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ANOTHER SUMMIT MEETING?

Editorial

The pressing question in the world today and certainly for several months to come concerns a summit conference of the heads of the major powers. Will there be another summit meeting? Should there be such a meeting? These are the forms in which the paramount question is posed daily in our newspapers and by countless thinking people. The amounts of paper, ink, TV and radio time devoted to this issue are only a single but substantial measure of the popular concern shown for it. The busy preoccupations of our diplomats and statesmen with this subject constitute an additional indicator.

By now so much has been said and written about the Moscow-proposed meeting that one seriously wonders whether the issue is any clearer at this moment than it was three months ago. In fact, by virtue of Moscow's skillful propaganda on this subject and the characteristic myopia of numerous private and official Western circles, it appears that much confusion has been created in the popular mind with regard to the preparations, procedures, agenda points, and the real aims of such a conference. Doubtlessly this is what Moscow wants in its relentless drive to have a summit meeting.

Fortunately, in the midst of this popular confusion, marked in some degree by loss of memory, perspective, and even logic, the stand taken by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles remains firm and solid. It deserves the full support and encouragement of every clear-thinking American. It is clear-cut and direct, and dissipates much of the supposed complexity and complicated nature of the issue which are made so only by the excessive verbiage and weaknesses in logic and reason spent upon it. As expressed in the U.S. aide-memoire of March 6, this position pointedly raises these questions for Moscow's specific and concrete answers: "What is the purpose for which a 'summit' meeting would be held? Is it the purpose merely to stage a spectacle? Or is it the purpose to take meaningful decisions"?

These questions are obviously related intrinsically to the two general ones cited first. When any question is put forth about whatever subject, the questioner does not act in a condition devoid of some motivation and

anticipated thought. Unless it is an utterly foolish and aimless question, the questioner utilizes ideas or feelings in framing it. So in this case, depending on the known understanding of the parties involved, the questions can imply certain premises of thought and a certain anticipation of the answers to be given. Thus a premise suggesting a diplomatic and political quarantine of the Moscow criminals could yield only a negative answer to the two general questions of another summit meeting. The premise itself is based upon a wealth of evidence and the position taken is logically irrefutable. However, the climate of opinion is such in the world today that the next feasible and self-respecting approach is to answer in the affirmative that we *should* have another summit meeting. Of course, this position does not necessarily imply that there *will* be such a meeting.

One cannot but agree that this sane and rational approach is being currently pursued by the Administration. Both premises and anticipated answers are implied by the questions it has raised. They are founded on an awareness of Moscow's criminal record and its present motives. They are soundly motivated by moral and political principles and are designed to secure unequivocal and concrete answers yielding substantive points for serious preliminary discussion. The answers furnished by Moscow will in part determine whether there *will* be another summit meeting. Other considerations paving the way to such a meeting are necessarily procedure, probable chances of agreement, and guarantees. The process is upward to the summit, not downward from it.

Now, for us to evaluate properly and intelligently the likely answers of the Kremlin it is necessary to keep steadfastly in mind three general points of analysis: (1) the background to the summit campaign, (2) Moscow's purposes in initiating the campaign, and (3) the graded order of substantive points with adequate guarantees in a success-bearing agenda. To be told that the purpose of a summit meeting is the relaxation of international tensions and the promotion of peace is tantamount to being told that we are all against sin. The vague generality of such an answer, especially on the basis of Moscow's long record of deception and duplicity, is enough to vitiate the basis of a conference. Nor is it at all sufficient to be told that the purpose is general disarmament. In terms of logical adequacy and the sensed requirements of the case, the statement of purpose would have to be specific and concrete in connection with basic issues rather than the superficial symptoms of those issues. As shown below, the three points cannot be satisfied with anything else, i. e. unless we are naïve enough to fall into a dangerous trap.

The position assumed by the Administration up to this moment appears to rest on the details of these three points. Verbal and gestural

gimmicks contrived by Moscow, as, for example, the planting of a smiling Menshikov in Washington or the anxiety of Khrushchev to come to these shores for a conference, are rightly taken at their worthless face value. Needless to say, if Moscow were at all sincere about a peace-promoting conference, it is plainly evident that such gimmicks and other softening tactics would be unnecessary. The strength of the Administration's position is best reflected in the firm behavior and observations of Secretary Dulles who without qualification openly discounts these gestures of "concession."

In our attitude toward a possible meeting the determining fact should be that we are under no moral or political obligation to offer any concessions to Moscow. To go even a quarter of the half way sought by Khrushchev would engender a perilous compromise. Our attitude must be further shaped by the fact that Moscow considers any such meeting as a medium of the cold war. Despite its calculated cheap denials of this fact, the Kremlin cannot but view another summit meeting in the same light that it had previous ones. It would represent another phase of psycho-political warfare, and the consequences of uncritical Western participation in it might well be more devastating in the long run than several Russian missiles planted on the United States. One need only recall some of the results of previous meetings. Teheran and Yalta under Roosevelt, Potsdam under Truman, and Geneva under Eisenhower, all resulted in some kind of loss for the United States. Commented on in this journal two years ago, the short study by Colonel N. Henry Josephs on *Criminal Optimism and the Four Summits* is as pertinent today as it was then.¹ It shows Moscow's coexistence policies as diversionary movements aimed at securing "a period of accumulation of strength for future revolutionary initiatives."

Considering our first point on background, it seems almost unnecessary to have to emphasize it, but the perennial fact is that many suffer from short memories. If they do recall the salient facts of the immediate background, it remains an act of memory than becoming one of evaluative understanding. In their personal lives such people would not only recall quickly the misdeeds of another but also, instinctively, tend to avoid the culprit because of his repetitive malfeasance. When it comes to rule by international criminals, the behavior of such people changes, as though distance, the aura of government, and the possession of destructive instruments change the nature of the case. This nature is by no means transformed. Any answer given by the Kremlin must be assessed in the light of its long record of broken treaties and promises.

¹ *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, September, 1956, Vol. XII, No. 3, p. 288.

Substantially, Khrushchev is no different from Stalin. In accidental qualities, he is actually far more dangerous. Let us not be quick to forget, among other things, how Khrushchev capitalized on the last summit meeting in Geneva and how he unabashedly renounced the agreement with the West on unifying Germany, in fact immediately after the Geneva meeting.

But this is just one major side of the necessary background to be constantly kept in mind. The other side consists of the *Sputnik* campaign, the Bulganin-Eisenhower exchanges, and the Kremlin's pre-conditions for summit talks. All of these fall into a pattern of calculated propaganda effort. It is no secret that Moscow reaped tremendous political harvest by launching into orbit its two satellites. Except in Moscow and ethnic Russia, this produced relatively little excitement in the Russian Communist Empire. In Western Europe this first success created a state of jitteriness because of its military implications. In the United States its impact was one of spiritual panic in many quarters; and in Asia and Africa the effect was damaging to the prestige and superiority of the United States. Actually, there was little cause for such widespread fear, but with the Russian propaganda mills grinding day and night and Western agencies of all sorts uncritically contributing to Moscow's desired effects, this set the stage for the next phase of the enemy's political warfare.

The phase of the Bulganin bombardment of letters to the capitals of the world followed immediately. The objective has been to capitalize further on the fear stimulated in the previous period. The pose has been one of earnestly seeking peace, despite an alleged equality of military and scientific might. The nine proposals set forth by Bulganin as points for summit talks are neither new nor fundamentally grounded. In all this time President Eisenhower maintained a posture of equanimity, self-assurance, and confident poise. This well-grounded posture of strength was further reflected in the pointed question raised in his reply of February 15 to Mr. Bulganin: "I beg to wonder, Mr. Chairman, whether we shall get anywhere by continuing to write speeches to each other?" While in his letter the President soundly reiterated the need to agree on the basic issues of strengthening the U. N., dedicating space to peaceful purposes, reunifying Germany, and honoring past agreements concerning the right of East European peoples to determine their own governments, Moscow had already set the pre-conditions of the summit meeting. For instance, in a scathing address in Minsk, Mr. Khrushchev explicitly stated, "We have declared and declare now that we do not intend to meet for the discussion either of the question of the people's democracies or the German question"

This determined stand by Moscow leads logically to the second point, namely Moscow's purposes behind the campaign for a summit meeting. Indeed, it mirrors in part the real purposes. These purposes are five in number. One, the Russians seek acceptance of a *status quo* in Eastern Europe and Asia. The very absence of the point on the captive nations in the summit agenda would certainly permit Moscow to turn to its captives and say that the decadent West is really not interested in them. Second, they hope to delay and possibly prevent the establishment of the IRBM bases in Europe. Third, Khrushchev aims to legitimize his own regime with the cloak of respectability which a summit meeting would provide. Fourth, the Kremlin intends to squeeze further political capital out of its *Sputnik* performances before U. S. achievements overshadow them completely. And lastly, the psychological, political, and propaganda value of another summit meeting would be exploited in many other areas of Communist enterprise, including matters pertaining to Asia and Africa.

With these points of background and Moscow's purposes it should be conclusive that Western insistence upon a graded order of substantive points in the agenda and with guarantees of enforcement should be firm. A meeting of heads of state would no more resolve the disarmament issue than those on lower echelons were able to do in London. Problems of outer space control are more futural than current. These plus the disarmament question could well be explored in the U. N. Our attention must not be distracted from the fundamental issue of freedom and slavery which necessarily entails the points on the captive nations and the re-unification of Germany. Upon sober analysis, these are basic to all others.

The course taken by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles must be fully supported. Both realize that it would be tragic to hold a meeting which would overlook these basic problems. The advantages would accrue entirely to Moscow. In fact, given the pre-conditions set by the Russians, it would be advantageous to us and the West to press loudly and incessantly on the problems of the captive nations, a reunited Germany, Korea, Vietnam, the U. N. and Hungary, and to take the initiative propaganda-wise even though the result would mean no summit meeting. It is highly probable that such a result would compound our advantages because the inability of Moscow to wangle a meeting of this sort would only serve to intensify the pressures within its own empire. The unfavorable repercussions would be felt in the so-called satellite area, notably Poland and Hungary, in Ukraine and the Caucasus, and in the Kremlin itself. We, too, can use the summit idea politically and psychologically with purposes which contradict those of the Kremlin. Not to meet at the summit with good reasons is not a vulnerable position.

THE KENNAN FABLES

By HON. MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN

Member of Congress from Ohio

Last November and December the British Broadcasting Corporation featured George F. Kennan in a series of six lectures titled, "Russia, the Atom and the West." This series of lectures was spread over a six week period, the last one given just as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was meeting in Paris in an emergency setting caused largely by the world-wide propaganda victory achieved by the Russian success in launching an earth satellite. This Russian feat led to wide speculation as to the military significance of the *Sputnik* with consequent doubts as to the adequacy of NATO to meet the Russian claims of overriding superiority in the missiles field, including the intercontinental ballistic missile. This was the setting for the NATO Paris meeting just as it was the setting for the Kennan lecture series over BBC.

A reading of the Kennan lectures leaves one with the feeling that here is a modern day Pied Piper of Hamlin. He produces what appear to be nice, easy solutions to very complex problems—much like the sweet notes on a flute—but as he rushes his listeners into an angry surf he fails to give fair warning of the relentless undertow that will pull them far out to sea. There is also a touch of Aladdin and his lamp, the magic rug and Yogi the mystic in Mr. Kennan's London performance. Yes, there are even bits of Potemkin's sleight-of-hand, skillfully interwoven with some sentimental appeals to questionable objectives.

These lectures, now published in book form, are valuable as a key to what is wrong with the foreign policy of the United States and how it got that way. Mr. Kennan once occupied positions of high responsibility and trust in the United States Government. As Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, he was in a position to lay down deep roots both as to policy and personnel sympathetic to its implementation. As Ambassador to Soviet Russia, his evaluation and impressions of the Moscow scene were used as authoritative guides in meeting day to day problems in our government's dealings with the world-wide Russian problem. Such influence has left its mark and accounts in a major sense for the fact that today we do not have a care-

fully defined, positive and dynamic national policy toward the Soviet Union. In its stead, our approach to the problems created by Russian Communist imperialism is bogged down with misconceptions about the Russians and their new empire, contradictions, self-defeating concepts and the negativism which goes with marginal goals. All these handicaps to a sound national policy toward the Soviet Russians are evident in Kennan lectures.

The Kennan discourse begins with a tribute to the Russians for what he describes as impressive economic success during the ten year period since his "Mr X" article was published. He concludes that the Russian success in launching an earth satellite is a dramatization of that program. The assumption he makes is that this success was a general end product of "impressive" industrial development and the result of Russian scientific and technological genius. Nowhere does he take into account the major role played by captured German scientists in developing the Russian earth satellite, a fact generally acknowledged in the free press. Also, he fails to point out the peculiar ability of the tightly controlled industrial capability of the Russian empire to put all its eggs in one spectacular basket. The Russians needed a sensational success in the field of science, and one which the free world would be able to see and evaluate. Events of the past years such as The Marshall Plan, the resolute action taken at Berlin and in Korea, the East German uprising, the Hungarian Freedom Revolution, and the general political unrest in Eastern Europe had seriously blunted the wave of the future long claimed by the Russian Communists. It is altogether probable that the Kremlin leaders put all their eggs in the *Sputnik* basket. Time will tell, but it is too early for us to equate the *Sputnik* feat with Russian "impressive economic success."

In examining what he calls "The Internal Soviet Scene," Mr. Kennan sees only two problem areas from what he views as the political side. The first is the struggle at the top, in the Presidium and the Central Committee and the second is the intelligentsia as represented by "academic youth" and "cultural intelligentsia." As he sees it, the struggle at the top is caused by pressure from the "cultural intelligentsia" who are to a large extent outside the apparatus of the Communist Party. Thus he appears to be completely unaware of the fact that the greatest political problem within the entire Russian Communist empire is Nationalism. The powerful political drive of nationalism is caused by the ever increasing demand of the non-Russian nations within the empire for recognition and complete independence of action from the bureaucracy of the Russian overlords. Even the communist elements and the managerial class within the non-Russian nations have been swept up by this political

movement. This movement begins with the masses of people who refuse to become Soviet citizens, as Mr. Kennan loosely refers to them. The non-Russian people of the empire are no less in tune with the era of nationalism in which the world finds itself than the people of Asia or Africa. People the world over today want to be recognized for what they are and not what some imperialists call them as a blind for the continued enslavement of nations. In his fifth lecture, however, Mr. Kennan takes note of the force of nationalism in the non-European world and sees it as "irresponsible new nationalism."

In this connection it is important to note the drastic step the Russian Communists have been forced to take as a consequence of the drive of nationalism within the Soviet Union. At no time during the forty years since communism became the doctrine of the Russian imperialists have there been so many non-Russian figures on the Presidium or in key positions of the Central Committee. This trend began shortly after Stalin was liquidated and Khrushchev has given great emphasis to it during the past year. Yet, in the face of these facts which Kennan ought to know as a reputed expert on Russia, he sees the struggle within the Russian empire as no more than an effort of the "intelligentsia" to win a few concessions from the ruling clique at the top. His reference to "the Russian cultural world" as a positive factor moving toward "complete intellectual and cultural freedom" discloses a deep-seated ignorance of the Russian character and some 300 years of history.

The Kennan lectures more than anything else carry a plea for a recognition of the *status quo*, which is, of course, the underlying objective the Russians now seek through another summit conference. In his first lecture he concludes on the note that we should show greater detachment toward events taking place within the Russian empire. He holds that "Their world is not our world;" which is a reserved plea for a world divided as it now is by virtue of Russian conquest and the police state. In his third lecture he advances the argument that we write off the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe by adjusting ourselves to Russian domination of these nations. This also is a stated objective the Russians have for calling another summit conference. Here is what Kennan has to say on the subject "there will simply have to be some sort of adjustment [to Russian occupation]* on the part of the peoples of Eastern Europe, even if it is one that takes the form of general despair, apathy, demoralization and the deepest sort of disillusionment with the West." He states as an argument for this write off of the once free nations, "The failure of the recent popular uprisings

* Author's insertion—ED.

to shake the Soviet military domination . . ." Here again he fails to understand the genuine political and psychological victory won by the Hungarian freedom fighters and the concessions the Polish people have been slowly but surely wringing from Gomulka and his Russian masters. It is the pressure of nationalism exerted by people of the captive nations coupled with the same type pressure which is being exerted by the people of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union which offer the best chances for peace and an end to the present unnatural division of humanity. Anything we might attempt to do to slow down or reduce these pressures would constitute unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of those many nations. The roots of Kennanism within our government have already reduced "Voice of America" broadcasting behind the Russian Iron Curtain to a faint and neutral whisper. There is far greater danger to our national security in broadcasting the theme of political evolution, which is a polite way of telling the enslaved people they must make accommodations to Russian occupation, than there is in the theme of individual liberty and national independence. There is little we as a nation can do to stop the new tide of human events which has been set in motion behind the Russian Iron Curtain, a tide which originates in the head-waters of nationalism. Our long range national interests and the cause of peace strongly urge that, at minimum, we take steps to associate ourselves with the coming victory of the non-Russian nations and people.

The second Kennan lecture suggests that the United States negotiate secretly with the leaders of the Kremlin, without regard to our NATO allies or the chartered role of the United Nations as an instrument for peace. He holds that NATO is too complex and inhibited to be useful in any negotiation with the Russians. This is the same line the Russians have been pushing ever since NATO came into being. He expresses the highly personal opinion that since the United Nations did not come into being until after the "predicaments" of the present were well along, therefore it should not be called upon to resolve such predicaments even though the peace of the world is at stake. To begin with he is historically incorrect in the assumption that the U. N. was created after these predicaments arose. The hard, cold facts are that the U. N. was created because of the prospect of the serious problems which now confront us and with the hope that they could be resolved peacefully on the basis of justice for all nations and people. It is also important to recall at this point that the Russians also maintain that the United Nations is unsuited to bring about peaceful solutions to world tensions. The Russians, like George Kennan, are doing their best to drag the United States into secret negotiations on a bilateral basis, a course

certain to wreck the defense structure of the free world and to put the United Nations out of business. The United Nations has not fulfilled all the hopes and expectations of the American people but it has served as a basis for uniting free people as in the case of Korea and in the case of Russian inhumanities in Hungary. Everytime the United States has been party to secret negotiations with the Russians or any of their communist henchmen, we have come out on the short end. Secret negotiations invariably lead to deals in which the interests of the common man are sacrificed to satisfy the vanity of the despot. The United States as a constitutional democracy is uniquely unsuited to the game of power politics but is ideally suited to the strategy of open covenants, openly arrived at.

The German people and their leaders were also struck a severe blow by Mr. Kennan in his BBC lecture series. Here is what he had to say on the question of a free and united Germany: "I wonder, in the first place, whether it is actually politic and realistic to insist that a future all-German government must be entirely free to determine Germany's military orientation and the obligations, and that the victor powers in the recent war must not in any way prejudice that freedom by any agreement among themselves." This obviously suggests that the Russians be allowed to limit the freedom of action of a united Germany to choose on which side of a divided world it will align itself. This is so because of the finality Mr. Kennan attaches to the present division of humanity and the fact that the people of that part of Germany, free to chart their own course overwhelmingly chose the side of free men. As to East Germany, Mr. Kennan sees little desire on the part of the people there to adjust themselves quickly to the free institutions of the German Federal Republic as he dismisses their case in the following words: "The long period of communist rule in East Germany will have left strong marks on the structure of life there." It is interesting to note in this connection that Kennan drags in the Gomulka promise to the Polish people "that the day the Americans leave Germany he will take up with the Soviet Government the question of the departure of Soviet forces from Poland." He fails, however, to disclose just how this Aladdin Lamp will close the huge gap between communist promises and performances which has contributed so much to the present critical division of the world.

Mr. Kennan has also concocted a bitter pill for the West Europeans, even though it is sugar coated with mysticism. He sees that scene as one in which the people are detached from the stabilizing influences of their rich heritage, reaching out for new and vague values which he fails to describe. This thesis flies in the face of the reality that Western Europe

is saving itself by a return to the old values, moral and political, which had been denied them by former leaders whose materialistic philosophy led them into the unrewarding game of power politics. It is true that American economic assistance programs lent a mighty helping hand in this process but the Western European people produced the leadership and moral fiber without which all of Europe would likely now be floundering in neutralism or attached to the Russian power bloc. Moreover, it was the determination of the European people to defend these old values which led to the establishment of NATO.

But this is not the way the self-designated historian, Mr. Kennan sees the recent past. He sees the constructive purposes of the European Recovery Program "overtaken and swallowed up in the space of a mere two or three years by programmers of military assistance based on a wholly different concept of the Soviet threat and of Europe's needs." This suggests that it was not really necessary for the Western European nations to construct a collective defense system or to keep it in a state of being comparable to the increasing Russian military threat posed in that area of the world. It seems he feels there is no geopolitical connection between the Berlin Blockade and communist aggression in Korea and Viet Nam. Nor does he sense the critical shift in the balance of power caused by the communist conquest of China, a development which forced responsible Western leaders to create new situations of military strength capable of deterring further Russian aggression and conquest. One can readily see that it is Kennan's limited conception of complex events taking place in the world arena which has led him into making proposals that have the ring of a wide-eyed, high school sophomore.

After lengthy treatment of the unhappy prospect of atomic warfare, Kennan repeats his belief that possession of this weapon of defense by the United States did not prevent the Russians from overrunning Europe in 1948 or at any other time. He also argues that the Russians never wanted and do not now want a general war, therefore, they would not have moved to occupy all of Europe even if we did not have the atom bomb. Why then, it is fair to ask, did the Russians keep in being since the termination of the war, a massive military striking force and dispersed in a manner to give them a huge initial advantage had they chosen the course of sneak attack? The Western nations, particularly the United States, quickly dismantled their war time military establishments. So rapid and complete was the disarmament that we were caught flatfooted and ill-prepared when the Russian-inspired communist war of aggression broke out in Korea. There never has been any

threat of aggression from the West so what motivated the Russians to keep such a massive military striking force in being?

Mr. Kennan also advances the idea, contrary to the reasonable estimates of responsible leaders in the free world, that the Russians are sincere in their claims for banning use of the atomic bomb, both as a military weapon and a diplomatic aid. He had this to say on the matter: "Surely everyone, our adversary no less than ourselves, is tired of this blind and sterile competition in the ability to wreak indiscriminate destruction." All sane men wish this were true but the realities of fact do not support this sweeping statement. Not quite four years ago the Russians launched a propaganda offensive in which they attempted to convince free people that the only alternative to an atomic war was what they called "peaceful coexistence." They used the same loose generalities peculiar to Mr. Kennan in explaining what they meant by "peaceful coexistence." The well informed on communist doctrine knew that this was a tactic developed by Lenin to lull the non-communist world to sleep, to cause free men to drop their defenses and thus to be easy prey to internal subversion and armed attack. More lately, Khrushchev announced that the first step necessary to "peaceful coexistence" was acceptance by the free world of the *status quo*. By way of enforcing acceptance of this condition, Khrushchev threatened the people of Europe with the spectre of atomic warfare unless they agreed. Even as Mr. Kennan was delivering the last of his lectures over the BBC, in which he pleaded the sincerity of the Russians, the Russians were engaged in delivering diplomatic notes to European members of NATO, the essence of which were thinly veiled threats that if they strengthened their defense capabilities, they would be marked out for early treatment by atomic warfare launched from the Soviet Union by missiles. It is only fair to ask who is rattling the atomic bomb and who is threatening atomic warfare unless a settlement of differences is entered into, on terms dictated by the Russians? Mr. Khrushchev's recent demonstration of diplomacy by ultimatum can hardly be taken as proof of the peaceful intentions of the Kremlin leaders.

