

The Ukrainian Quarterly

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A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

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
The Ukrainian Quarterly

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THE HELSINKI TRAGEDY

Editorial

"... On our small planet, there are no longer any internal affairs. The Communists say: 'Don't interfere in our internal affairs. Let us strangle our citizens in quiet and peace.' But I tell you: Interfere more and more. We beg you to come and interfere..."

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

(From his address at the AFL-CIO dinner on June 30, 1975, in Washington, D.C.).

In the winter of 1939, the Soviet Union, then a partner and ally of Nazi Germany, launched an unprovoked military invasion of Finland, and bombed its capital city of Helsinki as well as other strategic points and ports of that nation, thereby shocking the entire world. Acting in total agreement with Hitler, the Soviet government over the radio and in the press castigated the Finnish leaders, such as President Kallio, Field Marshal Baron Mannerheim and Ministers Cajander and Erkko, calling them "traitors of Finland," "agents of capitalist intervention," and so forth.

But the brave Finnish people staunchly stood up in defense of their country. Their small but well-trained and patriotically inspired army beat back one Soviet attack after another, inflicting heavy casualties upon the numerous but ill-trained and badly equipped Soviet troops, proving to the world that the USSR was a "colossus on clay feet."

It was only the sheer numerical superiority of the USSR that finally brought the Finns to their knees and the Moscow-imposed "peace" which cost the Finns the loss of strategic territory.

But the world then still had a conscience and moral fiber, and it reacted accordingly. The League of Nations promptly expelled the USSR, while England and France, as well as Italy and Spain (allies of Nazi Germany), denounced Moscow. President Roosevelt assailed Stalin, calling him a ruthless aggressor and tyrant. The Finnish people were widely praised for their fierce courage and heroism in opposing the Soviet Russian aggressors.

In 1940, the Soviet Union, still an ally of Nazi Germany, occupied the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, after annexing Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia and parts of Bukovina and Bessarabia, all as Moscow's share of the Hitler-Stalin agreement on the "spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe. But Finland was untouched, presumably because of Stalin's fear that a Soviet occupation of Finland would have adverse effects upon neutral Sweden; also, Hitler opposed such an annexation because he had his own plans for Scandinavia.

With the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in June, 1941, Finland was forced into the Axis coalition and became an ally of Hitler's Germany against the Soviet Union. The Finnish troops contributed heavily to the initial German successes on the Eastern front. With the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, Finland lost additional territory to the USSR, but was spared the fate of Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania and Bulgaria. It remained an independent country, with a status of precarious neutrality which some Finnish leaders maintain is rapidly changing to one of "neutralism."¹

Col. Halsti, a noted Finnish military and political analyst, contends that Finland more and more is assuming a position of subservience to Soviet policies behind its mask of independence. It feels Soviet pressures especially in the economic field and in the mass media. The Soviet build-up of naval and missile power in the Murmansk-Kola area has assumed a definitely aggressive character, and the "Finlandization" of the country (read, subservience to Moscow) is a "must" prerequisite for any Soviet plans for Scandinavia.

BACKGROUND TO THE HELSINKI SELLOUT

A historical digression here is in order as a reminder that Finland and her people always have been culturally and ideologically set against Russia, White or Red, especially against her aggressiveness, imperialism and domination. Despite the centuries of domination by Russia, the Finnish people have always been part and parcel of Western civilization and the Western democratic process.

It is all the more tragic that the so-called "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," a long-planned Soviet Russian device to have the European powers endorse and legalize Soviet Russian territorial conquests and the ideological and cultural division of Europe, should have been held in Helsinki, once a proud symbol of free-

¹ Col. Wolf H. Halsti, "Finnish Neutrality—Example or Warning?," *Freedom at Issue*, No. 31 (New York: Freedom House, May-June, 1975).

dom and resistance to foreign tyranny. Now Helsinki is in danger of becoming synonymous with historical sites at which the Western powers kowtowed and capitulated to totalitarian despotism, such as Munich, Yalta and Potsdam.

The Conference was conceived as long as twenty-one years ago by the Soviet Union as a substitute for a German treaty, which had been made impossible by the division of Germany into two separate states. Moscow made it clear that the Conference's aim was to obtain the "inviolability of frontiers" in all of Europe. The Western European powers, joined by the United States and Canada, responded without great enthusiasm. They stressed that their interest "was less in frontiers than in humanitarian issues." They made it clear that they would attend a big security conference if the Soviet Union concluded an agreement improving the Berlin situation and concurred in opening talks on mutual reductions of armed forces in Central Europe. These matters were allegedly "settled" by late 1972, when preparatory talks on the security conference opened in Helsinki.

The conference began in July, 1973, in Helsinki, where the foreign ministers of 35 governments agreed on an agenda for negotiations. It included a set of principles dealing with such matters as equality of states, the non-use of force, inviolability of frontiers, the right of peaceful change of borders, territorial integrity, expansion of trade and industrial, scientific and technological cooperation and, finally, "freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively," between the countries.

The Helsinki document is divided into four parts, known as "baskets," each of which contains a set of these principles. Basket One, for instance, involves ten principles of "good behavior," such as refraining from the use of force and the recognition of the *status quo*, which was the principal goal of the Russians. Basket Two concerns trade and technical exchanges. Basket Three calls for human contacts, the flow of information and other intellectual exchanges. But the escape clauses are so numerous that nothing at all may result. Basket Four concerns future follow-up machinery to see to it that signers are honest—or at least do not cheat.

A perceptive American political analyst summarized why the 35 state heads wanted this security conference:

For the West, the objective is to relax—just a little—the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe. This isn't "rolling back the tide of Communism," as in John Foster Dulles' day, but merely a modest expansion of the flow of people and ideas between East and West...

Moscow wants this conference to formalize the postwar European

status quo—in other words, to accept Russia's revision of East European boundaries, plus the permanent division of Germany... The "summit" also implies that the Soviet Union has a vested interest in political events across the continent...

For some—not all—Eastern Europeans, there is an extra purpose...

A few nations there—Poland and Hungary, for example—want to open up a bit without either risking basic political changes or frightening the Russians (they all remember Czechoslovakia, 1968). Such movement would be incremental and tightly controlled, but having documents signed by Mr. Brezhnev should help those who want modest changes...

Meanwhile, for nations not aligned to either bloc—Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and others—the "summit" provides a voice in European policies which normally isn't much heard. They favor anything which restricts the big powers, even theoretically, and promotes peace...²

THE HELSINKI "SUMMIT"—A VICTORY FOR MOSCOW

The signing of the "Helsinki Document" is undoubtedly a major political and psychological victory for Communist Russia and a humiliating defeat for the Western powers, especially for the United States, which helped make this victory for Moscow possible.

A pointed editorial in *The New York Times* aptly analyzed the results of the Helsinki conference:

For Mr. Brezhnev and his associates there was what amounted to Western moral, though not legal, recognition of an ideologically split continent. For President Ford and the West generally there were vague phrases about greater movement of persons and ideas...

Like many other Americans, we have been deeply skeptical about the Helsinki meeting... But it was not a happy omen that even as the Helsinki "summit" began, a leftist military leader in Portugal was proclaiming the need to use armed force to repress the majority of the Portuguese people, who want democracy, not Communist dictatorship.³

In discussing the incontestable victory of Communist Russia in Helsinki, another prominent American political commentator stated bluntly:

The Soviet Union ratified the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and its social and economic counterpart in the fall of 1973 without the least attention to its obligations—indeed, it serves the Soviet Union primarily as a catalogue of human rights they can deprive the people of, lest, carelessly, they forget, and inadvertently permit a human right to survive in the Soviet

² Robert Keatley, "When East Meets West in Helsinki," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 9, 1975.

³ "After Helsinki," *The New York Times*, August 3, 1975.

state... The critics of the Helsinki operations are saying very simply that the *effect* of the entire exercise is to sanctify the *status quo*.

This means a great many things, but primarily that the captive nations will continue under Soviet domination, and never mind that the Soviet empire continues to seek to subvert the governments of other countries and to upset the *status quo* elsewhere...

The fact of the matter is that day after day, month after month, the Soviet Union emerges as resolute, strong, imperious, condescending ever; while the U.S. loses its allies in huge hunks of the world as a result of an ineptitude so colossal it can only issue, as the great Cassandra of our generation predicted 20 years ago, from a fatal internal weakness...

It is easy to understand a lot of things. Easy to understand, for instance, why the U.S. would not, or could not go to war to save Hungary, or to save Czechoslovakia; easy, even, to understand why, at the margin, we simply packed up and left Indochina, never mind our treaty obligations and the rest of it. What is not easy to understand is the air of jubilation we crank up every time we get fleeced...⁴

Another eminent American writer marked the Helsinki "summit" down as a great personal triumph for Leonid Brezhnev:

He continued the basic foreign policy gingerly begun by Stalin's successors. With unflamboyant persistence, he has now brought to a legal conclusion the process of gaining recognition for all Russia's World War II territorial conquests—as well as the ideological ascendancy Moscow has since reaffirmed in that area.

And Brezhnev, by holding the West adamantly to his own timetable, managed to do this in the immediate wake of the Soviet-American space link-up. That event dramatically reminded the world there are only two genuine superpowers. This in turn exacerbates suspicions all the way from Paris to Peking that these superpowers are imposing their own patterns, thereby weakening the voluntary support on which Washington relies more than Moscow...

But the rest of East Europe is unlikely to gain much more liberty as a consequence of the Helsinki "summit." In 1984 the Russians are not going to be less tough about what they consider their private business than they were in Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968). Nor is the deal to be ratified here going to alter Soviet determination...⁵

EUROPEANS EXCLUDED FROM THE CONFERENCE

The immoral nature of the Helsinki conference can best be seen from the fact that although the meeting was purported to have been

⁴ William F. Buckley, Jr., "The Helsinki Document," *New York Post*, August 2, 1975.

⁵ C.L. Sulzberger, "What's Yours is Negotiable," *The New York Times*, July 30, 1975.

called in the interest of and for the benefit of *all* the European peoples, millions of Europeans were not represented at this council of European statesmen. It strongly suggests that we are returning to the infamous practices of past centuries, when absolute and despotic monarchs traded territories and subjected peoples as so much cattle. These millions of Europeans, with centuries-old traditions of political and national independence, were barred from attending the conference simply because they are enslaved by the Soviet Union, which, for all intents and purposes, represents old Russian imperialism and colonialism, cloaked now in Communist garb.

These excluded European peoples are the 48 million Ukrainians, 12 million Byelorussians, 8 million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and over 12 million Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians. They were not admitted to the Helsinki conference because they are coerced into political silence by the oppressive regime of Communist Russia.⁶

The Helsinki conference has served to confirm, morally and legally, the enslavement not only of the so-called nine European "union republics" of the USSR—Ukraine, Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (not to mention the five Turkic "union republics" of Central Asia), but also the countries of "people's democracies"—Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, which are ruled today by Russian oriented Communist *gauleiters*.

Of all the "union republics" of the USSR, only Ukraine and Byelorussia are charter members of the U.N., and the Soviet Union frequently boasts that these two republics are "independent states" that speak for themselves at international conferences. Their absence at the Helsinki conference consequently underscores their colonial status and dependence on Moscow.

In a Memorandum to the Helsinki conference, representatives of the Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish groups in Europe appealed in vain to the 35 heads of state not to "accept any compromise concerning the *free right for self-determination*, which belongs to *all nations* in Europe, Eastern and Western, including all nations in the Soviet Union"; they also appealed to the conference

⁶ *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Endorsement of Russian Slave Empire: A Memorandum to Member States Participating at the European Summit Meeting on July 30, 1975, in Helsinki, Finland, New York: The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, July, 1975.*

not "to compromise on *human rights* and not to recognize the *status quo* regarding the *Baltic States*..."⁷

But all appeals remained unheeded.

OPPOSITION AND L'AFFAIRE SOLZHENITSYN

Although preparations for the Helsinki Conference were going on for many months, opposition against U.S. participation in that meeting grew in intensity only in the last few months, especially after the shameful capitulation of the U.S. in Indochina last April and with the arrival in the United States of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the exiled Russian Nobel Prize-winning novelist. Likewise, the momentum of criticism of the Helsinki confab was accelerated by the total failure of the policy of detente (as far as the United States is concerned). More and more people are realizing that Moscow is playing for big stakes of world supremacy, while the U.S. is thinking merely of material and trade advantages. Our leaders talk a great deal about human rights in the USSR, but do little, except to pay lip service to the principle of human rights.

It has yet to be determined whether the present Ford-Kissinger "policy of detente" is a residue of the Nixon-Kissinger policy or whether it is President Ford's own policy. But from all indications it is now becoming clear that it is Secretary of State Kissinger who is sole architect of the disastrous policy of detente. It was he who advised President Ford to refuse to meet the author of *The GULAG Archipelago*; it was he who called Mr. Solzhenitsyn "a threat to peace," and it was he who tried to prevent President Ford from delivering a somewhat stronger speech at Helsinki. Kissinger, it is reported, "had wanted to give something more for Brezhnev to take home. He was worried about the future of detente..."⁸

On this crucial matter of detente, Prof. Ronald Hilton of Stanford University has provided some new light:

Detente is a means to an end. For the Soviet Union, it lessens the danger from the West while Moscow deals with Peking. President Ford fell into a trap by meeting Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok, appearing thus to reject Peking's claims to disputed border areas...

Western leaders have likewise fallen into a trap by agreeing to a summit meeting to conclude a European security pact that would guarantee the present European borders...

⁷ *Memorandum: The Security Conference and Baltic States*. Stockholm, Sweden: Estonian Information Centre, June 14, 1975.

⁸ AP Release, "Say Ford Pulled Rank on Kissinger at Helsinki," *New York Post*, August 8, 1975.

Moscow skillfully humiliated the United States in Southeast Asia... and is playing its game of chess throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America... Moscow seeks victory, not peace. It conducts a harsh campaign against *rapprochement* between South Africa and black Africa. Nothing less than the total humiliation of the West in Africa is sought—a repetition of Indochina, with the difference that the West depends on Africa for its critical raw materials...

The Russians believe that they are virtuous and that the United States is corrupt and decadent, that bourgeois democracy contains the seeds of its own destruction...⁹

A great segment of the American people, such leading American newspapers as *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*, and a great number of the members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats—all were decidedly against President Ford's trip to Helsinki.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington in a statement on the Helsinki meeting was critical of American weakness:

There are times in international diplomacy when the President of the United States ought to stay home. By cooperating with Brezhnev at the Helsinki summit in fostering the illusion that substantive progress toward greater security in Europe has been made, President Ford is taking us, backward, not forward, in the search of a genuine peace.

The European Security Conference is yet another example of the sort of one-sided agreement that has become the hallmark of the Nixon-Ford Administrations. Once again the United States has permitted the timetable of a complex negotiation to be determined by the Soviet Union and its allies. The predictable result is a series of Western concessions unmatched by comparable movement on the part of the East...¹⁰

"L'Affaire Solzhenitsyn" has greatly solidified the criticism in the United States of American participation in the Helsinki conference. In two public appearances (before large audiences in Washington, D.C., and in New York City, on June 30, 1975, and July 9, 1975, respectively), Solzhenitsyn warned the American people against the dangers of detente. At the dinner and luncheon given in his honor by the AFL-CIO, he lashed out at the West for failing to understand the "worldwide danger that Soviet power poses to its own freedom and security."

He mocked the SALT parleys, asserting that the U.S. government was being constantly deceived about the Soviet use of radar and the

⁹ Ronald Hilton, "Games Nations Play," *The New York Times*, July 17, 1975.

¹⁰ "Statement by Senator Henry M. Jackson: On the Helsinki Summit," July 22, 1975, Washington, D.C.

true size of the Soviet missiles and number of nuclear warheads. He further stated that "our whole [Russian] slave system depends on your economic assistance." It is American trade, he claimed, that allows the Soviet economy to concentrate its resources on armaments and preparations for war. "How many witnesses have come to your country, how many waves of immigration, all warning of the same experiences and the same dangers?" he asked. "Yet these proud skyscrapers still stand, and you go on believing that it will not happen here. Only when it happens to you will you know it is true..."¹¹

A few days before President Ford's departure for Europe, Mr. Solzhenitsyn accused President Ford of participating in "the betrayal of Eastern Europe" by planning to attend the "summit" meeting in Helsinki.¹²

In Moscow, Prof. Andrei D. Sakharov, the Soviet physicist, in a new essay on East-West relations, assailed the "secretive and totalitarian nature" of Soviet society. In stating that the problem of human rights cannot be separated from that of arms control, he pointed out that the greatest threats to peace are Soviet totalitarianism and what he calls the "amazing miscalculations and failures of Western foreign policy, which without a struggle is yielding bit by bit to its partner in detente."¹³

In the Canadian Parliament, Sen. Paul Yuzyk charged that Canada, by signing the Helsinki document, "was bowing to commercial and trade pressures exerted by the Soviet Union... Ask yourself how many people the Western world has liberated from Communism and then compare that with the people Communism has annexed by brute force and you will see what we are up against."

He said that great concern has been expressed in both Canada and the United States that the Helsinki document should have tacitly accepted the Soviet acquisition of such countries as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and others.¹⁴

The confusion or insincerity on the part of the U.S. government is best exemplified by the contradictory statements made by President Ford. On July 25, 1975, he invited for talks some 17 leaders of ethnic

¹¹ See the two addresses of Alexander Solzhenitsyn in *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, No. 7-8 (Washington, D.C.: July-August, 1975).

¹² Bernard Gwertzman, "Solzhenitsyn Says Ford Joins in Eastern Europe's 'Betrayal,'" *The New York Times*, July 22, 1975.

¹³ Theodore Shabad,, "Sakharov Calls Parley Critical," *The New York Times*, July 30, 1975.

¹⁴ "Helsinki 'Pact' Called Sellout," (CP), *The Winnipeg Press*, July 29, 1975.

organizations, to whom he explained the purpose of his going to Helsinki. He then said:

It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means... I can assure you as one who has long been interested in this question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and is not doing so now..."¹⁵

But in his departure statement President Ford omitted a reference to the Baltic States, and also altered one sentence in the original text. The sentence that had said United States policy supports "the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe," was changed to "the aspirations for freedom and national independence of peoples everywhere..."¹⁶

History will undoubtedly prove that the Helsinki "summit" meeting was a tragedy not only for the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, but for Europe as a whole, and in bringing this tragedy about the United States and Canada were active participants.

CORRECTION

In Prof. Joseph Dunner's article, "Detente, the October 1973 War and the Palestinian Problem" (Vol. XXXI, No. 1, Spring, 1975), two editorial errors regrettably occurred which have altered the author's meaning.

On p. 29, line 4 from the bottom, the sentence should read: "In Kissinger's position I would not have gone to Moscow but informed the Soviets that I was too busy with problems not only of the Middle East but also of Indochina, Cuba and Berlin."

On p. 31, line 13 from the bottom, the sentence should read: "Such a Palestine Arab state, which would preclude the submergence of the Jews of Israel in a 'secular' greater Palestine (in which they would again be a defenseless, ethnic and religious minority) will, however, be opposed by the Soviet Union."

The Editor

¹⁵ "The Statement by the President." Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 25, 1975.

¹⁶ "Statement by President," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1975.

CSCE AND THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Symbolically or otherwise, the Captive Nations Week of 1975 was the most outstanding ever. If anything, it provided the best possible context for the conveyance of seemingly unconnected events and developments that citizens witnessed separately and analysts treated also with unrelated attention and in piecemeal fashion. In this one Week, Congress observed the continuing reality of the captive nations; Governors and Mayors followed the President in issuing proclamations on the event; in a variety of ways citizens in all sections of the country honored the captive peoples; Solzhenitsyn highlighted the Week with an address to Senators and Congressmen on the shortcomings of detente as presently pursued; the White House virtually admitted its blunder in not inviting the Russian writer on the inept advice of the Secretary of State; Dr. Kissinger compounded the error by misrepresenting the Russian's message and was on the road defending detente with some afterthoughts on the morality of foreign policy; in space American astronauts and Russian cosmonauts shook hands in an orbital detente; and the final preparatory session was concluded with the announcement of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which Moscow has pressed for over a period of 21 years and Brezhnev has personally pushed with intensity for the past year. All this in the span of one week—the '75 Captive Nations Week.

A more appropriate occasion or context for all of these events and more could not be hoped for in view of their basic interrelationship. A number of legislators perceived this and spoke at length on the interrelated nature of these events.¹ As Congresswoman Holt of Maryland pointed out with reference to the Week and the CSCE, "While seemingly unconnected, these two events have a strong inner affinity. In a fast-moving, cynical era this point can be lost all too easily."² Her analysis and those of others developing this basic direction of

¹ E.g., "The European Security Conference," *Congressional Record*, July 25, 1975, pp. H7562-H7569.

² *Ibid.*, p. H7562.

thought are most refreshing and serve as an adequate basis for Kissinger's supposed challenge "What is the alternative that they propose?"³ and a fair assessment of the nature and significance of CSCE. Clearly as a response to Solzhenitsyn's ringing address at the AFL-CIO banquet in June, Kissinger rather belatedly chose to discuss the moral bases of our foreign policy in an address that is overflowing with generalities, grave omissions, conceptual errors, and gross exaggerations.

Since much of this led to further developments on the eve of the CSCE, several pointed comments on the Kissinger address are pertinent here. For example, since when can we "no longer expect that moral judgments expressed in absolute terms will command broad acceptance."⁴ Especially directed at our prime enemy, judgments of national independence and self-determination for the nations in the USSR, of justice and charity for those seeking to emigrate from this massive concentration camp, of hope and concern for those lingering in psychiatric wards and so-called labor camps, of human rights for those denied the most fundamental freedoms—these judgments and more cannot be stated in "absolute terms" and "command broad acceptance?" The Secretary's own absolute statement is in itself indicative of the little value he places on the power of politico-moral ideas, and their unique applicability to the one area of deepest concern for our national security. Yet, this is what Captive Nations Week is all about; this is in large part the core of Solzhenitsyn's message. Also, primarily responsible for the debacle in Southeast Asia and the addition of the latest two captive nations to the long list of captive nations, the Secretary is mute on the shortcomings of the Vietnamization policy, the leash placed on the South Vietnamese forces, and the damaging treaty of 1973. In this and other output, Kissinger sees us as trying to "survive in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills," as though the USSR is a sovereign nation.⁵ Nowhere does he disclose any vivid, working conception of the USSR as a land-empire, the largest and one of the last remaining. And when he crassly declares—"As a consequence of improved foreign policy relationships, we have successfully used our influence to promote human rights. But we have done so quietly, keeping in mind the delicacy of the problem and stressing results rather than public confrontation"—the very

³ Secretary Henry A. Kissinger. "The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy." Department of State, July 15, 1975, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

opposite is true in terms of the Khrushchev era, the repressions under Brezhnev, and the whole trade issue.⁶

Kissinger's inaccuracies and bad judgment were crystallized by his unfounded interpretation of Solzhenitsyn and the no-visit advice given to the President. In declaring that the Russian writer's message "is not only that detente is a threat but that the United States should pursue an aggressive policy to overthrow the Soviet system," the Secretary really overreached himself.⁷ Referring to the barbarities and stratagems of Moscow, the Russian writer expressed his message cogently when in Congress he stated, "I am not certain that in my addresses here I have succeeded in conveying the breadth of that terrible reality to American society which is complacent in its prosperity."⁸ This was the essence of his message and mission, and nothing more. Most observers recognized it as such, and one of the fairest defenses of the Russian writer's posture was offered by Senator Buckley of New York. As the Senator put it, "if the report is accurate, we can only conclude that either he has never bothered to listen to the greatest spokesman for freedom in the world today, or he has deliberately chosen to misunderstand his clearly and eloquently stated message."⁹ The subsequent post-rationalization that the advice given by Kissinger flowed from an agreement with Moscow at the time of the writer's release from the Soviet Union borders on fantasy. World opinion, the advantages of detente for Moscow, and the stature of the writer determined the release, and the President's statements on the incident as well as the explicit reopening of the invitation are scarcely conformable with the rationalization.

THE CSCE

In the context of the '75 Captive Nations Week and the described events, the final announcement was made for the convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Along with the Apollo-Soyuz spectacular, was this timed to heavily overshadow the annual observance and perhaps bury it forever? From the Russian viewpoint, drenched as it is in propaganda and ideo-warfare, there can be no doubt of this. From the Western viewpoint, there is scarcely an awareness of the timing factor. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, Moscow waited 21 years for the CSCE, and what better time to have

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁷ "Kissinger Explains Writer Snub," *The Washington Post*, July 17, 1975.

⁸ *Congressional Record*, July 15, 1975, p. S12671.

⁹ *Congressional Record*, July 16, 1975, p. S12765.

the working sessions concluded and the announcement made than during Captive Nations Week.

Covering the essentials of the CSCE, it should first be noted that not until 1970 did Moscow agree to the inclusion of the U.S. and Canada in the conference. Moreover, it supposedly made other concessions in the forms of the Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin in 1972 and concurrent negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. In fact, the latter that has been stalled in Vienna for some time predicated the CSCE. Nevertheless, in November, 1972, preparatory talks got under way, leading to negotiations on the foreign minister level in July, 1973, and working sessions in Geneva in September, 1973 up until July 19, 1975, when the announcement was made for the super-summit of 35 participants in Helsinki starting on July 30.

It should also be noted that almost to the very end of the working sessions little was disclosed as to the specific provisions and content of the final document to be signed. For the past year criticisms and apprehensions were registered by interested groups and individuals as some press reports gave intimations of points of contention between the negotiating sides. But these criticisms went unnoticed for the simple reason that nothing definite had been arrived at. When, in July of 1975, it suddenly became evident that Brezhnev would have his wish for a quick conference, no doubt to set the stage for both his visit to the U.S. later this year and the 25th Party Congress in February, 1976, the criticism mounted on the basis of fragmentary information and more was revealed about the nature of the document and its four "baskets" or sections. It is important to keep this sequence of events in mind because of the postrationalizations made by some officials that "All these critics remained mum for years, though it was obvious at least for six months that there will be a summit and that we will be there."¹⁰ The plain fact is that it was not so obvious.

One need only scan the *Congressional Record* for July to see that even our legislators were in the dark about the contents of the forthcoming document. For example, Senator McClure, joining with Senator Buckley, called for "a full and complete disclosure in public hearings of all proceedings and agreements reached during the conference on security and cooperation in Europe prior to the President's participation in the Helsinki summit."¹¹ He went on further to state, "This is a particularly appropriate time to call for public hearings on this issue. As this week is Captive Nations Week, we reflect upon the

¹⁰ Endre Marton, "Kissinger Overruled by Ford," *The Washington Post*, August 9, 1975, p. A3.

¹¹ *Congressional Record*, August 1, 1975, p. S14865.

circumstances surrounding the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe." As these demands increased in the colloquies on Captive Nations Week and the CSCE, more information and interpretation were meted out. It was stressed above all that the Helsinki document is not a legally binding treaty; rather, it is only a political statement of intent.

In addition, more about the four baskets was disclosed. The first basket dwells on security in Europe, entailing ten principles of inter-state relations that emphasize respect for sovereignty. Moscow's prime gem of "non-intervention in internal affairs" is stressed along with provisions for non-use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, peaceful settlement of disputes, equal rights and self-determination of peoples and fulfillment of international obligations. With some validity, it is held that this basket contains principles which contradict the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty. So that if the circumstances of Czecho-Slovakia in 1968 were repeated, Moscow could not interfere without violating these principles. By the same token it would apply on the other side—say Portugal—with greater chances for a Communist coup, depending on the effectiveness of Moscow's clandestine operations on the Communist Party level. Another point expounded with reference to this basket in Moscow's concession for peaceful changes of borders. With the document's implicit guarantee of life for the totalitarian powers in Eastern Europe, particularly Moscow's, this scarcely can be deemed a realistic concession. Moreover, the other flaunted concession in the form of an announcement 21 days in advance of large-scale military maneuvers is more nominal than real when the placement of USSR forces in Central Europe is considered along with the Warsaw Pact deployment of forces. A serious weakening of NATO would not require much preparation for an invasion of Western Europe and the premium stake this would involve.

The second basket refers to economic, scientific, technical and environmental cooperation. In large measure, this is a reiteration of the established cultural exchange programs, including the promotion of tourism and the hard currency it can produce for the totalitarian powers. Concerning this basket, Moscow will undoubtedly lean heavily on the whole trade issue, emigration, credits, poltrade and so forth. We should hear much about this from Moscow as it exercises "the spirit of Helsinki."

It is the third basket on cooperation in humanitarian and other fields that the West is placing its hopes on most. It calls for freer movement of people, ideas and information across the Iron Curtain, better working conditions for journalists, access to printed, broad-

cast and filmed information, family reunions and visits, and further emphasis on cultural and educational exchange. In short, this basket capsulates what the West has been striving for in the past twenty-five years. Aside from U.N. treaties on human rights and so forth, in a restricted sense the Secretary of State is right when he says that "At Helsinki, for the first time in the postwar period, human rights and fundamental freedoms became recognized subjects of East-West discourse and negotiation. The Conference put forward our standards of humane conduct, which have been—and still are—a beacon of hope to millions."¹² Herein an important yardstick lies for future tests and doubtlessly will be used in combination with basket two and its economic provisions on trade. In other words, all this can be used to reinforce poltrade and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. More, this combination for prudent action could also serve as a basic principle for basket four which provides for follow-up action in the form of a meeting of the participants in 1977 in Belgrade to review the results of Helsinki and the period ahead and to decide on further activities.

