Vol. XXXI, No. 4

The Ukrainian Quarterly

JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

Featuring In This Issue:

The Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

Subscription: Yearly $9.00 Single Copy: $2.50

New York City

1975

VOLUME XXXI

1975

SPRING—SUMMER—AUTUMN—WINTER

PUBLISHED BY

THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

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(Book Reviews in Italics)

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WINTER, 1975 VOLUME XXXI—No. 4 $2.50 COPY



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PLYUSHCH, RELEASED FROM MENTAL WARD, REACHES THE WEST

VIENNA, Austria.—Leonid Plyushch, the 36-year-old Ukrainian mathematician, confined to a mental asylum in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine, for nearly 3 years because of "anti-Sovict agitation and propaganda," arrived in the Austrian capital on January 10, 1976. Accompanying him were his wife Tatyana and two sons, Dima and Lesyk.

On January 8, 1976, TASS, the official press agency of the Soviet government said the Ukrainian mathematician had been given psychiatric treatment and he was being released because his "health has improved lately." Mr. Plyushch was handed over to his family at the city of Chop near the Hungarian border, from where they traveled by train to the Austrian border station at Marchegg. Mrs. Plyushch said that her husband was still under the influence of mind-dulling drugs, and he appeared frail and trembling. An English physician who identified himself as Dr. Gery Low-Beer of London, said after meeting Mr. Plyushch "To me, he looked like a normal and intelligent person. I have noticed no signs of a mental illness."

Meeting Mr. Plyushch and his family at Marchegg were representatives of Amnesty International, Mr. Michael Broue, secretary of the International Committee of Mathematicians for the Release of Plyushch, Mr. Michael Rudko, European Director of the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC), Dr. Serhiy Naklovych, representative of the Ukrainian community of Austria, Mr. Bohdan Osadchuk, Berlin-based Ukrainian journalist, Mr. Andrew Grigorenko, son of Gen. Peter Grigorenko, and others.

Mrs. Plyushch, on behalf of her husband, thanked all for their efforts to secure her husband's release, and said he was greatly concerned for other Ukrainian political prisoners, such as Moroz, Chornovil, Svitlychny, Karavansky and a number of Ukrainian women political prisoners.

After a short stay in Vienna, the Plyushch family was taken to Paris, where the French President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, said "they would be welcome."

UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN DISSIDENTS: A Qualification for Freedom

Editorial

"... In the area of demographic and ethnic policies, the Russian leadership of the USSR is attempting to create a uniform population, including *Umvölkung* (ethnic change through social engineering) and the creation of a *new Soviet man* (*sovietsky chelovek*), who would be essentially a Russian man ..."[1]

It is the general view in the West that the rise of intellectual and cultural dissent in the USSR, and especially among the intellectuals of Russian nationality, heralds a new rebirth of Russian political thinking. The West has acclaimed such outstanding Russian dissidents as Andrei Siniavsky, Yuli Daniel, Boris Pasternak, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Amalrik, Vladimir Bukovsky, Andrei Sakharov, Valery Chalidze, Pavel Litvinov, Alexander Yesenin-Volpin, Vladimir Maximov, General Pyotr Grigorenko, Pyotr Yakir, and many, many others. All these have been swept up and processed through the KGB mills of terror and degradation. Some of these victims of Communist oppression have succeeded in reaching the West through regular immigration channels, others through expulsion, as was the case with Solzhenitsyn. The West has welcomed them as true defenders of freedom and human rights.

But keen observers of Soviet affairs have not failed to notice that most of the dissidents released from the USSR and allowed to emigrate to the West are either Russian or Jewish, with the group given a salting of other Russified nationalities. So far not a single Ukrainian or Balt dissident of any distinction has been permitted to leave the USSR, a fact which underscores the flagarant difference in treatment by the Kremlin of the Russian and non-Russian political opponents in the USSR.

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1 "Discrimination and Abuse of Power in the USSR," by Walter Dushnyck in *Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A World Survey.* (This essay explores in depth the theme of the present editorial). Published by the Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies, The Hague, The Netherlands, Vol. II, 1975, p. 546.

While in Russia the KGB is arresting Russian dissidents for their opposition to the Communist regime, *in Ukraine and other non-Russian republics cultural and intellectual leaders of the non-Russian peoples are being persecuted for their national and political aspirations, aimed at the establishment of their separate, independent states.*

And it is in this area of national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples in the USSR that the Russian dissidents themselves behave rather awkwardly and suspiciously.

In the USSR, only two prominent Russian dissidents—so far as is known—have spoken openly on the ability of the "union republics" to exercise their constitutional right of secession from the USSR. Andrei Amalrik, in his book, *Will the USSR Survive Until 1894?*, predicted that some of the "union republics," notably Ukraine and the Baltic States, will definitely exercise such right at the first opportunity, probably such opportunity being provided by the inevitable Chinese-Soviet conflict.

Prof. Andrei D. Sakharov, in a memorandum submitted in March, 1971, to Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, stated:

> ... In the sphere of relations with national republics, our country has proclaimed the rights of nations to self-determination, up to and including secession.
>
> The right of the union republics to secede is proclaimed by the Constitution of the USSR. In fact, however, the mere discussion of this topic often provokes persecution. In my opinion, a juridical analysis of the problem and the passing of a law guaranteeing the right to secede would have great domestic and international significance as a confirmation of the anti-imperialist and anti-chauvinist nature of our policy ..."[2]

Likewise, in his *Letter to the Soviet Leaders,* Alexander Solzhenitsyn called on the Kremlin to abandon their domination over the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and marginally touched also on "some parts of Ukraine." It was not clear whether he included 48-million-peopled Ukraine in the number of countries to be free of Soviet Russian domination.

Regrettably, Mr. Solzhenitsyn in his public appearances in Washington and New York this past summer, failed to take a definite stand on Ukraine, despite the fact that he himself openly admitted being "part Ukrainian" and that "the fate of the Ukrainian people" was very dear to him.

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[2] Cf. *The New York Times*, August 18, 1972, quoted in Stefan Korbonski's article, "The Independence of Ukraine Through the Eyes of a Pole," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, Winter, 1972, New York, N.Y.

As for the rest of the Russian dissidents, both those in the USSR and those in the West, they either keep silent as regards Ukraine or go so far as to deny the right of the Ukrainians to independence. The Russians, even with respect to freedom, seem "more equal than others" in the Soviet Union.

"FREEDOM, YES—INDEPENDENCE, NO"

Another case in point is A. Levitin-Krasnov, outstanding Russian dissident and activist in the field of the Russian Orthodox Church, who in 1974 was allowed to leave the USSR and who presently is living in Switzerland.

Mr. Levitin-Krasnov gave his views in an interview to V. Hawryluk, a correspondent for the Ukrainian-language review *Suchasnist* (Contemporary Times), which appears in Munich, Germany.[3]

His exposition was shallow and confused and hardly in consonance with the facts of history. His appreciation of even current facts was deficient; for instance, he contends that a full half of Ukraine's population is Russian, a contention which is contrary even to the Soviet official population census. According to the census of January, 1970, there were 35.2 million Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR, and only 9.1 million Russians. (In Kiev alone, there were one million Ukrainians and but only 373,000 Russians). Such misrepresentation suggests the strength of this dissident's bias.

Unsurprisingly, then, Mr. Levitin-Krasnov views with extreme skepticism the idea of an independent Ukrainian state, arguing that the population of Ukraine is not homogeneous and that there are no natural boundaries between Ukraine and Russia which would delineate the ethnic zones of the two peoples. Even if a Ukrainian independent army could be created, he contends, half of it would speak Russian. But, given his bent, the whole army should speak Russian! He is so fearful of what may become of "Mother Russia" that he simply is unable to visualize a democratic Russia that could live in peace with a democratic Ukraine and democratic states of other non-Russian peoples, such as the Baltic nations and the Caucasian countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).

This argument is as specious as his others. In 1917, Ukraine was supposedly wholly Russified, but when the Czarist government collapsed, the Ukrainians were first to hoist the banner of freedom.

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[3] "Interview V. Hawryluka z A. Levitinom-Krasnovym" (An Interview of V. Hawryluk with A. Levitin-Krasnov), *Suchasnist*, No. 9, September, 1975, Munich Germany.

Within a few months they succeeded in organizing a Ukrainian army of several divisions, staffed and commanded by Ukrainian generals (who had been trained and qualified in the Russian armed forces) who revealed they had been conscious and patriotic Ukrainians by instantly serving their reborn country.

Mr. Levitin-Krasnov tolerates the vision of a sort of nebulous Russian-Ukrainian federation, or perhaps confederation. He seems to concede that a Ukrainian republic, with its own government, army and police is possible, but only and above all in union with Russia.

Another outstanding Russian dissident, still in the USSR, has distressingly similar views. He is Igor Shafarevich (born in 1923), a mathematician of world stature, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and a former laureate of the Lenin Prize. An active member of the unofficial Committee on Human Rights, founded by Prof. Sakharov and others, he authored a *samizdat* study of the Soviet law on religion.

Mr. Shafarevich's views on the non-Russian peoples in the USSR are contained in a recently published book, *From Under the Rubble,* which is a symposium of seven Russian authors.[4]

The author in question contributes a 17-page chapter entitled, "Separation or Reconciliation?: The Nationalities Question in the USSR." He admits that the question of nationalism is an explosive one in the USSR, and that therefore the *samizdat* literature has been skirting the issue carefully lest more inflamed nationalist passion be set in motion. Mr. Shafarevich condemns all imperialism and nationalism, but manages to stop short when it comes to the Russian brand of nationalism and colonialism.

He points out that the nationality question, as interpreted by non-Russian authors, is this:

> *All the problems of the non-Russian peoples are due in the long run to Russian oppression and the drive for Russification. The regions inhabited by these nations are Russian colonies. These people therefore have a clear task before them: to rid themselves of Russian colonial domination . . .*[5] (underscoring in the original).

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[4] *From Under the Rubble.* By Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Mikhail Agursky, A.B., Evgeny Barabanov, Vadim Borisov, F. Korsakov, and Igor Shafarevich. With an Introduction by Max Hayward. Boston-Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1974, pp. 308.

[5] *From Under the Rubble,* p. 93.

Mr. Shafarevich believes that such thinking is unfounded. For purposes of refutation and demonstration, he first cites five arguments most commonly used against the Russians by the non-Russians:

1) The great riches extracted from the non-Russian territories are used virtually exclusively for the benefit of the Russians;
2) The deliberate dilution of the non-Russian population by deportations (in the past) and by importation of ethnic Russians into the non-Russian territories;
3) The suppression of the histories and national traditions of the non-Russian peoples, along with fraudulent re-writing of their histories and destruction of their historical monuments;
4) The suppression of religion in the non-Russian countries;
5) The destruction of the non-Russian languages by enforced use of the Russian language in the non-Russian countries.

Mr. Shafarevich thereupon strives to demolish these arguments:

Ad 1: Some studies, he writes, show that "the Russian people enjoy a lower standard of living than many other peoples—the Georgians, Armenians, Ukrainians, Latvians, or Estonians."

If such indeed be the case (and many objective studies show it is not) it is primarily due to the superior organizational abilities of the latter peoples, who seem to be more skillful in coping with their miserable lives than the Russians.

Ad 2: Mr. Shafarevich does not deny the large-scale deportations from the non-Russian countries, but contends that the Russians were also subject to deportation, and adds: "While documents written by Ukrainians complain of Russian migration into Ukraine, Estonians and Latvians complain not only of floods of Russians settling in their lands but of floods of Ukrainians too...".

There are roughly about 50 million Ukrainians in the USSR, or every fifth inhabitant of the USSR is a Ukrainian. Many of them are in the armed forces, administration, etc. Thus, we would think, one is apt to run across a Ukrainian anywhere. But in "floods"? And found where he may be, is he there voluntarily?

According to the Soviet population census of January 15, 1970, the population of Lithuania was 3,128,000, of which *268,000 (8.6%) were Russians* and 25,000 (0.8%) Ukrainians; that of Latvia, 2,364,000, of which *705,000 (29.8%) were Russians* and 53,000 (2.3%)

Ukrainians, and that of Estonia, 1,356,000, of which *335,000 (24.7%) were Russians* and 28,000 (2.1%) Ukrainians.[6]

There are between eight and ten million Ukrainians outside the borders of Ukraine, mainly in Siberia, Central Asia and the Far East, all of whom were forcibly resettled via punitive deportations and exile. In these areas they are deprived of their schools, press, TV and radio facilities and other national institutions. Are they colonizers and on an equal footing with the Russians? Hardly. Nor does Mr. Shafarevich make any reference to the man-made famine in Ukraine in 1932-33, which cost Ukraine 7 to 10 million dead and which was an act of official Soviet genocide.

Ad 3: Mr. Shafarevich scoffs at the charge of cultural suppression, but to deny that the Soviet government has been systematically if gradually destroying the non-Russian cultures is to show disdain for the reader. Long before the German-Soviet war in 1941 the Kremlin was playing up "Russian culture" as the "leading culture of the world" as it degraded the cultures of the non-Russian peoples as "inferior" and therefore as ones that should look up to "Russian culture." Toward this end all history textbooks of the non-Russian peoples have been re-written and falsified. *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa of Ukraine, a great statesman and benefactor of the Ukrainian people, is depicted as a villain and "traitor" of the Ukrainian peope because in 1709 he fought, as an ally of King Charles XII of Sweden, against Peter the Great. And "villains" are all the national heroes not only of Ukraine but also of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkestan. At the same time, such Russian Czars and conquerors as Ivan the Terrible and Alexander Nevsky and such military leaders as Kotuzov and Suvarov have been exalted as "national heroes" despite the fact that all of them were ruthless destroyers of nations.

Ad 4: Regarding the destruction of the religions of the non-Russian nations Mr. Shafarevich writes exactly eight lines, among which is, "The Russian Orthodox Church was suffering its first blows while Islam, for example, was still being handled with kid gloves..." True, at the beginning the Russian Orthodox Church was persecuted, but since 1941 it has been a staunch ally of the Communist regime and has been used as a Soviet tool in domestic and foreign policies. He says nothing about the brutal destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox

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[6] *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1922-1972 god: Yubileyniy Statisticheskyi Yezhegodnik* [The National Economy of the USSR for the Years 1922-1972: Jubilee Statistical Yearbook]. (Moscow: Statistika, 1972); pp. 594, 619 and 681.

Autocephalic Church in 1937-38, with 30 archbishops and bishops and 20,000 clergy "liquidated," nor about the abolition of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine in 1945-56, with the arrests of 10 bishops and over 2,000 priests, monks and nuns. Nor does he say anything about similar onslaughts in Byelorussia, in the Caucasus and in Turkestan.

Ad 5: Mr. Shafarevich concedes Russification to the extent that the Russian language is "a state language of the USSR" and hence its universal use, citing some childish examples to support his shallow argument. He says of Gogol (Hohol, in Ukrainian), who was a native Ukrainian but who wrote in Russian: "Great as his genius was, I do not think he could have blossomed so profoundly or attained such a pinnacle of human achievement had he not been enriched by Russian culture..." He also libels Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's poet laureate and national hero, when he writes: "Likewise with Shevchenko: his prose in Russian demonstrates his desire to be a Russian as well as a Ukrainian writer..."[7]

That Gogol wrote in Russian is a fact, but whether he considered himself to be a Russian is another matter. His writings are replete with satire and acerb criticism of Russian society, the Russian system of government, etc.; and in Russian, it may not be too much to suggest, his targets may have been more likely to read him.

But Mr. Shafarevich is dead wrong in stating that Shevchenko wanted to be "a Russian writer." The entire life of this great Ukrainian poet was an intense and bitter anti-Russian struggle. His literary creativeness was sparked by *anti*-Russian ideology and thought. His few works in Russian were written mainly for those Russian liberal intellectuals who sympathized with him and who had secured his freedom from serfdom and release from captivity after ten years. (He had been sentenced by a Russian court with a personal notation by the Czar himself not to allow Shevchenko to "write and paint" during his internment and exile).

CONCLUSION

Both Levitin-Krasnov and Shafarevich grudgingly admit here and there that the Ukrainians are being oppressed, and even go so far as to "allow" the Ukrainians to establish their own republic, including their own army, administration, and so forth, but only on one condition: *The Ukrainians must "be with Russia."*

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[7] *From Under the Rubble*, p. 101.

In other words, the Ukrainians may be free only if they accept Russian "protection" or a kind of "federation" which would still allow Moscow to control Ukraine and to dominate the Ukrainian people.

What it all comes down to is that these Russian dissidents qualify freedom for the Ukrainians to the extent that there probably would be no increase in autonomy at all.

Needless to say, such Russian thinking is no novelty. But what is strange is that it is being propagated by some Russian dissidents who are being acclaimed in the West as "great freedom advocates." Well, in the case of Ukraine and the other non-Russian nations, they are not.

Only a free people can "federate" or make a meaningful and valid choice about their own government. What the Ukrainian people want and need now is freedom and independence.

Two hundred years ago the American colonists decided to free themselves from the British Empire, despite the fact that they were part and parcel of the English people and English political institutions.

Ukrainians and Russians are two different peoples: The Russians have been dominating and oppressing the Ukrainians under both the Russian Czars and the Russian Commissars.

How long will this oppression last?

UKRAINE, BYELORUSSIA AND THE U.S.A.

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

PART I.

The Slavic tripod supporting the cohesion of the USSR state is not sufficiently understood and appreciated in the West, particularly in the United States. The three Slavic nations—Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia—are in reality the very basis of this cohesion, which is essentially coercive in the relationship between centralist Moscow and the two non-Russian nations. Politically and economically, Ukraine and Byelorussia occupy a special position in the state of the USSR that, in the spirit of detente and Helsinki, should be of increasing interest and attention to Western diplomacy. In the United States this interest has been a sustained one, though it has varied and fluctuated from decade to decade. At this time it is surfacing again in the reflective diplomatic area and doubtlessly will stimulate a great deal of discussion and possible concrete action.

In the U.S. Congress, for instance, the Burke resolution has been revived, seeking the expulsion of Ukraine and Byelorussia from the United Nations. When the chief sponsor of this resolution asserts that "Neither Byelorussia nor the Ukraine under international law can be said to be a nation-state," it becomes evident that some confusion exists both with regard to international law and the concept of nation-state.[1] This is compounded when, accepting the U.N. as a representation of "as many nations of the world as possible," the Congressman states that "this is not by any stretch of the imagination the same as saying that the U.N. is supposed to represent as many integral parts of these nations, mere administrative units, on a fraudulently 'independent' basis as possible." This only leads to the reductio ad absurdum that the USSR is a nation, not to mention the internal contradictions of the legislator's statement. Not to over-extend the subject,

[1] Mr. Burke. "Concurrent Resolution Calling For The Expulsion of Byelorussia and the Ukraine from the United Nations," *Congressional Record*, September 26, 1975, p. H9 202.

one could even relate it to the October 1975 outbursts of Peking against Moscow: (a) Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping alluding to Moscow as "the most dangerous source of war" and, more so, the *People's Daily* concluding that "Soviet revisionist social imperialism, having a voracious appetite and stretching its tentacles in all directions, is more frantic and dangerous than old-line imperialism." From these and other viewpoints the subject of the Slavic tripod, particularly two members of it, and the U.S.A. deserves more than superficial examination.

THE BASIC BACKGROUND

Though some analysts and observes may not be aware of it, the question of the highest diplomatic relations with the non-Russian republics in the USSR touches several supporting bases with which one must be sufficiently familiar in order to view the subject in its totality and evaluate it accordingly. Objectively, these bases are touched upon in a succession of episodes from the years of World War II to the present, and these events in themselves serve to indicate both the background and compass of interest in the subject. In this section the factual content of these episodes are essentially portrayed to show the various bases underlying the subject, the direct and intermittent consideration given to it, and evidential indications of the absence of any extensive study devoted to it.

Regardless of the merits of claims and arguments, the pressure during World War II by USSR leaders and other authorities for the participation of the non-Russian republics in the contemplated world organization set the beginnings of the first important episode. They maintained that these republics are independent and sovereign states, and are therefore entitled to such diplomatic and political participation. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, through its ambassador to the U.S., Andrei Gromyko, Moscow sought to have all sixteen of the republics in the USSR seated in the new world organization, which later evolved into the United Nations. Later, both at the Yalta Conference in 1945 and that year in San Francisco the representatives of the Soviet Union supported this claim with the amendments of the USSR constitution providing for direct diplomatic relations on the part of the republics with foreign states. Concerning these important amendments, the Supreme Soviet amended the USSR constitution on February 1, 1944 with articles 18a and 18b. The first amendment provides that "Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements, and exchange

diplomatic and consular representatives with them." The latter specifies that "Each Union Republic has its own Republican military formations."[2]

Again, aside from attached interpretations and understandings at this juncture, the record is fairly clear that what followed was a process of bargaining and disputation concerning the status and eligibility of the non-Russian republics for admission in any world body. Significant, too, was the scaling down of the numbers insisted upon by Moscow from sixteen to "three or two," in addition to the USSR representation. As pointed out by one writer, this numerical shift and the illogical situation it created didn't seem to disturb the Kremlin negotiators who placed heavy credence in the new constitutional amendments that applied to all sixteen republics.[3]

This whole episode may be properly referred to under the caption of Sixteen-Three and Two, measuring the correlative resistance of the Allies and the Russian scaledown. From the sixteen of the previous year and into January of 1945, Moscow's objective was reduced to three or two by February and the Yalta Conference itself. Evidence furnished by Secretary of State Stettinius and others points to Roesevelt's firm resistance against the sixteen objective. He viewed this demand as inordinate, and one that logically justified a counter-proposal of forty-eight seats for the U.S., a parallelism which is subject to substantial question. However, in terms of his apparently limited understanding of the Soviet Union, Roosevelt felt that the geographical expanse and population of the USSR warranted two additional seats in the world organization. The account by one writer that the President came to Yalta with a determination to oppose even the two objectives seems weak in the light of sequential events.[4] It was at the Yalta Conference that Molotov, on February 7, 1945, formally raised the three and two formula, covering Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania.

Perhaps more than anything else Churchill's support of the Molotov proposal reduced the American resistance to the three and finally led to the acceptance of the two, namely Ukraine and Byelorussia. Quite understandably, the United States could hardly have settled for the three formula while continuing the recognition of the Lithuan-

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[2] *Istoriia sovietskoii konstitutsii: sbornik dokumentov, 1917-1957,* Moscow, 1957, pp. 405-406.

[3] Alexander Dallin. *The Soviet Union at the United Nationns...* New York, 1962, p. 107.

[4] Robert E. Sherwood. *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* revised edition, New York, pp. 856-857.

ian minister in Washington who was appointed by the previously free Lithuanian government. Parenthetically, at this date, if a move were made in the direction of establishing direct diplomatic relations with the non-Russian republics in the Soviet Union, the same issue would arise sooner or later. To be sure, a gradualist development could begin with the two Slavic non-Russian republics and, dependent on performance and events, shift toward the Caucasus and later into Central Asia before any serious consideration of the issue need be taken up in connection with the Baltic republics.

The conclusion of the main developments in this early episode was, of course, the invitation extended on April 30, 1945 by the executive committee of the San Francisco Conference to both Byelorussia and Ukraine to participate in the historic conference leading to the formation of the new world organization. Several days before this our new President, Harry S. Truman, had no moral choice but to state in his letter to the Secretary of State that "on this question President Roosevelt felt that the importance of the Ukraine and White Russia among the Soviet Republics and their contribution to the prosecution of the war and the untold devastation and sacrifices which their people have undergone in the cause of the United Nations entitled them to special consideration." Then, with this explanation, the President concluded, "In the loyal execution of the Conference of the obligation assumed on this question by President Roosvelt on behalf of the United States Government, I direct you to cast the vote of the United States in favor of the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as initial members of the International Organization."[5]

Following this early, foundational period, the remaining years of the 40's and the next two decades, overlapping even into this one, are marked by events and writings that indicate a continuity of interest and thought concerning the diplomatic status of the two non-Russian republics in the USSR and also the eligibility of the others in that federation of nations. For our purposes it isn't necessary to cite and relate each item supporting the continuity. The adequacy of the literary output will be shown in part here. Also for the events bearing on the subject, an economy in citation and reference will be observed to make the general point on continuity, as well as additional points that continually crop up when the subject is discussed.

A point frequently stressed in discussion of the subject is the legal status and substance of the two non-Russian republics' standing

[5] Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1945, p. 806.

in the international community as evidenced by their participations beyond mere membership in the U.N. A whole list of such participation can be provided for this period and beyond.[6] Not to belabor the point, it will logically suffice to indicate here the rapid extension of such participations in this early period. In the case of Ukraine, participation in a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties is seen in the treaty of 1944 with the Polish Provisional government on population evacuations, peace treaties in Paris, in 1947, with Romania, Italy, Finland, Bulgaria and Hungary, and the Danube convention in 1948.[7] Both Byelorussia and Ukraine were admitted to membership to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1945, and two years later Ukraine was elected to the Security Council of the U.N. Participations by both encompass also the Economic and Social Council, Human Rights, the ILO, UNESCO, Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency and so forth. However, it should be pointed out that there were treaties important to both republics, concerning with Poland, which were not signed by their representatives.[8]

By these and other evidences it appears that a de facto recognition base is involved, as several legal observers and analysts emphasize. But, on record, aside from the U.N. membership, the first direct approach to establish diplomatic relations with Ukraine at least was made by the British government in 1947. The British chargé d'affaires in Moscow made the overture through the USSR government, transmitting a request for the exchange of diplomatic representatives between his government and that of Ukraine. Evidently the matter rested there since the Moscow government took no action in the transmission of the offer and, in effect, denied the Ukrainian government this early opportunity for direct diplomatic representation.

The incident—and it cannot be regarded anymore than this in view of its spontaneity and lack of negotiating preparations—is often cited as "proof" that the Moscow government wouldn't permit any direct diplomatic relations with the two non-Russian republics. This may be, but one or even several such incidents, not to mention more carefully staged overtures, couldn't logically be accepted as "proofs."

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[6] One basic source is the United Nations *Yearbook*. The United Nations, New York.

[7] *UN Treaty Series* source, Vols. 42-49.

[8] *The New York Times*, New York, May 23, 1951.

Conditions and circumstances change, and this particular incident occurred during Stalin's tight reign.

The preceding developments produced an unmistakable impetus for growing private and official interest in the subject during the decade of the 50's. Highlighting this interest, the first was the hearing on the subject by a special subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the U.S. House of Representatives.[9] In 1953 both chambers of Congress had measures proposing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Byelorussia. It is enough to point out that the House hearing was conducted despite the negative comments on the proposal sent by the Department of State to Chairman Chiperfield of the Committee. Moreover, the special subcommittee, chaired by the Honorable Frances P. Bolton of Ohio, voted unanimously in favor of the resolution. It was never voted out by the full committee because of lack of time for consideration due to an early adjournment of Congress and a request by the Department of State to be allowed more time to study the subject in depth.

In this same period the subject of Ukraine and Byelorussia in all its relevant aspects emerged again in Senate hearings reviewing the United Nations Charter.[10] The extensive hearings naturally encompassed statements on the added voting issue, the putative parallelism between the republics in the USSR and the states of the U.S., the sovereignty of the two republics and so forth. While at the time Senator Lodge sought an additional vote in behalf of his Massachusetts, Senator Alexander Wiley felt that his Wisconsin should not be denied the same. Clearly, arguments that had been employed almost a decade before in connection with the U.N. membership of the two republics were now re-surfacing, and this not for the last time.

