

The

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A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

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Editorial

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QUO VADIS, AMERICA?

Editorial

"...I would like to express my commitment to the values and ideals of your organization and to tell you [it] in the strongest terms possible. I share the historical aspirations of Ukrainian Americans for freedom and independence for all the peoples of the world..."

"...I have great admiration for the people of the Ukraine. In our economic and diplomatic transactions with the Soviet Union, I will use the most effective means possible to strengthen the hands of those who are oppressed. I will also work for a free exchange of information and ideas..."

Jimmy Carter

(From his telegrams to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America of October 9 and 28, 1976, respectively.)

The course of U.S. foreign policy reached its apogee during the final stages of the presidential election campaign last October, a lamentable time when both major candidates were hammering away at each other and using ethnic issues as props for capturing more votes than the other. Seen from the outside, this feverish contentiousness on the part of the candidates did not endear the U.S. to foreign nations, especially the European nations. On the contrary, it demonstrated to them anew the shallowness of our political philosophy and our persisting ignorance of the nature of the Soviet Union and its overriding international objectives.

President Ford and Governor Carter grappled ardently with each other on the issue of Eastern Europe in a bid for the support of some 40 million Americans of East and Central European descent, most of whom are highly dissatisfied with present-day U.S. foreign policy with respect to the USSR and Communist-dominated Europe as implemented by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Both committed unpardonable goofs.

For his part, Governor Carter declared rashly that the U.S. would not intervene in the event of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. Thus the Kremlin was conveniently and invaluabley advised of America's indifference to the fate of Yugoslavia. While, to his credit, Presi-

dent Ford kept at arm's distance from this grave *faux pas*, Governor Carter only made matters worse by insisting that Yugoslavia is simply not important enough for American intercession. Yet even the Italian Communists, a rising force in their country, are worried sick about their neighbor's future once Tito is gone.

To be sure, President-elect Carter is a novice in foreign affairs and thus may be excused to a certain degree. But this is not the case with President Ford. After some twenty-odd years in the U.S. Congress, and then serving in the White House as both Vice President and the President of the United States, he should have known better than to state that "there is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe," no matter what his rationale.

Writing on Mr. Ford's well-nigh incredible statement, columnist Mary McGrory pointed out:

Given a choice between being thought wrong and being thought dumb, the politician chooses "wrong." He can row back from that. From an impression of dumbness, there is no return. The reason that Gerald Ford is sinking so rapidly is that during the second debate millions of his aghast countrymen decided that he is a dunce who knows far less than they do about the world situation. . . .¹

She added, "Gerald Ford plainly did not wish to offend the Soviets. Henry Kissinger has instructed him over-well in that respect. . . . He [Ford] said twice that the Soviets do not dominate Eastern Europe. . . . Millions of Czech-Americans, Croatian-Americans, Ukrainian-Americans could not believe their ears. Gerald Ford was trying to spare them. He did not want to trample on the dream of liberation. But by his clumsy expression, he insulted their intelligence and cast the gravest doubt on his own. . . ."²

EVOLUTION OF GERALD FORD

Although many experts and specialists on foreign affairs believe that Mr. Ford's assertion was a *lapsus linguae* (as some, with Latin, dignified his slip of the tongue), there are also some who disagree. Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC) and president of the American Council for World Freedom (ACWF), stated that President Ford's statement was a "political mistake, not ideational. The President's assertion was no slip of the tongue. It was an expression of both an intensive briefing and a state of mind conditioned by Kissinger."³

¹ "Denying Reality," by Mary McGrory, *New York Post*, October 15, 1976.

² *Ibid.*

³ NCNC Release, October 15, 1976, Washington, D.C.

The Georgetown University professor further stated:

To understand the President's ideational consistency in his assertion, one must see it, at least for the past year or so, in terms of a whole series of events involving the retention of Kissinger after the debacle in Southeast Asia, the snub given to Solzhenitsyn, the Helsinki mess which Congress is now looking into, the supposedly brilliant notion of Kissinger's aide, Sonnenfeldt, on "organic relations," the firing of Schlesinger, the last of any Captive Nations policy, and the whole insular detente policy, where the name was dropped but the self-defeating policy continues...⁴

On June 1, 1968, Congressman Gerald R. Ford had been presented by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America in Washington, D.C. with its treasured "Shevchenko Freedom Award." On that occasion the Michigan Representative expressed what then seemed to be a sympathetic understanding and a realistic position. He stated, among other things:

Every year on January 22nd my colleagues and I in the Congress commemorate the Ukrainian Declaration of Independence. We do this not merely to pay lip service to our constituents of Ukrainian descent but because of a sincere appreciation of the fact that our world still bears witness to a shameless rape — an imperialism that must not be forgotten. . .

For years I have supported the proposal for a special House Committee on the Captive Nations. It is my belief that in this way, the issue of Soviet Russian imperialism will become a focal point of our active attention and concern. . . This is as it must be, for Soviet Russian colonialism is not a mere slogan, it is a fact of life. . . For this reason I will continue to call for a special committee in the House of Representatives to study the plight of the Russian-dominated nations.

In this vein I have supported, and will continue to support, a proposal of a total Congressional review of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The reasons for such a review I believe to be obvious.

How is it possible to spend billions of dollars and sacrifice thousands of lives fighting Communism in Southeast Asia, while at the same time supplying goods and materiel to the Red States in Eastern Europe, goods that eventually may find their way to North Vietnam?...⁵

In eight short years Mr. Ford has apparently changed his position almost 180 degrees. Gone is the recognition of imperialism, gone the need for a special House Committee to study it, gone the need to act firmly and realistically towards the Soviet Union. Instead, we must humor it, placate it, even succor it. Could it be that President

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "Freedom of Ukraine — A Concern of the Free World," address by Rep. Gerald R. Ford (R., Mich.). *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, July-August, 1968, pp. 58, 62, New York, N.Y.

Ford is afflicted with a new disease called "Kissingeritis," as Prof. Dobriensky suggests?

THE TRUE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Some American officials, including Secretary of State Kissinger, have come to regard Eastern Europe as ending at the western frontiers of the Soviet Union. This, of course, is a wholly false view. Eastern Europe ends at the Ural Mountains, something that the late President Charles de Gaulle of France constantly reminded the world of. Eastern Europe embraces not only the satellite countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, among others. It also takes in the Baltic States, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia and the three Caucasian nations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, all of which are nominally independent members of the USSR, all of which possess the constitutional right to "secede from the Soviet Union." Naturally, this "paper right" could hardly be implemented; we need only note the brutal Russian reaction to the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and to the liberalization course of Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The "union republics" of the USSR are merely internal colonies of Communist Russia, as any dissident there will readily tell us.

The countries of what is improperly defined as "Eastern Europe" are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany, all of which are dictated to by the Kremlin. After the death of Stalin and the introduction of Khrushchev's "liberalization" policy, in the satellites there were widespread manifestations of dissent and surging attempts to break away from Russian control. All these expressions of popular will were promptly crushed by Soviet troops. Only Yugoslavia and Albania managed to break away from Moscow's stifling tutelage only because of the happy circumstance that their territories are not contiguous with the landmass that is called the USSR.

Post-Stalinist rule in the satellite countries, it is true, eased up on the reins for a variety of reasons, the new Kremlin tenants finding it more expedient to give East Europeans a measurable degree of autonomy, primarily in domestic affairs. But even in this they set up strong controls.

Political control in the satellite countries is maintained firmly by Moscow through a number of more or less covert devices: a Soviet representative is ensconced in the Ministry of Interior (secret police) in each and every satellite country; all the general staffs of

the satellite armed forces are directed by Soviet military leaders; all their Communist Parties are directed by the Politburo of Moscow, and all economic and financial institutions are subordinated to the overall plans of the USSR, as are the educational policies as well." Otherwise, there is no Soviet domination!

Although this "Eastern Europe" presents a varied political, economic and cultural landscape, their people are always mindful of the presence of some 30 Soviet army divisions, 16,000 tanks, thousands of war planes, and other Soviet personnel, including thousands of secret agents, special technical groups, and so forth. For these East Europeans the spectrum of life ranges from gray to black.

THE CASE OF POLAND

In his second "debate" with Governor Carter, President Ford, in proclaiming that there is "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe," singled out Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia as being "free and independent."

Yugoslavia, to be sure, is free of Soviet troops and Soviet secret police. But it is a Communist state, which means oppression of the people, persecution of minorities and large-scale denial of human rights and civil liberties. Romania maintains the same tight Communist control over its population. Because its petroleum relieves it of total economic subservience to the USSR, its own Communist hierarchy occasionally flashes some opposition to the Soviet Fatherland. But the prospect of ever escaping Kremlin control, in the consensus of expert opinion, is a very dim one.

Poland, alas, is a satellite *par excellence* of Communist Russia. According to anti-Communist sources, Moscow maintains four army divisions near the city of Lignica in Silesia to "protect and guard" communication routes between Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. Both officers and men are strictly barred from making any contacts with the hostile Polish population. The Polish secret police is directed by officers trained by the KGB; the whole network is subordinated to the KGB. There is no Polish foreign policy as such. Andrei Gromyko dictates it, with the assistance of the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw, Pilatowicz, who speaks excellent Polish and who may well be a Polish renegade. The economy of Poland is thoroughly exploited by Moscow. Polish dock-

⁶ Cf. "Human Rights in Communist Ruled East-Central Europe," by Walter Dushnyck in *Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A World Survey*. Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies. The Hague, 1976, p. 380.

yards at the Baltic Sea produce a great quantity of ships for the USSR, but at what price no one knows: "it is a state secret." A recently-discovered huge natural gas field, cut by the Polish-Soviet frontier, has been commandeered by the Kremlin. And Polish cultural life decays steadily under the tight censorship of the Communist Party, which, in fact, is dedicated to its eventual destruction.

To the West have come two important documents from Poland attesting to the subjugation of Poland by Communist Russia.

One is the *Program of the Coalition for Polish Independence*, published in July, 1976, and translated and disseminated in the United States by the North American Study Center for Polish Affairs in Evergreen Park, Illinois. In it the Polish underground body laid down its principal objectives, such as the restoration of genuine Polish sovereignty, the participation of all Poles in management and government; the introduction of civil liberties, which would conform to the spirit of the Polish nation and the development of free European nations; the creation of legal and organizational structures which would guarantee the rise and durability of multi-party democracy, and so forth.

As concerns the relations of Poland with Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania, the document stated:

We are not Russia's neighbor. Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania are our neighbors to the East. We are linked with these countries by the life we shared for many centuries within the frontiers of one state — the Polish Commonwealth of Nations. While it is true that this common existence was more peaceful at some times than at others, it was, nevertheless, a voluntary arrangement. The Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian and Latvian nations are not independent today. They were forcibly incorporated within the Soviet Union and are being subjected to a more severe political, ideological and religious discipline than is Poland. After centuries of close relationship, we can neither look with indifference at the incessant campaign of Russification being waged against them, nor be mutely sympathetic. We declare our solidarity with, and strong support for, these nations aspiring to independence from Russian domination. We should do everything in our power to help. . . .

The second document is the *Open Letter to Comrade Edward Giersek*, signed by 59 Polish intellectuals in protest against the proposal to amend the Polish constitution in order to legalize Poland's domination by Communist Russia. The text of the document, one of whose signatories is Prof. Dr. Edward Lipinski, the noted Polish economist, appeared in the November-December 1976 issue of *Freedom at Issue*, published by Freedom House in New York, N.Y. It demands

: *Program of the Coalition for Polish Independence*. The North American Study Center for Polish Affairs, Evergreen Park, Ill., 1976, p. 13.

full freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of labor, freedom of speech and information. The document states, among other things, that "no one doubts that the alliance with the Soviet Union has become a political necessity. We respect the great Soviet people, the fraternal peoples of Ukraine and Byelorussia. We want good-neighborly relations, we want to build a foundation of mutual trust. But such is impossible until Polish policy towards the Soviet Union is radically cleansed of all elements of servility. . ."

It further states that the "enforcement of the Soviet system has destroyed much of the social and moral life," that there is "not a single daily newspaper worthy of the name," and so forth.⁸

THE KISSINGER CONTRIBUTION

Once in an interview with a beguiling but razor-sharp Italian female journalist, Mr. Kissinger provided a revealing self-image: he is riding into a Western frontier town at dusk, a man on horseback, solitary, one man with a solemn duty to discharge.

Mr. Kissinger, we suggest, is the man on horseback of our time, a roving scholar, saddlebags complete with a Gibbon, who in his intellectual vision assigns priorities to history yet to be written. After trying valiantly but unsuccessfully to win his spurs in Southeast Asia, we next see him cantering to the Far East — always where the shooting is. Here, with the verve and charm of a Lawrence of Arabia, he for once actually and even constructively approximates his image. Truculent, ominously oil-rich Arabs and beleaguered, by now somewhat frenetic, Israel; heads of state are led by Mr. Kissinger's *ad hoc* negotiations into a temporary if uneasy *modus vivendi*. Angola? The horse is rested and ready, but, unfortunately, this item on his agenda has had too low a priority for too long.

The Soviet Union? Here the identities of over 100 million people have been under systematic genocidal attack for some 60 years. But what can one man do against an imperialism possessed of atom bombs, an almost absolute control of its inmates, and an aggressive philosophy of history that it brandishes more menacingly than its nuclear overkill? It is enough to shake the stentorian tones of any decent Harvard professor. Solution: consign the overwhelming portion of the true Eastern Europe to the historical scrapheap. And we cannot then but woo the historical aberration called the USSR with

⁸ Cf. articles by Stefan Korbonski, "Spirit of Helsinki Being Tested in Poland" in *Human Events*, and "The Helsinki Agreement and Self-Determination" in *Strategic Review*, on May 8, 1976 and Summer 1976 issue, respectively.

"detente": admittedly a servile posture but one obviously dictated in order to gain time.

In the course of which time Orwell's dire 1984 view of the predicament of the individual on the *Animal Farm* — already substantially realized — may embrace scores of additional millions even Orwell's vision did not encompass.

CARTER'S CHALLENGE

Should we have dwelled on Mr. Kissinger's wellsprings of behavior? It is only to point up, by analogy, the threadbare thinking that has passed for our foreign policy. Granted that the U.S. has a problem with the USSR, the point is that we haven't yet realized how many players we have on our team. The many millions under Soviet oppression may not be wearing our uniforms, but they possess our values and our spirit. Indeed, one of the overriding concerns of the Kremlin has been just this: to foment discord everywhere, to erect "blocs" here and there, to attack us incessantly as imperialist — all with an eye to diverting attention from the potentially catastrophic make-up of their colonial empire.

Governor Carter has made it a point to refer to his religious and ethical values. However genuine his attributes, this self-exposition may have been but a ploy to establish "identity" with the voters, just as his statements, quoted above, may have been just lip-service aimed at ethnics merely for their vote.

We profoundly hope it's not been but a matter of getting elected. As we see him, Jimmy Carter is a child of America — the values of hard work, sense of personal achievement, sharing good and bad with others, freedom consonant with responsibility, the belief that America as a country is unique in affording full expression to the individual.

Should he once grasp the fact that the latterday newcomers to America, Ukrainians among them, are the very same sort and similarly-motivated individuals who beat their way to these shores earlier to lay this America's foundations, he cannot but then meaningfully respond to the immense reservoir of strength to be tapped in the enemy camp. The shallow comfort of insularity must then fall away.

If we as nations have to play at power balancing, at devising and stocking more and more awesome weapons, at winning Brownie points at so-called confrontations, let us Americans bring to bear the essential value of humanity that has ensured its survival: the freedom and dignity of the one, thereby enabling the fruition of all.

A man on horseback may be needed — but only if he rides, at dawn, straight into the hearts of all men.

FROM THE EMS UKASE TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

BY STEPHEN S. CHORNEY

One hundred years ago, as he basked in the healing waters of the German health resort of Bad Ems, Russian Czar Alexander II signed one of the most disgraceful *ukases* in the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Proscribed by imperial order was the use of the Ukrainian language in the press, schools, theaters, public lectures, etc.

This prohibition was not the first of its kind; earlier prohibitions led to the unconscionable one of Bad Ems.

Russian Czar Peter I was the first to begin trying to Russify Ukraine, the Poltava victory in 1709 having presented a likely opportunity.¹ In his order of 1720, Peter I stated, "to repeat, no books may be printed."² To curry favor with the Czar, the Holy Synod in its turn prohibited the publishing of religious books in Ukrainian. The church body declared piously that the Ukrainian language was not "agreeable with Russian printing, and in the Eastern church such books should not differ from one another."³ This is also why, in 1769, the Holy Synod not only banned the printing of Ukrainian ABC books for children, but also in its wisdom ordered taken away those that were already in use. Since the ABC books had been published with the blessing of the Holy Synod, these, by extension, were regarded as church books.⁴

Appropriate implementations and modifications of such *ukases* followed under the reigns of Catherine II and Nicholas I. In addition, in a circular he issued on July 20, 1863,⁵ Minister of Internal Affairs Count Peter Valuev stated:

¹ Czar Peter I defeated Swedish King Charles XII and Ukrainian *Hetman* Mazepa near Poltava in 1709.

² Smal-Stocki, Roman, *Ukrainska mova v sovietskii Ukraini* (The Ukrainian Language in Soviet Ukraine), N. T. Sh., New York, 1969, p. 27.

³ Tymoshenko, P.D., *Khrestomatiia materialiv z istorii ukrainskoi literaturnoi movy* (Chrestomathy of Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Literary Language), Part II, Kiev, 1961, p. 201.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

...their (Ukrainian) dialect, which is used by simple people, is our same Russian language but spoiled by Polish influence; that common Russian language is very well understood by both Little Russians and Great Russians, and even better than the so-called Ukrainian created for them by some Little Russians and, especially, the Poles.⁶

Valuev did not forget to mention F. Morachevsky's translation of the Gospel. To forestall such efforts in the future, Valuev ordered the censorship to see to it that "only those books be printed in that language (Ukrainian) which belong to the area of creative literature; publishing of educational and religious books as well as other books destined for people's primary reading is to be henceforth terminated."⁷

A special instruction followed which prohibited the publication of popular literature in the Ukrainian. It also banned publishing of Ukrainian ethnographic materials in the *Gubernskie vedomosti*. This interdiction probably was inspired by the Polish insurrection of 1863-1864. Accusations of a tendency towards "separatism" began to appear in periodicals; a term taken from the Civil War then in progress in the United States. Katkov,⁸ who had only too happily accepted donations at the Publishing House of *Moskovskie vedomosti* for the publication of Ukrainian books, suddenly came to his senses, saying to Mykola Kostomarov, "It would be better to forget this money... God be with them — it burns."⁹ The Russian reactionary press now began to make a clamor about alleged connections of Ukrainians with the Polish insurrection, although the Poles, for their part, dismissed the Ukrainians as *haydamaks*, informing at every turn the Russian administration of their doings. This was not an unfamiliar reaction to the Ukrainian cause. The latter engendered hostility and even the most fantastic accusations, simply because the Ukrainians did not possess their own press and because

⁶ Yefremov, Serhii, *Istoria ukrainskoho pysmenstva* (A History of Ukrainian Literature), V. 2, Kiev-Leipzig, 1919, p. 47.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-4.

⁸ Katkov, M. I., (1818-87), Russian journalist. At first he was a moderate liberal, but from the second half of the 50's on, he was a leader of conservative Slavophilism.

⁹ Yefremov, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

the Russian progressive intelligentsia, who might have helped, remained completely indifferent.¹⁰

In 1872 permission was wrung for the establishment in Kiev of the "Yuzhnorusskii Otdel Geograficheskogo Obshchestva" (The South Russian Division of the Geographic Association). This Association united and stimulated the efforts of Ukrainian statisticians, ethnographers and other scholars in exploring their country. In due course the matter of popular education rose again. In 1873 M. Kostomarov started to talk about popular scientific books in Ukraine, but Mykhail Yuzefovych, a secret counsellor and head of the Kievan Archaeographical Committee, wrote sharply in *Moskovskie vedomosti* and *Kievlianin* that corrective action was necessary. A special committee, composed of the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Education, the Attorney-General of the Holy Synod, the Chief of the Gendarmerie, and Yuzefovych, gathered in St. Petersburg. This Committee diligently worked out a decree that was signed by Emperor Alexander II at Bad Ems. On May 30, 1876, the following became law:

His Majesty the Emperor on 18 (30) of the past May has royally commanded:

1. Be it forbidden to bring within the boundaries of the Empire any books or brochures published in Little Russian (Ukrainian) without specific permission of the Central Board on Publishing Matters.

2. Be it forbidden to print and publish within the Empire original and translated works in the same dialect, except:

a) Historical documents and manuscripts, and b) Works of creative literature, but in printing historical manuscripts the spelling of the originals must be unconditionally observed, and as to the works of creative literature, no divergence from commonly accepted Russian spelling should be allowed, and that permission for publishing works of creative literature be issued only after prior examination by the Central Board on Publishing Matters.

3. Be it forbidden to stage Little Russian plays, recitations, and also words to music.

4. Be it forbidden to publish the newspaper *Kiersky Telegraf*. This imperial will I propose to the Central Board on Publishing Matters, duly to be carried out.

¹⁰ Krevetsky, Ivan, "Ne bylo, net i byt ne mozhet" (There wasn't, there isn't and cannot be), *Literaturno-naukovyi vistyuk* (Literary-Scientific Herald), Vol. XXVI, April-June, 1904, pp. 128-158; *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVII, July-August, 1904, pp. 1-18; Yefrenov, S., "Vne zakona. K istorii tsenzury v Rossii" (By the Law: A History of Censorship in Russia), *Russkoe bogatstvo* (Russism Richness), XII, No. 1, January, 1905, pp. 64-104; Hornowa, Elzbieta, "Przesladowania ukraińskiej kultury przez rząd carski za panowania Aleksandra II" (Persecution of Ukrainian Culture by the Czarist Government under the Reign of Alexander II), *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu*, Seria A, Filologia rosyjska, 1972, pp. 113- 130.

For the Ministry of Internal Affairs: Vice-Minister, Secretary of State, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky.¹¹

Those against whom the *Ems Ukase* was directed learned fairly slowly about its existence. The Ukrainians eventually did when (1) they did not receive publications from Galicia to which they subscribed, (2) those of their books spelled without "b" and "bi" were not permitted to be published, (3) permission for Ukrainian stage performances or concerts was not granted, and (4) collections containing only the music to their manuscripts were slow in coming. In central Ukraine, some two to three years after the decree was promulgated, their suspicions were confirmed by the article, "La Liberte en Rus," printed in *Revue des deux mondes*, and by the brochure written by M. Drahomaniv which was submitted to the International Literary Congress in Paris in 1878.¹²

With the *Ukase* of 1876 a "grave-cross was erected" not only over literature but over the entire Ukrainian cultural movement. By the end of the 1870's, as if Ukrainian culture had been completely crushed, literary production in Ukraine ceased. Almost all of the Ukrainian writers stopped writing. If they did, they did so solely for their personal and family pleasure. "My older children," wrote Ya. Shchoholiv in his autobiography, "asked me to write, and I wrote for them. I wrote for them till 1878." But that year Shchoholiv's children passed away, and he added, "Now there was nobody to write for."¹³

From B. Hrinchenko's biography we learn that, at the time he was teaching, he had to copy surviving textbooks by hand in order to meet his pupils' need for the native word. The history of culture ought record this act of ethnocide which was heartlessly engineered by the Russian government at the cost of the Ukrainian people at the end of the "civilized" 19th century.

A thaw became visible in Ukrainian literature in 1880. With imperial permission, on December 8 of that year, M. Kostomarov made a substantial contribution to the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. His compilation of the Ukrainian dictionary compelled attention and won praise.

¹¹ "Do istorii ukaza 1876 roku pro zaboronu ukrainskoho pysmenstva." (A History of the 1876 *Ukase* Banning Ukrainian Literature) *Ukraino*, I, Vol. 2, May, 1907, pp. 150-151.

¹² Tymoshenko, P. D., *op. cit.*, pp. 309-310; See also Drahomaniv, M., *La Littérature oukrainienne proscrire par le gouvernement russe. Rapport presente au Congres Litteraire de Paris en 1878 par Michel Dragomanov*, Geneve, 1878.

¹³ Yefremov, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

On January 11, 1881, Kievan Governor-General M. I. Chertkov sent a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs in which he dwelled on M. Lysenko's request to permit circulation within the Empire of the third edition of his collection of Ukrainian songs, which had been published in Leipzig. Lysenko's request flatly discounted the suspicions of Ukrainian separatism. He went on to suggest to the authorities that they might view the possibility of putting Ukrainian literary and musical works on a par with those of the Russian as regards censorship. Upon receiving two meritorious Ukrainian books on January 13, 1881, the provisional Governor-General of Kharkiv, Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, also sent a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs asking for an explication of the rules concerning the Ukrainian language.

The consequences of these letters were a favorable report by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Count M. P. Ignatiev, to Emperor Alexander III and an ensuing royal order to review the rules of 1876. A secret conference took place in which the participants were counsellor K. P. Pobedonostsev, Secretaries of State Ostrovsky and Solsky, and the Acting Director of the Central Board on Publishing Matters, Court Master Prince Viazemsky. The decision was reached that the rules of 1876 be kept in force, but that they be so modified:

1. Be it permitted to print Little Russian dictionaries, provided that the common Russian spelling be preserved, or the one that was in use no later than the 18th century.

2. Permission to perform Little Russian songs and couplets that are cleared by censorship falls within the purview of the local higher authorities in each separate case, and permission to print the Little Russian texts to music, with observance of common Russian spelling, shall be given by the Central Board on Publishing Matters.

3. Be it prohibited to establish a special Little Russian theater and the founding of companies for performances exclusively of Little Russian plays.¹⁴

Although approved on October 8, 1881, these resolutions were not made public. The proper organs were informed "confidentially."¹⁵ The Russian government, in these problems of nationalities, developed such a degree of paranoia that it allowed Ukrainian concerts only if the Ukrainian words to the music be translated into the French.¹⁶

¹⁴ Lysenko's letter. See Chertkov's and Dondukov-Korsakov's notes as well as Minutes of the Committee which elaborated the project of the 1881 *Ukase*, reprinted in *Ukraina*, June, 1907.

¹⁵ *Koryfei ukrainiskoi stseny*, (The Standard-bearers of the Ukrainian Stage), Kiev, 1901, p. 13.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Subsequently, each new Czar renewed and modified these *ukases* according to the circumstances and demands of his time. Even when the 1905-1906 revolution broke out, the *ukases* were not abolished; their implementation was merely temporarily suspended.

To be sure, the Bolsheviki, during the Czardom, heartily condemned the anti-Ukrainian *ukases* and fervently demanded their abolition. G. Petrovsky, a delegate of the Russian Bolsheviki in the State Duma in 1913, waxed eloquent on this score. When Ukraine lost its statehood and became a Soviet "republic," the fledgling Communist state tried to neutralize the Ukrainian desire for freedom. In 1923 it introduced a conciliatory policy of "Ukrainization." But, within the spirit of the *Ems Ukase*, Ukrainization was subverted and finally done away with in the beginning of the 1930's by the now secure Communist regime.

The new masters of the land — Russians now tinged a Marxian Red — decided on "collectivization" of farms as an efficient economic step and, not incidentally, as a means to deal summarily with the antithetical individualism of men who tilled and loved the land. Which consideration predominated is a moot point. But it is a fact that the prime victim was the Ukrainian peasantry — the finest and most flourishing source of the Ukrainian language and folk traditions. The Kremlin-made famine in Ukraine of 1932-1933 cruelly claimed the lives by starvation of six to ten million Ukrainian people. In 1935, 250 blind Kobzar-singers who were summoned to Kharkiv, innocently, as if to a concert, were executed by order of the Communist regime. Those old but soulful Kobzar singers were "the spirit of Ukraine, the people, the singers of the real Kozak glory," stated Leonid Plyushch¹⁷ on a visit to the United States (March 31, 1976).¹⁸

The contemporary Communist government, which rules Ukraine from Moscow under the "nationalities policy," has more than upheld the principles of the *Ems Ukase*. Where the White Czars had been content to fabricate *ukases* in order to Russify the non-Russians in the Russian Empire, the Red Czars in the Kremlin set about destroying the non-Russian peoples not only spiritually but physically as well. Even during the honeymoon period of Ukrainization, they arrested and sent to hard labor camps in Siberia more and more Ukrain-

¹⁷ Ukrainian dissident, neo-Marxist who, on January 10, 1976, was released from Soviet prison and was permitted to emigrate under the pressure of Western Communist Parties (especially the French) and the protests of many Western intellectuals.