Mr. Kennan's greatest weakness lies in his inability or unwillingness to recognize that basic communist doctrine calls for world conquest by any and all means. The Russian leaders reaffirmed this doctrine as late as last October by a manifesto issued in connection with the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. This objective coincides with the centuries-long dream of the Russians, a fact which Mr. Kennan also refuses to accept. In speaking of the prospects for a political settlement in Europe he makes this startling observation: "I do not think we know what the Russians do want." He would have been in much better grace

and surely more accurate had he said: "I do not think I know what the Russians do want." It is a distinct disservice to thinking Americans to say that they do not know what the Russians are up to.

The BBC lecture series by Mr. Kennan leave no doubt as to what he personally wants at this stage of world affairs. He wants a "clean slate." But he offers no practical formula for acquiring this much desired state of world affairs. It would be quite unfair to criticize him for not coming up with such a formula because it would require the instantaneous wiping out of the long history of man and the immediate rebirth of all mankind. Mortal man does not have that power. It can be said for the Russians that they have been engaged for several centuries in the re-writing of history to their liking and more lately have been engaged in efforts to create a new type of man called *Homo Sovieticus*. We trust that Mr. Kennan will henceforth not engage in the same kind of activity.

These are the main trends of thought, as I see them, expressed in the Reith Lectures delivered by Mr. George Kennan. There is much marshmallow and honey interspersed between the lines but this is the basic message he intended for his listeners.

There undoubtedly is confusion in the minds of a considerable number of people in Great Britain as to just who Mr. Kennan, former American career diplomat and now assuming the role of historian, represents. He does not carry any influence in the councils of either the Democratic or the Republican Party, the two major political parties. His "containment policy" was draped around the neck of the Democratic Party by the Republicans in the 1952 national elections, a maneuver which cost the Democrats the support of many millions of thinking Americans. He has never stood for public office in the United States, though it is said he did offer to do so if he could be assured of nomination with no opposition. It appears that he is rapidly losing what few public supporters he had through his newly assumed role as historian. A real disservice to Anglo-American relations will result if the BBC listeners assume that the proposals advanced in the Kennan lectures have any credibility on the American public scene.

In these circumstances, the British Broadcasting Corporation might well give thought to sponsoring another series of lectures titled, "The Kennan Fables." This would clear the air and provide a basis of much good humor, because Mr. Kennan has forfeited the right to be taken seriously on the Russian problem.

LANDS AND NATIONS IN THE U.S.S.R.

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

There are basically two ways of treating the involved subject of *Lands and Nations in the U.S.S.R.* One is a detailed description of the geography, climate, and peoples of the Soviet Union, a sort of travelogue winding up more often than none in a swamp of statistics and disconnected facts. For our purposes this would be too elementary an approach, accomplishing no more than perhaps a hundred visits to the Soviet Union and still not arriving at a fundamental knowledge and understanding of its lands and nations.

The second way of developing this subject is an institutional analysis of our subject which can show how the lands and nations came to be what they are in the present framework in order to grasp their significance for our actions in the present and for the future. It is an approach by which the lands and peoples are functionally understood in a working conception of historical movement that serves to furnish both background and perspective. As one cannot truly come to know a person by his surface appearance and transient utterances, so with societies, empires, states, and nations it is *sine qua non* to perceive the background, the habits, the fibres of traditional force, the living past in the object of our concern. Material resources are important, but peoples and nations which determine the level of resources are vastly more important. Indeed, the ultimate weapon is man, not what he devises.

In applying this institutional analysis to the Soviet Union our aim is to arrive at a meaningful pattern of understanding, applicable and usable for action in the "cold war," a "hot war," and also in a period of reconstruction. At no cost to accuracy and objectivity, this compact analysis is admittedly adapted for national security policy consideration in scrupulous line with our own traditions. Among other things it will seek to provide an empirical basis for a single moral and political standard guiding and justifying our actions in both the Russian Communist Empire and the Free World. Primarily, this analysis is directed against the many grave misconceptions currently imprisoning the thoughts of numerous high-ranking people with regard to the Soviet Union.

CURRENT MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION

Now what are these gross misconceptions upon which some presume to base our policies? The first and foremost is that the U.S.S.R. is Russia. One may perhaps excuse the average journalist for notoriously perpetuating this myth and all the errors it entails, but it is clearly unpardonable for any responsible official to reveal his limitations by committing this basic error. Russia, the homeland of the Russian people, is no more coincident with the U.S.S.R. than the United States is with North America. A second misconception has the Soviet Union as a "nation," with a Soviet people, a Soviet society, a Soviet economy, and a Soviet political system. Here, too, the Soviet Union is no more a nation than was the British Empire, and whether many realize it or not, these monolithic terms, which readily serve the semantic purpose of blurring the real, diverse, and distinctive elements in the Soviet Union, have for some time been the stock of Moscow's terminology for export. The true meaning of *soviet*, as a council of workers, is not even any longer recognizable.

From these two main misconceptions many others evolve. For example, how often have you heard that the U.S.S.R. is like the United States, "a country of many nationalities and ethnic groups," some 177 of them; or that, like the U.S., the Soviet Union has its "national minorities, the Great Russians constituting the majority"; or that the U.S.S.R. is a "federal union" like ours, Byelorussia being a counterpart of Massachusetts or, as the expert Mr. Kennan would have it, Ukraine a counterpart of Pennsylvania. These notions have as much meaning as those harbored by many uncritical Americans only a decade ago that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is actually like ours and that in many respects the U.S.S.R. is a democracy like ours. They bear as much validity in fact and history as the baseless assertions that "the Soviet Union was formed forty years ago," that "Kiev, Kharkiv, Baku are Russian cities," that "there are the Russian peoples," and that there is even a Gross National Product of the Soviet Union, which again suggests the fiction of a Soviet nation.

The greatest part of anyone's education is devoted to a proper and accurate identification of things and events. If an address or lecture contained remarks to the effect that the United States was formed in 1795 or that Warsaw or Helsinki is a Russian city, you would probably have prudent doubt about the interpretations and judgment of the speaker. Doesn't it follow with equal force of logic that if these misconceptions about the Soviet Union prevail, interpretations that follow can only be accepted with similar doubt. In fact, as the Nazi experience in the U.S.S.R. well attests, plans and policies based on flagrant misconceptions

invite only disaster. It is a truism that we cannot afford to misidentify the sources of the enemy.

If these are the ruling misconceptions, then the importance of this institutional analysis becomes manifestly evident. It can be significant for every concourse of our national activity in relation to the U.S.S.R., be it diplomatic, military, economic, political, or psychological. Above all, the analysis penetrates at the very base of the Communist Empire, indicating its strengths and weaknesses. Although admittedly there are several points of vulnerability and weakness in the Soviet Union—economic and sociologic in character—the force of nationalism in the U.S.S.R. is, in my judgment, the most dangerous for Moscow; and this despite the shifting opinions of the late Admiral Stevens and others. Thus our analysis cannot be undertaken in the usual historical vacuum, captioned by such rhetorical vagaries and cliches as "the fight against Communism and Marxism-Leninism." For an understanding of lands and nations, history is vital and indispensable in order to stave off all sorts of institutional hiatuses and ideologic simplisms. In short, as the Russian scholar, Nicholas Berdyaev, rightly warns in his classic work on *The Origin of Russian Communism*, "It is particularly important for Western minds to understand the national roots of Russian Communism and the fact that it was Russian history which determined its limits and shaped its character. A knowledge of Marxism will not help in this."

THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE U.S.S.R.

Let us then look into these roots, into this institutional background of the U.S.S.R. One of the most misleading illusions is that the Bolshevik Revolution represented a break with Russia's past and uniquely initiated a new and dangerous society. It is the height of unrealism to believe that any such institutional hiatus is achievable in the evolution of a social organism. The eminent Russian historian, Peter A. Struve, well points out that "The roots of the Russian revolution are deeply imbedded in certain basic facts and processes of Russian history."¹ In a perspective view down to the present, these processes can be basically summed up in three overall and predominant secular features: (1) imperial expansionism and conquest of nations, (2) totalitarian authoritarianism and tyranny, and (3) an institutionalized Messianism expressed in a variety of ideologies.


Considering the first imposing feature of the Czarist past and the Communist present, probably no definition of it surpasses the one offered

¹ *Social and Economic History of Russia*. Paris, 1932. Preface.

by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on June 26, 1951 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

Historically, the Russian state has had three great drives—to the west into Europe, to the south into the Middle East, and to the east into Asia. Historically, also, the Russian state has displayed considerable caution in carrying out these drives . . . The Politburo has acted in the same way. It has carried on and built on the imperialist tradition. What it has added consists mainly of new weapons and new tactics . . . The ruling power in Moscow has long been an imperial power and now rules a greatly extended empire. This is the challenge our foreign policy is required to meet. It is clear that this process of encroachment and consolidation by which Russia has grown in the last 500 years from the Duchy of Muscovy to a vast empire has got to be stopped.

A glance at a political map covering this imperialist expansion to 1914 is sufficient for one to appreciate the old Russian saying, "Russia grows larger and larger."



Tolstoy put it this way: "Russia is the Continent and Europe its Peninsula." A review of a condensed record of Russian imperialist expansion shows vividly that there really is nothing new in the drives of present-day Moscow. The three chief directions—west, south and east—the frequency of wars and aggressions, the "eternal peace" gestures followed by broken treaties, constant meddling in the affairs of other states, the tactic of alternation—first west, then east, west, and then south—and the relentless conquest of nations form an unmistakable

legacy for the heirs of the Czars. Fortunately American scholars are beginning to realize this. In one of the soundest books on this subject, Dinko Tomasic, in his work on *The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism*, captures the meaning of this institutional foundation of the U.S.S.R. when in reference to "Expansion, greatness of the state, ideas of grandeur and Messianic ideas of world redemption or world domination," he accurately concludes, "This tendency toward exhibitionism and ideas of greatness was manifested also in the glorification of Russia, and the belief in the sacredness of its exalted mission in the world."

Now let us consider the second institutional basis of Russian Communism, that of totalitarian authoritarianism and tyranny. Usually without defining what they mean, people ascribe to Communism certain institutional forms which, significantly, are deeply rooted in the traditional Russian base of so-called Communist institutions. For policy and political action, the importance of grasping this institutional Russian continuum cannot be too strongly emphasized. With only differences in degree due to technology and bureaucratic skill, totalitarian authoritarianism and tyranny—by which are meant thought and act aimed at the subordination of institutions and persons to a centrally dictating will—are not the mutational product of any Communist innovation in ethnic Russia. They, too, have their firm roots and experience in the cumulative tradition of Russian institutions.

Thus when one reads the reflections of de Tocqueville or *Journey for Our Time* of the Marquis de Custine, two able observers in the last century, one cannot but be impressed by the truth of this continuum. In his classic, *Democracy in America*, de Tocqueville observes: "The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him; the adversaries of the Russian are men; the former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its weapons and its arts; the conquests of the one are therefore gained by the plowshare; those of the other by the sword." Supplementing this reflection today, one may add that there can be no greater danger to civilization than the combination of modern technology and a barbaric scheme of institutions as found in the U.S.S.R. As so vividly shown by de Custine, it is a traditional scheme supported by the submissiveness, servility, and humility of the beaten Russian masses whose wounds have been largely palliated by dreams of the deliverance of the entire world. Russian history is replete with many writers of the stature of Timofeiev and Nekrasov who have rebelled against this chronic submissiveness to authoritarian rule.

A systematic enumeration of the paramount institutional forms of traditional Russian totalitarianism will further demonstrate, except for

degree and magnitude, the substantial identity of these forms in the past and present. The first form is statism and all that it entails in the way of leader worship, state dominance, parasitical bureaucracy, policy of concessions and the like. The far-flung importance of the state in the U.S.S.R. is self-evident. But what is not evident to many is the fact that statism has always been typical of "Holy Mother Russia." At the head of Russia was the "God" anointed head of the state and empire, the Czar. For example, Peter I, in every respect "the first Bolshevik," could without restraint dismiss the Moscow Patriarch and proclaim himself the "God anointed Head of the Greek Orthodox Church." He and other Czars set the precedent of deification for Stalin later. State and personal worship, bureaucracy, class stratification, and unlimited power were the dominant characteristics then as now. Concessions and their reduction to the people were determined by the weakness and strength of the regimes then as now. In this century, for instance, Nicholas II, forced by defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 to grant a constitution and a parliament, soon quelled the revolution and by decree neutralized the *Duma*.

How powerful the Russian institution of statism is can also be gleaned from the writings of Russians who oppose the present regime but not the power of "Holy Mother Russia." As a fair example, Alexander Romanoff, Grand Duke of Russia, writes: "Could I, a product of an empire, an individual raised to believe in the impeccability of the state, still continue to denounce the present rulers of Russia? The answer was 'yes' and 'no' . . . To remain loyal to Russia and to follow the example of the early Romanoffs who had never thought themselves bigger than their empire meant to admit that the Soviet Government should be helped and not hindered in its experiment and to wish it would succeed where the Romanoffs had failed."² Alexander Kerensky wrote in 1943: "Russia, a geographical backbone of history, should exist in all her strength and power no matter who or how he is ruling her. From this comes his (Miliukov's) testament for us; to be on watchful guard of Russia—no matter what her name is—absolutely, unconditionally, and to the last breath."³ These examples could be multiplied, including the *Nacionalno-Trudovoy Soyuz*—the Russian N.T.S. which, ironically enough, receives American aid.

The second institutional form, economic collectivism and planning, is also not without deep roots in the Russian colossus. So-called Communism has only magnified and refined collectivist economic instruments

² *Always a Grand Duke*, pp. 180-181.

³ *Novy Zhurnal*, No. V. 1943.

for more extensive state political control. The Five Year Plans and economic crash programs have in essence nothing over similar crash programs initiated by Peter I. Praised by the present Russian totalitarians as a "progressive empire builder," Peter spared no costs, either human or material, in the building of Petersburg and numerous industrial projects. In this century, on the eve of World War I, Nicholas II ordered his Minister of Commerce and Trade, Kriganovsky, to prepare a Five Year Plan for state execution.

This traditional collectivist mentality is observable also in Russian agriculture. The commune, known as the *mir*, institutionalized collective ownership of farm property and was managed by an elderman (*starosta*) who was appointed by the head of the local Czarist police. At the beginning of this century, under the Stolypin reforms which allowed peasants to leave the commune, only small numbers in Russia did, and even some of these returned. In Ukraine, however, as much as fifty per cent of all peasant holdings were turned into privately owned farms by 1915. Thus, the transition from the *mir* to the *kolkhoz* or *sovkhоз* was an institutionally easy one. The Russian *Narodniki* or Populists envisioned this transition to complete socialist enterprise, and in the same 19th century the Russian writer, A. I. Hertzen, well perceived this collectivist nexus.

To complete this institutional picture of the Russian continuum into the present, other dominant forms would include genocide and the Russification of conquered nations, censorship and the distortion of history, the Iron Curtain technique, the secret police, Siberian slave labor, anti-Semitism, the fraud of the Potemkin village, and diplomatic duplicity and fifth columns. These institutional forms are all compatible parts of a totalitarian whole and again, despite differences in degree, have their able precedents in the tradition. The record of genocide is long and extends back to the slaughter of the people of Novgorod, the fourth Eastern Slavic nation. The mass murder of the population of Baturyn under Peter I, the drowning of ten thousand Crimean Tartars in the Black Sea under Catherine II, and the massacre of Polish revolutionaries and Ukrainian Catholics in the Kholmland under Nicholas I are just a few precedents to the crimes of Stalin and Khrushchev.

The Russification programs under Stalin, in Turkestan, Ukraine and elsewhere, continued the Czarist policies of banning books not in the Russian language, as under Peter I, and the many cultural suppressions under Alexander II in the last century. The same holds true for censorship and the distortion of history. When, for example, in 1863 the Czarist Minister Valuev declared "There never was, is not, and never will be a Ukrainian language," he gave eloquent expression to a policy of

distortion and censorship which in different ways has characterized the Red regimes of Moscow. Prohibitions against traveling abroad and passports for travel within the Empire presented a Czarist version of the Iron Curtain technique now practiced more severely by Red Moscow. As to the dreaded secret police, the MVD has its erstwhile predecessors in the Czar Nicholas II's *Okhrana* and Ivan III's *Oprichchina*. Needless to say, Siberia and slave labor have a perennial Russian meaning which surely was not conceived by Communist ideology. So with anti-Semitism and the Potemkin villages, whether under Catherine II, Stalin or Khrushchev.

When it comes to diplomacy, duplicity, and divisive conspiracy, the institutional approach provides deeper insights into the present than any abstractionist reliance on the principles of Leninism. The progress of Russian expansionism over the centuries has been largely based on these factors. To mention only the zigzag operations of Alexander I, his double-cross of the Western allies for Napoleon in the Treaty of Tilsit was a perfect model for Stalin's double-cross for Hitler in 1939. Also, none of the countless violations of treaties by the Red Czars could improve upon Alexander's violations of the Holy Alliance of 1814-15. Although pledged to police Europe in the maintenance of the *status quo*, he used the alliance as an umbrella for the instigation of Greek uprisings against Turkey. Alexander himself only perpetuated for his heirs a tradition set by Ivan III, Peter, and Catherine.

To strike a note of irony here, let us see how Marx and Engels viewed the Russian menace in writings which are taboo in the Soviet Union. In an article on *The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism* (1890), Engels observed, "Once again stupid Europe was made a fool of; Czarism preached legitimacy to the princes and reactionaries, to the liberal Philistines it preached the liberation of oppressed peoples and enlightenment—and both believed it." How different is this today—peaceful coexistence for the West, arms for Asia and Africa; trade for the business interests, the inevitable "victory of socialism" for the masses and so forth? In an article on *Poland's European Mission* (1867), Marx strikes a familiar ring: "In the first place the policy of Russia is changeless, according to the admission of its official historian, the Muscovite Karamsin, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star."

The Czars of the past sought such domination and employed all the tools of the trade, including fifth columns and ideologies. One could go back to the conspiratorial fifth columns of Ivan III in his peaceful destruction of Novgorod in 1478, but again let's hear how Marx described it with reference to the Russian conspiracy in the Balkans, Austro-Hungary, and elsewhere. In the April 19, 1853 issue of the *New*

York Tribune, he wrote: "Hundreds of Russian agents perambulated Turkey, pointing out to the Greek Christians the Orthodox Emperor as the head, the natural protector, and the ultimate liberator of the oppressed Eastern Church, and to the South Slavonians especially pointing out that same Emperor as the almighty Czar, who was sooner or later to unite all the branches of the great Slav race under one sceptre, and to make them the ruling race of Europe." These deceptive ideologies of Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavism, now combined with so-called Communism, still play their role in totalitarian Russian expansionism.

Finally, for our understanding of Russia and its people, the third institutional strand—Messianism as expressed by deceptive ideology—must be briefly considered. Russian Communism, as Berdyaev puts it, is the third form of Russian imperialism, the dominant preceding forms being the "Third Rome" ideology and Pan-Slavism. In each the Messianic elements of sacred mission, protection and liberation of others, the certain deliverance of the world, and the racist superiority of Russia to achieve these ends are present. They sanctify the conquest of nations and by pretext justify more conquests. This was so in the restricted civilized world of the 15th-18th centuries, in the more expanded world of the 19th and early 20th century, and by virtue of technology and science, the complete world now.

The ideology of the "Third Rome" commenced with Ivan III in the 15th century when he claimed the privileges of the Emperor of Constantinople, proclaimed Moscow the "Third Rome," and adopted the double-headed eagle. The ideology was formulated by the Pakovian Monk Philoteus who in 1524 wrote: "All Christian empires ended and were absorbed by one empire—that of our autocrat, in accordance with the prophetic books, the Russian Czardom. Two Romes have fallen, and the Third exists; but there will be no Fourth."

Serving the expansionist interests of Russia, this Messianic belief has lasted 500 years, even into the present atheistic Russian empire. Peter the Great exploited it before he named, for the first time, his imperial realm "Russia." Propaganda before the partitions of Poland by Catherine II claimed that her fellow Orthodox had to be protected from Polish and Jesuit persecutions. "Protection of fellow Christians" and "protection of the Holy Places and the Orthodox" in Jerusalem preceded and sanctified the wars against Turkey. And in 1948, on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the independence of the Russian Church, Bishop Hermogen, Rector of the Moscow Theological Academy, let it be known that the present Patriarchate of Moscow alone preserved the true Christian Faith, not shared by either the Catholic or Protestant worlds. Clearly, this Messianistic expansionism not only continues yet

in the "Third Rome" form but also, and more importantly, has been channeled into the latest form of materialistic millenarianism known as Russian Communism.

But in the tradition there was and still is another Messianic form, Pan-Slavism. Here, too, it was a sacred mission, one of protection and liberation, and a means for world deliverance. The Czars proclaimed it their secret duty to unify all Slav nations, and the constant wars in the Balkans ensued. It was also a sacred duty to hoist the Russian cross over the *Hagia Sophia* in Constantinople and plant the Russian interests in the Near East. However, as Hans Kohn shows in his work on *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*, what started as Pan-Slavism soon developed into Pan-Russianism. Pushkin gave literary punch to this as all Slavic rivers had to run into the Russian sea. Nevertheless, this ideologic tool was used in World Wars I and II; it reached our soil with the attempted American Slav Congress only a decade ago; and is being dangerously exploited by Khrushchev in the Soviet Union today. In words that could be readily adapted to so-called Communism, Engels well observed that "in truth Panslavism is a smoke screen for world dominion, appearing in the cloak of a non-existent Slavic nationality; and therefore our worst enemy."⁴

The new smoke screen for world dominion is the third Messianic form, Communism. As a militant faith within the empire it vanished over thirty years ago with Lenin's New Economic Policy and with the re-introduction of traditional modes of totalitarian rule supported by mass submissiveness. It never actually took hold in the non-Russian nations conquered by the Russian Bolshevik armies. As many had predicted—among them Russian scholar Hertzen—Russian Communism quickly proved to be "Russian autocracy turned upside down." Like the "Third Rome" and Pan-Slavist ideologies, it nevertheless continues to be a tool for the empire.

If this institutional analysis is correct, then romantic notions about some institutional chasm between the submissive Russian masses and their Moscow regime, about a powder keg of popular revolt in Russia proper, about evolution to freedom through technical Russian education are dangerous illusions which could only benefit the present heirs of a totalitarian tradition. "Psychologically," as the late Father Walsh taught, "the Russian people—upon whom the Revolution is based and without whose acquiescence it could not have been launched or so long sustained—have always revealed qualities of frustrated mysticism which inclines them to constant acceptance of contradictions and paradoxes."⁵

⁴ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, p. 118.

⁵ Edmund Walsh, *Total Empire*, p. 44.

Let us now look at this Revolution and how the pains of this frustrated mysticism laid the foundation, in terms of conquered lands and nations, for the threat confronting our own national existence today.

THE RUSSIAN AND NON-RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1917

In thinking about our present policy it is extremely important to grasp the framework of essential events which occurred in 1917 and the period thereafter. First, an empire called "Russia," and built in the course of nearly 500 years, was in dissolution and utter collapse. Like the demise of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, its fate appeared to be sealed for good. Second, in that year there were three revolutions in the empire, not just one. There were two revolutions on the soil of Russia itself and one vast revolution for national independence among the non-Russian nations in the collapsing empire. What is called the Russian Civil War was between the White Czarist loyalists and the Red Bolshevik rebels: the revolution for national independence was fought by non-Russian patriots in the Baltic area, in Poland, in Ukraine, the Caucasus and in Asia against foreign Russian domination, whether white or red. And third, at the time both the Russian Bolshevik revolution and the national non-Russian revolution succeeded; the March Russian revolution with Kerensky failed.