RANKING CRITICISM

The above embraces the essentials of CSCE. As discussion on them intensified during Captive Nations Week, they were subjected to sharp criticism, some valid, others not. Taking the chief, ranking criticism that led to an unprecedented meeting with the President, the foremost is the adverse psycho-political impact that "the spirit of Helsinki" would produce on the captive nations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. For example, at the All Nations Festival in Cleveland, Dr. Michael Pap, director of the Soviet Institute at John Carroll University, denounced the CSCE as a "psychological victory for the Soviet Union."¹³ Except perhaps for the Secretary of State, for whom brute power rather than the power of ideas and convictions is all-important, all critics shared this interpretation. One would have to be grossly naive to reduce a twenty-one year motivation of Moscow to zero by not recognizing this manifest effect. Without question, Moscow will capitalize on this heavy gain through its various media. The burning question is, as usual, how will we react? As a State Department release has itself admitted, the CSCE document "will how-

¹² Secretary Henry A. Kissinger, "American Unity and The National Interest," U.S. Department of State, August 14, 1975, p. 4.

¹³ "Some Cheering," *Time*, August 11, 1975.

ever, carry considerable moral and political weight since it is to be signed at the highest level."¹⁴

Another major criticism centers on the inviolability of frontiers, implying that we would be sanctifying the territorial conquests and rearrangements of Moscow and thus legitimizing in effect a Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe. As part and parcel of the first criticism, this one also carries considerable validity in the sense of an implicit stamp of approval being placed on what is obviously an accomplished fact. But here, too, the weight of this criticism depends on our action regarding the thrust of the document. State borders and entrenched Communist regimes are one thing, the captive nations or peoples are another. If the stamp of approval is on anything, it would be on the former, but this, logically, is offset by our continuing support of the latter, which, when they are liberated and free, will surely not sustain the former. Also, on legalistic grounds, the concession on peaceful changes of borders and the principles of self-determination and sovereignty, which ultimately rest with the nations and peoples, indicate the qualifications that must be rationally made for this criticism. There is enough evidence to suggest from the Western side that no freezing of the status quo is intended in the document, no matter how Moscow and its satraps will distort and mangle it.

Related to the above criticism is that focused on the Baltic countries, which were forcibly incorporated by the USSR at the beginning of World War II. One Senatorial critic raised the question "Are we implicitly recognizing the Soviet conquest of the Baltic states?"¹⁵ A number of Baltic spokesmen and others have answered in the affirmative. The frontier inviolability provision, that of non-interference in internal affairs would make it appear so, but in the light of historical fact and the provisions for self-determination and peaceful change of borders, legalistic as these are, it appears differently, particularly as the captive nation emphasis is invoked. Again, explicit statements reemphasizing the American position with regard to the Baltic nations are surely enough to indicate on what parts of the somewhat self-contradictory document we place our cards.

In a broader sense more important than the Baltic issue on frontiers is the issue of the non-participation of a number of European nations in the conference. This critical point was raised by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. In a released memorandum it states, "Specifically, 48 million Ukrainians, 12 million Byelorussians,

¹⁴ "Conference On Security and Cooperation In Europe," *GIST*, July, 1975, p. 1.

¹⁵ Senator Helms. *Congressional Record*, July 29, 1975, p. S14120.

8 million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and over 12 million Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians and others will not be heard at the conference, for they all are coerced into political silence by the oppressive regime of Communist Russia..."¹⁰ The Soviet Union supposedly represented them. In truth, the glaring discrepancy between the state compacency of the conference and the stark reality of the nations of Europe—where the largest non-Russian nation, Ukraine, isn't directly represented, though it is a member of the U.N.—is sufficient to show the unrealistic basis upon which the conference was held. Much could have been made of this point in the negotiating stage, but apparently our negotiators weren't that acute. This criticism, based on the captive nations thesis and the U.N. status of Byelorussia and Ukraine, is irrefutable. Nonetheless, supporters of the document will rationalize their position in terms of the self-determination provisions which, of course, is for the future, not now.

Other paramount criticisms included tactical matters hinging on Moscow's interferences in the Portuguese revolution and leverage concerning SALT II talks and MBFR negotiations. Columnist C.L. Sulzberger wrote, "The U.S. would be insane not to oppose a European security conference and block the scheduled summit... unless it is preceded by a Soviet pledge not to interfere by any means in Portugal."¹¹ Senator Lloyd Bentsen and others concentrated on this point in their demand that the President refrain from participating in the conference. It was after the conference that Dr. Kissinger issued a warning to Moscow on this score. This point in Moscow's interferences in the affairs of other states and nations is a most crucial one when consideration is given to the long tradition of imperialist Russian involvements, the far-flung operations of the KGB, and the conduits represented by Communist parties in over eighty countries. In brief, it would be foolhardy to believe that Moscow would cease these operations because of Helsinki. If anything, it will strive to make them more clandestine and, even in this, it won't succeed completely. This point is a most important one for our actions in the future under the Helsinki agreement.

As to the MBFR negotiations, this, too, is on the agenda for future action, though, as was pointed out earlier, the progress of these negotiations in Vienna predicated the conference itself. There is validity in the position that leverage should have been built up for the acceleration of these talks as well as SALT II negotiations. But

¹⁰ *Conference On Security and Cooperation In Europe: Endorsement of Russian Slave Empire*. New York, July, 1975.

¹¹ *The New York Times*, July 13, 1975.

the momentum developed for the conference, particularly under pressures from Moscow, was so that the criticism directed at negotiating tactics appeared rather belated. Logically, there is no reason why this criticism cannot, along with other points mentioned above, be turned to good account in the post-Helsinki period. Plainly, what the writer is stressing is that tactical errors leading up to the conference had been made, that the outburst of criticism during and after Captive Nations Week was salutary and healthy, and that the real significance of Helsinki, which appears as a bundle of compromises and contradictions with reality, will depend in the largest measure on our actions in the future and our coping with the uses to which "the spirit of Helsinki" will be applied by the totalitarian Red regimes.

THE PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH ETHNIC LEADERS

In terms of domestic effect the escalating criticisms resulted in what most observers and analysts overlooked, namely an unprecedented meeting between the President and some fifteen ethnic leaders concerned with our policy toward Eastern Europe. On record, no other President had called in such leaders for a review of his position on the eve of a summit. The conference was held on July 25 in the cabinet room of the White House, and the highest echelon of the Administration was present, including Dr. Kissinger. In addition, Representatives Derwinski, Zablocki, Flood, Rostenkowski, and Kemp attended the meeting.

The President's statement to the group was forthright and unequivocal. In his four-page presentation he pointed out the spectrum of criticism that had developed and immediately proceeded to give his observations on the conference. Considering the main ones, his first point bore on the nature of the document—"I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating State."¹⁸ The document is then viewed as involving "political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West." Second, with regard to national self-determination and independence, the President explicitly declared, "It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means." He then expressed his hope for this in those words: "I believe the out-

¹⁸ *Statement by the President*. The White House, July 25, 1975, p. 1.

come of this European Security Conference will be a step—how long a step remains to be tested—in that direction.”

As to the Baltic issue, the President was quite emphatic in saying “I can assure you as one who has long been interested in the question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and is not doing so now. Our official policy of non-recognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.” With reference to the principle of territorial integrity and the occupation or acquisition of territory, he stressed that the United States “has not abandoned and will not compromise this long-standing principle.” He added, “We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights.”

Finally, the President concentrated on the humanitarian contents of the third basket. Regarding the totalitarian states, he viewed CSCE as “establishing a yardstick by which the world can measure how well they live up to these stated intentions” as concerns the freer movement of peoples, ideas and information. Part of his concluding remarks are worth noting: “If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot of the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better, and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far.”

GUIDELINES OF INTERPRETATION

It would be difficult for any fair-minded person to find flaws in this presidential statement. The fears expressed at the meeting centered on the reaction of the captive peoples and the need for wide publicity for the statement over VOA, RFE and RL. As a participant in the meeting, this writer went beyond this in advocating the setting of guidelines of interpretation by the President so that our own people as well as those of Western Europe would know the position of the United States at the conference. Bearing in mind the doubtless psychopolitical exploitation of the conference by Moscow in the period ahead, I suggested that the President could begin by restating at least two of the above essentials on his departure from Andrews Air Force Base, more in Bonn and again in Helsinki so that there would be a structure for unavoidable future use.

Apparently, this was to be the course of implementation of the meeting, but the President in his departure statement at Andrews omitted from his prepared text the essentials on “aspirations of free-

dom" and the Baltic countries.¹⁹ This was widely noted by the media which explained it on grounds of not irritating the Soviet Union. The firm and strong address made by the President at the conference largely offset some of the creeping doubts that resulted from this omission. Truly, "History will judge this conference not by what we say today, but what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make but by the promises we keep."²⁰

Indeed, history will judge the conference and its two chief participants. While the President emphasized "the freer movement of people, ideas and information, Brezhnev in his address viewed the agreement in terms of its non-interference in internal affairs provision, which, of course, could negate the former. This alone should indicate the course of development in the future and the shape the conference's significance will assume. As we poise our thoughts on its significance, let us nevertheless remind ourselves of the lessons brought out in this concise analysis. The first is the evident bargaining mistakes committed prior to the conference. Given Brezhnev's obvious anxiety about CSCE, much could have been exacted from Moscow. To have held it just for the sake of detente is not good enough.

A second lesson concerns the timing of the fanfare about CSCE, during the period of Captive Nations Week. This was by no means the first time of such "coincidence," and the cumulative evidence is overwhelming as to Moscow's sensitivity to the Week and all of its implications, which most Americans are unaware of. Thirdly, really caught in this situation, the President accomplished a genuine "first" meeting with ethnic leaders and did set up CSCE as a yardstick for the period ahead. This writer was prone to advise, in addition, the President's reference to the absence of Byelorussian and Ukrainian participants in Helsinki on the basis of their U.N. status, but the situation was already a complicated and muddled one. And the final lesson is that with their moral victory Moscow and its minions will feel secure to intensify their political warfare activities in all parts of the Free World, including Western Europe, Canada and the U.S. The paramount question is whether in recognizing the dangerous shortcomings of detente as pursued by the Secretary of State, we will be able to cope with these expected assaults, to be honest enough to inform the public of the nature and extent of these subverting and aggressive operations, and to have the courage and vision to counter them freely without any fearful pangs of nuclearitis, a disease that evidently doesn't affect the global policies of Moscow.

¹⁹ *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1975.

2, 1975.

²⁰ "Ford: A Challenge, Not a Conclusion," *The Washington Post*, August

THE DISASTROUS FRUITS OF DETENTE*

By FRED SCHLAFLY

In the year since the VIIth WACL met in Washington, the tides of events have strongly favored the Communists. It is my melancholy duty to note that the Communists are victorious in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam, in Portugal, and even in Hong Kong where they persuaded the British authorities to surrender to the Chinese Reds the gallant refugees escaping from Red China by long distance swimming. In addition, the Soviet Communists are pressing for new overseas bases such as in Somalia, in the Spitzbergen Islands owned by Norway, and in the Madeira Islands owned by Portugal. Naval bases in the Madeiras would double the time available to nuclear armed Soviet submarines for patrolling American coasts because they would not have to make the long return trip to their Black Sea and Murmansk bases for rest and refueling.

Why does Communism appear to be the wave of the future in the second half of the twentieth century? There is need to analyze its strength and its many weaknesses. Before science can conquer a disease, it must first learn the life cycle of the organisms causing the disease.

Communism is a virus which gains control of bodies politic by (1) military force, (2) by psychological warfare and subversion, (3) by infiltrating Communist agents and spies, and (4) by faithfully supporting fellow Communists everywhere to the extent necessary for victory.

First, the Communists are willing to spend about forty percent of their gross national product for total military superiority and to steal every technical military secret possessed by the Free World. Thus the backbone of the huge Soviet submarine fleet are exact copies of the American Polaris submarine with its sixteen nuclear armed long-range missiles, the blueprints of which were stolen by Soviet

* Fred Schlafly is the immediate past president of the WACL (World Anti-Communist League), whose address was delivered by the Hon. Dr. Walter Judd, at the VIIIth Annual Conference of the organization, held on April 21-27, 1975, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

spies Morris Cohen, Harry Houghton, Ethel Gee and Soviet spy master Gordon Lonsdale, from the Portland, England naval base.

Second, the Soviets have developed psychological warfare to a fine art. They have persuaded the Free World that resistance to Communism is bad and that those who preach resistance such as the late great Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, General Douglas MacArthur of the U.S.A., former President Syngman Rhee of Korea, General Francisco Franco of Spain, and former Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal are bad people because they did not acquiesce in Communist aggressions.

Statesmen who cooperate with Communist governments by giving them long-term credits and the fruits of Free World technology such as former President Nixon, Secretary of State Kissinger, and former Chancellor Willy Brandt of Germany are praised as great statesmen who deserve the Nobel peace prize.

A third reason for Communist successes everywhere is the Communist intelligence system which has successfully penetrated most of the Free World countries. The top aide of German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Gunter Guillaume, confessed to being a long-time Soviet agent. John Vassall, a confidential secretary handling top secrets in the British Admiralty, confessed that for seven years he turned over important secret government information to the Soviet K.G.B. (John Barron's new book *K.G.B.* describes the training and successes of this vast spy apparatus). Vassall's treachery is fully described in his new book, *The Autobiography of A Spy*, published by Sidgwick and Jackson. There may now be equally high-placed Soviet spies in the American government just as Alger Hiss, Klaus Fuchs, the Rosenbergs and Joan Hinton obtained top American diplomatic and atomic secrets in the 1940s.

Someone in Washington informed the Soviet Embassy of Nixon's plan to send American troops into Cambodia but to forbid them to go more than 21 miles. As a result, the Communists were not surprised and simply retreated beyond the 21 mile limit. Efforts to expose the current Soviet spies in the United States have been weakened by the Soviet success in destroying two American counter-intelligence agencies, namely the Subversive Activities Control Board and the House Internal Security Committee, in terminating the Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations, and by attacking and discrediting the Senate Internal Security Committee, the CIA, and the FBI.

A fourth reason for Communist successes is that the Communists are more loyal to fellow Communists than Free World anti-Communists are to fellow anti-Communists. Under the Brezhnev Doctrine,

a threat to Communist control in any country such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Cuba, or Cambodia is met by the combined military and economic forces of the Soviet and Red Chinese power systems. The fact that the Soviet Union and Red China have serious political differences does not prevent them from cooperating against the United States in Southeast Asia, and from waging guerrilla warfare against the anti-Communist Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. The Communist countries will never acquiesce in the overthrow of Communism anywhere even though it is a severe economic liability, like Castro's Cuba.

Despite these strengths and impressive victories in the last year, Communism has many weaknesses which the Free World must exploit.

First, the Communists are unable to adequately feed, clothe and house their own people. The clothing of Communist subjects is abominable and their housing space and facilities are intolerable. In the early 1920s, again in 1933 when the United States recognized Red Russia, during World War II, and again in 1972 and 1973, the Communists were prevented from literally starving by massive food shipments from the United States.

The basic needs of human beings are food, shelter and clothing and the Communist system has failed miserably to provide these.

The spiritual defects in the Communist system are even more glaring than its material shortcomings. Communism forbids all religion and teaches that there is no God, no life hereafter and that when the citizen dies, his fate is that of a dead dog or dead rat, eternal nothingness. Worse, the Communists make their children believe these barren doctrines or forfeit all chance to get a good education.

By complete denial of religion, freedom of speech, the right to change jobs, the right to travel, the right to leave the country, and by a cruelly savage slave labor penal system, the Communists have forfeited all love and respect for their country by their own citizens. The Communist armies in World War II and in the Korean War had the highest desertion rates of any modern forces.

If, as we have seen, the Communist system is inherently inefficient, unproductive, and unjust to its own citizens, why is it winning on the continents of Asia, Africa and Europe? Why is the Free World in such disarray in the face of Communist challenges? Just as a physician cannot combat disease without accurate diagnosis and prognosis, so we cannot conquer the disease of Communism without scientifically taking advantage of Communism's many weaknesses. Here is a program of victory.

I. THE FREE WORLD MUST NOT REPEAT ITS PAST MISTAKES

Mistake One was assuming that the Communists keep their agreements. The historical record is that the Communists have violated every major agreement they have made, except the agreement which Joseph Stalin made with Adolf Hitler in August of 1939 which started World War II. Stalin was rightly fearful of Hitler's superior strength and not only kept his agreement to supply Hitler with vitally needed raw materials, but exceeded the deliveries he had promised to Hitler.

The Communists have always followed Lenin's dictum: "Promises are like pie crusts, made to be broken." (*Collected Works of Lenin*, Vol. 9, Russian, 4th ed., pp. 290, 291).

Joseph Stalin expressed it this way:

Words must have no relation to action — otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood.

(Stalin — "Elections in Petersburg," Jan. 12, 1913, *Sochineniya, Gospolitizdat*, Moscow, 1946, Vol. II, p. 277).

Here are some of the more than 100 treaties and agreements violated by the Soviet Union:

December 4, 1917 — USSR signed treaty recognizing independence of the Ukrainian Republic.

December 24, 1918 — Recognition cancelled and Ukraine invaded.

February 2, 1920 — USSR signed treaty recognizing independence of Estonia.

June 16, 1940 — USSR invaded and annexed Estonia.

April 12, 1920 — USSR signed treaty recognizing independence of Lithuania.

June 15, 1940 — USSR invaded and annexed Lithuania.

May 7, 1920 — USSR signed treaty recognizing independence of the Republic of Georgia.

March 17, 1921 — USSR completed conquest of Georgia.

August 11, 1920 — USSR signed treaty recognizing independence of Latvia.

June 16, 1940 — USSR invaded and annexed Latvia.

October 14, 1920 — USSR signed treaty recognizing Finland and its boundaries.

March 12, 1940 — USSR invaded Finland and annexed large portions.

December 2, 1920 — USSR signed treaty recognizing independence of Armenia.

In December, 1920 — USSR invaded Armenia and murdered 1,200 Armenian officers.

March 18, 1921 — USSR signed treaty with Poland defining its boundaries.

September 1939 — USSR invaded Poland and annexed half of it.

June 5, 1922 — USSR signed treaty recognizing independence of Czechoslovakia.

June 29, 1945 — USSR annexed part of Czechoslovakia.

September 27, 1928 — USSR signed the Kellogg-Briand Treaty which provided that "the settlement of disputes should never be sought except by peaceful means."

1929 — USSR broke treaty by invading Manchuria and seizing control of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

September 1939 — June 1940 — USSR broke Kellogg-Briand Treaty by invading Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Rumania.

November 16, 1933 — USSR signed agreement not to disseminate Communist propaganda in the United States, not to permit formation of any group aiming for the overthrow of the United States, and promising complete freedom of worship for Americans in Russia in exchange for recognition.

December 1933 — USSR violated this agreement by sponsoring Moscow meeting of Communist parties which resolved to overthrow by force the governments of the capitalistic countries, by publication of Communist newspapers in U.S., etc.

June 9, 1934 — USSR signed treaty for independence of all of Rumania.

June 26, 1940 — USSR seized part of Rumania.

April 2, 1944 — USSR seized all of Rumania.

February 6, 1934 — USSR signed treaty recognizing independence of Hungary.

November 1956 — USSR invaded Hungary and executed its leaders who had been promised immunity.

September 15, 1934 — USSR signed League of Nations Covenant and agreed "not to resort to war" and to have "respect for all treaty obligations."

December 14, 1939 — USSR expelled from League of Nations for invasion of Finland on November 30, 1939.

January 1, 1942 — USSR subscribed to the Atlantic Charter

which provided that the signers "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other."

1944-1975 — USSR took control of East Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, Cambodia and most of South Vietnam.

June 11, 1942 — USSR signed Lend-Lease Treaty with U.S.A. binding the USSR to return all undestroyed ships and equipment, etc.

January 1951 — U.S.A. demanded return of 84 ships and other Lend-Lease equipment worth \$800 million. Not returned, but a vague promise to pay sometime in the future.

February 4, 1945 — USSR signed Yalta Agreement promising "free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people."

1945 to date — No free elections have ever been permitted in the 22 captive nations.

May 3, 1945 — Molotov admitted in San Francisco that 16 Polish Government leaders promised personal safety by the USSR had been arrested. They were subsequently liquidated.

July 17, 1945 — USSR agreed at Potsdam that "Germany must be treated as a single economic unit (and that) freedom of speech, press, and religion shall be permitted."

June 1952 to date — USSR violated Potsdam promises by isolating East Germany from West Germany. Construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 was another violation.

June 26, 1945 — USSR signed UN Charter. In Article 25 it agreed "to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council."

June 25, 1950 — The UN Security Council called on all Member States to "render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution (to defend South Korea) and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." Throughout the Korean War the USSR gave every assistance to North Korea and none to the UN forces.

July 27, 1953 — Korean Armistice signed which forbade "the introduction into Korea of reinforcing aircraft, weapons and ammunition," and called for inspection by the Neutral Nations Commission.

1954 to date — USSR introduced advanced-type aircraft and weapons to North Korea and refused inspection by the Neutral Nations Commission.

July 21, 1954 — USSR signed treaty at Geneva which "prohibited introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and armaments and...

agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam."

1955 to date — USSR continuously violated this treaty by introducing latest-type armaments which are used to violate the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

July 23, 1955 — USSR signed agreement at Geneva that "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people."

1955 to date — USSR has continually prevented free elections in East Germany and built the Berlin Wall to prevent reunification.

March 31, 1958 — Supreme Soviet promised to stop further Soviet nuclear testing if other countries do likewise. U.S. stopped nuclear testing.

December 30, 1958 — Khrushchev announced USSR would not resume nuclear testing unless Western powers do so first. U.S. continued its stoppage of tests.

September 1 to Oct. 30, 1961 — USSR suddenly resumed nuclear testing. USSR conducts more than 50 nuclear weapons tests, including tests of weapons many times more powerful than any tested by the U.S.

July 23, 1962 — USSR signed treaty at Geneva "guaranteeing peace, freedom and neutrality of Laos."

April 1963 — By open warfare, Communist forces gained control of most of Laos.

July 4, 1963 — British Foreign Office informed Gromyko that Russians were continuing to violate the Geneva Treaty.

July 18-25, 1969 — 60 Russian-made PT-76 tanks used in effort to take over Laos. Capital city of Luang Prabang under attack.

October 25, 1962 — Khrushchev agreed in a letter to President Kennedy for on-site inspection of his removal of Cuban missiles and to remove Soviet troops from Cuba.

1962 to date — USSR violated letter agreement by not permitting inspection and not removing its troops.

August 3, 1968 — USSR signed Declaration of Bratislava guaranteeing the independence of Czechoslovakia.

August 20, 1968 — Troops of the Soviet Union and its satellites invaded Czechoslovakia and have remained there. This was in violation of said Declaration, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Charter, and the Warsaw Treaty signed by the USSR on May 14, 1959 which pledged "respect for the independence and sovereignty of the states and of non-intervention in their domestic affairs."

January 27, 1973 — in the Paris accords, the Communists promised a cease-fire in South Vietnam and not to introduce new troops and new equipment into South Vietnam.

On April 10, 1975 President Ford informed Congress that:

The North Vietnamese, from the moment they signed the Paris accords, systematically violated the cease-fire and other provisions of the agreement. Flagrantly disregarding the ban on infiltration of troops into the South, they increased Communist forces to the unprecedented level of 350,000. In direct violation of the agreement, they sent in the most modern equipment in massive amounts. Meanwhile, they continued to receive large quantities of supplies and arms from their friends.

Of course "their friends" who helped them violate the Paris Agreement with modern equipment are the Soviet Union and Red China. Elsewhere in the President's speech these treaty violators are tactfully referred to as "our adversaries."

The details of more than 100 Soviet Treaty violations may be read in the Staff Study of the Senate Judiciary Committee entitled *Soviet Political Agreements and Results* and in *The Treaty Trap* by Laurence W. Beilenson, published in 1969 by Public Affairs Press.

The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee wrote in his introduction to the Senate Staff Study:

Since the Soviet Union came into existence, its Government has broken its word to virtually every country to which it ever gave a signed promise... It was violating the first agreement it ever signed with the United States at the very moment the Soviet envoy, Litvinov, was putting his signature to that agreement, and it is still violating the same agreement...

I seriously doubt whether during the whole history of civilization any great nation has ever made as perfidious a record as this in so short a time.

*Mistake Two is helping the Communists every time their defective economic and political systems brought the Communist countries close to defeat or revolt.** In the early 1920s Communism was a colossal economic failure and starvation and chaos swept through Communist Russia. The American food relief missions saved the Communists from starvation. American technology built the Henry Ford Gorki tractor factory, the giant power plant on the Dnieper River;

* For documentation see *Wall Street and The Bolshevik Revolution* and *Military Aid to The Soviet Union*, both by Anthony C. Sutton, also *East Minus West—Zero*, by Werner Keller.

the Stalingrad tractor plant, the largest in Europe, which was designed by Albert Kahn, Inc. of Detroit, was built by the Austin Company of U.S.A., and produces tractors copied from International Harvester of Chicago.

When the Soviet system was again about to collapse in 1933, it was saved by American recognition and new credits. From 1941 to 1943, \$11 billion of American tanks, airplanes and other military equipment saved the Soviet Union from defeat by Hitler. Despite all-out Soviet aid to the North Korean aggressors in South Korea and to the North Vietnamese aggressors in South Vietnam, the United States furnished the following vital industrial equipment to the Soviet Union during the years these Soviet wars of aggression were being fought:

The Soviet T-34 Medium tanks used in the invasion of South Korea were made in U.S. built plants and all had U.S. designed Christi suspension system. The trucks used in this invasion were made at the Henry Ford designed and built Gorki plant in Russia. The tractors which pulled the North Korean guns were exact copies of the U.S. Caterpillar Model 60 made at Chelyabinsk, Russia.

The T-54 Soviet tanks used in the invasion of South Vietnam all had the U.S. modified Christi type suspension furnished by the Wheel Tract Layer Corporation of U.S.A. The GAZ trucks used on the Ho Chi Minh Trail came from the Henry Ford designed and built Gorki plant. The ZIL-130 cargo trucks and the ZIL-555 dump trucks used by the invading North Vietnamese came from the Moscow truck plant built by Americans.

The largest iron and steel plant in the world was built in the Soviet Union by the McKee Corporation of U.S.A. It is a copy of the U.S. Steel plant at Gary, Indiana. A giant new steel plant has been built at Kursk, Russia, by West Germany. *Iron Age* magazine of U.S.A. recently announced that the Soviet Union produced 137.6 million metric tons of steel in 1974, more than did the United States or any other nation. All Soviet iron and steel technology came from the United States and West Germany.

The Soviet Union has the largest merchant marine fleet in the world, about 6,000 ships. All of these ships were built with Free World technical assistance, and two-thirds of them by Free World shipyards. Most of the identified 96 Soviet ships used to carry Soviet missiles to Cuba and Soviet arms to North Vietnam had diesel engines licensed by Burmeister & Wayne of Denmark, or by Sulzer Gebruder of Switzerland or by Fiat of Italy.

During the years 1973, 1974 and the spring of 1975 when the Soviet-aided North Vietnamese were conquering Southeast Asia, the United States was financing, building and equipping the largest truck factory in the world on the Kama River in Russia. This plant occupies 36 square miles. During the same time, the United States was financing, building and equipping the largest tanker shipyard in the world on the Black Sea, the largest fertilizer complex in the world at Togliatti on the Volga River, and a very large acetic acid plant at Severodonetsk.

Soviet oil drilling and refining technology has lagged far behind the U.S.A. Gasoline and oil are vital to fuel the tanks and trucks used in the invasions of South Vietnam and Cambodia. So the United States has again come to the rescue of the Soviet Union. Universal Oil Products of Des Plaines, Illinois is building late model refineries and petrochemical plants in Russia. Dresser Industries of Pittsburgh furnished \$3.5 million of oil exploration equipment, Reeder Pump Co. supplied 500 submersible oil pumps, Koomey, Stuart, Stevenson supplied \$2.5 million of oil well blowout controls, Walworth Valve supplied \$20 million worth of valves. On April 12, 1975 the United Press reported that the Soviet Union, for the first time, surpassed the United States as the world's leading oil producer.

In April, 1975 the Ford Administration licensed the sale to the Soviet Union of 11 late model advanced design giant computers made by International Machine Corporation (IBM) for \$10 million. The Soviet Union has lagged far behind the United States in computer technology which is so vital in intercontinental ballistic missile guidance systems, nuclear submarines and other weapon systems. Until now, the United States would not approve the sale of late model IBM computers to Iron Curtain countries. On January 15, 1975 the West German government arrested nine men for attempting to turn over IBM computer circuits and manuals to the Communists. Now it's okay to let the Reds have IBM computer secrets.

On April 12, 1975 Sargent Shriver, the Democratic candidate for Vice President in 1972, announced that his clients Lazard Freres, Banque Nationale de Paris, Morgan Guaranty Bank of New York and 20 other banks were lending \$250,000,000 to the Soviet Union "with no strings attached to the loan."*

Earlier this year, the National Westminster Bank of London loaned the Soviet Union \$100,000,000. On February 18, 1975 Prime

* Also on April 12, the Bank of America announced that it has a syndicate ready to lend the Soviet Union \$500 million.

Minister Harold Wilson agreed to give the Soviet Union \$2 billion in low interest credits to acquire British plants and technology. On April 10, 1975 President Ford told the Congress that Western Europe and Japan had extended credits exceeding \$8 billion to the Soviet Union in the last six months.

