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

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Editorial and Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

203 Second Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10003

Tel.: (212) 228-6840
228-6841

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE:

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG has been professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, since 1954, and at various times headed the Russian Area Studies Program and the Western European Area Studies Program there. He was born in St. Augustine, Fla., in 1922, and studied at the University of Chicago, the University of Frankfurt, and Columbia University, where he received the Ph.D. and certificate of the Russian Institute. During 1965-67 he was president of the AAASS and is presently a director of the Conference of European Problems. His works include *Ukrainian Nationalism* (1955, 2nd ed. 1963); *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (1959, 2nd ed. 1966); *The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present* (1961); *Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union: An Introduction* (1962, 2nd ed. 1967, 3rd ed. 1974); and *The European Administrative Elite* (1973). He edited *Soviet Partisans in World War II* (1964).

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Professor of Economics at Georgetown University; in October, 1976, he was re-elected President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) for his ninth consecutive term; Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC), he was also elected President of the American Council for World Freedom (ACWF) in September, 1976; Director of the Institute on Comparative Political Systems at Georgetown University; he is the author of several books and a lecturer on international affairs; in April, 1977, he took part in the 10th WACL Conference in Taipei and addressed the Legislative Yuan in the capital of the Republic of China.

LUBOMYR R. WYNAR, Professor and Director of the Program for the Study of Ethnic Publications at Kent State University; founder and editor of *Ukrainian Historian*; member of numerous learned and professional associations; author of many books and articles on history, culture, political science and bibliography, including *Andrew Voynarovsky* (Munich, 1962), *History of Early Ukrainian Printing, 1491-1600* (University of Denver, 1962); *Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky* (Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1964); *History: A Selective and Annotated Bibliography* (University of Colorado, 1964); *Guide to Reference Materials in Political Science*, 2 Vols. (Colorado Bibliographical Institute, 1966); *American Political Parties* (Libraries Unlimited, 1969); *Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1894-1930* (Ukrainian Historical Association, 1971), and *Encyclopedic Directory of Ethnic Newspapers and Periodicals in U.S.A.* (Libraries Unlimited, 1972).

FROM HELSINKI TO BELGRADE

Editorial

> . . . The Mission regrets that it could not confer with all signatory countries at this time and intends to do so in the future. The limited time available precluded visits to some countries. The Warsaw Pact countries, however, refused to permit the Commission to visit their countries, an action which runs counter to the very spirit of Helsinki . . .[1]

Two years ago, this review commented on the Helsinki Conference:

"History will undoubtedly prove that the Helsinki 'summit' meeting was a tragedy not only for the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, but for Europe as a whole, and in bringing this tragedy about the United States and Canada were active participants..."[2]

Our objection to the conference embodied at least three vaild reasons:

a) The conference, manipulated as it was by the Soviet government, precluded the representation of at least 90 million Europeans. These included 48 million Ukrainians, 18 million Byelorussians, over eight million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and over 12 million Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians. Possessing no political voice under the oppressive regime of Communist Russia, one could hardly expect them to be heard at Helsinki.

b) The conference was initiated by Moscow for the sole purpose of having the current political *status quo* in Europe approved—of sanctifying the division of Europe into a slave and a free Europe. It also served as a substitute for a German treaty. Moscow made it abundantly clear that it saw the Conference solely as a vehicle to obtain recognition of the "inviolability of frontiers" in all of Europe.

c) In view of the nature of the Soviet system and its rigid control of the people under its domination, it was the height of political naivete to hope that the Kremlin would abide by the Final Act of the

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[1] *Report of the Study Mission to Europe to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, Washington, D.C., December 6, 1976, p. 1.

[2] "The Helsinki Tragedy, (editorial), *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3 (New York: Autumn, 1975), p. 246.

Helsinki Accords, especially as far as Basket Three was concerned (which called for human contacts, flow of information and other intellectual exchanges).

The United States, moved blissfully benign by the Ford-Kissinger policy of detente, went to Helsinki with almost an evangelistic fervor, claiming that its participation would help in the advancement of human rights in the USSR and its satellites. Soon thereafter, however, we saw the emergence of the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," the thrust of which is an "ideological assimilation" of the satellite states in order to make them more "manageable" by the Kremlin.

Former President Ford, even after his defeat in the 1976 presidential elections, continued to maintain that the Helsinki pact was "good and beneficial," and that the U.S. should stand by it. But his statement to the effect that there is "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe" explains a lot about the thinking of the Ford-Kissinger White House.

There is no doubt that the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress seriously believed that the Helsinki Accords would become vital instrumentalities in the implementation of human rights behind the Iron Curtain and in the whole world as well. Toward that end the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was established in Washington, D.C., consisting of U.S. senators and congressmen and government appointees.

Subsequently, in November, 1976, a Study Mission of the CSCE was sent to Europe to gather information about the current status of implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Accords and to establish contacts with key European political and governmental officials as well as private individuals and organizations concerned with various aspects of the implementation process. It was composed of Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-FL), the Commission Chairman; Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI); Rep. Jonathan Bingham (D-NY); Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ); Rep. Paul Simon (D-IL).

Significantly, former Secretary of State Kissinger prohibited three State Department members of the Commission from joining the Study Mission virtually concurrently with the refusal of the USSR and the satellite countries to allow members of the Commission to visit behind the Iron Curtain.

Travelling individually, Commissioners and staff aides met with government officials and parliamentarians in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Holy See, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and

Yugoslavia, as well as experts at NATO, the European Community, the Council of Europe, UNESCO, the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration. the OECD, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and so forth. In addition, the Study Mission met with a half dozen private refugee organizations and a number of recent Soviet exiles.

Despite the refusal of the USSR and the satellite governments to cooperate with the Study Mission, the report the Mission submitted on its return is quite optimistic.

REACTION BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

The Study Mission obtained direct evidence that the Helsinki Accords stirred a remarkable response of hope and even meaningful action among the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, that is, the satellite countries. Press reports from East Germany, in addition, speak of the agreements stimulating "restiveness," as expressed in thousands of new applications to emigrate.

On May 12, 1976, the Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR was formed in Moscow. Headed by physicist Yuri Orlov, a correspondent member of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR, this bold group included other well-known activists of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union.

On November 12, 1976, a Ukrainian committee was organized in Kiev, known as the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Its formation was especially important for a number of reasons. First, Ukraine, a nation of some 50 million and a charter member of the U.N., had not been represented at the Helsinki Conference. Secondly, violations by authorities of human and national rights are probably more frequent and far more blatant in Ukraine than in any other so-called republic of the USSR and probably in all of East-Central Europe. Thirdly, such violations are rarely reported in the Western press because few foreign correspondents in the USSR have access to sources outside of Moscow.

The Helsinki Accords, according to the findings of the Study Mission, have evoked a heart-warming response. A number of human rights committees have emerged in addition to those in Russia and Ukraine, e.g., Lithuania and Georgia in the USSR. In the satellite countries, Helsinki groups have made their appearance in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania. It would appear that the Soviet Union has quite a way yet to go in realizing its individual-negating ideal of a "Homo Sovieticus"—the 1984 Orwellian vision of the robot citizen.

THE CARTER COMMITMENT

The human rights movement has received the powerful support of President Carter, not because of the Helsinki Accords but rather in spite of them.

In his telegram to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America just a few weeks before his election to the presidency of the United States, he declared:

> ...The Helsinki Agreement has become a lopsided victory for the Soviet Union. When I become President, I will review that weak and unacceptable document. I am not afraid of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union...[3]

This was not mere electioneering. He reiterated his stand on human rights in a stirring address to the United Nations on March 17, 1977.

President Carter's stand on human rights, as could be expected, has added a new dimension to U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. For instance, for years the Kremlin has been campaigning against "Radio Free Europe" and "Radio Liberty," accusing them of "fomenting a cold war atmosphere" and of "instigating anti-Soviet feeling" throughout the Soviet Union. Under previous administrations these important media of truth dissemination were constantly under the threat of being "liquidated." Now President Carter has demanded an increase of expenditures for these important instrumentalities. The fact is that when a President of the United States openly makes an issue of human rights in the Soviet Union, he has taken the most threatening of all possible postures toward the Soviet Union.

"The issue of human rights is more threatening to the Soviet regime than the cruise missile or naval bases in the Indian Ocean. This is because it challenges the regime's very claim to legitimacy, as distinct from its mere military security," writes a perceptive American columnist.[4]

The Soviet regime has become exceedingly sensitive to the issue of legitimacy, because that legitimacy is not based on the consent of the peoples, and, in fact, never has been. This is incontestably true in the case of the non-Russian peoples forcibly coerced into the USSR, such as the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Eston-

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[3] See "Governor Carter's Telegrams to the UCCA Congress," in *Pertinent Documents* section, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (New York: Winter, 1976), pp. 417-418.

[4] Irving Kristol, "Detente and Human Rights," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 1977.

ians, Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and the Turkic peoples of Turkestan (over 35 million), who detest Soviet rule as an alien and harsh one, imposed upon them by sheer military force.

Therefore, President Carter is going to have to chose between detente, at its best a suspension of reality, with the Soviet Union and support of human rights in the USSR. And, thankfully, President Carter appears more and more as one with two feet firmly planted on the ground.

THE HELSINKI RESULTS

In the Semiannual Report of the President, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe related some rather meager results on Basket Three of the Helsinki Accords. They dealt with such topics as human contacts, family visits and reunification, emigration, travel and tourism, meetings among young people, sports, information, conditions for journalists, and so forth.[5]

Results are far less meaningful than expected, owing mainly to the lack of cooperation on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites

THE BELGRADE REVIEW CONFERENCE: WHAT HOPE?

The first post-Helsinki meeting of the 35 signatories to begin on June 15, 1977, in Belgrade Yugoslavia is slated to be an agenda-setting conference, at a level of experts, to determine procedures and timing of what should be a substantive review session.

There is no assurance that the conference will not become a futile verbal duel between the West and the East. The Communist governments will, as is the rule, try to avoid discussion of their past performance, engaging instead in generalities. Meanwhile, arrests of dissidents in Ukraine, Russia and other Communist-ruled countries go on and on. In the vast Soviet cacophony of propaganda, protestations and exhortations, one voice alone is unacceptable: the voice of dissent. Fortunately, America has regained its voice in the person of President Carter.

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[5] *First Semiannual Report of the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (Submitted to the Committee on International Relations) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing House, December, 1976), pp. 39-60

HELSINKI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

The subject of the Helsinki Accords and the measure of compliance exhibited toward them by the USSR are matters that will be discussed for months on end. Based on some personal involvement with the subject, my approach here entails in as succinct a manner as possible several observations leading up to Helsinki, some necessary conceptual notes regarding the "baskets" of the agreement, a concentration on the outstanding cases of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine, a few grounded points on properly interpreted human rights and the conduct of our foreign policy, and finally, in conclusive fashion, certain specific recommendations for our position at the forthcoming meeting in Belgrade. All of this is closely interrelated, and I believe it will contribute to any official monitoring objectives as concern additional perceptions into the subject, added documentation, and the dissipation of many current misconceptions and inaccuracies surrounding the subject.

— THE PRE-HELSINKI PERIOD —

My observations leading up to Helsinki are founded on some close, personal experiences. They convey a formed perspective which, I believe, cannot but receive consideration in our future actions. Toward the end of July, 1975,—on the very eve of President Ford's departure for Helsinki—it was my privilege to participate in a meeting with the President, who quite ably explained his reasons for going to Helsinki. It should be noted that the announcement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had been made the week, before, not with accident during Captive Nations Week, and many had already interpreted the scheduled CSCE as a psycho-political victory for Moscow. This interpretation I did not share. The President delivered a fine statement of justification, but it became quickly evident that a follow-up programming of this particular project would be virtually zero. My own suggestion for an initial reiteration by the

President of the statement's cardinal points was brusquely negated the following day at Andrews Air Force Base on the misguided advice of the Secretary of State. The usual rot about irritating the Russians was the offered explanation. In this and similar undertakings with Moscow, any intent to irritate is non-existent; but there is every intent to be honest with ourselves and the facts, and to the extent this intent is realized, we will gain even greater respect from the Russians. Wasn't it the man who wrote considerably about *The Rights of Man* at the beginning of our Republic, Thomas Paine himself, who also taught "He who dares not offend cannot be honest."

An early article of mine treats of this and other related observations.[1] Many of us are aware of the consequent foot-dragging on Helsinki by the previous Administration, which necessitated the formation of Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, but are we cognizant of its total indifference to the idea of urging the direct representation in Helsinki of certain excluded East European nations? In the contrived framework of representation, the three Baltic nations, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and others were not directly represented at Helsinki. Moscow's supposed representation of them via the USSR state was legally insubstantial and awkwardly indirect. That, for example, Ukraine, the largest non-Russian republic in all of Eastern Europe, was not directly represented reflects ill on Moscow and poorly on the judgment of our negotiators. Evidently, when it suits the former, our representatives can deal with Ukraine and Byelorussia in the U.N. and other international organizations; when it doesn't, the outcome is a befogged one as in Helsinki.

Moreover, it was only natural for those who for years have been properly concerned with all of Eastern Europe, and its significance for war or peace on a global basis, to react positively to the Helsinki Accords and, perhaps more so, to their possibilities for the future in the compatible spirit of universal human rights. Indeed, as it may very well turn out, we contemplated a long and engaging haul in the matter. In addition, the pursuit of the Accords has been viewed on the basis of compliance not only with regard to the over-emphasized Basket Three but also the others. The first basket, for example, with its principle of the self-determination of peoples is surely of fundamental importance to a nation that historically has advanced and practiced this principle since its very inception 200 years ago. The

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[1] "CSCE and The Captive Nations," *The Ukrainian Quarterly,* Autumn 1975, pp. 247-257.

seemingly exclusive stress by the West on the third basket is clearly misplaced. From an analytical point of view, Basket One, which the so-called socialist states emphasize, can be maintained as being more fundamentally important for human rights in their total integrated sense than any of the other baskets. If our approach in Belgrade is to be logical and effective, then a reordering of emphases is itself in order, starting with Basket One and its essential principle on the self-determination of peoples and nations and adjusting this reorder to a precisely ordered conception of human rights. Much is uttered nowadays about human rights, but the indistinctions are glaring and confusing, and the subject requires far more thought than has been shown in all concerned spheres of our society. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance has attempted a definition of human rights, but his admixture of rights and liberties clearly indicates the lack of intelligible order.[2]

— THE SCALE OF HUMAN RIGHTS —

Human rights have been an object of concern and study to philosophers for centuries, and as with other phenomena in objective reality they lend themselves to graded distinctions with equal worth within their respective generic categories. All presuppose a metaphysical basis found in our understanding and perceptions of man. Related to all the first three baskets of the Accords, human rights as voiced by the President in terms of a firm commitment assume groups and nations, even into the various freedoms man has talked about and aspired to for so long a time. A healthy and determinative shift occurs here, from the wantor desire to be free to the inherent right to be free. The basic importance of this shift and its enormous possibilities cannot be too strongly emphasized and shall be related later to the new directions in our foreign policy.

Thus, in the generic order of human rights, there is first the category of personal rights. These rights cover a broad, metaphysically-based range of the right to live, to multiply, to hold property, to develop, to express oneself and so forth in the ways of personal choices for free action, and always without encroachment or coercive effect upon others with similarly founded rights. When personal rights to mobilize, associate and socialize are exercised, the sphere of civil rights is entered into. On this higher and broader plane of collective expression, civil rights of group assembly, worship, work, oral and

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[2] "Vance: Avoid Arrogance on Human Rights", *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1977.

written speech, opportunity for development, representation and the like come into more aggregative play. Lastly, and still more extensive, the highest category of national rights, expressive of a moral organism called a nation with all its attributes of geographical territory, history, language, religion and so on, encompasses crystallized rights of existence, development and growth, the *balanced* and *responsible* exercise of which safeguards the expression of personal and civil rights and also contributes to international order, law, peace and an expanding community of free and responsible nations in whatever form of chosen state. It will be observed that both qualitatively and quantitatively the generic order of human rights is given to necessary objective distinction and gradation.

By what one can readily observe fourther, the uses of this objective scale of human rights are especially necessary for an effective treatment of the Helsinki baskets and the measurement of signatory compliance with them. The rife confusion is signified by the almost exclusive emphasis on Basket Three, single, inaccurate currency of "national minorities of the USSR," the reduction of human rights to the level merely of personal rights, the indiscriminate lumping of all dissidents as one, and the neglect of legal opportunities that an accurate conception of human rights in toto would stimulate. Let's take the last two here as examples.

Dissidents in the USSR differ in the emphases they place on human rights, according to our scale of human rights and regardless of degrees of overlap. Jewish dissidents seek mainly the exercise of their personal right to mobilize and emigrate; Russian dissidents express on the whole their civil rights to assemble, to criticize without fear of imprisonment, to be represented and so on; non-Russian dissidents stress chiefly their national rights to preserve their cultures and languages, to govern and determine for themselves, and in some instances to secede from the so-called Union. Viewed accurately in this light, these types of dissidence in the USSR, with degrees of cross-reference as to advocacy, obviously relate to both Basket one and three of the Accords. As to our second example, a legal treaty such as the Genocide Convention can logically be only applied to rights of ethnic, religious, racial and other groups and also of nations to exist and not to personal rights.

If with deep conviction and heartfelt proclivity we believe in human rights in toto, we should show no timidity or false restraint in advancing human rights on all three levels at the Belgrade evaluating conference. In this connection, it would not be out of place here to stress the crucial importance of accurate concepts and conceptions and

the honesty to tell it like it is by illustrating it with some familiar recent events. Though given to a broader context and wider horizons of analysis, it need scarcely be adumbrated that the standard captive nations analysis warmly embraces the issue of human rights in toto and as an intrinsic "natural." As applied to Eastern Europe, meaning not erroneously to the borders of the USSR but to the Urals line, the captive nations reality possesses a relative analytic ultimacy that logically renders the discussion of other issues secondary, though not second in importance. Put another way, if there were no captive nations in Eastern Europe, there would no need to discuss Helsinki, NATO, SALT etc.

Because of the lack of this well-grounded perception a Presidency was lost in our country. The unforgettable Ford gaffe on "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe" incurred during an upswing momentum a cost of irreplaceable time that his own pollster best described in these words: "It left us dead in the water for about 10 days." The gaffe was no slip-of-the-tongue but rather a reflection of a mental attitude similar to that prior to the Czecho-Slovak eye-opener in 1968, when in high places it was claimed that there were no more satellites in Central Europe. Desperate recourse to the President's Captive Nations Week proclamation only served to confirm this further because its vague generalities represented just another version bearing little resemblance to Congress' resolution of 1959.[8] In the spirit of telling it like it is, about the most accurate and honest statement emerging from the previous Administrations was provided by Vice President Rockefeller when he observed, "Whether we like it or not, a continuing attempt is under way to organize the world into a new empire in which the Soviet sun never sets... The era of old world imperialism has gone, and yet we find ourselves faced with a new and far more complex form of imperialism, a mixture of Czarism and Marxism with colonial appendages." In short, the lesson of all this is that even a nation such as we know it could be lost if we continue to shun realities and fail to formulate concepts, not to speak of courses of action, in conformity with them. This applies to the treatment of human rights.

— TWO OUTSTANDING GENOCIDAL CASES —

In concentrating on two outstanding genocidal cases in the USSR—which I stress at the outset are of continuous and current import

[8] See *Tenth Anniversary of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, 1959-1969*, US GPO, Wash. 1969: also the forthcoming volume on *The Bicentennial Salute to the Captive Nations*, US GPO, Wash. 1977.

since Helsinki and in the name of human rights—I should like to make a few preliminary points. From my own studies and direct experience with the House's famous Kersten Committee two decades ago, I doubt that there is any nation that has suffered repressions of human rights on a massive scale, for the length of time, and in an extensive variety of ways under what is called communism, but more realistically Soviet Russian domination, than has the Ukrainian nation since 1918. You name it, the Ukrainian people have had it—imposed wars, man-made famines, Potemkin representations, Russification, large-scale purges and murders, deportations and heavy concentration camp representation, widespread KGB surveilance and illegal arrests, economic exploitation and victimization by Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, discrimination and an assortment of genocidal incissions. Let's not forget, Krushchev himself admitted that Stalin entertained the thought of deporting close to 40 million Ukrainians at the time and scattering them about Asia, but the logistical problem was unmanageable.

Most of these ugly negations of human rights in Ukraine have continued in the post-Stalin period in varying degrees and in more subtle ways. In the repression of rights on all three levels—personal, civil and national— a long inventory of names can be compiled of arrests and imprisonments before and after Helsinki. Let me just mention a few here: Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, journalist, re-arrested '73; Valentyn Moroz, historian, re-arrested '70; Vasyl Stus, poet, arrested '72; Yuriy R. Shukhevych, re-arrested '72; Oksana Popovych, historian, re-arrested '74; Stephania Shabatura, painter, arrested '72; Nadia O. Svitlychna, teacher, arrested '73; Mykola Rudenko, human rights activist, arrested '77—and the list goes on and on. Most of these and countless others are today serving out their sentences in the Mordovian concentration camp and prisons. As in Nazi times, thousands are unaccounted for.

This approach in tacking the problem is, of course, necessary and documentative. However, in my judgment, unless it is strongly supplemented by a structured, institutional approach—which on our scale of human rights as applied to Ukraine must realistically be askewed to the level of national rights—inventory-taking alone will tend to be dispersive and will certainly be diluted by the typical Russian tactic of offset, i.e., for scores injustly imprisoned one or two are released and even allowed to emigrate for Moscow's publicized record of "humaneness" and "civilized conduct."

It is for these reasons that we should zero in on what is unique and deserving of world attention, namely, Moscow's religious genocide

of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine. This concentration on the structural, institutional level combines all three concerns of personal, civil and national rights, and strikes at the spiritual core of a people and nation. In speaking of the genocidal surgery of a nation, just imagine what would happen if the Polish Roman Catholic Church were similarly liquidated. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that although there are innumerable cases of religious persecution in atheistic USSR, most related to the deprivation of personal and civil rights and some to national rights, the fact is that the institutional objects, no matter how circumscribed, still remain in being. The imposing cases of the Ukrainian Orthhodox and Catholic Churches do not fall into this category. For centuries reflective of the spirituality of the Ukrainian nation, the two Churches were liquidated under Stalin, and the horrible condition of this religious genocide continues to this day, with heavy disintegrative impact on the nation as a whole. It should also be stressed that the fact that this act of genocide took place before Helsinki doesn't make it less true and gravely operational since Helsinki. For, as will be indicated, the subject has recurrently been brought up to the attention of our own authorities and those of the USSR.

In support of these general facts, another recent article of mine and a scholarly statement on the subject provide more than adequate details on these cases.[1] Suffice it to point out here that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was institutionally liquidated in the mid-30's, and its properties were absorbed in a wave of Russification by the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Catholic Church suffered the same genocidal fate in 1945. A Catacomb existence really applies to the faithful of both institutions to this day. On an individual case basis, those violating the imposed conditions include the Orthodox priest, Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk, sentenced in 1970 to ten years of hard labor for "national-religious activity"; the execution without trial of the Ukrainian Catholic priest, Rev. Mykhailo Lutsky, in the town of Stryi in January 1975; and the "mysterious" hanging of Rev. Ivan Luchkiv in the Lviv oblast in February 1975.

These two outstanding cases of religious genocide as pertains to the national rights of the largest non-Russian nation in Eastern Europe have been brought up time and time again. During hearings on the Genocide Convention, the Communist take-over of the non-

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[1] "Imperialism Religious Persecution and Genocide," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Autumn, 1976; Dr. Walter Dushnyck, "Genocide of Ukrainian Churches By Communist Regime in Ukraine," New York, March 1977.

Russian nations now in the USSR, and religious persecution in the USSR the subject was discussed. Our authorities have been aware of it, as have those of the USSR. Applications for the restoration of these Churches in the USSR have been numerous, and their rejection by the state monopoly of funds and property have been absolute. The appeals of Cardinal Slipyj, who was released by Moscow, have fallen upon dead ears in both worlds, as have those of other Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox prelates in the West. In Congress itself, a drive has been generated for the resurrection of the two Churches.[5]

All this effort and concern have not been for naught. In the current, expanding and exhilirating atmospere of human rights and on the eve of re-evaluating Helsinki, these prominent, outstanding cases are prime and natural items for a genuine development of our present concerns. They also lay a foundation for honest action in the sphere of international law, spirited by our firm commitment to human rights in toto.

— A NEW DIRECTION IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY —

The accumulation of all the cases of repressed human rights in Eastern Europe, both individual and institutional, both before and after Helsinki, would lack effective significance without a rational accommodation within an altered framework of our foreign policy. After all, many of these cases with continuing force into the present have been known for some time, and have been ignored because of the double standard that has been upheld on human rights. The new direction in our policy is evidently toward a single standard which logically necessitates this accommodation. And it is hoped that operationally this will be fully manifested in Belgrade.

The President's commitment to this single standard is clear and unequivocal. For example, in March he stated at the U.N., "no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation of freedom occurs in any part of the world." The retorts by Brezhnev and Gromyko are pointedly significant. On March 21, Brezhnev said, "We will not tolerate interference in our internal affairs by anyone and under any pretext."[6] What was overlooked by the media is

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[5] H. Con. Res. 165, "To Seek the Resurrection of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine."

[6] *The Washington Post*, March 22, 1977.

that in the same speech to the socalled All-Union Trade Union Congress he also said: "We have quite a definite opinion about the order reigning in the world of imperialism, and do not conceal this opinion"; in the USSR "There are no oppressed, exploited classes; there are no oppressed, exploited nationalities"; and regarding dissidents, "To protect the rights, freedoms and security of 260 million Soviet people from the activities of such renegades is not only our right but is also our sacred duty." Soon thereafter, Gromyko added, "We want stability in our relations. We would like them to be founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence and even better that they should be friendly."[7]

With no violation of contexts, these are the main contrasting points that we shall hear as the human rights issue grows. The all-important question is how will we handle these sterotyped Russian arguments. In 1961, Khrushchev continued his apoplectic reaction to the Captive Nations Week Resolution by challenging us to discuss imperialism. In his U.N. address President Kennedy accepted the challenge but failed to folow up on it. This time the Carter Administration has invited the Russians to debate openly "the principles that guide our respective societies before the court of world opinion."[8] This augurs well for a much-needed open and honest foreign policy, based on principle and morality and without, from our end, indulging in any Cold War rhetoric.

As described earlier in the section on the scale of human rights, the subject can become a constructive source of dynamism in its common denomination of all others issues, provided it is thought through clearly on the three levels of human rights and also is applied on a single standard basis. Moreover, such a dynamic advance in our foreign policy would crystallize all the human rights ingredients in our American tradition, ranging from the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to Wilson's principle of national self-determination, Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, and the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which we contributed so heavily.

One of the monumental political blunders of the Nixon/Kissinger period was the Executive's unqualified endorsement of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs in the Moscow agreement of May 1972. The traditional, imperial Russian conception and abuse of this principle vary radically from its meaning and use in the West. In essence, from the Russian viewpoint, what is mine is mine; what is

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[7] *The Washington Post*, April 1, 1977.

[8] *The Washington Post*, March 23, 1977.

yours will be mine, so don't interfere. Built on subversion, war and conquest, the USSR itself, now a veritable imperium in imperio, scarcely qualifies for the application of this principle. Moscow's abuse of the principle has been rampant, as, for example, Vishinsky's tirade in the Paris U.N. Assembly against the U.S. at the beginning of the 50's for interfering in "the internal affairs" of Hungary. If Moscow's domination were to extend to the Atlantic, the same cry would be made. On the human rights basis, there will be no need to recite these facts, for the international legal approach would suffice inasmuch as Moscow and its internal proxies are signatories to a series of treaties and compacts involving human rights.

As to there being no "oppressed" and "exploited" classes and, even more important, nationalities in the USSR, these matters also will come out in the wash as the court of world opinion reviews the facts. The important thing is to talk about them, publicize and review them, if the court is to render an opinion. In addition, there is no such thing as "Soviet people," but to assert that 260 million persons in the USSR are threatened by comparatively few dissidents of different nationalities, this is a confession of fear itself as concerns the expression of human rights. As the discussion grows on a global scale, we should anticipate more of such fearful confessions. Brezhnev's brazenness is revealed by the openness of his opinion about the mythical "world of imperialism" and his profound fear of having that different world focus its attention on the real imperialism and colonialism in Eastern Europe and Asia. Finally, on Gromyko's points, we, too, seek genuine stability in the friendliest of ways, but surely not on the basis of the Russian conception of "peaceful coexistence." First used by Lenin as a deceptive device to destroy the independence of the many non-Russian republics now held captive in the USSR, this basic policy of Moscow means, on one tier, systemic warfare that has always resulted in not only incalculable costs to human rights but also in human lives.

The benefits of integrating human rights into our foreign policy can be immense. First, it will mean the recovery of moral U.S. leadership in the world and a courageous initiative and offensive to advance human rights globally. Second, since a successful foreign policy rests on an effective combination of values (principles) means (knowledge, political, military etc.) and strategy, the more that is popularly learned about the USSR, particularly its majority non-Russian complex, the greater will be the chances for human rights fulfillment, popular support of the policy, and for peace itself. This will surely eradicate the many lingering myths, even in our highest places, about Eastern

Europe. And thirdly, it will enforce an accountability on the part of those who affix signatures to international treaties and agreements bearing on human rights but display little intention of implementing them.

— RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BELGRADE —

In summary form, all of the foregoing leads to these recommendations for the Belgrade conference:

(1) For our U.S. delegation to place high on its agenda an appeal to Moscow for the restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and Catholic Churches that had been genocided by Stalin. As a signatory to the Genocide Convention, its position is untenable;

(2) In furtherance of real *inter-national* agreement, to urge the direct signations of Ukraine and Byelorussia, which are in the U.N., to the Helsinki Accords and, as sponsored by numerous scholars in international law, to advance the idea of direct diplomatic relations with these non-Russian republics, which we recognize both de jure and de facto in the U.N. It is almost ludicrous that the largest non-Russian nation in Eastern Europe is permitted to remain unseen backstage;

(3) In the tone and spirit set by the President, to advance the human rights issue by openly laying out all the accumulated cases of Moscow's continuing violation and deprivation of these rights within the USSR;

(4) Toward international order through the rule of law, to press for accountability in terms of the U.N. Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention and other legal instruments upholding human rights; and

(5) As concerns Basket 2, to maintain in the face of growing pressures the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and credit restrictions and to propose for us and our allies the development of a genuine linkage between trade and human rights. It would defy logic to equip Moscow with Cyber-76 computers and other advanced technology for its further military build-up and at the same time strengthen its hand in the repression of human rights. This is not the compromising Kissinger type of linkage, which abused the poltrade concept. As shown in another contribution of mine to a current work, Kissinger wantonly applied the poltrade concept in reserve and largely conpromised our positions with the Russians.[9]

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[9] "The Politico-Economic Significance of U.S.-USSR Trade," *Nationalism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, University of Detroit, 1977.