¹⁸ After *Vilny svit* (Free World), No. 16, Vol. LXXIV, April 19, 1976, p. 1.

ian scholars, writers, artists, actors, and teachers; and in 1937 thousands of them were executed under the direction of Stalin's faithful henchman, Kashketin. Among them were L. Kurbas, K. Maksymovych, M. Kulish, M. Irchan, H. Epik, M. Zerov, O. Shumsky and many other notables.¹⁹ Thus, the *Ems Ukase* and the contemporary nationality policy of the Kremlin leaders towards Ukraine is tightly connected by "historical inheritance." The "Red" Russians are very much the sons of their "White" forefathers. The contemporary Politburo of the CPSU in its political propaganda on nationality hammers away at the pharisaical thesis that "historically all has naturally formed in just this way"; the fact that the Russian language and culture predominate in the Ukrainian SSR is, one is given to understand, a "progressive phenomenon," one which not only is irreversible but is the very foundation on which will be built "Soviet internationalism" along with a "new Soviet people." The barbarous lincicide of the Czars obviously appeals to the leaders of the CPSU, inasmuch as they translate such oppression as a "historically formed foundation," taking care, however, to rename, disarmingly, the term "Russification" as "Internationalization." Now buried deep in their unconscious is that the Ukrainian culture not long ago was far superior to the Muscovite.²⁰

It is not in the interest of the Russian chauvinists to try to "chop windows to Europe" with both Russian culture and the challenging cultures of the non-Russian nations. But to enlarge the "historically formed foundation" very much is. Thus they diligently burn invaluable Ukrainian archives and libraries; destroy historical monuments and churches; persecute Ukrainian patriots who protect their human rights, the Ukrainian language, folk traditions and religion; imprison and send them to concentration camps and psychiatric institutions and, sooner or later, throw them to the mercies of the cal-

¹⁹ Chorney, S., "Solzhenitsyn and His Confrontation with the Kremlin," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (New York: Summer, 1975), p. 155; Hirniak, Yosyp, "Do nedobytktiv Berezolla" (To the Remnants of the Berezil), *Suchasnist* (Contemporary Times), 2 (158) (February, 1974) p. 28; Chorney, S., "Les Kurbas — artyst, filosof (Les Kurbas' — Artist and Philosopher), *Suchasnist*, 12 (180) (December, 1975), p. 27.

²⁰ Hrushevsky, M., "Pozornoj pamiatj" (A Shameful Memory), *Ukrainsky vestnik* (The Ukrainian Herald), MO. 1, May 21, 1906; reprinted in the collection, *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainsky vopros* (Liberation of Russian and the Ukrainian Problem), Kiev, 1907; Hrushevsky wrote about this also in 1926 in *Ukraina*, No. 4, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the *Ems Ukase* of 1876.

loused KGB, who, long skilled in ethnocide, surpass even the Gestapo in depravity.

After Stalin's death, the smouldering Ukrainian national movement flickered and flamed up, but Moscow was not long in trying to snuff it out again. In 1958 a new school law appeared which enforced the Russification of Ukrainian schools. In order to finish once and for all the troublesome nationality problem in the USSR, N. Khrushchev proclaimed at the 22nd Congress of CPSU in 1961:

In the USSR a new historical community of peoples has arisen, who, having common characteristic features, compose the Soviet people. They have a common socialist motherland — the USSR, a common economical base — the socialist economy, a common socialist class structure, the common Marxist-Leninist world outlook, a common goal — the structure of Communism, and many common spiritual and psychological features.²¹

As a new leader of the Politburo, Leonid Brezhnev in his speech at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971 clearly stressed the role of the Communist party in the struggle against national sentiments and suggested a theory embracing a so-called "bringing together of and confluence of nations" and the creation of a "one Soviet people."²²

Between the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU the policy of Russification was seen as the keystone of the over-arching theory of "confluence of nations" and the new historical community — the "Soviet" people. The latter semantic creation was widely discussed on the pages of many theoretical and popular publications in an attempt to define its exalted uniqueness. This involved, of course, intense cerebral efforts to establish a relationship between the envisioned "one Soviet people" and the genuine existing nationalities.

The documents and materials of *The Ukrainian Herald* disclose that "the politics of the Russification of the non-Russians in the USSR always has been part of the internal policy of the Communist Party." They reveal that a sharp upswing in intensity of this policy has been all too evident since the 24th Congress of the Communist Party. The authors of *The Ukrainian Herald* acidly refer to the 24th Party meeting as "the convention of Russian chauvinists and Russi-

²¹ *KPRS v rezolutsiakh i rishenniakh zizhiv, konferentsii i plenumiv Ts. K.* (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Meetings, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee), Kiev, 1964, p. 360.

²² See *Voprosy filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), No. 6, 1971, p. 23.

fiers,"²³ pointing out that "after the November planning meeting of the CPSU in 1971, both the Party and the KGB launched a direct assault against the National Republics," the policy of total Russification being justified by "the emergence of a new community — the Soviet people." The proscribed usage of the Russian language and the total domination by Russians is not, of course, to be considered Russian "bourgeois nationalism" but, rather, a most desirable "internationalism."²⁴

In due course, the Russian Communists purged many members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, including the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Peter Shelest, charging him with nationalistic tendencies in April, 1973, during the CPSU's planning meeting. Today Shelest is under house arrest and the members of his family are subjected to constant KGB surveillance.²⁵

The writers of *The Ukrainian Herald* underline the fact that the "contemporary purges of the party members" in Ukraine are similar in nature to the genocidal purges of the thirties, thereby betraying their "strong anti-Ukrainian character."

During the entire Soviet period, Ukrainian culture has never been able to develop freely. However, what is taking place in today's Ukraine far outweighs in import any other period prior to the 24th meeting of the CPSU in 1971.²⁶ The Politburo is striving to "amputate the historical consciousness of the Ukrainian people, to destroy their language and culture."²⁷ It is shockingly evident that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is bent on continuing spiritual ethnocide through the liquidation of intellectuals. The secret police, with the assistance of military intelligence and military police, conduct unflinching surveillance of Ukrainian intellectuals. These militant — and last — vocal defenders of the national rights of the Ukrainian people are steadily being sent to prisons, psychiatric establishments and concentration camps. The Ukrainian voice is being throttled.

A complete "reexamination" of the historical and literary heritage has been conducted by the authorities. "Ukrainian historical

²³ *Ukrainskyi visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald), Sahaidak, Maksym, ed., Smolohskyp, Paris-Baltimore-Toronto, VII-VIII, 1975, p. 112.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-117.

²⁶ *Ukrainskyi visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald), Sahaidak, Maksym, ed., Smolohskyp, Paris-Baltimore-Toronto, VII-VIII, 1975, p. 118.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

research has been banned. Scholarly establishments are now busy fabricating all sorts of forgeries with the aim of distorting and eradicating Ukrainian history. Those scholars who recoil at this state of affairs are unceremoniously cast out of such establishments. The same situation prevails in all the other social sciences." ²⁸

The following statistics are significant, if we bear in mind that Ukrainians in number are at least 40 per cent of the Russians. In 1970 the student population of all Soviet universities and institutes comprised 59.5 per cent Russians; all other nationalities made up the remainder, of which Ukrainian students numbered but 13.5 per cent. In 1973, the Russian slice of academic workers and various scientific researchers was 67.7 per cent of the other nationalities, only 10.8 per cent being Ukrainians. In 1973, Russians holding Ph.D.'s in the Soviet Union numbered 55.7 per cent, leaving 44.3 per cent, of whom 9.7 per cent were Ukrainian. Candidates for Ph.D. degrees consisted of 59.6 per cent Russians, 40.4 per cent non-Russian, with 11.5 per cent Ukrainian. In the ranks of graduates of Soviet higher institutions in 1973, Russians comprised 61.8 per cent, with only 38.2 per cent of graduates being of non-Russian extraction. This included but 12.4 per cent of Ukrainian graduates.²⁹ As for the printing of books and periodicals in the USSR in 1973, Soviet sources show 80.4 per cent to have been published in Russian and 19.6 per cent in the non-Russian languages, with only 3.9 per cent in the Ukrainian. Russian newspapers garnered 62.3 per cent, non-Russian newspapers 37.7 per cent, of which 20 per cent were in Ukrainian.

Up to 1971 throughout the universities and institutes the lectures conducted in the Ukrainian language were few. In the last three years these lectures have further diminished. At Dnipropetrovsk University, for example, lectures on Ukrainian literature are conducted solely in the Russian language — as if, say, Chinese literature were being discussed. In the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, Prof. Voitko taught the only course in Ukrainian, philosophy. However, in 1973, he was dismissed from the institute.³⁰ Also in 1973, the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party decided to replace gradually academic journals which had been published in Ukrainian, with Russian ver-

²⁸ *Ukrainskyi visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald), Sahaidak, Maksym, ed., Smolokyp, Paris-Baltimore-Toronto, VII-VIII, 1975, p. 120.

²⁹ *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka, kultura v SSSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (National Education, Science and Culture in the USSR), Moscow, 1971; *Vestnik statistiki* (Statistical Herald), No. 4, 1974.

³⁰ *Ukrainskyi visnyk*, op. cit., p. 121.

sions.³¹ Further, during the convention of members of the staffs of institutions of higher learning of the Ukrainian Republic, which was held in Kiev on March 14, 1974, and conducted in Russian, it was decided to implement the educational process by the use of Russian everywhere, because that superior language is the standard-bearer of internationalism.³²

The campaign against the Ukrainian language as well as Ukrainian culture extends beyond the Soviet borders: for example, Poland. In January, 1974, V. Malanchuk (member of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R.) met with Tomaszewski, Counsel General of the Polish People's Republic, and "demanded that censorship of all Ukrainian publishing activity in Poland be tightened."³³

According to *The Ukrainian Herald*, "The administration of the Writer's Union of Ukraine has become an instrument of spiritual oppression, an appendage of the KGB."³⁴ It is important to point out that from 1973 on "only those graduate students who were specializing in Russian literature or the literature of the peoples of the USSR were being accepted into the Institute of Literature." Those in the field of Ukrainian literature or linguistics were denied entry and discriminated against.³⁵

After December 30, 1971, the date that the Politburo gave the KGB the assignment to destroy the *samvydav*, a wave of arrests promptly engulfed the whole Soviet empire. Ukraine and Georgia were hardest hit, with countless engineers, teachers, doctors, students, and workers being arrested.³⁶

Lviv University was subjected to a Soviet *pogrom* from March to May in 1973. Party officials and the KGB ordered the rector to ban the holding of the traditional evenings in honor of Shevchenko. The students tried to organize such an evening on their own initiative, but were dispersed harshly, with many being arrested. The latter unfortunates were subjected to physical torture (rubber bags were pulled over their heads until they lost consciousness, and they were beaten).³⁷ Recently it has become known that instructions have been given that of those accepted into institutions of higher learning

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, p. 122.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

in Western Ukraine no more than 25 per cent may come from the local youth.³⁸ Ukrainian books are also included in the ban. Libraries are constantly getting instructions to remove Ukrainian books from circulation.³⁹ Where Hitler had books burned in the town squares, the Soviet KGB does away with them in secret. In the last two years literary evenings in honor of Shevchenko have been forbidden. On orders from the KGB, collaborators in the Writer's Union of Ukraine will lay a wreath at Shevchenko's monument; at the same time the KGB will be taking photographs of those who come to pay homage. Afterwards, students will be expelled from the universities and intellectuals from their place of work. If anyone dares read Shevchenko's poems aloud, he will be sent to a psychiatric prison or to the "Gulag Archipelago."⁴⁰

The Russians seek to destroy the historical and cultural monuments of Ukraine's past, for all this which the genius of the Ukrainian people has created throughout the centuries remains a grave threat. In 1972 at the Yaniv Cemetery in Lviv, on the Pentecost, all the remaining crosses in the memorial section of the cemetery, where the graves of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) are located, were destroyed.⁴¹ The grave-crosses were uprooted also in the cemeteries of Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zolochiv, Horodok, and other cities. The Russians have systematically destroyed all the cemeteries associated with the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people: the objective scholar must be denied this important evidence. A unique collection of ancient Ukrainian pictorial art is rotting away, untended, in the Armenian Cathedral in Lviv.⁴² In 1972, on the orders of the KGB, I. Honchar's Ukrainian Museum in Kiev was shut down. Construction of a Kozak museum and a national park on the island of Khortytsya has been halted.⁴³ In December, 1972, the monument in Zboriv to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who fought the Czars, was taken down; a statue of Lenin (another "misguided intellectual," but one now safely dead) was put on the same pedestal while the sculpture of Khmelnytsky was spirited to a secluded place.⁴⁴ The bas-relief of Ivan Franko was taken down from the building

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 139-140.

where he went to high school in Drohobych, and a plaque in honor of M. Shashkevych was removed from its church.⁴⁵ In recent years it has been forbidden to erect memorials to Taras Shevchenko, who spoke up for the common man.⁴⁶

The Russians have all but demolished all the ancient churches in Ukraine. In the village of Volshyn in the Sokal District, Bolshevik hooligans broke into the church at night, tore down the banners and embroidered decorative cloths, broke the candleholders, hacked away at the icons, and committed other mayhem. Later, Broder, a Jew who was in charge of usable scrap, was called into the office of the state farm and ordered to remove this destroyed church property for scrap. When he categorically refused, he was so severely beaten that he had to be taken to the hospital.⁴⁷

This is how the Kremlin is "solving" the national problem in the USSR, especially in Ukraine. The essence of the nationality policy of Russian Bolshevism is a systematic ethnocide of the non-Russian peoples in the USSR. The whole series of facts which have surfaced refutes the assertions made by Brezhnev and other Kremlin leaders that the nationality problem in the USSR has been solved and that a nationality problem does not exist.

"The very nature of the cited facts helps the reader to understand that the Soviet regime is really a fascist dictatorship (in the form of social-fascism)..."⁴⁸ It is "a state in which scores of nations are being oppressed and made victims of physical and spiritual genocide, a state where there exists a real threat that national cultures and whole nations will be completely liquidated, a state, then, where the gravest crime against mankind is being perpetrated.

Homo sapiens, by definition, is a thinking animal. But where Nature favored him with a brain, and therefore with questing ideas, the Soviet dogma, momentarily informed by the insight of a Marx before it was irretrievably negated by the harsh machinations of a Lenin, has rendered its alleged concern, the individual human being, as an implacable enemy to be hoodwinked, coerced, killed — alas, killed or genocided at an ever-accelerating pace. In the Soviet Union, we may fairly say, the thinking animal disappeared — almost for good — shortly after the October Revolution.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

The *Ems Ukase*, should it have a saving grace, was but power and greed inspired. It sought to control peoples and their values; it did not seek *per se* to eliminate them.

Note the tragic hollowness of a Judas-goat Brezhnev when he bleats:

A new historical unity has been established in our country — the Soviet people — founded on the immutable unity of the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia, with the leading role to the working class as regards the friendship of all nations, and nationalities of the country.⁴⁹

May the reader note how the historically acquired attributes of peoples are invited, summarily, to invest themselves into one compost heap, "a one Soviet people." Note that this is a traducing of that precious feeling of humanity, an outrageous assault not against the commonness of humanity but as an unconscionable inability to comprehend the rich multitude of identities that compose it. Note, further, as Brezhnev squats down on his target, how perniciously he views the "working class."

The "working class" in the USSR may still be, so far as we can tell, a compliant group for him and his ilk to sway. But we hope not — and, indeed, we think not. The winds of change, we know, are sweeping this artificial state, despite how long protected by the *Ems Ukase* still airs of oppression. The dissidents tell us.

Surely, if we should take into consideration the "working" classes of England, France, and Germany — not to say, of America — the now powerful and vocal "middle" classes — how can we not view the protestations and posturings of a Brezhnev as nothing but a grinding, fatuous paucity of vision and commitment on the part of a human being and, more so, of a state? For imagine him, abruptly, put in as the American President. What? No KGB, no suppliant courts to despatch dissidents to "insane" asylums, no slave labor camps to dump "incorrigibles?" Worse, no climate of fear to intimidate the hundred of thousands one bold dissident may speak for.

So is the *Ems Ukase* and Brezhnev, or any other sterile USSR product, one.

⁴⁹ *Voprosy filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 3, Moscow, 1976, p. 19.

THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS CONCEPT IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Without doubt, one of the most challenging endeavors in the reformulation of U.S. foreign policy is the advancement of the vital concept of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. In what cannot be other than a panoramic but rigorously essentialist treatment here, this endeavor touches base with a wide variety of ideational and policy-making sources, ranging from the President to the civic involvement circuit, and on the basis of a long record and experience discloses many illuminating lessons of the past and for the highly engaging future. The endeavor, I believe, has developed a rationale of its own—integrally intelligible, thematic, concretist and historically well-founded, not to mention its innovative and risk-taking qualities—and has produced one challenge after another in the continuous process of rethinking and reformulating our basic U.S. foreign policy. Naturally, its confrontations meet with some progress and points of hard resistance; they necessarily encounter opposition whatever the sources of motivation, interest and bias. But all this is par for the course, which by nature is educational, political in the broad Aristotelian sense, and societal and historic in evolving significance.

Before we systematically examine the broad and most relevant spheres of the concept's application, a few preliminary points are in order concerning the method of approach, the distinctive features of the ruling concept itself and, as far as possible in the span of this presentation, the practical aspects of the endeavor as seen notably but not exclusively in the programmed operations of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA). Concisely and simply, our approach is a spherically integrative one, meaning a methodical portrayal of the concept's application from one sphere to another in graded order and with constant futural projection. As to our ruling and guiding concept, it points simply to the numerous non-Russian nations and peoples in the USSR, which, it is gratifying to note, a young but highly perceptive writer of *The Washington Post* holds in his currently widely-read book as constituting the majority of the

population in the USSR.¹ In sharp contrast to similar concepts, this non-Russian nations concept engenders emphases on imperialism, colonialism and nationalism. It is also a counterpart to the non-Han concept relative to mainland China. And, with minimum reflection, it will be observed that these two geographically concentrated concepts are integral parts of the still broader concept of the captive nations that has ultimate global implications.

Focusing on Ukraine, the largest and most strategically situated non-Russian nation in the USSR and also in Eastern Europe, UCCA enjoys a sound, theoretical framework that utilizes in full the valuable non-Russian nations concept. The practical extensions of this framework in the field of operations are, however, conditioned by a number of factors and aspects. For one, in the scope of U.S. population UCCA's representation is relatively small, and to exercise impact it must intensively depend on the cogency and vitality of its ideas, their relevant articulation and timely expression. The accessibility of political levers based on mass vote-getting is low for it; it increases at varying levels in terms of such factors as time, events and circumstantial confluence, steady activism, and a prudent balancing of principle and expedient action. Combining all these essential factors, the most important is the consciousness of process, a vivid awareness of a seemingly endless, evolving pattern of developments that will provide with inevitable force the occasions for pointed expressions of principle, truth and action. Now for the major spheres of application.

INSULAR DETENTE

The first starting-point sphere is, of course, what can be properly called insular detente. Insular because, as defined by Secretary of State Kissinger, it is only a process of negotiation, a state of peaceful coexistence neutralizing the motor forces of principles and promises and the attractive forces of aims and objectives that call for the shaping and construction of a better global society. Seeming stability, an equilibrium of power balances and apparent peace are the shortrun ends of insular detente as pursued by the Nixon-Ford Administrations. It was only when, in mid-1975, this type of detente came under increasing criticism that Kissinger began talking about the moral foundations of foreign policy and that President Ford soon thereafter chose to drop the term "detente." How uncomfortable and uneasy Kissinger is with these foundations is seen in his poorly timed

¹ Robert G. Kalsner. *Russia. The People & the Power*. New York, 1976, p. 60.

advocacy of justice and self-determination for black Africans a year later and complete silence with regard to the application of the same principles to the captive nations.

Many additional definitions have been offered for detente, but by analysis the most explicative one of the policy of the past eight years is the process-like one advanced by Kissinger.² It explains and conforms best with the type of policy executed by the two Republican Administrations. Aside from numerous points of controversy as to the scope and judgment of this policy, the critical and most essential question is "At what price these negotiations with our chief enemies?" When the entire subject is analytically reduced to its barest essentials, the heaviest price paid is found in the Moscow agreement of 1972 in which, recklessly and foolishly, President Nixon accepted the traditional, imperial Russian principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs" of the contracting states. It is difficult for our fellow citizens to understand this critical point, chiefly because many don't understand the very nature of the Soviet Union. If hypocrisy was involved in this particular agreement, the charge cannot be laid against Moscow. After all, it has been the primary principle of Russian empire-building for centuries, and Moscow in our times openly and frankly tells us that its conception of "peaceful coexistence" means systemic warfare with us, which automatically means interference in our internal affairs through the widest possible range of channels depending on circumstances and opportunity.

Historically, this spasm of detente is about the fifth in our relations with communist Moscow.³ Despite the presence of nuclear arms, it won't be the last. The price we have been paying is written in our blind acceptance of the USSR as an ostensible nation/state, hopefully capable of being drawn into a network of international political, economic, cultural and other relations and in time conditioned to rules of civilized behavior and conduct, with prolonged peace the net result of such development. The speciousness of this line of reasoning rests, of course, in the false assumption that the USSR is a nation/state vested with the presumed potentialities. The contradictory fact is that by nature and character it is an empire/state—by strict accuracy, an imperium in imperio—with fixed totalitarian and ideological structures that predetermine behavioral dynamics of expansion and extended domination. The reality and record of these

² *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, Part 4, House Committee on Internal Security, 1973. pp. 2422-24.

³ Gerald L. Steibel. *Detente: Promises and Pitfalls*. New York. 1975, p. 4

dynamics cannot be read and understood in terms of a year or a decade, but rather in terms of decades and, even preceding the Russian Bolsheviks, in terms of centuries of empire-building. The record of the Soviet Russians alone, a scarce 60 years, is phenomenal in itself.

Moscow prizes the Kissinger brand of detente greatly at this time. Brezhnev has indicated this time and time again. Twenty years ago, Khrushchev, in pushing for "peaceful coexistence," sought the emergence of the same condition. Had he obtained it then, the super-power status of the empire/state would by now have been greater than it is. The not so mysterious reason lies in the optimum condition desired by Moscow for "peace" with and advanced technology from the West, a euphoric envelopment of the latter and more subversive inroads by the former, and a free play for strategic acquisitions in the so-called third world of developing nations. This optimum condition buys time for consolidated repression within the imperium along with further military build-up necessary to display strength in areas of the Free World. The condition conforms precisely with the logical constructs of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" doctrine which differs radically from the live-and-let-live notion most of our people, in authority and beyond, ascribe to negotiating detente. In short, it provides the best possible world for the operation of traditional Russian imperial policy, and insular detente accommodates it substantially and in time. With what time frequency are we to anticipate more Vietnams, Angolas, and unsettlements in the Mid-East and elsewhere?

Not only is insular detente convenient to Moscow's strategy of "peaceful coexistence," but it is also progressively erosive to both the principles and objectives of a democratic society which couldn't possibly divorce itself from its functional obligations toward other segments of mankind, apart from the protection of material interests. In other words, the search for a mechanical equilibrium of power forces cannot realistically throw into a passive background the foundational layer of principles and precepts and the outer layer of societal ends and objectives, which are basically sharpened by the motor forces of principles. In trying to do this, insular detentists would have not only inconvenienced the Communist totalitarians but also deprived us of the use of our most valuable and potent assets in the living arena of world values, psychology and opinion. As shown later, it is this philosophical conflict that rests at the base of the poltrade issue, the human rights movement, the captive nations tradition, and the uses of diplomacy and propaganda in the continuing struggle against Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. It explains also

the division over morality in our foreign policy as crystallized in the Republican National Convention platform in Kansas City. More, it sheds meaning on stubborn, official resistance to the non-Russian nations concept in our foreign policy.

Insular detente has cultivated many illusions, but the foremost is the supposed utility of accommodating Moscow by throwing a cover of silence and non-knowledge over its past and present imperio-colonialism, its totalitarian repressions and brutalities, its conspiratorial and political warfare activities on all continents of the globe, and on its fixed long-range goals.⁴ It should be obvious on this theoretical plane that UCCA thought and action was geared from the start in firm opposition to the insular shortcomings of the Nixon-Kissinger brand of detente. As these shortcomings and limitations became clearer, the more incisive and intense the opposition. For if it were not so, we would have been compromising and sacrificing our own principles, convictions, and one of our most valuable contributions in the form of the non-Russian nations concept and its incalculable practical worth. From the very beginning our position has aimed toward a genuine detente, combining negotiation with useful, operative knowledge, pragmatic achievement with uncompromised values and principles, and a forward movement of objectives with courage, conviction and vision. In this direction lies the realistic alternative to the self-delusions of insular detente. But experience has shown that the cultural lag and persistence of ingrained myths concerning the USSR undergird a sense of insecurity on the part of our leaders—yes, from the President down—in the necessarily subtle treatment of the knowledgeable elements contained in this alternative.

THE HABITUDE OF MYTHS

Plainly, then, if the climate of insular detente has impeded the steady advancement of the non-Russian nations concept, certain lingering myths about the USSR as nurtured in our officialdom, not to speak of other circles, have served to preclude even a fair consideration of the concept and its real possibilities at the highest levels of our government. The sanctimonious avowal by our recent Administrations of open and fair appraisal of all viewpoints and positions should be taken with a grain of salt. Despite requests and pressures for it, this has not happened, and the combination of misplaced pre-

⁴ "The Illusions of Detente," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Summer, 1974, pp. 125-136.

conceptions and misguiding advice almost alone has predetermined the closed policy. As concern the non-Russian nations in the USSR, it should be emphasized that this habitude of myths differs in content from that of a generation ago, when the USSR, for example, was viewed as "Russia" and Ukraine, for instance, was thought of as a provincial "little Russia" and even as a musical instrument, the ukelele. Clearly, in whatever field of knowledge, there is no such thing as instant education with reference even to the basic identification of elements and objects. This always takes time and patience for accurate dissemination and absorption. No, today the habitude of myths is found not so much on the elemental plane of object differentiation but rather on that of conceptual distinction. And the consequent indistinctions and distortions lead to a host of problems, including the problem of effectively and strategically utilizing the crucial non-Russian nations concept in our relations with the USSR.

Outstanding among the conceptual myths is the strange misconception of the USSR as a nation/state, similar, for example, to the United States. Illogically, a misconceiver will express this misconception soon after properly and accurately identifying a number of the nations in the USSR. The really easy and logical transition from the distinguished national objects, such as Latvia, Byelorussia, Ukraine and so forth, to the conception of the USSR as a multinational state—or more meaningfully and historically more accurate, an empire/state—just eludes the misconceivers. In fact, Moscow itself officially paints the USSR as a multinational state, though quite contradictorily it also portrays the USSR's economy as a national one, with a GNP and so forth. Drawn from State Department publications, official addresses and other sources, countless examples could be cited of this prevalent misconception. For a few here, in a speech at the Naval Academy, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld speaks of the USSR as "a nation which possesses substantial military power. . . ." Winston Lord, a director of the policy planning staff in the Department of State, sees the USSR and the U.S. with "competing national interests." Secretary of State Kissinger, whose total works show no working comprehension of the Russian empire and whose adviser on Eastern Europe thinks in terms of "organic relationships," speaks of "our two peoples," "our two nations."

¹ "Navy Graduates Hear Rumsfeld," *The Washington Star*, Washington, D.C., June 3, 1976.

² "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China," *Department of State News Release*, March 23, 1976, p. 1.

³ Barry Schevoid. *Associated Press*, March 25, 1974.

The reasons for this conceptual lag are many, ranging from type of education to ethnical impressions in the U.S. Undoubtedly, for most the existence of Armenians, Georgians, Estonians, Ukrainians and others in the USSR is parallel to ethnic groupings in the U.S. So, just as the latter reveal groups of Italian, Polish, Armenian and other origins, who are nationally Americans, the former are viewed as similar ethnic groups, even as nationalities or nations, who nonetheless are arbitrarily dubbed as being nationally "Soviets." Words and faulty conceptual constructions can be confusing and do confuse, and the confusion in turn can only lead to misleading policy and action, whether by misdirection or omission. Thus, for example, this was shown in arguments paralleling Ukraine and Byelorussia with the Republic of China in the U.N. debates over the latter's expulsion. Or, because of the ill-founded nation/state notion, as well as our unjustified subscription to Moscow's imperial principle of "non-interference in internal affairs," the Ford Administration clearly missed the boat as concerned the Helsinki Conference in 1975 dealing with the cooperation and security of European nations. On the accepted scale of nations, it should have demanded the participation of the European non-Russian nations in the USSR. To have had the largest non-Russian nation in Eastern Europe, namely Ukraine, absent from the proceedings shows that it was a party not of nations but of states, both imperial and national.

With the vivid non-Russian nations concept, this and similar errors could be avoided and numerous strategic advantages in the political tug-of-war reaped. The concept opens up new vistas and possibilities that our current conceptual impedimenta preclude and foreclose. Engendering the metaphysical definition of a nation as a moral organism integrating the lives and loyalties of individual persons on bases of geographical contiguity, history, religion, legend, language and other cultural sinews," the concept conforms concretely with the non-Russian entities and national organisms in the USSR, in counterclockwise direction from Estonia to Turkestan. But, in sharp contrast to the false nation/state concept in our present policy, it goes far beyond this mere identification and differentiation analysis. In its very essence the concept logically implies and opens up the realities of nationalism, its manifold manifestations, the existence of an empire and potentialities for other forms of political organization and arrangement, and the sprawling presence of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, along with its phenomena of Russification, inter-national

• The author's work, *The Vulnerable Russians*, New York, 1967. pp. 126-138.

repression, genocide, and various forms of politico-economic exploitation. These and more cannot rationally be recognized and accommodated by the false nation/state concept that misguides our insular detentists, our Presidents and highest educational institutions in government, and, of course, the repetitive mills of academia and their stamped products in the media.

