

The

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JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

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
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE:

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Professor of Economics at Georgetown University; in October, 1976, he was reelected President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America for his ninth consecutive term; Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC), he was also elected President of the American Council for World Freedom (ACWF) in September, 1976; Director of the Institute on Comparative Political Systems at Georgetown University; he is the author of several books and a lecturer on economic and political-international affairs.

ROMAN V. KUCHAR, born in Lviv, Ukraine; he studied at the University of Lviv, Conservatory of Music, Vienna; University of Heidelberg, University of Colorado and the Ukrainian Free University in Munich; he is the author of novels, plays, poetry and essays; member of several academies and learned societies, including American and German societies; he also is a linguist; at present he is chairman of the Language Department of Fort Hays Kansas State University.

GEORGE P. KULCHYCKY received his education at West Technical High School in Cleveland, O., Kent State University (B.S.), John Carroll University (M.A.) and Georgetown University (Ph.D.); at present is professor of history at Youngstown University; his articles have appeared in *Horizons*, *Visnyk* and *ABN Correspondence*; he edited and translated M.I. Braichevsky's *Annexation or Reunification: Critical Notes on One Conception*; a member of several learned societies, he did research at the University of Vienna, the National Library of Vienna, as well as in Moscow, Warsaw and Prague.

BEN-CION PINCHUK received his higher education at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (B.A. and M.A.) and the University of Washington (Ph.D.); taught history at Tel Aviv University, was Senior Research Fellow of Russian and East European Research Center at Tel Aviv University and was Coordinator of Russian History Studies, Tel Aviv University; was Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Washington; he is the author of *The Octobrists in the Third Duma* and *Soviet Jewry during the Holocaust* (in Hebrew), as well as numerous articles and book reviews dealing with the USSR and its policies.

FOR A DURABLE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UKRAINE AND ITS NEIGHBORS

Editorial

... There will be no truly free Poles, Czechs or Hungarians without free Ukrainians, Byelorussians or Lithuanians. Nor, in the final analysis, without free Russians. Without Russians free of imperial ambitions, and who develop their own national life and respect the right of self-determination of other peoples... We appeal with especial stress to the Russian dissident movement in the USSR and the Russian political emigration for the strengthening and deepening of cooperation with the fighters for the independence of Ukraine...¹

This excerpt is taken from a document which appears elsewhere in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*. Signed by a group of Russian, Polish, Czech and Hungarian intellectuals in Europe, it was printed in the May, 1977 issue of *Kultura* (Culture), a Polish intellectual and cultural review appearing in Polish in Paris.

Signing the document were such known Russian dissidents now in Western Europe as Andrei Amalrik, author of *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*, Vladimir Bukovsky, Natalya Garbanevskaya, Vladimir Maksimov, editor of the quarterly, *Kontinent*, and Viktor Nekrasov, a Russian writer. Representing the Poles were Zbigniew Byrski, Jerzy Giedroyc, editor of the monthly, *Kultura*, Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski, Jozef Lobodowski, a poet, and Dominik Morawski. Finally, there were Tibor Merey, editor of the Hungarian literary review, *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Literary Gazette), and the Czechs Alexander Smolar and Pavel Tigrid, the latter being editor of the quarterly, *Svedectvi* (Testimony). (Only missing from this array were representatives of the Byelorussian, Rumanian and Lithuanian peoples, all of whom are also neighbors of the Ukrainians).

The declaration is a welcome development in the relations of Ukraine with its neighbors, even if long overdue. It denounces all imperialisms, including the Czarist Russian and the Polish imperialism

¹ "A Declaration on the Ukrainian Problem," *Kultura* (Culture), No. 5/356, May, 1977, Paris, France.

of past centuries which inflicted sufferings and persecution upon Ukraine. It calls for outright support for Ukrainian independence "because they (the Ukrainians) are the largest enslaved people in the USSR, and as a people the most determined, along with the Lithuanians, in their struggle for the establishment of an independent statehood..."

The weakest spot of the declaration, however, is this: "In any case, we want to create that situation in which they (Ukrainians) could express themselves as to an independent statehood." It unfortunately smacks of certain statements made at times by "liberal" Russian emigres who in their magnanimity would "allow" Ukrainians to have a general, all-national referendum to ascertain whether or not the majority of the Ukrainian people want an independent state.

Historically speaking, the Ukrainians already determined their political fate in 1917, voting then overwhelmingly (76%) for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and then through a series of official acts of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* (First, Second and Third *Universals*) they proclaimed at first the autonomy of Ukraine, then the Ukrainian National Republic, and, finally, on January 22, 1918, in the Fourth *Universal* they proclaimed the full-fledged independence of Ukraine. A year later (January 22, 1919) the Act of Union was proclaimed in Kiev, whereby all Ukrainian ethnographic territories were united into one, sovereign and independent state of the Ukrainian people.

The independence of Ukraine was recognized *de facto* and *de jure* not only by the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk on February 9, 1919, but also by the Communist government of Russia, first in a note signed by Lenin and Trotsky on December 17, 1917, and then at the signing of the Brest Litovsk Treaty on March 3, 1918. Ukraine lost its independence through conquest on the part of the self-same Communist Russia, and on that of Poland in the case of Western Ukraine. Thus any suggestion of a plebiscite or referendum for Ukraine would be a rude twisting of the nose of history.

HISTORICAL BITTERNESS MUST BE OVERCOME

In actuality, the tragedy of Ukraine began long ago with the signing of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654) by Czar Aleksiy of Muscovy and *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky of Ukraine. The agreement opened the door to Russian encroachments and penetration into Ukraine. Since that time Ukrainian-Russian relations have been marked

by intermittent wars and bloodshed, climaxed by outright genocide perpetrated by the Russians.

There was an opportunity for a positive solution of the Russian-Ukrainian centuries-long conflict in early 1917. That year the Ukrainian Central *Rada* offered the Russian Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky full cooperation and an alliance against the Bolsheviks in exchange for recognition of Ukraine's independence. The offer was turned down. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, recognized the independence of Ukraine as they sent their armies into Ukraine to conquer it. Since 1920 the Soviet Russian rule in Ukraine, despite the existence of the nominally independent Ukrainian republic, has been characterized by systematic persecution, mass deportations, Russification and physical genocide. Today Ukraine, with some 48 million people, is the prize colony of Communist Russia, despite the fact that there is a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic which is a charter member of the United Nations.

The Polish-Ukrainian conflict also is centuries-old, in the terms of a Polish statesman:

... [it is] an indisputed fact that for centuries the Ukrainian lands were the object of Polish expansion and colonialism. With the exception of one serious attempt at a union between Ukraine and Poland on the model of the Polish-Lithuanian union as equal with equal [the Treaty of Hadiach of September 16, 1658, concluded with *Hetman* Ivan Vyhovsky, which never went into effect], Polish-Ukrainian relations have been little more than a virtually uninterrupted chain of wars, of Polish bids for rule over the Ukrainian lands, and of their divisions between Poland and Russia ...²

On November 1, 1918, Western Ukraine (Galicia) followed in the footsteps of Great Ukraine by proclaiming the Western Ukrainian National Republic in Lviv. The Polish government of new and reborn Poland promptly attacked the Ukrainian state, thus initiating a new Polish-Ukrainian war which lasted until July, 1919, ending with the conquest of Galicia by the Allied-equipped Polish troops. In the meantime the hard-pressed Ukrainian National Republic in Kiev, governed by the Directorate under Simon Petlura, was forced to conclude an alliance with Jozef Pilsudski at the expense of Galicia, aggrieving some six million Ukrainians who hardly relished going under Polish rule. The combined Polish-Ukrainian troops reached Kiev, capital of Ukraine, on May 8, 1920, only soon to be repulsed by a Soviet counter-

² "The Independence of Ukraine Through the Eyes of a Pole," by Stefan Korbonski, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, Winter, 1972, New York, N.Y.

offensive. The Polish-Soviet war ended by the Treaty of Riga of March, 1921, which was tantamount to a betrayal of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Pilsudski regime.

From 1920 to September, 1939, the some seven million Ukrainians ruled by Poland were subjected to every variant of persecution, oppression and discrimination. The Polish "pacification" in 1930 of the Ukrainian areas was condemned by the League of Nations and many European governments. During World War II mutual massacres were committed by both the Polish and Ukrainian undergrounds.

In 1945-47, at the time when the Soviet government was liquidating the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) units in Western Ukraine, the Polish Communist regime was busy deporting some 500,000 Ukrainians from the Polish-held Ukrainian areas to the "recovered territories" assigned to Poland from the Third Reich. This genocidal operation was highly reminiscent of Stalin's deportation of the Crimean Tartars.³

Czech-Ukrainian relations never were as strenuous as were Ukrainian relations with Russia and Poland. In many respects the situation of the Czechs and Slovaks was similar to that of the Ukrainians until 1918, the year Czechoslovakia became an independent state. Some 600,000 Ukrainians for centuries lived in Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Ruthenia) and until 1918 were under Hungarian influence and domination. Although the Prague government pledged itself to grant them autonomy, it never kept its promise. Even though the Czech rule was never as harsh and inhuman as the Russian, or as oppressive as the Polish, nevertheless the Czech administration, fearing Ukrainian nationalism, supported the pro-Russian cultural and political elements in Carpatho-Ukraine. The crisis in Czech-Ukrainian relations came in the fall of 1938, after the infamous Munich pact, when Carpatho-Ukraine, following the lead of Slovakia, declared its autonomy in a federated state of Czechoslovakia. On March 15, 1939, when the Hungarian government, backed by Hitler and Mussolini, was preparing to invade Carpatho-Ukraine, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Parliament bravely proclaimed the independence of the country.

The Hungarian government sent several divisions into Carpatho-Ukraine which massacred the swiftly organized Ukrainian army-militia, known as the Carpathian Sich, and occupied the tiny country.

³ *Death and Devastation on the Curzon Line: The Story of the Deportation from Ukraine.* By Walter Dushnyck. Published by the Committee Against Mass Expulsion in Cooperation with the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1948, New York, N.Y.

Their killing of thousands of defenseless Ukrainians, guilty of no crime, did not endear the Hungarians to the Ukrainians.

The ties between the Ukrainian people and the peoples of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were established mainly through the common use of the Old Slavonic language in their respective Orthodox Churches in the XVIth-XVIIth centuries. After World War I, the Rumanians made haste to enlarge their kingdom by occupying Transylvania and the Ukrainian parts of Bukovina, Bessarabia and the district of Marmorosh of Carpatho-Ukraine, thus amassing a million-strong Ukrainian minority which endured national and religious persecution between the world wars. During World War II, Rumania, as a war ally of Nazi Germany, occupied a part of Ukraine west of the Dniester River and incorporated it into Rumania as the "Tranistria" district, a move which marred Rumanian-Ukrainian relations for a time.⁴

NEW SITUATION IN A CHANGING WORLD

The Second World War and its aftermath completely changed the political configuration of Central and Eastern Europe. Germany, once a menace to Central-Eastern Europe, as a divided country has ceased to be a powerful political factor it once was. Most of the Ukrainian ethnographic territories have been integrated into the Ukrainian SSR. Some 350,000 to 500,000 Ukrainians still live in Poland, where they are subjected to a slow but effective process of Polonization. Even though the Polish Communist regime has allowed the establishment of a Ukrainian social-cultural association on a national level, but with a limited scope of activity, the Ukrainian Catholic Church is still not permitted re-establishment, and chauvinist anti-Ukrainian feeling is still very much in evidence among the Polish population.

Czechoslovakia and Rumania each have some 150,000 to 200,000 Ukrainians, officially tolerated as a "national minority." As in Poland, there are some Ukrainian primary schools, even Ukrainian courses at the universities of Prague and Bucharest, but there is no Ukrainian Catholic Church, despite the fact that most Ukrainians in these countries are Catholics.

There is no Ukrainian minority of note in Hungary, or at least there is no detectable overall organization of Ukrainians in that Communist country.

⁴ "Ukraine and Her Southwestern Neighbors: Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary," by Peter G. Stercho. Paper delivered at "Ukraine in a Changing World" conference, held on December 7, 1974 dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the founding of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

But by far the most significant change in Central-Eastern Europe is the shift of political power to Moscow: all of them—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania—are now compliant satellites of Moscow.

The Poles, who by tradition have always been anti-German and anti-Russian, humbly take orders from Moscow. All in all, they have yet to change their attitude toward neighbors, such as the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians. The Czechs and Slovaks, who were notoriously pro-Russian, learned their lesson in 1948 and 1968; Soviet tanks moved into Czechoslovakia to crush the hopeful "liberalization" program of Alexander Dubcek. There is no love lost between the Rumanians and Hungarians, on the one hand, and the overbearing Russians, on the other.

From harsh experience, it should follow that a definite change should have been indicated in these peoples as far as the Ukrainians are concerned. Today's transgression is tomorrow's violation. Unfortunately no change has occurred, at least, to any appreciable degree. To be sure, all are victims today, all bagged by Moscow, the big game hunter among nations. Astonishingly, what the victims of the imperialistic jungle do not realize is that this international sport, so long a part of recorded history, is *passee*. Take the tired emigre leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. For the most part, they still live and dream in the years antedating 1939: they crave the restoration of the 1939 borders. The Poles want back Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian lands ("Lwow and Wilno"), while, to be sure, they would like to keep the territories annexed from defeated Germany in 1945. The Czechs and Hungarians dream of regaining Carpatho-Ukraine, while the Rumanians thirst for repossession of all of Bukovina and Bessarabia, now parts of the Ukrainian SSR and Moldavia.

THE POLISH DOCUMENT

Last year a "Program of the Coalition for Polish Independence," a product of the new Polish generation reared under Communist domination, surreptitiously emerged from Poland and was published in English by the North American Study Center for Polish Affairs in Evergreen Park, Ill. The document touches on the issues with which we are concerned here.

Par. 14 of the lengthy 26-paragraph document makes enlightened reference to Poland's eastern neighbors:

We are not Russia's neighbor. Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania are our neighbors to the East. We are linked to these countries by the life we

shared for many centuries within the frontiers of one state—the Polish Commonwealth of Nations. While it is true that this peaceful common existence was at times disturbed by Polish expansiveness, nevertheless it was a voluntary arrangement. The Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian and Latvian nations are not independent today. They were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union and are subjected to a more severe political, ideological and religious discipline than is Poland. After centuries of close relationship, we can neither look with indifference at the incessant campaign of Russification being waged against them nor can we be mutely sympathetic. We declare our solidarity with, and strong support for, these nations aspiring to independence of Russian domination. We should do everything in our power to help.

Even though the loss of Lwow and Wilno, for centuries associated with Polish culture, is and will remain extremely painful for us, we do not put forward territorial claims against our Eastern neighbors. We do demand, however, that all governments establishing their authorities in the Republic's former territories—which were detached as a result of external decisions and not surrendered with the approval of any of the nations directly concerned—should guarantee the Poles living in these lands equal rights and unrestricted opportunities to preserve their native tongue and culture. We also demand that Poles from Poland should be allowed unrestricted access to those places connected with the history of both our nation and former Commonwealth.⁵

This is, we believe, the most frank and genuine voice ever to come forth from a Polish political group with respect to the issue of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania. Here is the only logical and practical approach to this important problem.

In the interests of all, we wholeheartedly support both the declaration of the Russian, Polish, Czech and Hungarian intellectuals with respect to Ukraine and the policy statement of the Coalition for Polish Independence, an underground organization in Poland.

We readily concede—in the absence of Gallup polls—that both these statements may be the product of a few intellectuals. History teaches us, however, that thinking and feeling remarkably coalesce in the face of a common enemy.

Here is the first overt political break in a long drawnout development which cannot but help Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania and at the same time cause much anxiety and concern in Moscow, the transgressor whose retributive fate is long overdue.

⁵ "Program of the Coalition for Polish Independence." By the Coalition for Polish Independence, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, Spring, 1977, pp. 23-40, New York, N.Y.

DISSENTISM AND THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES

BY GEORGE E. KULCHYCKY

Official Soviet sources claim the "Communist millenium" is just around the corner. Equally valid is their claim that the "nationalities problem" within the Soviet Union is approaching final resolution. Soviet propaganda has succeeded in convincing the West that indeed the nationality problem is well-nigh non-existent, that what is now taking place is a blending of the different peoples into the much talked about "Soviet Man," whose culture and language will be Russian. Yet the path of the emerging "Soviet Man" is almost impassably strewn with the debris of the very nations that are supposed to have lain down and died.

In 1971 at the Party Congress Brezhnev had to caution the cadres, despite the propaganda, that it must continue to educate the people "in the spirit of internationalism and intransigence toward all manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, of national narrow-mindedness and conceit."¹ In February of 1972 the Central Committee of the CPSU, to mark the 50th anniversary of the USSR, claimed (as it always does) the Soviet Union to be "the most viable and perfected form of organization for a multinational state."² Yet the dissatisfaction and discord recorded by official and unofficial sources tell a different story.

The last Soviet census revealed that at least 47% of the Soviet population is non-Russian and that a large portion of these peoples does not claim Russian even as their *second* language. Unofficial Western sources conducting opinion polls have revealed that Soviet radio listeners prefer to listen to broadcasts in their native language.³ Proof that the nationalities problem is far from any resolution is provided by the uprisings in the camps of Temir-Tau and Kingir,

¹ "Dissidents Among the National Minorities in the USSR," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, (August 29, 1972), p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³ *Radio Liberty Committee Annual Report Fiscal Year, 1973* (Munich: Radio Liberty Committee, 1973), p. 17.

disturbances in Novocherkask, Dnipropetrovsk, Dniprodzherzhinsk, Kaunas, and other places.

Students of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union would do well to observe this movement in areas outside of Moscow proper and, specifically, in the non-Russian Republics. To depend on Russian dissidents for a revolution is to insure that there be no revolution at all. Although the Russian dissidents share many views and goals of the non-Russian opposition, they do not agree on the most fundamental principle, that is, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the establishment of free independent political entities in keeping with the principle of self-determination of nations. This is why there cannot be a common front comprising all the dissidents in the Soviet Union and this is why, say, Prof. Reddaway, is worried about some nations, specifically the Ukrainians, getting out of hand by going further than just demanding civil rights.⁴ The Russian dissident movement, as the Russians themselves admit, has no support among the masses. Where it took the Russian dissidents more than a year to collect several hundred petition signatures, it took the seething Lithuanians but several days to collect over 17,000 signatures.⁵ Yuri Yofe, at the NTS Conference in November, 1972, declared that "the Democratic Movement has never been so popular as, for instance, that of the Zionists, the Crimean Tartars, or the Ukrainians..." He pointed out that when Bukovsky, a Russian dissident, was being tried a Russian "female patriot from the public" protested, "Why should the likes of him be tried? They should be strangled without any trial."⁶ In contrast, the dissidents in Ukraine received heartwarming moral support from the populace, who, although locked out of the trial proceedings, threw flowers in the path of the dissidents as they were being led away.

A recent emigree from the Soviet Union, V.A. Kapshytser, has written, "One major question facing us is the national question... The national forces are breaking the Communist Empire apart."⁷ Gleb Rar, also from the NTS, has stated that the Russian dissidents number a scant 3 to 5 thousand intellectuals, and goes on to say that "most natural and most real are the ties between the elite and the

⁴ Tibor Szamuely, "The Future of Soviet Dissent," *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXIII, No. 6 (November-December 1972), p. 17.

⁵ Tibor Szamuely, "The Future of Soviet Dissent," *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXIII, No. 6 (November-December 1972), p. 16.

⁶ E. Orlovsky, "Russian Defeatism and Ukrainian 'Madness of the Courageous,'" *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, (July-August, 1973), p. 17.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

people in the national republics, all of whom are strongly united in the face of the threat to their national culture, their nationalism."⁸ A Columbia University study of the Soviet nationalities that was edited by Prof. Edward Allworth includes a work by Prof. Z. Brzezinski in which the latter states that the Soviet nationality question has proven itself to be the most dynamic force in the USSR. He further states that the liberal Russian dissidents fear the potentiality of nationalism almost as much as do their rulers.⁹

What makes these nationalities the most dynamic force in the Soviet Union? Simply their innate desire to survive as national entities. Where the Russian historian, for example, is not chastised for glorifying Russian history, even glorification of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and other more than less tyrannical figures, the non-Russian historian is forced to pass by in silence the past of his own people and to extol only its newly-found happiness within the common "Soviet Fartherland." Take as an example Prof. Ushangi I. Samonidze, a well-known Georgian historian. He recently completed a work, entitled, *The Historiography of the Bourgeois Democratic Movement and the Victory of the Socialist Revolution in Georgia, 1877-1921*. Upon its publication, he was attacked by the official newspaper, *Zaria Vostoka*, for using sources of the Mensheviks—ideological enemies of the Bolsheviks—and for allowing "great nationalist deviations to creep into his work."¹⁰

Not only the author but the Scientific Institute at Tbilisi, to which he belonged, suffered repression, many of its members being forced to undergo a period of "self-criticism." Another historian, M. I. Braichevsky, came up with a work, entitled, *Annexation or Reunification*,¹¹ which was critical of the Soviet approach to the annexation of Ukraine and the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654. The author, picking out Ukrainian heroes at random, called the reader's attention to the Soviet epithets that branded each if he was adjudged in any way anti-Russian.

⁸ E. Orlovsky, "Russian Defeatism and Ukrainian 'Madness of the Courageous,'" *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, (July-August, 1973), p. 18. Orig. cited in *Die Welt*, February 2, 1973.

⁹ Szamuely, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁰ "Peresliduvannia v Hruzil," *Homin Ukrainy*, July 15, 1972, p. 4.

¹¹ This work encompasses 101 typed pages and has been translated into English by the author of this article. It will appear in print shortly and will include the critical comments of the translator. It originally appeared in three Ukrainian journals, *Novi Dni*, *Vyzvolnyi Shliakh* and *Shyroke More Ukrainy* (see footnote 13). The last source includes the author's recantation letter written to *Visti Ukrainy*, a Communist paper for emigre consumption.

Thus, Ivan Vyhovsky—"filthy traitor," Ivan Briukhovetsky—"demagogue" and "traitor," Petro Doroshenko—"Turkish puppet, traitor," Ivan Mazepa—"filthy traitor, who sold Ukraine into foreign enslavement,"—*ad nauseam*.¹² For his efforts Braichevsky was forced to write a letter of recantation to the editor of *Visti Ukrainy*, a Communist paper aimed at the emigre reader.¹³

This is not to say that only non-Russian historians are repressed. In April of 1973 Russian Prof. O. Iakovlev, head of Propaganda in the Central Committee of the CPSU, was summarily removed for his article, "Against Anti-Historism," in which among other things he criticized Russian nationalism and the unconscionable glorification of the Russian past.¹⁴ The dictate was clear: both non-Russians and Russians must venerate the past of the Russian state, even *before* the October Revolution.

Now let us glance at a few of the most vocal nationalities and their place within the dissident movement in the Soviet Union.

Another nationality, the Lithuanians, has been heavily drained from the native land by resettlement. A recent addition to the Soviet Union and, like Western Ukraine, possessed of a rich religious heritage, Lithuania continues to display a degree of spiritual vitality that presents a marked and embarrassing contrast to other regions of the USSR where religion has come under efficient control.¹⁵ The Lithuanian opposition movement revolves around the Church and the clandestine *Lieutuvos Kataliku Bazynicious Kronica* (Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church), of which several issues have appeared. The Chronicle carries a running survey of the situation of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, printing the text of a petition to First Secretary Brezhnev and the Secretary General of the UN with 17,540 signatures, pastoral letters, and relating acts of invasion of church property, intimidation of children, etc.¹⁶ Needless to say, it includes

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

¹³ *Shhyroke More Ukrainy: Dokumenty Samydatu z Ukrainy*. Dokumenty VIII, (Paris: Published by P.I.U.F. and Smoleskyp), pp. 238-239.

¹⁴ "O. Iakovleva usuneno za krytyku rosiiskoho natsionalizmu," *Svoboda*, May 8, 1973.

¹⁵ "Recent Events Among Lithuanian Catholics," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, February 15, 1973, p. 2.

¹⁶ "New Issue of Underground Periodical Reaches West: No. 4 of the 'Chronicle of Lithuanian Catholic Church'" *ELTA Information Service*, No. 3 (175) (March-April, 1973), pp. 1 and 2.

much information about the political aspect of the Lithuanian struggle. It has covered the appeal of Simas Kudirka, who was naively handed over to the Russians off Martha's Vineyard; the fate of 80 political prisoners of the Mordovian camp (apprising the International Red Cross); the self-immolation of Romas Kalonta in Kaunas, in the wake of which thousands of Lithuanian youth protested the Russian occupation and as a result of which many were tried in May of 1972; and the self-immolations of V. Stonis of Varena and K. Andriuskevicius of Siaulai.¹⁷ An attempt at self-immolation by Zalius Kauskas seems to have been stopped by the KGB.¹⁸ An important coverage of their "samizdat" (underground publication) has dealt with the work of chief stage director Jonas Jurasas of Kaunas who refused to compromise his artistic conscience and attacked the mutilation of art. In an impassioned statement he declared "that a nation that does not contribute to the creativity of the theater is either dead or dying."¹⁹ As in other non-Russian Republics those who transgress against the prevalent ideology and regime receive the most severe punishment of all. Thus Aglis Stakiavicius was arrested for writing "A Critique of the Communist Manifesto" and for his "Results of Sociological Research in Lithuania," and placed in a mental institution.²⁰ Of particular interest to us Americans is the case of Simas Kudirka, mentioned above, who in 1971 made an unsuccessful attempt to jump a Soviet ship. Nothing was heard of Kudirka until his trial at the end of 1971. Kudirka, refusing to accept counsel, acted on his own behalf. He pointed out, "If Gravonski (the lawyer) is an honest man and defends me according to his conscience, then it can only do him harm. But if he is dishonest and plays the role of a second prosecutor, as often happens in political trials in Lithuania, then I think that my case is already complex enough and that one prosecutor is enough."²¹ Prior to his trial he was held in a mental ward without his knowledge while his family was being pressured, without success, into admitting that he was indeed insane.²² As his trial drew to a close Kudirka was permitted to speak for four hours. His state-

¹⁷ "A Lithuanian Samizdat Document," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, February 15, 1973, p. 10.

¹⁸ "Lytva Daie Pryklad," *Svoboda*, July 8, 1972.

¹⁹ "New Issue of Underground Periodical..." *op. cit.*, p. 10.

²⁰ "Resistance Movements in the National Republics," *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXII No. 3 (May-June 1971), p. 19.

²¹ Anatole Shub, "Kudirka on Trial," *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXII, No. 5 (September-October, 1971), p. 15.

²² *Ibid.*

ments were highly political, patriotic and anti-Soviet.²³ His sentence was ten years in a Soviet corrective camp.*

The "Martha's Vineyard" affair, the letter writing campaigns, and the appearance of the *Lithuanian Chronicle* in the West—all threw too much light on the Lithuanian situation for the Soviet's liking. To put a better face on matters the CP of the Lithuanian SSR decided to remove Justas Rugienis, an old Stalinist, and to appoint Kazimieras Tumenas as "Commissioner for the Lithuanian SSR of the Council of Religious Affairs." The former minister had been crude and high-handed in coping with the religious situation. Now, under Tumenas, the regime cunningly sought to fight the Catholic Church with its own hands by having the Church hierarchy issue soothing statements to Western correspondents and transfer activist priests to other regions.²⁴ All this activity clearly was designed to give "the clerical factions a decisive rebuff," averred former Lithuanian CP Secretary Snieckus.²⁵ In the meantime, in August of 1973, Issues No. 3, 5, and 6 of the *Lithuanian Chronicle*, which had been thought to be non-existent, made their way to the West. The three issues, however, were no longer exclusively religious in nature, covering cultural and political life in Lithuania as well. This marked the evolution of the *Chronicle* into an instrument dealing with an organized nationalist movement including attempts, according to the KGB, to contact and merge forces with the nationalist organizations in Georgia, Armenia, and other Soviet Republics.²⁶ This signaled the end of the *modus operandi* between the Catholic hierarchy and K. Tumenas, who, according to issue No. 7 of the *Lithuanian Chronicle* (which found its way to the West in the last days of 1973), called the leading members of the hierarchy to a "get-acquainted" meeting at which he took to task those who had "slandered Soviet reality."²⁷ With this meeting the struggle between the Lithuanian Church and the Lithuanian SSR regained its former pitch. More, a new militant spirit on the part of the Lithuanians was unmistakable. A statement,

²³ Algis Ruskenas, *Day of Shame*. (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1973),

* Simas Kudirka was recognized as American citizen and released from Soviet concentration camp. He is now in the United States. — *Ed.*

²⁴ "Lithuanian C.P. Changes Personnel and Tactics in Fighting Religion," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, June 12, 1973, p. 2.

²⁵ Terry McNeill, "Ideological Trends and Portents: A Review of Some Recent Developments," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, October 4, 1974, pp. 14-15.

²⁶ "Three New Issues of the Lithuanian Chronicle," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, November 5, 1973, p. 1.

²⁷ "The Seventh Issue of the Lithuanian Chronicle," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, January 30, 1974, p. 1.

which was dated August 31, 1973, called Communism and atheism an "alien ideology," and was signed for the first time by a group known as "Representatives of the Lithuanian Catholics" (probably an underground organization). It was clear that the Lithuanian movement now had achieved a semblance of organization.²⁸ To underline their new defiant spirit, 7,000 Lithuanian believers assembled at Ratnycia to see 2,700 youths receive the sacrament of Confirmation.²⁹

The year 1974 continued to be a good year for samizdat publications despite the arrest of many leading intellectuals. Issue Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the *Lithuanian Chronicle* came to light in the West. What was interesting about Issue Nos. 10 and 11 was the fact that for the first time the *Lithuanian Chronicle* was translated (although not very literally) into the Russian language. This was indicative, if anything, of the expansion of the vision of the *Chronicle* beyond the borders of Lithuania.³⁰ The impact of this development may be seen in the Russian *Khronika Potochnykh Podei*, which in its 32nd issue reprinted information taken directly from the 9th and 10th issues of the *Lithuanian Chronicle*.³¹ The 10th issue, besides discussing a "neo-Stalinist cultural revolution," also gave information about the trial of the students who had been preparing the publication of a new periodical, *Naujasis Varpas* (The New Bell). The leader of the students, Sarunas Zakauskas, who was sentenced to six years at a strict labor regime, accurately caught in his concluding statement the sentiment of the Lithuanians: the Soviet government was not the "government of the people."³²

The situation prevailing in Lithuanian matches those in the other two Baltic Republics, Latvia and Estonia. No. 17 of the *Chronicle of Current Events* printed information about the arrests of men who had scattered 8,000 leaflets criticizing the domestic and foreign policies of the regime, including the invasion of Czechoslovakia as well as the Sino-Soviet dispute; about the arrest of 84-year-old Fritz Menders, the founder of the Latvian Social Democratic Party, and about the arrest of Lidia Dornina for possession of banned literature, har-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³⁰ Albert Bolter, "Samizdat Review: Summer, 1974," *Radio-Liberty Dispatch*, October 25, 1974, p. 4.