To conclude, Congress Commission dealing with the Helsinki Accords shares a heavy responsibility in forging, on the eve of Belgrade, part of the human rights foundation which apparently our President envisions for our new foreign policy. It is hoped that in fashining a new and strong foreign policy our horizons go beyond Belgrade and entail all the for the expression of human rights as delineated in part in this article.

THE WESTWARD EXPANSION OF THE USSR

By JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

I. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TOPIC FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIET SYSTEM

Between 1939 and 1946 the USSR acquired access to a broad band of territories along all of its western frontier, except parts of the far north, increasing the Soviet population by 21 million or approximately one-eighth. The advances of the World War II period came after nearly two decades of virtually complete territorial stability both for the Soviet system and its sphere of influence. Furthermore, these advances have had no formal sequel; contrary to many expectations, no other territories have been directly incorporated into the USSR.

From the standpoint of international law the Soviet annexations constituted clear violations of numerous treaties of non-aggression,[1] as well as the multilateral obligations of the USSR as a member of the League of Nations. From the standpoint of power politics, however, the annexations seemed essentially defensive, designed to acquire a glacis against attacks and to eliminate the threat of Ukrainian "Piedmonts." I should doubt that there is much to be gained by reexamining in great detail the purely international aspects of these annexations. My impression is that neither the Western powers' diplomatic publications nor Soviet histories have added much to the evidence of German documents and memoirs published in the decade after World War II. A close reexamination of Soviet activities *within* the annexed territories, however, might well throw new light on Soviet intentions toward its allies (successively Nazi Germany and the Western powers). For example, the indoctrination manual for Soviet troops

[1] With the exception of Transcarpathia, nominally voluntarily relinquished by Czechoslovakia. The memoir by Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Moudry, *The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia* (Toronto, 1955) was a revealing source, but publications in Czechoslovakia during 1967-68 and by émigrés after 1968 might add more evidence. It is also clear that Stalin intended Transcarpathia to be a gateway assuring direct access to Hungary as well as the removal of the last significant Ukrainian Piedmont.

moving into Eastern Poland went far, in my opinion, to refute contentions that Stalin looked to a long period of friendship with Germany.[2] I know of nothing in Soviet publications which really provides convincing evidence on this point, but recent émigrés who held apparatus posts in the occupied territories ought to be questioned on their instructions. In a somewhat similar but less direct fashion some Soviet memoirs of the last months of World War II suggest that the writers had been instructed to disregard formal frontiers of the USSR by preparing as rapidly as possible for installing puppet regimes in the adjoining countries.[3]

Much more can be learned about Soviet intentions and capacities in the international field by considering the internal aspects of Soviet annexation policy and local reactions to Soviet control. Studies should, wherever feasible, compare aspects of the western annexations to parallel developpments in the East European satellites. During the 1950's when most studies of the annexations were made, it was still uncertain that the Communist regimes could maintain control over the satellites for a prolonged period; conversely, many observers thought that if control could be maintained as long as in the older Soviet regions a similar penetration of control would result. We are now in a position to see that in thirty years East European Communist regimes have not been able to achieve the degree of control attained in the USSR by the late 1940's. Intellectual life in East Europe is freer and more in accord with national traditions; the spirit of national independence is much higher than it was in most Soviet nationalities; and the intangible elements of cutomary ways of life persist more

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[2] *Partiino-Politicheskaia Rabota v Boevoi Obstanovke: Sbornik Dokumentov, Izdannykh vo Vremia Osvoboditelsnogo Pokhoda v Zapadnuiu Ukrainu i Zapadnuiu Belorussiu* (Moscow: Gosvoennizdat, 1940). Issued for official use of the Red Army Political Administration, the book was lent to me briefly by the late Gerold T. Robinson.

[3] I deal with both of these points in *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1961), and have not examined much of the flood of Soviet memoirs since that date. This outline has no pretensions as a bibliographical review. It is, nevertheless, surprising how few solid research studies dealing with the 1939-53 period in the Western territories have appeared. The early postwar series on Soviet affairs concentrated on the old USSR. Thus the Research Program on the USSR and the Munich Institute for Study of the USSR published little dealing primarily with the western territories. Apart from the books I mentioned the best resources for the beginner are the articles in émigré journals such as *The Baltic Review*, the *Ukrainian Review*, and especially the *Ukrainian Quarterly*. All vary widely in thoroughness and objectivity. The monthly *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press* (Karlpatz 8/III, 8 Munich 2), while highly selective, is very reliable.

strongly. Various explanations for the difference can be advanced: traditions of independence reinforced by the vestigial formal sovereignty of the East European states; the lack of large-scale immigration of Russians or uprooting of natives; above all, the brief duration of Stalin's intense totalitarianrule. In all of these respects the western annexations are intermediate; hence it would be very rewarding to examine in detail the degree of persistence of the elements just noted, and the extent to which each is correlated with the varying explanations for East European resistance to Communist *Gleichschaltung*.

Apart from the intrinsic interest of the subject, a detailed comparative examination of the success of Communism in East Europe and the western annexations would illuminate the sources of dissidence in the "old" USSR. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the East European satellites constitute the immediate source for Soviet intellectuals, and perhaps for the ordinary Soviet citizen, of most of their unorthodox ideas, even if such ideas are ultimately derived from the West. Far too little attention has been directed to the possibility that, from 1939 on, the newly annexed western territories performed a similar role. There were internal police barriers between the new territories and the old USSR for some years, but it is probable that these barriers were never as impermeable as were (at least until the late 1950's) the formal frontiers of the USSR. Today Soviet sources admit that the superior level of consumer services in the Baltic republics is widely appreciated in other parts of the Union. There is also evidence that clandestine nationalists from Galicia deliberately sought jobs in the Donbas in order to escape arrest and continue their anti-Soviet propaganda. In between these extremes there is a wide range of ways (which few Western works on the USSR even hint at) in which the western territories may have acted as windows on the West for the older portions of the Soviet Union.

II. SCOPE OF THE WESTERN ANNEXATIONS

Fortunately, the number of distinct areas annexed to the USSR between 1939 and 1946 is large enough to permit meaningful comparative analysis. By careful selection of areas one may control specific factors (such as those suggested above); such an analytic comparison is far more promising than the easier approach of examining territories lumped together by legal or cultural criteria. A brief survey of the annexations will, I hope, make this point clearer. From the chronological standpoint it is most important to stress the need for extending any study (except one confined to Transcarpathia) back to the

initial period of Soviet occupation in 1939-40. While the impact of the Soviet regime during this period was transistory, it was important both for its direct effect on the occupied populations (particularly through elimination of substantial leadership elements) and as an indication of the range of options which the regime has considered. Since there appear to have been two distinct phases of Soviet policy—a mild one down to June 1940 and a harsh phase from then until the German conquest—it is even possible to to makes some longitudinal comparisons.

Probably not much useful work can be done on the areas acquired from Finland, since nearly all of the native population was evacuated. The same is true of the Kaliningrad region of northern East Prussia. The southern portion of Bessarabia was directly incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR in 1940 as the Akkerman *oblast* (later renamed the Izmail *oblast,* possibly because the Soviet authorities were under the misapprehension that "Akkerman" was a German rather than a Turkish name), but in 1954 was absorbed in the Odessa *oblast.* I have never seen any indication that this small area, with a population of very mixed ethnic origin, presents any special features of interest to the investigator even if (as appears unlikely) he can find sufficient available information to warrant detailed investigation.

The two Lutheran Baltic republics, Latvia and Estonia, obviously constitute a unit, although the presence of Riga with its polyglot population makes the former more complex. Roman Catholic Lithuania, with its very different history, usually requires separate consideration in many respects. In fact, there are three distinct "Lithuanias" available for most comparative purposes: the Republic as it existed between 1919 and 1938; the Memel area, seized by Germany at the later date, which therefore did not experience Soviet rule until 1945; and the Vilnius area of Poland attached to Lithuania by Soviet fiat in 1939.

In contrast to these areas, which enjoyed greater or lesser experiences of national independence, the extension of the Byelorussian SSR into areas of northeastern Poland involved both an old and a new Soviet population with relatively slight traditions of ethnic distinctiveness, especially after the retrocession (1945) to Poland of Bialystok and the "repatriation" of most of the large Polish population of the remaining areas. Western Byelorussia comes as close as one can expect to the "pure" case of imposition of Soviet rule on a peasant population lacking distinctive consciousness. The central portions of Bessarabia were re-named the Moldavian SSR (which, in a curious sleight-of-hand, was deprived of almost all the areas—mixed Ukrain-

ian and Moldavian—east of the Dnister which had been in the old Moldavian ASSR). The overwhelmingly peasant population of the Moldavian SSR, with its low levels of education and income, somewhat resembles Byelorussia. Moldavians are, however, wholly distinct in language (though not in religious background) from the dominant Slavic populations of the USSR. In recent years discreet signs of irredentism have appeared in Romania proper, but during the Stalin period the Soviet leadership appears to have toyed with the notion of making Moldavia the Piedmont through which Romania as a whole might be absorbed into the USSR.[4]

Finally, there is Western Ukraine, or rather the four Ukraines acquired by the USSR during 1939-46. Galicia (it is hardly worth considering separately the small strip retroceded to Poland in 1945) is by far the most important. The presence of a major center, Lviv, with an ethnically variegated population, and the virtual absence of previous experience with Russian rule, are major distinctive features of Galicia. Its intense nationalist organization is (as noted below) by far the most significant characteristic of Galicia, making it almost unique among Soviet territories old or new. In contrast, the northern Polish Ukrainian holdings (Volhynia), Orthodox and Russian until 1917, have occupied a position intermediate between Galicia and Eastern Ukraine. Transcarpathia also has had an intermediate position, not because of previous experience with Russian rule, but because of the mixed religious affiliations of the Ukrainian population and the low prewar cultural attainments. Finally, Bukovina (acquired from Romania) appears to have resembled Galicia, although information is scanty on this small area.[5]

III. MAJOR TOPICS FOR INVESTIGATION

The range of topics which might be profitably treated is limited only by the very elastic scope of activities undertaken by the Soviet regime, the availability of data, and the researcher's imagination. Consequently, the few topics I shall consider below represent only those

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[4] Arnold Kleess, "Rumanisch und Moldauisch," *Osteuropa,* V (1955), 281-84.

[5] I treated Soviet incorporation of all these areas some twenty years ago in *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New York, 1955; 2nd ed., 1963), and *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York, 1959; 2nd ed., 1966). The latter book contains a bibliography of the considerable number of important books which has appeared on the Transcarpathian question up to 1959. Although there have been some article-length treatments and numerous references in memoirs and general treatments of the war period, I do not know of any really intensive consideration of Soviet annexation policies since the 1950's.

which I have encountered in my own work and can confidently assert could be investigated profitably.

A. *Soviet Guerrillas and Underground Operations.* The intensive case studies of the War Documentation Project, based largely on the immense German occupation records, deliberately omitted consideration of the newly annexed Soviet territories.[6] At the time these studies were made (1951-54) the need for information on the old Soviet Union was so evident and the future prospects of the western territories so obscure that the limitation was clearly justified as a measure of economy. Those of us involved with the Project knew that there is an immense amount of German documentation (since declassified) on Soviet partisans in the west; now there are scores if not hundreds of Soviet memoirs and histories dealing with the topic. Since the partisan episode throws a harsh illumination on many aspects of Soviet policy, it would be rewarding to extend the WDP investigations. Cooperation by the U.S. Government agencies which became the repositories of a large amount of preliminary cataloging and photocopying when the WDP was terminated could greatly facilitate a new investigation.

B. *Importation and Local Recruitment of Soviet Apparatchiki.* It is becoming increasingly apparent that the "normal" Soviet procedure is to recruit lower and middle levels of most elements of the party and state apparatus from local people, even at the oblast level.[7] Clearly this practice could not be applied to areas just acquired. In the most important western teritories the position of the local Communists, after formal dissolution of the Polish Communist Party in 1938, was obscure. We know something about the major officials imported to Western Ukraine from Eastern Ukraine, but little elsewhere. Did (as Soviet sources allege) independent sections of the "Communist Party of Western Ukraine" and "Communist Party of West Byelorussia" persist with Comintern authorization during 1938-39? Were they a major source of recruits, and how long were these local recruits trusted? What was their ethnic composition (there are hints that Jews and

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[6] The War Documentation Project was sponsored by Department of the Air Force, Human Resources Research Institute of the Psychological Warfare Division, under contract with Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research. The standing committee was headed by Philip E. Mosely, with successive Directors Fritz T. Epstein and Hans J. Epstein, and Alexander Dallin as Director of Research. When (1962) the completed studies were declassified, I undertook to condense and edit them for publication as *Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Madison, 1964). The serious researcher will want to proceed to the fuller versions available through the Air Force.

[7] See especially Joel C. Moses, *Regional Party Leadership and Policy-Making in the USSR* (New York, 1974).

Poles were preferred in more delicate posts, Ukrainian and Byelorussians in Public positions) ? There is also the question of partisan leaders transferring to party and state positions after demobilization, and their relation to the police agencies. The latter question had crucial reverberations just after the close of the Stalin period when Beria's intrigues focussed on the frontier police apparatus and the general discrimination against non-Russified elements.

C. *Industrialization and Urbanization.* As elsewhere, the Soviet regime in the western territories has emphasized an urban way of life based on industrialization. These territories varied considerably in their levels of urbanization and industrialization when acquired by the USSR; even Latvia and Estonia were dominantly peasant, however, and the other acquisitions overwhelmingly so. Much could be learned from the precise patterns of economic mobilization sponsored by the regime. The kinds of industrialization appear to have differed from the extreme concentration of heavy industry common elsewhere; thus textiles and food processing, but also automotive construction, appear to have been relatively more important. The housing situation in older cities is constructed on West European models. Despite great population growth some "slack" may have resulted from the disappearance of middle class elements and whole ethnic groups (Jews, Poles). These considerations deserve close attention. It would be especially useful to trace the settlement patterns of immigrants (particularly Russians) from the old USSR.

D. *Collectivization of Agriculture.* The rigid, sweeping collectivization of farms in the western annexed territories during 1949-50 came almost two decades later than collectivization in the old USSR, and the success of the new Soviet collectivization contrasted sharply with the faltering, abortive contemporary efforts in neighboring Poland. Unfortunately, Soviet central and republic newspapers gave little space to the campaign. The Soviet dissertations I relied on have been off limits for 16 years. Access to *oblast* level newspapers would be very desirable; possibly some emigrant could provide anecdotal knowledge. On the other hand, there are now available the retrospective, *raion* by *raion* accounts in the monumental publication *Istoria Mist i Sil Ukrains'koi RSR.*[8] An immense amount of detail suitable for comparative analysis is available in the volumes for Western Ukraine; unfortunately I know of no comparable data for Byelorussia. There ap-

[8] 26 volumes (one for each oblast), Kiev, 1967-74, See my serial review in *American Historical Review*. LXXVI (December 1971), 1570-73; LXVII (June 1972), 546-47; LXXVIII (June 1973), 716; LXXIX (February 1974), 193-94; LXXXI (February 1976), 189-90.

pear to be a considerable number of monographic studies for the Baltic republics, in their languages.

E. *Nationalist Guerrillas and Resistance to Collectivization.* The *Istoria Mist i Sil* provides astonishingly detailed accounts of forceful resistance to collectivization in many *raions*. For details of this resistance and the brutal Soviet repression (involving mass deportation of peasants from many Carpatian districts) the abundant émigré press (available at the Ukrainian Free Academy, 206 West 100th St., New York) is indispensable. Since the appearance of the *Istoriia,* moreover, it is possible to check émigré accounts (notably in *Do Zbroi)* of their guerrilla activity (*Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*—UPA) during 1944-49 against Soviet versions of resistance. An English doctoral candidate (David R. Marples of the University of Sheffield) proposes to do this. Unfortunately, such detailed Soviet versions of the lesser but significant Lithuanian armed resistance have not appeared. By using local materials and the good summary account by Stanley Vardys,[9] a basis for comparing Lithuanian nationalist guerrillas with the UPA (there was some clandestine collaboration between the two groups) could be constructed.

F. *Organized Religion Under Soviet Rule.* Standard recent works on religion in the USSR have devoted slight attention to the western territories, and almost none to the periods immediately following annexation.[10] Yet Soviet sources, generally not circulated widely in the West, show a keen awareness of the churches as one of the three major forces impeding imposition of full Soviet control (the others being spontaneous peasant resistance and the nationalist organizations). Indeed, Soviet authorities have made strenuous efforts to equate the religion to nationalist violence, e.g., in the assassination of the Western Ukrainian writer Yaroslav Halan, who collaborated with the Soviet regime in both anti-religious and anti-nationalist propaganda.[11] Much the most virulent Soviet campaign has been directed against the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church. The eventual "happy ending" to Cardinal Josif Slipyj's long incarceration is well known, but no one has done a scholarly study of the fate of lesser clerics. The role of the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, particularly the Exarch Nicholas, deserves candid exploration from many points of view. The

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[9] *Slavic Review,* XX (1963), 499-522.

[10] E.g., Richard H. Marshall, Jr. (ed.), *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967* (Chicago, 1971). Cf. my review in *American Political Science Review,* LXVIII (December 1974), 1827-28.

[11] See especially Vladimir Dobrychev, *V Steni Sviatogo Iura* (Moscow, 1971) and V. Cherednychenko, *Nationalizm proty Natsii* (Kiev, 1970).

role of the quasi-official Orthodox Church in suppresing the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Volhynia and similar organizations in Byelorussia is also worth investigating.[12] Less prominent activities of the Orthodox body in Transcarpathia, Bukovina, Moldavia, and the Baltic republics are well worth scrutiny. Nuances in treatment of the Roman-rite Roman Catholic Curch in Lithuania (and vestigial Polish elements in Byelorussia) as compared to the Uniate church need careful attention. Finally, the complex position of the Lutherans in Estonia and Latvia needs more study.

G. *Intellectuals and Cultural Institutions.* Intellectuals have spearheaded most resistance movements in the Western territories, and nearly all Soviet policies have involved culture. It would be misleading, however, to treat the highly significant cultural factors as residual. As elsewhere in the USSR, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Soviet regime policies toward the national cultures have awakened opposition among intellectuas who began with purely professional attitudes toward the society, or even as strong supporters of Marxism-Leninism.[13] Any comprehensive analysis should therefore take into account the following factors: (1) reactions toward Russification or Sovietization (e.g., introduction of "Soviet customs," use of "all-Union" calques on Russian words in the place ofnative expressions);[14] (2) relations with Russian immigrants, especially officials and intellectuals; (3) attachment to latent or symbolic manifestations of local patriotism such as folklore, dialectology, antiquarian local history; (4) use of language in the educational system; (5) intermarriage. For some of these factors generalization can of course be extended beyond the intellectual stratum, but it would probably by wise to devote initial study to them both because of their roles in the communication process and because evidence is more apt to be available.

H. Finally—but not exhaustively—I should like to call attention again to the importance of links between the peoples of the western annexations and the populations of the rest of the USSR. Clearly the significance of these links derives largely from the stronger attachment to national traditions mentioned earlier, but the means of com-

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[12] See the concluding section in Friedrich Heyer, *Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine vom 1917 bis 1945* (Cologne, 1953); and the more general remarks in Ivan S. Lubachko, *Belorussia under Soviet Rule*, 1917-1957 (Lexington, 1972).

[13] See especially John Kolasky, *Education in the Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto, 1968), p. 136.

[14] On "Soviet Customs" and Holidays, see A.I. Kholmogorov, *Internatsionalnye Cherty Sovetskikh Natsii: Iz Materialakh Konkretno-Sotsiologicheskikh Issledovanii v Pribaltike* (Moscow, 1970), p. 73.

munication should be examined carefully. At least until recently the western territories were more sealed off from the outside world (including the East European satellites) than many older metropolitan areas of the USSR, but infiltration of ideas and messages from East Europe and beyond should be examined where possible.

BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY ON THE DNIEPER RIVER: THE ZAPOROZHIAN KOZAKDOM IN THE XVIth CENTURY

By LUBOMYR R. WYNAR

PART II

[*Concluded*]

KOZAK VATAHA AND DRUZYNA

The origin of the Kozak *Vataha* (cooperative association) and *Druzyna* (military unit) is directly related to the activities of Ukrainian *ukhodnyky* and their penetration into the "Wild Plains" region. The *Vataha* consisted of frontiersmen engaged in exploiting the natural resources of the steppes.[26] This was in a true sense a cooperative economic enterprise with members conditioned by their existence in the steppes. *Vataha* activities were directed by Kozak *otamans* (leaders) who were responsible for the well-being of the entire group. The confrontation with Tatars, directly influenced the *vataha* military techniques and customs. Within a relatively short period of time the frontiersmen turned to the offensive by attacking Tatar herdsmen and merchant caravans. For some *Vataha* groups pillaging the enemy for rich spoils became the prime objective, so that military activity emerged as the dominant life style for these Kozak groups. This marked the beginning of the *Kozak Druzhyna,* a professional military organization with the prime purpose of fighting Tatars, Turks and later Polish *szlachta* and troops, as well as Moldavians and Muscovites. There were two distinct types of Kozak *druzhynas:* independent Kozak groups with their own elected *otamans* and groups which cooperated with local frontier administrations. This second type of *druzhyna* cooperated with the Ukrainian *starosty* of Cherkassy, Kiev, Bar and other fortified towns. At times frontier officials would not only support Kozak activities but would also hire their services (e.g.

[26] Comments on the Kozak *Vataha* in V. A. Holobutsky, *op. cit.,* pp. 56-57; Stokl, *op. cit.,* pp. 117-118; Hrushevsky, *op. cit.,* pp. 52-53, 81.

Dashkevych, Polozovych, Vyshnevetsky). It may be stated that the Kozak *Vatahy* and *Druzhyny* served as a basis for the further development of Ukrainian Kozakdom. They are directly related to the establishment of the Zaporozhian *Sich* (the independent self-governing military and political Kozak center) as well as to the registered Kozaks hired by the Polish State.

REGISTERED KOZAKS

The registered Kozaks were royal Ukrainian Kozaks, also known in historical sources as "Zaporozhian Kozaks," under the direct supervision of the Polish State through its officials representatives. The history of this formation reveals to a certain degree the official attitudes of Lithuanian and later Polish governments toward the growing military and political power of Ukrainian Kozakdom.

The origin and evolution of registered Kozaks could be traced back to the Kozak *druzhynas* hired by the frontier administration for fighting Tatars and protecting frontier settlements. This cooperation on the local level between the *starostas* and Kozaks proved to be useful to both sides and served as a basis for future negotiations between the Lithuanian-Polish government and the Kozaks.

The first major attempt to enlist Kozaks into regular governmental service was undertaken in 1524 by King Sigismund I who planned to establish a permanent Kozak regiment in the Dnieper region for "the defense of the State."[27] It was obvious that Kozaks would be very effective as frontier guards. This plan was never realized due to the lack of financing by the government and frontier administration. The same fate met the second proposal submitted by Ostap Dashkevych, *starosta* of Cherkassy, who in 1533 suggested hiring 2,000 Kozaks for the defense of the southern border of Ukraine and to construct a number of small fortresses on the Dnieper islands as protection against Tatar raids.

In 1541 a further attempt by Sigismund to conduct the forced registration of Kozaks also failed,[28] thus demonstrating the weakness of the government in controlling the growth and activities of Ukrainian Kozaks.

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[27] L. Wynar, "Pochatky Ukrainskoho Reiestrovoho Kozatstva," *Ukrainsky Istoryk*, Nos. 2-3. 1964. p. 3.

[28] This attempt at registration was an outcome of the increased Kozak raids on Tatar and Turkish settlements resulting in strong protests by the Ottoman and Crimean States to a rather alarmed Polish government.

The first regiment of registered Kozaks, which consisted of 300 men, was organized in 1572 by Sigismund Augustus and supervised by Crown *Hetman* Juriy Yazlovetsky. Successful registration attempts were also made in 1578 and 1583 by King Stefan Batory. This register attracted the attention of many historians due to the fact that Batory was portrayed as the chief organizer of Zaporozhian Kozaks. The critical analyses[29] of the so-called "Batory's Reform" by A. Storozenko, M. Hrushevsky, I. Krypiakevych, Jablonovski and other historians indicate that Batory's register of 500 and later 600 Kozaks should be regarded as a continuation of the earlier register conducted in 1572 by Sigismund Augustus.

At this point a significant question is in order. What was the basic motivation and objective of the Polish government in establishing the royal regiment of Zaporozhian Kozaks and how did such registration affect the Kozak community? First, it is necessary to note that the register of 1572 which listed 300 Kozaks and Batory's register of 500 Kozaks reflected only a minor fraction of the total number of Kozaks—therefore, these registers failed to represent the total Kozak strength.

In establishing a permanent institution of registered Kozaks, the Polish government aimed at achieving the following major objectives: 1) to control and limit the growth of the Ukrainian Kozaks by placing them under the direct royal supervision of the Polish state; 2) to divide the Zaporozhian Kozaks into two categories: legal registered Kozaks (also called Zaporozhians)[30] and the illegal unregistered or "disobedient" Zaporozhian Kozaks. By granting special privileges to the registered Kozaks and to declaring the self-governing Zaporozhian group as "enemies of the state,"[31] the Polish government aimed at undermining Kozak solidarity and destroying independent *Zaporozhian* groups; 3) to halt Kozak raids into Turkish, Tatar, and Moldavian territories and instead to utilize the Kozak military force in the Polish-Moscow war of 1579-81 and other governmental undertakings.

These goals never quite materialized. On the contrary, the establishment of the register only added a new dimension to the steady

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[29] The comprehensive analysis of Batory's register is presented by A. V. Storozenko, *Stefan Batorii i Dneprovskie Kozaky*, Kiev, 1904; I. Krypiakevych, "Kozachchyna i Batorievi Volnosty." *Zherela, op. cit.*, pp. 1-46.

[30] Prince Michael Vyshnevetsky, *starosta* of Cherkassy, who was in direct charge of a regiment of 500 registered Kozaks was called "Supremus dux militum Boristhenis nizovii doctorum."

[31] *Zerela, op. cit.*, p. 70.

expansion of Kozakdom, its institutions and the formation of a Kozak social class. In the first place, all registered Kozaks enjoyed special privileges. They were removed from the jurisdiction of the provincial administration and were placed under royal supervision. They had the right to elect their *Otamans,* be tried by their peers and they received royal confirmation of ownership of the lands they held. By the end of the 16th century they were able to elect their own *hetmans,* who replaced those appointed by the government. Kozaks also received the Trekhtemyriv estate for their hospital and headquarters. This grant proved to be an important factor in the future development of the political center of *Horodovi* (town) and of registered Kozaks in Ukraine. Registered Kozaks frequently cooperated with independent Zaporozhian formations and the Kozak *Sich* by participating in their raids, thus directly defying royal orders. In later years they fought against the Polish army and *szlachta* and supported the idea of an independent Kozak state in Ukraine. From the historical perspective it could be said that the Kozak register proved to be a failure for the Polish state, but beneficial to the development of Ukrainian Kozaks, especially their conservative faction.

ZAPOROZHIAN KOZAKS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SICH

The strongest group of Ukrainian Kozaks was comprised of Zaporozhians also known as *Nyzowi* or *Sichovi* Kozaks. They formed a military brotherhood, consisting mostly of bachelor warriors, beyond the rapids on the Dnieper River. This new frontier community established a permanent stronghold which became known as the Zaporozhian *Sich* or *Kosh,*[32] a military camp with its own government, own code of rules and customs. The Kozak *Sich* was organized in the secure area, usually beyond the rapids and in the wilderness, which was difficult to reach from land or water.

The genealogy of Zaporozhians can be directly traced to the Kozak *Vataha,* and *Druzhyna* formations. The Kozak *Sich,* a unique frontier community, existed over two centuries and finally, in 1775, was destroyed by the Russian government.[33]

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[32] The term "Sich" is derived from the Ukrainian verb "*Sikty*" meaning "to cut." "Sich" means wooden fortress. "Kosh" designates a Zaporozhian Kozak host.

[33] Comprehensive histories of Zaporozhian Kozaks were written by D. I. Evarnytsky, *Istoria Zaporozhskych Kozakov,* 1892-1897. 3 Vols.; M. Hrushevsky, *Istoria Ukrainskoho Kozachestva,* Kiev 1913-14. 2 Vols., V. A. Holobutsky, *Zaporoshskoe Kozachestvo,* Kiev, 1957. Other studies were discussed by L. Wynar, *Ohlad Istorychnoi Literatury pro Pochatky Ukrainskoho Kozatstva.* Muenchen, 1966.

Usually the foundation of the Zaporozhian *Sich* is linked to Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, one of the outstanding Kozak leaders in the 1550's.[84] He constructed a fortress on the Dnieper island of Khortytsia (ca: 1552) with a permanent Kozak regiment. From there Vyshnevetsky and his Kozaks conducted successful raids against Tatar settlements.

A special plan, developed by Vyshnevetsky and aimed at the destruction of the Crimean Khandom, was never to be realized due to the hostile relationship which existed between Poland and Moscow as well as to the lack of financial support by the Polish King, Sigismund Augustus.