The failure of the first Russian revolution and Kerensky's social democracy may be attributed to many proximate causes as, for example, Kerensky's greater concern for the imperialist retention of Ukraine and the Caucasus than for the political entrenchment of his government against Bolshevik competition. The ultimate cause of this failure, however, rested in the conspicuous absence of any institutional environment for democratic function in Russia—a significant point for romanticists envisioning a spontaneous democratic Russia in the future. As now, there was no real middle class in Russia for Kerensky to build on, and the weight of the totalitarian past could not be easily set aside. Lenin, who a few years before never dreamed of ruling Russia, provided the controls that were in consonance with the institutional sinews of the long Russian tradition. Despite his expeditious coup, he had the broad support of the masses with promises of land, bread, and peace. The politically-contrived notion that the Russians were the first to be victimized by Bolshevism is not supported by careful scholarship. In addition to Father Walsh and others, the Russian scholar George Fedetov, under whom I had the privilege of studying, wrote: "Moscow and Petersburg succumbed easily to Bolshevism . . . There must have been something in the Great Russian tradition that provided more food for

Bolshevism than the soil of the rest of the Empire: serfdom, the village commune, Czarist autocracy."

The truth is that in the rest of the Empire the struggle was not only against Bolshevism but also—even more so—against any form of Russian imperialism and colonialism. Decades before the full awakening of national consciousness in Asia and Africa, in the very bowels of the Russian Empire popular movements for national self-determination and independence surged forth. Significantly, passages from our own Declaration of Independence and the addresses of Lincoln and others were quoted to further inspire these movements; and with the announcement of Wilson's doctrine of national self-determination, they bloomed into open revolution. In contrast to Czarist bureaucrats and Kerensky Mensheviks, Lenin understood the full significance of these non-Russian liberation movements. Similar to what is going on today in Africa and Asia, even before the outbreak of World War I the Russian Bolsheviks sought to exploit the good and morally principled cause of national self-determination and independence for their own nefarious ends. Bolshevik literature abounds with this appeal to the non-Russian nations. In essence it repeats Lenin's writings on self-determination. As late as May, 1917, Lenin stated that, "If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break away from Russia, there is nothing bad about that . . . Anyone who says there is, is a chauvinist. No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations."

In 1917 and 1918, not only Finland, Poland, and Ukraine declared their independence and popularly determined themselves as sovereign states, but also Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, North Caucasia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkestan. Even within the territory of Russia, the Idel-Ural Republic was established among the Moslems in European Russia; the Far Eastern Republic was founded in what is now the Soviet Far East; and the millions of non-Russians and Russian "Siberyaks" in Siberia clamored for independence from Moscow. Many of these states, like Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, and Lithuania, were recognized not only by the new Soviet Russia, i. e. the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, but also by Western powers. Contrary to common misconceptions, there was no Soviet Union in this period; there was truly a Soviet Russia without a colonial empire, as shown on this map (see p. 30).

But this state of affairs was not for long. If not in words, certainly in deeds, Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks proved to be old-style Russian chauvinists. By familiar devices of divide and conquer, fifth



column infiltration, and the setting up of puppet regimes, Red Moscow picked up the institutional threads of the Russian totalitarian tradition and began to weave its own colonial empire. In this first wave of Russian Communist imperialism, the newly independent countries were invaded and conquered one by one until Trotsky's Red armies were stopped at the gates of Warsaw. Some, like Finland, Poland, and the Baltic nations, were fortunate to maintain their independence, thanks to Western aid and the absorption of Russian energy in capturing the economically richer prizes of Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Turkestan. In map form the picture appeared thus, after this first chapter in the conquest of nations by Soviet Russia (see p. 31).

This first series of conquests was made possible not only by the organization, armed might, and political devices of the Russian Communists but also by the ignorance of Wilson about the nature of the Russian Empire and on the part of others who supported materially the decadent Czarist forces which likewise fought the independence movements. One could only contemplate how different the course of history might have been in our time, had the principle of national self-determination been supported for all nations in the Russian Empire. History has shown, instead, that these early conquests laid the foundation both for an empire called the Soviet Union and for future aggressions leading to an



even more expanded empire. In 1922-24, as a response to the national feelings of its first captives, Moscow formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a spurious voluntary federation concealing a prison of nations. With this empire and given its opportunities, Moscow was prepared for future, direct and indirect aggressions, as the following maps show (see pp. 32-33).

U.S.S.R. — Moscow's PRIMARY EMPIRE

For those concerned with policy-making, the factors of population, resources, economy and so forth in the Soviet Union should have more realistic meaning in this institutional context than is otherwise the case. Statistics and factual data, especially those provided in the monolithic categories of Moscow, do not and cannot speak for themselves. An uncritical acceptance of such monolithic data in fact tends to misrepresent the realities of the Soviet Union and to breed all sorts of misconceptions, not to say some unwarranted fears. Aggregate population figures, for example, have considerably less meaning than those required by our context. Aggregate resources are also less meaningful than the particular location of these resources. So with economic and other aggregates resting on untenable assumptions about the nature of the Soviet Union and



serving to conceal important facts of economic colonialism, slave labor composition, occupational discrimination and a host of other inequities drawn along national lines.

The determining fact is that the Soviet Union is not a monolith nor has it ever been. It is not a country or nation like the United States or France; nor is it a genuine federation of nations. Like its predecessor, the Czarist Russian Empire, it is today Moscow's primary empire, with worse totalitarian features but also with the same multi-national pressures. Let us not confuse the terms nation and state. Legally, the present empire may be viewed as a state, but its political structure is multi-national; and at that consisting of relative few nations. As we saw, the Baltic countries were absorbed into this state or empire, but this in itself did not extinguish the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian nations. In fact, the criteria for what constitutes a nation, the integrating soul of a people—namely, common territory, descent, language, tradition, customs, history, and religion—are more applicable in number to such non-Russian nations as Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Turkestan than they are to many newly independent nations in Asia and Africa, or even to our own country where the language, in common with several other nations, is English. These non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. have all these qualities that make up their individual national consciousness and



their collective personalities, plus the indomitable will for national independence.

Without our institutional understanding of the Soviet Union, the usual population figures and charts could be very misleading. This shows up in such inaccurate usages as "the national minorities" or "177 ethnic groups." First, since we're dealing with estimates, there is real doubt that in the Soviet Union as a whole the Russians even constitute a majority. In fact, considering the dominant political position of Russia in the empire and the background to current statistics, there is every reason to believe that they are in the minority. Estimates on the basis of the empire census of 1897 show about 60 per cent of non-Russians. Lenin himself held that "In Czarist Russia the Russians constituted 43 per cent of the total population, i. e. a minority, while the non-Russian nationalities constituted 57 per cent." In the present period, it is interesting to read in the standard textbook used in the U.S.S.R. (*Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R.* by Balzak and others) that "Particularly rapid is the natural increase of population among the formerly oppressed nationalities . . . their rate of natural increase surpassing considerably the average birth rate of the U.S.S.R. as a whole."

There are many statistical tricks in padding figures for political purposes, as, for example, counting a person as a Russian because he


knows the Russian language or making election districts larger to reduce the quantitative influence of non-Russians. However, as in the above case or in the careless disclosures of G. M. Chekalin in 1941, slips are made. With the aid of governmental demographers, the Displaced Persons Commission took an interest in this subject and on the basis of reasonable extrapolations of the 1939 census, showed in the following chart that of an estimated total population of 202 million, over 54 per cent are non-Russians.

Estimates

Republic	Total	Russian	Non-Russian	% of non-Russians of total in republic
Estimated population..	202,087,877	91,520,472	110,567,405	54.7
Russian SFSR.....	114,337,428	83,923,672	30,413,756	26.6
Ukrainian SSR.....	42,272,943	3,889,111	38,383,832	90.8
Byelorussian SSR.....	10,525,511	757,837	9,767,674	92.8
Estonian SSR.....	1,120,000	91,840	1,028,160	91.8
Latvian SSR.....	1,950,502	239,912	1,710,590	87.7
Lithuanian SSR.....	3,134,070	78,352	3,055,718	97.5
Moldavian SSR.....	2,321,225	—	2,321,225	100.0
Georgian SSR.....	3,722,252	—	3,722,252	100.0
Armenian SSR.....	1,346,709	—	1,346,709	100.0
Azerbaijan SSR.....	3,372,794	327,161	3,045,633	90.3
Kazakh SSR.....	6,458,175	1,272,260	5,185,915	80.3
Uzbek SSR.....	6,601,619	369,691	6,231,928	94.4
Turkmen SSR.....	1,317,693	98,827	1,218,866	92.5
Tadzik SSR.....	1,560,540	—	1,560,540	100.0
Kirghiz SSR.....	1,533,439	179,412	1,354,027	88.3
Karelo-Finnish SSR....	512,977	292,397	220,580	43.0

It should be mentioned that soon after the release of this chart, in November, 1951, Beria sensitively denied its validity. Not only the overall percentages must have politically vexed him but also the breakdowns which refute the misleading notion of "177 ethnic groups." The non-Russian nations as represented by the non-Russian republics, with Turkestan combining the five Central Asiatic republics, comprise alone about 80 per cent of the total non-Russian population. This obviously leaves little for percentage distribution among the other so-called ethnic groups, most of which are tribes with no national character. In the event of the collapse of the empire, the problems will not be insoluble as Dr. Jessup and others suppose. Moreover, it is rather fuzzy thinking to regard any nation a "national minority" by virtue of its absorption and captivity in the empire.

The natural resources of the U.S.S.R. also assume more meaningful significance with the dimensions of our institutional analysis. In the



eight and one-half million square miles of this empire the most productive land, as you know, is in the oft-mentioned triangle from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and into Central Asia. Significantly, most of this area is located within the non-Russian homelands, notably Ukraine and its black earth region. For some time one of the great livestock countries of the world, Ukraine is the chief wheat-producing area and provides abundantly in sugar beets, oil seeds and numerous other commodities. White Ruthenia is important agriculturally in flax, grain, and potatoes. There are fertile regions in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the Uzbek area of Turkestan are some of the finest cotton lands and in the Turkmen area, cotton, grain, and oil seeds are prominent. The colonial importance of these non-Russian areas for Moscow is quite evident.

It is true that almost every significant mineral used in modern production is found in the U.S.S.R. However, to say that the empire is self-sufficient is as meaningless as the term "self-sufficiency" is vague. But here, too, it is vitally important to note the location of some of these mineral resources. Iron ore, of all kinds and grades, is located in the Caucasus, Turkestan, the Far East and, as one of the most important sources, in the Krivy Rih area of eastern Ukraine. For some time Ukraine was second to the United States in iron ore mining and doubled France, a leading European producer. In coal, the Donets Basin in

Ukraine, the Kuzbas in Turkestan, Georgia in the Caucasus rank among the greatest in the world. Among the largest oil centers in the world are the Baku in Azerbaijan, the "second Baku" in Turkestan where new oil finds requiring little refining have been made in the Fergana Valley. The largest manganese mines in the world are in Georgia which, along with Nikopol in Ukraine, supplies almost the entire output in the empire. About half of the copper, lead, and zinc resources are in Turkestan where also bauxite, uranium, silver, the exportable item of chromium, and tungsten figure prominently. Many of these resources are found in the Caucasus where Azerbaijan is also rich in zinc, silver, gold, copper, and vanadium. The resource base of the over 30 million Moslems in this empire is undoubtedly a firm one and should be considered, once we attain to the vision, in a general policy aimed at the entire Moslem world.

THE NON-RUSSIAN CENTRIFUGE IN THE U.S.S.R.

The Communist Djilas well points out that "In the U.S.S.R. operations are not concerned with Communism but are simultaneously concerned with the imperialism of the Great Russian-Soviet-state."¹ Both Russian institutional totalitarianism and Russian imperialism have been fiercely resisted by the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. The record is detailed by the decade for each of them. For the largest non-Russian nation, not only in the Soviet Union but also behind the European Iron Curtain, perhaps it suffices to quote William Henry Chamberlin who writes: "No people in Europe have a better fighting anti-Communist record than the Ukrainians."² Their nationalist upsurges in the 20's, the famous Kharkiv trials of 1930, the politically man-made famine of 1932-3—when the Russian satrap Kossior warned that "Ukrainian nationalism is our chief danger"—the purges and the Vynnytsia massacre of the 30's, their mass desertions to the Germans followed by U.P.A. underground operations against both Russian and German totalitarianism in the 40's, their leadership of opposition in Vorkuta and elsewhere in the first half of this decade, all these events and more signify an irrepressible will to re-establish the independence that was theirs in 1918.

The non-Russian centrifuge in the U.S.S.R. has always existed, but it has gained not even the knowing understanding of our Government, no less various means of support. In sharp contrast, Moscow's policy under Khrushchev has been shrewd and clever. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU he said that Stalin attempted to kill 40 million Ukrainians


¹ *The New Class*, p. 178.

² *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, 1950, Vol. VI, No. 1, p. 9.

and failed. His policy is different. He seeks to join them with a wide variety of favors and concessions under the semblance of Ukrainian independence. With no sympathetic ear in the West, Ukrainians and other non-Russians may well seek their freedom through other means than unrewarded self-sacrifice, and in the process we may stand to lose. Truly, the indifference of our policy in the cold war toward this non-Russian centrifuge hardly distinguishes itself from the nature of the German policy in the last hot war. "The steady flow of Ukrainian volunteers for the German forces we ignored. The millions of Ukrainians, who by themselves could have turned the scales in the east, were not only being left unused, but were actually being repulsed and disillusioned," writes Erich Kern in the best-selling *The Dance of Death*.

U.S.S.R. LANDS AND NATIONS AND U.S.

Can we do anything about this? The answer is emphatically yes. As this map indicates, we can conduct political warfare aimed at the



very heart of the Russian Communist Empire. It is impossible for us to realize the expansion of freedom in the world, and perhaps even to preserve existing freedoms, by giving the enemy the prime advantage of continually creating tensions on this side of the Iron Curtain. With

minimum danger of precipitating any hot war, we can employ diplomatic, political, psychological, and cultural weapons in an area that is even more important than the so-called satellite one. In the empire within an empire we can truly generate pressures for freedom by simultaneously pursuing these three goals: (1) real national self-determination and independence for all the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union, (2) the advancement of decentralist Siberyak tendencies in the Asiatic sphere of the R.S.F.S.R. itself, and (3) the hope of genuine freedom to countless innocent Russians in an attempt to create and broaden a discernible rift between the Moscow government and the underlying Russian masses.

This strategy of liberation through guided evolution confirms our own Great American Tradition. It offers us the long-awaited opportunity to follow a single moral and political standard of national self-determination and independence anywhere in the world. It focuses world attention on the remaining and worst empire in history. Its expression alone would decimate the aims of such spectacles as the recent Asian-African Conference in Cairo by relentlessly working for the affirmative answer to the question posed in *The New York Times* editorial, "Moscow's Glass House": "Is freedom any less the right of Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Moldavians, Armenians, Georgians and the like than it is of those about whom the Cairo meeting pretends to be so solicitous?"⁹ Whether we'll sensibly work for this answer depends on our intelligent attitude toward the same problem that Marx recognized a century ago this decade, when he said, "They will have learned before that the idea of Russian diplomatic supremacy owes its efficiency to the imbecility and the timidity of the Western nations, and that the belief in Russia's superior military power is hardly a delusion . . . There is only one way to deal with a Power like Russia, and that is the fearless way."¹⁰

CONDENSED RECORD OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALIST EXPANSION XV — XX Centuries

- 1478 — *Ivan III*, Grand Duke of Moscow, conquered free Republic of Novgorod the Great.
- 1485 — conquered and annexed to Muscovy the Grand Principality of Tver.
- 1492 — provoked first war with Lithuania for borderlands, ending in 1494.
- 1499 — second war with Lithuania until 1503.
- 1507 — *Basil III* resumed war against Lithuania, concluding in 1508 an "eternal peace."

⁹ December 30, 1957.

¹⁰ *New York Tribune*, December 30, 1853.

Lands and Nations in the U.S.S.R.

- 1510 — conquered and annexed Republic of Pakov.
- 1512 — Basil's second war with Lithuania commenced and continued till 1522.
- 1517 — Moscow annexed independent Grand Principality of Ryazan.
- 1552 — *Ivan IV* (the Terrible) conquered the Czarate of Kazan.
- 1556 — conquered the Czarate of Astrakhan.
- 1558-61 — expansion through White Ruthenia to Latvia and conquest of Smolensk.
- 1581 — *Ivan IV* conquered Czarate of Siberia and start of eastward expansion.
- 1617 — under Romanov dynasty, Peace of Stolbovo and partition of Karelia between Moscow and Sweden.
- 1654 — Alexis wars with Poland over Ukraine.
- 1658 — Moscow starts war against Ukraine.
- 1667 — Peace of Andrusiv and partition of Ukraine between Moscow and Poland.
- 1687 — *Peter I* wars with Turkey and the Khanate of Crimea.
- 1696 — conquest of Asov.
- 1700 — (a) treaty with Turkey and cession of Asov settled.
(b) Peter wars with Sweden for the Baltic coast.
- 1721 — Peace of Nystadt with Sweden and acquisition of Latvia, Estonia, Ingemanland and West Karelia.
(1) "Russia" established.
- 1722 — Peter I began war with Persia.
- 1723 — acquired western coast of Caspian Sea with Baku.
- 1733 — Empress Anna interferes in war of Polish Succession.
- 1756 — Russia interferes in war with Prussia, the Seven Years War.
- 1769 — *Catherine II* wars with Turkey for Black Sea Coast.
- 1772 — achieved first partition of Poland, with occupation of greater part of White Ruthenia.
- 1774 — peace with Turkey, annexing Black Sea Coast from the Don to the Bug and the Karbada.
- 1775 — destroyed the semi-independent Ukrainian Military Republic.
- 1783 — Catherine annexed the Crimea.
- 1787 — began second war with Turkey.
- 1793 — second partition of Poland and occupation of Lithuania and Courland.
- 1799 — *Paul I* interfered in war with France.
- 1801 — annexed Georgia.
- 1806 — *Alexander I* began war with Turkey.
- 1809 — Sweden cedes whole of Finland and Aaland Islands.
- 1812 — Peace of Bucharest, cession of Bessarabia by Turkey.
- 1813 — Alexander wars with Persia.
- 1816 — Russia embarks on full conquest of Caucasus.
- 1826 — *Nicholas I* wars against Persia.
- 1828 — Peace of Turkmanschai, acquisition of Erivan etc., from Persia.

- 1828 — Nicholas began war with Turkey and continues to conquer Caucasus.
- 1829 — Peace of Adrianopolis, annexation of Danube Delta and Caucasian Black Sea coast.
- 1853 — Nicholas resumed war with Turkey (Crimean) and began conquest of Turkestan.
- 1855 — Alexander II completed conquest of Caucasus.
- 1858 — in Central Asia, conquest of Amur.
- 1860 — annexation of Assuri.
- 1868 — conquest of Samarkand and Bukhara.
- 1875 — acquisition of Sakhalin.
- 1877 — war on Turkey.
- 1878 — Congress of Berlin, annexation of southern Bessarabia, Batum Kara.
- 1898 — Lease from China of Kwantung with Port Arthur and Dairen.
- 1900 — occupation of Manchuria.
- 1904 — war with Japan; checked Russian ambitions in Korea, China, Tibet.
- 1914 — Russian conspiracy at Sarajevo; assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by Serbian student Princip, who was in Pan-Slav movement financed by St. Petersburg.
- 1918 — Soviet Russia attacks Ukraine, whose independence it recognized.
- 1920 — attacks independent Georgia which it recognized.
- 1922-23 — forced incorporation of these areas in "federal union" of U.S.S.R.
- 1939 — attack on Finland.
- 1939 — attack on Poland.
- 1940 — annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
- 1945-49 — Moscow-centered empire encompasses Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria; satellite Yugoslavia; North Korea; mainland China; Mongolia.
- 1950 — Tibet.
- 1954 — North Vietnam.

KHRUSHCHEV'S COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

With the firm establishment of Nikita Khrushchev in the Kremlin, a new age has opened up in the USSR. It is already to be seen as quite different from the time of the rigid centralized system and collectivization introduced by Stalin; but it does not offer any new prospects for the growth of freedom and the removal of tension. Change has been necessitated by the new industrialization, which has put larger resources into the hands of the Soviet Russian rulers for the expansion of their influence and the successful exploitation of their new position.

One of the sectors in which the new-found Soviet power is being exerted is the field of foreign aid. Yet we would err grievously in equating this in any degree with the policy of the United States in extending relief and assistance to the nations that suffered so heavily in World War II and to the underprivileged and undeveloped nations and peoples of Asia and Africa. Rather, it is far more an extension under modern conditions of the policy which was practiced by Stalin at the expense of the peoples of the USSR during the twenties.

At that time it was the intention of the communist leaders to flood the European markets with raw materials. Quite secondary in the thought of the Kremlin was whether there was a real need for solid currency or whether the population of the USSR could stand the strain imposed by the policy of the government. Even in the last years of the New Economic Policy, keen students of the economy of the USSR and especially of Ukraine realized that the need for increased shipments of grain was seriously hampering the well-being of the Ukrainian peasant. This became sharply pronounced after collectivization and during the artificial famine of 1932-33. During all this period the Russians sold a disproportionate amount of grain on the world markets almost below cost, in order to foster the fiction that all was well at home and to depress the state of the economy of the free countries. The same situation held true in regard to the export of lumber. The great prison camps of the far north ruthlessly drove the unfortunate inmates to greater and greater exertions so as to maximize the amount of lumber that could be exported or used in the industrialization program.

In this period the chief Soviet possibilities for interference abroad lay in the dumping of the raw products of the Soviet Union. The result was the impoverishment of the local agricultural population, which was deprived of those opportunities for comfortable living and good food that it had had under the Czarist regime, when each village lived its own more or less self-contained life, hard and burdensome, it is true, but which still allowed the use of individual initiative to some degree. Home weaving and other domestic industries made it possible for the peasants at least in winter to satisfy in advance their needs for the coming season of working out of doors. Collectivization killed all this. By design of the government, the supplying of factory-made goods to the peasants did not make up for the ending of the home industries, and so the village sank lower and lower in its scale of living.

However, industrialization and the building up of large industries proceeded apace, as Stalin strove desperately to overtake the leading industrial nations, including the United States. It was the discontent produced by this policy that greatly hurt the Soviet Union in the early days of World War II, especially in Ukraine, leading to the mass surrender of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers. This policy might have been fatal had the Nazis not embarked upon the even more insane policy of ill-treating and neglecting those prisoners who fell into their hands and refusing all rights to the civil population. This checked the flood of surrenders and desertions, especially after the German troops entered the Russian SFSR and gave Stalin the right to claim that the Great Russians were the mainstay of the USSR. That and lend-lease from the United States enabled Moscow to surmount the crisis.

The West did not appreciate the situation, and in their desire to be friends with the USSR they allowed the Russian Communist forces to take possession of the present satellite states and to install therein their own type of government with all that that implied. Most of these states in the pre-war days had been in agricultural Europe. When the Communists were able by a successful *coup d'état* to take over Czechoslovakia, however, they were able to add to their domain an industrialized community which in 1939 had enjoyed quite an advanced scale of living. They secured extensive factories in working condition and were able to integrate these into their new-found industrial development.