Toward the close of the decade the subject of direct diplomatic relations with the two republics was again revieved on Capitol Hill. In 1958, Representative Leonard Farbstein of New York, who was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, inquired of the State Department the availability of studied material on the subject. In his first reply to the Representative's inquiry, dated June 26, 1958, Assistant Secretary William B. Macomber transmitted a copy of the communication sent in 1953 by State to Mr. Chiperfield and reiterated some of the objections to the proposal. Apparently not satisfied with

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[9] *Favoring Extension of Diplomatic Relations With the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia.* Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, GPO, 1953, pp. 112.

[10] *Review of the United Nations Charter.* Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Part 12 in particular, GPO, 1955.

this, the Congressman pressed for the contents of the study that was to have been made following the Bolton hearing five hears ago, and received another reply from Macomber, dated August 1, 1958, to the effect that the "Department has no record of a study such as you described having been made subsequent to this time." The following year, on April 29, Representative Farbstein introduced H.J. Res. 355, proposing U.S. diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Byelorussia. Three months later Congress unanimously passed the Captive Nations Week Resolution, which Farbstein himself backed enthusiastically, and in the turbulent events that ensued, it was visely judged to shelve the measure temporarily.

Though writings on the subject continued, in the public forum the subject was not brought up again until the Senate hearings on the Consular Convention with the USSR at the beginning of 1967.[11] The hearings were on a convention that would apply the consular branch network to nations within a given multinational state. Without objection to its application with the R.S.F.S.R., including such cities as Leningrad and Vladivostok, the chief counter-argument on the premise of multinationalism offered the alternative of additional U.S. Embassies, not only in Minsk of Byelorussia and Kiev of Ukraine, but since so much emphasis was placed in the course of the hearings on "windows" in the USSR, also in Yerevan of Armenia and Alma Ata of Kazakh Turkestan. In other words, the subject of U.S. Embassies in the USSR was now extended from the two familiar ones to two additional non-Russian republics in geographically distanced areas.

Finally, in the remaining years down to the present, further examples of interest in the subject can be readily cited, with a few posited in the most unusual contexts of reference. Among a number in the literary and scholarly field is a work produced in Poland, which dwells on the sovereignty of Ukraine, its importance in East European developments, and its expanding participation in international affairs. The book partially touches base with several of the essential points referred to in this section. For instance, the author states: "The recent merit of Ukraine during the last war and her increasing economic importance after the war gave Ukraine its heightened importance among the nations of the world. At the conference in San Francisco she participated as one of the nations which founded the U.N. Ukraine took an active part in the Paris peace conference in

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11 *Consular Convention With The Soviet Union*. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, GPO 1967, pp. 150-155.

1946 and signed peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Finland. In 1948-1949 Ukraine was a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the UN."[12] Prior to the ouster of Nationalist China from the U.N., comments from both official and unofficial sources flowed in abudance with regard to the representation of Ukraine and Byelorussia in the world organization. Well a year before, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusets argued that Red China should be admitted into the United Nations on the same basis as that enjoyed by Byelorussia and Ukraine. This spurious argument, which defies the reality of distinct multinationalism in the case of the USSR republics, was repeated ad nauseum in popular media on the eve of the U.N. decision. One noted columnist put it this way: "One argument is that the Soviet Union, for example, has two of its 'provinces' in the international organization."[13] With this misconception of "provinces," another columnist projected it by saying "It even might eventually provide a basis for Nationalist representation in the UN on the same ground that Byelorussia and the Ukraine are represented along with the Soviet Union.[14]

No sooner had the Republic of China been ousted from the U.N., action was begun in the House of Representatives for the expulsion of Ukraine and Byelorussia from the U.N. The Burke resolution, submitted by Representative J. Herbert Burke of Florida and co-sponsored by several other colleagues at the beginning of November, 1971, called for exactly this. As a retaliation for the action taken by the U.N., the measure was rationalized by Burke in these words: "The Soviets claim that both the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR are separate states. However, according to our State Department's Soviet desk, the British Embassy's information office and the French Embassy's information office, these two integral states of the U.S.S.R. have not been sovereign since the 1918 revolution, have no separate diplomatic relations with any other state, nor conduct their own foreign relations separate from that of the U.S.S.R.'s."[15]

Interestingly enough, despite the publicity given to the Burke resolution and all that appeared in the *Congressional Record*, the measure failed to get off initial ground. The temper of Congress was

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[12] Ed. M. Karas, A. Podraz. *Ukraina — Teraźnicjszość i Przeszłość*. Jagielloński Uniwersytet, Kraków, Poland, 1970, p. 317.

[13] David Lawrence. "A New Detente Shaping Up in Asia?" August 16, 1971.

[14] Crosby S. Noyes. "U.S. Facing the Inevitable On U.N. China Seat?", *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., May 14, 1971.

[15] David Lawrence. "Rep. Burke's Impending Resolution," column, November 3, 1971.

such that at least a hearing on the resolution could have been obtained. On the basis of a number of inquiries into this, it appears in part that the possibility of a full-scale hearing on the entire issue of the two non-Russian republics in all its ramifications was to be avoided in view of overall developments concerning the relations of the U.S. with the USSR. How accurate or true this may be is also of little concern here. The facts are that a move was on to bring into question all the legal foundations for the presence of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian representatives in the U.N., including the injected point of directe non-recognition, and also that a counter-measure appeared in Congress the following month, apparently to bring all this to a head.

On December 2, 1971, Representative Clement Zablocki, a high-ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced H.J. Res. 994, calling for the extension of U.S. diplomatic relations with both Ukraine and Byelorussia. As the resolution specifies on a joint basis, "That it is the sense of the Congress that the Government of the United States in support of its policy of negotiation, peace, and undersanding among nations should proceed to establish direct diplomatic relations with the Governments of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and in the creation of posts of representation in the capitals of Kiev and Minsk, respectively, consistent with diplomatic procedure in such matters."[16] Now, with the new Burke resolution, a re-play in Congress is in the offing.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASE

Dealing either directly or indirectly with the question of the recognition of the non-Russian republics in the USSR, authoritative opinion in most cases gravitates toward what may be regarded as the constitutional base of the subject. In one way or another, constant reference is made to certain articles in the USSR constitution, and at times to those in the constitutions of the republics. Off-hand, one may preconceptually write all this off as vacuous wordage representative of the ideal but far from reality as concern the "sovereignty," "statehood" and "independence" of the non-Russian republics. Basing the preconception is, of course, the idea and fact of Russian political domination over these areas. But, in terms of historical process and activist references to provisions of constitutional law, such easy

[16] Joint Resolution Relating to United States Diplomatic Relations with the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia. H.J. Res. 994, 92d Congress, 1st Session.

prejudgment cannot explain the reality of the provisions themselves and historical forces that brought them into play, let alone any possible need for implementing these forces and converting the ideal into concrete reality in our interest as well as that of the nations involved. It may very well be, as Professor V.V. Aspaturian holds in his work on *The Union Republics on Soviet Diplomacy* (Geneva/Paris, 1960) that the principal function of the republics' foreign ministries are "ceremonial, ornamental and symbolic," but this obvious observation still does not bring us to grips with the nominal existence of the constitutional provisions and their underlying real causes, not to mention again the praxeological consideration of acting upon the choice available to us.

In view of all this, it becomes necessary to gain some insights into the background of real forces leading to the initial and earliest provisions in USSR's first constitution and then proceed to an examination of the articles themselves. This would thus bring into sharp focus relevant historical perspectives and several substantive legal observations. This same mode of analysis will be applied in the subsequent section. The pertinence and validity of such an approach are revealed in a highly interesting account of the so-called nationality question in the USSR.[17] As the writer states it at the very outset, "Not since the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks) in 1923 has so much attention been paid to the nationality question as at the recently ended Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, at which fulsome assurances of loyalty to the Russian 'elder brother,' coupled with calls for vigilance against 'nationalist' tendencies, were a major feature." At that early Congress the issues of centralism versus federalism, national rights versus vague autonomism, and even, in depth, Russianism versus non-Russianism were crystallized. But it was clearly not only at that Congress that these issues flared up and were heatedly controverted. In fact, the entire pre-constitution period was pronouncedly marked by sharp argument on these and other related issues, the echoes and strains of which resound in the very present.

The details of this pre-constitution background are diverse and voluminous, but the essentials are unmistakably clear and basically meaningful. On the whole, toward the formation of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bolsheviks, such as Stalin and Ordzhoni-

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[17] Panas V. Fedenko. "Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress Trains a Spotlight on Nationality Question." *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union.* Institute for the Study of the USSR. Munich. May 4, 1971.

kidze, favored centralism and not the kind of Union that eventually came to pass. Opposing this position and in part supporting the more liberal stance of Lenin were the non-Russian Communists from Ukraine, Georgia, Tatary and other non-Russian areas. Leaders such as Mykola Skrypnyk and Rakovsky of Ukraine, G. Aliev of Tatary, F. Makharadze of Georgia, and even the Russian Bolshevik Nikolai Bukharin advocated a flexible federalism in line with Lenin's revised views that upheld centralism in principle, to be shown particularly in foreign and military policies as an expression of unity, but also favored extensive rights to the non-Russian republics in all other spheres. The non-Russian advocates pleaded for understanding of the problem at the risk of an unleashed civil war, protested the planted Soviet administrations in their areas with colonizers and Russifiers, condemned the deviation to Great Russian chauvinism, and sought national equality in the building of communism.

In evaluating both the constitutional base and the subject of diplomatic recognition, it is vitally important to constantly bear in mind the real continuum of this conflict, seen among the "Old Bolsheviks" themselves and historically repeated and re-expressed in every decade down to the present one. The nominal content in the provisions of the constitutions of the USSR and the non-Russian republics, as well as that in the sphere of international law, is thus not a massive vacuity but rather a verbalized expression of the tug of war that has ceaselessly been conducted in this fundamental area. In this early period, it is therefore essential to note the forces that were at work and in play. As one excellent account shows, Stalin was the chief advocate for the subsumption of the Sovietized non-Russian republics within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, granting a vague autonomy and clearly denying a measure of national self-determination to the non-Russian nations.[18] "Autonomization" was the issue between Stalin and his followers and most of the leaders of the non-Russian CP's. Counter-proposals of all sorts were made, including the present federal union and the creation of "a Union of Soviet Republics as a confederative state."

As alluded to above, the ailing Lenin was forced to intervene against the subsumption or "autonomization" proposal advanced by Stalin. He was clearly against the subordination of the non-Russian republics and, in a letter to Kamenev, offered the solution of a "Formal association together with the RSFSR into a Union of Soviet

[18] Jurij Borys. *The Russian Communist Party and The Sovietization of Ukraine*, Stockholm, Sweden, 1960, p. 298.

Republics of Europe and Asia." As is generally accepted among scholars in the field, Lenin long waged a struggle against evidences of imperialist Russian chauvinism, and in a memorandum of October 6, 1922 stated, "I challenge Great Russian chauvinism to a mortal combat." His later characterization of Stalin as a sort of Russianized non-Russian is a matter of historical record. In this particular conflict on the formation of the Union and the nature of the constitution, he did not hesitate to propose that in the Union CIK (Central Executive Committee) "the chair should be held in turn by a Russian, a Ukrainian, a Georgian, etc. Absolutely."

Through a political process of argumentation, wrangling, and pressures of all sorts, those favoring the federal approach eventually won, and the name, "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was finally adopted. The originator of the name has not been definitively determined, but the evidence seems to point to the Ukrainian delegation at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December, 1922. Frunze, who was a member of the delegation, is purported to have said the name was "proposed by us." Documents from both the Seventh Congress of the Soviets of the Ukrainian SSR and the First Trans-Caucasian Congress of Soviets earlier that month mention the new name. The significance of all this is that despite the centralization that in fact did enuse, largely due to the preponderance of Russian members in the central controlling committees and the diluted delegations from the non-Russian republics, the nominal attainments nevertheless reflected the real contending forces and the compromises arrived at.

The USSR came into being by a "Treaty concerning the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" signed on December 30, 1922 and adopted on the same day by the First Congress of the Soviets of the Union SSR. The treaty itself furnished the main legal and political outlines of the new Union and the relationships to it of the Republics which at the time were the RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Trans-Caucasian Federation, all united into "one union state." Led by Skrypnyk, the Ukrainian Communists strove in the constitutional meetings to concretize the treaty's outlines along decentralist lines, even to the event of deleting the phrase "unite into one union state," that Stalin accused them of preference for a confederation. By this time Stalin was emphasizing the "federation of Republics, a single union state which unites the military, foreign affairs, foreign trade, and other affairs, a state whose existence does not reduce the sovereignty of separate Republics." In short, in the course of the early constitutional disputes Stalin and his followers upheld the

dominant right of the Union, meaning central Moscow leadership, to act before the outside world as a single state. The adopted constitution reflected this in large measure with the chief powers contralized in Union leadership at the expense of the republics. In the last analysis the heavy Russian representation on the commission, in the First Congress, and even sprinkled among the non-Russian delegations carried the day in terms of numbers and power, if not in principles grounded in equality. Nonetheless, the strides made by the non-Russian advocates cannot be minimized, particularly as concerns the basic structure and name of the USSR.

Numerous pertinent issues were continually controverted and contested in Party circles, in the two chambers of the USSR, and in all of the republics during the period preceeding Stalin's tyrannical reign. The Russian centralist, Larin, summarized it well at a Central Executive Committee of the Union meeting in April 1926 when he declared: "...if it had not been for Ukraine, if it had not been for its energetic raising of questions about a complete, precise, hundred per cent implementation of our line in the question of nationalities, the life and work also of other, less considerable, national Republics would have been put into a more difficult situation in the national respect. I know that the attitude to Skrypnyk's frequent speeches at the sessions of the CIK is sometimes somewhat sceptical... And yet, comrade Skrypnyk by this activity of his in particular and the whole of Ukraine in general perform an extremely useful work, because they wage daily a persistent struggle for the full recognition of that equality of rights of all cultures situated on our territory which [the equality of rights] constitutes one of the foundations of our order. But in order to realize such a state structure with equal national rights, it is necessary to overcome the internal and external Great Russian chauvinism which has come to us from the old [i.e. pre-revolutionary] time. When discussing the question of the activity of the Ukrainian Government, this first feature, this first manifestation of a particular state role of Ukraine must be... recognized and noted by us with gratitude."[19]

Logically and empirically, within the context of the whole political situation as portrayed here essentially and without the support of many other details, the above testimony on the part of a fervent but honest Russian centralist is powerful attestation to what transpired in this early period of the foundation of the USSR and the formula-

[19] *Sessija Centralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Sojuza SSR 3-go Sozyva Bjuleten'* No. 13. Moscow, 16, April 1926, pp. 12-13.

tion of its first constitution. In a sense, it was no accident that under Stalin's reign and the phase of Russification that swept the non-Russian, as well as sympathetic Russian supporters were brutally liquidated in the purges of that period. Projecting this fundamental political substratum, the second World War brought a reversal in Moscow's policy, with solicitous amendments to the '36 constitution in favor of the non-Russian republics, and it was not really until the mid-60's to the present that Russification again sets in serious proportions in the non-Russian republics. Those familiar with the cases of Chornovil, Moroz, the many Latvian Communists, and scores of others cannot but detect the same spirit and motivation for the preservation and extension of human and national rights that inspired the Skrypnyks, Rakovskys, Alievs, Makharadzes, Bukharins and others in the earliest period. Their pleas and also sacrifices in the form of current imprisonment are in the name of the provisions of the USSR constitution. In short, the continuum of the struggle between, plainly, Russian centralism and non-Russian decentralism and greater independence is quite clear, and could be documented at length.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES

Turning now to the relevant constitutional articles, it should be pointed out at the outset that this fundamental part of the subject is far more complicated than just a casual and even studied reading of the USSR constitution and those of the non-Russian republics would suggest. A careful examination of the pertinent articles reveals above all the nominal results of basic struggle depicted above. Indeed, they exist as a monumental confirmation of the struggle itself, with centralism stamped in conditional victory but all the aspects of decentralism, "sovereignty," "independence" and "statehood" of the non-Russian republics also stamped with potentiality and realizable hope. Briefly, the articles, their content and subjection to balanced interpretation simply cannot be fully understood and appreciated without the constant reminders and lessons of the real background, particularly of the pre-USSR period.

For our purposes the first important article in the USSR constitution is article 13. Listing the constituent republics of the Union, the article states: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state, formed on the basis of a voluntary union of equal Soviet Social-

ist Republics, namely:..."[20] Immediately, in the light of our previous discussion, there are three points in this first provision of the state structure that have laid the basis for extensive argumentation and dispute; specifically "a federal state," "voluntary union," and "equal." At times the sophistry employed by the USSR apologists and others is unparalleled. Concerning the second point, it can be handled with dispatch despite the lengths Soviet legalists go to show the voluntariness of the union. Just as in the case of the three Baltic countries in 1940, there was voluntary action for union once the free republics of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia and others in the early 20's were reduced by the Red Army and its native political collaborators. The crucial fact in these and similar cases is not the action following the communist takeovers but the takeovers by force themselves, and from this angle the union could scarcely be viewed "voluntary" in any true sense.[21]

As to the third point on "equal" republics, the term is used as carelessly and glibly as "voluntary." A virtual syllogism is habitually contained in the apologia of the Soviet legalists, who argue that with the base of volition shown in the construction of the USSR state, a measure of sovereignty was necessarily transferred to the Union and its organs, but, as intended in the original voluntary act, to preserve the fundamental sovereignty and mutual interests of the republics and thereby advance the collective interest and the equality of all. This type of circular thinking we shall observe again and again. However, even apart from the annihilation of the previously free republics, no matter how short their existence was, the struggle between largely Russian Bolsheviks and those of the non-Russian republics in itself demonstrated the lack of equality among the republics, which has manifested itself in numerous ways and societal spheres these past fifty years. Indeed, any denial by Moscow of permission for direct diplomatic relations by the non-Russian republics could properly be viewed as another manifestation of inequality in a total sense, regardless of the rationalization produced by the circular reasoning mentioned above.

Lastly, when it comes to the nature and character of this "federal state," all sorts of opinions have been expressed, depending on one's conception and definition of federalism. It is not intended here to

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[20] *Constitution of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.* American Russian Institute, New York, 1950, p. 8.

[21] *Ukraine.* Legislative Reference Service, The Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs Division, December 18, 1967, p. 8.

cover the range of these legal opinions, except to point out that the poles of the spectrum are a unitary state and a quasifederation. Be this as it may, relatively few seem to disagree with the observation that the "nationality principle at the basis of the creation of the Soviet Union State is the distinctive characteristic of the Soviet type federation."[22] This distinguishes it from other federal states. Moreover, sufficient authoritative opinion emphasizes the admixture of characteristics in this nationality arrangement of a confederation of states, a federation, and a unitary state because of its high centralization of powers.[23] In terms of the contemporary history of this area this characterization of the USSR is apt and conformable with the frictions, compromises, adjustments, and dictation that have punctuated its constitutional development.

[*To be Concluded*]

[22] Andrei Vyshinskii, Ed. *The Law of the Soviet State,* New York, 1948, pp. 228-29.

[23] E.g. John N. Hazard. *The Soviet System of Government,* Chicago, 1960.

DETENTE: WHO IS PROFITING BY IT?*

By ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

In the eyes of the world it is generally accepted that the Moscow summit conference of 1972 and the Washington summit conference of 1973 have reduced tension between the superpowers and diminished the likelihood of a senseless nuclear exchange which would annihilate mankind. Fresh in one's mind are the jovial scenes of General Secretary Brezhnev clowning at Washington receptions and embracing movie star Chuck Connors, culminating in a series of preliminary agreements of mutual cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the areas of arms limitations, science and technology, transportation, oceanography, agricultural research and development, civil aviation and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In the spirit of detente the leaders of both states have pledged to avert nuclear war.

The benevolent image portrayed by Brezhnev—his performance at one Washington reception prompted President Nixon to comment that Brezhnev was "the best politician in the room"—indicated to millions of American and Soviet television viewers that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had embarked on a new foreign policy: one of peaceful coexistence with the Free World in place of a policy based on subversion and expansionism (for a further discussion see Peter N. James, "A Systems Analysis of Detente," *Imprimis,* March 1974).

Detente has given rise in the United States to a whole range of expectations and interpretations concerning the future prospects of Soviet-U.S. cooperation for international stability, reductions in the threat of nuclear war and the burdens of defense and even of progressive convergence between systems. These expectations rest upon assumptions regarding the character of the Soviet leaders, their policies and priorities which go well beyond the specific commitments

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* This article was prepared a few months before our withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the Helsinki conference and the developments in Portugal and Angola, but the author's views on detente have all been borne out by subsequent events—*Editor.*

made by both governments in the agreements reached at Moscow in May, 1972, and in Washington in June, 1973.

It is interesting that the Soviets seldom use the world detente in reference to the new relationship, and do so almost exclusively in pronouncements and commentaries aimed at Western targets. The Soviets prefer their own term "peaceful coexistence," usually adding "between states with different social systems," thereby indicating not only the limits on their cooperation but also reflecting an underlying assumption of a dynamic international environment and of continuing an irreducible competition—the Soviet word is "struggle"—between the opposing systems. Unlike detente, "peaceful coexistence," as explained by the Soviets, does not assume or require the abandonment by either side of incompatible objectives. Its stated aim is not to maintain the *status quo* or to promote stability, but to facilitate changes favorable to the Sovie Union and its allies. The Soviets, therefore, see "peaceful coexistence" not only as a form of struggle with the West but also as a strategy of struggle aimed at achieving Soviet global objectives. Since the Soviet leadership has gone to great lengths to spell out what it means by "peaceful coexistence" and the limits of that concept as well as its implications for Soviet foreign policy, there is no reason, as Soviet spokesmen themselves point out, why the West should harbor any illusions about it, or persist in basing its expectations on different assumptions concerning Moscow's policies and actions.

Thus, according to *Pravda* (August 22, 1973), "Peaceful coexistence does not mean the end of the struggle of the two world social systems. The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between world socialism and imperialism will be waged right up to the complete and final victory of communism on a worldwide scale." And according to the authoritative collective study *Leninism Today,* "Peaceful coexistence does not extinguish or cancel out class struggle... it is a new form of class struggle employed by the working class and the socialist countries in the world arena. It cancels only one type of struggle—war as a means of settling international issues." Further, according to an authoritative 1972 study of the USSR Academy of Sciences, *Problems of War and Peace,* "As for the policy of peaceful coexistence, it rests on a system of principles that make it possible to avoid a major international conflict in the course of development of revolutionary processes in individual countries."

Moscow interprets United States movement toward the new relationship with the USSR, that is U.S. "acceptance of the principle of peaceful coexistence," as a result of, and a further step in, the

decline of the power and influence of the U.S. as against the USSR. Hardly had President Nixon left Moscow at the end of May, 1972 before the vast propaganda apparatus of the USSR was proclaiming that

> The strategic course of U.S. policies is now changing before our very eyes from 'pax Americana'... to a definite form of necessity for peaceful coexistence. We must clearly understand that this change is a *forced* one and that it is precisely the power —the social, economic, and ultimately, military power of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries—that is compelling American ruling circles to engage in an agonizing reappraisal of values (as quoted by Leon Goure, Foy Kohler and Mose Harvey in *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy,* University of Miami, 1974, XXIII).

Subsequently Soviet spokesmen explained that U.S. leaders had no choice but "to concern themselves with ensuring that U.S. foreign policy objectives, methods, and the doctrines for achieving them are proportionate to its dwindling resources," and that the new situation represented "a great victory for our Party and for all the Soviet people—an event of outstanding significance."

Yet much remains to be done, as emphasized by Brezhnev himself:

> We soberly and realistically evaluate the current situation. Despite the successes in relaxing international tension, a hard struggle against the enemies of peace, national and social liberation faces us. Marxist-Leninists do not entertain any illusions in relation to the anti-peoples essence of imperialism and its aggressive aspirations (*loc. cit*).

It is against this background that we must examine the question of whether the Soviet leadership is changing direction, together with the significance of Brezhnev's warning to Nixon in Moscow that the USSR would continue to strengthen its strategic forces in all ways not specifically prohibited by the SALT I agreement.

The Soviet development of a large strategic missile force has propelled the USSR from the status of a self-proclaimed besieged fortress in a so-called "capitalist encirclement" to the rank of a world superpower which it shares only with the United States. It has, according to Brezhnev's assertions of 1973 and 1974, "insured more

reliably than ever before... the security of the Soviet people." The nuclear-based might of the Soviet Union is said to have become a "mighty factor for preserving peace... a factor which objectively promotes the development of world revolutionary forces." (*ibid.*, p. 2).

Soviet public discussions indicate that the leadership has no thought of resting content with the present situation, but that it intends to press further and ever more decisive shifts in the balance of forces against the U.S. and in favor of the USSR. Thus while current agreements constrain the U.S., the USSR is free to advance the socialist cause, to intensify the struggle, and to support national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The basic Soviet line on detente was laid down in 1971 in an article by a secretary of the Soviet Party's Central Committee, Boris Ponomarev. Titled "Problems in the Theory of the World Revolutionary Movement," the article was published in the October 1971 issue of the Central Committee's house organ, *Kommunist*. The piece was apparently written after, and clearly under the impact of President Nixon's dramatic Phase I announcement on August 15, 1971. Using the collective plural throughout, presumably to indicate that he expresses the opinions of the Soviet leadership, Ponomarev updated the guidelines of the International Communist Conference of 1969 and of the 24th CPSU Congress of March/April 1971.

Ponomarev finds that the current global situation is "objectively" extremely favorable for the short-run expansion of the world revolutionary movement on the Latin American continent. For the middle-run, Ponomarev envisions equally favorable conditions in the industrialized capitalist countries. Reviewing the complexities of the Third World, he also sees new opportunities there, albeit over the more arduous long run. In sum, through the prism of Marxism-Leninism, Ponomarev perceives unprecedented opportunities for revolutionary action resulting from an increasingly grave economic and political crisis in the non-Communist world. His main worry seems to be whether Communist parties—Soviet-oriented, of course—are subjectively capable of exploiting these opportunities. Therefore he gives them considerable advice on how to improve their organizational and political capabilities in the true and tested Soviet-approved way.

Ponomarev has been in charge of overseeing foreign Communist parties since 1955. He is one of Brezhnev's most trusted associates. He believes that economic crises in the West, particularly in the United States, will lead to severe political crises. His projections of doom for the West certainly go beyond the projection made at the 24th Soviet Party Congress of 1971. Ponomarev predicts that these political crises,

will favor "the development of the revolutionary process in the capitalist countries" to a point where "any sharp political crisis, whether domestic or international, or a sharp class conflict may become the drop which will make the cup overflow and create a revolutionary situation." (Senate Judiciary Committee, "Detente and the World Revolutionary Process," Washington, 1972, p. 5).

After a detailed examination of Ponomarev's article, several conclusions appear inescapable.

One: Professor Ponomarev means it when he proclaims "an increased role of the Communist Parties in the world revolutionary movement" as a corollary of his highly optimistic evaluation of global crisis situations.

Two: The importance of Communist Parties to the Soviet party government is, as always, in direct relation to their orientation toward Moscow. If Moscow "fears" the ascent to power of unfriendly Communist Parties, it is not likely that Moscow will wait without taking "decisive steps." Given its expectations, it is more likely that the Soviet Party government will attempt to strengthen its influence among Communist Parties now, particularly in order to see to it that the opportunities arising from revolutionary and other situations are not missed.

Three: The projections of shifts in the global balance of power through—gradual or more immediate—Communist take-overs have a significant bearing on the detente policy of the Soviet Union. Depending on the tempo of the world revolutionary process, the Soviet Union may lose interest in pursuing such a course altogether. Ponomarev's article does not indicate that the Soviet leadership is envisaging a left turn at this moment. It seems probable, therefore, that the Soviet leadership estimates it may continue with its detente policies without risk of weakening the Soviet position. Whatever compromises should become necessary, in the Marxist-Leninist view the prospects are that the Soviet Union will be able to take what it gives, and with considerable profit at that. As a minimum, the Soviet regime's perception of a grave crisis situation in the camp of its opponents should reduce its willingness, if any, to bail them out.