³¹ "Polavylosia chervove chyslo 'Khroniki Potochnykh Podli,' *Svoboda*, August 21, 1974.

³² "The Tenth Issue of the Lithuanian Chronicle," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, August 19, 1974, p. 2.

boring people of the former "bourgeois republic" and circulating Amalrik's *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*³³

The "cleansing" of the top echelons of the Latvian Party is indicative of the concern that the Soviet regime entertains for this republic. On July 14, 1972, the Latvian Minister of the Interior was removed. A few months later the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* reported the anonymous appeal of 17 top Latvian Party leaders that called upon the parties of Eastern Europe to exert pressure upon the Soviet leaders, who, after the death of Stalin, have been conducting, "an even more insistent application of the program of forcible assimilation of small nations." In this appeal they point out that non-Latvians are given the most responsible positions and that the proportion of Latvians has dropped from 62 to 57 per cent between 1959 and 1970.³⁴ A top Latvian party official, probably at the prodding of Moscow, responded to these charges with familiar Soviet double-talk; the emigre and Western radio programs, he claimed, were "trying to destroy the monolithic unity of the Soviet People."³⁵

A similar line is pursued by the Soviet authorities as regards Estonia, which in March of 1972 began to implement the nationalities program as outlined by the 24th Party Congress. The Republic has its own samizdat publication, known as the *Esti Demokrat*. Much of what is known about Estonia originates with this journal, portions of which are reprinted in the Russian *Chronicle*. Thus issue 25 of the *Chronicle* notes the existence of an "Estonian National Front" which espouses a referendum on self-determination.³⁶ The dissidents of this country, who in the main come from the new technical elite, take a different stand from their counterparts in the RSFSR and from, specifically, A. Sakharov. In one of their clandestine documents ("To Hope or To Act?") they raise the issue of armed retribution against the Communist rulers at a time when the Russian dissidents reject revolt as a means to gain ends in the USSR.³⁷ Although less active in underground publishing, the Estonians, like their Lithuanian brethren, are a cause of concern for the Russians. A report from Estonia that came to the West by way of Sweden in April of

³³ "Resistance Movements. . ." *op cit.*, p. 19.

³⁴ "Dissidents Among the National Minorities in the USSR," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, August 29, 1972, pp. 3 and 4.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁶ "Dissidents Among the National Minorities in the USSR," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, August 29, 1972, pp. 3 and 4.

³⁷ E. Orlovsky "Are Russians Striving for Revolutionary Changes in the USSR?" *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, (May-June 1973), p. 7.

1974 discloses that all private typewriters must be registered and that three samples of the typescript of each machine is kept on file by the KGB. Copying machines may be owned only by public agencies and even these can be used only in the presence of at least two officials.³⁸

Enjoying a far better situation than the Balts are the peoples of the Caucasus, who until recently have not had to endure rampant Russification and depopulation. Most representative of these republics is Georgia, Stalin's homeland. Its distance from the hub of the Soviet Empire, Moscow, and its quite different language seem to have prevented the debilitating developments being suffered by the Baltic Republics. The population in Georgia remains indigenous: 98 per cent is Georgian, according to the 1970 census. The inhabitants are determined to preserve their own identity; only about one-fifth of the population can be claimed to speak Russian.³⁹ Recently, the Georgian Party has been under attack by Moscow for putting republican and local interests ahead of the latter's ("all-Union") interests. Among other charges leveled at the Georgians is their "private ownership mentality and other negative manifestations."⁴⁰ The Party was instructed to be more vigilant toward "alien" views and "international education." The earlier-mentioned work of Prof. Samonidze sheds some light on the "class approach" Moscow has adopted to combat "nationalism" and "bourgeois nationalism." The much-propagated formula, "national in form, socialist in content," is accompanied by Russification. Thus the Russian language and history become prerequisites for the achievement of "real" internationalism.

Shortly thereafter First Secretary of the CP of Georgia Mzhavanadze (he had been Prof. Samonidze's protege) was unofficially criticized for having a soft spot for Georgian nationalists and officially was removed for "economic abuses."⁴¹ KGB Chief Yuri Andropov personally supervised the purge of the top leadership of the Georgian CP. Intimately bound with this purge was the riot that took place in Georgia in 1973, a riot which KGB reports described as "...a nationalist conspiracy under the influence of anti-socialist forces."⁴² Additional evidence of Georgian discontent may be found

³⁸ "From Behind the Iron Curtain," *ABN Correspondence* Vol. XXV, No. 5, (September-October, 1974), p. 46.

³⁹ "Dissidents Among the National..." *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴¹ Terry McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁴² "KGB Chief Andropov Conducts 'Purges' in Georgia," *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXV, No. 6, (November-December, 1974) p. 45.

in two samizdat documents that surfaced in the West in 1974. One, entitled *Historical Review of Moscow-Georgian Relations* (32 pp.), is a reassessment of Georgian political and historical attitudes to Russia. The other, a Georgian religious samizdat document that is the first of its kind, is entitled, *On the State of the Orthodox Church in Georgia*.⁴³

Of late the Crimean Tatar problem has captured the attention of the West as well as of the dissidents of the Soviet Union. A remarkable ten-page document, accompanied by 105 pages of signatures, reveals the plight of the Tatars who had been expelled from the Crimean Peninsula for "wholesale betrayal of the Fatherland" "during World War II. In 1959 this territory, on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, was given to the Ukrainian SSR to underscore the 1954 theme, "Forever Together." ⁴⁴ In actuality, however, the territory serves as the Soviet Riviera for the top Soviet bosses and the "aparatchiki."

In 1967 the Crimean Tatars, as a people, were absolved of their crime of betrayal but were not allowed to return to their former homeland. Their foremost defender is Gen. Grigorenko, a Ukrainian and a Red Army hero who for his efforts has been forced to spend most of his latter years in the mental institutions of the Soviet Union. *Chronicle of Current Events* No. 10 carries an interesting letter with the salutation, "Dear Friend," and which is signed, "A Ukrainian." The writer complains of the fact that the Russian minorities are progressively being squeezed out of the national republics. He slyly asks: "Whither now the representatives of the Great Russian people that

⁴³ Albert Boiter, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁴ Much valuable information about the Crimean Tatars and the "crimes" for which they were expelled from their homeland, may be found in Khrushchev's 1956 de-Stalinization speech. Simultaneously Khrushchev tells about Stalin's plans to expel all the Ukrainians from Ukraine (over 40 million) but that he could not carry out this design because of a lack of box cars and other means of transportation.

⁴⁵ The year 1954 was celebrated in the Soviet Union and Ukraine under the slogan "Forever Together." Hundreds of books appeared that gave the 1654 Pereyaslav Treaty the interpretation that the Ukrainians, after hundreds of years of struggle, had finally achieved their main objective which was *not* independence but "Reunion with their Great Russian Brothers." Nothing was said of the Korsun Agreement (1657) between Sweden and Ukraine, the defeat of the Russian Armies by the Ukrainians at the Battles of Konotop in 1659 and Buzhyn in 1661, and the Peace of Andrusovo of 1667, by which Poland and Russia divided Ukraine into spheres of control. It is this lack of historical truth that M. I. Braichevsky discusses in his book (see footnote 11).

led the Tatars, the Bashkirs, and others out of the darkness..?"⁴⁶ The "Ukrainian" gets a reply by one facetiously signing himself a "Little Russian" (also a Ukrainian)⁴⁷ and who promptly attacks bureaucratic Russification and Russian Party chauvinism, pointing out sarcastically that "nationality differences will continue to grow until the Russian Empire has been transformed into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (everyone of these words must become a fact); the hundred-headed monster (the nationalities) has only begun to react to all the good deeds of the Moscow Government."⁴⁸

Although the Crimean Tatars publish their own samizdat, called the *Information Bulletin* (at least 80 issues have appeared), little information has been received in the West that would shed new light on the plight of the Crimean Tatars. In mid-1974 several documents were received; although somewhat dated, they nevertheless were of interest. Two of them deal with the minutes of the Crimean National Convention, which brought together Tatars from the length and breadth of the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ Three other documents reveal the holding of a meeting of representatives of the Tatars on October 6 and 7, 1973. Another (December, 1973), entitled "The National Demands of the Crimean Tatar People" and addressed to the Politburo of the CPSU, carries 6,608 signatures,⁵⁰ and yet another is an "Appeal to U.N. Secretary Kurt Waldheim," dated January, 1974.⁵¹

Russian dissidents of late have begun to pay more attention to the Tatars and as a consequence have launched several protests to international organizations on their behalf. The latest protest, initiated by academician A. Sakharov, was sent to the International Red Cross and U.N. Secretary General Waldheim on behalf of Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Tatar dissident who had begun a hunger strike on June 22 and was still on it when the protest was signed on July 16, 1974. By his hunger strike, Mustafa Dzhemilev hoped to attract world attention to the plight of the Crimean Tatars.⁵²

⁴⁶ D. Pospelovsky, "Two Years of the Chronicle of Current Events," *Radio Liberty Research Paper*, No. 37, 1970, p. 31.

⁴⁷ The term "Little Russian" was introduced in Ukraine by the Russians, who consider themselves the "Great Russians" or senior partner of the East Slavs. They established the "Little Russian Prikaz" in 1662, and from then on Ukraine was referred to officially as "Little Russia."

⁴⁸ Pospelovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

⁴⁹ Albert Boiter, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁵¹ "Recently Received Samizdat," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, July 3, 1974, p. 18.

⁵² "Shist sovietskykh dysydyntiv vymahale vid ON dopomohy dlia tataryna Mustafy Dzhemileva," *Svoboda*, July 24, 1974.

Peter Reddaway, noted Sovietologist and author of several works about dissidents, remarked in an interview on February 18, 1974: "Among the most persistent dissenters are the irrepressible Ukrainians, who now have widespread conspiratorial groups demanding their rights and the considerable sovereignty guaranteed under the Ukrainian and Soviet Constitutions, but never honored."⁵³ Having the largest non-Russian population (over 40 million), Ukraine has borne the brunt of the KGB crackdown on the dissidents. Here the regime cannot afford to be lenient; the trials as well as the sentences reflect the worst days of the Stalinist thirties. The poet Masyutko, a political prisoner, estimates that of the 15,000 political prisoners 60 to 70 per cent are Ukrainians, yet Ukrainians make up only 18 per cent of the total population of the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ The total number of concentration camps, according to A. Sakharov, is about 900 with some 1.7 million inmates.⁵⁵

The Ukrainian dissident movement, the fact that it is a national movement notwithstanding, does not differ fundamentally from the movement in the RSFSR. It does not attempt to supplant Communism, it does not call for insurrection, and, like its counterpart in the north, calls for the implementation of the Ukrainian and Soviet Constitutions and of the Declaration of Human Rights. The chief difference, however, between the Russian *Chronicle of Current Events* and *The Ukrainian Herald* is that in the latter the nationality question is in the forefront. The *Herald* does not espouse any one platform or program. It is concerned broadly with the exposure of the trampling of democratic rights and of national sovereignty, the exposure of Soviet disinformation, concentration camps, illegal trials, and so on.

As regards the national question, the Ukrainians, of course, are more militant than the Russians. This is quite understandable: a Russian can be patriotic without running any risk. The Ukrainian, on the other hand, is in constant danger of being branded as a "bourgeois nationalist" or "national deviationist." To bypass official cen-

⁵³ " 'Irrepressible Ukrainians' cited by noted Sovietologist," *Svoboda*, March 9, 1974.

⁵⁴ Ted Harding, et al., *The Political Struggle in Ukraine Today*, (New York: Crisis Press, 1973), p. 1. P. Reddaway and A. Sakharov place the figure of political prisoners at 10,000. See also "Peter Reddaway Tverdyt scho Dysydenyzm v SSR nayslynshyi nizh Ukrainciamy," *Svoboda*, February 20, 1974, and "U Sovietskykh Tiurmakh nakhodytsia 1.7 milliona viaznyv, zaiavliae Sakharov," *Svoboda*, March 6, 1974.

⁵⁵ "U Sovietskykh Tiurmakh nakhodytsia 1.7 milliona viaznyv, zaiavliae Sakharov," *Svoboda*, March 6, 1974.

sure the Ukrainians have taken to celebrating the anniversaries of their poets and writers, using these holidays as a vehicle for expressing their national dissatisfaction.⁵⁴ But now even the recitation of the works of famous poets has become dangerous. Russians as well as Ukrainians have become aware that more is involved than just poetic declamation. Lying at the heart of the problem are the process of Russification in the Ukrainian schools and in Ukrainian life in general, the conscription of Ukrainian youth into work battalions in Kazakhstan and other far-off areas; the destruction of the culture and history of Ukraine; the bringing of Russian colonists to Ukraine, etc. Lying at the heart of Ukrainian concern is the disappearance of four million Ukrainians from the Ukrainian SSR since 1970.⁵⁵

The new leadership in the Kremlin no doubt recognizes that it must deal with a new generation—a generation which is not afraid to speak if only because it did not experience the heinous excesses of the Stalin era. Indeed, the regime must deal cautiously with the dissidents since most of them are products of the Communist system; they are members of the Komsomol and the Party. A condemnation of these would be tantamount to a condemnation of the system itself. It is precisely from this base that Ivan Dzyuba, one of the foremost dissidents, declares: "A resolute struggle against the survivals of Great Russian chauvinism is the foremost task of our Party."⁵⁶ In his work, *Internationalism or Russification?*, which has been smuggled to the West and translated into six languages, Dzyuba lays bare the facts and the means by which the Russians are converting the Soviet Union into a new Russian Empire. Since the appearance of this book the regime has published a rebuttal in the form of a book entitled, *What I. Dzyuba Stands For, and How He Does It*. The author, Bohdan Stanchuk (who actually is non-existent⁵⁷), through deployment of statistics attempts to vindicate the regime and to establish the in-

⁵⁴ The two most admired poets are T. Shevchenko, who lived in the 19th century and authored the *Kobzar*, and Vasyl Symonenko, a dissident of the 60's who wrote *The Shore of Expectations*, a collection of powerful poems. Symonenko died at 28.

⁵⁵ "Vid 1970's v Ukrainskiy SSR "Znyklo" chotyry milliony Ukraintsiv," *Svoboda*, December 21, 1974.

⁵⁶ Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?, Revolutionary Voices* (Munich: Published by the Press Bureau of the ABN, 1969), p. 39.

⁵⁷ V. Chornovil, "Iak i Scho Obstoiue Bohdan Stanchuk," *Ukrainskyi Visnyk*, Vol. VI, (Paris: Published by P. I. U. F. and Smoloskyp, 1972), p. 55. This article is the answer to Bohdan Stanchuk's book *What I. Dzyuba Stands for, and How He Does It*, itself a critique of Dzyuba's book, *Internationalism or Russification?*, published in both Ukrainian and English in Kiev, 1970.

ternational nature of the Soviet State as a genuine phenomenon. He is not very successful, alas, if only because the evidence against the regime is so overwhelming. But the story of Dzyuba, who was recently forced to admit the errors of his ways, is only part of the tragic story that is now transpiring. Levko Lukianenko has written from a Mordovian prison camp on the onslaught against the Ukrainian dissidents, language and culture, and, specifically, the burning of the Library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. He discloses that "...they (the Russians) even scatter magnesium strips over (copies of) their works in the library and set fire to them, but they cannot padlock the numerous channels of various outside (and inside) information which bring in new ideas. And each stream of new information carries with it new and fresh currents to demolish the old foundations of the chauvinist edifice. They (the Russians) are still strong enough to stifle the prisoners, but the spirit of our times, which constantly gives birth to thousands like us, cannot be imprisoned."⁶⁰

After the "thaw" unmistakably deliberate repressions began to be felt in Ukraine at the end of 1965. The chill of police terror again was in the air. But the youth refused to allow the police organs to function as before—they did not cravenly capitulate before fear. Instead, they boldly protested closed trials, unlawful searches, abrogation of constitutional rights, cruel punishment, and the other excesses of the KGB, that travesty human dignity in the USSR. Some paid with their lives. Many others paid with the loss of freedom. In 1966 V. Chornovil compiled *Lykho z Rozumu*, a "White Book," comprising biographical sketches of "twenty criminals."⁶¹ Shortly, Chornovil himself was incarcerated for "bourgeois nationalism." Released in 1969 after serving his term, he was promptly re-arrested.

Besides arresting as many of Chornovil's co-thinkers as they could, the KGB agents resorted to provocation. They enticed a young tourist, Yaroslav Dobosh from Belgium, to visit his family in Ukraine. Once there, Dobosh was arrested and charged with being a go-between serving the Ukrainian nationalists (OUN) in the West and the dissi-

⁶⁰ L. H. Lukianenko, "To the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, D. S. Korotchenko," *Fervent in the Ukraine*, edited by Michael Browne (New York: Crisis Press 1973), p. 93.

⁶¹ Viacheslav Chornovil, *Lykho s Rozumu: Portrety Dvadciaty "Zlochynciv"* (Paris: Published by PIUF, 1967) p. 334.

dents in the Soviet Union.⁶² Yaroslav Dobosh earned his release by naming five dissidents and even by managing to connect the Zionist and nationalist organizations to the "anti-Soviet activity."⁶³ As a result, from January to February in 1972 over 200 Ukrainian dissidents were arrested. Some place the number at over 300 and more.⁶⁴

This major assault against the dissidents was not unexpected by the Ukrainians. The well-known trials of the members of the Ukrainian Workers Party, of the Ukrainian National Committee, and of the Ukrainian National Front, unmistakably had foreshadowed what was to come in the early 1970's.⁶⁵

With the arrests in 1972 the "old political generation met the "new" political generation in the prison camps: Mordovia, Perm, others. The old surviving revolutionaries of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization and of the Insurgent Army (UPA), some of whom had been incarcerated for over 25 years, now became the mentors of the new generation.⁶⁶

In the wake of the arrests, riots and strikes broke out like a rash in Ukraine. In June of 1972, 10,000 rioters in Dniprodzherzhinsk overwhelmed the offices of the KGB and MVD, destroying files and records and taking over the offices of the Party and the Komsomol. In this confrontation about a dozen persons were killed and 100 wounded. In September of 1972 an uprising in Dnipropetrovsk also led to deaths and maiming. Again, in October, riots erupted in Dniprodzherzhinsk.⁶⁷

The mass arrests in Ukraine did not miss the upper levels of the Ukrainian CP. One of the first to fall was Petro Shelest, First

⁶² "Dissidents Among the National Minorities. . ." *op. cit.*, p. 2. A similar case occurred in 1968 when a young Russian named Brooks Sokol from Argentina was invited to the Soviet Union and then used to incriminate a number of dissidents.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Harding, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5 to 7. The above cited organizations published a journal called *Fatherland and Freedom*.

⁶⁶ "Hromadskyi Komitet Zakhystu," *Ukrainskyi Visnyk*, *op. cit.*, p. 147. This document tells about Anatoly Lupynis, his hunger strike and the education that he received while in the concentration camps. See also Avraam Shifrin's *Chetverty Vymir* (Munich: Published by Suchasnist, 1973) p. 360. Shifrin tells about the education of Yuri Shukhevych, son of Taras Shukhevych-Chuprynka, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and who was arrested at the age of 15, never receiving a formal education with the exception of the tutoring that was provided by fellow prisoners in the concentration camps.

⁶⁷ "Riots and Strikes Reported in Ukraine," *Intercontinental Press*, July 2, 1973.

Secretary of Ukraine. Only now, with the latest issues of the clandestine samizdat publication of the *Ukrainian Herald* becoming available, have new facts emerged about his fall. Issue 7-8 of the *Herald*, dated Spring 1974, reveals that Shelest was blamed for the dissent in Ukraine, earning the label of a "nationalist deviationist" at an extraordinary meeting of the Presidium in Moscow. Shelest, upon his arrival in Moscow, had fondly expected a promotion: Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR. Instead, he became Vice-Chairman, in effect a demotion, underscored by his being forbidden to return to Ukraine.⁶⁸ His post, First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP, was taken over by a Brezhnev protege and a rival of Shelest, Shcherbitsky. Ukraine, under the new Secretary and the guidance of Brezhnev, was to "set the pace for the whole nation (USSR) in this new clean-up bid," that indeed did shortly follow.⁶⁹ Local cadres centered on Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, were accused of "ideological feebleness" at the August Plenum of the Ukrainian CP held in March of 1973. Another Plenum, held in May of 1974, dealt with ideological issues, attacking Ukrainian "idealization of olden times," "parochialism," "narrowmindedness and boastfulness," "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" and other archaic "survivals of the past."⁷⁰ On May 17, 1974, *Pravda Ukrainy* bruited the following message: "We should continue to improve the work of the administrative agencies, in particular that of *internal affairs* (*italics ours*). They must intensify the struggle against violations of socialist legality and law and order." This latest directive of the CP of the Ukrainian USSR was only a follow-up to what was taking place in Ukraine even before the ascendancy of Shcherbitsky. The cells and prison camps of the USSR, already filled to capacity, now suffered crushing contingents of prisoners.

But the Ukrainian prisoners in the camps have continually protested their plight. The form of protest most common in the camps is the hunger strike. In December of 1970 on "Constitution Day" and "Human Rights Day" 27 political prisoners in Vladimir prison staged a hunger strike protesting inhuman treatment (8 of the 27 are known to have been Ukrainians).⁷¹ In 1971 Anatoli Lupynis began his hunger strike, which lasted for two years. He had to be fed intravenously by the guards. Presently, he is locked away in a men-

⁶⁸ " 'Ukrainian Herald' details Fall of Shelest" *Svoboda*, February 8, 1975.

⁶⁹ McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ "The Hunger Strike of Political Prisoners," *ABN Correspondence* Vol. XXII, No. 4, (July-August, 1971), p. 27.

tal ward.⁷² In April of 1972 Oles Berdnyk, author of eight books, declared a hunger strike, demanding that books seized during an illegal search be returned to him. The strike, which lasted 16 days, was successful: all materials were returned.⁷³ In December of 1972 a hunger strike staged by Mykola Bondar was begun on December 5 and lasted till the 10th, coinciding with International Human Rights Day.⁷⁴ Recently, historian Valentyn Moroz has gone on a hunger strike. He has been subjected to solitary confinement, stabbings in the stomach by thugs placed in the same cell with him, and humiliated by being given drugs to incapacitate him utterly as a human being. In Moroz we find the grandeur of man: he chose to brave death on his own terms with a hunger strike.⁷⁵

The crime of this young Ukrainian historian? Authorship of four short but biting works: *A Report from the Beria Reserve, Moses and Dathan, Chronicle of Resistance and Amidst the Snows*. Branded anti-Soviet, these works resulted in a 14-year sentence for Moroz. His imprisonment, assaults, and hunger strikes have drawn the appalled criticism of Western political figures as well as of international humanitarian organizations. The Western reaction forced the Soviet government to issue a communique, according to which his health was excellent. But, among other things, it also attempted to link him to the Ukrainian nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian separatism.⁷⁶ This official account, however, failed to quiet Western opinion. "The Wire Skeleton of Vladimir Prison" (as he has become known) was reported to have suffered several heart attacks and internal bleeding as a result of the forced feedings at the prison. Offers to have Western doctors examine him were rejected. Foreign Minister Gromyko's report that Valentyn Moroz's demands had been met and that he had been transferred to the Liubianka prison was proven false.⁷⁷ In desperation Valentyn Moroz swore that the year of 1975 would not find him in prison, that he would find a way to end his life. The campaign to

⁷² *Ukrainskyi Visnyk*, op. cit., p. 147.

⁷³ *News From Ukraine*, Vol. II, No. 1 (Summer, 1972), p. 2.

⁷⁴ "Ukrainian Inmates Stage Hunger Strike in Red Camps," *Svoboda*, January 6, 1973.

⁷⁵ "Valentyn Moroz v Smertelno-Zahrozlyvli Nebezpechi; 'Vidznachalut' Vstanovalennia Koncentraciinykh Taboriv v SSR; Zvernennia Vlazniv do Prezydenta Niksona," *Svoboda*, March 12, 1974.

⁷⁶ Valery Tkachenko, "How and for what V. Moroz is Serving his Term," *News Release Communique* No. 74 (34), May 8, 1974. This is an official Soviet Press release dealing with the case of Moroz.

⁷⁷ "Valentyn Moroz Continuing Hunger Strike," *ABN Correspondence*, Vol. XXV, No. 6, (November-December 1974), p. 3.

save his life took on greater proportions as 1974 drew to a close. Humanitarian organizations, Soviet dissidents, people at large—all rallied to his support. On November 22, 1974, Valentyn Moroz ended his hunger strike after Soviet authorities made certain concessions. The strike had lasted nearly 5 months (145 days). On November 23, one day later, President Ford met with Brezhnev in Vladivostok.

But the case of Moroz has not yet been closed. The authorities refuse to allow his wife to send him wholesome food to speed up his recuperation.⁷⁸ In the meantime the top Ukrainian Soviet churchman, Archbishop Filaret, on his visit to the United States, assumed a typical pro-Soviet posture: "Moroz—is not our concern."⁷⁹ In the meantime for the dissidents of Ukraine the name Moroz has become synonymous with freedom. A samizdat document urges "Ukrainian patriots to accept the challenge of Moroz and fight for freedom."⁸⁰

Another victim whose name is becoming as well known as that of Moroz is Leonid Plyushch. A member of the "Initiative Group of the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR," he has been put away in a Soviet psychiatric ward. Sakharov, also a member of this Group, has appealed to Western public opinion and especially to several scholarly congresses on behalf of Plyushch. Tatiana Khodorovych, also a member of the Group, compiled a hundred-page documented work about Plyushch that has found its way to the West.⁸¹ Soviet dissidents also have compiled a *Survival Guide*, which is dedicated to Leonid Plyushch, victim of psychiatric terror.⁸² Reacting to Western pressure, the Soviet Union at first agreed and then reneged on its promise to grant Plyushch and his family an exit visa on the ground that he still needs additional "medical treatment."⁸³ The Ukrainian National Association of the United States has offered to provide medical treatment

⁷⁸ "KGB Ne Dozvoliae Peredaty Morozovi Dvisti Hramiv Medu," *Svoboda*, February 19, 1975.

⁷⁹ "Ukrainsky Narod 'ne Bazhaie Sobi' Vlasnoi Ukrainskoi Tserkvy, Valentyn Moroz—'ne Nasha Sprava,' Kazhe Filaret, Ekzarkh Moskovskoho Patriarkha v Ukraini," *Svoboda*, February 20, 1975.

⁸⁰ (Continued) "Ukraine's Dissidents Organize, Says American Newsmen," *Svoboda*, December 14, 1974.

⁸¹ "Tatiana Khodorovych Vyhotovala Zbirku Dokumentiv Pro Doliu Leonida Plyushcha," *Svoboda*, June 21, 1974.

⁸² "Dissident 'Survival Guide' is Dedicated to Leonid Plyushch," *Svoboda*, December 28, 1974. The Guide prepared by Soviet dissidents tells those committed to psychiatric wards how to behave, answer questions, and in general, how to endure the ordeal of being committed.

⁸³ "Sovietskyi Uriad ne Pohodyvsia vydaty visu dliu Leonida Plyushcha i loho Rodyny," *Svoboda*, September 18, 1974.

and transportation out of the Soviet Union for both V. Moroz and L. Plyushch. Soviet authorities have yet to react to this offer.

Exactly how far the Soviet authorities have gone in their fight against "national deviationism" is to be seen in the cemeteries of Ukraine. In one of the latest samizdat publications V. Chornovil accuses the regime of violating graves by disinterring the bones of their ideological opponents. "Death," he points out, "evens out views and ideologies. Death demands respect." The Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR Art. 212 provides punishment for those desecrating graves. Many Ukrainians, upset about this state of affairs, he continues, are demanding the destruction of Soviet graves in retaliation. "Are we going to reach the point," he asks, "where a stage of seige will exist in the cemeteries?"⁸⁴

At his own trial, Zalyvakha, an artist, summarized the sentiments of Ukrainian dissidents as follows: "We believe that love of the Fatherland (Ukraine) is not a crime, but a holy duty of the citizen. (It is) this (that) gives strength and conviction to one's righteousness and faith, in that, sooner or later, the real criminals will be exposed and justly punished. We believe and we anticipate..."⁸⁵

⁸⁴ "V Oboroni Strilechkykh Mohyl," *Shyroko More Ukrainy*, op. cit., pp. 123-124. This is a letter to the Presidium of the Supreme Rada (Soviet) of the CC-CPU written by Vyacheslav Chornovil dealing with the selective destruction of graves and cemeteries.

⁸⁵ Chornovil, *Lykho z Rozumu*. . . op. cit., p. 12.

HUMAN RIGHTS ARE OLD HAT FOR CAPTIVE NATIONS

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Literally for decades, the vital issue of human rights has been at the very core of the dynamic issue of captive nations. At its highest point of relevancy and applicability it is still there. As far back as 1920, when the non-Russian nations now held captive in the Soviet Union were the first to be victimized by Soviet Russian imperialism, colonialism and an across-the-board deprivation of human rights, the two issues have been inextricably interlocked. In plain fact, human rights are old hat for the captive nations.

Closer to our day, this outstanding fact is clearly crystallized in the current Congressional document which selectively portrays the place of the captive nations issue in our own Bicentennial.¹ This compact volume, which is available through your Congressman or Senator, adequately summarizes the background and scope of the two inter-related issues. It serves as an excellent source for understanding the new President's emphasis on human rights in our foreign policy.