In 1557 the Khortytsia fortification was destroyed by Khan Devlet Girey, and Vyshnevetsky, after performing his military service for Ivan IV of Moscow, became involved in Moldavian affairs with the hope of capturing the Moldavian throne. He and his Kozaks were defeated by the Moldavian army, and Vyshnevetsky was captured and hanged in Constantinople in 1563.[85]

Some historians regard the Khortytsia stronghold as constituting the first Zaporozhian *Sich*. However, it should instead be considered as a prototype of the later Kozak *Sich* which differed from Vyshnevetsky's Kozak fort in administrative and political structures. Taking into consideration the deep penetration of Ukrainian frontiersmen in the lower regions on the Dnieper in the 1550's and 1560's, it is logical to assume that fortified camps of Zaporozhian Kozaks existed beyond the rapids during this time. However, the earliest documentary evidence concerning the first historical *Sich* is found in the chronicle of Marcin Bielski (1495-1576) under the year 1574,[86] and in an account describing Sammuel Zborovsky's expedition to the Zaporozhians in 1583.[87]

During this period the *Sich* was located on the Island of Tomakivka further down the Dnieper than Khortytsia. In 1594, according to the Lassota *Diary*, the *Sich* existed on Bazavluk Island, not far from Tomakivka. As it can be observed, the location of the Zapo-

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[84] L. Wynar *Kniaz Dmytro Vyshnevetsky*, Muenchen, 1964.

[85] Soviet historian Holubutsky considers Vyshnevetsky as an "enemy of Zaporozhians," who intended to "destroy" their *Sich*. Holobutsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78; criticism of his views in L. Wynar's monograph on Vyshnevetsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24, 54-55.

[86] *Kronika Marcina Bielskiego*. "O Kozakach," Sanok, 1856. pp. 1358-1361, Lubomyr Wynar, ed. *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks*, 1975, pp. 112-115.

[87] *Herby Rycerstva Polskiego Bartosza Paprockiego*. Krakow 1858, p. 158.

rozhian *Sich* was not permanent and from time to time it was transferred from one island to another.

The establishment of a permanent Kozak stronghold had a profound influence on the political and military consolidation of Kozak forces. It was conducive to a rather accelerated development of Kozak ideology and unified leadership. On the basis of Lassota's *Diary* as well as other sources, it is possible to reconstruct some basic features of the Zaporozhian *Sich*, the new military and political center of the Kozaks.

GOVERNMENTAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE ZAPOROZHIAN *SICH*

The self-governing system of Zaporozhian Kozaks was based on a rather crude and unrefined form of democratic principle, and it is within this context that the Zaporozhian *Sich* may be regarded as a democratic institution. The democratic features of the Zaporozhian brotherhood were reflected in their governmental processes, especially in the functioning of the *Kozak Rada* (general council) and in the election of the Zaporozhian *Starshyna* (officials). During the 16th century members of the *Sich* community could participate in Kozak political life. Thus each individual had a voice in the election of officials as well as a right to be elected to the highest administrative positions within the Zaporozhian government.[38] (At this time it is important to point out that the *Sich* community consisted only of males (usually bachelors), and all women were barred from entering the Kozak stronghold.[39]

The Kozak general *Rada*, the highest political organ of the *Sich*, was held on an annual basis and functioned as the supreme judicial and legislative body. Lacking written laws, the governing of Kosh was based on Kozak customs and traditions. The major function of the general Kozak *Rada* consisted of electing a Kozak governing body *(starshyna)*, making decisions on war and peace, planning major expeditions, and resolving any major problem which affected the entire Zaporozhian community.

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[38] The democratic nature of the Zaporozhian *Sich* is also stressed by G. Vernadsky who regards the "Zaporozhian regime as a democracy, since the *starshyna* had as yet no firm constitutional or hereditary rights." G. Vernadsky, *Russia at the Dawn of Modern Age*. New Haven 1959, p. 260.

[39] Married Kozaks who were associated with the *Sich* usually lived in northern sections of Zaporozhian lands on *Khutors* (special steppe farms), participated in *Sich* military activities and were *de facto* and *de jure* under *Sich* jurisdiction which was not limited to Kozak fortification but also included adjacent lands of Zaporozhe. They were members of the Zaporozhian army.

During his stay in the Zaporozhian *Sich* in 1594, Lassota [39a] observed that there existed a clear dichotomy within the Kozak society which was based on the elective process. The division took on the form of councils or *radas (kolo,* "circle"). One such council consisted of Kozak *starshyna* (officials) while the other of rank and file Kozaks (commoners). All major issues and policies were discussed separately by each *rada,* and the final decision was based on majority rule. This division within the Kozak community did not split Zaporozhian unity, but rather these councils were of an auxiliary nature through which grievances could be channeled and official business expedited. At times the policy decisions reached by each *rada* were in direct conflict. In such cases disagreement was usually resolved with the *starshyna* accepting the decision of the rank and file. Opposition to accepting the rule of the majority on the part of the *starshyna* often resulted in their impeachment.

The *Kosh* governing body consisted of the *Koshovy otaman* (or *hetman), pysar* (secretary), *suddia* (judge) and *asaul* (executive officer). As the *Sich* government became more complex, other administrative offices were created. Due to the fact that the *starshyna* was elected by the Kozak majority for a period of one year, establishment of any form of dictatorship over the freedom loving Kozaks was impossible.[40] Dissatisfaction with the *koshovyi* and the Kozak *starshyna* resulted in the election of a new government. The *Kosh* was divided into several administrative and military units called *kurins,*[41] headed by *Kurinny otamans* who were elected at a *Kurinna Rada.*

The *Koshovy Otaman* was given executive, judicial and military power over the entire *Sich.* The only period in which dictatorial powers of "life and death" were held by the *otaman* was during military expeditions. At the end of the 16th and during the 17th century *polky* (regiments) and *sotni* (a unit containing 100 men) were established. Lassota estimates that the *Sich* population consisted of about 3,000 Kozaks with an additional three thousand living outside the *Sich*

[39a] The first English translation of Erich Lassota *Diary* was edited by L. Wynar and translated by O. Subtelny. See *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks,* op. cit., pp. 61-109.

[40] A comprehensive description of the governmental structure and election of the Kozak *starshyna* is presented by Evarnytsky, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, pp. 217-248. On terminology, see G. Gajecky," Cossack Terminology: suggestion for the study of the *Hetmanate,* the Ukrainian Cossack State, *Ukrainsky istoryk,* Nos. 2, 1975.

[41] The word *kurin* also meant a large wooden barracks which housed Kozak regiments. In the 17th century the *Sich* consisted of 38 *kurins.*

compounds. Besides military duties *Sich* members were also engaged in trapping, hunting, fishing, and providing other commodities necessary for their existance. The Kozaks dwelling on *khutirs* were also engaged in farming. The Zaporozhians called themselves "The Knights" *(lytsari),* emphasizing their belonging to a warrior brotherhood.[42]

In general, when one examines the governmental structure within the Kozak *Sich,* it could be stated that a rather crude but workable form of democratic system was indeed present. This spirit of independence and freedom among the Kozaks was conducive to the acceptance of the "majority rule" concept, not only with respect to the election of their administrative officials, but also in regard to the determination of major policies and issues affecting their lives. The fact that the *starshyna* was elected on an annual basis and could be replaced at any time if unsatisfactory also was an important element in preserving a democratic system, since the administration had to be responsive constantly to Kozak needs. Although an orderly and refined technique of voting was absent from their political system, each member of the Sich community was, nevertheless, given a voice in decision-making, a process which at times would border on anarchy. *This birth of participatory democracy on the Dnieper River was conducive to the political and military consolidation of all Kozak forces in Ukraine.* Already in the 16th century the Kozak Zaporozhian ideology and their political and governmental system gained the support of the Ukrainian population. This permitted the Zaporozhian *Sich* to become the major center of Ukrainian national revival in the first half of the 17th century.

MILITARY FEATURES

The Zaporozhian life style was primarily indentified with military affairs. As a military force Kozaks developed a superior infantry, navy and light cavalry. They built their own fleet consisting of light war boats known as *chaiky* and *baydaky* which proved advantageous in their naval operations against the large Turkish galleys. Zaporozhians also had their own artillery which they captured from enemy forts and vessels. According to some sources, they were considered

[42] Vernadsky compared the Zaporozhian militant "order of knights" to the "Teutonic Order." Similar comparisons were made by other historians. However, such generalizations could be made only in regard to the military activities of both Zaporozhians and members of Chivalrous orders. The other aspects are not comparable.

experts in building fortifications (Chevalier) and developing unique forms of transportation and a mobile defense which was based on utilizing their wagons in a formation called a *tabor*.[43] The Zaporozhians' superb military skills were best reflected in their successful land sea expeditions. As a military power the Zaporozhians were feared by Turks, Tatars, Moldavians, Muscovites and Poles. The Turkish historian Naima (17th century) noted Kozak bravery by stating that "one can safely say that in the entire world one cannot find a more daring people, more careless for their lives or having less fear of death... because of their skills and boldness in naval battles these bands are more dangerous than any other enemy.[44]

At times of war, such states as Austria, the Vatican, Poland, Muscovy, and other countries endeavored to enlist the Kozak army into their service. Sometimes they succeeded; however, Kozak military activities were concentrated initially to a more or less permanent engagement against Turkish and Tatar forces. Zaporozhian military prowess constituted the basis for Kozak political power and influence in Eastern Europe.

KOZAK *SICH* AND POLISH CROWN

The growing power of the Zaporozhian Kozaks and the formation of the self-governing *Sich* created a rather precarious situation for the Polish government on both the domestic and foreign fronts. After the Lublin Union (1569) the Zaporozhian territory *de jure* belonged to the Polish Crown; in reality, however, Polish governmental authority was ignored by the Zaporozhians.[45] The establishment of a royal Kozak register failed to contribute to Polish governmental control of the growing Kozak organization and its political influence in Ukraine.

The Polish pro-Turkish attitudes in the 1570's and 1580's were contrary to the continuous Kozak struggle with "infidels." Their constant raids on Turkish garrisons and Tatar settlements in the Black Sea region as well as their independent interventions in Moldavian

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[43] Probably the best description of *tabor* formation was presented by Beauplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 531-532.

[44] *Collacteanea*, v. 1., p. 181.

[45] Clear indication of extreme tensions between the Zaporozhians and the government is illustrated by the mission of Gregory Glembocky, a royal envoy, to the Kozak *Sich* in 1584. This official representative of the Polish government was killed by the Kozaks and his body was thrown into the Dnieper. Storozhenko, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

affairs conflicted directly with Polish foreign policy of that time. The participation of Zaporozhian and Nalyvaiko Kozaks in the Vatican and Austrian anti-Turkish campaigns in the 1590's [46] reinforced the belief that the Kozak *Sich* was an independent self-governing community with its own foreign policy.

Another major source of disagreement was associated with the privileges granted by Polish kings to the Polish *Szlachta* in the so-called"free lands" south of the Podolia and Kiev territories which were inhabited by a frontier population under Zaporozhian jurisdiction. These settlers were not ready to accept Polish governmental control over their possessions. These various developments directly contributed to the first Polish-Kozak wars in the 1590's during which all Kozak formations (Zaporozhian host, registered Kozaks and independent Kozak *druzhyna* of Nalyvaiko) presented a united military front and were supported by the Ukrainian population. Polish Crown *Hetman Zolkievsky* stated correctly that "the whole Ukraine had gone Kozak." [47] The close relationship and identification of the Ukrainian Orthodox population with the "Kozak cause" contributed considerably to Zaporozhian popularity and the Kozaks were considered as protectors and defenders. The military victory of the Polish army over the Kozaks at Solonytsia (1596) failed to stem the growth of the Zaporozhian community. In the spring of 1597 the Polish Diet issued a special edict proclaiming the Kozaks "perdulles et hostes patriae" (public enemies and foes of the fatherland). However, it was too late to suppress the Kozak revolutionary movement which was already supported by many segments of the Ukrainian population. The major confrontation between the Zaporozhians and the Polish Crown was to occur in the following century.

THE IDEA OF KOZAK STATEHOOD IN THE 16TH CENTURY — MYTH OR REALITY?

We would like to conclude this article with a few comments concerning one of the central issues in regard to the early history of the Zaporozhians, namely, the question of Kozak statehood in the 16th

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[46] On Kozak foreign policy see: E. Barvinsky, "Prychynky do istorii znosyn tsisaria Rudolfa II i papy Klymentia VIII Z Kozakamy R. 1593 i 1594," *Zapysky NTSh*, vol. X, 1896. pp. 1-34; L. Wynar, *Ukrainian Kozaks and the Vatican in 1594*. Muenchen 1965, L. Wynar, *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks*, op. cit. pp. 26-46.

[47] On the Polish-Kozak relationship in the 1590's see comprehensive study by V. M. Domanytsky, "Kozachchyna na perelomi XVI-XVII v. v. 1591-1603," *Zapysky NTSh*, Vols. LX-LXIV. 1904-5.

century. This indeed is a controversial question, which up to this time has not been satisfactorily analyzed by historians. The stereotype definition of Ukrainian Kozaks as "freebooters," "mercenaries," a restless frontier community interested only in robbery, looting, adventures, and in their own selfish goals constitutes the typical description of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. Some historians considered the *Sich* a "military-brigand order" (V. Domanytsky), and Kozaks were described by the leading Romanian historian as "Berufsbanditen" — professional bandits.[48]

In this context, the Kozak movement was denied any serious political goals and its members were portrayed as pirates in pursuit of personal goals only. It is our contention that such generalizations and conclusions regarding Ukrainian Kozakdom in the 16th century require critical reexamination and a new interpretation.

A critical analysis of 16th century Kozak history will reveal some strong tendencies among Zaporozhian leaders to create their own independent state, to hold their own territory and to appoint their independent government. The creation of a self-governing Zaporozhian *Sich* was not a mere accidental event, but clearly indicates that the concept of statehood was not alien to Ukrainian Kozaks. At the same time it should be emphasized that the idea of an independent Ruthenian state in the 16th century was still alive.[49] In 1507-08 Prince Mykhail Hlynsky and a group of aristocrats revolted against Grand Duke Sigismund I and attempted to establish an independent Ruthenian principality. Although the plan failed to materialize, the notion of Ruthenian independence survived. Some evidence seems to indicate that Kozaks participated in Hlynsky's revolt.[50]

The activities of Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky and Kozak "Moldavian politics" points to new evidence concerning the maturity of Kozak political objectives. On the basis of critical analysis of Ukrainian-Moldavian relationships[51] in the 16th century, we find that there indeed existed a strong relationship between the Kozak's Moldavian expeditions and their political goals. In the second half of the 16th century one should note that the Kozaks undertook over 20 major

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[48] N. Iorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, V. III. 1910, p. 110.

[49] The question of tehe Ruthenian political forces in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is discussed by Horst Jablonowski, *Westrussland Zwischen Wilna and Moskau*. Leiden 1961, pp. 101-114.

[50] This assumption is based on Ostap Dashkevych's descendant of Kievan *boyars* and one of the Kozak leaders, participation in Hlynsky's revolt.

[51] L. Wynar, *Ukrainsko-Moldavski Vzaiemyny v druhij polovyni XVI st.* 1955 (unpublished dissertation).

excursions into Moldavia, taking with them their own candidates for the Moldavian throne. The major purpose behind these expeditions was to overthrow the Moldavian *Hospodars,* the *Vassals* of Turkey, and to replace them with their own candidates. Vyshnevetsky and his followers attempted to establish in Moldavia a "buffer state" under Kozak protection. The Kozak excursion to Moldavia in 1577 with Ivan Podkova as their candidate for the Moldavian throne illustrates this interesting phenomenon. After capturing Moldavia, Podkova, the new *Hospodar,* appointed Zaporozhian *Otaman* Shakh as commander-in-chief of all Moldavian military forces. Other important governmental offices were occupied by Kozaks or their sympathizers. It could be assumed that the Moldavian principality with a large proportion of Ukrainians in its population and its close ties with Ukrainian cultural and economic life served as a testing ground for Kozak state-building attempts.[52]

Kozak activity in the last decade of the 16th century reveals their political objectives in establishing a Kozak state on Ukrainian territory. The first Kozak revolt headed by *Hetman* Kosynsky (1591-1593) received broad support from the Ukrainian population, especially from the townspeople and peasants. In November, 1592, Kosynsky occupied the town of Ostropol and replaced the governmental administration with a Kozak government. An even stronger illustration of Kozak attempts at statehood are noticeable during the anti-governmental revolt of Severyn Nalyvaiko, leader of an independent Kozak *Druzhyna,* and the Zaporozhian Kozaks during 1594-1596. At this time the people of Bratslav rebelled against the Polish administration and established under Kozak protection their own government, adopting the Kozak administrative pattern. It is interesting to note that in some sources one finds the statement that the Kozaks "are defending the Ukrainian population and probably "will establish their own republic in Ukraine." [53] On the basis of careful investigation, Kulish, a noted historian, concluded that the "Kozaks aimed at establishing their own republic in Ukraine, and the Zaporozhian Sich they

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[52] Interesting study on Ukrainian-Moldavian relationships was published by N. A. Mokhov, *Ocherky istorii Moldavsko-Russko-Ukrainskykh Sviazei,* Kishinev, 1969.

[53] Report of Hans Tornberger of Feb. 20, 1596 —. See L. Wynar, "Severyn Nalyvaiko i Revolutsijnyi Ruch Bratslavskoho Mishchanstva," *Rozbudova Derzhavy,* no. 20., 1957, pp. 15-20.

only considered as a military, knightly school." [54] The concept of Kozak statehood was perpetuated in the 17th century and found its firm realization in the form of a Ukrainian Kozak *Hetman* State under the leadership of Zaporozhian *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

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[54] P. Kulish, *Istoria Vossoedynenia Rusy*, v. II, p. 106. The question of Kozak ability to establish their own "Republic" in Ukraine is also discussed by I. H. Rozner, "Antyfeodalnye Hosudarstvennie obrazovania v Rossii i na Ukraine," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 8. 1970, pp. 42-56.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRESENT-DAY UKRAINE

EDITOR'S NOTE: Following is *Memorandum No. 1,* released on December 6, 1976 in Kiev, by the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. The document was translated by the "Smoloskyp" Information Service for the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee in Washington, D.C., and published for the Ukrainian National Association by "Svoboda" Press in Jersey City, N.J.

THE EFFECTS OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN UKRAINE

1. THE FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN GROUP.

The evolution of the movement for Human Rights in the Soviet Union led to the formation on May 12, 1976, of the Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR. Yuriy F. Orlov, a corresponding member (of the Academy of Sciences) of the Armenian SSR was elected head of the Group. Orlov was summoned by the KGB and warned that his efforts to organize the Group were provocative and could be considered anti-Soviet. International support of the Group, however, forced the KGB to refrain from repressive measures against the Group's members, and within a few months the Moscow Group accomplished much in promoting the implementation of the humanitarian articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Today, the Group's activities are winning support even among the Communist parties of the West.

Although the Government continues to apply repressive measures against civil rights activists, these measures are clearly losing their effect. Government officials are forced to conclude that prisons and concentration camps not only do not strengthen their position, they weaken it. In fact, they weaken it more than the non-violent activities of dissidents, if they were allowed.

But, excessive optimism is as dangerous today as understimating the democratic movement and its effect on the Government. One thing can be said with certainty: the struggle for Human Rights will not cease until these Rights become an accepted norm of society.

In these circumstances the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote

the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords was formed on November 9, 1976. It includes the following members:

OLES BERDNYK

Prisoner of the Beria concentration camps (1949-1956); science-fiction writer, prominent in Ukraine and abroad; author of close to 30 books, some translated into English, German, Portuguese and other languages; expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine in 1972 for deviating from Socialist Realism; currently earns his livelihood by physical labor.

PETRO HRYHORENKO
(Pyotr Grigorenko)

Former major-general and department head at the Military Academy; for his legal aid to the Crimean Tatars, who seek to return to their homelands, he was stripped of his rank and placed for over 5 years in a special psychiatric hospital; released, he renewed his active struggle for Human Rights; author of numerous scientific articles and books. He is the representative in Moscow for the Ukrainian Group.

IVAN KANDYBA

Lawyer; one of the authors of the program of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union; although the Union was never formed, he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, which he served in full; now lives under surveillance in the Lviv *Oblast*; deprived of the right to work in his profession, lives in extreme hardship.

LEVKO LUKYANENKO

Lawyer; one of the authors of the program for the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union; at first sentenced to be shot, but later he and the co-author, I. Kandyba, received 15 years imprisonment; served his sentence in full; lives under surveillance in Chernihiv, where he works as an electrician; known abroad for his numerous appeals in defense of Soviet political prisoners.

OKSANA MESHKO

Prisoner of the Beria concentration camps (1947-1956); mother of Olcksander Serhiyenko, now a political prisoner in Vladimir Prison; active in the Human Rights movement in Ukraine; listeners of

[foreign] radio broadcasts know her for her fervent appeals on behalf of her son, in which she raises today's crucial problems.

MYKOLA MATUSEVYCH

Historian; born 1946; denied the right to complete his education when dismissed from the university for his views; once jailed for 15 days for Christmas caroling; dismissed from work several times for supporting political prisoners; lives from odd jobs.

MYROSLAV MARYNOVYCH

Electrical engineer; born 1949; does not work at his profession; for his independent thinking and friendship with dissidents, he was thrice dismissed from his job; presently, editor for the Tekhnika publishing house.

MYKOLA RUDENKO

Prominent Ukrainian poet and writer; author of over 20 books; was an army political instructor during the siege of Leningrad; he was severely wounded and is now a disabled war veteran; expelled from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Writers' Union of Ukraine for his philosophical and economics works; until recently, worked as a watchman; member of Amnesty International and head of the Ukrainian Public Group.

NINA STROKATA

Microbiologist; wife of the well-known Ukrainian political prisoner, Sviatoslav Karavansky; sentenced to 4 years imprisonment for defending her husband; presently lives under surveillance in Kaluga *Oblast;* forbidden to work at her profession.

OLEKSIY TYKHY

Teacher; from 1957 to 1964 he was in prisons and concentration camps for his political views; barred from his profession, he works as a fireman and laborer; interested in problems of education; in June 1976 his home was illegally searched; he was detained for 2 days and brutally mistreated.

Immediately after its formation the Group was the victim of a vicious act. On the night of November 10, 1976, the home of the Group's leader, Mykola Rudenko, was devastated. Someone threw bricks through the windows. For several minutes the building shook

from the hits. At first neighbors thought there was an earthquake. Following the attack, eight sharp brick fragments, ranging from one-half to one-fifth of a brick, were found amidst broken glass in M. Rudenko's apartment. A member of the Group, Oksana Meshko, was injured by one of the fragments. The police, summoned to the scene, refused to file a report, but a week later, police officials confiscated the brick fragments, explaining that they would be examined for possible fingerprints. Needless to say, the matter was dropped; they only wanted to dispose of the evidence.

If you take into account that M. Rudenko lives in the woods where privileged officials hunt boar and elk, it becomes clear that the attack was an obvious warning. Only the support of world opinion can protect the Group from merciless reprisals.

2. COMMON VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

From the first years of the Stalinist dictatorship, Ukraine became the scene of genocide and ethnocide. To show that we are not exaggerating, let us review the definition of genocide. It is as follows:

*GENOCIDE — one of the most heinous crimes against humanity, consisting of the destruction of national, ethnic, racial or religious populations... especially, the deliberate creation of living conditions that lead to the total or partial physical destruction of any population group.**

That is the definition of genocide by the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia. The authors of the article, however, do not cite examples of genocide — examples for which they would not have to search very far.

In 1933, the Ukrainian nation, which for centuries had not known famines, lost over 6 million people, dead by starvation. This famine, which affected the entire nation, was artificially created by the Government. Wheat was confiscated to the last grain. Even ovens and tool sheds were destroyed in the search for grain. If we add the millions of "kulaks" who were deported with their families to Siberia, where they died, then we have a total of more than 10 million Ukrainians who in the short span of some 3 years (1930-1933) were destroyed with premeditation. That was one-quarter of the Ukrainian population. Then there was 1937, when hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian prisoners were shot. Later, there would be the war with Germany, which would destroy 7 to 8 million more Ukrainian citizens. And after this, another war was to begin: the destruction of the

* *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*, Volume 3, page 186.

Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which took up arms against Hitler and would not put them down at Stalin's command. Along with the insurgents, innocent people were also killed. Hundreds of thousands of minors, women and the elderly went to concentration camps only because some insurgent drank a cup of milk or ate a crust of bread in their home. Some "insurgents" turned out to be Chekists in disguise. The prison term was uniform: 25 years. Later, more years would be added. Few of these martyrs returned to their homeland.

If one looks at the last half-century of our history, it becomes clear why our native language is not heard today on the streets of Ukrainian cities. Here is what the Ukrainian political prisoner M. Masiutko wrote from a concentration camp in 1967, that is at a time when we were expecting that the barbed wires would be coming down forever:

If a traveler somehow were to evade all restrictive prohibitions and succeeded in entering a camp for political prisoners in Mordovia, of which there are 6, he would be astonished. Here, thousands of kilometers from Ukraine, he would hear at every step the Ukrainian language in all its present dialects. The traveler would, naturally, ask, "What is going on in Ukraine? Disturbances? Insurrection? How do you explain such a large percentage of Ukrainians among political prisoners, a total that reaches 60 and even 70 percent?" If this traveler were to visit Ukraine soon after this, he would immediately see that there are no insurrections nor disturbances in Ukraine. But then a new question would arise: "Why is the Ukrainian language so rare in the cities of Ukraine, but so prevalent in the camps for political prisoners?"

Where can we find the source of these horrors that have befallen the Ukrainian nation? In our opinion, the answer lies in the fact that over the course of 30 years of Stalinist dictatorship, Human Rights, which were proclaimed in the Declaration of the Rights of Workers and Exploited Masses and in the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, were ultimately reduced to nothing. As a result of the bureaucratic destruction of the principles contained in the Declaration of the Formation of the USSR the national rights of Ukraine as a member of the Soviet Union ceased to be socially real.

In the 1960's Ukraine suffered another calamity. The most talented members of the young Ukrainian intelligentsia were thrown into prisons and concentration camps. These intellectuals had grown up under Soviet rule. They had been taught to believe Lenin's every word, and they believed. They ended up in concentration camps and special psychiatric hospitals because of this belief.

Here, the national question is paramount. For decades, the Ukrainian had it pounded into his head that for him there is no national question, that only the accursed enemies of Soviet rule could contemplate the separation of Ukraine from Russia. Even an inadvertent thought on this subject was so frightening that it had to be immediately forgotten. And God forbid that someone should mention it to a friend, or even one's brother. A worse crime has never existed during the entire, 1,000-year history of Ukraine.

Then, behold, a young person begins to learn Soviet law and unexpectedly discovers that such yearnings cannot be considered a crime at all; they are legal under the Soviet Constitution. Neither does the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR say that agitation for the separation of Ukraine from Russia is a criminal offense. The Code (Article 62) speaks of something else: "Agitation or propaganda conducted with the intent of undermining or weakening Soviet rule." Such agitation is punishable by imprisonment of from 6 months to 7 years.

But the separation of a republic from the Soviet Union does not necessarily have to weaken Soviet rule. On the contrary, this rule could find greater support among the populace — the republic remains soviet [Soviet—a council], but is completely independent. In this case, there is absolutely no agitation against Soviet rule. Or if there is, then it should be noted that such "agitation" is also present in the Treaty of December 27, 1922, by which the USSR was formed:

The union is based on the principle of voluntariness and equality of the republics, with the right of each republic to freely leave the Union.•

We could cite dozens of quotes from Lenin, which show that it is precisely by this voluntariness that one should interpret the spiritual and political nature of the Soviet Union.

As a matter of law, it cannot be inferred that a young person who dreams of the separation of Ukraine from the USSR yearns simultaneously to weaken Soviet rule. Let us, therefore, assert that even the restructuring of the economy on the basis of "capitalism which exists alongside communism" (NEP) was just another form of Soviet rule — a truly Leninist form, for that matter.

In spite of this, Levko Lukyanenko was sentenced to be shot, his sentence later commuted to 15 years imprisonment. Levko Lukyanenko certainly did not intend to eliminate Soviet rule in Ukraine; he simply wanted the Ukrainian people to realize their constitutional rights. With this as their goal, the young laywers, L. Lukyanenko and

• Lenin, V.I., *Collected Works*, Volume 45, page 360.

I. Kandyba, who sincerely believed in the Soviet Law they had learned so conscientiously, prepared a relatively moderate draft of a Program of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union. That was all they did, nothing more. The Union itself, naturally, was never formed.

But then, when several persons sit around a table, discussing something serious, that, according to the standards of the KGB, is an "organization." Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, in this case permits the application of all articles of the section titled, "Especially Dangerous Crimes Against the State" — Articles 56-63. Treason is also listed here (Article 56) and it is punishable by death. That was the justification for the death sentence for one of the authors of the Program.

Actually there was no legal basis for sentencing L. Lukyanenko and I. Kandyba. There was none because they never agitated against Soviet rule, and only such agitation can be considered a crime. And it is totaly incomprehensible how they could receive punishment that the Code prescribes for treason.

Here it should be noted that according to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights even anti-Soviet agitation (if non-violent) is not a crime but merely an expression of personal convictions. Can a nation be considered civilized if it ratifies international agreements that guarantee the highest of Human Rights and then passes internal laws that nullify those rights?

But then, the issue in Ukraine is not anti-Soviet agitation. None of the members of the young intelligentsia who were arrested in the 1960's and 1970's called for the destruction of Soviet rule; most did not even dream of the constitutionally allowed separation of Ukraine from Russia. The issue was widespread Russification, thinly disguised as "internationalism." The motivating force of this movement was I. Dzyuba, who later, after almost a year in KGB prisons, repudiated his own convictions. But they were not disavowed by V. Moroz, V. Chornovil, V. Stus, O. Serhiyenko, I. Svitlychny, Y. Sverstiuk, and many others. Prisons, dungeons, concentration camps, special psychiatric hospitals, strict KGB surveillance and a half-starving existence are the harsh rewards for their ardent belief in the sanctity of the spirit and the letter of the Soviet Constitution.

Power sits in judgment and not Law. And Power always interprets the laws to suit its needs. What is Soviet in nature is called anti-Soviet, including the treaty on the formation of the USSR and the Soviet Constitution.

What gives even the illusory justification (since it is not Soviet Law) for such trials? We often hear that the Constitution of the

USSR should not be interpreted literally because of Article 126, which establishes that the leadership nucleus of our society is to be the Communist Party. The Party issues its decisions and positions and the very same Party, and not some document, explains how we are to interpret this or that problem. If, for instance, the Party decides to combat nationalism, then nationalism should, of course, be considered an anti-Soviet activity. Efforts to instill in one's compatriots a love for the Ukrainian language and national culture are then considered anti-Soviet and are punishable by 10-12 years of imprisonment.