This introduced a new element into the European situation, seriously threatening all the rest of Europe, which had been ravaged and destroyed on a large scale in World War II. Catastrophe was averted by the Marshall Plan, which in its various ramifications made it possible for the devastated countries of Europe to restore their industries and to remodel their armies.

Recognizing the danger to their policies posed by the liberal assistance offers that were being made by the United States, the Russian Communists peremptorily refused to allow any of the nations within the Iron Curtain to accept them. Thus they found another way for strengthening the Iron Curtain and insuring a further disruption of the trade of these countries, a trade which before World War II had been carried on predominantly with the West.

American aid to the already industrialized countries of Western Europe flowed very largely through already recognized channels. The Governments with their leading economic advisers knew in most cases what they wanted and how to apply the proffered help, with the result that in a very few years the industrial capacity of Western Europe exceeded what it had been at the outbreak of the war. Even such countries as Greece and Turkey, which had less developed economies but possessed men familiar with the techniques of the modern world, were able to take advantage of the opportunities presented either by direct aid or through the World Bank to bring about a more equally distributed prosperity than they had ever known. They created new industries and new sources of income, adopted better methods of agriculture and showed themselves able to become part of the new European Community that was painfully being formed.

When it came to extending aid to some of the less developed lands in Asia and Africa, however, additional obstacles were encountered. The new states were extremely proud of their newly-formed independence; each thought that it should receive the lion's share of American assistance. They resented some of the questions which were raised both by the American government and the World Bank as to the need and practicality of some of the schemes they proposed. They objected to the American proviso that arms would be furnished for national defense, but not on a scale large enough to allow aggressive action.

In this situation some of these countries were willing to label the American action as imperialism and colonialism, sure slogans for arousing antagonism among the underprivileged masses, although the wiser leaders understood very well that the questions that were raised were vital for the future well-being of their economies. As an Indonesian remarked in a private conversation, these countries were not so much bothered by imperialism and colonialism as by a dislike on the part of a large part of the population for that steady and persistent work that alone guarantees the functioning of a complex organization.

THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST VENTURE ABROAD

It was this accumulated dissatisfaction that gave Khrushchev and his cohorts their opportunity in the Middle East, where the Arabs were

particularly exasperated by the founding of Israel. Some of the Arab states talked loudly about the need of securing enough arms to wipe out Israel and were hurt when they did not receive complete sympathy in Washington.

Nasser in Egypt opened the door wide to Soviet Russian penetration of the Middle East by making a large purchase of Czechoslovak arms for which he promised to pay with Egyptian cotton. Then, rightly or wrongly, the United States withdrew the promise of funds for the Aswan Dam, a favorite project of the Egyptians, on the ground that the commitments to Czechoslovakia would cause Egypt to spend there the money which the country had expected to use for the Dam. The Russians promised the money, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and then the futile attack of Great Britain and France, which resulted only in the blocking of the Canal and the deepening of the hostility of the Egyptians toward the "imperialistic and colonial" powers, while the Soviet Union made haste to declare its full support of Egypt in its efforts to liberate itself.

From here it was but a step for the Syrians in their turn to accept Soviet help, thereby alienating Syria still further from the West. [After World War I, France had claimed a protectorate or at least a sphere of influence in that country.]

These were the early major interferences of the Russians outside of their contiguous territory. Paying off handsomely, they set a pattern for the administering of Soviet aid. The very nature of the Soviet regime makes it possible to extend aid much more rapidly than the West can. Moscow in almost every case has first supplied arms to the underdeveloped countries in return for elaborate promises to repay later in raw materials at a minimum rate of interest. The Russians have never questioned just how they are to be repaid and they have been willing to honor the word of the country on the receiving end, but they are able to insist on payments in such amounts of raw materials that the recipient country cannot hope to repay without weakening its own economy still further or seeing itself forced into an unpleasant situation in case of a slump in the price of raw materials.

Burma found this out to her cost when she traded a certain amount of rice for cement. The result was that Burma could not provide the normal amounts which it had sold in the past to other Asiatic countries. Moscow in turn sold the rice to them at a price lower than Burma had ever asked. In addition the cement was dumped in Burma during the rainy season so that much of it was ruined, but the Russians made no allowance for this.

At the same time the Russians have not insisted upon the inclusion of Communist leaders in the government, being content for the time being to allow the country to deal as it will with the native Communists, many of whom were trained in the Moscow propaganda schools. Besides, these men who have operated for years in non-Communist lands may be a menace to Moscow. They may preserve too many memories of the struggle for national independence and may have become tainted with a form of bourgeois nationalism, as were the bulk of the Ukrainian Communist leaders during and immediately after the Ukrainian-Bolshevik wars in 1918-1920. Most of them were later liquidated on one pretext or another.

In the beginning Moscow has found more suitable to its purposes the hyper-nationalist young army officers. These youth respond in vain glorious fashion to the great amount of modern arms with Russian instructors accorded them, far more than contained in the more sober offers of the West and the United States. Their national pride is titillated by the willingness of the Russians to offer help; payment is deferred, with no one bothering too much about the precise details. These men are undoubtedly patriotic, but they have not had the experience of dealing with Soviet tactics. By the time that they do learn, there is the excellent chance that they will be bound in Soviet chains, while Soviet "advisers" will have taken over the important posts.

As already mentioned, the Russians have meanwhile contracted for such large quantities of produce for shipment behind the Iron Curtain that the countries concerned find their normal markets closed to them, while the Russians are supplying part of these from the payments received in return for the Soviet aid. In this manner the Russians are aiming both to force their trade within the Communist bloc and at the same time to establish a single control over all those materials that the free world needs from the more outlying districts of the world, especially from those upon which Moscow has set its heart. This process will go even further if latest reports that the Russians are planning their own international bank to control all exchanges and purchases outside of the Iron Curtain prove to be correct.

But since Moscow has set its goal not international prosperity but Communism and Russian domination, it is not tempted to extend its assistance everywhere. It has much preferred to concentrate heavily upon such areas as the Middle East, where it has found a relatively firm foothold, and by a show of lavishness in a few selected places lure other undeveloped countries into the Soviet net.

Since this aid is only a device and a weapon in the cold war, Moscow still retains its training school for Communists. These are later

sent into the very lands being aided to overthrow the government once the people have been propagandized to admire the high qualities of the Soviet Union and the Russian Communists. We have an example of this in the case of India, where Moscow is giving Nehru a steel mill and other products of Soviet industrialization, while at the same time the Indian Communists are working to get control of the different states, such as Kerala, in order to undermine the central government.

This is only an adaptation of the same old policy of infiltration that the *Borotbisty* and the *Ukapisty* were encouraged to adopt in Ukraine. Cooperating, they weakened the central regime of the *Rada* and later that of Petlura, but then they found it relatively easy to merge with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party. A very few years thereafter they were all liquidated on the ground that they represented a bourgeois nationalism.

The new policy of Khrushchev with his stress on competitive co-existence is then no step toward the relief of the tensions that exist between the free world and the slave imperialism of the Russian Communists. It is a policy which must be taken into account and opposed at every turn without fear or hesitation.

COMBATTING COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE

The opposition to it must take two forms. The United States and the World Bank must continue their foreign aid to many scattered areas. They cannot concentrate on merely one or two selected sections of the world as can the attacking Russians, for in that case, Moscow always can shift direction and suddenly pour huge amounts of supplies into some neglected area which is beginning to show signs of life. At the same time, however, the West must realize that this aid cannot always be given only to sound business risks. All these underdeveloped areas are obsessed with the dream of becoming industrial powers. Wherever there is the slightest possibility of accomplishing something, therefore, they should be helped more generously and with more tact than has been the case heretofore. In far too many instances the requests for both arms and financial assistance have been allowed to wander too long in a maze of bureaucratic red tape and super-detailed studies. The net result has been a mood of disappointment and frustration, a mood which has made these states all too amenable to the blandishments and offerings of the Soviet bureaucrats.

Moreover, the free world must step up its propaganda and stop soft-pedaling the situation that exists behind the Iron Curtain. The timid reaction of the United States and the United Nations to the Hungarian people, daring to risk their lives in a desperate struggle for liberty,

was wholly disheartening. Today there are far too many people in the free world who would like to believe that the situation behind the Iron Curtain is a permanent one and that some sort of development is possible which would peacefully allow the ideas of the West to penetrate. This is a dangerous illusion. On every side it is becoming increasingly clear that the relaxation after the death of Stalin was only a temporary affair, a mere respite for the new regime in Moscow to formulate its own plans for extending its domination. Even if Moscow seriously desires a reduction of tension, it is for its own purposes and not with the idea of promoting a lasting peace.

Consequently it is time now for the West to sharpen its own propaganda in two related fields. It must redouble its efforts to explain to the nations outside of the Soviet orbit the duplicity of Moscow. To date these nations have seen a Soviet Union, a government which seemingly desires peace and normal relations with other nations and government on official levels. They must be made to see also the Russian Communist Party centered in Moscow, which issues orders to step up sedition in the countries of the world with which its Moscow façade government is friendly.

This propaganda can be skilfully given a lasting foundation by stressing again and again that behind the Iron Curtain there exists a deep dissatisfaction in the satellite states, as witness Hungary, and that furthermore the Russians even on the territory of the USSR are practicing an unbridled imperialism over all the non-Russian peoples they have succeeded in dominating. To be hammered home is that these include many of the Mohammedan peoples of Central Asia, the spiritual brothers of many of the nations that are being attacked and infiltrated in the Middle East and in southeastern Asia.

There are reports that in Indonesia the Communists are pretending that the creed of Islam can be reconciled with Communism. There are stories that they have even built mosques in some areas, even though they are striking hard to eliminate the mosques in old, Russian-dominated Central Asia. Tomorrow they can do the same in Lamaist territory, even though they have oppressed and liquidated Lamaistic people, as the Kalmuks, in the Soviet Union itself. Moscow first learned this stooge stratagem when it inspired with sympathy for the ideals of Communism a certain number of Christian idealists. It is working the same device among the adherents of other religions, as in Israel, at the same time that it is not recognizing at home any Jewish cultural community.

This black-and-white contrast between what is happening to the non-Russian peoples in the USSR and the promises that Moscow is

making to the still uncommitted nations is not being capitalized upon by the propagandists of the United States and the free world. Instead, they acquiesce only too readily with those "democratic" Russians who regard it as blasphemous to detach any territory from "monolithic Holy Russia."

The new campaign of Khrushchev can only be met by a complete reconsideration of both the machinery for extending aid to undeveloped countries and the propaganda that is being sent to them. On neither score is the free world adequately countering the methods of the Russian Communists. The hope of a coexistence still lingers in too many influential quarters and too many even today fail to realize the real deadly nature of the struggle. Khrushchev's smiles are quite as dangerous as Stalin's frown—they must be recognized as such. The USSR has gone far in industrial development and presents a very different picture now in 1958, but it is pursuing the same brutal and relentless policy that marked its inception. The West must grasp this fact and refurbish its methods all the while retaining its firm conviction that freedom is indivisible and that the hopes for a happier life must be accorded not only the uncommitted nations that are being wooed by Moscow, not only the satellite states, but all the peoples of the USSR without exception. If the free world once accepts this central fact and acts upon it, it cannot but turn the course of events, disarm the Russian Communists of Moscow and inaugurate a new era for humanity.

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AS A TOOL OF SOVIET "PEACE POLICY"

By ALEXANDRA SULYMA

The most characteristic feature of the Soviet propaganda for co-existence with the democratic world is that it directs its appeal no longer exclusively to the "proletariat." It is looking for ways to win over to its side other social elements including the essentially bourgeois and to inspire in them sympathies for Communism, for Communist Russia, or at least for neutralism. For this purpose the Russians are using the most varied means to make the free world lose its spiritual and moral and also material means of self-defense against the aggression of Communism. This explains the steadily growing efforts at the spiritual expansion of Moscow in the various countries of the free world in its different strata. Following the instructions of Lenin, the Soviet workers are making maximum use of the democratic freedom of the West to paralyze and destroy that freedom.

There is developing a grandiose but still bloodless battle for the future of humanity. For this struggle Moscow is mobilizing without distinction all its powers and resources. One of its most pliant and principal tools in the Russian Orthodox Church.

We must do justice to the workers of the Russian Church by granting that they have undertaken their mission not from fear but from conscience, although this mission is as far from the tasks of the Church as heaven is from earth. In carrying out the tasks of the Russian people and their Communist Party, the church officials of Moscow sometimes show such farsightedness and appreciation of the Russian Communist approach that they are able to foresee and anticipate the actions of the Kremlin and in some way outline its trends in political concepts and still keep in the shadow and yield the undenied palm of primacy to the leaders of the Party. This interesting fact is to be carefully considered. In 1945 at a Pan-Anglican Conference in London, Nikolai, the Metropolitan of Kolomna and Krutitsk, chief agent of the foreign policy of the Russian Orthodox Church, said: "I believe that both our churches will serve the cause of our peoples and the cause of peace in the whole world."

In June, 1945, when this was said, the tactics of coexistence had not yet been worked out by the Kremlin and it was necessary to have a great deal of an unchurchly practical sense and political courage to speak in such language of coexistence.

The church for the first time boldly and on a grand scale approached the "peace" propaganda in July, 1948, when the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of Moscow attracted the representatives of the majority of the Orthodox Churches there who were then induced to join in issuing an appeal to all Christians on the need of peace. (*Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, 1948, Special Number).

From that moment the propaganda for peace has become the chief political goal pursued by the Moscow Patriarchate in its effort to make itself useful and indispensable to the Kremlin. From that moment, it seems, there has not been a single number of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* which has not contained a special section: "In Defense of Peace." Since that time there have been countless addresses on this subject, there has been devoted to it an endless series of visits, and books have been published in various languages. Though in the first appeal for peace, issued in the name of the Orthodox hierarchy with a purely Muscovite tinge, the peace-loving character of Orthodoxy was contrasted with the aggressiveness of "the Catholic and rationalistic-Protestant West," the Russian Church very soon placed its own ethos in the background and applied *itself* to its task—to involve as many circles as possible in its propaganda for peace.

How broad and universal the propaganda of the Patriarchate for peace is, can be seen from the conference of all churches and religions in the USSR organized in Zagorsk in May, 1952. Here Patriarch Alexis sat side by side not only with a Catholic bishop but also with a Jewish rabbi, a Mohammedan *mullah*, and a Buddhist *lama* to approve a common appeal to the believers of the entire world on the opposition between entry into war and faith in God. It is true that the conference was called by the Moscow Patriarchal Church and so the latter strengthened its leading position in religion in the USSR and beside its political goal there was a question of church prestige.

Now all the actions of the Russian Orthodox Church are connected with the propaganda for peace. All the delegations coming to Moscow to the Patriarchate are so treated that on their return to their countries they will be the bearers of the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence. The inseparable character of the ecclesiastical statements and the political lectures received in Moscow were expressed, for example, by the Anglican priest, Stanley Evans, at the time when he left the USSR and telegraphed the Patriarch: "We are deeply grateful for the sincere welcome which

all Orthodox people whom we met gave us and for the experience which we have had in contact with them. We will work without stopping for the strengthening of the mutual relations between our churches and peace between our peoples (*JMP*, 1955, No. 8, p. 8.).

The approach of the Moscow Orthodox Church to the problem of peace must therefore be identified with the approach of the Communist Party of the USSR, with the only difference that the Church permits itself its own pseudo-religious motivation of the basic principles of the Soviet conception of peace.

The chief ecclesiastical preacher of peace, Metropolitan Nikolai, emphasizes that the USSR is the leader of the policy of peace in the entire world (*JMP*, 1955, No. 8, p. 30) and said aloud to the naive Sovietophiles: "My country is not preparing to attack any one" (*JMP*, 1950, No. 12, p. 15); with the intention of overwhelming the politically disoriented, he resorted to false pathos and, as if surprised, asked: "Where in the East is the tyranny?" against which the West wishes to fight in defense of Christian civilization (*JMP*, 1954, No. 9, p. 44-46).

In defense of the positions of Communism Metropolitan Nikolai offers proofs which would not be stressed by the Party or political circles of the USSR who for the final success of their political mission must be hampered by a certain sense of political responsibility. The ecclesiastical ambassador of the Russians, Metropolitan Nikolai, is allowed to go to the international forum as a free amateur, dressed in the robes of his ecclesiastical authority and given the power of a wide initiative. When the Metropolitan descends to the role of Khlestakov, no one questions him, but he finds people in the Western world who fall under the spell of the spiritual rank of the preacher and have faith in his words. The Metropolitan in this situation trusts himself to affirm even that the USSR in its peaceful policy is guided not only by political considerations but also by the principles of human morality, which are identical with the Christian conscience (*JMP*, No. 8, p. 30). He inspires the thought that the government of the USSR has always stood for peace and for co-existence. (*JMP*, No. 5, p. 33). One need only have a slightly critical attitude toward these fantastic ideas for them to be shattered into powder but it is not the custom to contradict the highest officials of a Church, and so they are accepted as the bearers of truth and people yield before them and Metropolitan Nikolai counts upon that, not always without success.

Russian ecclesiastical circles always pay close attention to the political aims of the moment, which the Kremlin sets itself in its political coexistence and they steadily try to apply the resources of the church influences to assist in the achievement of its goals. Under the cloak of

propaganda of peace, the Russian ecclesiastical leaders defended the reunion of Korea under Communist leadership (*JMP*, 1953, No. 9, pp. 29-30). The Patriarch himself considered it necessary to protest against the "American aggression" in Korea (*JMP*, 1955, No. 2, p. 20). The Church leaders even went so far that they spoke out against the alleged use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons on the territories of Korea and China and they issued their protest against this not only in their own name but in the name of "true Christians of the entire world" (*JMP*, 1952, No. 5, p. 26). The effort to secure a "united Germany" in the spirit of the so-called "People's Democracy" has been for years a subject of church propaganda.

The supporters of Russian Orthodoxy understand that the chief obstacle in the path of Russian aggression is America. So when they are faced with the fulfillment of their mission of extending their influence into the United States, they have a solemn *The Deum* for the health of Eisenhower and in the intentions, allegedly, of the peace-loving Russian and American peoples. But this does not prevent their characterizing American culture as Satanic:

It is not a Christian but a Satanic culture, the culture of sharpened knives against their neighbor, the culture of the domination of greedy exploiters, a culture which offers to the Christian world not the Christian odor of virtues through which the follower of Christ can win the kingdom of Absolute Love and Truth but the odor of dead bodies piled up by evil will and the hands of anti-Christian robbers and murderers (*JMP*, 1950, No. 12, p. 33).

The Church is trying to surround the Soviet Communist system with an aura of holiness. The Church is trying to explain the rise of Communism in Russia and its spread beyond the boundaries of Russia as a phenomenon which is said to have nothing in common with the Party's political interests but flows allegedly from the moral needs of the human race. So everything connected with the spreading of the idea of Communism must be justified, glorified and sanctified as the highest wisdom of life. The very appeal to the moral nature of man—in the opinion of the theologian Krashennikov—demands that humanity strive to rebuild social relationships on the basis of Communism which is to secure eternal peace on earth and "good will among men."

Carefully concealing the phenomena of the Soviet totalitarianism and terror, Krashennikov writes:

We must recognize that the new shores of social development are wide enough to contain all peace-loving humanity with all the variety of its political and religious convictions, but there must be one will for mutual understanding and peace, which of course will be able to arrange at the proper time the peaceful life of the peoples.

As the result of this good will, the movement of the opponents of war does not exclude and at a certain time foresees the possibility of the peaceful merging coexistence of various social and economic systems in the foreseeing of a peaceful change of the outmoded forms of social life. (JMP, 1950, No. 8, p. 32).

This was said openly with the accent on the historical perspective and was said with the understood Communist optimism, but usually the significance of these lines is not clear to elements alien to Communism but is to the adherents of the practice of Communism, whose old ideology of Marxo-Leninism does not satisfy and who seek the correction of the imperialistic Russian Communist practice in those manifestations of Russian consciousness which are nearer to their hearts than Marxism.

The present policy of the Russian Communist Party has its justification not only in the materialistic ideology but also in the ecclesiastical and idealistic. This ambiguity of ideas is a sign of the spiritual exhaustion and uncertainty of the Communist Russian world. The materialistic interpretation of events is becoming steadily less convincing and needs the help of an interpretation of another order, an appeal to absolute morality, to the Law of God. Materialism in the form of Marxo-Leninism with even opposition on principle to religion continues to exist as the officially recognized significant factor of Soviet consciousness but also in a quiet steady battle idealism is winning some positions but only to lay foundations for and to strengthen the final goals set by materialism, when it proclaimed Soviet Communism the highest ideal of a religious person.

The idealistic religious philosophy is emerging as a twin of the materialistic, taking from the latter a large number of conceptions and categories; is it easy to project these into the conception of the world which for the ecclesiastics has a large number of aspects closely bound to the Bolshevik materialistic theory. Both the church and the Party put forward the idea of peace not for itself but in connection with the idea of the so-called socialist justice and the concept of the "liberation" of nations, with the idea of the permissibility not only of defensive war but of a war for social and national liberation, thus dividing wars into just and unjust. Under this division every war in the interests of Russia and its Communism can in advance be recognized as "just" as well as "progressive" and "holy." But this is the aspect of the Communist Party and the ecclesiastical conception of peace, which has been fittingly proclaimed only for internal use, in the USSR itself, so as to guard and develop the psychological adaptability of the Soviet masses to the future war, and externally the accent is a lid only on the pathos of peaceful coexistence, the preaching of confidence, and on the part of the Church on the preaching of Christian love among the people of two conflicting worlds.

The leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church understand that the fatal argument against the Communist-Orthodox "love of peace" is the proof of the inclusion of the Church in the work of the Communist Party with the political mission of the Soviet government. The Church is especially afraid of reproaches in its political interest in questions of peace and very zealously is trying to prove to the outside world its non-political character, and even decidedly rejects the "playing of politics" by the Vatican and the World Council of Churches.

But the connection of Russian Orthodoxy with the policy of Communism is so evident that an absolute denial by the workers of the Church would convince no one. So there has been developed an ambiguous casuistic formula: the Church is interested not in politics but in the rebuilding of social human life on more moral and more ethical bases.

Our Church avoids politics, despite the assertions of its enemies, in the sense in which the people of the West understand them. But it cannot stand apart from life. It cannot be indifferent to such questions as injustice and legality, violence and freedom, cruelty and mercy, wealth and poverty, the false and truth, evil and good. It only decides these questions in a special way for centuries its own. It looks at life and judges it as the Chief Pastor, Christ the Savior, looked at it and judged it, as He would look and judge about it now.

The Church knows how He would look and judge; it cannot be mistaken for there has been left to it the immortal and precise Interpreter of life, the Holy Gospel. It is not to the sorrow of the Church but to its joy that the civil government is carrying boldly into life many of those high moral principles which it always and unchangingly has preached and does preach (*JMP*, 1955, No. 6, p. 27).

These words reflect a refined blasphemy. The Church is building around itself an aura of mystic infallibility so as to conceal under the cloak of its obvious purity the filth, blood and suffering on which Communism has grown up. The Holy Gospel and Jesus Himself are dragged in for this justification. The consciousness of the Western bourgeois, intelligent man or ordinary fellow must be deadened by a splendid myth, a brilliant show, the categorical character of revealed truth.

The present scepticism of the West cannot be overcome by logic and fantasies can hardly be taken for proofs but the weary modern man of the West is longing for flashing marvels, and Russian Orthodoxy, reckoning on the psychology of the Western decadence, gives the Western individual decisive doses of Communist Orthodox morphine, which serve certain circles to produce the psychosis of Sovietophilism.