The substantial difference between the current nation/state concept applied to the USSR and the non-Russian nations cannot, for policy and other reasons, be too strongly emphasized. A measure of quiet reflection on this difference and its logical extensions will inevitably lead to the broader and historically-founded concepts of the empire/state and the captive nations. Historical facts alone, punctuated by brute conquest, forcible annexation and totalitarian rule, justify the extension of the non-Russian nations concept into the empire/state concept to embrace the imperialist phenomena cited above. Such facts alone justify also the further rational extension of the basic concept into the captive nations concept which engenders the real phenomenon of an imperium in imperio based on the empire/state concept that is vividly applicable to the USSR. Given appropriate thought and also relation to determining historical and empirical facts from 1917 to the present, this conceptual structure is really not as abstruse as it may seem. Once thinking and operating within it, it becomes quickly evident, for example, how without foundation and foolish a policy agreement on "non-interference in internal affairs" is with reference to an empire within an empire. With a modicum of imagination, innumerable other examples of policy error and lost opportunity will come to mind.

Apart from transient operations and interventions, UCCA has consistently and persistently worked within this solid conceptual structure. At every turn it has sought to change this crippling habitude of myths in government, the media, international organizations, academia and other spheres. Its inseparable, primary concern for the lasting freedom of our country and the liberation of Ukraine assumes maximum meaning and intelligibility in the working context of this structure, and receptivity to our concerns also reach maximum levels, despite domestic absorptions in recent years with inflation, recession, energy and other problems. Foreign policy problems begin to rank only eleventh in the minds of most Americans at this time, but this you can rest assured is only an ephemeral phase in the midst of a

rapidly changing world environment.⁹ The steadily mounting pressures of Soviet Russian expansionism guarantee a general acceptance of our conceptual structure. This is best indicated by the progressive acceptance of the generic concept of captive nations, regardless of the euphoric effects of insular detente. In this, UCCA has also been instrumental.

THE CAPTIVE NATIONS THESIS

Literally, volumes could be written about the captive nations thesis and the varying reactions, interpretations and experiences surrounding it over the past near-generation. Our approach here requires only an understanding of the thesis in relation to the preceding concepts and the dominant difficulties faced in its continued furtherance. We can start by recalling the many years of apoplexy suffered by Khrushchev, Suslov and others following the incorporation and codification of the thesis in the Captive Nations Week Resolution passed by Congress in 1959 and signed into Public Law 86-90 by President Eisenhower. Many officials and analysts, including then Vice President Nixon, couldn't understand the intensity of the vituperative reactions from the Kremlin. Yet, theoretically and philosophically, the simple explanation resides in the fact that the captive nations concept, based as it is on genetical analysis, is itself ultimately supported by the non-Russian nations concept and the adjunct concepts of the empire/state and the imperium in imperio. Genetically, if the non-Russian nations were not reduced to captivity to imperialist Red Moscow in the early period of 1920-24, there would be no factual basis justifying the empire/state concept which on further empirical bases following World War II, generated the empire within an empire condition that, in turn, laid the ground for the viable captive nations thesis.

The interrelationship of these concepts and their distinctive features simply escaped the comprehension of our officials and many analysts. Most didn't understand, and some still don't understand, the non-Russian nations dimension and thus the correlates of empire/state and the imperium in imperio. As a consequence, for years the thought was that the captive nations were only those overtaken by communist regimes in central and southern Europe. On the basis of this narrow conception programs and organizations were fashioned,

⁹ "Concern for National Security Rising in U.S., Poll Indicates," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1976.

and these for a time militated against the now generally accepted captive nations concept. Some still view the annual Captive Nations Week observance as a mere ritual, but little do they appreciate the educational process that has been involved since 1959.¹⁰ As for Moscow's reactions since about 1968, they have naturally been low-keyed for two reasons. One is its accurate reading of the failure of our Administrations to implement the Captive Nations Week Resolution. The second is our succession of domestic troubles during and after Vietnam and our acceptance of "peaceful coexistence" in the style of insular detente.

In concretist terms, objective political realities are never identical, closely similar, or synchronous. Even within the empire/state, marked as it is by a formal and substantial totalitarianism and internal politico-economic imperialism and colonialism, the disparities and differences from country to country in that state are wide and prominent. Indeed, cultures, mores and respective national characteristics differ as one moves from Estonia to Russia, to Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and others. The asymmetry broadens and deepens as transit is made from the internal empire to the external one in central and south Europe, to Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and, yes, to Yugoslavia also. Project this generalization to areas in Asia, Africa, Latin America and so on, and you begin to see the need for a flexible, comprehensive and yet substantially valid concept of captive nations. The empire concept may seem to be further dilated as Moscow's influence, cultivated interests of dependency by others, and virtual domination are extended, but the exploitation of indigenous communist parties, proxies, and trained instruments of totalitarian rule gird the concept for global application. The empires of the past scarcely enjoyed these advantages of control and deception, and the so-called American empire is conspicuously devoid of curtains, among many other things of institutional substance.

Whether directly or indirectly, in past union or present separation, the extension of totalitarian, communist domination over any nation and people creates a captive nation. To intuitively appreciate the concept, one must be familiar with Soviet Russian aggression since 1917, and the usual hiatus in knowledge of the 1917-24 period places one on the wrong track immediately. The scientific mode of genetical analysis, tracing the dynamic proliferation of this aggression and its successes, is the best technique establishing the captive

¹⁰ Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. "Abzug-Moynihan Race: At Opposite Poles," *The Washington Post*, August 26, 1976.

nations thesis. Of course, purely analytical problems arise, and questions bearing on them arise from time to time. At present the predominant questions are these: (1) alluding to the notion of Communist polycentrism, "How can you speak of captive nations in Yugoslavia or in mainland China where the regimes are different and even in opposition to Moscow?" (2) "How can you list any of the divided nations as captive nations—East Germany or North Korea or now both South and North Vietnam—where they are parts of the same nation?" (3) "How can the concept be applied to Turkestan or Angola or, for the future, many African states where there is considerable room for nation-building and the moral organism is not presently clear?" and (4) "What if Italy or Portugal or France were to come under communist party leadership through the democratic process, would it fall under the concept?"

As the term itself implies, captive nations directly refer to the moral organisms of peoples, aside from united or contending communist states and regimes. Though at this time differences do exist between Yugoslavia or mainland China and Moscow, the underlying distinctive national populaces are more or less oppressed by communist party rule in the respective state. Either by origin or sustenance all communist states are historically obligated to Moscow, and in the event of any crackup in any communist state, with the liberation of the nation or nations imminent, the patron of all communist states would automatically apply the Brezhnev doctrine for "the unity of the socialist commonwealth." A little reflection would show that, in brute power terms, the entire structure of this so-called planned exploitation of the resources of both the Russian and non-commonwealths depends ultimately on the empire/state and Moscow's non-Russian nations. Put another way, if for whatever reason the USSR were to collapse, the continued existence of the other communist states—yes, even including mainland China—would be only a question of time. On the basis of popular will and legitimacy, there is no such thing as a communist nation, and in the broad context of the so-called socialist commonwealth—in real, ultimate terms a euphemism for the Soviet Russian empire—polycentrism and its many superficial manifestations scarcely alter the captive status of the overtaken nations.

Concerning the question of divided nations, the division of cells into free and unfree, healthy and diseased, independent and dependent is a perfect analogy for the Koreas, Chinas, Germanys and Vietnams. The fact that the diseased cells of North Vietnam have obliterated the independent organism of South Vietnam and the national organ-

ism appears as one today does not erase from the historical record the free existence of South Vietnam and now its captive existence under the direct domination of Hanoi." Needless to say, in line with our reasoning above the very existence of communist Hanoi depended fundamentally on Moscow.

With regard to nations that don't seem to be full grown, the captive nations concept reasonably recognizes the reality of potentiality as well as actuality. A female fetus is no less human than a mature woman, and to actualize into the latter, it has to build itself both physically, mentally and spiritually. In our contemporary world of existing and emerging nations, where natural nationalism is standard form, a demarcable area of human aggregation beyond tribal units and with growing common interests is no less national in form than a mature nation. Nation-building really never ends, and there is more than enough evidence of requisites of national existence in Turkestan, Angola, Idel-Ural, Gambia and so forth. If so much of the world has properly developed in the natural form of nations, why should these and other areas be excluded from the concept of nation and, if communist-dominated, from that of captive nation.

The answer to the fourth question should rest on experience and intelligent reasoning. If the communist parties in West European countries were to become dominant in government, that in itself would not warrant the captive nations status. It is what they will do by way of political coercion, the use of police power, and the methodical liquidation of real democratic forces in all spheres of society that would justify the appropriate designation. The risks of such power assumption by the communists are enormous, and if cumulative experience is any guide, once the chance opportunity is seized, the proverbial curtain will fall. Then there will be no turning back for any democratic recovery. In the course of such a transformation, one would have to be naive, indeed, to believe that the resources of Moscow would not be engaged to accomplish the fateful act. After all, theoretically and practically, communists in the vanguard of the people are not social democrats committed to genuine democratic principles and action and the preservation of a societal environment for their operation.

By now it should be evident why Moscow and its minions have responded violently to the captive nations concept in its true sense. The concept is underpinned by the more fundamental concept of the

"*The New Captive Nations*. Congressional Record reprint. Washington, D.C., GPO, 1975.

non-Russian nations, which in turn supports the cognate concepts of empire/state and the imperium in imperio. The resultant captive nations construction can be applied globally, and in its application consistently points to the source of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, its varied spheres of extension, and the real division between any communist state and its regime and the underlying captive nation and people. Philosophically, not even 60 years of communist rule can confirm a political legitimacy in the nature of human government. Moreover, the more the captive nations thesis as described here circulates and is generally recognized, the more these basic points become ingrained and the force of communist propaganda diminishes.

It is for these reasons that UCCA has placed a high priority on the annual Captive Nations Week observance. It is by not understanding these reasons that some prominent Americans, like former Ambassador George F. Kennan, Senator Fulbright and former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, have sought the rescission of the Captive Nations Week Resolution. Mr. Kennan attempted to instigate this by exacting from President Kennedy a promise to ignore his proclamation of the Week as a price for accepting an ambassadorship to Yugoslavia.¹² No President has overlooked the Week since its inception in 1959. One of the firmest backers of the captive nations thesis is President George Meany of the AFL-CIO. American labor unionists and many of its leaders know the meaning and content of communist political warfare from experience both here and abroad.

THE ASSUMPTION OF WAR

The classic observation by the Prussian general, von Clausewitz, that war is only the continuation of politics applies in large measure to our world. He learned the truth of this from his experiences in the Russian empire at the end of the 18th century. Later, Lenin was more a student of Clausewitz than of Marx and perpetuated the imperial warfare principles of the previous Czars. In terms of these principles the state of war lends itself to two climates, a hot one and a cold one and each with varying temperature. The cold war, even with a near-freeze on its overt governmental actions, is a permanent condition for the empire/state of the Soviet Union. Many of our leaders and opinion-makers are not convinced of this. So, since relations between governments are apparently improving, relaxation is high and tensions low, they sense peace and thus see no need for well-planned,

¹² George F. Kennan. *Memoirs 1950-1963, Vol. II*, Boston, 1972, pp. 292-293.

programmatic action in what is supposed to be a cold warrior's dream world.

Now, hypothetically, let us assume the outbreak of a hot war, conventional or nuclear or both, between the so-called super-powers. Such a war we are, of course, intent upon avoiding but if by design, accident or miscalculation it should befall us, what policy directions would we adopt? To argue the condition of complete, mutual destruction in the possible event of nuclear exchange is really begging the question. The prospect of absolute co-annihilation is itself arguable on other grounds, philosophical as well as military. Also, to argue for a contained hot conflict, in Central Europe and after the fashion of Vietnam, for example, side-step the question. This would only postpone the final phase of the seemingly unending struggle, though in itself it might goad us into other policy directions. Or, to inject a hypothesis of our relative strategic unpreparedness, for instance, a first-strike capability on the part of the enemy, renders the question purely academic. We would simply be facing naked surrender or unilateral destruction.

To be realistic and non-indulgent in a nuclear numbers game, no person or group of persons is omniscient and prescient to foresee all the contingent factors, complexities and play of forces in another world conflagration. Given World War III of the hot kind, one that truly would be worldwide, what almost instinctively would be our policy course? Unless we should commit the same, stupid mistake the Nazi Germans had in the last war, rationally and for us instinctively the course would be along the track of the non-Russian nations concept.¹³ Whatever the type and scale of the direct confrontation, and any number of combinations is possible, this track would offer the fastest and most economical passage to politico-military victory and success. For, as we know now, linked to this valuable concept is the empire/state idea, and the terminal end of the track is the liberation of the non-Russian nations or, to put it another way, the end of the empire/state called the USSR. Equally important is the other track leading to the independence of the Russian nation and people from communist totalitarianism and centuries-long burdens and deprivations of imperial policy. Aside from doses of romanticism and mysticism in the thoughts of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and of generalities in that of Andrei Sakharov, it appears that their thinking is railed to the two tracks.

¹³ Erich Kern. *The Dance of Death*, New York, 1951.

In a hot war confrontation, therefore, if we were rational, we wouldn't think twice about this policy course. Our mobilized efforts would strike at the base of the aggressor. Traditional political rhetoric on principles of national self-determination and independence would quickly find a field for practical application and realization. Our consciousness would be attuned to the fact that in this type of conflict sole reliance on military combat is insufficient and a real and overwhelming appeal to the hearts and minds of the captive peoples is quintessential to the undermining of ideological, psychological and spiritual foundations of the enemy. Finally, all the relatively little used resources we have today concentrating on the non-Russian nations in the USSR would be quickly mobilized, and the pressing need for more would be acutely recognized in the areas of military education, political training, propaganda, civil military affairs and a host of other fields.

Veritably, there are paradoxes and ironies involved in this projection. Ironically, beset all too frequently by stubborn ignorance, sharp opposition and political expediencies, what the UCCA has done cumulatively and programmatically these past 30 years would be supremely crystallized in these war circumstances.¹⁴ Taking Moscow and the communists at their words, so akin to the words of Hitler and the Nazis which far too many ignored, we have consistently focused our activities on their meaning and content of "peaceful co-existence" and its two chief theoretical props, systemic warfare aimed at the industrial West and "wars of national liberation" designed for the less developed countries. Sole reliance on superior economic and military power to cope with these challenges is not enough. Paradoxically, in the type of war that does exist, the pursuit of the non-Russian concept in all of its applied manifestations would contribute even more than questionable military superiority or economic power to the deterrence of a hot World War III, regardless of its character. After all, more than half the population of the USSR is non-Russian, and the springs of insecurity for an adventurous Moscow can run powerfully deep.

ETHNOGRAPHIC WARFARE

At this point, then, the intelligent question to be raised is "Why, if in a hot war situation the non-Russian concept and resources per-

¹⁴ "In The Mainstream of Basic Issues," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1974, pp. 370-378.

taining to it would be totally utilized, should we neglect the same in the present ideational warfare situation, especially since they constitute a formidable deterrent power against the outbreak of a hot war?" This is a valid and determining question. The usual, informed answer that to lean too heavily on the non-Russian concept would irritate the Russians and foreclose further strides in normalization of relations suggests both a lack of appreciation of Moscow's overall "peaceful coexistence" strategy and a lack of imagination regarding the implementation of the concept. This type of answer is also highly suitable for those who are insensitive to the empire/state concept and its corollaries of Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism and all that these imply in the Soviet Union today. This answer is supposed to indicate a sense of diplomatic finesse and cunning pragmatism. Actually, it is mostly a cover-up for a variety of defects and shortcomings, ranging from ignorance to fear. The irritation excuse has even been used by National Security Council aides to prevent the distribution of a photo taken of President Ford and Baltic American leaders.

In the present, unmistakable phase of politico-ideational warfare all three of our main concepts—the non-Russian, the empire/state, and the captive nations—converge into a dimension of thought that has not been adequately tapped theoretically and, consequently, has remained a void in our policy considerations. If one reflects over these concepts carefully and rigorously and contemplates their respective, interplay extensions, he will discover a basis not only for an important and vital theoretical idea but also a firm and sound groundwork for minimum-risk policy action, both to cope adequately with Moscow's strategy of "peaceful coexistence" and its tactics of implementation as seen in the most recent case of Angola. The idea is ethnographic warfare, and its implicit policy directive pinpoints the non-Russian nations in the USSR.

The concept of ethnographic warfare lends itself both to the imperium in imperio, i. e., the USSR within the Soviet Russian empire as a whole, and Red China.¹⁵ As there are non-Russian nations in the former, so are there non-Han peoples in the latter. Because of similar, imperial structures under their command, both Moscow and Peiping employ the concept against each other in their intense rivalry. Peiping speaks of "social imperialism" in the USSR, and Moscow plays on the nationalist aspirations of the Turkestani, Mongolians

¹⁵ *The Bicentennial Salute to the Captive Nations*. USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 10-11.

and others in the Red Chinese empire. Both empires are highly vulnerable to the application of the concept by the democratic West. Based on the captive nations concept, ethnographic warfare can be waged against all segments of the Soviet Russian empire, but with the underlying foundational concepts of the non-Russian nations and the empire/state, its chief target is on the peculiar non-Russian dimension, namely those captive nations within the USSR. In sharp contrast to the use of the concept by the two imperialist, totalitarian powers, its Western use would be believed in and would enjoy maximum credibility by virtue of our democratic existence, our values and principles, and our basically demonstrated deeds.

We have been told about a "missile gap," a "strategic arms gap" and the like, but little have we heard about the real ideologic gap. Theoretically, Russian "peaceful coexistence" is a competitive, war-like concept that embraces the troika of pretended peace between governments of states, systemic warfare involving social systems, and wars of national liberation that afford conduits for Soviet Russian imperial expansion. In action, the latter two would in time weaken any free government given to this doctrine. To offset the action spurred on by the two theoretical constructs, all that we have been able to rely on has been really our economic and military power, and at considerable waste at that. But with an ethnographic warfare concept, focused on the non-Russian nations, what has been and is an ideational gap of serious import would be effectively bridged. Properly implemented and subtly employed, it would devastate the two operational constructs of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence."

Lest our citizens are frightened by the term ethnographic warfare, it should be stressed that it is only a war of ideas, a grated competition of thoughts and sentiments concentrated on the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. The terrain is a natural one for U.S. leadership and its anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, pronational independence qualities. Programmatically, the activity would enjoy a broad range of play, from dissidents to diplomatic relations to the Olympics. Its intensity and tone would be precisely gauged by Moscow's behavior both within and without the USSR. Its very active existence and judicious handling would prove to be a basic deterrent to both Soviet Russian expansionism and a consequent hot war outbreak. Along these lines the UCCA has offered and advanced numerous suggestions and ideas over the past 30 years.

POLTRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

When, for example, it comes to issues of economic relations with the Soviet Union and the broad subject of human rights the record of UCCA is superlative and even innovative. For many years, within UCCA itself there was little appreciation of the economic issue, one which was viewed as an arcane subject of minor relevance to broader political issues. As concerns human rights, emotions and sentiments have always buoyed this subject, but the connection between this and the economic always appeared murky to our members. The episode of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to our trade bill was actually a culmination to years of argument and controversy over the linkage of the two issues. The publicity and upstaging that surrounded the amendment must be credited to Jewish American groups and their resources.

The issue of US-USSR trade relations cannot possibly be regarded as minor by any subscriber to the concept of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. The effects of such deepening relations would inevitably have their impact, for better or for worse, on the texture, strength and directions of the imperial economy. The way we trade with the USSR is in most respects more important than the content of our trade, barring of course highly strategic goods. Detailed arguments along these lines were set forth by UCCA as far back as the Eisenhower Administration.¹⁶ But it wasn't until Senator Fulbright began his "seminar" on East-West trade in the mid-60's that we were the first to advocate the poltrade concept.¹⁷ In essence, the concept predicates our trade with the USSR and other communist states on cultural and human rights concessions. In the same way that our moral standards forbid us to honor and trade with criminals so they should be applied as much as possible to the international economic order.

Subsequently, I worked on this concept with Senator Lausche of Ohio. Had he been reelected to the Senate, there can be no doubt that we would be talking about a Lausche-Vanik amendment in the early 70's. Toward the close of the decade Senator Dirksen openly acknowledged the source of the poltrade concept in a popular publication and before his untimely death began to advocate a new policy

¹⁶ *Trade Agreements Extension*, House Committee on Ways and Means, Part 2, 1955. pp. 2333-2356.

¹⁷ *East-West Trade*, Hearings, Part II, 1965, pp. 94-104.

based on it.¹⁵ As mentioned, Jewish American leaders fully recognized the basic utility of the concept and launched a successful campaign on it. As Morris Brafman, president of the American Federation for Soviet Jews, put it quite expressively, "Trade negotiations, however, particularly between super-powers, cannot be pursued in a moral vacuum. I believe it was Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University who delivered the most succinct statement of the problem in testimony before a Congressional committee examining bi-lateral trade in February 1965. He labeled U.S.-Soviet trade an 'economic weapon for freedom' and noted further: 'we should have no hesitation or fear to utilize trade as a weapon for freedom.' This policy of proportioning trade bids to political concession bids represents a middle way between complete embargo and slipshod liberalization. Any relaxation of present licensing and credit restrictions on trade with Communist countries should require reciprocal political concessions by the Soviet Union."¹⁶

The tendency of Senator Jackson and others to restrict the scope of concessions to Soviet Jewish emigration, the abuse of the concept by Dr. Kissinger to exact concessions from Moscow on our side of the fifty yard line in South Vietnam, Indo-China generally, the Mideast and elsewhere, and also the thought of more trade for Russian concessions in the strategic arms area produced problems that had to be coped with and argued well into 1975. As each emerged, we dealt with it in as many forums that were open to us. Before a House committee the poltrade concept was further cultivated, and emphasis was placed on the need for across-the-board emigration from the Soviet Union.¹⁷ Later, to a Senate committee, the main thrust was toward the widening of possible concessions, embracing religious persecution and genocide, reunion of families, diplomatic relations and so forth.¹⁸ In short, the economic issue of trade was logically interlaced with the whole field of human rights, covering dissidents, Moroz, Sakharov, the Tartars, the resurrection of the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches and other relevant topics.

¹⁵ Senator Everett M. Dirksen. "Needed: A Realistic East-West Trade Policy." *The Reader's Digest*, June 1969, pp. 129-133.

¹⁶ One of mass letters to U.S. corporate heads, this to J.K. Jamieson, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, June 14, 1972, p. 2.

¹⁷ *Trade Reform*. Hearings. Committee on Ways and Means, Part 11, 1973, pp. 3550-3591.

¹⁸ *The Trade Reform Act of 1973*. Committee on Finance, Part 5, 1974, pp. 1759-1786.

Certain outstanding facts should be stressed here in connection with this whole battle, as indeed it was. One is the fact that we have always been concerned with the issue of human rights. Our long record on this couldn't be otherwise since we steadfastly seek the national independence of peoples. Concerns with forced repatriation, displaced persons, ratification of the Genocide Convention and a host of other issues in the field enable an easy linkage with economic trade in the poltrade concept. Rationally affinite to this are the valuable concepts of the non-Russian nations and the empire/state. It should be clear by now how on the basis of a few basic and well-grounded concepts a working structure of thought evolves and enables one to accommodate innumerable issues and policy problems with critical examination and disposition.

COLD WAR: REALITY OR FICTION?

Another outstanding fact of this battle that few have even recognized is the implicit repudiation of the disgraceful Nixon-Kissinger agreement to Moscow's cold war principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the empire. Trade with any totalitarian empire, as experience has shown, can never really be a simple commercial phenomenon. Concern with its effects necessarily means overt concern with the internal conditions of the empire. Interference in an empire such as the USSR becomes a moral obligation for any democratic state apart from the constant and growing threat that the former poses to the latter. The poltrade battle expressed this moral obligation and thus constituted, the first of many, an outright repudiation of the Nixon-Kissinger blunder. In Cold War terms, as in the past, Moscow's strategy of obtaining the best technology and know-how to strengthen its empire for realized goals in the not so distant future while consolidating repressively within on the agreement of non-interference and continuing its so-called revolutionary activities without, as in Angola, was partially thwarted by this battle, just another in the long series of the unending Cold War.

The division of thought produced in this country by Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" strategy and our insular detente response to it has led many to believe that the Cold War has ended. Is it now a reality or a fiction? The very application of the term "cold warriors" and its negative overtones indicates in itself that many journalists and others believe it is now a fiction. In the case of the trade battle they proved to be blind to its very existence. Had we given in to Moscow, its essential Cold War strategy of "peaceful coexistence"

would have been greatly facilitated. Contrary to the beliefs of many, Cold War operations are not restricted to rhetorical shouting and fulminations between governments. This is the least important aspect of it. As I showed in our sharp criticism of insular detente, the Cold War phenomenon has always been an integral part of imperial Russian policy.²² The tactics of "peaceful coexistence" with their deceitful gestures which are designed to weaken the main enemy in the long pull have able precedents as far back as Ivan the Terrible, and the source of the legacy is Tartar and Mongolian.

Karl Marx accurately described the perennial, imperial Russian policy as "neither peace nor war"; in other words, the ever-present gray condition of Cold War. This has always been and logically must be the policy of an imperium in imperio. Built on conquest, ever tarnished by illegitimacy, operating by brute coercion, obsessed with goals of world dominion, and pursuing policy courses to achieve these goals, Moscow is supremely rational in its only possible condition of "neither peace nor war." Some psycho-political aspects of this condition are even amusing for their conditioned Pavlovian responses. Though in many respects the worst empire in the history of mankind, its Kremlin custodians frequently and unabashedly lash out against the phantom of American imperialism. The technique is an old one. To cover up its own crimes of imperialism, colonialism and totalitarianism, impute the same by repetition to the enemy, and in the ensuing confusion countless believers and doubters will emerge in the opponent's camp. As to the Cold War, Moscow employs the same technique. Anyone who analyzes its Cold War machinations and disrupts the spread of euphoria is quickly denounced as a "cold warrior" intent upon reverting back to a condition which is incessant anyway.

Insular detente has done little to curb these and other advantages accruing to imperial Moscow.²³ A more genuine type of detente, based on a knowledgeability of the USSR and Moscow's clear-cut strategy and tactics, would convert these advantages into disadvantages for Moscow and help us to regain our identity as a nation, true to its glorious democratic traditions and living principles. But all this and more necessitates a working grasp of the fundamental, grounded concepts governing our relations with the USSR. In logical order, they

²² *Detente*. Hearings. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1974, pp. 468-474.

²³ See hearings on *Detente*. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1974, pp. 353-363.

are the concept of the non-Russian nations in the USSR, the evolving empire/state concept, that of the captive nations, and in consequent policy strategy the one of ethnographic warfare. Born in divorce from an empire, the United States has never by principle or benign neglect sought to sustain any empire, including the worst of them. Contrary to our very nature as a nation, insular detente has caused us to slide in this direction. And we're in a period when the great moral springs and forces of this nation are bringing about the elimination of this insular policy. It is not premature to look ahead.

PROSPECTS AND PRACTICES

The immortal words of Leonardo da Vinci are highly applicable at this point: "Wise counsel is listened to unwillingly and, the more it is needed, the more stubbornly it is refused by those who need it most." The achievements of UCCA have been carved only by breakthroughs into this ever-present barrier of a stubborn unwillingness to listen. In plain truth, no other group or organization in this country has advanced a similar complex of ideas and rationale for its activities as has been described here. The prospects for the period ahead are exceedingly bright in the way of a general acceptance of these truths. But, for a variety of reasons, the inertial practice of unwilling and stubborn listening will assuredly become more intense. You have to be prepared for this. In any case, the rewards of satisfaction in meeting the tremendous challenge and reaping the harvest of further advances for these truths are incalculable. Our contribution to the security and welfare of our nation, the liberation and freedom of Ukraine and all the captive nations, and to a real peace in the world, not one continually overshadowed by "neither peace nor war," will be equally incalculable.

UKRAINIAN RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN U.S.A. PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

BY MATTHEW STACHIW

I. *First Ukrainian Settlers in America 300 Years Ago*

When at the end of the XVth and the beginning of the XVIth centuries, after the discovery of the American continent by Columbus, Europeans began settling America, Ukraine already had behind it a centuries-old history of cultural, social-economic and political-state achievements. But because of the Lithuanian dynasty, which through family ties had assumed power over Ukraine at the end of the XIVth century and later on became Polonized through its Polish dynastic connections, the Polish nobility ultimately succeeded in dominating the political-social conditions in Ukraine.¹

The Ukrainian people, especially the peasantry, the basic element of the nation, were socially enslaved by the prevailing social system, which came from Poland in the first half of the XVIIth century and which led to the peasantry in Ukraine as well as in Poland being brought into serfdom and deprived of freedom of movement from place to place. The peasants were "glued to the land" (*glebae adscripti*). Under these circumstances it was wholly impossible for the Ukrainian peasantry legally to emigrate in general, and to America in particular. The only people who could legally go abroad from Ukraine and Poland were those persons possessing all the rights—the nobility and the burghers.²

But the discovery of America was known in Ukraine at that time. The "new world" was written about by University of Cracow

¹ *Istoria Ukraïny-Rus'ï* (History of Ukraine-Rus'). By Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Vol. IV. Third edition. New York, 1953: Political Conditions (XIV-XVIth Centuries); Vol. V: Social-Political and Church System and Conditions in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian Lands in the XIVth-XVIIth Centuries; Vol. VI: Economic, Cultural and National Life of the XIV-XVIIth Centuries, Second edition, New York, 1956.

² Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI.

Professors Jan from Glogow and Jan Stobnica.³ Also known were the writings about America by Maxime the Greek (1480-1556), well-known writer in the Church Slavonic language and exponent of the humanism he had brought with him from Italy.

Nevertheless, no Ukrainian social class at that time exhibited any particular interest in emigrating from Ukraine to the distant lands across the ocean. At that time a new Ukrainian military movement in the form of the Kozak order began to develop in the Zaporozhian *Sich*, the stronghold beyond the rapids on the Dnieper River. Similar to the Teutonic Order of Crusaders, it attracted the most active and military-minded from all the strata of the Ukrainian people: peasants, burghers, nobility. This new Ukrainian Zaporozhian Host established, on a vast territory between the Polish kingdom and the Crimea and Turkey, its own military and state organization that successfully defended the eastern Ukrainian lands against the early Tartar incursions. As a result, behind the back of the Zaporozhian Host the vast spaces of Ukraine could now be colonized and settled by Ukrainian peasants fleeing the central and western areas of Ukraine where heavy and oppressive serfdom had been introduced. In the new areas these refugee-peasants were prompt to build new homesteads, farms, and towns, free from any dependence, whether social or economic, on the landowners.⁴

A few decades later the Ukrainian Liberation War, led by *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnyts'ky (1648) and waged against Poland, resulted in the liberation of almost all the Ukrainian lands from the domination of the Polish kingdom and in the extension of the state of the Zaporozhian Host to almost all of Ukraine. In the new Ukrainian state all inhabitants-citizens of Ukraine were free, with serfdom of every form being abolished. Thus, in this new and promising situation, there was no need for the people to emigrate abroad, especially to far-distant America.⁵

³ Jaroslav J. Chyz, *The Ukrainian Immigrants in the United States: Avraham Yarmolinsky (Bulletin of the New York Public Library, Vol. 37, New York, 1933.)*

⁴ Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, Chapter 7: The Ukrainian Colonizing Drive to the East in 1625-1643, pp. 41 and ff, and subsequent chapters of the second part of the volume.

⁵ Mention ought to be made of the fact that at that time emigrants to America were coming primarily from Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Only in 1607 did the English found their first colony in America, which they named Virginia (cf. John F. Kennedy: *A Nation of Immigrants*. Introduction by Robert F. Kennedy, New York and Evanston, 1963, p. 88).

Nonetheless, as early as the first half of the XVIth century, there were individual Ukrainians who chose to venture across the ocean. Understandably, official records pertaining to such cases are probably non-existent, with even mention in the literature of the time a rare thing. Yet there exists evidence that the first Ukrainian immigrant, one Molasko, came to America in the first half of the XVIIth century. Apparently a specialist in the production of resin (tar), pitch and lye-potash, he was induced to emigrate to America by Captain John Smith (1580-1631), later governor of Virginia. (In returning from Turkey, Captain Smith had traveled through Ukraine, from the Dnieper River to Kolomeia, at the foothills of the Carpathians.⁶)

Molasko, then, may be considered to be the first Ukrainian to seek freedom in America, some 300 years ago.⁷

CAUSES OF UKRAINIAN IMMIGRATION IN THE XVIIITH AND XVIIIITH CENTURIES

A substantial emigration from Ukraine began at the time when, as a result of unfavorable circumstances that persisted for several decades, the strength of the Ukrainian state was sapped in resisting the pressure exerted simultaneously by Muscovite Czardom and the Polish Kingdom, the two having reached an understanding as regards their spheres of influence in Ukraine. With the Treaty of Andrusiv (1667) both monarchies agreed that Left-Bank Ukraine would constitute Moscow's sphere of influence, and all Right-Bank Ukraine, sans Kiev, would be incorporated into the Polish Kingdom. Subsequently, in 1681, the two imperialistic powers again agreed to combine efforts to prevent any attempt at state unity of the two parts of Ukraine. Moreover, Muscovy reached an understanding with Turkey and the Crimean Khan which called for the central and southern parts of Right-Bank Ukraine to be depopulated through the dispersal and deportation of the Ukrainians therein.⁸

⁶ *Trails and Works of Captain John Smith, President of Virginia and Admiral of New England*. Ed. John Grants, Edinborough, 1910.

⁷ The case of Molasko was first mentioned in the Ukrainian historical literature by Jaroslav Chyz, researcher on the Ukrainian immigration in the U.S.: cf. Chyz, *op. cit.*

⁸ Hrushevsky, Michael: *A History of Ukraine*. Edited by O. J. Frederiksen. Preface by George Vernadsky. Yale University Press, 1941. New Haven—London—Humphrey Milford—Oxford University Press; also, Doroshenko, Dmytro, *Istoria Ukrainy* (A History of Ukraine), Augsburg, 1947. p. 144 and ff.

Thereafter Muscovy endeavored by all means and methods to curtail the state rights of Left-Bank Ukraine under the rule of the *Hetmans*. It was *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa who endeavored to forestall the Muscovite designs by allying himself with King Charles XII of Sweden in a frontal war with Muscovy. But the decisive battle of the allied Ukrainian Kozak and Swedish troops with the Muscovites at Poltava in 1709 ended in defeat for the Swedish-Ukrainian forces and a swelling of the unnatural Muscovite social order of serfdom. The peasantry was reduced to the status of cattle for imported landowners to buy or sell at will. Frontiers with neighboring states were mounted by strong army contingents to prevent people from escaping abroad. Those who were caught were severely punished. The Iron Curtain thus was dropped long before Churchill labelled it and excoriated its function.

But this did not deter the Ukrainian peasants and burghers, the freedom they had enjoyed in the Ukrainian *Hetman* state still fresh in their minds, from fleeing abroad. The easiest escape route then ran through Wallachia, then under Turkish rule, where the lot of the peasants was far more tolerable than under Muscovite slavery or Polish serfdom. Also, Turkey beckoned to Ukrainian escapees because after the Battle of Poltava several thousand Ukrainian Kozaks had retreated to the Turkish territory, where they remained inviolate for many decades, despite the strident demands of Moscow for their forcible "repatriation" to Ukraine under Russian rule.⁹

The more liberal conditions of life under the Turkish rule were, for instance, expressed in a song, titled: "All is well, all is well to live under the Turk," while another song goes: "The Turk gave us land, so that we could live to an old age. . ."

Still another song depicted the easy flight to Wallachia:

"Oh, my brother, my little brother, take your girl friend,

A beautiful girl, a beautiful girl;

Then burn your hall and your house, and go into Wallachia.

⁹ Escape abroad from Ukraine was easiest to the territory under Turkish rule behind the River Boh through Wallachia. Among escapees were not only Ukrainian peasants, but also those Kozaks who refused to be driven to the north for the digging of canals and the building of fortresses, especially the new capital of Petersburg. Many Ukrainian folk songs reflect this period of Ukrainian history (cf. Drahomaniv, Mykhailo, *Novi ukrainski pisni pro hromadski sprawy* (New Ukrainian Songs About Community Problems), (1764-1880), Geneva, 1881; also, the same author, *Politychni pisni ukrainskoho narodu* (Political Songs of the Ukrainian People), Part II, Geneva, 1885, p. 76 and ff.

Let's go into Wallachia, little Wallachia,
So that we escape heavy serfdom. . ."
(Cf. Drahomaniv, *op. cit.*, p. 22 and ff.)

UKRAINIANS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF WASHINGTON

The emigration from Ukraine to the south into the territory under Turkish rule was attractive yet for another reason: it was comparatively easy to proceed further west from there. In the XVIIIth century Turkey maintained vigorous commercial relations with the West. Hence the willing and intrepid Ukrainian escapees from Muscovite serfdom and Polish slavery had the opportunity to go to the "new world," America.

We can assume that in the middle XVIIIth century the emigration from Ukraine to America was not insignificant, judging by the fact that many Ukrainians volunteered service in the Revolutionary Army of George Washington. According to the official records, this army included men with undeniably Ukrainian names, such as Looh, Lach, Hirni, Vous, Roosyn, Knias, Polin, Evan, Zoobrey, and others, from the State of Pennsylvania alone.¹⁰

EMIGRATION THROUGH SIBERIA

There are also indications that early Ukrainian immigrants entered the American continent from the west. After the total conquest of Ukraine by Muscovy (to be known subsequently as Russia), a harsh policy was imposed upon the Ukrainian people, resulting in punitive and administrative deportations to Siberia and the Pacific coast in Asia. From there some eventually made their way to Alaska and as far as California. Historical evidence attests to the fact that Ukrainian settlers in Alaska organized protests against abuses perpetrated by its Russian governor (this before Seward's purchase of Alaska). In 1809, a government clerk by the name of Naplavko, forcibly deported from Siberia to Alaska, organized, along with other Ukrainian settlers, a movement against the Czarist governor, Alexander Baranov, the goal of which was the establishment of a democratic republic patterned after the Ukrainian Kozak republic in Ukraine. This new state was to include Alaska, Kamchatka and the Aleutian islands. The movement did not succeed.¹¹

¹⁰ Chyz, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

**THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN EUROPE SPEEDS UP EMIGRATION
FROM UKRAINE**

In 1848, after a successful revolution in March of that year, a democratic system was introduced in Western Ukraine, then under the sovereignty of the Austrian monarchy, with serfdom being abolished.¹² This event constituted a great revolutionary attainment in the field of civil rights for the peasantry. Unfortunately, the abolition of serfdom was not accompanied by a restoration of the land back to the peasants, land which had been forcibly taken from them by the Polish nobility. As a result the landless peasantry, though now free, suffered economic misery.

This misery, this permanent hunger for land, compelled Ukrainian peasants, workers and artisans to seek a livelihood outside the boundaries of their country, notably in France and Germany, which at that time were developing industrially and were in need of manpower. It was about this time that a mass emigration began from Western Ukraine, including Carpatho-Ukraine (under Hungarian domination), to the countries across the ocean: the United States, Canada, and Brazil (Brazil receiving least of the newcomers). After the abolition of serfdom in Galicia, Carpatho-Ukraine, and Bukovina, this emigration grew by leaps and bounds, especially after 1860.¹³

There was no emigration, however, from the central and eastern areas of Ukraine, which after the second and third partitions of Poland were annexed by Czarist Russia. Even after the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861, peasants were unable to leave the empire; only the privileged classes, the nobility, could obtain exit visas to go beyond the boundaries. Moreover, the Czarist government conducted a systematic campaign against emigration to Western Europe and America, encouraging, instead, migration to the unsettled lands it had grasped beyond the Urals and in Central Asia.

Likewise, the Austrian government was negatively disposed to Ukrainian emigration from Galicia and Bukovina, as was the Hun-

¹² The Austrian Monarchy acquired Galicia from Poland during the first partition of Poland in 1772, and a few years later it acquired the Ukrainian land of Bukovina from Turkey. In 1867 the Austrian Monarchy became the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with two governments, one for Austria and another for Hungary.

¹³ Stachiw, Matthew. *Narys istoriyi natsionalno-suspilnoho rukhu v Halychyni, 1772-1890* (Outline of History of the National-Social Movement in Galicia, 1772-1890), in the *Zbarazh County* collection, Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York-Scranton, 1964, p. 97 and ff. and bibliography cited therein.

garian government to such emigration from Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia. This stance of both governments is understandable once we recall that the governments in Austria and Hungary then were in the hands of great landowners and arch conservatives. They were in danger of losing cheap agrarian manpower, all theirs for the equivalent of U.S. 12 cents for a 12 to 14-hour workday, and this without food or any other fringe benefit. In the meantime (in the 1870's) in the United States there was a rapid growth of industry. Great industrial concerns urgently needed manpower and would pay more.

So began the recruitment of Ukrainian immigrants by special steamship company agents, painting an attractive picture of employment and opportunities in America. The prospect of earning 15 times as much as what they were getting at home lured many. True, the industrial managers in America also saw these raw immigrants as offsetting the burgeoning trade union movement in America.¹⁴

The Austro-Hungarian government did put up quite a fight. By special decrees, both public and secret, it pressured the local (county) administration to use all possible means to discourage the exodus of peasants and workers. Such ordinances were issued regularly, beginning in 1877 and continuing up until the 1890's. The imperial governor of Galicia, Polish Count Casimir Badeni, did not even hesitate to send these circulars to the Ukrainian parishes, ordering the pastors to inveigh against emigration. Yet despite these official obstacles, which undoubtedly were counter to the new constitution providing for the free movement of citizens, the emigration fever spread like a forest fire from the western areas of Carpatho-Ukraine to the western parts of Galicia (the Lemko Land) and to Galicia and Bukovina. The flames licked farther east, to Ukraine under Czarist domination, first to Volhynia and Podilia, and then to the Kiev areas as well, despite the tightly-sealed Austro-Russian border and the Czarist censorship. Some people from Ukraine made their way to Austria, whence they emigrated to America in small groups at a time before 1914.¹⁵ Although the territory of Ukraine produced few Ukrainian immigrants, nevertheless the Ukrainian immigration percentage-wise was appreciable at the end of the XIXth century.¹⁶ Add to this that the statistical data of the U.S. immigration offices was gathered

¹⁴ For more about the low wages of workers in Galicia, see Stachiw, *op. cit.*, p. 102 and ff.

¹⁵ Bachynsky, Julian, *Ukrainska Immigratsiia v ZDA* (The Ukrainian Immigration in the United States), Lviv, 1914, p. 86 and ff.; Stachiw, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ Bachynsky, *op. cit.*, p. 95 and ff.

relatively late (the end of the XIXth century) and that most Ukrainian immigrants were improperly classified as to their true nationality, we may infer that there were at least 500,000 persons of Ukrainian birth here prior to the outbreak of World War I.¹⁷

World War I interrupted the immigration flow not only from Ukraine but from all other countries of Europe, but it resumed immediately after 1920. It continued on a smaller scale (because of restrictive U.S. laws) until the outbreak of World War II in 1939. After the end of the Second World War some 100,000 new Ukrainian immigrants (displaced persons and refugees) were admitted to the U.S. under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. Taking the best of various estimates, both official and unofficial, there are today in the United States at least 2.5 million Americans of Ukrainian origin (first, second, third and fourth generations) as well as naturalized citizens who were born either in Ukraine or in other countries of the world. They constitute a significant ethnic group in America.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 91 and ff.

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

BY ROMAN POPADIUK

Party-military relations in the Soviet Union have passed through three distinct stages. The first stage, 1918-1953, was characterized by the hegemony of the party over the military, with the purge of 1937 being the most visible example of the party's complete dominance. This stage, however, is marked by a transition phase, stretching from 1941 to 1953, in the course of which the military gained greater prestige yet still remained subordinate to the party. The second stage encompassed the years 1953-1964, with the years 1958-1964 serving as a transitional phase toward the third. It was in the years 1953-1957, the highpoint of the second stage, that the political power of the military increased dramatically. The transitional phase, 1958-1964, saw a resurgence in party strength and, more importantly, the first steps toward compromise and partnership between the party and the military. The third stage, which started in 1964-1965, has continued into the contemporary period. In this stage party supremacy has tended to reassert itself but has not reached the level it enjoyed in the first, nor for that matter is the military as strong as it was in 1953-1957. The party rules, but the military enjoys a greater voice and exerts a far greater influence than at first on the decision-making processes of the Soviet Union.

THE FIRST STAGE, 1918-1953 · PARTY SUPREMACY

Upon their accession to power the Bolsheviks were faced with two simultaneous and antithetical problems. The first problem was posed by the steadily advancing German army and the growing internal opposition to the Bolsheviks. The second was the lack of any forceful military power, the Bolsheviks having at their disposal only a handful of armed supporters. This problem was compounded by the Bolsheviks' ideological aversion to a standing army. Armies were regarded as the supporters of the upper classes of society; in the utopian Communist state there would be no need for such. To meet the needs of the pressing military situation and to remain ideologically

consistent, however, the Bolsheviki established a volunteer army along class lines.

In January, 1918, by a decree signed by Lenin, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was created. In the recruitment drive that was undertaken, however, only 106,000 soldiers were mustered. Moreover, organization and discipline in the ranks was lax if not non-existent, a situation which was not helped by the fact that military titles and ranks had been abolished in December, 1917.

The first pressing problem, that of the German army, was resolved in March, 1918, when the Bolsheviki signed a treaty with Germany. On the other hand, the growing internal opposition warranted a stronger Bolshevik military force.

To remedy the deteriorating military situation, Trotsky was made People's Commissar for War in March, 1918. Charged with the responsibility to establish a viable military force, Trotsky implemented a number of important reforms. One of his first steps was to centralize the command of the army. In May, 1918, a Supreme Military Council and an Operations Department were created. The latter dealt specifically with the internal Civil War fronts. In September of 1918 a Revolutionary War Council was set up. Trotsky assumed the chairmanship of the Council, whose task it was to coordinate the Red Army's activities. The administrative structure was completed when the Council of Defense was established in November, 1918.

Keenly aware of the need for trained, competent commanders, Trotsky brought many former Czarist officers into the Red Army. In order to make sure that these officers did not perform in "counter-revolutionary" fashion, Trotsky set up a system of political controls in the military. He also introduced discipline into the army. The practice of electing officers was abolished in the summer of 1918. The authority of commanders was emphasized and strict measures were taken against deserters, cowards, and other offenders.

Trotsky's reforms made the Red Army an affective fighting force, and it soon had the upper hand over its opponents. With the end of both external and internal threats in sight, the question arose of what type of military organization ought to be maintained in peacetime.

Although Trotsky had been the creator of a centralized standing army, he did not feel one was necessary once the Civil War was ended. Instead, he saw as the optimum course the creation of a territorial militia that would also function in production. Since the state needed a rapid economic rebuilding, he advocated a militia whose members would be part-time workers in the industrial areas and part-

time soliders as well. He also favored dispensing eventually with the political commissar system.

Opposed to Trotsky on all counts was Stalin. Stalin favored a standing army, opposed the use of Czarist officers, and desired retention of the political commissar network as a permanent institution. While the party was split, the military itself for the most part favored a standing army.

The Kronstadt Rebellion and peasant uprisings had clearly shown the value of a standing, disciplined army. However, the militia system was seen to have its advantages. Hence both a militia and a standing army were created as a compromise measure in 1923-24. By 1939, however, the militia had disappeared.

In structuring the new army in the 1920's, the party effected political controls in three ways. First, an effort was made to recruit into the party ranks officers and soldiers who would prove reliable. Second, political indoctrination was undertaken among all military personnel. Such work was carried out by both the party and the Kom-somol (the Communist youth). In addition, the system of political commissars was retained, despite the opposition of many. The matter of political overseers came to the fore in 1921, the year the Tenth Party Congress was held. The military plumped for ending the commissar system.¹ Although overruled, their opposition persisted. With the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, however, the party prevailed, and the powers of the commissars were increased. Eventually, this led to spying by the secret police in the military. The third way comprised an effort to have a strong proletarian representation in the most important sectors of the military since the proletariat, according to the Bolsheviks, was the most, if not only, trustworthy group.²

While the military was being subjected to party control, it also was being modernized. Two developments directly helped the military: the cooperation with Germany and Stalin's industrialization and collectivization programs.

Paradoxically, it was the party that took the lead in establishing contact with the German military. The party looked favorably on de-imperialized Germany, but the Red Army did not, focused as undoubtedly it was on the fighting quality of the Germans. In any event, contacts between both states was made in 1919. At this time

¹ Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967, p. 45.

² Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965, p. 476.

both Germany and the Soviet Union were international outcasts, Germany because of her role in World War I and the Soviet Union because of her ideology. Both, also, needed military aid; Germany was hampered by the severe restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and the Soviet Union was suffering economic dislocations. Hence they readily fell into mutually rewarding military agreements. The Soviet Union, for example, benefited by German help in the design of submarines and in the manufacture of such armament as tanks and machine guns.³

Years later (1933) this German-Soviet military cooperation came to an end only because of politics; with the rise of Hitler, the two states found themselves hopelessly at odds.

Stalin's launching of the first Five Year Plan in 1929 boosted the military's power and prestige. In fact, the plan was aimed at elevating Soviet economic and military capabilities roughly in equal measure. In addition to the benefits the military would receive from industrialization, Stalin also initiated programs to turn out better trained officers, mandated specific pay scales for each service, and separated the commanding personnel from the political, a move which enhanced the authority and effectiveness of the military commanders. To be noted, furthermore, is that in the Stalin purges of 1929 and 1931 the military virtually escaped unscathed. At the same time, however, Stalin was careful to keep soldier and party in balance. The concessions made to the military because of its professional needs offset by growing controls on the part of the police and the party.⁴ This leash kept on the military was tight enough for Stalin to be able to carry out with impunity a vast purge of the military in 1937.

We can detect two reasons for this cataclysmic undoing of many years of effort. One has to do with the fact that in September, 1936, a few military leaders had rallied to the support of the old Bolsheviks, Bukharin and Rykov, who were slated to be purged.⁵ This was enough for Stalin, ever apprehensive of personal attack, to hack the military arm almost to the armpit at the same time he was splashing away at other groups in the state because of real and imagined threat.

The second reason is that Stalin now wanted to create an officer class which owed ranks and careers to him personally. The military machine had been created; now he wished to fashion as well as to

³ Malcolm Mackintosh, *Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967, p. 67.

⁴ Kolkowicz, *op. cit.* p. 49.

⁵ Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 85.

operate the gears. This is an obvious corollary, after all, of Stalin's need to appoint people who would support him without fail in the event of political opposition.

It may be added that in his obsessive needs Stalin almost wrecked the machine altogether. Between 15,000 and 30,000 military officers below the ranks of marshal and general also were purged.⁶ A scant few years later the German warhead was thus able to smash what was left. Time, distance, climate, and shortsighted German policy as regards the nationalities — all these in conjunction — saved Stalin and the Soviet Union.

TRANSITION: 1941-1953

As we have remarked, the dozen years prior to 1953 may be regarded as a transition period between the first and second stages. In this period, especially in the World War II years, the prestige of the military zoomed. In the face of mortal threat, the regime extolled the military, including Czarist figures of old, in order to maximize the defense; what was being tapped was the people's love of their land. The party, realistic for once, relaxed its rigid membership requirements to admit as many soldiers as possible. In 1945, from May to September, adulation of the military was the order of the day as newspapers bombarded readers with endless lists of awards, honors, promotions of officers.⁷ Ironically, this was a just acclaim. Being acclaimed was not the professional military class (destroyed by Stalin), much less the gabblers of Marx: it was the people, who had taken to arms to defend their homes.

For his part, however, Stalin was becoming even more paranoid. As he toasted "the Soviet citizen," he downgraded the successes of the Soviet marshals and generals. Marshal Zhukov, a lionized figure of the war, was tucked away in Ukraine, well away from the lime-light. Although Stalin strove to extol the role of the party, he found he had a tiger by the tail. In every country's history, sooner or later, the military as a force in government coalesces. Not only had the military saved sacred Moscow (which Stalin had abjectly quitted, and consequently was never to be the same again), they also were indispensable with the ushering in of a new era — The Atomic Age. Thus, at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952, an unpre-

⁶ Louis Fischer, *Russia's Road From Peace to War*. Harper and Row, New York, 1969, p. 298.

⁷ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis*, Praeger, New York, 1966, p. 42.

cedented number of senior officers were admitted into the Party's Central Committee. Four became members, no less than 26 stood behind as candidate members.

In January 1953, the "Doctors' Plot" transpired. The alleged target of the doctors were five high military personnel. Because of Stalin's death, however, the purpose of the purge that the "plot" was to unleash will ever remain a matter of speculation. One interpretation is that Stalin was giving the military a sign that the purge was not going to affect it, that is, that it was aimed at the party and the secret police.⁸ Another view is that Stalin was seeking to split the military leadership so that he could purge a half of it and still retain the favor of the other half. Whatever the interpretation, Stalin's maneuvers show that he now viewed the military as a force to be handled with circumspection. Beyond repetition was the dictator's grotesque aberration in the purge of 1937. Not only had the military been proved under fire: the people at large had survived wartime horrors that made the Byzantine cruelty of an essentially immature creature pale by comparison.

Thus the first stage of party-military relations was characterized by the supremacy of the party. The party created the military machine, manipulated it politically and altered it to suit physically by purge. The military was a pliable creature of the party and of Stalin, whose death in 1953, natural or unnatural, signalled the finality of the end of this stage.

THE SECOND STAGE: THE RISING POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY

In the second stage the military played an explicit political role in three specific cases. They were those of Beria, 1953, Malenkov, 1955, and the anti-party case in 1957. It came to the fore more because of the disunity of the party than of any ambitious initiative on its part.

With the death of Stalin, Beria made a bid for power. He sought to use the security police, which he headed dictatorially, as the vehicle for gaining political control. His party rivals turned toward the military as a counterweight. The military was delighted with this opportunity to thwart Beria and his security forces. The two institutions had always been rivals, with the military always losing out. Mar-

⁸ Garthoff, *op. cit.*

shals Zhukov and Konev, it is reported, had a direct role in the arrest of Beria.⁹

Rewards to the military were soon forthcoming. Marshal Zhukov was given Beria's seat on the Party's Central Committee and many military personnel were promoted. The status of the security force declined. Furthermore, the party and police roles in the military declined, and military men who had been in disgrace were rehabilitated.

The military next had an opportunity to increase its power when a contest for party control sprang up between Malenkov and Khrushchev in the years 1953 to 1955. Although neither one was a particular friend of the military, Malenkov's programs promised less for the military, thereby making the military's choice easier.

In 1953 and 1954 Malenkov reduced the military budgets. Late in 1954, when discussions on the 1955 budget were in progress, the military began to display its opposition. It not only opposed Malenkov's reduced military allocations, but also took a stance against three other programs that Malenkov was pushing. First, Malenkov would draw on state reserves to help alleviate the tight consumer situation. Second, Malenkov favored greater investment in consumer industries at the cost of lower investment in heavy industry. Third, he propounded a strategic doctrine of nuclear deterrence. In its view, the military felt that the use of state reserves would threaten the defense capability of the Soviet Union while the decreased investment in heavy industry would weaken the military's industrial base. It opposed the nuclear doctrine because it saw it as mere justification for further reduction in military programs. More importantly, it felt that the doctrine was premature since the military's nuclear capability at that time was just beginning to develop." Thus, when Khrushchev began to attack Malenkov's programs, the military readily fell in with him.

Under the combined pressures of the Khrushchev faction, the military, and other party factions, Malenkov cracked. Stalin's protegee resigned in February, 1955. The military exacted a higher price for its support than it had in the case of Beria. The day after Malenkov's resignation Marshal Zhukov became Minister of Defense; the military budget was increased by 12 per cent, the appropriations for heavy industry were hiked up and the practice of dipping into state

⁹ Raymond L. Garthoff, "Khrushchev and the Military," in Alexander Dallin and Allan F. Westin (eds.), *Politics in the Soviet Union*, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1966 p. 482.

¹⁰ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, Praeger, New York, 1962, p. 23.

reserves was checked.¹¹ Most important, the military received greater freedom in the area of military doctrine with a concomitant diminution of the meddling within the military of the party.

At the Party Congress held in February, 1956, Zhukov was given candidate membership in the party's Presidium (today, the Politburo). The Central Committee elected six full and twelve candidate members from the military. And what was unprecedented is that members of the political control organs were excluded at this time from full and candidate membership in the Central Committee.

At this stage neither Khrushchev nor Zhukov could achieve a checkmate on the other. Their relationship was solely an alliance of convenience. Illustrative are two episodes which took place in 1957. Zhukov had Khrushchev further centralize the military supporting industries under the Ministry of Defense. This was a distinct concession to the military since at the time Khrushchev was trying to implement a program of industrial decentralization.¹² But it was soon Zhukov's turn to come to Khrushchev's aid. In June, 1957, Khrushchev's chief opponents in the party, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, made their move to depose him. Typical of a power struggle the world over, they managed to mount an anti-Khrushchev majority in the Presidium that all but sealed Khrushchev's fate. Khrushchev reacted by appealing for aid to the Party's Central Committee, where his strength lay in depth. But the military tipped the balance. War hero Zhukov sternly warned the Central Committee that the military would not allow any usurpation of power.¹³ Khrushchev subsequently emerged as the undisputed party leader. But now both Khrushchev and Zhukov emerged as the two most powerful men in the Soviet Union, accepted by Zhukov's becoming a member of the Party Presidium.

Even prior to these developments, wily Khrushchev was aware of the growing influence of the military. As a result, he early began to infiltrate his colleagues from the Stalingrad Group into important positions. The Stalingrad Group consisted of military officers who had served in the southern sector around Stalingrad during World War II. Most of them participated in the Battle of Stalingrad, which they came to consider the most important battle of the war. Khrushchev, who had served as the political commissar in the area during the war, had built up friendships and a following among the

¹¹ Garthoff, "Khrushchev and the Military," p. 248.

¹² Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy*, p. 30.

¹³ Garthoff, "Khrushchev and the Military," p. 253.

officers. In turn, there was the Moscow Group of which Zhukov was a member. It consisted of those officers who had served in the *Stavka* (the Supreme Headquarters) in Moscow during the War. This group felt that the Battle of Moscow was the decisive battle of the war. Also, it claimed much of the credit for the Battle of Stalingrad since the *Stavka* had done much of the planning for the battle. Unsurprisingly, a rivalry arose between the Stalingrad Group and Zhukov and his followers in the military. Khrushchev sought to exploit this rivalry for the party's benefit and his own. As a result, many of the military candidates and members of the 1956 Central Committee hailed from the Stalingrad Group, such as Konev, Chuikov, Biruizov and Grechko.