Mistake Three is the failure to expose and oppose Soviet psychological warfare. The Communists are masters at destroying Free World opponents of Communism and advancing the careers of Free World supporters of Communism. Thus, Free World anti-Communists like Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, General Douglas MacArthur, General Pinochet of Chile, General Franco of Spain, Syngman Rhee of Korea, J. Edgar Hoover, Congressmen Martin Dies, Walter Judd, Richard Ichord and John Ashbrook, Senators Barry Goldwater, Patrick McCarran and Joseph McCarthy, Prime Minister Vorster of the Union of South Africa, Chancellor Adenauer of Germany, etc. were constantly vilified and smeared not only by the Communist press but also by much of the communications media.

For example, the smear term "*McCarthyism*" was coined by Gus Hall, head of the American Communist party, and was first used in the May 11, 1950 issue of the official Communist American newspaper *The Daily Worker*. The Communists are masters of character assassination.

Likewise, Communist coined slogans are used to direct the thinking of people in the Free World. The slogan "*Bring the boys back home*" was invented by the Communists in the fall of 1945 in order to dismantle the American armies in Europe and Asia so that there would be a power vacuum for the Communist forces to move into. The phrase "*agrarian reformers*" was used to persuade the United States that Mao Tse-tung and his followers in the 1940s and Fidel Castro and his followers in the 1950s were not ruthless Communists but idealistic social reformers. Another clever Communist slogan popularized by Lord Bertrand Russell of England is "*rather Red than dead.*" This slogan illustrates the fallacy of the false alternative. The Free World is not faced with the alternatives of either being Red or dead. It also has the alternative of "rather free than slave."

The Communists called for *building bridges*. So on October 7, 1966 President Lyndon Johnson said we will "*build bridges to Eastern Europe.*" On October 12, 1966 President Johnson struck 400 items from the list of strategic products which for 20 years had been banned from export to Communist countries.

"*Peaceful coexistence*" and "*detente*" are two more effective Red word warfare slogans. The Communists have construed "*peaceful coexistence*" to mean they are free to capture Free World countries one piece at a time.

American labor leader George Meany explained "*detente*" to mean:

"The decision to provide the Soviet Union with Western technology*** to bail out the Russian leaders and to save them the hard choice between production for war and production for people.

American capital investment in the Soviet Union goes way back. And so does technical assistance. An American firm, the McKee Corporation, built the world's biggest iron and steel plant at Magnitogorsk.

What good did it do? Did it bring us any closer to peace? Our biggest corporate executives don't read history.

Time and space do not permit listing all the clever Communist propaganda falsehoods. Let us examine but one more.

The obituaries published on the death on April 5, 1975 of one of the greatest leaders of the twentieth century, President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, illustrate the point Adolf Hitler made that if a big lie is repeated often enough, the people will believe it. *The New York Times* obituary on April 6 contained numerous falsehoods such as repeating the false charges in the Philip Jessup written White Paper that no amount of U.S. aid would have saved the National Government of China because it "had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people," and that its government of Taiwan "was accompanied by repressive military rule."

The truth is the exact opposite and is splendidly documented in scholarly books by Dr. Anthony Kubek, *How the Far East Was Lost* and *The Red China Papers*, and by the 15-volume report of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on the American pro-Communists who persuaded our government to cut off aid to the National Government of China at the very time when the Soviet Union was giving massive military aid to the Chinese Communists.

Contrary to *The New York Times* obituary, President Chiang Kai-shek had made Taiwan a showcase of democracy and prosperity. It has enjoyed unparalleled tranquility and industrial and economic growth, and now has the second highest standard of living in all Asia.

In typical Communist fashion Red China smeared even the memory of President Chiang Kai-shek calling him "the common enemy of the Chinese people." On the contrary, he ranks not only as one of the greatest Chinese but also as one of the giants of the twentieth century. We in America pay Chiang Kai-shek our highest tribute

when we refer to him as the "George Washington of the Republic of China."

Mistake Four is the failure to win the wars fought with Communists. The United States and Greece under the leadership of General James Van Fleet won the war against the Communist armed guerrillas attacking Greece from Yugoslavia. The British under the leadership of Robert Thompson* were successful in defeating the Communist armed guerrillas in Malaya. But in Korea General MacArthur's great Inchon Landing, which broke the back of the North Korean Army, and General Van Fleet's successful counterattack which left the Chinese Reds short of food and ammunition and surrendering by the thousands, were lost because the British persuaded Washington that victory over the Red Chinese in Korea might jeopardize Hong Kong.

In Vietnam the American forces were unwilling to defeat the North Vietnamese in eight years, although the U.S. had defeated very powerful German and Japanese forces in three and a half years. All the normal means of victory were denied by the American State Department. Use of the Navy to blockade the ports of North Vietnam was forbidden, bombing of the North Vietnam dams and reservoirs was prohibited, landings in North Vietnam behind enemy lines, a la General MacArthur, were ruled out. No football game was ever won by promising the opposition that your players would never cross the middle of the playing field.

Since North Vietnam was always assured of being immune from invasion, we were not surprised when President Ford reported to Congress on April 10, 1975 that:

The North Vietnamese in recent months began sending even their reserve divisions into South Vietnam. 18 divisions, virtually their entire army, are now in South Vietnam.

The Communists would not dare strip North Vietnam of all troops, even their reserve divisions, if they had not been assured for eight years that the United States would not itself invade North Vietnam nor would it permit South Vietnam to do so. It was a grave military mistake to give the initiative to North Vietnam and never to attempt a surprise attack against the lightly defended North Vietnam homeland.

The excuse given for the United States' failure to win the war in Southeast Asia is that Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and

* Author of *Defeating Communist Insurgency*.

Ford undertook too much and overestimated American capabilities. This is ridiculous. Only the most inept leadership could deny victory to the 550,000 soldiers and airmen and powerful naval forces which the United States had in Southeast Asia plus the very capable Korean Tiger Division. With superior fire power, superior air power, superior mobility and superior resources such as equipment and repair facilities, it is plain that victory was denied because the United States leaders thought "detente" with Red Russia and Red China was more desirable than military victory.

Now the fallout from losing the war in Southeast Asia is hurting the Free World everywhere. President Marcos of the Philippines and Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan are questioning whether the United States has the will and the capability to continue to guarantee their defense. The defeats in Southeast Asia were accompanied by Portugal's shifting from an anti-Communist government to a pro-Communist government and by the surrender of its former anti-Communist territories of Angola and Mozambique to Communist armed guerrillas. Truly as General MacArthur told the U.S. Congress in 1951:

In war there is no substitute for victory.

The Paris accords signed by Dr. Kissinger in January, 1973 did not even represent a tie with the Communist forces, such as the United States accepted in Korea, but a humiliating retreat of the United States land, sea and air forces.

Listen to the words of the great American labor leader George Meany on Southeast Asia and "detente":

Can you imagine Harry Truman referring to the force which is smearing us and killing our friends as the 'adversary' [as did President Ford on April 10]? Truman would have laid it on the line. He would have specifically named Russia and the Chinese Communists. Told them to stop arming the Hanoi armies. And threatened action if they didn't."

Everywhere Communism is on the march. Everywhere the West is in retreat. Such are the fruits, the bitter fruits, of detente.

II. THE FREE WORLD MUST MAKE ITSELF STRONGER THAN THE RED WORLD

In October 1962 at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States had about an eight to one superiority over the Soviet Union in deliverable nuclear power. When Khrushchev's daring gamble to sneak 2000 mile range nuclear missiles into Cuba and inside America's Northern Dewline radar defenses failed, the Soviet Union mobilized its psychological warfare experts.

Their task was to persuade the United States to stop developing new nuclear weapons and to stop development of new delivery systems, such as mobile ICBMs to be mounted on moving trains and ships (which would not be knocked out by a surprise attack) recommended by General Thomas Power, Commander, U.S. Strategic Forces, and a new supersonic bomber to replace the old subsonic B-52s. In addition, their task was to block deployment of the great Anti-Ballistic Missile System then being perfected by the U.S.A.

The word warfare campaign of the Soviet-influenced wordsmiths was clever and effective. U.S. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, and their Secretaries of Defense, were persuaded to ignore President George Washington's advice that "the best way to insure peace is to be prepared for war." Instead they were persuaded that the way to peace is by unilateral disarmament. They were frightened by the propaganda slogan "*we must not run an arms race.*" They forget the lessons of history, beginning with the destruction of Carthage by Rome, that wars usually start when a rich nation fails to run an arms race. They scrapped 1400 B-47 nuclear bombers. They closed down the U.S. bomber bases which ringed the Soviet Union. They scrapped many B-52 bombers. They did not build any new strategic bombers. They cut our Navy in half. They disregarded General Power's advice to build mobile ICBMs.

Even after the Soviets tested four new super intercontinental missiles (the SS-16, SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19) while the U.S. was testing none, and deployed many new Delta super nuclear submarines, while the U.S. Trident is yet to be built, American leaders were persuaded that detente and the SALT agreement forbade America not only strategic superiority but also parity.

But the masterpiece of Soviet psychological warfare consisted in persuading Presidents Johnson, Nixon and Ford and their Secretaries of Defense to cancel the 20 great Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) designed to defend the whole country from enemy missiles, to scrap all but one of those already built, and to agree at Moscow in May of 1972 not to build any more, and not to permit any of our allies to have this marvelous system of defending itself from Red missiles.

This is called the M.A.D. strategy, an acronym based on Mutual Assured Destruction. It is truly mad. If the Communists strike first, and they usually do, the United States will have nothing left to strike back.

Before going to Moscow and signing SALT One, President Nixon said:

No President with the responsibility for the lives and the security of the American people could fail to provide this [ABM] protection.

Most important is the fact that the men in the Kremlin do not believe the Mutual Assured Destruction which they persuaded American leaders to accept. The Soviet Government estimates that because of its favorable geography, dispersed population, and far greater missile megatonnage its forces can destroy about 60 percent of the American population but that the United States can destroy only 6 percent of the Russian population. The Russians regard a 6 percent population loss as well worth victory over the Free World. Both the Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists killed much more than 6 percent of their own people in establishing and maintaining their Communist systems.

In his speech to Congress on April 10, 1975, President Ford said that "the United States cannot escape history." History made the United States the leader of the Free World. But a continuation of the present policies of detente, disarmament, and huge credits for Communism will cause either the disappearance of the Free World, or a new leader such as Brazil.

On March 20, 1975, *The New York Times* quoted a Ford Administration document as showing that, for the years 1972, 1973 and 1974, Communist aid to North Vietnam totaled \$1.2 billion, \$1 billion, and \$1.7 billion, respectively. U.S. aid to South Vietnam during those same years was less, totaling \$985 million, \$805 million, and \$1.3 billion, respectively. Although the Soviet Gross National Product is only about one-half that of the United States, Red Russia and Red China were willing to help Hanoi more than the United States helped Saigon.

In his speech to Congress of April 10 President Ford said: "We will not permit detente to become a license to fish in troubled waters."

Fine words and we applaud them. The reality is that during all the 27 months since the Paris Accords were signed by Dr. Kissinger detente has been permitted to become a license to fish in troubled waters. President Ford conceded that North Vietnam "flagrantly violated" the Paris Accords from the beginning.

President Ford's speech was silent on Portugal. Here are troubled waters where the Soviet Union is spending millions to capture important fish—control of NATO bases in the Azores, the Madeiras, and Portugal itself.

Pray, plead, and work for the following action by President Ford and other Free World leaders:

1. Stop the dead policy of detente and cancel all Soviet credits.

Why finance our adversaries while they are killing and enslaving our friends?

2. Reverse the disarmament policies which the *Wall Street Journal* of December 6, 1974 said caused a decline of U.S. investment in strategic weapons (in terms of 1974 dollars) from \$19 billion in 1961 to \$6.8 billion in 1974.

3. Build the ABM so that the Free World is safe from Soviet pressure and blackmail by nuclear threats. This involves renouncing the made-in-Moscow SALT One agreement which U.S. Senators charge the Soviet Union has already violated. Robert Hotz, editor of the authoritative *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, wrote that once the missile defensive system is installed it "would eliminate any possibility of a Soviet first-strike capability."

4. Adopt the missile-launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy described by Admiral Chester Ward and Phyllis Schlafly in their 846-page nuclear weapon 1975 treatise, *Kissinger On the Couch*. This strategy is approved by the American Security Council under the name "Assured Retaliation."

5. Take advantage of the best allies the Free World has, the one billion members of the captive nations. They are eager to free themselves from Communist tyranny.

6. Take advantage of the inability of Communism to provide for an orderly transfer of power. Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Brezhnev are elderly and not in good health. Brezhnev is a chain smoking cigarette addict. Already the power struggle to be the successor to these men is acute. Shelepin and Lin Piao, once named as successors to Brezhnev and Mao, respectively, have been purged. When Brezhnev and Mao die there will be great opportunities for freedom, just as there were great opportunities at the time of the death of Lenin and then of Stalin.

It has been a privilege for me to serve as Chairman of WACL. In closing this unhappy review of Free World mistakes I am pleased to report a personal victory over the forces of Communism.

In 1970 Simas Kudirka, a Lithuanian radio operator aboard a Soviet fishing vessel, leaped to what he thought was freedom on the deck of the U.S. Coast Guard vessel *Vigilant*, anchored alongside. To his dismay, and to America's shame, the Coast Guard permitted Soviet thugs to board the *Vigilant*, beat Kudirka to unconsciousness, and carry him back to the Soviet ship.

Lithuanian Americans and I became interested in his case. Research developed that his mother was born in Brooklyn, New York. I wrote the brief which persuaded the State Department that although

Kudirka was born in Lithuania and never lived in the United States, he was under American and international law an American citizen. My good friend, Frances Knight, head of the Passport Division of the State Department, issued a passport to Kudirka. Arrangements were made for his release from a Siberian slave labor camp. I had the great thrill of being part of the joyful group which welcomed Simas Kudirka when he, his mother, his wife and two children arrived in New York from Russia last December.

It is my duty and pleasure to hand the gavel, symbolic of the office of Chairman of WACL, to my successor, Dr. Carlos Barbieri Filho of Sao Paulo, Brazil. I wish you every success.

TRANSPORTATION IN UKRAINE

By MYKHAILO ILKIW

Natural geographical conditions in Ukraine are extremely favorable for land transportation because Ukraine is a country of extensive plains. The rivers, which flow from north to south, tightly connect the economic areas of Ukraine, although they freeze in winter time. Ukraine possesses few marshy areas, while her mountains are located on the borderlands and thus pose no obstacle to the development of transportation. Both the Black and Azov Seas are connected by rivers and railroad networks and are accessible to the whole of Ukraine. From the geographical viewpoint Ukraine, which is situated in the center of the earth's surface, should be a world transient transportation center.

Well-arranged and organized transport has great importance for the social and economic life of the country. In ancient times the cultural and economic life, as a rule, developed on the shores of seas and rivers, that is, along natural routes which were accessible to man. Today, the modern transportation system connects the farthest points of the globe.

The social-economic and political conditions of Ukraine for a long time were not conducive to the development of her national economy, especially in transportation and the mining of minerals. Therefore, the population of Ukraine was confined to agriculture. Moreover, the ruthless exploitation of Ukrainian raw materials by foreigners and occupiers impeded the development and growth of Ukrainian trade capital, so necessary for the building of industry and transport; the economic development of Ukraine was undermined by rapacious import-export policies. But when foreign capital found out the extent of Ukraine's great natural resources, the situation rapidly improved. Ukraine became a leading country in Eastern Europe in the building of railroad lines, with investments by the French, Belgian, British and German capitals, especially in the coal iron industries, providing a great stimulus for the development of transportation in Ukraine.

HISTORY

The first railroad line in Ukraine was built between Odessa and Balta in 1865; it was soon extended through Kremenchuk-Kiev to Moscow. The principal railroad lines in Ukraine became: Kharkiv-Rostov on the Don; Kryvy Rih-Donbas; Kiev-Moscow; Moscow-Kharkiv-Sevastopol; Kiev-Odessa; Kiev-Lviv; Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Kherson. In the 1870's additional railroad lines appeared: Kiev-Koziatyn; Berest-Hrayevo; Romen-Lubava; Kharkiv-Tahanrih and Kharkiv-Mykolayiv, which connected the agricultural areas with the ports of the Black and Azov Seas. These railroad lines were put down for the transportation of wheat destined for export abroad.

With the development of mining and the metallurgical industries new railroad lines appeared in the Donbas, the Lower Dnieper area and the Kryvy Rih area. In 1881-84 a new railroad line connected the Donbas and Kryvy Rih, and another in 1911-12 Krasny Lyman and Kharkiv.

On the eve of World War I the railroad network in Ukraine had a total trackage of 16,003.2 kms.,¹ with the average speed of trains on main lines from 60 to 80 kms. per hour (35 to 50 mph) and railroad stations 8 kms. to 11 kms. (5 to 7 miles) apart. But, in general, the rail system was technically a backward branch and could not discharge the growing needs of the national economy. The low-powered steam locomotives and the methods of signalization and communication were insufficiently developed.

In the western lands of Ukraine the first railroad line (Lviv-Peremyshl) was built in 1861. A few years later, in 1866, a line connected Lviv-Chernivtsi and Yassy, and another, in 1869, Lviv and Brody. In 1874 the first railroad line pierced the Carpathian Mountains, linking Galicia and Transcarpathia. At the same time a new Sub-Carpathian railroad line was erected: Khyriv-Striy-Stanyslaviv-Husiatyn. Owing to the construction of these new railroad lines the industrially-developed Austrian provinces were connected both with the export markets and the sources of cheap raw materials. Galicia and Bukovina were joined by 10 railroad lines.

In the period between the two World Wars railroad transportation in Ukraine was developed and technically improved. At least 4,000 kms. (2,500 mi.) of new lines were constructed, particularly in the Lower Dnieper and Kryvy Rih areas and in the Donbas, that is,

¹ *Ukraine and Russia*. By Konstantyn Kononenko. The Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, Wisc., 1958, p. 204.

in the industrial zones, indispensable for moving raw materials for the benefit of the Russian occupier. During World War II Ukraine became the principal battleground between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, resulting in the destruction of industry, including the railways of Ukraine.

After the war, thanks to the industriousness of the Ukrainian people, most of the Ukrainian lines were rebuilt, along with laying new ones, so that in 1964 the trackage of the Ukrainian lines amounted to 21,700 kms.² Subsequently, the car and locomotive yards, destroyed during the war, were completely restored and enlarged and a series of new railroad lines laid down, so that in 1971 the trackage increased to 22,100 kms.³ At this time, the railroad network in Italy comprised 16,015 kms.; France—27,710 kms.; West Germany—21,527 kms.; Sweden—5,149 kms.⁴

ELECTRIFIED TRANSPORTATION

The electrification of railways in Ukraine began in 1935. The first electric line was constructed between Dobhytsevia and Zaporozhia (203 kms.); in 1964 the trackage of electrified railway in Ukraine amounted to 3,283 kms.⁵ Electric trains connect Kharkiv-Lozova-Slavyansk-Mykytivka-Rostov on the Don, Kharkiv-Lyman-Mykytivka-Dybaltseve, Donbas-Kryvyi Rih-Fastiv and Lviv-Chop. Some of the railroad lines run heated cars of the newest type. The system of signals and communication has been considerably improved. In 1971 the network of electric lines in Ukraine amounted to 5,700 kms.,⁶ as compared with 4,268 kms. in Italy, 2,030 kms. in France, 8,161 kms. in West Germany and 7,520 kms. in Sweden.⁷

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² *Ukrainska Radyanska Entsyklopedia* (Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia). Published by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Kiev, Vol. XVII, p. 352 and ff.

³ *Narodne hospodarstvo USSR* (National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR). Statistical Yearbook. Published by "Statystyka," Kiev, 1972, p. 291 and ff.

⁴ *Calendario Atlante De Agostini*. Istituto Geografico De Agostini Novara. 1972, Rome, pp. 109, 162, 171 and 250.

⁵ *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*, op. cit., p. 352.

⁶ *National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR*, op. cit., p. 296.

⁷ *Calendario Atlante De Agostini*, op. cit., pp. 109, 162, 172, 250.

The Ukrainian lands possess not only great natural resources, but, by abutting on the Black and Azov Seas, give Ukraine the possibility of communication with the countries of the world at large. Both seas are accessible to the whole of Ukraine; rivers and railroad lines connect with them. A great part of the imports and exports of Ukraine is carried through the Black and Azov Seas, although neither sea is ideal for navigational purposes due to the shallowness of the coastal waters; also, the coastal waters freeze in winter time, including the ports themselves. But such obstacles and drawbacks can easily be overcome with modern technological means.

WATER TRANSPORTATION

Extensive water passenger service exists on internal lines between Odessa and Batum, Odessa-Mariupol, Mariupol-Batum, Rostov on the Don-Yalta, Izmail-Odessa and Odessa-Kherson. International sea passenger service includes Odessa-Marseilles, Odessa-Beirut, and others. Water communication and transportation of Ukraine is also maintained with the Dnieper-Black Sea route and the Danube. The principal ports of Ukraine are Odessa, Mariupol, Kherson, Novorossiysk, Mykolayiv, Izmail, Tahanrih, Kerch, Sevastopol and Yalta.

Navigation on the Black Sea dates back to ancient times, particularly the IV-VIth centuries, but it was only at the end of the XVIIth and the beginning of the XVIIIth centuries that a series of ports began to spring up on the coast of the Black Sea: Kherson was built in 1778, Sevastopol in 1784 and Odessa in 1794. At that time all loading and unloading equipment was made of wood, while labor was done manually. In the XIXth century, as a result of the economic development, several railroad lines leading to the Black Sea ports were established and the navigational services on the Dnieper, Don and Buh Rivers were improved and modernized.

During World War I the Russian navy was almost completely annihilated, but in the first decade of Soviet power it was rebuilt, and by the end of 1938 there was on the Black Sea a total of 167 ships with a combined tonnage of 469,000 and about 200 smaller craft comprising the so-called "local and auxiliary fleet."⁸

In 1935 the Black Sea State Navigation Company was founded in Odessa, for the purpose of developing navigation on the Black Sea. In the course of the following years the navy of Ukraine was expanded and numerous dryfreight, oil tankers, passenger and other technical

⁸ *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*, op. cit., pp. 352, 353.

ships were acquired. In the last few years sea transport improved considerably with the addition of modern passenger ships, super-oil-tankers and dryfreight ships of greater tonnage capacity. The new ships are much faster and are equipped with radar, radio and electronic instruments.

Also, the ports of Ukraine have been modernized, especially the loading and unloading facilities. In 1971 Black Sea ships carried a total of 40.5 million tons of cargo and 19.9 million passengers,⁹ as compared with 7,139,577 tons of cargo in Italy, 6,457,900 in France, 7,881,000 in Germany and 4,920,704 in Sweden.¹⁰

RIVER TRANSPORTATION

Natural conditions for river transportation are quite favorable, although some rivers are too shallow and freeze over in winter. Nevertheless, the rivers of Ukraine connect the various areas and thus provide cheap transport of cargo in the various parts of the country.

In the past the most intensive river activity was on the Dnieper. Even in the princely era of Ukrainian history, the Dnieper was known as the "route from the Varangians to the Greeks," that is, from Scandinavia to Byzantium. The Zaporozhian *Sich*, established in the XVIth century, played an important part in the development of river transportation in Ukraine.

Steamship navigation on the Dnieper began in 1823, but it was not until 1850 that the first regular passenger line between Kremenchuk and Pinsk—through the Prypyat—was established. In 1913 the Dnieper navigational fleet had a total of 400 automotive and 200 non-automotive craft, carrying 1,700,000 tons of cargo annually.¹¹ Navigational activities increased considerably with the erection of the "Dniprelstan" in 1932 and the clearing of granite cataracts which constituted hazardous obstacles to navigation. In 1933 a series of mechanized ports were established in Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporozhia and Kherson.¹²

With the incorporation of the Western Ukrainian lands into the Ukrainian SSR the total river system in Ukraine increased by 800 kms., mainly through the addition of the Rivers Styr, Horyn, Dnister and Seret. In 1947 the system was extended to all navigable rivers of Ukraine; in 1964 it carried a total of 15.9 millions of cargo and

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

¹⁰ *Calendario Atlante De Agostino*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109, 162, 171, 250.

¹¹ *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 355, 356.

¹² Kononenko, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

16.8 million passengers.¹³ The total length embraced by river navigation was then 4,000 kms.¹⁴

The river fleet of Ukraine now possesses modern passenger and cargo ships; the latter are capable of carrying cargoes of 600, 1,800 and 2,000 tons. Also, all loading and unloading equipment in the ports are mechanized and modernized. In 1971 the navigable river routes of Ukraine encompassed 4,700 kms., which carried a total of 22.6 million passengers.¹⁵

SURFACE LAND TRANSPORT

As mentioned above, Ukraine's flat terrain favors land transportation. The only unfavorable terrain are the marshes of Polissya. Several highways have been constructed in the Crimean Mountains and along the Caucasian sierras.

But these naturally endowed conditions for land transport have not been fully and gainfully utilized. Prior to World War I, Galicia (Western Ukraine) had 10,000 kms. of highways, but the central and Eastern Ukrainian lands had a mere 3,500 kms. (1935); by 1940 it had climbed to 13,700 kms.

The most densely developed road networks are in the Donbas, in the Dnipropetrovsk area and in Right-Bank Ukraine. In 1940 the Ukrainian SSR had 200,000 kms. of roads of all kinds, including 8,900 kms. of highways, 9,400 of improved roads, and 62,000 of paved field roads.¹⁶ Road improvement has gone hand in hand with motorized transportation; the 187,200 tons of freight transported in 1940 shot up to 2,067,800 tons in 1964; in the same period the number of vehicle passengers increased from 29,400,000 to 244,700,000.¹⁷

Bus lines connect not only all the *oblast* and *raion* centers but the majority of villages in Ukraine as well. This aspect of transportation service for the population constitutes 60% of the activity of the general system, especially in conveying the urban and suburban population.

On the city streets and roads of Ukraine there function a total of 45,000 buses every day, making a total of 14,350 scheduled trips.

¹³ *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

¹⁵ *National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR*, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

¹⁶ *Entsyklopedia ukraïnoznavstva* (Ukrainian Encyclopedia). Published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Munich-New York, 1949, p. 1097.

¹⁷ *National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR*, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

Some 360 enterprises, including 120 specialized units and employing 150,000 people, are engaged in this service.¹⁸

The aggregate length of roads in Ukraine in 1971 totaled 221,300 kms.¹⁹ as compared with 285,138 kms. in Italy, 649,000 kms. in France, 264,360 kms. in West Germany and 98,453 kms. in Sweden.²⁰

Ukraine possesses the following super-highways: Kiev-Moscow; Moscow-Kharkiv-Rostov on the Don; Leningrad-Kiev-Odessa; Zhytomyr-Rivne-Lviv-Peremyshl, and Lviv-Ternopil-Proskuriv.

AIR TRANSPORTATION

Air transportation of Ukraine, under normal conditions, could have a great importance for Europe and Asia, inasmuch as the shortest air route from Western Europe to Southern Asia passes through Ukraine. But because of the iron-curtain type of political conditions, the air routes of Ukraine have had no significant international importance. In 1923 a Ukrainian Society of Air Lines was established; in 1924 it opened a regular air communication connection between Kiev-Kharkiv-Odessa and between Kharkiv-Moscow. In 1928 the first international airline was established, linking Kharkiv-Baku and Teheran, Iran. This line was serviced by planes of Ukrainian construction carrying but a small number of passengers, eight persons at most.

Parallel with the development of civil aviation in Ukraine, a number of airports were constructed, most of which were destroyed during World War II. Restored in late 1945 were the airports in Kiev, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk and Lviv. Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, was connected by airlines with 22 *oblast* centers, comprising a total of 20,360 kms.²¹

In addition, new airports were built in Kharkiv, Lviv, Simferopol, Donetsk, Mykolayiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Vynnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Chernyhiv, Cherkassy and Kiev. Moreover, Kiev has direct flights to Moscow and Leningrad and other centers of the USSR. The Ukrainian capital also has direct air connections with Prague, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade and Vienna. In 1971 the air routes totaled 7,082,000 passenger-kms., and carried 10,000,000 passengers.²² In comparison, Italy had 120,656,000 kms. air routes and a total of 3,641,233,000 passenger-kms.; France, with total air routes at 199,031,000 kms., had 11,716,539,000 passenger-kms.; Ger-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 54.

¹⁹ *National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR*, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

²⁰ *Calendario Atlante De Agostini*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109, 162, 171, 250.

²¹ *National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR*, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

Ukrainian Soviet Economy

²² *Ibid.*, p. 305.

many, with 139,150,100 kms. of air routes, amassed 7,764,601,000 passenger-kms.; Sweden, with 49,049,000 kms. of air routes, ran up 2,183,571,000 passenger-kms.²³

PIPELINE TRANSMISSION

Pipeline transmission in Ukraine developed at the beginning of the XIXth century with the development of the oil industry; later, the drilling of natural gas. It is the cheapest means of transporting oil products and natural gas from the place of their extraction and refinement to the consumers. The total length of pipelines in Ukraine then constituted only 158 kms. The centers of oil drilling in Ukraine are Dolyna-Boryslav-Drohobych, Bytkiv-Nadvirna, Kachanivka-Okhtyrka in the Kharkiv province and Hnidyntsi-Pryluky and Maikop in the Kuban area.

The first gas pipeline of 70 kms., running from Dashava to Lviv, was built in 1940. In 1948 a gas pipeline was installed from Dashava to Kiev and through Bryansk to Moscow (about 1,330 kms. long). The aggregate gas pipeline length was 851 kms. plus 477 kms. of distribution lines bringing natural gas to 27 *oblast* centers and industrial enterprises. The total length of gas pipeline increased to 7,000 kms. in 1964, plus 6,800 kms. of suburban gas pipelines, for a total of 13,800 kms.