The legal contradictions are convincingly exposed by Ukrainian political prisoner Hryhoriy Prykhodko in his letter of November 17, 1975, to the Fourth Session of the Ninth Congress of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Externally, the Soviet Union is the most enthusiastic supporter of the Declaration of Human Rights, while inside the USSR, citizens are still so disfranchised that they would not dare demand those rights; furthermore, the Declaration has never even been printed in Ukrainian.

Externally, the Soviet Union speaks out against colonialism and for the right of national self-determination, while inside the USSR, it smothers every effort of non-Russian nations toward separation from Russia and independence...

...In fact, the actions of the Soviet Government contradict the very laws of the USSR.

They are contradicted because these laws are always interpreted not as they are written but as the Party leadership demands. In fact, a law in the USSR is a trap for the naive — it provokes but does not protect from arbitary application.

Even if it is accepted, however, that the Party must comprise the leadership nucleus of society, it does not automatically follow that any other form of thinking other than the Party's is unconstitutional. The Constitution gives Soviet citizens freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom to assemble and demonstrate. The leadership does not have the right to interpret these democratic articles of the Constitution for its own benefit; its role is limited to ensuring that these democratic freedoms are real and not just form declarations. If it acts otherwise, then its activities are unconstitutional and not those of citizens who struggle to attain those democratic freedoms. The Constitution is above the will of the Government because, theoretically and historically, the ward of Law is not the Party nor the Government, but the Individual.

The bureaucracy seeks to liquidate this 1,000-year-old legal norm. That is why, in practice, the situation again arises about which the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia writes, "He (the serf) was the victim and not the ward of law."*

3. THE SAVAGERY OF THE SENTENCES

In 1972 massive arrests began in Ukraine. Arrested were scores of young people who sympathized with I. Dzyuba, whose book, "Internationalism or Russification?," became popular in "samvydav."

A graduate student in philosophy, Vasyl Lisovy, never voiced his support for the "Generation of the 60's," as the young people began to be called. He was absorbed in his studies. But when Lisovy heard of the arrests of I. Dzyuba, I. Svitlychny, Y. Sverstyuk, V. Stus, O. Serhiyenko and others, his conscience would let him remain silent no longer. Lisovy clearly saw that neither universal law nor Soviet Law could justify these arrests. They were in esence illegal and unconstitutional and, as such, anti-Soviet. Believing in the sanctity of the Soviet Constitution, the Communist Vasyl Lisovy wrote to the Party and Government leadership, citing the illegality of the arrests. Toward the end of his letter he wrote that if these people are criminals, then he is also a criminal, because he shares their views. Socratic consistency then led him to the conclusion that he, too, should be arrested and tried along with them. Naturally, in writing these words, Lisovy did not actually believe he would be arrested.

But the soulless machine of the KGB immediately went to work. V. Lisovy's "request" was granted with extreme generosity. He was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment and 3 years exile.

For what? No one other than government officials and judges had read his letter. The question arises: Are these people so uncertain of their Soviet convictions that they should decide immediately to protect themselves from Lisovy's "agitation?"

Another example. Sviatoslav Karavansky and Hryhoriy Prokopovych never concealed their nationalism; it forms the basis of their beliefs. It is known that V. I. Lenin insisted on differentiating between the nationalism of subjugated nations and the nationalism of subjugating nations. Lenin did not condemn the nationalism of a subjugated nation, but justified it morally and politically, especially if it was not aggressive, but legally defensive in character. But S. Karavansky and H. Prokopovych, and hundreds of other Ukrainian nationalists who peacefully demanded Ukrainian independence were

* *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia,* Volume 2, page 447.

sentenced after the war to 25 years imprisonment because of their convictions. Later, under Khrushchev, some were released for several years. But when the Khrushchev thaw ended, they were again thrown into concentration camps for the same thing — for their convictions.

A year to 18 months from now S. Karavansky will complete his term of imprisonment, which now totals close to 30 years. We ask: Will the KGB extend his sentence by another 10-15 years? S. Karavansky does not conceal the fact that he has not renounced his nationalist convictions — they have only been strengthened and hardened. He is also well aware that under Soviet Law these convictions and their propagation are not crimes.

The scheme by which the KGB operates in taking the legally sanctioned nationalism of subjugated nations, a phenomenon Lenin found completely natural and politically justified, and transforming it into a "serious crime against the state," is well illustrated by the case of V. Marchenko. A philologist and linguist, he was simultaneously indicted for Ukrainian and Azerbaijanian nationalisms. This combination by itself is enough to understand that no real nationalism is involved here.

At the trial, the Azerbaijanian nationalism was dropped (Article 63, Criminal Code, Azerbaijanian SSR), the charge of Ukrainian nationalism, retained.

The court (we quote the decision of the court) "determined that from the end of 1965 to 1973, Marchenko, V. V., residing in Kiev, under the influence of nationalist convictions, which resulted from reading illegal anti-Soviet literature, listening to hostile broadcasts of Western radio stations and misinterpreting isolated issues of the nationalities policy of the Soviet State, with the intention of undermining and weakening Soviet rule..."

We quote no further, for it is abundantly clear that these simple, normal acts, the natural expresssions of social existence, in no way fall under any of the articles of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, not to mention international conventions. But to force the Criminal Code to work for the KGB, the following formula is arbitrarily invoked: "with the intention of undermining and weakening Soviet rule..." By applying this formula where it just will not fit, a talented liguist's love for the Ukrainian and Azerbaijanian languages was construed as a "serious crime against the state."

On the basis of these obviously demagogic charges, V. Marchenko was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment in a severe-regime corrective labor camp and 2 years in exile.

On September 19, 1974, Vasyl Fedorenko illegally crossed the border at the train station at Chop. The Czecho-Slovakian border guards arrested him and turned him over to Soviet authorities. In March of 1975, on the basis of Article 56 (treason, desertion to the enemy) and Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, the Uzhhorod Oblast court sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment, 5 years of which were to be served in the Vladimir Prison.

If we are to adhere to normal logic, then it follows from this inhuman sentence that the Czecho-Slovakian Socialist Republic is an enemy of the USSR. How else could V. Fedorenko have been charged with "desertion to the enemy"?

The point is that V. Fedorenko had earlier served a sentence for his nationalistic beliefs. That is why he was tried under Article 56 and not Article 75 (crossing the border without a valid passport or permit) which is punishable by 1 to 3 years imprisonment. They were not even ashamed to call Czecho-Slovakia an enemy state. But then, perhaps that is what the KGB thinks of Czecho-Slovakia.

In his final statement to the court, V. Fedorenko said:

Citizen judges! Is the independence of my thoughts so dangerous to your order? Can it be that my ideas, and only they, force you to try me on such an unbelievable charge as treason and to issue this brutal sentence?

Soon you will be celebrating the 30th anniversary of Victory. Then you feared neither cannon nor tanks — that was an army! Now you fear my convictions...

Only where the government does not fear its people and tells them the truth about its achievements as well as its failures, can freedom and democracy exist:... A nation whose government hides the truth from its people can be neither democratic nor free.

V. Fedorenko, in protest against this savage arbitrariness, announced an indefinite hunger strike. Existing on the brink of death, he has continued his protest for many months now.

We could cite dozens of examples where Ukrainian nationalism, real or imagined, leads to inhuman sentences. This clearly shows that it is not Soviet authority that conducts the trials (Soviet laws do not permit trials for nationalism protective of rights) but fanatical Great Russian chauvinists. Power, not Law, rules.

4. AFTER THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE.

When the European Conference was being prepared, a rumor began to circulate among the Ukrainian populace: there would soon be

an amnesty. Children, now of school-age, would be able to embrace their emaciated fathers, whom they had never seen as free men.

But these hopes were hollow. The Helsinki Accords, just as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ended up between the propaganda millstones, from where emerges the same old grist: bombastic proclamations that have nothing in common with reality.

We will say nothing about free contacts among people of various countries and continents. That is a luxury about which Ukrainians cannot even dream. The main issue is that government agencies, which consider themselves Soviet, adhere to their own laws.

Our Group could cite many examples of prison authorities forcing Ukrainian political prisoners and their families to speak only in Russian during visitations. No doubt this is explained by practical considerations: They want to monitor the conversation. But when you analyze it, this administrative measure takes on symbolic meaning: for the sake of the jailer's convenience, one is forced to renounce his greatest spiritual treasure — his native language.

Or take, for example, Article 6 of the Corrective Labor Code of the Ukrainian SSR, which states:

Persons sentenced to prison for the first time, who prior to their arrest lived or were sentenced within the Ukrainian SSR, are to serve their sentence, as a rule, within the Ukrainian SSR.

A perfectly natural question arises: How did those tens of thousands of Ukrainians end up in Mordovian camps, where, according to the testimony of M. Masiutko, they comprise close to 70 percent of all prisoners? Has the situation changed totally, perhaps, since the Helsinki Conference? The Group has abundant evidence that no changes for the better have occurred in this respect.

Article 6 of the Corrective Labor Code of the Ukrainian SSR recognizes exceptional cases, when, "for the sake of a more efficient rehabilitation" of Ukrainian prisoners it is permissible to send them to other republics. It is unclear what educational principles are involved here. One thing is known: in the past half century, more Ukrainians have died in Mordovia then Mordovians were born.

Our Group does not have at its disposals all of the information on Ukrainian political prisoners. We only have individual reports that we were able to gather. We list some of them:

Name and patronymic	length of camp term, exile	date of release	date of birth	profession	date of arrest
HEL, Ivan Andriiovych	10+5	1/12/87	1936	student-historian	1972
MOROZ, Valentyn Yakovych (of which 6 in prison)	9+5	6/1/84	4/15/36	historian	1970
OSADCHY, Mykhailo Hryhorovych	7+3	1/12/82	1936	writer	1972
KARAVANSKY, Sviatoslav Yosypovych	25+10	1978	1920	poet-publicist	1965
SHUMUK, Danylo Lavrentiiovych	10+5	1/12/87	1914	(second time) writer (3rd time)	1972
KURCHYK, Mykola Yakovych	28	1978	1927	locksmith	
MURZHENKO, Oleksiy	15	1986			1971
REBRYK, Bohdan	7+3	1984	1938		1970
ROMANIUK, Vasyl Omelianovych	10	1982		priest	1972
SHYNKARUK, Trokhym Yevhrafov	12	1982		poet (2nd time)	1970

STRICT REGIME

(MORDOVIAN ASSR TENHUSHIVSKY RAION, s. BARASHEVO, ust. ZhKh 385/3-5)

CHORNOVIL, Vyacheslav Maksymovych	6+5	1/12/83	1937	journalist	1972
STUS, Vasyl Semenovych	5+3	1/12/80	1936	poet	1972

(MORDOVIAN ASSR, st. POTMA, LISNE, ust. ZhKh 385/19)

ZHURAKIVSKY, Mykhailo	25	1978	1921		1953
KRAVTSOV, Ihor Ivanovych	5	1977		engineer	1972
SEMENIUK, Roman	28	1977	1927		1949

WOMEN'S ZONES IN MORDOVIA

(431200, MORDOVIAN ASSR, TENHUSHIVSKY RAION, s. BARASHEVO, ust. ZhKh 385/3-4)

KALYNETS, Iryna Onufriyivna	6+3	1/12/81	1940	poet	1972
POPOVYCH, Oksana Zenonivna	8+5	1986	1925		1973
SENYK, Iryna Mykhailivna	6+5	11/17/83	1926	nurse	1972
SHABATURA, Stefania Mykhailivna	5+3	1/12/80	1938	artist-tapestry designer	1972

CAMPS IN THE PERM OBLAST

(618810, PERM OBLAST, st. VSESVIATSKA, VS 389/35)

KALYNETS, Ihor Myronovych	6+3	1981	1940	poet		1972
KOVALENKO, Ivan Yukhymovych	5	1/12/77	1914?	philologist		1972
MARCHENKO, Valeriy	6+2	1981	1948?	philologist	June	1973
PRONIUK, Yevhen Vasyliovych	7+5	1984	193?	philosopher		1972
SVITLYCHNY, Ivan Oleksiiovych	7+5	1984	1929	philologist		1972
SYMYCH, Myron (2nd time)	15	1982	1917			1967
BESARAB, Dmytro	25	1978				1953
VERKHOLIAK, Dmytro	25	1980				1955
SHULIAK, Oleksa	25	1978				1953
PIDHORODETSKY, Vasyl	28	1982				1954
PRYSHLIAK, Yevhen	25	1977				1952
MAMCHUR, Stepan	25	1981				1956
KVETSKO, Dmytro	15+5	1987				1967
MOTRIUK, Mykola Mykolaiovych	5		2/20/49			
SHOVKOVY, Ivan Vasyliovych	5		7/7/50	engineer		
DEMYDIV, Dmytro Illich	5		11/3/48			
MARMUS, Volodymyr V.	6+5		1949			
MARMUS, Mykola Vasyliovych	5+3		1947			

(PERM OBLAST, CHUSOVSKY RAION, s. KUCHYNO, VS 389/37)

SVERSTIUK, Yevhen Oleksandrovych	7+5	1984	1928	writer	1972

(PERM OBLAST, CHUSOVSKY RAION, VS 389/37)

BERNYCHUK, Anatoliy	12	1982	1939		1970
HRYNKIV, Dmytro Dmytrovych	7+5	1985	7/11/48	poet	1973
CHUPRIY, Roman Vasyliovych	4		7/1/48		
RISNYKIV, Oleksa Serhiiovych	5½	1977	1938	poet	1971
HRYCHAK, Hryhoriy Andriiovych	25	1977	1930	artist	1952
HUTSALO, Yuriy	25		1928		
STROTSYN, Pavlo	25	1983	1928		1958
SYNKIV, Volodymyr Yosafatovych	4+3	1980	1954		1973
KYSELYK, Vasyl	25	1978	1927		1953
HLYVA, Volodymyr	28	1977			1949
PALIYCHUK, Dmytro	25		1928		
KULAK, Onufriy	15		1928		
YANKEVYCH, Stepan	25		1928		
FEDIUK, Vasyl	15		1925		

(618801, PERM OBLAST, CHUSOVSKY RAION, POLOVYNKA, VS 389/37)

LISOVY, Vasyl Semenovych	7+3	1982	1937	philosopher	1972

VLADIMIR PRISON

(600020, VLADIMIR — 20, ust. OD — I/st.-2)

ANTONIUK, Zinoviy Pavlovych	7+3	1982	1943	chemical engineer	1/12/72
BONDAR, Mykola Vasyliovych	7+3	1981	11/21/39	philosopher	11/7/71
HAYDUK, Roman Vasyliovych	5+3		1/1/38	Ph.D. in technical sciences	1973
ZDOROVY, Anatoliy Kuzmovych	7+?		1930	publicist	1/12/72
ROKYTSKY, Volodymyr Yulianovych	5+?		1935	electronics engineer	
PRYKHODKO, Hryhoriy Andriiovych	5+?			student at Lviv	
POPADIUK, Zoreslav Volodymyrovych				University	
SERHIYENKO, Oleksander Fedorovych	7+3	1982	7/26/32	artist-restorer	1/13/72
SAPELIAK, Stepan Yevstafiiovych	5+3		2/26/52	student	
TURYK, Andriy Markovych	25	1983	10/14/27		1958
BUDULIAK-SHARYHYN, Mykola Oleksandrovych	10	1978	4/22/26		9/20/68
PEDAN, Leonid					
SHUKHEVYCH, Yuriy Romanovych	10	1983	3/28/31	publicist	1973
FEDORENKO, Vasyl Petrovych	15	1990	3/30/28		11/16/75

IN EXILE

HORBAL, Mykola Andriovych, Tomsk Oblast, s. Porabel, SU-6, vahon 16.
HANDZIUK, Volodymyr, 636400, Tomsk Oblast, Chayinsky raion, s. Pidhorne, Lermontova 34/4.
KAMPOV, Pavlo Fedorovych, 636842, Tomsk Oblast, Pervomaisky raion, s. Komsomolske, prov. Poshtovy 3, kv. 2.
KOTS, Mykola, Tomsk Oblast, s. Hehuldet, vul. Pushkina 48, kv. 2.
KRAVETS, Andriy, 636500, Tomsk Oblast, Verkhnoketsky raion, p/v Bilyi Yar, Selyshche Poludenovka.
PROKOPOVYCH, Hryhoriy Hryhorovych, Krasnoiarsky Kray, s. Kurahino, vul. Molodizhna 3-6.
HUBKA, Ivan Mykolaiovych, 663120, Krasnoiarsky Kray, Pyrovsk, vul. Koreneva 47.

The Group's prime objective is to continue to collect information about Ukrainian political prisoners. The information already at hand, however, is quite sufficient to conclude that the "exception" mentioned in Article 6 of the Corrective Labor Code of the Ukrainian SSR has become the norm. None of the above mentioned political prisoners is serving his judicial sentence in his homeland. For writing poems

that were never made public, the talented poets Ihor Kalynets and his wife, Iryna, have been banished from Ukraine to the snows of Mordovia for nine years, to be subjected to KGB re-education "in the spirit of an honest attitude toward work" (Article 1, Corrective Labor Code of the Ukrainian SSR). Where else but in the USSR and China are poets thus "re-educated"?

On the other hand, Ukraine is well supplied with psychiatric hospitals.

By a decision of the Kiev Oblast Court, Vasyl Ruban was placed in the Dnipropetrovsk special psychiatric hospital for a manuscript which had been confiscated from him, one with the expressive title, "Ukraine — Communist and Independent." This topic has already been discussed in previous sections. For Ukrainian political prisoners, this manner of thinking is typical.

Anatoliy Lupynis was placed in a psychiatric hospital without any judicial proceedings. In 1971, he was taken for a "little treatment." They took him and "forgot" to release him. Lupynis was imprisoned from 1957 to 1967; he took part in a strike in the Mordovian Camp 385/7. For this he was placed in the Vladimir Prison. He maintained an 8-month-long hunger strike, which left him an invalid. He was bound to a bed in a camp hospital for approximately two years until finally released in 1967. His family and friends assume that Lupynis is kept in a psychiatric hospital for reading poetry at the site of the Taras Shevchenko monument on May 22, 1971.

Borys Kovhar was thrown into the Dnipropetrovsk special psychiatric hospital for refusing to work for the KGB. Our Group has at its disposal conclusive evidence to prove this.

Mykola Plakhotniuk, a physician, was kept in the Dnipropetrovsk special psychiatric hospital from January 12, 1972, to August 1976, when he was transferred to a similar hospital in Kazan.

Below, we list individual incidents of serious violations of Human Rights that have occurred in the last few months.

Mykhailo Kovtunenko, a Kiev physician, was arrested in September 1976 for refusing to work for the KGB. As with Kovhar, the Group has considerable evidence to prove this. He was accused of bribery, as in the noted case of the physician Mikhail Shtern of Vynnytsia.

Recent information indicates that M. Kovtunenko was transferred without trial to a psychiatric hospital in Kiev. Should world opinion remain silent, he too will be "forgotten," as were Kovhar and Lupynis.

On November 2, 1976, Yosyp Terelia was thrown into the psychiatric hospital in Vynnytsia. Terelia has spent 14 of the 33 years

of his life in camps, prisons and special psychiatric hospitals for his religious and nationalistic convictions. Freed in April 1976, he was pronounced perfectly healthy and even subject to military service. In fact, he had become an invalid; during torture his spine had been injured. He worked as a cabinetmaker in a regional hospital. From there he was taken by ambulance to an insane asylum.

Y. Terelia is an aspiring poet. He was never given the opportunity to study, but the emotions he expresses in his poems could not be suppressed. For his uncompromising nationalistic and religious feelings, expressed in large part in his poetry, Terelia has sacrificed almost half his life in camps, the Vladimir Prison and special psychiatric hospitals. From the Vynnytsia psychiatric hospital Terelia writes:

Today, on the 10th, I received my first injection, though I did not request it. But when people want to do "good" for their neighbor, they sometimes permit themselves the impermissible (that is, the amoral, the unconscionable). The reaction has begun — how wonderful; I feel a great deal of acidity.

The room holds almost 40 variously sick persons. I was placed among the violent, with a few fevered alcoholics tossed in, who scream every night as if wounded. Outdoor exercise is not permitted — fresh air is forbidden! The same goes for any contacts, even the orderlies are warned not to speak to me. "No exchanges." The food is horrendous, almost like the prison swill, and there are days when you wonder where you are.

*The KGB, it appears, had planned to have me killed by someone else's hand. As far as I am concerned, psychiatry and the police are like siblings serving the almost legendary KGB in order to show their better side, lest, Heaven forbid, they get a "mark." With this in mind Police Captain Tymoshchuk summoned me and began to blackmail me, threatening me with jail for "parasitism," for not working, although he knew very well that I had a job and that I have a job now.**

Among the gross violations of Human Rights, which have not abated since Helsinki, are the "camp trials" — a method borrowed from Beria's versions of jurisprudence. The "trial" is held without witnesses, without counsel and often without a representative of the local authorities, who should supervise. A typical "troika" from Stalinist times. With the aid of such "troikas," the camp administration maintains its zone in fear and submission and transfers the more

* On November 30th Y. Terelia was released from the psychiatric hospital (Ukrainian Public Group).

active prisoners, who demand the status of political prisoners, to the harsh treatment in Vladimir Prison. That is how they pacified Zone 36 by transferring Krasniak, Vudka, Serhiyenko and others to prison. Of the 14 Ukrainian political prisoners in Vladimir, 12 were sent there by "camp courts," most of them for 3 years.

Finally, a summation is in order. It is far from encouraging. More than a year has gone by since Helsinki and the Accords have not brought the Ukrainian people any improvement. New prisons are being built and the ranks of the KGB continue to grow. Today, every establishment has its own KGB curator. Monitoring of telephone conversations, of private mail, microphones in ceilings, planned "hooligan" muggings of Human Rights activists — all of these have become a matter of daily life. And there is no one to complain to.

True, there are fewer politically motivated arrests than in 1972, but all those considered "unreliable" lose their professional positions. The ranks of guard, engine stoker and common laborer are filled by writers, lawyers, and philologists. Psychiatric hospitals are still used as institutions for "re-educating" those who think differently. False accusations, such as bribe-taking, are made in order to hide political motives. Refusal to cooperate with the KGB, that is, to be an informer, brings sadistic, vicious reprisals, while informers are rewarded with automatic promotions.

All aspects of life today are controlled by the KGB, from the employee's bed beneath ceiling microphones (often unconcealed!), to the writer's study. For example, Mykola Rudenko summoned the KGB to remove microphones from his ceiling. Later, the KGB decided to place an informer by Rudenko, choosing Dr. Mykhailo Kovtunenko for this ignominious role. When Kovtunenko refused, he was immediately arrested for "accepting bribes."

Another example: After an illegal search, former political prisoner, Oleksiy Tykhy was arrested on suspicion of robbing a store. A guard then began to beat him. When Tykhy protested to KGB Lt. Col. Melnyk, V. O., the latter responded with brutal obscenities and shouted, "And who do you think you are?"

Actually, this detention was necessary for the KGB to confiscate Tykhy's manuscripts. In two days, he was released, but his manuscripts were not returned.

In the meantime, former political prisoners are returning unbroken, hardened, and determined to continue the struggle for Human Rights. It is enough to examine the membership of our Group to be convinced of that. This is a new, unusual social phenomenon, for which the authorities are not prepared. It appears that prisons, camps, and

psychiatric hospitals cannot serve as dams against a movement in defense of justice. On the contrary, they temper cadres of unyielding fighters for freedom. And the KGB can no longer make sure that political prisoners will never return.

If world public opinion does not lessen its moral support, if the Western news media focus more attention on the struggle for Human Rights in the USSR, then the coming decade will bring great democratic changes in our country.

Since the collapse of feudalism, the individual has become an active element in the formulation of government policy, in other words, a Ward of the Law. This means, that if there is a single individual that does not think as does the rest of society, the law must protect this individual's convictions. Otherwise the Aristotles, Copernicuses, Einsteins and Marxes would never see the light of day, for they would always be thrown into psychiatric hospitals and concentration camps.

There is but one Civilization — this is clearly seen from Space. The Sun's rays know no earthly boundaries. Man is formed from the rays of the Sun; he is a child of the Sun. Who has the right to restrain his thought which strives for Infinity? For the sake of life on Earth, for the sake of our grandchildren and their children, we say: Enough! And our call is echoed by the Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords, which were ratified by the Soviet Government as well.

OLES BERDNYK
PETRO HRYHORENKO (PYOTR GRIGORENKO)
IVAN KANDYBA
LEVKO LUKIANENKO
OKSANA MESHKO
MYKOLA MATUSEVYCH
MYROSLAV MARYNOVYCH
MYKOLA RUDENKO (Group Leader)
NINA STROKATA
OLEKSIY TYKHY

A signed copy is retained by the Group.

November-December 1976

12/6/76 MYKOLA RUDENKO

THE DISSIDENT SURGE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA "CHARTER 77"

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following document, known as "Charter 77," was signed in January 1977 by some 240 writers, journalists, scholars, former politicians and persons active during the "Prague Spring" of 1968; it is a political manifesto denouncing the suppression of human rights in Czechoslovakia. We reprint it through the courtesy of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia based in Washington, D.C. preserving the original spelling of Czech and Slovak names.

"Law No. 120 of the Czechoslovak Collection of Laws of 13 October 1976" includes the text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which were signed in behalf of our Republic in 1968 and confirmed at the 1975 Helsinki conference. These pacts went into force in our country on 23 March 1976. Since this date our citizens also have the right and the state has the duty to abide by them.

The freedoms and rights of people guaranteed by these documents are important assets of civilization which have been the goal of efforts of many progressive people in the past, and their enaction can significantly contribute to a humane development of our society.

We are welcoming the fact that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has agreed to join these covenants.

However, their publication is at the same time an urgent reminder of the many fundamental human rights which have regretfully been violated in our country. Quite illusory has for example been the right of free expression guaranteed by Article 19 of the first pact:

Tens of thousands of citizens have been prevented from working in the fields of their profession for the one reason alone that their views differ from the official ones. They have been the frequent targets of various forms of discrimination and chicanery on the part of the authorities or social organizations, they have been deprived of whatever possibility to defend themselves, and are practically the victims of an apartheid.

Hundreds of thousands of other citizens have been deprived of the "freedom from fear" (preamble of the first pact), because they live

in constant danger of losing their jobs or other benefits if they express their views.

Contrary to Article 13 of the second pact which guarantees the right to education, many young people are prevented from pursuing higher education because of the views of their parents. A countless number of citizens fear that if they manifest their conviction, they themselves or their children could be deprived of the right to education.

The assertion of the right to "seek, receive and impart information regardless of frontiers and regardless of it being oral, written or printed information" or that "imparted through art," (Point 2, Article 13 of the first pact) can be persecuted not only outside but also inside the court, frequently under the pretext of criminal indictment (as evidenced, among others, by the recent trial of the young musicians).

Freedom of speech is suppressed through a central management of all mass media, including publishing and cultural institutions. No political, philosophical or scientific view or artistic manifestation deviating only slightly from the narrow framework of official ideology or esthetics is permited to be published; public criticism of the social crisis phenomena is prohibited; the possibility of public defense against false and offensive charges by official propaganda is impossible (the legal protection against attacks on one's reputation and honor unanimously guaranteed by Article 17 of the first pact is practically non-existent); false accusations cannot be refuted and futile is any attempt to attain a rectification or a legal corrective measure; an open discussion, in the sector of intellectual and cultural creation, is out of the question. Many scientific and cultural workers as well as other citizens have been discriminated against for the one reason alone that some years ago they legally published or openly articulated views condemned by the current political power.

Religious freedom, emphatically guaranteed by Art. 18 of the first pact, is systematically curbed by a despotic arbitrariness through limits imposed on the activity of priests who are constantly threatened with the revocation of government permission to perform their function, by the loss of job, or by other repression of persons who manifest their religious faith either by word or action, through the suppression of religious instruction in schools, etc.

The instrument of restriction or of complete suppression of a whole number of civil rights is the system of an effective subordination of all institutions and organizations in the state to the political directives by the apparatuses of the ruling party and the decisions

of highly influential individuals. The Constitution of the CSSR and the rest of the laws and legal norms regulate neither the contents nor the form or the creation and application of such decisions; they are frequently a matter of oral adoption, unknown to and beyond control by citizens; their authors are responsible only to themselves and their own hierarchy; yet, they have a decisive influence on the activity of the legislative as well as executive bodies of state administration, justice, trade unions, social organizations, other political parties, business, enterprises, institutions, authorities, schools and other installations, and their orders have greater priority than the laws. If some organizations or citizens, in the interpretation of their rights and duties, become involved in a conflict with the directives, they cannot turn to any neutral authority, because it is non-existent. Consequently, all rights stemming from Articles 21 and 22 of the first pact (the right of assembly and the prohibition of its restraint), as well as Article 25 (the equality of the right of participation in public affairs), and Article 26 (equality before the law) are seriously curtailed by all this. This state of conditions prevents workers and the rest of the working people from establishing freely their labor and other organizations for the protection of their economic and social interests and the free exploitation of their right to strike (Point 1, Article 8 of the second pact).

Other civil rights, including the virtual prohibition of a "wilful interference in private life, the family, home and correspondence" (Article 17 of the first pact) are gravely violated also by the fact that the Interior Ministry resorts to various ways of controlling the life of citizens, such as telephone tapping and surveillance of private homes, the control of mail, shadowing of individuals, home search, the establishment of a network of informers from the ranks of the population (frequently recruited by illegal means of intimidation or, vice versa, promises), etc. The Ministry frequently interferes in the decisions of employers, inspires discrimination by authorities and organizations, influences the organs of justice and supervises even propaganda campaigns of the mass media. This activity is not regulated by laws, it is covert and the citizen is unable to protect himself against it.

In the cases of politically motivated persecution the organs of interrogation and justice violate the rights of the defendants and their defense, as guaranteed by Article 14 of the first pact as well as by Czechoslovakia's own laws. People in jails thus sentenced are being treated in a way which violates the human dignity of prisoners, impairs their health and attempts to break them morally.

