

# The

Vol. XXXII, No. 2

# Ukrainian

# Quarterly

**A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS**

Featuring In This Issue:

**THE U.S. AND EASTERN EUROPE**

*Editorial*

**THE XXVTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE**

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**DELETED DETENTE AND THE CAPTIVE NATIONS**

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**MINISTRY AND ESPIONAGE: THE YMCA IN UKRAINE 1915-1918**

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**ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION**

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**WOULD THE FALL OF ITS COLONIAL EMPIRE  
BE A CATASTROPHE FOR RUSSIA?**

*By Mark Perakh*

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
# The Ukrainian Quarterly

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## THE U. S. AND EASTERN EUROPE

### *Editorial*

"...Who rules East Europe, commands the Heartland;  
Who rules the Heartland, commands the World Island;  
Who rules the World Island, commands the World."

SIR HALFORD MACKINDER <sup>1</sup>

The political problems of Eastern Europe have never been a serious concern of the U.S. government ever since the United States of America arose as an independent nation two hundred years ago. This indifference toward Eastern Europe prevailed not only throughout the XIXth century, a time when the United States was guided by a baffling isolationism and an ostrich-like "uninvolvement" policy in European politics, but it has steadfastly subsisted throughout the three-quarters of the current century. This policy is even harder to comprehend when we recall that the two great world conflagrations in this century, World Wars I and II—in both of which the United States was heavily involved and, in fact, tipped the balance in favor of the Western allies—originated in Central Eastern Europe. World War I started between Austro-Hungary and Russia over the assassination of Austrian Duke Ferdinand in Sarajevo (Serbia), and World War II began with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939, Great Britain and France declaring war on Hitler in fulfillment of their pledge to uphold the independence of Poland. Although the United States dropped its isolationism, it never was to realize the importance of Eastern Europe until it was too late.

### NO WORLD "SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY"

Although the United States was one of the leading powers of the *Entente* alliance in 1918 (the others being Great Britain, France

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<sup>1</sup> *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. By Halford J. Mackinder, New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, Inc., 1942, p. 150.

and Italy), it failed to achieve a durable peace in Europe, and cared little about what happened in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

President Woodrow Wilson enunciated his "Fourteen Points," calling for the application of the principle of national self-determination for the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, but not for the peoples of the former Russian empire. The U.S. did everything it could to preserve the "unity and integrity" of Russia by supporting reactionary Russian generals and admirals. It turned a cold shoulder to the genuine independence movements of the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and the Turkic peoples of Turkestan, all of whom fell victim to Soviet aggression. Exceptions were the states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which succeeded in maintaining their independent governments before the Soviet power was fully consolidated in Moscow. The turn of the three Baltic countries, however, was to come later. In 1940 the Soviet government invaded them and destroyed all democratic institutions, the national armies, the police forces and the administrations. Established were "Soviet governments," which were promptly incorporated into the USSR as "union republics."

Although Finland managed to avoid the fate of the Baltic states, it became "Finlandized," that is, neutralized to the point of being humbly submissive to Communist Russia. Moscow could never forgive the Finns, of course, for taking part in the Nazi-Soviet war in 1941-45 as allies of the Axis Powers.

In the uneasy period between 1920 and 1939, the United States left the conduct of "Eastern European policy" to its two principal allies in Europe, Great Britain and France. The latter tried to maintain a power balance between the USSR and a revenge-craving Germany by establishing a shaky *cordon sanitaire* (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania), which proved to be a futile structure. These new, post-Versailles states seethed with restive and hostile national minorities running into the millions; in struggling for their own independent states they hardly contributed to the stability of the "Little Entente" (Hungarians, Germans and Ukrainians in Romania; Slovaks, Germans and Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia; and Ukrainians, Germans, Byelorussians and Lithuanians in Poland).

Then came World War II, and despite the Atlantic Charter and the declaration on "Four Freedoms" by Roosevelt and Churchill, the United States and Great Britain ended up by ignominiously surrendering the eastern half of Europe as a "sphere of influence" to Stalin's Communist Russia at Yalta and Potsdam.

U.S. LEADERSHIP IN EUROPE

Then, for almost a decade, from 1945 to 1955, the United States led the way in preventing the Soviet Russian takeover of *all* Europe. Through the Truman Doctrine the United States saved Greece and Turkey from Communist takeover. Through the Marshall Plan it rebuilt West Germany, a defeated enemy, and helped its European allies—France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Luxembourg—to stand on their own feet. It demonstrated through a forceful foreign policy that it would not tolerate any further Soviet encroachment in Europe or anywhere else. It did not hesitate to send its troops to South Korea to prevent a Communist takeover there by the Moscow-backed North Korean army, in the process succeeding in marshalling the support of the overwhelming majority of U.N. members for its move in Korea.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, testifying on June 26, 1951, before the House Armed Services Committee in Washington, stated:

...The other aspects of Soviet policy need to be mentioned. First, Russian policy-makers, Czarist or Communist, have always taken a long view. They think in generations where others may think in terms of a few years or a decade at most. Second, they are land-minded and have a deep and abiding and, on the historical view, justified confidence in the vastness of Russia as a factor in their security. Third, the ruling power in Moscow has long been an imperial power and now rules a greatly extended empire. It cannot escape the difficulties that history teaches us befall all empires.

This is the challenge our foreign policy is required to meet.

*It is clear that this process of encroachment and consolidation by which Russia has grown in the last 500 years from the Duchy of Muscovy to a vast empire has got to be stopped. This means that we have to hold, if possible, against its drives wherever they may be made. To hold means to hold against armed attack; it equally means to hold against internal attack—which is the new weapon added to the Russian policy by the Communists. . .* (italics added—Ed.)

This statement signaled at last a basic perception and understanding of what Russian imperialism is *per se* by a great American statesman.

Subsequently, on July 17, 1959, the U.S. Congress passed the *Captive Nations Week Resolution*, which upon being signed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, became Public Law 86-90. The resolution, drafted originally by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, professor at Georgetown University and a collaborator of this review since its very in-

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<sup>2</sup> "For a Policy of Freedom and Independence," submitted by Walter Dushnyck, to the Democratic Platform Committee, July, 1952, in Chicago, Ill., *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, July 15-August 1, 1952, New York, N.Y., p. 16.

ception, is an important milestone in U.S. foreign policy. More, it expressed the feeling of the American people regarding a great number of people once free and now enslaved by Communist Russia. The resolution specifically named them:

...*WHEREAS* the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led, through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others...

The resolution further stated that "the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as 'Captive Nations Week,' and to invite the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities. The President is further authorized and requested to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world..."<sup>3</sup>

The resolution provoked an angry and abusive reaction in Moscow, and almost every subsequent year during the observance of the "Week," the Soviet press, as well as the press in the satellite countries, is stung by the truth into deriding the resolution and calling for its abolishment.

Yet the list of captive nations has continued to grow. Cuba, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and, most recently, Angola, are additions to the list, and at the same time the resolution on the "Captive Nations Week" has come under attack by the spineless members of our media. Only a year ago, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a "hawkish" leader during our involvement in Vietnam, opined that the "Captive Nations Week Resolution" constituted a serious impediment to the "normal" relationship between the U.S. and the USSR.

#### FROM THE HELSINKI ACCORD TO THE "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE"

Even though each U.S. President after Eisenhower issued a proclamation on "Captive Nations Week," it was, as a rule, a toothless and innocuous ritual. Only the late President Kennedy seemed to have taken the wise counsel of Dean Acheson to heart when he threat-

<sup>3</sup> *The Captive Nations: Nationalism of the Non-Russian Nations in the Soviet Union.* By Roman Smal-Stocki. Bookman Associates, New York, 1960, p. 99.

ened to invade Cuba unless Khrushchev removed Soviet warheads from the island.

President Johnson was busy "building bridges" of understanding with the USSR, while President Nixon initiated the illfated policy of detente and vast trade agreements with Moscow. President Ford not only inherited Nixon's policy of detente, but its chief architect, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as well.

In July, 1975, President Ford and Dr. Kissinger journeyed to Helsinki, Finland, to affix the signature of the United States to the "Helsinki accord," a document which tacitly endorses the Soviet Russian acquisition of such captive nations as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and others, moving Alexander Solzhenitsyn to accuse President Ford of "betraying" Eastern Europe.<sup>4</sup>

#### "AN ORGANIC RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE USSR

Although there have been many denials both from the State Department and the White House to the effect that the U.S. government "supports the aspirations of the Eastern European peoples to freedom and independence," the moves of the Secretary of State and his close associates belie such protestations. A case in point is the so-called "Sonnenfeldt doctrine."

Last December Helmut Sonnenfeldt, State Department counselor and close adviser to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (and like his boss, German-born), at a closed-door meeting in London with American ambassadors to European countries presented a broad view of the USSR as an emerging superpower with which the U.S. must live and cooperate in order to avoid a possible World War III. In comparing the Russians (the "Soviets") with other "imperialists," notably the British, French and German, Sonnenfeldt stated:

They have not been able to bring the attractions that past imperial powers brought to their conquests. They have not brought the ideological, legal, cultural, architectural, organizational and other values and skills that characterized the British, French and German adventures.

In addition, there are serious underlying pressures and tensions in the Soviet system itself.

The base from which imperialism asserts itself has serious problems in the economic and social sectors. *There are also internal nationalist groups which are growing. Non-Russian nationalist groups in Russia are growing at a dis-*

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<sup>4</sup> "The Helsinki Tragedy," editorial. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, No. 3, 1975, New York, p. 245.

*proportionately faster rate, which will add to these tensions in the base whence springs Soviet imperialism. . .*<sup>5</sup> (italics added—Ed.)

After discussing the mutual though limited “benefits” of the policy of detente, Sonnenfeldt went on with his views on Eastern Europe:

With regard to Eastern Europe, it must be in our long-term interest to influence events in this area—because of the present unnatural relationship with the Soviet Union—so that they will not sooner or later explode, causing World War III. This inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West. . . *So it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one. Any excess of zeal on our part is bound to produce results that could reverse the desired process for a period of time, even though the process would remain inevitable within the next 100 years. But, of course, for us that is too long a time to wait. . .*<sup>6</sup> (italics added—Ed.)

The disclosure of the Sonnenfeldt secret briefing in London was first made through a number of leaks and counter-leaks, arousing confusion and alarm in Europe. Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak then reported a disputed version of Sonnenfeldt's statement on March 30, 1976, and two counter-versions have since appeared, both without authorization being labeled “official” summaries. One was published by *The Economist* of London, the other by *The New York Times*, quoted above. State Department officials have variously characterized the report as either “nothing new” or “nothing true,” but such comments did not satisfy a number of Republican-Conservative members of the Congress, nor did the nonchalance about the newly-enunciated “Sonnenfeldt doctrine” calm the ever-stirring political waters in Washington, London and elsewhere. The situation was aggravated when Mr. Sonnenfeldt refused Congressman Edward J. Derwinski (R.-Ill.) perusal of the original copy of his brief, claiming executive privilege. Senator James L. Buckley (C.-R., N.Y.) stated that Secretary of State Kissinger's letter to him did not convince him that “our policy in no sense accepts Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.”<sup>7</sup>

It also is reported that President Ford had not known about Sonnenfeldt's briefing before it was reported in the Evans and No-

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<sup>5</sup> “State Department Summary of Remarks by Sonnenfeldt,” *The New York Times*, April 6, 1976.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> “The GOP and Sonnenfeldt,” by Evans and Novak, *New York Post*, April 5, 1976.

vak column; upon reading it in an official summary, he told aides he could easily see how wrong conclusions could be drawn from it. He insisted, however, there is no acquiescence to the Soviet dominion.

#### THE DENIALS...

With criticism mounting in intensity both in this country and abroad regarding U.S. policy with respect to Eastern Europe, both the White House and the State Department saw fit to issue a series of denials.

Speaking at a meeting of representatives of ethnic organizations on April 2, 1976, in Milwaukee, Wis., President Ford stated:

...The United States strongly supports the aspirations for freedom, for national independence of peoples everywhere, including the peoples of Eastern Europe... Our policy is in no sense—and I emphasize this—in no sense to accept Soviet dominion of Eastern Europe or any kind of organic unity. Nor is it in any way designed to permit the consolidation of such dominion. On the contrary, the United States seeks to be responsive to and to encourage as responsibly as possible, the desires of Eastern Europeans for greater autonomy, independence, and more normal relations with the rest of the world...<sup>8</sup>

Mr. Sonnenfeldt labeled the statements attributed to him as a "gross distortion of fact," and added that "our policy seeks to encourage the independence of these countries... We do not accept that this is a sealed-off, exclusive preserve for anyone..."

Nevertheless, while saying that the word "organic" should receive the same fate as the word "detente," recently expunged by President Ford from the American diplomatic lexicon, Sonnenfeldt actually added:

We seek to influence the emergence of the Soviet imperial power by making the base more natural and organic so that it will not remain founded on sheer power alone...<sup>9</sup>

Thus, in trying to explain away his deliberate or unwitting remark, Mr. Sonnenfeldt ended by reiterating the very same thought, to "make the base (of the Soviet imperial power) more natural and organic," a process that cannot but efface the non-Russian nationalities.

Astonishingly, in his introductory statement before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the

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<sup>8</sup> *Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford*, Vol. 12, No. 15, April 2, 1976.

<sup>9</sup> "That Leak on USSR 'Clarified,'" by Murret Marder, *New York Post*, April 4, 1976.

House Committee on International Relations on April 12, 1976, he indicated his support of "the independence, national sovereignty and identity and autonomy of all the peoples and countries of Central and Eastern Europe."

Why such blatant contradictions?

Perhaps the statement of C.L. Sulzberger, the prestigious correspondent of *The New York Times*, can best explain U.S. policy vis-a-vis the USSR:

Semantics, or the meaning of meaning, is a principal element of contemporary diplomacy. The United States practices detente without daring to use the word and the Soviet Union practices a hard-line policy while masking it as detente. And each superpower, for its own reasons, pretends the contrary of what it is doing. . . Nevertheless, the architects of United States policy insist that policy hasn't changed, no matter how it is described. . . Washington says nothing even resembling detente occurred when the Russians sent their technicians, arms and Cuban troops to Angola. . .<sup>10</sup>

#### ARE WE "MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR COMMUNISM?"

Under the alarming but pertinent title, "Making the World Safe for Communism," *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz, in the review's April 1976 issue, provides a cogent analysis of current U.S. foreign policy. For all intent and purposes, he claims, our policy is favoring the growth and expansion of Communism and Soviet Russian influence and power throughout the world.

He has been joined by an impressive bloc of American figures—Ronald Reagan, James Schlesinger, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, James Burnham—the great Russian novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and many, many others.

As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—and not President Ford—seems to be the chief U.S. foreign policy-maker, he is bearing the brunt of scorching attacks. Which is hardly surprising if he did, for example, tell Admiral Zumwalt that the U.S. is an effete, declining power in comparison with the USSR, another ancient Athens vis-a-vis Sparta. And U.S. foreign policy does seem determined to legitimize the Soviet empire, the adherence of the United States to the humiliating Helsinki "accord" and the "Sonnenfeldt doctrine," being strong cases in point.

True, the psychological submission of the U.S. intellectual establishment and the growing isolationism of the American people be-

<sup>10</sup> "Detente Without Detente," by C. L. Sulzberger, *The New York Times*, May 26, 1976.

gan before the advent of Kissinger to extraordinary power in Washington. If he did not approve the American retreat from Soviet power, he managed nonetheless to accelerate it during his tenure in office. He contributed immensely to the euphoria of detente, during which the Russians have single-mindedly and very successfully pursued their global ambitions. More than any single man, Kissinger has expurgated from U.S. foreign policy the sense of mission, moral imperative and high purpose. To him, the captive nations have been needless irritants to cordial debates with the Soviet leaders, entities to be consigned to the ash-dumps of history.

But for the American people the captive nations of Eastern Europe and the USSR are constant reminders of what they confront in Communist Russia.

Is it possible that with this Bicentennial we are celebrating precisely what we possessed a scant two hundred years ago and no longer can muster—an overriding belief in freedom, a deep sense of our destiny, the conviction of the worth of the individual? Is it possible that the descendants of a small group of people who were fired by an ideal, resisted a great power and established their own independent state—can these descendants and the descendants of those drawn to this land of opportunity now deny freedom and independence to millions of their fellow men?

Perhaps it is possible. But we do not believe it. Of a small coterie in Washington, yes. But not of the American people, millions of whom remember fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers who had come here to escape oppression.

# THE XXVth CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE

## SPEARHEAD OF RUSSIFICATION OF UKRAINE

ZENON PELENSKY

"...The establishment in our country of a new historical community of peoples—the Soviet people—is an outstanding phenomenon of the current century, a century of the passage of humanity from capitalism to Communism. The XXIVth party congress [in 1971] paid special attention to the fact, when in the overall report of the Central Committee it was stated "that during the years of socialist construction in our country, there emerged a new *historical community of peoples—the Soviet people* [underscoring in the original].

(Cf. "The Basic Directions in Explaining the Problem of 'The Soviet People— A New Historical Community of People,'" by V. V. Lykholat and N. V. Kormarenko, in *Ukrainian Historical Journal*, January, 1976, Kiev, Ukraine.)

Two weeks before the XXVth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) convened in Moscow (February 24, 1976), in Kiev another congress had been held—the XXVth congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) (February 10-13, 1976). In accordance with party statutes, such congresses are held every five years, thus the XXIVth in 1971, the XXIIIrd in 1976.

Both *rapporteurs* at the Ukrainian party congress, *Volodymyr Shcherbytsky*, first secretary, and the Russian *Georgi Kryuchkov*, head of the Mandate Commission, declared that the congress was attended by 2,324 "elected" delegates, of which number some 1,897, or 80%, were "elected" for the first time. The congress was held in the sumptuous Palace of Culture "Ukraine," which was erected in the time of the leadership of Peter Shelest (who was bitterly assailed in Moscow for having authorized its erection).

The "election" of delegates was conducted according to the formula: One delegate for every 1,150 party members. This resulted in the most industrial centers (which are highly Russified) sending the greatest numbers of delegates: the *oblasts* of Donets—249; Dnipropetrovsk—190; Kharkiv—171; Kiev (city)—161, and Voroshilovograd—151.

## SOCIOLOGY OF THE CONGRESS

The bureaucratization of the congress members is best attested to by the fact that 710 delegates were members of *oblast*, city and *raion* party committees, and 735 were secretaries and members of various intermediate and local Communist partisan organizations. According to Comrade Kryuchkov's report, the delegates included 71 secretaries of *oblast* committees; 347 secretaries of city and *raion* committees and 88 of "party committees"; in addition, there were 202 "state" (Soviet) delegates from governmental offices: the Council of Ministers, deputy ministers, heads of state committees, and 57 of the highest-ranking functionaries of the trade unions and the Comsomol organization. There also were 75 directors of the so-called "industrial combines," that is, large factories and trusts, and 59 heads of collective farms and directors of state farms. In a word—the cream of the cream!

## ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Among the delegates were 1,695 Ukrainians, 567 Russians and 62 other nationals. (We may remark in passing that Kryuchkov might well have raised the number of Ukrainian delegates and lowered that of the Russian delegates for good "public relations"). According to the 1970 population census there were over 7 million Russians in Ukraine, constituting 19.4% of the population. We believe that today there are around 10 million Russians in Ukraine. According to the statistical data of the Central Statistical Bureau at the end of the Eight Year Plan, the Ukrainian SSR, on January 1, 1976, had 49.1 million people.\*) The Russians most probably constitute very close to 20% of the population. Consequently, the Russians among the delegates should make up about 20%, at least from a theoretical viewpoint. But, in terms of Kryuchkov's report, the Russian delegates constituted 24.4% (567 as against 2,324 delegates). These figures support the fact that the Russians are the dominating element in Ukraine.

## PRIORITY OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE RESTORED

Indeed, something happened at the XXVth Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine that shocked even the most suspicious

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\*) *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 5, 1976, Kiev.

critics of the Russian Communist regime in Ukraine, stunning them with a drastic and brutal development: the entire leadership of the CPU and all delegates at the congress returned to the Russian language as the language of external and internal official expression! This, although there were no special appropriate official decrees nor any change of the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR to warrant it!

Let us, however, not fall prey to illusion or become pipe-dreamers. The Russian language has always been the dominant language of the CPU: in daily proceedings, internal communications, correspondence, reports, minutes, and so forth. It was only for "window-dressing" effect that, in June, 1953, three months after Stalin's death, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CPBU) (later to be changed to CPU) began using the Ukrainian language *for the first time*. Up to the summer of 1953 the first secretaries of the CP of Ukraine had been non-Ukrainians: Russians, Jews, Poles, or Latvians. Not a single Ukrainian was entrusted with that post during 35 years of Communist rule in Ukraine.

The first Ukrainian to hold the post of first secretary of the party in Ukraine—and this only under pressure of Lavrenti Beria—was *Alexander Kirichenko*, who assumed it in June, 1953, and who held it until November, 1956. Kirichenko was considered to be a superficial "Ukrainizer" of the allegedly Ukrainian CPU. In the fall of 1957, however, he was transferred to Moscow, where he became an "unperson."

#### "THE BUFFALO" GRUNTS IN RUSSIAN

Alexander Kirichenko did break ground. He was succeeded by Ukrainians: *Nicholas Podgorny* (Mykola Podhorny—6 years); *Peter Shelest* (8 years), and *Volodymyr Shcherbytsky* (now in his 5th year).

Shcherbytsky's nickname in the higher echelons of the party is "The Buffalo," presumably because he is heavily built and of towering height. *Booyvil* (the Ukrainian for buffalo) is said to suffer from asthma, but this has not prevented him from following the tradition built up by his predecessors—using the Ukrainian language, especially at the plenums of the Central Committee and the party congresses.

Except on February 10, 1976. In opening the XXVth party congress, Shcherbytsky delivered his five-hour speech in Russian. Only in places where he touched on the problems of Ukrainian culture, did he switch to Ukrainian (for all of 15 minutes). But during the

four days of the congress all the "debates" were unfailingly conducted in the Russian language!

What kind of a "sovereign" republic is the Ukrainian SSR? What kind of a nation that its alleged leaders should be afraid to speak in their native tongue? They have done nothing to deserve the respect of the Ukrainian people, since they care solely about their own careers, their own sinecures and privileges, their own skins—and since they so docilely serve the Red Russian throne.

#### POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The sudden and abrupt Russification of the XXVth congress of the CP of Ukraine was no chance happening. Far from it. It was, in the opinion of the writer, an inexorable implementation of the Central Committee's directives from Moscow. The entire congress was shot through with the one guiding idea of changing the multi-linguistic of the republics into a "uni-linguistic of the common [Russian] Soviet state and Soviet nation." In the past the Russian Czars had tried to Russify the non-Russian subjugated nations through their principal vehicles—autocracy, Orthodoxy and the "unity" of the Russian people. Now, these slogans have been replaced by "Soviet autocracy, Leninism and the 'superiority' of the Russian people." The Russian language, of course, is declared to be a "superior language," because it was the "language of Pushkin and Lenin."

This crass Russification of the XXVth congress of the CP of Ukraine may be the forerunner of far-reaching constitutional changes that might bring about the end of the nominal status of the "union republics." Brezhnev, in point of fact, has been toying with the idea of changing the USSR and the republics' constitutions for some time.

#### CHANGE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE

The Shcherbytsky speech at the congress not only presaged the future amalgamation of the "union republics" into one "Soviet monolith"; it also denied that the Communist Party of Ukraine had ever been an independent and autonomous body.

A significant part of his speech went thus:

All the work of the CP of Ukraine was realized and is being realized under the *direct leadership* of the Central Committee and the Soviet government systematically provides our republic with an all-sided assistance. The *Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine, in solving its basic economic and cultural problems, always takes its point of departure from the directives and decisions of the Cen-*

*tral Committee of the CPSU*, it always relies on the advice of the Secretary General, the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine is guided unswervingly by directives of the CC of the CPSU because a basic, self-critical analysis of our attainments and shortcomings and a profound and all-sided study of the problems, are a prerequisite of our further successful movement ahead... (Italics ours.)

These "revelations" were applauded by some two thousand Ukrainian lackeys of Moscow, with total disregard of their national and historical pride as a separate people.

#### "STATE OF THE NATION"

The XXVth congress of the CP of Ukraine came up with the most "important" problems facing Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

The report of Shcherbytsky, covering the period of the last five years, was equivalent in form to what is known in the United States as a "State of the Union" address. Such "State of the Nation" addresses are given every five years concurrently with the congresses of the republic Communist parties and the CPSU. In the USSR, as well as in each "union republic," it is not the president of the Supreme Soviet, nor the president of the Council of Ministers, who reports on the "state of the nation," but the first secretary of the Communist Party. Normally, in all Western European democratic states and in the U.S., such status reports are delivered at the beginning of each year. In Ukraine, as well as in the USSR, the repressed and muted citizenry must wait five years to hear what they have "attained" or failed to attain.

#### ECONOMY OF THE REPUBLIC

*Alexander Lashko*, president of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, spoke on the economy—always an important problem—during the 9th Five Year Plan. His report, titled, "On the Project of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the XXVth Congress of the CPSU," dealt essentially with Ukraine's economic contributions to the "common and integrated" economy of the "Soviet fatherland." Like Shcherbytsky, Lashko spoke in Russian, trying to impact to the "delegates" the notion that the economy of Ukraine is part and parcel of the economy of the USSR. Likewise, some 76 "discussants" also spoke in Russian—with not one of them having the pride and conviction to act as if they were citizens of an independent

Ukraine, truly representing the Ukrainian people, for whom the Ukrainian language still is the language of everyday life.

#### THE NEW FACES

Then there was that favorite pastime of the congress—the “election” of new ruling organs of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Thus, on the fourth day of the congress, the “delegates” duly “elected”: 191 members of the Central Committee, 77 candidate-members and 57 members of the Revision Commission. The Central Committee at once “elected” from its members a new Politburo of the CP of Ukraine, which consisted of eleven full-fledged members and member-candidates; “elected” also was a Secretariat of the Central Committee.

As was to be expected—and thanks to Brezhnev’s grace and geniality—Volodymyr Shcherbytsky was “elected” the first secretary; and *Ivan Zakharovych Sokolov*, a Russian and a former first secretary of the Kharkiv *oblast*, became second secretary, replacing *Ivan Lutak*, a Ukrainian, who had been recently dismissed as a “Shelest adherent.” The four other new members of the Secretariat were *Mykola Borysenko*, *Valentyn Malanchuk*, *Yakiv Pohrebniak* and *Alexander Tytarenko*—presumably all Ukrainians.

The principal feature of the personnel change was the appearance of new faces along with the removal of the old veterans and the “liquidation” of all real and suspected supporters of Peter Shelest, former first secretary. Most of the new faces are nationality-indifferent, generally being “Soviet people” and “Soviet patriots.”

#### “ATTAINMENTS AND SUCCESSES”

In reviewing the addresses of Shcherbytsky and Lashko, the reader is likely to receive a very misleading impression. It looks as if the “Soviet people” did nothing more during the past Five Year Plan than to go from “one success to another,” from “one victory to another.” One superlative is piled on another. Neither the two *rappor-teurs* nor the 76 “discussants” gave any hint of their conceptual schizophrenia and typical paranoiac mendacity. The tragedy is that the Ukrainian people, deprived of a free press and cut off from the free world, have no possibility to compare these tall stories with reality.

#### THE BIG LIE

The truth of the matter is the USSR attained no economic, technological, cultural or industrial achievements to brag about. Most of

the "statistics" were either blown up or manipulated in slanted interpretations. Through statistics and figures, like Hegel's "dialectics," one can prove almost anything. For the serious student, Soviet "production statistics" are almost useless.

The Communist regime and its socio-economic dogma can only succeed and prove to be vital to the extent it can keep up with the ongoing technological revolution. We know that in most developed countries of the West—the U.S., West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Sweden—all machinery in the great industrial plants and factories is constantly being improved thanks to endless innovation, with ever-growing cadres of technicians, trained in electronics and computers, keeping apace.

#### ESPIONAGE—NO SOLUTION

This process of spawning ultra-modern inventions and innovations is not found in the USSR. Therefore, the USSR has had to make up for its lack of modern equipment and methods through its proverbial thievery, plagiarism and industrial espionage. It is a well-known fact, for example, that the original blueprints of the French supersonic plane "Concorde" were stolen by Communist spies in France and delivered to the Kremlin. These were used to help build a new "Soviet" supersonic plane, the "TU-144," which promptly plummeted to the ground at an international air show at Le Bourget in June, 1973. Such supertechnology can only develop and grow organically, from systematic theoretical study and practical application, from month to month, from year to year.

In his talk Shcherbytsky reported that in "our republic we have so many scientists that one can rake them up at will." "In the Institutes (of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR alone), in branch scientific research institutes, in project organizations and higher institutions of learning there are over 150,000 scientific workers," he stated. He then relieved the tedium of hyperbolic self-congratulations when he stated, "Some 60,000 scientific workers, diverted from the mainstream, are dissipating their strength and are preoccupied with things of little value; among them are some 800 doctors and 10,000 science candidates..." He added: "For the past six years there has existed in Kiev a Scientific Research Institute for Analyzing Instrument-Building, but in all this time not a single one of its projects has been introduced into production..."

His report brings to mind Charles Dickens' satiric work, entitled *The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club*, which he wrote in 1837

and in which he depicted a group of pompous creatures posing as scientists, who spent years "investigating" various fishes in a pond and writing windy and empty reports on the "progress of their research." It would seem that Ukraine of today is full of Communist Pickwick Clubs.

The speeches of Shcherbytsky and Lashko also reveal that the "problem of management is rapidly becoming a sore cyst soon to burst." There exist in parallel two multi-million organizations—the party and the state, with complicated and conflicting policies and administration, a duplication of duties and prerogatives, and each loaded with incompetent personnel, prone to lying and bribery. In a word, management is in near-chaos.

In his report, Mr. Shcherbytsky went on to say:

Of especial importance at this moment is the necessity of further study of the position of the Communist social-economic formation and the growing role of the CPSU in the building of Communism and the processes of the social-economic and spiritual life of society and the generalization of the organizational experience and ideological work of party organizations and their leadership in economic and cultural development. . .

