tyrants.

It is the last statement which is the most illuminating. Some of our leaders in public life have used precisely the same specious

³⁰ *The Washington Post*, August 17, 1959.

³¹ *The New York Times*, September 3, 1959, p. 4.

argument which Khrushchev makes use of. Texas, Arizona, and California are supposed to be comparable to Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia or any other non-Russian nation in the USSR. Implied, too, is the false comparison between our Federal Union and the artificial Soviet Union. Moreover, the unwary reader is supposed to infer that there is no more slavery of these non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union than there is any slavery of these three states in America.

Now, it should first be pointed out that the only type of parliament in Mexico which would come out with such a resolution could only be one similar to the Moscow-puppets in Warsaw, Kiev, Peiping, or Budapest. Second, and here again Khrushchev's ghost writer slipped on U.S. history, Texas, Arizona, and California entered the American Union voluntarily; Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and the other captive non-Russian nations were conquered by Russian forces and forced into the Soviet Union. Third, our United States is a voluntarily formed federal union of states with citizens who consciously identify themselves as American nationals; the Soviet Union is in reality an empire of many nations under the domination of Russian Moscow, with Ukrainians identifying themselves spiritually and consciously as Ukrainians, Georgians as Georgians, Lithuanians as Lithuanians, etc. In terms of national identity, the term "Soviet" is sheer nonsense. Fourth, the native language spoken in Texas or Arizona is the same as in New York or Maryland; the native language in Armenia is Armenian and is not the same as in Russia, and so with Ukrainian, Georgian, Lithuanian etc. Fifth, the histories of Texas, Arizona, and California can hardly or seriously be considered as "national histories" independent of the growing history of the American nation; the genuinely national histories of Lithuania, Georgia, Ukraine, Turkestan are not only independent of the history of Russia but even precede it by centuries.

In scholarly fashion, one could go on and on with these substantive distinctions which only serve to devastate Khrushchev's call for a comparison. We are not aware of hundreds of thousands of American refugees and escapees in Mexico; but we are fully cognizant of millions of such refugees and escapees from the Soviet Union. Nor are we aware of any independence movement in Texas, Arizona, or California; the evidence of this movement in Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, and the other captive non-Russian nations is literally mountainous.

Mr. Khrushchev is presently posing as a self-confident competitor, unafraid of ideas and ready to accept any challenge. On this score, we can provide him with a challenge of his life. Let's

test this comparison between Texas, Arizona, and California and, let us say, Ukraine, Lithuania, and the Caucasian nations (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) to compare with the area of California. Under U.N. auspices and with strict guarantees safeguarding the outcome, let us put it to a vote whether the *natives*, i. e., the permanent residents in our three states want to join Mexico, remain in the United States, or be completely independent and Lithuanians in Lithuania, Ukrainian nationals in Ukraine, similarly Georgian-speaking Georgians in Georgia and so forth want to remain in the Soviet Union or have their own independent states. Once the outcome is decided upon, the U.N. is to have complete jurisdiction over the areas in order to permit the steady implementation of the popular decision.

This is just one of numerous interesting challenges which could be thrown at Khrushchev. It is the result of the Captive Nations Resolution. We can have him on the run. Imagination, initiative, courage, and abidance with the truth are the only necessary weapons. His *sputniks*, *luniks*, and *missilniks* are all relative *puniks* as compared with these weapons which are available to us for the asking.

NEW PLANS OF MOSCOW ATTEST TO FAILURE, NOT SUCCESS

By KONSTANTYN KONONENKO

I.

In the last few months there have arrived from the Soviet Union such a profusion of official documents—among them the new "Seven-Year Plan," the 1959 budget, decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in regard to agriculture, new laws embodying reforms in instruction, a new penal code, and the like—that they cannot be allowed to go without examination. All these documents, with the exception of those pertaining to the penal code, deal with economic matters, for even the reform of public instruction is dictated by considerations of the economic order.

What is the general reaction to these documents? In many observers, including Western specialists, they evoke a vision of a grandiosity of momentum. They are accepted and analyzed as a new proof of the great strengthening of the communist system. There is no need to mention the attempt of the Soviet government to lift the Soviet population to a state of elation through incessant claims of "victories and great perspectives."

Truly, among the published documents one may quote a great number of numerical indicators capable of creating such an impression if treated uncritically. But who is to treat them critically? Some have neither opportunity nor interest, while others, especially those in the Soviet Union who know the true facts and could undertake a critical analysis, have no way of publishing such in the Soviet press. Thus the attainment of political goals, as intended by the publication of the documents, is assured.

It is therefore imperative to analyze these documents, especially since they are marked for propaganda purposes. At the outset, it is to be noted that one of the major propaganda slogans of Moscow is the "improvement" of living standards. Apparently, the time has come when communism has to pay dividends on the rosy promises it has been giving the population for the past forty years. It has been the whole content of Marxism, as a socialist

doctrine, that socialist methods of production would assure a much higher standard of living for workers than those of the capitalist system.

In demonstrating the existence of these conditions the Communists must of necessity reveal their standard of living. It becomes a goal in itself, and the socialist order becomes the condition of its attainment. We must understand that this development assumes the character of a verdict over the doctrine of Marxism itself. The question is no longer that of a possible bankruptcy of the Russian experiment, but rather one of salvaging the "credo" of communism. The so-called "revisionism," which is becoming a major threat to Moscow, is nothing but an attempt to negate the idea of the final crash to which Moscow is leading communism now.

But the most eloquent testimony of the critical acuteness which the matter of living standards has assumed for communism is the utterance of Khrushchev some time ago in Ostrava, Czechoslovakia:

Comrades, would it be bad if to a good theory of Marxism-Leninism we attach a piece of meat and a good piece of lard, along with a little milk; then even the most thick-headed, lazy good-for-nothing could learn Marxist-Leninist theory.

His statement, simple and primitive as it is, revealed nonetheless the entire void of communism. After forty years of communism the preservation of faith in the communist ideal requires something more concrete, a "piece of lard." There is nothing surprising about the fact that the new "Seven-Year-Plan," as well as other documents under discussion here, should take into consideration the improvement and raising of standards of living.

In the introductory note to the "Theses" of Khrushchev on the new "Seven-Year Plan," it is stated:

We must take a new step . . . for further improvement of the welfare of the population. If the principal aim of present-day capitalism, the attainment of maximal exploitation of the working class, is the main stimulus and a lever of its development, which development enriches only a small part of the society, so the supreme objective of socialism, its powerful moving force, is a permanent satisfying of the ever-increasing requirements of the whole society, the ever-increasing material welfare of the working class (*Pravda Ukrayny*, November 14, 1958).

This statement is so often repeated that it has become a cliche, but we must not forget that in it lies the basic social value of the doctrine of communism, and as long as the reality will deny it and furnish diametrically opposed facts, so long will exist the danger of the communist ideal collapsing. That is why this question must

be one of the most important criteria in analyzing the above-mentioned documents. How far do the new plans advance the solution of these tasks and what was fulfilled of that planned previously? The official reports fail to provide concrete answers to these questions.

II.

One seeks in vain in the new "Seven-Year Plan," as in all other plans for that matter, any fundamental justification for those numerical values of the various indicators which are quoted in the plan. Everything, so to speak, is based on "wishful thinking" rather than on fact. But there is an essential difference between the Five-Year Plans of Stalin and those of Khrushchev: the former constituted implacable laws, while the present ones have lost this characteristic. For instance, the "Six-Year Plan" was twice revised and complemented by subsequent decisions, which in fact introduced a radical change, and it finally was shelved. The new economic plan should not be regarded as an irrevocable affair because it is based on many baseless provisional calculations. If we take into consideration the personal bonuses for the managers of economic institutions for the fulfillment and "surpassing" of assigned plans, then we can expect increased pressure on the part of the managers towards revision of the plans so that they may indeed fulfill them and collect the bonuses.

Among the principal objectives of the plan is the one "to gain time in the peaceful competitive contest with the most developed capitalist countries," which underscores the limit of this peaceful period and indicates the need of making up for lost time. But most essential is that no material basis is given on which the increase of production is expected. In previous plans all the principal indicators provided what was expected in the way of production increases and also in the augmentation of productive capacities. On the whole they usually ran 35-45 per cent as to increase of production and 55 to 65 per cent as to increase of productive capacities. Now it is put generally:

A mandatory condition of a successful fulfillment of the plan is a general increase in the productivity of labor. High tempi of increase in the productivity of labor . . . constitute the major factor in the increase of production" ("Theses," Chapter II).

Only from the address of Nikifor Kalchenko at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine do we find out that the present plan envisions a 63 per cent increase in production, which in turn

implies the increase of productivity of labor (*Pravda Ukrainskaya*, December 30, 1958, p. 3). It is readily seen that all the calculations of the plan are based on a quicksand of false premises.

But let us analyze the measurements themselves. In the "Theses" of Khrushchev given for 1965 the figures are based either on the previous five years (that is, dating from the time of Stalin's death) or on the last year of 1958. We cannot discard the fact that there existed a plan earmarked for 1955-1960. We must ascertain in what measure the ensuing years really mark an increase in comparison with 1956. Only in this way can we discover whether there exist the greater possibilities of increase in production of which Khrushchev spoke, or whether we are merely faced with the previous plan, which has been somewhat modified and presented as a new one in order to hide its total bankruptcy.

Because of lack of space we shall limit our study only to those indicators which we consider to be the most important. They are shown on page 230.

In every case where there are two indicators for 1965—the smaller and the bigger—the former is taken (*Pravda Ukrainskaya*, November 14, 1958, and *Narodnoye khoziaystvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 60-61).

Thus if the level planned for 1960 was attained, then the rate of increase of production in the succeeding five-year plan would be far lower than for the preceding period. In coal production there would be no increase at all, and in the machine-tool and shoe industries there would be a definite decrease. But in actuality this cannot be the case, because the Sixth "Five-Year Plan" about which Moscow clamored so loudly was a complete fiasco.

The factual level of 1958 is lower by far than was envisioned in the Sixth "Five-Year Plan," and all loud pronouncements about "attainment" and "overtaking" of the annual plans are totally valueless, inasmuch as they are based on much lower indicators than those based on the concrete reality.

The XXIst Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR was labelled a "congress of victories." In reality, it should have been termed a "congress of failures," and Khrushchev should have been severely castigated rather than praised for what he had done with the Soviet economy.

In fact, there is no difficulty in determining the extent of the fiasco of economic planning in the USSR, even on the basis of the documents provided by the Soviet government itself. It suffices to provide a cross-section of the increases of production per year, com-

INDICATORS:	Goals for 1960	Goals for 1965	% increase 1965/1960	% increase 1960/1955
CAST IRON (millions of tons)	53	65	59	22
STEEL (millions of tons)	68	86	51	26
ROLLED METAL (millions of tons)	53	65	52	22
COAL (millions of tons)	593	596	52	—
OIL (millions of tons)	135	230	90	70
MACHINE-TOOL CONSTRUCTION (millions of tons)	200	190	90	-5
IRON FORGINGS (millions of tons)	28	36	35	38
AUTOMOBILES (millions of tons)	650	750	46	15
COTTON TEXTILES (millions of meters)	7,270	7,700	23	6
WOOL TEXTILES (millions of meters)	363	500	45	38
FLAX TEXTILES (millions of meters)	556	635	85	14
SILK TEXTILES (millions of meters)	1,074	1,455	104	35
SHOES (millions of pairs)	455	355	52	-22
SUGAR (thousands of tons)	6,530	9,250	91	42
MEAT PRODUCTS (thousands of tons)	3,950	6,130	78	55
FISH (thousands of tons)	4,200	4,626	57	10
MILK PRODUCTS (millions of tons)	25	36	85	44
VEGETABLE OIL (thousands of tons)	1,840	1,975	65	7

paring what they actually should be in the years 1960-1965 with the values stipulated by the new plan.

For example, the rate of increase of cast iron production in the new "Five-Year Plan" should in actuality be 4.4 per cent, but it is planned to attain a rate of 9.3 per cent in the course of all seven years; steel, correspondingly, 5.2 and 8 per cent; rolled metal, 4.4 and 9.3 per cent; coal—no increase at all; oil 14 and 30 per cent; machine-tool construction, a decrease of 1 per cent and an increase of 7 per cent; automobiles, 3 and 7 per cent; cotton textiles 1.2 and 4.7 per cent; shoes, a decrease of 4.4 per cent and an in-

crease of 6.4 per cent; meat, 11 and 16.7 per cent; milk products, 8.8 and 11.4 per cent, and so forth.

Thus, as we see, the percentage of the yearly increase during the seven years is twice if not more than should actually be indicated. Thus the next five years must make up for what was not attained in the previous five years.

If we compare the rates of the new plan with those given for the previous one then we see that they are not only lower but in fact in many cases are higher. Then the question remains: If these rates proved to be unrealizable in the previous plan, how could they be attainable now?

III.

The principal reason for the failure of the plan is that the increase of production which was to be realized in conjunction with an increase in productivity of labor, was not attained. But in the new plan, as we have pointed out, even a greater percentage of increase is predicated on an increase in the productivity of labor, although there is no tangible basis for the belief that such would ever happen. The Communists themselves have come to understand, as indicated by discussions in their press, that mechanization of the production process by itself does not assure the necessary increase in the productivity of labor, and that this also requires a considerable improvement of living standards. But the latter condition depends not only on the quantity of consumer goods, but also on the purchasing power of the population, that is, the scale of wages. Thus the fate of the plan based on a great increase in the productivity of labor depends on distribution of the social product, whereas this distribution, that is, the limitation of this part which goes for consumption and the augmentation of that part which is marked for further capital reserves, constitutes the basic and unique financial basis of the plan. Even if the solution of the problem of the productivity of labor at the expense of an increase in labor wages would enable the realization of the plan, it would suffer from the consequent lack of new capital investment needed for further planned industrial expansion.

All this compels us to infer the inevitability of the failure of this plan, as was the fate of the previous one. We may expect that in the near future the "Seven-Year Plan," for the purpose of concealing its failure, will be replaced with a new "Fifteen-Year Plan," which possibility is being discussed even now.

But the outlined plan does not provide any basis for a solution of the productivity of the labor problem. On the contrary, it is conceded openly that nothing can essentially be done in this respect. Inasmuch as this factor, as indicated above, possesses a decisive significance, it merits closer analysis.

This problem is discussed in Chapter IV of the plan (*Pravda Ukrayny*, November 15, 1958). We can see from it that no essential changes in the matter of wages are contemplated. There is only a provision for a wage rise in two periods during seven years, for the lowest-salaried level, from 270-350 rubles to 500-600 rubles a month. As far as other categories are concerned, there is a general and undefined statement to the effect that "some rise of wages of the middle-earners and officials" will be effectuated.

Although the nominal level is gradually being increased, the real value of the wage continues to be extremely low. Even at the official rate of exchange of the American dollar, which is very low, this would give only \$50 to \$60 as a monthly wage for the average Soviet worker.

It is necessary, however, to discuss the real value of the ruble as compared with the dollar, inasmuch as we now need a more precise notion of the value of the ruble.

According to the National Industrial Conference Board (*Information Please Almanac 1959*, p. 575) it is estimated that a worker in the USSR has to consume 11 times as much time to produce the same product as does his counterpart in the United States. The minimum wage per hour in the USSR is 1 ruble and 37 kopeks (from a monthly salary of 275 rubles), while in the United States the minimum wage is \$0.75. If for 1 ruble and 37 kopeks one can buy only one-eleventh of what can be bought for 75 U.S. cents, then 1 ruble and 37 kopeks equals 6.8 U.S. cents, which in the final analysis means that the real value of the dollar, in terms of its purchasing power, equals 20 Soviet rubles. Then the minimal wage of workers, even if it is raised, only comes to \$25 per month.

A rise for the low-salaried workers will affect the general wage level of the whole population, inasmuch as there is no provision to raise the real value of the ruble by lowering prices, which remain unchanged, with the exception of prices in communal canteens (workers' restaurants). Therefore, nothing is planned which would increase the productivity of labor, on which in great measure depends the planned increase of production.

Naturally, some may argue that in a system of labor wages based on "piece work," increase of production itself will also en-

tail an increase of wages, and also an improvement in living standards, which in turn will favor a further increase in the productivity of labor. But this is not so. It is a known fact that with an increase in norms of production there is an inevitable decrease in prices. But now at every step it is underscored that the increase of wages must be lower than the increase in productivity.