The recent tirade by Moscow against the President's U.N. address and its stress on human rights can in some measure be compared with the Khrushchevian outbursts, almost twenty years ago, against the Captive Nations Week resolution, which Congress passed in 1959 and President Eisenhower signed into Public Law 86-90. This is no historical accident, for the two are in substance intertwined. As then, so now, the fundamental question is whether, for want of will and knowledge, we will cringe with each growl from the Russian bear and make our confused retreat or, with courage and intellectual certitude, we will develop the interwoven issues into a winning foreign policy that would preclude any hot global war. This does not mean a revival of vacuous and threatening Cold War rhetoric but rather a knowledgeable and programmed concentration on the deep vulnerabilities of the USSR, which basically rest on human rights considerations. Imperial-

¹ *The Bicentennial Salute to the Captive Nations*, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1977.

ism, colonialism, Russification, religious genocide, suppressed non-Russian nationalism are just a few phenomena within the empire/state of the USSR that require a global airing. An adversary whose fundamental weaknesses and vulnerabilities are systematically revealed to the world would scarcely be in position or any credible posture to advance its global designs by whatever means.

FACING REALITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CNL

It is obviously not enough just to espouse human rights in an aimless and moralistic fashion. For a maximum, effective instrumentation of rights and values two basic prerequisites must be met and amply satisfied. One is an accurate and viable framework of understanding and perspective with regard to the present structure of global, politico-economic reality. The second prerequisite is a philosophically sound concept of human rights that can be realistically adapted to that framework. Failing in either of these, our pursuit of human rights as a basis for our foreign policy will itself be doomed to failure. In short, if we have the sensible courage to speak up for human rights globally and with a single standard, we must also possess equal courage and insight to face up to differential reality in the world structure, especially within the Soviet Union.

On this 19th Observance of Captive Nations Week (July 17-23) the occasion is a most fitting one to give serious thought to these two prerequisites, particularly in view of the Belgrade conference and its evaluation of compliance with the Helsinki Accords. As to the framework of understanding, it can be said with scarcely any rational argument that the only real threat to the U.S. and the nontotalitarian world is the USSR. Further, it can also be easily maintained that as concerns the denial of human rights in toto nowhere in this world does it compare with that of the so-called Communist, totalitarian states.² There is a vast difference between imperialist-totalitarian rule and any authoritarian dictatorship in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, a paramount fact that must be taken into account in any policy applications of human rights. These general facts, which are supported by abundant detailed empirical evidence, can be best perceived by a careful review of the CNL (Captive Nations List) which is a solid measure of the success or failure of our foreign policy:

² See the comprehensive *Case Studies On Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, A World Survey*, The Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies, The Hague, Netherlands, V. 1-5.

The Captive Nations—Who's Next?

Country, people, and year of Communist domination:

Armenia	1920	Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, etc.)	1946
Azerbaijan	1920	Poland	1947
Byelorussia	1920	Romania	1947
Cossackia	1920	Czecho-Slovakia	1948
Georgia	1920	North Korea	1948
Idel-Ural	1920	Hungary	1949
North Caucasla	1920	East Germany	1949
Ukraine	1920	Mainland China	1949
Far Eastern Republic	1922	Tibet	1951
Turkestan	1922	North Vietnam	1954
Mongolia	1924	Cuba	1960
Estonia	1940	Cambodia	1975
Latvia	1940	South Vietnam	1975
Lithuania	1940	Laos	1975
Albania	1946		
Bulgaria	1946		

Who's next Angola? Thailand? Republic of China? South Korea? Rhodesia? Ethiopia? Panama?

Outlining how the totalitarian domain of the world structure has evolved, the CNL is based on a firm, genetic analysis of Soviet Russian takeovers, directly or indirectly, of foreign non-Russian governments since World War I. The vehicles for these takeovers have ranged from overt Soviet Russian military aggression in the first wars against so-called international Communism in the 1918-22 period to syndicate proxy and armed assistance in Angola in 1976.³ We Americans are not given to this kind of perspective, but if human rights are to assume operational meaning, this perspective becomes intellectually indispensable for the framework that is the first prerequisite.

A bit of reflective thought on this outlined evolution stands to reveal many inescapable truths. First, for insight, if there were no CNL, logically there would be no need for NATO, SALT, Helsinki and numerous other issues which many believe to be primary problems. Another, the expressions of Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov and Amalrik for the withdrawal of Russian power to the national borders of Russia within the present USSR, for the self-determination of the non-Russian nations in the USSR, or a possible upheaval in the empire/state through its captive non-Russian nations—these and similar expres-

³ See L.E. Dobriansky, *U.S.A. and the Soviet Myth*, Chapter 2. Old Greenwich, Connecticut, 1971.

sions reflect the CNL. Also, the appearances of so-called polycentrism in the Red bloc, the Sino-Russian Communist conflict, and the maverickism of a Romania or Yugoslavia scarcely qualify the CNL. The concept distinguishes between the imposed Communist regimes in all of these cases and the nations as such, subjected to the more or less totalitarian rule of the basically illegitimate government. The CNL is a people's concept entailing the values of human rights, but going beyond them in structuring the commitment in the struggle for world peace and freedom.

More reflective thought on the CNL would show, too, its focus on the real force of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, parading in the guise of socialism and Communism. Just as we carefully distinguished between Nazi German imperialism and the German nation and people themselves, so here this similar totalitarian force is distinguished from the Russian nation at large, which in another sense has been captive for centuries to Czarist authoritarianism, imperialism, messianism and militarism that Marx himself clearly perceived a century ago.⁴ Moreover, it doesn't require much intellectual imagination to see that if there were no first generation of captive nations, there would have been no successive generations as shown in the CNL. About one-half of the captive nations are in the forced union of the USSR, whose economic resources are exploited by Moscow for its global adventures. Without these imperialized resources, Russia itself couldn't possibly attain to super-power status. The USSR is Moscow's empire within an empire, an imperium in imperio. The last bastions of imperialist rule in this world are Moscow and Peking, and the subjects of imperialism and colonialism still are prime items for human rights analysis and action.

The importance of a sure grasp of the CNL was nationally demonstrated in the last presidential campaign. Any misunderstanding of it can take its heavy toll and, according to most analysts, the unforgettable Ford gaffe on no Soviet domination over Eastern Europe lost him the presidency. For example, the President's own campaign pollster said, "the second debate—the one in which Ford made his mistake on Soviet domination of Eastern Europe—left us dead in the water for about 10 days."⁵ Another analyst stated, "it seems highly probable that had the President not stumbled over a question about eastern Europe in the second debate, costing his campaign 10 days of momentum, the outcome would have been reversed... the Eastern Eu-

⁴ J.A. Doerig, Ed. *Marx vs. Russia*. New York, 1962.

⁵ David S. Broder. *The Washington Post*, November 6, 1976.

rope affair, which cost the one irreplaceable asset—time." Still another observed, "What apparently had happened is that the discussion of the debate, and of Ford's admitted 'mistake' on Eastern Europe, in the press and in ordinary social intercourse had built a swelling consensus against the President." Numerous others commented in the same vein, with the conclusion that, given the voting blocs on each side, the marginal effect of vote swings in New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio proved to be decisive.

Mention is made of this poignant lesson because it is conceivable that a free nation also could be lost if we persist with our myths regarding the USSR, Eastern Europe and so forth; if, for whatever reason, we refuse to face the realities of Eurasia while advancing the cause of human rights. In our highest places, as also during the campaign, "Eastern Europe" is mistakenly viewed as ending at the borders of the USSR rather than the Urals. An attempt was made to pan off the Ford gaffe as a slip-of-the-tongue while in reality it was a reflection of a mental attitude similar to that prior to the Czecho-Slovak eye-opener in 1968, when in high places it was claimed that there were no more "satellites" in Central Europe. Desperate recourse to the President's Captive Nations Week proclamation confirmed this further because its vague generalities represented just another version bearing little resemblance to Congress' resolution of 1959. Plainly, if the human rights campaign is to succeed, our prevailing framework of understanding the totalitarian structure in the greater part of Eurasia requires basic adjustment. This is the first prerequisite; the second is a clear and sound conception of human rights.

THE GENERIC SCALE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

On several occasions the President has reaffirmed his firm commitment to human rights, globally and on a single standard basis. This has been done with such definitiveness and moral dedication that at this or some subsequent stage any substantial retreat from this position and posture would be a source of deep embarrassment and difficulty both to this Administration and the country at large. Moreover, it is manifestly evident at this stage that the second prerequisite must be developed into a clear and working concept if human rights are to play the role the President himself has already defined.

On all levels confusion persists, typifying the same condition that has persisted in the United Nations, with almost every aspect of hu-

⁶ R.W. Apple, Jr. "The Election Outcome," *The New York Times*, November 10, 1976.

⁷ Jack W. Germond. *The Washington Star*, October 21, 1976.

man life carved into a right. Exploding in all directions, with doubtless delight to word-playing totalitarian representatives, human rights are vaguely interpreted as political, social, economic, scientific, artistic, racial, sexual and what have you. The first serious attempt to define human rights by an Administration spokesman was undertaken by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the University of Georgia, but as concerns the highest generic level of these rights his address was found wanting.⁸

Both qualitatively and quantitatively, human rights lend themselves to a metaphysically-based generic ordering. There is first the category of personal rights, basic to the individual person. So far, the President has tended to over-emphasize this category. These rights, centering on the person, cover a broad range of the right to live, to multiply, hold property, develop, to express oneself, etc. in the ways of personal choices for free action, always without encroachment or coercive effect upon others endowed with the same rights. Anyone reared in the philosophy of the soul, the unique human personality, perceives this foundational level instantly.

For fulfillment no person can live alone and isolated. This is what Aristotle meant by saying that every man is a political animal. When personal rights to mobilize, associate and socialize are exercised, the sphere of civil rights is entered into. Civil rights in their accurate Latin sense—*civilis*—the rights of a citizen of a state entity, and not in any narrow sense, form the second generic category of human rights. On this higher and broader plane of collective expression, civil rights of group assembly, worship, work, oral and written speech, opportunity for development, representation and the like come into more aggregative play on a quantitative scale. It is into this category where most of the political, social, economic and other expressions of rights fall into, though derived from and anchored in the more fundamental personal rights. Vance, U.N. exponents, so-called minority groups and others tend to stress this category in human rights discussion.

Finally, and still more extensive, is the highest category of human rights, namely, national rights. Also derived from the preceding categories, these rights are expressive of a moral organism called a nation, a still greater aggregate, with all its attributes of geographical territory, history, language, religion and so on. With the same objective rules of noncoercion and encroachment, these rights are crys-

⁸ "Human Rights and Foreign Policy," *Congressional Record*, May 2, 1977, p. E2653.

tallized rights to existence, development and growth, the balanced and responsible exercise of which safeguards the expression of personal and civil rights and also contributes to international order, law, peace and an expanding community of free and responsible nations in whatever form of chosen state.

Strangely enough, and especially for our own country which originated and has developed beyond man's dreams on the principles of national independence, self-determination and liberty, this last category isn't even mentioned as an integral part of human rights. We went through the rituals of a Bicentennial, but its prime significance seems to have escaped us. This defect in our understanding of the generic scale of human rights goes a long way in explaining the present confusion and our muddled and even absent treatment of a whole array of particular issues. Let's just consider a number of dominant examples of this.

One example is the prevalent attitude toward the Baskets of the Helsinki Accords, which will be handled for compliance at the Belgrade Conference. In terms of our generic scale of human rights, there is an almost exclusive emphasis on Basket Three, which deals with personal and civil rights. Basket One, which deals with national rights, the third level of human rights, is scarcely mentioned by our leaders. And yet for the captive nations, not to speak of the prime character of our own American tradition, this is the most important form of human rights. Having lost this form, they have lost also much of their civil and personal rights. If we maintain this topsied attitude in Belgrade and elsewhere, the totalitarian Red representatives will have a Roman holiday with us in dialectical play.

Another example, rife in our media as well as in officialdom, is the indiscriminate lumping of all dissidents as one. Here, too, the generic scale of human rights enables us to view this situation with objective clarity by virtue of its conformity with the historically-founded captive nations analysis. This example in itself clearly illustrates the need for reconciling our two prerequisites, which in content means here the captive nations framework and an adequate human rights concept. Factually, dissidents in the USSR differ in the emphases they place on human rights, regardless of degrees of overlap and cooperation. One prominent group, the Jewish dissidents, seeks chiefly the exercise of personal rights to mobilize and emigrate. Russian dissidents, however, express on the whole their civil rights to assemble, to criticize without fear of imprisonment, to be democratically represented; in short, to become free citizens of Russia proper and presumably respectful of the national rights of others.

The third, large group of dissidents consists of non-Russian, such as Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians and others, for whom national rights to preserve their respective cultures and languages, to govern and determine for themselves, and in some instances to secede from the so-called Union are uppermost. Imperialist rule by Moscow, colonialism and Russification under the guise of migration and economic relocation measure the deprivation of these human rights in the non-Russian republics. In Ukraine, for instance, the heroic protests of Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, a journalist, Valentyn Moroz, a historian, Yuriy R. Shukhevych and hundreds of others are marked by national rights advocacy, identical in substance with the past nationalist campaigns against Western forms of imperialism and empire.

Clearly, the conceptual formula employed here can be flexibly and accurately used in all captive nations situations and for all examples, extending from the Danube to the Pacific and into the Caribbean. Thus Polish or Slovak dissidents may tactically strive for civil rights, though in the background national rights directed at the surcease of Soviet Russian domination are of equal importance. Croatian and Slovenian dissidents would be in the same position, except that their national rights expressions would be directed against Communist Belgrade centralism. In Cuba a human rights campaign would be carried on both the civil and national levels in view of the entrenched Soviet Russian power on the island. Red Chinese dissidence would be largely personal and civil, but Tibetan and Mongolian would also be national. In non-Communist areas of the world, i.e. outside the world of the captive nations, the major thrust is on the personal and civil rights level, though in an Angola it would also be national.

Applying the same formula to specific actions, outstanding violations of human rights, or to moves for legal and contractual accountability, the need for our two prerequisites becomes even more evident and pressing. Taking, for example, the most immediate action of evaluation of the Helsinki Accords in Belgrade, it should be clear from what has been described above that the types of dissidence in the USSR, with admitted degrees of cross-reference as to advocacy, obviously relate to both Baskets One and Three of the Accords, dealing respectively with national rights and civil/personal rights in the structure of human rights. To emphasize exclusively the one and to neglect the other would reflect unfavorably on our human rights stand.

H. CON. RES. 165

Concerning outstanding violations of human rights, there is now pending in the Congress a measure that deals with a unique and un-

paralleled case of religious genocide. House Concurrent Resolution 165, sponsored by Representative Daniel J. Flood and several of his colleagues, seeks the resurrection of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine. These national Churches of Ukraine were genocided by Stalin. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was liquidated in the 30's, and its properties were absorbed in a wave of Russification by the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Catholic Church suffered the same genocidal fate in 1945.⁹ There is on contemporary record no such combined case of religious genocide anywhere and relevant to all three generic categories of human rights. Yet, one may ask, why all the silence with respect to this case?

A distinguished writer on religious subjects recently wrote, "The Flood Bill asks the Soviet Union to permit the two churches to have legal existence in accord with the provisions of the Soviet constitution, the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords. Such a measure in the American Congress is unusual..."¹⁰ The writer is really the first to focus popular attention on this case. Where are our religious councils, all sorts of human rights advocates, indeed, the World Council of Churches and the Vatican itself? Unless our Government and these bodies show some courage in raising their voices on this outstanding case of religious genocide, which affects the largest non-Russian nation in Eastern Europe, the crusade for human rights will be of hollow value. Individuals are one thing, the soul of a nation of 50 million is quite another matter. Brezhnev recently pledged no return to Stalin-era repressions. Let's test him on this case of Stalinist religious genocide.

To repeat, if the two prerequisites on structural understanding and the generic scale of human rights are not met, this Administration's crusade is doomed to failure. If they are met with objectivity and knowledgeability, a successful and winning foreign policy can be forged. Again, human rights are old hat for captive nations analysis.

⁹ For background, see "Imperialism, Religious Persecution and Genocide," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Autumn, 1976.

¹⁰ William F. Willoughby. "Congress Bill Asks Soviets to 'Resurrect' Two Churches," *The Washington Star*, May 28, 1977.

UKRAINIAN EMIGRE LITERATURE AFTER 1945

By ROMAN V. KUCHAR

The social and political climate in which emigre writers from Eastern Europe are presently living and working resembles those conditions of life that Polish political exiles endured after 1831. Motivations for leaving their oppressed countries are common to the emigres of both periods. The later emigres similarly redoubled their efforts to maintain values destroyed in their homeland and to create new ones on behalf of a better future for their kin and humanity at large. Emigre writers in various foreign countries in the West could enjoy liberty, whereas back at home they would be considered "enemies of the people," become prisoners, or, worse, become mere tools in the enslavement of their own people. Living abroad allowed them to serve their country in a way that was unthinkable at home. A Polish scholar, discussing the literature of the period of the "Great Emigration" (in the eighteen thirties), depicted the typical literary reality of the emigre: literature in exile became the platform to defend the endangered positions of the subjugated country and to express its claims for liberty. Poetry and prose were used for political ends. Emigres needed state and public institutions, such as, parliamentary tribunes and the journalistic press. These institutions lacking, they replaced them with a literature of homesickness and nostalgia. Emigres had to create their own world, within the boundaries of which the individualistic, the national and the all-human were moulded into one. The problem of the personality was set against the background of a broader unit—the European civilization, the universe.¹

Although saddled with immense problems, the emigre writers were all the more to give them full expression in their works. To blend the problems of the individual with those of the suffering nation was the chief goal of the Ukrainian writers after the end of the II World

¹ J. Krzyzanowski, *Polish Romantic Literature*. Books for Libraries Press, New York, 1968, p. 37.

War. The writers associated under the name, the Artistic Ukrainian Movement (MUR), did not encompass all the active writers abroad, but the movement did represent the aspirations of the uprooted people (Displaced Persons) in that troubled and turbulent period. The central organization that united Ukrainian writers of various literary trends was brought to life in 1945 in Bavaria² (West Germany), under the chairmanship of an active novelist of the period, Ulas Samchuk, author of the trilogy *Volhynia*.

The organization soon became instrumental in stirring meaningful interests and cultural activities among people hitherto engrossed in problems of daily living. A series of art and literary journals, related by genres, themes and a common idea, began to appear. This type of post-war literature, although it gave reign to varying individual output on the part of members of the movement and non-member alike, had an undercurrent of patriotic feeling and a common denominator of national heritage. The turbulence of emigre life swam into focus in the writing of a single author that was usually illuminated from the central position of the exile community as a whole. This community was of primary importance because it was thought to be all encompassing, a sort of microcosm representing the entire nation.

Certain basic ethics, a moral coloring based on an idealistic philosophy, a common tune, even themes and topics of various works identifiable with positive, constructive values relevant to the needs of their captive country—all were shared by a majority of writers. A similar attitude, with some exceptions, prevails today.

The ardent hopes of the founders of MUR, however, to produce great works of literature did not materialize. Their endeavor proved too short-lived. Their energy soon vanished, and people dispersed all over the world.³ Even though MUR's literary activity did not accomplish the goals which obviously had been set too high, the movement nevertheless initiated a valuable literary platform for the exiles to discuss literary issues and it inspired innumerable Ukrainian *literati* to repeated efforts on behalf of their common cause. Among the active members of the literary movement were the poetess Oksana Laturynska, poet Volodymyr Shayan, such writers known for their prose as Ivan Bahriany and Ihor Kostetsky, literary critics Yuriy Sherekh and

² V. Radzykewycz, *Ukrainian Literature of the 20th Century. America*, Philadelphia, 1952, p. 128.

³ V. Lesych, *On the Border of Unaccomplished Generation. The Word*, Almanac 1, New York, 1962, p. 128.

Yuriy Dyvnych and poets Vasyl Barka and Yar Slavutych, among others.

Ukrainian emigre literature of those post-war years produced (not necessarily only in connection with MUR's activities) some outstanding works in poetry and prose. To mention a few: *The Ashes of Empire*, a work of epic dimensions by Yuriy Klen; *The Poet*, by Todos Osmachka; *Children of the Traders' Road*, a tetralogy by Dokia Humenna, and other novels also available in English translation, such as *The Hunters and the Hunted* by Ivan Bahriany and *Sons of the Soil*, by Iliia Kyriak, an earlier emigrant to Canada. Around that time some important poetic works were penned by Evhen Malaniuk, Oleksa Stefanovych, Mykhailo Orest and Sviatoslav Hordynsky, among others.

It is difficult, unfortunately, to present an objective evaluation of the more recent periods in the Ukrainian emigre literature (the nineteen fifties, sixties and the seventies), owing to some symptomatic factors that affect clear vision. To boil these down, there are no objective materials available that would encompass recent processes in the Ukrainian literature in exile in their entirety. The prevailing practice, as displayed by casual critics (because of the lack of specialists) can be characterized as fragmentary, subjective and exclusive, rather than inclusive.

Because of the dearth of professional literary criticism, anyone can venture now and then into this very complex and demanding field of specialization, applying his own set of values, a set that too often has nothing to do with exacting literary criteria. A book under review may be judged from the point of view of religion, morality, patriotism, or ideology; but seldom is it treated from an objective universal standpoint. This, unfortunately, is also true with regard to critical attempts on the part of men of letters turned critics. An author's work is appraised on the basis of whether he is of Eastern or Western Ukrainian origin, his camp, party or group adherence, his association with a literary school, his aesthetic mode of thinking, and his formal use of language material, rather than what his language expresses. Overrating one author and completely ignoring another is the typical outcome of such partisan criticism. Hardly one emigre critic agrees with another.

Personal encounters among critics, interested more in polemics than in objective literary evaluation, have been amply recorded.⁴ The sufferer is, of course, literature. The sad truth is that several impor-

⁴ V. Chaplenko, *Objective of Ukrainian Literature in Exile, The Liberation Path*, London, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 7-8, 1965, p. 743.

tant writers in exile have not yet received a fair appraisal of their work, since a critic knowledgeable about all emigre periods and the authors involved is yet to be found. Consequently, some writers, owing to considerable publicity received from their ranks, loom large on the emigre scene; others, lacking partisan backing, go unnoticed.

As to literary criticism of the earlier post-war period in exile, good work in this and related areas, such as the literary essay, was done by the profoundly erudite Ostap Hrytsay, the critic and bibliographer Evhen Pelensky, the temperamental ideologist Dmytro Dontsov, and several scholars like Volodymyr Derzhavyn, Volodymyr Radzekewycz and, especially, a proponent of an organic basis on which to build, Yuriy Sherekh. Subsequently, the ranks of able critics thinned out. We mention here Yuriy Lavrynenko, Ihor Koshelivets, Hryhory Kostyuk, Vasyl Chaplenko, Luka Luciiv, Bohdan Krawciw, Oles Babiiv, Bohdan Romanenchuk and Stepan Rodion.

Since MUR's time, there have been numerous attempts, more or less successful, to organize the Ukrainian emigre literature in professional associations. Of these, "Slovo"⁵ (Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile) and ADUK (Ukrainian Cultural Association), despite financial difficulties, are still holding their own.

The emigre situation is also shaped by the lack of a larger public. The average emigre's indifference to literature as a whole is usually put down to his exhaustion by the demands of daily survival. At the same time, however, dissident literature from Soviet Ukraine finds here both an eager reader and a ready publisher,⁶ not necessarily on account of its literary merits, but rather because of its political implications. This is, after all, a Political Emigration.

To sum up at this point, the growth of emigre literature has been stunted by the struggle to survive on the part of Ukrainian and other emigre writers themselves, the absence of a systematic and informed literary criticism, the lack of sophisticated readers and the lack of publishing funds (authors, as a rule, publish their works however they can).

Incomplete information and narrow perspectives as regards the latest period also make it difficult to draw a valid picture of the most recent developments and achievements in the work of an ever-increasing number of emigre writers. This last is perhaps the most heartening note.

⁵ H. Kostyuk, *From the Annals of Literary Life in Exile, Suchasnist*, München, 1971.

⁶ B. Boychuk, *About the New York Group, Terem*, No. 2, 1966, p. 38.

Despite hardships and drawbacks—or because of them—the steady growth in the number of Ukrainian poets, prose writers and playwrights nowadays is remarkable. Even though a few dozen representative Ukrainian emigre authors have died recently (among them poets Oles Babi, Bohdan Krawciw and Alexander Neprytsky-Granovsky, prose writers Nestor Ripecky, Mykola Ponedilok and Vasyl Sofroniv-Levytsky), there now are over one hundred more or less established poets and nearly as many essayists, short story writers and novelists.

In the ever-fertile field of poetry, women are particularly active in a variety of poetic types and styles of expression—from the patriotic poems of Laryssa Murowych to Lesya Chraplywa to the lyrical meditations of Irene Dubko. Dramatists are few in number, as indeed they have always been, but they still make their impact, e.g., Vasyl Chaplenko. Compared to the number of poets and of poets who essay prose, there are relatively few authors engaged wholly in prose writing.

Emigre prose may be described as a modernized version of realism. Its compass is considerable: a minute account of his time is given by Fotiy Meleshko in his trilogy, *Three Generations*; there are themes centering around the gruesome existence under the Soviet regime (works by Olha Mak, Olena Zvychaina, M. Mlakovy, Zosym Donchuk, etc.); there is conventional fiction and the social novel (such as Daria Jaroslawska, Ivan Kernycky, Jaroslava Ostruk and Ihor Kachurovsky); the lyrical, decorative prose of Vasyl Barka and Mykola Ponedilok; historical and biographical novels by Natalia Koroleva, Halyna Zhurba and J. Tys-Krochmaluk; psychological novels by Ulas Samchuk, Dokia Humenna, Vasyl Haidarivsky and R. Volodymyr, and even science fiction (Ludmyla Kovalenko and Leonid Poltava).

Mainly poets, the younger generation of Ukrainian writers in the United States forms a modernist camp called the "New York Group." It consists of Bohdan Boychuk, Emma Andiyevska, Jaroslav Tarnavsky, Bohdan Rubchak, Patricia Kylyna, and some associates from outside, like Martha Kalytovska and Vira Vowk. Most of these left Ukraine as children and completed their formal education in exile. Their strong inclination toward experimentation makes their poetry fresh and spontaneous.⁷ As a link between the New York group of modernists in poetry and the more traditional type of poetic expression represented by Yar Slavutych (with his stress on word artistry)

⁷ W. Zyla, *Manifestations of Ukrainian Poetry and Prose in Exile*, Books Abroad, Vol. 50, Spring 1976, p. 323.

or Volodymyr Hawryluk (noted for his intrinsic poetic imagery), there is Vadym Lesych, who uses effectively elements of surrealist symbolisms in his work.

There are also individual writers among the contemporary Ukrainian emigres who do not wish to associate closely with existing literary organizations, nor do they want to identify themselves with any defined literary schools like the traditionalists, modernists, or any prevalent literary fashion. Detached, their view is more objective as compared to those involved; at the least, they shun uniformity and platitude if only to avoid mediocrity. They like to think of their own creative work as having a universal background and as being conceived *sub specie aeternitatis* (under the aspect of eternity). An attempt to capture what might be called "a reflection of eternity" within the temporal confines of our age may better describe their inner motivation and the direction they make. Such a philosophical bend of mind predestines certain literary elements to be observed; the testimonial function of a "work of art" to the given period of time being important, it has to be psychologically through-composed and deeply rooted in the meaningfulness of life, in order to justify the search.

Individual interpretation arising from a singular literary vision based on timeless antecedents is exemplified by at least several Ukrainian emigre writers. Their work, sparking off an emerging revitalized literary consciousness, has the cutting edge of missionary fulfillment. No wonder there is a degree of sublimity in their ethical as well as aesthetical precepts!

As far as any individual writer is concerned, the germinating seeds of this new literary awareness are not yet sufficiently shaped or even clearly realized and directed toward relevant goals. In its present stage, the literary movement has hardly left the phase of anonymity; therefore, to identify with it champions or any particular dominant figure appears to be premature. Especially, we may add, since the trend is expanding and making inroads into the two camps of the traditionalists and modernists. Undoubtedly, a strong need is felt among the seriously minded emigre *literati* to render literature more meaningful as to its role in the life endangered by progressive dehumanization, and to validate a justifiable stand of great literature as an indispensable moral guide in the destiny of mankind.

Ukrainian literature in exile, despite the fact that it has been torn from its roots and twisted by homesickness, exists and functions within the range of its own native cultural, spiritual and intellectual developments as well as those of the Western world. In this, the literary creativity of Ukrainians in exile gains even greater signif-

icance, for it helps to preserve their identity as it assists their native country in its critical period of existence in continuing a homogeneous cultural process.

The alien Soviet system in Ukraine not only destroys native humanistic values and the rich heritage of an ancient cultural people, but also strives to obliterate its language, that fundamental distinguishing feature of identity. This is being pursued with the ultimate goal of reducing the Ukrainian nation along with other non-Russian nationalities in the melting, all-consuming Soviet crucible.

It is too early, as we have intimated, to pass final judgment on what should be considered a great or mediocre work in the maze of recent literary production within the Ukrainian emigre symbiosis. Neither the traditional camp nor any group of modernists seems to have produced any arresting work of art. Works in exile that are most spoken of suggest, as a rule, some kind of utilitarian basis rather than an artistic thrust. The works of others, unknown or isolated by silence, will have to wait for a later more stable era. One thing, however, is certain: Ukrainian emigre literature is worthwhile reading and studying. It is an earnest, honest, ingenuous literature, perhaps unequalled in its isolated sentiment and straightforwardness of purpose. Thanks to its moral content, ideals, constructive objectives and traditional aesthetics (even the extreme modernists among Ukrainian emigre *literati* are not quite free from the impact of heritage),⁸ it has the potential to function as a catalyst in the world literary processes in their present debilitating state of confusion and perennial crisis. If only the rest of the world become cognizant of the existence of Ukrainian as well as other emigre literatures.

⁸ R. Kuchar, *The Traditional and Contemporary in Ukrainian Emigre Literature*, *Ukrainian Review*, London, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring, 1972, p. 80.

UKRAINE OF THE SUMMER OF 1977

An Appeal to the Participants of the Belgrade Conference in the Summer of 1977

M e m o r a n d u m N o . 5

INTRODUCTION

The historical will of a people inevitably manifests itself in one or another form, expression, and action. As a mountain stream seeks crevices in order to make a riverbed, so the dynamic essence of a people seeks its spokesmen—the sons of its spirit in order to give other people-brothers the sign of its will.

The Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords is one such sign.

The bureaucratic structure of the Soviet state has met the appearance of the Public Group with hostility and force. During the three months of its existence, security organs conducted a number of brutal, even ferocious searches in the quarters of the Group's members, confiscating virtually all literary, epistolary and philosophical archives, Group documents and even books and materials having no relation to the case. Finally arrested on February 5, 1977, were the leader of the Group, poet Mykola Rudenko, and a Group member, teacher Oleksiy Tykhy. No formal charges were made.