This Pickwickian passage constitutes eloquent testimony to the paucity of the ideological concepts and is tantamount to a confession of total inability to cope with everyday life.

#### GROWING RANKS OF LUMPENPROLETARIAT

But Shcherbytsky proceeded to brag about the production of new professional cadres in Ukraine, declairing that "during the last Five Year Plan a total of 1,741,000 specialists were graduated from the higher and intermediate special educational institutions—369,000 more than in the previous Five Year Plan period. . ."

Yet one of the most dangerous phenomena now being faced by the Soviet regime is the so-called "sociologic scissors" formed by the blades of rapidly-produced specialists and the lack of professional employment. Factories, industrial enterprises and other sources of production are unable to provide these new specialists with ready employment, even under the rigid and controlled Soviet economy.

Communist leaders often deride unemployment in the "capitalist countries," blaming it on "ruling circles." But the problem of unemployment is far more acute in the USSR, and in Ukraine's western areas it has assumed almost catastrophic proportions. There the Soviet Russians are practicing tacitly but officially a sort of *numerus*

*clausus*, whereby they discriminate against the Ukrainian youth by limiting their admission to educational institutions, and later discriminate against them in favor of the offspring of Communist officials. Thousands of young specialists in Ukraine cannot find equitable employment, thus creating ranks of *Lumpenproletariat* who eventually might become an unmanageable problem for the regime.

#### PERSONNEL ASPECTS: DISMISSAL AND RESHUFFLE

On the final day of the XXVth congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine the matter of personnel was dealt with. The results of the "elections" were inspired beforehand by *Georgi K. Kryuchkov*, the aforementioned Russian *aparatchik* and chief of the section of party organizational work on the Ukrainian party's Central Committee. (He also had manipulated the June 15, 1975 "elections" to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.)

In turn, *V. V. Kulyk*, head of the Mandate Commission, reported on the results of the "elections":

The Central Committee membership had been increased from 147 to 191;

Member candidates of the Central Committee: dropping from 85 to 77;

Revision Commission: 10 additional members had been added for a new total of 57.

The Ukrainian Politburo consists of eleven full-fledged members and five members-candidates. In the past this number has fluctuated, with "vacancies" being filled by whoever was "convenient" for the ruling bloc.

The Secretariat is comprised of six persons: the first and second secretaries, and four so-called *resort* (section) *secretaries*, charged with specific sections of the party's work.

#### THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT

The most important bodies in this "establishment" structure are the *Politburo* and the *Secretariat*. The members of the eleven-man Politburo are *Volodymyr Shcherbytsky*, *Mykola Borysenko*, *Alexander Botvyn*, *Alexander Vatchenko*, *Hryhory Vashchenko*, *Ivan Hrushetsky*, *Alexander Lashko*, *Ivan Sokolov*, *Vitaliy Solohub*, *Alexander Tytarenko* and *Vitaliy Fedorchuk*. Member-candidates of the Politburo are: *Victor Dobryk*, *Borys Kachura*, *Valentyn Malanchuk*, *Yakiv Pohrebniak* and *Alexander Pohrebniak*.

The Secretariat consists of V. Shcherbytsky and I. Sokolov, first and second secretaries, respectively, and the four *resort secretaries*: M. Borysenko, V. Malanchuk, Y. Pohrebniak and A. Tytarenko. The hierarchical listing of names is important: the graduation on the scale reflects the eventual succession in power.

#### DISMISSALS

Three important members of the old Politburo were dismissed before the current congress met, namely, *Vladimir I. Degtiarov*, a Russian by origin and the first secretary of the Donets *oblast* committee (December 26, 1975); *Ivan K. Lutak*, second secretary, a Ukrainian by nationality (January 27, 1976), and a second-ranking man in the Ukrainian Politburo, and *Nikifor T. Kalchenko*, 70, also a Ukrainian and for many years president of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Reasons for their dismissal varied. It was said that Degtiarov was a "pro-Shelest man," and so had to follow in the footsteps of his former boss. Perhaps more to the point is that Degtiarov is a vain and arrogant man and totally inept as an administrator and executive. Never pro-Shelest or pro-Ukrainian, he was assailed by Shcherbytsky for "wrecking" the Five Year Plan in the Donets *oblast*.

On the other hand, Lutak and Kalchenko are Ukrainians, and their dismissal might be considered, at least to a degree, to be the result of their ethnic origin. Both of them had been die-hard Communists all their lives, and they never actually entertained any illusions with regard to a sovereign, non-Communist and independent Ukraine. They survived Stalin's terror and, in reality, pursued their political careers successfully under him. Like Shelest, they were both "hard-liners" and "hawks," advocating the military invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the "liberalization" course of Alexander Dubcek.

Their problem, however, like the problem of Shelest, lay in their awareness of the significance of the *unsolved nationalities problem* in the USSR. They sensed the dynamite hidden behind the facade of the Soviet "monolith," and consequently became convinced federalists and supporters of the greatest possible measure of autonomy for the "union republics." They certainly could not swallow Brezhnev's new "theory" about a "common Soviet nation" and "a common Soviet language and culture" [Russian]. Theirs was a case where the Kremlin simply would not tolerate any dissenting views.

## PROMOTION OF A "GENDARME"

Ukrainian Communist officialdom comprises a "rogues' gallery" which would be worthwhile studying from a socio-psychological viewpoint in order to learn just what kind of people these faceless individuals are who are helping the Russians to keep their own people in political and national subjugation.

One of them who was promoted to full membership in the Politburo, *Vitaliy V. Fedorchuk*, is head of the State Security Committee (KGB) of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. Thus the highest-ranking policeman of Ukraine is one of the eleven members of the ruling state body!

Ordinarily, we bear policemen as such no animus, for the police perform vital, essential, and at times very dangerous tasks for the benefit of society. But one who becomes a *supragendarme* in the service of a conqueror and oppressor of one's own people, is something else again. His role in Ukraine is a small-scale replica of the sinister role played in the USSR by KGB chief Andropov, who, in fact, gives orders to Fedorchuk. The latter is known for his special cruelty with respect to Ukrainian political prisoners. He is known for ordering hapless Ukrainian inmates to be brought in from far-flung Communist jails and concentration camps and "persuading" them to recant their "crimes" and to renounce their political views. One of his sadistic designs was to break morally and physically Yuriy Shukhevych, son of the late General Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka), commander-in-chief of the anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). He endeavored to force the young Shukhevych not only to denounce his political views, but also to renounce his dead father, who was killed by the KGB on March 5, 1950, in Ukraine.\*

## NEW GENERATION

Thus the present Central Committee of the CPU consists of 191 persons, including 44 new members. Of the old Central Committee of 147, formed in 1971, 70 were "re-elected" to the new body; 22 retired or died, leaving 55 "hard core" members who could not be

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\* [The son, Yuriy, was first arrested in 1948 at the age of 15, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment; released in 1956, he was given another 10-year sentence in 1958, which he served until 1968, but upon release he refused to return to Ukraine. In 1972, he was arrested in the city of Nalchik in the Caucasus and sentenced to 10 years at hard labor—Ed.]

squeezed out. In summing up, along with the 70 old members, 121 new members were added to the Central Committee. Almost half the names of the new members are Russian-sounding, and it is a fair assumption that they are in full support of the Brezhnev-Shcherbytsky policy of the "fusion of nations" into one "Soviet nation" as against the 55 old presumably "pro-Shelest hard-liners." The new Ukrainians in the Central Committee have yet to find their Ukrainianism in the hard, day-to-day struggle against the relentless Moscow drive to subvert and Russify the Ukrainian nation.

"ENEMIES ABROAD..."

Finally, the congress was warned of the ever-present "enemies abroad":

...We must take into account the fact that reactionary imperialist circles are doing their utmost to hinder international detente.

Anti-Soviet elements mourn the bygone "cold war" days and strive to restore its sinister specter at any cost.

Ignoring their commitments and distorting in their interests the results of the European Security Conference, the opponents of detente are stubbornly trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, and to fan a demagogical campaign. The emigre Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist organizations and the foreign Zionist centers act as their vociferous yes-men.

Our avowed and our disguised ideological enemies, together with all kinds of traitors to their own people, are resorting to ever more insidious and refined methods to shake and undermine the foundations of socialism in our own country and in the fraternal countries. All of them, including the Maoists and their slogans of anti-Sovietism, all kinds of opportunists and revisionists, and, I would add, every force hostile to us from extreme rightists to ultra-leftists, share one single ideological platform—anti-Communism...

We have repelled and will continue to repel any manifestations of bourgeois and revisionist ideologies by countering enemy attacks with militant, operative and convincing propaganda, by raising the political vigilance of the Soviet people...

The Kremlin is said to have become a superpower, a global power, but its minions in Ukraine openly and officially admit that the USSR is far from secure. As is any artificial creation.

## DELETED DETENTE AND THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

*By* LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Clearly indicative of the confusion in our national leadership is the deletion of the nomenclature "detente" and yet the announced retention of the type of self-defeating policy the term characterized. Substituting for detente the new, nominal designation, "a policy of peace through strength," is tantamount to declaring the absence of any comprehensive, well-defined and realistic foreign policy. One that is firmly grounded in values, principles and the sustaining traditions of our nation; that is conceptually and precisely geared to the dominant historical forces of Eurasia, where the prime and only real threat to our national security exists; one that holistically views the total assault of our chief Soviet Russian enemy; and certainly one that infuses purpose, mission, vision and courage into the consciousness of our people. It is no wonder that the very personification of detente, Secretary of State Kissinger, has been retained, for with the same type of policy we can expect the same medley of so-called pragmatic makeshifts, accommodating compromise, and cosmetic diplomacy that have only served to devalue these indispensable criteria of a realistic policy and to guarantee the further erosion of our guiding power in the world. As the writer emphasized a year ago, "Apart from the blunderous Moscow Agreement of '72 and grave shortcomings in understanding the USSR, the debacle in Southeast Asia in itself is sufficient cause for the removal of the Secretary of State and his motion diplomacy."<sup>1</sup>

Each Captive Nations Week Observance has proven to be an excellent national forum for a constructive re-examination of our foreign policy, and the 18th Observance, this July 18-24, should be no exception. As a matter of fact, it promises to be a fitting continuation of the '75 Captive Nations Week forum, highlighting the confusion and contradictions in our national leadership, the blatant defects of the deleted detente policy, now called "peace through strength," and the practical alternatives to the perilous course we

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<sup>1</sup> Letter to Members of Congress, National Captive Nations Committee, June 20, 1975.

have been pursuing. Examples of the prevailing confusion abound. For one, regarding Helsinki and the President's Captive Nations Week proclamation last year, one writer accurately observed, "Ironically, Ford recently proclaimed the third week in July as 'Captive Nations Week, 1975.' Though the proclamation made no specific mention of East European nations, they are the ones at whom the annual observance is aimed."<sup>2</sup> To this day millions of Americans are virtually convinced that the Kissinger policy has written off the captive nations to permanent Soviet Russian domination. The Sonnenfeldt doctrine revealed this year has served to confirm this conviction.

Another, even more fundamental, example of confusion is seen in another top aide to Kissinger interpreting the USSR as a nation/state while Vice President Rockefeller imputes an imperial structure to what is actually an empire/state. For the former, the USSR and the U.S. "have competing national interests,"<sup>3</sup> and as director of the policy planning staff in the Department of State, he doubtlessly must wield considerable influence with such misconceptions. How deficient and backward Kissinger's department is with regard to basic fundamentals is further revealed in a current publication of the department which under the caption of "Relations With the Soviet Union" states that, "for the first time in history, two nations have the capacity to destroy mankind," i. e. the USSR and the U.S.<sup>4</sup> With such ruling misconcepts on the USSR, Moscow need scarcely fear any imaginative and winning diplomacy on our part.

In "just telling it like it is," Vice President Rockefeller has added to our national leadership confusion with some fundamental truths that have consistently been embodied in the Captive Nations Week Resolution but have been buried by the policy of deleted detente. During his goodwill tour to West Germany, he frankly stated, "The era of old world imperialism has gone, and yet we find ourselves faced with a new and far more complex form of imperialism, a mixture of Czarism and Marxism with colonial appendages."<sup>5</sup> Actually, there is nothing new about traditional Russian imperialism, whether Czarist or Marxist, and its projections into Asia, the Mideast and the New World have able precedents in the past. The span of the Czarist Russian Empire roughly coincides with that of the USSR today, but

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<sup>2</sup> Fred Barnes. "Ford's Guard is Up on Pact," *The Washington Star*, July 23, 1975.

<sup>3</sup> Winston Lord. "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China." The Department of State News Release, March 23, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *United States Foreign Policy*, January 1976, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> *The Washington Star*, May 16, 1976.

the Soviet Russian Empire includes not only the USSR but areas beyond, in Central Europe, Asia and the Caribbean.

The important aspect about the Rockefeller statement is that basically it supports the method and content of genetical captive nations analysis, and distinguishes itself from the gross misconceptions shared by Kissinger and his aides. The paramount significance of this is that the former allows for a new ethnographic dimension in our foreign policy whereas the latter conceptually precludes it and falsely makes out of the empire-state of the USSR a nation/state, which is one of the many illusions in the policy of deleted detente. This point on a new ethnographic dimension cannot be too strongly emphasized because it is the foundation of an alternative policy to that pursued now. Also, it entered into the vital discussion on undeleted detente in the period of the '75 Captive Nations Week and will undoubtedly be discussed further in the period ahead.

#### THE FIRST EPISODE IN THE DEMISE OF DETENTE

As the printed record unmistakably shows, the period of the '75 Captive Nations Week was veritably the first episode in the demise of the Kissinger brand of detente. The '76 Week should appropriately occasion the second episode. To this day it remains a mystery as to how much of our media overlooked, no less understood, the interrelated events of the '75 Week. In tune with deleted detente the President's proclamation of the Week was ambiguous and weak, and surely without accident in timing, on Monday, American astronauts and Russian cosmonauts shook hands in an orbital detente. But on the following day Solzhenitsyn addressed Congressional legislators on oppressed peoples and the shortcomings of detente, while the White House implicitly admitted its blunder in not inviting the Russian writer on the inept advice of the Secretary of State, who by now took to a grassroot defense of his policy. In the course of all this, speeches in Congress observed the continuing reality of the captive nations, proclamations by Governors and Mayors emphasized all the captive nations, particularly those in the USSR, and assemblies here and abroad precipitated a mounting criticism of detente. Significantly, on Friday of the Week and much to the surprise of most analysts the official announcement was made of the forthcoming Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The cumulative effect of these successive events was clearly witnessed in the over-spill of debate, colloquy and discussion the following week. The interrelated nature of the events was perceived by

many legislators and observers. For example, with reference to the Week and the CSCE, Congresswoman Holt of Maryland pointed out, "While seemingly unconnected, these two events have a strong inner affinity. In a fast-moving, cynical era this point can be lost all too easily."<sup>6</sup> Or to take the analyst James Burnham who sees history "providing transparent symbols," he observed: "Take, in addition to the Solzhenitsyn display, an eloquent feature of the Apollo-Soyuz linkup: its date. It somehow happened that the week selected for this 'historic event,' as all official comment hailed it, was the same as that designated by an act of our legislature as 'Captive Nations Week': a yearly reiteration — so it was conceived to be — of our dismay at the subjection of the nations of Eastern Europe to Moscow's tyranny..."<sup>7</sup> He added further, "The juxtaposition could not have been more exquisite." The outstanding fact is that since 1959, when the Captive Nations Week Resolution was passed by Congress, Moscow has used every possible strategem to overshadow the Week, including negro liberation, the Moscow-New York flight run, the 1965 Suslov barrage in Vilnius, Lithuania, ratifying the Consular Convention, signing the non-proliferation pact and the like—all more or less timed with the Week. Regrettably, our people don't believe in history's transparent symbols.

So overwhelming was this cumulative effect of the '75 Week that the President in an unprecedented move summoned leaders concerned with Eastern Europe to a meeting in the White House to explain his reasons for participating in the Helsinki conference.<sup>8</sup> In his statement the President explicitly declared, "It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means."<sup>9</sup> This was addressed to many of those present who view the captive nations in the USSR, such as Ukraine, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia and others, as being of basic, critical importance to our foreign policy. It is significant to note that, in sharp contrast, the President's Captive Nations Week proclamation issued before this first episode spoke only in meaningless generality about "rededication to the aspirations

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<sup>6</sup> *Congressional Record*, July 25, 1975, p. H7562.

<sup>7</sup> "The Logic of Detente," *The National Review*, New York, August 15, 1975.

<sup>8</sup> For background, see "CSCE and the Captive Nations," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Autumn 1975, pp. 247-257.

<sup>9</sup> *Statement by the President*, The White House, July 25, 1975, p. 1.

of all peoples for self-determination and liberty.”<sup>10</sup> When the Sonnenfeldt doctrine on “organic relationship” flared up this spring, the President issued a Milwaukee statement to some ethnic leaders in the area, rejecting the notion of organic relationship, though not Sonnenfeldt himself and his boss Kissinger, and even more strongly affirming the pre-Helsinki point above.

What is the importance of this development for the ‘76 Week and a realistic alternative to the substance of deleted detente? Namely, on the bases of the President’s pre-Helsinki meeting and the confirming Milwaukee statement, Americans are looking forward to a Presidential proclamation of the ‘76 Week that will honestly translate the Congressional resolution upon which Public Law 86-90 is predicated, and to which his own Vice President has recently given part expression to, and that will convey with equal, pointed force the essence of the two mentioned statements. Not only would this clear up much of the existing confusion in our national leadership, but it would also clearly certify to the credibility of the President’s own declarations to ethnic leaders and others in the country. More, in truth the proclamation should realistically—or as the Vice President says, “just telling it like it is”—specify for the continued benefit of our citizenry and its memory the now long list of captive nations under communist domination.

#### THE UNFORGETTABLE LIST

One of the contributing factors to our mental block regarding the primary, empire nature of the USSR is the general unfamiliarity of our people, including notably those in the national leadership, with the long list of captive nations which commenced with the first thrusts of Soviet Russian imperialism at the close of World War I. Some know the record and the genetical analysis underlying it, but find it too disturbing to remember. Others mistakenly believe that differences between the totalitarian communist regimes alter the captive nation status of the peoples involved. The power center in the so-called communist world is without sensible question the USSR, and this would not have been possible without the earliest victims of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism shown on this list. As the historical record well shows, Moscow’s systematic exploitation of non-Russian resources in the USSR has enabled it to expand its empire far beyond the dreams of the old Czars. Since World II its ex-

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<sup>10</sup> *Captive Nations Week, 1975*, The White House, June 27, 1975.

panded empire has provided for an even more intensified exploitation of non-Russian resources both within and without the Soviet Union for a global expansionism felt by way of threat and influence on every continent of the world. Despite Kissinger's typically belated warnings to Moscow's forays in the Free World, the dynamics of Soviet Russian imperialism, as in part indicated by the list of its victims, will surely not be arrested by empty verbal threats or even our own type of sabre-rattling.

Considering present trends and the confused character and defects of our foreign policy, it would be worth your while to study this unforgettable list carefully, for it is inevitable by sheer historical process that more entities will be added in our time: <sup>11</sup>

#### THE CAPTIVE NATIONS — WHO'S NEXT?

*Country, people, and year of Communist domination*

Armenia	1920
Azerbaijan	1920
Byelorussia	1920
Cossackia	1920
Georgia	1920
Idel-Ural	1920
North Caucasia	1920
Ukraine	1920
Far Eastern Republic	1922
Turkestan	1922
Mongolia	1924
Estonia	1940
Latvia	1940
Lithuania	1940
Albania	1946
Bulgaria	1946
Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, etc.)	1946
Poland	1947
Romania	1947
Czecho-Slovakia	1948
North Korea	1949
Hungary	1949
East Germany	1949
Mainland China	1949
Tibet	1951
North Vietnam	1954
Cuba	1960
Cambodia	1975
South Vietnam	1975
Laos	1975

<sup>11</sup> For background, see author's work *The Vulnerable Russians*, New York, 1967, pp. 454; also his *U.S.A. and the Soviet Myth*, Old Greenwich, Conn., 1971, pp. 274.

## WHO'S NEXT?

Angola? Thailand? Republic of China? South Korea?  
Rhodesia? South Africa?

To the tune of an historical domino effect, the extension of this list within the short span of scarcely 60 years is phenomenal in itself. With perspective and sober reasoning, it would seem that by now a full understanding and analytic grasp of its mainsprings have been achieved in our national leadership. But as the few, selected examples cited earlier indicate, this is far from being the case. There is little appreciative knowledge of the very foundation of this captive cumulation, namely the numerous non-Russian nations within the USSR, and, as a consequence, no thought and attention are devoted to it in our active policy. Yet it is in this direction that a realistic alternative exists to our present self-defeating course of being confronted by one crisis situation after another on our side of the fifty-yard line and deluding ourselves that this is the course of world peace.

Angola is the latest example of the endless-crisis course. Developments there are rapidly qualifying this highly resourceful and strategic area as another legitimate addition to the captive nations list. Employing traditional Russian techniques, Moscow has been at work in Angola for about ten years and with its Cuban proxy seized the opportunity to plant its power and influence in the region. Despite the promised and misleading withdrawal of Cuban troops, Angola stands to become the "Cuba of Africa," a base for all types of warfare in southern Africa. By all estimates, it could easily have been saved with foresight and preparations long before the two branches of our government began blaming each other for this critical loss. It should not be overlooked that our *rapprochement* movement toward Cuba did not deter Havana from playing its role for Moscow. The South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, accurately interpreted this latest success of Soviet Russian global play in these words: "The Angolan crisis was a struggle of both white and black Africans against Russian and Cuban imperialists. . . . If the people of Angola elected a Marxist or Communist government, it was their right. It was, however, a totally different matter if a foreign power intervened with force."<sup>12</sup> Again, the typically belated Kissinger tour to Africa and his idealized expressions will add only further fuel for Moscow's political warfare operations in the area, directed in time at South Africa itself.

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<sup>12</sup> "Angola and Detente," *South African Scope*, March 1976, p. 11.

Throughout the Far East an overhanging apprehension exists as to our national will to resist communist imperialism and our sense of morality to meet commitments. Evincing the same apprehension, CENTO members meeting in London were recently assured by the Secretary of State that "The United States will stand by its friends." Our friends and some of our best allies in South Korea, the Republic of China, Thailand, the Philippines and elsewhere are not so sure. They all recognize that our defeat in Southeast Asia was a political and not a military one, and they rightly wonder whether more political blunders will be committed. Critical to this question of general confidence in the entire region is our future relationship with Taiwan. Aside from the strategic values of the Republic of China to our national interest and in spite of all the pro and con arguments bearing on "further normalizing our relations with Peking," the basic truth is that a severance of diplomatic relations with Taipei would be a prime and dishonorable example of how not to stand by one of our most loyal friends.

At a time when Free World confidence in our leadership and word is at a low ebb, there is every reason to reinforce it by plainly upholding principle and our close bond with the Republic of China. An unprincipled and imprudent severance in diplomatic relations with it would only deepen this lack of full confidence. Literally to sacrifice Taiwan in order to appease Peiping's arbitrary demand would not only not normalize our relations with a basically unstable regime but also abnormalize our relations with every friend in Asia. Such a rupture in diplomatic ties would mean a psychological blow to the free Chinese with damaging reverberations not only on the island but also throughout Asia, including the forces of anti-communism on mainland China. Proponents for the recognition of Peiping have yet to offer a sound case rebutting these fundamental considerations. Contrary to prevailing myth, it was not former President Nixon or Dr. Kissinger who opened the way for our relations with Peiping but rather the Red Chinese themselves. Efforts along these lines were known in the intelligence community in the summer of 1968. Plainly, in view of this and if the Peiping regime dreads so deeply the threat of Soviet Russian imperialism, to which it constantly refers as "social imperialism," these constitute additional, substantial reasons for us not to accede to its arbitrary demand. In the case of one divided nation we blundered badly, and three once-free entities joined the list of captive nations. Similar blunders on the basis of speculation and political miscalculation concerning the divided Chinese nation will result in the extension of the list.

Still the problem of another divided nation, namely Korea, is aggravated by unjustified allegations and pressures in our country concerning the denial of human rights in the free Republic of Korea. In what is essentially a war zone marked by open, military presence and a constant threat from the north, the expression of human rights enjoys a latitude and scope that far surpass other countries in the Free World which are not similarly situated. As in the case of the free Chinese, the overall politico-economic progress achieved by South Korea these past ten years cannot but attract the admiration of all who have invested heavily in its survival and continued struggle for national independence. Here, too, it should not be forgotten that it was Moscow that formed the North Korean armed forces and has had a vital, sustained interest in their preparations for further aggression. South Korea, too, could become a captive nation should we politically miscalculate to the detriment of our own strategic and politico-moral interests. The gain ultimately would redound to Moscow and its expanding global interests.

The real possibilities for more captive nations should be obvious, given the global goals and the growing array of means available to Moscow, as well as the essentially defensive and defective nature of delcted detente. The areas cited here are presently the most critical. Tomorrow, along the endless-crisis course propped by our own short-run makeshifts, they will be in South Asia, the Mideast, Latin America, and even Western Europe. Temporary peace in the Mideast, for example, is only a surface situation beneath which driving forces are at work toward a further, inevitable unsettlement. One of these forces is the deeply penetrating tentacles of Soviet Russian imperialism. Twenty years ago most analysts viewed this as "unthinkable." But as one of the few analysts with a grasp of understanding this chief force has vividly expressed it, the USSR "has pursued the age-old policies of Russia which, in the Middle East as elsewhere, have a very respectable ancestry under the aegis of Czarism."<sup>13</sup>

In short, so long as our policy, which the Secretary of State recently stated has not changed since World War II, continues to lack central direction of purpose and movement, in addition to compatible means for execution, the opportunities for Soviet Russian expansionism will remain bright and open. Moscow, with its traditional array of purpose, mission and techniques, which it does not fear to use even in a nuclear age, knows this, and consequently desires more

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<sup>13</sup> Hans Morgenthau in *Detente in Historical Perspective*, ed. by George Schwab. New York, 1975, p. 78.

than anything the continuation of deleted detente. For not only in the so-called Third World but also in Western Europe emerging opportunities exist through associated communist parties. Significantly, when it comes to the fundamental issue of mythical American imperialism and real Soviet Russian imperialism, the typical answer was recently given by France's Paul Laurent: "Differences of opinion that exist between Communist parties can under no circumstances be allowed to form an obstacle to joint action against imperialism and to the proclaiming of joint goals."<sup>14</sup> The imperialism here is the common American target.

#### MOSCOW VALUES DELETED DETENTE

When the President deleted "detente" from our official vocabulary — though the policy of drift has remained, Moscow immediately reacted in a very concerned manner. As a crude example, Georgi Arbatov, head of the think-tank Institute of the USA and Canada saw fit to advise the President not to listen to "right-wing loud mouths" and "old horses of the Cold War who criticize detente." This advice was entirely in conformity with the values the Russians have been reaping from detente, which in their clear logic of "peaceful coexistence" is in reality just another form of the incessant Cold War but at this stage and time of greater comparative advantage. In the whole discussion on detente, this crucial point of operational logic is insufficiently appreciated by our leaders, including the Secretary of State who only recently at the NATO meeting in Oslo began to attach some value to "Soviet ideology." But more important, we still have developed no logical counterpart, and thus no mechanics of positive action, to the national and motivating constructs of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" doctrine. As we shall see, this glaring gap in our posture can strategically be filled with the non-Russian dimension that the captive nations analysis provides.

On more than one occasion Brezhnev has defined clearly the Russian view of detente and its basic utility at this time for Moscow's unchanged global goals. As he stated it in 1973, "Peaceful coexistence does not mean the end of the struggle of the two world powers. The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between world socialism and imperialism will be waged right up to the complete and final victory of communism on a world scale."<sup>14</sup> Stripped of its Aesopean language, this means the further advance

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<sup>14</sup> "Communist Split Visible at Parley," *The New York Times*, May 23, 1976.

<sup>15</sup> *Pravda*, August 22, 1973.

of Soviet Russian imperialism and additional captive nations, including in the end the U.S., not inconceivably as another non-Russian republic in the World USSR. At the 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev restated this doctrinal point and emphasized that detente does not "in the slightest abolish the laws of the class struggle," which are mythical laws justifying Russian interventionism anywhere. In short, Moscow has always and with logical consistency maintained that detente can place no curbs on the systemic warfare construct of its fixed "peaceful coexistence" policy. This has been so since Lenin enunciated it nearly 60 years ago. Curiously, when Kissinger asserts that "Today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the challenge is unending..." one cannot but wonder about his perspectives.<sup>16</sup>

In addition to the integral systemic warfare construct, which operationally is chiefly directed at the advanced industrial democracies, the other fixed construct on "wars of national liberation" is also consistently upheld by Moscow. Angola is the most recent example of success in the operational application of this concept. At the same 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev let it be known that "Our party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom. This attitude to the complicated processes within the developing countries is clear and definite." Of course, the party controls the government with totalitarian reins, and as it fought in Lenin's time for the "freedom" of the now captive nations of Byelorussia, Ukraine and others, so on this two-level basis it has been fighting for the "freedom" of Vietnam, Angola, Portugal and countless others in our time.

What is not generally understood with appreciative insight is that the very logic of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence," involving systemic warfare, wars of national liberation, and ideational warfare in general, with each conducted through extensive networks of the dual party/governmental setup, sharply contradicts the peaceful intentions, the conciliatory moves and much of the process of deleted detente as viewed by us. When last fall the French President Giscard d'Estaing toasted Brezhnev at a state dinner in Moscow with the words "There should be a relaxation of ideological competition between East and West to avoid excessive tensions," the Russian leader was psychologically toasted. Whenever truths such as this one, the captive nations, the denial of human rights in the USSR and so forth confront the Russians, they characteristically display irrita-

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<sup>16</sup> *The Washington Post*, February 4, 1976.

tion enough to cause us to retreat for want of negotiating another relatively minor agreement. The pursuit of a policy of retreat from truths can only mean a steady erosion of our own values, purposes and leadership. More important at this stage, it signifies a failure on our part to provide a logical counterpart to the total doctrine of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence."