In the light of the above we can now analyze the anticipated increase in the volume of consumption for seven years which, according to the plan, has a value of 63 per cent. This increase could only take place at the expense of increasing the labor force. But increase of the labor force is estimated at 11,500,000 people, which is derived from the total expected increase in the population. This would give a total of 21 per cent of the present labor force. But at whose expense will the remaining 42 per cent of the increase in the volume of consumption be covered? Economist Prof. Maurice Allais (*Revue des Travaux de l'Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, Paris, 1958) estimates the annual increase of the average wage at 2.5 to 3.2 per cent beginning with 1953. Inasmuch as there were no essential changes in the wage system nor are there any plans or provisions for such, there is no basis to expect any change in this annual rate of wage increase. For seven years it will yield 21 per cent of the increase in the volume of consumption, and not 42 per cent as necessitated by the plan.

In this connection the following question arises: the plan contains the provision that "The sale to the population of products of cattle-breeding in seven years will be increased by 2.2 times, vegetable oil 1.9 times, fruits 3 times and sugar 1.7 times." But from what sources will the population be able to increase its purchasing power in such proportions?

Let us illustrate this with an example. In 1955 the cost of these products constituted 35.6 per cent of the entire sum spent on food [*Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoyi RSR (National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR)*, Kiev, 1957, p. 399]. If we take the sum of all moneys spent on food to be 100 and assume that at the expense of the annual wage increase of 3 per cent it will be transformed in seven years to 121, then with the expected increase in purchases of the above-mentioned products as much as 62 per cent of the entire sum will be needed. At whose expense will the needs of this kind be covered for which two-thirds of the entire food budget is now being spent?

This is, of course, obviously nonsense which only further confirms the pretentiousness of the entire plan in this respect as well.

The failure of the previous plan and the fraudulence of the new one becomes even more apparent if we take into consideration agriculture, that is, that branch of the economy whose "successes" Khrushchev propagandizes at every step and which plays a key role in his new plan. In any event it is here that he wants to achieve the greatest renown and a strengthening of his political position.

IV.

We have not the slightest intention to depreciate the serious achievements in agriculture in many sectors. What we wish is to analyze the reality correctly and to establish the real value of the Soviet economic plans, which are given a great amount of weight and consideration in the West.

Let us begin with what we consider most important: wheat. In the previous plan the production of wheat in 1960 was envisioned at 180 million tons (11 billion poods). In the new "Seven-Year Plan" for 1965 the same figure is proposed, although there is a hint that this figure might be lower, 10 billion poods, for instance. Tremendous efforts are required for this figure to be attained. Thus the failure of the previous plan is undeniable and even admitted. Khrushchev quoted the production of wheat for 1958 at 8 billion poods and admitted that the figure of wheat production for 1952 was somewhat miscalculated. In fact, what the government succeeded in gathering was 5.6 billion poods, a figure which was predicted by the Ukrainian press on this side of the Iron Curtain.

In seven years the production of wheat is to increase by 25 to 38 per cent. Such a percentage was attained in the previous seven years, but only by means of the cultivation of 36 million hectares of new arable lands. Now this is to be accomplished through a more rationalized use of the present lands, mainly through enhancing the fertility of the land. Is this possible? Thus far there is no basis for believing it can be done.

In his report Nikifor Kalchenko, president of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, stated that in 1958, which saw a good harvest, one hectare yielded 100 poods of wheat (*Pravda Ukrayny*, December 30, 1958). If we take into consideration the fact that great areas of arable land were used for the cultivation of corn, which as a rule produce more grain, it would appear that the harvest from one hectare of other types of wheat had not exceeded that which Ukraine had produced before the revolution, that is, in 1909-1914. Thus for fifty years no progress in land fertility had been made at the time, while in all other countries of the

world tremendous progress has been made in this respect in the past forty years. Khrushchev himself was compelled to admit it, saying:

"As far as the production of wheat is concerned, the country remained for a long time on the level that had been attained by pre-revolutionary Russia" (*Pravda*, December 20, 1958). Where are the bases for the belief that the forthcoming seven years could yield an increase in production of wheat of 40 per cent? Even in Ukraine, which from the viewpoint of wheat production leads all other Soviet republics, the production of wheat must be raised by 20 per cent per hectare in order to attain in 1965 2.1 billion poods, which it had pledged to produce in 1960 (cf. Kalchenko's speech).

Thus the new plan not only attests to the great failure of the former plan in wheat production, but compels it to concede its "grandiosity." We may mention parenthetically that no wheat plan (or any other agricultural plan for that matter) was ever successfully fulfilled, and it is certain that Khrushchev, too, will be unable to fulfill this one.

But the matter is not limited to wheat production alone. The problem of cattle-breeding is organically connected with agriculture. Let us analyze the problem of meat production in the USSR, inasmuch as the problem of increasing meat production has received much studious attention from the Soviet government, and it is in this important area that the Soviet Union is to "surpass" the United States.

Inasmuch as figures for cattle-breeding in the USSR are for the most part given in percentages, only in special cases being given in concrete quantities, we are compelled to make our own calculations.

According to the new "Seven-Year Plan" the production of meat in 1965 should attain 16 million tons, which according to Khrushchev's "Theseas," would mean a doubling of the 1958 level. Thus in the past year of 1958 meat production was 8 million tons. In a decision of the Plenum of the Executive Committee (*Pravda*, December 20, 1958) it is stated that the level of the past year (1958) was exceeded by 8 per cent by the level of 1955. Hence it would seem that the meat production in 1953 was 5.9 million tons, and in 1955, 6.3 million tons.

According to the provisions of the previous "Five-Year Plan," meat production in 1960 should be twice that of 1955, or 12.6 million tons, and in 1958, with an average annual increase, it should have been 10.2 million tons. But in reality the 1958 level only came to 8 million tons of meat, or in three years the deficit in production of

meat was 2.2 million tons. With an annual increasing percentage it will be 10.2 million tons, and not 12.6 as stipulated by the plan. Instead of an increase of 6.3 million tons during the "Five-Year Plan," the increase will only be 3.9 million tons, which would amount to only 62 per cent of the plan.

But even if the plan admittedly could be fulfilled, it could never attain the level of meat production in the United States. To overtake America, it would be necessary, as Khrushchev admitted himself (*Pravda*, December 21, 1958) to attain not 16 million tons, but 21 million tons, and this on the assumption, furthermore, that the United States would remain on the 1955 level. Khrushchev's "plan," which, as he expressed at a meeting in Minsk, would mean that in 3-4 years the Soviet Union would overtake the United States, remained but a hollow echo.

But let us return to the reality which is being planned for 1965. In the "Theses" of Khrushchev meat production is to be raised to 16 million tons. For the attainment of this goal the following is required:

- (1) An annual increase of cattle of the order of 3.2 times more as compared with the previous seven years;
- (2) An increase of hay production of 2 times; straw 4 times and other cattle feedstuffs—5 times;
- (3) A provision of 90 million tons of concentrated cattle feed-stuff, that is, grain, for cattle.

This is quite sufficient to indicate that the goal cannot be attained in such a short time and with conditions in the USSR as they are. Let us take, for instance, the problem of grain. We have already pointed out that the quota of grain production for 1960, and in somewhat decreased measure to boot, is being transferred to 1965. The present harvest yield of 8 billion poods, or 133 million tons, after a deduction of 15 per cent required for sowing, gives a bare 113 million tons of net yield, not taking into consideration the enormous waste which according to Khrushchev himself, amounts sometimes to 20-25 per cent of the entire yield. But even if we overlook waste, a deduction of 90 million tons for cattle feed would leave only 23 million tons for the population's needs, which would give exactly 6 poods of wheat a year per person, or a little more than half a "starvation" norm.

As we can readily see, material pre-conditions for successful fulfillment of the plan do not exist; one cannot hope that such would be available in the foreseeable future. Similar outlines in the previous plans also met with failure.

Of great significance will be the factor which we discussed before, on which depends the increase of production, namely, the productivity of labor. According to the plan for agriculture the productivity of labor will have to double, although everyone realizes that such cannot come to pass. In his report covering a three-year period, the head of the Ukrainian Soviet government complained that instead of a 55 per cent increase in productivity of labor, as called for in the plan, only 18 per cent, or a third, was realized.

And what of the basic problem, on which the increase of production very largely depends, the improvement of living standards?

While one readily concedes that the wages of collective farmers in the last few years have improved, what do these wages mean in reality?

The official statement of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party (*Pravda*, December 20, 1958) held that the wages for work in kind and in money reached a total of 83.8 billion rubles. For 45,000,000 wage-earning farmers this amounted to 1,800 rubles a year per farmer. Inasmuch as the products which are paid in kind as part of a wage are priced at the reduced cost of the state trading tariff, we must again restate the value of the ruble in relation to the dollar in order to obtain the equivalent value of the wage. If we take as a basis that one ruble equals 5 U.S. cents, then the yearly wage of a Soviet farmer is \$90, or \$7.50 a month, or about 4 cents an hour, if we take into consideration an 8-hour working day on the basis of a six day week.

If we recall that the average wage of a farm hand working on a great landowner's estate before the revolution was 183 rubles or 92 dollars [Prof. M. Ostapenko: "*Kapitalism v Ukraini*" ("Capitalism in Ukraine"), *Chervony Shliakh*, 1924, p. 118], we see that according to the purchasing power of the dollar this wage was much higher than at present. Thus after forty years of the Soviet power a farmer today is making less than a hired boy could earn before the revolution.

Thus the documents of the new Soviet economic plan indicate that in agriculture the previous plan met with failure and the new one has no real prospects of realization.

V.

To conclude the analysis of these documents, we shall briefly consider the financial aspect of the plan. It is the more urgent in view of the fact that in the previous plan it was the financial side which consequently precipitated several modifications.

As was true of the previous economic plans, the new "Seven-Year Plan" does not give any financial sources. Only the sums of capital investment in the various branches of the national economy are given. The financial scheme as such, is missing. In fact, we are given only a summation of the costs necessary for the realization of the plan. These costs are estimated at 1,970 billion rubles, of which sum 1,513 billion rubles are marked for construction in the productive category, 380 billion for apartment houses and 77 billion for schools and health institutions.

We are not able to appraise the validity of such a vast reserve sum. But we cannot bypass the fact that the general total of the capital investment is twice that which financed the previous "Five-Year Plan." Even after adjustments are made for the differences in the terms of the plans, the capital investment in the 1960-1965 plan is 40 per cent greater than that for 1955-1960. At the same time the increase of production in the coming five years will be 2-3 times lower than in the previous five years. This convincingly demonstrates that in the financial field the new plan is endeavoring to make up for the failure of the previous one, yet without any assurance that it will not meet the same fate.

The budgets, on the other hand, provide far broader analyses for the financial situation. Therefore, it would be instructive to consider the budget for 1959, as the first year of the new economic plan.

The 1959 budget encompasses a total of 723 billion rubles. Going back to 1951 as a base, we obtain:

Years	Sum of Budget	% of Increase
1951	480	—
1952	509	10.0
1953	530	4.2
1954	563	6.1
1955	584	—
1956	598	6.0
1957	617	3.3
1958	642	4.0
1959	723	12.4

[The figures are taken from the brochure, *Budget SSSR (Budget of the USSR)*.]

Thus in the seven past years the budget of the USSR has increased by 39 per cent, or an annual average of 5.6 per cent. Why it can suddenly increase in rate by 2.5 times is not explained. Hence, the indicator becomes shrouded in doubt.

To meet this sum 655 billion rubles are scheduled to come from state economy and 68 from direct taxation of the population. The

first figure includes 332 billion rubles which come from sales taxes, that is, indirect taxation of the population, 155 billion from the revenues of state enterprises, and the remainder from social security payments, revenues from forests, and the like.

The revenues from sales taxes increased by 11 per cent over the past year, together with an increase in sales volume of 9 per cent, that is, that part of the taxes imposed on sales not only did not diminish, but even increased. And this part is exceedingly great, inasmuch as it amounts to 332 billion rubles as against the general sales volume of 720 billions. This means that of every ruble in the price of merchandise 46 kopeks goes for taxes while only 54 kopeks covers the value of product and commercial gain.

Not least important is the fact that the state economic enterprises contribute 155 billion to the budget, while the allocation for their upkeep is 309 billion, or twice as much. Even more eloquent is the picture of industry. It is officially stated that the profit garnered by industry in 1958 was 15 billion rubles, which constituted 13 per cent of the entire profit of the state. The profit amounted, thus, to 117 billion. The budget takes 75 per cent, or about 90 billion rubles. The capital investment in industry amounts to 224 billion, or 134 billion more. In other words, we are confronted here not with the development of industry itself, not what K. Marx called "enlarged renovation of capital," but the reconstruction of industry at the expense of tax exploitation of the population. To talk about the superiority of the communist type of industry in comparison with the capitalist and to rely on greater rates of increase in industrial production is sheer nonsense. It is absurd and cheap manipulation with economic terms. This increase is being created not in the productive cycle of industry. To compare under this view the two types of industry is impossible, because they are different phenomena of economic nature. The rates of increase in the USSR characterize not the communist type of industry, but the communist system of taxation, which equals a pure robbery of the population.

Thus the real language of the published documents clearly and irrevocably proves that the Sixth "Five-Year Plan" of Khrushchev utterly failed, and that the new plan has no prospect of success, as it is not being based on economic reality. It further indicates that the entire system of communism is plagued by an organic disease which cannot be cured, because all these drawbacks and diseases form the very nature of communism.

The question arises: Why do these documents, which attest to the failure of the economic system, become in the hands of Moscow the instrument of its propagandistic self-praise to demonstrate an

alleged superior system of economy which will win over that of the free economy? What enables Moscow to fabricate before the world and present every failure as a victory?

This is made possible not only by a popular aversion to subjecting these phenomena to serious analytical criticism, phenomena which are being propagated with specific Soviet slant and interpretation, but also by application of false criteria. Mankind is threatened by the possibility of the clash of two diverse systems, and in the face of this threat these phenomena are cringingly accepted. A special psychosis is being created. All sorts of *sputniks* and space gadgets, that is, indicators of their military aspect, obscure the overall true reality of the Soviet situation. Therefore, true understanding and knowledge of the reality was never more imperative than it is now.

THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF MAZEPA AND CHARLES XII FOR UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

By BOHDAN KENTRSCHYNSKYJ

Any examination of the terms of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance of 1708 encounters great difficulties as far as sources are concerned. The last word of authority in this matter must belong to the late Prof. Borys Krupnytsky, who made a thorough analysis of the principal documents which cast light on the problem of the alliance of Charles XII with *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa and the Zaporozhian Cossacks. A summary of Prof. Krupnytsky's research appeared in a previous issue of this publication (cf. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1956, p. 47).

In addition to the documents ordinarily used by researchers for a reconstruction and an analysis of the alliance itself, there exists another group of source materials which makes possible the reconstruction of the political background of Ukraine against which this alliance was realized. It comprises the remnants of documents which bear on the political activity in Ukraine after the arrival of the Swedish troops and after Mazepa went over to the side of Charles XII. The *Hetman* and the King developed vast propaganda activities which evoked a strong reaction on the part of Czar Peter I and his protege, *Hetman* Ivan Skoropadsky. These activities left abundant traces in the source material, both Swedish and Ukrainian, as well as of Russian origin. We have in mind the *universals* of Charles XII, the *universals*, open letters and activities of the agents of Mazepa; the *universals* of Skoropadsky; the manifestoes of Peter, and finally the correspondence of the latter and his high dignitaries.

The matter of the *universals* and manifestoes has been discussed more or less superficially in the Ukrainian and Swedish historical literature. Some researchers have remarked that the events in Ukraine between the arrival of Swedish troops and the battle of Poltava had a propaganda rather than a war character. The basis for such a just viewpoint is provided by traces of this propaganda in the contemporary press, the diaries of Charles' soldiers,

and in other reports. Many documents of this category were published *in toto* in the past century in various Russian and Ukrainian source publications. Yet they do not provide a full picture. They can be completed, for instance, by the manifestoes of Peter, which constituted direct answers to the "shameful *universals* in the Little Russian language" of King Charles, as the irate Muscovite Czar called them. Altogether these materials give the gist of the reasons for which the Russo-Swedish conflict was waged in Ukraine in the fall of 1708 and the spring of 1709.