Of what are these exponents of lawlessness and arbitrariness afraid? Why this fear of people who openly reveal their convictions, inviting the ruling circles of their country—as well as those of other countries—to a creative, evolutionary dialogue?

The courage and openness with which the Group made its appearance should demonstrate that its members and actions could not be inimical either to the Soviets or to the revolutionary ideals of the New World and the humane ideals of Socialism and Communism.

Why the necessity of searches and arrests, when all documents of the Group were sent out into the world for publication?

We are not creating an underground—which shows that we are not preparing to abolish the Soviet system.

We are not afraid of discussions—which proves that we are certain of our convictions.

We are ready for our ideas to be accepted or rejected by an all-national referendum, which again proves that we would accept the will of the nation with enthusiasm.

But is the bureaucratic structure ready for it—a structure which has in its hands the repressive apparatus, censorship, docile executors, and not least, fear sown in the era of Stalin but which has not yet made its flight?

We are not many, but we may state that the will of Evolution is with us! Hence, again and again, our friendly and hopeful appeal to the ruling circles of the land:

Cease the repressions against honest people who think differently than dogmatists and the orthodox! Such people are the hope of the future. Such people can be relied on in a critical moment—they will not betray! Why should one be afraid of those who speak the truth at the risk of their lives, health and personal happiness? On the contrary, they should be invited to take part in constructive consultations and actions.

A normal state structure should be interested in the opposition, because the critical forces are the sign and testimony of imperfections—hence the possibility of improvement.

In contrast, “people’s approvals” at “elections,” conventions and other gatherings—these are not a matter for jubilation but a misfortune and a horrible symptom in that it attests to the numbness of the spirit of the people.

The monolithic strength of the nation is expressed not in bureaucratic resolutions and approvals, but in the freedom, the unfettering of the spiritual and intellectual life of the people.

One should be able to aspire to such freedom and not be prevented from attaining it by arrests and reprisals.

We declare sincerely and resolutely, that we are not afraid of the new wave of persecution, inasmuch as the truth is with us.

All people must die, but some die as rabble, cowards and traitors, while others die as loyal sons of the Mother-Nation. We prefer to die as the glorious knights of the Zaporozhian *Sich*, as have died Taras (Shevchenko), Lesya (Ukrainka) and the Stonecutter (Ivan Franko), fulfilling the will of Ukraine as it was reflected in their hearts.

And now, too, the voice of Mother-Ukraine thunders in our hearts. In executing its will, we are expressing to the Nation-Brothers our *credo*, our hope and our confidence that Light will overcome Darkness

and that the era of enmity, fragmentation and bickering will come to an end with the Sun of Freedom descending upon the Earth.

LISTEN TO THE WORD OF UKRAINE OF 1977

I. STATEHOOD

All the historical cataclysms which the Ukrainian people endured in the past centuries were generated by the idea of statehood.

The will of a nation aspires to independence, sovereignty and to the building of its own independent life, but neighboring vultures do everything they can to prevent such sovereignty, acting, instead, to preserve the nation, selected as a victim, as a source of food, of spiritual energy, and of everything else.

This is what happened to Ukraine. Although possessing enormous potential of love of freedom, sagacity, creativity and sincerity, and, in addition, rare riches of the earth and the spirit, it (Ukraine) could not preserve its statehood and became a colony of a cruel, merciless empire, whose will was diametrically opposed to the will of the enslaved Ukraine.

Russia violated all fraternal agreements (treaties), crushed the Word pronounced in Pereyaslav (Treaty of Pereyaslav, 1654). The people whose love of freedom enchanted Europe, became serfs, the peons of alien usurpers. Hryhory Petrovsky, speaking in the *Duma*, eloquently depicted the criminal action of absolutism adopted with respect to Ukraine, the unconscionable degradation of the cultural and spiritual life, the merciless exploitation of natural resources and the relentless genocide.

This is why the Ukrainian people supported the Revolution and the proclamation of the Ukrainian Republic with enthusiasm.

Nevertheless, the better ideas of the Ukrainian revolutionaries, as well as the ideas of Lenin on the nationality problem, have not been embodied in reality. The succeeding years could not overcome the chauvinistic spirit of imperialism, and the "spirit of Catherine and Peter" became even more strongly entrenched in the evil machinations of Stalin.

The millions of the tortured, executed and victims of starvation—this tragedy is now long known to all. One wonders at times why Ukraine is still on the geographic map, why one hears sometimes a Ukrainian word, and, above all, why Ukraine is a member of the United Nations—hence a sovereign state.

We shall not play "hide and seek": our statehood is only a paper affair. And the time has come to put the dot on the "i" and to finish with the relentless and perfidious game regarding our sovereignty as well as that of every other Union Republic.

The will of history is such that every people (even the smallest) should enter on the historical arena as the unique Son of His Mother within the One Brotherhood of Mankind.

We deeply respect the culture, spirituality and ideas of the Russian people, but why does Moscow have to make decisions for us at international forums (for instance, the Helsinki or Belgrade meetings) on one or another problem, obligation, or whatever? Why must the cultural, creative, scientific, economic and international affairs of Ukraine be decided upon and planned in the capital of a neighboring, though federated, state?

We do not consider ourselves to be naive simpletons. We fully understand that confronting us here is the spirit of imperialism and chauvinism, about which our Bard-Kobzar (Taras Shevchenko) spoke so clearly and with anger:

It was he, the First, who crucified
Our Ukraine,
And the Second finished off
The widow-orphan.
Hangmen, hangmen, cannibals . . .*

One would be hard put to say it any better. Contemporary revolutionaries, Communists, romanticists and builders of the New World of Love and Brotherhood—all should dutifully read the manuscripts of the past so that they might not fly in the face of abstractions of fabricated schemes, but should, instead, don the impregnable armor of the testaments of the Spirit of the People.

We will not allow ourselves to be trapped in the net of criminal chimeras, unless the satraps of the bureaucratic citadel simply crush us outside "legality" altogether. We simply, sincerely and with conviction state a few hard-thought positions regarding statehood (not only ours but that of neighboring peoples as well):

—Man is not for the State but the State is for Man. Therefore, every kind of social transformation should obtain the approval of the

* Excerpt from Taras Shevchenko's poem (1814-1861), assailing Czar Peter the First and Empress Catherine the Second for their destruction of Ukrainian independence, in 1709 and 1775, respectively.

nation through an all-national referendum. All "voices of the people," organized through the press, will be consigned to the garbage heap of history.

—We do not raise the problem of the "separation" of Ukraine. We need separate from no one. The planet is one. Mankind is one. All around us—people-brothers. From whom can we separate? On the contrary, we raise the problem of unity and the joining together of Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Latvia and other fraternal nations in One Spirit of Mankind.

—We are for the Union, known formally as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which eventually will be transformed into the Brotherhood of Free Peoples of the Earth. But each people in the Union should be a free member, an independent active spirit. Only under this condition will all those deformations disappear that cause frictions, sow tensions and breed suspicions among nations. Briefly, a people should be the masters of their own land, their tradition, their creative heritage, their will for the building of a better life—for each and all of them.

—It is hard to foresee just how this process of social transformation will develop toward a deepening of sovereignty of this or another nation, *but no plans should be drawn for it*. The sleeping giant-people have in their heart a great number of surprises for enemies and skeptics.

And one thing should remain clear: without a free and thinking Man no action of historical importance can be realized. Therefore, especial attention should always be given to Man, his spirit and his rights.

II. MAN AND HIS RIGHTS

We have a paradoxical state of affairs: we have a good Constitution, our country signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords and repeated endlessly in all these documents are assertions about human rights and about what Man *could do* and *has the right to do*; but in reality all these possibilities turn not only into a mirage, but boomerang into cruel blows as well. By demanding what was declared in official documents, one thereby condemns himself and those close to him to endless tortures.

Here is a ghastly paradox which must be resolved.

Undoubtedly, the explanation at bottom is that these rights are being proclaimed by the bureaucratic structure for mere window-

dressing purposes; they do not emanate from the conscience of Man himself.

Let us provide a most primitive example.

Freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of going out and coming into the country...

By affirming these rights the state structure has said nothing new to Man, merely hammering in a blasphemous fashion something that has been realized by all thinking human beings. And if Man once upon a time had asked himself, "his internal God," whether to act this way or that, now perforce he asks permission for freedom of speech or action from some official worm. But the bureaucratic worms can always be counted upon to find a number of paragraphs and pseudo-legal hooks to restrain Man from the realization of his will.

As for the illustration—the present situation.

If you want to emigrate—then you are an enemy of the State. But the state is only my voluntary agreement with others: is it not clear that I may both create a state and destroy it? Should others want to preserve it, this does not mean that they can keep me in the mousetrap of their will, for then they reduce themselves to jailers and slaves.

If you think otherwise—you are an enemy of the State.

But is the State some sort of Imperial Thought in which all people, to survive, must think alike?

The thought is a lightning stroke. How can it be brought into line with a law?

Whoever says he thinks the same as the State, he does not think at all, because to ape other people's thoughts, even brilliant thoughts, is to act like a parrot, to reduce oneself to a record-player.

The essence of all these reflections lies in that it is absolutely pertinent to return to the legal subject of Man, which is defined in Art. 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to act correspondingly with the *will* of the subject, and not toward the article's superficial realization.

Therefore, all provisions of the constitution, of international legal documents and so forth regarding human rights should be treated not as a right of the bureaucrat to allow me this or that, but as the human right to turn the sword of the law against bureaucracy, whenever one or another official arbitrarily forbids the expression of the will of the subject. (We do not speak here, of course, about clearly criminal attempts of the individual against other people, or in violation of other *rights*).

Specifically, we demand:

- Free movement from the Homeland and return to it;
 - Free dissemination of our ideas and acquaintance with the ideas of other peoples;
 - Free establishment of creative, artistic, philosophical and scientific associations and their dissolution;
 - Free participation in the formulation of conscience of the people and in the affairs of State;
 - Free activity directed towards uniting the Spirit of Man on the basis of Brotherhood, Love and Reason.
-

Man is a wonder flower of evolution. His mission is to unite the downtrodden world into a magical wreath of beauty and harmony. But the growth of this idea is prevented by the climate of militarism, present-day imperialism and chauvinism. In this terrible time when such problems as ecology, demography, energy and economics are catastrophically impinging on the equilibrium of the Planet, amicable, selfless and sincere actions on the part of all nations and individuals have become essential.

Those state structure which do not understand or do not want to acknowledge the seripusness of the situation, or who criminally neglect it—such structures are the enemies of Evolution and, consequently, of all Mankind!

Hence the violations of the right of self-determination of nations, of sovereign expression of the will, are violations of the universal law. And a state structure that is guilty of such violations is the enemy of Mankind and should receive a stern historical sentence—its elimination from the Tablets of Commandments of the Future, along with world shame and damnation.

We are puzzled by the serenity and indifference with which the goverment leaders of many states react to the repressions in countries that are signatories to the Helsinki Accords. It is clear that repressions of human rights are more or less common to all states, but such callousness should not have a place in the XXth century.

Is there really a pleasure in becoming ill-famed modern inquisitors and tyrants? Is it not more pleasant, humane and rewarding to do away with secrets, abolish censorship, disband agents and provocateurs and to rend asunder the fear which has constricted the soul of the people and prevented them from progressing?

UKRAINE OF THE YEAR OF 1977 PROPOSES:

—To release all political prisoners and to delete pertinent articles in the Criminal Codes of the (Soviet) Union and the Republics.

— To open the frontiers of the country for free exit and entrance therethrough.

— To open avenues for free information—scientific, artistic, literary, personal, and any other kind which does not violate Human Rights.

— To abolish forever censorship as a vestigial feudal institution, empowering publishing companies not to release on the book market any militaristic and meretricious products.

—To abolish the death penalty as a manifestation of the criminality of state structure itself. Since the state cannot create life, it has no right to take one away.

—To condemn in the forum of the United Nations the idea of killing itself, and to brand any state or person who tries to achieve its or his objectives through the agency of killing (wars) as enemies of mankind and, therefore, to be deprived of the right to enter into the Common Future.

—In the forthcoming years to liquidate armies (except internal forces of order) and to establish a World Brotherhood of Peoples on the basis of the United Nations.

—To decide jointly on all economic, ecological, demographical and cosmological problems.

It is time to awaken from the bureaucratic "sleeping sickness" and to realize that the problem of one man is the problem of all Mankind, and to use this axiom as a point of departure in all future activities.

UKRAINE of 1977, filled with sincere wishes and desires, but anxieties as well, sends its Love and Greetings to all brotherly peoples at the Belgrade Forum!

UKRAINIAN PUBLIC GROUP TO PROMOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

February 15, 1977

Kiev, Ukraine

Oles Berdnyk

Petro Hryhorenko

Oksana Meshko

Levko Lukyanenko

Ivan Kandyba

Nina Strokata

Mykola Matusevych

Myroslav Marynovych

ELIMINATION AS THE "HIGHEST STAGE" OF SOVIETIZATION

By BEN-CION PINCHUK

On September 17, 1939, under the pretext of defending their Ukrainian and Byelorussian brethren, the Red Army invaded Eastern Poland.*) The final borders of the occupied territory were determined on September 28, 1939, in the new friendship treaty with Germany.¹ Military occupation constituted only the first stage of the absorption and integration of these lands into the USSR. The destruction of the long-existing political, economic, social, and cultural order and its substitution by Soviet institutions were designed to insure that Soviet rule would be based on firmer foundations than that afforded by mere military power. By Sovietization here, then, is meant the transformation that was brought about in the various spheres of social activity to achieve a conformance with the regime existing in the USSR at the time. Effective control of the acquired territory was both a major goal of Sovietization and a prerequisite for the success of the Sovietization process. The structural changes introduced in government and society in the annexed territory were aimed at promoting integration and loyalty to the Soviet state.

The elimination of any overt or potential opposition to Soviet rule and the Sovietization process constituted an indispensable component of the integration. Intimidation, detention, transfer, imprisonment, and deportation to the interior of the Soviet Union were the different techniques used to destroy and eliminate the former elites as well as those elements of the population whom the new rulers considered undersirable or unadaptable. Thus the arrests and deportations should not be viewed as accidental by-products of Sovietization;

*) "Eastern Poland" comprised territories with Ukrainians and Byelorussians in a preponderant majority. These lands had been assigned to Poland by the Treaty of Riga of March, 1921, and confirmed by the Allied Council of Ambassadors in March, 1923 — Editor.

¹ R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, ed., *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington, D. C., 1948), pp. 105-107.

they were, in fact, two of the essential elements of that brutal process. The systematic nature of the elimination precluded its being regarded as an outcome and revealed it as a precondition and an inherent part of the thrust of Sovietization.

We are concerned here with the eliminatory component of Sovietization as it was applied to the Jewish community in former Eastern Poland. Although by definition this is a case study, an attempt will be made to place it in the general context of Sovietization as it operated in that territory. While the Jews shared many of the experiences of the entire population their case is unique because of their special socio-economic structure, the presence of several hundred thousand refugees, and their minority status in this multi-ethnic territory.

The integration of these lands into the Soviet state was a prolonged affair that went through several stages of varying intensity. One of its major characteristics was its acceleration, particularly after the summer of 1940. Accompanying the political and socio-economic changes being wrought was a continuous purge. The elimination of individuals and entire social groups started with the very entrance of the Soviet troops and did not cease until the last days of Soviet rule. The purge, however, was not uniform in its intensity. Low and high points on the elimination curve corresponded to policy decisions that usually bore no relation to developments in the area itself. More frequently they coincided with Soviet states of apprehension brought on by Germany.

These lands formally became an integral part of the USSR after local people's assemblies dutifully sought at the end of October 1939 to join the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics, the Supreme Soviet graciously accepting their request on November 1 and 2, 1939.² In order to secure a smooth election of pro-Soviet delegates, the local authorities detained or imprisoned people connected with the former Polish administration. Polish officials from all levels started to disappear at the beginning.³ Nikita Khrushchev, the man in charge of this Sovietization of Western Ukraine, recalled that while the preparations for convening the assembly were going on, "at the same time we were still conducting arrests. It was our view that these arrests served to strengthen the Soviet State and to clear the road

² *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945* (London, 1961), Vol. 1, pp. 69-70. Henceforth to be designated as *Polish-Soviet Relations*.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 572.

for the building of Socialism on Marxist-Leninist principles."⁴ The Soviet boss thus is refreshingly candid about the role of arrests in securing the establishment of the new rule. Arrests and deportations in this new area were also aimed at achieving what the Russians considered to be the "correct" ethnic composition of the territory. The Poles were the initial target of elimination. Thus large numbers of them were spirited away while Ukrainians and Byelorussians were installed in government positions.⁵*)

The arrests of the first few months seemed to be sporadic and selective in nature. Representatives of the Polish administration — magistrates, policemen, and others — simply disappeared, one by one. "It was not immediately realized that these were not only removed as persons, but eliminated as a social group, including families, close relatives, friends..."⁶ These individuals, imprisoned or deported, were the victims of the first wave of deportations. Officers and soldiers of the Polish army, clergymen, and political activists also were among the deported. The deportations were part of the preparations for the elections to people's assemblies.

Deportations and imprisonment on a massive scale, however, started in February, 1940. They coincided with the establishment of the Soviet administrative structure and the end of the transitional period. Polish officials, settlers, segments of the intelligentsia, and the more affluent Polish, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian peasants were among the victims.⁷ The second wave, in April, 1940, included people belonging to the aforementioned categories as well as the families of previous deportees. It also swept up many of the more affluent groups in the populace: bankers, merchants, factory owners, and peasants with larger farms. No ethnic distinctions were made in this wave.

With the German successes on the Western front in the spring of 1940, the Soviet authorities tightened their grip on former Eastern Poland. The third massive wave, June-July, 1940, was prompted by the same basic consideration: eliminating unreliable or unmanage-

⁴ *Khrushchev Remembers*, (Introduction and Commentary by E. Crankshaw) (Boston, 1970), p. 146.

⁵ A. S. Cardwell, *Poland and Russia* (N.Y., 1944), pp. 52-71.

⁶*) This policy of "Ukrainization" was a temporary Soviet expedient, merely "window dressing" tactics; the mass arrests of the Ukrainian intelligentsia began immediately after the "people's election" and lasted until the German attack on the USSR — Editor.

⁷ N. P. Vakar, *Byelorussia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 180.

⁸ *Polish-Soviet Relations*, pp. 573-574.

able elements from the areas closest to the German border. Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland constituted its majority. Small merchants, teachers, priests, and students, and free professionals were also among the unfortunate. Several weeks before the German attack on June 22, 1941, the Soviet authorities showed signs of growing unease in the border regions. Thus a fourth, large-scale deportation operation was one of the security measures employed. Among these deportees were members of all the previous groups, individuals who somehow or other had managed to evade previous deportations as well as people who did not fit any category of suspects and who were merely victims of a paranoid and increasingly insatiable security machine. Interestingly enough, trains filled with deportees continued to leave the lands several days after the start of the German invasion.⁸

A contemporary eyewitness who lived in Pinsk, Western Byelorussia, described the massive uprooting and destruction of the population that took place. After the elimination of those directly connected to the Polish administration came the turn of "...the 'settlers,' Polish peasants who had been settled in the region in order to strengthen the indigenous Polish element. They were simply removed by the Soviet authorities to places unknown. Then came the turn of village leaders, local notables, public activists. Actually, any person, Pole, Byelorussian, or Ukrainian, who was suspected of or carried any authority in the community was removed from the scene."⁹ The outcome was that the local infrastructure of leadership was done away with. Until the spring of 1940 all the "unreliable" ideological or social undesirables were systematically removed from the urban population. In the summer of 1940 the same process took place in the countryside.¹⁰ Some were transferred to other parts of former Eastern Poland, a method reminiscent of old Muscovite practices. Others vanished, either imprisoned or executed outright. Many others were jammed into boxcars headed for the labor and prison camps in the USSR. Imprisonment, transfer and deportation came in any order, leaving a bewildered populace hopelessly trying to decipher the pattern, to understand why one was detained for mere questioning while

⁸ *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943... Official Documents*. Published by the Polish Embassy in Washington by the authority of the Government of the Republic of Poland. (Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 19-20.

⁹ *Sefer Etdut Vzikaron Lichilat Pinsk-Karlin*, (Memorial Book of the Pinsk-Karlin Community) (Tel Aviv, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 311. Henceforth to be designated as *Pinsk*.

¹⁰ *Vakar*, pp. 164-165.

another was deported to Siberia. It took awhile for them to grasp that what at first seemed haphazard, even accidental, detentions was, in fact, a well-designed scheme to eradicate all those elements that conceivably could provide leadership on any level to oppose the regime.

By 1939 the Soviets had become highly adept in wielding the purge as a weapon of both terror and control. More than twenty years' experience in uprooting opponents of the regime, especially during the introduction of collectivization and the Great Purges of the mid-thirties, had resulted in well-tested techniques and trained personnel. General I. Serov was the man in charge of security in Western Ukraine. His planning and methods were visible throughout the occupied territory. One of his first moves was to seize the local archives and to draw up lists of persons who might have some motive, real or imagined, to oppose the new regime. People with independent incomes, wealthier citizens, and even individuals who had applied for a passport to travel abroad were included in the deadly NKVD lists.¹¹ These also included nationalists, socialists, democrats, etc. Another effective means of control was the introduction of compulsory registration of passports in the summer of 1940. The entire local population received passports that established different categories of limitations. There were those who received passports that were valid only for a few months instead of the normal five for Soviet citizens. Troublesome merchants, factory owners and other "non-productive elements" as well as political suspects, clergymen and former employees of the Polish government received "paragraphed" passports,¹² as often as not including paragraph 11. This paragraph imposed restrictions on residence and movement: people carrying these passports could travel only to small towns and villages at a distance of no farther than 100 kilometers. Many were transferred to the countryside where it was easier to control their movements and where they had no standing in the community. Frequently, transfer preceded deportation.

The more massive waves of imprisonment and deportation were carefully prepared operations. A detailed list of the categories to be

¹¹ *Pinsk*, Vol. 2, p. 318; Also, F. Shwartz, *Dos iz Geven Der Unheib*, (N.Y., 1943), p. 330. (This Was the Beginning).

¹² See: *Sefer Zikaron Likhilat Sarny* (Memorial Book of the Sarny Community), (Tel Aviv, 1961), p. 79. To be designated as Sarny; *Ianov Al Iad Pinsk* (Yanov Near Pinsk), (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 225. To be designated as Ianov: *Sefer Zikaron Dubno* (Memorial Book: Dubno), (Tel Aviv, 1966), p. 653; *Pinsk*, p. 319.

deported was prepared by Serov. This is the infamous instruction No. 001223 of October 11, 1939.¹³ Special headquarters and personnel were organized in advance to carry out the operations. The instructions included elaborate details concerning transportation and logistics. They paid special attention to the psychological side of the operation to ensure smooth and rapid execution: "...care must be taken that the operations be carried out without disturbance and panic, so as not to permit any demonstrations and other troubles not only on the part of those to be deported, but also on the part of a certain section of the surrounding population hostile to the Soviet administration" — so read the preamble to Serov's instruction.¹⁴

Despite their size, the ease with which the deportations were executed demonstrated the efficiency and ruthlessness of the purge machine. The exact number of prisoners and deportees from these lands is unknown and no doubt will remain so. As long as the NKVD archives remain closed we are left with varying estimates and approximate numbers.¹⁵ According to the computations made by the Polish Foreign Affairs Department in 1944 there were about 880,000 deportees and prisoners from former Eastern Poland, excluding prisoners of war and draftees in the Red Army. The Polish Justice Department estimated the number of prisoners to be 250,000 and placed the deportees at 980,000. About 52% were Poles: 30%, Jews, and 18%, Ukrainians and Byelorussians.^{16*}

While Jews constituted about 10% of the population, they made up about 30% of the deportees. This disproportionate percentage resulted from a combination of factors.¹⁷ By and large the Soviet au-

¹³ On the subject see note 24 on p. 145 by E. Crankshaw in *Khrushchev Remembers*.

¹⁴ The translated text appears in B.J. Kaslas, *The USSR-German Aggression Against Lithuania* (N.Y., 1973), pp. 327-334.

¹⁵ A detailed analysis of the problem is contained in: *Special Report No. 1 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression*, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, Second Session, Washington, D. C., 1954.

¹⁶ *Soviet-Polish Relations*, pp. 573-574.

*) Other sources, especially the Ukrainian, give a much higher percentage of Ukrainians and Byelorussians as having been deported from Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia — Editor.

¹⁷ According to various estimates there were about 1,270,000 Jews in Eastern Poland by the time of the Soviet occupation. To them must be added about 300-350,000 Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland. See: SH. Redlich, "Hayihudim Bashtakhim Shesupkhu Librit-Hamoatsot, 1939-1941." (*The Jews in the Territories Annexed by the Soviet Union*), *Bhinot*, No. 1, 1970, p. 71. For slightly different estimates see B. D. Welnyrb, "Polish Jews Under Soviet Rule," in P. Meyer et alia, *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, (Syracuse, N.Y., 1953), p. 331.

thorities applied the same criterial vis-a-vis the Jews as they did to other parts of the local population. Over and above this, however, there were the long-held hostile attitudes on the part of the Soviet government towards the Jewish problem and their nationalism, the special socio-economic structure of the Jewish community of former Eastern Poland, and the presence of several hundred thousand Jewish refugees in the area.

Ironically, the Jews of these territories, unlike other segments of the local population, had greeted the Red Army as a savior from the threat of Nazi occupation. The Jews' lot under Polish rule had not been a happy one. Many expected the Soviet rule to abolish the discriminatory practices of the former regime. But, the vast majority of the Jews were concentrated in the larger and smaller urban centers.¹⁸ Most of the Jews belonged to the middle and lower middle-class and were engaged in various forms of commerce, handicrafts, free professions and services.¹⁹ Thus the Jewish community was concentrated in localities and occupations that were hit first and hardest by the economic changes which the Soviet government introduced. Socially, many Jews belonged to the so-called "unproductive" strata of the population. The Jews were thus "over-represented" among those whom Soviet authorities and Communist ideology dubbed "class enemies" who had to be fought and eliminated.

The Jewish community was characterized by a highly developed consciousness of identity and an elaborate network of autonomous institutions. The Jewish communal organization (the *Kehillah*), for example, enjoyed a special legal status, including the right to levy taxes. And the intense and long national struggle that went on in multi-ethnic former Eastern Poland had influenced the Jewish population. The Zionist movement, including its various parties and organizations, had exerted a strong influence on local Jewry, as had the non-Zionist parties, particularly, the *Bund*. Extreme orthodoxy and *Khasidism* also had strong support here. An elaborate system of secular Hebrew, Yiddish, and religious schools had existed in the area. Dozens of periodicals, libraries, and publishing houses bore evidence to what might be described as one of the most vital Jewish communities in Europe.²⁰

By 1939 Soviet opposition to the idea of Jewish nationalism or to any form of Jewish autonomy had long been synonymous with

¹⁸ R. Mahler, *Yihudei Polin Bein Shtet Mulkhamot Olam* (Polish Jewry Between Two World Wars), (Tel Aviv, 1968), pp. 24-28.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-45.

²⁰ *Weinryb*, pp. 332-333.

Communist ideology and policies. In a word, the Jews were ever aliens. The goal of Soviet policy, particularly under Stalin, was the extinction as rapidly as possible of all expressions of Jewish separateness.²¹ In the annexed territory these policies came down to an all-out effort to liquidate all expressions of Jewish nationalism and all autonomous Jewish institutions. Whereas the Soviet authorities destroyed the institutions of the former regime and attacked the nationalistic tendencies among Poles, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians, they did not object to the idea of those groups as legitimate national entities. They merely had to be "guided." The result was that the Jewish population lost more of its political-cultural leadership than other ethnic groups during the process of Sovietization. It should be noted that by and large the political and communal leadership of the Jewish community belonged economically to the more affluent sections of the population. This factor alone would probably have doomed them to elimination.

The Soviet policy of disdain for the peculiar character and problems of the Jewish people found its most conspicuous expression on the eve of the Second World War in Moscow's attitude towards the Jewish refugees from the German territory. By the time the Red Army occupied former Eastern Poland, about a quarter of a million Jewish refugees from Western Poland were to be found in the occupied territory. About fifty thousand more arrived after the occupation, thereby raising the number to about three hundred thousand.²² Roughly, the refugees then constituted about 20% of the Jewish population of Soviet-occupied former Poland. Even in terms of sheer numbers, the refugees presented towering problems. In terms of adaptability to the regime and readiness to integrate into the Soviet system the refugees were an unfailing source of special embarrassment to the authorities. There were difficulties in providing jobs and housing for the refugees. Their family connections with German-occupied Western Poland and their tendency to move back and forth presented the ever suspicious Soviet authorities with serious problems of control. So did the question of the refugees' citizenship. As a result, the thousands of Jewish refugees constituted a category of people especially difficult to absorb, a formidable obstacle to the

²¹ S. Schwartz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, (Syracuse, N.Y., 1951), pp. 53-56; Z. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics*, (Princeton, N.J., 1972), pp. 485-510.

²² Weinryb, p. 342. For different estimates see A. Pechenik, *Yidn Un Yiddishkayt in Soviet-Rusland* (Jews and Judaism in Soviet Russia), (N.Y., 1943), pp. 59-60; *Jewish Affairs* (N.Y., August 1941).

smooth Sovietization process. This segment of the Jews, then, also was soon marked for deportation.

Jews also were "over-represented" in those categories that the Soviet authorities considered as class enemies because of their social origin or ideological convictions. Among the Jews — especially the refugees — was a relatively large group whom the Soviet could not see as at all assimilable. The consequence was that the Jewish population of this territory was more vulnerable to elimination than any other ethnic group. From the available evidence, however, anti-Semitic sentiments played no role in the imprisonment and deportation of Jews unless the disregard of their special nature and problems could be so interpreted. The policy and its implementation vis-a-vis the Jews was identical to that governing other ethnic groups. Only the proportions were different, and the consequences harsher.