It is only a question of time before this grave need will be recognized; the sooner the better, for it is time that Moscow has been buying in its support and use of deleted detente. As overall trends will show, the USSR has made rapid strides in the past decade in its own military build-up and the manufacture of arms for export to foment the so-called "wars of national liberation." Given our margin of technological advantage, and at that a dubious and shifting one in many areas, the USSR by mid-1975 has exceeded us in military manpower, major surface combatant ships and submarines, strategic offensive and defensive weapons, and in basic conventional ground force weapons, except for helicopters.<sup>17</sup> Well documented analyses along these lines, including the recent CIA revision on Moscow's military expenditures, can lead to a numbers game and all sorts of speculation. They can also distort our perspective regarding traditional Russian modes of diplomacy and Cold War operations.

Unless the Russians develop a first-strike capability in strategic arms, their use of overall military superiority will be no different from the manpower "steamroller" scare by which the former Czars frightened the capitals of Europe. In other words, "peaceful coexistence" will inevitably become more intensified, with diplomatic intimidation and blackmail predicated on a flaunted military superiority. To many of us this will appear as a so-called return to the Cold War; in reality, it will only be a more intensified phase of the present, marked by still greater unsettlement, friction and disarray in all quarters of the globe. Essential to the composite development of USSR's psycho-political strength, engendering the economic, sociological, cultural and other spheres under totalitarian control, is Moscow's ready access to advanced Western technology. One of the chief illusions of detente, "economic interdependence," would facilitate this.<sup>18</sup> Those given to this illusion had better interpret Brezhnev accurately when at the "25th" he clearly stressed, "Economic and trade ties with capitalist states strengthen and expand the policy of peaceful coexistence," as conceived by Moscow.

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<sup>17</sup> See excellent summary in *Bicentennial Operation Alert*, American Security Council, Boston, Virginia.

<sup>18</sup> See *The Illusions of Detente*, USGPO, Washington 1974, p. 9.

## THE NON-RUSSIAN DIMENSION

Is there a better alternative to Kissinger's brand of detente? There certainly is, for a more genuine peace, our strong leadership, a reborn America and a newly confident Free World. A careful analysis of the Secretary of State's speeches and statements will show that the supportive logic behind his generalizations breaks down into three essential points, namely the necessity for peace, the dread of returning to the Cold War, and the prospect of a nuclear war. In combination, these scarcely provide a counterpart logic to that of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" policy. No person in his senses would dispute the first point, but when one reviews, among other things, Moscow's role in Vietnam, its incitement of the Yom Kippur War, its try in Chile and Portugal, its success in Angola, etc., not to mention its avowed "peaceful coexistence" policy with its warfare constructs, we only delude ourselves that under the cover of his detente these events and more pave the road of peace. The "peace" achieved in Vietnam was a piece of territory lost to the enemy.

The second point on returning to the Cold War need hardly be elaborated upon in light of our foregoing analysis. If anything, it plainly indicates the Secretary's misconception of traditional Russian policy. As for the point on an outbreak of a nuclear war, the play on popular nuclearitis has become somewhat outworn. Here, too, one prays that this will never come to pass, and with undiminished growth in our military technology, the probability of it not remains high. But, for some reason, it is often overlooked that the presence of nuclear arms in no way deters Moscow from pursuing the warfare paths ingrained in its policy of "peaceful coexistence." Except for terminological differences, these paths have always existed in imperial Russian policy, and it is in this area that a policy with regard to the captive nations must be developed.

In providing a counterpart logic to "peaceful coexistence," one hesitates to use the appropriate term, ethnographic warfare. However, if we are realistic enough and view it in ideational terms as the communists do systemic warfare in their "peaceful coexistence," the necessary counterpart logic should become evident. Moreover, the methods of its employment would be consistent with the tides of "peaceful coexistence." The chief field for its employment is made to order in the non-Russian dimension of the Soviet Union itself, namely its captive non-Russian nations. Nowhere in any of Kissinger's works, from the early *A World Restored* to *The Troubled Partnership* is there any vivid awareness of this fundamental dimension

and its vast possibilities for effective competition with Moscow. For the recent period, his views are shaped by his aide's "organic relationship" notion.<sup>19</sup>

American concern for peoples and nations subjected to colonialist rule has always been a precious asset of our tradition. Indeed, the focal point of the American Bicentennial Revolution is the Declaration of Independence from an empire. Yet, ironically enough, when it comes to Russian colonialist rule within the USSR, involving over 125 million non-Russians, such concern and interest fades, and our official policy operates as though the USSR were some nation-state rather than the primary empire that it is. As a recent editorial put it, "Millions of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Jews, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidzhanis, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and other non-Russians wonder why they remain subjugated in an era when colonialism has been destroyed almost everywhere else."<sup>20</sup> Contrary to Kissinger's belated moral observations that we can "no longer expect that moral judgments expressed in absolute terms will command broad acceptance,"<sup>21</sup> judgments about national independence, the end of colonialist rule and human rights still command broad acceptance.

The formulation of this new policy and its imaginative implementation in the whole politico-economic sphere require not only a sensitive knowledge of the non-Russian nations and peoples in the USSR but also a modicum of courage, conviction and will to cultivate constructively this basic dimension—all in the fair spirit of competitive coexistence. A good start on this, as indicated earlier, was provided by the President's pre-Helsinki declaration. His Milwaukee statement on April 2 repudiated the notion of "organic relationship" and emphasized, "The United States strongly supports the aspirations for freedom, for national independence of peoples everywhere, including the peoples of Eastern Europe."<sup>22</sup> Thus, the credibility of these positions will be judged in the field of application as concerns the non-Russian dimension within the imperial state of the USSR. A studied interference in empires has always been the hallmark of the American tradition. The worst of them all, the USSR, can be no exception for a reborn and renewed America.

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<sup>19</sup> "The Sonnenfeldt Caper, *Congressional Record*, April 8, 1976, pp. S5204-5205.

<sup>20</sup> "Moscow's 25th Congress," *The New York Times*, February 23, 1976.

<sup>21</sup> "The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policies," Department of State, July 15, 1975, p. 6.

## MINISTRY AND ESPIONAGE: THE YMCA IN UKRAINE 1915-1918

By WAYNE WILLIAMS

In World War I the Young Men's Christian Association had over 26,000 secretaries employed in Europe, ministering to the physical and spiritual needs of the prisoners of war of both the Entente and the Central Powers. Though, on the whole, it appears that the services of these secretaries were impartial and in many cases distinguished, some of the American YMCA personnel were inclined to mix their ministerial duties with what must properly be termed espionage. In particular, those secretaries who were assigned to Ukraine, along the Russian Empire's Southwestern Front, perhaps justly earned the suspicion of Bolshevik historians who charge that they were agents of American imperialism.<sup>1</sup> Certainly, one must qualify the assessment of the foremost historian of Russian-American relations during the revolutionary era, George Kennan, who comments that the activity of the YMCA secretaries was restricted to the "introduction of recreational activities."<sup>2</sup>

The first YMCA mission in Ukraine began in August, 1915, when Secretary John Day instituted "religious-morale" work among the German and Austrian prisoners of war held at Darnytsia, near Kiev. Later that year, when a commission detailed from the Sixth Russian Army was investigating disturbances at the Darnytsia Camp, Day's work came under close scrutiny. The commission seems to have been suspicious of the "modest scale" on which YMCA activities were conducted there and further investigation uncovered a rather incriminating letter from Day's associate, John Springer, who was working in Frankfurt-am-Main. In part, the letter read:

His Royal Highness Prince Max Baden<sup>3</sup> is highly interested in your work in Russia which is of strategic importance.

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<sup>1</sup> R.H. Symonenko, *Imperialistychna polityka SShA shchodo Ukrainy* (Kiev: 1957), p. 98.

<sup>2</sup> George F. Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920* (Princeton: 1956), Vol. 1, p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> Prince Max von Baden became chancellor of the German Empire in 1918.

Any information which you can send will be highly appreciated, especially that which is received from Ukr[aine].<sup>4</sup>

Besides the charges which this obviously damning letter brought on, Day was also accused of setting up meetings between high ranking German and Austrian officers and members of the Czar's court purported to have Germanophile views. Day was, of course, immediately recalled and the matter apparently hushed up.

YMCA work in the Russian Empire continued after the Day incident; however it was given an entirely new focus in the months following the February Revolution and the American entry into the war. Then, the United States sought to demonstrate its sympathy for the ideals of the Provisional Government and at the same time insure a maximum effort on the Russian Front. In the summer of 1917 a presidentially appointed good will mission, which was headed by Elihu Root and included a YMCA officer, John Mott<sup>5</sup>, toured the former Russian Empire, met the leaders of the Provisional Government and brought back recommendations on how the United States might aid this newest democracy.

The only practical fruit of the Root Mission was the beginning of the American propaganda effort in the former Russian Empire and the development of YMCA work among the troops on the Russian Front. Root's report included a plan to extend the "practical, unselfish ministry" of the YMCA to those troops, and Mott received the approval of Prince Lvov and Foreign Minister Tereshchenko for the plan.<sup>6</sup> Following this recommendation the United States began to intensify its propaganda effort in the former Russian Empire, flooding the Eastern Front with films, lecturers, literature and sending some two hundred YMCA secretaries to coordinate the effort.<sup>7</sup>

It was under these conditions that a new secretary, Edward T. Heald, was assigned to Ukraine. As far as can be ascertained, Heald was never informed of the circumstances surrounding his predecessor's removal, nor does his work seem to have been hampered by the incident. Perhaps it was to his advantage that when he came to Kiev in the fall of 1917, Heald had to deal with officials of an autonomous

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<sup>4</sup> Symonenko, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

<sup>5</sup> Mott later became head of all YMCA activities in the former Russian Empire.

<sup>6</sup> United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia*, Vol. 1, pp. 152-153.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

Ukraine rather than with Russians<sup>9</sup>, as the latter might have recalled the Day case and eyed a resumption of YMCA activities there with some suspicion.

After several months of Russian language training in Petrograd and a short stopover in Minsk, Heald and his wife Emily arrived in Kiev on September 12 to begin work among the soldiers of the Southwestern Front, in conjunction with similar efforts being launched in Minsk and Odessa. Heald's first task was to seek facilities for the YMCA operations in the city. Fully realizing that political pressure was necessary to procure a suitable site, the secretary found his task complicated by the "three-cornered struggle going on between the Ukrainians, Bolsheviks and the Kerensky forces for control," and he was unable to tell "which is the stronger, or how far I can go with one without getting in bad with the others."<sup>9</sup> Deeming it wise to keep more than one iron in the fire, Heald used his prestige as an unofficial representative of the United States to open the doors to the offices of Oberuchev, the Provisional Government's Commissar of the Kiev Military District, Ukrainian Secretary for Military Affairs, Simon Petlura, and Hryhoryiv, the President of the *Rada* of Military Deputies, which was controlled by Ukrainian parties. Though each of the three welcomed Heald and the YMCA and tried to help him, it was through the aid of a certain Poslavsky, President of Kiev's Republic Club, that Heald was able to commandeer a small barracks building four miles from the center of the city and at the quarters of the 759th Infantry Regiment. At their new building the YMCA personnel was limited in its work both by the site (Heald described it as a small frame shed) and by the constant interference of Bolshevik agitators. Though they were able to put on *kino* shows, set up a game room and a small library with writing tables, and make use of adjoining fields for soccer and baseball, Heald admitted that "the Bolsheviks are ruling the roost at Druzhina 759," constantly taking over the facilities in order to hold political meetings.<sup>10</sup>

YMCA work gathered momentum in Kiev after the Ukrainians assumed complete power in Ukraine in late November. Heald immediately established relations with the Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainians responded by "taking us under their wing." An agree-

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<sup>9</sup> After negotiations with the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in early July, the Provisional Government had accepted the fact of Ukrainian autonomy and allowed the *Rada* to set up a General Secretariat to govern Ukraine.

<sup>10</sup> Edward T. Heald, *Witness to Revolution*, Edited by James B. Gidney (Kent State University: 1972), p. 165.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

ment was worked out with the Cultural-Education Committee of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* by which YMCA work was to be carried on within the rapidly organizing Ukrainian Army. Though Heald's diary maintains that the secretary refused to allow the YMCA to become, as he put it, "a Ukrainianizing agency," Heald's later reports to the State Department indicated that a compromise was reached whereby the YMCA agreed to use Ukrainian assistants, the Ukrainian language, and Ukrainian literature when working with Ukrainian troops; Russian assistants, Russian literature and the Russian language when in contact with Russians, and a combination when both were present.<sup>11</sup> With this agreement, the work at Druzhina 759 took on new life and the YMCA expanded its program to one of the barracks of the 20,000-man Pechersky garrison which was given to them by the acting Commander-in-Chief of the Kiev Military District, Lieutenant Colonel Pavlenko. The Pechersky hut included a lecture hall, a movie house, a gymnasium, a tea and game room, reading and writing rooms, and five classrooms where some 300 soldiers were instructed in geography, history, literature, French, English, drawing, modeling, agronomy, algebra and chemistry. At the opening of the hut on December 19, Heald estimated attendance of 1,000 and mentioned that sixty soldiers attended his first class in English. He remarked with evident pride that the hut was the "real center for the social life of the garrison."<sup>12</sup>

After the November Revolution in Petrograd the YMCA personnel seem to have become more involved in American foreign policy, much the same as were officials of the American Red Cross.<sup>13</sup> When, in early December, the United States began to countenance support of the various centers of anti-Bolshevik sentiment, detailed first-hand information from these areas was lacking; the diplomatic and consular staffs were small and scattered, and there were, as yet, no American intelligence operations. Secretary of State Lansing relayed frantic requests for information to American personnel in the former Russian Empire.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, though the YMCA might seem to be an unlikely candidate for intelligence work, the State Department was quite will-

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<sup>11</sup> United States Department of State, "Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1910-1929," doc. no. 861.00/1209.

<sup>12</sup> Extracts from a letter from Heald to the YMCA International Committee, made available to the author through the courtesy of James B. Gidney, Kent State University.

<sup>13</sup> The story of the Red Cross's activities in Petrograd under Raymond Robins is well known. The interested reader may consult Kennan, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> United States Department of State, "Records," doc. no. 861.00/1213.

ing to use information, from whatever source, to gain a clearer understanding of the chaotic situation in key areas of the former Russian Empire, and Heald's reports contained, in his own words, "all the dope I have been able to gather during the last few days on the political and military situation here."<sup>15</sup> However it is not clear whether in relaying the information they had gathered, the YMCA secretaries took the initiative themselves or were prompted by American diplomats.

It is more certain that the State Department looked upon the YMCA as a body beneficial to the Allied cause. In addition to Root's recommendations, which were made in regard to a vastly different situation, the State Department was aware of the possibility that the YMCA might still be of use in the changed circumstances after the fall of the Provisional Government. In two memoranda dated January 1 and January 29, 1918, Basil Miles, who was in charge of the State Department's Russian section, recommended that the United States lower its diplomatic profile in Russia, withdraw the Ambassador (who was accredited to the Provisional Government) and proceed to "deal unofficially with all parties. . . in all parts of the country-play with all of them."<sup>16</sup> How his recommendations affected the position of the YMCA may be surmised from the Department's response to a letter from Senator Robert L. Owen to Lansing which suggested among other things that "the personnel giving publicity to American opinion ought to be immediately expanded..."<sup>17</sup> Counselor of State Frank Polk replied that in addition to expanding the consular service and encouraging the development of the Red Cross activities, the State Department was "also assisting the YMCA to get additional secretaries into Russia as rapidly as they are selected."<sup>18</sup> Perhaps Bolshevik historians overstate their case in labeling the YMCA as a tool of American imperialism, but, on the other hand, Heald's reports to the State Department can hardly be dismissed as the "words

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. no. 861.00/1209. In addition to Heald's reports from Kiev, the YMCA's National Army Work Secretary, Jerome Davis, in a December, 1917 interview with American Ambassador David R. Francis, had related his impressions of conditions on both of Russia's European fronts gathered during his visits there. Later Secretary Russell M. Story submitted to the State Department a "Report on Conditions in Russia and Finland." *Ibid.*, doc. nos. 861.00/761; 861.00/1161; several other secretaries were appointed Vice-Consuls in Russia in 1918-1919.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. no. 861.00/1048-1/2 and 861.00/935.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. no. 861.00/986.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

of a private American observer," as Kennan indicates.<sup>10</sup> At the very least, the United States was meddling in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian Republic.

Before his arrival in Kiev, Heald had been influenced by a certain Ukrainian, Yatseievich, who had convinced him of the strength and sincerity of the Ukrainian movement. As has been mentioned, Heald's search for facilities led him to the Ukrainian political leaders, notably Secretary for Education Steshenko and Secretary for Military Affairs Petlura. His stated aim was "to learn how extensive their movement was, how far they would welcome YMCA work, and whether their relations with the Provisional Government or Kerensky forces were friendly."<sup>20</sup> Apparently Heald was impressed with the Ukrainians, and his admiration increased after the Bolshevik Revolution when he came to view the Ukrainian Republic as a viable alternative to Bolshevism:

The Ukraine now offers the most hopeful field for the Allies in Russia, the only part of Russia not flat-footed for peace with Germany. The Ukrainians have the power in their hands and have refused to share it with the Bolsheviks. So it has turned out that, after joining with the Bolsheviks to overturn the Kerensky Government, they have kicked the Bolsheviks out.<sup>21</sup>

Responding to Ukrainian defiance of the Bolsheviks and the idea of a separate peace, Heald remarked in his diary that "the Ukraine looms up as the one semi-quiet place in all the Russian Empire; the one place of comparative law and order; the one section of the land that remains true to the cause of the Allies."<sup>22</sup>

However, this was not the attitude which Heald's reports conveyed to his superiors and to the Department of State. Between November 29 and December 5, Heald reversed his views on Ukraine, primarily as a result of his interviews with the Czech leader Thomas Masaryk, former Duma Deputy Vasili V. Shulgin, and the leader of the Great Russian party known as the Right Wing Bloc, General Dragomirov.<sup>23</sup> Heald conversed with Masaryk in connection with YMCA work among the Czech troops in Ukraine and inquired of the Czech his views on the Ukrainian situation. Masaryk is said to have

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<sup>10</sup> Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

<sup>20</sup> Heald, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>23</sup> Heald's papers never mention the name of Dragomirov's party but internal evidence as to its purposes and strength indicate that he is most likely referring to the Right Wing Bloc.

regarded it as "quite desperate" and convinced the Secretary that most of the Ukrainian government was inclined to sympathize with the Central Powers, despite assurances to the contrary.<sup>24</sup> On December 3, Heald met with Shulgin, who was also the editor of the arch-conservative and anti-Semitic daily, *Kievlianin*, and an intense monarchist. Shulgin made it plain to Heald that he was of the opinion that the Ukrainian Republic was part of a "clever Vienna plan" designed to unite Ukraine with Austria-Hungary. He was adamant in his conviction and succeeded in convincing Heald that the salvation of Russia lay with the Don Cossacks and their Ataman, Kaledin.<sup>25</sup> From his interview with Shulgin, Heald was referred to Dragomirov, who was also excited about the prospects of Kaledin, saying that only the Cossacks, "monarchy and a strong hand could save Russia."<sup>26</sup>

Heald's reports to his superiors in Moscow, which contained information and analysis of political and military affairs seemingly unrelated to YMCA activities, reflected this new attitude. Consul-General Maddin Summers, to whom the Secretary's letters were shown, found them to be of worth and enclosed them in a report to the Department of State dated January 16. Summers noted that Heald was of the opinion that order could only be restored in Ukraine with the aid of the Allies or the Central Powers and felt that the Ukrainian government was

weak, compromised by its relations with the Bolsheviks and the Austrians, lacking dependable military force, and... a very artificial growth, without much popular support.<sup>27</sup>

But the Consul-General added that "there is universal agreement that conditions changed radically after this letter was written." Kennan, who refers only to the published sources, overlooked the text of Heald's letters and failed to qualify Heald's assessment of the Ukrainian situation as did Summers.<sup>28</sup>

One other incident confirmed in Heald's mind the opinion that the Ukrainian Republic was an Austrian invention. In mid-December

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<sup>24</sup> United States Department of State, "Records," doc. no. 861.00/1209; Heald *op. cit.*, p. 189.

<sup>25</sup> Heald, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, vol. II, p. 660.

<sup>28</sup> Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 185. Kennan refers only to the printed sources, perhaps being misled by the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series who said Heald's letter was 'not found with the dispatch.' The letter was, however, with the dispatch and presumably accessible to both the editors and Kennan.

Heald was accosted by an unnamed member of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* who was seeking to influence America to found the Ukrainian government through Heald. This "sleek, smooth, oily-tongued young man" relayed to Heald that Ukrainian General Secretary Vynnychenko and Hrushevsky, the President of the *Rada*, were "in the regular employ of Vienna," told Heald of alleged espionage activities of Austria and Germany which were carried out under the auspices of the Ukrainian government, and mentioned that ten to fifteen million rubles of Austrian money found its way into Ukraine every month. The *Rada* member then offered the opinion that if the United States was willing to pay more the Ukrainian Republic might be inclined to display pro-American sympathies. Apparently Heald gullibly accepted these unsupported allegations at face value. He remarked in his diary that "whatever faith I had previously had in the integrity of the Ukrainian government disappeared."<sup>29</sup> Luckily a more trained observer, Consul Douglas Jenkins, arrived on December 20, as a relieved Heald put it, "just in time to relieve me of increasing diplomatic embarrassments by virtue of being the only American in Kiev."<sup>30</sup> With Jenkins representing American interests, the secretary was free to devote full time to his expanding YMCA work.

Heald's duties were not suspended in early 1918 despite the outbreak of war between the Ukrainians and the Russian Bolsheviks.<sup>31</sup> Thus he was forced to remain in Kiev when the Russians besieged the city in early February. The fighting in Kiev has been described as probably more severe than in any city in the former Russian Empire during the Great War, and casualties were variously estimated at 6,000 to 10,000.<sup>32</sup> Heald, in particular, was horrified by the spectacle.

Barbarous disregard of life was shown during the last days of the struggle and the succeeding two days. It had been reported that the Ukraine Cossacks had been shooting without trial many Bolsheviks whom they captured during the first stage of the battle. In the last stage, the Bolsheviks, by way of retaliation, shot without warning bourgeoisie and peaceful officers of whom there were 22,000 in Kiev. At the corner of Marinsky Park sixty bourgeois citizens were shot on sight, and their bodies piled in plain view. During the two days succeeding the fighting, the Bolsheviks shot

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<sup>29</sup> Heald, *op. cit.* p. 195.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

<sup>31</sup> The Soviet government invaded Ukraine when it became apparent that the Ukrainian government would not recognize the legitimacy of Bolshevik rule. The Ukrainian Republic had already been accorded *de facto* recognition by France and Great Britain as an independent state.

<sup>32</sup> United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, Vol. II, p. 675; United States Department of State, "Records," doc. no. 861.00/1709.

without trial at the lowest estimate 250 officers, mostly Polish and Russian, just as they met them on the streets. There were many cases of distressing barbarity.<sup>33</sup>

Although the secretary had feared that the conquering Bolsheviks would be hostile toward the American representative in Kiev, he was reassured when the Allied consuls resident in the city met with the Bolshevik commander and were treated with the utmost courtesy.<sup>34</sup> However, having been informed of the signing of the Ukrainian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and fearing the imminent return of Ukrainian troops, possibly reinforced by German Army detachments, Heald left Kiev on February 15th.

Stopping over in Moscow, Heald obtained an interview with Consul-General Maddin Summers and submitted a detailed report on the fall of Kiev which was forwarded to the State Department.<sup>35</sup>

Heald then left Moscow for Vladivostok and upon arrival the Secretary prepared a report which he submitted to Admiral Knight, Commander of the American flagship *Brooklyn*, on March 18. This report, which adds further to his description of the battle for Kiev, seems only to have survived in extracts in Heald's papers.<sup>36</sup> In both cases Heald seems to have taken it upon himself to convey information of a military and political nature to the representatives of the American government.

In addition to providing a fresh view of the Ukrainian Revolution, the YMCA experience there contains several lessons. It demonstrates one of the major reasons why foreign governments are suspicious of the motives behind humanitarian offerings of the United States.<sup>37</sup> It is an indication of how poor the American information network was in 1917-18 that the United States was for a time forced to rely on this well-meaning but ingenuous political amateur as its diplomatic observer in the Ukrainian Republic. Heald provides an excellent illustration of the American "innocent abroad," the untrained observer, operating in an unfamiliar political and cultural milieu.

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<sup>33</sup> United States Department of State, "Records," doc. no. 861.00/1705.

<sup>34</sup> United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, Vol. II, p. 673-674.

<sup>35</sup> United States Department of State, "Records," doc. no. 861.00/1709.

<sup>36</sup> The extracts from the memorandum are published in Heald, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-204.

<sup>37</sup> American businessmen were also quick to supply information to the Department of State, especially representatives of Singer Sewing Machine Company and International Harvester, whose letters often appear in the records of the Department of State.

## **ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION**

*By* MICHAEL S. PAF

The prolonged nationwide debate on Ethnicity in America which intensified in the late 1960's culminated in the establishment of the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program. The legislation, first proposed in 1971 by Senator Richard S. Schweiker of Pennsylvania and Representative Roman Pucinski of Illinois, became law on December 20, 1973. The U.S. Office of Education was designated to administer this new program. The 1974 Fiscal Year HEW budget included appropriations for the "Title IX Ethnic Heritage Program." The announcement of the establishment of the Ethnic Heritage Program by the White House on Christmas Eve 1973 was greeted with great enthusiasm throughout the U.S.A. Prominent scholars, educators and ethnic leaders hailed it as one of the most important Federal Acts giving official recognition for the true meaning of America as a "Nation of Nations." It restored the historical record of America as a country where peoples of different cultures and backgrounds joined together in a voluntary union with steadfast determination to build, preserve and promote a free society.

In 1974, the first year of funding (\$2,355,000) for the Title IX Ethnic Heritage Program, the U.S. Office of Education received 1,026 applications; 42 grants were made or 2.7% of proposals were actually funded. In 1975, 608 applications were received and 49 grants were approved (7.1%). In 1976, in spite of uncertainty of availability of funds, 580 applications were filed with the U.S. Office of Education. Proposals were received from every state of the nation, as well as from the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the Trust Territories. The funds for the past two years ('74-75) were allocated primarily for development of curriculum for our schools. The introduction of Ethnic Heritage Studies in the American educational system has a two-fold meaning: first, it stands as the recognition of the rights and obligations of our ethnic communities to constructively cultivate their unique cultural heritage which is essential in the process of identity formation and general personality growth; and second, it recognizes ethnicity as a positive factor leading to higher levels

of social and cultural organization, reinforcing the development of conscious unity both through explaining and experiencing the ideals of freedom and equality. The general climate in our society and particularly in our educational system itself regarding the acceptance of the concept of cultural pluralism has been improved tremendously over the past two years. The value of these programs cannot and should not be measured on the basis of federal fundings. The program mobilized human resources and community participation in planning and implementing cultural and educational activities to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars. Today we have only established the condition for a free and dispassionate exchange of ideas. Our focus on ethnic studies in terms of self-identity, mutual understanding and community cooperation has brought to our curriculum development the rich resources of viable and vital ethnic communities across the nation. We have reached new levels of inter-and intra-ethnic cooperation within communities because we recognize the necessity of making the ethnic heritage studies program a high priority for our educational institutions. Hundreds of colleges and universities are now offering courses on Ethnic Heritage, training teachers, etc. In other words, Title IX Ethnic Heritage Program brought academic and ethnic communities together in the true spirit of "E Pluribus Unum."

In reviewing the purpose of the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program Act, once again I am inspired by the profound conceptual basis and empirical validity upon which this act was established. According to the 1970 Census, approximately 34 million persons living in the U.S.A. are immigrants or the children of immigrants. This figure alone represents a substantial percentage of the American population. According to a special Census Bureau Survey taken in 1969 more than 75 million Americans identify themselves with an ethnic origin. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization records show that from 1820 to 1973 more than 46 million persons immigrated to the U.S.A. from all countries. Our Black American population is now over 23 million. Except for the native American Indians, we all came to the promised land on boats — different boats to be sure and at different times in history.

Our American society has been given its essential form and character by the multiplicity of ethnic groups which have embraced it. We are now in the process of developing a "new pluralism" in our nation which consists of both national self-consciousness and group identity. This "new pluralism" is the product of unique American conditions and not imports from abroad. Ethnicity, as the most creative form of pluralism, has enriched our society through its numerous

expressions. The multiplicity of ethnic groups gathered together on these shores has given this nation its unique face, identity and strength among the nations of the world. The immigrants came to America to help build and promote the most durable democratic system of government in the world!

Since the birth of our nation, America's ethnic consciousness hasn't vanished but rather has grown. Henry Ford's "melting pot" myth in no way halted an intense search for answers to the questions: "Who are we?" "Where are we from?" "Where have we been?" "What have we contributed to the growth of America?" Today we have reached a critical point in the process of nation building. As we celebrate the 200th Anniversary of our Independence and Liberty, we need to increase our knowledge and understanding of our commonalities as well as the unique cultural characteristics of all peoples in our multi-ethnic society. In a world which is made increasingly smaller and inter-dependent by technological advances, a better understanding of who we as Americans are is crucial. America — having the most cosmopolitan population of any nation—has an unusual opportunity to lead all the nations in the world in improving human understanding, by demonstrating to the world that people of diverse backgrounds can live together in harmony, peace, happiness and freedom!

Ethnicity as expressed through our ethnic heritage studies program, therefore, has international implications. We are aware that the essence of our democratic society is individual freedom. Americans of all ethnic backgrounds have worked hard to achieve the proper balance between rights and responsibilities of all citizens. Protection of individual freedom in our society is the most commendable achievement. In our pluralistic society we also have the freedom to identify with all ethnic groups, a few ethnic groups, one ethnic group or no ethnic group. Acknowledging and accepting ethnicity is in a sense like expressing our freedom of choice and equality of opportunity regardless of what our origin.