Propaganda materials present great difficulties to the historians, since factual and exact information are not to be expected. Their principal value lies in that they touch upon a number of problems and yield indirect testimony as to the existence of such problems at a given time. The data launched by the propaganda are totally worthless if they cannot be supported by other facts and documents acceptable to researchers. The *universals* and manifestoes of 1708-1709 do not solve the problem of the origin and content of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance, but they do cast light on what the Ukrainians hoped to gain from it, on the official interpretation of King Charles XII, and also on Russian fears of the political consequences of this alliance, which were documented by the emotional efforts of the Czar to put the Ukrainian and Swedish interpretation and comments in doubt.

Because of the impossibility of securing the primary sources for an examination of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance and problems allied with it, a more careful examination of the indicated material would not, however, be without special significance. A systematic analysis of the basic elements of the propaganda from the period of the "manifestoes war" will enlarge the horizon of our limited suppositions about both the Swedish-Ukrainian and the Russian viewpoints with respect to the actualization of Ukrainian independence in connection with transforming Ukraine into the principal *place d'arms* of the Russian-Swedish great power contest. This essay is written for the purpose of illuminating these problems.

* * *

Although since the outbreak of the Great Northern War in 1700 eight years had elapsed before the events of war actually touched the Ukrainian lands which made up part of the *Hetmanstate* (*Hetmanshchyna*), yet from the very beginning of this war and its course a strong impact upon the formation of the internal political situation in Ukraine was evident. The defeats suffered by the

Czar on the fronts and the drawing-out of war operations for a number of years understandably evoked an internal ferment even in Muscovy proper, to say nothing of the autonomous or semi-autonomous countries, where ferment, open rebellions and national uprisings were always present.

When the Great Northern War began and when through all of Europe the news of the defeat of Peter at Narva spread with lightning speed, in Ukraine the repercussions of the uprising of Petryk were still very fresh.

An employee of Mazepa's chancery, Petro Ivanenko, nicknamed Petryk, had escaped to the Zaporozhian Sich, and from there had gone to the Crimean Khan, with whose help he proclaimed himself a *hetman*. It was another attempt to renew a Tatar-Turkish orientation, not infrequently employed in the policies of Ukrainian leaders aspiring to independence, especially in the second half of the XVIIth century during the reign of *Hetman* Petro Doroshenko.

In the *universals* of Petryk and in polemic proclamations and letters directed against him may be found a key to the national and social moods of the Ukrainian people at the end of the seventeenth century. Petryk was a clever demagogue, and in his propaganda he played on the emotions of the people, which he knew could easily be inflamed. His principal slogan in his *universals* was that of throwing off the Muscovite yoke. Although Petryk was an instrument of the Crimean Khan, nonetheless he had the traits of an honest patriot, and more than one of his political arguments was later incorporated into the *universals* of Mazepa.

In illuminating the hopeless situation of Ukraine under the rule of Moscow, Petryk wrote to the Zaporozhian Kozaks:

No wonder that the Polish King acts the way he does. We were once his subjects, but with God's help we liberated ourselves from his domination under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and inflicted upon him such evil that he cannot get rid of it to this day. No wonder that the Crimean Khan is against us: we always, ever since the olden times, have acted against the Crimean state, and are doing so now. But the acts of the Russian Czars are something else: they did not conquer us with sabers; our predecessors surrendered to them because of the Christian faith. In thrusting our people from the right bank of the Dnipro (Dnieper) to the left, the Muscovites exposed our people to all enemies, so that no matter from which side the enemy comes he can first burn our cities and villages and then take our inhabitants as prisoners, while Moscow rests secure behind our backs as if behind a wall. But even with this Moscow is not satisfied, but tries to turn us all into its slaves and servants. At first they put into slavery our *Hetmans* Mnohohrishny and Popovych (Ivan Samoylovych), who stood for us, and later on they wanted to subject us to eternal slavery . . . I also notified you that the Polish King, being dissatisfied with the Muscovite Czar because he did not fight against

the Crimea, himself wanted to make peace with the Horde and to declare war against Muscovy, in order to bring Ukraine back under his slavery. What fate would then await our Ukraine? Would not our brothers be put to death on the pole or drowned in water? Did they not force Kozak women to pour boiling water on their children, did they not pour cold water on our people during a bitter frost, did they not throw burning coal into the boots of our people? Did the Polish soldiers not rob our people of all their possessions? All this you remember well, and the Poles have not forgotten . . . Would they not do the same thing? . . . We have begun our work not to fight against our people, but to liberate ourselves from the robbery of Muscovites and of our own lords. You yourselves being of good head, judge and understand whether it is better to be in slavery or in freedom, whether a serf to a foreigner or your own master—under the Muscovite or the Pole—a peasant condemned to serfdom or a free Kozak!

The uprising of Petryk and his political agitation on a large scale, wielding an anti-Muscovite sword and playing on the patriotic aspirations of the Ukrainian masses, could not fail to evoke a reaction to the news that the bases of the powerful Muscovite state had begun to shake under the blows of a young and mysterious, almost legendary, "Lion of the North." The news was brought from the Baltic where the Czar was sending thousands of Kozaks to die in battles with the Swedes; the news also came from Poland and from Galicia and Volhynia, under the domination of Poland. The broad masses, who usually identified the policy of the *Hetman* with that of the Czar, the masses who formed a unified front against the Kozak officers, among whom they counted the *Hetman* as the most outstanding representative—they reacted to the news from the front by local, spontaneous outbursts, by rebellions and uprisings, by obstruction and opposition of every kind. As a rule the Ukrainian masses were supported by the Zaporozhian Kozaks.

But there were also other forms of reaction to the Swedish-Russian war among the Ukrainians. A new political trend, the "Swedish orientation," began to take root among the higher echelons of the Kozak nobility and officers. Among them the memory of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance concluded by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and King Charles X Gustav was still very fresh. Significantly, too, the desertions of Ukrainian Kozaks to the Swedish side in the Baltic, not only in the front lines but also from the regiments which were sent home, assumed such great proportions that Peter issued a special manifesto on January 9, 1702 (old style calendar). In it the Czar said that the ordinary Kozaks who had long fought against the Swedes in Livonia and who had been ordered to return home, "had deserted their regiments and their native country,

had not returned to their homes, but had gone over to the enemy, no one knows why . . . " A pardon was promised to those who would return voluntarily, but the death penalty and a "curse" was assured for those who disobeyed the Czar.

The strong internal political tension in Ukraine, characterized above all by anti-Muscovite sentiments and rebellions, provided a fertile propaganda ground and attracted the interest of all factors which directly or indirectly took part in or were otherwise interested in the outcome of the gigantic contest between Charles XII and Peter I.

In addition to the Russian interests in Ukraine, there were also the Swedish, Polish, Tatar, Turkish and Don Cossack interests as well. Moreover, with the war operations approaching the frontiers of Ukraine there was a revival and reactivation of the various Ukrainian political orientations and conceptions, which of necessity were anti-Muscovite and pro-Russian, anti-Polish and pro-Polish, anti-Turko-Tatar and pro-Turko-Tatar.

Among these trends were those launched by certain social classes for the purpose of strengthening their positions, as for instance, the Kozak officers, or concomitantly a trend against their privileges, and so forth. The clergy had their own problems while various groups conducted secret wars against one another. The Zaporozhian *Sich* had its own policies, but there, too, there were various trends and orientations. And inasmuch as the influence of the Zaporozhian Kozaks upon the popular masses was extremely great, so at the *Sich*, parallel with the *Hetmanstate*, there competed various foreign movements and orientations as well.

All these segments resorted to intensive propaganda as a means to combat enemies and adversaries, their interests being at cross purposes. Their propaganda slogans were full of nuances which reflected the intricacies of the problems with which public opinion in Ukraine was preoccupied at that time. They allow one to feel the pulse of the era and to extract the postulates of the broad masses, political groups and personalities.

Propaganda feverishness attained its acme in the last months of 1708 and the first months of 1709, when the Swedish troops crossed the Ukrainian border, when the alliance between Mazepa and Charles XII was concluded and when the Zaporozhian Kozak host finally went over to the side of the *Hetman* and the Swedes.

Propaganda activities were effectuated by all possible methods known at that time: *universals*, manifestoes, and letters, which were sent to regiments and companies of troops and to cities and villages, and which were read in churches or posted on church

buildings. In his manifesto of May 26, 1709, Czar Peter ordered *Hetman Skoropadsky* to give it to "all our Zaporozhian troops and throughout the whole of Little Russia in cities, towns and villages to be read and also in the church, and to make it known to all . . ." The same device was employed by Mazepa and Charles XII.

The church was widely exploited for propaganda purposes. Priests through their sermons spread the propaganda, while wandering monks were engaged as agents for spreading news and reports, engaged in whispering campaigns, instigated revolts among the population, or simply acted as spies. Beggars, wandering musicians (*lirnyks*), merchants, Chumaks (venders of salt—ED.), genuine and false (as well as genuine and impostor priests), served as propaganda media, constituting a vast network of propaganda activity in Ukraine. Letters and leaflets aimed at influential people in order to sway them to the one side, fraudulent and provocative letters designed to sow mistrust in the enemy camp, spreading of false reports and denunciations—all served as the propaganda means widely employed by both the warring camps in Ukraine.

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Both camps ascribed great value and weight to the propaganda weapon. Czar Peter was not only a master of its use, but he appreciated its importance. This continually allowed Mazepa, in his correspondence with Czar Peter and his ministers, to find good pretexts not to follow the Czar's order to join him with the Ukrainian troops.

"I am submitting to the wise judgment of your Imperial Highness," Mazepa wrote to Peter, "that if I, as the *Hetman* of Ukraine, leave the country, I am very much afraid . . . the enemy might resort to secretly sending alluring letters to the cities . . ." He had no deputy to whom he could entrust Ukraine, who would watch all activities of the enemy, look upon his tempting letters and warn against them, and he called upon the Czar to issue to all Ukrainian cities Czarist *universals*, ordering the Kozak officers to watch sharply for all enemy activities and not to accept or listen to his alluring letters and *universals*. The Czar was more than sensitive to such an appeal. He was constantly perturbed by the menace of the enemy's propaganda. As soon as he found out that Charles XII was directing his march toward Ukraine, he sent a letter to Mazepa in which he "proposed" to him to watch for any activities of the enemy in Ukraine and especially to be on the alert for and to intercept enticing letters.

Likewise, the closest advisers of the Czar, among them Menshikov, Golovkin and Sheremetev, always referred to the propaganda of the enemy in their correspondence with Mazepa. Golovkin admonished Mazepa to see to it that the Swedish King creates no factions in Ukraine. "Your Highness must especially take care that no agents from the enemy operate among the Little Russian people."

On October 29 (1708), five days after Mazepa went over to the Swedes, Sheremetev, commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, not suspecting Mazepa, appealed to him in a letter to send throughout Ukraine his *universals* opposing the "alluring" Swedish *universals*, which already had been circulated among the population. The first reaction of Menshikov, when he was finally convinced that Mazepa had gone over to Charles XII, was an appeal to the Czar to unleash the propaganda machinery. Czar Peter followed the advice of his aide and developed an intensive propaganda which, for the time being, put all war operations on a secondary level.

King Charles XII also realized the great value of propaganda, although he considered the saber to be the principal argument. Swedish General Lagercrona, upon making the first contact with the Regiment of Starodub, sent out "alluring letters," in which he appealed to the population not to fear the Swedes, to remain peacefully in their homes and to sell bread and other foodstuffs to the Swedish army. The King prepared several manifestoes to the Ukrainian people even before his arrival in the *Hetmanstate*; their contents are known from a reply of Czar Peter of November 6, 1708. Other manifestoes were issued later by Charles XII. They were characterized by a deep analysis of the Ukrainian problem and liberal use of such arguments which would evoke the deepest reaction in Ukraine. These manifestoes were prepared in the Latin language by Olof Hermelin, Charles' Secretary of State, which subsequently were translated into the Ukrainian language. It appears that Hermelin was a great expert on Eastern Europe and had been a professor at the University of Dorpat before the war. He especially knew the Polish problem well which almost exclusively was in his hands at the field headquarters of Charles XII and toward which he became more and more skeptical with the passage of time.

Hetman Mazepa had to put his hopes on the weapon of propaganda, although in this respect he was in a rather inferior position; to the very last moment of his alliance with Czar Peter he had to conceal his plans and, moreover, to take part in the anti-Swedish propaganda activities. He would issue anti-Swedish manifestoes under the pressure of the Czar, and some on his own ini-

tiative as well, so as to dull the alertness of Peter. His anti-Russian *universals*, which he began issuing after his alliance with Charles XII, were in direct contradiction of his anti-Swedish manifestoes, which naturally detracted from their impact. As an experienced politician, Mazepa must have known this fact, but he might have counted on the anti-Russian attitude of the masses and probably believed that he could excite and inflame them toward a general anti-Russian uprising. There was also a possibility that the Swedes would not enter into Ukraine. If they advanced directly to Muscovy, the Czar would be forced to withdraw his troops from Ukraine. With such a turn of events there would be no basis for apprehension with regard to Mazepa's previous anti-Swedish manifestoes.

But the King suddenly turned southward toward Ukraine; Mazepa was forced to make the best of the situation.

♦♦

In the propaganda war Czar Peter succeeded in taking the initiative and developed activities which in intensity, originality and elasticity were without equal. In these activities he heeded the advice of his able and cherished counselor and aide, Alexei Menshikov. It was Menshikov who on October 26, 1708, at the moment he was sure that Mazepa had crossed the Dneana River, immediately understood the political implications of this step and reported to the Czar: ". . . If he did this, it was not for the sake of his person alone, but for the whole of Ukraine."

This paragraph from a letter of the Czar's closest collaborator and counselor has a special significance. According to the Russian propaganda and to those Western European historiographers who have been influenced by that propaganda, the picture of *Hetman* Mazepa has been that of a romantic adventurer, who, by concluding an alliance with the Swedish King from purely personal motives, betrayed not only his sovereign but his own people as well. The letter of Menshikov of October 26, 1708, clearly demonstrates that the rage against the "treason" was not conditioned solely by the subjective mentality of a sovereign moved by righteousness, but from the very beginning also inspired by the fear that the *Hetman's* step would provoke a nation-wide uprising in Ukraine.

Small wonder that this facet of the problem was seized upon by the foreign diplomats stationed in Moscow, who commented on the developments in Ukraine. For instance, Marquis de Torcy, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, received in mid-December, 1708, from one of his agents in Eastern Europe the following statement:

"On voit que ce qui a oblige les Moscovites a approcher est moins la crainte des Suedois que l'inquietude que leur donnent les mouvements de l'Ukraine et des Cosaques."

The Prussian Ambassador, Georg Johan Freiherr von Keyserling, saw the attempt of Peter I in Ukraine immediately after the arrival of the Swedes as one to "destroy this fire in its inception" ("*dis Feuer in der ersten Entzündung zu daempfen*").

In the above quoted words of Menshikov lay the basic indicators of the Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which is being followed to this very day by Russian historiography. To aver the contrary and make Mazepa a "traitor" to his own country and people has become the main task of Russian historians who treat the problems of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance of 1708-1709.

In the same letter Menshikov insisted that by mass propaganda appeals the Czar should confuse and throw into disorder the masses of the Ukrainian people: "I advise you that at this evil event it is necessary to keep the common people on our side by all kinds of promises through the publication of *universals*, expressing all the *Hetman's* mischief against this people, so that they should not be persuaded by any of his enticements."

Immediately after receipt of Menshikov's letter, that is, on October 27, 1708, the Czar set his propaganda apparatus in motion. He issued on that day the first manifesto to the Ukrainian people. It was carefully worded to the effect that *Hetman* Mazepa had somehow disappeared, probably through the activities of "enemy factions," and called on the officers to direct their troops to the Czar's headquarters. Simultaneously Czarist couriers were dispatched to every Ukrainian regiment with copies of the manifesto, signed personally by the Czar, and marked "urgent, urgent," with an order to have it read at once to all companies. On the second day the Czar issued another manifesto, replete with cliches which were to remain in the Russian propaganda machinery: that Mazepa was a "traitor," that he sold out Ukraine to Polish King Stanislaw Leszczynski, that he planned the restoration of the church union (with Rome), and the like. Peter announced the "election" of a new *hetman* by "free vote" and called the officers for a conference in the city of Hlukhiv. Not trusting manifestoes alone, the Czar wrote personal letters to Kozak colonels, church dignitaries, his own generals and the *Otaman* (*koshovy*) of the Zaporozhian Sich, in which he used the same arguments against Mazepa.