In the patriarchal palace they count upon the political naivete of the native of the West together with his deep sense of religion. In its fight for peace, the Russian Church comes out against "politicizing" and still more zealously preaches the highest measure of the religiosity of its peaceful appeals. The problem of the coexistence of two worlds is given especial Christian significance (*JMP*, 1955, No. 2, p. 43); every

propaganda step in the question of peace begins with a statement that all Christians must pray as zealously as possible that God give peace to the world and only after such a prelude there is revealed the propaganda of the Soviet political principles exposed under a religious veil; an appeal is made to the original purity of evangelical Christianity:

We are not free to corrupt the childlike, simple teaching of Christ, intelligible to every one and clear as crystal, which does not allow any Christian war of aggression; murder by Christians is unthinkable and it is impossible to use force in the name of an assumed preservation of Christian civilization (JMP, 1955, No. 8, p. 34).

This idea of peace is given a clear theological basis supported by Gospel texts:

"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God" (Matt. 5,9). The performance of this commandment—in the opinion of St. Tikhon Zadonsky—is more important for Christians than even the performance of the commandment of mercy, for the merciful will only receive mercy, but the peacemakers will be called the children of God

On another occasion, when He said in an imperative form to his disciples "Have peace one with another" (Mark, 9,50), the Lord established love of peace as an unchangeable law of the activity of a Christian (JMP, 1950, No. 10, p. 19).

Thus every step the representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate appeal to the texts of the Gospel, knowing that the religious consciousness of the Western sects and the reformed churches are filled with a deep pietism before the Gospel.

The clever Moscow intriguers even do not stop at justifying with texts from the Gospel as "the union of all" and "Let all be one" the Soviet imperialism as an evangelical phenomenon (JMP, 1950, No. 3, p. 27).

Thus it is the mission of the church workers of Moscow in the propaganda of peace to use all connections, all judgments and ideals of the Western man, and place at their service all the traditions of the mass psychology of the West.

They know that in the Western world abstract idealistic humanism has not yet been overgrown. To snare people of this type they raise the idea that the world is based on faith in the better side of human nature, on "noticing in one's neighbor the better and not the worst qualities" of his soul. To this abstract humanism an appeal in an applied and pseudo-magnanimous manner is made in the style of cosmopolitanism:

My Brothers! We are children of different lands, but our feet tread one earth and one sun shines above us, sparing no one in its generosity.

Everything that stands between us is conditional—laws, mode of life, customs, manners. Everything which is given as our common share is majestic, eternal and full of joy Is it sensible to build a house and burn it, to dig a pit and fill it, to plant flowers and trample them and to carve a precious

stone and throw it into deep water, to bring a child into the world and then to drown it in a soldier's uniform and kill it?

Peace is not an act of politics. It is a matter of the greatest importance, a general need, the beginning of beginnings, the starting point for human existence upon earth . . .

Then, friends, brothers, dear comrades on our short earthly journey—let us defend peace!

Let us take each other by the hand and go forward into life!

When Metropolitan Nikolai delivered this address, masterly in form and sparkling in its cunning, before the World Congress for Peace in Helsinki on June 25, 1955, the hall greeted it with sincere and thundering applause (*JMP*, 1955, No. 7, p. 44). As a clever student of the Western man, the Metropolitan waved before his audience the allurements of the quiet sweetness of the beauties of nature, the vital forces of life, the vegetation of the smallest flowers, the joys of music, poetry and love and opposed to all this the awful phenomenon of war. He charmed his listeners and made them mediums to let them go from the conference blind and deaf to the language of common sense, to let them go as confirmed bearers of the Soviet poisonous "truth."

The leaders of the Russian Church know that for broad circles in the West democracy is a fetish, before which they bow blindly and unthinkingly. So in the propaganda for peace the Moscow ecclesiastics put in the list of democratic principles "the right of a man to arrange his own life" (*JMP*, 1950, No. 3, p. 25).

The Western Philistine is afraid of the accidents of life and he fears the hard blows of fate. The nightmare of war terrifies him and gives him frightful visions. The Russian Orthodox Church takes advantage of this quality of the Western man and presents to the Philistine the ghastly picture of the terrors of a future atomic war and employs for this picture the Biblical fears of the prophecies of Ezekiel (*JMP*, 1955, No. 5, p. 5). This is necessary to confuse the citizen so that he will take full advantage of the democratic system to vote against those who have a realistic view of a future war.

"Men do not wait for peace, they take it by storm" — these winged words shine constantly over Moscow. In accordance with these the Soviet ecclesiastical machine works fiendishly, trying to create a moral pressure for the maintenance of peace, until the policy of peace assures best the success of Russian Communism. Its task is to see that Communist and Sovietophile opinion, making use of democratic principles, will compel the policy of peace on the Western powers without a glance at the realities of political calculation. The Russian Church believes that it finally succeeded in paralyzing the capacity of the Western world to defend itself. Only when the instinct of self-defense perishes in the

West, will there come the war which is to give the Soviets every chance of success.

To bring that time nearer, the Church is hurrying and losing no time and is preaching anti-war sabotage. It approves the refusal to transport arms and soldiers and favors strikes in munition plants (*JMP*, 1950, No. 3, p. 24).

"The peace-creating" activity of the Russian Orthodox Church has a very wide range and reaches to every corner of the globe. Naivete and political undevelopment are the best aids for its triumphs. But resistance is growing.

The powerful forces of Catholicism, the united efforts of the Protestant and reformed churches must bring out the irreligious character of the activity of Russian Orthodoxy and unmask for the citizens of the free world the provocation in the political actions of the Russian Church and how its peaceful words conceal aggressive actions. The attack of the Russian Church with the aid of the Soviet police on the Ukrainian Catholic Church of Western Ukraine and the shooting of hundreds of priests and faithful offer good proof in facts of the peace-making words of the Russian Church.

REHABILITATION OF P. POSTYSHEV

By MYKOLA HALIY

Novy Mir (The New World), the organ of the Union of Soviet Writers, announced in May of 1957 that the publishing house, "The Young Guard," had issued the memoirs of Pavel P. Postyshev, entitled, *From the Past*. In making reference to this, the editor wrote: "Today Pavel P. Postyshev is no longer among the living, but our people will always remember this famous Leninist, one of the most outstanding leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state."

The rehabilitation of Postyshev would not normally evoke any acerb comments had he not been connected officially with certain activities in Ukraine. This having been so, the entire program of de-Stalinization initiated in February, 1956, by Premier Khrushchev, then a member of the "collective leadership," is open to serious doubts and challenge.

For Ukraine and the Ukrainian people Postyshev represents one of the most brutal criminals and terrorists produced by modern Russian Bolshevism. The activities of Postyshev in Ukraine in the years 1933-37 do not constitute minor and insignificant errors with respect to the Communist power; on the contrary, they involve a wholesale massacre of the Ukrainian population, an unprecedented liquidation of Ukrainian intellectuals, indiscriminate destruction of Ukrainian culture; the burning of Ukrainian books in the style of Hitler's vandals; and the mass genocide of the Ukrainian people through man-made famine.

It would seem that the rehabilitation of Postyshev did not come about by accident. The "collective leadership," after having condemned Stalin, had to "solve" somehow the case of P. Postyshev as well. It had two alternatives: an open trial or a posthumous rehabilitation. Evidently Khrushchev could not follow the first alternative, inasmuch as he would have to try not only Postyshev but the entire Russian Communist elite, including himself. Therefore, the second was followed, namely, the exoneration of this erstwhile genocidist of Ukraine.

Postyshev was Stalin's principal henchman, who, together with Khrushchev, liquidated not only the entire leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine, but committed wholesale murder of the Ukrainian population on a scale that easily approaches genocide.

To understand properly the atrocities of Postyshev in Ukraine and the masterful plan of Stalin and his bloody counselors regarding the liquidation of Ukrainian opposition, we must review briefly the historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine and the growth of the Ukrainian movement in the first decade of the Soviet power in Ukraine.

In the historical perspective, Ukraine always posed a vital problem for Russia in all the latter's stages of development. The nationality problem has been the Achilles' heel of all the regimes and political systems of this semi-feudal and slave state. Therefore, Russia's policy with respect to the nationality problem has always been the same: ruthless and extreme. Brutality and police terror, including physical liquidation of all those who in one way or another aspired toward freedom, social justice and the national and political independence of their people, were always the outstanding characteristics of Russia with respect to the non-Russian peoples.

In Ukraine this inhuman policy of Moscow was especially cruelly pursued in the 30's, assuming such dimensions that even the Western world, traditionally blind to the suffering of the nations enslaved by Russia, reacted against the inhumanities perpetrated by the Russian Communists. The period of this particular phase of the Russian Communist domination of Ukraine is known as the dreadful *Postyshevshchyna*, after the principal executioner of Stalin's policies, Pavel P. Postyshev himself.

Post-revolutionary Ukraine, in the course of a few years of intensive work and struggle, had undergone an outstanding metamorphosis which completely altered its national configuration. The industrialization of Ukraine contributed a great deal to the change of the national composition of its cities and industrial centers. The Ukrainian proletariat rose from a minority to a majority of the population, while the cities were engulfed by the nationally conscious Ukrainian element from the villages. By 1928 the number of Ukrainian workers, especially those who came from the countryside, had grown tremendously. In subsequent years this working class group was increased by a million more young Ukrainians from the villages and hamlets.

These developments underscored the thoroughgoing changes which took place in Ukraine in such a short time. The heretofore predominantly agricultural community was rapidly transformed into an industrial state. As a result, Ukraine ceased to be a narrow national problem to be interpreted one way or another from the viewpoint of the "correctness or incorrectness" of Stalin's nationality policy. Instead, it became a state, with all the attributes and problems of the state. The Russians, who endeavored to stop this swift progress of Ukrainian rebirth by inventing

a "theory of two cultures" (Lebedev), envisaging the Russian culture in the cities and the Ukrainian culture in the villages, were soon ignored. There developed a new culture which was 90 per cent Ukrainian which dynamic and progressive, supplanted the old Russian culture in Ukraine.

This young and dynamic development pushed Ukraine into a dangerous rivalry with Russia. At the outset of this rivalry it had already become clear that the slogans of Moscow regarding the "equality and brotherhood" of all the nations of the former Russian empire, and Lenin's motto of "self-determination to complete separation," were but falsehood and deceit. The non-Russian peoples were quick to realize that Moscow's objective was to destroy all the cultural and political achievements of the Ukrainian and other peoples and to reduce non-Russian nations to the level of provincial tribes.

It was evident that in Ukraine this could be accomplished only with the wholesale destruction of the Ukrainian intellectual forces and through enforced Russification.

The assault of the Kremlin began with the official approval of the Communist Party. One of its communiqüs stated as follows:

On January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks voted a historical decision. This decision is to dispatch to Ukraine Comrade Postyshev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and also to dispatch one of the most outstanding workers of our party, Comrade Khatayevich, and to restore as head of the GPU Comrade Balitsky, who for many years devoted himself to the struggle against the Ukrainian counter-revolution . . .

Postyshev arrived in Ukraine with hordes of Yezhov's secret spies and operatives whose purpose was to subdue, and eventually destroy the Ukrainians.

Speaking before a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in November, 1933, Postyshev said:

Take, for example, the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, where are hidden a considerable number of nationalists. There, under the auspices of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, was edited and published outright propaganda of chauvinism for the separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union, which makes one wonder where were the Ukrainian literati and the party organs? It is a fact, moreover, that in 1930 in the compilation of the section of Ukrainian culture of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences there appeared the following thoughts:

"With all its connections with Asia, Ukraine, from earliest antiquity to modern times, from the cultural viewpoint was always a corner of Europe, and it is impossible to understand its culture and art without connecting it with Europe. The Ukrainian arts—are part of the general European evolutionary process . . ."

Of course, the Russian Communists were unable to see that a scientific concept of the linkage of Ukraine with the culture of Western

Europe could hardly constitute a "propaganda of chauvinism"; and yet it was the Soviet constitution that guaranteed that any Republic member may freely secede from the USSR, whenever it so desires.

On another occasion, Postyshev stated:

We should hound our enemy to the end, to complete destruction. Death to Ukrainian nationalists, bandits, Petlurites! Beat him, the Ukrainian nationalist, the counter-revolutionary, beat this scum and have no fear . . .

In reading this one cannot help thinking of Nicholas Bukharin's characterization of the Russians. "The Russians," he said, "are the people of Oblomov, emissaries of death, disease and destruction by famine, the destroyers of cultures of foreign nationalities . . ."

The notoriety of Postyshev reached the Western European countries when he began implementing the man-made famine in Ukraine. In the fall of 1933, the press of Western Europe was full of alarming news about the catastrophe in Ukraine:

Le Matin: "The present-day situation in Ukraine—ruin, famine, and a tomb-like silence. Entire villages are dying out . . ."

The Manchester Guardian: "In the Ukrainian village it is quiet as in the cemetery. The misery of the enslaved, decimated people goes beyond imagination . . ."

V. Ammende: "Russia aims indirectly toward the destruction of the great part of the present generation of Ukraine . . ."

Victor Serge: "Now mass arrests are taking place in Ukraine. The guilt of the arrested: opposition and separatism. What awaits these young revolutionaries after the Moscow trial is not hard to imagine: death! The Ukrainian national and social cause must perish, smudged by the dirt of lies and blood."

Postyshev was responsible for the misery and destruction of the Ukrainian people. He openly stated time and again that he was sent into Ukraine to "steam out Ukrainian nationalism and counter-revolution with a hot iron," and this he did all too successfully until the fall of 1936. At that time he was removed from his post as secretary general of the Communist Party of Ukraine for "ideological deviation" and for the poor output of the Donbas mines. Thereafter he disappeared in the jungles of the NKVD network. He was succeeded by another hangman, S. Kossior, who lasted only until the end of 1937, when new disturbances in Ukraine threatened to upset the Soviet rule. Stalin then sent Molotov, Yezhov and Khrushchev, who were given unlimited powers to liquidate the "nationalist opposition" in Ukraine. Despite the objections of the Ukrainian Politburo, Khrushchev ordered another purge in Ukraine, which did not omit S. Kossior himself. The rule of the communist power in

Ukraine was then placed by Stalin in the hands of Khrushchev, who kept Ukraine in a state of total subjugation, which was one big reason why Stalin had implicit trust in his administration.

It is now clear why Khrushchev and Co. have decided to rehabilitate Pavel P. Postyshev, the hangman and executioner of the Ukrainian people. None other than Nikita S. Khrushchev himself earned the name of "Butcher of Ukraine," for he successfully completed the heinous work of P. Postyshev in plundering and devastating Ukraine and committing outright genocide upon the enslaved Ukrainian nation.

[Sources: *Proletarska Pravda*, No. 157, 1932; *Visti*, No. 188, 275, 1933; *Komunist*, No. 59, 1934; *Izvestia*, April 17, 1934; *Pravda*, No. 28, 1934; *Bilshovyk Ukrayny*, No. 1, 1934; *Novi liniyi v natsionalno-kulturnim budivnytstvi (New Lines in National-Cultural Construction)*, *Biblioteka Bilshovyka Ukrayny*, No. 24, 1930; V. Ammende: *Muss Russland Hungern?*]

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GROUNDWORK FOR WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION LAID BY CONFERENCE IN MEXICO CITY

Over 50 delegates representing 65 nations of the four continents gathered on March 20-25, 1958 in Mexico City at a Preparatory Conference with the purpose of convening a WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION in the near future.

Among the delegates were representatives of 65 nations: Asia and Australia—14 nations; Europe—15 nations (including Israel, Japan and South Africa); North and South America—22 nations and the ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) representing 14 nations enslaved by Moscow.

The Preparatory Conference was called jointly by the "Inter-American Confederation of the Defense of the Continent" and by the "Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League." The decision to work towards a world-wide Congress was taken in Taipei, Taiwan (Formosa) last fall at a meeting of the leaders of these organizations.

After six days of deliberation and work on the part of the Preparatory Conference, effectuated through various committees, it was decided that such a Congress will take place on October 23, 1958, on the second anniversary of the Hungarian freedom revolution, and that it will take place in one of three capitals: Istanbul (Turkey), Athens (Greece) or Lisbon (Portugal).

THE STEERING COMMITTEE

The WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION will be prepared by a fifteen-man Steering Committee, which was elected at the Preparatory Conference in Mexico City. It comprises the following leaders:

Dr. Ku Cheng-Kang (Free China), Dr. L. George Paik (Korea) and Dr. Nguyen Huu Thong (Vietnam)—Asia;

Admiral Carlos Penna Botto (Brazil), Dr. Jorge Prieto Laurens (Mexico) and Dr. Sergio Fernandez Larrain (Chile)—Latin America;

***Hon. Charles Edison and Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky—United States;
Fritz Cramer and George Dallas—Europe;***

Jaroslav Stetzko and *General Ferenc Farkas de Kisbarnak*—the ABN.

[In addition, two seats on the Steering Committee have been reserved for the Middle East and South Africa].

Marvin Liebman (United States)—General Secretary of the Steering Committee;

Francis J. McNamara (United States)—Deputy General Secretary;

Salvador Diaz Verson (Cuba)—Secretary of the Press;

Regional Secretaries: *Ernesto de la Fé* (Cuba)—Latin America;

Alfred B. Gielen (Germany)—Europe; and *Inamullah Khan* (Pakistan)—Asia.

UKRAINIAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE

Among the Ukrainian conference participants were the following:

Jaroslav Stetzko, President of the Central Committee of the ABN, and outstanding Ukrainian nationalist leader, who came from Munich;

Miguel Angel Rubinec, representing 14 nationality organizations in Argentina, who was also an official delegate of Argentina;

Dr. Vasyl Bezhlibnyk, representing the ABN in Canada;

Michael Sosnovsky and *Vasyl Boyko*, representing the League of Ukraine's Liberation in Canada;

Ignatius Bilinsky, editor of *America*, Ukrainian Catholic daily of Philadelphia, Pa., representing the American Friends of the ABN;

Dr. Nestor Procyk, of Buffalo, N. Y., representing the Organization of Four Freedoms of Ukraine;

Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Bulletin* and Acting Editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, representing the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA).

STEERING COMMITTEE'S PERSONALITIES

The members of the Steering Committee are the well-known anti-communist leaders:

Dr. Ku Cheng-Kang is President of the "Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League" and a prominent Chinese statesman; *Dr. L. George Paik* is President of Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, while *Dr. Thong*, Secretary of the "Asian League," is an attorney in Saigon, Vietnam;

Admiral Carlos Penna Botto is president of the "Inter-American Confederation of the Defense of the Continent" and chairman of the "Brazilian Anti-Communist Crusade"; *Dr. Laurens* is Secretary General of the "Confederation" and a prominent statesman of Mexico; *Dr. Larrain* is an outstanding industrialist of Chile;

Fritz Cramer, former general in the Imperial German Army, and owner of Hotel "Adlon" in Berlin, is President of CIAS (Committee of

Information and Social Action); *Mr. G. Dallas* is former Secretary of the British Labor Party;

Hon. Charles Edison, son of the famous *Thomas Edison*, is a former Governor of the State of New Jersey and Secretary of Navy in the Roosevelt Administration;


Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky is Professor of Soviet Economics at Georgetown University and chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA);

Yaroslav Stetzko is President of the Central Committee of the ABN, while *Gen. Ferenc Farkas de Kisbarnak* is in charge of the Military Department of the ABN;

Marvin Liebman, General Secretary, is also secretary of "The Committee of One Million" in New York;

Francis J. McNamara, Deputy General Secretary is a director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and Consultant to the House Committee on Un-American Activities in Washington;

**PREPARATORY CONFERENCE OF THE WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST
CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION HELD IN MEXICO CITY**



Standing from left to right: *Walter Dushnyck* (U. S.); *Miguel Angel Rubinec* (Argentina); *Ivan Boyko* (Canada); *Vasyl Bezchlibnyk* (Canada); *Michael Sosnovsky* (Canada); *Dr. Nestor Procyk* (U. S.). Sitting from left to right: *C. M. Chang* (China); *Yaroslav Stetzko* (ABN); *Adm. Carlos Penna Botto* (Brazil); *Dr. Jorge Prieto Laurens* (Mexico); *Dr. Salvador Mendoza* (Mexico) and *I. Bilinsky* (U. S.).

Salvador Diaz Verson, Secretary for the Press, is Chairman of the Inter-American Press Association;

Inmanullah Khan of Karachi (Pakistan), Regional Secretary for Asia, is head of the "World Union of Moslems";

Alfred B. Gielen, Regional Secretary for Europe, is also Secretary of CIAS and head of its German section;

Ernesto de la Fé, Regional Secretary for Latin America, is the former Minister of Information of Cuba.

The meeting of the Preparatory Conference was conducted by the presidium consisting of *Adm. Carlos Penna Botto*, *Dr. Ku Cheng-Kang*, *Dr. Jorge Prieto Laurens* and *Dr. Salvador Mendoza*, secretary of the Supreme Court of Mexico and an international jurist. All Mexican dailies in Mexico City, such as *El Universal*, *La Prensa*, *Novedades* and *Excelsior* gave very extensive coverage to the work of the Conference.

Following are statements and resolutions adopted at the Preparatory Conference:

A. CONVOCATION PLATFORM
of the
WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION

Through a careful and detailed estimate of the situation created by the International Communist Movement as an instrument of Russian imperialism, the delegates of the Preparatory Conference for the first WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION were led to the definite conclusion that the final objective of the Bolshevik imperialists of the Kremlin remains the same as it was since the ominous 1917 upheaval which brought the communist regime to Russia, namely, the establishment, as a result of a world Communist revolution, of a "World Federation of Soviet Republics."

The fanatics who insist on the Communist enslavement of peoples throughout the world may change their tactics occasionally, but they will always adhere firmly to a single-purposed strategy which aims at the domination of the whole world.

Regardless of the many-sided crises inside the Soviet Union and other subjugated countries which have occurred of late and are rapidly leaping to a climax, in spite of the fake and misleading decision to disband the Cominform and, notwithstanding the deceitful appeals for so-called "peaceful coexistence," the fact remains that the Moscow rulers continue to stake their fate on a "world Communist revolution" as an appropriate means to bring about a final and decisive victory over the free world.

The serious internal crises referred to, coming as an aftermath to forty years of the abject Marxist regime imposed by sheer force, present as marked features *overall slavery* and *low standards of living* for the people, which standards are even lower than those under the rule of the Czars.

Far from being satisfied with having driven the enslaved peoples in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries into the most extreme situation pre-



Delegates from 65 nations, convened in Mexico City March 20-25, 1958, deliberate on the convocation of a World Anti-Communist Congress for Freedom and Liberation

vailing today, i. e. moral degradation, undernourishment and a police regime based on threat and terror, the Bolshevik *societas sceleris* tries hard to drag all the other freedom-loving peoples of the world into the whirling turmoil of fanatical Communism.

It must be admitted, though, that it could not have been otherwise as the Kremlin rulers know only too well that the enslaved states can only last if the world surrounding them is equally enslaved. And, furthermore, Lenin's strategy stresses that it is absolutely necessary—due to what is called the *capitalist encirclement*—to attack the imperialist nations by all possible means, using the USSR as a base and springboard for this onslaught; with the understanding that the Communist Parties the world over remain under the strict obligation of devoting themselves to the task of maintaining and preserving the Bolshevik bridgehead in the free world. That bridgehead was considered by Stalin in 1939 as solidly being established.