Point 2 of Article 12 of the first pact which guarantees the right to freely leave one's country is generally violated; under the pretext of "protecting the state security" (point 3) this right is tied to various illegal conditions. Just as arbitrary is the procedure of issue of the entry visas for foreign nationals, many of whom are unable to visit Czechoslovakia for the only reason that they had some official or friendly contact with persons who have been discriminated against in our country.

Some citizens — whether privately, at the places of their work, or publicly, the latter being possible through the media abroad only — draw attention to these systematic violations of human rights and democratic freedoms and they demand a remedy in specific cases; however, their voices receive no echo, or they themselves become the object of investigation.

The responsibility for the preservation of civil rights naturally rests with the political and state power in the country. But not on it alone. Every individual bears a share of responsibility for the general conditions and thus also for compliance with the enacted pacts which are binding, for the government as for the people.

The feeling of this coresponsibility, the belief in the value of civic engagement and the readiness to be engaged, together with the need to seek a new and a more effective expression gave us the idea of creating Charter 77, whose issue we publicly announce.

Charter 77 is a free and informal and open community of people of various convictions, religions and professions, linked by the desire to work individually and collectively for respect for human and civil rights in Czechoslovakia and the world; these rights for which provision was made by enacted international pacts, the final documents of the Helsinki conference, numerous other international documents against wars, violence, and social and mental repression, and it represents a general declaration of human rights.

Charter 77 is based on the concepts of solidarity and friendship of people who share concern for the fate of ideals with which they have linked their lives and work.

Charter 77 is not an organization, it has no statutes, permanent organs and no registered membership. Everyone who agrees with its idea and participates in its work and supports it, belongs to it.

Charter 77 is no basis for political opposition activity. Its desire is to serve the common interest like numerous similar organizations of civic initiative in various countries in the East and West. It has no intention to raise its own programs for political or social reforms or changes, but it wants to lead in the sphere of its activity by means

of a constructive dialogue with the political and state authorities and particularly by drawing attention to various specific violations of civil and human rights, by preparing their documentation, the suggestion of solutions, by submitting various more general proposals aimed at furthering these rights and their guarantees, to act as a mediator in the event of conflict situations which might result in wrongdoings, etc.

By its symbolic name Charter 77 stresses that it has been established on the threshold of the year which has been declared the year of political prisoners, and in the course of which a conference in Belgrade is to review the progress, or the lack of it, achieved since the Helsinki conference.

As signatories of this declaration we entrust Dr. Jan Patocka, Dr. Havel and Prof. Jiri Hajek to act as spokesmen of Charter 77. These spokesmen are authorized to represent it before the state and other organizations, as well as before the public at home and in the world, and they guarantee the authenticity of its documents by their signatures. In us and other citizens that will join, they will find their collaborators who will participate in the necessary negotiations, will accept partial tasks and will share the entire responsibility.

We trust that Charter 77 will contribute that all citizens in Czechoslovakia can live and work as free people.

238 SIGNATORIES

Prague, January 1, 1977

SIGNATORIES

Milan Balaban, priest; Dr. Karel Bartosek, historian;
Jaroslav Basta, worker; Ing. Rudolf Battek, sociologist;
Jiri Bednar, electrician; Otka Bednarova, journalist;
Ing. Antonin Belohoubek, technician; Dr. Jan Beranek, historian;
Jitka Biollasova, clerk; Prof. Dr. Frantisek Blaha, physician;
Jaroslav Borsky, former state employee;
Dr. Jiri Brabec, literary historian; Vratislav Brabenec, musician;
Eugen Brikcius, self-employed; Dr. Toman Brod, historian;
Ales Brezina, employee; Ing. Stanislav Budin, journalist;
Doc. Dr. Josef Cisarovsky, applied arts critic;
Ing. Karel Cejka, technician; Otto Cerny, worker;
Prof. Dr. Vaclav Cerny, literary historian;
Miroslava Cerna-Filipova, journalist; Egon Cierny, orientalist;
Dr. Jiri Cutka, scientist; Jiri Danicek, worker;
Juraj Daubner, philologist; Ivan Dejmal, worker;
Jiri Dienstbier, journalist; Zuzana Dienstbierova, psychologist;
Lubos Dobrovsky, journalist; Ing. Petr Dobrovsky, technician;
Bohumil Dolezal, literary critic; Dr. Jiri Dolezal, historian;

Doc. Dr. Irena Dubska, philosopher; Dr. Ivan Dubsky, philosopher;
Ladislav Dvorak, writer; Michael Dymacek, mathematician;
Dr. Vratislav Effenberger, aesthetic;
Anna Farova, art historian; Zdenek Fort, journalist;
Ing. Karel Fridrich, economist; Jiri Frodl, journalist;
Prof. Dr. Jiri Hajek, politician; Doc. Milos Hajek, historian;
Jiri Hanak, journalist; Olaf Hanel, graphic artist;
Ing. Jiri Hanzelka, writer; Vaclav Havel, writer;
Zbynek Hejda, writer; Dr. Ladislav Hejdanek, philosopher;
Doc. Ing. Jiri Hermach, philosopher; Josef Hirsal, writer;
Dr. Josef Hodic, historian; Doc. Dr. Miloslava Holubova, art historian;
Robert Horak, former political functionary;
Ing. Milan Hosek, former state employee; Jirina Hrabkova, journalist;
Ing. Dr. Oldrich Hromadko, former Colonel of National Security;
Marie Hromadkova, former political functionary;
Doc. Dr. Milan Hübl, historian; Dr. Vaclav Hyndrak, historian;
Merit artist Vlasta Chranostova, actress;
Dr. Karel Joros, former political functionary;
Dr. Oldrich Jaros, historian; Doc. Dr. Vera Jarosova, historian;
Prof. D. Zdenek Jicinsky, lawyer; Ing. Otakar Jilek, economist;
Ing. Jaroslav Jira, technician; Karel Jiracek, former state employee;
Doc. Dr. Frantisek Jiranek, pedagogue; Vera Jirousova, historian of arts;
Jaroslav Jiru, histoian; Dr. Miroslav Jodl, sociologist;
Dr. Josef John, politician; Ing. Jarmila Johnova, economist;
Ing. Jiri Judl, technician; Pavel Jaracek, film producer;
Petr Kabes, writer; Dr. Oldrich Kaderka, lawyer and politician;
Prof. Dr. Miroslav Kadlec, economist;
Prof. Dr. Vladimir Kadlec, economist and politician;
Dr. Erika Kadlecova, sociologist; Svatopluk Karasek, priest;
Prof. Dr. Valdimir Kasik, historian; Dr. Franticek Kautman,
literary historian; Alexandr Kliment, writer;
Dr. Bohumir Klipa, historian; Prof. Dr. Jaroslav Klofac, sociologist;
Doc. Dr. Vladimir Klokocka, lawyer; Ing. Alfred Kocab, priest;
Zina Kocova, student; Doc. Dr. Lubos Kohout, political scientist;
Pavel Kohout, writer; Jiri Kolar, writer and graphic artist;
Dr. Bozena Komarkova, pedagogue;
Vavrinec Korcis, sociologist; Dr. Vaclav V. Komeda, historian;
Dr. Jiri Korinek, economist; Dr. Karel Kostroun, literary critic;
Anna Koutna, worker; Doc. Ing. Miloslav Kral, scientist;
Dr. Frantisek Kriegel, politician and physician;
Andrej Krob, worker; Doc. Dr. Jan Kren, historian;
Marta Kubisova, singer; Karel Kyncl, journalist;
Dr. Michal Lakatos, lawyer; Pavel Landovsky, actor;
Jiri Lederer, journalist; Ing. Jan Lestinsky, technician;
Dr. Ladislav Lis, former political functionary;
Oldrich Liska, former state employee;
Jaromir Litera, former political functionary;
Jan Lopatka, literary critic; Dr. Emil Ludvik, composer;
Klement Lukes; Dr. Sergej Machonin, theater critic and translator;
Prof. Dr. Milan Machovec, philosopher; Anna Marvanova, journalist;

Ivan Medek, music publicist; Doc. Dr. Hana Mejdrova, historian;
Dr. Evzen Menert, philosopher; Dr. Jaroslav Meznik, historian;
Doc. Dr. Jan Mlynarik, historian; Doc. Dr. Zdenek Mlynar, lawyer and politician; Kamila Mouckova, former TV announcer;
Jiri Mrazek, stoker; Dr. Pavel Murasko, philologist;
Jiri Mueller; Jan Nedved, journalist; Dana Nemcova, psychologist;
Jiri Nemec, psychologist; Dr. Vladimir Nepras, journalist;
Jana Neumannova, historian; Vaclav Novak, former state employee;
Dr. Jaroslav Opat, historian; Dr. Milan Otahal, historian;
Ludvik Pacovsky, journalist; Jiri Pallas, technician;
Martin Palous, computer operator;
Doc. Dr. Radim Palous, pedagogue; Prof. Dr. Jan Patocka, philosopher;
Jan Patocka, worker; Dr. Frantisek Pavlicek, writer;
Karel Pecka, writer; Jan Petranek, journalist;
Tomas Pekny, journalist; Dr. Karel Pichlik, historian;
Dr. Petr Pithart, lawyer; Ing. Zdenek Pokorny, technician;
Vladimir Prikazsky, journalist; Drahuse Probostova, journalist;
Jana Prevratska, pedagogue; Dr. Zdenek Prikryl, political scientist;
Milos Rejchrt, priest; Ales Richter, worker;
Dr. Milan Richter, lawyer; Zuzana Richterova;
Jiri Ruml, journalist; Dr. Pavel Rychecky, lawyer;
Vladimir Riha, pedagogue; Lieutenant General Vilem Sacher;
Vojtech Sedlacek, computer operator; Helena Seiclova, librarian;
National Artist Jaroslav Seifert, poet;
Dr. Gertruda Sekaninova Cakrtova, lawyer and diplomat;
Jan Schneider, worker; Karol Sidon, writer; Josef Slanska;
Ing. Rudolf Slansky, technician; Vaclav Slavik, politician;
Eliska Skrenkova; Jan Sokol, technician;
Doc. Dr. Jan Soucek, sociologist;
Ing. Josef Stehlik, former political functionary; Dana Stehlikova;
Vladimir Stern, former state employee; Jana Sternova;
Dr. Eva Stuchlikova, psychologist; Dr. Cestmir Suchy, journalist;
Jaroslav Suk, worker; Vera Sukova, journalist;
Jan Sabata, stoker;
Doc. Dr. Jaroslav Sabata, psychologist and former political functionary;
Vaclav Sabata, graphic; Anna Sabatova, clerk;
Jan Safranek, graphic artist;
Doc. Dr. Frantisek Samalik, lawyer and political scientist;
Ing. Vaclav Sebek, architect; Ing. Jana Sebkova;
Prof. Ing. Venek Silhan, economist; Dr. Libuse Silhanova, sociologist;
Ivana Simkova, psychologist; Doc. Ing. Bohumil Siman, economist and politician;
Doc. Dr. Jan Sindelar, philosopher; Jan Simsa, priest;
Vladimir Skutina, journalist; Pavel Sremer, microbiologist;
Miluse Stevichova, worker; Marie Stolovska;
Vera Stovickova, journalist; Dr. Miroslav Sumavsky, historian;
Petruska Sustrova, clerk; Marie Svermova;
Prof. Dr. Vladimir Tardy, psychologist and philosopher;
Merit Artist Dominik Tatarka, writer; Dr. Jan Tesar, historian;
Dr. Julius Tomin, philosopher; Josef Topol, writer;
Jan Trefulka, writer; Dr. Ing. Jakub Trojan, priest;

Vaclav Trojan, computer operator; Ing. Miroslav Tyl, technician;
Dr. Milan Uhde, writer; Petr Uhl, technician;
Zdenek Urbanek, writer and translator;
Doc. Dr. Ruzena Vackova, historian of arts; Ludvik Vaculik, writer;
Jiri Vancura, historian; Frantisek Vanecek, journalist;
Dagmar Vaneckova, journalist; Dr. Zdenek Vasicek, historian;
Dr. Jaroslav Vitacek, former political functionary;
Jan Vladislav, writer; Tomas Vlasak, writer;
Frantisek Vodslon, politician; Josef Vohryzek, translator;
Zdenek Vokaty, worker; Premysl Vondra, journalist;
Ing. Alois Vyroutal, technician;
Dr. Vaclav Vrabec, journalist and historian; Jaromir Wiso, designer;
Jiri Zaruba, architect; Dr. Jirina Zelenkova, physician;
Petr Zeman, biologist; Rudolf Zeman, journalist;
Zdenek Zikmundovsky, former state employee;
Doc. Ing. Rudolf Zukal, economist; Doc. Dr. Josef Zverina, priest.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE MAN WHO LOST CHINA. By Brian Crozier, Scribners, New York, 1976, 430 pp.

Mr. Crozier, author of Franco, De Gaulle, and other excellent political treatises, has now written "the first full biography" of Chiang Kai-shek, with the collaboration of Eric Chou. It constitutes not only the story of Chiang, but also that of modern China. The account is, on balance, fair and objective. The title may mislead, inasmuch as the author admits that Chiang might have been able to hold on to the mainland if he had gotten the same aid from the United States that the Chinese Communists received from the Soviet Union.

What really hurt the Nationalists was the Marshall mission, sent by President Truman in 1945. General Marshall had done a magnificent job in Europe, but knew almost nothing of Asia. And the advice he got was from anti-Chiang men like Vincent, Service and Davies, of the State Department (men now being rehabilitated by the left-liberals). Marshall, of course, was working within a political framework originally structured by Roosevelt at Yalta. This provided the USSR with opportunities for intervention in the Far East which stacked the deck against Chiang, and in favor of the Chinese Communists.

"In military terms, the catastrophic defeats of the Nationalist armies in the later stages of the civil war were made inevitable by the events of May and June 1946 in Manchuria." These events included Marshall-imposed truces which saved the Communists from military defeat, and massive Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists, including captured Japanese arms and equipment. Frustrated, Chiang decided to attack the Communists in Kalgan against the wishes of Marshall. In his fury, Marshall "inflicted a blow on Chiang Kai-shek, his government and his army, from which they would never recover. He persuaded the United States government to impose a total embargo on military deliveries to the Chinese government" (p. 294).

Meantime Chiang tried to introduce political reforms which would please the Americans. But these reforms did not satisfy the Communists, and when they protested, Marshall removed himself from his role as "mediator" of the Chinese "civil war." But with the cut-off of U.S. aid, while the USSR was meantime increasing its support of the Communist rebels, the military conclusion was inevitable. As Secretary of State, Marshall provided aid to the Greeks to fight Communism, while denying it to the Chinese Nationalists.

On the propaganda front, the Communists outsmarted the Nationalists. "The Communist delegation... was the only source of information available to both foreign and Chinese journalists. Chou En-lai was always available for comments... It is fair to say that all the news despatches about the peace talks filed from Nanking were based on Communist handouts." (p. 297). Crozier states that Marshall "was at a disadvantage in that the background he got from the State Department and the American Embassy in Chungking was heavily

slanted against the Nationalists and in favour of the Communists. He tended therefore to place greater credence in Chou En-lai than in Chiang Kai-shek."

Chiang was encouraged by the Truman Doctrine, and assumed that if Washington would help the Greeks fight Communism, it would also help the Chinese. But he was cruelly disappointed. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the House Foreign Affairs Committee early in 1947 that "the Chinese government is not in a position at the present time that the Greek government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists" (p. 304).

Truman sent General Wedemeyer to China to take a new look at the situation. Although Wedemeyer recommended resumption of military aid to the Nationalists, he made the mistake of criticizing the Nationalist Government before a briefing of top Nationalist officials, which played into the hands of Chiang's critics, now convinced that the Nationalists were going to lose. Then, of course, President Truman refused to implement the Wedemeyer proposals for aid to the Nationalists; in fact he suppressed the Wedemeyer report.

1947 closed with a boast by Mao Tse-tung that the Communists would win the war. The Communists had now passed from the defensive to the offensive. "Mao Tse-tung was right: the tide had indeed turned, and in 1948 it became clear to everybody except perhaps to Chiang Kai-shek that the defeat of the Central Government was now inevitable." Nor was Marshall any help. He warned Congress in February, 1948 against any renewed American military aid to the Nationalists: "The Chinese Communists have succeeded to a considerable extent in identifying their movement with the popular demand for change in present conditions. On the other hand, there have been no indications that the present Chinese government, with its traditions and methods, could satisfy this popular demand or create conditions which would satisfy the mass of Chinese people. . ."

Crozier describes the achievements of Nationalist China on Taiwan, contrasting orderly reform there with bloody purges and "cultural revolution" on the mainland. But in 1971 Nixon and Kissinger began the rapprochement with the Communists which included the decision not to use the veto to block the admission of Peking to the United Nations. Chiang died on April 5th, 1975: "It was a sad end to a life of extraordinary adventure, wild variations of fortune, and unfulfilled dreams" (p. 385).

The last chapter is entitled "An Assessment." Here Crozier refers to Chiang's "courage, his capacity for work, his will, and his stamina." Although he was capable of ruthlessness, he was not ruthless enough: "He did not, as Mao was to do, systematically execute people in large numbers." Chiang, with his courage and energy and his qualities of leadership, "was not only a flawed leader, but in the classical sense of the Greek tragedies, a tragic one." His tragedy was personal, but it far transcended the man himself: "the fall of China to the most totalitarian system of government yet devised, still more totalitarian than Russia's" must be blamed to a large extent on Chiang." It is more than ironical that Chiang, as the archenemy of Communism, should have played a role contributing to the end which, above all else, he abhorred; and that is why his failure must be termed tragic."

In Crozier's view, as against this failure, "the preservation of Chinese values in Taiwan, though not trivial, assumes smaller dimensions." Chiang's

lasting monument "was indeed one which he would have dismissed in earlier years as unworthy of his gifts and ambitions: the limited but undeniable success story of his island refuge."

Le Moyne College ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

RUSSIA UNDER THE OLD REGIME. By Pipes, Richard. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974, 360 pp.

Professor Pipes' latest work represents a turning point in American Russian studies and deserves special attention for many reasons. For one, *Russia Under the Old Regime* challenges most critically the prevailing view among American as well as many European historians as to the origin of Bolshevism in Russia. Furthermore, this penetrating study has reduced *ad absurdum* the Marxist monistic doctrine, according to which the roots of Russian Bolshevism are traceable to the Communist Manifesto of 1848, or for that matter, to the advanced stage of an industrialized (bourgeoisie) society. Obviously, Russia, by all standards of socioeconomic development, represented in 1917 an industrially underdeveloped country in Europe.

Pipes' work also lays to rest Lenin's myth which traces the Bolshevik revolution to the Decembrist uprising. This particular misinterpretation of Russia's history has reverberated in works produced by A. Yarmolinsky, *Road to Revolution*, F. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, D. W. Treadgold, *Twentieth Century Russia*, A. B. Ulam, *The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual, Personal and Political History of Russian Communism*, among others. On the other hand, Professor Pipes' linking of Bolshevism to Muscovy-Russian institutions as they began to emerge during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries does not represent a new interpretation. In addition to Ukrainian national historians (M. Chubaty, S. Tomashivsky, N. Polonska-Vasylenko), and this reviewer) as well as some Polish historians (O. Halecki, T. Komarnicki), German historians of Russia, especially H. von Rimscha, N. Berdiaev, Thomas G. Masaryk, Arnold Toynbee and Hugh Seton-Watson, among many others, realized decades ago that Bolshevism represents only the old Russian autocratic boots with reversed bootlegs (to use Masaryk's well-known metaphor).

Notwithstanding this common insight, Pipes' book remains innovative in many ways. He analyzes and discusses Russia's past against the background of world and, in particular, European history, pointing to similarities and differences, the latter outweighing by far any analogies in all periods of its development. This is especially true in the areas of socioeconomic formation, distribution of political power and relations between church and state, and finally with regard to the impact of outside factors, such as Byzantine influences, Tartar domination, geographical factors and, last but not least, the unique role and position of the intelligentsia in the rural-based autocracy which emerged from the *votchina* (patrimonial) system and became a state-structured entity only toward the end of the seventeenth century. However, Pipes' contribution is not so much his analyses of the formation of the Russian society and state—a terrain that has been explored by A. E. Presniakov, V. O. Kliuchevsky, S. M. Solovev, and a few other Russian historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—as it is his well-developed ties, all properly placed in perspective, between the political system of the ancient Russian state and contemporary Soviet Russian

totalitarianism. What emerges from his employment of analogies in a retrospective interpretation, abetted by the 57 years of the existence of the Soviet system, is comparable in importance to Alexander Solzhenitsyn's astonishing revelations in his *The Gulag Archipelago*.

After tracing Muscovy's course from the zone of mixed forest in the triangle formed by the Upper Dnipro River, Oka and Volga up until the middle of the sixteenth century, the author proceeds to show how it began to expand after 1480 at the rate of 5,000 sq. miles per day, thereby establishing itself as the fastest growing empire in history. "Since the early modern age Moscow was organized for warfare... In effect two-thirds of the labor of the country went directly for the support or 'feeding' of the military" (p. 115).

As a result of the warlust of the Moscow rulers, "in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was scarcely a year when Russians did not fight along their southern and southeastern frontiers. Although Russian historians tend to depict these wars as defensive in nature, they were as often as not instigated by Russian colonist pressure" (p. 20).

This hunger for conquest made for the development of a bureaucratic regime of the despotic or 'Asiatic' kind, also known as "agro-despotism," similar to the Mongol type of political organization.

This "agro-despotism," according to Pipes, had its roots in the *votchina*, "which was the private domain of the prince or czar, his *oikos* or *dvor*," (p. 21), a circumstance which led to the transformation of Muscovy into a giant royal estate, especially during the reigns of Ivan III, Basil III, and Ivan IV.

Muscovite "agro-despotism" is not comparable to European feudalism but rather with "Sultanism" and other oriental forms of social and political orders. Feudalism with its vassalage the term "appanage" within the context of Muscovy-Russian history cannot be supported, for, as the author himself observes, there existed basic differences between Kiev Rus' and Muscovy-Russia. These included the law codes (Rus' justice, in contrast to the first Russian Code of 1649, did not know the death penalty) and the whole socioeconomic structure, that of Rus' surviving in the Halych-Volhynian Kingdom and subsequently within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania-Rus' for another three centuries. Since the Muscovite state emerged after the collapse of the Kiev Rus' empire, it is historically inadmissible to use the term "appanagian Russia" in its proper West European application. Neither France's nor Poland's break up and the subsequent territorial unification which followed is comparable to the Eastern Slav situation unless Kiev, the original creator of Kiev Rus', would have emerged as a unifier of all the lands over which it had ruled in the IX-XII centuries.

Pipes' nomenclature is not consistent and therefore confusing. He uses, for example, the terms "Kiev Rus' " and "ancient Russia" indiscriminately, failing to offer adequate clarification of the emergence of all three Eastern Slav nationalities—Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. He does, however, on several occasions stress the basic differences among them.

All of Part I: "The State," dealing with "The Norman (Kievan) State," "The dissolution of the Kievan State," "The appanage principality of the northeast," "The problems of feudalism in appanage Russia," and "Mongol conquest and domination," points to the absence of an organic link between Kiev Rus' and Muscovy-Russia. Their disparity increased with the final triumph of patrimonialism in rising Muscovy, as is discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter and Chapter 4, "The Anatomy of the Patrimonial Regime," come up with striking

similarities as regards the Soviet regime. The former czarist *votchina* gave way naturally to the state ownership of the Soviet period. The destruction of all privileges (as in the case of Novgorod the Great) and a total regimentation of the population have been duplicated by the builders of the Soviet state. The Code of 1649 "was revived by Stalin in 1934 when he was about to launch his terror," especially "the supplementary clauses to Article 58 of the Criminal Code imposing severe sentences for failure to denounce counter-revolutionary crimes" (p. 109).

As early as 1649 "no distinction was drawn between the intention to commit a crime and the deed itself." ... "Denunciation would not have been half as effective a means of control were it not for the collective responsibility inherent in tiaglo" (p. 109). The similarity of language and intent of both documents, if left without annotations and dates, could confuse even an historian of Russia as to the time and origin of either.

Another inherited similarity survived in the impossibility to escape the system. "The frontiers of the state were hermetically sealed. Each highway leading abroad was blocked at frontier points by guards... It was never forgotten that of the dozen or so young *dvorianie* whom Boris Godunov had sent to England, France and Germany to study, not a single one chose to come back" (p. 111).

Moreover, "natives were discouraged from establishing contact with visitors from abroad. ... Perhaps nothing conveys better the attitude of the Muscovite state towards its population than the fact that until January 1703 all domestic and foreign news in Russia was deemed a state secret" (p. 111).

Chapter 5 deals with "the partial dismantling of the patrimonial state," a period in which serfdom was established as an institution (see the general law of 1592) during the czarist reigns from Michael to Catherine II, in the process some 800,000 formerly free peasants being reduced to serfs in Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands of the former Polish Commonwealth. Catherine II's policy of stimulating migration of Russians into newly conquered lands combined with mass deportations of non-newly conquered lands combined with mass deportations of non-Russians into Russia "has not changed today" (p. 119). On the other hand, new societal pillars — *dvorianie* — replaced the *boiars*, whose numbers had been depleted in previous purges, especially by Ivan IV's *oprichniki*.

A number of Peter I's reforms turned Muscovy-Russia into a markedly militaristic state with 210,000 regular and 110,000 supplementary troops, along with 24,000 sailors. "Relative to the population of Russia at that time (12 or 13 million) a military establishment of this size exceeded almost three times the proportion regarded in eighteenth-century western Europe as the norm of what a country could support" (p. 120). In order to maintain such a huge standing army "all groups (slaves, improverished *dvorianie* ordinary peasants) were now integrated with the peasantry and reduced to the status of serfs. This reclassification alone increased the number of tax-payers by several hundred thousand" (p. 121).

During the eighteenth century Russia was remolded from the former *votchina* estate of the czar into an autocratic-militaristic entity in which *dvorianstvo* gained special privileges at the expense of all other classes and groups. Nicholas I finalized the building of an autocratic empire.

In Part II, Professor Pipes offers in-depth analyses of the society: the peasantry, *dvorianstvo*, and the slowly emerging merchant-bourgeoisie.

Part III is devoted to the classic confrontation: Intelligentsia versus the state. This part, in contrast to Parts I and II, summarizes the essence and peculiarities of the crucial issues of the nineteenth century without any significant new interpretation yet with a predicted outcome—the replacement of the czarist police state by the Soviet police state. He does not, however, go beyond the 1880's, the course of a future historical development having been set up by that time.

In his "Concluding Remarks," the author comments: "In theory, of course, the crown might have reverted to the Muscovite system, expropriating all private property, reharnessing the classes in service or tiaglo, hermetically sealing off Russia from the rest of the world, and declaring itself the Third Rome. Such a transformation would have enabled Russia to close the loopholes which made mockery of its police system. But to have done so required a veritable social and cultural revolution. Given their upbringing, the leaders of imperial Russia were not the men to carry out such an upheaval. This required entirely new people, with a different psyche and different values" (p. 316).

"All this was done shortly after power had been seized (by the Bolsheviks). Then with each passing year the mechanism of repression was perfected until under Stalin's dictatorship it attained a level of wanton destructiveness never before experienced in human history" (p. 318).

Extensive notes making use of both Russian and Western literature, a chronology and a detailed index conclude this impressive undertaking to interpret Russia's history in a retrospective mirror which, though unexpected by many, brings into focus a chain of events leading this Euro-Asiatic society to the Hades where life and death meet every hour everywhere, affecting one and all from cradle to grave, within concentration camps as well as without. Bolshevism had succeeded in creating an absolute power which the czars had never imagined.

Professor Pipes' work is not just another account of Russia's history. It is a challenge to scholars. It confuses those who have been taught Russia's history from textbooks written in a pro-Russian fashion; it is dismaying to Marxist and pro-Soviet historians, and, above all, it is refreshing to those of open mind.

Eastern Illinois University STEPHAN M. HORAK

SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES THE NEXT TEN YEARS. Edtied by Henry Owen and Charles L. Schulze. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1976, 618 pp.

The Brookings Institution has a well-established reputation for the publication of scholarly works bearing on current fundamental issues. One may not agree with the interpretations given to the assembled data and the conclusions that are drawn, but it cannot be denied that the material usually offered is of the highest quality and a product of considerable, painstaking research. This bulky volume is the seventh in a series begun in 1970, and differs markedly from the previous one by its incorporation of diverse subjects and projections for the decade ahead. In every sense of the word, it deals with our national priorities, and if the reader seeks to become abreast with the foremost problems confronting our nation and grasp the major trends and options in each sphere of inquiry, this work will serve the purpose admirably and competently.

Even a mere scanning of the work's contents impresses one with the range and scope of the subjects examined. Edited with consummate skill, the contributions cover peace or war, U.S. defense policy, nuclear proliferation, U.S. foreign economic policy, inflation and stabilization, federal spending, the problems of state and local governments, and energy and the environment. Though the most fundamental of the subject matter, these do not exhaust the thirteen chapters in the work. In addition, the problems of organization, safety regulation, income security, and the relations between Congress and the President are intensively considered, too. Well over a dozen contributors participated in this highly documented production. The reader should find the assemblage of statistical tables and figures of basic worth. Those teachihng the social sciences in our colleges and universities could well consider this volume for supplementary reading on the part of conscientious students anxious to become broadly informed on the issues covered.

Throughout the work it is realistically re-emphaszed that we live in a rather dangerous world. The problems are formidable, the uncertainties are great, but a rational approach to both is all the more demanding and necessary adjustments for the better are achievable. The tone of the work is well set forth in the introduction provided by the editors. For example, it is clearly stated, "In East-West relations, the limits of U.S. influence are evident. The USSR will remain a totalitarian, heavily armed state, determined to continue to dominate Eastern Europe and to extend its influence in the world, whatever we may do. We can seek businesslike agreements with the Soviet Union, notably those that will limit the costs and risks of contriving U.S.-Soviet arms competition, but the possibilities of conflict will remain as long as the United States is committed to the defense of vital interests in Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East." As will be shown, the reviewer takes issue with some of the concepts employed in the work, but the attempt to strike a balanced *via media* in the treatment of those weighty problems cannot be deprecitaed. As concerns the government's role in our economy, this attempt to sort out what it could do efficiently and what it cannot is pressed forward and with convincing results.