Whether or not Ponomarev's political estimate is realistic, is another question. The Soviet military may take exception to the optimistic projection of revolutionary take-overs abroad, and consider it one-sided. Some Communist Parties in Western Europe may feel that the Soviet party is conjuring up revolutionary situations as a pretext to tighten control over them. Nevertheless, Ponomarev's re-

markable outspoken formulations provide a rather precise reading of the current attitudes of Soviet leaders. (*ibid.*, p. 10).

Three years later, Ponomarev, now a candidate member of the Politburo, declared at a meeting of European Communists in Warsaw in mid-October (1974) that "at present the Communist parties have greater possibilities and strength than ever before to exert an influence on the course of developments in Europe." He mentioned specifically a rallying of leftist forces in France and Italy.

Ponomarev attributed this both to "the present deepening of the general crisis of capitalism" and to "the dynamism" and political, economic and social successes of the socialist countries. "The conditions of detente have made it possible to unfold more freely and broadly the class struggle for economic and political rights of the workers."

Ponomarev welcomed "outstanding political events in Portugal and Greece, where prospects have been opened for democratic development." He also noted that a struggle was developing in Spain.

"In recent years, left-wing forces have been rallying in France and Italy," and he went on to speak of "considerable achievements" of the West German, Danish and "a number of other fraternal parties."

He said that the projected European Communist conference could contribute to merging the "socialist countries, the working class, all the working people and the democratic and peace-loving forces of Europe into one mighty torrent. Uniting with other left-wing forces and movements, the Communists are forcing their bourgeois opponents to retreat all the time." (*New York Times,* Oct. 26, 1974).

On October 22nd, 1974, the Soviet's leading ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, declared that detente was working to the benefit of the USSR. Economic crises in the West, he said, contributed to strengthened positions for Communist and leftist groups in several European countries, notably Portugal and Greece (*New York Times,* Oct. 23, 1974).

So much for the Soviet view of detente, or "peaceful coexistence." Nor has this view changed over the years. The detente of Brest-Litovsk was followed by War Communism. The detente of "socialism in one country" was followed by the "left turn" of the 6th Comintern Congress of September, 1928. The detente of the united front was followed by the Hitler-Stalin pact. The detente of the period 1941 to 1945 was followed by the rape of eastern Europe. The post-World War II detente was followed by the Greek war, the Czech coup d'etat, the Berlin blockade, and the Communist take-over of mainland China. The detente of the Stockholm Peace Appeal was followed by the Korean war. The detente of the Spirit of Geneva (1955) was followed

by the Soviet penetration of Egypt, then Iraq and Syria. This was followed by the Soviet-supplied Hanoi invasion of South Vietnam. In 1956 the Soviets invaded Hungary. President Kennedy's initiative towards detente, including the 1961 meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, was followed by the Cuban missile crisis. The detente of early 1967 was followed by the June war in the Middle East. The "Spirit of Glassboro" was shattered by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Tet Offensive, including the Hue massacre. Unilateral U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam was followed by the Easter Offensive of 1972, and the Nixon attempt at detente later that year ended with the October 1973 war. One has to have a perspective about these matters.

In view of the basic character of the Soviet regime and its internal policies, it was fatuous to have expected Soviet foreign policy to undergo a basic change. Communism is a dynamic creed. For its devotees to acknowledge that there is no enemy to be thwarted, that no further victories beckon beyond the horizon, would mean to renounce their faith. As a practical consequence the Kremlin after such an admission could no longer aspire to the leadership of the world Communist movement. But even more important, as Ulam points out in his *Expansion and Coexistence* (Praeger, 2nd ed., 1974, pp. 728-9) "is the fact that the whole logic of internal repression has always rested on the real or alleged foreign threat." Admit that "not merely coexistence but friendship is possible between the USSR and America, and how will you contend with your people's clamor for more rights and benefits for the citizen and the consumer?" (*ibid.*, p. 729). The past several years have seen a steady reimposition of strict controls over cultural life by a systematic repression of any sources of dissent. Soviet foreign policy since 1967 might be characterized as New Foreign Policy (NFP), no more capable of being maintained for a long time, no more compatible with the essence of the Soviet system than was the New Economic Policy proclaimed by Lenin in 1922, which came to an inglorious end in 1928.

The "basic principles" of the Nixon-Brezhnev detente (May 1972) committed both sides to the following:

1) Prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations.
2) Do their utmost to avoid military confrontations.
3) Recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.

4) Have a special responsibility... to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions.
5) Make no claims for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of states. (*Department of State Bulletin,* June 26, 1972, pp. 898-9).

According to one highly placed U.S. official, these self-denying ordinances were specifically applicable to the Middle East, and were understood to mean that it "should not be an area over which there should be confrontation between us." (Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, *Department of State Bulletin,* April 23, 1974, p. 485). The May 1972 Charter of Detente was taken quite seriously, at least on the U.S. and Israeli sides. It entered into their calculations on the chances of another Arab-Israeli conflict and significantly tipped the balance in favor of an optimistic assessment of the prewar situation. If the May 1972 summit meeting was the euphoric expression of detente, the Arab attack on Israel in October 1973 was the acid test of its genuineness.

Not since Franklin D. Roosevelt has an American President had more cause to regret a public expression of confidence in the good faith of the Soviet leadership.

There had been second thoughts on detente in the U.S. and Europe well before the October war. There were even doubts about SALT I, hailed by Mr. Kissinger as an "agreement without precedence in history." There was adverse comment on what some British wits called the Great Grain Robbery, which was welcomed three years ago by Secretary of State Rogers for its "beneficial effect on our balance of payments."

Nixon's and Kissinger's speeches about "generations of peace" and Soviet willingness "to cooperate in establishing an international system in which participants would operate with a consciousness of stability and permanence" seemed already a little out of date by September, 1973. But if the first euphoria was over, it was widely assumed in Washington that if the Soviets were insisting that "ideological war" would continue, this was no more than the ritual incantation of professional cold warriors which would not have the slightest effect on the pragmatic, businesslike and, on the whole, peaceful Soviet leadership.

If the Administration thought in early October that war in the Middle East was not imminent, despite some alarming intelligence reports, it was largely because of the assumption that without sub-

stantial Soviet support the Arabs would not be able to move very far. To Washingon, it was unthinkable for the Russians to allow a situation to arise—let alone deliberately foment it—which would jeopardize all the progress that had been made during the past two years in U.S.-Soviet relations. If the Russians knew that there would be war in the Middle East, surely they would inform Washington. A common effort would be made to prevent war, and if that should be impossible, to limit the fighting and bring it to a speedy end.

These comforting beliefs collapsed within a few hours on Oct. 6, 1973, not because of an intelligence failure or some tactical miscalculation, but because it had become the fashion in Washington to attribute aims to Soviet detente policy which were apparently quite unreal. Though many American policymakers dimly realized that their concepts of detente and peaceful coexistence were not quite identical with Soviet views about these subjects, they were not aware of the extent of the differences.

At the outbreak of war, the Soviet Union had some 4,000 military advisers in Egypt and Syria; unless these men were both blind and deaf, they must have known for several months about the preparations for a major war. Furthermore, according to the Soviet defense treaty with Egypt, Sadat was obliged to consult with the Russians, and the evidence indicates that he did, on or about Sept. 22. According to the Egyptian press, Sadat and Brezhnev exchanged urgent messages which, it later emerged, dealt with the Egyptian attack. Mr. Brezhnev raised no objections.

We do not know, and we may not know for a long time to come, whether the Soviet Union actually encouraged Sadat and the Syrians to attack.

The Soviet Union did not prevent the war (as it had done on at least two previous occasions) by telling the Egyptians that no new military supplies would be forthcoming. Lastly, the Russians did not inform Washington about the war preparations as they should have under the accord of 1972. Some observers in Washington believe that the Soviet Union was reluctantly dragged into the conflict. It is, of course, possible that the Soviet Union gave 5,000 tanks—more than can be found in the whole of NATO Europe—unwillingly and grudgingly. It is just thinkable that it supplied the world's most effective anti-aircraft system with a heavy heart and under protest and that it provided *à contre coeur* and *la mort dans l'âme* all those Saggers and Strelas and Frogs which no one else ever got before; it is conceivable that it was kicking and screaming while giving all-out political support to the Arabs. All this is possible, though for many reasons

a little difficult to imagine; what matters in the last resort is only the fact that they acted as they did.

Once the war had broken out, the Soviet Union was in no hurry to cooperate with Washington in ending it; the Soviet initiative came only on Oct. 20, when the tide of battle had turned in favor of the Israelis and Mr. Kissinger had been urgently called to Moscow.

During the first days of the war, the Soviet Union called on countless governments in the Middle East and Africa to give full support to Syria and Egypt in their struggle "against a treacherous enemy." Western diplomats in Moscow, inquiring about the fate of detente, were told that these Soviet appeals had been defensive measures, an effort to get others to help the Arabs so the Russians could fend off designs to involve them more directly in the war. By the same token, the declarations in the Soviet press (and by Mr. Brezhnev himself on Nov. 9) encouraging the Arabs to use the oil weapon against the West could be explained as a sincere concern on the Kremlin's part to see Americans return to a simpler and healthier way of life, not to overheat their apartments and to take longer walks.

Soviet behavior during the 1973 crisis can be seen in this light, but it is not the only possible interpretation; hence the crisis of confidence triggered by the war. In the end, Mr. Kissinger and the Soviet leaders did get together and an armistice was imposed in record time, but it is difficult to be impressed by the outcome. Crisis management in Stalin's days (the Berlin blockade) and the Khrushchev era (Cuba) had functioned equally well, after all. The benefits of detente were not readily obvious in resolving a conflict which should not have occurred in the first place.

Whatever its other consequences, the Middle East war has certainly contributed to a more realistic understanding of Soviet policy and the scope of detente. True, some observers regard the Middle East conflict as unique, in the sense that they see it as the one major unresolved issue between East and West. Once a settlement was reached in this region, the two superpowers could settle down to a prolonged period of constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation. Such optimism rests on a misreading of the situation: Soviet behavior in the crisis was not the exception—it was the rule. No settlement has been reached yet in the Middle East; the Russians want peace in this area only on their own terms. They want to gain a strong foothold in any future Palestinian state, pre-empting Chinese influence and gaining another base from which to perpetuate Arab

dependence on the Soviet Union, just in case there is peace one day between Israel and Egypt, and Sadat veers to the West.

Furthermore, one should not overrate the degree of stability in international relations. The interests of the superpowers clash in the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, Europe and Africa—everywhere, in fact, but Eastern Europe and the Western hemisphere, which seem to be tacitly exempted. The Arab-Israeli conflict was perhaps the most acute of the dangers threatening detente, but one could easily think of half a dozen crisis situations which may suddenly erupt. Nor is a sudden war or civil war the only threat to detente. If the Soviet Union were to emerge as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf or Western Europe, as the result of a gradual process, it is easy to imagine the consequences for the United States. Even if the Soviet Union shared America's desire to prevent the eruption of new crises, it is by no means certain that it could do so. For this reason, the recent confrontation between the superpowers over the Arab-Israeli dispute has not been in all probability the last of its kind—and probably not even the sharpest—in our time (see analysis of Walter Laquer, "Detente: What's Left of It?", *New York Times Magazine,* Dec. 16, 1973, pp. 27, 98).

The advocates of detente are wrong in assuming that a lengthy period of peaceful coexistence will bring irreversible internal changes in the Soviet system, that the Soviet leadership has become largely guided by enlightened self-interest and that American leaders can influence Soviet policy by strengthening the hand of the Soviet "pragmatists" against their doctrinaire rivals. They are wrong in assuming that the age of superpowers is drawing to an end, to be replaced by a new "pentagonal balance," and that under the new dynamic relationships in the world, power will no longer translate itself automatically into influence. (The new five-sided world order that President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger saw emerging in 1974 included the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, Europe and Japan as the pillars. It might have been more realistic to replace Europe and Japan with Kuwait and Abu Dhabi).

What then remains of the prospects of detente? The short and honest answer is not much, except the usual machinery for crisis management. In the military field, there is the hope that the Soviet leaders can be persuaded that an equilibrium of sorts in strategic weaponry can be accepted indefinitely, preferably at a lower level of military preparedness—an aim which SALT I failed to achieve. But should that happen, conventional military forces will regain much of

their importance, and in this respect the West will be negotiating from a position of weakness.

Prospects are little better in the economic field. The record clearly shows that the Soviet government needs our economic assistance. They are in dire need of long-term loans and scientific and technological expertise to uplift a sagging economy. They need automotive equipment in the agricultural field, computers, instrumentation and advanced machinery to improve production and the quality of consumer goods. They need guidance in the management of production schedules, manpower and the transportation of materials. They have yet to solve complex problems of mass producing automobiles and trucks and the development of synthetics, cement and catalysts needed in the chemical fields. In spite of an efficient espionage network, some secrets stolen from the West cannot be incorporated effectively into the Soviet military-industrial complex because the Soviets also need experienced capitalists from the West to help them, if only temporarily.

Statistics released by the U.S. Department of State and other sources show that in the Soviet Union today about thirty percent of their labor force is involved in agriculture, yet each farmer produces only enough food to feed about four to five persons annually. By comparison, about four percent of the American labor force is engaged in agriculture, but the average American farmer produces enough food to feed about forty-eight persons annually. In other words, when measured in terms of annual food output per farmer, the United States is producing food about ten times more efficiently than the Soviet Union. This is the other reason why three-quarters of the Soviet Union is closed to tourists; they do not want the world to see widespread food shortages under the Communist system, let alone the *Gulag Archipelago* described by Solzhenitsyn. It also explains why the Soviet government purchased four hundred million bushels of wheat, two hundred million bushels of corn, and forty million bushels of soybeans from the United States in 1972; this was the one billion dollar grain deal engineered by shrewd Russian negotiators and spawned by bureaucratic neglect, secrecy and a desire by U.S. government officials to make detente work, regardless of its adverse effects on the American economy.

One reason for the failure of Soviet domestic programs is that since World War II the Soviets have expended a disproportionate share of their national income on defense and military affairs. Though the Soviet gross national product is roughly half of ours, they are currently spending more on defense than we are. (The United States'

annual defense budget is currently about eighty billion dollars). By pursuing a defense-oriented policy for several decades, the Soviets now find themselves in need of foreign economic assistance.

It is now worth examining the publicized and unpublicized aspects of the Soviet defense program, and how it relates to their foreign policy and detente. A very strong case can be made that the Soviets gave up nothing when General Secretary Brezhnev signed the SALT Agreement with President Nixon during the Moscow summit of 1972. U.S. representatives, through secrecy, negligence, and stupidity, negotiated away our national security during the early 1970's by limiting the United States from deploying additional strategic weapons while permitting the Soviets to continue their massive arms build-up. For example, during the late 1960's the Soviets were deploying about two hundred to two hundred fifty intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) per year, but Leonid Brezhnev did not sign the SALT agreement until May of 1972 when the Soviets had deployed about 50 percent more land-based ICBM's than the United States. According to the agreement, the Soviets are permitted to deploy 1,618 land-based ICBM launchers compared to 1,054 for the United States. U.S. negotiators argued that we could afford to grant the Soviets an edge in numbers of ICBM launchers because the United States was technologically superior to the Soviets in areas such as missile accuracy and the deployment of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, the so-called MIRV's, which allow as many as ten or more nuclear warheads to be carried on a missile and, upon command, can direct each warhead to a separate target. Though the Soviets lag behind the United States in missile technology today, knowledgeable experts concede that by the late 1970's the Soviets will have closed the technology gap because of their first-rate research and development effort. In effect, our SALT negotiators have assured the Soviets strategic superiority in the missile field.

Our negotiators mistakenly assumed that the Soviets will not have a reliable MIRV system operational until the late 1970's. The record shows that on January 28, 1974 the Soviets test-fired a MIRV into the Pacific Ocean, and it is known that their weapons are currently capable of delivering nuclear warheads which are 1,250 times more powerful than the Hiroshima atomic bomb to within one mile of the designated U.S. target.

There is another disturbing aspect of the SALT agreement which must be made public at this time. When President Nixon signed the SALT agreement in St. Vladimir Hall, the Executive Office and the U.S. intelligence community were aware that the Soviets were design-

ing their land-based ICBM launch silos so that they could be used over again. The public and United States senators, however, were never informed of this fact, and the illusion was created during this political year that SALT represented a slowdown in the Soviet arms build-up, when there was nothing further from the truth. Compared to the U.S. land-based ICBM force of 1,054, designed on the basis of one ICBM per launcher, the Soviets are expected to have up to 4,000 operational land-based ICBM's by the late 1970's and these missiles can be launched from the 1,618 launchers which are permissible under the SALT agreement. With the reusable launchers and a MIRV capability, the Soviets will be able to deliver well over 10,000 nuclear warheads to U.S. targets—a reign of terror more deadly than the *Gulag Archipelago* described by Solzhenitsyn. Compared to U.S. missiles, by the end of this decade, Russian ICBM's will be capable of carrying still larger warheads, more MIRV's, and more decoys to foil U.S. defenses and more on-board protective shielding to prevent them from being destroyed. And this can be achieved without violating the terms of the SALT agreement (see analysis of Peter N. James, "A Systems Analysis of Detente," *Imprimis,* March, 1974).

Americans in rising numbers are growing apprehensive over the steadily expanding export of U.S. advanced technology and industrial know-how to the Soviet Union. What the critics are charging is that this aspect of detente is giving the Russians significant military and economic gains, while the United States is getting very little—if anything—in return.

In Congress and across the nation, the feeling is widespread that America is giving away the main advantage it still has left over the Communist superpower—technological superiority—and is financing this "giveaway" with loans underwritten by U.S. taxpayers.

One complaint: that acquisition of American "high technology" products such as computers, sophisticated electronic equipment and scientific instruments is adding a new dimension to the Soviet Union's massive program of weapons development. Another: that American help in building up Soviet industry—in such huge enterprises as the Kama River truck-manufacturing project—is easing internal pressures on the Kremlin while laying the groundwork for competition that in the long run could cost American jobs.

Faced with mounting criticism of the course being taken by U.S.-Soviet trade, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger—who with Richard Nixon achieved the "breakthrough" with the Kremlin—maintains that detente, with trade as a key element, is essential to avert the threat of a nuclear holocaust in today's world. Other officials who

support present trade policies argue that U.S. Government safeguards—and the hard-nosed common sense of American businessmen who deal with the Russians—are sufficient to protect this country's technological advantage. But there is far from a united front even within the Government.

The Defense Department, for example, has frequently protested specific trade deals with Russia and, according to Senator Henry M. Jackson (Dem.) of Washington, has been overruled 59 times on protests against shipments of what it considered to be material of military significance. Nine instances involved U.S. companies; 50 involved non-American companies in Allied nations which belong to the Coordinating Committee, formed in 1949 to keep strategic and military items out of Communist hands.

The Pentagon protests led to an amendment, sponsored by Senator Jackson, to the Defense Procurement Act for fiscal year 1975, which was signed into law by President Nixon on August 5, 1974—three days before he resigned. The amendment gives the Secretary of Defense a much stronger voice in deciding what military or strategic material must be withheld from the Soviets. Critics insist that the Jackson amendment should be viewed as only the first step toward a tighter system of export controls.

A foreign-policy task force of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, under the chairmanship of Eugene V. Rostow, former Under Secretary of State, asserts that "the economy of the United States —as distinct from some individual business interests—has little to gain from an expansion of trade with the Soviet Union."

But, the task force declares, "the Soviet Union has a great deal to gain from trade with the United States... both to raise the standard of living of its people, and to obtain for its military program some of the advanced technology it has been unable to develop itself—in the field of computers, for example."

George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, charges that trade with the Russians has turned into "a giveaway program—a welfare program for the Soviet Union." Mr. Meany and others point out that the Export-Import Bank, which is funded by the U.S. Treasury, has granted since early 1973 loans totaling about 469 million dollars to help finance 15 major contracts between American firms and the Soviet Union.

Production facilities being developed in Russia under these contracts include the Kama River truck complex, ammonia and fertilizer plants with pipelines, tank cars, port facilities and storage at both plants and ports, production lines to pelletize iron-ore waste for use

in making steel and plants and production facilities to turn out flywheels, pistons, clutch valves and machine friction drums.

In addition to contracts with Export-Import Bank financing, there are many more. American exports to Russia, which totaled only 162 million dollars in 1971, more than tripled to 547 million in 1972, and doubled again to nearly 1.2 billion in 1973—when sales of U.S. wheat, corn and soybeans accounted for 860 million.

Cooperation agreements—to which no monetary value has yet been affixed—include:

* Lockheed Aircraft—navigation systems, oceanographic apparatus, medical electronics and air-traffic-control systems.
* Armco Steel—metallurgical, chemical and oil-field equipment.
* Monsanto—computers for use in production of chemical and rubber-compound products.
* Control Data Corporation—computer equipment.
* International Telephone & Telegraph — telecommunications, electronic and electromechanical components, consumer products and scientific and technical data.
* Stanford Research Institute—a wide range of scientific, technological and economic activity.
* General Dynamics—ships, telecommunications, aircraft and microfilm equipment.

The charge is made that much of the American scientific and technical output to which the Russians are gaining access has military applications.

For example, says a congressional source, most of the oscilloscopes—devices which measure the properties of various materials—now in Soviet laboratories are American-made. The source adds: "These are extremely important to high technology with military application."

One area of special concern to those monitoring the flow of U.S. technology to Russia is "avionics"—the sophisticated items that go into the "black boxes" of missiles and aircraft—lumped, technically, under the name "semiconductors." Included are electronic gear for control and guidance of missiles, electronic countermeasures to protect aircraft, and precise navigational equipment.

The role of the Export-Import Bank in U.S.-Soviet trade is coming under increasingly sharp criticism. Mr. Meany, for instance, asserts:

> This bank was originally set up to encourage American exports by making loans available to foreign buyers. In this way it was supposed to promote American sales and jobs. But what it is doing now is subsidizing overseas production that will hurt American exports and employment, and one of the prime beneficiaries is the Soviet Union.

The AFL-CIO chief noted that Export-Import Bank loans to the Soviets have been made, for the most part, at 6 percent interest, with a small proportion at 7 percent. This, he declared, is "an economic-aid program," not to an undeveloped nation but to a superpower. He added:

> The prime rate in the United States now is 12 percent. We have been lending hundreds of millions, however, to the Soviet Union at a time when millions of hard-working Americans cannot get mortgage money to buy a home.

Mr. Meany pointed out that one Export-Import Bank loan of 180 million dollars was made to help the Russians produce nitrogen fertilizer. He commented:

> In other words, if we are short of fertilizer, then instead of investing in fertilizer plants at home, we invest in fertilizer plants in the Soviet Union, so they can export and sell fertilizer to us.

The Coalition for a Democratic Majority hoists a warning signal against the Soviet proposal to export large quantities of oil and natural gas to the United States if America provides the necessary technology and capital. The task force headed by Mr. Rostow declares:

> It would be politically and economically unwise for us to become dependent on significant amounts of energy whose flow could be shut off any day by the Soviets—as it was recently by the Arabs on Soviet prodding.

The task force holds that "there is no need to pay a political price or an economy subsidy" for materials available for export by the Soviet Union. The argument made is that "the strong Soviet need for dollars and other Western currencies will keep them exporting" their salable commodities.

Also, says the Rostow group, "the Soviet Union will continue to need Western technology, large amounts of capital, equipment and know-how of the widest variety on a large scale so long as its basic

policy is to concentrate so much of its resources on military expenditures."

Reinforcing Mr. Meany's arguments, the Rostow task force warns: "The Soviet acquisition of advanced Western technology and large sums of capital may enable them to utilize their tightly controlled and economically exploited labor force to compete unfairly with American labor and business in ways that will adversely affect our entire economy."

Senator Jackson has emphasized repeatedly his concern about Soviet moves to make massive use of American know-how in the manufacture of large aircraft. He declared in a Senate speech:

> The Soviets have asked all three of our wide-bodied jet manufacturers to build a large-capacity aircraft-manufacturing complex for the quantity production of wide-bodied transport aircraft.
>
> This aircraft-manufacturing complex would be more advanced than anything in the United States.
>
> It would produce in one place everything from the airframe and the engine to the fasteners.
>
> No such integrated aircraft-manufacturing complex now exists anywhere in the world. The aircraft it would produce would be 60 percent faster, carry 25 percent more, and fly 20 percent farther than the world's now largest wide-bodied jet, the 747.
>
> The production rate of this plant would be approximately equal to the total annual production of all three of our wide-bodied jet manufacturers.

Production of computers is another field in which Senator Jackson sees dangers. His contention:

> Recently one of our largest computer companies signed a protocol of intent with the Soviet Union which calls for the joint development of the next generation of large high-speed computers.
>
> In addition, this protocol calls for the American company to create a plant for manufacturing this new computer and for manufacturing the most modern peripheral devices. This plant, in the usual Soviet style, would be one of the largest in the world.
>
> This venture, if allowed, would not only create, full-blown, a most serious competitor for our overseas computer sales, but

it also would, by moving the Soviets 10 years into the future, enormously upgrade their military potential across the board.

Still another source of worry to Senator Jackson and those who share his critical views is Soviet interest in integrated circuits, which miniaturize electronic gear of all kinds. They were developed by the U.S. Air Force for its Minuteman missile program.

A committee of the U.S. and its allies, which passes on export of strategic goods to the Communists, permitted France to build an integrated-circuit plant in Poland and to train Polish technicians to operate it.

More recently, according to Senator Jackson, a U.S. firm contracted with a Soviet-bloc country to set up a complete "turnkey" production line to make integrated circuits for hand calculators. The Senator said:

> The production of integrated circuits for hand calculators sounds like an ordinary commercial transaction. But it has implications far beyond that.
>
> Because the technology lies not in the circuits but in the production line, such a production line with at most minor changes, can produce almost the entire range of circuits in military applications.

The Soviet Union's pressing need for U.S. and other Western technology was stressed in recent congressional testimony by William E. Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Russia's "technological gap," he said, "is an across-the-board one, from intercontinental-ballistic-missile systems to electric razors."

The Soviets, Mr. Colby added, thus have a special need to trade more with the United States, "especially for high-technology products." The CIA director added, however, that if trade relations with the U.S. were broken, the Russians "could find most of what they want in Western Europe and Japan."

That latter point, often cited by protrade advocates, carries little weight with critics who maintain that the U.S. is giving too much away in trade deals that narrow the technology gap, help Russia's productivity and bolster its military position.

If anyone should have prepared for the pitfalls of detente, it was Mr. Kissinger. For about a dozen years before he went to Washington to serve President Nixon, he had been a stern and unsparing critic of anything that smacked to him of "illusions" about detente. (*The*

Necessity for Choice, 1961, p. 204; *The Troubled Partnership,* 1965, p. 217).

In the first book, published in 1957, with which he attracted widespread attention, Professor Kissinger expressed a certain distaste for, or anxiety about, "peaceful coexistence, the term then in vogue. He twice found it necessary to instruct the reader that "peaceful coexistence" meant for Soviet leaders nothing more than "the most effective offensive tactic" and "the best means to subvert the existing structure by means other than all-out war." It was good Leninist doctrine, he patiently explained, that the Soviets, so long as the relationship of forces was not in their favor, should keep "provocation below the level which might produce a final showdown." (*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1957), pp. 142-43, 350).