Nobody should any longer be misled by the truly communist ways employed by the Kremlin rulers. Under the communist viewpoint the peoples of the world escape the usual geographical and national yardsticks of comparison—they are measured by different standards; this because they all fall into one of the two larger classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, with the full understanding that in every country the local Communist Party represents the "vanguard" of that proletariat. This is what makes it possible, as it always has, for the Soviet Russian statesmen to adopt in their foreign relations an astonishing double-

faced policy which may at the same time be offensive and defensive—offensive in what relates to their dealings with the Communist Party of each country in which they order the carrying-out of sabotage, threats and of subversion, and defensive in reference to diplomatic relations with each country. In other words, the Soviet Russian Government pursues defensive aims in its formal dealings with other governments, and its aggressive aims using the Communist Parties as its Fifth Columns with the ultimate goal of destroying the democratic way of life and of enforcing the despotic Communist regime throughout the world under the control of Moscow.

Perplexity and utter confusion seem to dominate the Free World, thus drawing a truly surprising, gloomy and dramatic picture.

Both perplexity and confusion flow directly from shrewd performances in international matters on the part of the Soviet Russian Government. Its tactics are based on threats to use force, which threats are strongly supplemented, on the other hand, by simultaneous psychological, ideological, economic and material propaganda.

The Free World goes on blindly, walking with banded eyes toward the imminent danger which lies ahead. The Free World is maintaining a compromising mood, adhering to the defensive and always looking for appeasement and conciliatory solutions.

The recent lenient Russian attitude shown towards their victims came about under the pressure of the national liberation struggle for independence waged by the nations enslaved by Russia. But it must be stressed that this lenient attitude of Moscow, which is due to a critical internal situation, does not mean that the Kremlin rulers have given up their firm determination to pursue and bring about a world Communist revolution.

Three main lines of action now envisaged by the Kremlin, namely, co-existence, the false *Pax Sovietica*, and the belief in the possibility of peaceful adoption of Communism by the Free World, are but alluring and deceitful maneuvers serving as a smokescreen to cover the difficult situation that they must contend with internally, to gain time and to subdue the ever-increasing discontent of the subjugated and exploited masses under the cruel Communist regime; on the other hand, the Kremlin intends to foil, puzzle and confound the free world by trying to induce it to believe in the lessening of global danger represented by Communism and Russian imperialism.

These new Soviet Russian plans date back prior to the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR and confirmed later by the same Congress, and are, despite the posthumous downgrading of Stalin, strictly in line with Lenin's saying: "A step backward, to allow for taking two steps forward, later on."

These plans also adjust themselves very precisely to Lenin's legacy when he said that "Communist methods should be so flexible as to allow compromises even with the devil and the court."

The theory of "Socialism in one country alone," which the Communists keep on venting now, and are also using as a stratagem, had its origin soon after the victorious revolution of 1917, when Lenin made the prediction that "A chain of well-succeeded revolutions will take place throughout Europe, following the establishment of Marxism in Russia."

The prediction having failed and as the chain of revolutions did not materialize, Lenin was forced, in order to save face, to foster a would-be theory of "unequal economic and political development," and as a consequence of this

"theory" he admitted "the possibility of adoption of Socialism in various countries at different times and by different methods."

Of course, Lenin did not save face at all because it was still in everybody's mind what he had once said, namely: "In no circumstances, under no possible conditions, can the capitalist countries be able to live at peace with the Soviet Republic."

Peoples enslaved by Communism and Russian imperialism and bearing on their own flesh the blood stains of the cruel regime, are beginning to rise in revolts; whereas, in the free world some people do not seem to realize the priceless gift of freedom and lean toward Communism. This shows, beyond any doubt, the high degree of confusion and misunderstanding prevailing nowadays in the free world.

Two facts account for the ideological distress of many people in the free countries:

1. The Communist propaganda, skillfully and relentlessly pursued by the rulers of the Kremlin for the past forty years;
2. The unbelievably poor judgment of many people, whose lack of vision does not allow them to understand and to properly evaluate the evils of Communism and Russian imperialism.

One thing is easy to forecast: "The Free World shall have to fight sooner or later in order not only to safeguard its own freedom, but also to liberate the enslaved peoples"; and the sooner it does so—the better, so the victory may be won less painfully and in shorter time.

The prevailing world situation has reached such a stage that it will not permit the utterance of words, of useless words, alone. Force, sheer force must be applied. Let us cease having conferences of the Geneva type, or any meetings with the Soviet Russian rulers, as they definitely lead us nowhere. Nothing useful comes out of them as the Soviet Russian representatives excel in fencing with procrastination, bad faith, distorted arguments, cynical proposals and dialectics.

After Stalin's death an open reaction against Communist regimes gained a new impact, but the Western leaders let it pass unnoticed.

In 1953 unrest among prisoners, initiated and conducted by Ukrainians, led to uprisings in many concentration camps in the Soviet Union (Vorkuta, Norilsk, Kingir). In the same year (June 3, 1953) an uprising took place in East Germany; in the spring of 1954 uprisings flared in Czechia and Slovakia; in March 1956 popular unrest developed in Communist-ridden Tibet, Manchuria and Southern Red China; on June 28, 1956 a fierce popular upheaval took place in Poznań, Poland, with crowds shouting "Bread and Freedom," and shortly after, on October 23, 1956 a heroic liberation revolt started in Hungary with a happy beginning, as it forced the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Budapest, to be followed, unfortunately, on November 4, by a renewed invasion of Hungary by armored divisions sent by Moscow to crush the freedom fighters who fought for the liberation of their motherland from ruthless and savage foreign domination. The Hungarians bled to death and were doomed, while the Western powers maintained their passivity.

The United Nations failed completely in the Hungarian case and deeply disappointed those who had nourished any faith in it at all. That failure was to be expected, though, inasmuch as among its members was the Soviet Union, armed with the right to use a veto. It is worth remembering that the League of Nations expelled Russia as an improper member when she invaded little Finland,

while the United Nations lagged far behind during the cruel Soviet Russian onslaught on Hungary, confining its action to an inoperative and desultory condemnation which, devoid of any moral, material or economic sanctions, was but symbolic and entirely ineffective.

Concerning the United States and the Latin American Republics, no less fault has been their behavior in opposing the Communist threat. Suffice it to say that they did not even trouble to implement the decisions taken at the 9th International American Conference (Bogota), the 4th Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers or at the 10th International American Conference (Caracas).

One might be prone to believe, in the particular case of the United States, that it was not sufficiently informed about the real character of Communism as practiced by the Soviet Russian government.

But this is not true, at least in what relates to the United States Senate. To prove it, one has only to read the following conclusions, reached by the U. S. Senate "Internal Security Subcommittee," which can be found in Document 85, dealing with Soviet Political Treaties Violations:

"The existing regime in Russia is based upon the negations of every principle of honor and good faith.

"The responsible leaders of the regime have frequently and openly boasted that they are willing to sign agreements and undertakings with foreign powers while not having the slightest intention of adhering to such undertakings or carrying out such agreements.

"Joseph Stalin expressed the Communist diplomatic philosophy even more bluntly: 'Words must have no relations to actions, otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.'

"Communism is not an evil thing only because it has been controlled by evil men since it first rose to power in 1917. It is organically evil. You must renounce 'bourgeois morality,' you must become an evil man before you become a good Communist. You must be a liar, a cheat, and probably a spy, before you can represent a Communist nation in international diplomacy. You must have no more regard for honor when you sign an agreement on behalf of your country than a forger does when he puts a name on a check.

"I seriously doubt whether during the whole history of civilization any great nation has ever made as perfidious a record as this in so short a time" (Senator Eastland).

Taking cognizance of all the facts referred to above, the Brazilian Delegation to the "Third Congress Against the Soviet Offensive in Latin America" held in Lima (Peru) in April 1957, submitted a proposal stressing the importance of an Anti-Communist World League.

That proposal met with unanimous approval and in order to effectuate it the Lima Congress decided to call a WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION as a preliminary step towards the ultimate goal.

That is why the authorized representatives of the "Inter-American Confederation for the Defense of the Continent" and of the "Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League" met in Taipei (Republic of China) early in October 1957, for the purpose of drafting the general features of the above-mentioned World

Congress. They signed the so-called "Taipei Statement," from which are quoted the following excerpts:

"1. The above-mentioned two international anti-Communist organizations, realizing that the ultimate aim of the international Communist bloc is world conquest and enslavement of the whole human race, agreed that it is not only necessary for peoples throughout the world, belonging either to the free nations or those under the Communist yoke, to coordinate and intensify their efforts directed against Bolshevik action, and, consequently, to employ real and effective collective measures to defeat the common enemy, but also very important that this intended effort should be capable of being exerted to its fullest extent, as soon as possible.

"3. The above-mentioned two Parties, namely, the 'Inter-American Confederation for the Defense of the Continent' and the 'Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League' decided, further, to issue immediately this statement not only to members of both Parties, but also to all outstanding anti-Communist civic organizations of the United States, Canada, Europe, Africa and the Middle East, asking them to kindly express their opinion on the matter with the shortest possible delay.

"5. Although statutes and the Agenda will be the task to be fulfilled by the 'Preparatory Conference,' both Parties deem it advisable to lay down clearly, in this statement, the basic and underlying principles of the proposed World Congress.

"The main objective is to stamp out Communism, to rid the world of the Marxist plague. That implies: 1) to liberate the peoples enslaved by Communists wherever that may be, in Europe and Asia; 2) to preserve the free peoples from being enslaved by the Communists in the future.

"These two aspects of the fight against Communism are, nonetheless, to be considered *simultaneous*, as the fight should assume, for efficiency's sake, a global character.

"In order to accomplish the aims in sight, the strategy is to be discussed at the World Congress, and, once approved, no effort will be spared to carry it out, until the final victory over the Bolshevik scourge is attained."

In accordance with the spirit and the letter of the "Taipei Statement" this Convocation has been written and unanimously adopted by the delegates of the "Preparatory Conference" for the WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION, held in Mexico City on March 20-25, 1958, and is now being issued to all outstanding anti-Communist organizations throughout the world. They are cordially invited to attend the First Congress and join the efforts aiming at the final overthrow of Communist regimes, servants of Russian imperialism.

Enclosed there will be found "The Statute on Rules," by which the WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION shall abide. Particular emphasis should be put on the statements which follow:

In the First WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION it will be our paramount endeavor, this as a broad and general outlook, to adopt and apply to the actual world situation as regards Communism, the Declaration formally made at the 10th International American Conference (Caracas) by the U. S. Secretary of State.

That Declaration must be amplified and made more extensive so as to give consideration to national and local characteristics of all peoples, either

those already under Communist bondage or those under threat of becoming enslaved by Communist regimes.

The said Declaration, which so clearly defined in 1954 the United States' viewpoint, read:

"1. Identify the existing danger and reaffirm the will to face it, all together, all united for that purpose;

"2. Lend strong moral support to the governments whose responsibility is to expose and eradicate, within their frontiers, the danger represented by intrigue and foreign treason."

The first part of this Declaration may very well remain as it is, without any change whatsoever, but the second part should contain the following change:

"Lend strong moral, ideological, psychological, material and military support to the governments throughout the world whose responsibility is to expose and eradicate, within their frontiers, the danger of the Soviet Russian offensive and likewise, help and support the national liberation movements already existing within the sphere of Soviet Russian domination, also those national liberation movements which may be organized in the future."

To be quite clear and not to leave any room for misunderstanding, the following definitions and statements are accepted:

The International Communism is hereby defined as being a huge worldwide clandestine organization directed by Moscow, which aims, through aggression, at enslaving all nations on earth under the vile and inhuman Communist rule.

Since International Communism is an instrument of Russian imperialism, the struggle against International Communism includes the struggle against Russian imperialism with the clear understanding that the ultimate goal of the struggle for freedom and justice throughout the world is the destruction of International Communism and Russian imperialism, the disintegration of the Russian empire, now existing in the form of the so-called USSR and the satellites, and the re-establishing of national independent states on the ethnographic territories of the peoples enslaved by Russia at any period in the past in Eastern and Central Europe and Asia.

B. POLITICAL STATEMENT

The delegates to the Preparatory Conference for THE WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION, after deliberating and discussing the means and ways of combatting the totalitarian Communist threat and, after adopting a series of resolutions calling for a convocation of a WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION, which in turn will promote the cause of the final liberation of all the enslaved nations and peoples now living under the heel of the totalitarian Soviet Russian imperialism and Communist regimes directed from Moscow, do unanimously adopt the following resolutions:

I. APPEAL TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America, as one of the principal leaders of the free world must vigorously exercise its moral and political leadership which has been seriously endangered by the abandonment of Hungary's fight for freedom a year and a half ago. Therefore, we appeal to you as a great champion of freedom and of the fundamental principles of your great country, which are freedom and

self-determination for all nations, to hold fast the standards of international decency, which do not allow bartering away other peoples' lives or their freedom and independence, for temporary gains and opportunistic expediency. Our concern for missiles and atomic weapons today should not throw us off balance regarding the frightful realities existing under the communist domination in Europe and Asia, where the enslaved peoples are fighting and dying for the cause of freedom and liberation.

We pledge, subscribe to and support an enlightened policy of liberation as enunciated by you and responsible officials of the United States Government, with specific stress on national self-determination and the independence of all the nations enslaved by Russian Communist imperialism and its subservient puppets. Such a policy would not only redeem the honor of the free world in the eyes of the enslaved nations, but would further the cause of peace in our generation everywhere.

II. PROPOSED "SUMMIT CONFERENCE" WITH RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEADERS

It now becomes apparent that another meeting of the heads of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, is imminent. Such a meeting is being generated by the vast propaganda machine of the Russian Communists who are endeavoring to stampede the leaders of the free world into another "Summit" Conference. The resolution to hold such a "Summit" Conference was adopted at the recent meeting of Communist leaders in Moscow, which meeting they believe would serve as another step in their drive to psychologically disarm the West and to further communist aggression everywhere.

The Russian tactical campaign of threats and intimidations is accompanied by a skillfully planned drive which offers the West "peaceful coexistence" as the only alternative to further Russian communist aggression through atomic warfare. None other than Nikita Khrushchev stated in his address in Minsk a few weeks ago that one of the conditions of such a new "Summit" meeting would be the acceptance of the *status quo* as it now exists, by the West. Thus, the West is being now invited to extend *de facto*, if not *de jure* recognition to Russian communist occupation of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. It is patently evident that the leaders of the Kremlin are seeking such a meeting in order to force such recognition from the statesmen of the free world.

We, therefore, believe that the free world can gain nothing from another "Summit" meeting, inasmuch as Moscow has convincingly demonstrated time and again what little regard it has for any meetings and conferences with the Western powers. But such a new "Summit" meeting would, on the other hand, enhance the prestige of the present Soviet Russian leadership not only in the eyes of the so-called neutral and non-committed nations, but in the eyes of the enslaved nations of Europe and Asia, which would see in such a meeting a final acquiescence to their enslavement by the West.

Finally, a new "Summit" conference would pave the way for a policy of "peaceful coexistence," which entails the acceptance of the present political *status quo*, which is in Soviet Russia's favor and in the interest of the international Communist movement. Such a policy would surely lead to the final and irrevocable surrender to Russia, with the ultimate result of communism dominating the entire world.

Therefore, we, the delegates to this Preparatory Conference for THE WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION must

regard a new "Summit" meeting as a scheme of Moscow to disarm the West, and we call on all anti-communist organizations the world over to oppose most vigorously these maneuvers of Moscow.

III. TRADE WITH THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist trade is communist aid. Economic and trade warfare is just one aspect of the TOTAL WAR communism is waging against the free world, but it is a most important one. Communist victory in this phase of the struggle will pave the way for Communist victory in all other fields—political, psychological and military.

All materials, including those not directly associated with the waging of military warfare, are strategic in the cold war.

The shipping of consumer goods to Communist nations enables them to concentrate more of their industry on the production of war materials.

Large-scale trade in such goods enables the Soviet Union to blackmail free nations and obtain political concessions from them by threatening to suddenly cut off such trade and thus disrupt their economies.

Trade of all kinds is used by Communist states to assist Moscow's political infiltration in non-communist nations.

In addition, under Soviet direction, Communist states are also trying to drive free world representatives out of certain markets and areas with the obvious intent of weakening them economically so that they can be more easily subverted by domestic Communist Fifth Columns.

These facts make it apparent that the free world, for its own protection, must take the offensive in the economic-trade war with the Kremlin. It must do all in its power to drive Communist states out of all world markets and to weaken the Communist bloc by depriving it of vital materials of all kinds.

It is ridiculous to give weapons to one's enemy in any battle. But the free world, through trade with the Communist bloc, is doing just that at the present time. Moreover, with the passing of each year, it is giving more and more aid, through trade to Communist nations. It is now considering a further loosening of its already seriously weakened embargo on trade in strategic materials with the Soviet bloc.

The Preparatory Conference for THE WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION deplores such action and calls upon the free nations of the world, as soon as feasible, to end trade of all kinds with Communist nations.

IV. "EXCHANGE DELEGATIONS"

During the past two years the Kremlin has opened up a new offensive in the cold war—a so-called cultural offensive. Its aim is to disarm the free world by having carefully selected Soviet artists impress various peoples with the cultural achievements of the Communist world. Moscow hopes that the attention of the free peoples will thus be diverted from Communism's continuing crimes against humanity and its gross violations of accepted standards of decent behavior in international relations.

Also, under the guise of removing the Soviet-imposed Iron Curtain, Moscow is exchanging with free nations small, selected groups of specialists of various kinds—engineers, doctors, farmers, educators, etc. The purpose of this move is

also to disarm the free world by creating the false impression that the Kremlin wants a full and free flow of information between the enslaved and free worlds and the friendliest of relations between them.

The Soviet Union has itself demonstrated—and is continuing to demonstrate—that this is a hoax. It is suppressing within its borders vital news about the free world; at the same time, it is promulgating false and vicious statements about various free nations. In addition, it has not permitted free world visitors access to all parts of the Soviet Union. Its satellite nations are still surrounded and cut off from the free world by barbed wire barriers, electrified fences and armed patrols. This bespeaks of the insincerity of the Communists' declared intention in the exchange program.

All phases of life in the Communist bloc are regimented. They are not free. The Preparatory Conference of the WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION therefore considers it violative of the high principles of free men to exchange delegations with Communist nations as long as this condition exists. Twice the United States major labor organization, the AFL-CIO, has been invited by Moscow to exchange a labor delegation with the Soviet Union. Twice the AFL-CIO president, Mr. George Meany, has refused, saying he will take no such action until the Kremlin permits the formation of a free trade union movement in all nations behind the Iron Curtain.

The Preparatory Conference of the WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION endorses this position as in keeping with the high principles all free men should live by. It urges all free nations—and all organizations within them—to adopt this same position on the question of cultural exchanges.

V. ANTI-COMMUNIST REFUGEES
A. Europe

WHEREAS, there are in Europe today some 200,000 non-resettled refugees from the communist sphere (this figure not including the ethnic German refugees); and

WHEREAS, each year some tens of thousands of men and women sacrifice everything they possess to escape from communist slavery to the free world; and

WHEREAS, each refugee who escapes is a living refutation of the communist lie; and

WHEREAS, the refugees who escape have been encouraged in many cases by the promise of freedom which is implicit in Western propaganda broadcasts; and

WHEREAS, so long as this refugee backlog exists, new escapees face the prospect of having to wait for years in the frustration and emptiness of camp life before they find an opportunity to migrate; and

WHEREAS, the proper reception of the refugees by the free world enhances its moral prestige and strengthens its position in the cold war—while inadequate reception plays into the hands of the communist redefinition agents; and

WHEREAS, a group of prominent Americans, all private citizens, having come together in the Zellerbach Commission on the European Refugee Situation, and having examined the refugee problem, have arrived at the conclusion that a determined effort, similar to the international effort on behalf of the Hungarian refugees, could liquidate the problem in short order;

Now, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that this Preparatory Conference for the WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION

urge the free nations to convene a conference for the specific purpose of planning a concerted attack on the residual refugee problem in Europe; and that it further urge the free nations to accept the refugee problem as a collective Western responsibility; and finally, that it urge them to make dispositions assuring the proper reception and speedy resettlement of the thousands of refugees who will every year escape to freedom—until the peoples today enslaved by Communism achieve their liberation.

B. The Far East

WHEREAS, there are in Asia millions of freedom-loving people who have fled and are fleeing from Communist tyranny and have been separated from their families and relatives behind the Iron Curtain without means of livelihood and deprived of all moral and material assistance;

Now, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that this Preparatory Conference for the WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERATION urge the free nations to convene a conference for the specific purpose of planning a concerted attack on the refugee problem in the Far East; and that it further urge the free nations to accept the refugee problem in the Far East as a collective Western responsibility; and finally, that it urge them to make dispositions assuring the proper reception and speedy resettlement of refugees who escape to freedom—until the peoples today enslaved by Communism in Asia achieve their full liberation through the reunion of their divided countries.

DRAY-KHMARA'S POETICAL CREATIVENESS PART II

By OKSANA ASHER

Several poems with nationalistic tendencies can be found among Dray-Khmara's unpublished manuscripts. One revealing example is his sonnet, "At Rudansky's Grave," written in 1930, which was dedicated to Zerov because he had visited the grave in the Caucasus in his company. Here Dray-Khmara's reflections reveal all his deep sorrow for the Ukrainian poet, buried far from his fatherland: "An orphan's ashes in a foreign land."

Among the six sonnets written in the same year, the summer of 1930, three of them, "Kiev," "Chernihiv," and "Podol," describe the glorious historical past of Ukraine. The impressionistic picture of the baroque city of Kiev, situated on reddish hills surrounded by the Dnieper River, makes vivid the unique, indescribable beauty of this city. In another poem, "Chernihiv," the poet compares the great historical past of this city with its insignificance in modern times, an insignificance which hangs over it like a black grave mound. Very symbolic is the sonnet in which the poet gazes over the Podol, lower part of Kiev from the heights which bear the monument of St. Volodymyr, during whose reign Kievan Rus', as Ukraine was then known, was Christianized. He sees Prince Volodymyr as charmed by this bright expanse of scenery, by the lights on the bridge that shine like beads of fire. But then the Prince notices that the cross he is holding has darkened and asks himself why he should be raised so high. And he rises and goes off into the distance—far from the city.

There is, among Dray-Khmara's poems, another category of personal verse, which he did not wish published. In the sonnet "Victoria regia," (1930), the poet compares the three stages in his own poetic metamorphosis during the stormy years after the Revolution with the three changes in color of the flower of *victoria regia*. Thus his first bloom was as pure and idealistic as the whiteness of the newly-opened flower of *victoria regia*. The second stage, light rose like the wings of the flamingo, was the color of dreams; while the third and last stage, the impassioned one, had the deep hue of a ruby.

To the same group of poems belongs the poem, "Nightmare," which was written in 1930 and which shows to some extent the state of the poet's mind and his vain struggle for peace. The first of the following stanzas introduces us into the world of the tranquil city, already enveloped in dreams. But the poet himself cannot sleep; in spite of his effort not to think, the events of the past day fill him with feelings of frustration, pain, and fury. When at last he falls asleep his dream turns into a horror which grips his brain like a vise. However, the poem is not finished, we may guess from the note at the end of the last stanza that the poet had intended to end this poem with the mental illness of the dreamer. The poem is written in a five-foot iambic beat, with the rhyme scheme of a-b-a-b-c-b-c-d-c-d-e-d-e-, etc.

Directly opposite in mood, in color, but also affecting the poet's intimate world, is the poem "The Letter to Oksana," dated July, 1934. Here, in the form of a letter, the poet expresses the deepest emotions of his heart, while preserving his originality and high poetic technique. The letter begins:

Greetings to you, my darling, little swallow
That left for Dnister blue the native nest
And floats somewhere high over the waters.