Henry Owen's chapter on "Peace or War" really provides the overall setting for much of the work. It treats in a comprehensive but substantial fashion the problems that confront us on all continents of the world and the consequences and burdens of them on our domestic resources. As regards the Middle East, the writer makes out a solid case for a U.S. policy of non-intervention toward Mideast disputes. This means no commitment of armed forces to one side or the other. Natural ly, USSR intervention would alter this policy. As for the China issue, the line of analysis is somewhat weak and inadequate. The writer would recognize Peking at the diplomatic cost of Taiwan, provided guarantees are secured for the safety of the latter, if it were necessary—and no necessity appears on the horizon—to submit to Peking's favorite preconditions, the practical alternative would be the two-Germany model of diplomatic relations.

This pivotal chapter discloses also some keen insights as well as shortcomings with respect to the basically important subject of U.S.-Soviet relations. Though at times one doesn't know whether the writer is talking about Russia proper or the USSR, which indicates a conceptual weakness, one is impressed to some extent by his perception into the non-Russian complex in the USSR. As in one place he states, "in short term the possibility of sharp reversals brought about by a struggle for power within the leadership or a clash between nationalities

within the USSR cannot be precluded" (p. 45). Without adequate basis, he nevertheless feels that in the coming decade this will not occur. It all depends. One of the formidable tasks confronting Moscow, he still sees, is "responding to pressures from the non-Russian nationalities that make up over half the population of the USSR without moving toward a federation that would weaken Moscow's power..." If one is looking for any incisive ideological directions to abet this, this volume will not provide it.

Pursuing this thread of conceptual analysis in the work, it becomes evident that others are not as well attuned. In the chapter on defense plolicy, for example, the Soviet Uniion is portrayed as a "nation." The technical analysis in the chapter is a well-balanced one and apppropriately scotched the superficial notion that to strengthen our defenses and offensive power, all that is required is an increase in defense expenditures. With a keener tie-up with the pivotal chapter and perhaps a better operational grasp of Moscow's uppermost insecurity, namely thab the USSR is not a country in the real sense of the term, the thrust of this chapter could have been greatly strengthened. For, in short, arms are not all; more important are those behind them.

The place of the United States in the world economy is competently described in a subsequent chapter. Here, too, a sense of balance is maintained, showing the economic primacy of the American economy regardless of the battering it has taken over the past ten years. The statistical indicators provided more than show this. For professional economists, the orientation taken in the chapter is both wholesome and salutary. The tendency to internalize macro-economic analysis with footnote concessions to external, foreign forces and pressures is adequately debunked here. However, despite its many merits, the chapter's discussion of East-West economic relations is, on the whole, weak. On trade with the USSR, the writers lean to heavily on the small percentages involved—the very error internal macro-economists commit—and fail to appreciate the qualitative and selective factors, notably advanced technology and what this can mean for Moscow's military build-up as well as the temporary resolution of broad economic problems. In short, ball-bearings, sophisticated in form, small and of comparatively of little value, possess lonr value in missible accuracy. The writers clearly minimize the selectivity factor, are obviously given to the false web theory of interdependence, and demonstrate no appreciative understanding of the poltrade concept, which presupposes an interpretative gasp of the overal directions and movements of the USSR political economy itself.

Once the earlier chapters are waded through, the contributions of Perry on "Stabilization Policy and Inflation," Schultze on "Federal Spending" and the others come into proper focus. After all, since World War II we have spent hundreds of billions in the enterplse of containing Soviet Russian imperialism. Yet, despite this, our economy has grown in strident ways with unparalleled increases in real wages and standards of living. The two chapters approach the problems of government intervention and growth with sober perspective and well justified agreements for a continued but more stable and prosperous economy. The Perry contribution is quite cavalier in its treatment of monetarism and shows its obvious bias, but its development of an incomes policy is realistic and deserving of future consideration. The chapter by Schultze provides an excellent historical and analytical background of federal spending and is pragmatic in character as to the optlum level of federal expenditures, but here, too, one can take issue with the

general undercurrent of thought and feeling toward extensive governmental operations in our economy.

As mentioned before, despite all this and more, the work is most valuable for its accumulated data and challenging viewpoints. The outstanding criticisms are that the pivotal chapter ascribes insufficient weight to the "peaceful coexistence" strategy of Moscow and, even at that, the succeding chapters are not adequately integrated and consistent with the basic chapter.

Georgetown University LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

CATARACT. By Mykhaylo Osadchy. Translated and edited by Marco Carynnyk, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1976, pp. XXIII, (240 (paper).

On August 28, 1965, Soviet authorities arrested Mykhaylo Osadchy, a 30 year old Ukrainian party member and journalist. After eight months of preliminary investigation and interrogation, Osadchy and three others were tried before the Lviv Provincial Court. The court found all four guilty of conducting "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and sentenced Osadchy to two years in a labor camp. Upon his release two years later, Osadchy began writing a literary memoir about his experiences since the initial arrest. The poduct of this writing, *Cataract*, originally appeared in four different *samvydav* (underground or uncensored) editions in Ukraine. In 1971, it was published in West Germany. This 1976 English-language version, edited by Marco Carynnyk, incorporates material from all four *samvydav* prints. Carynnyk has divided the narrative into paragraphs and sections and added much essential information in the form of reference notes, introductory and concluding sections, and a comprehensive index.

In *Cataract*, Osadchy recounts the arrest, interrogation, transit prisons, and labor camp life which he had endured from August 1965 to March 1968. Much of what he tells us is familiar to readers of literature arising from Soviet prison camp experiences. Initially, the individual arrested, especially if he were an apparently successful party member like Osadchy, underwent a period of shock and confusion. Osadchy devotes almost one-third of his narrative to the interrogation, a procedure which often left him feeling helpless and "utterly drained" (p. 27). The interrogation reminded him of a comedy; the trial was a whirling blur and "slick operation." At the labor camp, political prisoners suffered from a pervasive sense of gloom, fear, and the apparent absurdity of it all. And yet this persecution, we are told, liberated many. For the first time, these prisoners were free from the need to conform blindly to the dictates of Soviet politics. "The sentence means nothing" Osadchy comments, "you're entirely carefree" (p. 67). An atmosphere of tranquility and contemplation coexisted with that of fear and baseness at the labor camp. Above all,, the prisoner desires to survive. This drive for survival, synonymous with an effort to maintain one's self-respect and ideals, requires a defiance of camp authority. A prisoner resists not only by retreating into his own private world but also by concocting an alcoholic drink from varnish or refusing to obey orders with enthusiasm. "You can shoot a *zek* [prisoner]," Osadchy repeats on several occasions, "but you can't make him walk any faster."

Evocative terms and descriptions, including the use of mother cursing, give the narrative special dynamism. The lock of a transit prison cell door "screeches like an asthmatic old man coughing on the hearth" (p. 13); the prison gruel "seems to have glued itself to the black, smutty, and misshapen dish" (p. 14);

the interrogator is "as blunt and searing as a pint of Russian rotgut" (p. 20) or a "drug-crazed maniac who imagines every telephone pole is a felon" (p. 18). *Cataract* abounds with rich symbolism and allegories, all of it stimulating though sometimes difficult to grasp.

Many other literary memoirs of this type bristle with the moral indignation and style characteristic of *Cataract*. The special value of Osadchy's memoir stems primarily from his expression of pride in Ukrainian history and culture. *Cataract* emerges as a defiant reaffirmation of Osadchy's love of Ukraine and opposition to Russification that led to his arrest and imprisonment. Throughout he refers to leading Ukrainian personalities, especially in the field of culture, of the past and present. Osadchy complains that his interrogator could not speak properly his own native language, Ukrainian, and the prosecutor's Ukrainian was 'thickly larded with Russian" (p. 62). He chides some Ukrainians for their acceptance of Russification. Scorn is heaped on the quasi-official notion that all Ukrainians are inveterate chauvinists and smart alecks while Soviet authorities try to do their best for Ukraine. In one of the most moving passages of the work, Osadchy praises the Ukrainian prisoner Vasyl Pidhorodetsky for his unyielding devotion to the ideal of Ukrainian national independence (pp. 97-100).

As a testimonial to Ukrainian national and cultural identity, this edition of *Cataract* is enhanced by the introduction, reference notes, and the final section entitled "The Aftermath" added by Carynnyk. A well-conceived introduction presents background information on Ukrainian history, the Ukrainian national movement of the 1960's, and Osadchy. Reference notes, chiefly explanatory in nature, comment on those many Ukrainians mentioned by Osadchy in *Cataract*. "The Aftermath" provides information on Vyacheslav Chornovil; passages on repression in Ukraine from the *samvydav* publication, *Ukrainian Herald;* excerpts from letters Osadchy wrote from the labor camp; and bold protests against arbitrary treatment of such fellow Ukrainians as Valentyn Moroz written by Osadchy following his release in 1968.

After considerable official harassment, Osadchy was rearrested in March 1972. At a trial in September of that year, he was sentenced to seven years confinement in a strict regime labor camp to be followed by three years of exile. This continuing persecution makes Osadchy's message, especially in the edition provided by Carynnyk, all the more poignant and valuable.

University of South Alabama LARRY HOLMES
Mobile, Ala.

NATIONALISM IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE ERA OF BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN. George W. Simmonds, Editor. The University of Detroit Press, Detroit, Mich, 1977, 534 p.

The essays in the volume under review were prepared and read at the two-day Symposium on Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, held on October 3-4, 1975, at the University of Detroit. The conference was sponsored and largely financed by the Nationalities Council of Michigan, the members of which represent many major local and national ethnic associations.

The scholars, some fifty *in toto* who participated in fifteen separate sessions and two dinner presentations in the course of putting out this book, did so in the

conviction that nationalism has re-emerged as one of the major forces in the USSR and in Communist-ruled countries of Central and Eastern Europe. And so does this reviewer.

The compendium-book comprises three parts and a section of "End-Papers," which includes remarks and addresses of three scholars whose papers were not read at the conference.

Part I of the book, titled, "Dimensions of the Nationality Problem in the USSR and Eastern Europe," contains three essays setting forth both the traditional as well as the new techniques and concepts applied to the study of nationalism in the USSR and Communist-ruled East-Central Europe. Prof. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone of Carleton University (Canada), in "The Study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR," stresses difficulties in the USSR and the general climate of total control. Despite evidence of ethnic self-assertion "it is an article of faith in the Soviet Union that the 'national problem' (*natsionalnyi vopros*) in the USSR has been solved."

Prof. Ralph S. Clem of Florida International University and Prof. William O. McCagg, Jr., of Michigan State University, treat "Recent Demographic Trends Among Soviet Nationalities and Their Implications" and "The Nationality Question in Eastern Europe Since 1964," respectively.

Part II of the book, the largest section (pp. 58-347), deals with the Soviet Union encompassing Ukraine, Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldavia, Central Asia and the Soviet Jews.

The chapter on Ukraine features four principal essays: a) "Social Bases of Change in Ukraine Since 1964," by Prof. Wsevolod W. Isajiw (University of Toronto); b) "Resistance Against Russification in Ukraine Since 1964: A Profile of Three Ukrainians in Opposition," by Prof. Konstantyn Sawczuk (St. Peter's College); c) "Ukrainian Culture in the Brezhnev-Kosygin: Some Observations," by Prof. Mykola Stepanenko (Central Michigan University) and d) "Religion and Nationalism in Contemporary Ukraine," by Prof. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw (Carleton University).

Two basic articles cover Byelorussia: a) "Some Demographic and Industrial Aspects of Soviet Byelorussia during 1965-1975," by Vitaut Kipel (N.Y. Public Library) and b) "Developments in Byelorussia Since 1964," by Prof. Jan Zaprudnik (Queens College, CUNY).

The three Baltic States are dealt with in three separate chapters.

Prof. Tõnu Parming (University of Maryland) describes developments in Estonia in his article on "Nationalism in Soviet Estonia Since 1964."

Latvia is given two essays: a) "Latvian National Demands and Group Consciousness Since 1959," by Prof. Jurid Dreifelds (Brock University, Canada) and b) "Latvian Nationalism: Preface to a Dissenting View," by Prof. Janis Penikis (Indiana University).

Two articles deal with developments in Lithuania: a) "Political Developments in Lithuania during the Brezhnev Era," by Prof. Thomas Remeikis (Calumet College) and b) "The Organic and the Synthetic: A Dialectical Dance," by Prof. Algirdas Landsbergis (Fairleigh Dickinson University).

Of the Caucasian countries only Azerbaijan and Armenia are covered; Georgia is missing and also such small ethnic entities as the Ingush-Chechens, Karachais, Meskhs and other Moslem ethnic groups.

Prof. Steven E. Hegaard (Columbia University) dwells on "Nationalism in Azerbaijan in the Era of Brezhnev," assessing cultural-political developments in the last decade.

In an extensive essay on "Nationalism in Soviet Armenia—A Case Study of Ethnocentrism," Prof. Vahakn N. Dadrian (State University of New York, Geneseo) presents a rounded picture of present-day Armenia.

Moldavia is discussed in an article, "The Moldavian SSR, 1964-74," by Prof. Sherman David Spector of Russell Sage College, who presents the highlights of Soviet policies in that republic and Moscow's attempt to mold "Moldavians" out of Romanians.

The five Turkic republics of Turkestan—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan—are covered extensively in four articles: a) "Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia Since 1964," by Prof. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone; b) "National Renascence in Soviet Kazakhstan: The Brezhnev Era," by Prof. Allen Hetmanek, a specialist on Central Asia; c) "Nationalism in Uzbekistan in the Brezhnev Era," by Dr. James Critchlow, of USIA, and d) "Nationalism in Turkmenistan Since 1964," by Dr. Aman Berdi Murat of "Radio Liberty" and Prof. George W. Simmonds (University of Detroit).

Finally, the Jewish problem in the USSR and is Poland treated in two articles: a) "The Jewish Question in the USSR Since 1964," by Prof. Zvi Y. Gitelman (University of Michigan), and b) "The Jewish Question in Poland Since 1964," by Włodzimierz Rozenbaum (Indiana University), and two commentaries by Prof. Spector and Rabbi Fram (Temple Israel, Detroit).

The third part of the book, titled, "Eastern Europe," covers Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Albania and Romania, and encompasses a total of 169 pages.

The case of Poland is assessed in three articles: a) "Poland's International Position Under Gomulka and Gierek," by Prof. Kamil Dziewanowski (Boston University); b) "Polish Politics Since the 1960's," by Prof. Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz (University of Kansas), and c) "Recent Polish Nationalism: A Commentary," by Prof. Vincent Chrypinski (University of Windsor, Canada).

Prof. Stanislav J. Kirchsbaum (York University, Canada, discusses Slovakia in his essay, "National Self-Assertion in Slovakia," which is accompanied by a commentary by Prof. M. Mark Stolarik (Cleveland State University). In a separate article, Prof. A. Mikus (Georgian Court College) provides "Some Comments on Recent Constitutional Changes in Czechoslovakia with Special Reference to Slovakia."

Two articles and a commentary to one of them are devoted to Hungary: a) "Official Nationalism in Hungary Since 1964," by Prof. Peter Pastor (Montclair State College), accompanied by a commentary by Prof. Nador F. Dreisziger (Royal Military College of Canada); b) "Hungarians in the Communist Successor States Since 1964," by Elemer Homonnay.

Prof. David MacKenzie (University of North Carolina) treats of Yugoslavia in his essay, "The Background: Yugoslavia Since 1964."

Prof. Bogdan Raditsa, professor emeritus of Fairleigh Dickinson University dwells on "Nationalism in Croatia Since 1964," with a commentary by Prof. J. Prpic (John Carroll University).

Albania is discussed in two essays: a) "Albania in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin," by Prof. Nicholas C. Pano and b) "The Dismissal of General Begir Bal-

luku, Albania's Minister of Defense: An Analysis," by Prof. Peter R. Prifti (University of California).

Finally, the case of Romania is assessed by Prof. Mary Ellen Fischer (Skidmore College), in her penetrating article, "Nation and Nationality in Romania."

Part IV of the volume includes "Opening Remarks" of Rev. Malcolm Carron, S.J., president of the University of Detroit; an address by Aloysius A. Mazewski, president of the Polish American Congress, and an address, "The Politico-Economic Significance of U.S.-Soviet Trade," by Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky (Georgetown University), president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

This listing of the papers indicates the magnitude of the work that this collective symposium represents as well as the extensive area it covers, an area relatively unexplored on this side of the Iron Curtain.

The second part of the book, dealing with the nationalism of the non-Russian nations in the USSR, is especially thoroughly analyzed and assessed by many experts in the field. The omission of Georgia, the Crimean Tartars, the Tadzhiks and others is regrettable. But on the whole, the subject is well treated in the areas under discussion.

The third part deals with the satellite of states, minus Bulgaria and minus Yugoslavia, which is not a satellite Moscow, even though it still is a Communist state with all the features and characteristics of a totalitarian state. The problems of Jews in the USSR and in Poland also are adequately covered.

The book leaves no doubt that nationalism, in both political and cultural aspects, is on the rise in the USSR and in the satellite countries despite the sixty years of Communist oppression in the former and thirty years in the latter.

In his "acknowledgment," Prof. Simmonds expresses his appreciation and debt to two fellow Ukrainians: Bohdan Fedorak, chairman of the UCCA Branch Detroit-East, who "played a major part during the period the symposium was being organized and during the period of the preparation of this volume" and to Professor Anton Szutka of the University's Chemistry Department who, unfortunately, fell seriously ill). Without the latter's efforts, this project would never have come to fruition. As Conference Coordinator he labored indefatigably on financial problems and on the thousand and one details connected with a symposium of this order—until he was forced to the sidelines shortly after the symposium. This project represents for Prof. Szutka the culmination of a dream, and "it is thus fitting that we dedicate the book to him." We agree.

New York, N.Y. WALTER DUSHNYCK

LOOK WHO'S COMING: The Wachna Story. By Mary Paximadis. Illustrated by William Kurelek. Maracle Press Limited, Oshawa, Ont., 1976, 124 pp.

The Wachna Story by Mary Paximadis, a remarkable contribution to the history of Ukrainian pioneers in Canada, is a good source for researchers and an excellent and moving human story.

Theodosy Wachna (a Lemko from Western Ukraine), was born in January, 1874, in the village near Novy Sanch in the heart of the Carpathian Mountains of Western Ukraine. He completed his public school and three years of *gymnasium* before setting out in 1894 for the New World. He went to Mayfield, Pa., where

his older brother had already settled. Shortly after his arrival he secured employment in a coal mine, but left mining within a year due to an injury on his dangerous job. Later on, he worked in a printing shop, and subsequently in a brewery.

Stories about Canada, the new and great country to the North, had been appearing regularly in *Svoboda,* especially articles by Rev. N. Dmytriw, newly-appointed Canadian immigration agent and first Ukrainian Catholic priest in Canada. He wrote that Canada was a land of opportunity, a fresh, young country with vast resources, where an adult could acquire 160 acres of virgin land for only ten dollars, and the immigration department offered free transportation to individuals interested in settling in Canada's West. Fr. Dmytriw wrote that close to 100 Ukrainian families were already homesteading in the district of Dominion City.

Thus, after three years in the U.S., with what was by then a good command of the English language, Wachna made his way to Winnipeg, Man. In 1897, to the relief of Canadian immigration authorities, there appeared a bright-eyed young Ukrainian who spoke English and Ukrainian with equal fluency, and Commissioner McCreary appointed Theodosy as his Immigration Agent, to help the government with a steadily-increasing influx of Ukrainian immigrants from Europe.

Theodosy Wachna led these new immigrants to their designated territory near the southeastern border of Manitoba, adjacent to the U.S. There, in an area known as Stuartburn, is one of the oldest Ukrainian settlements in Canada. It includes the present-day towns and villages of Tolstoi, Gardenton, Vita, Arbakka, Zhoda, Senkiw, Rosa, Caliento and Stuartburn.

Eight Ukrainian families had settled there prior to the 1897 influx. Among these original immigrants were newcomers from Galicia: Prygrocky, Humeniuk, Kulachkowsky and Stefura. One Bukovinian, Wasyl Zahara, settled with his family on the bank of the Roseau River where the village oif Gardenton now stands. The colony of immigrants that included Prygrocky was the third oldest Ukrainian of colony established in Manitoba. In Stuartburn, Theodosy Wachna started a new life. Soon, under the influence of Hryhory Prygrocky, Theodosy, at the age of 23, married his daughter Anna, who was 15 years old.

Stuartburn had changed dramatically since the first Ukrainian colony was established there in 1896 The area had mushroomed into a dynamic community. The people of Stuartburn now had all-important church, with visiting priest, and several one-room schools, which they themselves had built. Many area parents, anxious that their children learn to read and write, sent their children to the school even though they were needed on the farm. They had Ukrainian teachers as well, which relieved the parents, who worried that their children would forget their language and customs. Active in community life, Wachna had written to his fellow Ukrainians in *Svoboda* about the progress of Stuartburn, or "Shtomboor" as it was called by the Ukrainians. "Whoever hired out during the harvest season last summer has food this winter. But those who were too lazy to work were suffering."

Since there was no dentist in the area, Theodosy read some material on the subject and extracted many teeth for the people of the region. He usually did it for free and considered it a way of building good will for his general store.

Theodosy believed in work. He preached and practiced it. And he felt the same attitude should prevail among his sons and daughters.

Work kept the children in good health and spirit. They developed dexterity in repair. Another unending chore for the Wachna girls was the laundry. In winter, they bundled up to their noses to pull the wash off the clotheslines behind the house.

Besides farming and minding the store, Wachna earned extra income on the side. He made 300 dollars a year as notary public, 400 dollars as secretary-treasurer of the Stuartburn municipality, and 300 dollars as secretary of the 12 schools he'd organized, for a total of 1,000 dollars a year.

Being poor, the district people made most of their household implements by hand. They made rakes with pegs, flails, and saws and shared them with others Washboards, tubs, wool carders, and sifters were all carved out of wood as time and need dictated.

Though none of the Wachna family lived in Gardenton, the children quickly formed bonds with Gardenton, youngsters on their numerous visits and summer vacations there. As the town was almost entirely Ukrainian, all the boys in Gardenton, even those who were English, German or Polish, spoke Ukrainian. The group did a lot of swimming, fishing, biking and hunting together.

It is a pleasure to read the author's reports describing the visit of Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky to Ukrainian settlers in Canada, particularly in Stuartburn.

"The arrival was of that of the potentate and Moses of Ukraine, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. He was titular head of five million. Ukrainian Greek Catholics in Western Ukraine and spiritual leader of Ukrainians throughout the world. The Metropolitan had just been to Rome to confer with the Pope, then left for consultations in Brussels with Cardinal Mercier. In the autumn of 1921, he was to arrive in Canada, on his second visit to the Americas. A militant Ukrainian, he was head and soul of the Ukrainian cause. He had fought the Polish government's dictum of dividing the land, a policy he claimed drove the most needy peasants from the soil. A militant churchman as well, he battled against the Latinization of his people."

Wachna received the great Metropolitan as guest with Bishop Nicetas Budka, Father Pelech, and a host of other leading citizens. The road from the church to Stuartburn was crowded with people. Everyone wanted to see and touch the giant man, and to give him messages to take to the oldy country.

At 53, Theodosy was still a very busy man and an incredibly hard worker. He continued to operate two large stores and buy, rent and sell farms, houses and apartments. He handled leases, loans and mortgages, completed deeds on properties, translated and wrote letters and documents, surveyed farms, and established roadway rights of way. He saw that new schools were built, teachers hired, bridges built and roads maintained. He was a counselor and adviser to the people of the district, and gave freely of himself.

Most of all, he loved his 15 children. He wished the best for them and spared nothing to achieve that end. For his sons, he desired a university education. He hoped his daughters would go into teaching or prepare for business.

This book is dedicated to Anna Wachna, who is now 95 years of age, and who will always be remembered and cherished by her 15 chhildren, grandchildren, greatgrandchildren and friends. The author expresses her acknowledg-

ments to all members of the Wachna family, above all, to Anthony Wachna, M.D., for his dynamic enthusiasm, drive, and total support, as well as to Johnny and John Paximadis of Windsor, Ont., who contributed to this project.

From Stuartburn have come Ukrainian men and women successful in the teaching, legal, medical, dental, and business professions. These people scattered across the land are dedicated to building an even stronger Canada. Such people are the true wealth of a country.

New York, N.Y. ROMAN S. HOLIAT

IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION, By Moses Rischin, Ed., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, Indiana, 1976, pp. VI—456.

The recent revival in the various ramifications of the dynamics of ethnicity in the United States has produced quite a number of studies, some of them rather original, but most content simply to rehash and compile selections from the publications of the previous decades.

The present compilation belongs to the last category, resembling, in some respects, the series published by the Oceana Publications (Dobbs Ferry, New York), known as the "Ethnic Chronology Series." Claims the editor: "The panethnic scope of the subject has compelled me to select those documents that best exemplify strategic topics central to an undersanding of the larger American experience in which all groups have shared." (p. XVII). Altogether 55 selections are included, grouped under: "Exodus," "New Men and Old," "Europe: Spectre and Hope," "The Labor Question," "Yellow Peril and Whites," "World War as Civil War," "World War II," "The Self-Determination of Nations," "World Revolution," "Restriction and Race," "A New American Culture," "The President: The Symbolic American," and "Beyond Race: An Ecumenical Law."

Every symposium of this type is, of course, bound to suffer by not many outstanding and "classic" passages from the libraries covering this subject. As far as we are concerned, Rischin can be severely criticized for not showing much interest in the immigration from Slavic Europe and Russia, giving us only one article from this area, that by Thomas G. Masaryk, "Our American Colonies Contributed to our Conquest of Freedom" (pp. 239-243), reprinted from Masaryk's *The Making of a State* (New York: Stokes, 1927). Even more "forgotten" are the Latin American immigrants. The Index is also rather sketchy, and the price of this paperback is definitely too high.

The compilation shadow-boxes; good punches are far and few between to produce a concerted attack.

City University of New York (Ret.) JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PERSECUTED IN UKRAINE: AN APPEAL OF THE UCCA EXECUTIVE BOARD

May, 1977 has been designated by the World Congress of Free Ukrainians as a month to be observed under the slogan "For the Freedom of the Persecuted in Ukraine." During this period Ukrainians in the free world are being called upon to exert strenuous efforts in defense of our brothers and sisters in Ukraine, who are being persecuted for their religious and national rights.

Ukrainians in the free world cannot remain silent in the face of irrefutable evidence that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has a detailed plan for incorporating Ukraine into Russia as an "inseparable southern province."

Parallel to the physical destruction of the Ukrainian people through man-made famines, the deportation of Ukrainians into the far-flung areas of Siberia—where they are deprived of their schools, books and the press—and the systematic importation of the ethnic Russian element into Ukraine, Moscow is conducting the planned destruction of Ukrainian culture and the basic ethnic identity which for centuries were the bulwarks against spiritual enslavement.

The Ukrainian people are fiercely opposing the fraudulent "doctrine" proclaiming that there exists a "centuries-long unity" between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. They are defending themselves against enforced and insidious Russification, as attested to by countless reports appearing daily in the Ukrainian press in the free world and in the statements of Ukrainian dissidents.

"Our purpose is to secede from the USSR and to establish a Ukrainian State," wrote a group of Ukrainian political prisoners from Vladimir Prison to U.N. Secretary General Dr. Kurt Waldheim in 1976. In another letter disseminated in Ukraine and abroad, a Ukrainian political prisoner wrote:

"The more I live under these conditions, the more clearly I realize that I have selected the right road and that true freedom can only be attained when our Fatherland—Ukraine—becomes free..."

This extremely grave and dangerous situation of the Ukrainian nation in its struggle against the genocidal policy of the Soviet Russian regime imposes on the Ukrainian emigration a heavy duty, a responsibility to God and history—to help in this struggle by all available means. Ukraine expects such assistance, especially from Ukrainians in the United States who, as citizens of the greatest democratic nation in the world, have full freedom to stand in defense of their kin in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America appeals to its Branches and Member Organizations to help the Secretariat of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians in implementing these defense actions in May. During this month our Branches, in close cooperation with our clergy and social-community organizations, will make special collections for the World Congress of Free Ukrainians for the 1977 budget. Toward that end, all UCCA Branches have received appropriate materials and collection lists.

We are firmly convinced that we will exert all our efforts so that the fund-raising campaign will be wholly successfull and that the struggle for human rights in Ukraine will benefit as a result of our participation.

April, 1977

EXECUTIVE BOARD
UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"REAL HAWKS' ORGY," a report by G. Vasilyev. *Pravda,* Moscow, USSR, January 29, 1977.

At the end of January, the Conference on U.S.-USSR Relations After Detente, held in Washington, apparently caused greater furor in Moscow and other Red capitals than anywhere else. The conference was sponsored by the American Council for World Freedom on an *ad hoc* basis of national organizations. ACWF is composed of numerous national bodies, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America being one of them.

The report sounds more like frenzied poetry than a journalistic account. It begins, "The windows of the hall were completely shuttered as if to make it impossible to tell whether it was day or night on the street." The writer is obviously so conditioned by this actual state of the Russian Embassy, only a block away from the Capitol Hilton site, that he couldn't tell the difference.

The report, if one could call it as such, rails against the participants in the conference, which included leaders in America on the captive nations, SALT, U.S.-USSR trade and so forth. As described erratically by the writer, "Retired Pentagon men, ruined CIA figures, anti-Soviet 'Sovietologists,' a British conservative lord, a reactionary trade union boss from the AFL-CIO, the ringleaders of East Europe"—these are the real hawks. Here, too, the writer can't tell the difference between a hawk and an eagle. But from this and more, it is evident the conference struck its mark.

"HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY," an address by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky. *The China Post,* Taipei, Republic of China, April 25, 1977.

Both the domestic and international editions of this organ carried lengthy excerpts from the address given by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President and chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, before the Legislative Yuan in the Republic of China. The Yuan is comparable to our Congress.

One of the highlighted sections is captioned "Colonial Empire." The speaker bore heavily on the internal empire within the USSR. As he was quoted, "The facts are that the USSR itself, founded on subversion, war and conquest, is a colonial emire—an *imperium in imperio* that does not qualify under this principle." The principle stressed is that of "non-interference in the internal affairs of a nation-state.

The free Chinese legislators took a keen interest in the elaborated subject of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism within the USSR. This extraordinary session lasted over two hours. Questions were raised on Peking's stance in regard to this subject.