Jews were among those arrested during the first weeks of Soviet rule. At this stage the targets mainly were people connected with the Polish administration and prominent political and public figures. The victims were selected and limited in scope, but since it was a bureaucratic undertaking, they were at times capriciously chosen. The families of Jewish soldiers and officers who had served in the Polish army and had become prisoners of war were deported during the first weeks of the occupation. So were some of the leaders of the communal organizations, identified closely with the Polish administration. While the number of deportees was small, the effect on the Jewish streete was pervasive.²³ Among the deportees of the first weeks were also people who belonged to the more affluent class of the population and who lived in close proximity to the new Soviet-German border. These deportations preceded similar deportations from other parts of the annexed territory.²⁴

The arrests and deportations among the Jews until the spring of 1940 were mainly directed against individuals who held, or were thought to have held, positions of leadership in different fields of communal activities. This was part of the destruction of the former order in its different manifestations; hence its individual and selective character. People who held some authority and who could have opposed the "re-education" of the masses were eliminated. The functioning of the communal institutions ground to a halt after a few weeks or months. The Jewish political parties, Zionist and non-Zionist

²³ *Entsiklopedia Shel Galuioi*, No. 9-Tarnopol (The Diaspora Encyclopedia, No. 9, Tarnopol), (Jerusalem, 1955), p. 385. *Yad Vashem Testimonials* (Remembrance), F-206-2178. Henceforth to be designated as a Y-V.

²⁴ Y.V. M-87-1469.

alike, faded away. But it should be noted here that the dissolution of the autonomous Jewish institutions and political parties occurred with but little official coercion. The attitude of Soviet Communism to the different expressions of organized Jewish nationalism was well known to the Jews. The potential threat was usually enough to insure the institutions' self-dissolution.²⁵ A few arrests of prominent leaders was enough to confirm former fears. "When some of our members were arrested," related one of the Zionist leaders in Western Ukraine, "we sought legal advice. Yet to our astonishment no lawyer would agree to defend the accused, so profound was the fear."²⁶ The same report emphasized that there were no mass arrests of Zionists during the first few months. Only the most prominent leaders or those who in one form or another showed active opposition to the changes being introduced were picked up.²⁷

In the process of eliminating the Jewish political leadership the Soviet authorities dealt first with the Social-Democratic groups, particularly the *Bund*. The ideological affinity as well as the traditional vying of Communism and Social Democracy for the same potential constituency played their roles herein. The elimination of several leaders was sufficient to convert a *Bundist* organization to a Communist cell, maintained a report from Western Ukraine.²⁸ The leadership as well as the rank and file of the *Bund* were psychologically unprepared to oppose Communist propaganda and methods. V. Alter and H. Erlich, two prominent *Bund* leaders, were arrested in the first week of Soviet occupation.²⁹ Before Vilnius was transferred to Lithuania, a delegation of its *Bund* leaders had voluntarily provided the NKVD with a complete list of the central committee of the party. On the following night all the members of the delegation and dozens of other leaders were arrested.³⁰ The mass arrests of the leadership were to start much later, as part of the intensification of Sovietization policy.

²⁵ On the subject of the almost voluntary, spontaneous dissolution of Jewish parties and institutions see: *Shoat Yihudei Polin (The Catastrophe of Polish Jewry)*, (Jerusalem, 1940), Vol. 1. pp. 23-24; 35-36; 41; 62. This volume is a compilation of contemporary eyewitness reports. Henceforth to be designated as *Shoat Poln.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁷ *Ibid.* It should be added, however, that many of the more important Jewish political leaders found refuge in Vilnius which was transferred to Lithuania on October 10, 1939.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

²⁹ D. Grodner, "In Soviet Poland and Lithuania," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, No. 4, 1941, p. 146.

³⁰ *Shwartz*, pp. 330-331.

One gets the impression that at the beginning the Zionist movement fared somewhat better than the *Bund*. A contemporary report from Western Byelorussia maintained that "...it looks as if the Soviet authorities show a more liberal attitude towards the Zionist Organizations."³¹ While this may have been so, one must recall that considerable local differences existed in the behavior of the Soviet authorities during the first few weeks of the occupation. In some places, Zionists were arrested immediately after the entrance of the Red Army; in other places, however, no arrests took place at all.³² Where there was opposition to the conversion of Hebrew to Yiddish schools, the local Zionist leaders were arrested at once.³³ These local differences might be attributed to the suddenness of the occupation, the absence of clear-cut instructions during the first weeks of Soviet rule and day-to-day bureaucratic problems connected with policy implementation.

Although the Zionist parties ceased their public activities soon after the arrival of the Red Army, some components, particularly the youth movements and the pioneer organization, continued an underground existence for some time.³⁴ The Communist party and the Comsomol in particular tried, with occasional success, to enlist the rank and file of the Zionist youth movements after the hacking away of the leadership. Existing records reveal some interesting accounts of efforts to coopt Zionist communes into the collectivization of the countryside.³⁵ By and large, however, such attempts failed, with the authorities resorting to a systematic elimination of the Zionist organization. Of great value in locating former Zionist and other activists were local Jewish Communists. The NKVD formed an elaborate network of Jewish informers, most of whom were Communists only too eager to prepare detailed lists of "enemies of the regime."³⁶

The characteristics of individual arrests are reminiscent of the detailed descriptions to be found in Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*.

³¹ *Shoat Polin*, p. 36.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 41; 62.

³³ Such was the case in Slonim, Rovno. *Shoat Polin*, p. 36.

³⁴ *Sefer Lida* (*The Book of Lida*), (Tel Aviv, 1970), p. 266; *Khalutsim in Polin* (*Pioneers in Poland*), (N.Y., 1961) Vol. 2, pp. 48-52.

³⁵ *Pinsk*, p. 187; *Shoat Polin*, p. 36.

³⁶ M. Tsanin, *Grenetsn Biz Tsum Himl* (*Borders as High as the Sky*). (Tel Aviv, 1970), pp. 16; 29; 42. *Sefer Izkor Likhilut Augustov Vhasviva* (*Memorial Book of the Augustov and Surrounding Community*) (Tel Aviv, 1969), p. 376. *Pinsk*, p. 318.

go.³⁷ The arrests of local Communists, even people who had served long sentences in Polish prisons, deepened the mood of fear reigning in the streets. If the purpose of the arrests was intimidation, a policy designed to immobilize opposition, it must be said to have achieved its goal in the Jewish community. "An atmosphere of anxiety descended on the town. People stopped talking about anything but the weather. They refrained from meeting friends and close relatives. Everyone was a suspect, for the terror reigned everywhere," recalled an inhabitant of Pinsk.³⁸ The arrested were rarely informed of their "crime." When they were sentenced for "anti-Soviet actions," their "crimes" turned out to be their public or political activities in Poland before the Soviet occupation.³⁹

Only a relatively small number of those eliminated during the Sovietization process, however, were arrested as individuals. With the consolidation of Soviet rule there was a shift to massive arrests and deportations of entire social groups, the authorities obviously deciding to accelerate the integration of the acquired territory. As far as the Jewish community was concerned, the mass arrests certainly were not in response to any overt Jewish opposition to the regime. In the spring and summer of 1940 the arrests and deportations spread from prominent former leaders to anyone who had enjoyed some prominence in the community or who had been involved in any way in some political party or in public life. The turn of their families came next. The vortex of the spinning purge machine grew wider and wider, sucking in ever larger numbers of victims, people more and more remotely connected with those initially claimed. Thus the spiral of victims continuously widened with the number of those being arrested.⁴⁰

As noted above, engulfed also were people whose only crime was their former economic status. Former bankers, factory owners,

³⁷ The following description, taken from an eyewitness account from Pinsk, comes very close to Solzhenitsyn's description of arrests in the opening chapter of the *Arkhipelag*: "there were dozens of methods of arrests. Some were simply asked to come to the local NKVD office. But this was done only rarely. In most cases people were invited to the bank, draft board, municipal office, education department, tax office, etc. There one always found an NKVD dressed as a civilian who quickly uttered only three words: please follow me." *Pinsk*, p. 313.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ D. Lederman, *Fun Iener Zait Forhang* (From the Other Side of the Curtain), (Buenos Aires, 1980), pp. 130-165.

⁴⁰ cf. *Sefer Zikaron Dubno* (Memorial Book of Dubno), (Tel Aviv, 1966), pp. 649-654; *Pinukas Slonim* (Book of Slonim), (Tel Aviv, 1962, Vol. 2, pp. 9-10; 23-24; *Ianov*, pp. 224-225; *Augustov*, p. 377; *Pinsk*, pp. 311-313.

merchants, real estate owners and lawyers — people defined by the authorities as "non-productive elements" — and their families fed the purge machine. The lists of such "class enemies" were ever expanded by making use of Jewish informers and the passport device. In the spring and summer of 1940 thousands of families were uprooted from their home towns, most of them being transferred to smaller places, at least ten kilometers from their homes.⁴¹ Transfer was one of the more gentle methods used by the Soviet authorities to remove elements deemed hostile to the inevitable social-economic transformation, a method of dispersing elites that had been pioneered by the Muscovite Grand Princes in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The effect upon the victims was a crushing one. "They were sent to villages where they were unknown, overnight becoming homeless refugees, leaving behind relatives, homes, everything dear to them. The mere fact of being exiled, degraded, gave those people the feeling of being social outcasts."⁴²

The refugees comprised the largest single group among the Jewish deportees. While no exact figures exist for the number of indigenous Jews arrested, transferred or deported, it probably did not greatly exceed their proportion in the population at large. But, the refugees, as mentioned above, presented the Soviet authorities with a series of problems that deportation neatly solved.⁴³

By the time the territory was incorporated into the USSR, the Soviet government considered all the remaining residents of former Eastern Poland, including the refugees, as entitled to Soviet citizenship. Yet the vast majority of the refugees refused to become Soviet citizens. Some, considering their stay on Soviet territory temporary, hoped to emigrate abroad. Others balked because they saw Soviet citizenship as a final break with their families still living on German-occupied soil. Still others simply detested the regime, if only because Soviet citizenship meant limitations on residence and movement as spelled out by the passport regulations.⁴⁴ The refugees by and large preferred to maintain the status of temporary residents.

Sometime during the spring of 1940, the Soviet authorities decided to tackle this problem head on. Special commissions of the NKVD were set up in April-May, 1940, to register the refugees. The registrants were given a choice: either to become Soviet citizens or

⁴¹ *Khurban Khilut Shchochin* (The Extinction of the Shchochin Community), (Tel Aviv, 1954), p. 75; Pinsk, 311; Iunov, p. 225.

⁴² *Pinsk*, p. 311.

⁴³ Weinryb, pp. 342-344.

⁴⁴ Y.V., A-J4-1203: N-13-105; SH-J1-702: K-116-1324.

to declare their willingness to return to their former homes, now under German occupation. Most refugees opted to return to German Poland.⁴⁵ This registration served as a kind of "loyalty test," and its outcome determined the immediate fate of the refugees.

Mass deportation of the refugees was the final and irresistible Soviet solution to the refugees' problem. Most of the Jewish refugees were removed from the territory in the second half of June, 1940. The operation itself lasted only several days. The secret police were assisted by the entire Soviet governmental apparatus and local Communist party members. Everything was prepared in advance: transportation, personnel, emergency plans. The propaganda section of the NKVD worked overtime to spread false rumors and misleading information in order to catch the victims unawares and prevent their fleeing.⁴⁶

The experienced Soviet deportation machine addressed its work with dispatch. The refugees who were deported even included people employed in Soviet institutions and who even had accepted Soviet citizenship. Although the arrests and deportations continued after June 1940, this was more a mopping-up operation.

A last mass wave of arrests and deportations did take place on the eve of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. In the Baltic states, in Bessarabia⁴⁷ as well as in Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia,⁴⁸ many thousands were deported on the nights of June 20 and 21, 1941. This onslaught was no doubt the reaction of Soviet nervousness in view of the deteriorating relations with Germany.

The elimination by various means of hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the Eastern part of former Poland was no accident, nor was it a marginal phenomenon of the Sovietization of the area. Rather, it constituted an integral part of the absorption of the acquired territory into the USSR. The Soviet government saw these lands as the first front line in case of a possible German attack. Hence the accelerated pace of Sovietization. The arrests, transfers, and deportations were an integral part of the social, economic, politi-

⁴⁵ Y.V., A-73-1204; B-56-757; G-13-705; also: *Pinsk*, p. 313; *Lederman*, pp. 130-131.

⁴⁶ Y.V., B-56-756; SH-71-762; *Pinsk*, p. 369; T. Fuks, *A Vanderbung Iber Ukupirte Gebitn* (A Wandering in Occupied Regions), (Buenos-Aires, 1947), p. 81; *Lederman*, pp. 135-142.

⁴⁷ *Redlich*, p. 73.

⁴⁸ *Sefer Lida* (Tel Aviv, 1970), p. 278; *Pinsk*, p. 320; *Ianov*, p. 225; *Shohochin*, pp. 76-78. The witness maintained that dozens of convoys with deportees from all parts of Eastern Poland reached Minsk on June 22, 1941.

cal, and, not least, ethnic reconstruction of the annexed area, designed to ensure control over the submissiveness of the population.

The higher degree of arrests and deportations that ravaged the Jewish population resulted from considerations that had little to do with any overt opposition on the part of the Jews. In treating the Jews as everyone else, or worse, the Soviet authorities were short-sighted in failing to recognize that in view of the mortal Nazi threat to them, the Jews were probably among the most loyal supporters of the regime. The deportation of the Jewish refugees was at bottom a deplorable testimony to the inability of the Soviet authorities to deal with a human problem by any means other than its purge apparatus. It is an irony of history, however, that those Jews who were deported into the interior of the USSR were the largest group of Polish Jewry saved during the Holocaust.

BOOK REVIEWS

UKRAINE IN THE SEVENTIES. Edited by Peter J. Potichnyj. Papers and Proceedings of the McMaster Conference on Contemporary Ukraine, October, 1974. Mosaic Press, Oakville, Ont. Canada, 1975, 355 p.

The present volume is an array of papers delivered in October, 1974, at the McMaster Conference on Contemporary Ukraine, the eighth conference of an annual series at that university dealing with various aspects of Soviet and East European studies, and the first conference ever held in North America to be dedicated exclusively to the problems of Ukraine. The success of the conference is attested to by this impressive volume, whose editor, Prof. Peter J. Potichnyj, was Conference and Program Chairman.

The wealth of information and data is compressed into six principal sections: a) resource developments, including two sub-sections on forests in Ukraine and the utilization of renewable resources of Ukraine; b) economics: the present state of cybernetics and republic-level economic planning; c) sociology and demography: current sociological research in Ukraine and the growth and redistribution of the Ukrainian population in Russia and the USSR (1897-1970); d) Non-Ukrainian nationalities: the social and political roles of the Jews and Russians in Ukraine and problems of Ukrainian identity in the USSR; e) party, state, society: the status of the Ukrainian Republic under the Soviet federation; the Communist Party of Ukraine after 1966; the ruling party organs of Ukraine; Shelest and his period in Soviet Ukraine, 1963-1972: a revival of controlled Ukrainian Autonomism and the nature and sources of dissidence in Ukraine; and, finally, f) Ukrainian studies in the West: problems and prospects.

This rich material, had it included a paper on the religious situation in Ukraine, would have caught the totality of Ukrainian life under the Soviet Russian domination. But even with this important omission (a reference to "religious dissidence" is made in Prof. Julian Birch's paper) the book still is one of the most complete and data-packed works on Ukraine in English in recent years. It is the product of some thirty-seven specialists from Canada, the United States and Europe (the two from Europe are Prof. Julian Birch of Sheffield University, England, and Dr. Borys Lewytzkyj, Ukrainian authority on Communism, of Munich, Germany). Twenty of them are Ukrainian scholars from various colleges and universities in Canada and the United States.

Some parts and chapters of the book are interesting and illuminating even for scholars, such as the rise and fall of Peter Shelest, Ukrainian-Jewish relations, the Russian ethnic element in Ukraine, and the struggle of Ukrainians in other parts of the USSR to realize their ethnic and cultural identity.

Of especial importance is the sixth part of the book, in which four noted scholars (one American and three Ukrainians) assess the progress and the

eventual prospects of Ukrainian studies in the West, especially in Canada and the United States.

In his "Opening Remarks," Prof. A.N. Bourns, president and vice-chancellor of McMaster University, tells why the Ukrainian studies will grow in Canada:

"Some of our non-Canadian guests may not fully appreciate the extent to which cultures other than English or French have contributed to Canadian life. Canada is not the 'melting pot' which some have claimed the United States to be. On the contrary, it is an intricate ethnic as well as social mosaic, in which the Ukrainian community occupies a prominent position.

"Ukrainians constitute a sizeable proportion of the population in a number of regions of Canada, and interest in Ukrainian culture has flourished across the country in recent years. There are few Universities from Montreal westwards which do not offer courses in Ukrainian language or culture, and Ukrainian language is now being introduced as an elective in quite a few high schools in Canada...

"At the same time one must note the intrinsic significance of Ukraine and some 40 million Ukrainians in the economics, politics and culture of the Soviet Union..."

In his "Preface," Prof. Potichnyj reveals that although the Conference Committee at McMaster University sent formal invitations to several scholars in Ukraine, none accepted; in fact, no responses were received. But the conference itself was lampooned in *Perets* (Pepper), a satirical Ukrainian review in Kiev (November 22, 1974), while *Radyanska Ukraina* (January 31, 1975), an organ of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, ridiculed the conferees as people "sitting on the icebergs of the Cold War."

Finally, it is gratifying that the editor should have eliminated the definite article "the" before Ukraine in all scripts, a practice still followed by many Western scholars and writers. The regrettable inference of this "tradition" is that Ukraine, rather than a nation, is some vague region or even geographical oddity.

Ukraine in the Seventies is a valuable contribution to the English-language literature on Ukrainian studies.

New York, N.Y.

WALTER DUSHYNCK

THE BICENTENNIAL SALUTE TO THE CAPTIVE NATIONS 1976. House Document No. 94-664, 95th Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 123.

It is not customary practice for one who has contributed to a book to assume the task of reviewing it. Clearly, that would be loading the deck. But this is not the conventional type of review. Questions of evaluation, merits and faults are left entirely to the reader to answer once he or she has perused the work, as a good citizen who has paid for its publication should. The content of this review is purely descriptive and explanatory, exposing the reader to what, factually, is another addition to our national archives.

This Bicentennial work is devoted to the captive nations not solely for humanitarian reasons but also strategic ones in terms of the present global struggle. The work was made possible on the basis of a Congressional resolution, H. Res. 1513, which toward the close of the 94th Congress this reviewer authored and both Representatives John H. Dent and Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania submitted.

The resolution would have been considered favorably in the Senate, but time was short and the same purpose could be achieved through the House route. Over 7,000 copies were printed, and each Senator received at least five copies. Despite the ever-present cries of economy when it comes to publication costs and the time squeeze, Congressman John Brademas saw the historical value of this product and was most instrumental in the passage of the resolution.

As a consequence of all this, the work had to be selective and yet contain all the necessary essentials for the reader's knowledge and understanding of the captive nations and their basic relationship to our national security and world peace. In addition to being a Bicentennial product, this book may also be viewed as a sequel to the volume on *The Tenth Anniversary of the Captive Nations Week Resolution 1959-1969*, similarly published by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1969. Another aspect for one's perspective is that this and the earlier work can serve as basic reference sources governing Captive Nations Week, which in light of meaning and substance extends far beyond the mere observance of the Week. Also, the printing and binding of the book were just about completed on the very eve of the 19th Observance of the Week. Months were literally spent in the careful preparation of the book and, as Congressman Flood, the Dean of Pennsylvania's legislators, points out in his foreword to the work, he and his colleagues express grateful thanks "to Miss Vera A. Dowhan, Executive Secretary of the National Captive Nations Committee, for all the compilation, typing, indexing and proofreading that it entailed." In the midst of heavy publication competition on the part of an unusually busy 95th Congress, the coordinative contributions of Mr. Ben Guthrie in the House Clerk's area were also quintessential.

The neatly bound work highlights at the outset our Statue of Liberty. After the title page the text of the affording resolution appears, followed by Congressman Flood's foreword. The tenor of his foreword can be gleaned from its opening passage. "You, as a concerned American rightly interested in the foreign policy, goals and permanent security of our Nation, might ponder the following questions before you scan this unusual volume." He continues, "As appears so often in our media, is the Soviet Union for you just Russia? Well, my friend, you couldn't even find 'Russia' as such on any authoritative or official map, whether produced here or in the Soviet Union." He asks further, "How do you define 'Eastern Europe?' Up to the borders of the Soviet Union, as some of our pundits do? A little geographical knowledge will disclose that the Ural Mountains have always divided Europe from Asia." It is in this vein that the three-page foreword addresses itself to all the dominant myths circulating in this country about the Soviet Union.

The table of contents quickly shows the scope and range of the work. In addition to the parts covered above, the full text of Public Law 86-90: Captive Nations Week Resolution is provided. Anyone who has dealt with this subject over the years cannot but express amazement as to the relatively few opinion-makers in this country who really know the contents of this law. Time and time again the reviewer has had to review its contents for inquirers from Government, the media, academia and other spheres of our society. Now, in this work, as indeed in the '69 product, they have it handily available to them and can read and re-read it as the occasion demands it. It is not so amazing, however, that the new generation is largely unfamiliar with the law. But, as experience shows, once the young students and others are exposed to it, their interest is abysmal. In this respect, the work provides the necessary element of continuity.

Important, too, is the section devoted to "Presidential Proclamations in the 1970's." The 1969 production covered all the Presidential Proclamations from Eisenhower to Nixon's first term. This one presents the proclamations from 1970 through 1976 under the Nixon and Ford Administrations. What is the significance of these Presidential proclamations? Very simply, they represent a barometric reading of our foreign policy trends, chiefly in relation to our main enemy, imperialist Moscow itself. Many analysts have carefully examined the succession of these proclamations, and a chasmic difference in tone and content exists between the first Eisenhower proclamation and several of those following. After the second Presidential debate, when Ford gaffed on no Soviet Russian domination over Eastern Europe, the President tried to retrieve his position by constant public references to his '76 proclamation. Just read this proclamation, and you'll find it to be so general that it dilutes the resolution upon which it is supposedly based and predicated. Not an iota of reference can be found to the chief Soviet Russian aggressor. The belated proclamation by President Carter for the '77 Captive Nations Week has already been defined as an indicator of the first retreat on human rights and the survival of the Kissinger brand of detente. A comparative analysis of the Presidential proclamations facilitated this conclusion. It is worth one's while to read these proclamations. They compress in condensed text a multitude of events in a given Administration.

Following the Presidential proclamations is the "Established List of Captive Nations," with the justified sub-caption "The Captive Nations—Who's Next?." This widely circulated list covers all the captive nations under Communist domination. It extends back to 1920 with the first family of captive nations—Ukraine, Armenia, Byelorussia, etc.—progresses forward with the second family in the form of the Baltic nations in 1940, and successively traces the post-World War II family down to Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos in 1975. "Who's Next?" at this juncture? It could be Angola, Rhodesia, South Africa and others. What is important about this established list is the fact that it is precisely and firmly historically grounded. Many have attempted over the years to alter it according to their limited lights of the captive nations evolution, but the standard list continues to be generally accepted by virtue of its restraint and historical accuracy.

As an example, one legislator from the South saw fit in the recent furor over Carter's delayed proclamation to place Russia at the head of the list and Angola at the bottom. His motives were good, but his analytical judgment was poor. If he had bothered to read the Captive Nations Week Resolution, he would have seen that it is directed at Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. Yes, as has been stated so often, Russia is a captive nation, but not to any foreign, imperialistic force, rather to centuries of barbaric institutions crystallized best in the Bolshevik party of Lenin and its succession to the present. Analogous to this was the Germany under Hitler. The question of Angola is still unresolved, for the broad countryside is still in the control of anti-Communist forces. In short, the moral of all this is not to distort the CNL (Captive Nations List) by fleeting passions and careless appraisals.

The remainder of the work includes proclamations by Governors and Mayors throughout the United States—incidentally, at grass roots more powerful than the Presidential ones. Also included are equally powerful addresses in the Congress and in the public at large. The book is one of sharp contrasts and reflects more realistically than any other production the disparate views held in this de-

mocratic Republic. Plainly and with educational purpose, it is for the reader, a privileged citizen, to read the book and judge for himself. That is the purpose of the work.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

ENCYCLOPEDIA DIRECTORY OF ETHNIC NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS IN THE UNITED STATES. Second Edition. By Lubomyr R. Wynar and Anna T. Wynar. Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 1976, 248 p.

This is a revised and updated edition of the *Encyclopedic Directory of Ethnic Newspapers and Periodicals in the United States*, originally published by Libraries Unlimited in 1972. A new section of 17 entries on the multi-ethnic press is presented along with inclusion of publications of several ethnic groups previously not covered. Also some new titles have been added, at the same time several newspapers and periodicals have been dropped because they became defunct in the meantime.

The 977 ethnic publications listed include the title of each publication, translation of the title if it is not in English, year of origin, editorial address (including telephone number and name of editor), language or languages used in the publication, sponsoring organization, if any, circulation and frequency of appearance of publication, and a very brief annotation on the character of the publication. This constitutes the main part of the book, taking up pages 29-210. In the introductory article, the authors state that they mailed 1,455 questionnaires and received 1,095 responses, of which 182 were excluded for insufficient information. A listing of 64 titles was based on secondary information received from ethnic organizations.

"The survival of ethnic communities and ethnic life in the United States is largely a result of the continued existence of the ethnic press" that "maintains the ethos, or spirit, behind an ethnic way of life," state the authors. Therefore, they strongly recommend that historians writing on the American way of life should use the ethnic publications as a source of information concerning each of the ethnic groups in the United States. The ethnic press gives the organizational structure of each respective community and reliably indicates the process of development and the degree of its assimilation and acculturation.

The detailed statistical data on the status of the ethnic press in the United States as of 1976 disclose the presence of 50 dailies, 14 semi-weeklies, 237 weeklies 81 semi-monthlies, 267 monthlies, 68 bi-monthlies, 128 quarterlies, 25 semi-annuals, and 92 publications with other frequencies. These 960 publications in 52 languages have a total circulation of 9,063,362 copies. Besides, as mentioned above, there are 17 multi-ethnic publications. The single largest number of titles is published by the Jews, 141 in all with a circulation of 3,016,235. Although the Ukrainians are publishing 77 titles, their total circulation only amounts to 197,638. Historically, the first foreign-language publication in America was the German bi-monthly, *Die Philadelphische Zeitung*, published in Philadelphia by Benjamin Franklin in 1732. At present there are 60 German language publications with a combined circulation of 437,484. The single largest number of dailies published by any ethnic group is in Chinese, numbering 13, followed by seven dailies in Spanish,

six in Japanese, three each in German and Polish, and two each in Jewish, Korean, Lithuanian, Russian, Slovenian, and Ukrainian; single dailies are published by the Czechs, Greeks, Italians, and Magyars.

There is no doubt in the mind of this reviewer about the great informative value of the *Directory*. However, as in any publication, there are some shortcomings in the *Directory* the elimination of which would enhance its scholarly level. Unfortunately, for example, neither the authors nor the publisher adhered to the orthography of the various languages in which the entries are listed. Too many languages are used in this book for any single individual to handle adequately; therefore, consultation would have been advisable. Not being qualified to analyze entries in many of the used languages, this reviewer will limit his comments to a few Central and East European languages within his expertise.

Anyone familiar with the Czech, Magyar, or Slovak languages knows well that the so-called *long* or *stressing* vowels constitute integral parts of these languages. The vowels *a*, *e*, *i*, *y* have specific meaning in the Czech and Slovak orthography as distinguished from simple *a*, *e*, *i*, *y*. Special sounds are expressed in Czech by *ě*, and in Slovak by *ä* as opposed to simple *e* and *a*, respectively. It is not of lesser consequence in the Magyar language to distinguish between *a* and *á*, *e* and *é*, *u* and *ú* as compared with simple *u*, and *o* and *ó* as compared with *o*. There are at least 26 such mistakes in the Czech titles listed, 27 in Magyar, and 13 in Slovak.

The value of this *Directory* would have been elevated had the authors and the publisher listed the Bulgarian, Byelorussian, Russian, Serbian, and Ukrainian titles in their original Cyrillic alphabet. Hopefully, the authors will not ignore these details in their third edition in order to observe scholarly prerequisite for such a multi-lingual directory. Nevertheless, the *Encyclopedic Directory of Ethnic Newspapers and Periodicals in the United States* remains a very useful handbook to all interested in any of the many fields of ethnic studies in the United States.

Drexel University

PETER G. STERCHO

ZWIĄZEK RADZIECKI: ZARYS GEOGRAFII EKONOMICZNEJ REGIONÓW
(The Soviet Union: An Outline of the Economic Geography of the Regions).
By Andrzej Maryanski. State Economic Publishing House, Warsaw, 1975,
460 pp.

This is a practical handbook dealing with the demographic and economic problems of the Soviet Union. Although all the sources, we may assume, derive from Soviet publications, the author cites some very interesting and accurate-sounding information on the ethnic composition of the Soviet Union.

We learn that over 75% of the population of the USSR belong to the Slavic linguistic group, comprising the three Eastern Slavic peoples: the Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Largest numerically are the Russians, 129 million strong, who make up 82% of the population of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federative Republic. In all other "union republics" the Russians constitute a minority and are to be found primarily in the cities. In the Baltic countries, one out of every five inhabitants is a Russian.

The second largest national group are the Ukrainians, 40.8 million in Ukraine and 5.5 million without. Of the latter, 3.3 million live in the Russian Re-

public (in the steppe zone, the Northern Caucasus, the Volga area) with the rest in Kazakhstan, the Far East (descendants of XIXth century agricultural colonization), and in other union republics.

The third largest Slavic people in the USSR are the Byelorussians, who number 9.1 million, most of whom live within the boundaries of their "republic."

According to the population census of 1970, the Russians numbered 129,015,000 with 99.8% naming the Russian language as their mother tongue. There were 40,753,200 Ukrainians (in Ukraine), of whom 85.7% declared Ukrainian to be their mother tongue. Of the total of 1,168,000 Poles only 32.5 still regarded Polish as their mother tongue. In the same year 13 million non-Russians reportedly used Russian as their primary language.

Because Poles are dispersed throughout the USSR, they are subject to rapid assimilation, as attested to by the systematic decrease of their numbers and also by the decrease in percentage declaring Polish as their mother tongue. For instance, in 1959 a total of 1,380,000 persons recognized themselves as Poles with 45.2% using Polish; in the latest census that percentage fell to 32.5%. The percentage is even lower among those Poles who live in Ukraine and Byelorussia.

In terms of population and economic potential, the Ukrainian SSR occupied second place among the union republics. Its territory encompasses 603,700 sq. kms., on which 40.8 million people lived in the census year.

The territory of Ukraine embraces three large economic regions: the South-western, the Donets-Dnieper and the Southern. Of all the regions, the South-western region is the most ethnically Ukrainian (87.8% of its population).