CONCLUSION

In summary, much progress in the development of transportation means in Ukraine has been achieved. This, however, only facilitates the exploitation of surface and subsurface treasures of Ukraine by the Russian occupiers. It is significant that the air transport system of Ukraine services first of all officials of the Soviet government and Party functionaries, as well as members of the armed services. The budget provided for the construction of the gas pipeline from Dashava to Moscow, but at the same time a great part of the population of Ukraine cannot use the natural gas extracted in Ukraine because of lack of funds and a policy of "high priorities." The 101 km.-long canal linking the Don and the Volga Rivers, and lying outside the territory of Ukraine, was built with the purpose of exploiting the industries of the Donbas and Kryvy Rih areas.²⁴ The construction of a network of bridges on some rivers has been discussed for years without actual realization. Also, the coasts of the Black and Azov Seas are not properly developed to attract domestic and foreign tourism. In this respect Ukraine is far behind other European countries.

²³ *Calendario Atlante De Agostini*, op. cit., pp. 109, 167, 171, 250.

²⁴ "Transportation in Ukraine," By S. Prociuk, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XIII, p. 68, June 1957, New York, N.Y.

PROF. NICHOLAS CHUBATY—UKRAINIAN HISTORIAN AND SCHOLAR

By WASYL LENCYK

On July 10, 1975, death claimed Prof. Dr. Nicholas D. Chubaty, outstanding Ukrainian historian and scholar, in a hospital in Paramus, N.J., at the age of 85. With his passing we have lost one of the greatest Ukrainian scholars, the last student of Prof. Michael Hrushevsky, one of the most outstanding Ukrainian publicists of our era and a prominent social-political and church leader.

Prof. Chubaty was born on December 11, 1891, into a family of Ukrainian burghers-farmers in the city of Ternopil, Western Ukraine, then under Austro-Hungarian rule. There he attended primary and secondary schools and finished a *gymnasium* in 1909 as an honor student. In the same year he entered a theological seminary in Lviv, from which he was graduated in 1913. During his theological studies, with special permission from Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky, Prof. Chubaty studied history under Prof. Hrushevsky, who then was a professor of history of Ukraine and Eastern Europe at the University of Lviv.

After graduation from the theological seminary, Prof. Chubaty did not choose the priesthood as a vocation, but continued his historical studies at the University of Lviv (1913-1914). During the occupation of Galicia by the Russians in the latter part of 1914, he moved to Vienna, where he continued his study of history at the University of Vienna (1914-1916). Toward the end of 1916—after the Russian troops were thrown back to the east by the Austro-Hungarian armies, Prof. Chubaty returned to Lviv and in August, 1917, won a Ph.D. degree. But while studying history, he also studied law under Prof. Oswald Balzer and other juridical disciplines as well (Roman law, philosophy of law and Polish law).

Thus, Prof. Chubaty also acquired juridical knowledge, and he even contemplated teaching the history of law of the Slavic peoples, and above all the history of Ukrainian law.

This multi-sided education which Prof. Chubaty received made him a scholar of considerable diapason, but at the same time it created

the danger that the future savant would not easily concentrate his efforts in one or another field of specialization.

And that was what happened. Prof. Chubaty, compelled undoubtedly by the circumstances of life, instead of producing work in one particular field, utilized his vast knowledge for scholarly and publicistic pursuits, as well as for his practical cultural-national and community activities. This course of action was also spurred by the alert, questing and dynamic nature of Prof. Chubaty—qualities which stamped him to the last days of his life. All and everything in Ukrainian life interested him, and he was prone to support any cause either by his word or his incisive pen. All his life he was a "fanatic of work," as he characterized himself in a letter to this writer on February 18, 1970. A fanatic of work, indeed, he was all his life.

In his own mind, however, Prof. Chubaty remained a scholar, for even though he wrote lesser works or articles, all these had a scholarly character and were well elaborated and supported with pertinent quotations. The longest period of his scholarly activities and creativeness was devoted to the history of the Church, and in this area he produced most of his work. Likewise, the overwhelming part of his journalistic activity was devoted to church matters.

CHURCH HISTORIAN

Although Prof. Chubaty had attained his doctorate in philosophy and began his university career as a professor of the history of Ukrainian law at the University of Kamianets Podilsky in 1919 during the time of the independent Ukrainian state, and later as a professor of the history of Ukrainian law at the Ukrainian Secret University in Lviv (capital of Western Ukraine) during the Polish domination in 1920-1923, he spent most of his life and devoted most of his work to the history of the Church.

As far back as his university years, Prof. Chubaty wrote a work, *Aspirations Toward Religious Union with Rome in Galician Rus in the First Quarter of the XIIIth Century (Seminarians' Almanac, 1913)*. His second book was, *Metropolitan Ipatius Potius: Apostle of the Church Union: (On the 300th Anniversary of His Death, Lviv, 1914)*. His major work was *Western Ukraine and Rome in the XIIIth Century in Their Aspirations to Church Union (Annals of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Vol. 123, Lviv, 1917)*. Another work, *The Legal Position of the Church in the Kozak State*, dealt with the historical and legal aspects of the Ukrainian Church in the Kozak period of Ukrainian statehood (*Bohoslovia, Vol. 1-2, Lviv, 1925*).

Prof. Chubaty also penned *A History of the Ukrainian Catholic Church*, which appeared in Vol. 3 of the *Ukrainian Encyclopedia* (Lviv, 1934), and which was reprinted in brochure form in 1947 in Germany.

A complete history of the Church was based on Prof. Chubaty's lectures and published by the Theological Seminary under the title, *A History of Union Aspirations in the Ukrainian Church* (Vol. 1-2, Lviv, 1937), which was also reprinted in 1947 in Germany.

A number of minor works and articles on religious themes in the English language appeared in *The Ukrainian Quarterly* ("Russian Church Policy in Ukraine," No. 1, Vol. II, New York, N.Y., 1946), and "The State and Church in Ukraine After 1654," No. 1, Vol. X, New York, N.Y., 1954). Appearing in the English language was also his *New Views Regarding Catholicism and Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe*, which was printed in the *Proceedings* (Vol. 1, New York-Paris, 1951).

One of the greatest works of Prof. Chubaty is his *History of Christianity in Rus-Ukraine* (Vol. 1, pp. 816, published in 1965 by the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome), brought up to 1353. The author envisioned a major work on Christianity in Ukraine in three volumes, but he succeeded in writing only the first part of Volume II, which is now being printed and which ends with the XVIth century.

In the first volume of this work the author provided a full synthesis and analysis of Christianity in Ukraine according to its development in Ukraine, as an organic offspring of Ukrainian spirituality. He maintained that Christianity in Ukraine had its particular character and its own separate individuality and, that it was, as other historians also assert, a "Kievan Christianity." In contrast to some historians' views that Christianity in Ukraine was a replica of Byzantine Christianity, Prof. Chubaty contended that "Kievan Christianity" was a "cross-pollinating between Eastern and Western Christianity on the basis of the pre-Christian culture of Dnieper Rus-Ukraine" (p. 2).

Consequently, his approach is not based on one religious faith (Catholic or Orthodox), but on Christianity in general, as was the case in Ukraine. This particular aspect has drawn the attention of some Ukrainian historians (Stepan Tomashivsky) and Russian historians, like Georgy Fedotov, who in his book, *The Russian Religious Mind—Kievan Christianity* (Harvard University Press, 1946) wrote that Muscovite Christianity, even though it originated in Kiev, was not its continuation, but rather a new and particular pheno-

menon, grown on Muscovite spirituality, different from the southern, Ruthenian-Ukrainian spirituality.

Likewise, *History of Christianity in Rus-Ukraine* was written against the background of the general history of Ukraine, in that it is self-explanatory. Prof. Chubaty wrote that after the fall of the Ukrainian state, "the Christian Church has replaced for the Ukrainian people the former state authority and has become the only institution representing the entire people" (p. 2). We must underscore that his book also took into consideration the developments in the universal Church as well as those that transpired in Byzantium and in Rome. The value of the book lies in that, in contrast to the views of the old Czarist Russian historians and the new Soviet historians, it clearly enhances the separateness of the Ukrainian people from the most ancient times, and not as Moscow had propagated and still propagates, upon the dictation of the Communist Party, a pseudo-theory about one "ancient Russian people" (*drevniy russkiy narod*) in the princely times. This theme was thoroughly analyzed in Prof. Chubaty's separate work, *Princely Rus-Ukraine and the Emergence of the Three Eastern Slavic Nations* (*Proceedings*, Vol. 178, New York-Paris, 1964).

Prof. Chubaty also devoted much of his knowledge and time to the problems of church history in countless articles scattered throughout various journals and newspapers in Ukraine before World War II and thereafter in the United States and Canada.

HISTORIAN OF JURISPRUDENCE

In preparing himself for a career of law historian, Prof. Chubaty wrote his doctoral dissertation at the University of Lviv on *The State-Legal Status of Ukrainian Lands in the Lithuanian State at the End of the XIVth Century* (*Proceedings*, Vols. 134-135, Lviv, 1924), which was very favorably reviewed by another Ukrainian historian, Lev Okinshevyeh (*Ukraine*, 1927).

Another important work in the field of the history of Ukrainian law was a cycle of his lectures, *A Survey of Ukrainian Law: State Law*, which he read at the Ukrainian Secret University in Lviv (*Proceedings*, Vol. 1-2, Lviv, 1921-1922), which was reprinted in 1947 in Munich, Germany. The value of this work resided in that it was the first comprehensive work from the history of Ukrainian law. Significantly, too, even the Soviet historians in their works on historiography cannot dispose of this work with silence as they so often do with other accomplishments of Ukrainian [non-Soviet] scholarships.

For instance, V.P. Shusharin cited Prof. Chubaty's book 13 times in his work, *Current Bourgeois Historiography of Ancient Rus* (Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1964). In a footnote on p. 57 of this work, Prof. Chubaty's book is listed, including the years of its printing and reprinting in Munich; there also is a reference to Prof. Chubaty, stating that he "taught the history of Ukrainian law and the Eastern church in various educational institutions in the city of Lviv. After World War II—in the U.S.A." As could be expected, no mention was made of the fact that Prof. Chubaty taught the history of Ukrainian law at the Ukrainian Secret University in Lviv, and previously at the University of Kamianets Podilsky, and the history of Ukraine at the Theological Academy in Lviv, as this would be tantamount to an official admission that Ukrainians had institutions of higher learning before the Soviet Russian takeover of Ukraine. But the very fact that his book was mentioned in a publication of the Soviet Academy of Sciences indicates that even his ideological adversaries cannot ignore Prof. Chubaty's scholarly value.

To his works on Ukrainian jurisprudence must be added the previously mentioned book, *The Legal Position of the Church in the Kozak State*. Prof. Chubaty also dwelt on juridical themes in the German language, *Literatur der Ukrainischen Rechtsgeschichte in Jahren 1919-1929*, which appeared in *Przewodnik Historyczny-Prawny* (Lviv, 1930, I, II, III).

In 1933, at the International Congress of Historians in Warsaw, Prof. Chubaty read a paper in German, *Gegenstand der Geschichte des Ukrainischen Rechtes*, which was published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in 1933 in Lviv.

He also wrote a *History of the Ukrainian Bar*, which was published in the almanac of the Ukrainian Lawyers' Association (Lviv, 1934).

ALL-AROUND HISTORIAN

Despite the fact that Prof. Chubaty had concentrated on two narrow areas of history, namely, the history of the Ukrainian Church and the history of Ukrainian law, he also studied assiduously other aspects of Ukrainian history, especially the ethnogenesis of the Ukrainian nation. When in 1930 a lively discussion had evolved among Ukrainian scholars in which such prominent scholars as Stepan Smal-Stocky, Myron Korduba, Konstantyn Chekhovych and Vasyl Simovych took part, Prof. Chubaty contributed two basic articles, publish-

ed in *Dilo* (Deed), the oldest Ukrainian daily paper in Western Ukraine.

Already in the United States, Prof. Chubaty returned to the same theme by writing in English, *The Ukrainian and Russian Conceptions of the History of Eastern Europe* (*Proceedings*, Vol. 1, New York-Paris, 1951). In 1953 he expanded the theme in another work on the ethnogenesis of the Ukrainian nation, namely, *Two Conceptions of Ukrainian Nationality in Their Historical Development* (*Proceedings*, Vol. 2, New York-Toronto, 1953). The same subject was also treated in his extensive article, "Kievan Rus in New Soviet and Polish Studies" (*Proceedings*, dedicated to the late Prof. Zenon Kuzela, 1964).

But the most basic and largest work on ethnogenesis is his work, *Princely Rus-Ukraine and the Emergence of the Three Eastern Slavic Nations*, mentioned above. Prof. Chubaty's articles on historical themes appeared in many reviews and newspapers, as well as in the English-language encyclopedias, such as *Slavonic Encyclopedia* (New York, N.Y., 1949) and the *American Catholic Encyclopedia* (Vol. XVI, New York, N.Y.), to which he contributed extensive articles on the history of Ukraine. He also participated in the preparation of the Ukrainian encyclopedias, in both the Ukrainian and English languages. His historical articles also appeared in the *Journal of Central European Affairs* (1944) and his article, "Ukraine Between Poland and Russia," in the *Review of Politics* (1946).

PARTICIPANT IN INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES

Prof. Chubaty was also active in the field of international scholarship by taking part in three International Congresses of Historians. In 1933, as we have mentioned, he took part in such a congress in Warsaw, at which he read a paper on the subject of the history of Eastern Europe. In 1955 he participated in the International Congress of Historians in Rome, at which he took part in the criticism of Soviet historian A.L. Sedorov on the subject of Soviet historiography. His remarks of 3 pages appeared later in the proceedings of the congress. Also, in 1960, Prof. Chubaty took part in the XIth International Congress of Historians in Stockholm, where he read a paper, "Kievan Rus and the Emergence of Three Slavic Nations." His solid argumentation against the Soviet Russian "theory" of the origin of the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples as stemming from a "common root," forced the members of the Soviet delegation to respect the Ukrainian scholar, and his assertion to the effect that Soviet scholars must act under the orders of the Communist Party,

went unchallenged by these scholars, among them Boris A. Ribakov and M.M. Tikhomirov.

The theme on the origin of the emergence of the three Eastern Slavic peoples was subsequently compressed into a book in Ukrainian; Prof. Chubaty was also preparing the English edition of this book.

In addition to his participation in the international congresses of historians, Prof. Chubaty also took part in the international congresses of "Pax Romana," an organization of Catholic intellectuals, at which he endeavored to pave the way for the Ukrainian truth, sometimes even against the opposition of the Poles, as so happened at the "Pax Romana" Congress in 1937 in Paris, when they opposed the election of a Ukrainian scholar to the international board of this Catholic organization. But, in spite of the opposition, he was elected to the "Pax Romana" international board at that particular congress.

In the summer of 1939, Prof. Chubaty came for the "Pax Romana" Congress in the United States, and from this time on he remained in this country, as the outbreak of World War II prevented his return to Ukraine. Here, too, he contributed much towards making the cause of Ukraine known among prominent Catholic leaders of various nations of the world.

As a politically-minded scholar and publicist, Prof. Chubaty tried to establish contact with outstanding scholars of other nations in order to enlist their support for Ukrainian scholarship and the Ukrainian cause at large. It was at these congresses that he made the acquaintance of Prof. Heinrich S. Schmidt of Vienna and Prof. Oscar Halecki, prominent Polish historian, with whom he renewed relations when they both found themselves in America. In the United States Prof. Chubaty met Prof. George Vernadsky of Yale University, the son of Prof. Volodymyr Vernadsky, the first president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, founded during the rule of *Hetman* Paul Skoropadsky in 1918 in Kiev, with whom he maintained close relations through the years. It was through Prof. Vernadsky, whom Prof. Chubaty characterized as "a very noble man," that Prof. Chubaty met Prof. Ralph E. Turner, editor of a *History of Mankind*. He also maintained close contact with Prof. Waldemar Gurian of Notre Dame University, Prof. Frederick Barghoorn of Yale University and Prof. Philip Moseley of Columbia University; through the last named Prof. Chubaty tried to enlist help from American academic institutions for Ukrainian scholars who came to the United States after World War II.

POLITICAL LEADER AND PUBLICIST

In his personal diary which is left in his archive, Prof. Chubaty wrote about himself:

"In my intellectual work I was, by my nature, a scholarly researcher, with a tendency to always reach a synthetic conclusion. Therefore, despite my vocation of historian-researcher, I also believed it was my duty to place my scientific knowledge to practical use. At the turning points of national life I always was an active citizen and readily gave my talents and my acquired knowledge for the service of the country. In such moments from a scholar I became a journalist, and, therefore, alongside my scholarly work, I possess a great heritage of journalistic work..."

It is from this standpoint that we have to view Prof. Chubaty's participation in the November 1, 1918, events in Western Ukraine, when the Western Ukrainian National Republic was established upon the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He served in the State Secretariat for Secretary Agenor Artymovych. In January, 1919, he was a member of the State Delegation of the Western Ukrainian National Republic to the Ukrainian Labor Congress in Kiev, at which the Act of Union between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed on January 22, 1919 in Kiev. In that same year he contributed articles to the daily newspaper *Nova Rada* (New Council) and founded a weekly, *Pravda* (Truth).

After 1920, when most Ukrainian newspapers in Western Ukraine had been abolished by the Polish government, Prof. Chubaty turned to pedagogical and educational work. He was a professor at the Ukrainian Secret University and the Theological Seminary, and later at the Theological Academy in Lviv; he was director of the teachers' seminary of the Basilian Sisters and professor at the State Male Teachers' Seminary, also in Lviv. At that time he wrote little, except for occasional scholarly articles which appeared in *Bohoslovnia* (Theology), *Dzvony* (The Bells), *Dilo* and *Meta* (Aim).

ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

But it was in the United States where Prof. Chubaty developed fully his political and journalistic activities which he began upon his arrival in this country in 1939 and continued to the very last day of his life.

First, he taught at St. Basil's College in Stamford, Conn., but later on he turned to journalism, and by his own account between

1939 and 1953 he wrote 1000 articles for the Ukrainian daily paper *Svoboda* alone, in addition to contributing to such Ukrainian Catholic newspapers as the daily *America* and the weekly *The Way*, both appearing in Philadelphia, Pa.

Prof. Chubaty entered the political field of the Ukrainian community in America during World War II, when he was one of the Ukrainian American leaders who re-activated the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) in 1944. The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America had been founded in May, 1940, in Washington, D.C., as a representative organization of American citizens of Ukrainian origin, to coordinate their activities and defend the enslaved Ukrainian people. But with the wartime U.S.-Soviet "friendship and alliance," it had become a target of ruthless and unabashed attacks by Communist and pro-Communist individuals and organizations, and with thousands of its younger members being drafted into the U.S. armed services, the UCCA was de-activated until 1944.

In 1944 Prof. Chubaty was the originator, founder and first editor of this periodical, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America for the purpose of disseminating truth, information and knowledge about Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. He remained the editor until the summer of 1957, in that time contributing some 40 articles, and he also succeeded in enlisting a number of younger journalists and scholars, such as the late Stephen Shumeyko, Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, now President of the UCCA and chairman of its Committee on Publications, and Prof. Constantine Andrusyshen of Canada; from the American side he won the cooperation of such noted Americans as the late Prof. Clarence Augustus Manning of Columbia University and the late William Henry Chamberlin, outstanding author and journalist.

The Ukrainian Quarterly has been well received in the American academic and journalistic worlds, as reflected in the numerous letters received from American scholars, journalists, senators, congressmen, university professors and others, preserved in Prof. Chubaty's archive.

Even after his retirement from the editorship of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Prof. Chubaty continued his journalistic work by writing articles for various Ukrainian journals in the United States and Canada. He especially penned a number of articles dealing with the Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate. All in all, he wrote over 2,000 articles, besides his major works.

Another important achievement of Prof. Chubaty was the re-establishment of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the United

States, of which he became its first president in the early 1950's. Under his presidency the Society purchased a building for its use in New York City.

The last years of his life Prof. Chubaty devoted to writing his history of Christianity in Ukraine, which unfortunately he could not complete.

He also planned to write his memoirs and record his many experiences of his rich and prolific life, but this project, too, was not to be realized.

The Ukrainian community in America and the Ukrainian academic world, in particular, had fully recognized and appreciated his lifelong contributions to Ukrainian scholarship and to the cause of Ukrainian freedom. In 1970 the Shevchenko Scientific Society marked Prof. Chubaty's 80th birthday anniversary and the 55th anniversary of his scholarly and journalistic activities with an academic conference, held in New York City. Four Ukrainian scholars, namely, Dr. Matthew Stachiw, Prof. Stephan M. Horak, Prof. Wasyl Lencyk and Dr. Jaroslaw Padoch, delivered special papers, dealing with all aspects of his scholarly and journalistic pursuits.

Sending greetings to Prof. Chubaty on this occasion were the Ukrainian hierarchs, including His Eminence Joseph Cardinal Slipyj, Archbishop-Major of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, prominent scholars and Ukrainian scientific and social-political organizations. He was also awarded a "Medal of Merit for Ukrainian Scholarship."

In December, 1974, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, on the occasion of the observance of the 30th anniversary of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, presented Prof. Chubaty with the "Shevchenko Freedom Award" in recognition of his service and work for Ukraine.

Prof. Chubaty was listed in several American directories of prominent persons, such as *Who Knows and What* (1954), *Who's Who in the East* (1957) and the *Directory of American Scholars* (1957, 1963 and 1969).

He left a great amount of correspondence with almost all prominent Ukrainian church and political and scientific leaders which may throw much light on the era in which Prof. Chubaty lived and worked and which may be useful for a preparation of a full biography.

BOOK REVIEWS

ARCHIPELAG GULAG 1918-1956 (*The GULAG Archipelago 1918-1956*). By Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Paris: YMCA Press, 1973-1974. Vol. I, 606 pp. Vol. II, 657 pp. (Russian).

In December of 1973 the first volume of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The GULAG Archipelago* was published in Paris. In the introduction, the author categorically states that there are no fictional characters or events. People and places are identified by their true names. It is not surprising, therefore, that Solzhenitsyn should have dedicated this work to all those who died in Gulag's concentration camps without ever having had the opportunity to tell about the horror they experienced in the Gulag inferno.

Relentlessly, page after page, Solzhenitsyn's book presents the reader with a meticulously documented account of people who were systematically imprisoned and tortured, most eventually vanishing without a trace in the eerie world of countless Siberian concentration camps.

In both volumes, Solzhenitsyn painstakingly deals with events in the period 1918 to 1956. The author describes not only how the population of the USSR was terrorized under Stalin's regime but, even more importantly, how this terrorism sprang up and flourished from the very beginning of the October Revolution.

The concentration camps were (and still are today) horrible institutions of slavery founded by the father of the October Revolution—Vladimir Lenin. This historical fact is of great significance, for most of the people in the USSR and, particularly, in the free world labor under the gross misconception that Stalin started and was responsible for the execution of millions of innocent people and the sending of others to concentration camps under the supervision of GHK-GPU-NKVD-KGB functionaries, recruited mainly from among the criminal elements of Soviet society (Vol. I, pp. 39-49).

But it all began in November of 1917 when mass arrests, initiated by the Bolshevik regime, caught up Cadets, land-owner families, Mensheviks, priests, writes, scholars, actors, producers, students, peasants and workers. Men and women from all walks of life were imprisoned, exiled and executed long before Stalin climbed on top. In fact, as early as 1904 Lenin was creating a *political machine* that would perpetuate a personal dictatorship of the Romanovs. The *organization* of the party, according to Lenin's politico-organizational philosophy, would take the place of the party itself. The *Central Committee*, on the other hand, would take the place of the organization; and finally, the *dictator* himself would take the place of the Central Committee.

Stalin was neither thinker nor writer nor orator. In the fateful year of 1917, "at the time when all the Bolshevik leaders were addressing massive gatherings, Stalin proved lacking in the power to stir people." He emerged from the civil war unknown to the masses. His spectacular rise to power "began only after it had become possible to harness masses and political elements with the aid of

Lenin's machine." It was not *he* who created the machine but the machine that created him. Stalin was not the founder of the system but merely its perfecter. He expanded it, and at the same time continuously exploited this apparatus to manipulate and control events for personal and political gain. Thus the Stalinist period is one of increased pervasiveness. It is a time of massive political purges. And apart from sheer numbers, the terrorism that spread swiftly throughout the entire Soviet Union attacked the notion of individual freedom and the national aspirations of the individual Republics.

A formidable task that Stalin set for himself. In the 1930's, Solzhenitsyn writes, hundreds of thousands of people had to be tried and convicted for attempts to exercise the constitutional rights of any national republic to be separated from the Soviet Union—however these rights were being viewed by the Kremlin. Among those convicted for "treason" were members of the SVU (*Soyuz Vyzvolennyya Ukrainy*) (Association for the Liberation of Ukraine). Later, other nationalists, such as Estonians, Latvians, Turkmen and Lithuanians, were targeted (Vol. I, p. 73).

The Soviet secret police, under the command of F. Dzerzhinsky, H.G. Yagoda, N.I. Yezhov and L. Beria, did well. On the basis of statistics compiled by Professor Kurganov, Solzhenitsyn points out that sixty-six-million citizens were executed by the Soviet secret police from the time of the October Revolution up to 1959. The techniques of mass murder improved steadily. For example, the secret police left political prisoners in the woods for non-fulfillment of a plan and, as a result, one hundred-fifty people were frozen to death in Karelia in December, 1928 (Vol. II, p. 54). Another example: on the Kem-Ustinsk highway not far from the town of Kutuy in February, 1929, a company of prisoners (about a hundred men) was forced to move into a bonfire in which they burned to death. Another: during the paving of a highway, the KGB functionary Gashidze sent political prisoners up on a hill where dynamite had been set up and then watched through binoculars as the exploding dynamite blew the prisoners apart (Vol. II, p. 54). (The question arises—why weren't they convicted along with the German Nazis in Nuremberg?)

In accordance with Paragraph 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code of 1935, children are criminally responsible for their crimes from the age of twelve years. As a result, the bitter fate of the Soviet concentration camps have also been visited on children. Solzhenitsyn describes, for instance, how children were playing in a collective farm club. While wrestling they knocked over some slogan billboards with their shoulders. Two older boys were sentenced under Paragraph 58 of the 1935 decree (Solzhenitsyn does not indicate the length nor the place of imprisonment). In another instance, a sixteen-year-old Chuvash pupil made a mistake in his not native Russian language while writing a slogan on a board. In accordance with Paragraph 58, he was sentenced to five years in prison (Vol. II, p. 228).

In Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*, the reader learns about the horrible murder of political prisoners in Siberian concentration camps in 1937 under the direction of Stalin's associate Kashketin (the same Kashketin who executed Ukrainian scholars, artists and writers—L. Kurbas, K. Maksymovych, M. Kulish, M. Irchan, H. Epik, M. Zerov, O. Shumsky, and many others). The methods of liquidation of political prisoners used by the KGB authorities were the same as those of the Nazi Gestapo. For example, guards took a group of prisoners into the tundra where no people lived. Slowly, the guards fell behind as if tired. Unexpectedly, they fired upon the prisoners' backs with machine guns. The

wounded were finished off with rifle butts. Pits were prepared nearby in which the corpses of the murdered prisoners were thrown (Vol. II, pp. 381-383). Interestingly enough, however, the murderers from the KGB detachment themselves were executed because Stalin preferred not to have witnesses. Kashketin himself was shot in Lefortovo in 1939. At Adak, a concentration camp on the Pechora River, the guards took the prisoners one night beyond the zone where the KGB special building was located. The prisoners were taken inside one by one; the KGB knocked them down, put rags in their mouths, tied their hands, loaded them onto a wagon and then hauled them to the camp cemetery. At the cemetery, the victims were thrown into large pits and buried alive (Vol. II, p. 383). Such is "the people's power" in the civilized twentieth century.

In order to treat the political prisoners even more cruelly, the administration of GULAG handed them over to criminals as their personal slaves. Thieves and bandits enjoyed absolute power over the political prisoners—power which they have never had in any country in history.

The author-humanist has exposed the real face of the Soviet leaders and, in addition, has severely condemned the failure to realize the motivations of the Kremlin leadership and the political shortsightedness of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. These two most powerful leaders of the Western world allowed Moscow to occupy Eastern Europe after World War II—a time when "America already had the atom bomb" and was in a position to rid the world not only of Hitlerism but of Stalinism as well. As a result, the door was opened for Stalin to move into Asia in the knowledge that there would be no opposition from the United States and Great Britain. Stalin seized Manchuria from Japan and actively supported Mao-Tse-tung in Red China and Kim-ir Sen in North Korea.

Solzhenitsyn strongly believes that the time is not far off when the Soviet Union, the prison of nations, will collapse and the liberated nationalities will try their criminal tyrants at the inevitable world-wide People's Court of Justice for the tears, torture and the blood of millions spilled in the Soviet camps of death.

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STEPHEN S. CHORNEY

KISSINGER ON THE COUCH, By Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, (Arlington House, 1975) 846 pp. incl. index and glossary.

THE KISSINGER EXPERIENCE—AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: By Gil Carl Alroy, (Horizon, 1957), 189 pp. incl. index.

The authors have an excellent reputation for their previous writings in the field of national security policy. Both have warned about the growing weakness of the United States in its strategic relationship with the USSR. In this book, they go over some of this ground, updating their analysis of the SALT agreements. It is one of the finest books which provides basic information for the layman about nuclear weaponry and defense strategy.