"50,000 PEOPLE ATTEND RALLY TO MARK SUCCESSFUL END OF TALKS," *The China Post,* Taipei, Republic of China, April 23, 1977.

During April 18-22 the 10th World Anti-Communist League and the 23rd Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League conferences were held in Taipei. Taiwan, the Republic of China. The five days of WACL discussions led to resolutions covering almost every major problem area in the world. Ukraine, the non-Russian nations in the USSR, and the captive nations in their entirety were embraced.

After the conference, a huge rally was staged at the Taipei Municipal Stadium, where 50,000 people attended the various festivities. Parades, addresses, fireworks and other activities featured the three-hour event. In its domestic and international editions this organ selected the address of the American delegate for partial print.

As the paper introduced it, "Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, USA, gave an assurance of support from the United States to the Republic of China when he said: 'As an American who travels and lectures in all sections of the United States, I can assure each and every one of you that the vast majority of the American people, in their hearts and minds, stands and will stand by you.' "

The quote continues: "Every poll, every count in Congress and a new President for whom human rights is a firm commitment, show this. We have been close allies, and we must continue in the closest, mutual alliance for the peace, security and expanding freedom of all Asia."

"INTRICATELY DECORATED EGGS SYMBOLIZE EASTER," an article by Russell Chandler. *Los Angeles Times,* Los Angeles, California, April 9, 1977.

A good and informative account is given in this piece on the significance and meaning of the Ukrainian Easter egg. The writer consulted with the pastor and faithful of the St. Innocent Orthodox Church in Tarzana. A photo shows young Luba Geeza, 17, a parishioner, designing an egg.

The Rev. Thaddeus Wojcik, pastor of the church, is quoted as saying, "*Pysanky* are a symbol of Resurrection. The idea of life within the shell is the same as the life of Christ rising from the tomb, when the egg is broken." According to Miss Geeza, who has made a specialty of the art, these Easter *pysanky* are kept as long as fifteen years, if they remain unbroken, and could be displayed year after year.

"FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE INSTITUTE FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, 1961-1976," a report edited by George J. Pripic. *John Carroll University,* Cleveland, Ohio, 1976.

This is a well-written report on the foundation and development of a well-known and prestigious institute at the John Carroll University in Cleveland. Basic responsibility and credit go to Dr. Michael S. Pap, who is also on the faculty in the University. He has guided this institution since its inception in

1961, and it has been a national source of thought and ideas that have countered some of the prevailing myths about "Russia," the Russians, Eastern Europe and so on.

The annual conferences held at the institute are set forth in chronological order. They range from "Major Problems of the Soviet Union" to "Democracy versus Communism." All other relevant data concerning theses, the faculty and the detailed events of a decade and a half are succinctly described in the report. The motto of the institute, coined by Dr. Pap, is "Shedding More Light and Less Heat." It is a motto that has been thoroughly upheld.

"SOVIET SHIP SEIZED OFF NANTUCKET," a report by Richard Martin. *The Washington Post,* Washington, D.C., April 11, 1977.

A Soviet fishing trawler was seized by the Coast Guard some 130 miles off Nantucket. It violated the new 200-mile U.S. fishing limit. What was most interesting about the incident was the name of the 275-foot vessel. The trawler is named Taras Shevchenko.

Mention is made of this because countless Americans are now aware of the name. Since 1964, when the Shevchenko statue was unveiled in the nation's capital and received both national and interminational coverage, the name is easily recognized, though not consistently pronounced accurately. From Moscow's viewpoint, the use of "Shevchenko," "Kiev" and other Ukrainian names is supposed to show the ostensible solidarity of the nations constituting the Soviet Union.

"WHEN YOU RUN OUT OF PLACES TO SEE, TRY SOME OF THESE," an article by Boris Weintraub. *"The Washington Star,* Washington, D.C., March 5, 1977.

Speaking of the Shevchenko name above, one finds an excellent recent example in this tourism account. A photo of the statue itself captions the recommendations of the writer for the Washington tourist. As a matter of fact, the tourist flow about the unique statue has been appreciable, though, unfortunately, this has not been capitalized on by those who erected the statue.

As the writer proposes, "Take a loaf of French bread and a jug of wine from the French Market in Georgetown and take them to the statue of Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko at 22nd and P Streets for a little Rubyiat." Thousands upon thousands have been seen to indulge in Rubyiat at the strategically placed statue.

"BUKOVSKY TELLS AFL-CIO ABOUT DENIALS OF RIGHTS IN SOVIET UNION," an address by Vladimir Bukovsky introduced by Hon. Joshua Eilberg. *Congressional Record,* Washington, D.C., March 17, 1977.

Congressman Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania introduced into the *Congressional Record* the complete text of an address delivered by Vladimir Bukovsky

before the AFL-CIO Executive Council at its annual meeting in Miami. In his introductory remarks, the Congressman points out the twelve years spent by the Russian dissident in Russian prisons. Bukovsky was released last year in exchange for the leader of the Communist Party of Chile.

The Russian dissident minces few words about Russian oppression of non-Russians in the USSR. Some of his choice statements in this address deserve attention. For instance, "When I'm asked here how many political prisoners there are in the Soviet Union—I answer '250 million.' "

"And this is no joke," he continues, describing all the deprivations of human rights.

He quotes the Ukrainian worker Ivan Sivak, who writes as follows: "I have been living thirty years already in the Soviet Union, not living but existing. During these thirty years little has changed in the life of a worker. I live in poverty and need. My pay is barely enough to cover food. In addition, in the Soviet Union there is no justice, no freedom. There are limitations in all spheres of life. Everywhere a man feels himself a slave."

Toward the close of his address, Bukovsky mentions some recent arrests in the USSR. As he puts it, "The arrests of the participants of the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki groups, Yuriy Orlov, Alexander Ginzburg, Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy, are a blow to the incipient workers' movement." These and other cases are prime ones for Belgrade and its review of the Helsinki Accords.

"TARAS SHEVCHENKO: SYMBOL OF FREEDOM," a statement by Hon. James J. Delaney. *Congressional Record,* Washington, D.C., March 10, 1977.

Thanks to his alert constituents, year after year the able statesman from Long Island City has observed the birthdays and deaths of Taras Shevchenko. This year, as he declares at the outset, "Today marks the 115th anniversary of the death of Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian nation's foremost hero, poet, and symbol of freedom."

In this extended statement in Congress, Congressman Dalaney also emphasized, "As a symbol of freedom, Shevchenko's spirit will never die. In 1964, more than a hundred years after his death, over 100,000 anti-communist Ukrainian Americans and Canadians came to our Nation's Capital from all over to cheer the unveiling of a statue of Shevchenko, which was erected at the command of the U.S. Congress, entitled Public Law 86-749.

The history of all this is accurately and factually described in the documents of Congress and encased in our national archives. Once again, as stated above, the Shevchenko name has a national ring. The regrettable thing is that the ring has been largely ignored by self-interested groups these past ten years. It is hoped that in the near future this error of indifference will be corrected.

"HOT DETENTE OR COLD WAR," an article by C.W. Sulzberger. *The New York Times,* New York, February 17, 1977.

This columnist, who in 1964 ranted against the Republican Party Platform because it included all the captive nations at the time, seems to be coming around

in his thoughts on the designs of Moscow. At the conclusion of this well-written column, he raises the question, "Is detente just a means of continuing cold war by other means?" As usual, he gives no definitive answer to his own question. No doubt, if he were pressed, his likely answer would be "Judge for yourself; read the column." Which, of course, is no answer of his own.

The true and glaring fact is that Sulzberger has been straddling these issues for well over a decade. Many of his columns have been excellent; others have been contradictory and below par. He will never give you a definitive answer, though many issues command it in the presence of intellectual honesty and a basic set of convictions.

According to the writter, Lenin "after almost a decade of what is called detente... looks like a stunningly accurate seer." Why? We and our allies are providing some $44 billion in credits to the Soviet bloc to pursue, at the direction of Moscow, its world ambition for a World USSR. To which any sober analyst can retort, "So, what?" This has been pointed out so often that ad nauseam enters into comment. The columnist would do well to study the outlines of Russian imperial history to see that even Lenin is not original. He would do better to learn more about the non-Russian complex in the USSR. Others are a bit ahead of him.

"HUMAN RIGHTS OF UKRAINIANS TO RESURRECT THEIR ORTHODOX AND CATHOLIC CHURCHES," a statement by Hon. Daniel J. Flood. *Congressional Record,* Washington, D.C., March 30, 1977.

A resolution in Congress, H.Con.Res. 165, has been submitted by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood and over a dozen co-sponsors to seek the resurrection of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine. In his statement on this, Mr. Flood started with the words, "I believe the President has warmed the heart of every morally conscious American with his firm commitment to human rights in our foreign policy."

The elder statesman then spares no words in pointing out the uniqueness of his resolution. He says it bluntly and honestly, "In the whole record of deprivation of human rights there are no comparable cases on the scale of national import than this Stalinist liquidation of the two major religious institutions of Ukraine." He continues, "Yes, there is religious persecution in the USSR and elsewhere, but these are outstanding cases of religious genocide." And, indeed, they are.

As parts of his statement, Mr. Flood appended the full resolution and the names of its co-sponsors. In addition, he included essential excerpts from the article written by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, on "Imperialism, Religious Persecution, and Genocide," which was published in an earlier issue of this journal. The article covers all the essentials bearing on the resolution.

"U.S. DIPLOMATS SET UP SHOP DEEP IN RUSSIA," an article by David K. Willis. *The Christian Science Monitor,* Boston, Massachusetts, February 1, 1977.

The opening of the U.S. Consulate in Kiev, Ukraine was the result of years of battle over the Consular Convention. However, one wouldn't know the contents

and significance of the battle by reading this journalistic piece. *The* Ukraine sounds like a province, is used as such throughout, and Kiev is supposed to be a "1400-year-old mother of Russian cities."

Final, formal arrangements for the opening of the USSR Consulate in New York and the U.S. one in Kiev won't be completed until 1979. In the meantime, as this story is related here, Robin Porter is in charge in Kiev and operates from an office in the large Moskva Hotel. It will probably take a couple of years for the American Consulate building to be completed. According to the writer, the staff will be composed of "about 20 Americans and 20 Russians."

It is doubtful that any Russian will be on the staff. At this late stage of the game, it is unfortunate that a writer for this organ doesn't seem to know the difference between a Russian and a Ukrainian. But such is the case. The USSR for him is a "nation." For instance, he writes, "The Ukraine produces half the nation's steel, one-third of its natural gas, almost one-quarter of its foodstuffs, and one-fifth of its coal." What's the "nation?" The USSR, of course.

"CATHOLIC UKRAINIANS ARE NO LONGER ALONE IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM," a release by the Committee for the Freedom of the Captive Nations. *Crusade for a Christian Civilization,* New York, April 3, 1977.

Inspired by the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), this release announces the publication of a special issue on Ukraine in the Catholic anti-Communist magazine, *Crusade for a Christian Civilization.* Its main thrust is the Soviet Russian genocide of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The TFP is led by the Catholic Brazilian, Plinio Corres de Oliveira.

The article referred to shows the grave consequences of the Vatican's *Ostpolitik* for the Ukrainians. As described in part, "In the interest of dialoguing with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Secretary of Vatican Council violated the very regulations of the Council in neither presenting nor submitting to the Council for a vote the petition by nearly 400 bishops asking the Council to condemn Communism."

In concluding, the four-page release "calls upon the free nations of the West to support Ukraine in its struggle, both as a matter of justice and because the 'captive nations' are the Achilles' heel of Communism." Needless to say, the societies of the TFP are a solid support in this most vital field for justice and freedom.

"DECLARATION ASKS RIGHTS FOR UKRAINE," a report by Barry Schweid. *The Miami Herald,* Miami, Florida, January 8, 1977.

This report adequately covers the declaration of rights for Ukraine, adopted by Ukrainian dissidents in Kiev and smuggled to the West. The author of it is Mykola Rudenko, and one of its signers is the Ukrainian World War II general, Pyotr Grigorenko. The dissident group in Kiev parallels another union of dissidents in Moscow.

As the reporter emphasized, both groups were formed to monitor Moscow's compliance with the human rights provision of the 1975 Helsinki Accords on European security and cooperation. Since this report, members of both groups have been arrested for this activity. This has been brought to the attention of the now established Fascell Commission in Washington.

Pointing out that Ukraine was absorbed into the Soviet Union in 1922 as "a sovereign state" and also has a seat in the United Nations, the writer stresses, too, one of the cardinal points made by the Ukrainian dissidents. And that is the legal eligibility of Ukraine "to separate representation at the European security conference" and also "greater sovereignty" to be granted by Moscow. This point was made long before the Helsinki conference, but American negotiators argued that they couldn't do anything about it. What could have been done was for President Ford to announce that we stand ready to negotiate with *all* nations of Eastern Europe.

"SOVIET DISSIDENT HELD," a report. *Newsday*, Long Island, New York, February 8, 1977.

Pertinent to the preceding item, this is a report on the arrest of Mykola Rudenko, 55, for his dissident activity in monitoring Moscow's compliance with the Helsinki Accords. The arrest followed by two days that of Alexander Ginzburg in Moscow. Ginzburg has been a long, outspoken activist with a fine reputation in poetry. It was evident that the KGB struck both the Kiev and Moscow groups almost simultaneously.

According to this report, at a news conference held by the Moscow branch of the Helsinki Committee, the spokesman related the manner of the police assault against Rudenko. It was reported that "Rudenko's wife had been stripped naked as an act of humiliation while police searched their home." In a totalitarian state such as the USSR all such barbarities are not uncommon.

"THE ORDEAL OF VASYL PETROVYCH FEDORENKO," a letter to the editor by Vladimir Bukovsky and Leonid Plyushch. *The New York Times*, New York, February 11, 1977.

This letter, signed by two released dissidents from the USSR, is a heartrending appeal to Western conscience in behalf of Vasyl Fedorenko. Fedorenko is a Ukrainian dissident who has spent most of his mature years in Russian prisons and camps. He was first arrested in 1959 for "anti-Soviet propaganda."

In the 60's and 70's he was again arrested and re-arrested on similar charges. In 1974 he escaped into Czecho-Slovakia, but was apprehended by Czech authorities and returned to the USSR. That year, he renounced his Soviet citizenship and appealed for permission to emigrate. This was denied.

The writers point out that since December 10, 1975, the prisoner has been on a hunger strike and "was driven by the cruel treatment of the Vladimir Prison administrators to make an attempt to end his life by self-immolation." In short, this is another individual case that, along with hundreds of others, should be brought up in Belgrade.

"KEELHAUL," a letter-to-the-editor by anonymous. *National Review,* New York, November 26, 1976.

Letters have been published in this periodical about our alleged Keelhaul operation during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. Keelhaul was the infamous repatriation process at the close of World War II, when hundreds of thousands from the Soviet Union were forcibly returned by the West. It is an irradicable blemish on the American record of just asylum. Now it appears that it was recommitted in 1956.

This unsigned letter from an American of Russian descent appears to place credence in the allegation made in an earlier letter from a Ukrainian deserter from the Red Amy. He takes issue with an early statement that in 1956 the deserting "troops were Ukrainian, not Russian." As he says, "This I cannot believe 100 percent, since I know of Russians and White Russians who deserted in Hungary, as well as Ukrainians." One need only consult the hearings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to veritfy the truth of the writer's statement. Yes, they were mainly Ukrainians, but others deserted in bulk, too.

An inquiry has been made into this allegation. It is being researched. Depending on results, the next move may be to confront the new Administration with the subject. To put it simply, we cannot ever again afford another Keelhaul.

"UKRAINIANS PROTEST AT PAPAL OSTPOLITIK," a commentary by Robert Conquest. *Soviet Analyst.* London, England, October 28, 1976.

The writer of this piece is well versed in East European affairs. Here he gives a brilliant and concise account of the pressing Ukrainian Catholic problem with the Vatican. The familiar case of Cardinal Joseph Slipyj and the patriarchal issue are described with accuracy and candor. The Vatican still holds to its position that jurisdiction of patriarchs is limited to the boundaries of their own territory.

On this, the Jesuit professor in Rome, George A. Maloney, is quoted as saying that "Vatican politics with Moscow play a greater role in formulating the answer." In this, he is right. Already there are signs that the Vatican is responding somewhat to the Carter crusade for human rights. There are numerous avenues to pursue this, and the most selective have been chosen in the United States.

"WHAT THE GAFFE SAID," a column by James Burnham. *National Review,* New York, November 26, 1976.

President Ford's unforgettable gaffe on there being "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe" is skillfully analyzed in this column. Along with other analysts, this one doesn't accept the slip-of-the-tongue excuse offered during the last campaign. The column quotes at length a foreign reaction contributed to by emigres from the Soviet Union. It states in part, "In reality Ford's slip merely comes down to the fact that he said out loud what he thinks..."

L.E.D.

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

I. UKRAINIAN LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES

UCCA President Supports President Carter's Policy on Human Rights. — Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) and Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC), voiced full support for President Carter's policy on human rights on behalf of these two organizations. In his letter to President Carter, dated February 25, 1977, he stated:

Your unprecedented response to Andrei Sakharov and your firm position on human rights deserve the praise of every American who cherishes the traditions and values of our nation. I was enormously moved by these inspiring actions and most warmly congratulate you on them. Such actions have been lacking for too long.

It is my earnest hope that our new morality in foreign policy will go beyond just humanitarian concerns and will be developed in strategic terms. The vulnerabilities of imperial Moscow are extensive and deep. Its military prowess, spurious claims of external interference, and synchronized threats cannot conceal them, nor should they ever induce any fear in us. The spiritual interdependence of mankind is a force far greater than all of these and more in combination, and on numerous legal bases alone we can and should advance the issue of human rights in the spirit of this overall interdependence. Pursuit of freedom along this course would contribute, more than anything else, toward the goal of peace and freedom and the fulfillment of our own principles.

Senator Percy in Defense of Rudenko and Tykhy. — In support of other efforts being made on behalf of Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy, leaders of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Senator Charles H. Percyy (R.-Ill.) said on April 4, 1977 that he would make a direct intervention with Soviet Ambassador Anatole Dobrynin. Rudenko and Tykhy were arrested in connection with their activity aimed at promoting Soviet compliance with the human rights provision of the Helsinki Accords in Ukraine.

"The people of this country are deeply concerned about the treatment of Soviet citizens who have the courage to stand up for basic human rights," said Percy. "I believe we must do everything we can, in every way we can, to let the Soviets know this."

New Resolution on Ukrainian Churches in the U.S. Congress.—On March 17, 1977 Congressman Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania, joined by 13 other U.S. Congressmen, introduced H.Con. Res. 165, calling for the Resurrection of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine.

The resolution, which was referred to the Committee on International Relations, reads:

WHEREAS the Charter of the United Nations, as well as its Declaration of Human Rights, sets forth the objective of international cooperation "in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"; and

WHEREAS in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Article 124 unequivocally provides that "In order to insure to citizens freedom of conscience, freedom of religious worshlp, and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens"; and

WHEREAS not just religious or civil repression but the genocide—the absolute physical extermination—of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in a nation of over forty-five million brutally violates the basic civilized rights enunciated above: NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT

RESOLVED by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the President of the United States of America shall take immediate and determined steps to:

(1) call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to permit the concret resurrection of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in the largest non-Russian nation both within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in Eastern Europe; and

(2) utilize formal and informal contacts with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' officials in an effort to secure freedom of religious worship in places of both churches that their own constitution provides for; and

(3) raise in the General Assembly of the United Nations the issue of Stalin's liquidation of the two churches and its perpetuated effect on the posture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the light of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights.

Co-sponsoring the resolution were Congressmen: Frank Annunzio (D-Ill.); James A. Burke (D-Mass.); James J. Delaney (D-N.Y.); Edward J. Derwinski (R-Ill.); Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.); Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.); Edward I. Koch (D-N.Y.); John J. Moakley (D-Mass.); Edward J. Patten (D-N.J.); Ronald A. Sarasin (R-Conn.); Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.); William F. Walsh (R-N.Y.) and John W. Wydler (R-N.Y.).

Three-Pronged UCCA Conference in Chicago.—Upon the initiative of the UCCA Executive Board, a three-pronged conference was held over the weekend of February 11-13, 1977 in Chicago, Ill., dealing with a variety of problems of important concern for the UCCA and the Ukrainian community.

Representing the UCCA at the conference were: Joseph Lesawyer, executive vice president; Walter Masur, vice president; Ignatius M. Billinsky, secretary; Ivan Bazarko, administrative director; Mrs. Ulana Diachuk, treasurer; Ivan Oleksyn, executive vice president-designate; Mrs. Luba Shandra (UNWLA); Lev Futala and Dmytro Hryhorchuk, members of the Executive Board; Dr. Volodymyr Nesterczuk, auditing board; Omelan Pleshkevych, Mykhailo Panasiuk, Ananiy Nykonchuk and Bohdan Kazaniwsky, members of the UCCA National Council.

Meeting with them were representatives of the Ukrainian Medical Society of North America; Ukrainian cooperatives and credit unions and representatives of UCCA Branches from the mid-West states.

At the meeting with representatives of the Ukrainian Medical Society, chaired by its president Dr. Achilles Chreptowsky, a number of timely mat-

ters were discussed and solved, thus ironing out some misunderstanding which arose at the XIIth UCCA Congress last October. In a joint statement the Ukrainian Medical Society stated, among other things:

"As a consequence of positive deliberations and statements by members of the UCCA executive organs, the Executive Board of the Ukrainian Medical Society of North America declares its further support of and active participation in the work of the executive organs of the UCCA..."

Other representatives of the Medical Society included Dr. Stepan Woroch, Dr. Wasyl Truchly, Dr. Oleh Woliansky, Dr. Pylyp Demus and Dr. Myroslav Kolensky, and Dr. Roman Mycyk of the Credit Union "Self-Reliance," the host.

The second meeting with representatives of UCCA Branches was hosted by the UCCA Chicago Branch and welcomed by Dr. Julian Kulas, former Branch chairman.

Taking part in the meeting were: Vasyl Lishchynetsky (Cleveland); Nestor Shcherbiy and Dr. I. Grunyk (Detroit); Bohdan Tyshynsky (Milwaukee); Lubomyr Kuzyk (Wisconsin Dells); Stepan Pylpychak, Mykola Wozniak and Osyp Lucyk (Hammond, Ind.); Bohdan Deychakivsky (Lorain, O.); Ananiy Nykonchuk (Pittsburgh, Pa.), as well as representatives of local organizations, such as UNWLA, ODFFU, ODWU, SUMA, AF-ABN, Ukrainian Businessmen's Association, Credit Union "Self-Reliance," Ukrainian American Foundation, Ukrainian Schools Council, Ukrainian Baptist Congregation, the editorial office of **Ekran** and the Ukrainian Radio Program, and the Brotherhood of the First Ukrainian Division.

Addressing the gathering were Mr. Bazarko, Mrs. Diachuk and Dr. M. Semchyshyn of Chicago, while Mr. Lesawyer was chairman of the session.

In the evening a supper for all guests was arranged by the local UCCA Branch, at which Mykhailo Panasiuk, its chairman, was master of ceremonies. The speaker at the dinner was Walter Masur, a UCCA vice president, while Mr. Lesawyer provided information on the course of the conference.

Finally, on February 13 (Sunday), a conference on financial and economic matters was held in the headquarters of the Ukrainian Savings Union "Pevnist," in which 38 persons took part. Represented at the conference were spokesmen of the UNA, UWA, the Providence Association and UNAA —all Ukrainian American fraternal associations; the Association of Ukrainian Cooperatives, the League of Ukrainian Savings Banks and the Association of Ukrainian Businessmen and Professionals of Chicago.

Addressing the conference were Omelan Pleshkevych, who spoke on "Efforts in Organizing Ukrainian Economic Life in the U.S. in the Past"; Joseph Lesawyer on the activities of the fraternal associations; Dr. Volodymyr Nesterczuk on "U.S. Economics and Ukrainian Part Therein." Speaking at the conference were also Dr. Kulas and Dr. Roman Kobyletsky.

Speaking on behalf of the UCCA was Ivan Bazarko, who outlined UCCA efforts to establish an Economic National Council, whose task would be the planning of Ukrainian economic life in America and the coordination and collaboration of fraternal associations and private financial institutions within the UCCA.

Taking part in the conference were-UNA: J. Lesawyer, Mrs. U. Diachuk, president and treasurer, respectively; UWA: I. Oleksyn, president;

Providence Association: B. Kazaniwsky, secretary; UNAA: W. Masur, L. Futala and A. Nykonchuk, president, vice-president and secretary, respectively; Association of Ukrainian Cooperatives of America: R. Mycyk, O. Pleshkevych, D. Hryhorchuk, Dr. Roxolana Harasymiw, M. Panasiuk, Prof. V. Iwashchuk, Dr. V. Nesterczuk, R. Mihun and O. Saciuk.

The League of Ukrainian Savings Banks of America: Dr. J. Kulas, V. Holod, R. Semkiw, M. Hrynevych, M. Kulas and Dr. R. Kobyletsky.

The Ukrainian Businessmen's and Professional Association: Dr. R. Kobyletsky, T. Jackiw, Dr. Bohdan Staruch, V. Nychy and M. Senchyshak.

U.S. Senators Protest Arrests in Ukraine.—Twenty-five U.S. senators, led by Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.) and Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), protested on April 5, 1977 the arrest of two Ukrainian human rights leaders, to Soviet Communist Party chief, Leonid Brezhnev.

Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy are members of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, an unofficial group of human rights activists which has been monitoring Soviet compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Agreement. They were arrested in early February.

"We wish to make clear that we oppose Soviet harassment of the dissident citizens and that the United States Senate intends to stand firm in its commitment to the human rights provisions agreed to by our countries in the Helsinki Accords," the Senators said in a letter to Brezhnev.

"We view the arrests of Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy, as well as those of Yuri Orlov and Alexander Ginzburg, members of a related Helsinki Pact monitoring group in Moscow, as a violation of human rights by the Soviet Government. Such arrests are a dismaying indication of the lack of importance the Soviet Government attaches to implementing the Helsinki Agreement," the Senators said.

Rudenko is a poet and writer, a member of the Soviet section of Amnesty International, and head of the Ukrainian Helsinki group in Kiev. Tykhy is a teacher from the Donets region of Ukraine.

Signing the protest letters were the following U.S. Senators:

Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.); Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.); Wendell R. Anderson (D-Minn.); Birch Bayh (D-Ind.); Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.); Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.); John C. Danforth (R-Mo.); Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.); Robert Dole (R-Kan.); John A. Durkin (D-N.H.); Jake Garn (R-Utah); Robert P. Griffin (R-Mich.); S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.); H. John Heinz, III (R-Pa.); Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.); Spark M. Matsunaga (D-Hawaii); John Melcher (D-Mont.); Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.); Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio); Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.); Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (D-Mich.); William V. Roth, Jr. (R-Del.); Robert T. Stafford (R-Vt.); Adlai E. Stevenson (D-Ill.); and Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D-N.J.).

Testimony on Destruction of Ukrainian Churches by the Soviet Regime in Ukraine.—Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of **The Ukrainian Quarterly** and a member of the executive board of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, was one of seven witnesses in a "public tribunal" on March 17, 1977 at the Carnegie Center for International Peace in New York City, sponsored by the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry. The hearing arranged at the request of the Join Executive-Legislative Commission on

European Security and Cooperation, was held for the purpose of collecting evidence to the effect that the USSR has been steadily violating the Helsinki Accords by denying basic human rights to Christians and Jews.

Constituting the panel of international jurists, religious leaders, academic authorities and human rights specialists were Dr. Rita Hauser, former U.S. Representative to the U.N.; Dr. David R. Hunter, director of education, Council on Religious and International Affairs; Bayard Rustin, executive director, A. Phillip Randolph Institute; Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, national director of Interreligious Affairs, American Jewish Committee, and Sister Ann Gillen, executive director, National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry.

Among the witnesses were: Prof. Thomas E. Bird, professor of Slavic Languages at Queens College, CUNY; Dr. Walter Dushnyck, representing the UCCA; Prof. William Fletcher, director of Soviet Studies at the University of Kansas; Prof. Howard Greenberger, New York University Law School; Rev. Blahoslav S. Hruby, secretary, Research Center for Religion and Human Rights in Closed Societies; Ilya Levkov, National Committee on Soviet Jewry, and Rev. Alexander Veinbergs, Latvian Lutheran Church.

In his 20-minute deposition, Dr. Dushnyck declared that although religions in the USSR suffer from persecution, none of them compare to the tragedy of the Ukrainian Churches which were simply genocided and put outside the law by the Soviet government.

He spoke about the renascence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1919-1921 and its rapid development despite Communist restrictions. But in the 1930's Moscow launched an all-out assault against that church, through a process of dislodging it from within and by sheer physical destruction, by arresting three Ukrainian metropolitans—Vasyl Lypkivsky, Mykola Boretsky and Ivan Pavlovsky, and over 40 Orthodox archbishops and bishops, and hundreds of priests and monks and thousands of lay leaders.

At the present time, Dr. Dushnyck continued, there is no Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine as an independent institution. There is, however, the so-called "Exarchate of Ukraine," which is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It encompasses 18 dioceses, some of which have no bishops (Sumy, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk and Khmelnytsky). There are no seminaries, except one in Odessa, where all subjects are taught in Russian. There is lack of Ukrainian religious books, missals and Bibles. The official organ of the exarchate, **Pravoslavny Visnyk** (The Orthodox Herald) is published in Ukrainian. Ukrainian Orthodox priests who demand more freedom for the church are being arrested and sent to labor camps, as was the case of Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk, who was sentenced in 1970 to 10 years at hard labor for undefined "national-religious activity."

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine was destroyed in 1945-1946, when the Soviet government, in cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church, organized a fake "synod" of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, attended by only 216 terrorized priests (out of some 2,638) and abolished the Union of Brest (1596), under which a great majority of Ukrainian and Byelorussian eparchies were united with the Holy See in Rome.

Today, there still exists a Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine in the catacombs, as attested to by persistent Soviet propaganda reports in the

press, over TV and radio stations and in films. Reportedly, there are 3 Ukrainian Catholic bishops in Ukraine, who are said to profess their loyalty to Patriarch Josyf Slipyj, the only surviver of the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in Ukraine. He is now in Rome, being released in 1963 from Soviet slavery after 18 years as a prisoner.