Here are some statistical data on the regions and subregions of Ukraine.

Lviv Oblast: The Ukrainians constitute 88.8% of the population; Russians—8.4%; Poles—1.7%, and Jews—1.1%. After the war some 200,000 Russians settled in the *oblast*, mostly in Lviv and other cities. There are only 42,000 Poles in Lviv, whose population now is 553,000, 70% of whom are Ukrainians. Before 1939 Lviv had only 312,000 people.

Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast: 95.5% of the population are Ukrainians, 3.7% are Russians, 0.5% are Poles and 0.3% are Jews.

Ternopol Oblast: With its 96.4% of Ukrainians, it is the most densely Ukrainian *oblast* of Ukraine. Russians make up 2.3%, and there are only 15,000 Poles, who are diminishing rapidly owing to assimilation.

Volhynia Oblast: 95.4% here are Ukrainians, 4.1% Russians, and 0.5% Poles. As a result of "repatriation" the number of Poles in Volhynia has dwindled to 5,000.

Rivne Oblast: 95.2% Ukrainians, 4.2% Russians, 0.4% Poles, and 0.2% Jews.

Characteristic of the Zhytomyr *oblast* is the relatively large concentration of Poles (90,000), constituting 5.6% of the *oblast* population. These Poles are the descendants of the Polish colonizers of the XVIth and XVIIth centuries. Largely of peasant stock, they consider the Ukrainian language as their mother tongue although at the same time they claim their Polish nationality. They are mostly to be found on the intermediate course of the Sluch River and in the areas around Baranivka and Dovbysh.

Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, has 1,631,900 inhabitants; it is the third largest city in the USSR. Its population comprises 64.8% Ukrainians, 22.9% Russians, and 9.3% Jews, plus a sprinkling of other nationalities, such as Byelorussians and Poles (8,000). Since 1960 Kiev has had a subway 10 kms. (about six-mi.) long.

The population of the Donets-Dnieper region is the most urbanized segment of the population (it comprises 70.3% of the total urban population). The nationality composition of the Donets and Voroshilovohrad *oblasts* (7,643,000) is mostly Ukrainian and Russian (52%, and 41%, respectively). In the Donets *oblast* live 94,000 almost totally assimilated Greeks, descendants of the Greek colonists of the XVIIIth century. In 1970 only 5.7% of them named Greek as their mother tongue. The rest have taken to Russian.

Kharkiv (pop. 1,222,900) is the second largest city of Ukraine, accommodating two-thirds of the population of the Kharkiv *oblast*.

In the Poltava and Sumy *oblasts* the Ukrainians constitute 90% of the population; the remainder are Russians.

In the Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad and Zaporizhia *oblasts* Ukrainians account for 74% of the population. In the flatlands adjacent to the Sea of Azov, there exist sizeable concentrations of Bulgarians and Moldavians.

In the eastern part of the Black Sea flatlands Ukrainians make up 80%, while in the Odessa *oblast* the Russians mostly live in the cities. The western (Bessarabian) part of the Odessa *oblast* is spotted with numerous clusters of Bulgarians and Moldavians. In the Black Sea flatlands before World War II, there lived some 300,000 Germans, especially in the area of Odessa, but most of them have since gone, either through deportation by the Soviet government during World War II or retreating with the German armies in 1934-44. In the western part of the Odessa *oblast*, between the deltas of the Dniester and Danube Rivers, there is a great melange of peoples: Russians, Moldavians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Jews, among others.

In the Crimea—which was "given" to Ukraine in 1954 by Moscow (on the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav)—the Russians constitute 67.3% of the population, the Ukrainians only 26.5%.

The book, in addition to describing various union republics, contains a great deal of information and statistical data on the economic growth of Ukraine and other "republics" and their exploitation by White as well as Red Russia. Some of the statistical data on the population of Ukraine have undergone considerable changes, according to the 1976 edition of *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1975 g.* (National Economy of the USSR in 1975, pp. 10-32). For example, by 1976 the population of Ukraine had risen to 49,075,000, and the populations of Kiev, Kharkiv and Lviv to 2,013,000, 1,385,000 and 629,000, respectively.

New York, N.Y.

ROMAN S. HOLIAT

A THEORY OF CONFLICT. By Brian Crozier, Scribners, 1974, 245 pp.

Mr. Crozier is co-founder of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, and author of many biographies and works on Communism. This book is a study of revolutionary conflict or rebellion, the internal challenge to the security of the state. He deals with Allende in Chile, Vietnam, Ulster, Greece and the Tupamaros of Uruguay. The price of revolution is exorbitantly high, Mr. Crozier argues, and the onus is on the revolutionaries to prove the value of their utopias. Crozier chides democratic governments who fail to act promptly and decisively against revolutionaries. The book is dedicated "to the victims of Revolution the world over."

The case histories presented are analyzed within the framework of five axioms: 1) Man is innately envious and aggressive; 2) His nature is not subject to change; 3) His behavior, however, is susceptible to change, either for the better or for the worse; 4) He has an overwhelming need for order; 5) Human progress is dependent upon free inquiry.

In revolutionary conflict and its strategic consequences, no compromise is ultimately possible, although expediency or temporary disadvantage may dictate a tactical cease-fire or an interim "settlement," or limited agreements in which neither side suffers to excess. What is at stake, writes Crozier, "is the survival of civilization." The case is not altered by pointing to the imperfections of that civilization, to the cruelties that may still be practiced or endured in countries that belong to it, onto the distance between aspiration and achievement; for, says the author, "the imperfections, the cruelties and the shortcomings are inherent in Man's nature and his evolutionary inheritance."

Writing in 1974, Crozier states: "However much those who live in democratic societies may disapprove of certain aspects of life in contemporary Spain, Greece and Portugal, they too belong to the civilised stream, along with Scandinavia, the United States, Brazil and Australia and all other States deeply touched by Roman law, English common law or Christianity, however residual."

The alternative proposed is the "long night of totalitarianism," whether the revolutionaries win or sovereign States allow their freedom to be eroded to the advantage of a totalitarian super-Power. "Between the imperfect present, flawed but correctible, and the irreversible future, there can be no compromise, and there should be no hesitation. The point is not to resolve the conflict but to win." All who adopt the neutralist stance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, equating the two in the interests of a hypothetical "conflict resolution," stand condemned of selling the past, according to Crozier. Equally, those who wish to compromise with the terrorists and fanatics who threaten a way of life from within are accepting the unacceptable. The internal enemy can be defeated, he says, although it "may be beyond the present power of the West, under nuclear stalemate, to defeat the external enemy." Societies unwilling to defend themselves against the internal revolutionary threat or insufficiently resistant to it, "were likely to find themselves incapable of standing up to the mixture of threats and blandishments with which the Soviet Union conducted its foreign policy."

Crozier's analysis of the young revolutionaries of the West in the late sixties is superb: "... these developments amounted to the advent of new forms of barbarism." Liberal adults, who had furiously attacked the violence of Nazi youth, defended that of the left revolutionaries in America, and western Europe. "Perhaps most startling of all," writes Crozier, "the most startling example of moral decay, disorientation and collapsed self-confidence was the decision of the World Council of Churches in 1970 to support terrorism in Africa." And with the declining acceptance "of the moral authority of the churches went a corresponding decline in the authority of elders in general, whether parents or teachers."

By removing the sense of personal moral responsibility, by ascribing all guilt to neurosis and all neurosis to the frustrated sex drive, the Freudian school of psychology powerfully contributed to the decline of moral standards. By challenging the moral authority of the churches and of established society, and by introducing the class struggle and the concept of collective guilt, Marxism in all its phases powerfully contributed to discontent and to conflict. The

author quotes Lord Halsbury: "What revolutionary movements have achieved... from 1789 to the present day is the wrecking of Western society by envy, malice and guilt."

In his final chapter entitled "The Reduction of Conflict," the author proposes remedies for the following: 1) the encouragement of hate, 2) violence and pornography, 3) the alienation of the industrial worker in the technological age, 4) the decline in public and private morality. Here Crozier is on less sure grounds. He would restrict pornography to "combat zones" as in Boston, and would require TV stations to show violence and sex only in the late hours to spare the children.

The first duty of government, according to Crozier, is to maintain order and guarantee the physical safety of the citizens and then property. This "is best done through due process of law." But if the law enforcement agencies fail, "then the armed forces... must be the ultimate resort." He cites certain European countries where due process seems to be breaking up under pressure from the revolutionaries and as a result of liberal permissiveness.

Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy* should be required reading for all citizens, in Crozier's view. His thesis was that "free institutions and democracy were conceived and established by men who adhered to a public philosophy"; that modern democracies have abandoned it; and that they cannot hope to survive against the totalist counter-revolution until it is regained. "Essentially what Lippmann was writing about was a philosophy of civility, the notion that the public good transcends individual or sectarian interests."

The author concludes that "we shall not reverse the trend towards self-destruction until political leaders learn afresh the need, in their own enlightened self-interest, for a public philosophy." And, "we shall not produce public men imbued with the necessary spirit until we succeed in reversing the Jacobin and Marxist dominance of certain schools and certain faculties and the absence of a coherent public philosophy in those that are not so dominated."

Le Moyne College

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

MASTER OF SPIES. THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL FRANTISEK MORAVEC.

By Frantisek Moravec. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1975, pp. xx, 240.

It is unfortunate that the publisher should have decided to give this publication a title tending toward sensationalism, for the memoirs of the late General Moravec are soberly focused on the intelligence and counter-intelligence services, under Moravec's direction, in Czechoslovakia and then in England under the exiled President Benes. In this respect, the most important parts of the story are the several interesting revelations regarding Dr. Benes' attitudes on international relations, especially his inability to evaluate properly the Soviet game until it was too late.

Other intimate details are offered along the way. We learn, for instance, of "Benes, always correct, weighing every word, dry, scholastic, without any emotion, rarely smiling and never joking; Masaryk, emotional, fond of contact with common people, good-hearted, resentful of bureaucratic procedures, completely informal and never fussy about a salty word if it expresses his point..."

(pp. 151-152). Benes induced Moravec to arrange for Heydrich's assassination to overcome the criticism of the Allies for the lack of "meaningful resistance to the enemy" (p. 196). Or, "Benes had a number of mistaken beliefs and he would accept no proof to the contrary. He thought, for instance, that the war would be short, that he would be acceptable as President of the Communist Party, that the advancing Russian armies would not enter Czechoslovakia but would leave the Czechs and Slovaks to deal with the Germans on their own territory, and that Czechoslovakia, being on the border of the Russian sphere, would become the bridge for peaceful coexistence between East and West." (p. 229). Only after the Russians' behavior during the Polish uprising in Warsaw, and after their armies had invaded Ruthenia, "did Benes see at last what was to be expected from them in victory. But by then it was too late to change the line to which he had deeply committed himself." (p. 231). "When Benes went to Moscow for the second time conditions had already completely changed. He was now moving toward an inevitable destiny which he had prepared for himself and his people by his decision to put his faith into Soviet hands, to gamble on the veracity of the Soviets and the loyalty of the Czechoslovak Communists." (p. 232). He went to Moscow "without enthusiasm, with grave doubts. He tried to postpone his trip on the grounds that he was ill," but was forced to make it because of the Communist demand that a new government be set up on the soil of liberated Czechoslovakia. "He was already a sick man when he left London and his condition worsened after his return home. He suffered from spinal tuberculosis, arteriosclerosis and high blood pressure. His illness had a great influence on his mental disposition, which changed frequently and rapidly. One day he would be his normal self, composed, quiet, methodical and full of optimism. Another day he would be depressed, irresolute, indifferent and devoid of energy—and his views changed accordingly." (p. 236).

We also learn that contrary to Churchill's claim, Marshal Tukhachevsky's "treason" was not reported by Benes. (pp. 48ff.).

The memoirs were prepared for publication by his son, Hanoyi Moravec Disher (where does "Disher" come from?). His father's memory was the only source of the narrative here. "He had total recall, and he cultivated his memory as a useful, indeed necessary, tool of his trade," but he was unable to bring any official documents out of Czechoslovakia with him after the Communist takeover.

The book in no way replaces numerous other studies of the career and life of Benes—and there are hardly any references to them here. But it raises numerous points which will have to be noted and referred to by future students of Benes and his role in Soviet-Allied relations. (Too bad that there is no index.)

City University of New York (Ret.)

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

THE UKRAINIAN TRANSLATION OF SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS. A Stylish Analysis by Orysia Prokopiw. University of Ottawa Ukrainian Studies, No. 2. Constantine Bida, editor. The University of Ottawa Press & Gateway Publishers, Ottawa-Edmonton, 1976, Pp. 334.

Professor C. Bida, a Shakespearian scholar and President of the Ukrainian Shakespeare Society established in 1957 in Heidelberg, Germany, has pub-

ished a new work in the field of Ukrainian Shakespeariana, this time not his own but a doctoral dissertation which he supervised at the University of Ottawa in 1974.

The authoress of this work, Mrs. Orysia Prokopiw, has comprehensively analyzed the texts of Shakespeare's sonnets as rendered by the following Ukrainian translators: Ivan Franko (1882, 1884, 1907, a.o.), Pavlo Hrabovsky (1900), Maksym Slavinsky and later Vasyl Onufriyenko, Yar Slavutych, Oleh Zuyevsky, Ihor Kostetsky, T. Savych, Ostap Tarnavsky, Sviatoslav Hordynsky, Svyatoslav Karavansky and the complete anthology by D. Palamarchuk: *Vilyam Shespir: Sonety*. Kiev: Dnipro, 1966.

Among the most valuable aspects of O. Prokopiw's work is her comparative method of examining the translations vis-a-vis the Shakespearian originals, the analysis of content and form in the individual authors and the subtle perception and assessment of the positive and negative renderings of Shakespeare's ideas by the Ukrainian translators. It is also the first attempt in Ukrainian Shakespeariana to evaluate the evolution of the authors who assumed the difficult task of conveying the world of ideas, feelings and experiences of that great English poet and dramatist.

The study itself, written in English, is composed of a historical examination of Ukrainian translations, a discussion of general sonnetic "structure," an analysis of "rhetorical figures" and their "characterization" (with special reference to sonnets 18, 130, 60, 46, 29 and 11), conclusions, bibliography, transliterations and an index of names. As already noted, the authoress places special emphasis in her study upon comparative stylistic analysis and this has given her the best results.

In the field of Shakespearian scholarship this work appears to be sufficiently well founded and scholarly sound, and in several aspects has significance not only for the specific problems of English-Ukrainian translations of Shakespearian sonnets, but provides material for general theoretical problems such as that advanced by the present reviewer at the XII International Congress of the International Federation for Modern Languages and Literatures (*Fédération Internationale des Language et Litteratures Modernes*), held at the University of Cambridge in 1972. It refers to the problem as to what extent can a translation be treated as a "bilingual creativity," and what relationship exists between the deep and surface structures of the same or two different literary creators. This work by O. Prokopiw, therefore, provides valuable and unique material for further research in this and other general theoretical problematic areas.

It is gratifying to note that this new publication is one of the volumes from the "University of Ottawa Ukrainian Studies" series edited by Prof. C. Bida and sponsored by the Iwachniuk Studies and Research Fund at the University of Ottawa together with Gateway Publishers Ltd. of Edmonton.

The Ottawa Center of Ukrainian Studies has not only merited a long tradition of studies and publishing activity, e.g. *Kobzar*, 1840-1961, *Poesie du Quebec Contemporain* in Ukrainian translation, 1968, but initiated in 1976 the publication of a series of scholarly works in Ukrainian Studies under the auspices of the University of Ottawa Press. Mrs. O. Prokopiw's work is one of the initial volumes of this series, the others now being in print or in various stages of preparation for publication.

TO DEFEND THESE RIGHTS; HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET UNION.

By Valery Chalidze. Translated from the Russian by Guy Daniels. New York: Random House, 1974; pp. 340. Dedicated to Andrei Tverdokhlebov, a founding member of the Moscow Human Rights Committee.

The author is a co-founder of the Moscow Human Rights Committee, editor of the fifteen issues of a clandestine "samizdat" journal called *Social Problems*, and an active defender of human rights and civil liberties in the Soviet Union. Upon coming to the USA in 1972 to lecture at Georgetown University, he was deprived of his Soviet citizenship and refused re-entry into the Soviet Union. He now lives in New York. He is editing a bimonthly journal, *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*.

The book *To Defend These Rights* is a presentation of his struggle for human rights in the Soviet Union and for the securing of personal freedom for every individual in the USSR. He helped defend the persecuted in the USSR within the framework of the Soviet law and the Soviet constitution. In this book the author presents special cases of Soviet law and the USSR's position regarding the international conventions of human rights. The Soviet restrictions placed upon freedom of speech and publication, discrimination against religious, social and national minorities, and restriction of movement are thoroughly depicted, including the treatment of prisoners in the Soviet penal system of concentration camps and mental institutions. Condemned is hunger as a method of reeducation of the inmates and the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes in the USSR. He recounts his own experiences as a Soviet dissenter.

His work is to be regarded as an important analysis of the USSR in the last decade. It provides the real picture of Soviet political power and its system of political oppression and exploitation. This book has a preface, eight chapters, and twelve appendices, notes and an index. On page 56, in the notes, it explains the aims of the "Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights" and the "Moscow Human Rights Committee." It also mentions the Ukrainian dissenters' movement, whose activities are aimed at the defense of Ukrainian national rights and against the forced Russification of Ukraine's educational and cultural heritage and institutions. On page 128 is mentioned the illegal detention of Ukrainian intellectuals during the period of preliminary investigations. On page 297 is mentioned the Ukrainian intellectual dissident Leonid Plyushch, who was committed to a lunatic asylum for his appeal to the UN on the violation of human rights in the USSR.

This work will help the Western world better understand the Soviet Union's political system and to see it as it is the Red Russian Soviet Imperialist system, the last existing colonial power in our times.

Senior Librarian
Brooklyn Public Library

ALEXANDER SOKOLYSZYN

U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE: PAST AND FUTURE. By Vladimir Petrov. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1975. 60 pp.

RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES AND DETENTE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY. By Jeffrey Simon. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1975. 314 pp.

Professor Petrov of George Washington University makes a subjective appraisal of detente as he feels it is perceived by the Soviets. He recognizes that

"a common American view notwithstanding, Soviet-American detente does not signify the end of the adversary relationship between the U.S. and the USSR." Theoretically, at least, resort to negotiations does imply that there will be self-restraint and continuous and active diplomatic intercourse, Petrov feels.

Petrov does not deal with the issue of whether detente is "good" or "bad" for the United States, or whether its illusions should be pursued more vigorously, less vigorously, or at all. He does argue for what he describes as "maximum" realism in appraising our own strengths and weaknesses as well as those of the adversary, and of the international environment in general." Petrov's assessment is that barring the turmoil of a major economic depression in the West, the Soviets will continue to strengthen themselves via a detente policy, continually modifying it to take advantage of new opportunities for exploitation of Western weakness but firmly avoiding any direct confrontation with the United States which they feel would result in war.

Professor Simon (Georgetown University) assembles documents on detente from Russia, China and the satellite countries as backup for his introductory analysis of selected documents of ruling Communist parties throughout the world. He identifies three views among the ruling Communist parties as to what detente means. He argues that what whereas public attention has been focused on detente with the Soviet Union and Red China, more might be achieved if the U.S. reexamined its relations with some of the smaller ruling Communist parties.

Simon's objective is to provide documents which provide a better perspective of the views of ruling Communist parties. These are introduced by a consideration of the history of Communist studies, illustrating how paradigms and their assumptions affect the conclusions of those who apply them, and illustrating the evolution of guiding American perceptions of Communism.

The author sees three general approaches emerging from the cold war period which were applied to American relations with the Soviet Union. *Containment* is said to have laid the basis of postwar American policy. These advocates assert a position of so-called containment of Soviet outward movement, arguing against any effective action at weakening the Soviets. *Liberalization* theory argues for inhibition of an American response to Soviet pressures. The *counterforce strategy*, said to be championed by John Foster Dulles, rejects accommodation to a fundamentally immoral totalitarian regime which is not susceptible to reform or gradual moderation of its policy. A second assumption of counterforce strategy is the recognition that the Soviet Union's coercive control over its diverse nationalities internally and its satellites externally could be exploited as a major vulnerability. Advocates of counterforce strategy broadly see containment as defeatist and liberalization as capitulation.

Simon feels that the world order which emerged at the end of World War II is breaking down and that we are moving into an indeterminate future wherein "the future course of behavior of the ruling CPs is open and unpredictable" and that detente has contributed to demise of the bipolar norm. Simon contends that any artificial adherence to the deterministic policies of the cold war era and the paradigm of rigid bipolarity will blind policymakers to the areas of flexibility and opportunity in a changing world. Certainly, Western policymakers should not be blind to any flexibility and opportunity to promote counterforce strategy (which is not what Simon means); however, the effort to build policy on an illusion that Communism is something other than an evil which does not become modi-

fied of its essential character over time and changing circumstances and altered surface reflections is probably guaranteed to be less desirable from a moral, practical, humanitarian, peace-fostering perspective than a rigid policy of charade detente.

Jackson, Mississippi

TOMMY W. ROGERS

UKRAINIANS IN PENNSYLVANIA. A Contribution to the Growth of the Commonwealth. Published by the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of Philadelphia, Editor-in-chief Alexander Lushnycky; cover design—Tanya Krawciw. Philadelphia, 1976, 134 p.

On the occasion of the observances of the bicentennial of the American Revolution in 1976 many U.S. ethnic communities have published accounts of their respective contributions to the growth and development of America. These accounts have appeared in various state and municipal journals, program books and special brochures, including publications on Ukrainian immigrants in the United States.

Ukrainians in Pennsylvania is the second known work dealing with Ukrainian immigrants on a state level, the first being *Ukrainians in Texas*, by Victor Balaban and Bohdan Hirka (cf. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Spring 1977, p. 69). The book is a compilation of the work of several authors, who dwell on such topics as Ukraine and Ukrainians in general, Ukrainians in the United States, Ukrainians in Pennsylvania, Ukrainians in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, Ukrainian social, fraternal, and professional organizations and associations, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian churches (Catholic, Orthodox, Baptist), as well as of articles dealing with Ukrainian schools, press, architecture, fine arts, music, folk art, theater, Ukrainian women's organizations and Ukrainian sports.

An impressive number of authors, all of whom are acknowledged specialists in their respective fields, toiled on this project that was initiated by the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of Philadelphia under the chairmanship of Dr. Ivan Skalchuk, who contributed a foreword to the book. They include (in the order of their articles in the book) Lew Shankowsky, Alexander Lushnycky, Natalia Pazuniak, Michael Elko, Peter G. Stercho, Michael Komichak, Rev. Ronald Peter Popivchak, Ivan Korovytsky, Rev. Leon Zabko-Potapovich, A. Vlasenko-Bojcun, Olie Cherniavsky, Wolodymyr Kyveliuk, Roman Shwed, Mary Hanusey, Andrii V. Szul, Stephanie Pushkar and Nadia Diakun.

The book also includes three appendices: Ukrainian Organizations in Pennsylvania, a directory of Ukrainian institutions in Philadelphia and a Bicentennial Calendar of Events (1976), plus an array of illustrations.

Some of the photographs offer nostalgic testimony to the presence of Ukrainians in America as early as the 1880's—examples: the St. Nicholas Ukrainian Brotherhood (Shenandoah, 1885), the "Boyan" Ukrainian choir (Shamokin, 1894), and a Ukrainian band (Shamokin, 1894); a picture of an early Ukrainian family, Andrew and Anna Andrejczyn and their baby daughter Mary, who settled in Pittsburgh in 1890; the first Ukrainian school in Pittsburgh (1901); the mastheads of *America*, Ukrainian Catholic newspaper, the first issue of which

appeared on August 15, 1886, in *Shenandoah*, and of *Svoboda* of June 19, 1895, published in Shamokin. There are two photographs of young Ukrainian men in the U.S. Army: Denis Labovsky of Olyphant and Fedko Kochan of Shamokin, both of whom served during the Spanish-American war, with Labovsky also seeing service in Cuba, China and the Philippines.

The author had the usual plaguing difficulty with statistics on the Ukrainians. According to the Federal Census of 1970, some 49,239 persons in Pennsylvania claimed the Ukrainian language as their mother tongue. But in 1975, a survey of Ukrainian communities in the state was carried out on behalf of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee. The survey was based on questionnaires sent out to Ukrainian community leaders and their organizations, and to all the churches (Catholic, Orthodox and Baptist) as well. The response indicated that the actual number of Ukrainian residents in Pennsylvania was at least 105,116. But even this number seems to be too small if we take into consideration the fact that Ukrainians, unlike other European immigrants, settled *en masse* in the latter part of the 1870's in Pennsylvania and at that time were not uniformly classified by the U.S. immigration authorities. They were variously registered under such names as Ruthenians, Rusnaks, Rusyns, Little Russians, Carpathians, and even Greeks (based on their Greek Catholic rite). Even today, some descendants of these first Ukrainian settlers still insist on calling themselves by the traditionally older names. Some of them have been absorbed by other ethnic communities, all contributing to the confusion and obfuscation in the calculation of the precise number of Ukrainians not only in Pennsylvania but in other states as well.

All in all, the book (except for its unimaginative square format) is a reliable source on Ukrainian life in Pennsylvania for those students of demography and the social-cultural mosaic which is the United States, described by Walt Whitman as "not merely a nation but a teeming Nation of Nations."

New York, N.Y.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

A DECLARATION ON THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM*

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following statement appeared in the May, 1977 issue of *Kultura*, a Polish-language intellectual and literary review published in Paris, France.

In this declaration which we announce, considering it to be a further and important step forward in the cooperation of emigres from the East, a secondary matter—one even obscuring the essence—would be an analysis of similarities and differences between Russian imperialism of the past century and contemporary Soviet imperialism. The essence of the matter is imperialism itself. This is so regardless of whatever embodiment in which it manifests itself, by what it is motivated and under what mask and in what historical circumstances it exists. Nor can we afford not to mention the injustices inflicted on Ukraine on the part of centuries-old Polish imperialism.

Regardless of its forms, objectives and conditions, imperialism equally enslaves peoples who are its victims and equally poisons the people who are its agents. Stating that, one cannot neglect to mention one basic difference: in contrast to Czarist Russia, the Soviet Union is today the last colonial empire of the world, and sooner or later the general trend toward liberation must attack its anachronistic existence.

In the imperial structure of the USSR there exist two degrees of dependence: the status of "limited sovereignty" in the so-called people's democracies of Central-Eastern Europe, and the status of full non-sovereignty in the incorporated union republics. The Poles, Czechs or Hungarians have incomparably greater possibilities for preserving their national and cultural identity than do the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Baltic or the Islamic peoples. The first ones are subjected to the processes of Sovietization, but not as yet of Russification. The latter ones are being Sovietized and with every year intensifyingly Russified. The fates of both, however, are tightly connected: there will be no truly free Poles, Czechs or Hungarians without free Ukrainians, Byelorussians or Lithuanians. Nor, in the final analysis, without free Russians. Without Russians free of imperial ambitions, and who develop their own national life and respect the right of self-determination of other peoples.

We have placed the Ukrainians at the head of our declaration because they are the largest enslaved people in the USSR; and as a people the most determined, along with the Lithuanians, in their struggle for the establishment of an independent statehood. In any case, we want to create that situation in which they could express themselves as to an independent statehood.

In the course of almost a decade of the "thaw" under the reign of Khrushchev in Ukraine there are descendants of the "executed rebirth," those trying to

rebuild even partially what was destroyed in the times of Stalin. Then came the pogroms of Brezhnev, which have lasted to this day. But there is nothing to indicate that Ukraine has capitulated. On the contrary, Ukrainian patriots most densely populate the prisons and camps, while the resistance in Ukraine has become the synonym of national resistance in the empire.

Therefore, in announcing today this declaration, we pose for public opinion three problems. First is the Ukrainian problem itself. Secondly, the problem of other *national minorities* (which for some time now have constituted *national majorities* in the USSR), which aspire to self-determination and which wish to actualize the *right of secession*, guaranteed on paper by the Soviet constitution. And, thirdly, the problem of the imperial people, for whom it would be much better the sooner they understand that the liquidation of Soviet colonialism is also in their own interest, for it alone can prevent the threat of future mutual bloodshed.

We appeal with special stress to the Russian dissident movement in the USSR and the Russian political emigration for the strengthening and deepening of cooperation with the fighters for the independence of Ukraine.

Signers:

<i>Andrei Amalrik</i>	<i>Zbigniew Byrski</i>	<i>Tibor Mery</i>
<i>Vladimir Bukovsky</i>	<i>Jerzy Giedroyc</i>	(Editor of <i>Irodalmi Ujsag</i> ,
<i>Natalya Gorbanievskaya</i>	(Editor of the monthly	Hungarian literary re-
<i>Vladimir Maksimov</i>	<i>Kultura</i>)	view) (Hungarian)
(Editor of the quarterly	<i>Gustaw Herling-</i>	<i>Alexander Smolar</i>
<i>Kontinent</i>)	<i>Grudzinski</i>	<i>Pavel Tigrid</i>
<i>Viktor Nekrasov</i>	<i>Jozef Lobodowski</i>	(Editor of the quarterly
(Russians)	<i>Dominik Morawski</i>	<i>Svedectvi</i>)
	(Poles)	(Czechs)

* Cf. *Kultura* (Culture), No. 5/356, May, 1977, Paris, France.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1977," addresses by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood and others. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., July 20, 1977.

In a sense, the 1977 Captive Nations Week was unique by virtue of President Carter's double reversal on issuing a Presidential proclamation. This story is described elsewhere. Notwithstanding the hesitancy on the part of the White House, the 19th Observance was successfully conducted in the Congress. Representatives Daniel J. Flood and Edward J. Derwinski led the observance in the House of Representatives.

Congressman Flood stresses in his address the theme of human rights and the captive nations. As he states, "The cause of human rights is nowhere more applicable, more pressing and more noble than in the direction of the over 27 captive nations found in that vast imperio-totalitarian part of the world." He continues, "As massive evidence shows, no part of this globe represents a graver denial of human rights, including the right to national independence, than the Communist imperio-totalitarian world imprisoning the captive nations."

As in the case of other representatives, Congressman Flood incorporates into his statement the Captive Nations Week proclamations of Governor Meldrim Thomson, Jr. of New Hampshire and Governor William G. Milliken of Michigan. He also includes an excellent article by Andrew M. Greeley on "The Captive-Nation Caper" and the testimony on the Genocide Convention given recently by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The dozen and more addresses given this day make for exceptional, constructive reading.