Peter considered that the "election" of a new *hetman* was an important factor; therefore, he ordered a series of spectacles through which he thought he would separate the masses from Ma-

zepa. On November 5, on the eve of the "election," a theatrical dethronement of Mazepa was staged in the city of Hlukhiv: all medals and orders were ripped off Mazepa's effigy, after which the effigy was hanged.

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In the meantime the *universals* of Mazepa and King Charles were spread widely throughout Ukraine, to which the Czar reacted quickly. On November 6 and on November 10, 1708, he issued two manifestoes in which he cleverly played on the prevailing moods and situations. On November 6, the "election" of *Hetman* Skoropadsky took place, and the whole procedure of the election, the oath and the speeches were grist for the propaganda mill. At the same time Menshikov captured and razed Baturyn, capital of Mazepa. The brutal punishment inflicted upon all the inhabitants—the wholesale murder of some 6,000 people regardless of age and sex—was extensively used by the Russian propaganda machinery to terrorize other Ukrainian cities. Carriers of the macabre news were not only refugees from Baturyn and its vicinity, not only special Muscovite agents whose purpose was to spread the news about the victory of Menshikov to all corners of Ukraine, but also Ukrainian Kozaks who upon capture were nailed to planks and dropped into the Desna River, so that the people of Ukraine might see how the Czar punished those who supported *Hetman* Mazepa. Brutal reprisals, torture and merciless destruction of cities and villages, at which both the Czar and King Charles XII were unequaled masters, were employed in order to create fear in the population rather than to achieve any military aims.

But at the same time Czar Peter also used other methods. He was generous in granting high privileges and great estates to those Kozaks who deserted the ranks of Mazepa. The same device was also used by Mazepa.

On November 10, 1708, the Czar ordered the public execution and torture of Mazepa's partisans captured in Baturyn. Men were impaled or roped to huge wheels and tortured to death. The Czar personally directed these executions. Moreover, he ordered all Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchs to come to Hlukhiv and take part in the "election" of Skoropadsky; it was there that he ordered the anathema of Mazepa (the official act of anathema was announced on November 12, 1708, in Hlukhiv and Moscow).

Unsure whether harsh methods would yield better results than soft ones, the Czar tortured the Ukrainians with one hand, while

he patted them on the back with the other. So for many months before the Battle of Poltava he attempted to lure the Zaporozhian Kozaks by promises in his manifestoes or by bribing them with money. Swallowing his pride, he endured the chicanery practiced by the Zaporozhians with regard to his envoys. Only after the *Koshovy* of the Zaporozhian *Sich*, Hordienko, had finally decided to cast his lot with Mazepa, did Peter decide to destroy the Zaporozhian *Sich*. He ordered public torture of those who would not denounce Mazepa, and publicly rewarded those who did. He razed to the ground entire cities and villages which resisted his troops, a fate which befell Kolyberda, Perevolochna, Pochery, Pohary and others. But he also ordered the death penalty for his Russian soldiers if they pillaged Ukrainian villages at the "wrong time." He promised a half of Mazepa's treasure to those who would reveal where it was hidden. Through his ministers Peter devoted special attention to the Ukrainian students in Kiev, especially those who had come from Polish domination and from Lithuania. In the Czar's eyes students were as dangerous and unreliable as monks, about whom Golitzin wrote to Golovkin at the beginning of 1709 that "it is difficult to ascertain the loyalty of monks, inasmuch as the monks are avoiding us. In all Kiev I found only one man, namely, the Prefect of the Brotherhood Monastery, who was friendly to us."

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On the other hand, the Swedish-Ukrainian side was not asleep. King Charles XII issued several *universals*, while Mazepa was extremely active, issuing *universals* and letters and sending out hundreds of his expert agents throughout the country. On October 30, 1708, he wrote to Skoropadsky, then a Colonel of the Starodub Regiment, and to other members of the Ukrainian military elite. Letters were sent to all other Colonels. Because Mazepa's agents, whose task was to instigate the population against Moscow, were so numerous, many were captured by Czarist forces, as in Chyhyryn, Korsun and Bohuslav. These agents masqueraded under various guises: monks, *lirnyks*, beggars, and the like.

Mazepa did not overlook other ways of making friends, namely, gifts, money grants, and other privileges, especially in dealing with the Zaporozhian *Sich*. Parallel to the agents of the *Hetman* were the hundreds of Zaporozhian agents who were active in those areas where the *Sich* had specific interests, such as Stary and Novy Kodak. The propaganda of the Zaporozhians was very effective among the broad masses of the Ukrainian people, especially in the South, in which direction the Swedish troops were marching.

The Poles from the camp of King Leszczynski also tried to develop propaganda in Ukraine, but it was of narrow scope, being directed to influential individual Ukrainian families. Because of the animosity toward Poles in Ukraine, the Polish propaganda was doomed to failure, especially among the peasant masses.

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When we analyze the *universals* of Peter I and Skoropadsky on the one hand, and those of King Charles XII and Mazepa on the other, one significant fact strikes the eye, namely, all these manifestoes deal with the same drastic and timely problems and attitudes which permeated the minds of the Ukrainian society of that time. We find in them the same elements, except with different interpretations. On a primary level is the play upon and the exploitation of *national and patriotic emotions*. Mazepa speaks of "our fatherland" being brought to the edge of the abyss. King Charles XII calls to arms all "for whom the fatherland and the safety of wives and children is dear." He commends that everyone "who loves his fatherland" be loyal to *Hetman* Mazepa and promises to "drive out traitors of the fatherland everywhere and treat them as enemies."

Czar Peter appeals to the Ukrainian people to save the "unity of their fatherland" and "to liberate your fatherland from all dangers and destruction." In another manifesto he speaks of the "Little Russian land, your fatherland" and about the selling out by Mazepa of "your fatherland." These expressions, painstakingly elaborated by the Russian propaganda machinery, were echoed by Skoropadsky in assuring the Ukrainian people that Mazepa was "never a true son of our fatherland."

This element of necessity was connected with the problem of Russian-Ukrainian relations, which none of the contesting factors could forget or omit. Mazepa speaks of the "ever inimical Muscovite power" liquidating the remnants of Kozak privileges and liberties, usurping the power over Ukraine, occupying cities, planning to destroy the Kozak officers and to turn Kozaks into *dragoons*, preparing to deport the Ukrainian population behind the Volga and to Siberia, and planning to settle the Ukrainian lands with Muscovites. The march of Russian troops into Ukraine is the beginning of the realization of these plans. All this, Mazepa wrote, he has learned from intimate friends in the entourage of the Czar.

King Charles XII repeatedly referred to the Russian yoke and tyranny under which the Ukrainian people languished.

The Czar and Skoropadsky spared no effort in refuting these accusations. Liquidation of privileges and liberties, wrote Czar Peter I, is "a plain lie," for all privileges and liberties bestowed by Czar Alexei "remain untouched and are solemnly observed." No Ukrainian cities are occupied by Russian troops, he continued, except those which were agreed upon for the period of war and which would be evacuated upon the destruction of the enemy.

.... We can without shame assert that no people under the sun can boast of their liberty and privileges more than the Little Russian people under our Imperial Highness, because not a single penny from the Little Russian land is allowed to be taken into our Treasury..., and with our troops, maintained at our expense, we are defending the Little Russian land, the holy Orthodox churches and monasteries and cities and villages from the Musulman and heretic onslaught.

Skoropadsky announced that it was not true that "Moscow, that is, the Great Russian people, is inimical to our Little Russian people" and that it was sent to reduce the country to ruins. Since Ukraine has been in union with Muscovy, he wrote, she has flourished with churches, trade and other forms of welfare. There is no enmity with the Great Russians, on the contrary, from "them as those who profess the same faith we receive all amity." *

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In this battle of ideas and orientations great significance was ascribed to *religious motives*. Constant threats of a union of the Orthodox Church with Catholic Rome, persecution of Orthodoxy, etc. belonged to the most indiscriminate weapons in the psychological warfare armory of Czar Peter I against his adversaries, King Charles XII and Mazepa. The alleged selling out of Ukraine to the Poles, the Pope, the Uniates and the "heretics" was one of the heaviest artillery pieces which the Russian propaganda mounted. The extent to which this weapon was considered deadly is attested to by the fact that both the main adversaries resorted to the most paradoxical arguments to refute it. For instance, King Charles attacked Peter I for his statement to the effect that he, Charles, wanted to introduce the Lutheran faith in Ukraine, and in turn accused the Russian Czar that "he for a long time has been negotiating with the Roman Pope for the purpose of suppressing the Greek faith and of introducing the Roman faith in his empire."

* cf. the present-day communist propaganda line steadily pounded home by Moscow and its puppets in Ukraine is based on "Russian-Ukrainian friendship" and the "Russian older brother"—ED.

The evidence of this was already to be seen "in Moscow," where the Jesuits were being allowed to "establish" schools and churches. "There is no doubt" that after the termination of the war, the Czar would force all to accept the Roman faith. "From him such a faith the Little Russian people may expect"

This was also a trenchant weapon which greatly irritated the Czar. He accused Mazepa of suggesting these arguments to Charles XII and denied that he had conducted any negotiations with Rome. He turned the argument against Charles XII, stating that it was he who had come to Ukraine to "enslave the Little Russian people again under the ancient Polish yoke . . . and to restore the Union."

All these propaganda arguments were diametrically opposed, nonetheless they were powerful psychological weapons in the struggle for the minds and souls of the Ukrainian people.

* * *

Although space precludes analyzing all the other elements of this psychological warfare, we should like cursorily to examine some of them:

(1) *Taxes*: The Czar accused Mazepa of imposing taxes in Ukraine without his knowledge and approval, and promised to abolish them. Mazepa, on the other hand, accused the Czar of every evil and promised to bring about an easing of taxation;

(2) *Pillage*: Both warring sides accepted responsibility for pillage. The Czar promised to pay indemnities after the war for all damages caused by the Russian troops and encouraged the population to draw up lists of damages;

(3) *Tortures and bestialities*: Each side accused the other of sadistic acts and submitted supporting evidence. Especially they accused each other of barbarous treatment of war prisoners;

(4) *Glorification of Self and Degradation of Enemy*: Boasting about one's bravery and deriding the enemy for his cowardice and barbarism was one of the most popular propaganda items.

(5) *Outlawing Enemy Propaganda*: Both sides issued stern warnings to their troops not to read the enemy's proclamations and to "shut your ears" to his manifestoes;

(6) *Mendacity*: The Czar assured his troops that the mendacity of the Swedes was notorious throughout Europe. The same argument was used by Charles XII with respect to the Russians;

(7) *Sabotage*: Both sides tried to incite the population to commit sabotage and muster active resistance against the enemy;

(8) *Promises and Threats*: Both sides used both rewards and threats, for unconditional loyalty in the first case, and severe reprisals in the second. In this respect the Czar proved to be much more forceful. He stimulated partisan activities by offering cash rewards for captured or slain Swedes; 2,000 rubles for capturing a Swedish general, 1,000 for a colonel, 5 rubles for the capture of other officers and enlisted men, and 3 rubles for slaying a Swedish soldier.

* * *

The most interesting facet of this propaganda warfare was the question and treatment of the *state status and future independence of Ukraine*.

Mazepa openly staked his future on the liberation of Ukraine from the Muscovite yoke. The *Hetman* developed his independence slogans extensively in his *universals* and through his secret agents, declaring that the Swedish King will always defend Ukraine from "the tyrannical Muscovite yoke," will liberate its people and will "not only restore all rights" taken away from "the glorious Zapozhian host" but will also increase them, "all of which he assured and confirmed with his Kingly word, never yet broken, and with his written assurance."

The Swedish King reiterated these goals in his *universals*.

Of course, this matter of liberation was a most sensitive one for the Russian side, and consequently the propaganda efforts of Peter were centered around it. He sought to convince the Ukrainian people that Mazepa was guided not by national interests, but by egotistic ones. The Czar repeatedly asserted that the separation of Ukraine from Muscovy would not bring about independence but a return under the Polish yoke. Between Mazepa and King Charles, he charged, there existed a secret agreement to this effect. The Swedish King reacted publicly with the flat statement that "it is the biggest lie ever known that we ever have negotiated with the illustrious Polish King to the effect that Ukraine will be given to Poland."

Peter I replied that the "Swedish King refutes by lies" and quoted a letter of Mazepa's to King Leszczynski which had been intercepted and which the Russians published in connection with another manifesto of Peter I (January 21, 1709).

In this manifesto the Czar said that Mazepa "in his lampoons in the form of *universals*, signed with his own hand and stamped with his seal and published for the instigation of the Little Russian people, swore with God-forgetting conscience that whatever he did

was for the welfare of the Little Russian people and for the conservation of their liberties, and that this people shall not be submitted either to Our own or to Polish authority, but only remain free, in which cause he allegedly received a promise from the Swedish King. Today, however, his blasphemous lie has become evident. He lied when he wrote this as he lied about all other things, having in mind to entice the Little Russian people . . . ”

* * *

The letter was truly compromising. Unfortunately, we have no way of finding the *universals* in which either Mazepa or Charles XII took issue in the matter of the letter, if such *universals* have been preserved at all. On the other hand, the question of the authenticity of the letter arises. Mazepa's biographer Mykola Kostomarov quoted (1883) the “original” in the Russian Archives, but it is known that as far back as 1698 there were fabricated “original” letters of Mazepa to the Polish King Jan Sobieski. Although the falsification of the latter letters has been definitely established by impartial historians, the Soviet historiography treats these letters as “proof” that Mazepa tried to put Ukraine back under Polish authority. On the other hand, it is known that before the arrival of the Swedish army in Ukraine a secret liaison between Mazepa and the Swedish King was maintained through Leszczynski. It is not impossible that tactician Mazepa gave the impression that he was willing to accept the Polish conditions as long as Leszczynski was useful to him. But there are no data to support the thesis that either Mazepa or the Swedish government committed themselves at any time in the matter of Polish territorial claims with respect to Ukraine.

These two suppositions are bolstered by the fact that in the treaty between Charles and Mazepa and the Zaporozhians, Ukraine is considered as an independent partner. Leszczynski does not figure in it either as a sovereign or as an intermediary, nor is Poland mentioned. It would appear that after his alliance with the Swedes Mazepa presented Leszczynski with a *fait accompli*.**

In the light of these considerations, the letter of Mazepa, even if authentic, loses much of its value. It is significant that in this letter, allegedly sent on December 5, 1708, there is no reference to the Swedes, with whom the *Hetman* had operated for a month and a half. Thus, it might be a matter of a letter written before the alliance with the Swedes, or of a falsification, or of a tactical-diplomatic

** This problem shall be the subject of an analysis by the writer in a subsequent article.

move in order to offset the probable bitterness and disappointment of Leazczynski when the latter found out about the contents of the Swedish-Ukrainian treaty.

This is directly attested to by the Czar in his propaganda efforts, in which stress is put not on the credulosity of the population with respect to Mazepa's alleged statements in the letter, but rather on the inconveniences of Ukrainian independence under Swedish protection. He assured the Ukrainians that no good could come from the Swedish alliance: the Swedes were of "different faith and tongue" and their country was far away from Ukraine. The Czar held forth the promise of further concessions and privileges to the Ukrainian people upon his victory over Charles XII.

* * *

An analysis of the effectiveness of the Russian and anti-Russian propaganda which tore the hearts of the Ukrainian people on the eve of the great Swedish-Ukrainian tragedy at Poltava and Perevolochna, is outside the framework of this essay. We might note that the matter is by no means simple, as is represented by the traditional Russian historiography, both Czarist and Soviet: that the political theses advanced by Mazepa and Charles XII found no reaction among the Ukrainian masses. There is much substantial evidence to the contrary. Propaganda reveals its power only when its sponsors are victorious. We can fully agree with the Swedish historian Harald Hjaerne, who said:

We must take into consideration the fact that both the Czar and the Swedish King were foreign rulers in Ukraine whose status depended largely on the success of their arms. The Kozaks could not alone be decisive in this success, but the ultimate victory pushed the uncertain and shaky to the side of the victor.