The Ethnic Heritage Act offers the educational institutions of the nation a real challenge and an opportunity to motivate our students to engage in the learning process and appreciate the differing and unique contributions to the national heritage made by each ethnic group. The National Advisory Council on Ethnic Heritage Studies appointed by the Secretary of HEW in Summer 1975 reviewed the two years activities under the Title IX Ethnic Heritage Program. We were impressed with the positive achievements with extremely limited funds. The fifteen members of the Council established the

fact that the programs developed so far led to a considerable attitudinal change among our people which strengthens the fiber of our society. The Council also *adopted* a set of recommendations as to the future development of Ethnic Heritage Studies to be initiated during our Bicentennial Year.

On the basis of what was learned in the past two years, the priorities of the Ethnic Heritage Program should now:

a) Concentrate on in-service training programs for teachers and organize periodic workshops for ethnic community leaders—to fully utilize the curriculum materials already available.

b) Identify the most neglected and forgotten ethnic groups in the U.S.A., seek them out and offer assistance in developing programs to regain their pride in their cultural heritage.

c) Provide documentary evidence (audio-visual, monograph, oral history, etc.) to prove that cultural pluralism strengthens the basic principles of our free society.

d). Offer systematic opportunities for all ethnic communities to engage in meaningful dialogues to re-establish a mutual trust in our social and political system to build an even better and more stable America. Fear of the unknown always leads to hatred, misunderstandings and conflict.

e) Return to classroom atmosphere and thus avoid street corner confrontation to settle our differences.

f). Support the learning process to reinforce the concept of the U.S.A. as a pluralistic and unified nation.

g). Recognize and include in our American history books the contributions of all Americans in forging our free and pluralistic society.

To carry out these vital tasks the U.S. Government will have to identify and entrust the responsibilities of the Ethnic Heritage Program to the most knowledgeable and sensitive individuals. There is no place in this program for those Americans who do not recognize any value in Ethnic Studies or take an outright negative attitude toward the concept of Ethnicity in America. I would suggest that the Federal Government take notice and advantage of the National Ethnic Studies Assembly capabilities.

I also believe that it would be a tragedy for America—the “Nation of Nations”—to celebrate the Bicentennial of our Independence and Freedom without a firm commitment toward the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program. Respect for cultural pluralism will surely earn for America the respect of the world and restore confidence in her as indeed the promised Land of Liberty.

## WOULD THE FALL OF ITS COLONIAL EMPIRE BE A CATASTROPHE FOR RUSSIA?

*By* MARK PERAKH

The essays in the book, entitled, *From Under the Rubble*, have evoked a lively and meaningful discussion. Their various authors have daringly ignored the KGB and Soviet orthodoxy in suggesting long-needed solutions. For the first time in many, many years, we have Soviet voices boldly upraised on Soviet problems.

We shall deal with one or two of the most interesting essays in the collection, specifically those by Igor Shafarevich, a prominent mathematician, who writes on a non-mathematical theme: "Separation or Reconciliation: The Nationalities Question in the USSR?," one of the most explosive problems of contemporary Russia.

Shafarevich is refreshing in that he is in favor of granting the "borderland" (non-Russian) peoples in the contemporary USSR the right of deciding whether they want to remain or to separate. But he sees no benefits in separation. "Nothing indicates the necessity of dismembering the state into national atoms," he writes. In his view, the Russians "do not suffer from this nationalist arrogance that is so evident in the attitude of the Western Europeans toward their Eastern neighbors." And he emphasizes: "Whatever decision is taken, the only sane way toward it is the reconciliation of the peoples."

It is difficult to imagine, however, that the thinking of Shafarevich, with all its humanistic direction and attractiveness, should find a sufficiently wide and sympathetic response among Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, and others who, at least at the present time, see in their "union" with Russia more negative aspects than positive. Nor is it shared, for example, by the Ukrainian emigration, which sees as Ukraine's principal task its liberation from the "older brother." But support for Shafarevich's views would be forthcoming from most Russians, regardless of varying political beliefs. For them, the "unity" of Russia benefits equally the Russian people and the "borderland" peoples. For such groups as represented by the review *Veche* (Meeting), the problem of the non-Russian peoples has no significance whatever. But Shafarevich, in

another essay, "Does Russia Have a Future?," sees separation of these peoples to mean a collapse of "Russia," tantamount to its destruction. Is this necessarily so?

Let us take a cognitive trip with Mr. Shafarevich, who finds abhorrent the notion of the Soviet Union as a colonial power. We can distinguish five mental milestones along the way.

1. *Exploitation of the resources of the territories of the non-Russian peoples:* Mr. Shafarevich recoils from the assertion that great riches are extracted from the territory inhabited by the non-Russians and are sent to the Russian-inhabited part of the USSR. How can this be, he asks, when the living standard of the Russian people is lower than that of the Georgians, Armenians, Ukrainians, Latvians, or Estonians?

Logically, of course, there is no necessary connection. Great Britain, upheld today as the classical example of the grasping colonial empire, nevertheless was distinguished by a two-class system, the haves and have-nots. It is of interest to examine the living standard of the ethnic Russians.

In the first place, even within a class, the Russian standard itself is uneven. The workers of Leningrad, for example, enjoy a much higher living standard than those of Siberia and of the Ural area, conditioned as these areas are by the Soviet methods of selective "supply" and by the climatic conditions. The privileged class—the Party functionaries, managers, artists, intelligentsia, etc.—needs no comment here. This elite, without possible rebuttal, is mainly Russian, and enjoys a material level of life which is comparable to the highest of the Western democracies.

For a personal look on the part of the writer:

In the central part of the Kalinin *oblast*, in the *raions* of Kikhoslavl, Remeshi and others, the Karelians live in compact groups, their villages interspersed with the Russian. The natural conditions of both Russian and Karelian villages are identical. Yet one's impression is that, as poor as the Russian villages are, the Karelian villages are even poorer. This is Russia proper.

Another example: Tadzhikistan. Well-known is that wool commands a much higher price than any other agricultural product cultivated in Central Russia. The high income of the wool collective farms is a matter of envy. But the writer knows from his personal experience that this income never reaches the rank and life of the collective. Some eighteen kilometers from the capital of Tadzhikistan, Dushanbe, is a rich collective farm festooned with many Soviet "awards," a showcase with the ultimate accolade: it bears the name

of Lenin. It is graced by a sumptuous administration building. Here periodically are brought foreign tourists, and films are taken to "document" the outstanding successes of Tadzhikistan under the Soviet government. In no other Soviet collective farm has the writer seen such an exemplary administration, headed by an obese functionary wearing countless stars and sundry decorations.

It so happened that the writer spent a month with the family of an ordinary collective farmer in his farmhouse, situated some three hundred meters from the imposing administration building. Behind the farmhouse runs the highway between Dushanbe and Ordzoni-kidzebad, serviced by a public bus every half hour. From the bus stop at night one can see the great glittering lights of Dushanbe.

The old farmer and "master" of the farmhouse had never been in Dushanbe in his whole life. During our one-month stay he never took off his working clothes, sleeping in them in a clay "bed" with no linen, covered only by some flimsy fabric. There was but one pair of shoes to service three children; the shoes were worn only whenever one of them had to go out on a forbidding day. Their meager daily food consisted of flat cakes and sugarless tea. The family literally "lapped" the dishes after each meal eaten by the students who were brought to the collective farm to help harvest the wool crop.

The writer's impression, then, is that the lot of the Tadzhik collective farmer is worse than that of the many Russian farmers in the not-so-rich Kalinin *oblast*. Living standards are apparently lower also among the farmers in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia by comparison with those of our cited Russian farmers.

On the basis of the writer's observations the living standard of the population of such urban centers as Dushanbe, Frunze, Dzambula, Tashkent and Alma-Ata (he has in mind workers and lower-rank officials) is lower than that of Moscow, Leningrad, and some other cities of Russia. (Even worse off are the people of Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk and even Novosibirsk, excepting Akademgorodok).

On the other hand, Shafarevich is correct—in some cases—in saying that among some peoples in the USSR the living standard is higher than that of the Russian people. As an example, he cites the Estonians. This is quite true. On crossing the Russian-Estonian border a traveler cannot escape the fact that food and both the quantity and quality of products are superior in Estonia. But this is not because the Estonians have more riches than the Russians. The Estonian and Russian sides of the border share climatic conditions and land. But the Estonians cultivate enough cucumbers (as an ex-

ample) to bring them to market for additional income. The Russians do not.

The traveler's eye catches a difference even in the look of the forest on either side of the boundary: in Russia the woods are wholly neglected; in Estonia, they are meticulously cleared and cultivated. Colonization, apparently, herein has not yet spoiled Estonia and its culture.

Mr. Shafarevich is right (again, refreshingly) in pointing out that the great part of the economic value, produced by all the peoples of the USSR, is not being returned to them. In great part it is given over to maintaining a great military machine. Add the cost of subversive adventures (Vietnam, Cuba, Somalia, Angola and so forth). But the question as to whether this burden is fairly apportioned among the Russian and other peoples in the USSR remains open.

In our opinion, a country like Ukraine is not recompensed for its mineral riches, used in a multitude of ways for the benefit of the whole Soviet state. If, to Mr. Shafarevich's somewhat prejudiced eye, the Ukrainians appear to live better, we can only say that he has not spent too much time in the mecca of the Soviet Union, Moscow, home of the elite, nor does he appreciate the native industriousness of such a people as the Ukrainians.

Perhaps Mr. Shafarevich sees it this way: the natural resources of Ukraine—the coal, the petroleum, the natural gas, the iron, the manganese, titanium, mercury and other metals—all this of itself does not redound to the credit of the Ukrainians. These resources are, after all, accidents of nature. The true exploitation takes place in the exploitation of the culture of the "older brother." A culture is not a transient, exhaustible gift. It is the truest treasure; it is divine.

We put ourselves in Mr. Shafarevich's place and lo! we, too, view with a critical eye these lesser peoples who scramble for material things and who do indeed achieve a higher standard of living. But there is hope, always hope, for these people. They already are benefiting from the superior Russian culture. Soon, soon, they will aspire to be Russian. And if they give of their natural resources, why, this will make them feel better about their exploitation! There are benefits for both.

2. *Deportations*: Mr. Shafarevich is pained by the charge that as a result of mass deportations and concomitant importation of Russians not only is the autochthonous population of a country diminished but its character is altered as well. That is, it tends to become Russian. Shafarevich piously states that the Russian people have also

grievously suffered from deportation. And, then, with a flash of rationalistic brilliance, he adds: "While documents written by Ukrainians complain of Russian migration into Ukraine, Estonians and Latvians complain, not only of floods of Russians settling in their lands, but of floods of Ukrainians too."

We break step with our older brother here. It is one thing to exile a dissident or a criminal. It is another to conduct a genocidal chess game with peoples.

Needless to say, the migration of Ukrainians into Latvia or Estonia or wherever was done against their will. For whatever might have been the magnet to draw Ukrainians hundreds of miles, to abandon their homes and homeland, to move to an alien land? Mr. Shafarevich does not say.

It is not as if these Ukrainians in the Baltic countries are allowed Ukrainian schools and newspapers, Ukrainian theaters, musical ensembles. In a word, to transport their culture. Not at all. These Ukrainians, uprooted from their land, are forced to speak Russian along with their surviving Baltic fellow-prisoners. The colonizing Romans did this very thing: intermixed populations to rob the denizen of his identity.

But perhaps Mr. Shafarevich sees further than we. He may grant—in an unguarded moment—that the Ukrainians did not of themselves "flood" the Baltics. But—he might protest—how can it be charged that Russians are colonizing the Baltics if Ukrainians be sent there? And — another flash of brilliant rationalization — how much easier for these Ukrainians, removed from cloying contact with their native soil and, further, sharing Russification with another people—to acknowledge their enviable destiny—that of becoming Russian?

For, it is now clear, Shafarevich means "recognition" and not "reconciliation." Spelled out: recognition of the superiority of the older brother, and not "reconciliation of peoples." And it is clear because of the breathtaking outrageousness, both cerebrally and emotionally, of his implication that Ukrainians, *en masse*, would—had they a choice to begin with—descend upon lands as devastated as their own.

The Russians were able to come up successfully with such a small-scale enterprise as the Berlin wall because of a vast experience in walling off countries, much less cities.

It is this Russification wall the Ukrainians confront and deal with; they are sympathetic, not antagonistic, to fellow victims such

as the Baltic nations. In Mr. Shafarevich's happy phrase: they share benefits.

3. *Destruction of Non-Russian Cultures*: Mr. Shafarevich disputes that the cultures of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR are being persecuted.

We are learning our fellow-traveler's ways of thinking. Yes, he will admit, this and that is true; but the Russians have had it harder! A gambit of interest to a psychologist, we would suppose, but hardly something solid in the cognitive process.

So he says, in effect, IF the non-Russians are being persecuted, the Russians themselves, and their culture, are under even heavier fire. Ergo: by a process of diminution, the non-Russians are scarcely persecuted. And since this is so, what matter what language is being spoken? (But it always happens to be the Russian language).

But one's own language has its uses. Example: as a member of the Ukrainian underground circa 1944 stood before a Soviet firing squad, he would shout: "God Save Ukraine," in *Ukrainian*. Not in Russian, not in Swahili, not even in the military jargon that had stood him in good stead till this moment. It helped him to speak in the tongue *that was he*. Yet no Russian, no matter how evil he may be perceived to be, is persecuted because of his language.

4. *Religious Persecution*: Here Mr. Shafarevich contends that the Russian Orthodox Church has suffered more persecution than any other church in the USSR. This, by now, the familiar invidious comparison to which our fellow-traveler is prone. But, in all fairness, we must see him as a Soviet child. The Russian Wall had kept from him the awesome facts of the wholesale destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in 1937-38, the wanton liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, the brutal destruction of all Christian churches in Byelorussia, the Baltic States and the Christian countries of the Caucasus, not to mention the Moslem religion prevailing in Central Asia, and the Jewish faith.

Let us, charitably, go further.

5. *The Role of the Russian Language*: Mr. Shafarevich uncomfortably admits that the Russian language has become an instrument of the Soviet government. But he is disarming. He asks: "But what do the Russians gain from it?"

The Russians, of course, do gain—at least in the short run. Their efforts at homogenizing the peoples of the Soviet Union have paid off in more effective control if not cohesion. Indeed, the Union's survival for a half century attests to the efficacy of a language not only sup-

planting others but used propagandistically. (The other side of this coin of control is the Soviet secret police).

In the long run, however, the Kremlin—the ruling Russians—lose. It is instructive to note that, despite the oppression of all peoples, including the Russians, people born during this past half century are the dissidents protesting today against the stifling of all freedoms. Including the freedom to foster one's native language.

#### THE USSR: COLONIAL EMPIRE

Let us summarize at this point of our brief journey. Mr. Shafarevich admits that many peoples make up the Soviet Union. But it is not an empire because: a) there is no exploitation of natural resources of the non-Russians (the non-Russians live better); b) deportations are not confined to the ethnic Russians; c) destruction of cultures is not confined to the ethnic Russians; d) persecution of church? The Russian Orthodox Church has suffered most, and e) the Russian use of the Russian language is unimportant. In short, since the master nation suffers at least as much as the oppressed ones, no empire exists.

We might eventually agree with Shafarevich that the Russian people have not particularly benefited from the existence of the Russian colonial empire, present or past. But this experience serves to deny its existence.

We need but cast a clean eye on this empire that the "Soviets" took over, lock, stock and barrel. It was created through wars, aggressions and expansionism; it has been held together through the suppression of the national aspirations of the conquered peoples. The Russian *muzhik* (peasant) sent down to quell revolts in the Caucasus may not have gained anything personally. But this does not detract from the colonial nature of the war.

When the last czar fell, Ukraine (and other nations) declared its independence. The *Red Army* swarmed down and stomped out its life. Did any local forces put down the attempts of peoples in Central Asia to separate from Russia? No. Red Army forces did so—with the impressed help of Ukrainians in the Red Army. *Divide et impera*.

If today problems in Kazakhstan or Byelorussia of even a secondary nature are being decided in Moscow, we take this as a distinct characteristic of colonialism.

Are there Ukrainians or other non-Russian to be found in the central organs of the government? Yes, of window-dressing propor-

tions. Perhaps, then, the natives are prominent in their national republics. Not so: the long-established cadres of personnel wholly devoted to Moscow bristle with Russians. Here and there a representative of a "basic nationality" holds a decorative post or serves as a figurehead for Russian "deputies" (especially in the scientific institutions).

In rarer cases, the converse is true. A Russian heads an important government department, his "deputies" being representatives of the local nationality, e.g. the security organ (KGB).

We usually hear (from the Russians) that the representation of Russians in the organs of government in the national republics is quite legitimate, inasmuch as great numbers of Russians live in these republics. But the very presence of Russians in great numbers in the "borderland" countries attests to the colonial nature of the state.

Finally, a significant indicator of the colonial nature of the USSR is the attitude to the Soviet authority of the peoples in the "national republics." There is no doubt that all the non-Russian peoples in the USSR—be they Georgians, Uzbeks, Lithuanians or Moldavians—view the Soviet authority as the *Russian* authority.

Mr. Shafarevich sees little of this. Instead, he says, "Different peoples in cooperation can give birth to a culture of a higher quality than any of them in isolation." Even if this statement is "true" (it embodies a value judgment) it begs the question of the subjugation of one people by another.

In support of his thesis, Shafarevich cites Gogol. As is known (even in the USSR) Gogol (Hohol in Ukrainian) was a Ukrainian, but he became a great Russian writer. "Great as his genius was, I do not think he could have blossomed so profoundly or attained such a pinnacle of human achievement had he not been enriched by Russian culture," writes Shafarevich.

Surely this statement is debatable. Can we claim that Tschai-kowsky, a Russian composer, owes his performance to his knowledge and use of Ukrainian folk melodies? Well, yes—with about an equal measure of validity. We might remark that in Gogol's time the Ukrainian culture was so suppressed and demeaned as to occupy an inferior status. It is quite possible that Gogol chose an audience that could repay him in prestige. Be this as it may, we see no reason why Gogol could not have been as effective a writer in the Ukrainian language using Ukrainian material (although, unlike Shafarevich, we do not claim to understand the wellsprings of creativity).

To pursue Mr. Shafarevich's logic, however, it is a pity, that

Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, those towering figures of literature, should have confined themselves to the Russian language.

We content ourselves merely by asking: Should any Ukrainian wish to incorporate in his work the elements of, or sheer inspiration afforded by the Russian, Japanese, or Arabic culture, does it follow that Ukraine should be in a position of colonial dependence as regards any of these?

Mr. Shafarevich adds: "I do not think Russians suffer from the national arrogance that Western Europeans display in their relations with their Eastern neighbors and even more toward non-Europeans..."

Just as patriotism can degenerate into chauvinism, so national pride into national arrogance. Granted. We do not wish to deny Mr. Shafarevich his opinion. What is rightly our due, however, is to be given some idea of how he arrived at this invidious comparison. And it was not too long ago that Russian culture disdained the Ukrainian language as the patois of the peasant. We can only marvel—with this as a yardstick—of the titanic arrogance of Western Europeans.

Even today one hears the scornful way the working class or the quasi-intelligentsia, whom Solzhenitsyn calls *obrazovanshchina*, (somewhat under-educated group) refer to the Uzbeks, Kirghizes and the Caucasians as *chuchmeks*, or even worse, as *blackasses*. The poor Karelians who live in the Kalinin *oblast*, it would seem, should not evoke any envy on the part of their Russian neighbors. Yet there exists a profound hostility toward them; among the inhabitants of Pritverya the word "Karelian" is synonymous with insult. To our eyes, the mode of life and the outward appearance of the Karelians differ not a whit from those of the Russians. Yet in the Karelian *oblast* the Russians believe and propagate notions about the "extreme sloppiness" of Karelians, their innate "dishonesty" and other regrettable (and laughable) shortcomings.

From personal observation and study: anti-Semitism in Russia proper is perhaps less evident than in Ukraine or Moldavia, but more marked than in Georgia or Central Asia. Moreover, in Central Asia the agents of anti-Semitism are the Russians who are living there, not the indigenous population.

Another contention of Shafarovich: "The Russians mix easily with other peoples and often place too low a value on their own culture." From this one might gather they hover unobtrusively in the background. Which fails to explain how the Russians manage to ingest other peoples. We have in mind not that small number of representatives of European peoples (Germans, Dutch, French), who become Russified in their new fatherland. We refer to entire national

entities. The Muromas, Chukches, Ulchises—are peoples who have been digested by the Russians to the point of extinction. Today the same process is threatening the above-mentioned Karelians. There is a gradual disappearance into the Russian maw of a part of the Ukrainians—with the virtual absence of a reverse process in Ukraine—and of Tartars, Jews, Yakuts, and others.

Shafarevich confesses “a typical Russian fault”: “inability to see the boundary which separates us from other nations.” Perhaps, he explains, “this may derive from a perverted and ill-understood notion of equality, since we consider all peoples to be equal, and immediately—without asking them—inscribe them as Russians.”

This broad, generous notion of equality might be more laudable if, in the figurative act of embracing a brother, the latter would not in the bear-hug lose language, church and national identity. There are those not even graced by the bear-hug: the Uzbeks, Georgians, Jews, not to mention Negroes, Arabs or Chinese.

The act of extinction becomes one of grace; black becomes white. Here, always, is the problem. It was pointed out by Andrey Siniavsky (cf. Abram Tertz, *Continent*, No. 1): “The Russian man is incapable of assuming that any evil should come from him, the Russian man. Deep in his soul (as any other human being) he is good.” And such men like Shafarevich are undoubtedly “good,” perplexed only that Ukrainians, Byelorussians and others should want to detach themselves from the older brother. “We do not want to oppress you, for we consider you to be equal with us. Let’s live together!” Or, what wild notion is this of dismembering a family...

But what are the problems relating to possible results of a hypothetical dismemberment of the Soviet empire?

First of all, what significance would the dismemberment of “Russia” have for non-Russians everywhere?

In Israel news about the reduction of the ominous imperialist power would be greeted with great joy. Gone would be the Merchant of Death, the purveyor of arms in the Middle East, Ireland, Indochina and South America, arms that kill and maim people daily. Over the globe the fraudulent vision of the “Promised Land” would mercifully fade into oblivion.

The neighboring peoples of Russia—the Czechs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Poles, and others—would cheer the fall of the USSR; again for them to enjoy would be true freedom, extinguished by Russian imperialism.

And what of the non-Russian components of the "Soviet people" in the USSR, those enslaved peoples who see their national and political rebirth as impossible without the fall of the Kremlin?

And the question to ask is: Leaving the Russian peoples themselves, would they lose with the dismemberment of the empire?

Let us take first its economic aspect. If Shafarevich is right in stating that there are no "extractions" of economic resources from the "borderland" territories, then the Russian people would suffer no economic loss from the fall of the empire. But whether he is right or wrong, even without Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Byelorussia, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, even without the territories populated by the Tartars, Bashkirs, Buriats, and others, Russia would remain a great country with a numerous population and with great natural riches surpassing most other countries of the world. Such a Russia, freed of the messianic burden of supporting and financing subversive forces throughout the world, could concentrate on developing its own resources, raise the living standards of its own people, and achieve that long-elusive millennium.

Would Russia lose anything in the cultural field? The demonstrated Russian genius in letters and science aside, we have the reassuring examples of such small countries as Denmark and Switzerland, even tiny Israel, surrounded by enemies on all sides, as viable and precious cultural entities.

There could be a mutual cultural "insemination," and indeed it is desirable, but this hardly calls for political amalgamation in one state. True, the former colonies of Russia would no longer be forced to use the Russian language as a "state" language. But Shafarevich himself recognizes that the use of the Russian language on the territory of "Russia" in no way genuinely serves the Russian people.

Above all, the demise of the empire would bring to the Russian people innumerable moral assets, a strength which would obviate the enervating crutch of messianism.

In truth, all this we have tried to communicate has been said in far more cogent fashion by the spokesman of Russia's conscience, Solzhenitsyn. He calls on Russia to return to its own internal problems. He advises "self-limitation" and stern rejection of attempts to impose its will upon other peoples. He, like Shafarevich, sees as "inadmissible" a forcible keeping of the "borderland" peoples under Russia's control. But what is needed is one step forward in this cognitive and *moral* journey: a declaration that the "borderland" nations should not only be given the *possibility* of deciding their own fate, but more, regardless of all conditions and circumstances, that there be a division

of "Russia" which must *obligatorily* precede any decision about the future of its former component parts.

Should the Russian people, through duly authorized representatives, say to their "united" neighbors: live your own life as you wish; we herewith renounce our empire and we shall take care of our own house—such a step would create a favorable climate for a future *rapprochement* on a voluntary basis, and one not necessarily to be realized in one state.

Of course this is only a utopian speculation. In all probability the fall of the empire will come only as a result of fresh shedding of blood, of great cataclysms, with a long period of healing of wounds preceding any *rapprochement*. But it is overdue. History knows no "eternal" creations. The Russian empire, especially vulnerable like all empires, is now living on borrowed time.

A word, finally, on an important problem: China. The shadow of this aggressive power falls on Russia and the entire world. In contrast to the Soviet empire, China does not have cancerous nationalities problems (Sinkiang and Tibet constitute but an insignificant part of the "Heavenly Empire").

We hold that the preservation of the Soviet empire does not insure a successful struggle with China. Even today "Russia" is no match for China, nuclear hardware notwithstanding.

Should cruel circumstance involve the peoples of contemporary "Russia" in a conflict with China, their only logical resort would be an alliance with the free countries of the world, with a possible participation on the part of the United States. But such an alliance would be possible only if there will have emerged independent national organisms which would struggle for their own preservation, and not for some imaginary "unity of the Soviet people."

## BOOK REVIEWS

**THE UKRAINIAN HERALD**, Issue 7-8: Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR. An Underground Journal from Soviet Ukraine. Introduction by Robert Conquest. Spring 1974. Compiled by Maksym Sahaydak. Translated from the Ukrainian and Edited by Olena Saciuk and Bohdan Yasen. Smoloskyp Publishers, Baltimore-Paris-Toronto, 1976, pp. 209.

*The Ukrainian Herald* (Ukrainsky Visnyk) first appeared in January, 1970, as a secret and underground publication in Ukraine with the set purpose of providing "without generalization, information about violations of the freedom of speech and of other democratic freedoms guaranteed by the constitution, repression in Ukraine through the courts and outside the courts; violation of national sovereignty (facts relating to chauvinism and Ukrainophobia), attempts to misinform the citizenry, the situation of Ukrainian political prisoners in prisons and camps, various protest actions, etc."

In the course of two years (1970-1972) six issues of this highly-informative publication appeared despite an unflagging witchhunt by KGB agents throughout Ukraine. It was disseminated extensively among intellectuals, Ukrainian universities and high schools, and a goodly number of party officials. Publication ceased as the result of the mass arrests of Ukrainian intelligentsia in 1972. And just as it began to seem that *The Herald* had gone for good, it appeared, 7 and 8 issues combined, in the spring of 1974, new leaders and intellectuals having taken over the publication.

On October 16, 1974, the Moscow Bureau of *The Baltimore Sun*, in assessing the new issue of *The Ukrainian Herald*, stated that in contrast to previous issues it has taken "an openly anti-Russian, anti-Soviet position." Above all, the clandestine periodical charged that the ethnocide of the Ukrainians and other non-Russian nations in the USSR was an official and deliberate policy of the Soviet government.

The volume under review contains three basic parts. One deals with the vaunted East-West "cooperation," resulting in strengthening of the Soviet dictatorial regime, another with the ethnocidal policies of Moscow with regards to the Ukrainians and the third presents some poems by young poets. There also are extensive bibliographical notes and an index of names.

In the first part the policy of detente is succinctly analyzed from the viewpoint of the dissident circles in Ukraine, underscoring the extent of the role the West has played in strengthening the Soviet regime in the past and present.

The kernel of the book, entitled, "Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR," encompasses two sub-articles, "Demographic Statistics Exposing the Colonial Policy of Moscow's Occupation Forces in Ukraine" and "The General Program." The former is a detailed study of the destruction of the Ukrainian nation during the Soviet era through physical genocide. The latter chronicles the intensification of repression in Ukraine after the XXIVth Congress of the CPSU in 1971. This

section, which provides information on the most recent arrests, acts of repression, and the systematic suppression of Ukrainian culture, contains five sub-sections that deal with the policy of total Russification, the purge of party cadres of the Communist Party of Ukraine (containing inside accounts of the campaign against Peter Shelest, first secretary of the CPU and a member of the Politburo in Moscow), the prohibition of Ukrainian scholarship and culture, the persecution of the intelligentsia (listing the most recent arrests and dismissals from teaching and research positions in the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR), the destruction of Ukrainian historical and cultural monuments and the destruction of churches and persecution of the faithful.

The contents and, indeed, the importance of this volume, is greatly enhanced by the Introduction, contributed by Robert Conquest, the world-renowned British Sovietologist and author of *The Great Terror*, and other books on the USSR.

In discussing the "Shelest Affair," Prof. Conquest writes that national feeling and opposition to Moscow centralism is so strong in Ukraine that unless the Kremlin maintains unceasing vigilance, the Ukrainian Communist Party itself and its leaders find themselves having to take it into account:

"It is natural enough, of course, that a party leader in Kiev should envy the independence from Moscow, however limited, enjoyed by the leaders of the states of Eastern Europe, most of them smaller than Ukraine.

"In fact (looking at it from another angle), the leaders of Communist parties in the West, as well as in Eastern Europe, should in all logic stand for an independent, even if Communist, Ukraine. For the Brezhnev Doctrine, which purports to give the 'socialist community' the right to invade and repress any of its members which have gone to the bad, like Czechoslovakia in 1968, in fact means that the USSR alone has this right—and simply because it is the largest and strongest. But if Ukraine and the other subject nations of the USSR had this sort of independence, Russia by itself (though still the largest) would lose this overwhelming preponderance. So any Communist wishing to be something better than a puppet of Moscow, should logically work to this end..."