There is no more incisive critique of the detente policy and its architects. And since the book was written Congressional neglect of Southeast Asia has led to the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, with Laos not far behind. Solzhenitsyn

and other victims of the Soviet system have eloquently expressed themselves about the impact of detente on freedom everywhere.

Schlaflly and Ward can find no redeeming features in Henry Kissinger, his works and pomps. They review his entire career, beginning with Germany, and how and why he gained fame. Near the end of the book they state that the "final and fatal flaw in the leadership qualities of Henry Kissinger" is "an obsessive, pervasive fear of nuclear war." If this is true, it has been a characteristic of major U.S. policy makers for years. The reason that we did not help the Hungarian Freedom Fighters was fear of a confrontation with the USSR. The same is true in the Middle East, East Asia and our policies in Cuba in 1961 and 1962, and our actions in the Congo between 1960 and 1963.

Constitutionally, of course, the President must shoulder the blame for policy failures in the "Cold War" and recent presidents from Truman to Ford must share this blame. The roles played by their Secretaries of State has not always been clear, although there is no doubt that Secretary Kissinger was the most influential of them all. The ironic thing about it is that in several of his pre-Washington, D.C. books he warned about the perils of "peaceful coexistence" and detente.

That we have suffered foreign policy setbacks cannot be refuted. To my mind, southeast Asia is just as serious as the SALT concessions. There is no doubt that Secretary Kissinger is culpable to a large degree, and it also seems clear that like several famous men in the limelight, Kissinger suffers delusions of grandeur. But I cannot believe that he *wants* us to be defeated, that he *wants* us to lose. I was appalled by his arm twisting of President Thieu (although Nixon was perhaps even worse) leading to the disastrous January 1973 agreement on Vietnam. Yet I am convinced that Kissinger and Nixon both thought it was the best agreement they could get which would result in the return of our POW's. I am also convinced that at the time, they believed that the United States could make good the promise of intervention made in Nixon's letters to Thieu. There can be no question that from January to the debacle of April, both Ford and Kissinger pleaded with Congress to take action. Neither wanted South Vietnam to fall, as did some members of Congress.

The danger now is that the Administration will apply the same pressures against Israel to "take a chance on peace." And U.S. Administrations since Truman have been notorious in applying more pressure against weak allies than strong enemies. In this respect Kissinger is no different than his predecessors.

Thus the problem with this book, if there is one, is that the authors may confuse bad judgment under an adverse political climate with what they indicate is close to treason.

I hold no brief for Kissinger and have criticized him ever since he came to Washington in 1968 to serve Nixon. But I do not believe he is the incarnation of evil, nor do I think that he wants Brezhnev and Company to move into the White House.

The authors several times quote Melvin Laird in support of their theses, yet Laird became more dovish on the Vietnam issue, among others. They also quote Strausz Hupé and Kintner, among others (two of my favorite people) against Kissinger and the Council on Foreign Relations, yet both men are members.

In short, the authors have done an admirable job in telling us *what* has gone wrong. I am less certain as to their explanations of *why*.

Author AlRoy has worked in the Middle East for ten years, of which four were with the State Department. He is Professor of Political Science at Hunter College. His thesis is that Kissinger has sold out to the Arab cause, and that the policy of appeasing the Arabs has failed and will continue to fail.

AlRoy refers to "the rigid adherence to bankrupt policy in the Middle East" which derives from an "ideological outlook in the State Department that has more to do with the Protestant missionary experience than the reality of that part of the world." Having failed to make many conversions, the "missionaries" stayed to "minister to Arab nationalism." Thus Arabists in the State Department regard "as some brand of liberal Protestantism one of the most politically aggressive civilizations in history."

Kissinger's "firm anti-Zionism" goes back "at least to his Harvard student days." State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs "is traditionally concerned with Soviet advances in that part of the world to the point of obsession" and takes the view that "a vibrant Arab nationalism is the best shield against Soviet penetration."

The author believes that Kissinger is promoting a "step by step" approach first advocated by Harvard law professor Roger Fisher in his book *Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs, A Working Approach to Peace* (1972). Fisher is pro-Arab and an anti-anti-Communist (my characterization, not AlRoy's). The rationale for this approach is that if you go to the Israelis and tell them to give up the occupied territories all at one whack, they will protest, "If the pill is too large to swallow, lots of little pills will go down well." Kissinger's idea of the final map "pretty much matched the pre-June War map."

AlRoy claims that our policy of placating the Arabs at the expense of Israel is a mistake and cannot succeed. Vying with the Russians for Arab favor is "like playing with loaded dice" in which you are bound to lose: "Whatever we, the United States, might offer the Arabs at Israel's expense, the Russians could always go one better. They could invariably outbid the United States because they have neither the domestic political nor the moral constraints that America has."

The author wants the State Department to build a Mid-East policy based on friendship with non-Arab states: Israel, Iran and Ethiopia. But since he wrote the book there has been revolution in Ethiopia and Iran has gone along with the Arab states on the oil embargo. He does suggest that if it comes to the U.S. and Israel standing alone, in and out of the UN (as far as the Mid-East is concerned) there is nothing the Arabs or their friends can do about it.

AlRoy believes that appeasement in the Middle East can have repercussions elsewhere: "It is manifested in potentially disastrous economic conditions in the Western countries that might easily lead to political chaos; in heightened disunity and distrust among Western wealth; in growing elation and solidarity among countries hostile to the West; in America's loss of superiority and perhaps even of parity relative to the Soviet Union in conventional arms and nuclear capacity; in the conquest of the UN and other international organizations by anti-Western coalitions; in the West's impotence before ruthless warfare through rises in the price of petroleum... in the steady erosion of the Western strategic posture in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and elsewhere."

This is quite a list. He might have added East Asia. Although somewhat strident, AlRoy makes many good points. The Soviet involvement in the Middle East is little different from elsewhere, and this involvement forces us to look at the area differently than before 1956 (the first year of major Soviet penetration).

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ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE UNDERGROUND: A Study of the RSDRP in the Ukraine, 1907-1914. By Ralph Carter Elwood. Publications on Social History, issued by the International Institut voor Sociale Geschiedenis Amsterdam, No. VIII. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., 1974, pp. 304. 67.60 Dfl.

First of all, this reviewer would like to express his satisfaction with this study, the outgrowth of Prof. R.C. Elwood's doctoral dissertation under the supervision of the late Henry L. Roberts of Columbia University, one of the most brilliant East European scholars this country has produced. And it should be added that his former students are emerging as most befitting monuments to their teacher; Elwood, indeed, is one of them. An associate professor of Russian History at Carleton University and associate editor of the well known journal, *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Mr. Elwood is also Editor of volume one of the series *Resolutions and Decisions of the CPU 1898-1964*.

This work is not a study of Ukrainian political thought of the three decades preceding World War I, contrary to its subtitle and the numerous references to Ukrainian political parties, their programs, formation, and actions. While contributing well to these aspects of Ukrainian political history, Dr. Elwood centers his attention on the activities of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDRP) in Ukraine, specifically, to the part of the Ukrainian lands which fell under Russian occupation following the partition of Poland (1772-1795). This study, however, is the best detailed work, available in any language, illuminating and analyzing all aspects of RSDRP activities in the largest non-Russian land of the former Czarist Empire—Ukraine. It "reexamines the underground through an analysis of its composition, organization and activities between the unsuccessful revolution of 1905-1907 and unsuccessful war of 1914-1917." Furthermore, Ukraine has offered the author an interesting testing ground in considering Ukrainian history, traditions, its rapid industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century, together with the emerging native Ukrainian nationalism, all of which had to be dealt with not only by the Czarist regime but also by Lenin, the factions of the RSDRP, and all other Russian-based socialist movements and parties.

The author's perception of the period and events as related to the title comes across clearly in his own observation: "Adding particular interest to a study of the RSDRP in the Ukraine is the fact that the Bolsheviks lost the Ukrainian revolution of 1917. Some of the reasons for this defeat can be found in the pre-war period—both in the organization and composition of the party and also in Lenin's nationality and agrarian policies formulated before he came to power" (p. ix).

To prove this well known historical fact Elwood devotes 276 pages, plus a sixteen-page-long bibliography, a prolonged research in several American and European libraries and archives, and a thorough examination of available Soviet material. Regrettably, from the plentiful Ukrainian national literature dealing with the modern history of Ukraine and its political thought in particular, only a few titles (J. Majstrenko's *Borot'bism*) have been utilized. Such essential

authors as D. Dontsov, whom Lenin debated on several occasions, Ivan Franko, an intellectual giant and promoter of socialism, M. Pavlyk, who seems to be the first Ukrainian Marxist, I. Mazepa, Iu. Lypa, B. Martos, M. Mikhnovs'kyl, and many others, are not even mentioned. Of the periodicals one misses *Ukrainskaya zhizn*, *Zapysky N.T. Sh.*, *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, *Ukrain'skyi istoryk*, *Ukrainian Quarterly* and many more that contain a wealth of material totally unknown to English-speaking readers. This reviewer believes that Elwood's negligence does not represent a case of discrimination and politically motivated selectiveness as practiced by some Western East European experts with the naive reference to "subjectivity" of such sources, a tactic which in fact serves them as a convenient cover for their own bias. The author also does not mention the fact that the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party was founded in 1897 (one year earlier than RSDRP) by such renowned figures as Lesia Ukrainka, Ivan Steshenko and Mykhailo Kotsiubyn's'kyi. A sketchy reference to the RUP activities unnecessarily diminishes the value of the study; hopefully, a second edition or a second volume to this study would not only be desired but also appreciated by many.

RSDRP, according to Elwood, was essentially the party of Russian and Jewish minorities in Ukraine; Ukrainians in the membership as well as in the leadership represented only a small minority—some 7 per cent. Considering its program, leadership and composition, the party had little chance to become popular among the Ukrainian peasantry or the emerging nationally conscious middle class.

Employing laboratory-style inquiries the author reviews the following topics: (1) The origin of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine; (2) The period of reaction, 1907-1911; (3) Weaknesses and correctives in the underground party; (4) The organizational structure of the underground party; (5) Social democratic activity in the underground; (6) Social democratic activity in legal organizations; (7) On the eve, 1912-1914; (8) Epilogue: war and revolution.

Each of the chapters contains a mass of information, bolstered by statistical data, on the social, economic, national, and political aspects of the development in Ukraine and within the RSDRP specifically. What emerges from all the details and critical analysis is summarized in the concluding paragraphs: "For the Bolsheviks as well as for future historians, the events of 1917 showed the shortcomings of pre-revolutionary Social Democratic tactics in the Ukraine. Their program had appealed neither to the discontented Ukrainian nationalists nor the land-hungry Ukrainian peasants." This reviewer, as much as such experts as Arthur Adams, Jurij Borys, John Reshetar, and Robert Sullivan, agrees wholeheartedly with the findings without being disturbed by Soviet histories, especially those written since the late 1930s when the CPSU assumed complete control over Soviet historian treating of the RSDRP/CPSU.

And a final note: Why should Ukrainian names such as "Khmelnitski Bohdan" be Russified when Western scholars know better and are aware of the fact that by so doing they needlessly offend the Ukrainian people? Unfitting for a fine scholarly work as this study.

DETENTE: PROMISES AND PITFALLS, By Gerald L. Steibel. Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 89.

The reviewer of this compact highly readable study had the pleasure of sharing with the author the platform of a conference dealing with detente at Cleveland's John Carroll University in June, 1974. The author is a very thoughtful and studious analyst and showed much competence in his treatment of the subject then. He is a director of foreign affairs research at the Research Institute of America and formerly was evaluation director for the Free Europe Committee.

Introducing the work is a foreword by Irving Kristol on "The Politics of Appeasement." Kristol's views generally are challenging and refreshing, but one can take serious issue with him on the matter of Congress' supposed ineffectiveness in foreign affairs and, specifically, its denial of further arms aid to South Vietnam. If it weren't for Congress, we'd be hell-bent on easy trade with the USSR, and if it weren't for Kissinger's accord with Hanoi in 1973, our moral obligation to the South Vietnamese would have had brighter prospects of fulfillment. Despite the introducer's somewhat justified lamentations about Congress pecking away at the military budget, it is interesting to observe Congress as a whole coming through in support of the Pentagon's substantial demands. In short, incisive and solid as the foreword may be on the politics of appeasement, it does contain a number of exaggerations.

With this appropriate foreword, the book commences with an historical account of the many detentes we've entered with Moscow since the 20's. It then develops the broad field of arms, particularly in the so-called nuclear age since World War II. The third chapter on "Crisis Management" covers a number of crisis situations, especially in the Middle East. This is followed by an analysis of US-USSR trade and its host of problems. Chapter five on "Soviet Mellowing" deals with a variety of positions for change in the Soviet Union and the realities of the empire-state. The author then goes on to discuss what he calls the fallout on the allies, relating to detente, Vietnam, Germany and other subjects. And the final chapter, quite appropriately, dwells on the important topics of ideology and negotiation. The book is documented throughout and discloses much valuable information and insights. It also contains many fine distinctions of concept and thought bearing on the prime subject. However, even a scan of the chapters shows that its field of analysis remains limited—e.g., the whole area of captive nations in relation to detente is not even alluded to—and the broad conceptual framework of the very two prime parties to detente is somewhat shoddy, e.g., the USSR for the author is merely "Russia." With such shortcomings and more, real possibilities, alternatives for a different course of detente, and real pressures of change are denied to the reader.

As he did in the Cleveland conference, the author measures the pulse of detente historically and in terms of five or six cycles of detente with Moscow since 1920. He states and leans toward the view that "Detente, the record reveals, is an idea whose time has come again and again, but never to stay" (p. 4). The construction, though accurate and useful in itself, gives further indication of the author's weakness as to the history and composition of the USSR. For instance he states that detente "goes back almost the entire course of the Soviet Union's history," implying that this commenced in 1917 (p. 4). There wasn't any Soviet Union when the first detente emerged.

However, the construction is as follows: (1) 1920, the *Lenin detente*, with Lenin's regime in trouble, the Chase Bank in New York offered a \$20 million credit, our government assisted with \$66.3 million, in addition to foodstuffs for \$10 million in gold, and our firms, including the Ford Motor Company, sent over 600 engineers and technicians to help build power stations, railroads, dams, etc.; (2) 1935, *Stalin's detente*, with Hitler threatening, again we supported the regime via trade, propaganda, etc.; (3) 1941, the *Devil's detente*, the result of Hitler combatting Soviet Russian imperialism with his own, and the West saved the Moscow empire; (4) 1954, *Khrushchev's detente*, with Moscow in trouble in the post-Stalin period, as the writer rightly asserts, for "the first time, detente had become of necessity the framework for negotiation on something like a mutuality of power"; and (5) 1968, *Brezhnev's detente*, with growing economic problems magnified by a steady arms build-up, this period is divided into two phases, the first concentrating on arms control, the second from 1972 broadening negotiations in a variety of fields.

The conclusions the author draws from his historical analysis are both realistic and pragmatic. First, detente is an up-and-down affair, not a straightline evolution. Second, it is an institutionalization of conflict, not a replacement for it. And thirdly, it has become a negotiating process. As he correctly puts it, "Detente, obviously, is unfinished business" (p. 13). The fundamental question in all of this is the quid pro quo calculus. In mid-1975 there is widespread doubt in the U.S. about the benefits we have been deriving from this process, not to mention concern for its impact on the captive nations, not only in Central Europe but also in the Soviet Union itself. This concern has been ever-present, but the author omits it completely.

On the issue of arms control, the work is essentially satisfactory. Our concessions on the ABM's are well treated, with the Hudson Institute's criticism on effective reinforcement of defenses to make reliance on offensive weapons obsolete fairly elaborated. The nuclear test ban treaty is also viewed in terms of pros and cons, with the non-verification of the threshold limit of 150 kilotons fairly stressed. Ample statistics, showing our slide in nuclear strength relative to Moscow's, are clearly provided. The author cites the disquiet in popular American opinion over the SALT I accords and the Vladivostok agreement, which in the polls has been greater since 1974. And the MBFR, the mutual and balanced forces reduction, is informatively handled, though its predication of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is overlooked, an important point that showed popular critical strength in mid-1975.

In the area of trade with the USSR, the work is found wanting. Far more homework could have been undertaken by the author, and the material is all there in print from the early Fulbright hearings in 1964-65 through the Senate Finance hearings. It is evident that he has no grasp of the poltrade concept as advanced by the reviewer back in 1965. The abuse of the concept by Kissinger to condition Moscow's behavior in trouble spots of the Free World is non-existent in the work. And the author's reliance largely on newspaper accounts of the emigration issue—as though it were only a matter of Jewish emigration—indicates further the superficiality of his examination and, as stressed above, the shortcoming of his overall conceptual framework on the Soviet Union, which he regards as a "nation" (p. 42). His conclusion that "Neither side has an altogether clear conception of what the relation of trade to detente ought to be" (p. 45) cannot but be

regarded as fatuous. For Moscow trade is a strategic sieve, for us it could be poltrade as evidenced in pallid form by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

The final chapter on ideology and negotiation is a most necessary one, and the author performs a creditable job, especially in distinguishing between detente and Moscow's "peaceful coexistence." The chapter could have been enormously strengthened if topics such as Soviet Russian imperialism, non-Russian nationalism, economic imperialism and so forth were included. After analyzing this and similar works the reviewer is convinced more than ever that educational work and effort on the non-Russian nations in the USSR are the determining items for the immediate future and in the decline of present detente.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN: CRITICAL ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS. Edited by John B. Dunlop, Richard Haugh and Alexis Klimoff. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975, pp. 666.

The present volume is the second edition of a book which was first published in 1973 almost simultaneously with the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The GULAG Archipelago 1918-1956*. This second edition has been substantially enlarged to take Solzhenitsyn's latest work into account.

The contents of the book include the prefaces to the first and second editions and two parts devoted to critical essays, ranging from brief reviews to detailed scholarly studies that explore the literary dimensions of Solzhenitsyn's work as well as his moral and political significance. The other sections of the book encompass "Documentary Materials," including statements by Solzhenitsyn, his autobiography, his letters to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers and Patriarch Pimen and his "Nobel Lecture" as well. They also contain "Bibliographical Surveys," a "Select Solzhenitsyn Bibliography" and "Notes on Contributors and Editors."

A total of thirty-three prominent literary and political figures from the United States and other countries have submitted critical essays on Solzhenitsyn as a writer and as a man. Among them are such luminaries as Heinrich Böll, Lidia Chukovskaia, Milovan Djilas, Roman Jakobson, George F. Kennan, Mary McCarthy, Roy Medvedev, Czeslaw Milosz and Gleb Struve.

Included in the essays are views on such themes as Solzhenitsyn's nationalism, his women, his vision of art and his views on the "new realism," as well as the peculiarities of his language.

Solzhenitsyn's nationalism is expressed by a number of his heroes in such books as *August 1914*. In her essay on "Solzhenitsyn's Nationalism," Rosette C. Lamont writes:

Nationalism, for this Russian novelist, is not an idea, an intellectual fabrication, but an affective reaction, deeply rooted in the subconscious. It has something to do with the soil, the ever-changing scenery—the high mountains of the Caucasus, the wooded, gently hilly country around Voronezh, "the spot where real Russia starts"; it has everything to do with the people, particularly country folk, and their profound faith in God and in their saints; it is connected to the full-bodied languages spoken in Georgia,

Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the dialects of the various sections of this immense land. Divorced from political ideologies, from transient rule of inept czars or ruthless bureaucratic dictators, Solzhenitsyn's nationalism is as natural as a tree, deeply rooted in the subsoil of a culture and rising toward the heavens in a desire to transcend the immediate situation...

A deeply religious man, Solzhenitsyn criticized the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church in his letter to Patriarch Pimen on the occasion of the latter's appeal to Russian emigres during Lent of 1972. The blade of his attack was directed against the subservience of the Moscow Patriarchate to the atheistic regime. The novelist pointed out that the Russian Church has "its agitated opinion on every injustice in far-away Asia and Africa, but on misfortunes at home—never a word... Has the Church upheld and defended anything whatever [in the USSR] ? The entire governance of the Church, the appointment of priests and bishops (even of disreputable ones, so that the Church might the more easily be mocked and destroyed) is conducted as secretly as before by the Council for Religious Affairs. A Church ruled dictatorially by atheists—this is a spectacle unseen in two thousand years..."

George F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, in assessing Solzhenitsyn's works states rightly that the most valuable contribution Westerners can make by way of reaction to Solzhenitsyn's message is to recognize its direct relevance to themselves, their problems and their behavior.

Another internationally-famed critic, Milovan Djilas, says that what is new in *The GULAG Archipelago* "is its authenticity and the breath of death and irrationality that permeates it." He points out that "the silence about Soviet labor camps reveals Russia's weakness and her shame. Both will last as long as the truth is not fully revealed and responsibility for the crimes established." He queries: "Would the Germans be respected and even liked as a nation today, if they had not publicly revealed the crimes of their Nazi past, if they had not willingly nailed themselves to the pillar of shame. Reasonable and honest persons cannot but be impressed by their act..."

Other critical essays by equally competent and qualified writers are important and persuasive, but they are too numerous to be quoted here. They provide the English reader with a broad range of critical opinion on Solzhenitsyn's literary art and the unique message that he brought to the West.

This message, incidentally, also partly because of the irresponsible treatment of the great Russian novelist by the Ford-Kissinger "coalition," has had a great impact on the American people. It might yet prove to be the undoing of some important heads if the U.S.-Soviet detente, against which Solzhenitsyn in Cassandra-like words has been campaigning ever since his expulsion from the USSR, turns sour, degenerating wholly and unmistakably into a vehicle for Moscow's imperialistic designs.

New York, N.Y.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

THE ELUSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Malcolm H. Kerr. New York: State University of New York Press, 1975, pp. 347.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN SOVIET POLICY. By R.D. McLaurin. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath Co., 1975.

Among a growing number of studies that have been focused on the uproar in the Middle East, it is good to find two publications which, in a way, are complementary to each other. While Kerr's symposium offers us some penetrating comments on the explosive aspects, with some overlapping coverage as interpreted mainly by the United States, McLaurin's approach is centered on the historical treatment of Soviet strategy in relation to the Washington policy, but prepared along a "textbook" treatment, with plenty of references and a good index (the latter lacking in Kerr).

In Kerr's symposium we find a variety of perspectives on the problem of peacemaking in the Middle East: what efforts the government leaders of Israel and the Arabs have made, or have avoided making, to settle the conflict between themselves; what their underlying considerations are that have made the issues so intractable; what the role of the UN has been, and why has it failed to serve effectively either as a mediator or an arbiter; and what of the U.S. government, which under six Presidents has been intensively engaged in Middle Eastern diplomacy in and out of the UN; have its approaches to peacemaking been realistic and constructive, or blind and misconceived?; how have the approaches of the parties evolved most recently, in the aftermath of the 1967 and 1973 wars, and what prospects are now emerging that each will act to contribute to a Middle East peace or to obstruct it?

These questions occupy the attention of six authors: a Syrian historian, Dr. George M. Haddad, now teaching at U.C. Santa Barbara; an Israeli specialist in Arab affairs, Aharon Cohen; a Canadian officer formerly in command of UN forces in the Middle East, Lt. General E.L.M. Burns, Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa; and three American scholars: the editor, Dean Malcolm Kerr, U.C., Los Angeles; Fred J. Khouri, Villanova University; and John C. Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

There is little consensus among the authors, and, in fact, on repeated occasions the same events take on strikingly different significance in different chapters.

If there is one point on which agreement emerges from the symposium, it is that the Middle Eastern conflict has now reached a stage of unprecedented danger, and that a solution has become too urgent a need to be ignored any longer.

Historically oriented, these essays offer the reader an appreciation of the depth of the problem of peacemaking. Attitudes and approaches that have been constructive (on the part of the Israelis and Arabs), or ineffectual (the UN), or superficial and inadequate (the U.S.) are deeply ingrained in the record reaching back a full generation. Moreover, the authors show that the basic character of the issues has not really changed very much either, although the bargaining positions have changed in recent years. The variety of perspectives is most evident in the very different interpretations of facts offered by Israeli and Arab writers and by other authors who have conflicting views of the significance of the American policy at various historical junctures. All authors show that whatever

hopes for peace have been aroused in recent years need to be measured against a long historical record of similar hopes that ended in failure.

Since so much has been written favoring the Israeli's stand, and much less about the Arab stand, it is worth noting that the book does not hesitate to be critical of the relationship of Zionism to American politics.

A narrower point of view is that of McLaurin, whose chapters cover: Soviet Foreign Objectives, Soviet Regional Objectives in the Middle East, Constraints on Soviet Policy, Soviet Activities, Political Activities, Economic Activities, Military Activities, Cultural Activities, and Conclusions and Implications. There is a short but a very good bibliography.

The conclusion is "Overall,... Soviet policy and activities in the Middle East do not represent a threat to U.S. interests... Only in Iraq may Moscow be in a position to increase the cost to decisively dissuasive levels... If a settlement is impossible, then there is probably little the United States can do (except in short-term palliatives) within the framework of commitment to Israel's security. If, on the other hand, a settlement can be achieved, the American position can be salvaged." (pp. 150-151).

Both authors somehow fail to note that the desperate American desire for "the elusive peace" may be an inability to accept Clausewitz' dictum: "War is an act of violence... (It) is politics continued by other means."

City University of New York (Ret.)

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

THE RED CHINA PAPERS: WHAT AMERICANS DESERVE TO KNOW ABOUT U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS. By Anthony Kubek. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1975, 256 pp.

This study focuses on a century of Chinese history (1841-1941), a century of Sino-American relations (1841-1941), the war and post-war era (1942-1948) wherein the anti-Nationalist faction in the U.S. manufactured a disastrous policy of direct political intervention in China's internal affairs, free China as an American friend, and the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford policy that seems to have promised doom for Chiang Kai-Shek (recently deceased).

As Kubek well states, to comprehend what has happened to China since the close of World War II is to understand much of what has happened to the entire world since 1945. President Roosevelt's "back door to war" proved to be Stalin's "open door" to the Communist conquest of China. As a result of the "treachery" of Pearl Harbor (note that the Japanese had previously struck twice without warning in sixty years; see John T. Flynn's *Roosevelt's Road to Russia* for articulation of the foreknowledge of the attack before Roosevelt's policy had manipulated and enticed the Japanese), the American people were coalesced into unity for the same cause for which Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists had been fighting for years—a free China.

By their fateful strike the Japanese did what the American president had as yet been unable to do; namely, to mobilize vigorous support for the war effort. If the Japanese had simply chosen to ignore the American military presence in the Pacific and had continued to push southward, it is possible that the American government would have had to find some excuse to declare war.

In the fall of 1945, at the moment of Japanese surrender, America's leaders had at their disposal the largest military machine the world had ever seen. Also at their exclusive command was the most powerful weapon ever devised, the atomic bomb. Yet, ironically, the masters of the Soviet Union were now able to seize large chunks of territory and extend their despotic control over vast populations in Europe and Asia. The men in the Kremlin took full advantage of the fact that the American people, weary of war, were anxious to bring the boys home. The United States government thus missed the rare opportunity to employ effectively an unparalleled military potential in guaranteeing the frontiers of freedom, a goal for which World War II had been fought in the first place. It is no great exaggeration to say that the United States won the war against one form of totalitarianism and then lost the peace to another form. The loss of the peace, within five years of the winning of the war, may properly be described as the great historic reversal of the twentieth century.

The hundreds of millions of helpless Chinese on the mainland of Asia were among the principal victims of the great reversal. Kubek shows how George C. Marshall's mission to China was structured against the Nationalists and provided the Communists with their route to domination. As Kubek puts it mildly: "It can no longer be doubted that there were some important people in Washington in those times—either actually in government or close by as consultants—who sincerely believed that the corpus of the Marxist-Leninist ideology contained the best answers for the problems of most of the world." Many more were motivated by a "fuzzy but seemingly practical vision of 'one world' to be achieved by 'cooperation' at all levels with all existing regimes, regardless of the totalitarian nature of Communist regimes". Taken together, Kubek asserts, "there were simply too many such misguided people in positions of power and decision at one of the truly critical junctures in American national history."

The contrast between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the "People's Republic" on the mainland is stark, arresting, and vivid. The reasons for this marked difference, Kubek writes, can be reduced to the single issue of individual human dignity. On Taiwan, the Chinese individual possesses all the dignity of his ancestors. On the mainland he is under massive pressure to surrender it to the State. For more than two decades the United States government made an official show of recognizing this difference, and the American people generally understood it. Even under liberal President Lyndon Johnson the China policy (due to the highly visible role of the Chinese Communists in the war of aggression by Russia-China-North Vietnam against the peoples of the South) remained officially unchanged.

The Nixon Administration set the machinery in motion "for perhaps the most momentous shift of policy in the diplomatic history of the United States." Fundamental changes were also under way in the American public attitude toward the mainland regime. Whatever else our China policy may show, it gives a clear warning that the American nation, irrespective of its enormous material power, is suffering a noticeable dotage of moral power. "The greatness of the American nation", Kubek asserts, "does not lie in its wealth... but rather in its sincere dedication to the idea of freedom and democracy."

Jackson, Mississippi

TOMMY W. ROGERS

PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

I. UCCA TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT FORD ON THE SUMMIT MEETING IN HELSINKI

The Honorable
Gerald R. Ford
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

On behalf of the Executive Board and the entire membership of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, we express our grave concern over your decision to attend the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has been instigated mainly by the USSR for its own imperialistic political purposes. The overall aim of the Conference, as seen by Moscow, is to legalize and approve the political *status quo* in Europe, and consequently to confirm Communist Russia's vast territorial conquests in Eastern and Central Europe. Moreover, through the manipulations of Moscow, several million Europeans will be excluded from taking part in the Conference. In addition to 48 million Ukrainians, millions of Byelorussians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians—who all possess centuries-old traditions of political independence—will be barred from the Conference, because they are enslaved by Communist Russia.