* * *

There remains the question how the Swedish and the Russian sides presented the matter of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance before their own public opinion. Did the propaganda for home consumption follow the same pattern as that in Ukraine, or was it, as often happens, of a different sort? The question can be definitely answered on the basis of reliable historical sources.

It is necessary to state at once that the propaganda of Charles XII in Sweden was in the main identical with his propaganda in Ukraine, while the Russian propaganda for Ukraine and for Russia differed basically.

The directives for the informing of the Swedish people in the homeland were prepared in the field headquarters of Charles XII

in the form of "Chancery Bulletins." These were sent to Stockholm where they were published in the newspaper, *Ordinaire Stockholmiske Post-Tidender*. On the basis of these directives Swedish diplomats disseminated the Swedish propaganda throughout Western Europe, composing pamphlets, leaflets and brochures or providing material for the foreign press. At the beginning of 1709 the Stockholm newspaper reported that the purpose of Mazepa's union with King Charles XII was that of seeking the "protection of His Royal Majesty against Muscovite tyranny and oppression."

The act of joining the Swedish troops by Mazepa on October 29, 1708 (Swedish style), was extensively commented upon in the press. Immediately after his arrival Mazepa and his officers were received in audience by the King, the Stockholm newspaper said, at which time Mazepa "in a brief but emotional speech in Latin gave himself, his people and country over to the protection of His Royal Majesty and for the defense against the Muscovite tyranny, assuring that he would serve loyally with all his strength His Royal Majesty and would respect His Royal Majesty as their savior from the Muscovite yoke." To this he was given the answer that his arrival was the more pleasant to His Royal Majesty and it was appreciated that he, known for his bravery, manifested such great confidence in His Royal Majesty. And because His Royal Majesty had brought his troops to Ukraine not to harm the population, but for the purpose of avenging his unfaithful enemy, therefore His Royal Majesty desired *not only to take Mazepa and the population under his protection, but to try to liberate them—they who voluntarily had cast themselves into his arms—from this yoke under which they had been suffering to that day.* He expressed the hope that they on their part would loyally and truly serve His Royal Majesty, so that they can fully benefit by those fruits and advantages which, thanks to him, would follow.

As far as the Russian propaganda was concerned, we have already seen from the cited letter of Menshikov that the interpretation by Peter I of the purpose of Mazepa's alliance with Charles XII and King Leszczynski was far from the actual conviction entertained by the Russian government in this matter. This is even more firmly supported by a speech which Peter I delivered to his troops on June 26, 1709, on the eve of the Battle of Poltava:

The Swedish King and the impostor Leszczynski have swayed to their side the traitor Mazepa and have sworn mutually to detach Little Russia (Ukraine), to create of it an independent principality under the rule of this traitor, by incorporating into it Volhynia, and to put under Mazepa's sovereignty the Zaporoshian and Don Kosaks. Attracted by this hope, the traitor hoped to

mobilize 200,000 Kozak troops, bribe the Porte, the Crimean Khan and the Horde against us, and for the fulfillment of his evil design appeal to Little Russia, the Swedish King with all his forces, and also Leszczynski, who is marching with 25,000 troops, to unite with him. But thanks to God's help the Kozaks and the Little Russian people have remained faithful to us. The Swedish troops, because of our victories and the severity of winter, are reduced to half of their number, the troops of Leszczynski are defeated and dispersed, while the Sultan has confirmed the peace with us and has refused to send them relief troops and has forbade the Khan and the Horde to unite with them. Against us there remain barely 34 regiments, and these are not complete, but exhausted and miserable. We must finish off these remnants! To arms, comrades! Faith, Church and the Fatherland demand this of you.

On the eve of the battle Charles and Mazepa made an inspection of their troops, but we have no documents about the speeches delivered to the Ukrainian Kozaks, many of whom found a more dreadful fate the next day than their Swedish comrades in arms.

Note: All sources and references are to be found in works in the Swedish language by the author: (a) "Propagandakriget i Ukraina 1708-1709," Karolinska Förbundets Årbok, Stockholm, 1958, pp. 81-124; (b) *Mazepa*, Stockholm, 1959, Chapter XIII.

THE WORLD OF MAZEPА

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

This year marks the 250th anniversary of the battle of Poltava which launched Peter I and modern Russia on its imperial way. That victory of Peter ruined Charles XII of Sweden and ended for good and all Swedish hopes of playing a commanding role in the European arena. It also marked the culmination and in a way the ruin of the work of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa for through his alliance with Charles he secured recognition by a great European power of an independent Ukraine and in the debacle which followed, he won deathless glory by carrying Charles to safety in Turkey even though the exertion was too much for him and he died a few months later, an exile but still a free man and *Hetman* of Ukraine.

Far too often modern historians have seen fit to present Mazepa through the eyes of Peter and to regard his efforts to win independence for his country as a mad action, based either upon some moral defect in his character or as the senile gesture of an old man dreaming of the days of his youth and unaware that history had moved on and left him in a stagnant backwater. Neither judgment is correct and although his hopes of liberty for his country failed, the background of those efforts was intelligible and the result was determined almost by chance.

Mazepa was born in the first half of the seventeenth century. He was trained in that period and inherited its ideas. In fact he was still a young man when Bohdan Khmelnytsky raised the standard of revolt against Poland and his long and adventurous career spanned the effective life of the *Hetman* state. He witnessed the rise of the Zaporozhian Sich to political prominence and his death set it on the path of an almost inevitable decline but it was his work that made it possible for Ukraine to rise again and to struggle anew for its liberty and independence. It may therefore be worthwhile to notice the change in the position of the countries of Eastern Europe during his lifetime and the impact upon them of the newer forces that were beginning to stir in Western Europe.

Let us look back at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Western Europe was being torn to bits by the wars resulting from



This map of Ukraine or the "Land of Kozaks" represents generally the Ukrainian lands of the Mazepa era. The cartographer was Johann Baptista Homann, who published it in *Atlas Maior*, in 1710 in Nuernberg, Germany.

the Protestant Reformation. The German princes were sharply divided between those who remained loyal to Rome and those who followed the ideas of Luther and Calvin. These culminated in the Thirty Years War which from 1618 to 1648 engrossed the entire attention of Western Europe. Almost every country in the Western half of Europe poured out blood and treasure in the apparently endless campaigns which devastated city after city and left the heart of the continent, the German states, almost helpless for another century, while their rivals and allies alike reaped the profits.

The struggle left Poland and the East to itself and gave the region a chance to solve the pressing problems of reorganization at a moment when it could be almost secure against Western interference. At the beginning of the century there was no doubt that Poland was the main bulwark of the political structure but there was no doubt also that Poland was living in a disorganized anarchy

under which the central forces were helpless either to adopt a policy or to follow one already formed.

At the moment when in Moscow Ivan the Terrible, his oprichniki and hangmen were crushing the power of the old *boyars* and extinguishing the last survivals of liberty and civic independence in such places as Novgorod the Great, the magnates and the lesser *szlachta* of Poland were perverting the old "golden liberty" of Poland to their own class privileges and were hamstringing every attempt of the Kings to exercise any effective control over Polish policy. The nobles were so intent upon crushing the Orthodox population of the Ukrainian districts and producing a purely Polish Latin Catholic state that they never stopped to realize the cost of that policy. The more far-sighted but politically helpless kings could do little to stop it and thus arose the problem of the Zaporozhian Sich.

The Kings of Poland needed the Kozaks to protect their southern border against the Turks and the Crimean Tatars but they were unable to secure for them a suitable place within the framework of the *Rzeczpospolita Polska*, for the Kozaks were Orthodox, they were good and brave fighters who had tasted the fruits of liberty and were in no mind to be praised to the skies during wartime and reduced to serfdom immediately after. Even the device of registering a few thousand Kozaks was not a safety valve in time of war, kings and nobles alike were only too glad to enroll as Kozaks as large a part of the Ukrainian population as was possible. Then to add to the difficulties of the state a policy of matrimonial alliances had brought to the throne the Vasas of Sweden. At the time it seemed advantageous but the impact of the Reformation upon Sweden created hostilities between the Catholic and Lutheran Vasas and both sides dreamed of welding the joint state under their own faith.

So the problem was joined. The Kings of Poland wanted to find some solution that would satisfy the Kozaks. The nobles on the other hand sought only to suppress them but they were unwilling to make a consistent effort to replace them on the exposed frontiers of the state with an equally efficient body of troops and they preferred to exert their power in spasmodic attempts at pacification and suppression only to call in a few years again upon the same men whom they had roundly denounced.

On the other hand the Kozaks so closely confined their interest to the struggle against the Turks and Tatars that they had not given thought to the creation of their own local government. Long accustomed to the feudal rule of the nobles, they had not provided an answer to the great wave of Polonization which had spread

among those nobles. Even the Vyshnevetsky family which had furnished some of the great Kozak leaders in the sixteenth century threw their lot in with the Poles, adopted the Roman Catholic Rite and appeared as the most bitter enemies of their former brothers. It required some new impulse from outside to remedy this situation and it was Bohdan Khmelnytsky who furnished it immediately after the close of the Thirty Years War.

Yet as if there were not troubles enough in Eastern Europe, there was still the problem of the Turks. After their capture of Constantinople, the Ottoman Turks had cemented their hold upon the entire Balkan Peninsula except for the small district of Montenegro, a land-locked principality, and they had pushed up the valley of the Danube to place a strong garrison in Budapest in the heart of Europe. From there they were able to menace not only Poland but the Holy Roman Empire as a whole and yet Europe had nothing better to do than to waste its resources on internecine religious wars. In the mountainous regions there were still some semi-independent principalities as Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia, areas where the Christians had some hopes of maintaining themselves, even though they were nominally subject to the Sultans. Then in the further east the Sultan had extended his power over the Crimean Tatars, the last important remains of the Golden Horde which for a couple of centuries had counted the Muscovites among its most loyal servants and had breathed into them its own spirit.

This was the political world of the day but the cultural situation was equally confused. The fall of the Byzantine Empire had deprived the Orthodox of that cultural center to which they had looked for centuries. The Patriarchs of Constantinople, no longer the second in control of a Christian Empire, were made and unmade with zeal by the Sultans and their advisers and subjected to all kinds of impositions and Turkish political schemes. They had been forced from their great churches such as St. Sophia into the Phanar where they attempted to provide for the religious and cultural needs of the Christian East but against tremendous odds.

Those odds did not become less when the ambassadors of the various European powers tried to use them for the purposes of the European religious disputes. France and England, the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire, the Italian cities and Spain all poured money into the Sublime Porte to keep on the patriarchal throne an incumbent favorable to either Roman Catholicism or Protestantism of some sort. The Patriarch had no printing press at his disposal and he was compelled to secure any necessary printed books from one of the ambassadors in Constantinople and to trust that the

texts had not been too badly altered for political and religious propaganda. The Monasteries of Mount Athos and some in the Danubian province tried to supply the lack but again the need was far greater than the supply and the Patriarchs who had previously been the patrons of culture were now compelled to beg through the Eastern world for alms to secure the funds to meet the Turkish impositions and to give some aid to their impoverished flocks.

It was here that the Czars of Moscow saw their opportunity to drive a hard bargain politically as well as culturally. The Czars had long claimed that by the marriage of Ivan III and Sophia Paleolog, they had become the political heirs of the Emperor of Constantinople. Now they used their resources and their donations to have the Metropolitan of Moscow reclassified as a Patriarch and as the Patriarch of the Third Rome, they demanded that he take precedence over the older Patriarchs and be recognized not only as the political and religious but also the cultural head of the entire Orthodox world at a time when education was at a lower ebb in Moscow than in any of the other Orthodox cities. They insisted on the maintenance of all the peculiarities that had been introduced into the Russian Church in the past as the norms of all Orthodoxy in the future. It is true that in the middle of the seventeenth century, they did modify this position by inviting the scholars from Kiev and using them in responsible posts but at the same time the strains of this concession were still visible in the twentieth century in the Russian Church through the sects of the Old Believers who never tolerated even this slight withdrawal from the standards of Muscovite omniscience.

It is small wonder that the leaders of Ukrainian thought were torn by the end of the sixteenth century whether it was better to retain what they could and make an agreement with Rome, whether they should cherish their own attachment to an impoverished Constantinople or whether they should swallow their intellects and their patriotism and join Moscow. The first attitude prevailed among those groups which were later to become the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The third attitude was shared by the unthinking who saw in Moscow a center of Orthodoxy, such as it was. The second was the position taken by the Kievan Academy and the brotherhoods of many Ukrainian cities which sought to borrow from the West what they could profitably take and at the same time maintain the old contacts in the hope of a better day.

At the same time the turn of political events in the sixteenth century had brought the Polish court and the magnates into close contact with the culture of the Italian city states. Many young Poles

studied in Italy and brought back the gains of the Renaissance so as to make the Wawel at Krakow a center of Italian luxury and thought. A little later the introduction of the Jesuits to counteract Protestant missionaries in Poland brought in a new touch and gave new ideals to education. All combined to incorporate Poland even more fully than before in the newly developing world of the West and thus rendered its cultural influence even greater and in a way more menacing to Ukraine than it had been earlier.

All these varying factors were reflected in the Ukrainian movement during the seventeenth century. Once the Ukrainian nobles had been largely Polonized, the masses of the people were left rudderless. Some, the more uneducated, clamored for Muscovite support. The better educated and the more far-sighted renewed their efforts to revive their own culture and to connect it again with the half-forgotten memories of the old Kievan Rus, when Kiev had been next to Constantinople a center of culture and political power, known and respected not only in the east of Europe but as far west as France where one of the daughters of Yaroslav the Wise had married a King of France.

In this political and cultural crisis, Ukraine was at the very center of events. Its connections with Constantinople, loose as they had become during the centuries of the decline of the city on the Bosphorus, still insured it a hearing throughout the entire East. At the same time it had never openly broken those connections and despised them as had Moscow. It was open by position to the Moslem world and more than that, it was easily subjected to the cultural influences coming through Poland from the West. It remained only for the Ukrainian leaders to pick the proper path.

This is well shown by the educational revival. There were those men like the great polemical writer Ivan Vyshensky who saw the people destined to follow in the old paths and revivify them. Yet the brotherhoods, largely composed of artisans in the cities, saw what they had to learn and in their schools they endeavored to revive a knowledge of the Greek language by calling teachers from Constantinople but at the same time they attempted to rival the Jesuit colleges which were being established throughout the country at Polish inspiration by introducing a course of study which would have the same appeal as the more thoroughly Western orientation given by their opponents.

This combination of the old and the modern was the distinguishing feature of the Ukrainian educational revival. The process reached its height in the school at Kiev which was later developed by Metropolitan Petro Mohyla into an Academy. This for a century

was the most famous school of its kind in Eastern Europe and in its international reputation it was more than able to compete with any of the Polish schools and also with the school of the Patriarch on the island of Chalki in the Sea of Marmora.

Yet Mohyla was himself a product of the complicated political and cultural position in which Ukraine found itself. He was a Moldavian *hospodar*, one of the nobles from the south who had been for a while in the Polish service and his acquaintance with the entire area and all fields of thought inspired in him a dream of still more far-reaching activity. This was nothing less than a reorganization of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the administrative and scholarly lines of the West. With remarkable success he was able to fit the prevailing Orthodox theology into the scholastic method and his restatement of many of the problems of the Orthodox Church remained in vogue for almost two centuries. Mohyla's *Catechism* and other writings with their combination of scholastic method and Orthodox theology competed throughout the entire East with the Protestantizing writings of the Patriarch Kyrillos Loukaris who was more or less under Dutch influence despite the close relations that Loukaris had with the Zaporozhian Kozaks who were at the time raiding the Ottoman lands and even the outskirts of the Turkish capital.

When the great storm of an organized Kozak rebellion broke under Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1649, the *Hetman* naturally turned his gaze to the south. He early realized that the Crimean Tatars, while they were willing to back him to a certain degree, still feared a rejuvenated Ukraine and were willing to forget their hostility with the Poles, now that a newer and closer rival had appeared. He looked to the south and dreamed of an independent Ukraine which could draw upon the help and assistance of all those semi-autonomous principalities between him and the Sublime Porte. It was only the death of his older and able son Tymish in Moldavia and the consequent disruption of all his plans that he started on that ill-fated path which led to the Treaty of Pereyaslav and allowed Moscow once and for all to enter the internal affairs of the Kozak host. It was a move that was to cost Ukraine dearly in the future, when his guiding hand was removed.