In the past, it is to be recalled, Ukrainian nationalism was savagely distorted in the West mainly through the propaganda efforts of Ukraine's enemies. Prof. Conquest says of current Ukrainian nationalism:

"Generally speaking, Ukrainian nationalism as it now exists is of a liberal and generous type. For example, that there was at one time a good deal of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, is undeniable. As elsewhere, certain types of nationalism—those which regard members of any other culture as representative of the foreign oppressor—associated themselves with it. One of the most remarkable things about all recent currents of Ukrainian nationalism is the way in which it has not only totally purged itself of any such taint, but has actually come to regard the Jewish population with special friendship, as fellow-sufferers under the same oppression..."

*The Ukrainian Herald* contains a wealth of truthful information which cannot be found in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*, or, for that matter, in the last edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, which graced the USSR by reprinting Soviet propaganda on Ukraine and other non-Russian nations in the USSR.

New York, N.Y.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

**CASE STUDIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.**

A World Survey. Ed. Willem A. Veenhoven. Vols. 1, 2. The Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies, The Hague, Netherlands, 1975, pp. 582, pp. 555.

This reviewer won't conceal the fact of his difficulties in offering within the span of normal book review limits an adequate and fair assessment of this two volume output. Very simply, there is so much to be said about this veritable contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the existence and violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world that several articles would be in order rather than just a book review. In whatever format, a critical account cannot but show the tremendous values of this pioneering and encyclopedic effort, where its sterling and advantageous qualities by far outweigh relatively minor defects of individual styles, organization and indexation.

Beyond question of doubt, these two volumes should grace the libraries of all governmental institutions, as well as those of universities, public reading rooms, large and small newspapers, and organizations concerned with human rights and fundamental freedoms. Lest the reader believe this to be an over-enthusiastic note, the enthusiasm is based on long experience with the subject and, I think, an honest and objective analysis of the contents of these volumes. As I carefully perused each article, my thoughts drifted constantly to the motivations, problems and reactions surrounding the whole effort of the famous Kersten Committee in the House of Representatives in the 50's. Our field of endeavor was, of course, more limited, namely the areas of Communist takeovers, but the limitation in area afforded room for more detailed analyses of each case. Without detracting from the substantial analyses of identical areas covered here, it can be truthfully stated that this achievement represents a crystallizing globalization of the same motivations, problems and doubtless reactions.

The chief contribution of this successful endeavor is the highly readable assemblage of material bearing on the subject within the scope of two massive volumes. That the work becomes a vital source of basic research into the subject goes without saying. It compresses into a handy unit essential data and analyses that the reader would otherwise have to spend an inordinate amount of time and effort to obtain. As a compendium the work also stimulates an integrated and graphic view of the human condition on all continents of our world, which cannot but multiply the stimulation for considerable reflection and soberly directed activism on the part of the absorbed reader. In short, striving to the maximum for analytical objectivity, essentialist empiricism and certitude, these two volumes constitute a heavy contribution to social scientific study in general and, as such, in particular is of prime value to every person, whether a scholar, analyst, law-maker or whatever, because it deals in effective account with the human condition in this world.

On the basis of all this and more, it would not be amiss or presumptuous to urge strongly that every youth and student in our colleges and universities be responsibly exposed to these volumes. Again because of the graphic view presented in them, these youths who will mould the world of the future will doubtlessly gain in one historical instant what even decades of practical experience may not divulge. Professors and others teaching any of the disciplines in the social scientific field have a moral obligation in at least exposing their students to this rich and well-developed reservoir of interdisciplinary knowledge. Yes, as always, there are points of criticism and objection to be registered, but this in-

tellectual and moral obligation rests on perspective, wisdom and honest convictions regarding the values of human rights and fundamental freedom. Our experience in disseminating the published results of the Kersten Committee met with less than full success in this regard.

As indicated, the reviewer could cite numerous points of criticism. It is unfortunate, for example, that the two volumes are lacking in useful indexes. The high quality and empirical contents of the work warrant them. As another example, the excellent introduction written by Willem A. Veenhoven, the editor-in-chief, shows some inconsistency with other parts of the work when Baltic people and others are viewed as parts of "Russia" rather than the USSR. Moreover, his distinctions between ethnic groups and nations, particularly in the USSR, are not as sharp and steadfast as objective evidence demands. It could also be pointed out that a serious omission of topic exists in the work, namely, not a studied article exists on the topic of genocide. The right to live is fundamentally a human right, and though some genocidal notes are to be found here and there, no compact study of the topic is included. A third volume of the compendium is due to be published this year. Hopefully, this vital and basic topic will be covered.

If one seeks to be hyper-critical, the articles making up the compendium can be subjected to similar criticism, depending on one's viewpoints and even sentiments. But such an approach would be basically negative and really to no permanent avail, for the compendium in toto stands as a monumental achievement deriving its overall excellence from the many expert and sound contributions made by the various scholars and analysts. The first volume consists of articles by Stefan T. Possony on political prisons in the USSR; J. Milton Yinger on American blacks; Joseph Dunner on anti-Jewish discrimination since World War II; Clemens Amelunxen on foreign workers in West Germany; Manuel Medina on regional and other conflicts in Spain; and Georg Maier on the regimented society of Peru.

Adding to the diversity and scope of the first volume are the articles and chapters on the Indian in Latin America by Miguel Leon-Portilla; the new Indianism by Victor J. Hanby; discrimination in the Arab Mideast by Costa Luca; the Kurds by L. M. von Taubinger; the Kabyls in North Africa by Emmanuel Silvan; types of discrimination in Pakistan by Albert E. Levak; the inter-ethnic conflict in Africa by W. J. Breytenbach; the ethnic minorities in Japan by William Wetherall and George A. DeVos; human rights in East-Central Europe by Walter Dushnyck; Australian race relations by Colin Tatz; the Mongolian Nation in Red China by Paul V. Hyer; and discrimination in Great Britain by Winifred Crum Ewing.

From this survey alone the reader can instantly sense the global coverage attempted in the work. The second volume supports this further with absorbing and extensive articles by Maurits van Haegendorn on ethno-linguistic cleavage in Belgium; Katharina Otzen on discrimination and preferment in West Germany; Christopher Bagley on West Indian migrants in Britain; Clemens Amelunxen on women in Islam; Georges R. Tamarin on Israeli society; Emmanuel Silvan with another perspective on the Kurds; S. R. Mohan Das on discrimination in India; D. Wickramansayake on the caste system in Sri Lanka; R. K. Vasil on ethnic discrimination in Fiji; Justus M. van der Kroef on the Papuans of West New Guinea; Jiro Suzuki and Mickey Sakamoto on discrimination against foreigners of Japanese descent in Japan; Denis Worrall on government in the plural society,

the South African model; John S. Western on discrimination in Australia and New Zealand; Victor J. Hanby on Indians in American cities; and Susan Eckstein on occupational inequality in urban Mexico.

This second volume includes also several pungent articles dealing with Red China and the USSR. Sechin Jagchid writes on "Discrimination Against Minorities in China"; Stefan T. Possony presents one on "Anti-Semitism In the Russian Orbit"; and Walter Dushnyck offers an extensive chapter on "Discrimination and Abuse of Power in the USSR." Needless to say, these and the preceding presentations do not exhaust the areas of human rights problems in our world, but it cannot be denied that these volumes represent a solid and scholarly beginning. Also, in terms of the world conflict, each area of suppressed human rights is important, but it doesn't require much perceptive reasoning to establish the primary significance of the vast, Communist, totalitarian area of suppression. In depth, volume and extent it exceeds all others.

From this angle of graded importance certain chapters in both volumes deserve special consideration. Dr. Possony's article on political prisons in the USSR today is thorough, well documented and penetrating. It covers almost every aspect of the so-called corrective labor system in the USSR and provides a concise but essential analysis of the economics of Communist camp-colonialism. His treatment of "ethnic groups" could stand a sharper definition and categorization, and the reviewer would take issue with the flat statement that "the Russian people itself suffered enormous losses" with regard to concentration camps. David Dallin's classic on forced labor shows the contrary. The erudite doctor's second article on anti-Semitism in the Russian orbit in volume two is equally comprehensive and factually established. It analyzes the subject in terms of the entire socialist background and fully justifies his conclusion that "the Kremlin is committed to a policy of anti-Semitic oppression."

The two chapters written by Dr. Dushnyck partake of the same qualities of scholarly excellence and firm command of the assigned subjects. His first one on human rights in East-Central Europe gives a state-by-state account, commencing with Albania and ending with Yugoslavia. The approach is a holistic one, interweaving human rights violations in all essential spheres of human existence. The real sources of the Hungarian Revolution in '56 could have been succinctly explained, and the economic controls and ownership under "socialism" could have been developed more poignantly as a force shaping a variety of human rights violations. But, notwithstanding, the lengthy analysis furnishes a working pattern for all of these East-Central European states, and the writer's conclusions are well fortified by the documented presentation. The author's article in volume two deals with the USSR and thoroughly covers the various nations and ethnic groups within that empire-state. Russification, religious genocide, and current dissidence are exceptionally well done in this extensive treatment.

For an American analyst who sees ethnographic warfare as the answer to the warfare concepts in Moscow's "peaceful coexistence," much of the data in the above articles is highly useful so are the contents and perspectives of the articles on Mongolia and Red China. Dr. Hyer's piece on "The Mongolian Nation within the People's Republic of China" is illuminating and well structured. The reader will be impressed by the author's care with definitions, as, for example, his emphasis on the cultural rather than ethnic or national basis of "Chineseness." Another example is his point on the cultural divergence between sedentary Chinese agriculturalists and the pastoral nomadic Mongols. The Mon-

golian aspiration for national independence is clearly underscored, but the author is pessimistic about the outcome, particularly because of the Red Chinese pressure for amalgamation or assimilation.

The contribution by Sechin Jagchid, a Mongolian scholar, on "Discrimination Against Minorities in China" is a relatively short presentation. However, his historical treatment of the subject and the perspectives he forges are most fruitful. He minces few words when he relates the policy of "the Middle Kingdom" toward the non-Han "barbarians" and China's dynasties of conquest and infiltration. The so-called commonwealth of the "five peoples"—Chinese (Han), Manchu, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans—in the new Republic of China in this century is handled objectively and dispassionately. An inkling of the author's conclusion can be gleaned from his observation that "blood is much thicker than ink and if Mao Tse-tung uses nationalism as a weapon to fight against his former 'big brother,' the Soviet Union, then inevitably, non-Chinese people also will use nationalism to struggle for their own existence against outside rule by the Chinese."

All of the other renditions obviously do not relate to the world struggle between the two super-powers as the above. Professor Yinger's article on the American blacks is statistically supported as concerns discrimination, and his prognosis for the future is optimistic. Professor Dunner's work on anti-Jewish discrimination is well organized and pungent, and covers the areas of the USSR, the satellite countries, Western Europe and other regions. Dr. Amelunxen's piece on foreign workers in West Germany is most informative, and the quote from the poet Max Frisch—"We called for manpower, but human beings came"—indicates its general tenor. Mrs. Ewing's paper on discrimination in Great Britain is quite weighty and refreshing, but her observations on nationalism are somewhat disputable. She sees the problem in Eastern Europe applicable to that of Great Britain, and politicians have to choose between bowing "to the wishes of a minority," or preventing "fragmentation in what they deem to be the interest of the whole nation in the long run." The USSR, an empire in itself, can scarcely be compared to the United Kingdom where consent of the governed still prevails, and a larger, unfragmented unit doesn't mean the existence of a "nation."

Critical comments of like order could be made of the other equally scholarly and thought-provoking contributions. But, as said earlier, this could run into articles in themselves. Certain examples were cited here to show the nature of the contributions and the total achievement of the two, massive volumes. After pouring through these remarkable presentations, any reader could hardly wait for the release of the third volume. There will even be room for more volumes in the future. The Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies is to be highly commended for its excellent accomplishment, and the editors deserve maximum praise for what must have been a most arduous task of achieving a semblance of readable continuity.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

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**WOHIN STEURT DER VATIKAN?: Papst zwischen Religion und Politik**  
(Where is the Vatican Heading?: The Pope Between Religion and Politics).  
By Reinhard Raffalt. Wilhelm Heyne Verlag. Munich, 1975, pp. 300.

The volume under review is a concise history of the Catholic Church in its universal scope, dealing extensively with the politics of the popes and treating in good measure of the martyrdom of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The present Pope, Paul, born Giovanni Montini on September 26, 1897, has had feeble health from a young age. During the rule of Fascism in Italy he shared the socialist viewpoint. After terminating studies at a papal diplomatic academy in 1923, he was assigned as a nuncio to Warsaw, whence he was recalled after five months because of poor health.

Author Raffalt submits that 92% of the Orthodox Christians live under Communist regimes in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the remaining 8% being Orthodox under the Greek Orthodox Church, but that only 1% of the total recognize the Patriarch of Constantinople as their spiritual head. The latter, incidentally, is still recognized by the Patriarchate of Moscow but only *pro forma*, inasmuch as the Moscow prelate is dependent on the Soviet "church minister" who continues the old Czarist policy of treating the church as an instrument of the government.

According to the author, Pope Pius XII was a fierce opponent of Communism: "Pope Pius XII—Pacelli believed that no Catholic could collaborate with the Communists, and if he did so, the Church had the right to excommunicate him" (p. 124).

"Pope Pius XII thought categorically: there is the denial of God, and here—Christianity, two hostile principles, and any understanding between them would be a sin. Montini—Paul VI thought pragmatically: it is nowhere said that Communism because of its atheistic doctrine cannot achieve the social requirements expressed in the Gospel; it is possible that Communism may perform this even better than all forms of capitalism. Pope Pius XII was the last hierarch who thought eschatologically, while Montini went to meet the world's demands to be realized by the Church. . . The silence in these matters, which came into existence after World War II, continues between Montini and the Communist world" (p. 125).

The "flirtation" with Moscow was initiated by Pope John XXIII in his encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*, on April 10, 1962, a year before his death. Although he did not name Communists *per se*, he spoke of them in rather laudable terms, something hardly expected of a pope. On March 7, 1962, Pope John XXIII received in an exclusive audience Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, and his wife, Rada, thus initiating a Soviet-Vatican "dialogue." In John XXIII's mind, the "dialogue" was not an end in itself, but rather a means of reaching an understanding with the Orthodox world, the power of which he had had an opportunity to assess as a papal legate to Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece (1931-1944).

The Vatican invited Russian Orthodox delegates-observers to the Ecumenical Council as a result of the negotiations between Metropolitan Nikodim of Moscow and Msgr. Jan Willebrands of the Vatican's Secretariat for Christian Unity (now a cardinal); Nikodim demanded that there be no condemnation of Communism by the Council. Also, Patriarch Athanagoras of Constantinople tried to reach an understanding with the Moscow Patriarchate, but to no avail, the Patriarch of Moscow preferring to be the sole spokesman of the Orthodox world.

But not all prelates kept silent at the Council, according to the author. Metropolitan Maxime Hermaniuk of Canada stated:

"I am bewildered, that of all possible forms of injustice which were mentioned in the basic document, namely, political, cultural, economic and international, not a single Christian had raised the injustice of the persecution of the Christian Church. In the entire document the expression 'Persecuted Church' cannot be found. There was not even an effort to discuss religious freedom in the previous decree of the Second Vatican Council."

The author adds: "All participants at the Council were aware that no one was thinking of Ukrainian immigrants in Canada, but of those faithful of the Ukrainian Church who remained under the Soviets. They have been united with Rome for the past 350 years. All their bishops, hundreds of priests, thousands of monks and nuns and hundreds of thousands of the faithful, men and women, were accused of and condemned for their fidelity to the Holy See. Many of them, through prison tortures and forced labor in concentration camps, died the death of martyrs. For the past twenty-five years the Catholic Church in Ukraine has been declared an illegal institution, and today it does not exist anymore, according to the atheistic regime" (p. 134).

Subsequently, author Raffalt says that the enthronement of Patriarch Pimen was attended by Cardinal Willebrands, as Pope Paul VI's representative, who heard Patriarch Pimen say that the Ukrainian Catholic Church no longer existed. The papal representative not only accepted this statement in silence, but failed to report it to the Pope on returning to Rome. All knew, however, that Pimen's statement was inspired by the Soviet regime.

After an account of the release of Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj from an 18-year imprisonment in Soviet jails and his elevation to the rank of Archbishop-Major and Cardinal, the author provides a short report on the history of the Ukrainian Catholic Church:

"The situation with Ukrainians is another matter. Most of them lived in the USSR, and a lesser number in Poland, but they had their own nationality which was neither Russian nor Polish. In 1596 their bishops under the terms of the Union of Brest returned to the Roman Church. The Vatican recognized the Ukrainian rite and ecumenical rights, which highly displeased the Roman clergy of Poland. On the other hand, in Russia its separation from Orthodoxy would have been tantamount to a 'crime against the imperial (Czarist) majesty' for they would have to recognize as their head not the Czar, but the Pope. And Catherine, Nicholas I and Alexander II would have ordered bloody persecutions..."

The author dwells extensively on the Synod of Ukrainian Bishops called by Cardinal Slipyj in 1971, and on the letter of the Vatican Secretary of State Villot, sent to Ukrainian bishops in November, 1972. In it, Villot wrote: "The Ukrainian Church has no legal authority that would extend over the bishops—only the Holy See does."

This meant the demotion of Cardinal Slipyj from his office as Archbishop-Major and the liquidation of the office itself. "Yet on the basis of the Union of Brest, Slipyj had the patriarchal right to nominate bishops and call the synods... The independent character of the Ukrainian Church, guaranteed by the Holy See in the Union of Brest, was transformed into direct dependence of each individual bishop on the Roman Curia. Afterwards Slipyj could not nominate any bishops, and still less assign them common activities. On the other hand,

the Vatican could assure unoccupied sees for metropolitans who were in consonance with its Eastern policy but without the experience possessed by Slipyj. The Autocephalic Eastern Church with almost 50 million faithful, tied to Rome by its fidelity and martyrdom, had lost its right and form; the Pope thought that he had acted correctly, but Moscow attained its goal" (pp. 136-138).

The papal "minister for foreign affairs," Archbishop Casaroli, is allowed to state: "If we succeed in conducting this Eastern policy for fifteen years without impediments, Russia will become Christian, and perhaps even Catholic..." Although these words were hardly taken seriously, nevertheless, they indicate the farsighted aim of the Vatican, for Pope Paul VI's current problem is to reach an understanding with Moscow (p. 139).

The author further states that in "the matter of differences between Catholicism and Orthodoxy an oversight occurs, in that the primacy of the Pope is neither final nor the only obstacle for Orthodoxy. The history of the church schism from its very beginning revealed the problem of the continuation of 'Roman thought, independent of and apart from that first Rome which even today pretends to be an eternal city.' Already by the end of the ancient era, Orthodoxy was centered in the other, 'Second Rome'—Byzantium. After its fall, arose the 'Third Rome,' which exists to this day—Moscow. Moscow and not the city in which the Vatican is located is now the only legendary Rome for Orthodoxy as well as for Russia." (p. 140).

As a result of this policy, the writer goes on, some unbelievable developments are occurring in the Ukrainian Catholic Church:

"When Rev. Efrem Vasyl Kryvy was consecrated a bishop for Ukrainians in Brazil, his archbishop, Cardinal Slipyj, was absent although he lives only a few steps from St. Peter's in Rome. Those who were interested in this matter knew why he refused to attend the consecration. In the Basilica, in a secluded corner sat six representatives of the Patriarch of Moscow, member-delegates who had been conducting negotiations with the Vatican for some time. Steps were taken that the appearance of the grey-bearded freedom fighter should not perturb the Russian guests. But Slipyj gratified the Pope: filled with anger, he stayed away. Later on, he declared: 'During my imprisonment, I was condemned to death. In Rome there were moments when I felt even worse'" (p. 256).

Raffalt also dwells on the situation of the Catholic Church in South America, where pro-Communist feelings run high among the clergy. At a number of Catholic universities the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung have become mandatory subjects. Many parishes have no pastors.

Included in the book also are descriptions of visits to the Pope of various Communist dignitaries.

This is an extremely informative book and one which can only sadden the majority of Catholic faithful throughout the world. The author makes no bones about his bitterness and dissatisfaction over the "flirtation" between the Vatican and Moscow. But he ends:

"Nobody knows whether Peter's ship will sail against the wind or with the wind, inasmuch as what is being rejected today may become a newly-born truth tomorrow" (p. 296).

THE LANDS OF PARTITIONED POLAND. By Piotr S. Wandycz. University of Washington Press: Seattle and London, 1974, pp. 431.

We are indebted to the University of Washington Press for publishing a series of eleven books entitled *A History of East Central Europe*. Vol. VII of the series, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918*, by Piotr S. Wandycz, covers a complex period of the history of Poland, Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine, beginning in 1795 when the partitioning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was completed by Russia, Prussia and Austria and ending in 1918 when an independent Poland was reestablished.

Wandycz, a history professor at Yale University, has written a fairly objective book, tracing the histories of the lands under Russian, Prussian and Austrian rule, noting their divergent evolution as well as the threads that bound them together. While it is a comprehensive presentation of the political, social, economic, and cultural developments of all the nationalities inhabiting the vast area of the old Commonwealth, emphasis centers, not surprisingly, on the Polish nation, and only to a lesser degree on the Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Byelorussian. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian national revival and political activity is amply treated, though perhaps Wandycz oversimplifies the complex political and social struggles of the Ukrainians against Polish nationalism, Russian and Austrian autocracy as well as the intra-national struggle between the Russophile "Old Ruthenians" and the rising Ukrainian party.

Ukrainian cultural achievements, too, do not receive the in-depth coverage given the Polish. Ivan Franko is mentioned in connection with political activities (he is quoted as saying the Poles "must, once and for all, give up any thought of building a 'historical' Poland in non-Polish lands, and they must accept, as we do, the idea of a purely ethnic Poland"), but there is no reference to his poetry. Shevchenko is not neglected, but Lesya Ukrainka rates only a one-line tribute as contrasted with 18 lines for Maria Konopnicka.

Although Minsk is the capital and chief city of Byelorussia, the four indexed references to it concern only statistical and administrative (*gubernias*, etc.) listings.

Statistical data is a noticeable shortcoming of Wandycz's work. For example, we learn little about education in eastern Galicia under the Austrian regime, whether primary instruction was in Ukrainian, whether Polish children attended the same schools, etc.

The third and final partition of Poland came after Frederick the Great and Empress Catherine of Russia went into panic by the model democratic Polish constitution of 1791. Actually, the "Third of May" reforms were gradualist and moderate by comparison with the radical social features—pledging complete freedom to the peasantry—proclaimed in Kosciuszko's insurrection manifesto that followed. The overwhelming might of the predatory powers easily crushed the uprising, but the three-way division of Poland made permanent the balance-of-power system that was to burden the peoples of Central Europe for the next century and a half.

By comparison with the "Russification" and *Kulturkampf* Germanization inflicted on their brothers in Russian and Prussian-occupied Poland, the Poles of Austrian-held Galicia enjoyed considerable liberty. There was a price, however, embodied in the "divide et impera" policy of the Vienna government to turn not

only Ukrainians against Poles but even the Polish peasantry against the more politically sophisticated gentry and intelligentsia.

To some degree, the Austrian policy worked to the benefit of the dominant Ukrainian population in eastern Galicia. Governor Franz Stadion, for example, in 1848 encouraged the Ukrainians to petition the government to make Eastern Galicia a Ukrainian province, much to the dismay of the Poles. The Ukrainian national movement had found a shelter in Galicia and, as Wandycz quotes Hrushevsky, "To the oppressed Ukrainians in Russia, Galicia appeared an open window looking out on the free expanse of Ukrainian development and in time of extremity a place of refuge."

This did not sit well with some Polish leaders, most notably Roman Dmowski, leader of the National Democratic party. He rejected the far-sighted cooperative outlook of Prince Adam Czartoryski, historian Jozef Szujski and the Polish Socialists who demanded that "Polish and Ruthenian peoples recover their independent national existence." To Dmowski, the "magnanimous policy" on eastern Galicia made no sense. He failed to see the ambiguity of his own demand that the Ukrainians had either to be forced to become Poles or more self-reliant vis-a-vis Russia and Poland. His ultra-nationalist politics, embracing anti-Semitism, while finding favor with the big landowners and urban middle-class Poles of eastern Galicia, caused both Polish conservatives and social democrats to deplore his detaching the national cause from humanitarianism.

Ukrainian sources Wandycz lists in his "Bibliographical Essay" include L. Rudnytsky, Nicholas Chubaty, Vasyl Lutsiv, Mykhailo Drahomanov, Dmytro Doroshenko, Fedir Savchenko and, of course, Mykhailo Hrushevsky.

Proofreading of the Index was slipshod. For example, five of the six page references under the "Byelorussia" entry are incorrect. "Bromberg" has a page 230 reference, "Bydgoszcz" one for page 45, but only a cross-reference from "Bromberg." The reference to Jakub Szela is given as page 137. It should be page 135. The page references under the "Ukraine" entry are all correct; however it is necessary to refer to "Ruthenian," "Galicia" or "Eastern Galicia" concerning Ukrainian activities in Austrian-held Galicia.

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JOHN SWITALSKI

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HANDBOOK OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES. By Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers and Frederic Harned, editor, associate and assistant editors, respectively. New York: The Free Press, (c. 1975); pp. 481. Bibliography included.

This book contains the five following parts: 1. The Slavs; 2. The Baltics; 3. The Transcaucasus; 4. General Asia; and 5. Other Nationalities (such as Jews, Tartars, and Moldavians). Each part deals with several nationalities presented by different scholars who are specialists in their particular field.

The Russians, the major nationality of the USSR, are described by Rome Spechler in an optimistic way. It is generally known that they are the promoters of the Communist Russian imperialistic policy of world revolution and world domination. It ought be remembered that the Russian people are the main rulers in the USSR with a unique monopoly in every aspect of life, with a strong policy of Russification, cultural supremacy, and assimilation, having as their main goal

that of creating a unique Soviet nation. The Russians are implementing the Czarist-dream policy, the traditional imperialistic policy of world domination. The Soviet Union, the enslaver of the Captive Nations, is the last colonial empire in existence in modern times, shaming modern civilization.

Ukraine, the first victim of Soviet Russian aggression as well as the largest Captive Nation, is treated by Professor Roman Sporluk. Byelorussia is dealt with by Jan Zaprudnik. Estonia is described by Rein Taagepera and the other two Baltic states, Latvia and Lithuania, by Frederic T. Harned. The Transcaucasus part covers Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan; and Central Asia includes Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. The book also has a selected bibliography and tables.

Prof. Sporluk teaches history at the University of Michigan and has a law degree from Lublin University (Poland) and a Ph.D. from Stanford University. He was a Research Associate in Ukrainian Studies at Harvard University.

His article on Ukraine begins with general information on its territory, population and economy. He states that in 1970, 35.5% of the Ukrainian labor force was employed in industry and construction, 31.7% in agriculture and forestry, 7.5% in transport and communication, 6.8% in trade, and 13.4% in education, medicine, and public health. The average monthly wage for Ukrainian workers in 1970 was 115.2 rubles, with 102.2 rubles in education, 120.9 rubles in transportation, 121.9 rubles in science, and 85 rubles in health. Kolkhoz farmers received a lower pay from the state farm workers (sovkhoz). This is followed by a concise history of Ukraine, starting with Kievan Rus, Galicia and Volhynia and their Polish conquest in 1387 and then in 1569. The rise against Poland in 1648 gave, for a short time, independence to the Ukrainian Kozak State. Subsequently, Ukraine went under Russian protection in 1654 (Pereyaslav Treaty), and was partitioned between Poland and Muscovy in 1664. The *hetman* office, symbol of Ukrainian autonomy, was abolished in 1764. The partition of Ukraine put Western Ukraine under Austrian rule. In Ukraine the nobility were absorbed by the Russians, and the Czarist regime stifled the development of Ukrainian culture by forbidding Ukrainian printing during the years 1876-1906 (Valuev's infamous Czarist Russian *ukase*). But in Austria there was more freedom for Ukrainian culture and social life. West Ukrainian representatives sat in the Galician (Halychyna) provincial assembly and in the Austrian Parliament in Vienna.

During the first World War, the Ukrainians proclaimed their independence on January 22, 1918. The author calls *Hetman* P. Skoropadsky the "Ukrainian Mannerheim" (p. 24), who was overthrown by the Directorate. Shortly afterwards the Red army took control over all of Ukraine; after the Second World War the Soviet Russian control spread over the other Ukrainian territories which had been under Poland, the Czechs, Hungary, and Rumania.

The suffering of Ukraine under the Soviet Russian rule is objectively presented, delineating the role of the Russian Communist Party, the real ruler in Ukraine. All directives, plans and orders in Ukraine are given as direct orders from Moscow. The author mentions several major Soviet crimes in Ukraine, such as the famine of 1932-33, artificially created to promote the collectivization in Ukraine, leaving six million Ukrainians dead. He points out the main Moscow policy of exterminating Ukraine as a nation, the relentless Russification, the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian cultural heritage, monuments, churches, libraries, and schools. He points out the political trials, deportations, the unconscionable reprisals.

Describing Western Ukraine under the Polish rule, the author mentions the

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in Vienna in 1929. This organization opposed the assimilation policy of Poland's rulers, performing in protest some acts of sabotage and terror, hoping to achieve independence for Ukraine. He errs in saying that the "OUN ruled in Ukraine in Hitler's promised territorial reorganization of Europe, the new Europe." Those Ukrainian ethnographic territories under the German rule were placed under direct German control with a Governor, with the Ukrainians having only a committee for social work and some other relief activities. The author apparently has not availed himself of the many researched accounts on the OUN. Its history is connected with the creation of the independent Ukrainian state of 1918-19 and with its defense with arms, its resistance to foreign oppression and its ideological education. The OUN kept alive the ideal of an independent Ukrainian State. The same was true of Ukrainian nationalists living in Ukraine under other occupations, such as the Muscovite-Russian, Polish, Rumanian, Czech or Hungarian, even of nationalists living abroad with no precise knowledge of the situation in Ukraine. But different groups acting autonomously came up with different theoretical and practical approaches to Ukrainian liberation, and such was the cause of a big split which persists even unto today. The Western Ukrainian Republic, created on November 1, 1918, in Lviv, in accordance with Wilson's policy of national self-determination and proclaimed by the Ukrainian National Assembly, which on January 22, 1919, in Kiev, had been united with the Ukrainian National Republic, was delivered by the Western powers into the hands of Poland, which introduced a strong policy of assimilation. In 1939, Poland was divided between the Soviets and the Germans, but the fight for an independent Ukraine has never stopped, even up to the present day. On June 30, 1941 in Lviv Bandera's OUN proclaimed Ukraine's independence of the German will, and later organized an army called UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), which fought both the Soviet Russian Muscovites and the Germans for a free and independent Ukraine. Soviet Ukraine in 1945 joined the UN as an original signatory member. Soviet policy in Ukraine was that of terror, oppression, purges, and deportation to Siberia.