Four years later, in 1961, Professor Kissinger was worried most about the Western tendency to see a Soviet turn from belligerency to detente as evidence of far more than a change of tactics. "But," he cautioned, "one of the principal Communist justifications for a detente can hardly prove very reassuring to the free world; peace is advocated not for its own sake but because the West is said to have grown so weak that it will go to perdition without a last convulsive upheaval." As for the Western attitude, he observed disapprovingly that "all the instincts of a status quo power tempt it to gear its policy to the expectations of a fundamental change of heart of its opponent" and to the imminence of "a basic change in Communist society and aims." Americans, he thought, were especially susceptible to the belief that all problems were soluble and that "there must be some way to achieve peace if only the correct method is utilized." In this work he was especially censorious of President Eisenhower's "ambulatory" personal diplomacy which inspired him to lay down the general rule that "whenever the Communist leaders have pressed for a relaxation of tensions they have tied the success of it to personalities." (*The Necessity for Choice,* pp. 178-81, 194-95).

After four more years, in 1965, Professor Kissinger had some more pungent things to say about the American tendency to think of detente in terms of personal relations. It was "futile," he repeatedly stressed, to engage in "personal diplomacy" with the Soviets "even at the highest level," for one reason because their leaders were committed to a belief in the predominance of "objective" factors. Whenever Soviet leaders "have had to make a choice between Western goodwill and a territorial or political gain," he maintained, they "have unhesitatingly chosen the latter." If the Soviets seem to make "concessions," they make them "to reality, not to individuals." He noted that

there have been five Soviet periods of "relaxation" since 1917, all of which had come to an end for the same reason—"when an opportunity for expanding Communism presented itself." (*The Troubled Parthnership,* pp. 192, 197-98).

As late as 1968, the year before he went to Washington, Professor Kissinger was still of much the same mind about past detentes. "During periods of detente," he observed sharply, "each Western ally makes its own approach to Eastern Europe or the USSR without attempting to further a coherent Western enterprise." He summed up the entire process in a way that is still instructive: "Each detente was hailed in the West as ushering in a new era of reconciliation and as signifying the long-awaited final change in Soviet purposes. Each ended abruptly with a new period of intransigence, which was generally ascribed to a victory of Soviet hardliners rather than to the dynamics of the system. There were undoubtedly many reasons for this. But the tendency of many in the West to be content with changes of Soviet tone and to confuse atmosphere with substance surely did not help matters." ("Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," in *Agenda for the Nation* [The Brookings Institution, 1968], pp. 599, 608-9).

In fact, he was not the only one in the Nixon administration who had premonitions of what was going to happen in the name of detente. In 1969, the then Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson had given this assurance:

> We shall not bargain away our security for vague improvement in the "international atmosphere." Progress in East-West relations can only come out of hard bargaining on real issues. A detente that exists only in "atmosphere" without being related to substantive improvement in the relationship between the powers is worse than no improvement at all. It tempts us to lower our readiness. (September 5, 1969 in *Department of State Bulletin,* September 22, 1969, p. 259).

In 1970, Robert Ellsworth, the U.S. representative to the NATO Council, came even closer to one of the real issues that later arose to bedevil the Soviet-American detente. He recognized that the Soviet's and Warsaw Pact's "hunger for access to the science and technology of the West" was a key element in their diplomacy and in their push for "expansion of trade, scientific and technical relations" between East and West. Ellsworth went on to explain that the principal difficulty confronting the Soviets was their inability to pay. It was still possible for an American official to be brutally candid about what the proposed deal entailed:

> They (the Soviets) would be able to pay if they could balance their imports by increasing exports of raw materials, and oil gas, but they are unable to achieve this balance. Thus, they must ask for credits—credits which would have to be guaranteed, or possibly even subsidized, by governments. In essence such an agreement is not trade, but aid. Decisions about extending such aid, as well as decisions about transferring advanced technology from West to East, are not simply economic or technical decisions. They involve the highest political considerations.

Finally, Ellsworth told the tragic story of the Duke of Urbino who had committed a "classic blunder" four hundred years ago:

> He possessed by far the most advanced artillery of the 16th century, which he foolishly loaned to Cesare Borgia for the alleged purpose of a Borgia attack upon Naples. Instead, Borgia promptly turned the artillery upon Urbino as he had planned all along. That was the end of Urbino. (October 6, 1970 in *Department of State Bulletin,* November 23, 1970, pp. 642-43).

Who would have guessed that so many American capitalists would become 20th-century Dukes of Urbino? (see analysis of Theodore Draper, "Detente," *Commentary,* June 1974, pp. 31, 32).

The people who rule the USSR are Stalin's pupils who have not forgotten his lessons even if they have learned some new ones. They reject categorically the notion of a world in which there are no basic conflicts and no rivalry between their system and that which somewhat anachronistically is still called "capitalism." The Sino-Soviet conflict has not been a road to Damascus on which the Soviet leaders found the sudden illumination that they must henceforth seek cooperation rather than conflict with the West. It has taught them the necessity of prudence in their methods; it has not punctured the main ideological premises on which Soviet policies have been based since Brest-Litovsk. "A new generation of leaders may begin to question these premises," writes Adam Ulam, "but unhappily it is also conceivable that they would retain them while abandoning their predecessors' caution." (*Expansion and Coexistence,* p. 776).

Will the Soviet Union continue to wait patiently for something to happen in Communist China while that country continues to advance to the status of a superpower? Can the Soviet system as presently constituted afford normal coexistence with the West? Today, every restriction on Soviet citizens' freedom, every act of suppression,

indeed "ideological coexistence" in any form, is still rationalized by the regime as a necessity ultimately due to the capitalist danger. Can Soviet Communism under any leadership dispense with this psychological prop? Can the Soviet state afford prolonged and far-reaching cooperation with the West if one of the results might well be the erosion of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe?

If we are to believe Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Moroz, or Kudirka, the present generation of Soviet leaders, mindful of the maxim of their eighteenth century predecessor—"that which stops growing begins to rot"—will persist in seeking the phantom of security through more repression at home and more expansion abroad. Upon arriving in this country four years after the U.S. Coast Guard rejected him, Simas Kudirka declared: "It is as if I left hell and arrived in a new sunny land." (*New York Times,* Nov. 8, 1974).

THE ROLE OF THE SOCIOLOGIST AND SOCIOLOGY IN EASTERN EUROPE

By HERMAN R. LANTZ and JERRY GASTON

I. INTRODUCTION

The interest in the development of sociology and the role of sociologists in east European societies has grown significantly in the last two decades. Several factors account for this interest: the ending of the "cold war," the increase in official contacts between sociologists from the East and West.

The growing interest in the sociology of science over the last decade increases the importance of comparative assessments of the development of science and social science. This is especially significant given the notions about the relationship between science and the social structure (see Merton, 1957; Barber, 1962).

In addition to these factors, there is a generational and an ideological factor that is relevant in understanding the interests of western sociologists in the sociology of eastern Europe. One large segment of intellectual life in the West in the 1920's and 1930's looked upon the Soviet experiment with great admiration as an effort to do away with social injustice. The attraction for what seemed to be another utopia was understandable at that period in history. Discouragement among intellectuals in the Soviet experiment emerged slowly as knowledge about Soviet purges became known and disillusionment grew with the Russian-German nonagression pact in 1939. Apprehension about the aims of the Soviet Union climaxed when humanistically oriented intellectuals of the 1920's and 1930's lost confidence in socialist efforts to develop the humanistic society which had been promised. It took a new generation, relatively untouched by the experiences and attitudes of their parents, to reopen the question of the goals and expectations of socialist societies. Many sociologists in western capitalistic countries, concerned about relating sociological work to social problems, have developed an interest in new structural arrangements which offer some hope for the poor and the socially rejected. Many western sociologists feel a sense of frustration about the relationship

of their work to change in these vital areas of social concern; many feel that they have little impact on society and the changes which are necessary. East European sociologists, with the many possible opportunities for intervention through programs of social planning, appear to have a greater impact on their society than is the case in western countries (Wiatr, 1971). For these reasons, sociologists in the west are curious about the role and position of sociology in east European socialist countries, and whether or not those sociologists have a role which is fulfilling and satisfying in the sense of influencing vital changes.[1]

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the nature of sociology and the role of the sociologist in eastern Europe and to explore some of the major problems contained in that role. Our remarks are applicable to the countries in eastern Europe, but do not apply to China. This paper deals with the following aspects of east European sociology:

(1) Centralized social planning and the organization of sociological research;

(2) Sociological orientations including social philosophical, and empirical;

(3) Apostolic, neutral, and critical perspectives; and

(4) Alienation and the sociologist in eastern Europe.

In discussing the role of sociology in eastern Europe, we recognize that there are differences between societies and that each society is in a different stage of social and economic development. Also, we recognize that the role of the sociologist in each country is not identical. Further, this paper does not, and cannot, deal with all of the problems sociology encounters in eastern Europe. The paper is not primarily concerned with theoretical or substantive developments, although each receives some attention.[2]

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[1] The observations reported in this paper are based primarily on formal scientific visits during which extensive discussions with sociologists in Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia took place. The comments also reflect the observations of others, and these are noted in our footnotes. In some instances statistical data would have been helpful. Nevertheless, such data are often not compiled and especially difficult to obtain for a western sociologist. Such problems are especially pronounced in areas having political overtones.

[2] For recent books and articles dealing with the nature of sociology in eastern Europe see Wiatr, 1971; also Dunn, 1969; Fisher, 1964; Kassof, 1968; Simirenko, 1966; Kiss, 1967; Kolaja, 1969; Macku, 1968; Szczepanski, 1968. Denitch, 1971, Matejko, 1972.

II. CENTRALIZED SOCIAL PLANNING AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN EASTERN EUROPE

Sociologists in eastern Europe work in many sectors of the society. The majority of sociologists work in applied research and are located in the research institutes, with or without some teaching responsibilities. A far smaller number of sociologists work in the universities. At times the sociologists in universities are involved in empirical research, but often their research and writing is of a highly theoretical character. The observations in this paper, while carrying implications for all sociologists in east European countries, are primarily concerned with the larger number involved in applied research, whose main task is supplying data for planning agencies.

The underlying assumption in centralized social planning in all east European societies is that such planning will enable the society to resolve the problems of upgrading the physical and social existence of the population more effectively than might be the case under a system of individual initiative found in the West. All academic disciplines are expected to be involved in planning and to contribute to the necessary changes. Social planning is initiated by the Communist Party which espouses broad social goals, social priorities and the direction which social changes will take. These deal with a wide variety of social and economic concerns, such as improving working conditions, creating better housing, creating incentives among youth, and the plight of the aged. Once these concerns became known, planning bureaucracies came into focus. Planning bureaucracies incorporate the social goals of the party and develop research priorities. These may change from year to year and are dependent on political events as well as changes in the needs of the society.

The concept planning bureaucracy is one with which sociologists in the West are familiar. These are secondary level structures, whose major responsibilities deal with allocation of money for research and implementation of the research priorities developed at the Party level. Planning bureaucracies are also involved in assessing research results and the recommendations stemming from research. They may initiate research on their own. They are powerful agencies, because they control funds. They are likely to discuss planning with people in the political hierarchy. Planning bureaucracies also make assessments about the feasibility and appropriativeness of research projects. It is difficult to function effectively without their approval, because the bureaucracy is entrusted with considerable power and responsibility. There are planning bureaucracies which devote special attention to

one particular problem, or a complex of different problems. They sometimes employ sociologists on their staffs; more often they receive proposals from sociologists located elsewhere. There is also a third level involved in implementation of research. Research institutes and sociologists, affiliated with institutes and universities, develop research plans which can further the social goals espoused by the Communist Party and the bureaucracy. These institutes have funds appropriated on the basis of general and specific research aims and goals. In some east European societies (Yugoslavia is an excellent example), research institutes are permitted to make contacts with industrial and business sections for special research needs. Yet even in these instances the research needs bear a relationship to broader social goals espoused by the Communist Party and planning bureaucracies.

The status of sociology derives from the expectations which the Communist Party has of sociology, in the financial support it is willing to provide, in the expansion of the university curriculum in sociology and in the quotas which may be set for the number of graduate and undergraduate sociology students permitted to enroll.

Thus, in eastern Europe social planning and disciplines such as sociology are closely interwoven. The integration of all professional sociological activity is controlled to a far greater extent than in the West. It is difficult to implement deviations from officially recommended, approved, or condoned plans for research, training, and instruction. While it is correct to note that large numbers of sociologists in the West are dependent on their local and national governments for research support, the extent to which such dependence exists differs (Lantz, 1969). We would not argue with the proposition that in the West there are somewhat similar dependency patterns, nor would we reject the idea that in the future the dominating tendency in the West will be the growth of the state and the state's effort to reach out for greater power in controlling the direction of social science. We do assert that at this point in history, however, the control by the state of the development and direction of fields such as sociology is greater in the East than in the West.

Given such a description of sociological research and social planning, one may wonder whether Communist Party membership is necessary for financial support of research. The Party expects, and often receives from sociologists, a generally sympathetic attitude toward its pronouncements relating to the major social goals and changes it enunciates. But it does not follow that professional sociologists must be members of the Party in order to have their work

supported. Indeed, one can find sociologists who believe it is wiser not to have a party affiliation since they may avoid difficulties during periods of political stress and change.

In suggesting the close relationship between the goals of planning bureaucracies and the research of sociologists we do not mean that such a relationship is identical in all eastern societies. Other considerations enter. In those countries where sociology is highly developed, the opportunities for more independent research and the development of new theoretical formulations may be greater. For example, sociologists in Poland have had more opportunities of this kind than would be the case in some other eastern societies. Nevertheless, sociology in each of the eastern societies is always subject to the controls of planning bureaucracies when the need arises.

The aftermath of the 1968 Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia had profound implications on sociology in several eastern countries. Both the Communist Party and the planning bureaucracy reasserted their authority in sociological activities. Even in Poland, greater priority was given to special problems within the socialist society, rather than cross cultural collaboration. Moreover, the kinds of problems that could be worked on received more careful scrutiny than had been the case during a more relaxed period.

III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL PLANNING BUREAUCRACIES TO SOCIOLOGY, AND THE ORIENTATION OF EACH

The existence of institutionalized social planning means that agencies of implementation, in this instance the planning bureaucracy, possess power and such power results in identifiable problems with sociology. Any planning arrangement which defines the importance and social usefulness of an intellectual discipline must either reduce it to a technical arm of the planning structure, or it must give it areas of freedom to function as an intellectual discipline able to determine its own direction. Neither of these alternatives is accomplished in any simple way in east European societies. To reduce sociology to a technical arm fulfills bureaucratic needs, but alienates many sociologists an independent role, sociology develops in ways inconsistent with the social and research needs of the society as perceived by the political and bureaucratic structures. Sociologists may wish to engage in research which they, rather than bureaucracies, consider important, and research moves into sensitive areas. Ideologies and new doctrines emerge, therefore posing complications for any political and social establishment. For example, social criticism has a relationship

to theories of social change. If one starts from the position of examining new socialist structural arrangements in light of testing Marxian theory, one will find that while some aspects will be confirmed, many will not be, and this means that socialist social theory can be revised and move in directions not intended by the political structure. Thus, within accepted socialist ideology there are mutually contradictory forces which impinge on particular disciplines such as sociology. There are forces designed to contain and give direction, and there are forces designed to liberate in order that disciplines and people be self-directed (Lantz, 1972). A further complication arises from the fact that planning bureaucracies, by involving the sociologist, create the conditions which lead to change in both the policies and structures of the planning bureaucracies themselves. To be sure planning bureaucracies have much authority in determining research needs. The very fact that a discipline such as sociology has a legitimate function of inquiring into how the social needs are being met, means that planning structures themselves cannot remain immune from criticism. The result is constant tensions between planning bureaucracies and sociologists. Such tensions arise out of different perspectives, different orientations, and different purposes. The different perspectives of sociologists and bureaucracies cause difficulties. Bureaucracies report that sociological research is inconclusive, methodologically weak, and complicated to read and understand. Many recommendations from sociologists are seen as ambiguous, difficult to implement and requiring sums of money which are unrealistic and unavailable. Even when recommendations and findings are clear, the problems of reordering social life contained in sociological recommendations are viewed as too difficult to implement (Lantz, 1974). Sociologists in the West are familiar with such responses and recognize them as limitations of what sociology can accomplish.

One of the fundamental problems in a socialist society with extensive social planning is that the perspective of a planning structure may not coincide with the aim of sociologists. Planning bureaucracies are presumably concerned with the management of resources in a context of particular socialist social goals. Under some circumstances they can expand their goals, but usually fiscal restraints operate. Planning bureaucrats are sympathetic to many recommendations about changing social policy, but their major concerns continue to be with producing socially desirable changes within the limits of the financial resources at their disposal.

IV. SOCIOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS: SOCIAL PHILOSOPHICAL AND EMPIRICAL

Sociologists have special problems in dealing with bureaucracies depending on their orientation. The empirically-oriented sociologist often finds that in a general way he can adapt to a bureaucratic perspective. The sociology understood best by bureaucracies is a sociology that provides them with knowledge about the data and processes of development. This is especially important given the state of economic underdevelopment in most east European societies. Thus, high priority is assigned to such investigations as the migration of people from region to region, the personal, social and familial consequences of such migration, the efforts to socialize a peasant population to industrialization, and the operation of health care planning. The aged, the youth and the impact of mass media on attitudes are other examples of areas that are assigned high priority.

Although each west European society has sociologists who come out of an empirical orientation, there are also sociologists who have a philosophical perspective; sociologists who are much more concerned with problems of social philosophy, social criticism and sociological theory and their relations to broad social goals. Sociological training in several east European societies comes out of a strong philosophical tradition. This aggravates the problems of a planning bureaucracy since social philosophically-oriented sociologists are concerned with research, priorities, the results, the recommendations and the consequences for certain kinds of empirical work. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a narrow research focus will emerge, fostered by planning bureaucracies. They believe that such a narrow research focus is preoccupied with studying "what people do" and that such research leads to accommodation and adjustment rather than critical examination and change. Sociologists with a social philosophical orientation fear the growth of "establishment" sociology.

Having made these points we hasten to add that certain qualifications are in order. Although the empirical orientation of sociologists is welcomed by planning bureaucracies, the work of empirical sociologists can be critical of existing arrangements. Likewise there are sociologists with traditional Marxist philosophical orientations who are essentially conservative, and who are strong supporters of the socio-political structure. This was also the case in the 1950's when the regimes themselves were less stable and when sociology was used primarily to support the political structure.

It is in this general context that some of the resentments regarding microfunctionalism in east European sociology have to be assessed. Sociologists in eastern European sociology are split on this issue within societies and between societies. Although some sociologists look upon functionalism as providing an understanding of how to achieve industrial integration and efficiency in an economically developing society, and functionalism is accepted by most as a method; the non-functionalists are concerned that the rise of a functionalist perspective will continue to result in a proliferation of small empirical studies, without regard to the real experiences of people. Moreover, non-functionalists believe that functionalism inadevertently will represent a tendency toward accommodation while minimizing criticism.

One of the major problems which western sociologists observe is the problem of *how east European sociologists expect to maintain a balance between social-philosophical criticism in order to achieve social goals, and a solid research tradition that can help implement goals, but one that does not become overly committeed to small, narrow, empirical studies and a perspective of accommodation* (Hollander, 1969).

V. APOLOGETIC, NEUTRAL AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

In the previous section we identified the perspective of sociologists with a critical orientation. Indeed, different orientations have emerged over the years that can be identified as apologetic, neutral and critical (Birnbaum, 1968).

Each orientation has a rationale and some ideological underpinning. The emergence of one or another of these perspectives is complicated and subject to a wide variety of political, social and personal motivations. The ascendence of one or another of these perspectives takes place at different times and remains a dynamic element in east European sociology.

When research reveals the existence of social problems, sociologists who take an apologetic position assert that social progress is inherently slow, that rapid social transformations are complex and that society has to be patient and realistic about what may be accomplished. Sociologists who take a neutral role believe that their responsibility resides in integrating and reporting their findings without assessing or making judgments. Those who accept the critical role believe that social progress is best achieved by operating with a conflict model of change. These proponents emphasize the dialectical nature of social forces and the role of human action in articulating

these conflicts. Sociologists with a critical orientation are extremely sensitive about the need to assess the impact of new socialist structural arrangements in a humanistic-social justice context. Thus, there is a special concern with the emergence of new forms of human exploitation and the emergence of new forms of social inequality. This concern is serious since the present state of economic underdevelopment and the inherent shortages create conditions for new forms of manipulation of resources. For example, socialist goals to industrialize require special skills. Under these circumstances a factory manager needing an engineer is in a position to offer him and his family an attractive incentive, perhaps an apartment already denied to a worker who is in greater need. Thus, one finds a paradox. A policy designed to minimize shortages continues to work to the disadvantage of the worker for whom the socialist system was created. Earlier in the history of socialist societies it was anticipated that a population could be socialized to work for the social good rather than personal reward, but such a development is yet to come. Thus, while humanistic ethics can be espoused in principle, the existence of basic shortages in consumer goods and increased needs makes it difficult for such ethics to function effectively (Lantz, 1972).

It is essentially the fear that bureaucratic planning structures will be unresponsive to emergent problems of social injustice, not alleviated by planning, which disturbs those who hold the critical perspective. The view exists among many east European sociologists, especially in Yugoslavia, that social criticism about prevailing conditions must be discussed between sociologists and government leaders in order to clarify social goals (Tomovic, 1968).

Insofar as sociology wishes to occupy the role of critic in eastern Europe and insofar as it wishes to be taken seriously for what happens to the society, it must also bear some responsibility for the consequences of its research and recommendations. In western societies, at least until recent years, there was sufficient funding so that low quality research easily could go unnoticed. In eastern Europe, funding has always been in short supply and accounting for research results and the consequences of the results has always been under greater scrutiny than in the West.

VI. ALIENATION AND THE SOCIOLOGIST IN EASTERN EUROPE

While the problem of alienation in western, capitalistic societies has been discussed well by many authors, far less is known about alienation under new socialist structural arrangements. East Euro-

pean sociologists, in efforts to create a society with minimum of alienation, realize that alienation remains a central concern for them as sociologists.

Sociologists can experience alienation in their role for several reasons. First, there is the matter of the relationship of the role of the sociologist to the total reward system. This problem is part of a larger social dilemma: how does a society sustain motivation to achieve socialist goals without creating social inequality? Although much has been accomplished to improve benefits for the economically underprivileged, much less has been done for professional groups. Sociologists are part of a category of professionals with a high level of education, yet they are limited in what they may earn and achieve relative to their western colleagues. Although these professionals do well in relation to large sections of their societies, they do poorly in relation to colleagues in the West. The differences may pose a very real problem if alienation is to be avoided.

Second, as noted earlier, sociological activity and social planning activity are interrrelated. There is a real dilemma because sociological involvement in furthering social goals is expected and required. Yet, there are contradictions because if sociologists become involved in research, in making recommendations, and in criticizing, they will also be held responsible and accountable and may suffer serious rejection when their recommendations prove to be incorrect. The failure of sociology to alert the appropriate agencies to the problems of workers in Poland which resulted in strikes and protests caused the neutral and apologetic sociologists to come under attack from both planning bureaucracies and sociologists with a critical perspective. The result was that sociology in general was criticized and many sociologists experienced a sense of alienation.

Third, there is the problem of "rising expectations," a perspective not restricted to the masses, but appropriate for other groups such as sociologists. If sociologists are led to believe that they have an important place in the councils of social planning, they will also find that their perception of their importance does not correspond with the perception held by those in authority. Thus, when sociologists find that their arguments convince no one in authority, for whatever reasons, disappointment and alienation result.

Fourth, a factor which fosters alienation is that sociologists have to bear a responsibility for the consequences of their efforts in a socialist society, a heavier responsibility than is borne in most western societies. Such responsibility is especially heavy since eastern societies, as underdeveloped societies with serious problems, make demands

for recommendations from sociology, which is also underdeveloped in eastern Europe.

The greater the complexity of the social problem to be resolved, the greater the potential for failure and criticism. Under these circumstances the problem of alienation for the sociologist in his role is very real.[3]

A final irony can be noted. In the West, governments do not assume responsibility for alienation. The alienation which develops in the United States or in west European capitalistic countries is in a sense viewed as a personal hazard and responsibility. But the socialist society professes to assume some responsibility for reducing alienation. Is there a contradiction between what a socialist society promises and what it can achieve in this connection? Is it possible that in the pursuit of efforts to reduce alienation through sociological involvement one may also find new forms of alienation as a result of such involvement?

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The context in which sociology functions in eastern Europe differs from the context in America and in most of western Europe. Where there has been heavy federal funding and the setting of research priorities, such as in the United States and Sweden, questions relating to the autonomy of sociology have emerged. There are lessons to be learned from eastern Europe. For sociology which is heavily implicated in the planning structure in eastern Europe faces serious problems in its development and in its future. As a socially sensitive discipline which is supposed to be aware of what happens in different parts of society, sociology is always vulnerable and is always subject to miscalculations. Although we have already noted the hazards that are inherent in a critical perspective, even the neutral or apologetic perspective has its risks. One of the intriguing research problems that should be undertaken is a study of how sociology grows and develops under conditions of shifting social and political perspectives and what happens to sociology under these conditions. Put another way, how does sociology in an eastern European society grow, develop, or survive since it functions at the pleasure of socio-political planning agencies which are themselves under political pressures and subject to changes in goals. How do sociologists function given a social context in which support of the discipline itself remains a question? Moreover, can European sociology avoid becoming a technical

[3] This point was made clear in personal conversations during trips by the senior author to eastern Europe.

branch in the arm of the planning bureaucracy? The needs of an underdeveloped society with respect to social and sociological information are for statistical data which relates to the large efforts to produce change and transformation. Social philosophical analysis and social criticism run counter to these needs and are inclined to be problematic as areas of inquiry for the sociologist.

The tendency to create the role of a functionary for the east European sociologist is part of a world-wide phenomenon that has to do with centralized social planning and the power of the state. In east European societies the power of the state is apparent in its most dramatic form, but the growth of the state in planning is also a world-wide process. Given the state of the world, with current and future shortages of food, services, commodities and energy, centralization of authority has grown and will continue to grow.

It is out of these conditions of unequal distribution or maldistribution that planning priorities for reallocation of resources emerge. Under these circumstances the independence of all academic fields becomes restricted. What is taking place in eastern Europe with respect to sociology represents a glimpse into the future. Shortages in material goods and services in all societies create needs for planning bureaucracies. Planning bureaucracies in control of funds grow at the expense of the independence of academic disciplines. It may well be that such a process is not reversible, but it would be prudent for sociologists to face the question of how they can maintain an orientation which permits them to deal with the significant social issues of their time without losing their autonomy and independence. Eastern sociology has not yet provided such a model; perhaps western sociologists can address themselves to this issue.

This paper has several limitations which should be noted. First, the authors recognize that while they have addressed themselves to several important aspects of sociology in east Europe, there are other equally important dimensions that have not been dealt with. Second, while we believe the points made are correct, we have not provided systematic statistical data to substantiate the ideas. We believe that our comments based on discussions with sociologists in eastern Europe, and on our own observations, are verifiable. Yet we would be the first to acknowledge that differences of opinion exist. It is our hope that the issues raised in this paper may become the subject of further interest on the part of sociologists in this country, since the implications have far-reaching consequences.

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MIEROSZEWSKI MAKES UP FOR POLES' LACK OF A 'SOLZHENITSYN'

By JOHN SWITALSKI

Kultura, the eminent Polish emigré journal in Paris, reports in its 9/336 (Aug.-Sept. 1975) issue that the Russian journal, *Kontinent*, reprinted an article by Juliusz Mieroszewski—"The Russian 'Polish Complex' and the ULB Territory" (*Rosyjski 'Kompleks Polski' i Obszar ULB*)—which had appeared in the 9/324 (Aug.-Sept. 1974) issue of *Kultura*.