You are fully aware of the tragic situation of the Ukrainian nation which suffers national, religious and cultural persecution and outright genocide. Only a month ago you issued a Presidential Proclamation on Captive Nations, calling on the American people to dedicate themselves to the freedom and independence of all captive nations.

Consequently, your taking part in the Helsinki Conference appears to be wholly inconsistent with the general and principled position of U.S. foreign policy and national interests of our country. For all intents and purposes the European Conference will sanctify the Russian territorial conquests and will strengthen Moscow's slave empire in Europe.

For the past thirty years the United States has been spearheading a decolonization drive of the European empires of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, but at the same time it has been indirectly upholding the Russian Communist empire, the only great colonial empire in the world today.

As loyal American citizens we implore you, Mr. President, not to go to the Helsinki summit meeting and not to affix the signature of the United States to a document legalizing the enslavement and perpetual domination of Eastern and Central Europe by totalitarian Communist Russia.

We beg you, Mr. President, to reconsider your decision. Millions of Americans believe, as we do, that U.S. participation in the Helsinki summit meeting will not only legalize the usurpation by Communist Russia of Eastern and Central Europe, but it will turn out to be an irretrievable blunder which will in the end hurt U.S. national interests and the cause of universal freedom.

EXECUTIVE BOARD
UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

II. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: ENDORSEMENT OF RUSSIAN SLAVE EMPIRE

July, 1975

TO MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE EUROPEAN
SUMMIT MEETING ON JULY 30, 1975, IN HELSINKI, FINLAND

Your Excellency:

On July 30, 1975, you will represent your government and your people at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has come into being largely through the insidious efforts and pressures exerted by the government of the USSR, which alone stands to gain from this international conclave.

Although the conference purports to be in the interest of and for the benefit of the European peoples, millions of Europeans are excluded from this council of European statesmen. As in the times of absolute and despotic monarchies of past centuries, these millions of Europeans, with centuries-old traditions of political and national independence, are enslaved and dominated by the Soviet Union, which, in reality, represents and champions old Russian imperialism and colonialism, cloaked now in Communist garb.

Specifically, 48 million Ukrainians, 12 million Byelorussians, 8 million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and over 12 million Armenians, Azerbatjanis, Georgians and others will not be heard at the Conference, for they are coerced into political silence by the oppressive regime of Communist Russia.

The Security Conference has been a goal of Soviet Russian diplomacy since 1954; finally, the USSR has succeeded in inducing 32 European governments, as well as two outsiders, the United States and Canada, to gather in Helsinki to sign a perfidious document, which would guarantee the political *status quo* and the Soviet Russian illegal conquests of Eastern and Central Europe.

At this Conference, the Russians will get almost everything they want, for which they will give almost nothing in return, except some lipservice "concessions." They reluctantly agreed that "peaceful border changes" are possible, if such changes do not run counter to the "Brezhnev Doctrine," by which the Kremlin claims the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of any "socialist country." We all know what the Russians did in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in South Vietnam and the Middle East in 1973, and what they are doing today in Portugal.

The Helsinki Conference will seal not only the fate of such non-Russian European "union republics" of the USSR as Ukraine, Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (not mentioning the five Turkic "union republics" of Central Asia), but also the countries of the so-called "people's democracies"—Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria—all ruled by Moscow-picked viceroys and Russian-trained and Russian-oriented *gauleiters*.

The U.S. Congress issued a document some years ago, listing over 50 international treaties and agreements concluded between the USSR and various countries, all of which were broken unilaterally by Moscow.

Ukraine: A Classic Case of Russian Colonialism

Any illusions or hopes that may be entertained regarding Communist Russia's "peaceful intentions" must be measured against Soviet Russian policies in all the countries they dominate now, especially Ukraine, the largest non-Russian nation in the USSR.

In 1917, after the fall of the Russian empire, Ukraine, along with other non-Russian nations, established its own independent state, which was promptly recognized by the new Soviet regime on December 17, 1917. Recognition was granted again on March 3, 1918 at the signing of the peace treaty between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. But though it granted diplomatic recognition to Ukraine, the Soviet government launched an armed aggression against Ukraine, thus starting a Russian-Ukrainian war lasting for over two years. In 1920 Ukraine was reconquered by Russia, but in destroying the Ukrainian independent government, Moscow was fearful of destroying the framework of Ukrainian statehood. A "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" was established and in 1922 it was made a "union republic" and a constituent member of the USSR. In 1945 Ukraine became a charter member of the United Nations, even though it has no international recognition as an independent state. Yet, the Soviet government claims constantly that all the Soviet "union republics" are "sovereign and independent" and that their right to secede from the USSR is guaranteed by the Soviet constitution.

In fact, Art. 14 of the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and Art. 17 of the USSR constitution specifically stress the right of secession by any republic from the USSR.

In reality, however, anyone taking part even in an academic discussion on secession is subject to severe punishment and repression.

The colonial rule of Moscow in Ukraine is characterized by the following features:

§ *Political Oppression*: All Ukrainian political parties and groups are outlawed, and considered to be "anti-state groups" and dealt with accordingly.

§ *Russification*: One of the ugliest features of Russian rule in Ukraine is the enforced Russification of the Ukrainian language and culture, Ukrainian institutions and schools—all for the purpose of creating a *Soviet man*, who would be a Russian.

§ *Economic Exploitation*: Despite the fact that Ukraine is very rich in natural resources, the Ukrainian population is always shortchanged by the central government in Moscow. Consumer goods are scarce, as are other articles of prime necessity, such as clothing, medicine, and so forth. Most key positions in the Ukrainian economy and administration are occupied by imported Russian officials, while Ukrainians are forced to seek employment elsewhere, more often than not by official direction.

§ *Religious Persecution*: In the 1930's the Soviet government destroyed the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, followed by the wanton destruction in 1945-46 of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, forcing some five million Ukrainian Catholics into the fold of the Communist-controlled Russian Orthodox Church. It also persistently harasses other Christian adherents in Ukraine—the Baptists, Evangelics, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses, and it relentlessly persecutes communicants of the Judaic faith by closing down synagogues, molesting religious leaders and terrorizing worshippers.

§ *Destruction of Human Rights*: In 1972-73 the KGB (Soviet Secret Police) arrested some 600 Ukrainian intellectuals—writers, literary critics, journalists, professors, students, artists, painters, scientific workers and representatives of other strata of society in Ukraine—on suspicion of “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.” Many of these young men and women had been arrested in the first massive drive against Ukrainian intellectuals in 1965-66, and a number of them have been sentenced for a second time. Many of them are subjected to torture and are incarcerated in psychiatric asylums where they are gradually destroyed through forced injections of drugs and chemicals. These people had sent petitions to the government and judicial authorities, protesting the lawlessness of the KGB and the arbitrariness of the Soviet courts. They defended the Ukrainian language and culture, and they were deeply concerned because the Soviet Russian government still persisted in destroying the essence of the Ukrainian national identity and eradicating the Ukrainian national independence. The persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals constitutes a gross violation of the U.N. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the Soviet constitution itself.

Sanctifying Soviet Russian Colonialism in Europe

The “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” is a brain child of the Kremlin. Its purpose is very clear and unmistakable: Moscow wants the European powers to approve its territorial conquests in Europe as a stepping-stone to its domination of the European continent.

On June 26, 1951, the late U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated:

Historically, the Russian state has had three great drives—to the west in Europe, to the south into the Middle East, and to the east into Asia... The Politburo has acted in the same way. What it has added consists mainly of new weapons and new tactics... The ruling power in Moscow has long been an imperial power and now rules a greatly extended empire... It is clear that this process of encroachment and consolidation by which Russia has grown in the last five hundred years from the Duchy of Muscovy to a vast empire has got to be stopped...

On June 17, 1959, the U.S. Congress enacted the “Captive Nations Week Resolution” (now Public Law 86-90), which stated, among other things:

Whereas the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Romania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam and others...

In 1960 Cuba and this year two new nations were added to this long list of captive nations: Cambodia and South Vietnam. Two other prospective captive nations are Laos in Asia and Portugal in Europe.

Your Excellency:

As a representative of an enlightened European state you must be fully aware of the inherent dangers of your nation giving its official approval to the Soviet Russian conquests. You also must know that there will be no "golden peace" in Europe nor a relaxation of "tensions." The Soviet Russian strategists, unlike Western diplomats, think in terms of the prophetic statement of British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, who said: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island: Who rules the World Island commands the World." It is this goal that the Russians are after.

Despite official denial from Washington that the Helsinki pact "won't settle borders in Europe," the American people in the vast majority, as stated in the press and in the U.S. Congress, are wholly convinced that the Helsinki summit will be an official endorsement of Russian control and hegemony over East-Central Europe.

Some of the European leaders may think that their countries will benefit from certain provisions dealing with human rights, but these are so imprecise and hedged as to raise serious doubt about whether they can ever be implemented.

The Helsinki conference is so grave a matter that it caused Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Nobel Prize winning Russian novelist, to call participation in the Helsinki meeting a "betrayal of Eastern Europe."

And the betrayal is not only of Eastern Europe, but of all humanity.

Please transmit the contents of this Memorandum to your government immediately. Thank you.

EXECUTIVE BOARD
UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

III. APPEAL TO THE WORLD CONFERENCE—INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR—1975

Mexico City
(June 19 to July 2, 1975)

As part of the campaign dedicated to achieving the goals of International Women's Year, this conference will consider the situation in which women find themselves in different parts of the world, and, after determining the facts, will formulate policies and programmes that will address themselves to the conditions that prevent the integration of women as full and equal partners with men wherever they may live. Unfortunately, some governments misrepresent the situation that exists in their countries by concealing facts with self-serving rhetoric. In such cases our conference is forced to look elsewhere to determine the objective conditions facing women in these countries. A prime example is the Soviet Union — one of the participants at this conference, which denies the rights and protections Women's Year has been trying to extend to all women. Reports from the unofficial publications, *Chronicle of Current Events* and *The Ukrainian Herald* testify to the harsh reality of injustice and fear that faces women in the Soviet Union and especially in Ukraine.

1. Strict Curtailment of Human Rights

In a statement regarding International Women's Year (SG/SM/2120 IWY/1) United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim stated that this year should be an occasion for all persons to combine their efforts to "ensure that fundamental human rights and responsibilities are shared by all humanity." The statement serves to emphasize that a state that denies basic human rights to all its citizens cannot profess to have achieved equal rights for women, and by the same token indicates that the women's struggle must also be a human rights struggle. Yet today many Ukrainian women are imprisoned in Soviet prisons, while others are exiled to hard labour camps far away from Ukraine. Stripped of their basic human rights, they are serving harsh sentences for having exercised the rights guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which the USSR has signed.

When *Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets*, for instance, spoke in defense of Ukrainian political prisoners, especially in the case of Valentyn Moroz, she lost her job. In early 1972, she was tried on a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for which she was sentenced to six years in labour camps and three years in exile. *Stefania Shabatura* also wrote appeals on behalf of Moroz for which she was sentenced to five years imprisonment and three years exile. *Nadia Svitlychna* was arrested for her outspoken defence of Ukrainian political prisoners and for refusing to denounce her husband, Danylo Shumuk, after his arrest and sentencing for political activity. She is presently imprisoned in a hard labour camp in Mordovia, serving a four year sentence. *Nina Strokata-Karavanska*, a microbiologist, was arrested and convicted for "anti-Soviet agitation" because of her protests against the violations of human rights in the USSR and for her outspoken defence of her husband, Svyatoslav Karavansky, also a political prisoner—whom she refused to denounce.

2. Punishment for Political Expression

While the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women calls on women to seek greater participation in political activities, the Soviet Union metes out severe sentences to Ukrainian women for their attempts to secure genuine political expression. The USSR comouflages reality with boasts about the participation of women in the sham political life of Soviet Ukraine by providing us with "statistics" in the document, "The Situation and Status of Women Today: Some Essential Facts" (OPI/CESI NOTE IWY/IS).

3. Denial of National-Cultural Expression

But the plight of Ukrainian women is based on more than just political activities. While paragraph 266 of PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (booklet E/CN. 6/514/Rev 1) encourages women's interests in traditional drama, music, dances, folk art, etc. to deepen their awareness of their national identity, Soviet authorities destroy or close churches, censor books, ban art work, suppress religious traditions, and discourage participation in Ukrainian art and traditions. Even the Ukrainian language is the target of subtle discrimination. Soviet authorities withhold literary awards, deny pro-

motions, or indeed even employment, to all those who are active in Ukrainian cultural life and speak out in defence of the Ukrainian language and culture.

Those Ukrainians who refuse to submit to these subtle forms of discrimination face harassment, arrest and imprisonment by the Soviet authorities. *Alla Horska* was expelled from the Artists' Union of Ukraine and subjected to interrogation by the Soviet Secret Police, the KGB, for creating a stained glass window which displeased authorities because of its "nationalist" content. She was later found murdered. *Stefania Shabaturo* was harassed by authorities for introducing allegedly Ukrainian nationalist motifs into her tapestries (motifs which later, at her trial, were dubbed "anti-Soviet"). *Iryna Senyk* is imprisoned for her poems written during imprisonment.

Even during this International Women's Year Soviet authorities sentenced *Oksana Popovych*, a historian, to a Mordovian labour camp for disseminating *samvydav* (self-published) literature. Her sentence calls for eight years imprisonment and five years exile.

4. Dangerous and Debilitating Conditions in Soviet Concentration Camps

International Women's Year has among its objectives the enhancement of the general state of health among women in the world. Many Soviet dissident documents attest to the poor health that almost all Soviet political prisoners suffer because of poor diet, excessive work and general mistreatment (including beatings) imposed by Soviet prison authorities. *Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets*, *Nina Strokata-Karavanska* and *Nadia Svitlychna* are all reportedly suffering from serious illnesses; still they are denied medical treatment. Continued imprisonment under these conditions poses a serious threat to their lives.

To summarize, in accordance with the aims of this Conference, when we consider major obstacles to be overcome by women in achieving equal rights, opportunities and responsibilities, the following must be listed among the barriers in the way of equality:

1. the strict curtailment of human rights;
2. the punishment for political expression;
3. the denial of national-cultural expression;
4. the dangerous and debilitating circumstances in Soviet concentration camps where women of various nationalities are imprisoned.

We, Ukrainian delegates of various Women's Organizations in the free world, appeal to each and every participant in the United Nations Conference of the International Women's Year to move and support resolutions encompassing the concerns of this appeal.

We urge the Conference to call upon the Soviet Union to adhere to its own constitution and to the UN Declaration of Human Rights by guaranteeing in fact the rights and protections promised by Soviet and International Law. We call upon this conference, in the name of humanity and justice, and in the spirit of International Women's Year to intercede before the government of the USSR to grant amnesty to Ukrainian and all other women political prisoners in the USSR.

IN PARTICULAR, we urge the Conference to pass a resolution calling for the immediate release and return to their families in Ukraine, with a full restoration of their rights as citizens, of: NINA STROKATA-KARAVANSKY, microbiologist, IRYNA STASIV-KALYNETS, poetess, STEFANIA SHABATURA, artist, IRYNA SENYK, writer, NADIA SVITLYCHNA, journalist, OKSANA POPOVYCH, historian, and many others imprisoned in Soviet labor camps.

WORLD CONGRESS
OF FREE UKRAINIANS
REV. B. KUSHNIR
President

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
OF THE WORLD CONGRESS
OF FREE UKRAINIANS
SENATOR PAUL YUZYK
Chairman

WORLD FEDERATION OF UKRAINIAN WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS
S. SAWCHUK — *President*

DELEGATES TO THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR CONFERENCE:

Andrey Semotiuk
Mary Beck
Helen Prociuk
Maria Kwitkowska
Uiana Celewvch
Mary Dushnyck
Olena Hlrniak
Bohdanna Chuma
Maria Zarytska

Uiana Diachuk
Olha Stawnychu
Camille Smorodsky
Daria Stepaniak
Halya Klymuk
Rozolana Klymuk
Natalia Chomut
Marta Sterniuk
Helen Evans

Olga Zawerucha
Anna Ostafiohuk
Valentyna Mushynsky
Stefania Bukshowana
Zirka Yaskewych
Helen Hnatyshyn
Christina Isayko
Volodymyr Sheparowych
Olena Lozynsky
Roman Chaykowsky

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"THE 1975 CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," an address by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C. July 16, 1975.

This is just one of over 50 addresses and statements issued during the 1975 Captive Nations Week observance. The Flood address, however, crystallizes the congressional observance of the annual event since other legislators, some 30 of them, join the Pennsylvanian Representative on the order of the day. Congressman Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois leads the minority Republicans in a bipartisan effort and undertaking of the event.

Among the points made by Congressman Flood in this most eventful of weeks is that "Penetrating the fog and mist of current detente, this combined manifestation reassets the truths that one-half of mankind cannot remain free while the other half remains enslaved, that the dominant force of nationalism cannot be repressed decisively in Eastern Europe, within the Soviet Union, or in the People's Republic of China, and that, as the leading nation of the world, the United States has a responsible and historic task to perform—namely, the advancement of national independence and self-determination throughout the Communist Empire."

The address develops the above theme, and other Members follow with impressive, individual addresses. In addition, Flood incorporated proclamations of the Week by the President and Governors of Louisiana, Georgia, Rhode Island and elsewhere, as well as the message of the National Captive Nations Committee, written by its chairman, Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky and which calls upon Congress to reject "any permanent Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe resulting from a European Security Conference." This, as some of the following exemplify, the Congress did in statements during and after the Week.

"ARE WE IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZING SOVIET CONQUEST OF BALTIC STATES?," an address by Senator Helms. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., July 29, 1975.

Following many addresses that recognized the Week was "timed" for numerous events—the observances themselves, the Apollo-Soyuz orbital detente, Solzhenitsyn, Kissinger's defense of detente, the announcement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—this one seizes on the President's omission in his departing remarks for Helsinki of two important items.

One sentence omitted from the original text was "The United States policy supports the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe by every proper and peaceful means." The other omission was "The United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and is not going to do so at Helsinki." These unfortunate omissions received wide publicity.

In appending the Captive Week proclamation by Governor Thomson of New Hampshire, the Senator declared, "I am nevertheless proud to call attention to

the New Hampshire Captive Nations Week Proclamation, and to congratulate the distinguished Governor for his forthrightness and courage." One of the "whereases" of the proclamation reads: "Whereas, the Presidential Proclamation issued by President Ford in 1975 fails to emphasize the true spirit of the congressional resolution which was to give support and encouragement to the enslaved people of captive nations to carry on their struggle for freedom from Communist domination until liberty again reigned triumphant in their oppressed land..."

"THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE," an address by Congresswoman Holt and colloquy. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., July 25, 1975.

Another outstanding example from the *Record*, which for three weeks was replete with material on Captive Nations Week, is found in this address by Mrs. Holt of Maryland and the colloquy that followed, involving Representatives Symms, Crane, Daniel, Rousselot and Kemp. The Holt statement is incisive for its analysis of the various presidential proclamations from Eisenhower to Ford.

The Congresswoman put it this way: "While seemingly unconnected, these two events (Captive Nations Week and the CSCE) have a strong inner affinity. In a fast-moving, cynical era this point can be lost all too easily. By tracing the two events to their inception, we can see, moreover, the tragic and dangerous weakening of our American ability to see the world around us as it actually is and not as we wish it to be." And this she does remarkably well from 1959 to the present, including the addition of two more captive nations to the already long list of such nations dating back to 1920. The failure of the Nixon Administration to prevent the Southeast Asian debacle was brought out. This fact alone would justify the firing of Kissinger as Secretary of State.

"CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE," an address by Senator Buckley and colloquy. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., July 17, 1975.

To take one more example of the events of the '75 Captive Nations Week, the address by Senator Buckley of New York spurred on a colloquy involving Senators Helms, Curtis, Taft and others. Senator Helms observed, "This meeting of the CSCE is ironic in that the final session has been announced during Captive Nations Week."

Senator Taft, under the caption of captive nations, stressed, "The captive nations which stand out in particular as continuing victims of Soviet oppression are Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia." Senator Buckley placed emphasis on the inadequate comments about the CSCE in the press.

"SOVIET DISSIDENT," a report. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1975.

According to this report, a group of Soviet dissidents has appealed to the International Red Cross for help for the Ukrainian dissident, Leonid Plyushch. The Ukrainian is a mathematician who was tried in 1972 for so-called anti-Soviet agitation. His only "crime" was to plead for greater cultural and political freedom for his people.

Plyushch has been incarcerated in a prison psychiatric hospital, a ward seven for political prisoners. Since November of 1974 he has been subjected to a series of debilitating drugs. The group seeking help for him states that he is now being given insulin shock treatments. Efforts have been made by the U.S. government to seek his release, but to no avail as yet.

"WEST CRITICIZED BY SOLZHENTSYN," a report. *The Times*, Montreal, Canada, May 6, 1975.

During his stay in Canada, the exiled Russian author, Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, criticized what he called the West's "influence" to the fate of countries such as Ukraine. The criticism was made in a three and a half minute message broadcast by the Ukrainian unit of Radio Canada International.

The author mentioned the death in 1933 of six million Ukrainians during Stalin's man-made famine. He observed, "The insensitive Europe ignored the tragedy."

"WILL THESE WOMEN STILL BE ALIVE IN 1976?," an advertisement. *The New York Times*, New York, March 8, 1975.

Addressing itself to the 1975 International Women's Year, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians appeals in this advertisement to Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin for the release of all women imprisoned in the Soviet Union because of their political, religious or social convictions. In particular, it seeks the release of five Ukrainian intellectuals, four of whom are pictured in the ad with detailed backgrounds.

One of the featured women is Nadia Svitlychna-Shumuk, a philologist. The others are a writer, microbiologist, artist and poetess. The blatant violation of human rights in these and other cases was strongly underscored.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," a report. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D.C., June 29, 1975.

President Ford is reported here proclaiming the 1975 Captive Nations Week. The Week ran from July 13 to July 19. As pointed out by numerous Members of Congress, the presidential proclamation was general and not linked specifically with the Captive Nations Week Resolution passed by Congress in 1959. In other words, the proclamation went through the National Security Council wringer, and the President, as every predecessor since Eisenhower, went along with it.

The report states, "Despite the opposition of the Communist world, each U.S. president since 1959 has annually declared a Captive Nations Week." In terms of issuance, the record is a perfect one. Unquestionably, when detente declines, the resolution and the Week will rise in scope and intensity.

"RUSSIA MOVES TOWARD AN EXPLOSION," a commentary by *The Economist*, London. *The Blessings of Liberty*, Washington, D.C., October, 1974.

This pungent publication of the Foundation for Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order, headed by Dr. Charles W. Lounsbury, reproduces a hard-

hitting commentary by *The Economist* of London. The commentary stresses the economic lag in the USSR and its dilemma between a free market operation and more democratic rule, neither of which Moscow can tolerate.

Worthy of full quotation is this: "The men in the Kremlin have read in their textbooks that a regime is in danger when its institutions hinder the development of productive forces. And in the Soviet Union it is also necessary to take account of the nationalistic revival that is now building up, from the Baltic states through the Ukraine down to central Asia, after all the years of Russian domination of the country's other nationalities. Put those two things together and the prospect would appear to be pretty explosive." Yes, indeed.

"STUDIES OF NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES OF THE USSR IN THE UNITED STATES: AN APPRAISAL," an article by Stephan Horak. *Revue Canadienne des Etudes sur Le Nationalisme*, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada, Autumn, 1974.

A detailed analysis of the problem depicted in the title is provided here by Professor Horak of Eastern Illinois University. The study is well documented and thorough, except for certain fundamental omissions of developments in the 50's. He notes the changes that have occurred over the past fifteen years in American scholarship concerning the non-Russian complex in the USSR and its bright prospects for the future.

What the author fails to understand is the great impetus given to these changes by events in the governmental and some academic circles during the 50's. In short, academia was far behind the governmental and political. The Mosely's, Brzezinski's and others, who were absolutely necessary to the process of change for more extensive studies in this vital field, were relative late-comers. Had the writer been aware of the conflict in VOA, the operations of the D.P. Commission under Commissioner O'Connor, the output of the Kersten Committee, the conflict with the American Committee of Liberation, and the isolated efforts of Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki, Prof. Manning and others, his rendition would be cast in more accurate perspective. Nonetheless, his article is valuable in the data and analysis it provides.

"HELSINKI: THE UNINVITED," a letter to the editor by Jan Zaprudnik. *The New York Times*, New York, August 6, 1975.

This striking letter to the editor by Professor Zaprudnik of Queens concentrates on a fundamental shortcoming of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Two of the largest nations in Eastern Europe weren't even represented at Helsinki. Ukraine with a population of about 50 million and Byelorussia with over 10 million were supposedly represented by their Russian masters in Moscow.

As the writer rightly points out, "The Soviet Government asserts that Byelorussia and Ukraine are independent states speaking for themselves at international conferences." He also points out their U.N. status and validly states, "One wonders how European security and cooperation could be decided with the exclusion from direct participation of nearly sixty million allegedly independent Europeans." This problem is considered in an article on the CSCE in this issue.

"THE BRIGHT FLAME STILL BURNS," an article by George Woodcock. *Asian Outlook*, Taipei, Republic of China, November 1974.

Valentyn Moroz and his suffering and imprisonment are the focus of this well-written article published in a widely read Asian periodical. The writer relates Moroz's background, evaluates his activities in terms of Article 126 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., which proclaims "freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization," and justly concludes that his trial was a strictly political trial disguised as a criminal one.

The writer appears to be optimistic concerning the impact of Moroz on developments in the USSR generally. Citing the Tkachenko statement claiming that the sentence on Moroz "was met with approval by people in the Ukraine," he pointedly asks "why, if such public approval was the consequence, there was any need to try Moroz in camera!" As he sees it, the tyrants in the Kremlin are losing confidence and holds that, though a Ukrainian, Moroz would have been recognized by Dostoyevsky as "a fellow spirit, as would Turgenev and Belinsky, Tolstoy and Kropotkin."

"THE LOGIC OF DETENTE," a commentary by James Burnham. *The National Review*, New York, August 15, 1975.

What most analysts of the current scene have overlooked, this one perceives expertly the so-called coincidence of Solzhenitsyn and the Apollo-Soyuz linkup with Captive Nations Week. Seeing history as "providing transparent symbols," he observes, "Take, in addition to the Solzhenitsyn display, an eloquent feature of the Apollo-Soyuz linkup: its date. It somehow happened that the week selected for this 'historic event,' as all official comment hailed it, was the same as that designated by an act of our legislature as 'Captive Nations Week': a yearly reiteration—so it was conceived to be—of our dismay at the subjection of the nations of Eastern Europe to Moscow's tyranny..."

The writer could also have added to the "coincidence" the official announcement during the '75 Week of the European Security Conference. As he vividly puts it, "The juxtaposition could not have been more exquisite." The writer's analysis of Solzhenitsyn is also quite perceptive, alluding to some of his "Great Russian, Third Rome rhetoric... for the non-Russian subject nations."

"THE UKRAINIAN FESTIVAL ON ICE," a review by Alan M. Kriegsman. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., October 9, 1974.

Another favorable review is given here of the renditions of the Ukrainian skaters who performed in Washington and elsewhere. In some measure he views it as a Bolshoi Ballet on skates. The review furnishes a background of the Ukrainian troupe and favorably comments on its various displays.

It can be said that at least in comparison with some other reviews, this one does not confuse Ukrainian with Russian. Interestingly enough, on the same page an article appears on "Skating Around The Grain Deal." Any connection?—a deeper one than most realize.

"ARGENTINA IDENTIFIES EX-NAZI," an AP report. *Associated Press*, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 29, 1975.

Though this report is about Walter Kutschmann, a former Nazi Gestapo officer, it covers several Ukrainians who worked for the officer. Kutschmann has been accused of executing 38 Polish Jews in 1941. Living in Argentina under the name of Pedro Ricardo Olmo, he has been tracked down by the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna.

The Ukrainian aides played a role in digging the graves for twenty professors and eighteen family members who were murdered in 1941. The report shows that after the Jews were executed, the Ukrainians were also murdered as possible witnesses. It does not reveal whether the Ukrainians were formally aides of the Gestapo officers or having been commandeered, as so many were, into the sordid job.

"UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS," a statement by the Honorable William F. Walsh. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., October 8, 1974.

A letter written by Dr. S.J. Klufas and M. Mykytyn, officers of the Syracuse branch of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, is incorporated in the remarks of Representative Walsh. The letter details the cases of Valentyn Moroz and Leonid Plyushch, the two Ukrainian dissidents suffering torture by the Russian jailers. It is factual and objective throughout.

In his remarks the Congressman stresses that he has "become very concerned about the plight of thousands of Ukrainians being held political prisoners by the Soviet Union." He goes on to state that these "people are being tortured and abused solely for their political beliefs and this is contrary to every principle for which the United States stands." He addressed himself to Secretary of State Kissinger on the matter. The importance of such action by our citizens cannot be too strongly emphasized.

"A 12-YEAR QUEST FOR JOB AT LIBRARY OF CONGRESS," an article by Lance Gay. *The Washington Star-News*, Washington, D.C., February 18, 1975.

This lengthy article about Roman Marynowych and his determined fight to land a position with the Library of Congress is both sickening and hopeful. The subject is apparently well qualified to work for the library, having had formal training and experience in library work, and yet has been repeatedly rejected over a twelve-year period for reasons of being "over-qualified." Marynowych is a well-known producer of Ukrainian radio hours both in Washington and New York.

