

The

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Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

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
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UNDER THE BLANKET OF DETENTE

Editorial

...My confidence in American power is utterly destroyed. A country that does not know how to use the enormous power it has, has none... The disintegration of the morale of the American political establishment and the crisis of self-confidence which is rocking the whole American people does not augur well for the outcome of America's detente policies..."

*Wolf H. Halsti*¹

This characterization of America by Col. Wolf H. Halsti, Finland's leading foreign affairs analyst and a military and political figure in his own right, may shock many Americans. Indeed, it should.

For the past six years, ever since the Nixon Administration took over the reins of government in Washington, the American people have been living under the spell of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente. They have been lulled into apathy by the "Nixon Doctrine," which enunciated a new era of international cooperation and, in particular, a new era in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. According to the Nixonian propaganda slogan of "no confrontation, but negotiation," American power, prestige and influence around the globe has been gradually de-escalated not by the enemy—say, the Kremlin—but by our own government and our own Congress.

Morality-minded people may attribute this steady decline of the United States to the Watergate disease, corruption in the government and the massive opposition to the Vietnam War in the late 1960's. But, historically, this hardly is the whole story. This downward trend in the disintegration of American power and the diminution of the American voice began even before the Nixon ascendancy to the presidency in the White House. Nixon merely provided the finishing touches to what had become a national disaster of massive proportions. Limitations of space confine us here to an evaluation of the present situation.

¹ Col. Wolf H. Halsti, "Finnish Neutrality—Example or Warning?," *Freedom at Issue*, No. 31 (New York: Freedom House, May-June, 1975).

In commenting on the present calamitous U.S. foreign policy, George Meany, that stalwart conscience of American labor, stated bluntly:

...We believe that American workers should express their views as to any contemplated reassessment of our nation's foreign policy.

We should raise the question as to whether or not that reassessment should be limited to the Middle East or whether it should be a global reassessment, including, of course, our relations with the Soviet Union...²

Mr. Meany adds that "perhaps the most disastrous policy sold to the American people by Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon was this thing called detente."

CASUALTIES OF THE POLICY OF DETENTE

One of the first costs of the policy of detente was the loss of U.S. power and prestige in the United Nations. In its pursuance of detente with the Kremlin the Nixon Administration sidetracked the U.S. role in the international body, which, as we all know, came into being in 1945 largely as a result of this nation's efforts.

The United States, as a world superpower, for many years asserted a considerable influence in the U.N. that was used to enhance and promote the noble objectives for which the United Nations was created. The United States poured more material resources into the U.N. and its specialized agencies than did any other power on earth.

Yet for the past six years, U.S. influence in the international body has been fading away mainly because of the detente policy with the USSR. For the sake of detente the United States barely lifted a finger to help the Republic of China to remain in the U.N., and it was summarily ejected by the U.N., making room for Communist China. U.S. allies all over the world were bewildered and disheartened as they saw the writing on the wall: before the expulsion of Nationalist China from the U.N. Dr. Kissinger was in Peking paving the way for the Nixon visit to Mao.

Likewise UNESCO and ILO, those important agencies of the United Nations, have gradually fallen under the sway of Moscow.

During the final days of the non-Communist Saigon government, the U.N. Secretary General was telling the world that aid to the Vietnamese refugees was a "political matter that the U.N. should avoid." Even before that the U.N. had *de facto* recognized the Viet

² George Meany, *The Shambles of Detente*. Address to the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department, April 8, 1975, Washington, D.C.

Cong group as a "provisional government of South Vietnam," as it had recognized Arafat's PLO. The depths of ignominy were plumbed when the great superpower—the United States—was able to corral a niggardly four votes out of a total 120 member states in opposition to recognition of the PLO.

In May, 1972, both President Nixon and Brezhnev signed a document entitled "Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S.A. and the USSR," which spelled out certain specifics. Among other matters, both sides agreed "to do everything in their power so that conflicts and situations will not arise which would increase international tensions."