The editors of *Kontinent*, however, expressed disapproval of Mieroszewski's referring to the Soviet Union as "Russia." "The author (Mieroszewski) is an experienced publicist whom we should not have to remind that the Polish war (1920) resulted from Soviet, not Russian, imperialism." *Kontinent* argues that "multinational armies were led by the Russian Tukhachevsky, the Georgian Stalin, the Magyar Bela Kun, the Armenian Gaj, the Kalmuck Gorodnikov, the Jew Yakir, and standing behind their backs: the Russian Lenin, the Poles Dzierżyński and Marchlewski, the Jews Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev."

Kontinent emphasizes that the majority of the inmates of the "Archipelago" *gulags* are Russians and that millions of Russian peasants perished in the years of collectivization and that Russian workers also were victims of what should be referred to as "Soviet," not "Russian" imperialism. *Kontinent* does not explain the ruthless and unrelenting "Russification" in Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic countries or the dispersal of thousands of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians and Latvians throughout the Soviet Union, both in and out of the gulags. The editors' statement concludes: "as to the problems of the so-called ULB (Ukraine, Lithuania, Byelorussia), we have always, and still do, maintain that the right of self-determination of all these nations is one of the *fundamental* positions of our publication."

What did *Kultura's* chief political commentator have to say that the *Kontinent* editors judged was well worth reprinting for their readers?

Mieroszewski began his article by stating, "We fear the Russians, but not on the field of battle, as we demonstrated in 1920. We fear

Russian imperialism, Russian political aims." Why, he asked, must Russia have satellite states such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary instead of friendly, neutral neighbors? Because, just as the Poles traditionally fear Russian imperialism, the Russians likewise have a fear of Polish imperialism.

To illustrate, Mieroszewski related how in the middle of World War II, when all of Poland was in German hands, Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov informed correspondent Edgar Snow that, in the event of Germany's defeat, the Kremlin would not agree to the return to power of key figures in the exiled Polish government. Mieroszewski added that Stalin had said to Mikołajczyk: "We remember that the Poles were once in Moscow."

Asking whether Moscow's "Polish complex" concerning potential Polish imperialism is without foundation, Mieroszewski replied to his own question by saying: "I think not. Many Poles still dream not only of a Polish Lwów (Lviv) and Polish Wilno (Vilnius), but even of a Polish Minsk and Kiev." While to the Polish mind, Jagiellonian Poland has nothing in common with imperialism, "for Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Byelorussians it represented the purest form of traditional Polish imperialism."

"We can demand," the *Kultura* pundit continued, "that the Russians abandon imperialism if we, too, reject forever our imperialism in every form and manifestation... We cannot demand that the Russians return Kiev to the Ukrainians and at the same time demand that Lwów be returned to Poland."

Mieroszewski, however, stated that he had received many letters from Poles in the exile "Establishment" that shared his view, expressed earier, that Poland must accept the permanent loss of Lwów and Wilno. These Poles understand that from Moscow's perspective that to control the ULB, Poland must be reduced to satellite status. "History has taught the Russians that a truly free Poland has always reached out for Wilno and Kiev and for domination of the ULB expanse... In other words, Poland cannot be truly independent if Russia is to keep its imperialist status in Europe."

He continued: "I would like to emphasize two points. First, it is not possible to discuss Polish-Russian relations without considering the ULB territory, because Polish-Russian relations in every period of history were related to this region... Secondly, it seems to me that the Russians have always underrated Ukraine and are continuing to do so, but have always overrated the Poles and still do." He illustrated the latter statement by recalling both how Khrushchev agreed to allow the "Panorama of Racławice" (depicting Kościuszko's victory

over a Russian army) to be returned (from Lviv) to Poland provided it was not publicly displayed and the banning in 1968 of a Warsaw student production of Adam Mickiewicz's classic anti-Czarist play, *Dziady* (Forefathers' Eve).

"It seems to me," Mieroszewski observed, "that the 'December events' (the three-city Baltic dockworkers' demonstrations of 1970) on a large scale are much more likely to happen than an armed uprising. Not a single Polish exile politician would call for a rising in Poland. The Russians, however, do not fear social discontent in Poland so much as a national uprising. They believe likewise that a workers' revolution aimed at overthrowing the party leaders and their regime would in a few days be transformed into a general revolt against Russia."

He reminds the reader that the Poles, not the Russians, suffered the nightmare of the Warsaw Uprising, the shock of being betrayed by their western allies, the shock of their country being occupied by the Soviet army. "We lost the war totally, not even the scrap of an independent republic remains." So it is not surprising that even Catholic writers have accepted the alliance with the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of Polish politics: an alliance as a vassal, not a rival, state.

Returning to Litvinov, Mieroszewski said that while Poles regard as comical the Russian diplomat's conjuring up the spectre of 16th and 17th century Poland, Stalin and Brezhnev, as the Czars before them, understand that history offers no alternative to the territory of Ukraine, Lithuania and Byelorussia being ruled by either Poland or Russia. The Poles, too, see no third course. It is either "we" or "they." But Mieroszewski regards this "we" or "they" outlook as a "barbaric anachronism." He says, "The Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Byelorussians cannot in the 20th century be pawns in a historic Polish-Russian game."

What is the solution?

> We must seek contacts and understandings with Russians prepared to recognize the right of self-determination for Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Byelorussians, and likewise resign ourselves once and for all to the loss of Wilno and Lwów and reject any plans or politics designed to establish our hegemony in the east to the disadvantage of these nations. Poles and Russians must understand that only a non-imperialist Russia and a non-

> imperialist Poland have a chance to establish mutually acceptable relations... Only this solution will bury the catastrophic "we" or "they" system which today gives Russia an alliance with a satellite Poland but which, in the event of an outbreak of a Russo-Chinese war, will have the majority of Poles hoping for a Chinese victory.

In a final word, Mieroszewski says that the politics of an enslaved nation must draw people of different political persuasions toward a common moral ideal which will purify the independence program and give it an ethical dimension. But he sees a lack of such a moral, supra-national dimension in existing Polish freedom programs.

Mieroszewski concluded: "We do not have Solzhenitsyns, but we have Iwaszkiewiczes (compromising writers), apostles of [Communist regime] licensed success. Among the exiles, we have rabid anti-Communism, which produces nothing but crude hatred of Russia. That anti-Communism lacks a moral dimension because it is infused with national egoism and even narrow nationalism. *'Gulag'* interests us only insofar as that from the top of that pyramid of bodies and souls one can see forebodings of the decay of Russia, which in turn will make possible the return to Poland of Wilno, Lwów and perhaps even more... We should return to Mickiewicz. He better and more truly understood the word "freedom" and the moral dimensions of that word."

The Poles, it is true, do not have a Solzhenitsyn, but Juliusz Mieroszewski—to a great extent—makes up for that lack.

BOOK REVIEWS

BREZHNEV: THE MASKS OF POWER. By John Dornberg. Basic Books, Inc., Publishers. New York, 1974, pp. 317.

Leonid I. Brezhnev is undoubtedly one of the most powerful men in today's world by virtue of his unlimited power in the USSR and the prestige that he and the USSR enjoy at present in the world, a result precisely of his successful policies abroad. Yet, in spite of his seemingly outgoing image and his impact on world affairs, Brezhnev's life and career are little known outside the Soviet Union.

Author John Dornberg has done very successfuly what he set out to do: provide for the first time a picture as complete as possible of this man who has climbed his way up the precarious party ladder to become the supreme ruler of the Soviet Union. M. Dornberg, a freelance journalist specializing in Soviet affairs, worked from 1965 to 1972 for *Newsweek,* first as its Bonn correspondent and later as its bureau chief in Eastern Europe and Moscow. His earlier books include *The Other Germany* and *The New Tsars.* Living now in Munich, he is a Communist affairs analyst for *The Toronto Star* and various newspapers in the United States.

This intriguing book is based on extensive research and interviews with people who knew Brezhnev during his early years as a party functionary. The author illustrates the many facets of Brezhnev's personality with an abundance of anecdotes and episodal descriptions of the Soviet leader in various situations.

Brezhnev was born on December 19, 1906, in the small town of Kamenskoye, some twenty miles west of Dnipropetrovsk, in Ukraine. It was then and now is an industrial locality, populated by Ukrainians and some Russians. There Brezhnev attended a classical *gymnasium,* where most of his professors, judging by their names, were Ukrainians, among them, Prof. Yosyf Z. Shtokalo, who, according to the author, is professor of physico-mathematical sciences at the University of Kiev and a full member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

Between 1917 and 1920 Kamenskoye and the whole of Ukraine went through a turbulent time; a Ukrainian independent government was established in Kiev, and a three-year war was waged between the Ukrainians and the Red and White Russians, with occupation by German and Austro-Hungarian troops. If Leonid Brezhnev had any political views in that critical period, he kept them to himself. As a matter of fact, there is no indication whether he felt himself to be a Ukrainian, although Dornberg writes that Brezhnev's Russian is heavily tempered by a "Ukrainian inflection."

In the period 1920-1931 Brezhnev worked at the *zavod* (plant) and studied engineering. In late 1929 he was appointed deputy chief of the Sverdlovsk province department of agriculture, a post which he held but briefly. In 1931, back in Kamenskoye, Brezhnev finally became political, joining the Comsomol and becom-

ing its chief at the metallurgical institute. One person who knew him then described him as "a man who seemed to shun contact with others. He never attended any of the Comsomol or student social affairs at the technicum. His manner bordered on arrogance. He was a paragon of party orthodoxy. People were visibly afraid of him."

He was already a chief party propagandist in the Dnipropetrovsk *oblast* when Ukraine was bludgeoned by a manmade famine in 1932-33. He met and cooperated in the 1930's with almost all leading members of the Ukrainian Communist Party: M. M. Khatayevych, S. Kossior, Pavel Postyshev, N. N. Popov, Gregory Petrovsky, Panas Lubchenko, Demyan Korotchenko, Mikhail Burmistenko, Leonid R. Korniets, Ivan S. Hrushetsky, Andrey P. Kirilenko, A. Kirichenko, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, Nikolai Podgorny, Peter Schelest and others.

He witnessed the bloody destruction of the entire executive committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1937 by Stalin's emissaries—Nikita Khrushchev, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich and Nikolai Yezhov, the NKVD chief. When Khrushchev became Stalin's viceroy in Ukraine, Brezhnev became his chief lieutenant; he combatted "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," "Trotskyist subversion," "rightist deviation" and German fascism. He also led a Russification drive on Ukrainian schools, the press and the theater in Dnipropetrovsk. When the Soviet Union invaded Finland in the winter of 1939, Brezhnev was mobilized with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

After the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet war, he was made a full colonel and in April, 1942, was assigned to the staff of the 18th Army as its chief political commissar. Toward the end of the war Brezhnev was made a major general and became head of the political directorate of the 4th Ukrainian Army Group. Subsequently, he was transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Army Group under General Nikita Khrushchev and General Nikolai Vatutin. (Gen. Vatutin was ambushed and mortally wounded by anti-Soviet Ukrainian Insurgent Army units, dying in a Soviet field hospital in Volhynia—W.D.). There Brezhnev also met General Sergei Shtemenko, now the chief-of-staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces, and Marshal Andrei Grechko, both Ukrainians and members of what the author calls the "Dnieper Mafia." Grechko is presently Defense Minister of the USSR.

With the war over, Brezhnev hoped to rejoin the Dnieper Band, but Stalin as well as Khrushchev, who had resumed his post as party chief of Ukraine, had other plans for him. He was named political commissar of Ukraine's Carpathian Military District with headquarters in Lviv, where the first secetary of the *oblast* committee was Ivan Hrushetsky, his friend from Dnipropetrovsk. If Brezhnev, like other Soviet leaders, has any deeds on his conscience to hide, then in all probability some of them were committed in this period. Resistance of Ukrainians to Sovietization had to be crushed and "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" (OUN and UPA) to be deported or liquidated, all of which provided an excellent training ground for the hatchet job he was called on to perform five years later in Moldavia.

By this time Brezhnev was a trusted and chosen member of Khrushchev's entourage, a process which ended by bringing him to the apex of power in the Kremlin. He remained Khrushchev's ally even though he knew that Stalin mistrusted Khrushchev and feared his "going native" and becoming a "Ukrainian separatist." There is no record of Brezhnev's involvement in the plot against Lavrenti Beria nor in subsequent rivalries among the top Kremlin protagonists.

After Khrushchev's downfall in the autumn of 1964 he was too powerful, and an ally of the Soviet armed forces besides, for anyone to stop him from taking the controlling seat. At the 23rd party congress Brezhnev was elected Secretary General, a post which he holds to this day.

For the past decade, especially since Brezhnev crushed the liberalization course of Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia, his prestige and power have grown steadily, and the "Brezhnev Doctrine" is an ever-ready and effective club held over the satellite countries. His policy of detente with the United States pays off well; he also concluded a "friendship treaty" with West Germany, whereby the permanent division of Germany was sanctioned. He still has to face the Chinese dilemma, contain the rebellious Communist regimes of Romania and Yugoslavia, and cope with domestic dissent, economic shortages, etc. He is now preparing for the 25th party congress, scheduled for April, 1976, and planning for his successor. Mr. Dornberg sees two distinct possibilities for his post: Volodymyr Scherbytsky, the Ukrainian party chief and member of the Politburo, and Kirill Mazurov, a Byelorussian. In all likelihood, the Russian majority in the Central Committee would favor the latter as one posing less of a threat than anyone from so numerous a nation as Ukraine.

The book is well spiced with quotations, and Mr. Dornberg's bibliography includes several books by Ukrainian authors.

New York, N.Y. WALTER DUSHNYCK

BURZHOAZNA-NATSIONALISTYCHNA PROPAHANDA NA SLUZHBI ANTY-KOMUNIZMU (Bourgeois-Nationalist Propaganda in the Service of Anti-Communism). By Mykola Varvartsev. The Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Kiev, 1974, pp. 192.

Almost all the Communist writers in Ukraine, should they wish to remain in the good graces of the party, have an easy way to do it: they need only continue to grind out pamphlets and brochures under the seal of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR that attack all free Ukrainian organizations, the press and individual leaders abroad. Such is the case with the book under review, *Bourgeois-Nationalist Propaganda in the Service of Anti-Communism,* whose author set for himself as a target the Ukrainian press in the free world.

His guiding contention is that the Ukrainian press in the free world is "bourgeois-nationalist" and long would have ceased to exist had it not been for "state and private subsidies." Comrade Varvartsev tries to tag every Ukrainian editor or leader here and abroad as either a Nazi collaborator or an American "ultra" rightist.

For instance, we read: "Lev Dobriansky is one of the diehard propagators of the 'cold war' and a fanatical opponent of normal relations between the U.S.A. and the USSR. He writes his articles and books for the purpose of instigating an atmosphere of distrust and hostility toward the Soviet state. Covering his anti-scholarly works with a professorial title, he nevertheless has not succeeded in achieving laurels for his 'research.' "

Concerning *Svoboda,* the oldest Ukrainian daily in America, the Communist scribe writes:

"In its activities, the 'non-partisan' *Svoboda,* which justifies its name by its freedom in disinformation, tries to inculcate a negative attitude toward all progressive forces. Under its roof have gathered professional slanders. Curiously enough, here cooperate harmoniously both mad 'ultra-ites' and their 'critics,' and all sorts of simulated opponents of 'democratic socialism.' For instance... its editor A. Dragan publicly thanks Panas Fedenko, leader of the so-called 'Ukrainian Socialist Party,' which, according to its pronouncements, opposes the ultra-rightists, especially the OUN... *Svoboda,* which is supposed to be the organ of the 'Ukrainian National Association,' is, in fact, an instrument of the Banderaite and Melnykite extremists..."

Ukrainian newspaperman Zenon Pelensky, who writes for the Ukrainian-language Catholic weekly, *The Christian Voice,* appearing in Munich, Germany, is described as follows: "[He] is an active participant of the bourgeois-nationalist organizations, an adherent of the aggressive policy of fascist Germany. As far back as 1930, he took a personal part in terrorist acts aimed at provoking conflicts among the states. In one of his coded letters from Lviv to the Berlin OUN headquarters he outlined in great detail his plan to burn the Soviet Consulate [in Lviv] by bombing the premises from three sides and to kill the consul. In planning this act he thought it would create panic in Warsaw and undoubtedly would provoke a Polish-Soviet war. Z. Pelensky and to a certain degree R. Sushko thought that the war would push the Ukrainian problem forward from a standstill... Small wonder that the current writings of this 'commentator' of the Uniate newspaper should be a direct continuation of the old provocative line...

"Also collaborating with this review is Ivan Hrynioch [Rev. Dr. Ivan Hrynioch], one of the most active henchmen of the fascist regime, once chaplain of the punitive legion Nachtigal, which committed bestial massacres of the population, especially of the Lviv intelligentsia in July, 1941. Archival documents, preserved in the USSR and abroad, attest to the fact that Hrynioch was an agent of the security police, the SD and also of the *Abwehr*" (pp. 36-37).

> Author Varvartsev makes wrong and untruthful conclusions as regards the Ukrainian legion "Nachtigal" and its political adviser, Dr. Theodore Oberländer, former federal minister of the Bonn government, who were accused of committing this dastardly massacre.

Simon Wiesenthal, the head of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna, and the Polish Communist government of Warsaw both stated that they had irrefutable proof that 20 Polish professors and 18 of their relatives were killed by an SS squad in Lviv on July 4, 1941, under the command of *Untersturmführer* Walter Kutschmann, who is now living in Buenos Aires as Pedro or Peter Ricardo Olmo. (Cf. Wiesenthal's statement: *The New York Times,* June 28, 1975 and *N.Y. Daily News,* June 29, 1975; cf. "Statement of the Principal Commission for the Study of Anti-Polish Nazi Crimes," under the chairmanship of Prof. Pilichowski, issued at the beginning of May, 1975 in Warsaw, declaring that the "latest investigations of charges [against Dr. Oberländer and the "Nachtigal" legion] proved baseless"; see, "Rehabilitation of the 'Nachtigal' Legion," by Zenon Pelensky, *The Christian Voice,* June 22, 1975, Munich—R.S.H.).

The late Bohdan Krawciw, noted Ukrainian poet and literary critic, and former associate editor of *Svoboda,* is depicted as "a professional disciple of Goebbels. At

the beginning of 1940, he moved to the capital of the Third *Reich* where he was provided with a two-story building in Karl Fetter Street by officials of the Ministry of Propaganda. Here Krawciw established the editorial office of the newspaper *Holos* (The Voice) with expenses paid by the Hitlerites... When the fascist troops perfidiously attacked the Soviet Union, Krawciw began publishing the newspaper *Ukrainets* (The Ukrainian), in which he praised Hitlerite tyranny and the enslavement of the Soviet peoples..."

The editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* also was assailed:

"For example, such a 'Sovietologist as W. Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly,* is one of the propagators of the ideology of the American ultras. Before the war he had become a partisan of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. According to the press, while staying in Belgium, he was in close contact' with the chieftain of the OUN, the agent of German espionage, E. Konovalets [Col. Eugene Konovalets, assassinated by a Soviet agent in May, 1938, in Rotterdam Holand] 'with whom he held frequent conferences.' After the war he utilized his connections with American circles for the 'reorientation of leading factors of U.S. foreign policy' regarding 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists...' " (p. 69).

A number of known personages are assailed as "fanatical anti-Communists," such as Congressman Edward J. Derwinski, Canadian Senator Paul Yuzyk, the late Roman Smal-Stocki, the late Clarence A. Manning, Walter Kolarz, Richard Pipes and Matthew Stachiw. He castigates the annual observances of "Captive Nations Week," and recalls that "former president of the United States D. Eisenhower, invited by the bourgeois nationalists to unveil the Shevchenko monument in 1964 in Washington, delivered an address in the tone of the 'cold war' that was loudly publicized by nationalist propaganda..."

In order to enhance his "scholarly" arguments, Varvartsev uses financial statements of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the Ukrainian National Association and its organ *Svoboda*, the Ukrainian American newspaper, *America,* and others, in an attempt to convince the reader that the Ukrainian press in the free world could not sustain itself were it not for "state subsidies" of—in the U.S.A., the U.S. government, in Canada, the Canadian government, and in West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany in Bonn.

To impress his readers, Varvartsev writes that the budget of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America from July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1966—for four years—amounted to $314,005.00 — $88,426.00 of which sum, he said, was utilized for the publication of "anti-Communist propaganda by the UCCA."

As "proof" that the Ukrainian press in America is "subsidized by the CIA," Varvartsev writes that at the National Foreign Policy Conference, sponsored by the State Department in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1970, a conference devoted to the problems of U.S. foreign policy, eight seats were assigned to the Ukrainian 'ethnic press,' i.e. representatives of *Svoboda, America, The Ukrainian Quarterly,* and other ultrarightist publications..." He conveniently omits the fact that the expenses of these participants were paid by their respective organizations.

In addition, he charges that the CIA "fully subsidizes the propaganda center of the OUNz, or the so-called Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (ZP UHVR) and its 'research association' 'Prolog' " in New York, the "First Ukrainian Printing in France' (Paris), *'Suchasnist'* (Federal Republic of Germany) and 'Smoloskyp' (U.S.A.)."

The Communist writer also deplores the "poverty" of the Ukrainian language in the overseas Ukrainian press. However, his own Ukrainian language is replete with Russian words and expressions, as approved by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, so as to make the Ukrainian language as close to the Russian as possible.

We doubt if Ukrainian readers outside Ukraine will get excited over Varvartsev's "revelations" regarding the free Ukrainian press. And if this pseudo-scholarly work is accessible to Ukrainians in Ukraine—which we seriously doubt —they would well know how to interpret and read this "academic product."

In short, the book is a childish travesty which brings neither honor nor credit to its author or its sponsors.

New York, N.Y. ROMAN S. HOLIAT

U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE: PAST AND FUTURE. By Vladimir Petrov. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 60.

Still another work has been published to explain detente, its background, meaning and portent. The author of this addition to the growing literature on the subject is a professor of international affairs at the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies centered at the George Washington University. The contents of this concise rendition give an immediate indication of the span of topics treated, starting with a conception of detente and asymmetry in national objectives, then devoting the major sections of the book to U.S-Soviet bilateral relations and detente in the world at large, involving the Middle East, Cyprus, Europe and Red China, and ending with an evaluation of prospects for detente and the 1972 text on Basic Principles between the two superpowers.

If the reader has followed and kept abreast with the sprawling output on the subject, particularly the earlier critical hearings in Congress two and three years ago, he would find little new data and perspective in this short work. As a matter of fact, he would be quite equipped to reject offhand the somewhat arid stance of the writer who pretends to display a pure objectivity by offering no conclusions or recommendations; worse still, with a measure of illogic, he thinks the absence of advocacy of any cause — in this case, being for or against detente —insures objectivity. Certitude, which ultimately rests on both balanced analysis and convictions rooted in principles, escapes the author completely in his unimpressive preface. If his weak introductory statement was necessary to reinforce the posture of the institute which sponsored the work's publication, to some extent the unrealistic methodology becomes explainable. The institute has been vulnerable to liberal criticism and foundation status questioning.

The definition offered for detente is only one of many, and where it implicitly assumes that the USSR is a "nation," it is obviously deficient. According to the writer, essentially, "Detente is a process by which two or more nations move away from a continuous confrontation with each other in the general direction of cooperation" (p. 1). Relaxation of tensions, accommodationism, changes in respective national perceptions of the "enemy" and so forth are supposed characteristics or attributes of the detente condition. Detente as a facet of a con-

tinuing cold war, though be it by indirection, proxies, sustained subversion and the like, would necessitate a broader definition, such as provided by Russian "peaceful coexistence," but the linkage of these elements and more evidently cannot be encompassed by the author's given definition. To be sure, he bears on these elements in subsequent discussion, but the fact remains that this in itself shows the inadequacy of his posited definition as against others. One needn't belabor the other deficient point except to state that to view the USSR, in nature and character a land-empire, as a "nation," and this is given initially in the definition, then the road one follows in subsequent analysis cannot be other than a misguiding one. Reliance on "traditional Communist value judgments" by the so-called Soviets, instead of a traditional system now in the guise of a Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, is one of these points of misguidance.

Aside from the author's observations on Moscow's views toward the SALT talks and negotiations, which are scarcely informative for those familiar with the critical output of the American Security Council, his treatment of the important subject of trade relations between the U.S. and the USSR is rather naive. The reader is told, for example, that "the Soviets have had a perfect record of paying their bills" (p. 17). Britishers would tell otherwise, but the $11 billion lend-lease obligation is sufficient to cite. On the same page we find USSR equated now with Russia when the writer, in obvious conceptual confusion, speaks of "the development of Russia's natural resources." More than half of the valuable resources of the USSR are found in the non-Russian nations of this land-empire, and if wise politico-economic strategy on the part of the West were possible, these would be targetted in business deals coupled with political criteria.

The naiveté of the author shows up most in this assertion regarding the hard debate on the Trade Reform Act in Congress. Indeed, one wonders whether the methodology conveyed in the assertion is supposed to appeal to business interests in behalf of the institute's fund-gathering activities. The assertion is, "It has been quite clear from the beginning of the debate that the issues involved were not discussed on their merits, and that political, rather than economic, considerations dominated the arguments of those who opposed the deal." To document this insular statement, the author states in a footnote that "witnesses opposing trade with the Soviets included representatives of such political groups as the National Captive Nations Committee" (p. 17). The research carelessness of the author displays itself here, for NCNC is widely known to be a purely educational, coordinating agency dealing with the U.S. and all the captive nations. Based on Public Law 86-90, the organization is in the forefront of propagating knowledge concerning the land-empire nature of the USSR and the crucial importance of the non-Russian view toward trade, from Lenin down to the present. The view is consistently politico-economic and with broad ramifications in social values. It was in terms of this view, on the Russians' own conceptual ground, that the chief opposition was launched and succeeded. Furthermore, the general thinness of the author's presentation in this area is also shown in his limited understanding of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which for him simply means a demand for "unrestricted emigration for Soviet Jews" as a condition for extension of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union. The fact is that the Amendment is far broader than this and applies to all, Russians and non-Russians alike, on this emigration issue. In brief, the Amendment itself was fought over for quite a period in order to accommodate the non-Russian nations on the basis of the land-empire thesis

and also to make it viable to additional points of politico-economic and social value, such as reunion of families and abolition of extortionate import taxes on care packages sent by relatives and friends in the West.

The discourse on detente in the world at large is, in compact form, interesting and on the whole well done, but the rapid passage of events has outdated several parts of the section. For instance, the treatment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) carries only background merit now in view of what transpired mid-way 1975. It is interesting to observe, however, the author's judgment on its flow of negotiations and prospects of realization. Referring to the freer movements of people and ideas, he observes, "Since Moscow feels that relinquishing this right would open the way for all sorts of subversive influences in its domain, the issue has become a stumbling block at CSCE, with no immediate prospects of overcoming it" (p. 43). He continues, "It is likely, therefore, that CSCE will be kept outside U.S.-Soviet detente relations..." Of course, the very opposite took place, both in the immediate realization of CSCE and in the intertwining of the contents of CSCE agreements and detente. The whole story of this can be found by the reader in the pages of the *Congressional Record* for July, 1975.