Yet we must not imagine that for Moscow this century was an era of unrelenting progress. The old dynasty of the Rurikoviches, the last ruling scions of the old royal family of Kievan Rus, had died out and with it the last traditions of the rights of the Grand Princes and Czars of Moscow to reign over all the Eastern Slavs. The new dynasty of the Romanovs had a struggle to reassert it-

self as the embodiment of Muscovite claims and it was not until the middle of the century that Czar Alexis was able to boast of anything like the authority of the former rulers. Then there began an almost imperceptible infiltration of Western ideas into the Muscovite mode of life.

Just about the time of Khmelnytsky's revolt, the Czar supported Patriarch Nikon in an effort to reform the Orthodox Church of Moscow on the lines of Constantinople and he encountered bitter opposition not only from the people but the nobles and the hierarchy. That was why Nikon and the Czar began to invite Kievan monks and scholars to Moscow, even though they looked upon them with suspicion. Nikon too awoke the Czar's suspicions and was banished but the work slowly went on, as Alexis and his successors schemed to extend their power over Ukraine.

It was even for them a hard struggle. *Hetman* I. Vyhovsky, Khmelnytsky's assistant and successor, even made a treaty with the Poles, bringing the Host back as a third equal member of the Republic along with Poland and Lithuania but the Polish nobles rejected this and a Russian engineered revolt overthrew the power of Vyhovsky who paid the penalty for his clear-sightedness. There were in the Host pro-Polish, pro-Russian and even pro-Turkish parties and these to a large degree neutralized one another and left the Kozaks powerless.

Finally Alexis to solidify his position took a decided step. By the Treaty of Andrusiv, he and the Poles divided Ukrainian territory along the line of the Dnieper. The agreement held and from that time there were two *Hetmans*, sometimes cooperating against odds and sometimes hostile. It was frankly a stopgap to defeat the Kozak hopes but circumstances gave Moscow the advantage.

In 1683 Sultan Mohammed IV and his Grand Vizier Kara Mustapha decided upon a move to further the power of Islam. They attacked Vienna in the hope that they could drive the Christians out of the Danube valley and menace the Holy Roman Empire and the heart of Europe. Thanks to a sudden attack by a force of Poles and Kozaks under King John Sobieski, the attack on Vienna proved a boomerang. Vienna was saved and in short order the Turks were driven out of Budapest and within a few years were forced temporarily to surrender Belgrade. The turn in Turkish fortunes had come and the steady withdrawal of Moslem power began.

Poland did not profit because of her internal condition but the Regent Sophia of Moscow saw her opportunity. With Turkey momentarily prostrate, she exerted pressure on the Turks to have the Patriarch of Constantinople transfer to Moscow the control over

the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was in 1685, just at the period when Mazepa was rising to influence in the service of *Hetman Samiylovych*.

The consequences of this transfer gradually became evident and even more than the political division of the country at Andrusiv, it put Ukraine at the mercy of both the Muscovites and the Poles. Slowly the Metropolitans and hierarchy of Kiev lost all power of independent action or publication. Slowly but steadily they were isolated from the south and an iron curtain closed over Ukraine. The leading scholars of Kiev were given good positions in Moscow, if they would bend the knee or Siberia if they would not. On the other hand those still under Poland found their position equally intolerable. The Orthodox Church there was completely isolated and the only protection of any individuals was to accede to the Ukrainian Catholic Church which became the spokesman for that part of the Ukrainian people.

The full consequences of this division were mitigated by Mazepa, after he became *Hetman*. It was his European court at Baturyn that was visited by European travelers. It was through him that new ideas could find shelter and support. It was through him that the Kozaks were used to extend Muscovite holdings to the Black Sea.

He could do all this because in a strange way he had won the confidence of Peter I who had made himself sole Czar in 1689 and was filled then as throughout his life with a mad desire to tear Moscow from its old moorings and if possible destroy them as he went on to what he called Europeanization. Mazepa's whole interest was to find a way to unify Ukraine, to develop it to the best of his capacity, so far as he could keep the confidence of Peter, and to introduce such reforms as would make the Host once again an organized body able to function for the well-being of the people. At the same time, as the list of his donations compiled by his nephew after his death shows, he continued in the traditions of the earlier Ukrainians and made rich gifts to churches and monasteries throughout the entire Patriarchate of Constantinople as well as throughout the whole of Ukraine.

Thus when the Northern War started at the very end of the seventeenth century, the balance of power in Eastern Europe had been entirely changed. One factor remained, an unreformed Poland, but that was no longer a menace or a threat to any one. The un-thinking policy of the Polish nobles toward the Kozaks had brought it about that the Kozaks had developed over a large part of their territory their own government, a government it is true that was

bound by Moscow but still one that was treated as a separate entity, even though its rights were consistently disregarded.

Poland under the Saxon kings had no real voice of its own and only a few Poles were willing to see it. They continued to dream of the past, even though their moves were being controlled by forces outside of their own territory. Augustus II could make his agreements and enforce them through his Saxon subjects and troops and the Polish nobles could murmur or accept. It made no difference.

Turkey had been fatally weakened, how fatally no one knew. Moscow had taken Azov from the Crimean Tatars and they were only a more or less helpless appendage, withering on the vine to be plucked by Moscow or the Kozaks at will. Yet the main heart of Turkey, the Balkans, still remained, and it would take many years before the fate of the Christians there was decided.

There were only two great powers in the area. There was Sweden, which had practically made the Baltic Sea a Swedish lake and there was a reorganized Moscow-Russia under the imperious command of that northern giant, Peter I, who was willing to change everything except his own unbridled personal power. The Northern War, nominally between the boy King of Sweden, Charles XII, on the one side and Moscow, Denmark and Poland on the other, was in reality concerned with one or two questions. Could Peter crash through the Swedish lines to the Baltic Sea at some point and compel the Swedes to evacuate their holdings to the south? Or could Charles drive deeper into Europe, secure a firm base south of the Baltic and force Peter to the east? If the answer was to be first, Ukraine would inevitably have been totally absorbed in the Russian interior. If the second was the answer, Ukraine could find a new support either in the south of the new empire or could secure a foothold on the Black Sea either with or against the consent of the Ottoman Empire.

After the victory of the Swedes at Narva, when the King proved his ability, Mazepa hoped that he would continue to Moscow with his troops based on the Swedish possessions in Finland. When Charles turned against Poland, the old *Hetman* realized that Peter was only waiting to wipe out the Kozak organization and Ukraine and felt that it was his duty to try to help his people by some sort of a practical alliance with the King. How to do it?

The advance of Charles into Ukraine and the move against Poltava indicated that Charles had perhaps vague hopes of opening up the southern route to supplies. The war was fought against the background of the War of the Spanish Succession in which again all of Western Europe was involved. Those moves favored some

plans of Mazepa; they hampered others. The crucial battle of Poltava was lost but the masterly way in which the old *Hetman* carried Charles to safety in the south and the work of Orlyk and the diplomacy of Charles postponed for a half century the complete victory of Moscow. The results made it clear that if Ukraine was not to be the decisive factor in solving the problem of the Balkan Christians, Moscow for its part would have to reckon with the Empire advancing down the Danube and the maritime nations of the West sailing in through the Mediterranean Sea.

The battle of Poltava made Moscow and the Russian Empire. It postponed the liberation of Ukraine. Two hundred fifty years later, despite all the efforts of Czars and Commissars, Moscow has not yet solved the riddle of the Straits. That elusive goal, the goal of Peter, still remains and so long as it does, there is hope for the independence of Ukraine and the reopening of those roads in all directions that were the glory of the medieval Rus.

C O R R E C T I O N

In the article, entitled, "Russian Emigration and the Anti-Communist Struggle," by Gregory D. Gourjian, June 1959 issue (No. 2, Vol. XV) of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, the following corrections should be made:

(1) On p. 120, 10th line from the top of the page should read: "Bolsheviks, and in the Volunteer Army of General Kornilov out of 300,000 . . . "

(2) On p. 120, 25th line from the top of the page should read: "a military expert, but he lived in Rostov on the Don during the crucial period."

(3) On p. 120, 26th and 27th lines from the top of the page should read: "Although Georgia was not occupied by the 'Volunteer Army' of Gen. Denikin, armed skirmishes between it and the Georgian army occurred on the border, and the writer plainly saw the situation and the causes of . . . "

(4) On p. 121, 22nd line from the top of the page should read: "General Mal-Mayevsky. His *clie-de-camp*, Capt. Makarov, was notorious . . ." and the word "Makarov" should be substituted for the word "Orlov" in the 24th and 26th lines of the same paragraph.

IVAN MAZEPА — PATRON OF CULTURE AND ARTS OF UKRAINE

By VOLODYMYR SICHYNSKY

The era of the reign of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepа (1687-1709), who ruled Ukraine uninterruptedly for twenty-two years, belongs to the most flourishing period of culture, science and arts in Ukraine, unequalled by any other period of the Ukrainian Kozak state. During Mazepа's reign the arts and the general culture in Ukraine attained such a high degree of development and displayed such originality that they justly were given the name of "Ukrainian baroque."

Mazepа's patronage of Ukrainian arts and science was not an ephemeral affair or a hobby designed to achieve personal glory and popularity. He was a typical representative of the enlightened Ukrainian society, a spokesman of a cultural process which is characterized by piety for the past history of one's country, by respect for human creativeness and by love of the arts and beauty. Patronage of this kind is an indispensable means of elevating the cultural level of society, of forging the unity of the nation and of building up its resistance against the pressures of politically-misguided and aggressive neighbors.

The noble and beneficial influence of Ivan Mazepа was evident in every phase of Ukrainian spiritual and material culture—in science, education, literature, the theater, music, military, secular and church architecture, all the branches of arts, engraving, artisanship and industry.

Science, education and instruction, as bases of the cultural and economic development of the people, found the enthusiastic support of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepа. A dense network of primary and secondary schools in his time was chiefly responsible for the fact that almost the entire population of Ukraine, including women, was literate. This was attested to by numerous foreign travelers who visited Ukraine at that time.

Mazepа paid especial attention to the development of the Academy of Kiev, which soon became one of the greatest centers and bastions of science and education not only in Ukraine, but in the

whole of Eastern Europe. Foreign visitors called the Academy a "flourishing university" and a "most famous school" (Beauplan, Manstein, Bell). Through the efforts of Mazepa and his financial donations the Academy was transformed into a university in 1700. At the beginning of the XVIIIth century the number of students at the Academy reached 2,000, who represented a cross-section of the population of Ukraine: the nobility and high military families, city dwellers and simple Kozaks. Such democracy in institutions of learning was an exceptional phenomenon in the whole of Europe and made for the fact that in Ukraine there were no marked social distinctions among the various strata of the population. The Academy attracted students not only from all corners of Ukraine, but also from the neighboring countries of Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia and, later on, Muscovy. There were students from Greece and Arab countries as well.

The curricula of the Academy, in addition to philosophy and religion, included the study of foreign languages (Greek, Latin and German) and all other subjects known at that time: the natural sciences, medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and the arts, especially architecture, painting and engraving. The professors teaching at the Academy were noted scientists and writers, who translated books written in Latin and German into the Church Slavonic language.

Mention should also be made of the fact that all important religious, polemic and philosophic treatises, texts of the natural sciences and of mathematics; texts of song, music, architecture, books on military science (fortifications and artillery), and books on education, the art of speaking, philology, poetry, lexicons and dictionaries—all of which were known in Eastern Europe in the XVIIth-XVIIIth centuries, either came from Ukraine or were connected with the Academy of Kiev.

Mazepa donated sizeable sums of money for the remodeling and extension of the building of the Academy itself so that in 1704 it was an impressive edifice, worthy of symbolizing Ukrainian culture and science. The renovation of the Academy's *Bohoyavlennia* Church cost Mazepa 200,000 zolotys. In addition, the *Hetman* provided the sum of 1,000 zolotys annually toward the maintenance of dormitories for needy students.

The College of Chernihiv was the second higher school in Ukraine rebuilt and developed by Ivan Mazepa. In 1700-1702 he built a new building for the College, which, from the architectural viewpoint, represented a valuable example of the Ukrainian baroque. Significantly, all higher schools in Muscovy had been patterned after the Academy of Kiev and other colleges of Ukraine.



The St. Nicholas Cathedral in Kiev, which was built by *Hetman Ivan Mazepa of Ukraine*, in 1690-1696. The cathedral was demolished on orders of the Soviet government in 1937, as a measure against the religious beliefs of the Ukrainians.

Architecture was one of the most favored subjects of Mazepa's patronage, upon which he lavished fortunes. He built fortresses, public buildings and churches. The palaces of the *Hetman* in Baturyn, Chernihiv and elsewhere were of great architectural value as examples of a unique Ukrainian style. Most of them were razed to the ground upon orders of Czar Peter I after the Battle of Poltava.

Mazepa not only provided abundant sums of money for the purpose of architectural constructions, but was also an innovator and planner of these projects. On the basis of historical documents, as well as from the history of the edifices themselves, we know that with the very first years of his reign Mazepa saw to it that

the Ukrainian architects increased in number. The first known Ukrainian architects of his era were Ivan Zarudny, Stepan Kovnir, Prokip Kornievych, Apanas Peryatynsky, Yosyp and Fedir Starchenko, Martyn Tomashevych and Ivan Fedorovych. Ukrainian specialists and artists increased in number also in other branches of Ukrainian culture, especially in the field of engraving.

The example of the *Hetman* was followed by the entire Kozak nobility, which contributed generously to the general cultural development. Noted in this regard were such Kozak Colonels as Hertsyk, Mykolashevsky, Mokievsky, Dunin-Borkovsky, Borokhovych and Myrovych.

Mazepa completed three huge churches which had been started by his predecessors, renovated and expanded five churches which had been erected by the Princes of the XIth-XIIth centuries, and put up another four churches. In addition, he was responsible for at least 10 smaller churches. Some 25 churches were built by him in the years 1690-1706.

He completed the Mharsky Monastery in the Poltava province, a structure begun by *Hetman* Ivan Samoylovych in 1684. Two other imposing churches, the Mykolaivska Church in the Pechersk and the Brotherhood Church in the Podol in Kiev, reflected the influence of the Western European basilica type of architecture. They were erected by architect Yosyp Starchenko in 1690-1696.

In these constructions the old Ukrainian architectural tradition was evident as well as the original characteristic of finished details. After the Battle of Poltava the Russian Czarist administration ordered Mazepa's insignia and coat of arms to be removed from all his churches, while the Soviet regime ordered both churches demolished.

The All Saints Church of the Pecherska Lavra is noted for its original Ukrainian style, not known in the architecture of other peoples. It is most evident in its central building with 5 cupolas and original ornaments. The Church was erected in 1696-1698; over the main altar was the coat of arms of Ivan Mazepa, its patron and founder, which subsequently was removed by the Russian government.

Among other more important churches built by Mazepa was the Ascension Church (*Voznesennia*) in Pereyaaslav, 1695-1700.

Mazepa also was very active in the restoration and reconstruction of architectural monuments of the Middle Ages (XIth-XIIIth centuries). His work of restoration paralleled his statehood aspirations—he sought to awaken interest in the historical past and to connect the Ukrainian political life of his day with that of the old

period of Ukrainian statehood. This task required tremendous effort, energy and money, but was rewarding in the end. While the exteriors of churches were renovated and given a national character, the interiors remained intact, thus making for an original Ukrainian baroque.

From the viewpoint of historical significance, the most valuable churches restored by Mazepa were:

St. Sophia Cathedral in Kiev, founded in 1017; the so-called "Gold-Plated" Monastery of St. Michael, erected at the beginning of the XIIth century, and the Main Church of the Pecherska Lavra, erected in 1073.

The most remarkable reconstruction was that of St. Sophia Cathedral which, from a 5-cupola roof, was transformed into a 9-cupola cathedral, adorned with strikingly beautiful designs and motifs.

No less attractive was the architecture of the "Gold-Plated" Monastery, which was demolished by the Soviet regime in 1934 upon the express orders of the Kremlin.