Once he gained firm control of the party after the June, 1957, events, Khrushchev concentrated on trimming the growing independence of the military. In October of that year Zhukov was sent on a visit to Yugoslavia. Albania was then added to his itinerary in order to keep him out of Moscow. With Zhukov out of the way, Khrushchev was able to exploit leadership rivalries in the military. More, he was able to achieve the dismissal of Zhukov as Minister of Defense. Zhukov, being absent, was unable to rally any forces on his behalf; in fact, he was first advised of his dismissal upon his return to Moscow in late October. About a week later he also was dismissed from his Presidium and Central Committee seats, the party castigating him for having sought to abolish party control over the military (in which Zhukov had been rather successful). Khrushchev filled the top military positions with members from the Stalingrad Group. By April, 1960, all the important posts in the Military High Command were held by members of the the Stalingrad Group.

The ouster of Zhukov signalled the reassertion of the party. The study of Marxist-Leninist doctrines once again became mandatory for officers (it had been voluntary under Zhukov). The prerogatives and prestige of the political commissars were increased. Khrushchev became the final voice on national security questions, something which Zhukov had sought to make his own domain. The role of the party and the Komsomol were strengthened, and a new recruitment drive for party membership was initiated. The fall of Zhukov, therefore, brought to an end the new party-military relationship, a relationship in which the military had fast been becoming first among equals.

TRANSITION: 1958-1964

The next party-military confrontation came in 1959. In this instance the party was unable to run roughshod over the military as it had done in the first stage, while the military was unable to have its own way as it had on a number of occasions in the second stage. Thus, 1959 marks the beginning of a phase (say, 1958-1964) in which the dynamics and practice of partnership and compromise were hammered out, with actual partnership to begin with the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime.

With the removal of Zhukov, the party sought to introduce a number of "reforms" into the military. Some of these aimed at combatting elitist tendencies in the military and at easing the party's access to the military establishment. The military, even though it had been stocked with Khrushchev's friends, opposed these measures, even including Defense Minister Malinovsky, whom Khrushchev had put in that position. In early 1959 a compromise formula was arrived at. Khrushchev agreed to limit the political organs' freedom to manipulate the officer corps while the military, in turn, permitted the removal of the remaining Zhukovites in the military." This concession by the military showed that once the Stalingrad Group headed the military, it was becoming more professionally minded; defying Khrushchev, its members had protected the Zhukovites from Khrushchev, deserting them only when greater benefits to the military as a whole were to be achieved.

Khrushchev, however, was not too happy with this compromise. In January, 1960, he announced a program to reduce the conventional forces, which stood at 3,623,000, by 1.2 million men, or a third. Khrushchev contended the reduction was warranted because modern technology puts an emphasis on quality rather than quantity and because of the improved international situation. Another but unannounced reason was to weed out anti-Khrushchev elements within the military. The military, in turn, opposed Khrushchev for two reasons. First, the program threatened established careers and the professionalism of the military as an institution. Second, the program was seen as a massive retaliation.

At first Khrushchev was successful; throughout 1960, one-half of the proposed reductions were carried out. But in December, 1960, the military began to strike back by obstructing party policies and allowing a deterioration of discipline within its ranks.

¹⁴ Kolkowicz, *Ibid.*, p. 160.

In the first half of 1961 the rate of reductions was greatly slowed down, mainly because of the changed international situation. The Kennedy administration had started a military buildup and Berlin had flared up as a problem between the United States and the Soviet Union. In July, 1961, the Soviet Union publicly announced the suspension of the reduction program; obviously, at a time of international crisis, Khrushchev needed the support of the military. No reconciliation, however, was to take place between Khrushchev and the military. When the international situation improved, the military reductions were resumed (1963-1964). Although the party had prevailed in this struggle, it had not had an easy victory.

There also had been other problems in the early 1960's. In May, 1962, Khrushchev, nettled by the opposition within the military, appointed General A. A. Yepishev, a close associate, to head the Main Political Administration and charged him with rooting out the opposition.¹⁵ Yepishev, making his findings public in August, 1962, stated that the main problem areas were the Ministry of Defense, the Ground Forces and the military academies. This led to an intense verbal war between the military and the political control organs which was waged in the press.

The Cuban missile crisis overshadowed the party-military struggle for a time. But once the crisis passed it, too, became part of the squabble. The military faulted the party for both initiating and fumbling the situation. In turn, the party unleashed a policy aimed at intimidating the High Command. In early 1963, however, a compromise was reached: In return for the party's easing of some controls and the indoctrination within the military, the latter allowed the party to speak for the military on strategic doctrine. Furthermore, the military agreed to abstain from criticizing the party.¹⁶

By the end of 1964 Khrushchev had been deposed, portending a new stage in party military relations. While we know of no direct evidence that the military played a role in Khrushchev's ouster, the consensus of opinion is that since there had been much friction between Khrushchev and the military, the latter played one role or another in his overthrow.

It was the division between the military, as a whole, and the Stalingrad Group within the military, plus the latter's early support of Khrushchev, that had obviated a more important role politically for the military in this second stage. Overall, however, the military

¹⁵ Kolkowicz, *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹⁶ Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military*, p. 173.

had made important gains in this second stage. The transition phase led to an important development: the inability of either the party or the military alone to achieve its own objectives and the need, therefore, for compromise, as shown by the events of 1959 through 1963. This made for the post-1964 period, the period of partnership, or the third stage of the evolution of party-military relations.

THE THIRD STAGE: PARTY-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

The post-Khrushchev era is one marked by the climaxing of a number of changes that, originating in the Stalin and Khrushchev periods, now have put the military in a more favorable position. These changes can be categorized as political, technological, and professional.

Politically, the most important happening was the death of Stalin. His death brought to a welcome end the extreme suspiciousness, terrorism, and subordination of institutions that marked his rule throughout. With his death, however, a leadership crisis resulted. The party split into rival factions, each seeking supremacy. Some factions sought the aid of the military in their intra-party battling. For its part, the military, although suffering some divisiveness itself (the competition between the Moscow and Stalingrad groups), benefited by being able to play an increasingly important political role. Another important political development was the decline of the secret police after Stalin's death; it left the military as the institution with a monopoly on force.

The global role of the Soviet Union has made the military more secure. The party cannot afford an open split with the military for such would endanger the Soviet Union's international political and military positions. Furthermore, a shared political philosophy prevents any serious rupture from occurring. The military and the party see eye to eye on a number of important points. For example, they oppose all types of domestic dissent and favor a state economy.¹⁷

Technological changes have also helped in the military's rise. The complexities of nuclear war and military strategies and doctrines have elevated the officers into an almost invulnerable position vis-a-vis the political officers and the political organs of control.¹⁸ Moreover, the military establishment has become inextricably intertwined

¹⁷ William E. Odom, "The Soviet Military: The Party Connection," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXII, No. 5, pp. 16-17, September-October, 1973.

¹⁸ Kolkowicz, "The Military." p. 138.

with the whole Soviet economy and society and, as a result, political, military, and economic policy and decision-making have become very complex, rendering the military indispensable.

The military has also become a more professional institution, its cohesiveness making it more powerful. Since Stalin, military officers have come to be more and more a tightly-knit class of technocrats and skilled personnel.¹⁹ It also has become a complex bureaucracy and as such has developed the characteristics of all bureaucracies: the covering-up for personnel, resistance to change, the common front to external hostile individuals and groups. It is no longer the ragtag assortment that passed for the Soviet fighting force some sixty years ago.

There are three basic ways in which the military can influence the party leadership. First, it can exert pressure as a typical interest group (as has been seen in the Khrushchev period). The military has certain economic and logistic needs and seeks to meet them by means of speeches, articles in the press and lobbying among party members.

A second is through the use of formal party and government channels. With respect to the party, the military has one member on the Politburo. When he was on the Politburo, Marshal Grechko, privy to all policy discussions and program initiatives, did not neglect the opportunity to influence the top party leadership. Dmitry Ustinov will now undoubtedly play the same role. Furthermore, the Politburo maintains a Defense Council for advice. This council, composed of both civilian and military personnel, is the highest level constitutional office where the leaderships of the party and the military meet for formal discussions.²⁰ Military men also come into contact with party members in the Party's Central Committee, the body that furnishes the all-important Politburo. As of October, 1973, there were 36 military full and candidate members on the Central Committee, where they can air their views. As regards the government, the Minister of Defense is a member of the Council of Ministers. Consequently, he is in contact with the council's chairman, Kosygin. In addition, about 12,000 servicemen serve as deputies to local Soviets, Union Republic Supreme Soviets, or the Soviet Union.

A third mode of influence is through significant personal relationships, an important reinforcement of the more formal channels

¹⁹ Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military*, p. 31.

²⁰ Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXII, No. 5, p. 3, September-October, 1973.

of influence. Brezhnev and Grechko, for example, had developed a close personal relationship. Brezhnev has since regarded the support of the military as necessary for the political policies of detente. In turn, the military has received increased benefits. This type of relationship may well survive with Brezhnev and Ustinov.

At this point we might comment on some recent developments. The installation of Ustinov as Defense Minister in place of the deceased Grechko does not seem to threaten the party-military partnership. Although Ustinov is the first civilian Defense Minister since Trotsky, this does not indicate a return to the strong type of civilian control that Trotsky's era exemplified. The reasons are twofold. First, the military is too large and too powerful a bureaucracy to be responsive to the whims of a single man. Second, Ustinov has had a long career of catering to military needs. A production expert who has been in charge of military output, his appointment may be seen as an attempt not to shake up the present leadership. It was evidently easier to install Ustinov, a member of the Politburo, than to face the problem of selecting a military man and then having to make room for him on the Politburo. Furthermore, the two most likely military candidates for the post, Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, commander of the Warsaw Pact, and General Viktor G. Kulikov, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, were regarded as ineligible.²¹ Yakubovsky is suffering from poor health, while Kulikov at the age of 54 was regarded as too young.

Also, Brezhnev's recent elevation to the rank of marshal in no way reflects on party-military relations. This self-enhancement is one step in a long series of steps designed to make Brezhnev first among equals in the party hierarchy.

Today, then, the influence of the military is expressed in a number of ways. First, in proposed policies that will require military support. In the past, political figures usually predominated in military decisions (as, most notably, Stalin's military decisions in World War II). Second, in diplomacy. Defense Minister Grechko, for example, was the principal member of the delegation to Prague in 1969 that ousted Dubcek. He had also visited Egypt in the period when Soviet bases were being set up there.²² Third, as a bureaucracy. In some cases the military has displayed the typical self-interest of a bureaucracy with the result of hampering the party. A case in point were the SALT

²¹ David K. Shipler, "Soviet Military Still Subordinate to Communist Party," *The New York Times*, May 24, 1976, p. 3, col. 1.

²² Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military," p. 11.

I negotiations. At first the military balked at passing classified information on to the civilian negotiators. When the military saw that SALT would not harm its interests, it cooperated, and the party was able to proceed with the negotiations.²³ Fourth, the military still exerts influence over military budget allocations. For example, in the first year of the Brezhnev regime, the party split, one group favoring a low military budget, another the usual one. Military spokesmen inveighed against the cuts. The budget was not cut.

In conclusion, six general points regarding party-military relations can be made:

First, party-military relations have never revolved around the question of which institution is supreme. Rather, friction has generated along functional lines. The party, regarding itself as the sole repository of truth, has insisted on having its political tentacles extend into every Soviet institution, including the military. The military, on the other hand, has seen these political controls as a serious impedance to the carrying out of its duties and responsibilities. Even in the second stage, when the military was fast becoming a prime political force, the military did not seek to rule *per se* but rather sought to free itself of party interference and to obtain a reasonable role in decision-making. The military was successful to a great extent in realizing these goals in this stage. In the third, a compromise appears to have been reached in which the military is professionally more autonomous and has a greater decision-making role. The party, however, still maintains controls within the military and is the spokesman for all policies. This has been a workable compromise.

Second, even in the 1950's when the military played a large political role, in most cases it was not the initiator of political action. Rather, the military contented itself with being the backer of a party faction which entertained views similar to its own.

Third, one of the biggest problems between the military and the party has been that of the military budget and the appropriations for heavy industry. The military, naturally enough, has favored generous budgets for both.

Fourth, another area of party-military dispute is that of military doctrine. At one time, the party had full say in this matter. Today, while the military has been given a greater voice in doctrine, friction still exists. The reason is that military doctrine at bottom is still in the hands of the Politburo and the Central Committee.

²³ Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military," p. 10.

Fifth, the fates of Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev show that the military has become an important element in the leadership successions and power struggles of the party. This influence is likely to persist.

Sixth, the military is content with party rule so long as its basic needs are met. The party, after all, sees eye to eye with the military with respect to certain essential needs of the state: the need to control dissent and nationalism and the desire to continue a command economy. The military seems content with being a professional organization with influence on the decision-making process. The military is now able to defend and maintain its interests, and in partnership with the party is able to maintain the type of state which is acceptable to both.

At present there is no reason to believe that the present partnership will soon fall apart. The only conceivable event which could unbalance it is an intensification of the various nationalist and dissident movements. In such event, it would be the military and not the party which would come to the fore as the defender of the Soviet state.

Another factor in a possible future military hegemony is the rise of the technically trained men started coming into the military in large numbers. As of now they do not hold high command positions, but in the future they undoubtedly will. A changing of the guard is inevitable with the dying off of the old officers who were raised under Stalin and Khrushchev. The younger officers do not put much faith in political controls; emboldened by knowing they are indispensable, they oppose them. The older officers served in a time when politics was the most important factor. Thus, while they opposed the party many times, they still felt obligated and subordinate to it, thereby preventing any serious breach between the military and the party in general. This sort of affiliation no longer holds among the new officers. Overall, highly unlikely is the emergence of a policy which could be detrimental to the military. Instead, on balance, the possibilities for a military hegemony have increased.

BOOK REVIEWS

IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH, 1941-1945. By Petro Mirchuk. Vantage Press. New York-Washington-Atlanta-Hollywood, 1976. pp. 217

In the Introduction to this revealing book, author Petro Mirchuk writes: "I am a Ukrainian. Whenever I mention that during World War II, from 1941 until the end of the war in May, 1945, I was a prisoner in the German concentration camp at Auschwitz, I am never believed.

"You mean that you are a Ukrainian Jew. How could you, a Ukrainian, be sent to a German concentration camp? It is known that the Ukrainians cooperated with the Germans. When the Germans entered Ukraine, the Ukrainian population greeted them with flowers..."

And so the story begins. The author, a Ukrainian student at that time, was arrested by the Gestapo in 1941 and imprisoned in the infamous death-ridden concentration camp at Auschwitz (*Oswiecim*). Was he the only Ukrainian in this "German mill of death." By no means. According to the author, he knew of hundreds of other Ukrainian prisoners in that camp alone, and there were scores of other concentration camps in Nazi-held Eastern and Central Europe, as well as in Germany itself. In each of them were Ukrainian prisoners. After the war, some 1,200 Ukrainian political prisoners who were released from various concentration camps, demanded indemnification from the West German government as compensation for their mistreatment and persecution in the Nazi concentration camps.

It's true, writes author Mirchuk, that hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians welcomed the invading German troops as "liberators" and he provides a cogent and logical explanation. During World War I, Germany and its allies, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, had recognized the newly-established Ukrainian state, an event which took place only twenty-three years before and still was very fresh in the minds of millions of Ukrainians. Then, ruthless persecution of Ukrainians by the Soviet regime, and equally brutal treatment of some 6 million Ukrainians under Polish rule, only strengthened this memory, but only for a fleeting moment. The disillusionment came after the Nazi authorities banned the newly-restored Ukrainian government on June 30, 1941, and arrested almost all of its members, including Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetzko, leaders of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), while all other leading members of the same organization, and later on of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), were hunted down to the last days of the Nazi occupation of Ukraine. Moreover, the UPA and OUN, comprising thousands of Ukrainian youth, had waged implacable underground resistance and warfare against the Nazis, and also against the Soviet partisans and, after 1945, against regular Soviet troops and security forces.

Author Mirchuk was one of the youthful leaders of the Ukrainian underground. Neither coward nor hero, he describes graphically how his own imagina-

tion and ingenuity, combined with luck, helped him to survive almost four years of concentration camp existence. There, in these "mills of death," on a round-the-clock basis, millions of men, women and children were subjected to humiliation, torture and death. Systematically beaten and tortured to reduce them to the level of animals, many of the prisoners, their spirits and bodies broken, were eventually, like animals, led to the slaughter. Those who could not be broken and turned into animals were slaughtered even sooner.

According to the author, the concentration camp population was composed not only of Jews from every occupied country, but also of Slavic nationalities, especially Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Russians and Byelorussians, all of whom were considered by the Nazis as being *Untermenschen* (subhumans) to be eventually annihilated. While still in jails before being sent to a concentration camp, their treatment by prison authorities differed, depending on the nature of commandants and personnel, and on the overall policy made in Berlin.

"Besides Polish and Ukrainian prisoners," Mirchuk writes, "there were many Jewish prisoners as well. There was a difference in their treatment, however. Polish and Ukrainian prisoners were interrogated about the activities and movements of the underground. The Jewish prisoners were not interrogated. They had been brought here only to await transport to the concentration camp. . ." They were to be destroyed in gas chambers.

Author Mirchuk also reveals that in some prison cells and camp barracks Czech and Polish prisoners acted as supervisors and informers, and treated Ukrainian political prisoners brutally.

With the advance of Soviet troops the prisoners from the dreaded Auschwitz death camp were moved westward to such camps as Mauthausen, Melk and Ebensee, where they were liberated by the U.S. Army.

Finally, Dr. Mirchuk details how the West German government refused hundreds of Ukrainian, Polish, Yugoslav and other prisoners to be compensated under the Federal Indemnification Law on the assumption that they were in Nazi concentration camps not as political opponents of the Nazi regime, but "because of their nationality. . ." (p. 215). But this is another aspect of Mr. Mirchuk's life as a freedom fighter for the independence of Ukraine. He was a member of the Ukrainian liberation movement and paid for it with four years in a German concentration camp. He came to the U.S. in 1952; in 1959 he received an M.S. degree from Drexel University and in 1965 a Ph.D. from the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Germany. A member of several scholarly and social organizations, Dr. Mirchuk has authored some twenty books, including two on the Ukrainian liberation movement and the UPA, and one on the Ukrainian uprising of 1768, entitled *Haidamaks*.

In the German Mills of Death is an important documentary book for two specific reasons: a) it is eyewitness testimony of Nazi inhumanity to man; and b) it rebuts some anti-Ukrainian propaganda that Ukrainians were Nazi collaborators *en masse*. This simply was not true, as many of them died in death camps, or were executed for their Ukrainian patriotism and their opposition to Nazi tyranny.

THE ECONOMICS OF DETENTE AND U.S.-SOVIET GRAIN TRADE. By Miles M. Costick, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D. C. pp. 115.

In a compact and selective way this treatment of U.S.-USSR trade contains all the fundamental data and analytical points necessary for a critical assessment of such trade. As Dr. Ray S. Cline writes in the foreword, "The author argues persuasively that Brezhnev and his colleagues see detente primarily as an adversary policy designed to increase Soviet power vis-a-vis the United States without alarming the Americans or their allies into effective countermeasures." Dr. Cline formerly headed research activity in the CIA and was the director of research and intelligence in the Department of State. The author is a private consultant on foreign affairs and trade, has an impressive educational background in economics and business, and has been a legislative assistant on Capitol Hill.

The work is well organized, neatly documented, and makes for easy and interesting reading. At the very outset, the reader is provided with a summary overview of the essentials of each chapter. This immediately focuses the reader's attention on the main chapter points and serves to whet his intellectual appetite to indulge as soon as possible in the supportive chapter contents. The author is keen on definitions and proceeds quickly in the introductory chapter to define trade policy in relation to foreign policy generally and, thus, detente to trade. From this point on, practically every page in the work is heavily footnoted with supporting evidence.

A scan of the chapter titles in the book is sufficient to impress upon one the scope and breadth of the analysis pursued by the author. An economic profile of detente is succinctly portrayed, and is followed by successive discussion of Soviet agriculture, the grain transactions, the grain deals in '72/'73 and /'75, the long-term agreement, and grain for Soviet oil. The author then develops the concept and content of agripower, as well as Soviet strategy in relation to food and maritime activity. His conclusions, which are strongly critical of Secretary of State Kissinger's linkage of the American and Soviet economies, flow logically from his analyses of these areas. An appendix furnishes some absorbing data on the complexity of world grain trade and Moscow's manipulation of it. The importance of the work and its timeliness for critical appraisal of our current and future economic relations with the Soviet Union fully justify a convenient index for ready reference. Unfortunately, there is none.

Strictly speaking, in terms of a precise analytical framework for a close examination of Soviet Russian strategy regarding trade with more advanced states there is really nothing new in this work. A few quotations in the work point to this historically-based framework, but anyone familiar with established Soviet Russian trade policy within the broader conceptual framework of its "peaceful coexistence" policy can only profit from the additive data offered here. For example, Brezhnev's statement in 1973 to the Warsaw Pact representatives is quoted as an explanation of detente from Moscow's viewpoint: "We communists have got to string along with the capitalists for a while. We need their credits, their agriculture, and their technology. But we are going to continue massive military programs and by the middle 80's we will be in a position to return to a much more aggressive foreign policy designed to gain the upper hand in our relationship with the West." Actually, this is just another but more recent example of countless such similar expressions not of ambiguous detente but of

Moscow's traditional "peaceful coexistence" policy going all the way back to Lenin.

It is evident that the author is not sufficiently familiar with the broad construction and chief components of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" policy, into which all that he supplies by way of current empirical information can be compatibly fitted. However, this limitation by no means detracts from the work, and its popular objectives and purposes are well fulfilled. Without the intellectual pattern of broad Soviet Russian strategy, encompassing not only trade but also cultural exchange, athletics and so forth, the work accomplishes its mission in showing that we are being shafted in this relationship and, as a result, knowingly or unknowingly, contributing to our enemy's strength and relatively to our deepened weakness. For the full analytical framework or pattern referred to here the reader would do well to consult the Senate Foreign Relations hearings seminar on East-West trade back in 1964-65.

Many valuable points are advanced and argued by the author. As concerns, for instance, our grain exports to the USSR, even a 10% or 15% figure of our total exports will have a marked impact on the market. The '72/'73 grain deal cost our consumers some \$3.3 billion by way of increased domestic prices. Important, too, is the fact that Moscow has the resources to correct its agricultural and other deficits, but this would require a scaling down of its top priorities, notably military, and this it has no intention of doing. Comparisons on American and USSR agricultural productivity are aptly underscored in the work. About 31% of the latter's labor force still is engrossed in agriculture as against 4% of the former's. The output of the average Soviet farmer is only 9% of the American; the former harvests about 18 bushels of grain per acre compared to 48.3 bushels per acre by the latter. American beef cattle yield is 99 kilograms compared to 57 kilograms per animal in the USSR. In contrast to the Khrushchev period, under Brezhnev capital investment in agriculture increased by 69% in the '66-'70 period and by about 57% from '71 to '75. At present, about one-third of total capital investment in the civilian sector of the Soviet economy is directed into agriculture. Adding all this and more together, the author rightly concludes that to avoid committing still more resources into agriculture for modest productivity gains, Moscow prefers to import relatively cheap grain and conserve its limited resources for further investment in the military-industrial complex.

The concept of poltrade, which is fundamentally different from Kissinger's so-called linkage concept and which was advanced by the reviewer in the Fulbright hearings ten years ago, eludes the author completely. But this, too, is part of the broad analytical pattern attuned to policy. However, emphasis is placed in the work on the Jackson-Vanik amendment which, as a faint expression of poltrade strategy, tied credit extensions to emigration liberalization. The net result of this constructive action was to compel the Soviet Union to finance its imports with sales of gold and oil or by borrowing from Western banks. The cause of human rights is capable of more than substantial results than most people realize. The author quotes Swiss bankers as estimating total USSR and satellite debts in 1975 at \$25 billion. In 1976 some analysts have raised the estimate to \$40 billion. The great question now is whether Western banks will extend more loans for the totalitarian states to in part repay on old ones and extend their imports of prime technology or to relieve these states of the strictures of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and have government support Moscow and its confederates in the further pursuit of their strategy. The additional questions

concerning bloc default and possible redirection of resources should be obvious. We're coming rapidly to a point of crystallization of issues that will demand considerable articulation and determination in behalf of not only the human rights issue but also that of national security.

These projections are not analyzed sufficiently in this work. Moreover, the easy acceptance of Kissinger's economics of detente, in the sense that the Secretary of State understands economic issues, is groundless. Nevertheless, the work should make its imprint, especially in the treatment of current issues.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

DISSENT IN THE USSR: Politics, Ideology, and People. By Rudolf L. Tokos, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. 453. Bibliographical References and Index.

This study, prepared under the auspices of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, is the outcome of an earlier draft of the manuscript which was begun in 1969-70. The editor is indebted to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the director of the Research Institute, for the stipend that enabled him to thoroughly study Soviet dissent, and to Peter Reddaway, whose documentary coverage of the democratic movement in the USSR led to the final realization of the manuscript.

This collection analyzes dissent in the Soviet Union from the point of view of five disciplines: politics, history, sociology, philosophy and law. Evidence is mainly drawn from *samizdat* (self-publishing underground sources).

The collection is organized into four parts, each one made up of three chapters.

Part One seeks to answer: "What is the political significance of Soviet dissent?" It is called "Dissent: Strategy and Tactics"; its contributors are Frederick C. Barghoorn, Howard L. Biddulph and Theodore Friedgut. Here is contained much scholarly literature pertinent to Ukraine. Detailed accounts of the political persecution of Ukrainian dissident intellectuals are provided. The cited writers and their works are: V. Chornovil: *The Chornovil Papers*; John Kolasky: *Education in Soviet Ukraine and Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*; I. Dzyuba: *Internationalism or Russification?*; M. Brown: *Ferment in the Ukraine*; V. Moroz: "A Report from the Beria Reserve" in *Ferment in the Ukraine*; P. Reddaway: *Russian Uncensored*, and G. Luckyj: "Ukrainian Dissent."

Part Two, called "Society, Ideology, Religion," seeks to answer: "What are the ideas and beliefs that motivate dissident activities?" The contributors herein are Walter D. Connor, George L. Kline and Barbara Wolfe Jancar. Regrettably, the contributors do not treat of the religious persecution of Ukrainian individuals and institutions. This is odd in view of the persistent and systematic destruction of Ukrainian religious centers. It is incomprehensible in view of the press coverage accorded to Cardinal Slipyj and the long-term imprisonment inflicted on him by the Soviet regime.

Part Three, "*Samizdat* as Political Communication," asks: "How are dissident beliefs communicated to the Soviet public and the world?" Contributors are Gayle Durham Hollander, Gene Sosin and Peter B. Maggs. The only men-

tion made of a dissident Ukrainian intellectual is in regard to V. Moroz and his article, "The Case of Valentyn Moroz: Valentyn Moroz's Defense Speech," which appeared in *Survey* 18, No. 1 (82) (Winter).

Part Four, "People of the Democratic Movement," asks "Who are some of the groups and individuals who constitute the dissident movement?" Contributors are Robert M. Slusser, Peter Dornan and George Feifer. Parallels are drawn between I. Dzyuba and A. Sakharov in relation to the problem of Soviet nationalities. I. Dzyuba, in his *Internationalism or Russification?* states that the "constitution of the USSR guarantees the republics the right to secede from the Union" and that Leninist principles would permit such. The contributors also refer the reader to S. Karavansky's petition to Gomulka which appeared in Brown's *Ferment in the Ukraine* and to V. Moroz's *A Chronicle of Resistance*, which speaks of the Hutsuls, all documents of resistance to the Soviet regime.

Summary: To our knowledge, this collection is a scholarly one and can be useful to those who seek substantial material which challenges Soviet hypocrisy, their purposeful distortion of history, false claims to Ukrainian territory, and lawlessness. Parts One and Four deal with Ukrainian issues objectively. Parts Two and Three are disappointing for not capitalizing on the material given in the other two parts. An important book, however, on an important issue.

New York, N. Y.

CHRISTINE SPONTAK GINA

REPUBLICAN HUMOR, by Stephen J. Skubik and Hal E. Short. Foreword by President Gerald R. Ford and Introduction by Nelson A. Rockefeller. Published by Acropolis Books, Ltd., Washington, D. C., 1976, p. 196.

Republican Humor is a rare book, indeed, and it is timely as a source of humorous political stories for political speakers. Easy reading, it contains 380 stories quoting over 100 Republican leaders, including President Gerald Ford, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and many cabinet members, ambassadors, governors, senators, members of Congress, and others.

President Ford:

"Gentlemen — Senator Humphrey is a dear friend of mine and I can still remember the very first time I ever heard him speak at the Alfalfa Club. Hubert was in the second hour — of a five minute talk."

"I couldn't find my program, so I leaned over to the member sitting next to me and asked, 'What follows Senator Humphrey.' He looked at his watch, then he looked at me and said, 'Christmas!'"