"CARTER'S DESPERATE MOVES TO MAINTAIN DETENTE," a commentary. *Human Events*, The National Conservative Weekly, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1977.

Under a sub-caption "Almost Cancelled Captive Nations Week," this commentary presents so far the detailed story about the President's hesitancy to issue a Presidential proclamation of the 1977 Captive Nations Week. Also, under the photos of Dr. Dobriansky, Mr. Lee Edwards, and President Carter, the statement is made, "Without prodding by Prof. Dobriansky and Mr. Edwards, President Carter may well have completely ignored Captive Nations Week."

The story actually begins on May 9, when the first approach was made to the White House for the annual Presidential proclamation. The commentary traces the steps through the Office of Management and Budget, the State Department and the National Security Council. At first, a proclamation was being worked on, then at the last minute word was received that none was necessary since the President has already stated his views on human rights.

At this juncture a battle had to be fought with press releases, grass-roots protests, Congressional criticism, and an appropriate Observance discussion of the subject on July 20. As all this jelled and reporters' interest grew the White House by the morning of the 20th spread word that a proclamation would be issued. The commentary accurately describes all of this and more, and rightly concludes, "In other words, President Carter, who began his Administration with a relatively tough stance toward the Soviets on both human rights and SALT, now appears to be scurrying in retreat before Brezhnev's wrath. It may be the biggest retreat before the Russians since Napoleon's army escaped Moscow in the winter of 1812."

"UKRAINIAN ADVISES CARTER TO TELL BREZHNEV TO HIS FACE, 'STOP LYING'," an article by Flora Lewis. *The New York Times*, New York, July 28, 1977.

Geli Snehirev, a Ukrainian writer and film director, wrote a letter to President Carter urging him to face Brezhnev and tell him "Stop lying." The letter reached the West last March. Snehirev has also renounced his Soviet citizenship at the time the new draft constitution was announced. As he was returning his internal passport, he said "from beginning to end, your constitution is a lie."

In renouncing citizenship Snehirev also pointed out, "I don't want to remain a citizen of a state that has destroyed the elite of my Ukrainian people, the best part of the peasantry and the intelligentsia, that has denatured and slandered our past history and humiliated our present." There is no knowledge of the Ukrainian writer's whereabouts since the publication of his letters.

The letter to the President and his human rights crusade states in part, "You were insisting on the truth. If you yield, the monstrosity will take over the world." The dissident also urges Carter, "Flex your muscles and exert your will. Do not listen to cowardly advice. Let the cowards crawl under the table, let them tremble and wait, as long as they do not aid the monstrosity."

"IN U.S.S.R., MINORITY PROBLEMS JUST WON'T WITHER AWAY," an article by James N. Wallace. *U.S. News and World Report*, Washington, D.C., February 14, 1977.

Although much of the data in this article is impressive and accurate, the writer's concepts are starkly faulty. There really is no such thing as "national minorities" in the empire/state called the Soviet Union. The writer has spent three years in the Soviet Union and is now based in Tokyo.

He's right in declaring that a "racial time bomb is ticking away inside the Soviet Union. The dangers it presents deeply upset the Kremlin." The bomb is made up of two components: one, the tensions between "Mother Russia" and the non-Russian nations and, two, the decline of the Russians as the dominant proportion of the total population.

The writer also emphasizes the forces of Russification and colonialism. Very instructively, he cites the changes ahead and the mounting pressures between the Russian center and the broad non-Russian periphery. For example, by 1985 over half of the labor force in the USSR will be non-Russian. He covers Georgia,

the Baltic States, Central Asia and highlights the dissidence "in Ukraine, which is big and rich enough to constitute an independent nation." Regarding, again, concepts and perceptions, Armenia, for example, is not that big and rich; thus it cannot constitute an independent state (not nation—it is independent that way).

"WORLDWIDE HUMAN RIGHTS," a statement by the Honorable Philip M. Crane. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., July 19, 1977.

The eloquent Representative Crane of Illinois charges in this statement that President Carter's approach to human rights in the Soviet empire remains inadequate. His concentration is on Hungarians in Romania, Czecho-Slovakia and Ukraine. As he says, "Few people know that the Soviet Union itself harbors about 180,000 Hungarians in the Ukrainian S.S.R."

In terms of historical interpretation, the changes and transfers of what is dubbed here as Subcarpathian Ruthenia are grossly inaccurate. You wouldn't know that a Carpatho-Ukraine existed. The Congressman can't be held responsible for this. But once this is brought to his attention, the Hungarian bias of the interpretation will be fully appreciated by him, a former professor of history.

"WHO ARE THESE 'CHAMPIONS' OF HUMAN RIGHTS?", an article by Volodimir Khistoviy. *News From Ukraine*, Kiev, Ukraine, May 1977.

Moscow is jittery over Carter's human rights campaign and so are its minions in Kiev and other satrapies of the Soviet Russian Empire. This scurrilous piece of journalism slanders Metropolitan Matyslav of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America. It attacks him for the part he played at the Conference on human rights in 1968 in Teheran. He was supposed to have fallen ill from his reversals at that conference, and "Later on, leaders of the ultrareactionary Ukrainian Congress Committee of America consoled the poor old man in their own way by awarding him the 'Shevchenko Diploma of Freedom'." The award is officially "The Shevchenko Freedom Award," granted to Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and others, but this is an indication of the sloppy research of the writer.

Later on, we get the usual guilt by association technique, as if there was any. The Metropolitan was supposed to have attained to his sacerdotal status "on instructions from Nazi Gauleiter Hans Koch." The Nazis were in command of Ukraine in 1942 and all important matters had to be processed through the imposed machinery, but what has this to do with any association. The technique of the half-truth is obvious in this scandal-article. The minions must be desperate.

"BELGRADE CONFERENCE: THE NEED TO SUPPORT SOVIET BLOC DISSIDENTS," an article by Stefan Korbonski. *Human Events*, The National Conservative Weekly, Washington, D.C., June 18, 1977.

This long-standing Polish activist and writer urges the United States to give its full support to the many dissident groups in Eastern Europe, meaning

up to the Urals. As he forcefully puts it, "The present state of the dissident movement poses serious problems for the Soviets." Even the Communist Party and the Red Army are being infected with the plague of dissidence. The plague can spread, perhaps uncontrollably, with a determined assistance from the U.S.

Covering the dissident movements in each state, the writer places emphasis on that in Ukraine. He writes, "Of the three dissident movements mentioned above, the Ukrainian Public Group, taking advantage of the fact that the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic is a member of the United Nations, is demanding its own independent representatives in Belgrade as well as the establishment of a United States consulate in Kiev." The latter actually has been provided for several years ago.

"NOW A COLD WAR OVER HUMAN RIGHTS," a commentary. *U.S. News & World Report*, Washington, D.C., February 21, 1977.

Based on reports from both Moscow and Washington, this commentary attempts to survey the various reactions to President Carter's stance on human rights. A spokesman, for example, is quoted as saying that "The President told Ambassador Dobrynin that the United States will not back down on the human-rights issue." Though many don't realize it, the Captive Nations Week test for the President's proclamation was recently the first indication of a back-down. The next test will be the Belgrade conference.

It would not be difficult to assess the many other views expressed. One American is quoted as saying "Tweaking the nose of the Russian bear is not likely to produce big changes in Soviet policy." This supposedly brilliant observation misses the whole point of psycho-political warfare that Moscow has been successfully waging under cover of "detente." A mere reading of daily newspapers will show how the Kremlin is anxious to perpetuate the form of detente carved out in the Nixon Administration.

"UKRAINIAN BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM—ENEMY OF THE YOUTH," an article by Olexiy Kartunov. *News From Ukraine*, Kiev, Ukraine, March 1977.

This minion publication of Moscow's disinformation offensive has been intensely busy of late in maligning organizations abroad, particularly the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. This article focuses on the O.U.N., the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Its main thrust is that the O.U.N. is preparing youth for inevitable war. For instance, it is stated that "The nationalist leaders urge young people to join those branches which play a leading role in modern warfare: rocket, parachute, chemical, etc."

Evidently the writer is annoyed by the products of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, a UCCA journal. The writer mentions that "Walter Dushnyck, one of the UCCA (Ukrainian Congress Committee of America) leaders, speaking before the U.S. Republican Party's resolution commission in Kansas City in August 1976, entreated the U.S. Administration to renounce the policy of detente and the Helsinki accords." Facts: neither is true, for the position was one of a genuine detente,

not Moscow's type, and a different direction on the Helsinki Accords, namely, emphasis on human rights.

The writer seems to be disturbed by our military-industrial complex, which is nowhere near that of the USSR. Again directing his aim at the UCCA, he writes, "The profascist *Ukrainian Quarterly* magazine (New York) wrote in issue No. 2 for 1973 that a number of scientific workers of Ukrainian descent were linked to the military-industrial complex, notably the military circles of the United States and NATO." So, you want them to be angels facing Red devils?

"THE UKRAINIAN GROUP," a statement by the Honorable Clifford Case. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., July 18, 1977.

Senator Case of New Jersey, who was a sponsor of the bill to establish our monitoring commission on Helsinki, releases his statement here on the harsh sentences meted out to the Ukrainian dissidents Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy. The Senator's statement is based on the first declaration after the trial by the Ukrainian Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. As the Senator says, "This statement was relayed to the West from General Griorenko, coordinator between the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Groups."

The 12 and 15 year prison sentences given to Rudenko and Tykhy are plainly deplorable. Being in poor health, Rudenko is virtually consigned to death with this sentence. To isolate the trial and those attending; the trial was held in a small village called Druzhkivka, over 300 miles from Kiev. As the Senator phrases it, "Not content with holding the trial in a remote village where any strangers wanting to attend the trial would be recognized immediately by the local police, the trial was held in a 'Red Corner'—a Communist Party information center—inside a factory for which one needed a special security pass—thereby further limiting the attendance at the trial."

In this so-called process of justice the court held the Ukrainian Group to be an anti-Soviet organization with anti-Soviet documents. The declaration of the Group brands the charge as "a blatant falsehood." It states emphatically, "We find only documents which discuss the actual violation of the Helsinki Accords in our country." This case and numerous others clearly show how sensitive Moscow and its KGB are to mounting dissidence within the USSR.

"SOVIET TEEN-AGER BREAKS WORLD HIGH JUMP RECORD," a special report. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D.C., July 4, 1977.

Vladimir Yaschenko, an 18-year old Ukrainian, broke the world high jump record in the U.S.-USSR Junior Track Meet in Richmond. The 6'3", 175-pound student, who lives near Kiev, accomplished the feat at 7-7¼ inches by using the straddle style. The report points out, "Yaschenko gave the Soviet team its only moment of glory on a day otherwise dominated by the Americans."

"YUGOSLAVS BOOT 2 U.S. PROTESTERS," a report. *Associated Press*, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, July 1, 1977.

As in the cases of Jewish protestors earlier, two Americans were expelled from Yugoslavia for trying to uphold the human rights of Ukrainian dissidents.

Andrew Fedynsky and Adam Misztal attempted to call a press conference and were peremptorily ejected. They are members of the Washington-based Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee.

It was expected that any such protests or demonstrations would be dealt with swiftly by Yugoslavian authorities. There are political prisoners in Yugoslav jails as well as in Soviet prisons and concentration camps. No doubt, there will be even stricter controls during the full-scale fall sessions of the Belgrade conference.

"WHY NO CAPTIVE NATIONS DECREE?", an article by William F. Willoughby. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1977.

The writer was apparently unaware that under pressure the President finally changed his mind and did issue a highly generalized proclamation for Captive Nations Week. Nonetheless, all that he writes is valid and accurate up to the time of issuance, and if there had been no persistent prodding of the White House, it is certain that no proclamation for the '77 Week would exist.

Quoting at length the chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, the writer points out that with no proclamation of the Week, Carter would be "the first president since 1959 to fail to proclaim Captive Nations Week since it was enacted into law in 1959." He quotes from an early release by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, "Your failure to proclaim Captive Nations Week is a source of grave disappointment to millions of Americans and our allies abroad."

There are some attempting to cover up this story by pointing to the fact that the President did issue a proclamation during the Week. Any proclamation of a national event is issued well in advance of the event. All the Presidents since Eisenhower issued theirs before the Week got under way. President Johnson issued an early one in June. And as shown earlier, the National Captive Nations Committee approached the White House on this early in May.

"SOVIET SAID TO JAIL SCULPTOR WHO HONORED BICENTENNIAL," a report. *The New York Times*, New York, June 17, 1977.

A Ukrainian sculptor, Petro Ruban, has been sentenced to prison for his sculpture honoring the United States Bicentennial. This was disclosed by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn from his home in Vermont. He issued through Representative James M. Jeffords of Vermont documents provided by the Moscow committee for the defense of human rights, containing this information.

It is also revealed that the Ukrainian craftsman had already served 16 years for advocating Ukrainian nationalism. The current charge is for "engaging in private enterprise" and "theft of state property." A perfect case showing how basic economic freedom is to artistic, political and other freedoms in a society.

"THE UKRAINIAN EXAMPLE," an editorial. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., July 6, 1977.

The unjust trial and harsh sentences given to Mykola Rudenko and Oleksy Tykhy have inspired this well-written editorial. The editor recounts aspects of

human rights that are well known, and makes the point with reference to Moscow's repressions that "No less important is its resistance to meaningful 'national' rights for the 100-plus ethnic or national groups within its borders." There is obviously some conceptual confusion here as to nation and an ethnic entity.

In the editorial, the Russians are held to be a minority in the USSR, and the 50 million Ukrainians are viewed as the "most sensitively located and historically the most assertive." Against this short background the editor interprets the harsh Rudenko-Tykhyy sentence as an intimidation of "closet nationalists." He is not too sure that it will work because over the decades even harsher repressions have not extinguished the nationalist spark.

The Helsinki Accords are viewed as a political stimulation for such nationalism urges. President Carter's stress on human rights and the decision to raise the power of our radio broadcasts to the USSR have, according to the editorial, raised suspicions in the Kremlin as to the President's purposes. The editor warns, "In current international conditions, ethnicity is fire and no outsider should play lightly with it." He fails to show that the force of nationalism, which is above mere ethnicity, exists for our subtle use, for which there are many courses of action. Or do we just sit on our hands?

"CAPTIVE NATIONS MARCH: THE SPIRIT IS LIBERATING," a report by Bryant Mason. *Daily News*, New York, July 18, 1977.

The 19th Observance of Captive Nations Week was conducted in New York City with services at St. Patrick's Cathedral and then a march up Fifth Avenue to the Goldman band shell in Central Park. In the park Representative Mario Biaggi of New York, Secretary of State Mario Cuomo and Barry Farber, a candidate for mayor, addressed some 200 marchers. Their main theme was to speak out steadfastly for the captive nations.

The chairman of the rally, Ivan Docheff, summed up the meaning of the day. He said, "It's an important thing to keep the spirit and not let memories of imprisoned countrymen fade." He continued, "Sooner or later, we'll be able to break the Communist curtain and free these people." The New York observance of Captive Nations Week was one of many across the country and abroad.

"GATHERING IS SMALLER AND OLDER FOR CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RALLY," a report. *The New York Times*, New York, July 18, 1977.

Covering the same event as the one above, it is interesting to note different type of interpretation given to the observance. The preceding report speaks of a liberating spirit; this one dwells on smallness and age. The heat on this day and the fact that a competing group had scheduled a similar event at the end of the week on the Statue of Liberty island are not accounted for. One of the leaders of the march was quoted saying, "It doesn't matter how many attend. As long as what we do here gets across the Iron Curtain, it gives encouragement." And, indeed, he's right.

Another quoted was Bohdan Pylypiw, who is of Ukrainian descent. He said, "It shows we're still here, we still care about them. It adds a psychological lift.

Sure, it's little, but it has importance in the long run." In a sense, the smallness of the group is regrettable because what it represents in terms of the Captive Nations Week resolution should be of concern to all Americans. This is not strictly a so-called ethnic event.

Concerning the drift of our policy, what is highly important in the report is the reference to the President's neglect to proclaim the Week before it commenced. The report states, "This year's protest began without the usual declaration from the President making the Captive Nations Week official. A White House spokesman said yesterday that he did not know why President Carter, who was at Camp David for the weekend, had not made the declaration."

"THE ECLIPSE OF LENIN'S IDEAS ON THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM,"
an article by Adam Ciolkosz. *The Polish Review*, New York, November 1976.

The writer was a distinguished Socialist member of the Polish parliament prior to World War II and is the author of *The History of Polish Socialism*. His chief point in the article is that Lenin's ideas should be invoked in demands that the national and cultural identity of the 1,167,000 Poles in the Soviet Union be preserved. He relies heavily on Lenin's so-called attempt to prevent the rise of Russian chauvinism in the USSR.

Lenin's real attitude toward the non-Russian nations is a highly debatable subject. The writer seems to place too much trust in Lenin's words and ignores his deeds. The warning to Rosa Luxemburg in 1914 that by opposing Polish secession, she was in fact helping the reactionary nationalism of the Great Russians, can be completely discounted. At that time he was advancing the self-determination of the non-Russian nationalities in the Czarist Russian Empire, but when he attained to power, he ordered the liquidation of countless non-Russian nationalists and did nothing to stop Trotsky's Red Army from destroying the newly independent non-Russian republics.

One could refute words with Lenin's deeds endlessly. The ace opportunist was Lenin himself. At his peak of power in Soviet Russia, he could have firmly respected the self-determination of the non-Russians and simply have experimented with his notion of communism in Russia proper. Too many place too much credence in Lenin's words, words that topsy-turvied Marxism as well.

L.E.D.

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

I. UKRAINIAN LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES

UCCA President Asks the United States to Intercede in Belgrade for Rudenko and Tykhy.—Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the UCCA, appealed to the U.S. government for the release of Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy through an appeal to the Belgrade Conference.

Dated July 2, 1977, the appeal addressed to President Jimmy Carter in the White House, read:

"The harsh sentences meted out by Moscow to the two Ukrainian dissidents, Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy, underscore again both the imperio-totalitarian nature of the regime and its threatening reactions to your courageous human rights stand.

"As head of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, which represents over two million Americans of Ukrainian ancestry, I appeal to you to intercede in behalf of these two latest victims of Soviet Russian injustice and have our delegation in Belgrade place these two cases in top priority of post-Helsinki business.

"The hasty action by Moscow shows, too, the myth of its 'non-interference in internal affairs' position where Ukraine and its heroic proponents for national human rights are treated as a colony. As we approach Captive Nations Week this July 17-23, the brutal denial of these rights, particularly among the captive nations in the USSR, deserves open, official emphasis and the Rudenko-Tykhy cases, to mention only a few, validate such action.

In full support of your human rights crusade and with all best wishes for your firm leadership."

19th Annual Observance of "Captive Nations Week" in U.S.—The 19th annual observance of "Captive Nations Week" was marked during the week of July 17-23, 1977 throughout the United States with traditional ceremonies, parades, programs and official proclamations of the Week by Governors of many states and Mayors of large and smaller cities. The observance was held in the spirit of human rights and the convening conference to assess the results of the Helsinki Accords, whose preparatory phase began in June prior to the Belgrade conclave in the fall. Since 1959, when the "Captive Nations Week Resolution" was enacted, four new nations were added to the list of 22 enslaved countries enumerated in the Resolution, namely, Cuba, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos. The next possible victims seem to be Angola and Mozambique in Africa.

Appeal of NCNC Chairman to U.S. Legislators and the President.—As in previous years, Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC), wrote a letter to all U.S. Senators and

Congressmen, urging them to take part in the observance of "Captive Nations Week" and make appropriate statements in the U.S. Congress.

And, like in previous years, Dr. Dobriansky, in his role as NCNC chairman, wrote to the President of the United States, urging him to issue an early Presidential Proclamation of "Captive Nations Week," as authorized and requested by Public Law 86-90.

President Carter Tries to Skip Issuing Presidential Proclamation.—But for reasons which are still wrapped in something of a mystery, President Carter, though ultimately reversing himself under pressure, had planned to become the first President since passage of PL 86-90 to ignore the event.

With the approach of the Week and no reply from the White House, Dr. Dobriansky received a note from the Office of Management and Budget(!) saying that the matter would be handled by the State Department. Still later, the NCNC Chairman was directed to Greg Treverton, a staffer on the National Security Council, headed by the President's chief White House adviser in foreign affairs, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

On July 14, three days before the Week, Mr. Treverton informed Dr. Dobriansky that the National Security Council was still working on the statement. Inasmuch as Dr. Dobriansky had to go out of town for a conference, he entrusted Lee Edwards, executive director of his group, to follow up on the matter.

But when Mr. Edwards called, Mr. Treverton said there wasn't going to be any proclamation. It was "not required," he said, despite the language of the 1959 law stating that the President is "authorized and requested" to issue such a proclamation.

Mr. Treverton said that the proclamation wasn't necessary because of the President's well-known stand on human rights. Mr. Edwards was taken aback, and told the NSC official that "a lot of people" were going to be surprised and disappointed.

Carter's Failure To Proclaim Captive Nations Week Called "New Low" In U.S. Foreign Policy.—President Carter's failure to proclaim Captive Nations Week was called a "new low" in U.S. foreign policy by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the UCCA and Chairman of the NCNC.

In a sharply worded letter to the White House, Dr. Dobriansky pointed out that Mr. Carter was the first President since 1959 and the enactment of Public Law 86-90 not to proclaim Captive Nations Week.

The President's failure was termed a "grave disappointment" to millions of Americans and our allies but one which will 'delight' the Kremlin and other Communist capitals.

"It may be a cosmetic 'first,' Dr. Dobriansky wrote President Carter, "but it is also a new low in this basic barometer of our foreign policy."

The full text of Dr. Dobriansky's letter to President Carter follows:

Dear Mr. President:

Your failure to proclaim Captive Nations Week is a source of grave disappointment to millions of Americans and our allies abroad. Those in the Kremlin and other Communist totalitarian centers are doubtless happy and delighted by this generous inaction and certainly will weigh it accordingly. For one who is supposedly committed to human rights globally we expected

from you the strongest proclamation yet. Instead, for the first time since 1959 and in strange contrast to your five predecessors you chose to ignore this traditional annual observance of Captive Nations Week that has consistently given coherent expression to human rights on the scale of over 27 nations held in Communist captivity. Your indifference to this concrete issue reflected not only poor judgment but also casts heavy clouds of doubt over the substance and directions of your human rights advocacy. We are appalled by this indifference. On record, it may be a cosmetic "first" but it is also a new low in this basic barometer of our foreign policy course toward the imperio-totalitarian part of the world.

Both Republicans and Democrats Express Criticism of the President's Failure to Issue a Proclamation.—As the news spread about the failure of President Carter to issue a Captive Nations Week Proclamation, the pressure began to mount. Republican leaders—many of whom, in fact, had ignored the "human rights" issue when Presidents Nixon and Ford were in office—began making some noises.

Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan.), contending that Americans were "distressed" because the President had failed to issue a proclamation, introduced a resolution that would have directed the Administration to bring up the subject of "captive nations" at the Belgrade conference this fall on the implementation of the Helsinki document.

The Democratic leaders also got into the act. Mr. Andrew Valucek, director of Minority Divisions of the Democratic National Committee, issued a special plea to the White House to come forth with a proclamation.

By Wednesday morning, July 20, when House members were scheduled to make statements in honor of Captive Nations Week, President Carter had yielded to political pressure at home. Before the House went into session on its special order, with many members primed to blast the Preseident, Carter had issued a token proclamation, thereby avoiding harsher condemnations.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Captive Nations Week, 1977

By the President of the United States of America

A PROCLAMATION

Since 1959 the Congress, by joint resolution (73 Stat. 212), has authorized and requested the President to designate the third week in July as Captive Nations Week.

Our own country was established on a profound belief in national self-determination. Throughout our history we have sought to give meaning to this principle and to our belief in liberty and human rights.

In recognition of this commitment, NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 17, 1977, as Captive Nations Week.

I call upon the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, demonstrating America's support for those who seek national independence, liberty and human rights.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twentieth day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy seven, and of

the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and second.

JIMMY CARTER

Several Dozen U.S. Legislators Mark 19th Annual Captive Nations Week in Congress.—During Captive Nations Week (July 17-23, 1977) several U.S. Senators and Congressmen introduced appropriate statements in the U.S. Congress. These included:

a) **Senators:** Robert Dole (R.-Kan.); H. John Heinz, Ill. (R.-Pa.); Thomas J. McIntyre (R.-N.H.); Charles H. Percy (R.-Ill.) and Harrison A. Williams (D.-N.J.).

b) **Congressmen:** Joseph P. Addabbo (D.-N.Y.); John M. Ashbrook (R.-Ohio); Mario Biaggi (D.-N.Y.); Don Bonker (D.-Wash.); William S. Broomfield (R.-Mich.); J. Herbert Burke (R.-Fla.); James C. Cleveland (R.-N.H.); Silvio O. Conte (R.-Mass.); Lawrence Coughlin (R.-Fla.); Philip M. Crane (R.-Ill.); James J. Delaney (D.-N.Y.); Edward J. Derwinski (R.-Ill.); John D. Dingell (D.-Mich.); Christopher J. Dodd (D.-Conn.); Joshua Eilberg (D.-Pa.); Millicent Fenwick (R.-N.J.); Daniel J. Flood (D.-Pa.); Louis Frey, Jr. (R.-Fla.); Benjamin A. Gilman (R.-N.Y.); Marjorie S. Holt (D.-Md.); Frank Horton (R.-N.Y.); Henry J. Hyde (R.-Ill.); Jack F. Kemp (R.-N.Y.); Peter H. Kostmayer (D.-Ill.); Norman F. Lent (R.-N.Y.); Marc Marks (R.-Pa.); Robert McClory (R.-Ill.); Joseph M. McDade (R.-Pa.); Lawrence P. McDonald (D.-Ga.); Morgan F. Murphy (D.-Ill.); Henry J. Nowak (D.-N.Y.); Mary Rose Oakar (D.-Ohio); Richard L. Ottinger (D.-N.Y.); Claude D. Pepper (D.-Fla.); John J. Rhodes (R.-Ariz.); Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D.-N.J.); John H. Rousselot (R.-Calif.); Ronald A. Sarasin (R.-Conn.); Newton Steers (R.-Md.); Samuel S. Stratton (D.-N.Y.); Larry Winn, Jr. (D.-Kan.); Lester Wolff (D.-N.Y.); John W. Wydler (R.-N.Y.); C.W. Bill Young (R.-Fla.); and Clement J. Zablocki (D.-Wisc.).

Carter Proclamation on Captive Nations Called "A Retreat on Human Rights."—President Carter's four-days late and weakly-worded proclamation on Captive Nations Week was called the "beginning of a retreat on human rights" by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC).

Dr. Dobriansky, who before July 17, 1977, sharply criticized President Carter for his failure to proclaim Captive Nations Week, charged on July 20, 1977 there was "no excuse" for the delay—the first in the 19-year history of Captive Nations Week.

"Captive nations and human rights are a natural combination," he stated, "and we therefore expected a prompt and strongly-worded proclamation from President Carter.

"Instead, we were first informed there would be no proclamation. Then we are presented with a *pro forma* statement which makes no mention of any of the 27 nations now under Communist captivity or the primary cause of their captivity—Soviet Russia.

"We note that this deplorable misreading of the cause of captive nations follows closely the formation of the inter-agency committee on U.S.-USSR relations—the first such government agency of its kind.

"We feel compelled to ask: Which is more important to this Administration—human rights or relations with the Soviet Union?

"We will be watching very carefully the Administration and the White House to determine the answer and how President Carter develops what he himself has called his 'crusade for human rights.'

"His near disastrous inaction on Captive Nations Week suggests that his commitment to his human rights crusade is growing lukewarm if not cold.

"If so, that is tragic news for the hundreds of millions living under Communism who look to the United States and its leadership for encouragement, inspiration and hope for their individual freedom and national independence."

AFL-CIO Leader George Meany Calls for Support of Captive Nations.—On the occasion of the 19th annual observance of Captive Nations Week, George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO and honorary chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC), issued a strong appeal calling for the support of all captive nations in their struggle against Communist tyranny.

His statement reads as follows:

There is no more important and burning issue today than that of human rights. The foundation of civilization and the progress of mankind rest upon individual freedom and political democracy.

Heartened as we are over the emergence of Portugal and Spain as free nations and peoples, trade unionists everywhere are deeply saddened by the Communist or Fascist elites in both hemispheres.

Hypocrisy too often prevails at international assemblies, as representatives of the most repressive regimes declare their devotion to human rights and human progress, without challenge by free nations of the world. In the face of such callous perversions, silence destroys truth and blights the hopes of those in chains and serves the cause of tyranny.

The plight of the self-delusion of much of the West, its blindness or indifference to peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union itself, dulls the conscience and weakens the security of freedom where it still exists.

Therefore, on the occasion of Captive Nations Week 1977, the AFL-CIO calls for renewed and much stronger advocacy and action for human freedom. The free nations of the world, and their representatives in international organizations, must be summoned to a combined and concerted effort to assert the cause of human rights and liberties as the dominant issue of our times and to focus the searchlight of world concern on the victims of oppression.

UCCA President Testifies Before Fascell Commission.—Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University and President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) was one of several witnesses who appeared on April 28, 1977 before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, headed by Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.). His testimony, entitled "Helsinki, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy," covered several phases of Soviet Russian persecution in Ukraine and especially the wanton destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches by the Kremlin.

At the close of his testimony, Prof Dobriansky offered the following recommendations for the Commission:

1. To place high on the agenda in Belgrade an appeal to Moscow for the restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox and Catholic Churches that were genocided by Stalin.

2. In furtherance of real inter-national agreement, to urge the direct signations of Ukraine and Byelorussia, which are in the U.N., to the Helsinki Accords and, as sponsored by numerous scholars in international law, to advance the idea of direct diplomatic relations with these non-Russian republics, which we recognize both *de jure* and *de facto* in the U.N.

3. In the tone and spirit set by the President, to advance the human rights issue by openly laying out all the accumulated cases of Moscow's continuing violation and deprivation of these rights in the USSR.

4. Toward international order through the rule of law, to press for accountability in terms of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention and other legal instruments upholding human rights.

5. As concerns Basket 2, to maintain in the face of growing pressures the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and credit restrictions and to propose for us and our allies the development of a genuine linkage between trade and human rights. It would defy logic to equip Moscow with Cyber-76 computers and other advanced technology for its further military buildup and at the same time strengthen its hand in the repression of human rights.