(It is interesting to note that in Russia proper the Russian communist government refrained from destroying churches of historical note. In Ukraine, on the other hand, the churches were leveled as a means of "fighting religious prejudices" of the people. Needless to say, the churches and monasteries built by Mazepa were assigned "priority in destruction" by Moscow.)

Other churches reconstructed by Mazepa included the Trinity Church of the Pecherska Lavra, the St. Cyril Church in Kiev, a few churches in Chernihiv, and several monasteries and smaller houses of worship throughout Ukraine.

It is estimated that the *Hetman* spent at least 2,000,000 *zolotys* in this work. This figure was arrived at by the so-called Bender Commission, appointed by King Charles XII of Sweden to assess the estate of the dead *Hetman*. Ukrainian officers, especially those of the General Staff of Mazepa, provided detailed data on sums expended by the *Hetman* for his various cultural and scientific foundations throughout Ukraine.

The patronage of Mazepa in the fields of the humanistic sciences, education and instruction was so extensive that it is quite impossible to detail here the development of the various branches of learning which resulted from his support and influence. Literature, the theater, music, the song, printing, libraries, engraving and etching—all developed and flourished at the end of the XVIIth and at the beginning of the XVIIIth century.

It was during the reign of Mazepa that a number of outstanding books of both religious and lay character appeared, rendered in extraordinary and elaborate print with beautiful etchings and good binding. First place in the art of printing in Eastern Europe was held by the Pecherska Lavra in Kiev.

Books dealing with Ivan Mazepa were destroyed by the Russian government, but at least 20 various editions have survived. These books are replete with descriptions of his high knightly virtues, which strengthened the spirit of and respect for Ukrainian tradition. Despite the fact that the baroque provoked a "high style" in literature, folklore elements and influence of the Ukrainian popular vernacular, especially in the Kozak *dumas*, made their mark. Some of these literary works are ascribed to *Hetman* Mazepa's authorship.

Books and collecting were among the most favored hobbies of Mazepa, which is also attested to by foreign travelers who were received by the Ukrainian leader in his capital city of Baturyn. The French diplomatic envoy, Jean Baluse, who visited Mazepa at the end of 1704, wrote:

Ruler Mazepa showed me his collection of arms, one of the most beautiful that I ever have seen in my life, and also a selected library, with books in Latin everywhere.

There developed during the time of Mazepa a new literary form known as "Kozak chronicles" (*litopys*). Of these special significance is attached to the *Litopys samovytsia* (*The Chronicle of the Eye-witness*), allegedly written by Colonel Fedir Kandyba, a military secretary at the chancery of the *Hetman*; *Diystvia* (*Events*) of Col. H. Hrabianka, and *Skazanie o voyni Kozatskoi* (*Story of the Kozak War*), by S. Velychko, secretary of the General Military Chancery. Permeating these Kozak chronicles is Ukrainian patriotism, with references to Ukrainian antiquity as well as an emphasis on the geographical, cultural and economic separateness of Ukraine.

General public instruction in Ukraine went parallel with education; the problem of education received much attention at the time of Mazepa. Formation of the spiritual life of the youth, religious and national education, codes of ethics and social behavior, relations of the family, marriage, etc.—all these topics were widely discussed. In this connection a special series of books was published, containing "proverbs," "stories" and "humor," which were circulated among the people. One such book, *Etyka abo Filosofia pravouchytelna* (*Ethics or Philosophy of Righteous Living*) of 1712, contained 62 engravings of M. Zybrytsky, and was translated in modern times in St. Petersburg, Lviv, Moscow and Vienna.



The "Gold-Plated" Monastery in Kiev, which was erected in 1108, but remodeled by *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa during his reign in Ukraine. The Monastery was razed in 1934 by the Soviet government during its campaign against religion.

A number of foreign travelers who visited Ukraine reported on the high level of education and science. In the second half of the XVIIth century, Paul of Aleppo, in writing that the whole population of Ukraine was literate, remarked about the Ukrainian upper classes:

Among monastery principals (cf. the Pecherska Lavra) there are learned people, jurists and speakers, who know logic and philosophy and dwell upon deep problems.

Similar reports were made by the Swede K. J. Hildebrandt in 1688, by the Scot P. Gordon, the Dane Jul Just in 1711, and others.

Knowledge of foreign languages was a general characteristic of the cultural life of Ukraine of the Mazepa era, in which trend Mazepa provided stimulating leadership and direction. Contemporaries wrote that Ivan Mazepa was a master of Latin, and fluently spoke the Dutch, Italian, German, French, and Polish languages. It was

not a rarity that a Ukrainian officer of the Mazepa era should know, in addition to the Latin, also the German, French, and Italian languages.

Hence Ukrainians were used by Muscovite publications in the capacities of interpreters, diplomats, editors, proof-readers and so on, as is attested to by documentary evidence. Generally speaking, Ukrainian cultural cadres at the time built up the cultural life of Muscovy, serving as teachers, judges, priests, artists, and the like.

Russian historian P. Pekarsky wrote in his monumental work, *Nauka pri Petri* (*Science under Peter*), published in Petersburg in 1862:

The Little Russian erudite class had one good point, namely, with its assistance, xenophobia disappeared from Kiev, which is being supported in Moscow . . . At the beginning of the XVIIIth century, in the field of public instruction in Russia the Kievans were the principal leaders: all important translations from the classic languages, all monumental treatises on the dogmas of faith, all sermons, the majority of poetic works on the glorification of victories and great men, theatrical works—all these were written by Little Russians or were composed under their supervision" (Vol. II, p. 2, 4-5). [Little Russian was the term by which Russian chauvinists referred to the Ukrainians—ED.]

The support of engraving and etching tendered by Ivan Mazepa was considerable. Engraving on stone, wood, metal, and especially on precious metals, became widely practiced in Ukraine. Mazepa's buildings—architectural monuments—provide ample material for the study of Ukrainian engraving, which was noted for its original style and design. Engraving was widely applied in decorating the iconostasis, the principal ornament of churches. The iconostasis of the Mazepa era was of great dimensions, being several stories in height, and therefore cost much money. In all churches built by Mazepa there were impressive iconostases built by first-rate Ukrainian artists. The beautiful and ornate iconostases of the "Gold-Plated" Monastery and the Mykolaivska Church in Kiev were barbarously destroyed and burned in the 30's by the Soviet Russian government.

The metal-casting industry was highly developed at the time of Mazepa; from his era remain products of a high technical and artistic level. Bells, cannons, church objects and domestic appliances were covered with etchings, sometimes even with portraits. The casting of bells in Ukraine was a highly intricate and expensive art, and the church bells were known to be huge and extremely costly. Mazepa was a great patron of this art as well. Inasmuch as the Russian government could not destroy these objects so easily, some church bells have survived to our time. At least four bells of an

extremely rare quality have been preserved: that of Novhorod-Siversky of 1698; the Domanytsky Monastery in the Chernihiv province, 1699; Chernihiv, 1701, and the St. Sophia Cathedral, Kiev.

Priceless jewelry products of silver and gold, often adorned with rubies and diamonds, were among the commonplace gifts given to the churches by Mazepa. These treasures were confiscated by the Soviet Russian government.

The era of Ivan Mazepa considerably promoted the development of painting. The Academy of Kiev and the painting school of the Pecherska Lavra were the centers of the art. Ukrainian monumental painting was well acquainted with the Western European trends, especially the Italian and Dutch schools. Portraiture was dominated by realism and the monumental form. In iconostasis painting the realistic trend went so far as to have Ukrainian Kozak folklore scenes reproduced. Religious paintings very often contained portraits of church "patrons and donors." (In existence are many church pictures with a likeness of Ivan Mazepa.)

Engraving had special significance; it was not only a branch of the arts, but served as a unique means of reproducing drawings, portraits, maps and sketches. In Kiev alone, at the time of Mazepa, there were 20 famous engravers. The founder of the Ukrainian school of engraving was Alexander A. Tarasevych, who was educated and who worked for a number of years in the West. In 1688 Tarasevych, upon the invitation of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa, came to Kiev. Proving to be an excellent master of his metier, he worked for many Western European publications, notably those in Augsburg, drawing portraits of kings, princes, emperors, state and church dignitaries, and the like. His school in Kiev produced the majority of Ukrainian engravers, including D. Halyakhovsky, Leo Tarasevych, Ivan Shchyrsky, Ivan Myhura and Ivan Strelbytsky. All were inspired by Ivan Mazepa; their work contained many references to Mazepa's coat of arms, allegorical symbols and his likeness in recognition of his good deeds for people and country.

Extremely popular at the time was the engraving of the so-called "academic theses," that is, engravings representing academic debates and artistic soirees of the Academy of Kiev. Executed by outstanding Ukrainian engravers, very often the students of the Academy, these were dedicated to important persons. At least four such engraved "academic theses" were dedicated to Mazepa.

Mazepa's deeds as a patron of the arts and sciences were not limited to Ukraine alone, but extended outside the frontiers of Ukraine, thereby contributing toward better political, cultural and economic relations with foreign nations. It is known that he founded

churches in Vilno and in Poland. His generous hand extended as far as Palestine, the Greek Athos and the Near East, especially Syria, Antioch and Alexandria. In Syria Mazepa donated a Gospel printed in the Arab language to the city of Aleppo in 1708. Mazepa also gave a silver chalice and other church objects to the Church of the Divine Tomb in Jerusalem.

Another of Mazepa's concerns was the development of industry in Ukraine. We might mention here the industry of papermaking, which developed to a high degree under Mazepa. There are documentary data to the effect that in Chernihiv province alone there were 12 paper plants in the XVIIIth century. Ivan Mazepa founded a few paper factories, especially in the village of Bilytsia in 1680.

The production of glass, which began to develop in Ukraine at the beginning of the XVIth century, reached its highest level of production at the time of Mazepa, especially with regard to artistic glassware. Under the *Hetman's* aegis, at least four new glass factories were established.

Ceramic production also developed to a high degree, especially in the proper *Hetmanshchyna*, in such centers as Starodub, Kozeltsi, Nizhen, Chernihiv, Ichnya, Oleshnya, Pohari, Novhorod-Siversky and Baturyn. Ceramic factories are known to have existed also in the provinces of Kiev and Podilia, and in Galicia and Volhynia as well.

Textile production had a great economic significance, providing as it did material for clothing for the entire population. During the reign of Mazepa the textile industry in Ukraine attained sizeable proportions and provided linen, broadcloth, silk and other textiles.

The organizers and promoters of industry and of the entire economic life in Ukraine were Kozak officers who not only were well trained in the military art, but constituted an enlightened class with an understanding of the economy and the technique of production and trade.

Under the direction and leadership of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa, who generously supported science, education, the schools, the church and the whole economy of the country, Ukraine was well on the road to economic, cultural and political independence. Under normal conditions Ukraine would have flourished, a great and powerful nation.

BOOK REVIEWS

ARMS OF VALOR. By Pavlo Shandruk, Lt. Gen. of the General Staff, Ukrainian National Army. With an Introduction by Roman Smal-Stocki, Ph. D. Translated by Roman Oleśnicki. Robert Speller & Sons Publishers, Inc., New York, 1959. P. 320. Library of Congress Catalog No. 58-12846. \$6.00.

The publication of memoirs by Ukrainian political or military leaders compared with the great number of memoirs appearing in other countries is a rare phenomenon. Therefore, we must welcome this book by General Shandruk who, by writing his memoirs, may encourage other Ukrainian leaders, who took active part in the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation for freedom and independence, to do likewise.

General Shandruk's memoirs embrace three important and vital periods of his life.

The first period deals with the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people toward their statehood and independence immediately after World War I, that is, the Ukrainian national revolution in former Russia. This important period covers the era of Ukrainian independence and the defensive war of Ukraine against her aggressive neighbors.

As this is a vast assignment, it is not surprising that the author should have used a telegraphic style, endeavoring to cover as much ground as possible in the shortest possible way. It is therefore inevitable that in places one can detect certain shortcomings and gaps, which, however, General Shandruk has succeeded in bridging without affecting the unity of the book. In this part he covers his role in the epoch-making events in Ukraine: the outbreak of the Russian revolution and the Ukrainian national rebirth; his part in the organization of the young Ukrainian national army and of his own Ukrainian independent unit, the Zaporozhian Rifle Battalion; the struggle within the ranks of the Ukrainian Galician Army against Poland; the struggle for Kiev, and the famous "winter march" of the Ukrainian armies.

The second period of General Shandruk's book analyzes his experience under the Polish occupation; six chapters are devoted to such subjects as the Ukrainian-Polish alliance (Petlura and Piłsudski), the internment of the Ukrainian army by Poland, his work with the exiled Ukrainian military staff; "enticements" and "invitations" extended by the Soviet government to return home, and finally his career service in the Polish army. This part, too, is somewhat cursorily written without elaboration on such vital topics as the activity of the Ukrainian government-in-exile, the situation after the conclusion of the Ukrainian-Polish treaty, the relations with the Ukrainian population of Western Ukraine which was wholly hostile to this treaty and which was harshly persecuted by the Polish government.

In the reviewer's opinion, the third part of General Shandruk's memoirs is the most interesting and the richest from the viewpoint of factual information. Probably this is so partly because these events are still very fresh in the

memory of all of us, and partly because the author writes about this part of his experiences with a more interesting approach. The reader might be perturbed about what happened to the author's wife, to whom two chapters are devoted ("My Attempts to Rescue My Wife" and "My Wife's Story"); these two might well have been combined into one.

This third part deals principally with the outbreak of World War II, his arrest by the Gestapo (after the defeat of the Polish army, in which General Shandruk held the rank of Colonel), the German-Soviet war, the creation of the Ukrainian National Committee and the beginning of the organizing of the Ukrainian National Army under his command, the surrender of the First Ukrainian Division to American-British troops, and the end of the war.

The author's presentation of his efforts to save the Ukrainian Division from falling into the hands of the Soviet authorities is somewhat dramatic and leaves the reader in a state of confusion. It appears that at the last moment the Ukrainian Division was split and was taken prisoner (in the American and British zones; no mention is made of the French zone), and that all the efforts of the author to reach the division in Rimini, Italy, as the commanding officer of that division, failed, because he and his staff were turned back to Munich by the British. It is rather regrettable that General Shandruk did not dwell more on this particular development.

This part also deals with the creation of the Ukrainian National Committee and its relations with all Ukrainian political groups, Hetman Skoropadsky, the President of the Ukrainian National Republic in exile, and the two rival Ukrainian nationalist organizations which combatted each other. This part, too, could have been more thoroughly analyzed, especially the behavior and activities of these groups in the last moments of World War II.

In another chapter, "The Struggle for the Independence of Carpatho-Ukraine," the author makes an unnecessary digression in incorporating the historical development of that part of the Ukrainian land. This appears pointless, especially since the author had no relations with Carpatho-Ukraine, never was there and did not take any active part in its recent history. On the other hand, the author neglected to incorporate the reactions and active agitation of the Polish government and especially the Polish army, in which he then served, when Carpatho-Ukraine rose to fight for its autonomy and later for full independence in 1938-39. We cannot assume that the author, as a high officer of the Polish army (although he did not serve on the Polish-Carpatho-Ukrainian border in the Carpathians), did not hear anything from his officer colleagues on how they treated Ukrainian refugees from Carpatho-Ukraine fleeing the Hungarian gendarmes. (These refugees in fact, were shot without trial on the Polish side.) True, this incident seems minor in comparison with the great developments of World War II, and hence we must impute to the author nothing but good will and a desire to give as much information as possible. But in this respect he could have omitted the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine without being accused of ill-will or ignorance of that particular problem of Ukraine.

The introduction to General Shandruk's book was written by Prof. Smail-Stocki, of Marquette University, a well-known specialist on Ukrainian history. In a lengthy (17 pages) preface he gives an analysis of the Ukrainian liberation efforts and the part General Shandruk played in them. The reader being introduced to the Ukrainian question will profit by a second reading of the introduction after finishing the main body of the work, will doubtless join all those who are dissatisfied with the political arrangement of Eastern Europe

and will see all the crass errors of those who dictated the arrangement after World War I, as well as that after World War II. It is abundantly clear that the unjust treatment of the Ukrainian problem, as well as that of the other enslaved peoples of Eastern Europe, is being avenged even now. Unfortunately, the assumption that Stalin is now pushing somebody in hell into a cauldron of boiling tar provides no relief here to the suffering of a great nation.