A Congressman:

"I welcome this opportunity to be here today -- to exchange views and feelings with this distinguished cross-section of what has come to be known as the small business community. Personally, I've always been a little amused by that term 'small businessman' — and a few years ago, after a meeting like this, I asked one of the speakers what his definition of a big businessman would be. He said, 'Congressman, it's very simple. A big businessman is what a small businessman would be if the government would ever let him alone!'"

Vice President Rockefeller:

"The best part about being Vice President is presiding over the Senate. Where else could I have Barry Goldwater addressing me as 'Mr. President?'"

Former Governor of California, Ronald Reagan:

"One day in New York City, I was hurrying down Fifth Avenue on my way back to the hotel when about thirty feet in front of me a man stopped suddenly, pointed his finger at me and in a loud voice said, 'Ah hah! I know you. I see you all the time in the "pitchas" and on the T.V.' He came at me while he was talking, fumbling in his pockets for pen and paper. All the time he kept up his loud declaration that he knew me and had seen me in the movies and on T.V."

"Everyone on the street had stopped and was watching as he approached. When he finally got to me he thrust the pen and paper at me triumphantly and said, 'I gotta have your autograph, Ray Milland.' So I signed Ray Milland — there was no point in disappointing him."

U.S. Ambassador to Italy, John A. Volpe:

"A well-known government official entered a room in a Washington hotel and began pacing up and down. When a woman asked him what he was doing there, the government official said: 'I am going to deliver a speech.' "

"Do you usually get very nervous before addressing a large audience?' 'Nervous?' he replied. 'No, I never get nervous.' "

"In that case,' demanded the lady, 'what are you doing in the ladies room?'"

U.S. Senator from Kansas, Bob Dole:

"I walked into the Senate chamber one day and Senator Humphrey was talking. An hour later he was still talking."

"During his speech, Senator Humphrey remarked, 'Now gentlemen, let me tax your memories.' "

"Just then Senator McGovern jumped up and shouted, 'Why haven's we thought of that before?'"

U.S. Senator from Arizona, Barry Goldwater:

"You know, sex is a lot like politics. You don't have to be good at it to enjoy it. People have asked me what I think of sex in the streets. Well, it may be one of the newer ways to demonstrate against the establishment, but it's got to be damned uncomfortable."

U.S. Senator from Illinois, Charles H. Percy:

"The Democrats loved Barry Goldwater. They got a great deal of pleasure from his campaign slogan, 'In your heart you know he's right.' They would add, 'Yes, extremely right.'"

Congressman from Illinois, Edward J. Derwinski:

"When Pope John XXIII sat for his portrait by the famous photographer, Yousef Karsh, his humor was quite apparent when the Holy Father remarked, 'The Lord knew from all eternity I was going to be Pope and you'd think he would have made me more photogenic.'"

"One of a Congressman's small pleasures is reading an angry letter from a person who says he'll never vote for you again -- and then seeing from the address that the writer lives in another district."

— Congressman from Kansas, Keith G. Sebelius:

"Former Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, described as 'the wizard of ooze, who marinates his tonsils with honey' and 'born with a golden thesaurus in his mouth,' once said, 'I must use beautiful words; I never know when I might have to eat them.'"

Republican National Committeeman from Illinois, Don W. Adams:

"An epitaph on a tombstone in a small Southern Illinois cemetery reads: 'Here lies a Democrat and an honest man.'"

"Our question is, 'How did they get two guys in the same grave?'"

Republican National Committeewoman from Utah, Myrene Brewer:

"A grandson, on the occasion of my father's 100th birthday, quoted from a letter he had received from his grandfather on his birthday, 1947 — November 7th: 'You will be 21 years of age in a few days, a man with your own right — too young to vote this year but you can vote for a Republican President next election.'"

Republican National Committeeman from Florida, William C. Cramer:

"'There are hundreds of ways to make money,' said a politician, 'but only one honest way.' 'What's that?' asked his opponent in debate. 'Aha,' retorted the first, 'I thought you wouldn't know!'"

Republican National Committeewoman from Virginia, Cynthia Newman — "Sleep with the President" —

"The day of the 1948 election, Tom Dewey said to his wife, 'I want you to go down and buy yourself a beautiful, filmy new nightie and negligee because tonight you are going to sleep with the President of the United States.'"

"Mrs. Dewey did so, came home, donned her new nighttime finery, and set down and waited, and waited, and waited."

"Finally Tom came home, and looking sadly at his wife asked, 'Well, aren't you going to say anything?'"

"'Just one thing,' she replied. Do I call Harry Truman or does he call me?'"

Mr. Skubik is a well-known Ukrainian American activist in Washington and throughout the country, while Mr. Short heads a public relations and fund-raising firm in the Nation's capital.

Washington, D. C.

A WASHINGTONIAN

IN NAZI-OCCUPIED UKRAINE

In a letter, dated November 5, 1976, Prof. Roman Szporluk of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Mich. wrote:

In his review of the *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, Mr. Alexander Sokolyszyn writes: "He errs in saying that the 'OUN ruled in Ukraine in Hitler's promised territorial reorganization of Europe, the new Europe.'" My chapter does not contain the phrase which Mr. Sokolyszyn attributes to me. I urge you to publish a correction explaining the reviewer's error in the next issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

Contacted by this office, Dr. Sokolyszyn supplied a photostatic copy of Prof. Szporluk's relevant passage in the above-mentioned book, which reads as follows:

"It [the OUN] hoped for an independent, OUN-ruled Ukraine in Hitler's promised territorial reorganization of Europe" (p. 25).

We regret this inadvertent misquotation.

Editor

PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

I. GOVERNOR JIMMY CARTER'S TELEGRAMS TO UCCA CONGRESS

Following is the full text of the message of the Democratic Party's Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter to the XIIth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent, held October 8-10, 1976, in New York City. The telegram, dated October 9, 1976, reads:

I deeply regret that I am unable to attend this 12th Quadrennial meeting of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc. Nevertheless, I would like to express my commitment to the values and ideals of your organization and to tell you in the strongest terms possible. I share the historical aspirations of Ukrainian Americans for freedom and independence for all the peoples of the world.

During the long months of this campaign I have met many Ukrainian Americans. I have listened to them and I have learned that Ukrainian Americans are proud, independent, freedom-loving people who want an opportunity to work, to improve their neighborhoods, to be active in a constitutional democracy, to practice their religion and to fight totalitarianism abroad. It is clear to me, and I hope to you, that our dreams and aspirations are the same.

I tell you tonight that President Ford does not understand those goals. More in sorrow than in anger, I say it is incredible and disgraceful that after 25 years in Congress, and two years as president, Mr. Ford would come before the American people and state for all the world to hear that "there is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe."

In 1975, Henry Kissinger and President Ford traveled to Helsinki to sign the treaty of comprehensive security and cooperation in Europe, the "Helsinki Accord." It was supposed to lead to greater personal freedom for the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Instead, conditions have worsened, while Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger have looked the other way.

The list of Soviet abuses of human rights is long. They have continued to jam Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty — to keep the truth from millions of people — who live in what Solzhenitsyn calls the "muffled zone." Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops and tactical airforce throughout those lands remind Ukrainians and East Europeans of their "freedom," each and every day of their lives. And no one in this room need be reminded of the Soviet destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches. The memory of that religious genocide is too fresh, the pain too great to forget. And yet the religion of millions of Jews and Catholics and Baptists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continues to be jeopardized.

Are we expected to turn our heads in silence when the great Ukrainian patriot, Valentyn Moroz, is imprisoned for the crime of advocating freedom for all Ukrainians to express and live their rich cultural heritage? President Kennedy and Pope John did not turn their backs on Cardinal Slipyj and I promise

you I will not turn my back on Valentyn Moroz, or on the dream he symbolizes. The Helsinki agreement has become a lopsided victory for the Soviet Union. When I become President, I will review that weak and unacceptable document. I am not afraid of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union. I will make detente a two-way street.

I wish you well and ask your support. Working together we can restore the dream of freedom and liberty to all people. Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

In answer to a telegram sent to Governor Carter by the XIIth UCCA Congress in reference to his stand on Ukraine, he sent another telegram on October 28, 1976, which reads as follows:

To the Members of the XIIth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent:

Thank you for your telegram. I have great admiration for the people of the Ukraine. In our economic and diplomatic transactions with the Soviet Union, I will use the most effective means possible to strengthen the hands of those who are oppressed. I will also work for a freer exchange of information and ideas.

In recent years I believe our government has come out second best in its dealings with the Soviet Union, and has not paid sufficient attention to the nationalities behind the Iron Curtain. The Republicans are responsible for the grain sale of 1972, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, the refusal to see Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and the statement that Eastern Europe is not dominated by the Soviet Union.

I would make detente a two-way street.

I would try to make it an instrument for a long-term peaceful change within the Communist system, as well as the rest of the world. To this end, I welcome your ideas, your suggestions and your support.

JIMMY CARTER

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"FORD'S E. EUROPE VIEW HIT," a report by Aldo Beckman and Eleanor Randolph. *Chicago Tribune*, Chicago, Illinois, October 8, 1976.

The '76 Presidential campaign will be long remembered for the Ford gaffe in the second TV debate. This first-page report covers the issue extensively. As the report recounts "In the debate, Ford said: 'There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and there never will be under a Ford administration.' He said Poles, Romanians and Yugoslavians he has visited consider themselves free."

After pointing out Carter's seizure of this issue, the report continues, "Dr. Lev E. Dobrianski, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, called Ford's statement 'incredible' and added that it 'blatantly contradicts the brute realities of Russian colonialism in Eastern Europe.'" From the start, the NCNC chairman held that the President's statement was no slip of the tongue. It is characteristic of the Kissinger orientation not to regard the Central European nations even as "satellites."

"A CARTER COMEBACK AND END OF EROSION OF LEAD DISCERNED," a *The New York Times*. New York, October 8, 1976.

This first-page report also covers the Ford gaffe in the second presidential campaign debate. As it relates the unforgettable event, "Then Mr. Ford said there was 'no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe -- a statement that produced a storm of protest from the ethnic Americans whom the President had hoped to lure away from the Democrats. Lev E. Dobriansky of the National Captive Nations Committee, in a typical reaction, called Mr. Ford's comment 'preposterous' and 'shocking.'"

In several subsequent statements on this by NCNC it was strongly pointed out that though publicly shocking the Ford observation was in line with his thinking. The Solzhenitsyn snub, the Helsinki mess, the Sonnenfeldt scandal and other misevents of similar character were recited.

"UKRAINIANS RAP FORD STATEMENT," a report. *The Norwich Bulletin*, Norwich, Connecticut, October 10, 1976.

Reporting on the 12th Quadrennial Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent, this account highlights the address of Representative Christopher J. Dodd to the congress. The able Congressman is quoted as saying, "The Soviet Union is making a mockery of the Helsinki Accords to guarantee freedom of thought and expression by its oppression of Ukrainians trying to maintain their cultural independence." Following in his father's footsteps, the Congressman has a broad knowledge and understanding of the East European area.

The report also concentrates on the criticisms registered by the UCCA President against President Ford's statement on Eastern Europe. As it phrases

it, "Lev Dobriansky, president of the Congress of Ukrainians in the United States, said he was switching from support of President Ford to support of Jimmy Carter." The UCCA President was quoted further as saying, "Any assistance I can give to the opponent, the Democratic presidential candidate, I will be very happy to do so." Basic principles and values were involved in this switch, which was representative of countless Americans of whatever background.

"CARTER ESCALATES CRITICISM," a report. *The Star-Ledger*, Newark, New Jersey, October 9, 1976.

After the election, Ford's pollster, Robert Teeter, admitted that the second debate — the one in which Ford made his mistake on Soviet domination of Eastern Europe — "left us dead in the water for about 10 days." That blunder escalated, and this first-page comment is a further example of it.

Following Carter's several criticisms of Ford's blunder, the report states, "In New York, the president of the largest Ukrainian-American organization said yesterday Ford's statement was 'preposterous and shocking.' Lev Dobriansky, president of the Congress of Ukrainians in the United States, said he was switching from support of Ford to support of Carter." In reality, this outstanding episode of the presidential campaign proved only to be an occasion for the public announcement. Its effects snow-balled right up to election day.

"EASTERN EUROPE REMARKS DRAW MORE FIRE," a report. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D. C., October 9, 1976.

Newspaper organs across the country carried identical or similar observations made by the president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America or in his capacity as chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee. *The Miami News*, *The Baltimore Sun*, the *Chicago Law Bulletin*, the *Ohio Fairborn Herald*, the *Long Island Press*, the *Philadelphia Daily News*, *The Evening Bulletin* in Philadelphia the *Detroit Free Press*, the *Buffalo Evening News* and scores of others repeated the points quoted above.

This *Washington Star* report repeated some of them but went on further to quote the UCCA president. "My immediate feeling was that it was a stupid statement to make," Dobriansky said. "It was, as I said at the time, preposterous and shocking, but from the public view. Privately, this seems to me to have been the culmination of a whole series of misstatements and misdeeds coming from the White House." A subsequent press release by NCNC spelled out this series, from the Southeast Asian debacle in the spring of 1975 to the present.

"UKRAINIAN-AMERICAN HEAD ASSAILS FORD STATEMENT," a report. *The New York Times*, New York, October 10, 1976.

This report in the Sunday edition of *The New York Times* summarized the position taken by the president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America with reference to the now unforgettable Ford gaffe and his own stand on the candidates. Dr. Dobriansky publicly announced his intention to vote for Jimmy Carter. The decision was based on a careful appraisal of the Administration's foreign policy record.

All the essential points of objection to the Ford statement are concisely stated in the report. In the second debate the President said: "there is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and there never will be under a Ford Administration." In a number of statements on this and the President's admission of a mistake, the UCCA President was specific in reaction and evaluation.

"VOTERS MUST CONSIDER STRENGTH," a column by John Chamberlain. *Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel*, Florida, October 30, 1976.

This column appeared in some 300 other papers about the country. The columnist is a prominent writer of long standing. He is well-known for his conservative views. In this particular piece he attempts to rebut the views of the UCCA President and also National Captive Nations Committee Chairman regarding the Ford campaign blunder. The entire column is devoted to the rebuttal.

It begins, "Does it really make much difference who is elected President? Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, the Georgetown professor who heads the National Captive Nations Committee seems to think it matters a great deal to those ethnic Americans whose ancestors came from countries now behind the Iron Curtain." It then quotes at length a release by NCNC, titled "The Mistake was political, not ideological." Referring to the Republican platform in Kansas City, the writer then states, "I can fully understand Dr. Dobriansky's disillusion with detente."

The chief thrust of the rebuttal is that the writer doesn't believe Carter would do any better than Ford because our "detente-ridden foreign policy has been thoroughly bipartisan." He proceeds to take up the cases of China, the captive nations, Helsinki and so forth and argues that the all-important matter is military might. He ends in this vein, "When it comes to realities, Dr. Dobriansky should ask himself a single question on the morning of Nov. 2. That question is which party is best prepared to keep military 'R and D' going and to vote the appropriations needed to keep the world balance of power tilted in our favor."

The answer to the question is that there is general realization for a firming up of our military strength, to be achieved by selective improvement more than just increased appropriations. Also, the super-emphasis placed by the writer on the military neglects political, economic and other weapons necessary to cope with the Soviet Russian challenge.

"THE CAPTIVE-NATION CAPER," a column by Andrew M. Greeley. *Sunday News*, New York, October 24, 1976.

Under the column's caption of "People and Values" this popular writer starts by saying, "Before Americans forget completely about Eastern Europe — that marvelous election bonus which President Ford gave to Governor Carter — there is an important point to be made: The captive nations issue, so much before the public eye for a few weeks, has been a matter of profound concern to some 7% of the population for three decades." The writer feels that the country will forget the issue and that the 7% will be grossly insulted.

He does a splendid job on comparing the issue with those of Israel and Black rights. To say the issues are simply different is misleading. As he puts it, "If one wants to play that game, the differences go both ways. Israel is an

independent country and Lithuania, the Ukraine, and even Poland and Hungary are not." His arguments are penetrating, and his words are striking. For example, he writes, "Freedom and dignity are indivisible. One supports them everywhere or nowhere." How pungently put.

In applying his rules the writer minces few words. For instance, "The Jew who is for freedom in Israel and not in Poland is a hypocrite; the black who is for equal rights in the United States and not for equal rights in Lithuania is a hypocrite..." In short, this piece is one of the finest written in behalf of the captive nations that one could recall.

"POPE REJECTS PLEA OF EXILED CARDINAL," an article. *The Evening Bulletin*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, July 30, 1976.

Ample coverage was given to the Pope's refusal to permit Cardinal Slipyj's attendance and participation in the Eucharistic Congress held this past August in Philadelphia. This extensive article is an example. No explanation was forthcoming from the Vatican for the negative action. Bishop Losten of Philadelphia is quoted as saying "That the Pope's action may have come from a desire to avoid disruption with in the church."

The article then proceeds to review the whole case of the patriarchate issue which analysts and observers are well familiar with by now. As to one view, Bishop Losten holds that canonically he is unable to consider the Cardinal a Patriarch because "the title has not been approved yet by the Pope or papal synod." Another view is recorded by Father Volodymyr Andrushkiw of Cohoes, New York, who believes that he is the Patriarch in view of the fact that in 1945 the cardinal before his arrest was archbishop of Lviv, an archdiocese that was the only Ukrainian archdiocese in the world at the time.

"AN UNHOLY PARTNERSHIP," a column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., November 10, 1976.

What many observers knew all along regarding the implementation of the Helsinki Accords is excellently summarized in this column. The unholy partnership referred to is between Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin. The partnership aims to stall the work of the Congressional Commission on the Helsinki pact.

The federal commission, consisting of 12 members of Congress and three executive branch officials, was unable to obtain visas from the East European Communist states for a fact-finding mission there. Thanks to Kissinger's negative attitude throughout, only Yugoslavia issued visas to the group. As the columnists state it, "the Soviet Union and all other Communist embassies in Washington (including Poland and Rumania) turned down visa requests in nearly identical language." This is just another example of Kissinger's attempted sabotage of the Fasel Commission. More will be heard about the commission in the months ahead.

"INCREASED POLICE REPRESSION," a commentary. *International Digest*, Washington, D.C., August 1976.

Published monthly by the American Council for World Freedom, this issue

highlights intensified KGB activity in the USSR. Based on reports of *Intelligence Digest*, Moscow is hardening its internal security measures as popular discontent and underground protest spread. The digest is quoted as saying, one of the problems facing the Soviet KGB and MVD is "the emergence of illegal or pirate Soviet radio stations which are supplementing the underground anti-Communist press within Russia."

Underground radio stations exist in Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkestan. In recent months, according to the commentary, the "number of arrests in the Ukraine for nationalist and religious activities has sharply increased. . ." Considering overall trends in the West as well as in the Soviet Union, such activities will inevitably expand.

"COLORFUL FINALE FOR CONGRESS," a report by John Corr and Thomas Ferrick, Jr. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 9, 1976.

Over 100,000 persons attended the concluding ceremony of the 41st Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia. This report features the addresses of the Pope and President Ford. On the first page the Ukrainian Bishop Losten stands out in impressive regalia among cardinals and bishops.

The Ukrainian Catholic contribution to the success of the Congress was notable. The many services conducted in its cathedral and churches, the symposium conducted under its auspices, and its vigorous participation in the week-long ceremonies and events advanced the status and meaning of the Ukrainian Catholic Church among all the participants in the Congress.

"UKRAINIANS VIEW CANADA AS THE LAST HAVEN," an article by Roman Rakhmany. *The Winnipeg Tribune*, Winnipeg, Canada, January 17, 1976.

Syndicated in papers throughout Canada, this absorbing article underlines the hope countless Ukrainians in the USSR nurture for some day emigrating to Canada. The prolific writer of the piece presents with deep human feeling the expressions of several dissidents who look to Canada as their last haven. Two of them have renounced their Soviet citizenship and requested the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for permission to emigrate to Canada.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, 38-year old radio and TV journalist, is quoted as saying, "I have already appealed to the Canadian government to grant me Canadian citizenship and to take steps towards my release and my departure from the USSR" Another prisoner, Danylo L. Shumuk, has taken similar steps and observes, "Having been deprived of my freedom and my Motherland (Ukraine), I have no need for the citizenship, because without freedom and a homeland that citizenship is superfluous for me." All this indicates the backlog that has been forming and awaiting the implementation of Helsinki.

"AMERICA'S BICENTENNIAL YEAR MARKS THE UKRAINIAN CENTENNIAL ALSO," a statement by the Honorable Christopher J. Dodd. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., June 14, 1976.

In a fine congressional statement Representative Dodd of Connecticut points out the fact that in 1876, "Ukrainians came to these shores to settle and con-

tribute to the building of a great nation." He underestimates the number of Americans of Ukrainian descent, but he incorporates many essentials that form their contribution to American life. The approximately two million exceed his number of 800,000.

The Congressman is quick to contrast life here with that in the Soviet Union. Referring to Chornovil, Iryna Senyk, Valentyn Moroz and others, he states, "Their names are an 'Honor Roll' of freedom-fighters to whom we should pay due respect." His concluding remarks are worth noting: "I think we can do this best by telling our captive brethren in the Ukraine that they are not alone in their human rights struggle, and that we are with them. As we approach our own Bicentennial, we can do no less."

"CELEBRATING HERITAGE CAN BE FUN," an article by Allison Wolowitz. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D.C., June 19, 1976.

The celebration staged by Ukrainian Americans on our Bicentennial is given in detailed account here. The entire program is portrayed, including a traditional Ukrainian food fair, an art exhibit, the parade from the Washington Monument to the Shevchenko statue, the symposium at Catholic University, and the concert at Constitution Hall.

For any individual group this celebration was the most outstanding in the Nation's capital. It fittingly preceded the official celebration a week later. On record, every American of Ukrainian background can take pride in this achievement.

"SOVIET PROMISES: MERELY EMPTY WORDS," a statement by the Honorable Edward I. Koch. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., July 22, 1976.

The articulate Representative from New York minces few words in stripping down Moscow's promises. Against the words of the USSR Constitution, the Helsinki Accords and other documents that the Russian totalitarians conceal themselves with, specific facts of abuse and tyranny are presented. As the Congressman says, "ostensibly the Soviet Union represents a bastion of freedom and rights for all."

For the promise of "religious freedom," he cites the case of Pastor Georgi Vins, the leader of a Baptist movement in the USSR. Vins has been harassed and imprisoned over the past 13 years. For "freedom of speech," the Congressman mentions the Crimean Tartar Mustafa Dzhemilev, Valentyn Moroz and others. For his work in behalf of the oppressed in the USSR, Congressman Koch was honored with a "Shevchenko Freedom Award" at the 12th Quadrennial Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent.

"ARCHBISHOP AMBROSE SENYSHYN, 73," an obituary. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 12, 1976.

The death of Archbishop Senyshyn, metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of America, came as a heavy loss both to the Church and the Ukrainian American community. As mentioned in this obituary, the Archbishop was born in 1903 in Stary Sambir in Ukraine. He entered the Basilian novitiate in 1922 and was ordained a priest in 1931.

The prelate came to this country in 1933 to serve in a Chicago parish. In 1942, Pope Pius XII elevated him to the status of bishop. He became the metropolitan of Philadelphia in 1961. The Archbishop played constructive and significant roles in the civic and political life of the community.

"BUCKLEY URGES AT UKRAINIAN RALLY THAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY STRESS 'FREEDOM FOR ALL CAPTIVE NATIONS,'" a report. *The New York Times*, New York, October 18, 1976.

At a rally in Bryant Park, Senator James L. Buckley of New York declared that a keystone of American foreign policy should be "freedom for all captive nations." The Senator has consistently maintained this during his tenure in the Senate. To an assembly of several hundred the Senator also urged adequate funds for Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Voice of America. "We must never allow those voices to be stilled," he said.

Sharing the same platform with the Senator was Representative Edward I. Koch. The Congressman bore on the human rights issue in the Soviet Union. It was a tragic outcome for the Senator in the elections a month later. His qualities of leadership and personal integrity will be lost in that august body.

"FIRST THOUGHTS ON THE SECOND DEBATE," a letter-to-the-editor by Vera A. Dowhan. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D.C., October 15, 1976.

President Ford's gniffe on no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe is the focal point of this letter to the editor. The writer is executive secretary of the National Captive Nations Committee. She characterizes the President's statement as "shocking and ludicrous."

As the writer emphasizes, "If there is no Soviet domination over eastern Europe, how does the President account for his 1976 Captive Nations Week Proclamation in which he stressed United States support for the aspirations of freedom, independence and national self-determination of all peoples?" Quite aptly, the writer states that the President's statement was "a bonanza for the Kremlin."

"DODD SAYS SOVIETS ARE MAKING A MOCKERY OF HELSINKI ACCORDS," a report. *The News*, New London, Connecticut, October 8, 1976.

Addressing the 12th Quadrennial Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent in the Americana Hotel in New York, Congressman Dodd of Connecticut told the 1,000 delegates and guests that Moscow has been manipulating the Helsinki Accords to its own advantage. He stressed that only a continuing public and official outcry such as ours can force Moscow to change their anti-human rights policies.

The Congressman pointed out also, "The Congress of the United States and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America have worked very hard in the past to correct these injustices." He continued, "We cannot afford to diminish this effort now..." The Congressman speaks and comports himself in the finest tradition of his great father, the late Senator of Connecticut.

L. E. D.

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

I. UKRAINIAN LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES

UCCA Congratulatory Message to President-elect Carter. — On November 3, 1976, Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky sent the following telegram to President-elect Jimmy Carter:

"Heartiest and warmest congratulations on your well-deserved victory. We look forward to your positive leadership here and abroad, to develop new dimensions of policy in order to make our America great again. As in the past campaign, you have our fullest measure of support and confidence."

The telegram was sent on behalf of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the National Captive Nations Committee, of which Prof. Dobriansky is president and chairman, respectively.

Captive Nations Week in Boston. — The week of July 18-24, 1976 was designated as "Captive Nations Week" in Massachusetts by Governor Michael S. Dukakis. Referring to the American Bicentennial, the proclamation stated that the "Captive Nations of Armenia, Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and others, today find themselves in a situation which strongly parallels that from which these United States of America liberated themselves two hundred years ago."

It also added that Americans from the captive nations "by their commitment to the national independence of the captive nations — Armenia, Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and others — have heightened the appreciation of the blessings of liberty and self-determination among their fellow citizens."

The observance was sponsored by Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian organizations in Metropolitan Boston. Gov. Dukakis signed the proclamation on June 30 in the presence of Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian representatives. The Boston UCCA Branch was represented by Konrad Husak, president, Orest Szczudluk, vice president, Mrs. Maria Walzer and Mrs. Tania D'Avignon.

On Sunday, July 18, priests of the Boston Catholic Archdiocese included in the prayers of the faithful "a remembrance of those suffering throughout the world." Prayers were requested by Humberto Cardinal Madeiros, Archbishop of Boston, according to the July 16, 1976 issue of **The Pilot**, Archdiocesan weekly. Also, all priests received a press release, which detailed the purpose of the CNW and the current situation in captive countries in Eastern Europe.

On June 11, 1976 representatives of Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian organizations visited Cardinal Madeiros and asked him for assistance in the observance of this year's CNW. The Boston UCCA Branch, which arranged the audience, was represented by Very Rev. Peter Ohirko, pastor of Christ the King Ukrainian Catholic Church, Mrs. Maria Walzer and Walter Tutka.

On July 21, 1976, the "Bob Hilton Show" on Channel 7, WNAC-TV, included a short program dedicated to the observance of the CNW, and Orest Szczudluk, chairman of this year's CNW Committee, informed viewers about the captive nations in the Russian colonial empire, their struggle for freedom and the purpose of the CNW to enlist the support of the American people, the U.S. Government and the Congress for the freedom and independence of all captive nations. Special emphasis was placed on informing the public through "letters to the editor" in several Boston newspapers.

Impressive Ukrainian Bicentennial Festival in Philadelphia. — Some 15,000 Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians, including many delegates attending the Fourth Congress of Ukrainian Students in the Free World, viewed the diverse program marking the Bicentennial of the American Revolution and the Centennial of the Ukrainian Settlement in America, held on Friday, August 13, 1976 at the Robin Hood Dell in Philadelphia, Pa.

The concert was the culmination of a week-long series of Ukrainian exhibits and programs in honor of the dual anniversaries, staged by the local Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee. "Philadelphia '76," the official municipal Bicentennial organization, approved the events as a recognized project in the City of Brotherly Love. Citing the many "contributions to the cultural and social life of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," Mayor Frank L. Rizzo proclaimed the week of August 9-15 as "Ukrainian Week."

During the concert intermission Roman Shwed introduced Paul Garabidian, coordinator of ethnic programs for "Philadelphia '76," who presented Dr. Ivan Skalechuk, president of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee, with a plaque for the Ukrainian community's participation in the jubilee. Also singled out by Mr. Garabidian for their work were other members of the committee, namely Oksana Gengalo, vice-president, Stefania Pushkar, cultural chairman, and Methodius Borecky and Dr. Mykola Cenko, members. Also attending the concert were Bishop Basil H. Losten, Apostolic Administrator of the Philadelphia Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy, Joseph Lesawyer, president of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of America, and Ivan Bazarko, Executive Director of the UCCA.