Dr. Dushnyck also touched on political oppression in Ukraine, stressing the fact that Ukrainians are resisting the policy of Russification and are fighting for the freedom and independence of their country.

He was also interviewed by the "Voice of America" for broadcast over the Ukrainian-language service to Ukraine.

New Board of Directors of Ukrainian Free University Foundation in U.S.—At an election held recently a new board of directors of the Ukrainian Free University Foundation was elected, comprising the following:

Dr. Peter Goy—president; Dr. Vasyl Luchkiw and Dr. Alexander Nychka—vice presidents; Dmytro Bodnarchuk—secretary; Dr. Ivan Sierant —secretary-treasurer and John Marchenko—treasurer.

Members of the executive board: Osyp Moroz, Theodore Wolanyk, Mykola Turetsky, Ivan Burtyk, Dr. Eugene W. Fedorenko, Wasyl Ivashchuk, Dr. Jaroslaw Padoch, Prof. Leonid Rudnytzky, Alexandra Kysilevska-Tkach; members-at-large: Myron Novosad, Dr. George Starosolsky, Dr. Stepan Woroch.

Auditing committee: Dr. Petro Bohdansky, Prof. Nicholas Chirovsky, Prof. Jacob P. Hursky, Dr. Roman Rychok and Franko Wirstiuk.

Press and Information: Anna Maria Vlasenko-Bojcun **(America)**; Volodymyr Lewenets **(Svoboda)**; Dr. Walter Dushnyck **(The Ukrainian Quarterly)** and Dr. Wasyl Werhan **(Narodna Volya)**.

Ukrainian History to be Taught at University of Akron.—A course of Ukrainian history will be taught in the Spring Quarter of 1977 at the University of Akron, in Akron, Ohio. The Department of Special Programs in its **Bulletin** made the following announcement:

"Ukrainian History of the 17th Century, Course No. 0941:030;301 (I.I. CEU). A study of Ukrainian history and culture of the 17th century dealing with political, social and religious life in Ukraine in that period. Ukrainian-Polish Wars 1630-1638; oppression of the Kozaks, the revolurevolution of 1648 under the leadership of **Hetman** Bohdan Khmelnytsky, establishment of the Ukrainian Military Republic and the **Hetman** State in 1649-1764 will be explored."

The course in Ukrainian History, on a par with other evening courses in continuing education, started on Friday, April 1, 1977, from 7:00 to 8:00 P.M. and was held once a week for eleven sessions.

The course was taught by Dr. Theodore Mackiw, Professor of Modern Language and Director of Soviet Areas Studies at the University. He completed his graduate work in History and Slavic Studies at Frankfurt University, where he received his Ph.D. in 1950. He also studied at Oxford (England), Seton Hall University, and Harvard Extension School. In 1959 he was granted a Post Doctoral Research Fellowship in the field of Slavic Studies at Yale and in the summer of 1967 was awarded the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) Graduate Fellowship in East European Studies at Indiana University.

Prof. Mackiw had served on the faculties of Schwyz Collegium, Switzerland, Lane College, Seton Hall University and the University of Rhode Island before joining the University of Akron faculty in 1962. He is the author of several publications in the field of Ukrainian history. His most recent book is **Prince Mazepa: Hetman of Ukraine, in Contemporary English Publications, 1687-1709.**

Ukrainian Youth in New York Protest Arrests in Ukraine.—Some 250 Ukrainian youth were not deterred by a torrential downpour on March 4, 1977 to protest the recent arrests in Ukraine at two different Soviet offices in New York City. The protest was organized by the Ukrainian Student Organization of Michnowsky (TUSM) to observe the 27th anniversary of the death of Gen. Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka), commander-in-chief, who was ambushed by Soviet security troops and killed on March 5, 1950 in Western Ukraine.

The protest was directed against the systematic persecution of Gen. Shukhevych's son, Yuriy Shukhevych, who has been in Soviet jails and slave labor camps since the age of 14, as well as the recent arrests of Mykola Rudenko and Oleksiy Tykhy, members of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords.

The first demonstration took place in the form of picketing the New York offices of "Aeroflot," the Soviet airline, at 45th Street and Fifth Ave. Closely guarded by New York City policemen, the protesters marched in a circle between 45th and 44th Streets, carrying American and Ukrainian flags and appropriate posters condemning the persecution and denial of human rights in Ukraine.

The second part of the demonstration was held on 66th St., off Lexington Avenue, one block away from the Soviet U.N. Mission due to city ordinance which prohibits protests at the Soviet Mission. From a sound unit mounted atop a truck, Ihor Zwarycz, TUSM president, informed passers-by about the reasons for the protest demonstration.

At the same time, Miss Oksana Dackiw and Andriy Priatka were allowed by the police to go to the Soviet Mission to present Soviet officials with a resolution protesting the persecution in Ukraine. According to the police, Yuri Shcherbakov, first secretary of the Mission, refused to talk to them or accept the resolution. The resolution accused the Soviet government of violating the so-colled Final Act of the Helsinki Accords; it demanded the release of political prisoners and the implementation of human and national rights in Ukraine. Towards the end the youth burned the official Soviet Olympic flag which Ukrainian youths seized during the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal.

Ukrainian Easter Eggs and Ritual Breads Exhibition.—A special exhibition of Ukrainian Easter eggs **pysanky** and Ritual Breads was opened at the Ukrainian Museum of the UNWLA in New York City on March 25, 1977. In conjunction with the exhibition, a three weekend program was held which featured a film on Ukrainian Eastern Eggs and lectures on traditional Ukrainian breads and **pysanky**. Workshops for both children and adults on the art of decorating Ukrainian Easter Eggs were held.

The exhibition attempted to portray the old Ukrainian folk traditions involved in these two art forms, their evolution, territorial differentation, and their present continuation. A large part of the **pysanky** shown in the ex-

hibition were on loan from private collections; the rest belong to the Museum's collection. They cover the central, southern, northwestern and western parts of Ukraine, and they date from the 1920's to the present time. Ritual breads were also widely represented. They included wedding **korovai,** breads made for funeral rites, Easter **pasky,** Christmas **kolachi** and small baked items (birds, cones, etc.) for children.

The most recent **pysanky** and ritual breads were provided by members of the Ukrainian community in the U.S. as part of a contest organized by the Ukrainian Museum in February of this year. The contest material showed that these Ukrainian traditions are still very much alive in America. It is worth noting that some contest participants admitted they had never attempted to bake these traditional breads or knew how to make **pysanky** before the contest.

An illustrated booklet provided background material on the exhibition. It included an introduction and an essay on **pysanky** by Oksana Grabowicz, the Museum Curator, and an essay on Ukrainian ritual breads by Lubow Wolynetz, who is a long time collector, researcher and craftswoman in this field.

A ten minute prize-winning color film **"Pysanky"** by Slavko Nowytzkyj was featured during the program. This film received the Golden Eagle and Golden Hugo awards in 1976 and was placed among the finalists in the American Film Festival.

The Ukrainian Museum is located at 203 Second Avenue, New York City, and is opened Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday, 1:00-5:00 P.M. Admission is $1 for adults and 50¢ for senior citizens and children under 12. For information: (212) 228-6840-41.

Senator Jackson Urges Release of Rudenko, Tykhy and Others.—In a telegram sent on March 16, 1977 to Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) urged the immediate release of Mykola Rudenko, Oleksiy Tykhy, Alexander Ginzburg, Yuri Orlov and Anatole Shcharansky.

Earlier in February, Sen. Jackson scored human rights violations in the Soviet Union. He was followed by Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.).

"The best thing that our neighbors in the Soviet Union can do—and I say neighbors in the world sense—is to rethink what they have done, and for Secretary Brezhnev and his associates to understand that the release of these prisoners and the cessation of this harassment of their fellow citizens is the best way to secure the easing of tensions and to find the path to peace," said Sen. Humphrey.

"I would also like to join in the comments of the Senators concerning the position of leadership that President Carter has taken in this regard... I believe he is off to a good start in this area of human rights," said Sen. Nunn.

The text of Sen. Jackson's telegram to Brezhnev reads:

"In the name of international obligations freely accepted by your government to respect the right to freedom of opinion and expression I call upon you to release Alexander I. Ginzburg, Yuri Orlov, Mykola Rudenko and Anatoly Shcharansky and let them and their colleagues exercise their international recognized human rights."

New Chicago Mayor Pledges Support for Ukrainian Development.—Some 800 people from the local Ukrainian community gathered at the SUMA Hall on March 27, 1977 to meet with the new Mayor of Chicago, Michael Bilandic, and his staff. They were met at the doorway by girls in Ukrainian national costumes and were welcomed, according to Ukrainian tradition, with bread and salt. Atty. Julian Kulas, president of the Ukrainian Democratic Organization, opened the meeting, stressing the concern of the Ukrainian community for their neighborhood, discussed at the Mayor's office a week earlier. Dr. Kulas recalled Mayor Bilandic's commitment to the preservation of the Ukrainian neighborhood and plans that had already been approved by the Department of Planning and Development.

In his remarks Mayor Bilandic recalled that he was brought up in a Croatian community, went to a Croation school and that he wholly understands the problems of the Ukrainian community and shares its concerns. He cited common aspirations that the Ukrainian and Croatian peoples have in their struggle for freedom, noting the joint participation in Captive Nations Week observances and saying that "We have to continue working together to help our enslaved countries."

He reaffirmed his support for the development and improvement of the area where the Ukrainian community is located and said he would continue to work closely with the federal government for the renovation of the city and of the Ukrainian neighborhood area.

Mayor Bilandic was accompanied by Commissioner Matthew Bieszczat, State Senator Michael Nardulli and Richard Troy, Trustee of the Sanitary District.

Taking part with the Ukrainian delegation which called on Mayor Bilandic on March 18, 1977, were: Msgr. Peter Leskiw, pastor, St. Nicholas Cathedral; Msgr. Marian Butrynsky, pastor of SS. Volodymyr and Olha; Roman Mycyk, president of "Self-Reliance" Federal Credit Union; Dr. Achilles, Chreptowsky, president, Ukrainian Medical Society of North America; Dr. Roman Kobyletsky, vice-president of Security Savings and Loan Association; Walter Nychaj, League of Americans of Ukrainian Descent; Dr. Bohdan Staruch, president, Ukrainian Businessmen's Association; Roman Barabasz, director, Division-Western Health Clinic; Mrs. Mary Shpikula, secretary, Ukrainian Democratic Organization; Dr. Ivan Lesejko, UCCA Youth Council; Oleh Saciuk, publisher of **News-Record**; Andrew Iwaniuk, Eugene Daczyszyn, Mrs. Anna Petrow, Atty. Zenon Forowycz and Theodore Jackiw, members of the Ukrainian Democratic Organization.

Bridgeport Group Protests Engagement of Soviet Cruise Ship.—The Human Rights Coalition for Soviet Citizens of Greater Bridgeport (Conn.) will oppose and demonstrate against the Soviet cruise ship "Kazakhstan," which is scheduled to come to the city in June.

The organizing committee views the Soviet cruise ship symbolically as representing the USSR's oppressive policies against freedom of religions and cultural expression, freedom of information and freedom to travel.

The cruise ship will be used for entertainment and will contain a duty-free shop which will have articles for sale made in Russian prisons and labor camps by political prisoners.

The Human Rights Coalition, which has been in existence for over a year, has publicly stated:

"As long as the Soviet Union continues to keep thousands of political prisoners in camps; as long as the Soviet Union continues to use and abuse medical practices and drugs on prisoners; as long as the Soviet Union continues to prevent a Catholic from being a Catholic, a Baptist from being a Baptist and a Jew from being a Jew; as long as the Soviet Union continues to oppress the cultural traditions of Ukrainians, Tartars, Lithuanians, Poles, Slovaks and many others; we in the free world must continue to show and demonstrate, for all, our care and concern..."

The Human Rights Coalition is made up of representatives from the Ministry of Social Concern; the Diocese of Bridgeport; the Knights of Lithuania; the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America Branch; United Jewish Council of Greater Bridgeport; YWCA of Greater Bridgeport; the International Institute of Connecticut, and the Judeo-Christian Women's Association.

The Coalition has written testimony for the House Foreign Relations Committee in favor of the recently enacted Helsinki Monitoring Bill and, by invitation, sent a representative to testify before the Republican National Platform Committee last June in Washington, D.C.

The Coalition has circulated a number of petitions and maintained contacts with Senator Lowell P. Weicker and Congressmen Stewart B. McKinney, Robert N. Giaimo and Ronald A. Sarasin, urging them to plead for the release of Nijole Sadunatio, a Lithuanian, Valentyn Moroz, a Ukrainian, and Ilia Glazer, a Jew.

Philadelphia Pays Tribute to Moroz on His Birthday.—On Friday, April 15, 1977, outside Independence Hall some 300 people gathered at noontime to deliver a message of support for Valentyn Moroz on his 41st birthday anniversary. He was born on April 15, 1936.

The program was under the chairmanship of Sister Gloria Coleman of the Cardinal's Commission on Human Rights of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, who welcomed the assembled and asked everyone to join Orysia Styn-Hewka and Marusia Styn in singing "America the Beautiful."

Samuel Smith, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, spoke on the struggle and plight of Valentyn Moroz.

Mayor Frank L. Rizzo, who has been supporting the cause of Ukrainian political prisoners for a number of years, demonstrated again his concern for one of them, Valentyn Moroz, to whom the ceremony was dedicated.

James Cavanaugh, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, who last January organized a group of concerned judges and lawyers to send letters of support to Valentyn Moroz and a letter on his behalf to the Attorney (Procurator) General of Ukraine, again expressed concern for Moroz.

Atty. Esther Polen of the Jewish Community Relations Council, emphasized the common concern of all Americans on account of the violation of human rights in the Soviet Union.

Counsel Louis Johansen, who on the "Day of Solidarity with Ukrainian Political Prisoners," introduced a resolution on behalf of Ukrainian political prisoners, which was adopted by the City Council and sent to the Department of State and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, again spoke on behalf of these victims of Russian Communism. He also introduced a resolution on behalf of Moroz, a copy of which was sent to the martyred Ukrainian historian.

In turn, Mayor Rizzo read telegrams from two Pennsylvania Senators, John Heinz and Richard Schweiker, and Sen. Henry Jackson, all of whom pledged their support for Moroz and other Ukrainians in Soviet prisons.

Also seated on the dais were Bishop Basil H. Losten and Louis Konowal, City Tax Treasurer.

Philadelphia's TV stations covered the program in their newscasts that same evening. The ceremony was organized by the Committee for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz.

Shevchenko Scientific Society Holds Triennial Meeting.—Dr. Jaroslaw Padoch, former treasurer of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and four-term (four years each) supreme secretary of the Ukrainian National Association (UNA), was elected president of the American branch of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh), at the Society's triennial meeting, held on April 16, 1977 at the Ukrainian Institute of America. He was elected for a 3-year term, in accordance with the Society's bylaws.

The one-day meeting's agenda comprised reports and discussions, debates on an analysis of the current situation in Ukraine, especially on Moscow's intensified onslaughts on Ukrainian scholarship, culture and language; adoption of a series of resolutions and election of new officers.

One of the resolutions called for broader participation of members in American and international scholarly movements; still another called for the greater participation of younger members, and so forth.

Others elected along with Dr. Padoch to the Society's governing organs are:

Prof. Roman Maksymowych, Prof. Wasyl Lew, Prof. Stefan M. Horak, Rev. Prof. Meletius Wojnar, OSBM, Ivan Kedryn-Rudnytsky, Prof. Bohdan Hnatiuk, Prof. Eugene W. Fedorenko, Dr. Volodymyr Nesterczuk (vice-president and treasurer)—vice-presidents;

Prof. Nicholas Chirovsky, scientific secretary; Prof. Roman Andrushkiw, Prof. Oleksa Bilaniuk, Dr. Nicholas Wacyk, Dr. Wasyl Werhan, Prof. Ivan Holowinsky, Prof. Peter Goy, Anthony Dragan, Dr. Edward Zarsky, Prof. Wasyl Lencyk, Prof. Gregory Luznycky, Athanas Milanych, Dr. Ivanna Ratych, Prof. Bohdan Romanenchuk, Dr. Leonid Rudnytzky, Dr. Alexander Sokolyszyn, Prof. Lew Shankowsky, Prof. Dmytro Shtohryn—members;

Dr. Oxana Asher, Dr. Frank B. Kortchmaryk, Dr. Ihor Sonevytsky, Prof. John Hvozda, Dr. Wasyl Kalynowych and Prof. Vasyl Luchkiw—alternate members;

Auditing committee: Prof. Joseph W. Andrushkiw, chairman; Rev. Prof. Athanasius Pekar, OSBM, vice-chairman; Dr. Peter Bohdansky, secretary; Roman Kobrynsky, Dr. Walter Dushnyck, Dr. Volodymyr Sawchak, Dr. Michael Kushnir and Roman Huhlewych, members;

Elected delegates to the Supreme Council of the Shevchenko Societies are: Prof. J. Andrushkiw, chairman; Dr. Roman Osinchuk, Dr. Gorge Starosolsky, Prof. Nicholas Bohatiuk, members.

The session was chaired by a presidium consisting of the following: I. Kedryn-Rudnytsky, chairman; Dr. G. Starosolsky and Dr. L. Rudnytzky, vice chairmen; Dr. Ivanna Ratych and Dr. N. Wacyk, secretaries.

Attending the meeting were 58 mandated members, with a total of 136 votes.

OBITUARY: Prof. Vsevolod Holubnychy, noted economist and professor of economics at Hunter College and a known Ukrainian authority on the economy of the Soviet Union, and especially that of Ukraine, died on April 10, 1977 at the age of 49 in New York City.

Born in Ukraine, he came to this country with his parents in the post-World War II years and received his education at American institutions of higher learning. He authored scores of articles in Ukrainian, English and German on the economy of Ukraine and the Soviet Union, which were published in various scholarly journals. He also contributed articles to the Ukrainian encyclopedia and its English edition, **Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia.** He was a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. Prof. Holubnychy was buried in the Ukrainian Orthodox Cemetery, South Bound Brook, N.J.

II. UKRAINIANS IN THE DIASPORA

CANADA

New Head of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.—Prof. J. Rozumnyj, Head of the Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba, was elected president of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science in Canada (UVAN) at the meeting held on March 6, 1977 in the Academy's headquarters in Winnipeg, and chaired by Senator Paul Yuzyk.

Other executive officers, elected along with Prof. Rozumnyj for a three-year term, are:

Dr. O.W. Gerus (Dept. of History, U. of Manitoba)—1st vice-president; Dr. I. Lubinska (Dept. of Zoology, U. of Manitoba)—2nd vice-president; J.S. Muchin (Head, Special Collections Department, E. Dafor Library, U. of Manitoba)—secretary and A. Kachor—treasurer; Dr. A. Baran (Dept. of History, U. of Manitoba)—past president. Members of the Board: Dr. M. Marunchak, Dr. P. Potichnyj (Political Science Department, McMaster U.) and Dr. I. Tarnawecka (Dept. of Slavic Studies, U. of Manitoba).

During the meeting the membership paid tribute to the memory of the late Prof. Watson Kirkconnell, who passed away on February 6, 1977. **The Jubilee Collection of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in Canada,** published recently to mark the 25th anniversary of the Academy in Canada, was distributed to members at the end of the session.

At present the Academy has a total membership of 74, including 38 members, 16 member-correspondents and 20 associate members.

Ukrainian Woman Elected Citizenship Judge and to Windsor U. Board of Governors.—Valerie Kasurak, executive consultant for the Excelsior Life Insurance Company in Windssor, Ont. and an energetic community leader, was named to the Board of Governors of Windsor University.

She was born in Brandon, Man., the daughter of Mr. & Mrs. Theodore Kasurak. Miss Kasurak holds degrees from Windsor and London Universities and is a former secretary of the Mayor of Windsor. She holds executive posts in some 60 Ukrainian and Canadian community groups and is a former member of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations.

A few months after her appointment to the Board of Governors of Windsor University, Miss Kasurak was appointed Windsor's citizenship

judge. Her appointment to this judgeship is in line with the expanded citizenship court program under the new Canada Citizenship Act. The law reduces the waiting time for citizenship from five to three years, and allows mothers to apply for citizenship on behalf of their children.

OBITUARY: Dr. Watson Kirkconnell, noted Canadian scholar, translator, linguist, poet and literary critic, who is best known among Ukrainians for his translations of Taras Shevchenko's poetry and the works of other Ukrainian poets, died on February 26, 1977, in Wolfville, N.S., where he lived in retirement with his wife. He was 81 years old.

Born in 1895 in Port Hope, Ont. a fourth generation Scotch Canadian, Dr. Kirkconnell was educated at Queens University in Kingston, Ont. and at Oxford University in London, England. He taught English at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ont., and later at the University of Toronto and other Canadian universities.

There are some fifty major works to his credit, including translations of literary works and literary criticism; he also wrote numerous scholarly articles.

But it was in western Canada that Dr. Kirkconnell acquired extensive knowledge of various ethhnic cultures and became especially interested in the Ukrainian community, its socio-psychhological fabric, its culture and literature.

His first translation of Ukrainian poetry appeared in **Canadian Overtones in 1935.** But his major accomplishments in Ukrainian literature are the translations of **The Poetic Works of Taras Shevchenko** and **The Ukrainian Poets, 1189-1962,** both done in cooperation with Prof. C.H. Andrusyshen of the University of Saskatchewan.

Moreover, Prof. Kirkconnell authored such book and pamphlets as **Our Ukrainian Loyalists, The Ukrainian Canadians and the War, Our Communists and the New Canadians, Twilight of Liberty, Seven Pillars of Freedom, The Ukrainian Agony** and others.

Dr. Kirkconnell's article and book reviews also appeared in **The Ukrainian Quarterly,** and he was a member of its Editorial Advisory Board.

For his contributions to Ukrainian literature in Canada and for his advancement of Ukrainian causes, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee awarded him the Taras Shevchenko Medal, making him one of six non-Ukrainians ever so honored.

ENGLAND

Marchenko Named "Prisoner of Month" by Amnesty International.— The April 1977 issue of Amnesty International Newsletter reported that Valery Marchenko, a Ukrainian political prisoner, has been designated one of its three "Prisoners of the Month."

The other two are Muhammad bin Abrullah bin Awadh Al Aulaqi of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Liu Chen-Sung of Taiwan.

Mr. Marchenko was born in Ukraine in 1947, and studied Ukrainian and Oriental languages at Kiev University from 1965 to 1970. For the next three years he published stories and essays in a Kiev newspaper and, at the same time, taught Ukrainian language and literature. A number of his translations into Ukrainian from Azerbaijanian literary works were published by

Ukrainian publishing houses.

In 1973, Marchenko was arrested on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" under both the Ukrainian and the Azerbaijanian criminal codes. The Kiev regional court found him guilty in December that year of preparing and disseminating "slanderous fabrications aimed at undermining Soviet authority" and of criticizing Soviet policy toward Ukraine.

Several witnesses were called in connection with unpublished works written by Marchenko but none could recall anything "anti-Soviet" in them. Marchenko himself stated at his trial that he had "wished only to express his opinion in his writings."

Marchenko was sentenced to 6 years in a strict regime corrective labor colony and 2 years of internal exile. He is serving his sentence in the Perm region, near the Ural Mountains, sewing bags six days a week. He suffers from a kidney ailment requiring constant medical treatment.

DENMARK

Chile Proposes New Exchange of Political Prisoners, 8 of Them Being Ukrainian.—The Sakharov Human Rights Committee, based in the Danish capital, reported on April 22, 1977 that the Chilean military government is ready to exchange 13 of its political prisoners, most of them Communists, for 13 political prisoners from Soviet jails and concentration camps, similar to the exchange of Vladimir Bukovsky for Luis Corvalan, Chilean Communist Party leader, last December.

According to the April 27, 1977 issue of **Svoboda,** Ukrainian daily, the New York office of Amnesty International has a list of 13 Soviet political prisoners, among whom are 8 Ukrainians, designated for exchange. They are (Ukrainians in dark print):

Oksana Popovych, Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, Semyon Gluzman, **Valentyn Moroz, Yuriy Shukhevych, Iryna Senyk, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Svyatoslav Karavansky, George Vins,** Sergey Kovalyov, Igor Ogurtsov, Edward Kuznetsov and Vladimir Osinov.

III. IN CAPTIVE UKRAINE

Arrest Two Other Members of Ukrainian Helsinki Group.—On April 24, 1977 Reuters reported from Moscow that the Soviet secret police had arrested Myroslav Marynovych and Mykola Matusevych, members of Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Two others members of the group, Mykola Rudenko, a Ukrainian writer and poet, and Oleksa Tykhy, a teacher, were detained in February, 1977.

Mr. Marynovych was born in 1949 and is an electrical engineer by profession, although he could not find employment in his field; for his independent thinking and friendship with dissidents, he was thrice dismissed from his job. Presently he is editor of the "Tekhnika" Publishing House.

Mr. Matusevych, born in 1946, is a historian. He was denied the right to complete his education when dismissed from the university for his "unorthodox" views. Once he was jailed for 15 days for Christmas caroling, and he was dismissed from work several times for supporting political prisoners.

Reuters reported that the two faced possible charges of "anti-Soviet" activity. It also said that several Moscow-based "Helsinki group" members and two members of a similar organization in Tbilisi, Georgia, are in police custody.

Report Rudenko's Transfer to Prison in Donetsk.—According to the "Smoloskyp" Ukrainian Information Service, Mykola Rudenko, 56-year-old Ukrainian poet, was transferred from the Kiev Prison to the penal institution in the Donetsk area of Ukraine. Rudenko is the leader of the Ukrainian "Helsinki group" and was arrested on February 5, 1977, along with another member, Oleksiy Tykhy. The UIS reports that the trial of Rudenko and Tykhy will be held in Donetsk.

The charges are criminal and not political, a ploy used by the authorities which dissident sources in Ukraine fear is intended to disassociate the two from human rights considerations under the Helsinki Accords. Rudenko was charged with allegedly possessing $36 in American currency, and Tykhy was accused of allegedly owning a firearm.

Arrest Art Historian in Odessa.—Vasyl Barladian, an art historian from Odessa and the author of an appeal to "all Christians around the world," was arrested in early March, 1977, according to the press service of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.

He is a former head of the Odessa University Art Department and a lecturer on art and ethics at the Odessa Institute of Naval Engineering.

During the search of his quarters, KGB agents confiscated several underground manuscripts, a Bible, a copy of **Zhyttia Sviatykh** (Life of the Saints), and other religious publications.

In his appeal, written in June of 1976, Barladian said that he is being harassed for allegedly being a "Ukrainian, Byelorussian and even ancient-Bulgarian nationalist."

But his sole "offense," he wrote, was that he did not disassociate himself from Ukraine's history.

"After analyzing the works of Marx and his followers, I came to the conclusion that people like myself were stripped of their rights only because we did not know how and did not want to become bastards, that we could not disassociate ourselves from national treasure, from the sacristies of the history of nations, children of which we are. Such is the logic of Marxism," wrote Barladian.

Berdnyk, Ukrainian Poet, Detained and Released.—Oles Berdnyk, a Ukrainian poet and a member of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, was detained and interrogated by KGB agents, according to "Smoloskyp" Ukrainian Information Service. He was arrested on April 11, 1977 by three KGB agents, two of them dressed in civilian clothes.

According to former Red Army General Petro Hryhorenko, who received details of the detentions from the 50-year-old Ukrainian poet after he was released, Berdnyk was taken by the secret police by train to Donetsk where he was interrogated.

Gen. Hryhorenko told Western reporters in Moscow that Berdnyk refused to answer any questions unless Mykola Rudenko, leader of the Kiev Group, was released. He was finally allowed to send word to his wife about the arrest, but dissident sources in Kiev said that the telegram was inter-

cepted by the secret police. After two days Berdnyk was released and allowed to return to Kiev, from where he informed Gen. Hryhorenko of what had happended.

The UIS reported that Berdnyk was also taken to Donetsk for a face-to-face confrontation with Rudenko and possibly Tykhy, in the hope that he would testify against the two.

Sources in Moscow see the detention of Berdnyk as a tactic at intimidating Ukrainian human rights activists and putting psychological pressure on his family.

Oles Berdnyk is a former prisoner of the Beria concentration camps (1949-1956); in addition to being a poet, he also is a science-fiction writer, prominent in Ukraine and abroad. He is the author of some 30 books, some translated into English, German, Portuguese and other languages. Expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine in 1972 for deviating from "socialist realism," he has been earning his livelihood by physical labor.

OBITUARY: Lev Revutsky, prominent Ukrainian composer and musicologist, died on March 30, 1977 in Kiev at the age of 87, after a "grave and prolonged" illness, according to a Kiev newspaper.

Lev Revutsky was born on February 20, 1889 in the village of Irzhavets, Chernyhiv province, Ukraine. He was trained at a private music school in Kiev and at the M. Lysenko Music-Drama School. By 1916 he finished his musical education at Kiev University, then at the piano section of the Kiev Music School and finally at the Composers' Faculty of the Kiev Conservatory.

He became a music teacher, concert director, and professor at the M. Lysenko Institute and the Conservatory. During World War II he was professor at the Conservatory in Tashkent, Uzbekistan; after the war he returned to Kiev to teach at the Kiev Conservatory. Such Ukrainian composers as V. Homolaka, H. Zukovsky, Platon Maiboroda, Hryhory Maiboroda, M. Dremliuha and many others—were his pupils.

His most important achievement is his musical heritage, especially his compositions which he began creating as a young man. He composed waltzes and songs for soloists; also his First Concerto for piano with orchestra, as well as his First Symphony date from those years.

Among his best works is the cantata-poem, **Khustyna** (The Kerchief) to the lyrics of T. Shevchenko, for choir, soloists and piano, written in 1923. The Second Symphony, based on Ukrainian folksongs was finished in 1926. The Second Concerto for piano with orchestra, numerous compositions and vocal pieces—all attest to his musical talent, and his use of the rich Ukrainian musical treasury and the musical heritage of such giants of Ukrainian music as Mykola Leontovych and Mykola Lysenko; he was a pupil of Lysenko and he added arrangements to his opera, **Taras Bulba.**

Lev Revutsky was a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the Union of Composers and was chairman of the board of Ukrainian Composers. He was named a "Hero of Socialist Labor" and received four "Orders of Lenin," four "Orders of the Red Banner" and the Shevchenko and Stalin state prizes.