The weakest part of the book, it seems to the reviewer, is the chapter entitled, "Why." Since conclusions are easily to be drawn from the preface and the book itself, this chapter in effect is redundant.

From the viewpoint of technical arrangement, the maps and illustrations might better have been placed on separate pages at the end of the book rather than in the text, especially in places that have no relation to them. The name index is extremely useful and welcome, but it also would have been desirable to have an index of geographic places, to facilitate following the developments.

Regardless of the drawbacks as noted, the memoirs of General Shandruk are extremely readable and so colorful in spots that they compel the reader to finish the book at one sitting.

The book merits the full attention not only of the Ukrainian public, but also of American students of the historical events of Ukraine, inasmuch as it provides many interesting facts and interpretations of recent history in Eastern Europe.

Ukrainian Institute of America

JULIAN REVAY

DAS RUSSISCHE PERPETUUM MOBILE. By Dieter Friede, Marienburg Verlag Wuerzburg, 1959, pp. 228.

This book is an interesting compilation of reportorial and journalistic material, replete with citations from the works of known specialists on Russia and the USSR, statesmen and philosophers, as well as with the observations of the author himself. According to the author, the Soviet regime is the continuation of the Czarist regime, the "life and continuation of the Russian history" (p. 14); "the Bolsheviks are above all Russians" (p. 28). These are the basic theses of the author which he endeavors to prove in the book, at times with an extremely emotional display. Mr. Friede purposely calls his book *Das Russische Perpetuum Mobile* to underscore that the once-established machine of terror in Russia operates permanently.

The author, a German journalist of Berlin, was arrested in the late 40's and spent many years in Soviet concentration camps, including those in Vorkuta. First on the basis of his own observations made in the slave labor camps, and later on through additional studies, the author came to the conviction that "the permanent Russian aspiration is to seize the domination of Europe and Asia, and for the Czars and the general secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union there remains one and the same objective: the conquest of the world" (p. 30).

In support of his thesis Author Friede quotes the opinions of various foreign and Russian authors, statesmen, philosophers and poets: Alexander Herzen, Lord Palmerston, George Kennan, Danilevsky, Berdyaev, Blok, Bismarck and many others. It would be safe to state that the book contains more opinions of other authors than of the author himself, whose role seems to be that of tying up the material into a topical bundle. The book also contains many historical digressions, based mainly on the history of German-Russian relations.

Both in the sphere of international relations and in the methods of fighting its adversaries, the Soviet regime invented nothing new, but adopted and applied the old tactics of terror to new conditions, and took over the heritage of the Czarist predecessors: "Russian slavery of our days, does not begin with the Siberian border poles as was the case in the times of the Czars, but has been greatly extended to the private sphere" (p. 66). Such is the difference between authoritarian Russia and that of Stalin-Khrushchev.

Three chapters of the book are devoted to an explanation of modern Soviet slavery, which the author illuminates with special charts showing the geographic location of the slave camps and with descriptions of life in them. Regrettably, these descriptions tend to be fragmentary and lack unity and cohesion such as we find in the book of Dr. Scholmer (*Die Toten kehren zurück*). Nonetheless, they manage to provide a general picture. There is also a reference to the brutal suppression of the uprisings in the Vorkuta camps and the terror applied to women prisoners, and mention of the terrible conditions of the camps of the gold mines of Kolyma. As was true for the Czars, for the Kremlin Red masters as well "Kolyma is a country of gold, beclouded in deadly silence, a hell from which no one comes out to freedom" (p. 99).

The chapter on the "Enslaved Nations—Persecution of Religion" deserves studious attention, inasmuch as it deals with the Soviet colonial policy with respect to the non-Russian nations. But this policy, too, is not new; it is but a continuation of the policy of enslavement practiced by the Czarist regime. The author dwells longest on the policy of Moscow, White and Red, applied to the Poles, Ukrainians and Hungarians. After a short survey of Polish-Russian relations, Author Friede discusses extensively the Ukrainian-Russian relations, beginning with the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654 and ending with the terror of Khrushchev after World War II. The author learned of Ukrainian affairs through talks and discussions with his co-prisoners, Ukrainians from the western areas of Ukraine, and supplemented his knowledge with additional study and research. His survey of Ukrainian matters is historically correct, but, unfortunately, is somewhat superficial. He concludes with the following statement: "Entire villages were deported to the East. The thinning out of the population of Ukraine is the work of Khrushchev" (p. 132).

More detailed is the author's analysis of the German-Russian relations, which he obviously knows well and in which one notices his German patriotism and a subjective viewpoint. "Four Times Against German Unity" is the title of the chapter in which Mr. Friede attempts to prove that Russia has always been against German unity. Unfortunately, the arguments of the author cannot be left unchallenged; they are heavily biased and one-sided. He sees only the interest of one side, namely, the German side, and all arguments in favor of this side are qualified as good and just, while he rejects those which are against it. His partiality goes so far as to force him to omit a good many historical facts, simply because they are unacceptable to the German viewpoint. For instance, the author completely bypasses Hitler and his criminal policies in Eastern Europe, jumping immediately to the conferences of Teheran and Potsdam, and castigates the Allies for their "evil intentions" with respect to the German people and their aspirations toward unity. This chapter seems to be the weakest of all, which of course does not help the book earn a very high rating.

In the final chapter Author Friede, in quoting Karl Marx, repeats after him: "The policy of Russia is unchangeable; the methods, tactics and moves change but the leading star of Russian policy is an inextinguishable star." He adds that Marx' definition holds today and sees in Moscow a danger, stating:

"Russia is the eternal hotbed of unrest for the world" (p. 27). Only close union of the European nations with the United States can offset the future danger. "The union of Europe and America can even turn geopolitics to the detriment of the USSR. Vast expanses which once were the undoing of Napoleon and Hitler work today to the detriment of Russia" (p. 217).

A list of Russian aggressive wars and annexations and three songs of Soviet prisoners close the book.

Regardless of the shortcomings of the book, which we enumerated in part, it is essentially based on correct observations and analyses and provides much informative material, especially for the mass German reader. But for a student of Soviet Russian affairs the book, being a compilation, is inadequate, even if the great mass of quotations which the author ably presents in his work is taken into account.

Prolog Research and Publishing Association

LUBOMYR O. ORTYNSKY

BITTER HARVEST. The Intellectual Revolt Behind the Iron Curtain. Edited by Edmund Stillman. Introduction by Francois Bondy. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1959, pp. XXXIII & 313. \$5.00.

The present volume of Frederick A. Praeger is one of the series of "Praeger Publications on Russian History and World Communism," which has provided several important books in the last few years for the purpose of learning and understanding Russian imperialism and Russian and World communism. Among these are such outstanding works as Bertram D. Wolfe's *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, John Armstrong's *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus*, and the anthology of V. Zavalishin, *Early Soviet Writers*. (It is disheartening to note that major New York bookstores do not have the above-mentioned books in stock.)

Bitter Harvest is an anthology of prose, poetry and publicistic works of thirty-one Communist writers, written for the most part recently (1955-56) in the USSR and in the countries of the "people's democracy" behind the Iron Curtain. The anthology does not contain a single work by an emigre writer from either the USSR or the satellite countries, and thus assures the directness and authenticity of the materials gathered by Mr. Stillman. The anthology is prefaced by a well-written and penetrating introduction by Francois Bondy.

All the authors in the book are Communists, not only those who became disappointed in Communism but also those who were persecuted for their literary creativeness and died rather than conform to the oppressive communist teaching and policies. Among them are also those writers and intellectuals who still live behind the Iron Curtain and belong to official Soviet or satellite literary associations.

Most numerous in the anthology are Polish, Hungarian and Russian writers. The Polish writers are represented by the works of Marek Hlasko, Bohdan Drozdowski, Stanislaw Dygat, Leon Kolakowski, Michal Bruk, Pawel Herta, Stanislaw Zielinski, Adam Wazyk, Stanisława Sznaiper-Zakrzewska, Leopold Infeld, W. Godek and R. Turski, 12 authors in all.

The Hungarian writers are: Tibor Dery, Gyorgy Paloczi-Horvath, Karoly Jobbagy, Peter Veres, Miklos Gimes, Gyula Hay and Imre Nagy—for a total

of seven. Of the Russian intellectuals we have Alexander Jashin, Yuri Nagibin, Nikolai Zhdanov, Ilya Ehrenburg, Boris Pasternak and Dimitri Granin. The remainder of the intellectuals in "revolt" comprise Minh Hoang (Vietnamese), Harijs Heislers (Latvian), Wang Meng (Chinese), Milos Macourek (Czech), Milovan Djilas (Serbian) and Wolfgang Harich (East German).

The very fact that there is a preponderance of the writers of Poland, Hungary and Russia in the anthology makes it somewhat one-sided. Not adequately represented in the book are the Czechs, Chinese, and Germans, while completely forgotten are the Estonians, Lithuanians, Rumanians and Bulgarians, not to mention the writers of such culturally distinct countries as Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and other non-Russian republics of the USSR.

The absence of writers from these countries is especially curious. In the works of these writers, many of whom were oppressed and executed and many of whom are still active and living, there may be found even more characteristic examples of active opposition to "socialist realism" and party conformism than in the works of certain Russian writers, as for example, Ilya Ehrenburg, the notorious glorifier of Stalin.

Despite this shortcoming the anthology of Edmund Stillman merits attention. It presents examples of literary and publicistic creativeness which prove time and again that the Soviet system in the USSR and its brand in the satellite countries has failed to extinguish the faith of individual writers and intellectuals in the value of man as such, and their insistence on truth and free artistic expression. They prove beyond any doubt that the exigencies of humanity and free creativeness remained and still remain the moving force under the communist regimes, the long decades of communist terror and oppression notwithstanding. The artistic climate of works embraced in the anthology, their topics and ideas or conclusions or the lack of them, support the belief that the free human spirit will remain unbreakable despite the horrendous crimes committed by communism upon humanity.

The permanent and characteristic trait of all the works written by these writers, be it poetry, prose or publicistic essay, is their prison atmosphere. A heavy and oppressive mood, hopelessness and the inertia of every-day life, a lack of faith in struggle and aspirations and a lack of inspiring zeal—all this leads the communist "man" to revolt against the communist tyranny, to search for an exit in acts of humanism and decency. Such is the prevailing solution of the heroes in the works of the anthology, and such is the end of the authors themselves.

Bitter Harvest is an excellent complement to a series of similar anthologies of works by poets, writers and publicists who were either liquidated in the USSR or their works banned as those of "bourgeois nationalists," "cosmopolitans" or, simply, anti-communists. To such belong the Ukrainian anthologies *Broken String*, by Bohdan Krawciw (New York, 1955), *Muse in Prison* by Yar Slavutych (Detroit, 1955 and Jersey City, 1956), *The Executed Rebirth* of Yuri Lavrinenco (Paris, 1959) and the Polish anthology, *Broken Mirror*.

As far as Ukrainian literature in the Soviet Union is concerned, especially since the time of the so-called "thaw" and the new oppressive wave which is now again in evidence in Ukraine, another anthology similar to that of Mr. Stillman may be compiled with perhaps more "rebellious" works than those presented in *Bitter Harvest*. It would be authentic, even more moving and interesting, and perhaps more welcome as a more unhampered form of the creativeness of the writers in the Great Slave State. BOHDAN KRAWCIW

UKRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"KRUSHCHEV VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES," an address by the Honorable Thomas J. Dodd, *Congressional Record*, Aug. 13, 1959, Washington.

One of the most penetrating addresses on the world situation was delivered last August by Senator Dodd of Connecticut. In it, the Senator explained why he was opposed to the invitation extended to Khrushchev. "I believe," he said, "that in our own time we are repeating the same pattern of concessions to insatiable tyranny which 20 years ago reached the point of no return at the conference table in Munich." The Senator carefully documented the events leading to the invitation, stressing particularly the Berlin threat.

Scoring Vice President Nixon for his description of Khrushchev as a man who "worked his way up from the bottom," Senator Dodd emphasized that before "we accept the Vice President's 'rags to riches' summary of Khrushchev's career, let us get the facts into the record." With the precision of a lawyer stating his case, the Senator then enumerated methodically the crimes of Khrushchev in Ukraine and elsewhere. As he put it, "Nikita Khrushchev rose to Communist prominence as the hangman of the Ukraine."

This factually compact address may well become a historic one. Analyzed by the editors of *Time* magazine (August 24, 1959), it may serve as a basis for a "battle cry in one of the decade's hottest political controversies." The address is powerful, forceful, and constructive and, indeed, should be studied by every American seeking a clarification of the basic issues and threats confronting this nation.

"WORLD GOVERNMENT VIA NATO," by Elizabeth H. Oath. *American Opinion*, June 1959, Belmont, Massachusetts.

The author of this engaging article shows real and valid concern for the sovereign independence of this nation. She depicts the forces at work to achieve Atlantic Union through our NATO alliance. What troubles her in addition, and with considerable justification, is the group of people fomenting this particular drive. Names such as Elmo Roper, Thomas K. Finletter, Paul Nitze, Mordecai Johnson, Eric Johnston and others are cited.

Examining the reasoning of some of these individuals, the writer singles out Mr. Johnston. She writes: "As to the ubiquitous Eric Johnston, his most recent claim to the headlines came from his part in seeing that the Communist butcher, Mikoyan, was given so hearty a welcome as our guest. L. E. Dobriansky, Professor of Soviet Economics at Georgetown University, wrote to President Eisenhower: 'If our people were to depend on the naive and dangerously misleading statements of such uninformed persons as Cyrus Eaton, Adlai Stevenson, Eric Johnston, and other inadvertent tools of current Moscow propaganda, public opinion in this country could itself rapidly become a captive of Moscow' (p. 22).

As concerns not only this subject but also our relations with Moscow, the thinking of these persons must be subjected to the severest scrutiny. The writer demonstrates well the fuzziness characterizing their hastily adopted views. Regarding "Russia," their views are not only fuzzy but completely distorted.

"CONTROL OF THE ARTS IN THE COMMUNIST EMPIRE," consultation with Ivan P. Bahriany. Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, June 3, 1959, Washington, D.C.

A contemporary history of Ukraine is outlined in this consultation along with the details of the consultee's personal history. In every sense of the word Bahriany's fund of rich experience with Russian Communist tyranny is a reflection of the composite experience of the entire Ukrainian nation with Russian domination. Bahriany, who is a world renowned Ukrainian writer, gives a vivid account of his own imprisonment, the Russification policy of Moscow, the Pasternak case, the broadcasts of the "Voice of America" to Ukraine, and the dangers and limitations of the current cultural exchange program. His disclosures on these and other points raised in the consultation with the House Un-American Activities Committee make for extremely instructive reading, especially in this illusory period of "relaxed tensions."

Receiving wide coverage in American newspapers and periodicals, the writer's observations were quoted, for example, by *Human Events* in its August 5 issue. Bahriany declared "that exchanges are planned to demoralize the West and to cover up the lack of cultural freedom in Russia." His views regarding the "Voice of America" were similarly pointed. Referring to the argument that Ukrainian broadcasts should be curtailed because the people of Ukraine know the Russian language, the writer forthrightly stated that as "one who was reared and lived in Ukraine, I could say that not all Ukrainians understand Russian. Secondly, even if they understand, they certainly do not like the Russian language" (p. 24).

"MEET NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV—THE HANGMAN OF UKRAINE," a complete issue. *Svoboda*, Wednesday, September 16, 1959, Jersey City, N.J.

A veritable public service in information and analysis was performed by this widely respected organ of the Ukrainian National Association. The Association is the oldest and largest fraternal society of Americans of Ukrainian descent in this country. *Svoboda* is a Ukrainian-language daily which is read internationally and also is issued weekly in the English language.

In preparation for the Khrushchev visit, *Svoboda* researched intensively into Khrushchev's record down to present date and, quite objectively, reported its findings in this special issue. The issue was printed in heavy volume and distributed throughout the country. Requests for additional copies were made in Washington and elsewhere. The issue consists of a number of significant articles written by Clarence A. Manning, Lev El Dobriansky, Bohdan Krawciw and others. The material is powerfully documented and forms for the American reader a complete picture of the man Khrushchev and his policies.

L. M. D.

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