Taking part in the festival, named "Echoes of Ukraine," were Renata Babak, mezzo-soprano, formerly with the Lviv and Bolshoi Operas; Andriy Dobriansky, bass-baritone with the Metropolitan Opera, with Thomas Hrynkiw, accompanying both performers; pianist Roman Rudnytsky, who performed for the first time "Fantasia Op. 41" composed by his father, the late Dr. Antin Rudnytsky; the Shevchenko Bandura Capella from Detroit, under the direction of Hryhory Kytasty; the local mixed choir "Kobzar," directed by Roksolana Harsymovych, and the "Verkhovyntsi" SUMA dancers from New York, with choreography, by Oleh Genza.

Other programs culminating "Ukrainian Week" were a Folk Art Exhibit at the Folklife Pavilion at Eakins Oval on the Benjamin Franklin Parkway, where different aspects of Ukrainian folklife, such as weaving, wood carving, Easter egg decorating, folk instruments, embroidery and ceramics were demonstrated on designated days.

There also were outdoor concerts of songs and dance staged at Independence Mall and Eakins Oval. In addition, a month-long exhibit of the works of Alexander Archipenko, Alexis Hryshchenko, Jacques Hnizdovsky, and George Kruk were on display at the University Museum.

Ukrainian Catholics Participate in the Eucharistic Congress. — Thousands of Ukrainian Catholic faithful and numerous clergy from the United States, Canada, Europe and South America were among the half million participants in the 41st International Eucharistic Congress, held from August 1 to August 8, 1976 in Philadelphia, Pa. The official Ukrainian participation was led by Bishop Basil H. Losten, Apostolic Administrator of the Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy of Philadelphia, who also headed the Ukrainian section of the Eucharistic Committee.

The 41st International Eucharistic Congress, whose theme was "Hunger for Jesus. Bread and Life," opened on August 1, with a procession through the center of the city. Some 800 Ukrainians marched in the procession, some in native costumes with the Hutsul "Cheremosh" group getting special applause from the estimated 300,000 viewers that lined the streets. The Ukrainian group carried the sign "Ukraine" and some thirty male members of the League of Ukrainian Catholics pulled a float depicting themes of the Congress.

Beside Bishop Losten, other Ukrainian hierarchs who took part in the Congress and concelebrated Liturgies at the Cathedral of Immaculate Conception were: Bishop Joseph M. Schnondziuk and Bishop Jaroslav Gabro (U.S.A.), Bishop Andrew Roborecky, Bishop Jerome Chymij and Bishop Demetrius Greschuk (Canada) and Bishop Efrem Kryvyj (Brazil).

On August 3, 1976, a symposium of four speakers — Bishop Losten, Rev. Athanasius Pekar, Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky and Dr. Peter G. Stercho (who also served as moderator) — discussed the plight of the Ukrainian Catholic Church under Soviet Russian domination. A panel discussion on Eastern spirituality was held on August 4 at the Ukrainian American Citizens Club, with Rev. Dr. Ronald Popivchak acting as coordinator, which included Sister Marian, Rev. Emil Boychuk, Rev. Alexander Hawkaliuk and Sister Agnes.

An ecumenical service was held at the Cathedral on August 5, with Bishop Losten hosting Pastor Ivan Berkuta of the First Ukrainian Baptist Church in Philadelphia. "Youth and the Eucharist" was the theme of a special multi-media presentation compiled by Peter Galadza and directed by the newly-ordained Rev. Roman Mirchuk, joined by Revs. John Sianchuk, and Emil Boychuk. The event was held on August 6.

Some 800 persons attended a concert of Ukrainian church music on August 6, in which the following took part: Andrij Dobriansky and Carlotta Ordassy-Earanska, of the New York Metropolitan Opera; pianists Thomas Hrynkiv and Martha Cybyk, violinist Adrian Brittan, St. John the Baptist Church Choir from Newark, N.J. under the direction of Michael Dobosh, the "Prometheus" Male Choir under the direction of Michael Dlaboha, and the "Kobzar" Mixed Choir, directed by Roxolana Harasymovych.

On Saturday, August 7, the Cathedral was packed with the faithful for the Liturgy concelebrated by the participating Ukrainian bishops. That afternoon some 15,000 persons attended the Byzantine Liturgy at the Veterans Stadium, which was celebrated in English, Arabic, Greek and Old Slavonic. The combined Ukrainian choirs sang the responses in Old Slavonic from the reading of the Gospel through the end of the Liturgy. The main celebrant was Melkite Patriarch Maximos V Hakim, who mentioned three times the name of "Joseph Cardinal Slipyj, head of the Ukrain-

ian Catholic Church," during the Liturgy. Bishop Losten was master of ceremonies, assisted by Frs. R. Popivchak, Martin Canavan, Richard Semnack and John Bura, while Rev. John Steversky was one of the deacons.

The Eucharistic Congress concluded with the "Statio Orbis" Liturgy on Sunday, August 8, at the JFK Stadium with some 100,000 in attendance, including hundreds of Ukrainians, led by the clergy and the colorfully attired "Cheremosh" Hutzul group. A message from Pope Paul VI was transmitted directly from the Vatican, and President Gerald Ford appeared in person and addressed the throng.

Protest Pope's Ban on Patriarch Slipyj's Trip to U.S. — Concurrently with the Ukrainian participation in the Eucharistic Congress, several hundred members of the Ukrainian Patriarchal World Federation and the Society for the Patriarchal System in the Ukrainian Catholic Church staged a week-long protest scoring the Vatican for barring Patriarch Slipyj from attending the Eucharistic Congress and for its "religious" detente with Moscow. Throughout the week, members of the above-mentioned organizations distributed thousands of brochures and leaflets, decrying the Vatican's attitude toward the Ukrainian Catholic Church, its neglected martyrdom in Ukraine, the bartering with the Kremlin at the expense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the negative stand on the question of the Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate.

The group picketed daily the residence of John Cardinal Krol, host of the Eucharistic Congress, who was accused of failing to invite Joseph Cardinal Slipyj to the Catholic gathering.

On August 5, 1976, a group of the Society's members interrupted an address on ecumenism by the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Marshall, president of the Lutheran Church in America, by chanting through bullhorns: "What price ecumenism?" One of the women then proceeded to state that Jan Cardinal Willebrands is the "architect of Vatican-Moscow detente, a dialogue for which he sacrificed the Ukrainian Catholic Church." Cardinal Willebrands presided over the session. Dr. Marshall acknowledged that the protesters raised a valid question.

Also, on August 5, members of the Society were received by Patriarch Maximos V Hakim, who is said to be sympathetic to the cause of a Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate and who earlier took a strong stand on married clergy, stating that the Eastern Churches "have the right, and the exercise of the rights, to admit married men to the order of priests."

The protest activities of the Ukrainian patriarchal groups were extensively covered by the Philadelphia press, especially **The Evening Bulletin**, **The Philadelphia Inquirer**, and **The Western Catholic Reporter**, **The Evening Times** (Trenton, N.J.), and others.

Ukrainian Orthodox League Holds Convention in Cleveland. — Mrs. Alice B. Sivulich of Easton, Pa. and John Pawluk of Minneapolis, Minn. were re-elected presidents of the Ukrainian Orthodox League of the U.S.A. and of the UOL's Junior League, respectively, at the 29th annual convention, held in Cleveland, Ohio, on July 14-18, 1976. Other officers elected at the convention were: Dr. Stephen Sivulich and Mrs. Elizabeth Mitchell, first and second vice-presidents; Deborah Sirko, treasurer; Andrea Chromchak, recording secretary; Martha Sheska, corresponding secretary; Linda

Arson, financial secretary, and Maria Sulyn, Martin Trembly and Joseph Wosnak, auditors.

Last year, Mrs. Silvilich became the first woman to head this Ukrainian American youth organization.

Spiritual advisors, appointed by Metropolitan Mstyslav Skrypnyk, head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A., are: Revs. Andrew Beck of Carnegie, Pa., William Diakiw of Lyndora, Pa., and John Nakonachny of Maplewood, N.J.

Joining Mr. Pawluk on the UOL's Junior League executive board are: Rebecca Druash, vice-president; Marcus Filipovich, treasurer; Donna Wachnowsky, correspondencing secretary; Dori Hryshchyshyn, recording secretary, Ruth Zapaniuk, financial secretary, and Miss M. Sheska, as advisor. Appointed spiritual advisor by Metropolitan Mstyslav was Rev. John Scharba of Hammond, Ind.

CeSUS Holds Its Fourth Congress in Philadelphia. -- Andrew Chirovsky, a theology student at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome, was elected president of the Central Union of Ukrainian Students (CeSUS) during the fourth Congress of Ukrainian Students in the Free World, held on August 12-15, 1976, at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, Pa. He is the author of an English-language anthology of the works of Vasyl Symonenko.

In his acceptance speech, Mr. Chirovsky said that the role of CeSUS should be two-fold: it should be a coordinating body for all Ukrainian students and, secondly, it should be a training center for future community leaders. He further stated that during the next three years, the CeSUS executive board will make efforts to have the union admitted into the U.N. as a Non-Governmental Organization, and will continue actions in defense of Ukrainian political prisoners in the USSR and Ukraine, and engage in community, church and cultural activities.

This year's congress, in contrast to that held in 1973, was devoid of ideological undertones, although a leftist-oriented group of Ukrainian students, mostly from Canada, made a bid for the presidency of the Union, but it lost to the majority. The latter consisted of delegates representing the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations in America (SUSTA), the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations in Europe (SUSTE), the World Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of Michnowsky (TUSM), the Organization of Youths of Ukrainian Descent (ODUM) and the Ukrainian Academic Society "ZAREVO."

In addition to Mr. Chirovsky, the new board includes the following: Andriy Onuferko (SUSTE) -- general secretary; Oleh Zawadowsky (SUSTA) -- treasurer; Myron Tataryn, the Ukrainian Canadian Students' Union (SUSK) -- international liaison; Dmytro Jakuta (ODUM) -- press and information. The auditing board is headed by Zenovij Zwarycz (SUSK) and the arbitration board by Andrij Chornodolsky (SUSTA).

The European delegation was composed of Ukrainian students from Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, Austria and France. All in all, CeSUS is said to represent some 5,000 Ukrainian students in the free world.

Mr. Ivan Bazarko, UCCA Executive Director, delivered greetings from this central Ukrainian American organization during the Congress' business session.

XIIth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent Held in New York City. — On October 8-10, 1976 the XIIth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent, or the UCCA Congress, was held at the Americana Hotel in New York City, which was attended by 487 delegates and some two hundreds guests from all parts of the United States.

Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University was reelected President of the UCCA for his ninth consecutive term. Reelected also were Joseph Lesawyer and Ivan Bazarko as executive vice-president and administrative director, respectively. In addition, the Congress elected an Executive Board of 15 members, a National Council, an Auditing Committee and a Board of Appeals. The post of the executive vice-president will be rotated each year among representatives of the four Ukrainian American fraternal associations.

a) **Notables at the Congress:** Attending the Congress, its luncheons, banquet and business sessions were Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, who brought the audience to its feet when he stated that no official in the U.S. government is against the liberation of Ukraine, but it has been a standing U.S. position to advocate freedom and independence of all peoples who seek it; U.S. Senator James L. Buckley; Mykola Livytsky, President of the Ukrainian National Republic-in-exile; U.S. Congressmen Lester Wolff, John Murphy, Edward I. Koch and Christopher Dodd; Dr. Myron B. Kuropas and William J. Baroody, Assistants to President Ford; Mykola Plawiuk, vice president of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians; Dr. Serhiy Radchuk, president of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC); Mrs. Patrick Moynihan, wife of the Democratic candidate for the U.S. Senate from the State of New York, and Rev. Michael Bourdeaux, director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Communism, in London.

b) **Business Sessions:** The XIIth Congress was prepared by the UCCA office and a special committee in charge of arrangements, which included Dr. Roman Klufas, Stepan Chuma, Olena Hirniak, Anastasia Brodin, Pauline Andrienko-Danchuk, Rosalie Polche, Maria Zuk, Daria Semegen, Olena Hentish, Eugene Luckyj, Mykhailo Yuzeniv, Mykola Chomanchuk, Michael Saldan, Roman Krupka and Mykhailo Turko.

The session was officially opened by UCCA President Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, who expressed the hope that the deliberations of the Congress would proceed in orderly fashion and in an organizational business manner. Thereafter, UCCA executive vice president Joseph Lesawyer conducted the session, calling on the youth units to mass their colors, and asking Rev. Dr. Volodymyr Gawlich of St. George's Ukrainian Catholic Church, to offer the invocation.

There were two slates for election of the Congress Presidium of which the first had an overwhelming majority; as a result the following delegates were elected to the Congress Presidium: Prof. Peter G. Stercho (Drexel University) — chairman; Dr. Bohdan Futey, Mrs. Ivanka Rozankowska, Askold Lozynsky, Dmytro Hryhorchuk — vice chairmen; Eugene Iwashkiw and Mrs. Dana Procyk, secretaries, and Orest Szczudiuk and Zenon Onufryk, members.

In turn, Mr. Bazarko read and explained a set of regulations, which, with certain modifications, were adopted. At that moment Congressman Lester Wolff (D., N.Y.) appeared, and introduced by Mr. Lesawyer, de-

livered a brief address criticizing Soviet Russian policies of genocide in Ukraine.

During the afternoon session, after a welcoming address by Mr. Plawiuk from the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Mr. Bazarko read the list of members of the Bylaws Committee and the Nominating Committee, elected at the pre-Congress session of the UCCA Board of Directors. The first committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. John O. Flis, included Dr. Irene Padoch, Paul Dorozynsky, Dr. Volodymyr Nesterchuk, Alexander Shevchenko, Dr. Bohdan Dzerovych and Yaroslav Rak. and advisors Dr. Vincent Shandor, M. Kormylo, Petro Samoyliw and Dr. Stercho.

The Nominating Committee, headed by Walter Sochan, included the following: Dr. Yaroslav Bernadyn, vice president; Christine Kulchycky and Walter Masur, secretaries; Dr. Michael Danyluk, Dr. Bohdan Hnatiuk, Christine Nawrocky, Andrew Sokolyk, Dr. Matthew Stachiw, Dr. Wasyl Omelchenko, Stefania Bukshowana, Lev Pryshlak, Ivan Porytko, Michael Nych, Dr. Volodymyr Sawchak and Michael Chaikivsky.

Several special working committees, such as those on youth, schools, education, external and internal affairs, the situation in Ukraine, resolutions and so forth, were elected from the floor. Brief supplementary reports were rendered by members of the UCCA Executive Board, the chairman of the Policy Board, Prof. Ivan Wowchuk; Dr. Walter Gallan for Social Service; John Wynnyk, chairman of the Auditing Committee; Dr. Edward Zarsky for the UCCA Educational Council, and Roman Huhlewych for the Board of Appeals.

During that part of the session two U.S. Congressmen addressed the gathering: Rep. John Murphy (D., N.Y.) and Christopher Dodd (D., Conn.) at the luncheon session.

The principal address was delivered by Prof. Dobriansky, titled, "Telling It Like It Is," in which he assailed U.S. foreign policy toward the USSR, and proposed that the Congress send a protest to the White House.

In turn, Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and chairman of the Resolutions Committee, read a prepared statement to President Ford, voicing the Congress' protest against his views pertaining to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. The resolution was accepted with some minor modifications and sent to the White House.

Mrs. Ulana Mazurkewych, head of the Philadelphia Moroz Committee, read excerpts from an interview Averell Harriman gave that day over NBC's "Today Show," in which he told Brezhnev that Cardinal Slipyj is not a "full cardinal," and that the United States is not planning to "join the Ukrainian liberation movement." Some 400 signatures were collected to send telegrams to President Ford and Governor Jimmy Carter on the Harriman issue.

The Friday evening session concluded with the acceptance of a vote of confidence to the outgoing officers, submitted by Mr. Wynnyk, chairman of the Auditing Committee.

c) **Appearance of Vice President Rockefeller at the Banquet:** The plenary session on Saturday was devoted almost wholly to discussion on changes of the Bylaws, with Dr. John Flis and Mr. Dorozynsky outlining in detail each and every proposal, then submitting them to the Congress as motions, requiring a simple majority to pass.

Mr. Bohdan Fedorak of Detroit, Mich, delivered an address on Saturday, dealing with Ukrainians in America, their role in American life and their responsibilities to their kin in Ukraine.

Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller appeared unexpectedly at the banquet to rectify President Ford's ill-fated remarks dealing with the "independence" of Eastern Europe, made during a television debate with Mr. Carter three days earlier.

"All I can say is that it was a mistake, period," said Mr. Rockefeller. "He is for the freedom of all nations and the freedom of all people, including Ukrainians. He is your friend and I know it." The Vice President explained that President Ford was under "a great deal of tension" during the debate and "he said the reverse of what he wanted to say."

"I wanted to be here myself, to be with my friends, to set the record straight." He was given a standing ovation by some 700 Ukrainians when he entered the banquet hall and when he was leaving. He was introduced by Dr. Dobriansky.

In his official greetings on behalf of the White House, Dr. Myron B. Kuropas, Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs, conveyed the text of a telegram from President Ford:

"I send my warmest greetings to the delegates of the XIIth Quandrennial meeting of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and I applaud your efforts to perpetuate in this country the great culture and traditions of your forebears.

"Your untiring dedication to the highest principles of democratic life have enabled you to contribute to the strength and vitality of this nation while at the same time bringing credit to your ancestral heritage."

Another Assistant to President Ford, William J. Baroody, present at the banquet, did not speak.

d) **Presentation of the "Shevchenko Freedom Awards"**: Senator James L. Buckley and Congressman Edward I. Koch, both of New York, appeared briefly at the banquet, receiving their "Shevchenko Freedom Award" from Dr. Dobriansky and Mr. Lesawyer, respectively. Both legislators praised Ukrainians and pledged support in their struggle for the freedom and independence of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian recipients of the "Shevchenko Freedom Award" were His Beatitude Patriarch Slipyj, whose plaque was presented by Dr. Dushnyck to Rev. Mitrata Volodymyr Bilinsky; a posthumous presentation of the award to the late Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn by Bohdan Fedorak to Msgr. Myroslav Charyna.

Also, receiving the Awards were: Mrs. Lydia Burachynska from Mrs. Ivan Rozankowska; attorney Michael Piznak from Mr. Lesawyer; attorney Stephen Jarema from Dr. Dobriansky; Prof. Bohdan Hnatiuk from Mr. Bazarko; Dr. Ivan Skalchuk from Mr. Wynnyk, and Prof. Stercho from Dr. Anthony Zukowsky.

Each recipient made a brief statement in appreciation.

c) **Ethnic Representatives**: In turn, attorneys Bohdan Futey of Cleveland, O. and Julian Kulas of Chicago, Ill., who acted as toastmasters at the banquet, called on three Ukrainian speakers to address the gathering briefly: Mykola Livytsky, President of the Ukrainian National Republic-in-Exile, Mr. Mykola Plawiuk, vice president of the World Congress of

Free Ukrainians, and attorney Serhiy Radchuk, president of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee.

They also introduced ethnic leaders attending the banquet: Dr. John G. Lexa, secretary general of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences; Dr. John Kosiak, president of the Byelorussian Congress Committee of America; Dr. Ivan Docheff, president of the Bulgarian National Front; Dr. Juozas Audenas, Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania; Leopold Babirecki, Polish National Alliance and Polish American Congress, and Mr. Howland H. Sargeant, former president of "Radio Liberty Committee."

Appearing in the concert program of the banquet were Martha Kokska-Musiychuk, mezzo-soprano of the New York City Opera, and Andriy Dobriansky, bass-baritone with the Metropolitan Opera Company, accompanied by Prof. Ihor Sonevtsky and Roman Stecura, respectively. The banquet was opened by Mr. Wynnyk, chairman of the Banquet Committee, while the invocation was delivered by Msgr. Myroslav Charyna, president of the "Providence" Association of Ukrainian Catholics, and the benediction was said by Very Rev. Volodymyr Bazilewsky, rector of St. Volodymyr Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral, New York City.

f) **The Final Day:** Following religious services celebrated in the hotel by Rev. Gawlich, Dr. Kuropas delivered an address on special progress made and anticipated under the present Administration. Also, the Rev. Michael Bourdeaux, director of the Center on Religion and Communism in London, and Nick Medvid, delegate from California, addressed the session.

The debate on the Bylaws changes resumed and it was at 4:45 P.M. that the final item on the Bylaws agenda was voted upon. After a brief interval, the Nominating Committee proceeded with the presentation of the slate. Mr. Sochan, chairman of the Nominating Committee, read the names of persons and organizations with a statement explaining the complexity of the situation and difficult circumstances under which it had to work in view of the protracted debates on the Bylaws changes and the new structure just adopted. The election of the new UCCA organs followed.

Written messages and telegrams were received from Governor Carter (see "Pertinent Documents"), Metropolitan Mstyslav of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A., Bishop Jaroslav Gabro of the St. Nicholas Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy of Chicago; Governor Hugh Carey of New York; Mayor Abe Beame of New York; Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago; Pastor W. Borowsky of the Ukrainian Evangelical Alliance of North America; Pastor Mykola Harbuziuk of the Ukrainian Evangelical Baptist Alliance, and Antin Melnyk, from the Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigration in Europe, from Munich, Germany.

Patriarch Slipyj Greets the UCCA Congress. — In a written message, read at the Congress banquet by Rev. Mitrate Volodymyr Bilynsky, His Beatitude Patriarch Joseph Cardinal Slipyj, conveyed the following:

"To the Illustrious Congress of the UCCA:

"The unity of all leaderships of organizations in your Congress is a powerful factor in our church and national life. We must neutralize all divergencies and set one common course in decision activities for all; this will be a great attainment in our life.

I pray to the Almighty that your Congress be crowned with the best possible success and that it become a guideline for the whole Ukrainian people.

"Not being able to take part personally, I am sending hereby our Patriarchal Blessing.

"Divine Blessings for all of you!"

**Josyf
Patriarch**

The message, dated October 6, 1976, was sent from Toronto, Canada.

UCCA Congress Protests Ford's Statement on Eastern Europe. — On October 9, 1976 the XIIth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent dispatched the following telegram to President Ford:

The Twelfth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent, meeting on October 8, 9, 10, 1976 at the Americana Hotel in New York City hereby expresses its strong protest against your statement of October 6, 1976 to the effect that there is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and against enumeration of some countries under Communist rule which you classified as "free and independent." Your statement is not only contrary to known facts, but it contradicts your own proclamation of Captive Nations Week last July. Moreover, your pronouncement will help in great measure Soviet Russian propaganda in its claims that there are no captive peoples from East of the Elbe River to Vladivostok. Relentless persecution of the 50 million Ukrainian people by Communist Russia belies your assertion that there is no Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. There are more than 40 million Americans of Central and East European origin to whom your statement is an echo of the propaganda blare from Moscow. They wonder at our leadership of the free world when such a blatant misstatement is made. We know that the American people at large do not share this type of political statesmanship. We demand that a full rectification of this matter be made as soon as possible.

Presidium

Twelfth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent

Ukrainian Heritage Is Topic of Ten Lectures.—The Ukrainian perspective was the underlying theme of a series of 10 Bicentennial lectures ranging from "Why and How Did our Predecessors Come to This Land" (first) and "We in America by the Year 2000" (last).

The program was headed by Dr. Vasyl Markus, a native of Ukraine, and a professor of political science at Loyola University of Chicago, who was joined by 14 professors and recognized scholars from other universities.

A project of the Chicago Ukrainian community, the program, which coincides with the centenary of the first Ukrainian Settlement in the United States, was sponsored by the Center of Ukrainian and Religious Studies, 2305 West Superior Street, which selected Dr. Markus to plan and coordinate the program which began February 20 and ended May 14, 1976.

Funded in part by the National Endowment for the Humanities which provided a grant of \$5,000, the Ukrainian Bicentennial Program was presented in cooperation with the American Issues Forum in Chicago, which

prepared the essays on which the lecture topics were based. The lectures were held in the Cultural Center of Sts. Volodymyr and Olha, 2257 West Chicago Avenue, on Friday nights from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. Besides the ten lectures, there were two exhibits, the first on March 5-7 consisting of materials from the archives of the Ukrainian National Museum, and a second exhibit of Ukrainian American Artists in Chicago from April 30-May 2.

The series of lectures included:

- 1) "The Land of Plenty: How and Why Did Our Ancestors Immigrate to this Country?"—Dr. Jaroslaw Harasymiw (Northwestern University);
- 2) "A Nation of Nations: Stages and the Ways of Ukrainian Integration into a Larger Society"—Dr. Volodymyr Nahirny (Hunter College of CUNY);
- 3) "Our City—A Multi-Ethnic Home: Ukrainians in Chicago; The Influence of a Larger Mid-Western City on Ethnic Life"—Prof. Myroslaw Samchyshyn (Northwestern University);
- 4) "American Freedoms: How Did They Affect Ethnic Life"; Subtopic: "Religious Freedom"—Dr. Jaroslaw Pelensky and Dr. Thomas R. Bird (Queens College of CUNY);
- 5) "American Democracy at Work: What Did We Learn from and What Did We Contribute to the Workings of the American Political System?"—Dr. Eugene Pyziur (St. Louis University) and Dr. Richard S. Hartigan (Loyola University of Chicago);
- 6) "Work, Production and Rewards in America: Economic Achievements and Prospects of Ukrainian Immigrants in America and Chicago"—Dr. Jaroslaw Komarynsky (Northern Illinois University) and Dr. Lubomyr Wynar (Kent State University);
- 7) "Education in America: Family, School, Community. Who Are Our Children?"—Dr. Bohdan Cymbalisty (New Jersey State Schools for Boys) and Prof. Daria Markus (University of Illinois, Circle Campus);
- 8) "Culture and Artistic Creativity in America: American Influence on Ukrainian Cultural Activity"—Prof. Bohdan Rubchak (University of Illinois, Circle Campus);
- 9) "America: Global Power and Responsibility: How Can the United States Promote Freedom in Today's World?" Dr. Sam C. Sarkeian and Dr. Vasyl Markus (Loyola University of Chicago);
- 10) "Our America in the Year 2000: Ukrainian American Community by the Year 2000"—Dr. Thomas Kochman (University of Illinois, Circle Campus).

Unveil Lesia Ukrainka Monument in Kerhonkson, N.Y. — Some 2,000 persons took part in the unveiling of a monument of Lesia Ukrainka, Ukraine's greatest poetess, on Sunday, September 19, 1976, at the Ukrainian National Association (UNA) Estate (Soyuzivka) in Kerhonkson, N.Y. The monument, executed by sculptor Mykhailo Czereshniowsky, is placed on a mound opposite the bust of Taras Shevchenko, sculptured by the late Alexander Archipenko. The estate in the Catskill Mountains, is the property of the Ukrainian National Association, the oldest and largest Ukrainian

American fraternal association, and serves as a resort and cultural center for the association's 90,000 members.

After the singing of the American national anthem, Mrs. Mary Dushnyck, UNA vice president and chairman of its Women's Committee which was in charge of the monument erection, opened the ceremony and welcomed Prof. Isydora Kosach-Borysova, Lesia Ukrainka's sister, and all representatives and guests. Prof. Borysova, assisted by Mrs. Dushnyck and UNA President Joseph Lesawyer, unveiled the monument and cut the blue and yellow ribbon held by organization representatives near the statue. She also sprinkled it with soil brought from Ukraine by a tourist.

The monument was blessed by the Rev. Ivan Mak, pastor of the local Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Rev. Dr. Bohdan Woloshyn, the Very Rev. Protospesbyter Artemy Selepyna, head of the Consistory of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A., and the Rev. Joseph Lukaszewycz, each of the clergymen sprinkling it with holy water. The master of ceremonies was Mrs. Anna Haras, supreme advisor of the UNA.

The principal speaker at the ceremony was Dr. Larissa M. I. Onyshkevych, professor of literature at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J., who spoke on the "Contemporary Relevance of Lesia Ukrainka's Works."

The concert program included a medley of Ukrainian songs by the "Moloda Dumka" chorus from the metropolitan area of New York under the direction of Semen Komirny, to the piano accompaniment of Oksana Kuybida; several poems of the Ukrainian poetess recited in Ukrainian by Mrs. Ivanna Kononiw, noted dramatic artist, and the recitation in English of Lesia Ukrainka's poem "Contra Spem Spero" by Natalia Chuma, a rising Ukrainian actress from the younger generation; vocal arrangements, with choreography, of Lesia Ukrainka's poems, performed by seven girls from the Taras Shevchenko School of Ukrainian Subjects in Lachine, Que., Canada, under the direction of Mrs. Tekla Moroz, accompanied by guitarist Andrew Harasymovych.

Greetings from the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America were tendered by John Wynnyk, chairman of its auditing committee, and George Stefanyk, son of the famous Ukrainian novelist, Vasyl Stefanyk, who spoke on behalf of the Association of Ukrainian Writers "Slovo" in Canada.

At the conclusion, Mr. Lesawyer thanked Prof. Borysova, the clergy, performers and guests for taking part in the ceremony and the UNAWC for its efforts. Thereafter the program ended with the singing of the Ukrainian national anthem.

Patriarch Slipyj Visits UCCA. — On Friday, September 24, 1976 His Beatitude Patriarch Joseph Cardinal Slipyj visited the main offices of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian National Women's League of America at their headquarters in New York City. Some 110 persons, including school children, welcomed the venerable Ukrainian churchman and his secretary, the Rev. Dr. Ivan Dacko, both of whom had come to the U.S.A. for the funeral of the late Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn, who died on September 11, 1976.