As to the final section on "Prospects For Detente," the author covers an adequate range of real possibilities and, regardless of his self-contradicting caveats of methodology at the beginning of this treatise and also the end, he does wind up with a general conclusion and argumentative advocacy on careful appraisals of our strengths and weaknesses as well as "those of the adversary." He concludes, "It is this appraisal, more than anything else, which would determine the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, whether 'detente' remains the catchword or not" (p. 55). No sensible analyst can deny this, but in the course of the detente process itself the comparative scales of strengths and weaknesses could change if points of advocacy were not made, a necessary condition to which the author assigns little weight. Among many arguable points, his contention that Moscow's main motivation in pursuing detente is supposedly the redirection of resources from the military and politically oriented foreign aid is grossly untenable. But so are many other interpretations making up this ostensibly objective work.

Georgetown University LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

EASTERN EUROPE: *A Geography of the COMECON Countries.* By Roy E.H. Mellor. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, pp. 358. $17.50 bound. $9.00, paper.

Roy E.H. Mellor, Professor of Geography at the University of Aberdeen, England, has authored two works, *Geography of the USSR* and *COMECON: Challenge to the West,* in addition to numerous articles in learned journals. His professional qualifications and training include extended travels and a knowledge of some East European languages, a fact proven in his books, except for some minor lapses such as "War Schau" instead of Warschhau (p. 329). Another terminological confusion, if not lack of knowledge, is evidenced by a reference to the Carpatho Ukrainians (Ruthenians) as "Russians" (p. 121, Table 4.8). Mellor does not explain why 569,000 "Russians" migrated to or settled in Car-

patho-Ukraine, as he correctly uses this name in the Index (p. 350). However, the use in 1975 of statistical data for East Central Europe taken from an outdated book by D. Kirk, *Europe's Population in Interwar Years* (Geneva, 1946), cannot be condoned by scholars.

Another observation in regard to the study as a whole is that often whole pages sound and look like translations of the work of contemporary East European writers and of speeches by government officials, including various figures, tables, and maps, even if no sources in most cases are given. This should not be an expert's practice.

It was not the author's intention to cover all aspects of present day geography. Therefore, the work is primarily concerned with the complex and diverse human geography, with physical parts and others such as geology, climatology, agricultural and natural resources either being left out altogether or just mentioned in passing.

On the other hand, and as this reviewer sees it, particular attention without noticeable justification has been paid to the historical background, especially the last two hundred years, for a better understanding of the Marxist experiments of the last three decades. In fact, the reader has been given an almost almanac-like "history," too much for an uninformed reader and not enough for a college student who in any case probably would not study "history" and Marxist-Leninist theory from a textbook classified under geography.

Mellor's work is divided into three main parts covering (1) physical environment and political geography; (2) the demographic and economic framework; and (3) COMECON and the national economies, along with 48 figures representing history, transportation, various aspects of agriculture and industry and 14 tables covering mostly changes in population. Regrettably, neither illustrations nor tables are sourced or documented, except for a very few.

Within these three parts are no less than fifty subtitles, covering such topics as "Roman and Medieval Transport Systems," "Historical Evolution from the Graeco-Roman Period to the Early Twentieth Century," and "The International Socialist Division of Labor." Such condensation of topics result in an abnormal shortening of treatment; one, for example, is 37 lines long ("(The Sorbs," p. 131).

The best written and informative part of the book is the one dealing with "Sketches of National Economic Geographies: the Developed Countries" (GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), and "The Developing Countries" (Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania). Those chapters can be used well within general and comparative geography. Conversely, the "historical chapters" are not only the weakest but are not worthy of inclusion. One can only wonder why Columbia University Press did not advise the British author about the American school system, for this book, as it is, cannot be recommended for undergraduate students of geography, even less so for graduate students who by that time in their schooling have acquired more knowledge than the book is offering.

Bibliographical entries are not made according to American standards, thereby adding to the general confusion. It should be noted, however, that maps are well drawn, illustrations are clear, and tables are helpful, indeed. Perhaps most profitable use of this work may be made by teachers as additional material in high schools and four-year colleges.

Eastern Illinois University STEPHAN M. HORAK

EXCURSIONS IN THE INTERIOR OF RUSSIA INCLUDING SKETCHES OF THE CHARACTER AND POLICY OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS

Scenes in St. Petersburg, Etc.
By ROBERT BREMNER, Esq.
Vol. I, London 1840

A narrative of a short visit to Russia, during the Autumn of 1836 in the course of a general tour through Europe.

P. 4 (Russian custom-house on the border of Finland): ...Carriage trunks, pocket-books, and pockets are searched, not once merely on landing, but over and over again at certain stations along the road. One had his box of tooth-powder carefully emptied to see what treason or what contraband might lurk in its dusky shelter. Another had his soap-balls cut in two, with the same purpose; the next saw his stockings slowly unfolded, pair by pair, and was not sure that some of them did not vanish in the process; for the searchers have a trick of coming three or four together, and, distracting their victim's attention by opening several packages at the same time, quietly secreting any article that pleases them...

P. 5 ...There are evils in Russia which, although civilization may banish them, neither the knout nor the emperor have yet been able to root out.

P. 41 (Inspection near Kronstadt): ...The sealing was now resumed. Not a particle was left open. Our very writing-materials, nay, our walking sticks, and our old umbrella, were tied together and adorned with the government seal, till the officers at St. Petersburg, twenty miles away should examine them, and declare whether they could be admitted to the country, without injury to the life of his majesty, or the fortunes of his subjects. We were not allowed even a change of linen.

Letters were strictly searched for, and we should advise the traveller not to bring any *sealed* ones with him if he wish to keep out of trouble; in case of doubt, they search the person, and should any be found, if a fine is not imposed, they will at least send them to the post-office for you.

P. 42 ...Particular inquiries were made whether we had any Russian money; a point on which many have gotten into serious difficulties on coming here. It is the law of Russia that you may take as much paper money *out* of the country as you please, but none of it is ever allowed to come *back*.

P. 44 ...We were first to the harbor-master, and we were bowled from one set of clerks to another, making declarations about ourselves, our object of coming to Russia, and our luggage. After being detained some hours at the place, we were twice paraded round ramparts a mile or two, with all officers marching beside us, first to custom-house, and then to Mr. Foster, secretary to the Admiral of the Fleet... who gave us passports for St. Petersburg, then roubles being charged for each,—a fee from which all travellers designated as noblemen, officers, or clergymen, are exempted...

P. 46 ...In no part of the world... has the traveller such tedious and provoking formalities to go through... But in Russia the annoyances are so great, to strangers entering by land as well as those coming by sea, that we have known travellers who have visited every country of Europe, vow that they would not enter Russia again for any temptation.

It is alleged that these annoyances are expressly intended to keep foreigners away, the emperor being jealous of the spread of liberal opinions, and unwilling to expose his subjects to contagion...

Ottawa, Ont. V. J. KAYE

DRAJ-CHMARA ET L'ECOLE "NEO-CLASSIQUE" UKRAINIENNE (Dray-Khmara and the Ukrainian "Neoclassic" School). By Oksana Asher. Winnipeg-New York: The University of Manitoba, 1975; pp. 324.

Dr. Oksana Asher, the daughter of Mychajlo Dray-Khmara, in addition to her previous articles and separate publications in Ukrainian and English, has now enriched studies of Ukrainian literature with one more scholarly work—a book in the French language about her father and the "school of neoclassicists."

Draj-Chmara et l'ecole "neo-classique" ukrainienne is part of the series, "Readings in Slavic Literature," put out by the Slavic Department of the University of Manitoba (Winnipeg-New York, 1975). This book deserves special attention from non-Ukrainian as well as Ukrainian readers.

First, this is one of the few monographs about modern Ukrainian literature which is written in French. Lately our scholars and in particular our specialists in Ukrainian literature have been attracted to the English-speaking world; a sufficient number of publications, studies and translations have already been published in English. These now outnumber the studies made in French, Spanish, Portuguese, German and Italian. Although the new publication of Asher does not, of course, make up the difference, its appearance is one important step in this direction.

The existence of numerous translations of the original poems of Dray-Khmara into French makes an agreeable impression. For the most part there have been prosaic translations like those of Professor Clarence A. Manning or Watson Kirkconnell in the English language, but with Asher the exactitude of the content of the originals is astonishingly reproduced. So one can see, in these translations, the understanding, the perceptibility and the feeling of all the details of Dray-Khmara's poetic expression and the world of his ideas, wishes and feelings. Certainly the free verse of the originals helps translation, as for example:

"No flood of sadness ever
Did totally surround
As on this day,
Nor did I search so far and keenly,
With anxious
And impassioned
vision

Into the sapphire misty shore
Of dreaming shadows."[1]

We must stress here that these French translations of Dray-Khmara's poems are lent depth because most of Asher's work is dedicated to the formal analysis of his poetry (to his "poetic technique, language, style, metrics and rhythm," pp. 85-252).

The overall importance of this new publication lies in the fact that the author discusses the role of the "neoclassicists" in Ukrainian literature and thoughtfully connects the creative works of Dray-Khmara with the "neoclassicists" of his time. With objective and scholarly perception, the author reveals the conditions under which Mykola Zerov, Maksym Rylskyj, Pavlo Fylypovych, Oswald Burghard (Klen) and Mychajlo Dray-Khmara happened to live and write during those well-known "cursed years" up to the complete liquidation of this group in the early 30's.

The author does not forget to relate the creative works of the "neoclassicists," in particular these of Dray-Khmara, with the poets of Western Europe, and especially with the French Symbolists and the French Parnassiens. Here is one more justification for this French edition.

Just as the school of the "neoclassicists" was an unusual occurrence in the history of Ukrainian literature, so is the work of Asher an unusual revelation in Ukrainian literary studies. Being well trained in contemporary methods of research, excellently acquainted with the "spirit of the time" and intimately connected with the world of ideas of her great father, the author has produced a thoroughgoing study of his "life and creative work" against the background of the epoch and the literary climate of the "cursed years."

And when we take into consideration all the efforts connected with the publication of this book, we must in all fairness acknowledge that few of our culturally active people have been as well served by their descendants as Dray-Khmara. Happily, the optimism in his poem "Povorot" (Return) was not without grounds:

"I shall die,
And that in which I believe,
Will remain
And live without me—"[2]

University of Manitoba JAROSLAW B. RUDNYCKYJ

[1] O. Asher, *A Ukrainian Poet in the Soviet Union,* New York, 1959, p. 33.
[2] "Povorot," Dray-Khmara, *Poezii,* p. 85.

PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

I. U.S. RESOLUTION ON POLITICAL PRISONERS

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.,—Following is the text of a draft resolution on amnesty for political prisoners, as introduced in the General Assembly on November 12, 1975, by the United States:

The General Assembly, noting with satisfaction that, in spite of continuing denial of the right of self-determination in certain areas, great progress has been achieved towards eliminating colonialism and insuring the right of self-determination for peoples everywhere;

Believing that the lessening of international tensions makes even more promising renewed efforts to assist people to exercise their human rights;

Deeply disturbed that there are frequent reports that many persons, including members of national parliaments, writers and publishers, persons who have sought through peaceful means to express views at variance with those held by their governments or to oppose racial discrimination, and persons who have sought to provide legal assistance to persons in the disfavor of their governments, are detained or imprisoned, and in many cases have been subjected to torture, arbitrary arrest and detention and unfair or secret trials in violation of rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Recalling that, pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1235 (XLII) of 6 June 1967, the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities have been authorized to examine information relating to such reports;

Noting with appreciation resolution 4 (XXVIII) adopted by the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities with respect to the human rights of persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment:

1. Appeals to all governments to proclaim an unconditional amnesty by releasing all political prisoners in the sense of persons deprived of their liberty primarily because they have, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, sought peaceful expression of beliefs and opinions at variance with those held by their governments or have sought to provide legal or other forms of nonviolent assistance to such persons;

2. Requests the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to strengthen their efforts on behalf of political prisoners, including the establishment of working groups to conduct studies including visits, whenever necessary, to determine the facts relevant to the rights of political prisoners and the response of governments to this appeal;

3. Urges all governments to cooperate with the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of

Minorities in their efforts on behalf of political prisoners, including requests to make such visits as they may deem necessary for the purpose of investigating, and reporting on the circumstances relating to the detention, trial or imprisonment of such persons;

4. Requests the Secretary General to assist in any way he may deem appropriate in the implementation of this resolution, and to report to the General Assembly at its 31st session with respect to the activities of the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the implementation of this resolution.

II. FINAL COMMUNIQUE

FIRST ANNUAL INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON FREEDOM AND SECURITY

Washington, D.C.
September 25-28, 1975

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The Conference recommends essential changes in U.S. governmental economic policies toward Latin America.

1. U.S. foreign aid, by bailing countries out of their predicaments, prevents the proper correction of destructive inflationary policies. It creates socialism by using governments to try to solve problems that only a free, competitive market can solve. The only exceptions are emergency cases such as now exist in Chile.

2. U.S.-supported institutions such as the InterAmerican Bank and the World Bank have also led to governmentalization of economic activity, and inhibited economic development in general. U.S. support of the ILO, by fostering economically counterproductive labor policies, has helped prevent real wages of Latin American workers from increasing.

We recommend policies that will augment commercial, non-governmental free market relationships between all nations of the Western Hemisphere for the mutual benefit of all parties.

CHILE

Chile has defeated Communism by ousting Salvador Allende, although the Communist Party underground still exists and Marxist ideas still survive. International Communism will do everything possible to wreck Chile through propaganda, economic warfare, terrorism and, if necessary, direct military intervention. In this respect, all Western Hemisphere nations have a heavy responsibility that the reporting by their diplomatic missions in Chile is accurate and truthful.

The U.S. policy of granting asylum must be carefully operated to prevent the infiltration of Chilean and other Communists into the legitimate elements of refugees from Chile.

The current refusal of the United States to support Chile with emergency economic and military aid is near-sighted and potentially fatal. It only serves the Communists' drive to reastablish a base of operations on the South American continent from which they will pursue the destruction of the United States and the free world.

INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST SUBVERSION

While Communist terrorists plan to subvert the Bicentennial celebration in the United States and commit acts of violence during the Olympic Games in Canada next year, our defenses are being weakened. Current attacks on the CIA are weakening the U.S.'s chief defense against the KGB. These dangerous trends must be reversed. An international organization against terrorism should be set up in the Western Hemisphere and extended elsewhere in the Free World.

It is important that the free governments of this hemisphere coordinate their efforts to eradicate the Communist terrorist apparatus that has been spawned on their territories by the governments of Communist Cuba, Red China and mainly by the USSR.

CUBA

Castro's Cuba continues a formidable propaganda and subversive offensive in the Americas.

Red Cuba is not independent. It is dominated economically, politically and militarily by Russia.

We must not and cannot disregard Castro's enslavement of the Cuban people. We cannot by recognition sanction Castro's perversion of religion and his destruction of Cuban culture and his stealing of over two billion dollars of foreign property and all private property of the Cuban people.

As to trade, only Castro can gain from it. The island is penniless. It has practically nothing to sell, while Castro badly needs our products. We therefore strongly urge that U.S. diplomatic relations and trade relations *not* be established with Castro's Cuba.

PANAMA CANAL

The United States of America secured perpetual sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone in 1903. Since 1904 the cost of the Canal to the U.S.A. has been about seven billion dollars. The United States also paid the cost of the Panama Railway and bought all of the land in the Canal Zone, in addition to building, operating and providing for the military security of the Panama Canal as an international waterway.

Secretary Kissinger's proposal to transfer the Panama Canal to a country vulnerable to a Communist takeover must not be approved. Stable ownership by the United States and continued U.S. operation of the Canal are essential to the security of the Free World, and most immediately to that of the Western Hemisphere. The Canal should be modernized extensively as has now been proposed, and should be kept firmly in the hands of the United States.

David N. Rowe, Chairman (USA)
Committee on Final Communique

Committee Members:
Dr. Manuel Ayau (Guatemala)
Mr. Jose Lucio Correa (Brazil)
Sra. Nena Ossa (Chile)
Mr. Patrick Walsh (Canada)

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"THE 1975 CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," a report by the Honorable Edward J. Derwinski. *Congressional Record,* Washington, D.C., September 17, 1975.

The *Congressional Record* of the U.S. Congress is replete with data and material for the months of July and September on the highly successful and most unusual 1975 Captive Nations Week. As many legislators pointed out, the events during the Week were not accidental. The Congressman from Illinois declares, for example, "Here the week was crowded with such pertinent events as the Solzhenitsyn appearance, the Apollo-Soyuz spectacular, and the announcement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation of Europe."

Included in the statement was the proclamation of Mayor Perk of Cleveland. This was one of over three dozen proclamations by Governors and Mayors across the nation. Also, the text of a radio broadcast by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky on "Captive Nations Week Plus Seventeen Years" was incorporated. Additional material in this one of numerous reports covered rallies and comments here and abroad.

"LEFTIST FADS ASIDE, THE THREAT IS REAL," an article by Andrei Sakharov. *The Washington Star,* Washington, D.C., October 19, 1975.

In this thought-provoking article the Russian dissident and now Nobel Prize winner warns the West of the danger represented by the armed and determined totalitarian group in the Kremlin. He particularly inveighs against Western intellectuals who are insecure about the radicalism of the youth and disinformed by Red Chinese and Soviet Russian socialistic propaganda. Throughout he dubs the so-called communist systems as totalitarian, and to good effect.

Although subject to some basic criticism, the article is straightforward and hard-hitting. For instance, the author states, "The illusions commonly entertained by the leftist-liberal intelligentsia as to the nature of society in the USSR and the other socialist countries, as to real domestic and geopolitical aims of the ruling circles in those countries, make it difficult to evalutate the true significance of detente." He calls for Western intellectuals to support the struggle for human rights in the USSR. However, both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn have yet to admit clearly to the reality of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. Indirectly, they have alluded to it in various forms.

"THE 17TH OBSERVANCE OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," a report by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood. *Congressional Record,* Washington, D.C., September 19, 1975.

Among the numerous reports on the outstanding 1975 Captive Nations Week is this comprehensive one by the Pennsylvanian Representative. As he puts it,

"The extensive observance both here and abroad, the Solzhenitsyn message, the Apollo-Soyuz feat, Kissinger's defense of detente, and the calling of the European Security Conference contributed to a most memorable and successful 1975 Captive Nations Week." He emphasizes that the related events of the Week will be remembered for some time to come.

The statement incorporates important material assembled by the National Captive Nations Committee. In addition to other proclamations, the statement by the President to ethnic leaders on the eve of his departure for Helsinki is featured in the statement. Also, the text of another radio broadcast by Dr. Dobriansky on "The Helsinki Super-Summit" is included.

"ECUMENISM FOR EXPORT ONLY," an article by Miss Eva Piddubscheshen. *Diakonia*, Fordham University, New York, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1975.

What was originally an address delivered at a protest rally against visiting, so-called Soviet Churchmen, is adapted here in article form and is an impressive account of the foolhardy situation we find ourselves in today. The periodical in which the article appears is devoted to promoting Eastern Christianity in the West and is edited by Reverend George A. Maloney. As the article well shows, for Moscow and its "religious" puppets ecumenism is only a one-way street.

The author, who has spent a productive lifetime in religious affairs and issues, pulls no punches in this treatment of the visiting Soviet churchmen. She points out, "The Soviet churchmen who are being hosted here come from a country where the system of government is as different from ours as night is from day." Patriarch Pimen is cited as expressing joy over the liquidation of the Ukrainian Uniate Church. The underground publications in the USSR indicate that these official churchmen have really no loyal following. The article is replete with similar specifics on the religious situation in the USSR.

"THE 1975 CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," a report by the Honorable Edward J. Derwinski. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., September 19, 1975.

In another among the numerous reports on the 1975 Captive Nations Week, Representative Derwinski emphasizes the unusualness of the '75 Week, and at the outset states, "As the pages of the *Record* disclose, the week, its observances across the country and abroad, Solzhenitsyn, the timing of the Apollo-Soyuz orbit and the announcement of the European Security Conference—these and other events were interwoven." He also says, "On this basis of historical convergence, one can hardly wait for the 18th Captive Nations Week observance in July 1976."

As in other reports, this one produces evidences of the different activities during the Week. The excellent program of the Detroit observance is published in full. Another radio broadcast text by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, appears under the title "Helsinki and East Europe." So do addresses and activities in the Republic of China.

"CREATIVITY AND COMMUNISM," an editorial. *The Wall Street Journal,* New York, N.Y., October 7, 1975.

The Soviet film director, Sergo Paradjanov, is the subject of this enlightening editorial. The producer of "Shadows of Our Forgotten Ancestors" and other winning films, the director was viewed as the most promising director in the postwar period. But then he ran into trouble with the regime. As the editor explains, "He signed protests on behalf of Ukrainian nationalists and found it hard to make any more movies."

By 1969, Paradjanov was able again to produce, and his film "The Color of Pomegranates" was hailed by Western critics as a masterpiece. In 1971 he commenced with another film about the destruction of religious frescoes in the cathedrals of Kiev by Soviet governments under Lenin and Stalin. The regime curbed this one, and in 1974 the director was arrested and sentenced for a term of six years in a forced labor camp in Ukraine. Western attempts to have him released have failed so far.

"A SUCCESSFUL 17TH OBSERVANCE OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," a report by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood. *Congressional Record,* Washington, D.C., October 3, 1975.

Another report on the '75 Captive Nations Week appears here with an observation on the Laotian nation. Representative Flood notes, "Furthermore, with Laos now definitely under Communist domination, the long list of captive nations should have greater meaning." A short essay on the "Captive Nations" by the Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee is included in the report and contains a revised list of the captive nations.

The report also includes an incisive statement by Mr. Fred Schlafly, President of the American Council for World Freedom. Articles and editorials from *The Rising Tide* and the *West Roxbury Transcript* in Massachusetts are also incorporated into the Congressman's report. Emphasis again is placed on the unique convergence of events during the '75 Week.

"ETHNIC SUPPORT CLAIM UNETHICALLY PHONY," a commentary. *The National Spotlight,* Washington, D.C., September 17, 1975.

The thrust of this commentary is directed at the Ford meeting with ethnic leaders on the eve of his departure for Helsinki to sign the European Security agreements. According to it, "One of the greatest coups in the propaganda war to keep public awareness down, and to mute the opposition, was when President Ford induced Rep. Edward J. Derwinski, R.-Ill., to endorse the Helsinki accords." The unfortunate side of this commentary is that it is factually baseless.

The facts are that several sources sought the meeting with the President, one which, incidentally, was unprecedented. Contrary to the innuendos of this piece, the organizations represented were broadly based, and the "participants" could have easily been reached through the White House. Also, the three or four quoted

in the commentary as being opposed to the Helsinki agreements certainly didn't express themselves in this manner at the meeting. For a factually founded and accurate account of the meeting, as well as the President's clear-cut statement, the reader can find them in the reports on the '75 Captive Nations Week, which was related to the announcement of the European Conference.

"COMMUNIST DISSIDENTS: THE MEMORY HOLE," a commentary. *Time*, New York, October 13, 1975.

A very timely comment is expressed here concerning human rights and the difference of protests in the West, directed at some denials in the West but scarcely those in the East. The commentary begins poignantly, "The readiness of many Westerners, from political leaders to street demonstrators, to denounce repression in Spain is rarely extended to the totalitarian Communist countries." It fails, however, to explain that this is the price of "detente," particularly as concerns the political leadership. "Moscow wouldn't like it" is the usual rejoinder.

The Ukrainian cases receive due mention in the comment. As the commentator puts it, "The most compelling example: The Ukrainian nationalists in the Soviet Union. Unlike the Basque separatists in Spain, they call for nothing more radical than the wider use of the Ukrainian language in schools and other forms of cultural autonomy for their 48.5 million countrymen." The writer quite effectively stresses that names such as Valentyn Moroz, Leonid Plyushch, Ivan Svitlychny, Ihor and Iryna Kalynets are hardly known in the West. "The memory hole," which the commentator uses to describe the disappearance of dissidents of the past, can well be applied to the general populace, and the responsibility then rests in large part with our media. In government circles these and other names are well known, but action is curbed by the foolish strictures of detente as presently pursued.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," a letter by Maximilian J. Hodder. *Human Events*, Washington, D.C., September 27, 1975.

This is a most striking letter to the "Conservative Forum" section of this periodical. The writer holds that the difference between the 16 previous observances of Captive Nations Week and the recent 17th one is the final act of betrayal of the captive nations of Eastern Europe at the Helsinki Conference, "a Yalta reincarnated." Referring to Kissinger, the writer ends by asking "Will Gerald R. Ford, if elected President, rid himself of the chief architect of the American tragedy of the past five years and will he uphold in 1976-1980 the high and noble ideals Rep. Gerald R. Ford espoused and advocated in 1970?"

The ideals are found in the quotation offered for July 11, 1970, during that year's Captive Nations Week: "There are some Americans who think that Captive Nations Week should be soft-pedaled or forgotten. I strongly disagree. Americans must continue to make known their deep concern about the people of the Captive Nations and convey this message to the Captive World. Americans should continue to make known their refusal to accept the regimes imposed upon these unfortunate

victims of tyranny." The writer then observes, "This beautiful and noble address was signed: 'Gerald R. Ford, House of Repressentatives.' "

"UKRAINIANS CELEBRATE CENTENNIAL HERE WITH PARADE," a report. *The New York Times,* New York, September 22, 1975.

A parade down Fifth Avenue, led by Cossacks on horseback, is featured in this report on the Ukrainian celebration of the American Bicentennial as well as the 100th anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in the United States. Over a thousand Ukrainian Americans participated in the parade, despite a pouring rain. Rallies were held at Bryant Park and the United Nations.

Senator James L. Buckley, who addressed the gathering, is quoted as saying, "I can think of no other people who came here more for their freedom than the Ukrainians. Too many people in this country want to hide from the fact that there is a new wave of repression in the Soviet Union." Representative Edward I. Koch and Miss Mary V. Beck also addressed the group.

"FOLLOW THE WINTER SUN THROUGH THE BACK DOOR OF RUSSIA," an article by Betty Chancellor. *Carte Blanche* magazine, Los Angeles, Calif., January/February 1975.

This article is a good example of the popular lag in American thinking about "Russia." It appears that each generation has to be re-educated about the so-called "mystery inside an enigma." The writer entered the Soviet Union, which is merely "Russia" for her, via Siberia and well displays her uncritical sights in this misinforming narrative. No sooner interchanging Russia and the USSR, she states, "Over a hundred different nationalities live in the Soviet Union with different languages, traditions, cultures. Russian is the national language but traditional languages are also taught."

And so it goes, Russia is the USSR which is a nation with a Russian language. Quite a mish-mash. By precise definition of terms it would probably amaze the writer to know that less than two dozen nations in compact form exist in this land-empire. The moral of this example is that physical presence in an area is no guarantee for acquired knowledge.

"SOLZHENITSYN AIRS GRIEVANCE AT WEST," an article by Roman Rakhmanny. *The Gazette,* Montreal, Canada, May 5, 1975.

This prolific and highly knowledgeable writer reports on the Russian dissident's expression of concern about the West's indifference to the fate of such countries as Ukraine. Solzhenitsyn's message was beamed over the Ukrainian language section of Radio Canada International and repeated by Montreal's station CFMB. The writer also reminded his listeners about the man-made famine in Ukraine in 1933 when "Six million peasants died then."

The writer also quotes the Russian author as saying "My mother was almost entirely of Ukrainian origin. My grandfather, the only male member of the family

after my father died, was a Ukrainian. His lively language and his perception of the world still resound in my memory. Thus, the fate of the Ukrainian people is not strange to me; I regard their fate as my own."

As the writer indicates, these words are inspiring. However, political analysts are still waiting for some concrete views from the author concerning the independence of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. Much speculation persists in this vital field of thought.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK AND THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE," a commentary. *Latvian Information Bulletin,* Washington, D.C., October 1975.