In 1946, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was absorbed into the Russian Orthodox one. After Stalin's death, in 1953, there came a short time of relaxation under Khrushchev, only to be followed after his ouster by a strong persecution policy and massive arrests of Ukrainian Soviet intellectuals, such as Valentyn Moroz, Leonid Plyushch, Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, Ivan Svitlychny, Eugene Sverstyuk, Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky, Yuriy Shukhevych, Stephania Shabatura, Irena Stasiv-Kalynets and others.

A special section is devoted to the demography of Ukraine, which had a population of 48,200,000 on January 1, 1973. The ethnic Ukrainians in 1959 made up 76.8% and in 1970 only 74.9% of the population. In the same period the Russian population in Ukraine had increased from 16.9% to 19.4%. Ukrainians made up 87.2% of the West Ukrainian population in 1959 and 88.7% in 1970. In 1970 about 5.5 million Ukrainians lived in Soviet republics other than Ukraine. Kazakhstan also contained 930,000, states our author.

Ukraine has its distinctive culture, influenced by the Byzantine heritage in religion, art and social life. Ukraine uses the Cyrillic script. Its first institution of higher learning, the Kievan Academy, established in 1632, was also the first institution of higher learning in Eastern Europe. In architecture, under the Byzantine influence, it developed a "Ukrainian Baroque" art style. During 1876-1905, Ukrainian publications were banned in Ukraine. Writers from Ukraine

under Russian rule had to publish their works in Western Ukraine, at the time under Austrian rule, especially in the city of Lviv, which became a center of Ukrainian culture. During the independence of Ukraine, 1918-1919, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was established by *Hetman* P. Skoropadsky. The article depicts the harsh condition of Ukrainian intellectuals and dissenters protesting Russification and demanding more intellectual freedom, such as Ivan Dzyuba with his *Internationalism or Russification?*, published in the West in English in 1968, who was then forced to change his views.

A chapter is devoted to Ukraine's external relations, with its membership in the UN, UNESCO, ILO, etc. Another chapter deals with the media such as language, printing, educational, scientific and cultural institutions, all along with statistical tables. The Ukrainian national attitude is presented in detail, characterized by antagonism to the Muscovite Russian behavior of today.

Ukrainians in the Soviet Union are struggling against assimilation with the Russians. A special chapter deals with "Recent Manifestations of Nationalism" in Ukraine. It states that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) ceased operations under heavy Soviet Russian pressure in the 1950's, but between 1958 and 1961 the KGB announced the arrest of a number of OUN members. In 1964 in Ukraine there was an organization called the "Ukrainian National Front," which regarded itself as a continuation of the OUN. In 1965-66 it published a journal called *Fatherland and Freedom*. In the footnotes is mentioned also the "United Party for the Liberation of the Ukraine" of 1958; the "Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Party," known also as the "Jurist Group," was active in 1959-60, whose members were tried in Lviv, in 1961. It is known that at that time there also existed the "National Committee," whose 20 members were tried in Lviv in 1961, two being executed. In 1964 the "Ukrainian National Front" was reestablished. In 1965-66, the KGB arrested a number of Ukrainian intellectuals and tried them in Lviv and Kiev, such as Ivan Dzyuba and Vyacheslav Chornovil (see *The Chornovil Papers*, published in 1968). Between 1966 and 1972, fresh arrests were made by the KGB, this time including for the second time historian Valentyn Moroz, who was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Protesting Russification, a group of students and professors from the Dnipropetrovsk Educational Institute were arrested. The arrests of 1972 included Yaroslav Dobosh on a visit from Belgium. The Dnipropetrovsk group demanded the abandonment of the resettlement policy, discrimination against Ukrainians in the educational system and the degrading of Ukrainian culture to a provincial role. The above organization demanded in 1959-61 national liberation and establishment of an independent sovereign Ukraine, and the secession of Ukraine from the USSR. There were also various proposals for political reforms, such as abolition of the KGB, of censorship, release of all political prisoners, and the right to have political parties. They demanded also equal rights for minorities inside Ukraine, including the Jews. They condemned the Soviet anti-Semitic policy and anti-Semitism in general. There finally came the ouster of Shelest, the political Communist ruler in Ukraine. Ukrainian writer Oles' Honchar complained of the lack of any understanding of Ukraine's national past and of the destruction of an old Kozak church. This chapter includes information from the underground publications, such as *Visnyk* — (The Herald), available also in English for the Western World, telling of the desire of Ukrainians to be free and independent.

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ALEXANDER SOKOLYSZYN

**EAST CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS.** By Joseph Rothschild. *A History of East Central Europe*, Vol. 9. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974, pp. 420.

In a foreword, Professors Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold, the editors of the series, "A History of East Central Europe," identify their task, to be accomplished in eleven volumes, as an attempt to provide "the scholar who does not specialize in East Central European history and the student who is considering such specialization with an introduction to the subject and a survey of knowledge deriving from previous publications."

Professor Rothschild was assigned the writing of a history of the interwar period of all countries between the Baltic Sea and Greece with only a brief discussion of the Baltic states. The author, professor of political science at Columbia University, is known in the academic community for his works, *Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat*, *Communist Eastern Europe* and *The Communist Party of Bulgaria*.

Realizing the endless difficulties of his assignment, such as the number of countries involved (ten altogether), the level of the presentation for the intended users, the variety and selection of subjects along with the problem of emphasis, the linguistic perplexities, the basic historical nature of the assignment itself and, last but not least, the embodied political emotionalism, the author chose a mixture of a handbook and an interpretative monograph. That has proved to be a successful approach even with some unavoidable difficulties, such as in the selection of the subjects most characteristic in a given country. As examples, the Romanian Iron Guard is selected to typify similar movements in other countries; Bulgaria serves as a model for the economics of peasant agriculture; Hungary exemplifies the impact of depression on a transitional economy; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia emphasize the problem of multi-ethnicity, and Poland offers a case study for the structure of a semi-fascist "government party."

Much attention is given the Jewish question in all countries on account of their number and importance. Other minorities are given almost as much space and elaboration.

The "Bibliographical Essay," eleven pages long and limited entirely to American, British, and a few German titles, make it possible to keep footnotes to a minimum. The exclusion of works in the East European languages is a regrettable shortcoming, and so is the fact that some seven million Ukrainians living within interwar Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania are represented with but one if worthwhile title—*Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*.

The book itself is destined to become controversial, perhaps even trendsetting for a new approach of American East European scholarship towards the whole of Eastern Europe, including the USSR.

Its intention, structure, methodology and general overview are embraced in a twenty-five-page long Introductory Survey, which, contrary to the author's denial, produces a pessimistic, almost disaster-laden picture of interwar East Central Europe. Furthermore, Rothschild sees the complex political and socio-economic situations in only two sacredly applied terms, "Left-Radical" and "Right-Radical," leaving the impression that between the two extreme movements there existed but a huge vacuum. The reader who is not well trained in world history may be led to believe that this geographical area, in almost all regards, including standard of living, education and political freedom, represented the

darkest spot on earth. Needless to say, the situation in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy, and also the United States, in certain geographical areas and in some aspects, fared no better if not worse. Discrimination, persecution, lack of freedom, starvation—all were always present in the neighboring Soviet Union though this is never mentioned by the author. His reference to Nazism in Germany as the sole and exclusive evil perplexes the historian, especially now that the horrendous crimes of the Soviet regime in the USSR have long become part of general knowledge.

These critical remarks aside, Rothschild's Introduction can hardly be questioned as to its honesty, although analytical elaborations concerning the origin of the failure to bring about a better solution for this part of Europe are mentioned only marginally. For instance, having observed that the Great Powers, especially France and England, abdicated their responsibilities in regard to East Central Europe and even refused to support their alliances (France, in particular), thus virtually inviting Nazi German penetration, Rothschild would or could not venture a timely and inescapable conclusion as regards the total failure of the Versailles settlement, which already has been labeled by H. Nicolson as "very, very stupid." This "pyramid of mistakes" should also include the United States entry into WWI which forced Germany into the Armistice and imposed upon her the "Treaty" of Versailles. In the final analysis, these events resulted mainly in the saving of the French, British, and Japanese colonial empires and the shouldering of an already decaying France with the "responsibilities" of post-war settlements and peace. Furthermore, instead of the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire it would have been better for Europe had the Russian colonial empire been destroyed and Germany's treaties with Soviet Russia of March 3, 1918 and with the then free Ukraine of February 9, 1918 been kept in force. The new mini-multi-national states, such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland, contained a large percentage of national minorities exposed to greater persecution than was the case in old Austria-Hungary. Amputating some areas from the Hapsburg Empire would have been justifiable; however, its dismemberment in the end improved nothing. The Danubian Federation of Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Hungary proper could have become a more solid economic entity than what did come out of the chaos of splits. Furthermore, the German-Austrian solution of the Polish problem was, in fact, closer to Woodrow Wilson's proposal than multi-national Poland as she emerged after WWI. One should also remember that Hitler's rise to power started in Versailles and not in Munich.

Finally, the myth of the "struggle for democracy" has for too long been used as an apology for the mistakes and as a cover for the different intentions. In the German Empire, even under Wilhelm II and despite the conspiracy of silencing, more political, social, judicial, and economic justice and progress was made and practiced than in Russia, Japan, in the colonies of France and England and in the treatment of American Blacks and some other ethnic groups before and after World War I.

Bolshevism could not have been contained by a "cordon sanitaire," but only by a victorious Germany. Regrettably, all these and other related matters are not even mentioned in the context of historical alternatives for they would possibly have seriously challenged and confused some of the author's "traditional conformities." However, it would be wrong to state that the author is not aware of the fact that history at that turn went into the wrong direction and was made by mediocre politicians.

In fact, Rothschild's own observations only increase doubts as to the wisdom of the outcome of the war itself as well as all the post-war settlements. "The real failure of the interwar territorial settlements lay not in any alleged hypocrisy in applying the principle of ethnic justice, but rather in the impossibility of reconciling this principle with the other major political aims of the peace makers; the permanent diminution of Germany and containment of Russian power, and the restoration of international order in Europe," (p. 4). "Thus East Central European hopes of achieving security by bringing the weight of benevolent, if distant, Great Powers, to bear against the area's rapacious and immediate neighbors proved abortive" (p. 8). "Given this constellation of predatory, indifferent, and ineffective Great Powers, a constellation that it would neither prevent nor even control, East Central Europe might nevertheless have achieved at least minimal power-credibility if it had been able to achieve internal regional solidarity and some system of mutual assistance" (p. 8). "It is scarcely an exaggeration to suggest that as a general rule in interwar East Central Europe, common borders entailed hostile relations. Thus, the 'blame' for the demise of the region's independence must be charged to its own fundamental weaknesses, the instability of its institutions, and its irresponsible governments, as well as to the active and passive faults of the Great Powers" (p. 8). "Thus, each state of interwar East Central Europe had one or more enemies from within the area, and each of the 'victor' states among them also a Great Power enemy—Poland—even had two" (p. 10). "An important, and often the main, component of the several revisionist-irredentist territorial disputes in interwar East Central Europe was the ethnic one" (p. 12).

"Interwar East Central Europe was preponderantly unproductively agricultural. While far higher proportions of its population were engaged in farming than was the case in Western Europe, the productivity of its agriculture in terms both of yield rates per unit and of yield rates per agricultural worker was far lower... The peasant's standard of living was falling precisely at a time when his expectations and self-esteem were rising" (p. 15). "The general peasant resentment and mistrust of urban society extended also to the proletariat, the area's other interwar 'outsider' class" (p. 17). "But the East Central European dictatorship would not or could not emulate the totalitarian dynamism of Hitler's example. Their commitments were essentially bureaucratic and conservative, at most technocratic and oligarchical. Projecting no mass ideology, they either failed or refused to elicit mass support" (p. 21). "Nazi Germany thus acquired control over the area's economy by first dominating its exports, then through these its imports, and finally rendering it utterly dependent on continuing German purchases, supplies, spare parts and infrastructure" (p. 24).

In the final conclusion and in attempting to explain events of the past, Rothschild is quite correct by placing blame where it belongs first of all: "In retrospect, one must assign greater responsibility for the catastrophes of 1939-41 to the malevolence, indifference, or incompetence of the Great Powers (including the USA) than to the admittedly costly mistakes of these states" (p. 25).

This reviewer, however, feels that the "mistakes" (or the just plain ignorance) are to be tied directly to the self-interest of France and Great Britain. Their "victories" in WWI did not prevent the collapse of their colonial empires a few decades later, and, in fact, it was their approaching decline together with the internal decay of their aging societies that helped Stalin to impose his tyranny upon one hundred million people of East Central Europe after 1945.

This shattering Introduction is followed by condensed chapters on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the three Baltic states. In addition to demolishing many myths created by some patriotic national historians or their Western friends, each chapter offers a brief historical introduction, outlines the political development and structure, and provides an economic analysis in addition to numerous maps and tables devoted to such areas as population by ethnicity, religion and growth increases, the economy, education, and elections.

In regard to the Ukrainian question, especially in the chapters on Poland and Czechoslovakia, the reader, for a change, will find one of the most honest and objective presentations available in American East European literature. Rothschild's understanding of the problem and his sympathy for the persecuted is to be acclaimed and remembered.

This is not the first English language study on East Central Europe of the interwar period; however, among the many titles this reviewer has read and used for classroom teaching, this one is among the most thought-provoking as it stresses the peculiarities of each country without topical repetition producing monotony in similarities. There is no visible evidence of special preference for one nationality over another; even Czechoslovakia does not escape the scrutiny of honest criticism. Its challenging nature invites questions, disagreements, criticism and approval, and exactly this type of study should be appreciated more than books complying with the prevailing conformities.

This study should be used not only for classroom education and general information; its potential lies in its challenge and thus perhaps in the formulation of national thinking and policy affecting Europe, the USSR, and East Central Europe in particular.

*Eastern Illinois University*

STEPHAN M. HORAK

## PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

### I. TESTIMONY OF LEONID PLYUSCH IN U.S. CONGRESS

*House International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations, Washington, D.C., March 30, 1976:*

I am thirty-seven years old, my nationality is Ukrainian. I graduated from Kiev State University, where I studied mathematics. Until 1968 I worked in the Institute of Cybernetics at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. I was dismissed from my position there under the pretext of a cutback in staff, but in fact I was fired having written a protest letter to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* about the case of Ginzburg and Galanskov. I could not find a job. In January 1972 I was arrested on charges of anti-Soviet propaganda.

*Why was I put in jail and then in a psychiatric hospital?*

In 1966 I began writing articles for *samizdat*, about the nature of the Soviet state, its ideology and nationality problems in the USSR. I believed that a revolution in the USSR was impossible and unnecessary, but that gradual democratization of the country by reforms from above and propaganda among the people was essential. Because I wanted to take an active part in the struggle for democratization, I helped circulate *samizdat* and gather information for the *Chronicle of Current Events* and *The Ukrainian Herald*, which informed people about the struggle for human rights in the USSR.

In 1969 I joined the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR. This group legally protested violations of the Soviet Constitution and the UN Declaration on Human Rights. At that time there were fifteen members. Now, only two are free—Tatyana Velikanova and Tatyana Khodorovich. The others are in camps, have emigrated, or have ceased to be active after serving prison terms.

Gregory Podyapolsky, a physicist by profession and a poet, died a few days ago. He died of nervous strain, persecution and worry about his friends.

On January 15, 1972 I was arrested and held for interrogation in an isolation cell of the Republican KGB in Kiev. I was accused of all the above activities.

From the first day of the investigation, I refused to give any testimony. I knew that any statement I might make about my friends, even a positive one, would be used against them. Neither the KGB nor the prosecutor's office is interested in the truth. I told the investigator that I regard the KGB as an anti-constitutional organization and that I do not wish to partake in their crimes against the people.

*As early as 1969 a friend of mine was told during an investigation that I was a schizophrenic and had already been sent to a psychiatric hospital. Therefore, from the first day of my arrest, I was convinced that I would be placed in the Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric hospital.*

In May 1972 I was taken for an in-patient examination at the Serbsky Institute, but I spent the next six months in Moscow's Lefortovo prison. The decision to place me under compulsory treatment was reached after a few con-

versations with the psychiatrists, among them such prominent Soviet psychiatrists as Academician Snezhevsky, Lunts, Nadzharov and the Morozovs. There were three experts in my case. As I learned later, the final diagnosis was "creeping schizophrenia since adolescence."

From July 1973 until January 8, 1976 I was in Dnipropetrovsk's special psychiatric hospital. I was subjected to "treatment" by tranquilizers -- haloperidol and trilhiazin—and underwent two sessions of insulin therapy.

Most of the inmates at the Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric hospital are mentally disturbed murderers, rapists and hooligans. About sixty of the inmates are political prisoners. Most of these are mentally normal. I don't have the opportunity to name all of them, but I should say something about two of them — the poet Anatolyy Lupynis and the writer Viktor Rafalsky. They are regarded as being socially dangerous and mentally disturbed. I particularly want to draw attention to the plight of Doctor Mykola Plakhotnyuk. In the summer of 1971 Mykola Plakhotnyuk was strolling along the street in Kiev with a friend, an American girl of Ukrainian background. They were followed by KGB agents who never let them out of their sight. One of them came up to Plakhotnyuk and hit him in the face; Plakhotnyuk wrote a complaint about this to government bodies. This complaint was used by psychiatrists to declare him insane and suffering from a persecution complex.

*A healthy political prisoner realizes the full horror of psychiatric prisons from the first day he spends in the special quarantine wards. Conditions in these wards are exceptionally hard. When the patient is later transferred to another part of the hospital prison, he finds things a bit "easier." I suspect that the explanation for this is that the hospital authorities want to eliminate any possibility of protest against the arbitrary methods of the orderlies and doctors.*

The orderlies are criminals who serve their sentences in this hospital prison. They beat up the patients on the slightest pretext, or even without any reason at all, simply because they feel like it.

Patients in the quarantine ward are given large doses of tranquilizers, but no effort is made to analyze possible contra-indications. The tranquilizers are administered without the correctives necessary to relieve the patients' physical suffering. This makes the patients writhe with pain. Their eyes roll and their tongues hang out.

I was sent to the prison together with several malingerers — criminals who thought they'd have a chance to rest in the hospital. But when they saw the beatings, the agonies of a full bladder (patients are let out to the toilet only according to a strict schedule) and the suffering caused by the tranquilizers and sulphur which are injected for punishment, they wished they could return to the camps and prisons from which they had come, and confessed to being malingerers.

*How is the mind of a normal person traumatized in this prison?*

It is extremely painful to observe the suffering of others, to see how patients are beaten and how they fight for a place by the peephole in the toilet and how they eat feces.

**THEN THERE IS FEAR OF PUNISHMENT, FEAR FOR ONE'S OWN FAMILY.** The KGB and the militia told my wife that she'd be thrown in prison herself for writing protests against my imprisonment. It was hinted that our children would be taken away from us, and my wife was urged to leave me because I was mentally disturbed.

Finally there is treatment with large doses of tranquillizers. The dosages are completely arbitrary. The drugs degrade patients intellectually, emotionally and morally. The process is reinforced by the fear that the degradation is irreversible.

*The incarceration of people for their convictions in psychiatric prisons has aroused indignation throughout the world. This is why Soviet authorities are particularly harsh with people who reveal the details.*

Vladimir Bukovsky collected and transmitted to the West the findings of Soviet psychiatrists in the cases of six who were confined to psychiatric prisons for their convictions. These findings were published in the West, including testimony to the United States Congress. For this Vladimir Bukovsky was convicted in 1972 to seven years in prison and camp and five years in exile.

The Kiev psychiatrist Semyon Gluzman criticized a psychiatric report from the Serbsky Institute on former Major-General Pyotr Grigorenko and was sentenced to seven years in strict-regime camps and three years in exile.

The Moscow biologist Sergei Kovalyov, a member of the Initiative Group was sentenced three months ago to seven years in strict-regime camps and three years in exile. He has been accused of compiling and transmitting to the West *The Chronicle of Current Events*, a samizdat bulletin, which reports violations of human rights in the USSR.

*People are persecuted not only for dissent, but even for moral support of families. At present, for example, Victor Dadutsky and Maya Kaganskaya are not being allowed to emigrate to Israel because they were concerned about my family. Maya is a talented writer. People like her could be the pride of any country. But in our country talented people are not valid if they are not conformists. Maya cannot be published, her husband has been fired from his job and they are living in poverty.*

Prisons and camps in the Soviet Union contain people of various nationalities who were sentenced for expressing unorthodox convictions.

The Ukrainian historian Valentyn Moroz was sentenced to many years in prison, camp and exile for discussing in essays which were published in samizdat and in the West a taboo subject — the suppression of Ukrainian national culture and the pillaging of Ukrainian historical relics.

Mikhail Shtern, a doctor from the Ukrainian town of Vynnytsia, was sentenced to eight years in camps simply because he did not object to his two grown sons' departure for Israel.

*I cannot list here the names of other brave and honest people, persecuted in the Soviet Union for expressing their views. I am unable to tell in detail about the conditions in the camps and prisons where these people are held. Let me simply note that these conditions are extremely difficult, and they are intended to crush the human personality, to force a man to renounce his views and to frighten the population of the country with possible repressions. The chief methods used to attain this goal are heavy labor and a diet lower in nutritive value than the UN minimum.*

In conclusion, I want to say that my presence here as a free man is the result of efforts by many people in the Soviet Union and in the West who publicly spoke up on my behalf. Regimes which persecute people for their views, regardless of their ideologies, are afraid more than anything of publicity and protests. Therefore, I call upon all honest people who cherish the rights of man to speak on behalf of prisoners of conscience throughout the world.

## II. LETTER OF REV. VASYL ROMANYUK TO POPE PAUL VI

The following letter, written in the summer of 1975 by Rev. Vasyl O. Romanyuk, imprisoned Ukrainian Orthodox priest in the USSR, to His Holiness Pope Paul VI, was released in January 1976, by SIS (Smoloskyp Information Service) in Baltimore, Md.

During the last few years the trampling of elementary human rights in the USSR has reached such an extent that even for the slightest manifestation of a dissenting viewpoint, a human being is incarcerated for many years in a concentration camp or a psychiatric hospital. In 1972 in Ukraine alone, repressions were carried out against approximately 800 people. Some were sentenced to long terms and are being held in the concentration camps of Mordovia and the Urals, others were fired from their jobs, expelled from academic institutes, evicted from living quarters. Among those so repressed are many women. Some of them received long terms of imprisonment, while the Soviet Femida (the mythical goddess of justice—ed. note) paid no heed to the fact that among them were some who are sick and some who are mothers with small children. The Soviet government talks a great deal about peace and friendship among peoples and in every way possible curses the "Chilean junta," while it cruelly suppresses all dissidents in its own house.

I consider it my duty to ask Your Holiness to consider the inhumane treatment of the repressed women. In the Mordovian concentration camp there are several scores of women repressed for their beliefs. Among them are several Ukrainian women known to me personally: the poetesses Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets and Iryna Senyk, physician-biologist Nina Strokata-Karavanska, artist Stefa Shabatura, school teacher-philologist Nadia Svitlychna, and Oksana Popovych. The sole guilt of these women was that they, like also all those repressed, did not think the way the "high and mighty" had wished.

I ask Your Holiness to demand from the Soviet government that it cease trampling upon human rights, that it free all those repressed, first of all the women, and grant permission to leave this horrible country to all who so desire. I must add that the named women, as a protest against the highhandedness and lawlessness to which they have been subjected, have refused to work during the International Women's Year, for which they are being threatened with new court action and starved for nearly half a year now in punitive cells and solitary confinement.

It has become known to me that some ranking members of the Catholic and Protestant churches have been awarded the so-called "Lenin Prizes for strengthening peace among peoples"; therefore, I would like to use this opportunity to remind them that if they believe in the good intentions of the Soviet government, let them try to persuade it to stop suppressing the elementary freedoms and religious convictions of the people, because only then will its grandiloquent words about peace and friendship among peoples have real meaning. If the Soviet government refuses to fulfill these demands, then it will become clear that it does not want peace, but is merely trying to deceive world public opinion. For without justice, any kind of peace is impossible and all Christian dignitaries who receive the aforementioned award should, in that case, refuse it.

A country, where any semblance of justice has been destroyed, where the longtime preaching of rabid atheism has brought up a man-brute, is incapable

of any kind of peace and cooperation with other nations. I, for example, wrote approximately 400 complaints and statements because of the highhandedness and lawlessness to which I have been subjected. I got nowhere. From everywhere came the inhuman and cold words: "You were sentenced correctly." And there are people who have written thousands of such complaints, but no one listened to them — there you have an example of progressive Soviet cannibalism.

The Soviet Union is the fiercest enemy of Christianity (especially Catholicism), of national and religious rites and traditions. The KGB investigator told me during my inquest that "the Church in the USSR should be curtailing rather than expanding its activities, and therefore those church workers who try to force their convictions upon the believers are undesirable for us and we will fight against them." For three years now, I have been writing to all the jurisdictions for permission to obtain a Bible. Their answer to me is always that I shall not receive it, that "we shall not allow you to engage in religious propaganda here." This is how freedom of conscience really looks in the USSR.

Your Holiness! In this brief plea, I do not have a chance to list all the facts relating to the trampling of human rights in the USSR. Anyway, there is really no need to do so, for in the West there are many documents that testify to the terrible crimes against peace and humanity perpetrated by this government during a time of peace. Therefore, I and my colleagues hope that the Most Holy See will help form some kind of an international committee to examine the facts relating to the trampling of human rights in the USSR. We also ask that representatives of the international community be allowed to visit us, so that they could become convinced of what is happening here. I should remind Your Holiness that not only concentration camps and psychiatric hospitals are being used against dissidents — there have also been cases of simple physical destruction. In 1970 the painter Alla Horska was killed in Kiev; that same year a priest of the Orthodox faith was killed in the Lviv Region, while Volodymyr Osadchy, brother of the presently repressed Ukrainian writer Mykhajlo Osadchy, was recently killed in Sumy. This list can be continued for quite some length. Even before my arrest, I myself was threatened with physical punishment and with a psychiatric hospital. The chief warden of Vladimir Prison told me the following bit of "wisdom": "I tell you that all of you anti-Soviets should be simply locked up in psychiatric hospitals, because you are not normal people. You see what power we wield, the tanks and rockets we have, that Nixon himself comes to us, that in any case America will soon be on her knees before us, and yet you dare to criticize the Soviet authorities. Normal people, obviously, would have no part of something like that."

Your Holiness! It is with great hope that we turn to your Shrine, to all of Christendom in this Holy Year, and to all people of good will, so that they would raise their voice of protest against all that has been mentioned in this appeal. And as for myself, as a sign of protest against the cruelty and inhumanity being inflicted on dissidents, and against the prohibition of my having a Bible, I proclaim a hunger strike starting the first of August 1975.

Most humble servant of Your Holiness,  
*Vasyl Romanyuk, priest.*

**III. STATEMENT****OF UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA ON  
THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRAGIC DEATH  
OF SIMON PETLURA**

Fifty years have elapsed since the tragic death of the Supreme Commander and Head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, Simon Petlura, which occurred on May 25, 1926 in Paris.

During the last half century, two new generations of Ukrainian people were born and reared in Ukraine. Ukraine had undergone the Golgotha of World War II. In the aftermath of the war hundreds of thousands of emigres left Ukraine and were dispersed throughout the whole free world—telling the truth about Ukraine and its enslavement. In Ukraine itself a continuous struggle is going on against the enforced Russification which threatens the very existence of the Ukrainian people.

Nevertheless, the image of Simon Petlura is still before our eyes—the image of one of the greatest figures of our modern history. The fateful date of May 25, 1926 shall always be regarded as a day of national tragedy. In commemorating this date we should realize fully who Simon Petlura was for the Ukrainian people, and recognize his role in the Ukrainian aspirations for statehood; we ought to realize this not only out of reverence for the martyred leader, but also because this awareness becomes a guidepost in our further struggle for the attainment of the national ideals of the Ukrainian people.

While in exile, Simon Petlura wrote: "We firmly believe in the Ukrainian statehood. For us, it is a living reality, because we are carrying its ideals in our hearts, and because its spirit and importance permeate our very lives..."

Therefore, the enemy was only quieted when the hands of Schwartzbard insidiously terminated the life of the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian National Republic and the head of the Ukrainian Government.

Simon Petlura, as a man and statesman in the modern history of the Ukrainian people, has become a symbol of the struggle for freedom and independence, for a Ukraine free of Bolshevik occupation.

Therefore, we call on all our component parts—the Ukrainian central organizations and societies and their branches—to commemorate reverently this year the memory of the tragically fallen Supreme Commander. We all live in the shadow of his personality! Let his memory remain with us and future generations in Ukraine and outside it forever.

Let these words of Simon Petlura become a testament for all of us who are fighting for an Independent Ukraine:

"The blood shed for this great ideal is not drying out. Its warmth will remain forever in the soul of our nation and will play the role of restive and durable ferment which reminds us of the unfinished task and calls on us to bring it to its successful conclusion."

**UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA**

## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"MOSCOW'S 25TH CONGRESS," an editorial. *The New York Times*, New York, February 23, 1976.