The poet interrupts the picturesque description of Bessarabia to ask his child to repay, with caressing and tender words, the love she received from her grandmother in whose care she was placed. Poetic language becomes especially moving when he refers to the letter of the child in which he glimpses her first feelings and first thoughts, the blossoming of her soul. He takes a deep interest in the events of her life and goes into the details of her stories about the rabbit, a flowering bush, or her great dog, Rozboi. The unrhymed letter is also in regular five-foot iambics which are common in Dray-Khmara's poetry.

The second volume of Dray-Khmara's collected verse, *Sonyashni Marshi*, (*Sunny Marches*), contains several long poems (unlike the first volume, which consists exclusively of short poems). But what is really new and of great significance is a folklore-balladic element combined with a new Romantic strength which is characteristic of several of the poems.

In his review of *Sonyashni Marshi*, Rylsky wrote:

The book was written by a master. This can be seen from the richness of its language, from the rhythms, rhymes, from the choice of images. Thematically, the book reflects the spirit of our day: the poet is in love with struggle and the process of building, which is so characteristic of our time.¹⁰

¹⁰ The copy of an unpublished review by Rylsky on *Sonyashni Marshi*, Kiev, August, 1935, p. 1.

The long poem, "The Death of Koloman Vallish" which describes the death of a young leader of the revolt in Szeged (Hungary) is written in the archaic style of the Serbian epics, using such devices as the repetitions of certain words, fixed lines and occasional fixed rhymes. But these stylistic elements are not dry or bookish—the poet makes them live because he is using them not as ends in themselves, but as a medium of expression.

Notable for its stylistic power is an allegory, "Spanish Ballad," written in the autumn of 1934 and dedicated "To the Fighters of Asturia." The original imagery, richness of rhyme, and force of rhythm (six-foot iambics) of this brilliantly painted picture of a bull-fight is impressive. Here is the bull captured and led into the arena to be killed. He is still a brave bull, but what is happening? He fights, not with his human tormentor, but with the wind, like a strange knight in another land. Surrounded by groups of fools, troubled by the red of the fighters' capes, he sees the ripped belly of the old horse, hears the drunken laugh of guitars and the sharp sound of castanets. The points of the *banderillas* planted in his flesh are like hot needles, his blood drips on the sand. He is here, not of his own will, but forced by strangers into this unequal battle. As in a broken mirror, he sees his days of freedom; sees the noisy Guadalquivir, the Andalusian plains, the snows of the Nevada mountains, the silken pasturage of autumn, and the deer herd in his charge. Who has forced him away from this peaceful life? Neither the primitive savages nor the cave beasts, but that man whose garments sparkle with gold braid. He is lord of many *haciendas*, the black cross is on his dress . . . Long live Spain, and Espada's hand! Today it will bring death to the angry bull. Already the trumpets are sounding the call to the mortal battle, the fierce enemies are joined in the final struggle . . . The matador already sees the bloodied ear in his hand, hears the applause, the choir of glory. One well-aimed blow . . . But suddenly the crowd stares in horror. The stroke went wrong, it missed the vital spot and only stung the bull, and in his heart there rose again the old fire. The sound of the trumpets is broken off, the bull has lifted the matador on his horns. And the West turns pale as onto the sand falls the green cross of Holy Brotherhood. And the East, where still sound the hellish cry and the weeping, takes up the flag—drowned in blood.

This poem strangely foreshadows the Spanish Civil War which, two years later, tore the country apart.

In the poem, "Thomas More," written in the summer of 1935 and employing an unusually complex variation of the Anciabach, Dray-Khmara describes man's search for the Happy Island, the scene of

More's golden tale that was nourished with his blood, so that it became immortal and sank from view and rose again, shining without darkening, like the blue star from the heights. He saw the *condottieri* searching for Utopia, all the courageous fellows, young and all, the *conquistadors*; the robbers of the prairies, the pirates of all oceans and seas, all come because they heard that there the transfigured men wore the precious stones and rings. Adventurers arrived from India, from Cuba, from Samoa, always dreaming about the treasure. Also seeking the Happy Island were great humanists, musicians, the creators of the incomparable *canzonas*; but they could find its miracle nowhere. The dreamers complained, weeping softly, that they were deceived by the eloquence. The centuries passed, some roaring like a shot, others quiet, colorless, crawling like smoke, and suddenly from the depths of the sea appeared a wonderful island. And again the travellers coming from distant lands, and looking at it, do not believe their eyes: some of them laugh with light hearts, others are overcome by despair.

The happy ending of this poem is artificial. It was, most probably, introduced by the poet to make it publishable. The whole poem expresses, through poetic images, man's search for happiness. In short, it is the poet's own attempt to find acceptance, a possibility in which he still believed as late as two months before his fatal arrest.

Many of the poems in *Sonyashni Marshi* relate to the poet's life in Kiev, as, for example, *Symfoniya*, on the theme of symphony concerts in Proletarsky Park, or "Winter Tale," describing a morning view of Kiev from the poet's window.

The melodies of the poem *Symfoniya*, with its fluent rhythm, carry us into spheres of sound and bright colors. The "stinging" and "kissing" flutes the poet compares to wasps, and the oboes—to velvet bumble-bees. In the last stanza he reaches the fastest tempo; the violins go mad and the thundering fanfares fly away over the dark waters of the Dnieper. But suddenly the verse breaks off: there is no Dnieper. Maybe, the poet says, somebody deceived you, or maybe it was only an illusion created by the magic stringed tones. It is just this powerful element of fantasy in Dray-Khmara's poetry, so well illustrated in the images of this poem and its mysterious ending, that makes one forget the real world of objects and accept his world of symbols.

The poem, "Winter Tale," (1935), pictures an early winter morning with its various shades of light. The pale sun begins its first march through the room; it observes the bookshelves, leafing through the books. The whole poem is one of freshness, light and gladness. This sunny Kiev the poet can never forget. Far away in Kolyma, he wrote that nowhere is there a sun such as he found in Kiev.

Even on the eve of his arrest, Dray-Khmara believed it possible for him to be rehabilitated in the eyes of the Soviet government. Although he was never a communist sympathizer, he did not feel himself actively a counter-revolutionist; and if his poetry expressed ideas that were in disharmony with officially approved opinions, he still felt he had made definite efforts to remain an acceptable member of the existing society, in which it was his lot to live. Indeed, he expressed in several poems his admiration for some of the actions of the Soviet government, such as the expedition of scientists to the North Pole, to one of whom (Schmidt) he dedicated his poem, "To the Hero," written in 1935. As the motto for his poem he took a line from Blok, "Take your little boat and swim to the distant pole." In other times the singers only dreamed of finding the Pole, wrote Dray-Khmara. They were those worn out by the battle of life, already in the shadow of death's flag, searching for peace and forgetfulness. But you, the hero, are the powerful eagle who goes to conquer the mist of dreams and melt with the fire of passion the icy armor that holds the giant ocean in chains. Your ship will leave its wake in the country of the whale, the polar bear, and the seahorse; the unshackled giant will open its treasure to us, and gardens will bloom on its frontier. Obviously, Dray-Khmara was certainly not by nature a die-hard conservative. Neither was he anarchistically inclined. He was, beyond his great scholarship, a man who loved life and his fellow men, one who hoped and believed in the possibility of improving conditions for all, but who believed in attempting such betterment within the framework of the extant political and social system, whatever it might be.

Nevertheless, his attempts to write verse of "modern" content, in the hope of its favorable reception by Soviet critics, was unsuccessful because he could not set aside his standards of aesthetics and write pure propaganda as did Tychyna and Rylsky. Dray-Khmara admired the early poetry of Rylsky and had also praised highly Tychyna's work. It was to Tychyna that he dedicated one of his unpublished poems written in 1926 in which he hails Tychyna as a poet who opens the world to Ukraine. But he could not accept the later works of these two poets and preferred death, if it must be, to faithlessness to his art. Thus, in his poem, "Fatherland," Dray-Khmara includes in his vision the emerald steppe, the gloomy taiga, the cold tundra, all the vast expanse of the Soviet Union. He sees spring bring to all these lands its green revelations, the sun gives warm caress and makes diamonds of the dew, the ships on the water are, to the poet, cheerful birds at rest. This poetic language is full of feeling for the land, but nowhere do we find any direct praise of government officials which would have been sufficient to insure the poet's acceptance as a loyal member of the Soviet society.

A typical poem from this volume, "Second Birth," written in 1935, illustrates the poet's poetical development. In his review of this poem Rylsky wrote:

Doubts arise enveloped in symbols in "Second Birth." It is probably the author's confession, his renouncement of the old poetical creation and the blessing of the new political development; but all this is written in such misty words and images that I am wondering if it does reach the aim which the author would like to achieve.⁵⁰

This poem expressed in poetical symbols and images ideas which are brilliant rather than misty. Obviously, Rylsky's criticism of 1935 was that of the Party line, which could not approve Dray-Khmara's confession that revealed not only his disappointment over the condemnation of his early verse of idealistic conception, but also the painful struggle of his soul, his sufferings and his last hope to survive. To obtain the picture of the poet's cry of despair I present this poem in an English translation:

It seemed sufficient honor so to render
Flesh tributary shapes of sun and glass,
Forgotten words of long sonorous splendor
And cadence like love's mist that softly pass.

A heavy bustard, painfully arising
On the fresh wind, gasped hard as it arose:
Struck in full flight by sudden shot surprising
It dropped upon a bridge of guelder rose.

My naked soul still drowsy, I sent flying
Upon the snowstorm's elemental force,
Till helpless, like a frightened pigeon crying
The blast that caught and spun her from her course.

I called her back: deep in my flesh I nourished
Her being, as a jeweler sets a jewel:
Her rainbow glitter rose again and flourished
Her blaze of changing gold found a new fuel.

She drank not blood, but fire from my being,
The burning heat equator's middays give,
I cried my joy, like a creator seeing
His Galatea waken, flush, and live.

I gazed into those eyes, that turquoise shimmer,
And saw — exult! — new worlds, new spheres appear:
Deep in the eyes' translucent wells stars glimmer —
Rebirth! Your soul, your second soul is here.

⁵⁰ The copy of an unpublished review by Rylsky on *Sonyashni Marshi*, Kiev, August, 1935, p. 3.

The first stanza reveals to us the poet of *Prorosten'* in "forgotten words of long sonorous splendor." Indeed, in 1926, he wrote that he cherished "words vast and full sounding . . . old words, that in lost depths abounding, were sought through ages mute in vain." But how was this beautiful original poetry received? It was severely criticized by the Communist press for being counter-revolutionary, though Dray-Khmara thought his work to be unpolitical. But actually he was accused only because he did not use mere slogans for the Soviet regime. The living, human feeling and the free thought in these poems was enough not only to condemn the poetry but to liquidate the poet himself. Thus, from 1928 on, after the appearance of "Swans," he could not publish anything. This crisis was followed by his first arrest in 1933, a sudden painful shock, the first death of his soul which the poet describes in the second stanza of the poem, where he compares his soul to "a heavy bustard, painfully rising on the fresh wind." After Dray-Khmara was released from prison he felt like a stranger in his beloved country; even his closest friends avoided him as if he were an enemy because they feared lest they suffer from any contact with him. He was alone. He could not find any work in his profession of teaching, though there were few better specialists in his field. The only sphere of action left to him was to write poetry, with the hope that it would be published and that ultimately he might be accepted again as a member of Soviet society. These poems, then, flow directly from his wounded heart. They were born of suffering and passion. He spoke truly when he said: "She drank not blood, but fire from my being." With a cry of joy he welcomed his new creation after the years of silence. But the Soviet approval to which he aspired was destined never to be his.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RED BOOK OF THE PERSECUTED CHURCH. By Albert Galter. Published under the auspices of the Commission for the Persecuted Church of the International Catholic Organizations. The Newman Press. Westminster, Md. Pp. 491. \$5.75.

There has been much propaganda talk about the imminent "Summit" conference of the Western leaders with the Russians. The new Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Mikhail A. Menshikov, has been exceedingly busy softening American public opinion these past few months. The extent of his success is indicated by his unusual popularity with certain American groups and, alas, a certain section of the press, radio and TV industry. Some of our radio commentators, in their naive and immature adulation of "Smiling Mike," have gone so far as to bestow upon him the affectionate title, "All-American Russian."

For those who suffer so gravely from poor memory and who are prone to overlook what Ambassador Menshikov represents, we recommend a newly published book on the persecution of the Catholic Church by the Russian Communists and their communist puppets in the subjugated countries they control. The work, *The Red Book of the Persecuted Church*, by Albert Galter, was published under the auspices of the Commission for the Persecuted Church of the International Catholic Organizations. Its Italian and French versions have already appeared; the English edition has now been published in the United States by the Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland.

The Red Book of the Persecuted Church is not, to be sure, the first authoritative account of the persecution of the Catholic Church behind the Iron Curtains in Europe and Asia. There have appeared in the United States alone several books and pamphlets by George Shuster, Gary MacEoin and Luigi Giusoni. The America Press has published several pamphlets, such as *The Church of Silence* by Rev. Robert A. Graham, S.J., *Red China Takes Over* by Douglas Hyde and *Martyrdom in Ukraine* by this writer.

But this latest addition to the literature is perhaps the most complete inasmuch as documentary evidence on the persecution of Catholicism behind the Iron Curtain is concerned. The volume's outstanding feature is that it provides the reader with overwhelming evidence of the all-out assault upon and persecution of the Catholic Church in all the countries that have come under the Soviet Russian communist domination.

For the most part, a chronological order of events regarding the persecution of Catholicism is followed in the book. The period beginning in 1939 (the signing of the Soviet-German pact, which precipitated the outbreak of World War II) covers the persecution in the USSR and the countries taken over by Moscow in that period: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine. (The author deemed it advisable to separate Carpatho-Ukraine from Ukraine, although from 1945 on Carpatho-Ukraine has been politically and administratively an in-

tegral part of the Ukrainian SSR.] Next come the countries indirectly dominated by Moscow: Albania, Bulgaria, China, East Germany, Korea, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam and Yugoslavia.

Replete with documentary evidence, the book is a grim register of systematized hatred of God and the persecution of Catholics, yet it also contains examples of heroism, self-denial and martyrdom. Further, it depicts the tragic fate of those Catholics who were led into apostasy and schism.

The story of the persecution of Ukrainian Catholics, taking up twenty-six pages of the book, is objectively and impartially presented. The author points out that in the past Czarist Russia also persecuted the Ukrainian Catholics. But the difference between the Czarist troops that occupied Western Ukraine in 1914-15 and the Soviet troops overrunning the country in 1939 was that the later Russians came to "liberate" the Ukrainian people and to "reunite them with the fatherland." The Russians were extremely tactful at first in Western Ukraine in 1939, the author says, in order to avoid antagonizing the majority of the Ukrainian population, but they pursued their policy of disorganization and subversion of the Ukrainian Catholic Church nevertheless. They tried to induce Rev. Gabriel Kostelnyk to challenge the authority of Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky, the great Ukrainian Catholic leader, but the former spurned them despite the arrest by the NKVD of his son.

But the all-out assault on the Ukrainian Catholic Church began in 1945, after the death of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. [Sheptytsky died on November 1, 1944, and his funeral was attended by Nikita S. Khrushchev, then Secretary General of the Communist Party of Ukraine.] The Russians cleared the way for the imposition of Orthodoxy on April 11, 1945 by arresting five Ukrainian Catholic bishops: Metropolitan Joseph Slipy (who succeeded Metropolitan Sheptytsky), Bishops N. Budka, G. Khomyshyn, J. Latyshevsky and N. Charnetsky. [Bishop J. Kotsylovsky was arrested later by the Polish communist authorities in Pere-myshi.] The prelates were subsequently subjected to a secret trial in Kiev and condemned for "treason and collaboration with the German occupation forces." The charge, of course, was wholly spurious; the Ukrainian Catholic Church, especially Metropolitan Sheptytsky, was known for its uncompromising, even hostile attitude toward the Germans (cf. *L'Osservatore Romano*, October 14 and 15, 1946).

The Russians then proceeded to assemble a false synod headed by three apostate priests, G. Kostelnyk, J. Melnyk and A. Polvetsky, which decided to abolish the Union of Brest (1596) and accept the Orthodox faith. This apostate group eventually was recognized by Moscow as the sole church authority, and Orthodox Bishop Macarius took over the administration of the newly-imposed Orthodox Church. Although the Soviet constitution recognized the separation of Church and State, the Soviet Russian regime reverted to Czarist methods by putting the state machinery at the service of the scheme for "reunion" with the Russian Orthodox Church, which was then and is now controlled by the Soviet government.

The Ukrainian Catholic priests were given the choice of freely joining the new "church" or facing certain persecution, exile and torture. Many of them, under MVD duress, did join; but out of 2,300 priests serving before the war, over 1,000 refused to submit and joined the Ukrainian underground resistance, or accepted arrest and exile to Siberia and Kazakhstan.

A similar fate befell the Ukrainian Catholics in Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Russians used the same spurious and contemptible methods in order to under-

mine and supplant the Catholic organization with the communist-controlled Russian Orthodox Church. Bishop Theodore Romzha, a stalwart Ukrainian Catholic prelate, was removed from this life by an engineered "road accident," in which his carriage was smashed to bits by a Soviet army tank.

At this writing it is known that Bishops Kotsylovsky, Lakota, Khomyshyn and Budka died in prison; Metropolitan Slipy, after several years of slave labor, lives in strict confinement in the Krasnoyarsk area, and Bishops Charnetsky and Latyshevsky, after serving hard labor sentences, are not allowed either to return to their former dioceses or to exercise pastoral ministries.

In conclusion, *The Red Book of the Persecuted Church*, is an outstanding document attesting to Russian brutalities and inhumanities. It demonstrates time and again how useless it is to talk about "peaceful coexistence" with Red leaders and their political system, which denies the basic human rights of man and relentlessly pursues religious persecution. The book should be read by every thinking and intelligent American, and especially by those groups of American, English and other nationals who have suddenly begun to believe in the good faith of Premier Khrushchev and his deceitful maneuvers, ever aimed at leading the West into one political trap after another. Their ruthless persecution of the Catholic Church in the countries they brutally dominate is more than sufficient proof that they are not worthy to sit at the councils of men who believe in God and human dignity.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

LA LIGNE CURZON ET LA II-e GUERRE MONDIALE. By Romain Yakemtchouk. Editions Nauwelaerts, Louvain-Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, Paris, 1957. Pp. 135.

Dr. Romain Yakemtchouk, the young explorer of modern political history and a doctor of political and diplomatic sciences, in the last few years has written a series of scientific works devoted to the problems of international law and international politics. They have appeared in various journals and scientific surveys in the French, English and German languages. In 1954, for example, he published *L'Ukraine en droit international* (*Ukraine in International Law*), which dealt with the problem of Ukraine in the international aspect. Again, in 1955 Dr. Yakemtchouk published an article, *L'Ukraine et les grandes puissances* (*Ukraine and the Great Powers*), which appeared in the Belgian review, *Revue Nouvelle*. The author is well acquainted with the problems of Soviet foreign policy and the history of Soviet diplomacy in the last decades.

In his latest book, which appeared in the French language at the end of 1957, Dr. Yakemtchouk discusses the problem of the so-called Curzon Line. Although little known generally, the Curzon Line is hotly discussed in the Ukrainian and Polish press, inasmuch as the Curzon Line was approved as a political border between Poland and Ukraine (that is, the Soviet Union), by the United States, Great Britain and the USSR at their meeting at Teheran during the last war.

The subject studied and discussed by the author is not only interesting from the viewpoint of politics, but it arouses historical curiosity as well. It is to be recalled that this demarcation line between Poland, Ukraine and Byelorussia was proposed in 1918 by Lord Curzon, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain as a "compromise" line between Poland and Western Ukraine, but was rejected by the former, which relied on a policy of "accomplished facts" rather than on international arbitration.

The author devotes but a few paragraphs to the political concept of the Curzon Line of 1918-1920, the principal thesis of the book being centered on the attempts of the Great Powers to apply this concept during World War II. As a historical introduction the author refers to the Soviet offer of 1938 in the matter of the transit of Soviet troops through Polish territory during the Czechoslovak crisis. He then dwells upon the initial German-Soviet parleys in 1939, which culminated in the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact by Molotov and Ribbentrop on August 23, 1939. This agreement precipitated the Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland, its dismemberment with the division into "spheres of influence," and the final settlement of the German-Soviet border, which was effectuated by the treaty of September 28, 1939.

Then Dr. Yakemtchouk proceeds to present a survey and analysis not so much of Soviet-Polish relations, but rather of the unilateral Soviet pressure upon Poland, her hard-pressed government and her military representatives. The culmination of these relations was the mass murder of the Polish officer corps by the Russians in Katyn and the severance of diplomatic relations between the Polish government-in-exile and Moscow.

Finally, the author discusses the history of the Anglo-American attempts to restore the Polish state and to attain a solution of the territorial problems which would have been acceptable to Stalin, who at that time, especially during the conferences at Teheran and Yalta, was the principal partner of Churchill and Roosevelt. During hot debates at Teheran on the subject of the Polish-Soviet borders, Churchill proposed as most "just and well-grounded" a solution to Stalin, namely, the old Curzon Line, which proposition was accepted by the Conference of the "Big Three" at Yalta in February, 1945.

Moscow dealt in the usual manner and with its own peculiar "diplomacy" with the fanatical opposition of the Polish national groups, which resisted such a decision. In Poland, already under the occupation of Soviet troops, Moscow installed a puppet government of "national unity," which was totally subservient to the Kremlin. This government, in a gesture of "gratitude" for the Soviet "help" and "liberation," quickly accepted the Yalta decisions and approved the new Soviet-Polish frontier by a special treaty of August 16, 1945, which, with a few exceptions, was based on the old Curzon Line concept.

The book of Dr. Yakemtchouk is written with a fundamental knowledge of the matter and is based on huge documentary literature and material. In addition to a number of collections of documents of the German, British, American, French, Polish and Soviet governments, the author also availed himself of some 160 special works in various languages and 75 articles dealing with the same subject. One may say with assurance that his book will occupy a prominent place in the bibliography dealing with World War II and pertaining to the territorial settlements of Eastern Europe. The book also contains a map comparing the original Curzon Line with the "border" of Ribbentrop-Molotov outlined in their pact of 1939.

The value of Dr. Yakemtchouk's book is not diminished by his interpretation of certain political developments, which are open to challenge. For instance, the rejection of the Curzon Line by the Polish government-in-exile induced the Russians to create a Polish puppet government (the Lublin Committee), which not only accepted the terms of the Yalta Agreement, but eventually facilitated the speedy satellitization of Poland. Whoever is familiar with the basic tenets of Soviet Russian foreign policy will almost certainly discard the author's contention as

invalid. Regardless of what the Polish government-in-exile would have done, Moscow had a long-preconceived plan to create a series of puppet states in Eastern and Central Europe, through which it hoped to continue its expansion into the heart of Europe. The Russians succeeded in doing so in the case of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, although initially all these countries had non-communist governments. In the case of Poland the Curzon Line was only one of the flimsy pretexts advanced for the satellization of the country.

It also seems to this reviewer that the author should have included in his book the reaction of the Ukrainian political circles to the implementation of the Curzon Line, as a result of which the Ukrainians lost several of their traditional ethnic areas, such as Lemkivshchyna and the areas of Peremyshl, Yaroslav, Kholm and Pidlassya, which the Russians handed over to Poland. The establishment of the political border between Poland and the USSR along the Curzon Line provoked not only passive opposition on the part of the population of Western Ukraine, but also the armed resistance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in the years 1945-47.