A good coverage of some aspects of the events surrounding the Helsinki Conference can be found in this periodical issued by the Latvian Legation in Washington. The commentary is based on Congressman Derwinski's report on Captive Nations Week in the September 17 *Record.* What is naturally highlighted is the fate of the three Baltic nations.

The President is quoted as saying "To keep the Helsinki Conference in perspective, regarding the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States... Our official policy of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference." Actually, in his prepared statement the President went beyond this to underscore the right to national independence on the part of all the captive nations in Eastern Europe, which by implication includes Ukraine, Byelorussia and others within the USSR. Statements by Representatives Frank Annunzio of Illinois, Jack F. Kemp of New York and others are referred to in the commentary to suggest a growing skepticism as to the effects of Helsinki.

"SOVIET DISSENTERS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF MATHEMATICIAN," a report. *The New York Times,* New York, June 13, 1975.

The case of Leonid Plyushch is treated in this report which centers on a group of Soviet dissenters appealing to the International Red Cross in his behalf. The 36-year-old mathematician, it is reported, was being given insulin shock treatment in a psychiatric hospital. The Ukrainian dissident was arrested in 1972 on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

In a similar move the group addressed itself to several international scientific and medical associations for their intervention on Plyushch's behalf. The telegram messages stressed the serious condition of the mathematician who has been incarcerated in a Dnipropetrovsk hospital in Ukraine since 1973. This is just one outstanding case among thousands caught in the heightened repressions during this period of detente. Without question, both within and outside the Soviet Union popular pressure for the surcease of such repressions must be maintained. Complete silence and hushed attempts via governmental media are grossly inadequate.

"DEMOCRATIC STATES IN UN URGED TO PROTECT FREEDOM," a report. *The Catholic Register,* Toronto, Canada, June 21, 1975.

This report covers an address delivered by Senator Paul Yuzyk of Winnipeg at a Baltic commemorative service held in Toronto. The Senator is an articulate and active spokesman for all the enslaved nations under Red regimes. The event recalled the forced deportation of thousands of Balts in June 1941.

Senator Yuzyk is quoted at length. For example, he declares "The Soviet Russian empire was established by force and will evidently be maintained by force under a totalitarian system which cannot allow 'liberalization,' democracy and freedom to make headway within its jurisdiction." The Senator called for "concerted action" by democratic members of the UN to advance freedom among the captive nations.

"AN OUTSTANDING CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," a report by the Honorable Edward J. Derwinski. *Congressional Record,* Washington, D.C., September 18, 1975.

In another report on the '75 Captive Nations Week, filled with examples of proclamations and activities, Congressman Derwinski of Illinois begins by observing that "an interpretative analysis of the 1975 Captive Nations Week shows that it was the most outstanding in years." Citing previously mentioned events, he continues, "The unique convergence of events prior, during, and after the week was no mere historical accident."

One of the main documents incorporated in the statement is the release by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America on the President's meeting with ethnic leaders on the eve of his departure for Helsinki. Part of the President's statement at that meeting is quoted as follows: "It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means."

"UKRAINIAN CATHOLICS, VATICAN AT IMPASSE OVER PATRIARCHATE," a letter from Rome by Mary Martinez. *The Wanderer,* Minneapolis, Minnesota, August 14, 1975.

This letter is actually a long article describing the rising tensions between Ukrainian Catholics and the Vatican over the patriarchate issue, involving Yosyf Cardinal Slipyj. While the former, according to the writer, hold that Cardinal Slipyj was formally installed in St. Peter's in the presence of 14 Ukrainian Bishops and 80 Ukrainian priests as "Patriarch of Kiev-Halych and the entire Rus' Ukraine," the Vatican issued a communique that a Ukrainian patriarchate "does not exist." The writer traces the developments leading to the present deadlock.

As analysts know, the issue is not a purely religious one. It is heavily drenched in policies of the West toward the Soviet Union. Fr. P. Mailleux, Provin-

cial for Eastern Rite Jesuits and nicknamed "The Red Pope," is quoted as saying in August 1973, "There is no doubt that the establishment of a Ukrainian patriarchate would be considered a provocation by the Soviets" and "it would be considered a hostile interference in the internal affairs of the USSR." Where have we heard this before? As the writer shows, other Jesuit specialists on the USSR, such as Fr. Alexis Floridi, Fr. George A. Maloney and Fr. Wilhelm de Vries support the stand of Ukrainian Uniates against present Vatican policy, which will undoubtedly change once detente is properly rivised.

"THEY'VE WEATHERED MANY STORMS," a headline. *Daily News,* New York, September 22, 1975.

The New York Daily News, which consistently over the past seventeen years has supported captive nations causes, gave first-page publicity to the Ukrainian American parade down Fifth Avenue on September 21. The circulation of the paper is one of the largest in the country. A large picture over the headline shows the marchers in a downpour of rain.

As the short report reads, "Clouds? Rain? Don't let that fool you. It's really a beautiful day for Ukrainian-Americans as they marched down Fifth Ave. yesterday." It goes on to note, "The parade observed U.S. bicentennial and centennial of first Ukrainian settlement in U.S." The event was a huge success.

"IS DENMARK THE NO. 1 IMPERIALIST?," a commentary. *AIM Report,* Accuracy In Media, Washington, D.C., August 1975.

Referring to a column by C.L. Sulzberger in *The New York Times Syndicate* claiming that Denmark is now the number one imperialist, this commentary accurately criticizes the thesis and under a further caption, "The New Imperialism," demonstrates that Soviet Russia within the Soviet Union is number one by far. This important periodical, as its name suggests, specializes in enforcing accuracy in the media.

The commentary justifies its critical position in this manner. "Dr. Lev Dobriansky of Georgetown University states that the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. have long been subjected to economic colonialism." The vital economic importance of Ukraine to the designs of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is particularly underscored. It goes on to say "that the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union are absolutely vital to the economy of that country... and that they should be recognized by the West as colonies exploited by the Russians."

"UKRAINIAN LOSES RELIGION APPEAL," a report by William Willoughby. *The Washington Star,* Washington, D.C., May 24, 1975.

This religious editor for the Washington newspaper describes the continued imprisonment of a Ukrainian baptist, despite the many appeals and pleas by the American Baptist Churches. Georgi Vins was sentenced to five years in

prison and five years in exile for violating Ukrainian civil laws forbidding religious activities of unlicensed ministers and congregations. Vins opposed this arbitrary power of licensing.

At the time he stood trial, Vins was supported by the World Council of Churches which intervened in his behalf. Dr. Carl McIntire staged demonstrations in his behalf. All this to no avail. The dissident will serve the rest of his sentence in the Yakutsk Autonomous Republic in Eastern Siberia.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK AND HELSINKI," a report by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood. *Congressional Record,* Washington, D.C., September 24, 1975.

Adding to the many reports on the '75 Captive Nations Week, this one contains more data on the happenings in relation to the Helsinki conference. As the Congressman rightly observes, "These and other events did not go unnoticed by supporters of the captive nations." Included in his statement is the memorandum submitted to the President by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. It is titled "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Endorsement of Russian Slave Empire."

Among many points made in the memorandum is this one: "48 million Ukrainians, 12 million Byelorussians, 8 million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and over 12 million Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians and others will not be heard at the Conference, for they are coerced into political silence by the oppressive regime of Communist Russia." A telling point on the makeup of the conference.

L.E.D.

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

I. UKRAINIAN LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES

Ukrainians in New York Mark the Bicentennial, 100th Anniversary of Ukrainian Settlement.—On Sunday, September 21, 1975 over 5,000 Ukrainians from the metropolitan area of New York and the neighboring states gathered in New York City to honor the Bicentennial of the American Revolution and the Centennial of the Ukrainian Settlement in America. The assembled also paid tribute to Ukrainian women political prisoners in Ukraine and elsewhere in the USSR. The event included a parade down Fifth Avenue, led by a group of swashbuckling Ukrainian Kozaks on horseback, floats, bands and folk dancers in native costumes and members of UCCA branches, fraternal organizations, women's groups and members of Ukrainian American youth organizations in their organizational uniforms. The marchers, proclaiming pride in their heritage and gratitude for the freedom and bounties provided by life in the United States, proceeded from 58th Street to Bryant Park at Sixth Avenue between 40th and 42nd Streets, where the Bicentennial program was held.

Speaking at the program were the Hon. James L. Buckley, U.S. Senator from New York; the Hon. Edward I. Koch, U.S. Congressman from New York; Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the UCCA, and Dr. Mary Beck, former councilwoman and deputy mayor of Detroit, Mich. The program was opened by Roman Huhlewych, chairman of the United Ukrainian American Organizations of New York, a Branch of the UCCA, which sponsored the event, and addressed by Dr John O. Flis, chairman of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of New York. Dr. George Wolynetz and Mrs. Mary Dushnyck introduced the speakers, while Very Rev. Patrick Paschak, the Provincial of the Basilian Fathers in the U.S., gave the invocation. Appealing to the ear and eye was the performance of the Bandurist Ensemble from Hempstead, N.Y. under the direction of Rev. Serhiy Kendzeravy-Pastukhiv.

At the conclusion, Dr. Ronald Lee Gaudreau, executive vice president of the N.Y.C. Bicentennial Corporation, presented to Mr. Huhlewych a "Certificate of Recognition" to the Ukrainians of New York.

After the program at Bryant Park thousands of marchers formed columns and in orderly manner proceeded to Hammerskjold Plaza opposite the UN headquarters, where another program was held and dedicated to Ukrainian women political prisoners in Ukraine and the USSR, in this International Women's Year. The program was opened by Dr Flis who called on Mrs. Dushnyck to serve as master of ceremonies. Appearing on the program were Lady Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton, president of the Committee to Unite America, Mrs. Ulana Celewych of Chicago, president of the Women's As-

sociation of ODFFU, and Askold Lozynsky, chairman of the student TUSM association.

At the conclusion, Mrs. Dushnyck read a resolution, which was to be sent to President Ford later, while Miss Christine Furda and Miss Marta Zhelnyk read a telegram and an "Acknowledgment of Solidarity," respectively, sent subsequently to UN Secretary General Dr. Kurt Waldheim.

The manifestation was extensively covered by the N.Y. press, radio and TV media. On Sunday morning WOR radio station carried a report on the parade, while Channel 2 (CBS) carried a part of the program at the Plaza on its 11:00 p.m. news program. Sen. Buckley was interviewed by a reporter from NBC-TV, at Bryant Park. On Monday morning the popular N.Y. **Daily News** carried a photograph on its entire front page, and two pictures in the centerfold. **The New York Times** of September 22, 1975 also carried a report and a photograph of the parade.

ACWF Holds Annual Meeting in Washington.—On Thursday, September 25, 1975, the American Council for World Freedom (ACWF) held its annual meeting on the eve of the Inter-American Conference on Freedom and Security, both of which were held at the Statler Hilton Hotel in Washington.

Reports were presented by ACWF president Fred Schlafly, secretary Lee Edwards, and Lynn Bouchey, conference coordinator. The Council's agenda included a number of important topics, such as Portugal, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Panama Canal and Cuba. The Council also decided to establish an Inter-American Institute on Comparative Politics, Culture and Economics, tentatively scheduled at the University of Miami.

At the conclusion of the meeting a new executive board of the ACWF and a board of directors were elected: Fred Schlafly was reelected president, with Lee Edwards as executive secretary.

Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, was reelected 1st vice-president, and Prof. Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institution, as 2nd vice president. Dr. Walter H. Judd was reelected honorary president of the ACWF.

Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of **The Ukrainian Quarterly,** was reelected a member of the board of directors, while Ignatius M. Billinsky, editor of **America,** another UCCA delegate, was reelected a member-at-large. Attending the meeting was also Miss Vera A. Dowhan, secretary of the National Captive Nations Committee.

Joining the new board of directors were Adm. John McCain (USN Ret.), who replaced the late Gen. Thomas A. Lane, and Paul Bethel, American political leader of Miami, Fla.

Inter-American Conference on Freedom and Security.—Scores of representatives from various countries of South and Central America, as well as the United States and Canada, took part in the Inter-American Conference on Freedom and Security, held on September 25-28, 1975 at the Statler Hilton Hotel in Washington. Taking part in the conference were representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Republic of China, United States, Ukraine and Lithuania.

Representing Ukraine was Mrs. Slava Stetzko, editor of **ABN Correspondence** in Munich, West Germany, while Simas Kudirka, the world-famed Lithuanian seaman, represented Lithuania. The conference was addressed by Sen. Carl Curtis (R., Neb.), Sen. Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.), Sen. Jesse Helms (R., N.C.), Congressman Philip Crane (R., Ill.) and Congressman Daniel J. Flood (D., Pa.). Among leading Latin Americans who addressed the conference were Brazilian Congresswoman Dulce Salle Cunha, Augustin Navarro of Mexico and Chile's Supreme Court Justice, Enrique Urrutia. Other internationally known leaders who addressed the conference were Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, Republic of China, Mrs. Slava Stetzko and Simas Kudirka.

During the conference three panels of experts dealt with a variety of topics relating to the political, economic and social problems of South and Central America, the Panama Canal and Cuba, as well as U.S. policies toward the Southern Hemisphere.

The first panel, moderated by Dr. Possony, dealt with "Revolution and Counterrevolution" in Latin America, and featured several speakers from the U.S., Cuba, Chile, Brazil and Canada. The second panel discussed the "Economic Interdependence of the Americas" and was moderated by Dr. Dobriansky, and also included several speakers from the various countries. The third panel dealth with the "Strategic Balance in the Southern Hemisphere" and was chaired by Dr. Roger Fontaine of Georgetown University, in which a number of speakers participated, including Adm. John McCain.

The final session of the conference was held on Sunday afternoon and was chaired by Dr. David N. Rowe, professor emeritus of Yale University, who was chairman of the resolutions committee. After a long discussion, a final communique was accepted, whereupon the conference was adjourned. (See text of the Final Communique appearing in the "Pertinent Documents" column in this issue.—Ed.)

Economy of Ukraine Discussed at Harvard Conference.—On September 26-27, 1975 a conference on the economy of Ukraine was held at Harvard University. Sponsored by the Research and Development Committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), the conference, entitled, "Ukraine Within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet," was organized by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and Temple University's School of Business Administratiion, and was chaired by Prof. I.S. Koropecky of Temple University's department of economics.

The first session, after the opening address by Dr. Seymour L. Wolfbein, was presided by Dr. Peter Wiles of the London School of Economics and included the following scholars: Dr. Vsevolod Holubnychy, Hunter College, N.Y.C.; Dr. Koropecky, Temple University; Prof. Stanley H. Cohn, SUNY at Binghamton, N.Y.; Prof. George Logush, Fordham University; and Prof. Gertrude E. Schroeder, University of Virginia; discussants were Prof. Aron Katsenelinboigen, University of Virginia, and Prof. Carl B. Turner, North Carolina State University.

In the evening all participants were hosted at a dinner given by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, with Dr. Abram Bergson of the Economics Department at Harvard as a guest speaker and Prof. Omelan Pritsak, Director of the Harvard Ukrainian Institute, as chairman.

The Saturday morning session included the presentation of papers by David F. Bronson and F. Douglas Whitehouse, Central Intelligence Agency; Dr. Michael Boretsky of the U.S. Department of Commerce; Prof. Leslie Dienes, University of Kansas, and Prof. Craig Zum-Brunnen of Ohio State University. Discussants at this session were Dr. Herbert S. Levine of the University of Pennsylvania and Theodore Shabad, correspondent of **The New York Times.**

The third session chaired by Prof. Holland Hunter of Haverford College featured Prof. James Gillula, Duke University; Prof. V.N. Bandera, Temple University, and Prof. Z.L. Melnyk, University of Cincinnati; discussants at the session were Stepan Rapawy, U.S. Department of Commerce, and Rev. Michael J. Lavelle, S.J., of John Carroll University.

Topics at the conference covered such subjects as the theoretical model of the republic's economy, changing economic prerogatives, demographic and labor trends in Ukraine, the technology of Ukraine compared with the USSR and selected countries of the world; the role of Ukrainian mineral resources in Soviet industry, environmental impact of industrialization in Ukraine, the imput-output analysis of the external economic relations of Ukraine, the capital formation in Ukraine and her financial relations with the USSR, and so forth.

Nationalism in the USSR, Eastern Europe—Subject of Symposium at University of Detroit.—The University of Detroit held a well-attended symposium on "Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe under Brezhnev and Kosygin," in which some 55 Sovietologists, historians, sociologists and political scientists from the United States and Canada took part. The symposium, initiated and organized by the UCCA Branch in Detroit-East under the chairmanship of Prof. Dr. Antin Shutka, was held on Saturday and Sunday, October 3 and 4, 1975.

The two-day conference included the presentation of a series of papers on 15 themes dealing with developments in the USSR and East European countries.

Among Ukrainian scholars who addressed the symposium were Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the UCCA, who spoke on the "Politico-Economic Significance of U.S.-USSR Trade," and such known Ukrainian educators as Prof. Konstantyn Sawczuk, Prof. Wsevolod S. Isajiw, Prof. Ihor Kamenetsky, Prof. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, Prof. Mykola Stepanenko and Prof. Roman Szporluk. Their topics encompassed two general themes: "Social and Political Aspects of the National Problem in Ukraine" and "Cultural and Religious Dimensions for the National Problem in Ukraine."

Recent political and social developments in Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Central Asia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Albania, Byelorussia, Croatia, Poland and Armenia were also discussed extensively by specialists on these countries. A special session on Soviet Jewry was held on Sunday. The conference was opened with introductory remarks by Rev. Malcolm Carron, S.J., president of the University of Detroit.

Soviet Embassy in Washington Attacks Prof. Dobriansky.—In a move which is clearly a case of "meddling" in the internal affairs of the United States, the USSR Embassy in Washington unleashed a scurrilous attack on

Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and prominent American scholar, lecturer and leader.

The USSR Embassy has been disseminating an article, entitled "A Lie in Behalf of the Cold War," written by one "Boris Bannov" for the **Novosti** Press Agency, a known KGB filter in Moscow, in rebuttal of Prof. Dobriansky's article, "The Despairing West and the Confident East," which appeared in the Summer 1975 issue of **The Ukrainian Quarterly**, and which was reproduced in the **Congressional Record** by the Hon. Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania (94th Congress, First Session, 578-422-40610).

The Soviet article is a crude piece of unabashed Soviet Russian propaganda, which in its blatancy and distortions exceeds even the worst Soviet examples of deliberate fabrications. Yevgeny Rudkovsky, Information Officer of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, had the temerity to send the article to Congressman Flood with a request that he introduce it into the **Record** as "a follow up in the **Congressional Record** on Dobriansky's article."

In his comment on the Soviet propaganda ploy, Prof. Dobriansky stated:

"...The so-called Bannov article deserves little comment. Its disclosure alone is useful to the reader for the type of fabrications, distortions and thematic ploys that the Soviet Russians, in true Leninist fashion, are particularly adept in. Anyone who has read my extensive article cannot but be impressed by the non-sequiturs of the Bannov response, involving Nazi killings, terrorism in Vietnam, spurious percentages on Ukrainian economic growth, and Moscow's ostensible non-participation in wars since World War II. The Soviet Russian record of genocide, imperio-colonialism, and support of 'wars of national liberation' could be cited in detail to demolish the Bannov arguments. Parenthetically, nowhere in my writings will one find the use of 'captivated' with reference to the captive nations: they're scarcely captivated by Moscow's imperialist domination. Need more be said..."

Byzantine Male Choir of Utrecht on Tour in America.—Under the sponsorship of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the patronage of the hierarchies of the Ukrainian churches, the Byzantine Male Choir of Utrecht made a whirlwind concert tour of twelve Ukrainian American communities in the period from October 30 to November 11, 1975. Appearing with the choir was also Volodymyr Luciv, Ukrainian tenor from London, who accompanied himself on the **bandura**, the Ukrainian national instrument whose sound resembles that of the harpsichord. The choir, consisting of 42 Dutchmen, was established in 1951 by Dr. Myroslav Antonovych and has been under his direction ever since, except for 1953-1954 when Dr. Antonovych did research work at Harvard University. Earlier he completed his doctoral studies in musicology at the University of Utrecht, Holland. In the twenty-four years of their existence, the "Dutch Kozaks," as they are sometimes called in Europe, have reaped laurels of praise in Western Europe for their rendition of Ukrainian church, classical and folk music. They have performed at Westminster Abbey in London, St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris, and in Rotterdam, Cologne, Brussels, Munich, Basel and Luxemburg; they have been heard on radio broadcasts in Germany, France and England, and have a number of records to their credit. The Choir's repertoire included the works of such Ukrainian

composers as Bortniansky, Berezovsky, Vedel, Lysenko, and others. Arriving from Canada, the choir gave concerts in Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, New York and in Newark, N.J., Philadelphia, Pa., Washington D.C., Detroit, Mich., Cleveland, Ohio and Chicago, Ill.

Ukrainian Doctors Protest Visit of Soviet Psychiatrists.—The Ukrainian Medical Association of North America (UMANA), in a letter signed by its president, Dr. Achilles Chreptowsky, and administrative officer, Dr. M. Charkewycz, protested the participation of 26 Soviet doctors in the annual meeting of the Canadian Psychiatric Association, held on September 23-26, 1975, in Banff, Alta., denouncing them as pawns of the Soviet secret police, the KGB, who commit innocent people to psychiatric prisons

The letter cited specifically the cases of Leonid Plyushch and C. Gluzman who are currently confined to the Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric ward and pointed out that among the Soviet psychiatrists touring Canada and the U.S. was Alexander Kachayev, assistant director of the Serbsky Institute in Moscow, who was responsible for committing Plyushch. In addition to Kachayev, the 26-man Soviet group of psychiatrists included eight others from the Serbsky Institute. In the letter, dated September 18, 1975, the Ukrainian Medical Association also appealed to Canadian psychiatrists "to raise your voice in defense of human rights and the elementary value of human dignity and democracy..."

Ambassador of Ukrainian SSR Holds Press Conference on Apartheid.—Ambassador of the Ukrainian SSR to the U.N., Volodymyr N. Martynenko, Permanent Representative of the Ukrainian SSR to the U.N., called a press conference in his capacity as acting chairman of the U.N. Committee on Apartheid. Mr. Martynenko has been the Acting Head of the Committee on Aparteid since Edwin Ogebe Ogbu of Nigeria vacated that post earlier this summer.

The press conference, held on October 14, 1975, was called to introduce members of the World Peace Council which presented the Committee on Aparteid with its highest award for the committee's work.

During the press conference Mr. Martynenko was asked about the Amnesty International report which singled out the USSR (and indirectly the Ukrainian SSR), South Africa, Spain and Uganda for gross violations of human rights. Mr. Martynenko was told that President Idi Amin of Uganda agreed to allow a team to investigate the status of human rights in Uganda, and was asked whether he would be prepared to allow a similar team to investigate the status of human rights in Ukraine, following President Amin's lead. This would indirectly apply pressure on South Africa to agree to such a team as well.

In reply, Mr. Martynenko said that he was giving the press conference not as Ambassador [of the Ukrainian SSR], but as head of the Committee on Apartheid.

In reporting on the press conference the Human Rights Bureau of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians in New York stated in its release of October 16, 1975 that a recent report of Amnesty International singled out the Soviet Union, South Africa, Spain and Uganda as countries where gross violations of human rights are occurring daily. On October 2 President Idi Amin of Uganda, while at the U.N., agreed to allow a team from Amnesty

International to inquire into alleged violations of human rights in his country. A series of protests came when the Spanish government announced that it would execute certain Basques for killing a number of policemen. The U.N. has been investigating South Africa for the last ten years. Only the Soviet Union has not been investigated so far.

The Bureau release also stated that a recently published report of the U.N. on the subject of the World Conference of the International Women's Year held in Mexico City notes a report by Amnesty International. The Amnesty report deals in great detail with the plight of women political prisoners in Ukraine.

Mark 25th Anniversary of Bridgeport UCCA Branch.—On October 25, 1975 the Bridgeport Branch of the UCCA observed the 25th anniversary of its founding with an elaborate program and banquet, organized by branch officers under the direction of Myroslav Stachiw, current branch chairman. Appearing as speakers at the banquet were Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of **The Ukrainian Quarterly**, Orest Dubno, Deputy Commissioner of the Tax Department of Connecticut, representing Governor Ella Grasso, and Victor Muniec, representing William Seres, Mayor of Bridgeport. Dr. John O. Flis of New York acted as master of ceremonies.

The entertainment program consisted of songs by Mme. Renata Babak, mezzo-soprano, formerly of the Lviv Opera and the Bolshoi Opera; Ukrainian folk dances performed by the Ukrainian Dancing Group "Dnipro," and the Ukrainian vocal group "Hutsulky." During the program "Certificates of Recognition" were presented to Bridgeport Ukrainian organizations and individuals for their dedicated services to the UCCA. Messages of congratulations were sent by U.S. Senators Abraham Ribicoff and Lowell Weicker, Jr. and Congressman Christopher J. Dodd.

U.S. Congressman Urges Expulsion of Ukraine and Byelorussia from U.N.—Congressman J. Herbert Burke (R.-Fla.) introduced on September 26, 1975, a resolution calling for the expulsion of Ukraine and Byelorussia from the United Nations on the grounds that both are "merely subdivisions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, incorporated into the USSR at a truly horrendous cost in human lives..."

Congressman Burke, however, stressed that both Ukraine and Byelorussia "have repeatedly demonstrated a historic sense of identity and fierce nationalism," paying a high price for their desire for real independence. He said that the two republics have none of the international criteria for nation-states and, therefore, cannot be members of the U.N.

"Neither has, since the revolution of 1917, had any of the attributes of sovereignty and independence that are the criteria of nation-states for U.N. membership. Neither has carried on its own international relations, independently of the Soviet Union," said Rep. Burke.

Ukrainians Want to See Their Country Free, Asserts Shriver.—Sargeant Shriver, one of the eleven candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination, said in an interview with the Ukrainian Service of the "Voice of America" that many Ukrainians want to see their country independent.

In an interview with Mr. Shriver, VOA reporter Ada Kulyk centered on his recent trip to Kiev.

"Even today there are many Ukrainians who would want to see Ukraine an independent state, because, after all, it is larger than many of the countries which have already gained their independence. Ukraine has its own history, and its own language, culture and traditions," said Mr. Shriver.

Senator Jackson Protests Plight of Ukrainian Political Prisoners.—Sen. Henry M. Jackson expressed his concern for the fate of Ukrainian political prisoners in Soviet jails in separate letters to President Gerald Ford and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The letters, dated October 31, 1975, were written in the aftermath of a meeting with Sen. Jackson by three members of the Philadelphia Committee for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz on October 21. He cited in both letters a petition with 3979 signatures in defense of Ukrainian political prisoners, which he received from the above-mentioned Philadelphia Committee.

In his letter to President Ford, Sen. Jackson focused his appeal on the cases of Valentyn Moroz, Leonid Plyushch and Yuriy Shukhevych, and said, in part:

"I have the privilege of informing you of a petition on behalf of three Ukrainian political prisoners, Valentyn Moroz, Leonid Plyushch, and Yuriy Shukhevych. This petition was circulated by Americans of Ukrainian descent in several American cities and has 3879 signatures.

"I urge you to instruct Ambassador Moynihan to protest strongly at the United Nations the incarceration of Valentyn Moroz and his fellow political prisoners as a gross violation of the principles accepted by the Soviet Union itself in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination..."