Among other witnesses who appeared before the Commission on the same day was Prof. Peter Reddaway, lecturer at the London School of Economics, author of *Uncensored Russia* and many articles on religion and nationalism of the non-Russian nations in the USSR.

Ukrainian National Association Presses Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine.—The Ukrainian National Association (UNA), the oldest and largest Ukrainian American fraternal association, undertook a major defense action of Ukrainian political prisoners by informing over 200 U.S. legislators of the recent human rights violations in Ukraine. The action by the UNA was undertaken within the framework of UCCA directives urging all Ukrainian American organizations to take part in the all-national defense of human and national rights in Ukraine.

The program climaxed on May 18, 1977, when UNA leaders from various parts of the country visited their Senators and Congressmen to apprise them of the persecution in Ukraine. Each Senator and Congressman received a UNA-prepared information kit containing biographies of Mykola Rudenko, Oleksa Tykhy, Mykola Matuskevych, and Myroslav Marynovych, all members of the Kiev Helsinki group, arrested early this year, as well as Valentyn Moroz and other Ukrainian political prisoners, copies of previous resolutions in their defense, and other pertinent documents.

The covering letter, signed by UNA President Joseph Lesawyer, also requested that the legislators write a letter to Leonid Brezhnev, secretary general of the CPSU, urging the release of the four latest Ukrainian political prisoners.

In the evening a reception was held at the Capitol, hosted by Sen. Robert Dole (R.-Kan.), in which 200 people took part, including more than 50 U.S. legislators, among them 31 U.S. Senators.

Sen. Dole pledged that he would continue to campaign for human and national rights in Ukraine, and said he would urge the American delegation

at the Belgrade conference to press for total Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords.

In his closing remarks Mr. Lesawyer thanked all the legislators and guests for attending, and asserted that their attendance was proof that American concern for human rights in Ukraine is strong.

Conference on Human Rights Held at the State Department.—National and human rights of peoples enslaved by Russo-Communists and their struggle for freedom and independence were brought into sharp focus during a special State Department conference on Tuesday, May 17, 1977, attended by representatives of non-governmental organizations and ethnic groups, including Ukrainians.

The purpose of the conference was to brief the representatives on the preparations for the forthcoming meeting in Belgrade on the review of progress in the implementation of the Helsinki pact and to hear views and opinions of the cross-section of the American people.

Addressing the conference on the part of the State Department were the following officials: Warren M. Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State; William J. Dyess, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Public Affairs; Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department; Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Belgrade Preparatory Conference; Patricia M. Derian, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; Nicholas G. Andrews, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs; Mark Garrison, Director of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs; John J. Maresca, Officer in Charge of Political Affairs, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, and Guy Coriden, Senior Consultant, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Attending the conference were Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky (UCCA), Joseph Lesawyer (UNA), Dr. Alexander Bilyk and Mrs. Stephanie Wochok (Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics), Dr. Walter Dushnyck (*The Ukrainian Quarterly*), Anthony Dragan (Svoboda), Ignatius M. Billinsky (America), Borys Potapenko (Ukrainian Information Bureau) and Andrew Fedynsky (Ukrainian Helsinki Committee in Washington).

During the question-and-answer period, Prof. Dobriansky voiced criticism of the official definition of human rights, which includes only personal and civil rights, but not national rights. In reply, Mr. Nimetz said that the Department is "aware of the struggle of Ukrainians for their national rights." Pertinent questions were also put by Messrs. Lesawyer, Potapenko and Fedynsky.

The destruction of the Ukrainian churches was also mentioned by Sister Agnes of the Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, while Prof. J. Mikus of the World Slovak Congress underscored that Ukraine is the second largest nation in the USSR and fights for its freedom and national independence.

On the second day the conference was divided into a number of workshops dealing with specific aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

"Human Rights After Helsinki" Conference in Washington.—On May 19, 1977, an international conference on the subject of "Human Rights After Helsinki" was held at the Capitol Hilton Hotel in Washington, sponsored by the American Council for World Freedom (ACWF).

The chairman of the conference was Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC) and president of the ACWF. The conference brought together some 15 internationally recognized experts who discussed various aspects of human rights.

The conference encompassed three panels stressing the denials and violations of human and national rights in the USSR, and the suppression of human and civil rights in mainland China and Cuba.

Panel I featured "The Nationality Problem in the Soviet Union and Its Impact on Eastern and Central Europe," with Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, discussing Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Caucasus; Mr. Jonas Jurasas—the Baltic States; Dr. Aman Murat—Central Asia and the Moslems; Dr. Pavel Litvinov—Russia. Dr. Dobriansky acted as moderator.

Panel II dealt with "Human Rights in Mainland China," featuring Dr. Parris Chang of Penn State University; Dr. Edmund Luttwak, School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University; and Dr. William Whitson, Chief of Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Library of Congress. Rev. Raymond de Jaeger was moderator.

Finally, Panel III was dedicated to "Human Rights in Cuba," featuring Paul Bethel, former press attache, U.S. Embassy in Havana; Frank Calzon, Cuban writer, and Dr. Roger Fontaine, director of Latin American Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

In the evening, some 300 people attended a "Freedom Banquet," among them many young people. Speaking at the banquet were Rep. John Buchanan of Alabama, Dr. Valery Chalidze, Congressman Samuel S. Stratton of New York and Robert Dornan of California, and Dr. Pavel Litvinov.

Rep. Buchanan, member of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, introduced last year a resolution on behalf of the Ukrainian Baptist Minister Georgi Vins, who is still in a Soviet jail. He quoted from Prof. Dobriansky's testimony before the Fasel Commission on how the Russians genocided both Ukrainian churches. Dr. Chalidze, former associate of Prof. Andrei D. Sakharov in Moscow and now editor of *The Chronicle of Current Events*, stated among other things that the majority of political prisoners in Soviet jails were Ukrainians.

Master of ceremonies was Lee Edwards, secretary of the ACWF; Msgr. Walter Paska of Sts. Peter and Paul Ukrainian Catholic Church in Washington delivered the invocation, while Rev. Wade Akins of New Life Ministries International said the benediction.

UCCA Executive Board Holds Plenary Meeting in New York.—On Saturday, June 4, 1977, the UCCA Executive Board held its plenary session, attended by 25 members. It was opened by UCCA President Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, and presided over by Ivan Oleksyn, a vice president of the UCCA. After the minutes of the last meeting were read by Ignatius M. Bilinsky, two new members were welcomed to the board: Dr. Roman Maksymovych and Prof. Volodymyr Stoyko, representing the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Association of Ukrainian University Professors, respectively.

Reporting on the activities of the UCCA Executive Board were the following officers: Prof. Dobriansky—on his activities in Washington; UC-

CA Administrative Director Ivan Bazarko—on the work of the UCCA Office and the fund-raising campaign for the World Congress of Free Ukrainians; Dr. Walter Dushnyck—preparation of a memorandum on repressions in Ukraine in connection with the Belgrade conference; Mrs. Ulana Diachuk—on UCCA finances; George Nesterchuk, chairman of the UCCA Washington Branch—on the progress in establishing the UCCA Information Bureau in the nation's capital; Eugene Iwashkiw—on the national manifestation to be held on September 18, 1977 in New York City; Dr. Bohdan Hnatiuk and Mr. Billinsky reported on the session and work of the Secretariat of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians in Toronto, and Mrs. Slava Rubel—on the youth summer camps and sports rally, and so forth.

Lyudmila Alekseeva Tells of "Severe Repressions" in Ukraine.—Mrs. Lyudmila Alekseeva, Russian historian and member of the Moscow Helsinki group, said at a press conference in New York City that "the most severe repressions by the Soviet government are taking place in Ukraine, and these repressions are heavy, penetrating and systematic."

The press conference, sponsored at the Carnegie Endowment Center on June 8, 1977 by the International League for Human Rights and the *Khronika* Press, also heard Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United States, who announced that he has agreed to act as legal counsel for Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy, members of the Ukrainian Helsinki group in Kiev, but expressed doubt whether he would receive a Soviet visa.

Mrs. Alekseeva, who spoke in Russian through an interpreter, read a list of members of the "Helsinki watch" groups in Moscow, Kiev, Vilnius, Tbilisi and Ervan (Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia) and told of chicanery and persecution by the KGB.

Asked to expand her statements made in Europe to the effect that repression in Ukraine is the "greatest and most severe," she stated:

"Even after Ukrainian political prisoners terminate their terms of imprisonment, they continue to be persecuted. Many of them cannot return to their place of origin; they cannot get jobs or housing and they are officially discriminated against."

She said that it was her feeling that repressions in Ukraine are motivated by the Kremlin's fear and apprehension of the existing separatist tendencies in Ukraine and of the eventual secession of Ukraine from the USSR.

Attending the conference were Dr. Walter Dushnyck (*The Ukrainian Quarterly*), Vasyi Tershakovets (*Svoboda*), Ihor Dlaboha (*The Ukrainian Weekly*) and Borys Potapenko (Ukrainian Information Bureau).

Dr. Drazhnulowsky Elected Chairman of UCCA Educational Council.—Dr. Roman Drazhnulowsky, noted Ukrainian cartographer, was elected chairman of the UCCA Educational Council at the Council's meeting, held on June 25, 1977 in New York City. His predecessor, Dr. Edward Zarsky, who could not attend the meeting because of illness, was elected first honorary chairman of the Council and was cited for his contributions in organizing the Ukrainian educational program in this country.

Also elected to serve on the executive board were: Drs. Eugene Fedorenko and Roma Trach and the heads of the Association of Pedagogues and the Board of Sponsors of Ukrainian Schools, vice-chairmen; Dr. Ihor Huryn, secretary; Atanas Kobryn, treasurer; Mrs. Natalia Chomaczuk,

chairman of the kindergarten committee; Dr. Lesya Tkach, chairman of the program committee; Mrs. Pavlyna Andrienko-Danchuk, chairman of the educational committee. Dr. Alexander Luzhnytsky, Prof. Stepan Demchyshyn, Elizabeth Czartorysky, Eugenia Kuzmowycz, Roman Zwarycz, Dr. Roman Korchmaryk and Stephania Kwasowsky were elected members-at-large of the executive board.

The auditing committee is comprised of Messrs. A. Kulynych, M. Heretz, I. Hubchak, I. Kobasa and O. Pryshlak. Prof. Stepan Stecyk will hold the position of office director.

Ukrainian American Veterans Hold Convention, Reelect Lt. H. Polche National Commander.—Harry Polche, an active member of the New York City Ukrainian community and a lieutenant in the New York City Police Department, was reelected national commander of the Ukrainian American Veterans (UAV) during its 30th anniversary convention, held at the UNA Estate in Kerhonkson, N.Y., on June 3-5, 1977.

The sessions were held concurrently with the fourth annual convention of the National Ladies' Auxiliary, at which Olga Wengrenovich was elected president.

The UAV was founded in Philadelphia, Pa. for the purpose of uniting, strengthening and preserving in comradeship all Ukrainian American veterans of Ukrainian origin and to perpetuate the memory of departed comrades and the Ukrainian ethnic heritage. The well-attended conventions included delegates from Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C.

The three-day sessions included reports by national officers, discussions, resolutions and plans for future activities, as well as the anniversary banquet.

Joining Lt. Polche on the executive board were the following:

Past national commander Stephen Shegda, senior vice-commander; Bohdan Bezkorowajny, junior vice-commander; Roman Bednarsky, finance officer; John Lupa, adjutant; Michael Zedayko, judge advocate; Michael Chaika, quartermaster; James Pender, chaplain; Mary Wolkins, historian, and P. Walter Procyk, welfare officer.

In addition to Olga Wengrenovich, elected national president of the Ladies' Auxiliary, the following were elected to its national board:

Laura Pellock, senior vice-president; Olga Lupa, junior vice-president; Olga Pope, secretary; Olga Wengryn, treasurer; Mary Kopko, chaplain; Anne McAloon, historian; Frances Shegda, sergeant-at-arms, and Pauline Pender, service officer.

Among the honored guests at the convention were: N.Y. State Senator Edwyn A. Mason, Col. Nicholas Krawciw, Army War College; Joseph Lesawyer, UCCA executive vice-president and UNA president; Ivan Oleksyn and Edward Popil, president and financial secretary, respectively, of Ukrainian Workingmen's Association; Col. Walter Steck, president of Veterans Coordinating Committee of N.Y.; Roman Danyluk and Stephen Sheparovych, 1st Division of the Ukrainian National Army; Myroslav Muc and Orest Slupchynsky, Brody Lev, Inc., and Mrs. Rosalie Polche, United American Ukrainian Organizations of Greater New York.

Written messages were received from President Jimmy Carter, Governor Hugh L. Carey, Gen. Samuel Jaskilka (of Ukrainian descent), the Ukrainian

National Women's League of America, "Providence" Association of Ukrainian Catholics and others.

The resolutions called on the U.S. government to stand firm in its negotiations during the Belgrade preparatory conference, and to intercede on behalf of Mykola Rudenko, Oleksiy Tykhy, Mykola Matusevych and Myroslav Marynovych, all members of the Kiev Helsinki group, who were arrested early this year.

Twelve "Suppressed Cultures" Stage Exhibit in New York.—Under the umbrella of the Council of East European Ethnic Cultures, an exhibit was held for one week beginning April 30, 1977, uniting 12 distinct groups whose ethnic cultures are being "Sovietized" in the USSR. The exhibit was held at the Ukrainian Institute of America and the Yeshiva University Museum, both in New York City. It featured for the first time under one roof examples of the suppressed art, artifacts, religious arts and symbols, handicrafts, photos, and other historical mementos of the Armenian, Byelorussian, Crimean Tartar, Estonian, Georgian, Jewish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, Tartar, Turkmen and Ukrainian communities now living under the Soviet flag.

On display there also were priceless Bibles and Torah scrolls, paintings, original books, manuscripts and newspapers, jewelry, tapestries, icons, and a gallery of photos of artistic and religious institutions, now destroyed, that have not been shown publicly since they were spirited out of the USSR. Honorary chairpersons for the exhibit were Ms. Patricia Barnes, Congressman Edward Koch, Councilman Paul O'Dwyer, and Dr. Pavel Litvinov, grandson of Maxim Litvinov and co-editor of the *Chronicle of Current Events*, now being published in New York.

II. UKRAINIANS IN THE DIASPORA

CANADA

Lidia Burachynska, Ukrainian Veteran Women's Leader, Elected President of World Ukrainian Women's Federation.—Mrs. Lidia Burachynska, a veteran Ukrainian women's leader, was elected president of the World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations at the Third World Congress of Ukrainian Women from the free world, held May 26 to 29, 1977 at the Sheraton Hotel in Toronto. Some 70 representatives of Ukrainian women's organizations from Canada, the United States, England, West Germany, Belgium, Austria, Argentina, Brazil and Australia took part in the congress, also attended by some 400 guests. During the congress a rally in defense of Ukrainian political prisoners in Ukraine was held at City Hall, with over 1,000 persons in attendance. Representatives from all Ukrainian faiths, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, and other community groups attended the opening ceremonies, with Mrs. Stefania Sawchuk, outgoing president officially opening the congress, and Bishop Isidore Borecky of the Ukrainian Catholic Diocese of Toronto offering the invocation.

The agenda of the congress comprised discussions on educational, social, financial, cultural and organizational matters. An exhibit of dissident works, women's literature, paintings, embroidery and photographs of the Federation's—was also staged.

In addition to Mrs. Burachynska, the following were elected to the executive board of the Federation: Mrs. S. Sawchuk, honorary president; Dr. Natalia Pazuniak, first vice-president; Vera Buchynska, second vice-president; Stefania Bernadyn, Volodymyra Cenko and Iryna Skulska, secretaries; Lidia Diachenko, treasurer; Daria Buydunyk, financial secretary; committee chairwomen: Anna Maria Barna, organizational; Luboslava Shandra, program; Myroslava Lasowska, cultural; Lida Dackiw, folk art; Maria Dolishna, educational; Natalia Iwaniw, social aid; Olena Prociuk, international liaison; Slava Drabak, USSR analysis; honorary members: Isydora Kosach-Borysova, Hanna Dmytrenko-Ratych, Kateryna Kraus, Maria Solonyuka and Stefania Pushkar.

The auditing committee comprises Iryna Kryveniuk, chairwoman; S. Prociuk, P. Riznyk, A. Mirchuk, A. Chayka and I. Kachanivska. Iryna Pelen-ska was appointed editor of *The Ukrainian Woman in the World* quarterly.

Ukrainian Canadian Committee Appeals for Rudenko and Tykhy.—On July 5, 1977 the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) sent a telegram to Donald Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, urging intervention by the Canadian government for the release of Rudenko and Tykhy.

Signed by Serhiy Radchuk and P. Bashuk, president and secretary general of the UCC, the telegram read:

The recent dispatches from Moscow confirm that Mykola Rudenko and Oleksa Tykhy, members of the Helsinki Monitoring Group in Ukraine, have been secretly sentenced to long prison terms. This proves that they are denied the right to ask questions on why the Helsinki Treaty is not being implemented in their country, an activity which is guaranteed by the Helsinki Accords, Part I, Section 7.

Rudenko and Tykhy were sentenced notwithstanding resolutions unanimously adopted in February on their behalf by Canada's House of Commons and Senate. They are the first from the Helsinki Monitoring Groups to be silenced, as the representatives of the Helsinki Group in Ukraine.

On behalf of thousands of Ukrainian Canadians who are deeply concerned about the inhuman treatment of their kin in Ukraine, we ask you to immediately intervene with the Soviet government and protest at the Conference in Belgrade against this political verdict, and to demand their release with the right to leave the Soviet Union and settle in any country of their choice.

GERMANY

OBITUARY: Prof. Dmytro Chyzhevsky, foremost expert on Ukrainian literature and linguistics, and professor at Ukrainian, German and American universities, died in Heidelberg on April 17, 1977 at the age of 83.

Born in 1894 in Alexandria, Ukraine, Dr. Chyzhevsky obtained his secondary education in his native city and then went on to study, first, natural sciences at Petersburg University and, later, philology, history and literature at the University of Kiev.

During the Bolshevik upheaval Dr. Chyzhevsky was arrested and placed in a concentration camp from which he escaped in 1921 and made his way to Germany, where he completed his higher education. He taught first at the Higher Ukrainian Pedagogical Institute in Prague, and later at the

Ukrainian Free University. From 1939 through World War II, he taught at Halle University in Germany, and after the war through 1950 at Marburg University.

In 1950 he began teaching at Harvard University and continued his lecturing through 1957 when he returned to West Germany and assumed the post of professor and director of the Slavic Institute at Heidelberg.

One of the world's leading Slavists, Prof. Chyzhevsky's bibliography encompasses more than 800 works in Ukrainian, German and English. He authored the monumental *A History of Ukrainian Literature*, which in 1975 was published in English under the editorship of Prof. George S.N. Luckyj of the University of Toronto.

Prof. Chyzhevsky was a member of numerous scholarly societies and academies, including the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.

POLAND

Ukrainians Form Helsinki Group in Poland, Appeal to the West for Help.—The Ukrainian Central Information Service in Toronto, Canada has reported that Ukrainians in Poland established a group to monitor the application of the Helsinki Accords to the Ukrainian minority in Poland.

The anonymous signers of the document explained that Ukrainians are not only oppressed in the USSR, but in many East European countries, as well. They wrote that while the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in Ukraine reported widely on human rights violations in Ukraine, little is said in the West about the fate of Ukrainians in Poland.

"The West learns of the suffering of the Ukrainian nation and its heroic struggle from national activists in the native land, but almost no one speaks about the fate and circumstances of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians living in Soviet satellites, where they are the subject of national discrimination and intense assimilation," said the document, written sometime in April, 1977.

Citing their own plight as an example, the Ukrainian group in Poland said that "Poland is considered one of the more humanitarian countries within the Soviet satellites, but the minority rights provisions prescribed by the Helsinki Accords are used only for propaganda purposes."

They further stated that the Helsinki Accords were a windfall for Ukrainians, which gave them a source of hope "for a better tomorrow for our undaunted nation."

"That is why we join the formation in Kiev on November 6, 1976, of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords and seek that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights become the foundation for relations between governments and citizens, without regard to their nationality or religious beliefs," they wrote.

They further stated that since 1956 life for Ukrainians in Poland seemed to be improving. They said that Ukrainians in Poland were experiencing a renaissance.

That year the Polish government approved the establishment of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (USKT). The Society began to publish regularly a newspaper called *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word).

Ukrainian scholarship also took a step forward, they said, with the formation of schools of Ukrainian studies, and the opening of Ukrainian departments at several universities.

"Ukrainian life emerged from the underground and began to flourish. But what happened to this renaissance?" they asked.

They said that despite some official easing of pressure on the Ukrainian community, Ukrainians in Poland are still discriminated against.

Those Ukrainians who were forcibly exiled from their native territory in Western Ukraine to western Poland still cannot return there, they wrote. The group also said that anti-Ukrainian articles still appear in some Polish publications.

"In reality history is repeating itself. We live in an era of intensified discrimination, an even more intensified assimilation of the Ukrainian minority than that which took place in (Western) Ukraine between the two wars," said the Ukrainian appeal.

They appealed to Ukrainians in the free world to employ every possible means to publicize the struggle for human and national rights in Soviet satellite countries, "which is tightly connected with the struggle for freedom in our native land." The Ukrainian group in Poland also urged the Ukrainian Churches in the West to support the full implementation of the human and national rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords.

OBITUARY: Rev. Mitrata Vasyl Hrynyk, outstanding Ukrainian Catholic theologian and defender of the rights of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Poland, died in Peremyshl on May 31, 1977 at the age of 81. Since 1967 he had served as Vicar General of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Father Hrynyk belonged to a group of exceptionally talented priests of the Peremyshl Eparchy. He was a professor of theology and a close collaborator of Archbishop Josaphat Kotsylovsky. During the First World War he took part in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine, to which his four brothers gave their lives. The fifth brother died last year in Western Ukraine after serving many years in Soviet jails and concentration camps.

After the end of World War II Father Hrynyk was arrested by the Polish Communist police and kept several years in jail, where he underwent tortures and chicanery, which greatly undermined his health. Released from jail he served as a pastor near Gdansk; in 1967 he was named a Vicar General of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and moved to Peremyshl, the seat of one of the oldest Ukrainian Catholic eparchies. For the past ten years he exerted his efforts to get back the Ukrainian Cathedral in Peremyshl, which was taken illegally by the Polish Catholic hierarchy. His appeals to Cardinal S. Wyszynski and Apostolic Envoy Archbishop A. Casaroli remained unanswered. Also, for years he tried to get permission to call a "little sobor" (assembly) of Ukrainian Catholic priests in Poland, but the permission was refused by the Polish hierarchy unless the meeting would be conducted in Polish, a condition which the Ukrainian prelate flatly rejected. Finally, in 1972, such an assembly was permitted, at which many problems connected with the Ukrainian rite were discussed and ironed out. He built a parochial house as well as a mausoleum at the Ukrainian cemetery, with the names

of outstanding Ukrainian clergymen imprinted on a marble plaque. **Mitrata Hrynyk** was buried in the mausoleum with hundreds of the faithful taking part in the mournful rite.

BULGARIA

Western Writers Demand Release of Rudenko, Berdnyk.—Thirty-eight writers from the United States, Canada and Western Europe signed a joint petition demanding the release of **Mykola Rudenko** and **Oles Berdnyk** and urged participants at the International Writers' Conference held in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia to support their demand, according to the "Smoloskyp" Ukrainian Information Service.

"If this conference is to be true to its avowed purpose, then its participants must come to the defense of two of their colleagues who are being repressed for the sole reason that they, in the spirit of Helsinki, actively tried to implement the ideals of peace and human rights, the same ideals to which this conference is dedicated," said the petition.

Signing the appeal were **Arthur Koestler**, **Friedrich Durremant**, **Leonie Adams**, **Edward Albee**, **Joseph Bruchac III**, **Prof. H. Brugmans**, **Allan Bullock**, **G.T.R. Cairncross**, **George Canellos**, **A. Bessel**, **William Clair**, **Andrei Coderescu**, **Robert Creeley**, **Ronald Duncan**, **Jeannie Ebner**, **Luc Estang**, **Edvin Forest**, **Kimon Friar**, **Xen Fritton**, **David Garnett**, **Helen Gardner**, **Stella Gibbons**, **Herbert Gold**, **Jan H. de Groot**, **Daniel Guerin**, **Edward Krichel**, **Warren Leampan**, **Bernard Malamud**, **Marion Montgomery**, **Iris Murdoch**, **Anne Roiphe**, **Pierre Seghers**, **Michael Mott**, **Richard G. Stern**, **Jesse Stuart**, **Paddy Chayefsky**, **Wallace Markfield** and **Prof. Fabino Buscalferri**.

The International Writers' Conference, which was held from June 7-14, 1977, consisted of representatives of the 35 nations which signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975. It was dedicated to "The Writer and Peace: the Spirit of Helsinki and the Obligation of Craftsmen of Culture."

The petition was distributed during a press conference on June 10, 1977 by **Andriy Karkoc**, a correspondent of "Smoloskyp" and a member of the Washington-based Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee.

Among the 150 writers there were 13 from the USSR. The sole Ukrainian writer, who was included in the Soviet delegation, was **Vasiliy Kozachenko**, head of the Union of Writers of Ukraine.

III. IN CAPTIVE UKRAINE

Rudenko and Tykhy Receive Heavy Sentences.—**Mykola Rudenko**, Ukrainian poet and head of the Kiev Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, and **Oleksiy Tykhy**, a member, were sentenced to the full extent of the law on Friday July 1, 1977, on alleged charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. The secret trial was held in the town of Druzhkivka in the Donetsk area of Ukraine.

Rudenko, 56, was sentenced to seven years incarceration and five years exile, and **Tykhy**, 50, received ten years confinement and five years exile. The maximum sentence was demanded by the prosecutor.

Rudenko and **Tykhy** were the first two dissidents associated with watch groups in the Soviet Union to be sentenced. The trial was held in a

closed factory on June 23. Relatives and friends of the defendants were not notified until June 28. Tykhy refused the appointed attorney and acted as his own defense attorney. Rudenko accepted the designated lawyer just for advisory purposes, but the court-appointed advisor repeatedly sided with the prosecution.

Members of the Kiev and Moscow Helsinki groups who attempted to attend the trial were intercepted by the local militia and confined for the duration of the trial.

In their final statement on July 1, both defendants pleaded not guilty to charges of anti-Soviet agitation. They said they only spoke the truth, reported the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political prisoners.

Kiev Committee Denounces Trial of Rudenko and Tykhy.—Members of the Kiev Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords scored the trial of Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy.

In a statement released in London on July 2 by the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, the Kiev committee said that the investigation and trial were conducted by "gangster-like methods."

"Such is 'socialist democracy'! And so, seven years strict regime and five years exile for the leader of the Ukrainian Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, the poet and philosopher Mykola Rudenko; and ten years of special regime and five years exile for a member of the group, the schoolteacher Oleksiy Tykhy," said the Kiev Group members. "Can this be called a trial? No."

The document, called, "Declaration of the Ukrainian Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords on the Trial of Mykola Rudenko and Oleksa Tykhy," was signed by Petro Vins, Petro Hryhorenko, Olha Heyko-Matusevych, Oksana Meshko and Nina Strokata-Karavanska.

The statement further said:

"People are tried openly and justly (if they are criminals), but in this case people have been tyrannized for many years and afterwards secretly taken away for investigation, in a gangster-like manner, 800 kilometers away from their native city. For the trial they chose a place (Druzhkivka) a hundred kilometers even further away. 'Krasnyi Ugolok' (Red Corner), a recreation club, situated in a closed factory, was transformed into a court scene and filled with a carefully selected public. No friends or observers were allowed into the court. Not even close friends or family had been informed either about the end of the investigation or the beginning of the trial..."

Ukrainian, Who Marked U.S. Bicentennial, Sentenced.—A former Ukrainian political prisoner, who was working on a sculpture marking the American Bicentennial, was sentenced by a Chernyiv court. He may serve up to 23 years.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a Russian exile writer and Nobel prize winner, and Rep. James M. Jeffords (R-Vt.) made public documents of the Moscow Helsinki group relating the arrest of Petro Ruban. The UPI reported his arrest in a story on June 16, 1977.

Ruban, who served 16 years for alleged Ukrainian nationalist activity, was initially charged with "engaging in private enterprise" and "theft of state property."

According to the report, Ruban worked in the souvenir department of a state factory in Pryluky, and spent his free time working on a Bicentennial sculpture. The Press Service of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) reported on the basis of material supplied from Moscow by Tatiana Khodorovich and Viktor Nekipilov that apparently somebody did not like the idea of Ruban making a Bicentennial sculpture. The unfinished sculpture was eventually stolen from his workshop.

At his trial, according to Khodorovich and Nekipilov, Ruban said that his desire for Ukraine's secession from the USSR was the real reason for the arrest.

"I am being tried because I wanted to see Ukraine secede from the Soviet system," he said at his trial.

Initially, during the first trial on December 29, 1976, Ruban, whom the two Russian dissidents described as a "Ukrainian patriot," and a talented woodcarver," was charged with "engaging in private enterprise" and "theft of state property." He was then sentenced to 13 years in prison.

Ruban's case was reviewed by a Chernyiv court on April 19, 1977, and the charge of "anti-Soviet agitation" was added. This offense, according to the Criminal Code, carries a sentence of up to 10 years.

"With one move, the authorities repaid Ruban for his idea of honoring the United States of America, and for possessing differing views," wrote Khodorovich and Nekipilov.

Ruban's name appeared on the list of 15 political prisoners, nine of whom were Ukrainian, which Dr. Andrei D. Sakharov included in a letter to President Jimmy Carter on January 21, 1977.

"No Gains in Rights in Ukraine Since Helsinki Talks," Says Ukrainian Dissident.—In a letter to the participants of the Belgrade review conference, Oksana Meshko, a member of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, said in Kiev that there have been no gains in human rights in Ukraine since the Helsinki talks.

"The following state of affairs exists: After signing the Helsinki Accords, the leaders of governmental organs did nothing to implement the Final Act as regards humanitarian affairs, specifically about human rights," wrote Mrs. Meshko.

A copy of her letter was received in New York by the Press Service of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. The mother of Alexander Serhienko, a Ukrainian political prisoner, she said that repressions in Ukraine are rampant. She also wrote that copies of the Helsinki Accords have been confiscated from each member of the Kiev group, and the right of self-defense is regarded by the procurator and the KGB as "anti-Soviet."

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