The Ukrainian prelate was welcomed officially by Ivan Bazarko, Executive Director of the UCCA, and Mrs. Alexandra Riznyk, on behalf of the UNWLA, offering him traditional Ukrainian hospitality in the form of

bread and salt. Several PLAST and SUMA youths in their organizational uniforms presented Patriarch Josyf with flowers. Greeting the prelate was also Dr. Volodymyr Sawchak, chairman of the New York City UCCA Branch. Representing St. George's Ukrainian Catholic Church were Rev. Dr. V. Gawlich and Rev. Sebastian Shewchuk.

In his brief speech, Patriarch Josyf paid tribute to the Ukrainian community in America, saying it was "the most advanced settlement of Ukrainians in the free world."

"You set the tone for all Ukrainians to follow," he said. "Even Ukrainians in the native country look up to you." He further stated that being with Ukrainians in America is the most historic event in his life, as "Ukrainians here represent the best of our people." Referring to the Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate, he said that the establishment of such an institution is not "schismatic." "We are all Catholics, but we want our rights," he concluded.

Patriarch Josyf Meets with President Ford. -- On Saturday, September 18, 1976, President Gerald Ford met with Joseph Cardinal Slipyj, Bishop Basil H. Losten, Apostolic Administrator of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in America, and Bishop Ivan Prashko of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Australia, said an official White House press release. The meeting, held in the Oval Room at the White House, came about in response to a request from Bishop Losten immediately following the funeral of Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn and made through Dr. Myron B. Kuropas, Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs.

During the meeting, President Ford conveyed his condolences to the Ukrainian Catholic leadership on the death of Metropolitan Senyshyn and expressed his conviction that Ukrainian Catholics would be guided by the late Metropolitan's example of leadership.

Both Patriarch Slipyj and Bishop Losten expressed their concern over the plight of Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine who were not permitted to worship in freedom, and requested the President to do all in his power to see that human rights were restored to the people of Ukraine, concluded the release.

Following the meeting with President Ford, Patriarch Josyf went to Arlington National Cemetery, where the primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church celebrated a requiem service at the grave of the late President John F. Kennedy. It is to be recalled that President Kennedy was instrumental in Patriarch Josyf's release in 1963 from an 18-year incarceration in Siberia concentration camps.

Subsequently, Patriarch Slipyj visited a number of Ukrainian communities in the U.S. before departing for Canada. At his meetings in the various Ukrainian communities he repeatedly stressed the necessity for Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church as "firmest assurance of the preservation of unity of the Ukrainian people and their Church. . ." (cf. *The Catholic News*, September 30, 1976).

The 84-year-old prelate who has claimed he was prohibited from attending the International Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia last August because of his dispute with the Vatican, stated: "I am loyal to the See of Peter, to the Universal Church. All I desire and champion is the recogni-

tion of the Particular Ukrainian Catholic Church, that, indeed, all may be one. . ."

The Ukrainian prelate also met Archbishop Jean Jadot, Apostolic Delegate in the U.S., while visiting Washington, D.C.

Prof. Dobriansky Elected President of ACWF. — Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the UCCA, was elected President of the American Council for World Freedom (ACWF), at the organization's two-day meeting, held September 24-25, 1976 in Washington, D.C. Dr. Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, was elected a member of the Board of Directors, consisting of 22 members, including two former honorary ACWF presidents, Dr. Walter H. Judd and Fred Schlafly, and five members of the executive board.

Joining Dr. Dobriansky on the executive board, are: Dr. Stefan T. Possony, first vice President; David Keene, second vice president; Lee Edwards, secretary and Jay A. Parker, treasurer.

Other members of the Board of Directors, are: Paul Bethel, Rev. Raymond de Jaeger, Ronald F. Docksai, Dr. Joseph Dunner, Marx Lewis, Gen. Daniel Graham, Adm. John McCain, Dr. Robert Morris, Ron Pearson, Neil A. Salonen, Dr. David Rowe and Dr. Edward Rozek.

The ACWF consists of some 34 American national organizations, including the UCCA, which are dedicated to the support of the freedom and independence of the captive nations of Europe and Asia, and the preservation of the national security and independence of the United States.

"Ukrainian Day" Parade Draws 2,000 in New York City. — On Sunday, October 17, 1976, some 2,000 Ukrainian Americans paraded on New York's Fifth Avenue in the traditional "Ukrainian Day" parade, staged annually for the past several years. The parade concluded with a program at Bryant Park behind the New York Public Library.

Among the speakers were Sen. James L. Buckley and Congressman Edward I. Koch, both from New York; Robert D. Gould, ethnic campaign director for Daniel P. Moynihan; Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, newly-reelected President of the UCCA; Dr. Volodymyr Sawchak, chairman; of the New York City Branch of the UCCA, and Askold Lozynsky, who acted as master of ceremonies. The parade and rally, which were sponsored by the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of New York City, headed by Dr. John O. Flis, served as a salute to the Bicentennial and Centennial of the Ukrainian Settlement in America.

Several speakers scored President Ford's statement about the independence of Eastern Europe and called for unrelenting support by the United States of all captive nations, striving for their freedom and independence. The *New York Times* of October 18, 1976 gave extensive coverage of the event.

Open UNWLA Ukrainian Museum in New York. — On Sunday, October 3, 1976, some 500 persons took part in the opening ceremonies of the Ukrainian Museum at the UCCA-UNWLA building at 203 Second Avenue, New York City. The Museum, according to Mrs. Oksana Grabowicz, curator, is the culmination of some 50 years of work by members of the Ukrainian National Women's League of America (UNWLA — "Soyuz Ukrainok"), who have been collecting, preserving and cataloguing Ukrainian historical

artifacts. Mrs. Grabowicz stated that only "seven to eight percent of our artifacts are on display at the present time."

On display during the opening were Ukrainian *kylyms* (rugs), embroidered cloths, shirts, blouses, a Hutsul wedding veil, vases, ceramics, silverwork, and woodcrafts; many of the pieces date back to the 18th and 19th centuries.

Speaking at the dedication on Saturday, October 2, 1976 were Mrs. I. Rozankowska, Mrs. A. Riznyk, Ivan Bazarko, Dr. V. Sawchak, Joseph Le-sawyer, and Mrs. U. Diachuk.

Representing the Ukrainian churches were Bishop Basil H. Losten, Apostolic Administrator of the Philadelphia Archeparchy, the Rev. Dr. Volodymyr Gawlich and Rev. Dr. Meletius Wojnar, from the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and Rev. Volodymyr Bazylewsky, pastor of St. Volodymyr Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral.

On Thursday, September 30, a press preview was held for Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian journalists. Reporters and photographers from *The New York Times*, *Daily News*, *Good Housekeeping* as well as from the Ukrainian press, viewed the exhibit.

OBITUARIES: Archbishop Ambrose Senyshyn, Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States, died on Saturday, September 11, 1976, at the age of 73, after a prolonged illness, which had incapacitated him for almost a year. He was buried on September 16, 1976, with Patriarch Josyf Slipyj leading hundreds of clergy of various denominations. The remains were interred at the Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception crypt in Philadelphia, Pa.

Prof. Alexander A. Granovsky, professor emeritus of the University of Minnesota, and one of the leading Ukrainian political leaders, died on Thursday, November 4, 1976, the exact day of his 89th birthday. He was buried on November 6, 1976 in St. Paul, Minn.

(Extensive articles-obituaries on Metropolitan Senyshyn and Prof. Granovsky will appear in the Spring 1977 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* — Editor.)

a) Eugene Lachowitch, outstanding Ukrainian political leader and former participant in the struggle for Ukraine's independence, died in Deerfield, Fla. on October 16, 1976 at the age of 76 after a prolonged illness.

Mr. Lachowitch was born on June 4, 1900 in Ushnia, Ukraine. In 1918, as an 18-year-old youth he joined the ranks of the Ukrainian Galician Army and fought for the independence of Ukraine until 1921. In the years 1922-23 he studied at the Polytechnic in Danzing, and in 1923 he emigrated to the United States, where he continued his studies, receiving a diploma in engineering.

But his love for his native Ukraine drew him into the continued struggle for the independence of Ukraine. As a member of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) and later of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Mr. Lachowitch went to London as the representative of the late Col. Eugene Konovalets, head of the OUN, where he spent 2 years (1933-35), lecturing to important British political groups, running an information bureau and developing important political contacts.

In the summer of 1935 he returned to the United States and became an associate editor of *Svoboda* and also an organizer for the Organization

for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU). In addition, he contributed to such Ukrainian publications in the U.S. as *America*, *Nationalist*, *The Trident and Ukraine*; *Visnyk* (The Herald) in Lviv, and *Rozbudova Natsii* (Reconstruction of a Nation), in Prague, Czechoslovakia.

In 1942, he left the editorial staff of *Svoboda* and joined a commercial engineering firm, first in Brooklyn, N.Y., and later in Miami, Fla.

During 1946-48 he was very active in the Ukrainian Liberation Front and was one of the founders and first president of the Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms for Ukraine (ODFFU). He also authored a number of brochures and books. Surviving him are his wife, Olga, nee Hrytsai, daughters Karen and Christine, four grandchildren and three sisters.

b) **Dr. Theodore Dobzhansky**, world-renowned geneticist, who gained international acclaim for his research, writing and lecturing about evolution and genetics and their relationship to modern man, died in Davis, Calif. on December 18, 1975, at the age of 75.

Born in Nemyriv, Ukraine, on January 25, 1900, Dr. Dobzhansky received his early education as a naturalist at the University of Kiev, from which he graduated in 1921; he remained in the Ukrainian capital for three years as an assistant in zoology and later lectured at the University of Leningrad.

He left Ukraine when the science of genetics was suppressed by Stalinist dogma and, as a Fellow of the International Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, worked at Columbia University in 1927-28. Later he taught at various universities in the U.S., completing his teaching and research as an adjunct professor of genetics at the University of California.

It is to be recalled that in 1953, at a scientific convention in Hamburg, Dr. Dobzhansky paid tribute to those Soviet scientists who had sacrificed their careers in defending the theories of Thomas Hunt Morgan, American geneticist, against the "pseudo-theories" of Trofim D. Lysenko, a "master of propaganda," who "destroyed the efforts of a whole generation of plant and animal breeders" in the USSR. Dr. Dobzhansky, author of numerous works and member of various national and international organizations, was also a distinguished member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.

c) **Mykola Ponedilok**, noted Ukrainian writer, playwright and humorist died in New York City on January 25, 1976 at the age of 54. He was born in 1922 in the Kherson area of Ukraine and studied at the University of Odessa before the outbreak of World War II interrupted his pursuit of higher education. He came to the United States in 1949 and continued his acting and writing calling. His first collection, *Vitaminy* (Vitamins), was published in 1957, to be followed by his second collection, *Soborny Borsheh* (United Borsch), in 1960. Later on he published *Hovoryt Lyshe Pole* (Only the Field Speaks, 1962), *Smishni Sliozyny* (Funny Tears, 1966), *Zorepad* (1969) and his last novel, *Riatuyte Moyu Dushu* (Save My Soul, 1973).

For years Mr. Ponedilok had been appearing at various Ukrainian cultural functions and events as a humorist with a distinct style, sophistication and subtle satire on contemporary Ukrainian themes. He frequently appeared with his writer-friend, Ivan (Iker) Kernytsky, making a distinct impact on the Ukrainian scene in the U.S. and Canada. He was a member of the Asso-

ciation of Ukrainian Writers "Slovo" and scores of other Ukrainian organizations.

d) Major Michael Darmopray, prominent Ukrainian American leader of Philadelphia, Pa., died on September 5, 1976 at the age of 80. Born in Western Ukraine, he emigrated to the U.S. as a child and subsequently enlisted in the U.S. Army in January, 1916 at the age of 19. After service in continental U.S.A. and the Philippine Islands he attended Officers Training School and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry in 1918 and served on active duty until June, 1920. He was active in the U.S. Army Reserve after discharge, until retired with the rank of Major in 1937.

After his release from the army, Maj. Darmopray engaged in the occupation of real estate broker in Philadelphia until his retirement in 1973. He was active in Ukrainian American affairs throughout his lifetime, and headed the Ukrainian American Citizens Association for 30 years. He also was most influential in the founding of the Ukrainian American Veterans Organization in 1948 and elected its honorary national commander. He served as solicitor for the Ukrainian Savings and Loan Association and was a leading force in the establishment of the UCCA and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UARC), and was a sustaining member of many other Ukrainian organizations.

Surviving are his wife, the former Julia Bullick, a son, Walter (Tom), an attorney, who is a past national commander of the Ukrainian American Veterans and a Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve; a daughter, Doris M., two brothers, Joseph and Peter, and a sister, Roseanna Torbik.

II. UKRAINIANS IN THE DIASPORA

CANADA

Establish Ukrainian Institute at University of Alberta. — The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies was established by the University of Alberta's board of governors, according to *The Edmonton Journal* of June 19, 1976. The Institute has a tentative budget of \$355,000.00, funded by the Department of Advanced Education. The Institute will serve as a resource center for English and Ukrainian bilingual education (there are 154 kindergarten and 218 Grade 1 and 2 students now in a bilingual Ukrainian and English program in public schools); would encourage research on Ukrainian and Ukrainian Canadian subjects by graduate students and academic staffs, and would help coordinate program development for other universities.

The Institute itself would offer no courses or degree programs, but would help strengthen and expand such courses of interest in other departments.

In its first year of operation, a detailed survey of interests and sources would be made across the country, with an eye to filling any gaps, help prevent duplication, and encourage research and publication in a systematic manner to meet the most pressing needs.

In 1977, a work shop will be held to assess the study of Ukrainians in Canada. The Institute would also put out a newsletter; offer a Ukrainian studies summer school course or in-service sessions for teachers of Ukrainian; arrange a 1977 conference on Canadian Ukrainians; amass a Ukrain-

ian Canadian library, and provide student travel bursaries for graduate study in Ukraine.

Prof. Tarnopolsky to Represent Canada on U.N. Human Rights Committee. — Prof. Walter S. Tarnopolsky, a Ukrainian professor of law at Osgoode Hall law school in Toronto, and a former Chairman of the Committee for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz, recently was appointed Canada's first representative on the newly formed human rights committee created by the United Nations to oversee the reports of state parties on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which went into force earlier this year.

Prof. Tarnopolsky was involved in several key activities of the Moroz Committee during his term as its head including visits to Canadian parliamentarians to ask for the government to intervene on Moroz's behalf.

On the Canadian scene, Prof. Tarnopolsky is best known in the human rights field for his authorship of the book, **The Canadian Bill of Rights** which has become a standard textbook in civil liberties circles in Canada. A former Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Windsor, he has shown a steadfast concern for human right not only in Canada, but in the USSR as well.

Prof. Tarnopolsky will join 17 other experts of "high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights" serving in their personal capacities under the terms of the covenant when they meet for the first time in March, 1977 in New York. He is scheduled to serve a four-year term beginning January 1, 1977.

Under the reporting procedure, the human rights committee will consider reports from state parties on their compliance with the provisions of the covenant. The committee may consider communications from one state party which feels that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations. That could only be done, however, when both states concerned agree to the competence of the committee. For those state parties which have also ratified the Optional Protocol, the committee may also hear communications from individuals who claim to be victims of violations of their rights by state parties. In the case of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, however, neither procedure will be available to the committee because these governments have not ratified the Optional Covenant nor agreed to the optional procedure relating to complaints from other state parties. In short, the new human rights committee will be responsible mainly for reviewing reports of the state parties on how the rights contained in the Covenant (based on the U.N. Declarations of Human Rights), have been implemented in their countries. Apart from challenging the veracity of the reports, however, the committee has no real power to implement human rights.

UCC Protests One-Sided Soviet Cultural Exchange. — In connection with the November 1976 concert tour of four Ukrainian artists from the USSR, arranged with the Ministry of Culture (Gosconcert) in Moscow, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee again denounced the cultural exchanges between Canada and the Soviet Union as a one-sided infiltration without the Canadian side being properly asserted.

Ukrainian Canadian artists, choirs and dance ensembles are not permitted to perform in Ukraine unless they are politically acceptable to the Soviet authorities. Also, Canadian publications in the Ukrainian language

are not allowed free entry in Ukraine, while Soviet Ukrainian publications are delivered freely by mail and are made available through Soviet-supported bookstores in Canada.

For these reasons the Ukrainian Canadian Committee strongly appeals to the Canadian Government to immediately discontinue this type of one-sided Communist cultural infiltration until the Soviet Government agrees to unrestricted reciprocal cultural exchange with Canada in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Treaty.

The protest-statement was dated November 1, 1976.

Oppose Soviet-made Statue of Lesya Ukrainka. — The Saskatoon City Council rejected an offer by the Soviet Union to unveil a monument in Saskatoon of Lesya Ukrainka, Ukraine's greatest poetess, but the local UCC Branch said that University of Saskatoon officials are considering approving the proposal.

Dr. R.W. Begg, president of the University, told the UCC that the statue will be placed on the campus grounds. He explained his decision by saying that he considers this "an opportunity to honor a great Ukrainian poetess and that the unveiling of the statue will be a cultural, not a political event."

The local and provincial UCC executive boards wrote to Dr. Begg, that "all such tokenistic acts of the Soviet Union are of a political, not cultural nature.

"The University is accepting a statue from a government which in fact suppresses the literary, linguistic and cultural freedoms of the various peoples of the USSR," said the UCC statement. "It is therefore not only ironic but also questionable why the Soviet Union would donate a statue of this literary figure to the people of Canada, and particularly to Saskatoon..."

"The statue as a gift from the Soviet Union, however, becomes a cynical mockery of Soviet reality disguised in the tokenistic gesture of a cultural gift."

THE NETHERLANDS

Amalrik on Ukraine and Ukrainians. — After his arrival from the USSR a few months ago, Andrei Amalrik, the well-known Russian dissident and author of *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*, gave a number of press interviews in which he touched on the situation of Ukraine and the Ukrainians. He had a press conference in Amsterdam on July 19, 1976, appeared on a German TV broadcast and gave an interview to *Le Monde* and another one to the reporter of the Ukrainian-language weekly *Shliakh Peremohy* (Way to Victory), appearing in Munich, Germany, in which he made several observations on Ukraine and Ukrainians.

He met a number of Ukrainians in the slave camps in Kolyma, most of whom were UPA and OUN members, who, even after they terminated their sentences, were prohibited to leave the Magadan area. They all are serious and industrious and enjoy great popularity with the local population. Amalrik also met a number of Ukrainian officers from the Soviet armed forces, sentenced for their anti-government views.

He said that he read Valentyn Moroz's *Report from the Beria Preserve*, which had a powerful impact on him. He stated that the Ukrainian intelligentsia and youth are very active, and that the "most cruel repressions against nationalist sentiments take place in Ukraine."

Amalrik further noted that the situation in Ukraine is tragic, as Moscow considers Ukrainian nationalism a great threat to the Soviet system.

GERMANY

Prof. Janiw Re-elected Rector of Ukrainian Free University. — At the session of the Senate of the Ukrainian Free University (UFU) in Munich, held on July 7, 1976, Prof. Dr. Volodymyr Janiw was unanimously re-elected Rector of the UFU, with Prof. Dr. Zenon Sokoluk being elected vice rector of the University. Moreover, Dr. Alexander Kulchycky was elected Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, with Dr. H. Waskowych as vice dean. Attending the session were three Directors of UFU Delegations in other countries: Prof. Alexander Kulchycky (France), Prof. Wasyl Lew (U.S.A.) and Prof. Jaroslaw Rudnyckyj (Canada).

Courses during the summer of 1976 were held at the Faculty of Philosophy and the Juridico-Economic Faculty and were followed by special courses given jointly by the UFU and the University of Michigan. There also were special courses for teachers of Ukrainian studies. Giving courses were Ukrainian professors from the United States, Canada, Brazil, Germany, France and England.

In addition to giving courses, the UFU also publishes symposiums and monographs in Ukrainian, as well as in German and French.

OBITUARY: Dmytro Andrievsky, outstanding Ukrainian nationalist leader, writer and diplomat, died on August 30, 1976 in Munich, West Germany, at the age of 83.

Mr. Andrievsky was born on September 27, 1892 in the Poltava area of Ukraine. During and immediately after the period of Ukrainian independence, Mr. Andrievsky served as secretary of the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in Switzerland.

Subsequently, he moved to Belgium where he received a degree in engineering and became associated with a large Belgian engineering firm until the outbreak of World War II.

Mr. Andrievsky, a highly erudite man, was a powerful member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), of which he was one of its founders — at the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, which was held from January 28, to March 11, 1929 in Vienna, Austria. He became a member of the Supreme Council of the OUN (PUN — **Provid Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv**) and a close adviser to Col. Eugene Konovalets.

A prolific and profound journalist and publicist, especially one well-versed in West European thought, philosophy and political trends, he was highly critical of the Nazi movement. During an international economic conference held in 1933 in London, Mr. Andrievsky disseminated a memorandum assailing Nazi policies and their contemplated **Drang nach Osten** strategy, directed against Ukraine and other East European countries. After the assassination of Col. Konovalets in May, 1938 in Rotterdam by a Soviet agent and the split within the ranks of the OUN in 1940, Mr. Andrievsky joined Col. Andrew Melnyk, successor of Col. Konovalets, and remained with the group to his last days.

In the 1930's Mr. Andrievsky was also very active in the international student movement and took part, as a representative of CeSUS (Central Union of Ukrainian Students). In Belgium he became a patron and guardian-

sponsor of some 70 Ukrainian students from Western Ukraine who could not be registered at any Polish universities and had to obtain their education in Western Europe, especially at the University of Louvain in Belgium.

Mr. Andrievsky also took part in the organization of the Ukrainian National Council (*Rada*) in 1948 and served as vice president of the Executive Organ of the *Rada* and in other important posts. In the OUN he kept the department of foreign relations, was head of its Senate and honorary president of the OUN Senate. He wrote several books on the topic of Ukrainian political development and countless articles to various Ukrainian review and weeklies, as well as to Belgian publications.

BRAZIL

OBITUARY: Gen. Andrew Dolud, outstanding Ukrainian military leader, died on September 26, 1976 in Curitiba, State of Parana, at the age 88. Born into the old Ukrainian patriotic family in the Zaporozhia area, Gen. Dolud took part in an Ukrainian national and political movement. When the Ukrainian National Revolution broke out, he was a general staff captain in the Russian army, but he soon joined the Ukrainian independence movement. First he became a member of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and later he joined the Ukrainian army. In 1919 he was sent with a cavalry brigade to Western Ukraine to assist the Ukrainian Galician Army in its struggle against Polish troops. Later he became a chief of staff of the Ukrainian army group which made a famous break through the Soviet troops in the direction of Odessa. He emigrated to Brazil with his wife in the late 1940's.

ITALY

New Head of Basilian Order. — From July 7-20, 1976 a general assembly of the Basilian Order was held at its premises in Aventino in Rome, attended by delegates from the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil and other countries.

Rev. Dr. Isidore Patrylo was elected new Proto-Archimandrite of the Basilian Order; he belongs to the American Province of the Order. Elected as consultants were Rev. Modest Gnesko (Canada), Rev. Clement Korchagin (Brazil), Rev. Paul Myskiw and Rev. Athanasius Welyky — former proto-archimandrites. The Basilian Order provides over one-third of the priests for the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the diaspora, has conducted since 1902 the Major Papal St. Josaphat Seminary in Rome and publishes books on the history of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and so forth.

POLAND

Chair of Ukrainian Studies at Warsaw University.—A recent issue of *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word), published by the government-approved Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society, reported a statement of Dr. Florian Neuwazny, chairman of the Chair of Ukrainian Philology at Warsaw University. He has reported about new changes in the structure and has said that the chair of Ukrainian philology has become an independent section on a par with other Slavic philologies. At present a total of 41 students are taking Ukrainian studies, which are divided into two sub-sections: literature and linguistics. Later on a third sub-section will be added, that of literary translation.

In addition to Dr. Neuwazny, other teachers are Dr. Serhiy Kozak and Antin Serednytsky. The two Ph.D. recipients are Hanna Pazdro who wrote on the "Connection of Ivan Franko with Polish Journalism," and Vasyl Nazarchuk, who wrote a thesis on the literary creativity of Ivan Drach.

III. IN CAPTIVE UKRAINE

Release of Ukrainian Political Prisoners — A number of Ukrainian political prisoners were released recently from Soviet concentration camps, according to Ukrainian dissident sources in Ukraine. Among them were **Dr. Roman Korolchuk, Mykola Horbal, Mykola Kots (7 years) Taras Melnychuk (3 y.) and Vasyl Pyrus (25 y.)**, who were released from the Perm concentration camps compound, after terminating their sentences. **Ivan Sokulsky**, sentenced in 1971 to 4 years for an alleged co-authorship of the "Letter from Creative Youth of Dnipropetrovsk," was released from the Vladimir Prison. Prior to his release he was taken to the Serbsky Institute and promptly adjudged "insane," but he was released nevertheless with a strong admonition that his further involvement in "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" would land him in a psychiatric ward.

Two Ukrainian jourists, **Lev Lukyanenko and Ivan Kandyba**, were also released from 15-year internments, but they were prohibited from living in Kiev, but could reside within a 50 kilometer-radius of the Ukrainian capital, if local authorities would give permission.

The same tactic has been applied to **Nina Strokata-Karavanska and Nadya Svitlychna**, both of whom were released after 4 years of imprisonment but were prohibited from residing in Kiev or any other large city of Ukraine.

Ask Western Support. — In an emotional appeal addressed to "world humanity, people of good will and to those who believe in democracy, freedom and human rights," 19 political prisoners in the USSR requested letters of support from the West, according to a report of the "Smoloskyp" Ukrainian Information Service from Helsinki, Finland.

The letter is replete with descriptions of their incarceration and the harassment they endure. They charged that they were unjustly arrested, tried and convicted, and that the sole reason they were imprisoned was because they "did not think the way others told them to think."

The political prisoners, all confined in the Mordovian prison camps, listed three major requests of the West, among them "demand an end to political repression and scorn, and the practice of political banishment." They also requested that Westerners write letters to the leaders of the CPSU demanding that they abide by the Final Act of the Helsinki Accord and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among the 19 prisoners were 6 Ukrainians: **A. Yushkevych, O. Ovsienko, V. Chornovil, V. Stus, Z. Popadiuk, Y. Mykytko**, the others being Jewish, Georgian, Armenian, Estonian and Russian political prisoners.

Rev. Romaniuk Renounces Soviet Citizenship. — Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk, the imprisoned Ukrainian Orthodox priest publicly renounced his Soviet citizenship.

In letters to Ukrainian Catholic, Orthodox and Baptist hierarchs in the free world and the National Council of Churches, Rev. Romaniuk wrote

that he wants no part of Soviet citizenship. In another letter to the U.S. President and Congress, the incarcerated Ukrainian priest asked the U.S. government to grant him American citizenship.

Copies of letters which Rev. Romaniuk wrote to Western governments and religious and humanitarian institutions, telling about repressions in the USSR, were made public by the press service of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.

At the end of 1974, Danylo Shumuk became the first Ukrainian political prisoner to renounce his Soviet citizenship. He was subsequently followed by Vyacheslav Chornovil in March 1975, and Valentyn Moroz and Mykola Bodnar in the spring of 1976.

Rev. Romaniuk said, "I may die in a Soviet concentration camp, just as many more before me died, but let me at least have the citizenship of your country [U.S.A.] which is the fortress of freedom and truth on earth," he pleaded.

Rev. Romaniuk told the Ukrainian hierarchs that it was his duty to tell the clergy and faithful of the three denominations that "in the Soviet Union officials trample the basic provisions of the Helsinki Accord's Final Act, which are regarded as the basis of friendship and cooperation between nations."

Fr. Romaniuk was sentenced in 1972 to 10 years confinement in a concentration camp, and five years of exile. Two years earlier he wrote to the Soviet Ukrainian Supreme Court questioning the incarceration of Valentyn Moroz. When the Soviet police searched his home in Kosmach, they confiscated many Ukrainian books.

Union of Writers of Ukraine Holds 7th Congress.—The 7th Congress of the Union of Writers of Ukraine was held on April 14, 1976 in Kiev, which focused its attention "on the results of creative activity" in the republic's writers' organization during the preceding five-year period and on the means of further developing the "literary process in the light of the historic decisions of the 25th Congress of the CUSU." Thus, Ukrainian poets, novelists, playwrights, literary critics, translators, and scholars were given new tasks of generating "new literature" evolving around the party's ideological program of "creating a Soviet people" out of a myriad of distinct nations and peoples in the USSR. Attending the congress were representatives from the Soviet Writers' Union, as well as those from the Russian Federation, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Azerbaijan.

OBITUARY: Yuriy K. Smolych, Ukrainian writer and journalist, died on August 16, 1976 at the age of 76, as reported by *Pravda Ukrainy* of that date. After the revolution, Mr. Smolych was an actor in the theater and an inspector for the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian SSR. Later on he turned to journalism and, according to the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*, he penned many pamphlets and brochures against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists." For a number of years he was president of the Society for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad in Kiev and an associate editor of the KGB-sponsored *News From Ukraine*, published in both the Ukrainian and English languages and widely disseminated among Ukrainians in the free world. He was also a lecturer at the T. Shevchenko University in Kiev.

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