Though this editorial didn't expect any surprises at the recent 25th Congress of the CPSU, it wisely hedged by citing some events at the 19th, 20th and 22nd Congresses. Notable, of course, was Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th in 1956. As it turned out, the 25th was standard and stereotyped by and large. But what is impressive about this editorial is its emphasis on the non-Russian nations in the USSR.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that behind the apparent calm, order and stability of the USSR lurk the real, explosive forces of non-Russian nationalism. As the editor rightly points out, "Millions of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Jews, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaïdzhanis, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and other non-Russians wonder why they remain subjugated in an era when colonialism has been destroyed almost everywhere else." In a real sense, the main target for preserving peace and at the same time expanding freedom is focussed here. The question is, "What do we do about it?" Specific answers have been and will continue to be given to this fundamental question, but under the Kissinger brand of detente both a lack of understanding and courage have left them in temporary abeyance.

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"CASTRO DISCOUNTS ROLE IN REVOLUTIONS," a report. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D. C., February 26, 1976.

Regarding the 25th CPSU Congress, this report covers in part the address of Castro to the Moscow meeting. Cynically, the Cuban premier discounts his role in precipitating revolutions while some 12,000 Cubans are engaged as Kremlin proxies in overtaking Angola. Actually more important than the Castro speech was that of Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Scherbitsky.

Scherbitsky upheld the main Brezhnev line that there must be no deviation from Soviet Russian communism. In this connection he concentrated on the dangerous trend of nationalism which he said it was the "sacred duty" of communists to combat. As the report points out, "This is a live issue in the Ukraine, but Scherbitsky also was obviously referring to foreign Communist parties such as the French and British, which have criticized Moscow for alleged human rights violations and have gone their own way on matters of policy." The danger to the West of coalition governments with communists is profound. Should these communist parties succeed, there will be numerous tests of their sincerity concerning political pluralism, even including its application in principle to the non-Russians in the USSR.

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"'SOUND TORTURE' BEING USED BY KGB AGAINST UKRAINIAN DISSIDENT MOROZ," a report. *The Rising Tide*, Washington, D. C., February 16, 1976.

The tragic case of Valentyn Moroz, the Ukrainian dissident, continues with one ordeal after another. This extensive report indicates that the valiant historian is being subjected to additional KGB torture. His solitary cell has been wired by the KGB and is exposed on a twenty-four hour basis to a blaring noise.

At the time of this report, indications were already present that Moroz would be transferred to one of the KGB's psychiatric hospitals for treatment similar to that meted out to Plyushch. The report also covers repressions and persecutions of Ukrainian intellectuals in Odessa "because of pro-Ukrainian sentiment." As an example, another Valentyn Moroz, a poet and no relation to the historian has been dismissed from work in an Odessa radio station for writing anti-Soviet poems. This new wave of harassment plainly shows that Ukrainian nationalism is an ongoing and basic movement which Moscow has been unable to cope with.

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"A RUSSIAN NOTEBOOK," an article by Robert G. Kaiser. *Esquire*, New York, January, 1976.

The writer was a correspondent for *The Washington Post* and recently returned from his post in Moscow. He has also written a book on his experiences in the USSR. This article suggests by its many points of confusion that a period of reflection on these experiences is in order. Though the content and specific data are doubtlessly interesting, the writer's conceptual understanding remains somewhat amiss.

As one example, to refer to the anthem of the USSR as "national" in itself shows a misconception of the real empire and multi-national character of the USSR. No doubt the author is aware of the non-Russian peoples dwelling in the USSR, and in contradiction of his other terms refers to them as "local nationalities." Some of his philosophical observations are worth reading. He observes, "It must be remembered also that the Russian nation transmits from generation to generation an abiding fear of invasion and anarchy, a fear based on sound historical precedent." From the context of his presentation one cannot decipher whether this includes "the local nationalities," whose lands have been the constant object of Russian imperialist invasion and conquest.

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"UKRAINIANS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM," a statement by the Honorable Marvin L. Esch. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., October 30, 1975.

In contrast to the above, the well-worded statement by a Representative of Michigan displays a deeper grasp of understanding the plight of the Ukrainian nation. He declares, "There are few areas of the world where liberty has been more consistently denied than in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian people have been the subject of atrocities for almost a thousand years." Quoting George Bernard Shaw, the Congressman stresses, "liberty means responsibility." And he points out that enjoying liberty, we Americans have the responsibility "to use

our rights and our liberty to help those people around the world who are fighting for their own liberty."

The impressive statement commends Ukrainian women in the fight for freedom. Odarka Husiak, who was a courier in the Ukrainian underground, receives special mention. She still lingers after her arrest in the 40's in Moscow's concentration camp system. The Representative urges each of his colleagues "to write to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin urging amnesty for the multitude of oppressed Ukrainians who are now being held by the Soviets as political prisoners."

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"TO THE PEOPLES, PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENTS," a declaration.  
*Ukraine, Kiev, Ukr. SSR, 1975.*

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II, this illustrated quarterly published in Kiev devotes almost the entire summer issue to the event. Many of the illustrations are colorful, but this declaration by Moscow's organs leaves much to be desired. Against the realities 30 years ago and those in the Soviet Union today, the declaration recks with propaganda fever. The usual drivel is encountered about the ever peace-loving USSR, but forgotten is the Stalin-Nazi pact which ignited the destructive war.

It is amazing how unabashedly words such as equality, freedom, peace and colonial rule are lavishly used. "A lasting peace, freedom of the peoples is the most worthy monument to those who perished during the war" is Moscow's appeal. For the worst empire the world has ever known, this and similar declarations from Moscow plainly show how amateurish Goebbels was in the profession of distortion and disinformation. Also, reading the sections on Moscow's strivings for disarmament, one would hardly know that it maintains the largest military establishment in the world. The reiteration of "peaceful coexistence" in almost all major sections of the declaration conveys the clue to Moscow's plans for world dominion.

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"SOVIET 'TREATMENT,'" a commentary. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Massachusetts, February 5, 1976.

This commentary deals with the case of Leonid Plyushch, the Ukrainian mathematician and dissident who was released by Moscow. Plyushch's descriptions of torture in Moscow's psychiatric hospitals and camps are summarized here. Much of it was emphasized by the dissident in a press conference upon his arrival in Paris.

According to the commentator, two points must be remembered. One, the "Soviet Union still brutally punishes citizens for political reasons, despite the long years since Stalinism and the still fresh memory of the Helsinki agreements to respect freedom of thought and conscience." How painfully true! The other well-made point: "World opinion nevertheless can have an impact on Soviet decisions and alleviate suffering in individual instances." Amnesty International holds that at least 10,000 political and religious prisoners are being mistreated in the USSR—an object case for world opinion.

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"MARRIED MAN IS SUSPENDED AS A PRIEST," a report. *Religious News Service*, Vatican City, April 22, 1976.

Another point of friction between Cardinal Joseph Slipyj, Major Archbishop of the Ukrainian Rite Catholic Church, and the Vatican is brought out in this report. The Cardinal evidently ordained a married man and father of three children to the priesthood. This took place somewhere near Rome, and the priest involved is Rev. Zenon Chruszcz, a Venezuelan citizen of Ukrainian origin. The Vatican, which did not approve the action, has suspended the priest and has commenced an investigation of the matter.

Married clergy is common in the Ukrainian Catholic tradition. What is at issue here is a jurisdictional problem. The Vatican holds that this is not allowed in countries where Latin Rite Catholic bishops have primary jurisdiction. Three similar cases have occurred in Canada, where Ukrainian Catholic Church leaders contend that the suspensions are invalid according to Eastern Catholic canon law. As the lengthy report implies, associated with these problems is the Vatican's refusal to recognize the cardinal as the Ukrainian patriarch, "Josyf I, primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," because of the non-existence of a territorial base for such a patriarchate. This, too, is a continuing source of conflict.

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"UKRAINE'S DAY," an editorial. *The Chronicle*, Willimantic, Connecticut, January 26, 1976.

A full length account is given in this editorial of the observance of the 58th Anniversary of Ukraine's independence. The account relates in a concise manner the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918 and carries the story of Ukrainian captivity as a nation down to the very present. As it points out in the sequence of events, Moscow "had created a Communist puppet government in Ukraine, to be known as the 'Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,' which in 1922 was forced into the 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),' as an 'equal and sovereign state.'"

The editor is to be complimented for this highly accurate portrayal. Some of our large city newspapers could learn from this competent editorialization. Fittingly, the editorial features a one-sentence paragraph in this vein: "Both Moroz and Plyushch have become symbols of resistance to tyranny."

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"SHEVCHENKO SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY," part of program. *Eastern Economic Association*, Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania, April 15, 1976.

Featured in this scholarly program is the Shevchenko Scientific Society. The program consists of other participating organizations, such as the Association for Social Economics and that for Cultural Economics. The chief contribution of the Shevchenko Society is its coverage of "The Economy of Ukraine in the 1970's."

The chairperson of the seminar on Ukraine's economy is Dr. Nicholas G. Bohatiuk of Le Moyne College in Syracuse, New York. Several informative papers carry the titles "Capital Formation in Ukraine after World War II," given by Dr. Z. Lev Melnyk of the University of Cincinnati, "Agricultural Development

in Ukraine," prepared by Mr. Val Zabijaka of the U.S. Department of Commerce, and "Organizational Forms and Performance: The Ukrainian Industry," offered by Dr. S. A. Billon of the University of Delaware. That there is a grave need for such knowledge in our country and its academic institutions goes without saying. These constitute a veritable contribution.

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"WHEN LOWLY EGG BECOMES SYMBOL OF MANKIND'S FUTURE," a feature article by Marilynn Marter. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 7, 1976.

A most informative and detailed article appears here on the symbol and preparation of the traditional Ukrainian *pysanky*. The article is introduced by colorful illustrations of Mrs. Maria Mazur painting an egg design and displays of richly tintured eggs. The writer credits Mrs. Mazur as "possibly the most skilled practitioner of the ancient art of *pysanka*." She goes further in her cultural analysis to state that the "Ukrainian American Maria Mazur makes a significant contribution to world destiny."

The whole process of the art is carefully itemized in the article. Any reader wishing to indulge in it can follow the prescribed steps. The beautiful works of Mrs. Mazur have been exhibited at the Philadelphia Museum of Art and also the Philadelphia Folk Fair.

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"SOME RUSSIANS FAVOR CANADA," an article by Roman Rakhmanny. *The Citizen*, Ottawa, Canada, December 26, 1975.

Author of numerous penetrating articles on Canada and the Soviet Union, this writer provides another one in this opinion analysis section. The main point of the presentation is the desire of most refugees from the USSR to emigrate to Canada, despite its taxes, inflation and strikes. This is an arguable thesis, but the writer assembles his data, covering mostly Ukrainian expressions, and quotes at length the writings of Vyacheslav Chornovil and others to support his point.

In a letter to the Soviet Supreme Council, Chornovil has stated, "I have already appealed to the Canadian government to grant me Canadian citizenship and to take steps towards my release and my departure from the U.S.S.R." The case of another prisoner, Danylo L. Shumuk, is also cited. From a reading of the representative cases it is apparent that the title of the article, no doubt furnished by the editor, is incongruous with the contents of largely Ukrainian subjects.

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"PEOPLE," a commentary. *Perspective*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, March 1976.

This organ of the Philadelphia school system carries a commendative write-up on the election of Dr. Richard D. Hanusey. Dr. Hanusey is of Ukrainian origin. He's been a Superintendent of Schools in District 5. Recently, he was elected president of the Mental Health Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania.

The commentary covers Dr. Hanusey's long and distinguished career in the school systems and associations of Pennsylvania. Among his numerous accomplishments is his chairmanship of the Urban-Suburban Secondary Schools Committee and the Bi-Lingual Education Program of the Philadelphia School District. Ukrainian Americans take pride in his achievements.

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"LAWYER MEETS MODERN 'SAINT' IN SOVIET RUSSIA," an article by George Destefano. *Fairpress*, Westport, Connecticut, October 29, 1975.

A prominent lawyer in the Connecticut area gives his impressions of Sakharov, the Russian scientist and dissident. These impressions are clearly incisive and penetrating. The Westport attorney, Leo Nevas, who is a delegate to the World Federation of United Nations Associations Biennial Conferences, met and talked with Andrei Sakharov in his Moscow apartment and says, there exists "a world of difference between Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. The physicist is basically a socialist who desires the democratization of the U.S.S.R., while the author of *The Gulag Archipelago* is a rightist who entertains quasi-mystical visions of a theocratic Russia."

The lawyer also points out in this interview Sakharov's feelings toward Western intellectuals. He admires them, but also holds them as being "naive." They "don't understand how difficult it is to move the Soviet system off its present base," Sakharov is quoted as saying. He also contends that humanitarian appeals for Russian and non-Russian prisoners in the USSR is not enough. Hard bargaining, or in other words the poltrade position, is stressed. The Westportian conveyed the right impressions in toto.

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"I FEAR FOR MY LIFE, UKRAINE PRIEST SAYS," a report by Richard Dowden. *Catholic Herald*, Boston, Massachusetts, April 23, 1976.

This report dwells on a Ukrainian Catholic Rite priest in Britain who has been threatened by his parishioners. Both the name of the priest and the location of the parish have been withheld to prevent any reprisals. The source of the conflict, as reported, is "between those Ukrainians who acknowledge Cardinal Sliptyj as Patriarch and those who side with Bishop Hornyak, leader of the Ukrainian Rite Church in Britain."

According to the reporter, Bishop Hornyak subscribes to an agreement consummated at the Second Vatican Council. It specifies that "only the Pope or a Council has the power to create a Patriarch." The report ends by stating that Cardinal Sliptyj "had a statue of himself erected on the facade of the Ukrainian Church in Rome. At the base of the statue is inscribed, 'Josef I. . . , P.' "The P stands for Patriarch."

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"THE PRISONERS WHOM ONE TENDS TO FORGET," an article by Roman Rakhmanny. *Le Devoir*, Montreal, Canada, August 5, 1975.

Appearing in French, this article by the prolific Ukrainian Canadian author concentrates on underprivileged women in today's world, namely those in

the Soviet Union who are imprisoned for political freethinking. At the outset, he cites the imprisonment of Oksana Popovych, a Ukrainian dissident, who received a long prison sentence during the International Women's Year. This case was brought to the attention of Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the U.N. Secretary-General.

Dr. Waldheim has stated, "Yes, we are familiar with this case as well as with other similar cases both in the Soviet Union and other countries where women are imprisoned for their views, beliefs and self-expression..." Waldheim in reply to delegates at the IWY meeting in Mexico also stressed that the U.N. Committee for the Defense of Human Rights studies all such cases in depth and seeks to correct the situation "by diplomatic means rather than public protests." How effective this is concerns the concerned.

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"NAVY GRADUATES HEAR RUMSFELD," a report. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D. C., June 3, 1976.

For some time efforts have been made to inject accurate conceptions of the USSR in all parts of our national leadership. When a high-ranking member of the Administration or any official in our government equates the USSR with Russia or thinks the Soviet Union is a nation, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America is quick to criticize, and with beneficial effect. In this report of the address by our Secretary of Defense to Naval Academy graduates an example arises.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared with partial accuracy that "the greatest threat to freedom in the years ahead will almost certainly come from the Soviet Union..." We beg to differ; the threat is an ongoing one and the greatest of any now. But, then he speaks of the USSR as "a nation which possesses substantial military power and has shown an inclination to use that power to the detriment of the freedom of others." This conception of the USSR as a "nation" is pretty inexcusable at this late stage of our development in relations with the Soviet Russian empire. With such notions, we will be hard put to meet "the greatest threat."

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"AN EGGSHELL FOR ALL SEASONS," an article by Sybil Harp. *The New York Times*, New York, December 14, 1975.

"The humble eggshell" begins this lengthy article, "which in most homes ends up in the garbage can, is the basic working material of a devoted and enthusiastic group of crafts people." With this, the writer then elaborates on all the various uses of the eggshell: Christmas decorations, Easter and, of course, the perennial use of the richly designed Ukrainian egg.

As the writer plainly states, "It is the Ukrainian eggs, however, which are usually identified with the technique at its best and they are unsurpassed in the beauty and intricacy of their traditional symbolic motifs." The reader is given data on where to acquire the art and its techniques after this superlative praise by an artist herself.

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"HOW WILL KISSINGER LOOK IN FUTURE HISTORY BOOKS?", an article by Patrick J. Buchanan. *Sunday News*, New York, May 23, 1976.

A former speech writer for ex-President Nixon and now a columnist, the writer furnishes a reflective account of the Secretary of State. He believes that Kissinger's place in history is a shaky one. It would have been a more secure one had H. K. not intrigued for and won the position as Secretary of State.

Many points in this analysis are subject to argument. For example, about HK being the miracle worker in Nixon's first term. Contrary to the writer's position, HK didn't open the door to Red China; Peking itself did, as early as the summer of '68. Or, on detente with the USSR, Moscow has been pushing this since Khrushchev announced Lenin's "peaceful coexistence" in 1955. HK merely fell in with it, and with damaging results in many areas.

One paragraph deserves careful attention. Buchanan writes, "More than any single man, Kissinger has drained the U.S. foreign policy of its sense of mission, of righteousness, of high purpose. To Henry Kissinger, captive nations resolutions were unnecessary irritants to cordial discussions with Soviet leaders; hence they were to be discarded. To his countrymen, however, they were once symbols and expressions of conviction that the military imposition of an alien ideology upon the once-free people of Eastern Europe would never be embraced as legitimate by the United States." How true in parts! Regardless of K, Captive Nations Week still remains as a shining symbol. Also, in all of this, where have our two Presidents been who are supposed to determine foreign policy?

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"SOUTHPORT'S UKRAINIAN CLUB SEEKS 'NEW BLOOD,'" an article by George Destefano. *Fairpress*, Westport, Connecticut, November 5, 1975.

Interest in the USSR and in matters Ukrainian continues unabated in the area of southern Connecticut. This interesting piece dwells on a Ukrainian American club run by "old-timers" who emigrated here at the turn of the century. The club is a large two-story building bordering on the Connecticut turnpike and has been in existence for 45 years. The Gudzik family has been the mainstay of the club.

Ukrainian as such, according to Adolf Lango, the treasurer, "is rarely spoken in the club except by the old people and then just the outbursts are in Ukrainian." The first woman president of the club is Lango's wife, of French-German ancestry. The rule is that a Ukrainian's spouse is automatically entitled to membership. The club is now drawing on new blood, young people who are taking an interest in their heritage.

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"105TH ANNIVERSARY OF VLADIMIR LENIN'S BIRTH," a commentary. *Ukraine*, Kiev, 1975.

This issue of the illustrated quarterly hails the words of the Russian chauvinist, Lenin: "given united action by the Great-Russian and Ukrainian proletarians a free Ukraine is possible; without such a unity it is out of the question." The myths of "proletarians" and "unity," not to speak of so-called "Great" Russians led to the armed conquest of Ukraine and its captivity to this very day.

L.E.D.

## **CHRONICLE OF CURRENTS EVENTS**

### **I. UKRAINIAN LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES**

**UCCA President Assails the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine."**—On April 5, 1976 Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, sent a letter to President Ford denouncing Helmut Sonnenfeldt's thesis, which called for the establishment of "organic relations" between the USSR and Eastern Europe, and called on the U.S. government to officially repudiate this thesis.

"The disclosures, both unofficial and 'official' of the Sonnenfeldt thesis on desirable organic relationships between the Soviet Union and its satellites are thoroughly outrageous for your Administration which is on record to uphold and advance the principles of national independence and freedom not only for the few captive nations in Central Europe but also for the many more within the Soviet Union and beyond," wrote Dr. Dobriansky.

Referring to Sonnenfeldt's remarks as "insular and callous," Dr. Dobriansky said that his implications of permanent captivity of nations in the USSR "contradict your own statement on the eve of the Helsinki conference last year."

"This incredible episode is further evidence of the deteriorating character of our foreign policy which is predicated on the false notion that the USSR is a nation-state rather than an empire in itself," he added. He further stated that "peace will not be maintained by false notions of the nature of the USSR, successive appeasement and compromise, and secrecy and deceit."

In addition to being President of the UCCA, Dr. Dobriansky also is chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, on behalf of which he sent his letter to President Ford.

**UCCA Presidium Holds Meeting, Discusses Current Problems.**—On April 9, the UCCA Executive Board Presidium held its monthly meeting in New York City, at which a number of current issues pertaining to the operations of the UCCA were reviewed and discussed. Included in the agenda were an assessment of the Plyushchea' visit to the United States, the Sonnenfeldt "thesis" relevant to the relationship between the USSR and Eastern Europe, the forthcoming XIIth Congress of the UCCA, the observances of the American Bicentennial and the Centennial of the Ukrainian Immigration in America, the 1976 "Captive Nations Week," and so forth.

Presenting reports were Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, Joseph Lesawyer, Ivan Bazarko, Ignatius M. Billinsky, Dr. Bohdan Hnatiuk, Prof. Peter Stercho, and others—all members of the UCCA Executive Board.

**Mark Anniversary of Destruction of Ukrainian Catholic Church by Communist Russia.**—The hierarchy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the U.S., in a special letter dated April 11, 1976, called on the clergy and the faithful to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the wanton destruc-

tion of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine by the Soviet government. It designated a "Day of Prayer" on April 25, 1976 for all those who suffered in the past and continue to suffer today for "the Holy Catholic Faith."

The letter read, in part:

"In commemorating the 30th anniversary of the martyrdom of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Galicia and in Carpatho-Ukraine, we, the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchs in the United States, set April 25 as a Day of Prayer for our martyrs, for those who were tortured to death but not defeated because they did not abandon their Holy Catholic Faith; for those who today are suffering in prisons and concentration camps."

The letter was signed by Archbishop-Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn of Philadelphia, Bishop Joseph Schmondiuk of the Stamford Eparchy, Bishop Jaroslav Gabro of the St. Nicholas Eparchy of Chicago, and Bishop Basil H. Losten, Auxiliary Bishop and Vice General of the Philadelphia Archeparchy.

**Ukrainian Scholars Attend Linguistic Conference.**—Four Ukrainian scholars took an active part in the annual northeast conference on teaching of foreign languages, held on March 25-27, 1976 at the New York Hilton Hotel in New York. The theme of the session, attended by several thousand teachers and university professors, was "Language and Culture: Heritage and Horizons."

A workshop dealing with Slavic Ethnicity Studies at the American universities was organized and conducted by Prof. Myroslava Znayenko of Rutgers University in Newark. Panel members included Prof. Peter Goy, City College of New York; Prof. Olha della Cava, Center for Immigration Studies; Prof. Larissa Onyshkevych, Rutgers University in New Brunswick; Prof. Thaddeus Gromada, Jersey City State College; and Prof. Frank Mocha, New York University and the Polish Institute of America.

All speakers stressed the meaningful and beneficial cooperation of Slavic ethnic communities in this country in terms of support of the respective Slavic courses.

**Ukrainian Film Director Wins Award.**—Slavko Nowytski, Ukrainian American director-producer of "Pysanka: The Ukrainian Easter Egg," has won the "Golden Eagle" award from the Council on International Non-Theatrical Events (CINE) in Washington, D.C.

A jury of specialists made the recommendation for the award to the board of directors of CINE. As the national final screening committee, they select the motion pictures that will represent the United States in international competition abroad.

"Pysanka: The Ukrainian Easter Egg," which was released early this year, has also passed the pre-screening committee of the American Film Festival and will compete for the "Blue Ribbon" award. Mr. Nowytski, who resides in Minneapolis, Minn., already has a "Blue Ribbon" award for his film, "Sheep in Wood" (1971).

The film begins with the mythology of ancient sun worshippers as it applies to the egg. It then follows the step-by-step creation of a design on a plain egg. A montage of designs that have made the "pysanka" world-famous climaxes the film. The art of the "pysanka" in the film is demonstrated by Luba Perchyshyn.

The Minnesota Museum of Art, one of the first purchasers of the film, presented it as one of the highlights during opening ceremonies of the "Ukrainian Heritage" exhibition on April 10, 1976.

The film will represent the United States at the Festival of Films of Art in Asolo, Italy.

The film is available for purchase by public libraries, schools and organizations from Filmart Productions, 3926 Macalaster Drive, Minneapolis, Minn. 55421.

**UCCA Board of Directors Meets in New York.**—On Saturday, May 1, 1976 the UCCA Board of Directors held its plenary session at the Ukrainian Institute of America, attended by 82 members. The main points on the agenda included the format and program of the forthcoming XIIth UCCA Congress, observances of the Bicentennial and Centennial, the UCCA budget, and continued defense of the enslaved Ukrainian people.

The meeting was opened and conducted by Joseph Lesawyer, UCCA Executive Director, while UCCA Secretary Ignatius M. Billinsky read the minutes of the last session of the Board of Directors.

UCCA Executive Director Ivan Bazarko reported on several personnel changes in the composition in the UCCA executive organs. In turn, Ivan Wynnyk, head of the UCCA Auditing Board, presented a detailed report on the finances of the UCCA on the basis of two audits, stressing not only the systematic, but gradually increasing collections of the UCCA. Mrs. Ulana Diachuk, UCCA treasurer, presented a preliminary budget for 1976, encompassing such expenses as administration and office equipment, the Washington office, publication of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and various other publications, books and brochures; the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, the UCCA Educational Council, and expenses connected with Bicentennial observances, travels and donations to various relief and charitable causes.

Mr. Bazarko reported on the format of the XIIth Congress, which will include plenary sessions and working committees. He also enumerated a number of special committees which will be elected at the Congress, with the exception of the nominating and by-laws committees which are elected by the Board of Directors. On his suggestion, the Board of Directors approved two principal addresses at the Congress: one, "America and Ourselves," by Dr. Myron B. Kuropas, Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs, and the other, "Ukraine and Ourselves," by Bohdan Fedorak, chairman of the UCCA Branch in Detroit-East.

Prof. Peter Stercho reported on the work of the by-laws committee, which was followed by extensive discussion. The Board approved the composition of the by-laws committee, elected by the same Board of Directors on February 10, 1973.

Mr. Lesawyer read a brief report of UCCA President Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, who was currently attending the WACL Conference in Seoul, Korea. His report touched on such matters as the establishment of the American Consulate in Kiev; a new resolution in Congress on the American Bicentennial and Soviet Russian domination of the captive nations; the forthcoming observance of "Captive Nations Week" in July with the active support of the AFL-CIO and the UCCA protest against the "Sonnenfeldt doctrine."

Mr. Lesawyer also reported on the Bicentennial observances, coordinated by the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of America. Other reports were given by Prof. Ivan Wcwchuk, head of the UCCA Policy Board, Dr. Anthony Zukowsky, head of Committee for the Study of Ukrainian Life in America, and Dr. Walter Dushnyck, who presented a progress report on the book, *The Ukrainian Heritage in America*.

**Thousands Visit Ukrainian Festival in New York.**—Over 15,000 visitors were treated to a sparkling show of continuous Ukrainian music, dance, songs, fashions and bandura art during the 3-day Ukrainian Street Fair (*yarmarok*), held May 14-16, 1976 on East 7th Street, between 2nd and 3rd Avenues in New York City, in tribute to the Bicentennial of the American Revolution and the Centennial of the Ukrainian Settlement in America.

East 7th Street, known as "Little Ukraine," was sealed off by police and decorated with American and Ukrainian flags, banners, trident signs, and with extra lighting at night. Ukrainian food and crafts were available at booths and tables, as were demonstrations of ceramics, enamel art, wood-carving, Ukrainian Easter egg painting, cooking and glasspainting. All were stellar attractions.

The Ukrainian Festival was opened by Dr. John O. Flis, chairman of the N.Y. Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee, followed by invocations by Rev. Dr. Volodymyr Gawlich and Very Rev. Volodymyr Bazylewsky, pastors of the St. George's Ukrainian Catholic Church and St. Volodymyr Ukrainian Orthodox Church, respectively, and the singing of the American and Ukrainian national anthems by Martha Kokolska-Musiychuk, N.Y. City Opera.

Among honored guests and dignitaries at the Festival were Bishop Joseph M. Schmondiuk of the Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy of Stamford, and his Vicar General Msgr. Emil Manastersky; former U.S. Ambassador John Davis Lodge, Congressmen Mario Biaggi and Edward I. Koch, who all spoke at the program, and a number of N.Y. City Hall officials and representatives of ethnic organizations. Addressing the audience were also Joseph Lesawyer, President of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of America; Dr. Anicetas Simutis, Consul General of Lithuania, Dr. Volodymyr Sawchak, chairman of the United Ukrainian American Organizations, UCCA Branch in New York City, and Guy Wiggins, former member of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. Serving as masters of ceremonies on each day of the fair were Mrs. Mary Dushnyck (on opening day), Mrs. Laryssa Kukrycka-Lysniak, and Volodymyr Starosolsky. Participating in the program were some fifteen different choral, dance and bandura ensembles from the metropolitan area of New York, under the overall musical direction of Prof. Ihor Sonevytsky.

**"Ukrainian Heritage Day" in Boston.**—"Ukrainian Heritage Day" in Boston, Mass., held on April 9, 1976, will long be remembered not only by the Ukrainian community, but by non-Ukrainians as well who visited the Ukrainian exhibit that day. For the first time in the history of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Ukrainian national flag flew over the golden dome of the State House. The highlight of the day's activities was the attendance at the midday program of Michael Dukakis, Governor of Massachusetts, the Lieutenant-Governor and members of the State Legislature and other prominent citizens.

The program was opened by Orest Szczudluk, chairman of the Massachusetts Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee, with the master of ceremonies Christine Sahan-Zommers. The principal address was delivered by assistant district attorney and UNA advisor Dr. Anna Chopek, while the opening prayer was recited by the Very Rev. Rev. Myron Pacholok, pastor of St. Andrew's Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the closing prayer was delivered by the Very Rev. Dean Peter Ohirko, pastor of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of Christ the King.

Participating in the concert program were a young SUMA dance group, a teenage SUMA dance group, the SUMA mandolin orchestra and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church choir. The feature of the Ukrainian exhibit was a Ukrainian Easter egg table, set with all the traditional Easter foods. Other tables displayed Ukrainian embroideries, costumes, dolls, ceramics, woodcarvings, banduras, Ukrainian currency, and stamps, and so forth. A panel and table was set for the display by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, which included rare books. There were panels showing the map of Ukraine, paintings by famous Ukrainian artists, an exhibit of enameling on copper, woven wall coverings, and a display of newspapers of the Ukrainian fraternal associations and other publications on Ukraine in the English language. Other panels had pictures of famous movie stars and athletes of Ukrainian descent.