Unable to liquidate the Ukrainian underground resistance by military forces and security police, Poland resorted in 1947-48 to large-scale forcible deportations of Ukrainians from these areas. Some 300,000 Ukrainians are now scattered throughout the western and northwestern areas of Poland in consequence of these deportations. Their plight is deplorable; they are being discriminated against and persecuted by both the Polish government and the population. All their appeals and pleas to Warsaw to return to their native areas have yet to meet with a positive and humane attitude of the present government of Poland.

BOHDAN KRAWCIW

COMMUNISM ON THE DECLINE. By George C. Guins. Philosophical Library. 1956, New York, pp. 287.

The author of this work has written several books dealing with Communism and the Soviet Union. His present thesis is that the decay of Communism commences when the people in Communist-dominated states generally come to understand that Communism is founded on illusions. In his preface he states somewhat guardedly that "There is a strong possibility that the present stage of Communism is its last stage." In his concluding remarks he asserts that "the final stage and even the death throes of Communism may be very prolonged." It should be noted that the manuscript was prepared before the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution and, of course, the recent delivery of the *sputniki*. The work is based largely on a study of Soviet periodicals and press accounts since the late 1930's.

Unquestionably there are several fine insights and sound observations in this analysis, particularly in the economic and sociologic sections. The comparative treatment of socialism and the free enterprise economy, the descriptive account of Soviet bureaucracy and the role of the entrepreneur in capitalism, and the analysis of the secular agricultural crisis in the Soviet Union give evidence of a firm grasp of the essentials which contrast the relatively free economy from a socialized one. As the author rightly perceives it, "If the essence of a depression, as an economic calamity, is the pauperization of masses, then there is a permanent depression in the Soviet Union." Despite a negligible rise in the standard of living and the absence of capitalist crises and unemployment, the USSR economy is subject to its own crises in the form of gross structural imbalances, violation or

non-observance of plans, underproduction and overexpenditures, all summed up in a marked dearth of consumer goods, high prices, and low wages. What is not adequately treated, however, is the essential thrust or assault character of this politically-driven economy, which in large part accounts for the rapid military and scientific developments that of late seem to frighten many misjudging Americans into near hysteria.

Although its documentation is impressive and broad in coverage, the work is not cohesively organized. It definitely suffers from an inadequate definition of terms, it is cast in a misleading framework of political reference, and thus it conspicuously lacks a rational justification for its governing thesis. Briefly, the analysis is not thoroughly and conclusively thought out. The attempt to interweave the economic, political, sociologic, and literary trends in the Soviet Union is admirable and in several respects successful, but numerous gaping holes nevertheless remain. The incessant confusion of Russia and the Soviet Union breeds recurring inaccuracies, and the reader is left wondering whether one of the author's aims is to becloud one of the foremost problems in the USSR, namely that of the captive non-Russian nation. Moreover, it is a real question as to whether Communism, as a doctrine with objective reference, was ever on the ascent in the USSR or, in the realistic terms of a power concept, as to whether the Moscow-centered empire has been or is now on a decline.

It can be easily demonstrated that the illusions of Communist ideology were widely appreciated in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union as early as the 1920's. Indeed, both Russian aggression and Bolshevik thinking were fiercely resisted and at no time were the peoples of Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Turkestan and elsewhere in the broad non-Russian periphery deluded by Communist ideology. Czarist-like Russification, followed by Pan-Slavism and the present "liberalization" program toward the non-Russian cultures served as the means of control and appeal by Moscow. Thus much evidence of the bankruptcy of Communism ideology existed long before the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution, but this work scarcely alludes to it. Such evidence, and more, actually undermines the overall thesis of this work and causes us to realistically focus our thoughts on the power techniques and totalitarian devices employed by empire-building Moscow. Communist ideology may still serve as a Trojan Horse in areas free from Russian domination but, contrary to the baseless presuppositions of this book, it never had any roots in any of the captive non-Russian nations brought under Moscow's yoke of force and terror since 1920.

One of the outstanding defects of this work is its utterly misleading framework of political reference in connection with the Soviet Union. In any analysis a distorted context can only lead to inaccurate interpretations and wrong conclusions, and this book abounds with them. For example, its observations on Moscow's virgin lands exploitation in Moslemic Turkestan—where, incidentally, no mention is made of the forcible displacement of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and other non-Russian youth to this area—contain a reference to the "Asiatic parts of the nation," meaning the Russian (p. 95). One may ask by what authority is the Moslemic Turkestanian nation now a part of the Russian nation? With current Moscow usages, elsewhere the Soviet Union is characterized as a "nation" (p. 160) and Caucasian and Ukrainian cities are referred to as "cities of southern Russia" (p. 68). To cap this mass of disinformation, the author at the end writes about some mythical "peoples of Russia" and finally, showing his true hand, he urges that American policy must let the Russian people "know whether the West

will respect the historical frontiers of the Russian state or try to dismember the country." In short, like Kerensky, the fascist and anti-Semitic Russian Solidarists (NTS), and other imperialist-minded Russian anti-Communist émigrés, Mr. Guine is fearful of the West supporting the national self-determination of the now captive non-Russian nations in the USSR.

There is abundant evidence to show that words are as much tools of deception for many an anti-Communist Russian as for the Russian Communists, both of whom share the common desire of maintaining at all costs the territorial framework of the Russian Empire. In addition to the verbal twists above, the author employs another when he states that there "are and will be national movements among minority groups, especially among the Moalem and Ukrainian peoples" (p. 251). These are no more "minority groups" in their respective homelands than are the Lithuanians, Latvians or Estonians. Moreover, it is evident that the author does not know how to handle the fundamental fact that Communism implanted itself in Russia and not in any of these non-Russian countries. His simple argument that Communism has no relation to Russian culture and history "since Communist ideology now dominates in so many non-Russian countries in Europe and Asia," actually reaches the height of simpism. Although the recent histories of Poland, Ukraine, Georgia and other non-Russian countries could be invoked, one need only point to Hungary in order to underscore the paucity of this argument. Russian scholars on the order of Berdyaev and Fedotov demonstrate with intellectual honesty the intrinsic relationships between Communism and the Russian past.

Many other serious flaws mar this work. No satisfactory account is given of the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument for Russian Communist expansion. The Russian genocide of the Ukrainian Catholic and also Orthodox Churches is not even mentioned. The collectivist mentality of the average Russian prior to 1917 is conveniently concealed, and the institutional significance of the village commune in ethnic Czarist Russia for the collectives that followed under the Red Czars is brashly brushed aside. These and other defects hardly contribute to an understanding of the supposed decline of Communism. They certainly do not help the American reader to understand the Soviet Union as an empire in itself. This reviewer submits that in the long run books of this type work to the disadvantage of the unvested Russian masses themselves.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

VEBLENISM: A New Critique. By Lev E. Dobriansky. Introduction by James Burnham. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1957, pp. 409.

Professor Dobriansky's new book on Veblenism contains much more than its title indicates. In a sense, one could almost say that in Dobriansky's book Veblenism is only an illustrative sub-subject within the broad structure of the book which transcends the conventional dimensions of critical examination of one man's contribution to the body of scientific knowledge in a particular field. Dobriansky's *Veblenism* is a substantial work encompassing a lucid and well integrated survey of the history of Western philosophy to serve as the intellectual framework within which Veblen's thinking is subjected to comparative exposition and critical examination. The latter, in its turn, is used as a convenient vehicle for a magnificent discourse on the related subjects and areas of social philosophy and sciences. The concluding part of the book deals with the pertinent problem of reconstruction of the social and economic order.

Thorstein Veblen has a unique place in American intellectual history as well as in economics. In addition to being a witty critic of American civilization in general and of American capitalism in particular, Veblen remains to this day the most original and daring American economic thinker, who managed to avoid the fate of the many inhabitants of the proscribed "underworld of economics." Veblen initiated a genuinely American school of economic thought, known as Institutionalism, which, although now dead as a formal school of economic thought, has left behind significant imprints on modern and even contemporary economics.

It is not unusual to find in the history of philosophical and scientific thought "new" schools asserting their legitimate complaints and genuine contributions through exaggeration. Such aggressiveness prevents the dissenters from achieving the full measure of their innovating potentiality. They create in a destructive mood and manner. Synthesis is not their virtue, this is left to subsequent generations of more orthodox-minded thinkers. Veblen was such an aggressive innovator. He is an outstanding example of almost total opposition and sweeping claims. Yet he and his immediate "institutionalist" followers made valuable contributions.

In this country, the work of Institutionalists accomplished a task similar to that which the Historicists and various "social reformers" achieved in Europe. The sociological-historicist-institutionalist revolt in economics broadened the assumptions and widened the method of economic analysis. But the real work of reconstruction is not yet finished. It has only begun. It moves along the path of a salutary integration of classical mechanistic simplicity with a more realistic psychological, technological and sociological complexity. The corresponding switch in emphasis from the neo-classical "mathematics of subtlety" (the analytical use of calculus) to the contemporary "mathematics of complexity" (*matrix algebra*) as partial tools of economic analysis is one illustrative characteristic of the new development in economics. Indirectly, this development owes much to the work of Thorstein Veblen.

Yet, as Dobriansky so clearly reveals, Veblen worked from very uncertain foundations. He was influenced by conflicting and ephemeral philosophical trends, among which Darwinist evolutionism was prevailing. It was this latter that Veblen wanted most to bring into economic analysis. But dynamic economic analysis is a difficult assignment even when imposed on simple mechanistic assumptions. It was so much more difficult for Veblen who wanted to develop a self-contained system of organicist dynamics. Too many unruly variables crowd such "living" models. In such a theory exactness is possible only at the expense of both logical consistency and operational realism. It was Veblen's intuitive genius rather than his formal philosophical intention or analytical rigor that made a genuine contribution to the future development of economics.

One can arrive at this conclusion about Veblen's work without the use of the magnificent evaluating apparatus of Dobriansky's critique. But Dobriansky has established this conclusion with philosophical finality and analytical certainty. And beyond this, it is worth stressing, Professor Dobriansky's major work constitutes a valuable contribution of its own to the field of philosophy of science in its neglected relevance for the social sciences. In view of the fast increasing use of the social sciences in the various areas of their possible and potential application for significant policy purposes, Professor Dobriansky's contribution is most timely. The tribute paid to this contribution in *The New York Times* Book Review Section by Professor Dorfman of Harvard was well deserved.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"THE CHIMERA OF A SOVIET THERMIDOR: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS," by Włodzimierz Baczkowski. *Orbis*, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., Fall, 1957.

Some of the most fundamental issues relating to the Soviet Union and Communism are cogently examined in this article. The impact of Russian history upon present-day Moscow, the relation between the Russian masses and their Moscow government, and the supposed reality of Communism are carefully and persuasively analyzed. The author cautiously furnishes authoritative evidence to substantiate each of his major points. He pulls no punches in his treatment of Western illusions concerning the possibility of a Soviet Thermidor which he rightly views as a projection of Western idealism. The unrealism of Russian émigrés, particularly those in the Russian NTS, is thoroughly scored for its misleading effect. The writer, who has a rich background in these matters, sees the hope of the West in the fixed aspirations of the captive non-Russian nations both within and outside the Soviet Union.

Because of its scholarly and well documented nature this article constitutes a must for all students desiring to understand the contemporary Russians in a realistic and unemotional way. Indeed, it would be advisable and highly desirable for Mr. Kennan or Allen Dulles to read and study it carefully. Drawing heavily upon Russian history, the writer ably shows how a totalitarian Russian regime can indefinitely maintain itself in power. In the light of his solid treatment, the episodes of the Kronstadt mutiny in 1921, the New Economic Policy of Lenin, the patriotic "Fatherland" idea of World War II, and even the de-Stalinization program, all of which the West had hailed as the Thermidors of the Russian Revolution, properly appear as sources of illusion for the Western mind. Russian émigrés, dreaming of their return to the homeland, have fanned the Thermidor illusion. As pointed out, Alexander Kerensky, for example, in an article on "The Turn Towards Freedom" (*The Slavic Review*, No. 46, 1937) hailed the issuing of the Stalin Constitution as "the recent solemn publication of the most democratic constitution" and blindly stated that this proved that "the Stalinists are seeking salvation on the road to democracy."

The writer convincingly shows how communist doctrine was adapted to basic Russian nationalism at the very outset of the Bolshevik Revolution. The idea of the withering away of the state was rejected first in practice and later in theory. The early example of this he refers to as the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 when Moscow appealed to patriotic love for fatherland and even employed the Czarist General A. Brusilov. Actually it was a war between combined Polish and Ukrainian forces and the Russian Bolshevik army under Trotzky on non-Russian soil.

However, the basic continuity of Russian history and institutions is brought out remarkably well. The Russian sense of world mission is no product of Marxian doctrine. As the author puts it, this sense was developed since the 15th century and "the idea of liberating oppressed peoples and social classes is, in a sense, a psychological product of the oppression to which the Russian people have been subjected for many centuries." Moreover, the Russian village commune up to 1917 made the transition to socialist arrangements quite simply and easy, just as N. G. Chernyshevsky and the populists in the 19th century envisioned it. For government, industry, and other forms of Russian society the writer skilfully portrays the fundamental continuity of Russian history down to the present. His analysis serves to dispel much of the sentimentalism and illusions built up in the West on the Russian question.

"THE SOVIET UNION AS REPORTED BY FORMER SOVIET CITIZENS,"
Interview Report No. 18, Office of Intelligence Research, the Department of State, Washington, D. C., August, 1957.

Estimates of a situation on the basis of mere visual observation are, of course, hardly trustworthy. Much more goes into an accurate estimation of conditions than simple observation. Reports such as this do serve a purpose, however. At times they disclose some useful information that finds greater meaning in a broader context. They reveal, too, certain harbored sentiments and feelings which may be of deeper importance.

According to these informants from the Soviet Union, there is a great deal of anti-Semitism in the USSR. "There is only one racial group toward which the Russians today feel any real hostility and that is the Jews" (p. 15). The reason given is that the Jews were responsible for the revolution. The report goes on to say that Stalin's nationality policy tended to reduce tensions between the Russians and non-Russians and that the situation today is much better in this regard than under the Czars. It fails to show how or why. Later, however, the source states that the problem of the non-Russian nations in the USSR "would prove a difficult one . . . in the event that the present regime in the Soviet Union were overthrown either by war or revolution." The reader cannot help but wonder about the logic of the informant. If tensions have been substantially reduced, as he points out in one place, then why should there be this probable difficulty, whether in war or peace?

The illogical strain of this report is further seen in the judgment expressed on this basic problem. The source states that "In so far as possible, national minorities should be given the chance to vote on the question of independence or union with Russia." This is a magnanimous thought, but his conception of the problem is a characteristically distorted Russian one since the non-Russians in their native homelands are not by any means "minorities." Also, the question is not one of independence or union with Russia; on the contrary, it is one of union or no union with Russia or any other country after independence is achieved. Any free union logically follows a free choice of independent entities.

"RUSSIA, THE WORLD'S LARGEST COLONIAL POWER," an article. *Das Ostpreussenblatt*, Hamburg, West Germany, January 11, 1958.

Strongly incited by the shameful results of the recent Asian-African Conference at Cairo, the authors of this article spare no fundamental historical facts in showing that the largest and worst colonial power is Russia. As they point

out, no one at this conference stood up to contradict Mr. Razhidov, president of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan and chief delegate to the conference from the Soviet Union. Almost a dozen Moslemic Uzbeks were in the large delegation. Having a clear field, Razhidov pictured the Soviet Union "the never-tiring vanguard for peace and the eternal enemy of imperialism and colonialism." On this issue the West has been fast asleep although all the cards are in its favor. Many wonder when it will awake to the facts so vividly described here.

"Russia," the article stresses, "was not merely one of the several colonial empires and remained as such under Soviet rule—it was the colonial empire *par excellence*." It continues, "Starting out as the Principality of Moscow, Russia has been expanding continuously for 700 years, and it has done this by wars of colonial conquest." The article makes the sound point that this empire-building had taken place overland rather than overseas so that in contrast to the colonies of the West, "the Russian colonies were kept out of view from the rest of the world." The record of Russian colonial and imperialist conquests down to this decade is then given in major part.

Yes, indeed, as the article concludes, "It seems as if in Cairo the Soviets even succeeded in brainwashing their African and Asian friends." More accurately, it was the Russians with the use of Turkestanian agents. The paramount question is when will the West expose the truth of Russian colonialism for which no brainwashing tactic is at all required.

"THE ANSWER TO SPUTNIKS," by James Burnham. *National Review*, New York, December 14, 1957.

As a supplement to the above comments on Bishop Sheen, much of the constructive work done by the bishop would certainly be further advanced by his closer familiarization with the analyses offered by James Burnham. This article is just one of many which excel in lucidity of expression, clearness of thought, and power of logic, reason, and truth. The author neatly takes apart the popular simplistic assumption that the way to beat the Russians is to launch bigger and better *Sputniks* and to maintain arms superiority. He soundly points out that only a few years ago we enjoyed overwhelming superiority over Moscow, and yet, judging by Russian Communist advances in China, Tibet, North Korea, and North Vietnam and Russian consolidation of its empire in Eastern Europe, this did not deter the expansion of the Communist threat. In his words, "Is it not obvious? What we were missing, plainly, was not arms but a policy."

The writer ably demonstrates the "how to be sure to lose" qualities of the containment policy we have been pursuing. The reason why our policy of drift can't work is, as he puts it, "It leaves the Communists undisturbed within the Soviet sphere, and at the same time free to make trouble anywhere outside the Soviet sphere." Significantly, it guarantees for us a future of endless "tensions" and losses; for the enemy it insures political sanctuary in his empire. Simply stated, at best it is a "heads we tie, tails you win" situation. As an alternative, the oft-misunderstood policy of liberation is advocated. Burnham lists concretely what should and could be done. Concerning his point on the Kersten Amendment, he stresses that the "existence of a multi-national corps with Polish, Hungarian, Russian, Ukrainian, and the other national units (Chinese already existing in Formosa) would heighten and direct the nationalist tendencies within the Soviet structure that have a potential explosive force no less shattering than in Africa and southern Asia." In short, it would decimate our enemy.

"THE LEPROSY OF COMMUNISM," by Bishop Sheen. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., March 19, 1958.

Bishop Sheen is undoubtedly one of the most effective public speakers in this country. His writings attract considerable attention, too. For some time, however, many students and observers concerned with the Soviet Union have viewed his conception of "Russia" as being fundamentally wrong and his pious hopes for the eventual salvation of the Russian people as being rather inordinate, to say the least. Without question, the good bishop is perfectly correct in his prayerful concern for Russia and its long tyrannized masses, but it appears that a principle of balance should be justly exercised. The crucial facts which unfortunately seem to escape the bishop are that the Soviet Union is not Russia; that there are over a hundred million non-Russians in the USSR who have suffered much more since 1920 than the Russians; and that the Ukrainian Catholic Church was liquidated by a Russian policy which extends centuries back. In the interests of truth as well as proportionate charity it would seem that a balanced concern is in order.

This article, which Senator Kuchel introduced into the *Record*, gives further evidence of the imbalances in the bishop's thought on these issues. He soundly urges that the United States go on the offensive in pleading for the liberation of the captive countries. In listing these countries, however, Poland, Hungary, China and others are mentioned but here, as elsewhere, no mention at all is made of Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Turkestan and others vitally situated in the basic empire, the Soviet Union itself. Sadly enough, for Bishop Sheen this empire has meant "Russia." Yet if he were understandingly cognizant of early Russian Communist colonialism and imperialism and Moscow's conquests of these formerly independent nations, his theses in this article about us having "them answering our notes for a while," about "pleading for their liberation," i. e. the captive nations, would be strengthened immeasurably. For if pressures within the Soviet Union succeed, success is guaranteed for the liberation of others.

"RUSSIA TODAY," by Ambassador You Chan Yang. *Korean Survey*, Washington, D. C., January, 1958.

Two choices are put forward to the Free World by the Korean Ambassador to the United States. One is swift death in atomic explosions; the other, beating the Russians in missile development and developing new mechanisms for international cooperation among the free countries. The Ambassador is quite cognizant of the force of Russian imperialism and colonialism within the Soviet Union as well as outside of it. He knows the captive status of Ukraine, White Ruthenia and the other non-Russian nations in the USSR. It seems curious, then, why he should overlook a third choice, political warfare on the terrain of the Russian Communist Empire.

The well-liked diplomat is correct in saying that "Russia, under its Communist dictatorship, has earned the loathing and distrust of all mankind." He is right also in showing that by diplomatic trickery Russia "was able to entrap nine hundred million people behind its Iron Curtain." However, with his keen appreciation of what colonialism and imperialism mean, it is unfortunate that he omitted this prime target for the Free World. Perhaps that is to be a major functional role of the new alignment the Ambassador has in mind.

**"EX-COMMUNIST NIKOLAI KHOKHLOV," An Interview. *Manion Forum Network*,
South Bend, Indiana, February 16, 1958.**

Conducted by the prominent Dean Clarence Manion, this forum recently interviewed Mr. Khokhlov, the former captain of intelligence in the USSR army. Some of the views expressed by Khokhlov are fairly sound, particularly in regard to Hungary and the West. When Khokhlov begins to spout about the Soviet Union and his N.T.S., the disinformation mounts so rapidly that it is truly a pity for Dean Manion to be deceived by it without even perhaps knowing it.

There can be no doubt that in good faith and in the spirit of principled anti-communism the dean invited Khokhlov to shed true light on the Soviet Union. But had he known of the fascist and imperialist nature of the N.T.S., the fantasies of its underground, and the depth of Communist infiltration in this outfit, there can equally be no doubt that he would have thought twice in making this interview. As so many others have learned from experience with such Russian anti-communists, carrying the badge of anti-communism is necessarily no sign of serving the national interests of this country or any other in the Free World. This breed, so like the Russian Communists, is primarily interested in saving the Russian empire which is now garbed as the Soviet Union. Americans who are unfamiliar with this problem do learn this in time.

Some of the myths panned off on Manion deserve to be noted. Khokhlov talks about "traditions of old Russian democracy" and that "democracy was in the history of Russia also." He apparently figures that the dean doesn't know about Ukraine and Russia, and thus wouldn't pin him down. The glaring fact is, of course, that there was never any democracy in Russia, not to speak of any tradition. Kerensky's fiasco is proof of it in our time. Khokhlov speaks also of the Russian people being "put into the chains of Communism." A college history student would fairly ask "when haven't they been in chains?" With no evidence to show any *en masse* opposition of the typically submissive Russian people to the Moscow regime since 1917, it is most doubtful whether there is any potentiality in them to change their regime. His statements about the N.T.S., political prisoners in USSR, the disintegration of the regime "within two or mostly three years" are of the same calculated, disinforming character. There used to be a Boldyreff floating about with the same fables until people got wise to him. Now Khokhlov is traversing green pastures.

**"FORTY YEARS OF SOVIET RUSSIA," by John LaFarge. *America*, New York,
November 2, 1957.**

At the time of the fortieth anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution many articles were written to explain the origins and development of Russian Communist power. This article is of this nature. It appeared in this well-known Jesuit periodical read by Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

The author's observations on Lenin and his political tenacity, on the real place of Communist theory in this development, and on the Christian answer to the Russian challenge are quite interesting and instructive. It is most unfortunate, however, that the writer identifies Russia with the Soviet Union and, in effect, bases his presentation on the grossest historical falsity.

L. E. D.