The hardships endured by the subject of this account are well described. He travels weekly to Union, New Jersey, where he works as a reference librarian in the Union Public Library. For his family and other objectives he is determined to win this battle with the Library of Congress. His resolve is his hope, and this sympathetic article should aid him in his effort.

"LEONID PLYUSHCH," a report. *Current Abstracts on Soviet Affairs*, Radio Liberty Research, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, May 1, 1975.

Radio Liberty publishes regularly this abstract which is most helpful to analysts of the USSR. In this issue a report is abstracted from *Le Nouvel Ob-*

servateur regarding the persecuted Ukrainian dissident and mathematician, Leonid Plyushch. The extent of world concern for the plight of the dissident is underscored.

April 23, 1975 was proclaimed as "International Plyushch Day." The unprecedented action was taken by the International Committee of Mathematicians in union with Amnesty International. Two French journalists, Pierre Ajame and Laurent Schwartz, review extensively the efforts taken in behalf of the Ukrainian intellectual.

"SOVIETS GIVE 2 VIEWS ON WEST," an article by Henry S. Bradsher. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D.C., May 9, 1975.

A most interesting and instructive account is presented here concerning different views toward the West given by the Kremlin on the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II. For the international audience the view cast was in terms of detente and disarmament. For the "internal" in Kiev and elsewhere it was "vigilance against any ruses of the hostile imperialist circles." While Brezhnev spoke of the Cold War as a past event, Shcherbytsky, party first secretary of Ukraine, talked about the ongoing Cold War.

The article goes on with further quotes by the two along these two divergent lines. It refers to the Shelest case in 1972, prior to Nixon's visit to the Kremlin. But, quite accurately, the writer concludes that, in contrast to Shelest, Shcherbytsky is not challenging Brezhnev's line. For, in the tactics and strategy of Moscow, as the writer ends, "Internal propaganda has always emphasized the need for vigilance against the West, despite talk of detente."

"SOLZHENITSYN SPEAKS OUT," an interview. *National Review*, New York, June 6, 1975.

Whether one likes it or not and for whatever reason, the fact is that the appearance of Solzhenitsyn at the time of America's observance of Captive Nations Week was a genuine, historical boon. Mr. George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO and honorary chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, played a tremendous role in this. This long interview with the Russian author serves as a wonderful background to his physical appearance in Washington and New York.

The interview covers a wide range of subjects—the KGB, incarceration of dissidents, the author's views on democracy and so forth. One might take issue with the Russian exile on a number of points, particularly his views of the seasoned Marx, but one cannot deny the power of his overall message regarding Communist barbarism and inhumanism. As to the incarcerated, the author points out, "Some of the Ukrainians—Karavansky, Shukhevych, Sverstyuk, and many others—have been imprisoned for close to 25 years." On more than one occasion he has dwelled on the non-Russian dissidents in the USSR.

"WAS 'QUIET DON' PLAGIARIZED?," an article by Vadim Medish. *Washington Star-News*, Washington, D.C., February 2, 1975.

The writer of this penetrating article is a Soviet emigree who is now a professor of Russian Studies at the American University in Washington. The

article pits Solzhenitsyn against Sholokhov, the former accusing the latter of plagiarizing the work *And Quiet Flows the Don*, which contributed to his receiving a Nobel Prize in literature. The book is about the Don Cossacks during the Bolshevik revolution.

Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, has said, "It was common knowledge. Everyone understood that he (Sholokhov) just stole these papers from a White Russian officer who had died and included them in the book. It was a joke that the only thing he had ever written that was any good was what he had stolen." The Cossack who really wrote the book was Fyodor Kryakov. Solzhenitsyn is calling for a complete investigation of Sholokhov's literary career. Sholokhov has been a Cossack lackey for the Kremlin most of his life. As in the case of Kissinger and peace in Vietnam, Brandt, and others, this case promises to create further embarrassment to the Royal Swedish Academy which dispenses the prizes.

"WHILE THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS BEING CELEBRATED, THE MARTYRDOM OF THE UKRAINE CONTINUES," an article by Roman Rakhmanny. *Le Devoir*, Montreal, Canada, February 6, 1975.

Seizing upon the sharp discrepancy between the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the cruel realities in the USSR, this prolific writer has the first part of his article published in the influential French-Canadian daily of Montreal. The essence of this informative piece is stated succinctly, "recognitions of rights are not equivalent to the granting of rights." His account of developments in the USSR shows why.

His account concentrates on Ukraine and its dissidents. As he rightly stresses, their only crime has been their demand to apply the principles of the Declaration to their own country, Ukraine. Dissident internationalists listed are Grigorenko, Karavansky, Strokata, Moroz and Plyushch. This part of the article should have impressed readers considerably.

"SOLZHENITSYN AIRS GRIEVANCE AT WEST," an article by Roman Rakhmanny. *The Gazette*, Montreal, Canada, May 5, 1975.

The same writer capsulates Solzhenitsyn's remarks over the Ukrainian language broadcast of Radio Canada International. The Russian writer's references to Western indifference to Ukraine, the man-made famine, and his own genealogy are appropriately cited.

Solzhenitsyn is quoted as saying, "My mother was almost entirely of Ukrainian origin. My grandfather, the only member of the family after my father died, was a Ukrainian... Thus, the fate of the Ukrainian people is not strange to me; I regard their fate as my own."

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

I. UKRAINIAN LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES

17th Annual Observances of Captive Nations Week in U.S.—Thousands of Americans throughout the country, including those of Ukrainian and other ethnic backgrounds, observed the 17th annual "Captive Nations Week" under the impact of the Communist takeover of South Vietnam and Cambodia and on the eve of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was to open on July 30, 1975 in Helsinki, Finland. Therefore, the mood of the country was far more receptive than in previous years and nationwide observances of the Week, which this year ran from July 13 to July 19, were especially meaningful and attuned to Communist attempts to take over the government in Portugal.

The visit and the appearance of Alexander Solzhenitsyn at the AFL-CIO dinner in Washington, D.C. (June 30) and at the luncheon in New York (July 9) contributed considerably to the awareness of the American people to the fallacy of the policy of detente and the importance of the captive nations.

The UCCA central office in New York issued a special appeal to its branches and member organizations, urging them to spearhead the activities and to cooperate fully with all American civic and patriotic groups in these observances.

Appeal of NCNC President to U.S. Legislators.—On June 20, 1975 Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC) and President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), sent a letter to every U.S. Senator and U.S. Congressman, urging them to participate in the Week and in a reappraisal of detente "as it has been compromisingly applied" in the last few months during which new nations in Southeast Asia have been added to the long list of captive nations:

His letter read, in part:

"On this eve of our own American Revolution Bicentennial, Congress can once again innovate guidelines and directions under the significant theme of 'Independence from Empire.' This theme illumines the uniqueness of our revolution as against the French or Russian; it is the same theme permeating Public Law 86-90. To dispel the present confusion and doubts, Congress can (1) declare forthrightly now that it will not accept any permanent Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe resulting from a European Security Conference; (2) in furtherance of a realistic detente and popular enlightenment, initiate studies of the earliest captive nations now in the USSR; and (3) review all the international treaties relevant to

national and human rights signed by the USSR and its associates, determining for an informed public opinion the degree of their fulfillment. Such action would restore public confidence in our leadership in the Free World, reassert basic principles and values in our foreign policy, and serve in fitting preparation for our own ARB..."

The Presidential Proclamation.—On Friday, June 27, 1975 President Gerald R. Ford signed the Captive Nations Week Proclamation, designating the week beginning July 13 as Captive Nations Week, in accordance with Public Law 86-90:

**THE WHITE HOUSE
CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1975
A PROCLAMATION**

The history of our Nation reminds us that the traditions of liberty must be protected and preserved by each generation. Let us, therefore, rededicate ourselves to the ideals of our own democratic heritage. In so doing, we manifest our belief that all men everywhere have the same inherent right to freedom that we enjoy today. In support of this sentiment, the Eighty-sixth Congress, by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorized and requested the President to proclaim the third week in July of each year as Captive Nations Week.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 13, 1975, as Captive Nations Week.

I call upon the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge rededication to the aspirations of all people for self-determination and liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-seventh day of June, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.

GERALD R. FORD

Observances of Captive Nations Week in U.S. Congress.—This year a substantial number of Senators and Congressmen took the floor in Congress in observance of Captive Nations Week and used the occasion to manifest their moral and political support for the captive nations of Central-Eastern Europe and the USSR in their search for freedom and national independence.

a) **U.S. Senate:** The following U.S. Senators introduced special statements on the Week: Birch Bayh (D., IN.); J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R., MD.); James L. Buckley (R-C, N.Y.); Quention N. Burdick (D., ND); Carl T. Curtis (R., NE); Barry Goldwater (R., AZ); Clifford P. Hansen (R., WY); Jesse A. Helms (R., NC); Roman L. Hruska (R., NE); Hubert H. Humphrey (D., MN); James A. McClure (R., ID); Claiborne Pell (D., RI); William

V. Roth, Jr. (R., DE); Robert Taft, Jr. (R., OH); Strom Thurmond (R., SC) and Harrison A. Williams (D., NJ);

b) **House of Representatives:** Joseph Addabbo (D., NY); Glenn M. Anderson (D., CA); Frank Annunzio (D., IL); William L. Armstrong (R., CO); John M. Ashbrook (R., OH); Herman Badillo (D., NY); Alphonso Bell (R., CA); Mario Biaggi (D., NY); James J. Blanchard (D., MI); William S. Broomfield (R., MI); J. Herbert Burke (R., FL); James A. Burke (D., MA); James C. Cleveland (R., NH); Barker B. Canable (R., NY); R. Lawrence Coughlin (R., PA); Philip M. Crane (R., IL); Robert W. Daniel (R., VA); Dominick V. Daniels (D., NJ); James J. Delaney (D., NY); Edward J. Derwinski (R., IL); John D. Dingell (D., MI); Pierre S. du Pont, IV (R., DE); Marvin L. Eash (R., MI); Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R., NY); Daniel J. Flood (D., PA); Robert N. Giaimo (D., CT); Benjamin A. Gilman (R., NY); James M. Hanley (D., PA); Henry Helstoski (D., NJ); Marjorie S. Holt (R., MD); Henry J. Hyde (R., IL); Jack F. Kemp (R., NY); Robert J. Lagomarsino (R., CA); Robert McClory (R., IL);

Robert H. Michel (R., IL); Henry J. Nowak (D., NY); Richard L. Ottinger (D., NY); Edward J. Patten (D., NJ); Melvin Price (D., IL); John J. Rhodes (R., AZ); Peter W. Rodino (D., NJ); J. Edward Rousch (D., IN); John H. Rousselot (R., CA); Martin A. Russo (D., IL); Ronald A. Sarasin (R., CT); Herman I. Schneebeli (R., PA); Garner E. Shriver (R., KS); Samuel S. Stratton (D., NY); Steven D. Symms (R., ID); Joe D. Waggoner, Jr. (D., LA); William F. Walsh (R., NY); Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (R., OH); John W. Wydler (R., NY); Gus Yatron (D., PA), and Clement J. Zablocki (D., WI);

c) **Governors:** Hugh L. Carey—NY; Dan Walker—IL; J. James Exon—NE; William G. Milliken—MI; James B. Edwards—SC; George Busbee—GA; Meldrim Thomson—NH; George C. Wallace—AL, and Edwin Edwards—LA;

d) **Mayors:** Abraham D. Beame—New York, NY; J.W. Cate, Jr.—St. Petersburg, FL; Ted Bates—Warren, MI; Richard J. Daley—Chicago, IL; Harry E. Atkinson—Newport News, VA; Edward H. McNamara—Livonia, MI; John Garthe—Santa Ana, CA; Vincent A. Cianci, Jr.—Providence, RI; Bartholomew F. Guida—New Haven, CT; Robert B. Doyle, Jr.—Mobile, AL; Jack C. Hunter—Youngstown, OH; Thomas G. Dunn—Elizabeth, NJ; Frank L. Rizzo—Philadelphia, PA; Stephen P. Clark—Metropolitan Dade County, FL; Edward Zarinsky—Omaha, NE.

Solzhenitsyn Assails West for Supporting USSR.—Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Russian Nobel prize-winning novelist who was expelled from the USSR in February, 1974, assailed the West for helping the Kremlin leaders maintain the despotic regime which keeps dozens of nations and millions of people in Communist slavery.

Speaking at a banquet on June 30, 1975 in Washington, given in his honor by the AFL-CIO, Mr. Solzhenitsyn warned against the danger of detente between the USSR and the United States, stating that it only serves to strengthen the dictatorial regime, while millions of captive people are suffering oppression and persecution. In his 90-minutes address to some 3,000 guests, including a Ukrainian group, he made several references to

Ukraine, citing in one instance the man-made famine in Ukraine which cost Ukrainians several million lives.

"While millions of people were dying in Ukraine, President Roosevelt was establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union," said the novelist.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn was introduced by George Meany, AFL-CIO president, who also brought to the dais two other prominent former inmates of the "Gulag Archipelago," namely, Alexander Dolgun, an American who spent eight years in Soviet slave camps, and Simas Kudirka, the Lithuanian seaman who tried to defect from a Soviet fishing trawler, but was captured by Soviet guards and taken back to the USSR; he was released as a U.S. citizen in the fall of 1974 and allowed to come to America. Both were greeted warmly by Mr. Solzhenitsyn.

Attending the dinner were Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*; members of the Moroz Defense Committee in Washington—Andrew Michniak, Andrij Chornodolsky, Irene Yasinsky and Andrew Bilyk; Osyp Zinkevych of the "Smolenskyp" Information Service, and Dmytro Corbett of the Ukrainian Service of the "Voice of America."

Also an AFL-CIO luncheon in honor of A. Solzhenitsyn was held on July 9, 1975 at the Americana Hotel in New York City, attended by over 1,000 guests, including a group of some twenty Ukrainians from the area.

UCCA Asks President Ford to Boycott the Helsinki Parley.—On July 23, 1975 the UCCA Executive Board sent a telegram to President Ford, asking him not to attend the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to be held in Helsinki, Finland, stating that his signature on the document will "legalize and approve the political *Status quo* in Europe, and consequently confirm Communist Russia's vast territorial conquests in Eastern and Central Europe..."

The telegram further stated that the United States has been spearheading the decolonization of many of Europe's empires, but at the same time it "has been indirectly upholding the Russian Communist empire..." (see text of telegram in the "Pertinent Documents" column—Ed.).

President Ford Meets with Ethnic Leaders before Helsinki Trip.—On July 25, 1975, President Ford met in a 40-minute audience with 17 leaders representing various American organizations of U.S. citizens of Central and Eastern European descent, with whom he discussed his trip to Helsinki to attend the security conference which was to open on July 30.

Attending the meeting were spokesmen of Armenian, Byelorussian, Czech, Estonian, German, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian organizations. Accompanying them were Congressmen Edward J. Derwinski (Ill.), who was instrumental in arranging the meeting; Clement Zablocki (Wisc.), Jack Kemp (N.Y.), Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.) and Daniel J. Flood (Pa.). In attendance were also General Brent Scowcroft of the National Security Council, and Donald Rumsfeld, Philip Buchen, Robert Hartman and John Marsh—all of the White House staff.

In his statement, President Ford, said among other things:

"I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating state. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communications between the peoples of East and West. It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means..."

In reference to the Baltic States, President Ford said: "I can assure you as one who has been long interested in this question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and is not doing so now..."

Both Congressmen Derwinski and Flood pointed out that it was the first time in American political history that a President met with a group of American ethnic leaders on the eve of an important international conference.

Representing the Ukrainian group were UCCA President Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky and UCCA Executive Vice President Joseph Lesawyer, and President of the Ukrainian National Association. Mr. Lesawyer raised the question of a direct request by President Ford to Brezhnev for the release of Valentyn Moroz and Leonid Plyushch. General Scowcroft interjected that the case of Moroz was brought up in Vladivostok.

Prof. Dobriansky said that fears are expressed that Moscow would widely utilize the Helsinki agreement for its psycho-political propaganda and will twist it according to its own interpretative likings. He urged that the President's definitive statement to the effect that the U.S. supports the aspirations of the peoples of Eastern Europe to freedom and national independence be widely disseminated by VOA, RFE and RL, so that the adverse psycho-political impact of the Helsinki meeting on Western Europe be effectively reduced.

Bureau of WCFU Opened in New York City.—At the beginning of August, 1975, the Secretariat General of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU) opened its Human Rights Bureau at 441 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1410, New York, N.Y. 10017. Heading the bureau is attorney Andriy Semotiuk, Ukrainian student and community activist in Canada. He has worked on various levels of the WCFU, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) and other Ukrainian Canadian organizations. His most recent assignment was to head the Ukrainian delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City, held from June 19 to July 2, 1975.

Among Mr. Semotiuk's assignments in New York will be to inform the UN delegates, as well as the press, radio and television, of the repressions of Ukrainians by the Soviet government and other incidents of human, civil and national rights violations.

He will endeavor to have the question of human rights in Ukraine raised on the floor of the UN and will try to have the WCFU Human Rights Commission, headed by Senator Paul Yuzyk in Ottawa, granted the status of a Non-Governmental Organization.

New Bibliographical Reference on Ukraine Published in Chicago.—A new bibliographical publication of interest to Slavists as well as to students of Ukrainian studies in general is **Ukraine: Selected References in the English Language** (2nd revised and enlarged edition), written by Roman Weres and published by the Ukrainian Research and Information Institute in Chicago in 1974. The volume contains 1,958 entries, listing works, both monographic and serial, relating to the history, economy and culture of the Ukrainian people, and to the people of Ukrainian origin in the United States and Canada. The entries are divided among a broad range of subject headings which cover topics relating to history, geography, politics, culture, literature, and the arts. Annotations indicate the nature and scope of the books and articles listed, and author and subject indexes are included. A short introduction provides an outline of the history of Ukrainian bibliography, discussing works in Ukrainian, English and other languages.

Charge 'Britannica' Fosters Pro-Soviet Views on National Republics in USSR.—The **Encyclopedia Britannica**, which once enjoyed a deserved reputation for high standards and objectivity, was criticized for its 15th edition being replete with pro-Soviet propaganda and bias in its articles on all the 15 "union republics" of the USSR. The charge was brought by Prof. Romuald J. Misiunas of Williams College and was contained in the June 1975 issue of the **Slavic Review**, published by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

Prof. Misiunas charged that the fifteen articles were written by Soviet scholars, which are "a rehash of the official [Soviet] point of view current at the moment, which in many cases enjoys only a tenuous connection with what we in the West consider objective fact." He further stated that the "articles on the non-Russian republics suffer more particular shortcomings than the lengthy article on the RSFSR. Only five of the fourteen articles (on Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine) were written by residents of their respective republics. Of these only the authors of three (Estonia, Georgia and Lithuania) are unmistakably members of the respective republics' majority nationality" (meaning that the articles on Latvia and Ukraine were written by Russian authors).

Four of the articles, for example, identify the local Communist party as "the leading political organization," and three as "the guiding political organization," and one as "the most important organization" — as though there were other political organizations.

The article on the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has a heading "Political Organizations," and lists three: The Communist Party, the Lenin Communist Youth League [Comsomol] and the Communist Pioneers [school-children]. None of the articles says that the Communist party is the only one permitted, or that republic officials serve at Moscow's pleasure.

Prof. Misiunas also charged that Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan receive very little historical coverage, and even the names of the non-Russian republic are not given in their native language, but in Russian. For instance, he cited, the official name of the Ukrainian SSR in Ukrainian is "Radyanska Ukraina," but in the article in the **Britannica** is called "Sovietskaya Ukraina," which was Russified by the Russian author. He also listed a number

of inconsistencies and overt bias in the case of the Baltic States, Byelorussia and Turkestan.

Prof. Misiunas concluded that because the articles on the non-Russian republics in the USSR contain a long "list of errors, inconsistencies, infelicities, and highly debatable statements, it can only be concluded that the fifteen *Britannica* articles on the republics of the USSR are not a reliable source of information on the the USSR."

After protests from readers complaining of pro-Soviet bias and following a scholarly review in the *Slavic Review* by Prof. Misiunas, the *Britannica* has conceded its errors. Warren E. Preece, who edited the new edition, said that all fifteen articles on the national republics will be revised for the next edition (cf. *The New York Times*, September 17, 1975).

Convention of League of Ukrainian Catholics.—The 37th annual convention of the League of Ukrainian Catholics (LUC) was held September 18-21, 1975 in Philadelphia, Pa., at which a new national executive board was elected.

For the third time in the League's history, a woman was elected president of the organization. She is Anna Kupczak from West Seneca, N.Y. Incumbents who retained their offices are: treasurer Joseph Novack, recording secretary Marion Hubec, education and civic director Harry Kany, sports director Nick Supko, publicity director Marie Glowa, and convention procedure director Marilyn Glascott.

New officers include executive vice-president Leroy Grimm, vice-president Stephen Postupack, corresponding secretary Beverly Sywulak, membership director Joanne Pawluk, and cultural director Alice Berwecky.

For the first time members elected a woman religious to the national board. She is Sister Stephanie, S.M.I., a former directress of novices of the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, who became the League's new religious director. Esther Bilon retained her position as director of the LUC's Beatification of Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky Committee; and Harry Makar will continue as editor of *Action*, the League's publication.

Ukrainian Literature at Rutgers University in New Brunswick.—For the third semester now Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J. is offering a course (3 credits) in Ukrainian literature in translation. The course, which is financially supported by the Ukrainian community of New Brunswick, now has twenty-two students and is taught by Dr. Larissa M.L. Onyshkevych.

Among the students are four from St. Sophia Ukrainian Orthodox Seminary in Bound Brook, N.J.; many others are of second, third and fourth generation Ukrainian descent; about a third are of other ethnic origins (e.g., Italian, Hungarian, German, Anglo-Saxon). Due to student interest Dr. Onyshkevych is also teaching a first-year course in Ukrainian language.

Last spring three students received prizes for their work in Ukrainian literature courses; all three recipients also chose to do extra work during the summer by translating a chosen work from Ukrainian literature courses; all three recipients also chose to do extra work during the summer by translating a chosen work from Ukrainian literature into English. Because of the obvious benefit of such prizes, it is hoped that students in the 1975-76

courses may also be given such awards. Anyone interested in sponsoring such prizes (in the sum of \$100) may contact the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Rutgers University, 31 Mine Street, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

Ukrainian Culture and Civilization and Language Courses at Kent State University.—This fall a Ukrainian Culture and Civilization course will be offered at the Trumbull Campus of Kent State University in Warren, Ohio. The course will be offered through the Experimental Programs Division for three hours of credit at the upper divisional level.

The Ukrainian Culture and Civilization course will be taught in English and will present the student with a well rounded view of the country and its people. Included with the course will be the history of the country, as well as a history of Ukrainians in the United States. Also to be covered are such topics as Ukrainian literature, customs, and music. Additional information may be obtained from: Ethnic Heritage Program, Trumbull Campus, 4314 Mahoning Avenue, N.W., Warren, OH 44483.

The Ukrainian language is now offered at the Trumbull, Geauga and Ashtabula Campuses of Kent State University through the Critical Language Program. Three four-hour and three three-hour courses are available, which enable a student to accumulate 21 undergraduate hours. The Ukrainian courses fulfill the language requirements for almost all units of the University, except for those such as chemistry, which specifically calls for Russian or German.

For those who are not registered at Kent State University, it will be necessary to contact the Administration Office of the appropriate campus, or to write directly to the Critical Language Programs: Trumbull Campus, 4314 Mahoning Avenue, N.W., Warren, OH 44483; Ashtabula Campus, 3345 W. 14th Street, Ashtabula, OH 44004; Geauga Campus, 206 E. Park Street, Chardon, OH 44024.

Plenary Session of UCCA Executive Board Held in New York.—A great number of problems connected with UCCA activities were the subject of the UCCA Executive Board's plenary session, held Saturday, September 6, 1975 at the Ukrainian Institute of America in New York City. The meeting, the first after the summer vacation, was attended by 27 members and was chaired by Joseph Lesawyer, UCCA Executive Vice President, with Bohdan Kazanivsky, a UCCA Secretary, taking the minutes. In a one-minute pause of silence the assembled paid final tribute to three former UCCA executive officers who passed away during the last few months: the late Theodore Mynyk, Vasyl Shabatura and Prof. Dr. Nicholas Chubaty.

UCCA Executive Director Ivan Bazarko reported on several steps and decisions taken by the Presidium of the UCCA Executive Board, including the establishment of a Ukrainian Women's Year Committee; UCCA representatives at the WACL Conference in Brazil; the International Women's Conference Mexico City; the University of California at Berkeley; plans for the 12th UCCA Congress in October, 1976, and the progress of remodeling the UCCA-UNWLA building in New York City.

Mr. Apollinare Osadca, the architect, reported that among the contractors who submitted bids for remodeling the UCCA-UNWLA building

there was only one Ukrainian contractor. The Committee accepted by vote the most advantageous bid of those presented by the architect.

Present at the meeting were also Mrs. Lidia Burachynska, Mrs. Ulana Celewych and Mr. Andrew Semotiuk, representative of the WCFU, who outlined efforts of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians and the Ukrainian Women's Committee to intervene in the U.N. on behalf of Ukrainian women political prisoners in the USSR.

Prof. Dr. Antin Shutka, present head of the UCCA Branch Detroit-East, and Mr. Bohdan Fedorak, its former chairman, reported that upon the initiative of their UCCA Branch, the University of Detroit is sponsoring a two-day scholarly conference on nationalism in the USSR, in which a total of 53 scholars will take part, including seven Ukrainian scholars. All the assembled congratulated the UCCA leaders in Detroit for their action and voted an appropriate donation to help in implementing this worthwhile effort.

Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, reported the highlights of his activities on behalf of the UCCA in the Nation's capital, which included:

- * His radio broadcasts in Miami, Fla., Buffalo, N.Y., and others;
- * The Solzhenitsyn visit to the U.S.A. and its impact upon the American people, and efforts to meet the Russian novelist on the Ukrainian American forum;

* Despite the "summit" conference in Helsinki, the "Captive Nations Week" of 1975 was a notable success as regards the many statements by U.S. legislators in Congress;

* Meeting of ethnic leaders with President Ford on July 25, 1975—in which he and Mr. Lesawyer took part—was very beneficial in that it was the first time in American history that a President sought advice from ethnic leaders on the eve of a great international conference, even though the President's statement on Eastern Europe was altered prior to his departure for Helsinki;

* The UCCA applications for Bicentennial grants are still active;

* Extreme efforts must be made for the passage of a Congressional Resolution calling on the President to proclaim January 22, 1976 as "Ukrainian Independence Day," because the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917, like the American Revolution of 1776—was directed toward "independence from empire," and all UCCA Branches must appeal to their respective senators and congressmen, urging them to introduce appropriate resolutions to that effect.

Upon Prof. Dobriansky's suggestion the UCCA Executive Board voted unanimously to apply for membership in the WACL as an associate member. Also, his suggestion to accept a proposal from Mr. Aloysius Mazewski, President of the Polish American Congress, to initiate talks on mutual cooperation in the U.S.A., was accepted. Dr. Dobriansky also proposed to have a whole-page ad in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in March, 1976, with the Shevchenko monument and a brief history of the Ukrainian settlement in America featured.

Subsequently, Mrs. Ulana Diachuk, UCCA Treasurer, reported on the finances of the UCCA. She stated that a UCCA contribution was made to the World Congress of Free Ukrainians and payments were made for the

remodeling of the UCCA-UNWLA building. She further stated that intensive preparations are now in full swing for the 1975 annual fund-raising campaign for the Ukrainian National Fund, which will begin on October 15, 1975.

Dr. Anthony Zukowsky, chairman of the Committee for the Study of Ukrainian Life in the U.S.A., stressed the need for a number of improvements in the system of our organizational life, including the organizational structure of the UCCA, which problems will be discussed at the meeting of the Committee on October 25, 1975. Scheduled to speak at the meeting are Dr. Roman Drazniowsky (Ukrainian schools); Prof. Peter Stercho (Ukrainian scholarship and culture); Mrs. Christine Kulchycky and Dr. Bohdan Futey (activization of the younger generation) and Mr. Omelan Pleshkevych (economic sector). Mr. Bazarko and Dr. Michael Danyluk will discuss proposed improvements in the organizational structure of the UCCA.

Other matters discussed at the meeting included reports by Messrs. Lesawyer and Bazarko on the work and plans of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee; a plan for activities in the U.N., submitted by Dr. Vincent Shandor, forwarded to the UCCA Policy Board; resolutions submitted by Prof. Ivan Wowchuk, head of the Policy Board, which resolutions were forwarded to the Presidium of the UCCA Executive Board, and the forthcoming visit of the Byzantine Choir of Utrecht to the United States.

OBITUARIES: a) Prof. Nicholas D. Chubaty, eminent Ukrainian scholar and historian, died on July 10, 1975 at the age of 85. In his message UCCA President, Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, issued the following statement:

"On behalf of the UCCA and myself I express the profoundest sorrow and shock over the sudden death of Dr. Mykola D. Chubaty. To his wife and family we extend our deepest condolences and prayers in their hour of bereavement. Dr. Chubaty, whom we honored just a few months ago on the 30th anniversary of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, will long be remembered for his solid and lasting contributions to the freedom of man, of Ukraine and of the United States. He founded the *Quarterly*, labored long in the councils of the UCCA, and was a great advocate of Ukrainian religious freedom. He was an internationally eminent scholar and historian, a prolific writer, a firm Ukrainian patriot, and an influential, intellectual force in his America. We shall miss him for his warm personality, liberal outlook, and constructive criticisms. His contributions and his great person are the precious legacy he has left for us, and we revere his name and enduring power in them."