**Flood Introduces Resolution on Bicentennial Theme.**—Congressman Daniel J. Flood (D., Pa.) introduced on April 12, 1976 the House Concurrent Resolution 613, calling on President Ford to designate "Lasting Independence From Empire (LIFE)," as a Bicentennial theme. The idea for the special Bicentennial LIFE resolution originated with Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President who, in a letter on U.S. legislators on Ukrainian independence suggested the theme. The resolution points out the difference between the American Revolution and other revolutions, and cited the U.S. as a symbol of freedom for the captive nations. It said that "the historic uniqueness and experiment called the United States of America—constituted by ethnic, racial and religious strains from every quarter of the globe—still stands as the formidable politico-moral force and symbol of national independence and freedom for over a billion in the captive nations and millions in nation-building states about the world."

As co-sponsors of the resolution the following Congressmen affixed their signature to the document: Clarence D. Long (D.-Md.), Walter B. Jones (D.-N.C.), Romano L. Mazzoli (D.-Ky.), Leonor K. Sullivan (D.-Mo), Gus Yatron (D.-Pa.), John Dent (D.-Pa.), Tim Lee Carter (R.-Ky.), and Robert N.C. Nix (D.-Pa.). The resolution was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

**UCCA Appeals to President Ford In Defense of Moroz.**—In pursuing its systematic actions in defense of Ukrainian political prisoners in Ukraine and the USSR, the UCCA Executive Board on June 3, 1976 dispatched another telegram to President Ford, urging him to intervene on behalf of Valentyn Moroz, Ukrainian historian, now languishing in a Soviet prison.

The telegram read:

On May, 18, 1976 a Reuters dispatch from Moscow reported that Valentyn Moroz, the Ukrainian historian who has been in Soviet jails

since 1970, and who had already served four years in 1965-68 for his political convictions—had been transferred from the notorious dungeon in Vladimir Prison to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow, known to be used by the Soviet government for drug experimentation on political prisoners-dissidents.

The fate of Valentyn Moroz is well known to you, and you personally intervened on his behalf during your meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok in December 1974. You also acknowledged this problem during your press conference, held for the ethnic organizations on April 2, 1976 in Milwaukee, Wisc.

In this critical moment of Mr. Moroz's life, the Executive Board of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America appeals to you to intervene with the Soviet government for the immediate release of Mr. Moroz from the Serbsky Institute and grant him clemency so that he may join his family and salvage his shattered life. Hundreds of thousands of Americans of Ukrainian origin would be eternally grateful to you for this act of humanism and good will on your part. Thank you.

On June 16, 1976, the UCCA Executive Board received a letter from the White House, signed by Roland L. Elliott, Director of Correspondence, which read:

On behalf of President Ford, I want to thank you for the Executive Board's telegram of June 5 regarding Valentyn Moroz.

Following the President's meeting with ethnic organizations in Milwaukee, the concern of the United States Government and the American people regarding the present situation of Mr. Moroz was again brought to the attention of the Soviet Government which, as you are aware, views the case of Mr. Moroz as a strictly internal matter. However, the Administration remains deeply concerned for those everywhere who are unable to exercise fundamental human rights.

It is the President's view that, as Americans, we must never acquiesce in the suppression of human liberties. We adhere to the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not only in appropriate international forums, but also in our exchange with other governments, including that of the Soviet Union. The President believes that this approach offers the best prospect benefitting individuals such as Mr. Moroz.

With the President's best wishes.

**UCCA President's Participation in WACL Conference in Korea.**—At the 9th Conference of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) in Seoul, Korea, UCCA President Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky pressed for concrete action on the forthcoming Captive Nations Week, July 18-24. The conference accepted his resolution, and the new leadership promised to implement the resolution in full. Dr. Dobriansky participated in the conference which was held in Free Korea's National Assembly from April 30 to May 4, 1976. He represented the UCCA, the American Council for World Freedom, in

which he is first vice-president, and the National Captive Nations Committee.

His resolution, "For a World-Resounding 1976 Captive Nations Week," called for each member organization to request from its Head of State and legislative body a proclamation and statements in behalf of all the captive nations. It stressed for them "to join with the President of the United States and its Congress" in this regard. The resolution was passed unanimously. Discussions between Dr. Ben Limb, the new Korean chairman of WACL, and Dr. Dobriansky have resulted in an agreement to implement the resolution. It is to be WACL's first action project in the new administration.

Another resolution prepared by the UCCA President on the American Revolution Bicentennial was also accepted by WACL. The resolution, "The 9th WACL General Conference Salutes the American Revolution Bicentennial," was incorporated into the final communique of the conference.

During the conference Prof. Dobriansky had talks with delegates to the concurrent conference of the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League. As a way for strengthening APACL, the delegates approved in their final session "the promotion of APACL activities, particularly the holding of Captive Nations Week." The talks centered on the Week and detente, the non-Russian nations in the USSR, and a new policy among Free World allies.

While in Korea, the UCCA President visited one of the tunnels built by the North Koreans through the Demilitarized Zone. He walked about a mile through it. He also attended many social functions given by Korean officialdom and renewed many acquaintances at the Freedom Center where he lectured several years ago.

During his additional visit to the Republic of China, the UCCA President had an audience with President Yen Chia-kan and the cause of the captive nations was further discussed. Dr. Dobriansky was received at luncheon by Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, head of China's WACL Chapter, and some basic WACL problems were discussed.

**Bishop Losten Named Administrator of the Philadelphia Archeparchy.**—On June 8, 1976 Pope Paul VI named Bishop Basil H. Losten Apostolic Administrator of the Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy of Philadelphia. The announcement was made by the Most Rev. Jean Jadot, Apostolic Delegate to the United States. Metropolitan Senyshyn continues to be the head of the See while all administrative matters will be conducted by Bishop Losten.

The appointment of Bishop Losten was made due to the incapacitating illness of Archbishop Ambrose Senyshyn. The Metropolitan has been hospitalized several times during the past year, and now is convalescing in Philadelphia.

The rights and duties of an apostolic administrator are contained in the *Motu Proprio*, "Cleri Sanctitati." In general, the administrator enjoys the same rights and privileges as the resident bishop.

Bishop Losten is a native of Chesapeake City, Maryland and was born on May 11, 1930. He was ordained by the late Metropolitan Constantine Bohachevsky in 1957 and became an Auxiliary Bishop on May 25, 1971. His pastoral ministry was centered in the Philadelphia area. He heads the archdiocesan insurance program, was the builder of Ascension Manor, a resident building for senior citizens. He continues to head both programs.

**Ukrainians Attend White House Conferences.**—On May 18, 1976, a meeting-seminar on "Ethnicity and Education" was held at the White House, which was attended by scores of educators and specialists from around the country, including those of Ukrainian descent. The conference was opened by John O. Marsh, Jr., Special Assistant to the President, and was moderated by Dr. Myron B. Kuropas, Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs.

The overall purpose of the conference was to assess the progress of the ethnic studies programs and the response of the Administration and Congress.

One of the principal addresses, "The Ethnic Heritage Studies Program," was delivered by Prof. Michael S. Pap, professor at John Carroll University, director of the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies at the same university, in Cleveland, Ohio, and president of the National Ethnic Studies Assembly. He is of Ukrainian descent. Dr. Pap gave a thorough analysis of ethnic studies programs and concluded that the concept of cultural and ethnic heritage is being slowly accepted.

Other speakers at the day-long conference included Mrs. Marjorie Lynch, Under Secretary of HEW; Harold L. Hodgkinson, director of the National Institute of Education; Robert P. Hanrahan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Education Department of HEW; Dr. Mitchell Kobilinski, director of the Small Business Administration; Leonard Randolph, program director of Literature, National Endowment for the Arts; Dr. John B. Tsu, member of the National Advisory Council on Ethnic Heritage Studies; Dr. Francis X. Femminella of the same Council; Armen Tashdian, program director of the Office of Planning and Analysis, the National Endowment for the Humanities; Dr. Dennis M. Ogawa, University of Hawaii; Paul Gibson, director of Urban and Ethnic Education, Illinois Office of Education; David Roth, Midwest Director of the Institute of Pluralism and Group Identity; Paul H. O'Neill, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Senator Richard S. Schweiker of Pennsylvania.

In addition to Drs. Kuropas and Pap, other Ukrainians attending the conference were Mrs. Luba V. Toloczko-Markewych, chairperson of the Illinois Consultation in Education; Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Prof. Peter Goy, City College of New York, and Paul Fenchak, educator from Baltimore, Md.

On June 1, 1976 another conference was held at the White House, dealing with "Ethnicity and the 1980 Census," which was attended by some 70 scholars, educators and specialists from all parts of the country. It was organized and chaired by Dr. Myron B. Kuropas, Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs, in cooperation with the Ethnic Millions Political Action Committee (EMPAC).

The overall purpose of the conference was to discuss with the representatives of the Bureau of Census the shortcomings of the 1970 census, and to find a new system of cooperation with government officials in order for the census to reflect a more precise representation of the American ethnic mosaic.

The principal speaker at the conference was Dr. Michael Novak, author and executive director of EMPAC. He analyzed the 1970 census and problems it created, and contended that "America is the most pluralistic

country in the world; the American population represents a nerve system in the world, and all major events in different countries have a direct impact on the American society." For years, he said, the U.S. population census presented a completely wrong picture of ethnicity in America, which in turn resulted in miseducation and misinformation. For example, Irish Catholics compose only 16% of the U.S. Catholic population, while one had the impression that at least 50% of U.S. Catholics were Irish. The Anglo-Saxons, he went on, constitute only 14% of our population, but the impression was given that the percentage was much higher, since most if not all of our culture was based around them.

It was brought out in discussion that place of origin or political bodies or boundaries do not necessarily mean ethnic origin. Passports are even more confusing for identification. Russian Jews, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Czechs, Slovaks or Poles should be counted according to their ethnic identity. In the last census, for instance, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russian Jews in the U.S., for some unexplained "practical reasons," were grouped together and identified as "Russians."

Other speakers on the program included Robert L. Hagan, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Census; Meyer Zitter, Chief Population Division, Bureau of Census; Nampeo McKinney, Assistant Chief, Population Division, Bureau of Census, and Alfred Tella, Special Advisor to the Director, Bureau of the Census.

In addition to Dr. Kuropas, other Ukrainians who attended the conference included Mrs. Stefania Wochok, Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics; attorney Zenon Forowycz and Michael Koc, UCCA Chicago Branch, and Prof. Peter Goy, City College of City University of New York.

**Ukrainian Engineers Society Holds Annual Meeting.**—On May 15, 1976, the Ukrainian Engineers Society of America held its annual meeting at which George Honczarenko, member of the UCCA Executive Committee and a well-known Ukrainian professional and community leader, was elected president. The meeting, held at the Ukrainian Institute of America in New York City, was attended by Ukrainian engineers from around the United States, including branch presidents from Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Detroit, New Jersey and New York.

Reporting for the outgoing executive board of the organization was Ivan Mokriwsky, who said that the society was active in all aspects of the engineering profession as well as in Ukrainian community life. Also reporting were branch heads.

In his acceptance speech, Mr. Honczarenko said that during the Bicentennial-Centennial year the Engineers Society would sponsor a series of scientific conferences marking the contributions of Ukrainian engineers to America's technological growth and development.

In addition to Mr. Honczarenko, the newly elected board includes: R. Hawrylak, first vice-president and press secretary; E. Zmyj, second vice-president and organizational chairman; Dr. G. Karapinka, secretary; Dr. O. Moroz, research chairman; M. Stepaniuk, administrative assistant; O. Glut, professional liaison; S. Prociuk, editor of the Society's technical journal *Engineering News*; M. Borecky, editor of *The Bulletin*; Dr. R. Andrushkiw, delegate to the Ukrainian Professional Society, and E. Iwashkiw, representative to the UCCA. The auditing board, headed by I. Mok-

riwsky, includes M. Hnateyko, O. Leskiw, W. Mysak and I. Zajac; the arbitration board includes E. Iwashkiw, chairman, and B. Kotys, L. Kurylko, E. Fylypowych and R. Halibey—members, while the aid and work committee includes B. Mak, M. Ilkiw and W. Luciw.

**U.S. Marine General of Ukrainian Origin Honored.**—Gen. Samuel Jaskilka, Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, was honored recently by the Marine Club of Hartford, Conn., in ceremonies attended by Connecticut Governor Ella T. Grasso, and U.S. Secretary of the Navy, J. William Middendorf II.

Gen. Jaskilka, who is of Ukrainian descent, received the Marine Club's Gideon Welles Award, which is named after a Connecticut newspaper-editor who served as President Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy. The award is given annually to a Connecticut native or resident "who contributed to the advancement, honor or prestige of the U.S. Naval Service." Secretary Middendorf received the award in 1975.

Gen. Jaskilka was born in Ansonia, Conn., and is a graduate of the University of Connecticut. He took part in numerous Marine Corps combat campaigns in the South Pacific in World War II.

For heroism in combat during the Korean War, he received two Silver Star Medals and the Bronze Star Medal. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his service in Vietnam.

He was promoted to his present rank in March, 1976. He became assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps on July 1, 1975. He and his wife, the former Norma Blick of Stafford Springs, Conn., have four children.

Another prominent Ukrainian American guest at the ceremony was Deputy Connecticut State Tax Commissioner Orest T. Dubno, who is also a former member of the U.S. Marine Corps.

**UCCA-UNWLA Building in New York Opened.**—On Saturday, May 22, 1976, the five-story building on Second Avenue in New York City, purchased jointly by the UCCA and "Soyuz Ukrainok" (UNWLA), was blessed and officially opened in ceremonies attended by some 150 representatives of various Ukrainian Central organizations.

The act of blessing was performed by five Ukrainian clergymen—Very Rev. Patrick Paschak, Provincial of the Basilian Fathers; Rev. Dr. Volodymyr Gawlich, pastor of St. George's Ukrainian Catholic Church in New York, and Very Rev. Msgr. Myroslav Charyna, president of the "Providence" Association of Ukrainian Catholics and a vice-president of the UCCA—from the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and Rev. Volodymyr Bazylewsky, rector of St. Volodymyr Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral in New York City, and Rev. Ivan Tkachuk—from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Speaking at the ceremony, conducted by UCCA Executive Director Ivan Bazarko, were Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, and Mrs. Ivanna Rozankowsky, President of "Soyuz Ukrainok," who delivered appropriate addresses after cutting the blue and yellow ribbon symbolizing possession of the premises.

Other speakers who delivered congratulatory messages included Prof. Dr. Volodymyr Janiw, Rector of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Germany, who was on a visit to the U.S., Prof. Joseph W. Andrushkiw (Shevchenko Scientific Society), Prof. Vasyl Omelchenko (Ukrainian Aca-

demy of Arts and Sciences), Prof. Ihor Sonevytsky (Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of America), Dr. Volodymyr Sawchak (United Ukrainian American Organizations), Myroslav Shmigel (SUMA) and Mrs. Daria Stepaniak (Women's Association of ODFFU).

#### **OBITUARIES:**

a) **Dr. Theodore Dobzhansky**, world-renowned geneticist, who gained international acclaim for his research, writing and lecturing about evolution and genetics and their relationship to modern man, died in Davis, Calif. on December 18, 1975, at the age of 75.

Born in Nemyriv, Ukraine, on January 25, 1900, Dr. Dobzhansky received his early education as a naturalist at the University of Kiev, from which he graduated in 1921; he remained in the Ukrainian capital for three years as an assistant in zoology and later lectured at the University of Leningrad.

He left Ukraine when the science of genetics was suppressed by Stalinist dogma and, as a Fellow of the International Educational Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, worked at Columbia University in 1927-28. Later he taught at various universities in the U.S., completing his teaching and research as an adjunct professor of genetics at the University of California.

It is to be recalled that in 1953, at a scientific convention in Hamburg, Dr. Dobzhansky paid tribute to those Soviet scientists who had sacrificed their careers in defending the theories of Thomas Hunt Morgan, American geneticist, against the "pseudo-theories" of Trofim D. Lysenko, a "master of propaganda," who "destroyed the efforts of a whole generation of plant and animal breeders" in the USSR. Dr. Dobzhansky, author of numerous works and member of various national and international organizations, was also a distinguished member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.

b) **Mykola Ponedilok**, noted Ukrainian writer, playwright and humorist; died in New York City on January 25, 1976 at the age of 54. He was born in 1922 in the Kherson area of Ukraine and studied at the University of Odessa before the outbreak of World War II interrupted his pursuit of higher education. He came to the United States in 1949 and continued his acting and writing calling. His first collection, **Vitaminy** (Vitamins), was published in 1957, to be followed by his second collection, **Soborny Borshch** (United Borsch), in 1960. Later on he published **Hovoryt Lyshe Pole** (Only the Field Speaks) 1962, **Smishni Sliozy** (Funny Tears) 1966, **Zorepad** (1969) and his last novel, **Riatuyte Moyu Dushu** (Save My Soul), 1973.

For years Mr. Ponedilok had been appearing at various Ukrainian cultural functions and events as a humorist with a distinct style, sophistication and subtle satire on contemporary Ukrainian themes. He frequently appeared with his writer-friend, Ivan (Iker) Kernytsky, making a distinct impact on the Ukrainian scene in the U.S. and Canada. He was a member of the Association of Ukrainian Writers "Slovo" and scores of other Ukrainian organizations.

c) **Roman Kupchynsky**, outstanding Ukrainian poet, writer and journalist, died on June 10, 1976 in New York City at the age of 81. Born on September 24, 1894 in Rozhadiv, Zboriv County in Western Ukraine, into a

Ukrainian priestly family, he acquired his secondary education in the Pere-myshl Gymnasium from which he graduated in 1913. Adept in sports he won the discus throw and shotout at the all-Galician track and field competitions in 1914.

With the outbreak of World War I, he joined the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and fought with it for Ukrainian Independence and attained the rank of lieutenant. After some time as a Polish POW, he returned to Lviv and attended for two years the Ukrainian Secret University, while writing poetry, satire, feuilletons, and short stories. His first poem was published in 1915 in the *Herald of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine*. Mr. Kupchynsky had also a flare for music, which, coupled with his talent for poetry, resulted in some 100 songs, most on Ukrainian military themes. He also wrote a trilogy, *Zametil* (Snowstorm), published in Lviv in 1928-30.

Writing under the penname of *Halaktion Chipka*, he became widely known and popular, and for a number of years headed the Society of Ukrainian Writers and Journalists in Western Ukraine. Arriving in the U.S. after World War II, he continued his prolific literary activity, writing a book *Hunting Stories*, published in 1964, and a satirical poem, *Skoropad*, again on Sich Riflemen themes. He was one of the founders of the Association of Ukrainian Journalists in America, and in 1966 was made an honorary president of the Association.

## II. UKRAINIANS IN THE DIASPORA

### CANADA

**Ukrainian Canadian Committee Urges Canadian Intervention for Moroz.**—The Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) requested Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to "personally intervene" on behalf of Valentyn Moroz by seeking his "unconditional release" from prison with the right to emigrate from the USSR.

"At this critical moment in his life, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee would greatly appreciate your personal intervention with the Soviet government, requesting an unconditional release of Valentyn Moroz, with the right to emigrate from the Soviet Union the same way as the Leonid Plyushch family was released last January," wrote Atty. Serge Radchuk, president of the UCC, and Paul Bashuk, secretary general.

They stressed to Mr. Trudeau that "the life of Valentyn Moroz is of great concern to all Ukrainians in Canada."

**Vatican Suspends Three Married Ukrainian Priests.**—Three married Ukrainian Catholic priests have been suspended by the Vatican because of their marital status. They are Revs. Taras Lozynsky, John Girhiny and Andrew Kormaniak, who were ordained Last September by Auxiliary Bishop Michael Rusnak of the Toronto Eparchy, with the permission of Bishop Isidore Borecky, and have been serving in the diocese.

Soon thereafter, according the Religious News Service, Archbishop Guido Del Mestri, then apostolic pronuncio to Canada, asked that the three priests not exercise their ministry publicly because the Vatican did not approve their ordination. Furthermore, last March, Bishop Borecky received a letter from Archbishop Angelo Palmas, the present pronuncio, confirming the priests' suspension and requesting that he wait for the Vatican's

final decision. Bishop Borecky reportedly indicated that he did not intend to honor the suspensions and held several talks with Latin-Rite bishops in Ottawa, hoping to get their support and assistance.

It was stated that the Vatican's objection to the ordination of the priests included a claim that they were not adequately prepared educationally and theologically for ordination. Bishop Borecky, however, sent the Holy See documents showing that they were indeed prepared.

The matter is being reviewed now by the Vatican Congregation for Eastern Churches and a decision is expected soon on the ministry of the suspended priests.

In a separate dispatch from the Vatican, Reuters reported that the Congregation for Eastern Churches also suspended Rev. Joseph Chrusch of Venezuela, a married priest and father of two children who was ordained by Patriarch Josyf. The Congregation said that the autonomy of the "Pomisna" Ukrainian Catholic Church does not include the right to ordain married priests, according to Reuters.

**Ems 'Ukase' Discussed at Slavists Congress.**—A special session on the Ems Ukase of 1876 was held on June 1, 1976 during the annual Congress at Laval University in Quebec City, Que. The session, entitled, "The Ems Ukase and Its Impact on the Development of Ukrainian Culture," consisted of four papers: "The Effects of the Ems Ukase on the Development of Modern Literary Ukrainian," by Prof. Bohdan Medvidsky of the University of Alberta; "Ukrainian Theater after the Ems Ukase," by Prof. Valerian Reutsky of the University of British Columbia; "The Ems Ukase and the Problem of Linguicide," Prof. Jaroslaw B. Rudnyckyj of the University of Manitoba, and "The Czarist Censorship and the Ukrainian Movement: The Ems Ukase," by Prof. Roman Solchanyk of Harvard University. Chairing the session was Prof. Constantine Bida of the University of Ottawa, while Mark Antonovych of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was the discussant.

It is to be recalled that the Ems Ukase, issued by Czar Alexander II in 1876 prohibited publishing in the Ukrainian language in Ukraine.

**OBITUARY: Rev. Ireneus Nazarko, OSBM,** a Ukrainian priest, scholar and editor, died on April 20, 1976 in Ottawa. He was the spiritual director of the Basilian novitiate in Ottawa and a senior editor of the Basilian Fathers' monthly, *The Light*.

He was born in Ternopil, Western Ukraine, and completed his elementary and secondary education there and his higher education at the universities of Vienna and Innsbruck, in Austria, receiving degrees in philosophy and theology. He was ordained a priest in 1930, and while in Lviv he headed the Marian Society. During World War II he was the head of the Basilian Monastery in Lviv.

In 1946, Fr. Nazarko arrived to Canada and became editor of *The Light* and contributed numerous articles on religious themes to a number of publications and authored several major works on the history of the Ukrainian Church. In 1950 he earned still another doctorate and taught the history of the Ukrainian Church at Montreal and Ottawa universities. From 1953 to 1963, Fr. Nazarko was a consultor to the Basilian Curia in Rome and from 1955 to 1967 he served as rector of St. Josaphat's Pontifical Seminary in Rome.

**KOREA**

**Ukrainians at WACL Conference in Seoul.**—A seven-member Ukrainian delegation from the free world took part in the 9th annual Conference of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), held on May 1-3, 1976 in Seoul.

Some 310 delegates from 61 national member units and 10 international organizations from Asia, the Middle East, Australia, North America, Latin America, Europe and Africa, attended the sessions which were held concurrently with the 22nd conference of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL). Greetings were received from Korean President Park Chung Hee, and other free government leaders.

Held under the slogan "National Freedom Against International Communism," conferees reviewed the international situation and pointed out what action should be taken for free world security, national independence, freedom and peace. They formulated plans and adopted a series of resolutions, condemned Soviet Russian genocide, ethnocide and linguicide; they called for the abolition of concentration camps and psychiatric wards, and so forth.

No. 4 of the resolutions reads:

[We] stand for the dissolution of the Russian colonial empire—the USSR and its satellites—strongly supporting the heroic struggle for national independence and freedom for all the enslaved nations, like Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Northern Caucasus, Turkestan, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Croatia, Albania, Cuba, and others. . ."

Heading the Ukrainian delegation was Yaroslav Stetsko, president of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) and member of the WACL executive council. Other members of the delegation were: Dr. Stepan Halamay and Andrew Sokolyk (U.S.); Dr. Roman Malashchuk and Vasyl Bezchlibnyk (Canada); Mrs. Slava Stetsko, editor of *ABN Correspondence* (Germany), and Yaroslav Svorak (Australia).

Attending the conference as observer was Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, on behalf of the UCCA, National Captive Nations Committee and American Council for World Freedom.

**III. IN CAPTIVE UKRAINE**

**Moroz In and Out of Serbsky Institute, Moved to Labor Camp.**—Valentyn Moroz, noted Ukrainian historian, has been moved to the USSR's leading institute of criminal psychiatry, according to a May 18, 1976 Reuters dispatch. His wife, Raissa Moroz, told Western correspondents in Moscow that officials of the Interior Ministry's Medical Service informed her that her husband has been transferred to Moscow's Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry.

The Serbsky Institute has been frequently denounced by dissidents in the USSR as an "insane asylum," where many prisoners were kept under "observation," said Reuters.

Leonid Plyushch, the Ukrainian cyberneticist who was released this past January and allowed to emigrate to the West with his family, was held at the Serbsky for two years before being confined at the Dnipropetrovsk prison hospital.

Moroz was due to complete his prison term at Vladimir Prison where he has been confined since November 18, 1970, on June 1, 1976. The move could mean that Moroz, whose health has not been previously questioned, could be committed indefinitely to a psychiatric prison instead of going to a camp, said the dispatch.

Then, on June 21, 1976, psychiatrists at the Serbsky Institute informed Mrs. Moroz that her husband has been found "mentally healthy." According to a press release of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (abroad), Moroz is being held in Moscow's Butyrka Prison, from where he will be transferred to one of the Mordovian labor camps to complete his sentence.

It is to be recalled that the 40-year-old Ukrainian historian was sentenced for the second time in 1970 to six years in prison, three years in labor camps and five years in exile.

Soviet dissidents in the USSR say that the favorable verdict by the Soviet psychiatrists is a result of the worldwide protests over Moroz's possible incarceration at the notorious Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric hospital, organized in the free world by Ukrainians, Western psychiatrists, government leaders and Communist party members.

**Lukyanenko, Kandyba Complete Prison Terms.**—Lev Lukyanenko and Ivan Kandyba, member of the so-called "Jurists," a group of Ukrainian lawyers who called for the peaceful secession of the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR, were released from 15-year incarceration, according to the press service of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (abroad).

Lukyanenko, 49, and Kandyba, 47, were arrested in 1961 and charged with high treason, membership in an anti-Soviet organization, and anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

During the trial, the defenders argued that they did not commit any treasonous acts. They said that what they proposed was guaranteed by Soviet law.

According to them, if a vote were taken in Ukraine, and a majority of the people favored secession from the USSR, then based on Soviet law, Ukraine should be accorded that right.

They were sentenced to death by a firing squad, but the sentence was later commuted to 15-year in prison. Lukyanenko spent his years in the Mordovian and Perm concentration camps, and also in Vladimir Prison, where he documented the facts surrounding his trial, which were published in the West. It was in Vladimir Prison that Lukyanenko met Lithuanian seaman Simas Kudirka, who was released as a U.S. citizen and lives presently in the United States.

Kandyba was also confined in Vladimir Prison, where he wrote a petition to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, describing the lawlessness in the labor camps. Both Kandyba and Lukyanenko were active among prisoners, protesting constant violations of human rights by camp authorities and the Soviet secret police.

**Tatyana Khodovich Castigates Plyushch for Marxism.**—Tatyana Kho-

dorovich, noted Soviet dissident and member of the Moscow Initiative Group of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, criticized Leonid Plyushch for his pro-Marxist statements, a Russian emigre source in Paris told a Reuters correspondent.

Mr. Plyushch, a former Ukrainian political prisoner, who resides in Paris since his release from the Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric hospital, made frequent statements on his belief in Marxism during his tour of France, the United States and Canada.

Mrs. Khodorovich's letter was sent to the Paris Russian emigre magazine *Kontinent*, edited by Russian writer Vladimir Maximov, who released the letter on May 19, 1976.

She charged in the letter that anyone who supports an ideology "based on violence and attaches bright and pure ideals to it, takes upon his soul a more frightening sin than the evil itself, for he changes good for evil and destroys the gulf between them."

She further stated: "I urge you to show responsibility. Your word, precisely because of the moral eminence of your human make-up, now has huge power and persuasiveness."

Mrs. Khodorovich, a close friend of the Plyushches, was aware of his views, but, she said, they negated everything she herself treasured. Also a close associate of Prof. Andrei D. Sakharov, Mrs. Khodorovich often supplied information on other Ukrainian prisoners, such as Valentyn Moroz, which eventually reached the West.

**Nadya Svitlychna Released from Slave Camp.**—Nadya Svitlychna, who was arrested in April, 1972 for so-called "anti-Soviet activity" and sentenced to four years of imprisonment, completed her term and was released in May, 1976, according to the press service of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. Born in 1936 in the Donbas area of Ukraine, she completed her studies at the University of Kiev and worked at Kiev Radio and later as a librarian. In 1969 she married Danylo Shumuk, a former Ukrainian political prisoner (who was arrested again since), and the couple have a son, Yarema. In April, 1972, she was called for interrogation by the KGB daily, and finally arrested. The court of the Kiev oblast found her guilty of harboring the manuscript of her husband's memoirs.

She spent four years in the Mordovian concentration Camp No. 3, together with other Ukrainian women political prisoners, such as Stefania Shabatura, Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, Oksana Popovych, Iryna Senyk and Nina Strokata-Karavansky (released at the end of 1975).

Her brother, Ivan Svitlychny, noted Ukrainian literary critic and writer, is still incarcerated in the Perm concentration camp. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and five years exile.

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