In his letter to Brezhnev, Sen. Jackson stated:

"I have received a petition, signed by nearly 4000 individuals, which expresses the mounting concern in the United States, particularly among Americans of Ukrainian descent, for the fate of Valentyn Moroz, Leonid Plyushch, and Yuriy Shukhevych. I share that concern, and it is also especially disturbing to me that many young women have been imprisoned in recent years simply for endeavoring to exercise their cultural freedom as Ukrainians—among them Stefania Shabatura, Nadia Svitlychna-Shumuk, Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, and Nina Strokata-Karavanska.

"I continue to hope that you will act to restore to Valentyn Moroz and his fellow Ukrainian prisoners the rights which your government is pledged to uphold under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.'"

Inaugurate Chair of Ukrainian History at Harvard.—On October 24, 1975 Prof. Omelan Pritsak, first professor of the Mykhailo S. Hrushevsky Chair of Ukrainian History at Harvard University, delivered the inaugural lecture, on "The Origin of Rus." Prof. Pritsak, who also is Director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, was introduced by Prof. Henry Rosovski, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, who also expressed gratitude to the Ukrainian community for its generosity in endowing the three chairs of Ukrainian studies at Harvard, the first community-funded chairs

at this prestigious American university. In the evening a banquet was held at the Sheraton Commodore Hotel, attended by over 100 guests from various parts of the United States and Canada.

Ukrainian American Christians Throw Eggs at Soviet 'Prelate'.—A group of Ukrainian Christians pelted an Orthodox Church prelate of the USSR with eggs as he left the Church Center of the U.N., where he was attending a preparatory session of the World Conference on Religion and Peace. They called him a "collaborator" in the destruction of religion in the USSR.

In what a spokesman described as a "rotating protest" against the presence of Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev, the demonstrators—Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox—confronted the metropolitan at JFK, at his hotel and at the U.N. When he left the U.N. church center (Oct. 28), more than 100 placard-waving Ukrainian Americans jeered and threw eggs, hitting the prelate, his aide, and "plastering" his car.

According to the spokesman for the demonstrators, the protest was not aimed at the World Conference on Religion and Peace but at Metropolitan Filaret's participation. (He came as an observer). The spokesman said the Soviet churchman "cannot effectively espouse religion because he has shown himself to be a collaborator with the Communist Party and an instrument of the regime in the destruction of religion."

As the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, he added, Metropolitan Filaret "has done or said nothing in defense of the right for the legal existence of the Ukrainian Orthodox or Ukrainian Catholic Churches in that country."

Last March, when Metropolitan Filaret and 18 other Soviet churchmen visited the U.S. at the invitation of the National Council of Churches, demonstrations were held in several U.S. cities by Ukrainian Christians. Protests were also issued by Archbishop-Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, four Ruthenian Catholic bishops and the consistory of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A.

Songs, Art Exhibit Highlight Ukrainian Bicentennial Program in Philadelphia.—A two-week exhibit of art works by Ukrainian artists and a concert of Ukrainian songs highlighted the first of many Ukrainian programs marking the Bicentennial of the American Revolution in Philadelphia. The dual event, held at the University of Pennsylvania Museum on November 8, 1975, was sponsored by the local Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee under the auspices of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. Co-sponsors of the program were Philadelphia '76, Inc. and the National Cultures Center of the University. The evening concert was preceded by the official opening of the Ukrainian Heritage Exhibit of Contemporary and Folk Art at the museum. The display, which lasted through November 23, included the works of 50 Ukrainian artists, which were judged by a three-member panel consisting of Arcadia Olenska-Petryshyn, Zenon Feszczak and Jacques Hnizdovsky. During the opening ceremony the visitors were addressed by Dr. Ivan Skalczuk, chairman of the Philadelphia Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee. The Committee, in addition to the art exhibit, also set up a Ukrainian folk craft display in a separate room at the museum, which included embroidery, woodcarving, ceramics, **pysanky** and weaving.

The concert program included songs by the "Prometheus" Male Choir under the direction of Michael Dlaboha, featuring several soloists and **bandura** players, and two Ukrainian folk dance ensembles.

The non-Ukrainian guests at the performance included Robert Crawford, Philadelphia Commissioner of Recreation; Barrett Malko, representative of Philadelphia '76; Michael Rainone, chairman of the Ethnic Heritage Advisory Council of Philadelphia '76, and Joseph Minott, from the museum.

Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R.-Pa.), architect of the Ethnic Heritage Studies Bill, in his message cited the worthy contributions of the Ukrainian community to the development of the United States.

UCCA Concerned About High Parcel Taxes by the USSR.—The UCCA Executive Board Presidium at its monthly meeting on November 7, 1975, decided unanimously to appeal to the proper authorities of the U.S. government in the matter of exorbitant levies imposed by the Soviet government on relief packages sent by U.S. citizens to their relatives in Ukraine. The UCCA Executive Board is collecting documentary material on this matter which will be used in a memorandum to be submitted to the U.S. government.

Other matters discussed at the meeting pertained to the fund-raising drive for the Ukrainian National Fund, the UCCA publications, the situation of Ukrainian political prisoners in Ukraine and elsewhere in the USSR, the Bicentennial programs and the XIIth Congress of the UCCA to be held in October 1976. Presenting their respective reports were Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, Joseph Lesawyer, Ivan Bazarko, Dr. Bohdan Hnatiuk, Dr. Walter Dushnyck, Mrs. Ivanna Rozankowsky and Dr. Anthony Zukowsky.

OBITUARIES: a) **Bohdan Krawciw,** one of the most prominent Ukrainian poets, journalists and literary critics and one of the pioneers of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, died on November 21, 1975 in Rutherford, N.J. after a brief illness, at the age of 71.

An associate editor of the Ukrainian daily **Svoboda** for several years, Mr. Krawciw retired in 1973, shortly before being awarded a scholarly fellowship by the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard for the preparation of a work on the methodology of Ukrainian literature. At the time of his death he was also editor-in-chief of **Suchasnist** (Contemporary Times), a Ukrainian-language literary-political review, published in Munich, West Germany.

Born on May 5, 1904, in the village of Lopianka, Dolyna county, in Western Ukraine, into the family of a Ukrainian Catholic priest, Mr. Krawciw completed his secondary education in 1923 at the Academic **Gymnasium** in Lviv, and studied philosophy, literature and law at the Secret Ukrainian University and at the Jan Casimir University there. During his university years he was president of the Ukrainian Student **Hromada,** administrator of the Ukrainian Academic Home in Lviv (1928-29), head of the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (SUNM), a participant in the first Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists in Berlin (1927), a member of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), and a co-founder of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929.

A member of the PLAST (scouting) organization since childhood, Mr. Krawciw assumed the editorship of the PLAST monthly, **Molode Zhyttia**

(Young Life), which he continued to edit in Augsburg and Munich, West Germany (1948-49) and later in New York in 1953. In 1928 he became editor-in-chief of **Yunatstvo** (Youth); from 1928-30 he was associate editor of **Ukrainsky Holos** (The Ukrainian Voice) in Peremyshl, and editor-in-chief of **Visti** (News), a Ukrainian nationalist weekly, which was soon suspended by the Polish government, with Mr. Krawciw being incarcerated in the concentration camp in Bereza Kartuska. Prior to this, Mr. Krawciw was arrested by the Polish police in 1930 and sentenced to three years for nationalist-revolutionary activities.

From 1935-37 he was editor and co-editor of **Dazhboh, Obriyi** (Horizons) and **Holos Natsiyi** (Voice of A Nation)—all in Lviv; from 1940-45 he was publisher and editor of **Holos** (The Voice), **Ukrainets** (The Ukrainian) and **Khliborob** (The Farmer)—all in Berlin, for Ukrainian workers in Germany. After the war, in 1947-48, Mr. Krawciw edited the Ukrainian scouting reviews, **Molode Zhyttia** and **Na slidi** (On the Trail).

Mr. Krawciw came to the U.S. in 1949 with his family and settled in Philadelphia, Pa., where he was editor of the Ukrainian Catholic daily **America** from 1950 to 1955; later he joined the editorial staff of **Svoboda** to work there until his retirement in 1973. He wrote scores of scholarly and popular articles on literary themes. Mr. Krawciw was also the general editor of **Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia,** a major, two-volume reference work on Ukraine in English, which was published by the University of Toronto Press. He was also substantially involved in editing the Ukrainian version of the encyclopedia.

One of the major literary facets of Mr. Krawciw was poetry, which he began composing as a youth. Among his major collections are: **Doroha** (The Road), **Promeni** (The Rays), **Sonety i strofy** (Sonnets and Stanzas), **Pisnia pisen** (The Song of Songs), **Don Kikhot v Alkazari** (Don Quixote in Alcazar), **Ostannia osin** (The Last Autumn), **Pid chuzhymy zoryamy** (Under Foreign Stars), **Rechi i obrazy** (Things and Images—translations of R.M. Rilke), **Ludyna i voyak** (Man and Soldier [General Taras Chuprynka]), and others.

Mr. Krawciw, in addition to his preoccupation with Ukrainian literature, journalism and editorial work, was also active in scores of Ukrainian organizations. He maintained his active interest and membership in PLAST, was a member of the Executive Board of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (1951-55), and was a member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.A., and others.

As an expert on Ukrainian literature and an extremely well-informed student of the current process in Ukraine, Mr. Krawciw was a constant target of vicious attacks by the official Soviet press in Ukraine.

Surviving are his widow, Neonila, a daughter, Mrs. Maria Dzvinka Jawny, two sons, Nicholas, a West Point graduate and now a Lieutenant-Colonel in the U.S. Army stationed in Europe, and George, an employee of the "Voice of America" in Washington; brother Roman of Philadelphia, six grandchildren and near and distant relatives in the free world and Ukraine. He was buried at the Ukrainian Orthodox Cemetery in Bound Brook, N.J.

b) **Dr. George Andreyko,** a retired physician and veteran Ukrainian American leader and community activist, died on April 13, 1975 at the age of 76.

Born in Terebovla, Western Ukraine, he was brought to this country as a child by his immigrant parents, Dmytro and Olha Andreyko. His father was a teacher by profession, and both parents worked hard to educate their two daughters and two sons. After graduating from the New Britain High School in 1917 with top honors and as editor of the Class Book, **The Bee Hive,** Dr. Andreyko served in the U.S. Armed Forces during World War I. He was a graduate of Columbia College and University, and attended the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons. He received his medical degree from the University of Berlin, Germany, in 1928. Dr. Andreyko practiced general medicine in New York City for 13 years before joining the Medical Staff at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Castle Point, N.Y. in 1944, serving there until his retirement in 1967.

In the early 1920's, while attending Columbia University, Dr. Andreyko plunged into Ukrainian American cultural and political life in New York City. Following in the footsteps of his father—author of a Ukrainian primer and a book of 600 Ukrainian songs published in Germany, teacher of the Ukrainian language and a supreme advisor of the Ukrainian National Association in 1914—Dr. Andreyko became very active among the Ukrainian American youth. When in 1921 the Ukrainian Free University was established in Vienna, which later moved to Prague, Czecho-Slovakia, he was first to respond to appeals from this Ukrainian academic institution for financial support. He and his many friends made systematic collections among Ukrainians in New York for the University; he also maintained contact with Ukrainian students in Berlin, and perhaps this contact was the inducement for him to study at the University of Berlin. In his personal archive, now in the possession of his wife Mary (nee Zborowsky) there is preserved important correspondence with many prominent Ukrainian scholars and educators, including the late Prof. Stepan Smal-Stocky, prominent Ukrainian philologist, and Bohdan Lepky, outstanding Ukrainian poet and novelist, whom Dr. Andreyko met later in Berlin; they became friends and he was a frequent visitor at the Lepky home.

Dr. Andreyko was a fine journalist with an excellent command of the English, Ukrainian and German languages. He also acted as interpreter and translator for some of the most outstanding Ukrainian political leaders in the U.S., such as the late Dr. Longin Cehelsky, Dr. Luke Myshuha, and others.

In 1930, when oppression by the Polish government and the persecution of Ukrainians by the Soviet regime intensified in the two parts of divided Ukraine, Ukrainians in America raised their voice in protest against the enslavement of their kin in Ukraine. It was at that time that an organization, "Young Ukraine," was established in New York City, which was headed by Dr. Andreyko, who succeeded with other professionals in forming the group. The most outstanding achievement of the organization was the publication of an English-language magazine, **Nestorian,** dedicated to the problems of Ukrainian culture, history and national traditions. Dr. Andreyko was one of the editors. Apart from his article on Taras Shevchenko, Dr. Andreyko's

translations of Shevchenko's poetry were considered the best of the time. For the past thirty years the Andreyko family lived in Walker Valley, N.Y., which Dr. Andreyko called a "counterpart of the Carpathians."

c) **Volodymyr Lassovsky,** Ukrainian artist and cultural activist, and head of the Cultural Council of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, died in New York City on November 10, 1975, of an apparent heart attack, at the age of 68. Born in Western Ukraine in 1907, Mr. Lassovsky studied art in Lviv and later in Paris, France. As a painter he was known for his expressionist style. The end of World War II found him and his family in Austria, from where he emigrated to Argentina and lived there before taking up permanent residence in New York in 1959. In New York he was active in a number of Ukrainian organizations and was strongly involved in the preservation and development of Ukrainian art and culture. At the second World Congress of Free Ukrainians in 1973, he was elected head of its Cultural Council.

d) **Dr. Lev Zabko-Potapovych,** honorary president of the All-Ukrainian Evangelical Baptist Fellowship, and longtime Baptist leader, died in Crum Lynne, Pa. on November 8, 1975 at the age of 85. Dr. Zabko-Potapovych's activity as a Baptist leader dates back to his native Ukraine, where he headed a Baptist parish in Lviv. A member of the Ukrainian national army during the liberation struggle of Ukraine in 1917-20, he attained the rank of colonel. In the United States, where he settled after World War II, Dr. Zabko-Potapovych was for a long time the pastor of the Ukrainian Baptist community in Chester, Pa. He also headed the Ukrainian Baptist Missionary Society, and since 1973 represented the Ukrainian Baptist Fellowship on the Secretariat of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians.

II. UKRAINIANS IN THE DIASPORA

CANADA

Ukrainian World Congress Petitions U.N. for Ukrainian Women Political Prisoners.—On October 15, 1975 the Secretariat of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU) submitted to U.N. Secretary General Dr. Kurt Waldheim a memorandum-petition, pleading for the release of Ukrainian women political prisoners from Soviet jails and concentration camps.

In a covering letter, the WCFU Secretariat stated, in part:

"...Because the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR governments are co-founders and co-signatories of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Ukrainian men and women political prisoners have written many appeals to the United Nations for help. In the name of humanity and respect for national rights, and in the name of the voiceless people in Ukraine, we, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, supported by over 20,000 signatures of Ukrainians, citizens of the United States of America, Canada, England, West Germany, Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil and Australia, contained in two bound volumes, petition Your Excellency to intervene before the government of the USSR for the release of Ukrainian political prisoners. In the spirit of the U.N. Proclamation of International Women's Year, we particularly appeal to you to take the necessary steps towards successfully gaining amnesty for Ukrainian women

political prisoners and to allow them to return to their families and homeland with restoration of their citizen's rights..."

The memorandum was signed by Very Rev. Dr. Basil Kushnir, President of the WCFU; Mrs. Stefania Sawchuk, President of the World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations; Senator Paul Yuzyk, Chairman, WCFU Human Rights Commission, and Mrs. Ulana Celewych, Chairman, Committee to Defend Human Rights.

Ukrainian Canadian Leaders Meet with Minister of Multiculturalism. —In the follow-up of the conference held on September 12, 1975 with Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) held a meeting on October 5, 1975 in Winnipeg, Man., with John Munro, Minister of Multiculturalism, to discuss the problems previously presented for the Prime Minister's attention. In the course of the two-hour conference Minister Munro offered the following explanations:

* The financial assistance for Ukrainian-language instruction centers will be discussed at one of the conferences of the Prime Minister with the Premiers of the Provinces;

* Support of ethnic press will be considered through the increase of official advertising and, possibly, through the reduction of postal rates;

* The CBC is prepared to allocate more time for multicultural programs; such type of multicultural programming should be based on regional needs;

* Federal assistance for the development of Ukrainian cultural centers across Canada is favorably considered by the government, as this approach should be applied to large and well-organized ethnic communities, such as the Ukrainian Canadian group;

Special emphasis was placed on the reunion of Ukrainian families, and the UCC proposal for the establishment of a Canadian Consulate in Kiev;

* In the field of human rights, an entry visa was requested for Vyacheslav Chornovil in connection with the fact that he renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Taking part in the conference, from the UCC were Dr. S. Radchuk, Dr. I. Hlynka, P. Klymkiw, J.S. Petryshyn, A.I. Yaremovich and Dr. S.J. Kalba. Minister Munro was accompanied by Senator G. Molgat and M. Andrassy, director of multicultural programs.

Senator Yuzyk Assigned to U.N.—The Canadian Secretary of State for Foreing Affairs, Allan McEachen, appointed Senator Paul Yuzyk as a Parliamentary Observer from the Senate at the 30th session of the U.N. General Assembly. He was a member of the Canadian delegation.

Senator Yuzyk's chief interest is in the implementation of Human Rights, particularly in the Soviet Union, as well as in the free flow of people and ideas between the Soviet-aligned countries and the Western democracies. In this respect the U.N. Human Rights Commission has so far been ineffective because of the negative role of the USSR.

OBITUARY: Mrs. Iryna Pavlykowska, prominent Ukrainian woman leader died on September 25, 1975 at the age of 75. She was born in 1900 in Lviv, Western Ukraine, into the family of Dr. Ivan Makukh, a prominent Ukrainian political leader. After completing her secondary education, she attended the Ukrainian Secret University in Lviv, and studied at the Music

Institutes in Lviv and Warsaw. In 1925 she joined the executive board of the Union of Ukrainian Women ("Soyuz Ukrainok") and became director of the cooperative "Ukrainian Folk Art" and co-founder of **Nova Khata** (New Home), and was on the executive boards of several Ukrainian women's and other organizations.

After World War II she found herself with her family in West Germany, where she organized a Union of Ukrainian Women, which soon became an overall Ukrainian women's association in Europe. In 1948 she participated in the World Congress of Ukrainian Women in Philadelphia, Pa., where she proposed the establishment of a World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organization (WFUWO). In 1950 she emigrated to Canada and lived first in Ottawa and then moved to Edmonton, where she became a leader of the League of Ukrainian Catholic Women and held several important posts in that group. She helped to organize national congresses of Ukrainian women in England (1963 and 1974), Brazil (1963) and Germany (1970); she also represented the WFUWO at the International Women's Congress in Dublin, Ireland. She was awarded a medal by the Taras Shevchenko Foundation of Canada and a Papal Order, **Ecclesia et Pontifice.**

She was the wife of the late Julian Pavlykowsky, outstanding Ukrainian statesman, director of the Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives and "Narodna Torhivla" in Lviv, Western Ukraine, and a member of the Polish Senate in Warsaw. He died in 1950 in Munich, West Germany.

FRANCE

Communist Organ Demands Release of Leonid Plyushch.—L'Humanite, the official organ of the French Communist Party, in its October 25, 1975 issue, editorially demanded that the Soviet government immediately release Leonid Plyushch from psychiatric imprisonment. The editorial was a follow-up to a pro-Plyushch rally, held two days earlier in Paris. The meeting was sponsored by the International Mathematicians Committee in Defense of L. Plyushch, and French Socialists. Rene Andre, editor of **L'Humanite,** criticized the organizers of the demonstration for not approaching the French Communist Party for help in the action.

Over 5,000 people attended the protest rally, held under the slogan, "Leonid Plyushch Must Be Freed," held in one of Paris' largest public halls.

Mr. Andre said that French Communists would not have refused to aid in the preparation if they had been asked.

"Leonid Plyushch's case is not a triviality for us. For quite some time now we have been attempting to determine the real facts about his case," he wrote. He continued that if everything that is known about the case of the 36-year-old Ukrainian mathematician is correct, "and unfortunately, we have no evidence to the contrary," then Plyushch should be freed.

"If it is true that this mathematician is incarcerated merely for expressing views about some aspects of Soviet policy which differ from the official line—we can state unequivocally that we are in complete disagreement, and demand that he be released as soon as possible," wrote Mr. Andre.

Some thirty representatives of French labor unions, political life, and academic and professional spheres issued statements in defense of Plyushch

during the rally. The speakers scored the Soviet system for arresting and committing Plyushch to an asylum without the advantage of due process of law. The Ukrainian cyberneticist was termed "a symbol" because he did not give in to pressure.

DENMARK

Ukrainian Representative at the Sakharov Hearing.—Dr. Andrew Zwarun, representative of the "Smoloskyp" Ukrainian Information Service of Baltimore, Md., was one of the witnesses who appeared at the "International Sakharov Hearing," held on October 17-19, 1975, in Copenhagen. The conferees discussed such themes as political and ideological suppression in the USSR, religious persecution and misuse of psychiatry; suppression of the non-Russian nationalities (Ukrainians, Jews, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Volga-Germans, Crimean Tartars, and others), and so forth.

In the course of the conference, Dr. Andrei D. Sakharov, the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize nominee and the initiator of the conference, sent a statement to the hearing's organizers, stressing the importance of "speaking up in defense of political prisoners in the Soviet Union." Among the "prisoners of conscience" cited by Dr. Sakharov were Leonid Plyushch, "whose mind is being destroyed in the Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric hospital," and Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk, who was sentenced to ten years in prison for religious activities.

Dr. Zwarun's testimony, entitled, "Persecution of Nationalities in the USSR: The Status in Ukraine," was divided into four major areas of persecution and repression in Ukraine: discrimination against the Ukrainian language, literature and intellectuals; falsfification of Ukrainian history aimed at destroying the Ukrainian identity; religious persecution; officially sanctioned anti-Semitism and the government-instilled antagonism between Jews and non-Jews in Ukraine.

Following his testimony, Dr. Zwarun, a 32-year-old microbiologist, was crossexamined by members of the panel, in particular by Simon Wiesenthal, director of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna.

AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND

OBITUARIES: Dr. Julian Kostiuk, leader of Ukrainians in Austria, died on June 12, 1975 in Vienna, Austria at the age of 74. Born on March 14, 1901 in Lviv, Western Ukraine, he terminated a **gymnasium** in Peremyshl, where he was very active in Ukrainian student societies. At the end of World War I he volunteered into the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA). In 1926 he graduated from Charles University in Prague, obtaining a degree in pharmaceutical science. Upon his return to Peremyshl, he worked closely with Archbishop Josaphat Kotsylovsky and was editor of the Ukrainian Catholic weekly, **Beskyd**, while operating his pharmacy. At the end of World War II, in 1944, he, his wife Maria (nee Gregolynska) and four children moved to the Austrian capital, where Dr. Kostiuk established his own

pharmacy. He headed the St. Barbara Brotherhood and the European Committee for Assistance to Ukrainian Students (KoDUS); he also was head of many other Ukrainian organizations and was their delegate to the First World Congress of Free Ukrainians, held in the fall of 1967 in New York.

Mykhailo Yeremijiw, former secretary of the Ukrainian Central **Rada** who read the Third **Universal** on November 20, 1917 in Kiev, proclaiming the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic, died in Geneva, Switzerland on September 16, 1975 at the age of 87.

Mr. Yeremijiw, who lived in Switzerland for the past 46 years, left Ukraine in 1919 having been assigned the post of secretary of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Rome. In 1917-18 he edited **News of the Central Rada,** and was on the editorial board of the daily, **Robitnycha Hazeta** (Workers' Gazette). In 1924-27 he was associate professor at the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Podebrady, Czecho-Slovakia, and in the years between 1936 and 1944 he edited the "Ofinor" information bulletins in French, and contributed many article on Ukraine to Swiss and French journals. In November 1974, accompanied by his daughter, Natalia, he visited Canada and the United States.

III. IN CAPTIVE UKRAINE

KGB Hangs Ukrainian Catholic Priest. —A Ukrainian Catholic priest was hanged by the KGB in Drohobych, a city in Western Ukraine, apparently because he continued his religious activities, according to the September 25, 1975 issue of **L'Osservatore Romano,** official Vatican daily.

The Vatican newspaper's sources reported that Rev. Mykhailo Lutsky was warned three times by the Soviet secret police to cease celebrating Liturgies and administering the Holy Eucharist. He was told that "such acts were considered illegal in the Soviet Union."

On the morning of January 30, 1975, **L'Osservatore Romano** reported Father Lutsky was asked by several KGB agents to visit a sick person.

"This was only an excuse," the Vatican paper wrote. "Led into a wood nearby, Father Lutsky was tied and hanged to a tree. In order to cover up the crime, the KGB agents left a note in Fr. Lutsky's pocket which said that he committed suicide after reading the Bible.

"But the suicide note was called false by the Christians in the village, who knew the priest's zeal and holiness," concluded the newspaper.

Report Plyushch May Be Released from Psychiatric Ward.—Leonid Plyushch, Ukrainian mathematician and cyberneticist, may be released from a psychiatric ward in Dnipropetrovsk. An AP dispatch filed on November 28, 1975 in Moscow said that Plyushch, arrested in January 1972 on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation," declared insane and committed to a mental hospital, may be released soon and allowed to emigrate to the West. Quoting dissident sources, the dispatch said Plyushch's wife, Tatyana, had been told by authorities to prepare exit visas for her husband and family after the personal intervention of Health Minister Boris Petrovsky. Plyushch had been diagnosed as "having reform-making illusions," the dispatch said.

Ukrainian Political Prisoners Plead for Free World Help.—A number of letters from Ukrainian political prisoners, incarcerated in the Mordovian

and Perm concentration camps and the Vladimir Prison indicate that Ukrainian political prisoners consider free world assistance essental to their survival.

The five letters, received recently by the Press Service of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Abroad), were signed by Vyacheslav Chornovil, Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk and Vasyl Stus and accuse the KGB and Soviet government of crimes against humanity, and call on western governments and church hierarchs to stand up in their defense.

In a letter to President Gerald R. Ford, dated August 1, 1975, Chornovil said that the President of the United States should consider the plight of the political opposition in the Soviet Union, "represented by the political prisoners."

"I must say that the ideas I profess are not merely my own, but are also voiced by a wide range of Soviet political prisoners of different nationalities... Clearly, behind each one of us, political prisoners, repressed for our opposing views, there are hundreds and thousands of people who think as we do..."

In an earlier letter Chornovil wrote to the prosecutor of the Sub-Carpathian military district that several illegal acts were committed during the investigation of his alleged crimes in 1972-73.

Rev. Romaniuk informed Pope Paul VI, in a letter dated around August 1, 1975, of the intensive KGB persecution in Ukraine. In 1972, the Ukrainian Orthodox priest said, over 800 persons were persecuted by the secret police, and of this number, he added, many were sentenced to long prison terms, other were deprived of their jobs or evicted from their homes. In a subsequent letter to the World Council of Churches in Geneva, Rev. Romaniuk appealed to them to review the denial of human rights in the USSR, and told them that he was in his fourth year of unjust imprisonment.

Vasyl Stus, a Ukrainian poet, wrote an essay, "I Accuse," stating that on seven occasions he appealed to official organs to prosecute those individuals who were responsible for committing "mass crimes against an entire generation of Ukrainian intelligentsia..." In this essay, written in 1975, Stus in referring to the KGB perpetrators, wrote:

"Therefore, I wish to try them as enemies of Ukrainian culture, enemies of the Ukrainian nation, enemies of humanism and world culture, and enemies of humanity..."

'THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY' PRESS FUND

We gratefully acknowledge the following donations to *The Ukrainian Quarterly* Press Fund:

$25.00: G. Siomko, M. Luchow;
$16.00: M. Ilkiw;
$10.00: W. Wenger, J. Halicki, W. Wasyliw and Dr. W. Gallan;
$ 5.00: D. Burshtynsky.

U.Q. Administration