(Cf. Prof. Wasyl Lencyk's feature article on Prof. Chubaty, appearing elsewhere in this issue.—Ed.).

b) Dr. Michael Sosnowsky, outstanding Ukrainian writer and journalist and associate editor of *Svoboda*, died suddenly on July 25, 1975 in Jersey City, N.J., at the age of 56.

He was born on December 1, 1919 in the village of Hayi Velyki, near Ternopil, Western Ukraine. After his graduation from a gymnasium in 1938, he attended the Ukrainian Catholic Theological Academy in Lviv, but the outbreak of the German-Polish war, and the subsequent occupation of Western Ukraine by the USSR, prevented him from becoming a priest. He entered

the medical faculty at the University of Lviv, but his studies were again interrupted by the collapse of the Eastern front and the reoccupation of Western Ukraine by Soviet troops.

After the war he and his wife lived in Fuerth, West Germany, and he continued his law studies at the University of Erlangen and graduated in 1948; in the same year he entered the Ukrainian Free University in Munich to study Ukrainian jurisprudence, receiving an M.A. degree in 1949.

That year he emigrated to Canada and continued his education at the University of Toronto, from which he received a B.A. degree in library science; in 1968 he also acquired a degree of doctor of political science at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich.

Dr. Sosnowsky was an active and prominent member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and took part in anti-Polish, anti-Soviet and anti-Nazi Ukrainian resistance activities, becoming one of the members of the supreme council of the organization. While in Germany he was editor or associate editor of such Ukrainian newspapers as *Chas* (Time) and *Samostiynyk* (The Independent), and after his arrival in Canada he became a co-founder of the Canadian League for Ukraine's Liberation, and editor-in-chief of its organ, *Homin Ukrainy* (Echo of Ukraine). Also, in 1967 he became an accredited correspondent of *Svoboda* with the Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa, and in 1972, as executive director of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU), he was an accredited correspondent of the same daily at the U.N. He joined the editorial staff of *Svoboda* in Jersey City on September 1, 1973 as its associate editor.

In April, 1958, he attended the Preparatory Conference of the World Anti-Communist League, along with other Ukrainian leaders in Mexico. In the spring of 1968 Dr. Sosnowsky, with a group of Ukrainian representatives from the U.S., Canada, and Europe took part in the U.N. International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran, Iran.

On December 7, 1974, Dr. Sosnowsky was one of the speakers at the conference on "Ukraine in a Changing World," organized in New York on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, delivering a paper on "Dissent in Contemporary Ukraine and the Idea of Secession of the Ukrainian SSR." His articles and book review appeared in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

In addition to his articles in various Ukrainian newspapers, Dr. Sosnowsky wrote two important books in Ukrainian: *Ukraine in International Relations 1945-1965*, and *Dmytro Dontsov: A Political Portrait*, a critical study and analysis of modern Ukrainian nationalism and its ideologist, the late D. Dontsov. He was also an associate editor of *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, for which he composed a very extensive index.

Dr. Sosnowsky was a member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society; the Association of Canadian Slavists; the Association of Ukrainian Journalists of Canada and the U.S.; a member of the executive board of the Canadian League for Ukraine's Liberation (1949-1970), and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee; in the U.S. he was president of the Senior TUSM society; vice chairman of the Newark-Irvington, N.J. UCCA Branch, and chairman of the Publicity and Information Committee of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee of America.

c) **Wasył Shabatūra**, one of the oldest Ukrainian American pioneers, past president and lifetime honorary president of the Ukrainian National Aid Association (UNAA), and one of the founders of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, died on July 7, 1975 in Pittsburgh, Pa. at the age of 91.

Born on July 7, 1884 in Krevyche, Peremyshliany district, Western Ukraine, he came to America in 1907 and settled in McKees Rock, Pa., and later on moved to Pittsburgh, where he held hotel employment for a number of years. In 1920 he was elected financial secretary-treasurer of the UNAA, the fourth largest Ukrainian American fraternal association, which position he held until 1942. In that year he was elected president of the association in which post he remained until his retirement in 1962.

Mr. Shabatūra was one of the founders in May, 1940 in Washington, D.C. of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and served as one of its vice presidents. He was an enthusiastic worker for the well-being of his people, and devoted to his Ukrainian Orthodox Church, to which he dedicated much of his time and toil.

d) **Dr. Volodymyr Huk**, a noted Ukrainian community leader, physician and sportsman, who won many Ukrainian national tennis titles, died on June 23, 1975 in Livingston, N.J. at the age of 55.

Dr. Huk was born in Otnia, Stanyslaviv province, on April 21, 1920. He began his medical studies in Ukraine and completed them in Western Europe after World War II. Coming to the United States in 1948, he settled in Newark, N.J., where he lived with his family and practiced medicine.

An outstanding physician, Dr. Huk was also a very active member of the Ukrainian community. He was a former member of the executive board of the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America; former president of the Newark Branch of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America; former president of the Ukrainian Sports Association "Chornomorska Sitch," and other professional organizations, including the American Medical Association, the New Jersey Medical Society and the Essex County Medical Society.

e) **Julius Epstein**, prominent American writer and journalist, died on July 3, 1975, in California at the age of 74. He was born in Vienna in 1901. On his grandmother's side he was related to the famous Austrian composer Johann Strauss, while his grandfather, Julius Epstein, an accomplished pianist, was a close friend of Brahms.

As a student at the University of Jena, he was one of those who made a revolution, in the name of Marx. He soon discovered—and rejected—the deceptions and crimes practiced by the self-styled apostles of the false prophet. Epstein's early intellectual life was marked by bookish knowledge of Marx, and literary and personal contacts with Freud and poet Karl Krauss. But his existence was shattered when Nazi killers were on his heels and he had to flee abroad.

In America, where he began the second part of his life, he embraced the optimism and missionary sense of the young and dynamic republic. Out of the combined Austrian tradition and ruin, Nazi homicidal-suicidal fury, Communist insincerity and savagery, and American progress and purpose

grew Epstein's commitment to one overriding and fundamental idea—namely, that no idea or ideology is good and true enough to justify cruelty and extermination.

During the period from Rapallo to the Berlin Wall, Epstein, a gifted journalist, repeatedly scooped his better-paid but less sharp-sighted colleagues. As a newspaperman he was most proud of his discovery that the Austrian state treaty called for the forced repatriation of refugees from Communism. Thanks to Epstein's disclosure, the treaty was changed and many lives were saved.

As a Congressional consultant, he brought to the fore the truth about the Katyn Forest slaughter of some 10,000 Polish officers by the NKVD. He also played an important part in the reconciliation of the United States with Germany; he assisted in international efforts to secure the release of Rudolf Hess.

Mr. Epstein also wrote **Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to Present**, and along with the American Civil Liberties Union and Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, UCCA President, he sued the U.S. Defense Department to declassify official documents regarding the U.S. government agreements on the forced repatriation of anti-Communist refugees. He also penned two articles for *The Ukrainian Quarterly*: "American Forced Repatriation" (Vol. X), and "German-Ukrainian Operations During World War I" (Vol. XV).

In his eulogy at Mr. Epstein's funeral, Dr. Stefan Possony, said, among other things:

"As a Hoover historian, Epstein's greatest satisfaction was that he documented the bloody story of the mass repatriations and deportations which the U.K. and the U.S. forced upon anti-Communist Russians and Ukrainians; and which, as we all know, resulted in the enslavement and death of more than one million human beings. For this work, and during the last two years of his life, he finally received the recognition he had never craved but which he richly deserved."

II. UKRAINIANS IN THE DIASPORA

CANADA

Prime Minister Trudeau Meets with Ukrainian Canadian Representatives.—On September 13, 1975 Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada met with leaders of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) at a luncheon-meeting and discussed problems of the Ukrainian community in Canada, including financial assistance, multicultural programs and continuous human rights violations in Ukraine.

The UCC delegation was led by its president Serge Radchuk, while Mr. Trudeau was accompanied by Defense Minister James A. Richardson, Ron Robert, special assistant to the Prime Minister, and Liberal Party leader Charles Huband of Manitoba.

The Ukrainian group presented the Canadian Prime Minister with five two-page briefs summarizing their demands.

Dr. Simon J. Kalba, UCC executive director, said that the Ukrain-

ian Canadian Committee was in need of a substantial financial grant from the government in order to support performing arts, reference libraries, museums, crafts, research, youth organizations, and so forth. He further stated that the UCC coordinates the activities of 26 organizations and requested an initial grant of \$3.5 million out of a total \$10 million.

The Canadian Prime Minister was also asked for more support of multicultural programs. The UCC officers asked for a special deputy minister for multiculturalism, support for Ukrainian language education, reduced postal rates for the ethnic press, and multilingual and multicultural radio and television programming.

Turning to human rights and international relations, the group expressed concern over the recently signed Helsinki agreement. Mr. Trudeau was aware of its concern over the document, from the UCC's previous communication to him on the matter.

Furthermore, the UCC urged "the Canadian government to impress on the Soviet Union its basic desire of fostering the implementation of a basic tenet of the agreement—the reunification of members of families between Soviet Ukraine and Canada," said one of the briefs.

Mr. Radchuk said that cultural exchanges between the two countries lack balance. He said that Soviet officials screen Canadian artists and choose artists in the USSR to visit Canada.

Dr. Kalba showed the Canadian officials a letter from Vyacheslav Chornovil in which he renounced his Soviet citizenship and requested Canadian citizenship. Dr. Kalba also stressed the continued mistreatment of Valentyn Moroz and protested the visit of 26 members of the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute to Canada.

In addition, the Ukrainian representatives requested that immigration be linked to other aspects of Canadian-Soviet relations, especially trade and commerce. Wheat deals were specifically cited by the UCC. The Canadian government was also asked to open a consulate in Kiev and to establish an information center in Western Europe to serve Ukrainian refugees.

The UCC received no commitment on their requests although Dr. Kalba said that Mr. Trudeau's reaction to the grant was "amenable."

The meeting was held in Winnipeg, and Mr. Trudeau agreed to a follow-up meeting in Ottawa. News of the meeting between the Canadian Prime Minister and the UCC was reported by *The Winnipeg Press*, *The Tribune*, *The Toronto Star* and over the CBC.

Senator Yuzyk Chosen Delegate to NATO Assembly.—This year the 21st Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly of NATO was held in Copenhagen, Denmark, from September 22 to 26, 1975. Both chambers of the Parliament of Canada were represented by 21 delegates—3 senators and 18 members of the House of Commons, with Paul Langlois, M.P., as leader.

Senator Paul Yuzyk, Progressive Conservative of Winnipeg, represented the Senate, where he is a member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Relations. At the NATO Assembly he was a member of the powerful Political Committee. Sen. Yuzyk is highly qualified to serve on this committee as he is professor of Russian and Soviet History at the University of Ottawa, conducting also courses in Soviet Foreign Policy and Canadian-Soviet Relations.

He was a Canadian delegate at the 18th NATO Assembly session, held in Bonn, Germany, in November, 1972, and also at the 20th session in London, England, in November, 1974. He was active on two committees—the Political, and the Education, Cultural and Information. Sen. Yuzyk was instrumental in the adoption of resolutions dealing with East-West relations and the dissident movement in the USSR, making prominent the case of Valentyn Moroz, the imprisoned and persecuted Ukrainian historian.

New Ukrainian Orthodox Metropolitan in Canada.—Archbishop Andrew was named Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox Church of Canada at its Sobor, held at the University of Manitoba, on July 2 to 5, 1975, in Winnipeg.

He thus became the third head of the Church, succeeding Metropolitan Ilarion (Ivan Ohienko), who died on March 29, 1972. The Sobor also bestowed the title of Metropolitan on Archbishop Michael, who was the acting head of the Church until now. Upon his own wish and with the approval of the Sobor, Archbishop Michael will head the Eastern Eparchy of the Church.

Also, on the proposal of the Synod of Bishops and the Church Consistory, the Sobor elevated Bishop Borys to the rank of Archbishop, and named Protopresbyter Nicholas Debryn as Bishop; he will be consecrated at a later date.

The Sobor also elected the Church's governing organs, that is, the Consistory, elected for a period of five years. Reelected head of the Consistory was Protopresbyter Dmytro Luchak.

Attending the conclave were 250 delegates, 75 priests and some 300 guests. In addition to business proceedings, which ranged from administrative matters to the Church's stand on the current repression of the Ukrainian people, the Sobor also honored Ukrainian Orthodox women in recognition of their services to the Church and the Ukrainian people.

ITALY

"Ukrainian Days" Are Held in Rome.—Fifteen Ukrainian Catholic Bishops, led by Joseph Cardinal Slipyj, over 120 priests and close to 4,000 Ukrainian Catholics from Western Europe, the U.S., Canada, and Australia, as well as Yugoslavia and Poland, launched the festive "Ukrainian Days" on July 12, 1975 in Rome, in conjunction with Holy Year.

The objective of these festivities, which included an Archiepiscopal Synod and a congress of the laity, was the recognition of Joseph Cardinal Slipyj as Patriarch of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. This title has been denied to Cardinal Slipyj by Pope Paul VI.

Bishop Isidore Borecky of Toronto, in his sermon during the outdoor services, said "Whether anybody likes it or not, His Beatitude Josyf is our Patriarch." The same idea permeated Bishop Ivan Prashko's homily during the Sunday afternoon concert at the Vatican's largest auditorium, where the Pope holds his public audiences. It was filled by some 4,000 persons, including 14 cardinals and many distinguished political leaders and diplomats. Bishop Prashko, who come from Australia, spoke in Ukrainian and Italian.

On Saturday morning, a historical service was held at St. Peter's Basilica, celebrated by Cardinal Slipyj, assisted by 14 Ukrainian bishops.

The Archiepiscopal Synod was held on Monday, July 14, 1975. At the same time, the congress of the Ukrainian Patriarchal World Federation for the Unity of Church and People was held on July 15, 1975, at the Studite Monastery in Castel Gandolfo, which was attended by 90 delegates from four continents. The Congress sent two memoranda—one to Pope Paul VI, informing him that the question of the patriarchate was for them "an accomplished fact"; and the second to Jean Cardinal Villot, the Vatican's Secretary of State, criticizing the Vatican's failure to speak out in defense of persecuted Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine.

Some 15 Italian and other newspapermen attended a press conference, which dealt with the matter of the Ukrainian Catholic patriarchate and the suppression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church by the Soviet government.

Absent for reasons of health were Archbishop-Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn (USA), Bishop Andrew Roborecky (Canada), and Bishop Joseph Martynets (Brazil). Absent for unknown reasons were Bishop Andrew Sapelak (Argentina) and Archbishop Gabriel Bukatko and Bishop Joachim Segedi, both from Yugoslavia.

MEXICO

Ukrainian Delegation at World Conference of Women in Mexico City.—Taking part in the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City, June 19-July 2, 1975, were some 30 Ukrainian delegates from the free world. The purpose of the Conference, the first of its kind ever held, was to improve the status of women by promoting equality, development and peace. The Conference consisted of two parts—the official intergovernmental World Conference and the independent nongovernmental Tribune, which provided a forum for interested groups and individuals.

The Ukrainian delegation took part in the Tribune for the most part, although two women participated in the official Conference—one as an observer of the World Movement of Mothers, and another as a member of an official delegation.

The Ukrainian delegates succeeded in making known the plight of Ukrainian women prisoners in the USSR to the officials and delegates attending the Conference and the Tribune, totaling about 7,000 from all around the globe. One of the most effective methods was the 48-hour hunger strike outside the Tribune building. A large sign in English and Spanish as well as women in various types of Ukrainian attire attracted Tribune participants as well as the media. Literature in English and Spanish was widely distributed, petitions were signed and interviews and discussions were held. The Mexican media gave extensive coverage to the hunger strike, with nearly every paper carrying a picture or report, and TV and radio reports as well.

A Memorandum concerning Ukrainian women prisoners and human rights was presented to the Conference president, Dr. Pedro Ojeda. It was to be forwarded to the UN Secretariat for the attention of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The Memorandum and a press release were also distributed to all Conference delegates.

During discussion periods at the Tribune, the issues of Ukrainian women prisoners, amnesty and equal rights were brought up by Ukrainian delegates and evoked reactions from Soviet participants and their adherents. A press conference held by the Ukrainian delegation brought forth a good turnout, including a vocal representative of *Pravda*.

At a hospitality booth and exhibit of Ukrainian folk art and pictures of the women prisoners, material was distributed to the visitors, including Soviets. The Ukrainian delegates were in contact with the press, various Human Rights committees (Amnesty International, International League for the Rights of Man) and several other groups. Members of the delegation took part in receptions, including their own, where they had opportunities for contacts with Conference and other delegates and were able to raise Ukrainian issues. Also, the Ukrainian delegates from the U.S. were received by the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Joseph Jova, who was presented with a copy of the Memorandum and other papers.

In an atmosphere of differing political views and various cultures conflicts were bound to erupt. For instance, women from developing countries complained that poor women were not being given sufficient attention and that women from privileged nations were concerned primarily with sexuality and achieving higher executive powers, etc. Also, at a briefing for U.S. delegates at the U.S. Embassy, the meeting was almost disrupted by radical elements.

At the conclusion of the Conference, a 10-year World Plan of Action to improve the status of two billion women was approved. Also, a Declaration of Mexico called for a new world economic order to help the poorer nations and urged an end to colonialism, Zionism and apartheid. The Plan is not legally binding but provides for a monitoring system, as stated by Helvi Sipila, Secretary General of the Conference.

Taking part in the Conference were the following delegates from various Ukrainian organizations: Coordinator—Andriy Semotiuk; Chairpersons—Mary Beck, Helen Prociuk, Ulana Celewych and Maria Kwitkowsky. From the United States—Mary Dushnyck and Halya Hirniak (UCCA), Ulana Diachuk, Olga Stawnychy, Camille Smorodsky, Daria Stepaniak, Halya and Roxolana Klymuk, Stefania Bukshowana, Valentyna Mushynsky, Natalia Chomut, Maria Zarytska, Roman Chaykowsky, Dorothy Fitzpatrick and Helen Evans. From Canada—Bohdanna Chuma, Christina Isayiw, Helen Hnatyshyn, Olena Lozynsky, Olha Zaverucha and Anna Ostafichuk. From Australia—Zirka Yaskewych and her sister. From Argentina—Marta Sterniuk and Volodymyr Sheparowych.

III. IN CAPTIVE UKRAINE

Religious Persecution in Western Ukraine Reported.—Citing the 35th edition of the *Chronicle of Current Events*, the Russian-language underground publication, the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners based in New York reported an intensification of religious persecution by the KGB in Western Ukraine. The *Chronicle* said that on December 22, 1974, a Ukrainian Catholic priest by the name of Vynnytsky was stopped on a street in Lviv and fined 50 *karbovantsi* for celebrating the Liturgy in his apartment.

Several people were arrested in Kolomyia in 1973 for religious activities, including Revs. Dmyterko and Petro Chuchman. Rev. Dmyterko was to become a bishop after death of Rev. Ivan Slyzniuk. Towards the end of 1974 the quarters of the three older nuns in Lviv were searched by the KGB. The officers confiscated several prayerbooks and threatened the nuns with arrest.

The Chronicle also reported that a teacher in Odessa, A.B. Holombiyevsky, is in danger of being confined to a psychiatric ward for harboring "abnormal convictions."

Plyushch's Wife Pleads With American Astronauts for Husband.—Tatiana Zhytnykova Plyushch, wife of Leonid Plyushch, 36-year-old Ukrainian mathematician incarcerated at the Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric prison, appealed to the three astronauts who were about to take part in the joint U.S.-space venture to raise their voices on behalf of her imprisoned husband.

She said she was appealing to the American spacemen as "the last desperate hope" to save her husband, who, she said, is being tortured by drug treatments at the asylum because of his beliefs.

"The Soviet leadership has shown that it is more important to break one of its freedom-minded people than to meet the demands and requests of public opinion from those Western countries with which it is ready to cooperate on earth and in the skies," Mrs. Plyushch was quoted by the Associated Press on July 6, 1975 in a dispatch from Moscow.

Mrs. Plyushch asked the spacemen to help in the case of her husband and four others: Yelena Sakharov, wife of dissident-physicist Dr. Andrei D. Sakharov; she has an eye disease for which authorities had refused to grant her treatment abroad; Vladimir Bukovsky, serving a seven-year term on a charge of "anti-Soviet activity," and two Jewish activists, Mark Nashpits and Boris Tsetlionok, serving five-year sentences in Siberia.

Ukrainian Writer Rudenko Appeals to Brezhnev.—As was widely reported by the international press, in April 1975 the KGB arrested two members of the Soviet branch of Amnesty International for their human rights activities. They were Andrei Tverdokhlebov, a Russian cyberneticist from Moscow, and Mykola Rudenko, a Ukrainian writer from Kiev. Their Amnesty groups had been working in defense of political prisoners in Yugoslavia, Spain, and Sri Lanka, yet they were charged with "anti-Soviet activity" and, on orders from the prosecutor in Moscow, their homes were searched. Rudenko was released a few days after his arrest. He was, however, expelled from the Ukrainian Writers' Union (one year earlier he had been expelled from the Communist Party). The fate of Tverdokhlebov has remained unknown.

On July 3, 1975, in response to his and Tverdokhlebov's arrest, Mykola Rudenko wrote an open letter to the Secretary General of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, complaining about the lawlessness of the secret police. Copies of the letters were received by Western newsmen in Moscow and have reached the West (in the U.S. the letter was distributed by the "Smolenskyp" Information Service of Baltimore, Md., on September 15, 1975).

The letter is characterized by Rudenko's emphasis on the impeccability of his credentials as a Soviet citizen—his working-class background, long-

time membership in the party, heroic participation in World War II, and on the unconstitutional nature of the actions against him on the part of the Soviet bureaucracy. This last point he illustrated with the fact that the prosecutor in Moscow, and not the prosecutor in Kiev, gave the order for the search of his apartment, thus violating the constitutional sovereignty of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

Mykola Rudenko was born on December 19, 1920, in a village in the Voroshylovhrad region in eastern Ukraine. In 1939 he was about to enter Kiev State University, when he was drafted into the Red Army. For the duration of the war he served as a political commissar. During the siege of Leningrad he was wounded, spent a year in various hospitals, then returned to the front. For his service in the army he was awarded numerous medals and decorations. After the war, Rudenko entered the literary profession, and at one time was the party committee secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union. Between 1947 and 1956, ten separate collections of Rudenko's poetry appeared in print; in 1955, his first prose work, the novel *Wind in the Face*, also appeared in print. For three years, from 1947 to 1950, he served as the editor-in-chief of the journal *Dnipro*, the official organ of the central committee of the Comcomol of Ukraine.

In the concluding paragraph of his letter to Brezhnev, Rudenko wrote:

...I believe in the human mind, I believe that it will overcome! This is inevitable. And there is nothing evil in the fact that Western nations are helping us free ourselves from Stalinism—I welcome this help. It comes not from the bourgeoisie, as some assure us, but from the high culture of the spirit...

New Cabinet of Ministers in Kiev.—On July 4, 1975 all Soviet Ukrainian newspapers in Ukraine carried a complete rundown of the new members of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, as announced by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

The new council is headed by O. Liashko and includes 42 cabinet members. In addition to this group, 16 other government committee heads are included, among them W. Fedorchuk, head of the Ukrainian branch of the Soviet Secret Police (KGB).

Congresswoman Fails to See Moroz in Prison.—Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick (R.-N.J.) failed in her attempts to get permission from Soviet authorities to visit Valentyn Moroz during a congressional tour of the USSR, but she angered the Soviet hosts with her efforts, according to the August 14, 1975 issue of *The Christian Science Monitor*. Elizabeth Pond, staff correspondent for the newspaper, wrote that because of the various proddings by the Congressmen about violations of human rights in the USSR and the curtailment of emigration rights, several heated moments flared up in discussions between the Soviet authorities and the visiting American legislators. In one of such discussions Rep. Fenwick was accused of "damaging Soviet-American relations."

"It's an obsession with you, isn't it?" asked one member of the Supreme Soviet in response to the continued American inquiries about repression of human and civil rights in the USSR.

Rep. Fenwick, who hails from Somerville, N.J., replied that it was,

"just as patriotism is an obsession for Russians, who consider those wishing to emigrate as traitors." She was denied permission to see Moroz, Ukrainian historian, who is serving a nine-year sentence at Vladimir Prison.

Karavansky Meets Wife in Mordovian Concentration Camp.—Svyatoslav Karavansky, Ukrainian philologist and poet, met his wife, Nina Strokata-Karavanska, a microbiologist, in a Mordovian concentration camp infirmary in April, 1975, after not seeing each other for several years, according to the press release of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Abroad). Both were arrested by the Soviet secret police on charges of "anti-Soviet activity."

Karavansky was tried for the third time in prison in April, 1969, and received eight additional years in prison to the eight-year sentence he was handed down in November 1965. He will be released in 1980 after serving more than 30 years.

His wife was arrested in 1971 and sentenced in 1972 to four years in concentration camps for "anti-Soviet agitation." She was initially fired from her job in Odessa and harassed by the KGB for refusing to denounce her husband after his second and third trials.

According to reports from the Mordovian camps where the two Ukrainian dissidents are being confined, Karavansky did not recognize his wife at first sight due to her extremely weakened condition as a result of a serious ailment.

At the end of 1974 Strokata-Karavansky, Iryna Senyk, Stephania Shabatura, Daria Husak and Nadia Svitlychna-Shumuk refused to work and asked to be released from prison in deference to International Women's Year.

Svitlychna and Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets were punished with two weeks in solitary confinement, while Svitlychna was also denied the privilege of seeing her son, Yarema.

In January, 1975, Strokata and Shabatura were placed into the camp's prison for three and six months, respectively. They again refused to fulfill their work quota and were placed on a severe prison diet which left them emaciated.

Soviet Review Attacks Senator Yuzyk.—Sen. Paul Yuzyk of Canada was severely criticized for his book, *For a Better Canada* in a review written by L. Ovdienko in the current issue of the *Ukrainian Historical Review* (Ukrainsky Istorychnyi Zhurnal).

The author began his review by calling Senator Yuzyk "one of the leaders of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist emigre organizations" and a "remnant of the trenches of the Cold War."

"The blinders of anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism are hindering Sen. Yuzyk's realistic appraisal of the essence of peaceful coexistence. The militant nationalist does not waste a single opportunity in order to disseminate his reactionary ideas which show his deep-rooted hate for the USSR and the socialist system in Ukraine," wrote Ovdienko.

According to the Communist writer, Sen. Yuzyk attempts to sow "animosity and disputes between Russian and Ukrainian peoples on historical grounds, to defame the great achievements of the Ukrainian people under socialism, and to undermine the friendship between the Soviet nations..."

OBITUARY: a) **Pavel Virsky**, the choreographer who raised Ukrainian folk dancing to unprecedented heights and made it famous all over the world, died in Kiev on Tuesday, July 8, at the age of 69, according to TASS, the official Soviet news agency.

Until his death, Virsky headed the Ukrainian Dance Company which he founded in 1951 and which he took on countless tours around the globe, including the U.S. and Canada. The ensemble made its U.S. debut in 1962 at the old Metropolitan Opera and appeared twice more in the U.S., drawing repeated acclaim from the American critics. The choreography, the techniques and the style of the Virsky dancers made a strong impression on many young Ukrainians in the U.S. and Canada, inspiring them to pursue this unique and popular facet of Ukrainian culture.

Pavel Virsky was born in Odessa on November 25, 1905. It was in this city that he completed the Music and Drama Institute and began his professional career in 1929 with the opera and ballet theater as a solo dancer and choreographer. In subsequent years, Virsky's work took him to many cities in Ukraine as well as to Moscow and Leningrad. He was premier danseur, ballet master, director and choreographer. During World War II he worked as assistant director of the Red Army Chorus.

A sophisticated expert in the field of folk choreography and Ukrainian national dances, Virsky was not content with a purely ethnographic approach to the popular dance idiom. He made use of the classical dance and the technical achievements of professional dancing to enrich the Ukrainian folk dance.

Pavel Virsky was awarded many titles, including that of People's Artist of the USSR and the Shevchenko Prize in 1965.

b) **Volodymyr Kuts**, who became the first male athlete to win two gold medals for the Soviet Olympic team, died Saturday, August 16, 1975, of an apparent heart attack at the age of 48, according to TASS, the official Soviet press agency.

Kuts, who was born on February 7, 1927, in the village of Oleksyne, Sumy oblast, in Ukraine, won his gold medals at the XVIth Olympiad held in Melbourne, Australia, in 1956, establishing new Olympic records in the 5,000 and 10,000-meter runs. His record of 13 minutes and 39.6 seconds in the 5,000-meter run still stands. He also set a world record of 28 minutes and 30.4 seconds in the 10,000-meter run that same year. In 1957, the Ukrainian runner, popularly known as "Iron Man Kuts," set a world record of 13 minutes and 55 seconds for 5,000-meters.

Volodymyr Kuts introduced a new style of long distance running in the early fifties when he won both the 5,000 and 10,000 runs in the USSR. A man of great stamina, he alternated his pace—from slow smooth runs to spurts—a technique that was murderous to his opponents.

Kuts won the European title in 1956 and 1957 and was named "Sportsman of the Year" by Europe's sports writers.

In 1961, Volodymyr Kuts was graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Physical Education and, upon retirement from active competition, coached track and field. For his achievements, he was awarded the Order of Lenin and held the title of "Merited Master of Sports."

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