Both Nixon and Kissinger were utterly naive in believing the Soviet Russian pledges. As for Brezhnev, as in the case of his predecessors, he never for a moment had any intention of living up to his side of the agreement. Appearing in Havana immediately after signing the agreement with the United States, Brezhnev publicly declared that detente would not in any way bring about a relaxation in the ideological struggle to destroy the so-called capitalistic system and replace it with the beneficent (read, dictatorial) system of world-wide Communism.³

Thus, under the cover of detente, the Kremlin armed Egypt and Syria and pushed them into war against Israel in October, 1973. Nixon and Kissinger pleaded with Brezhnev to agree to the calling of a meeting of the U.N. in an effort to bring about a ceasefire. But for several days there was no response from Moscow. On the contrary, in a message to the Algerians, three days after the Arab attack on Israel, Brezhnev said:

Today more than ever the Arab brotherly solidarity must play its decisive role. Syria and Egypt must not remain alone in their struggle against a perfidious enemy...⁴

Only when the Israelis began to get the upper hand—driving deep into Syria, crossing the west bank of the Suez and entrapping the crack Soviet-trained Egyptian 3rd Army Corps—did the Russians suddenly want a ceasefire.

Contrary to his agreement with the U.S. to prevent "conflicts and situations" which would increase international tensions, Brezhnev did everything he could to increase them. The Kremlin even toyed with the idea of sending its troops into the Middle East. That is how Brezhnev understands the policy of detente.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

THE VIETNAM DEBACLE

Another outstanding casualty of the policy of detente is our unprecedented and ignominious retreat from Southeast Asia, caused not only by our own internal weakness and dissension but also by our leaders' wholly unwarranted trust in Communist promises and agreements.

In January, 1973, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the United States and North Vietnam with the USSR as a guarantor. Conditions of the ceasefire enabled the North Vietnamese to outflank the South Vietnamese Army on every front. According to General William C. Westmoreland, former Army Chief of Staff and commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, "Hanoi's violations of the Paris ceasefire agreement greatly strengthened its military advantage by use of the demilitarized zone, Laos and Cambodia, to say nothing of the large-scale build-up of forces and their reinforcement with modern Soviet materiel..."⁵

General Westmoreland further stated that South Vietnam's sole aim was to hold on to its territory and avoid encroachment along the ceasefire line. But North Vietnam took the opportunity to field 20 combat divisions while flagrantly violating the Paris agreement. The United States had not provided adequate support in contrast to that furnished North Vietnam by the USSR and Red China. Also, despite President Nixon's letter to President Thieu stating that the United States would react vigorously to a major Communist violation of the Paris agreement, the U.S. government was paralyzed by the Case-Church amendment prohibiting the use of funds for combat activities in Southeast Asia. This action not only tied President Ford's hands, but also removed the only meaningful deterrent to a large-scale attack on the part of North Vietnam.

In addition, our mass communications media and an impressive number of our senators and congressmen were openly advocating abandonment of South Vietnam, advancing all sorts of plausible arguments therefor, such as the rampant corruption of the Saigon government, the lack of patriotism of the South Vietnamese people and their unwillingness to fight for their freedom. They conveniently forgot that these people have been fighting for the past twenty-five years or their heroic overcoming of Hanoi's Tet offensive in 1968.

⁵ William C. Westmoreland, "The Demise of South Vietnam," *The New York Times*, May 17, 1975.

THE CRUMBLING ALLIANCE OF EUROPE

The examples of U.S. policies in the Middle East and Indochina illustrate only a part of our global decline as a superpower and a leader of the free world. Yet the repercussions of our wholesale defeat in these two vital areas are wide-ranging and ominous.

President Ford's resolute action in recapturing the *Mayaguez* and his recent visit to Europe helped to dispel doubts about American credibility and reliability, but they do not undo the loss of South Vietnam, Cambodia and perhaps Laos. The NATO summit conference was declared a "success," although it is no secret that this alliance is shaky and dissension-ridden, and is now vastly out-matched by the forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Portugal is regarded as a "lost cause," and Washington has little hope that the United States will be able to keep the Azores base very long.

The problem of Greece and Turkey remains a cause of considerable concern for the Ford Administration, as both countries constitute the Eastern Mediterranean anchor of U.S. strategy. If Portugal goes over to the Communist side, both Spain and Italy would be adversely affected.

But there are other pivotal areas which invite Communist aggression in both Asia and Europe. South Korea and Japan are uneasy, especially as Kim Il Sung, President of North Korea, harps continuously on the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea. President Marcos of the Philippines stated recently that "closer links with the Communist states are the only way to ensure our security and survival." A few days later Manila recognized the Peking regime.

In a similar vein is expressed the apprehension of responsible statesmen of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Burma.

But Soviet pressures are also being heavily felt in other parts of Europe, especially in Finland and Scandinavia, not to mention Berlin and such exposed flanks as Romania and Yugoslavia.

Col. Halsti, quoted at the beginning of this editorial, says that there is an apparent shift in Finland's policy from neutrality to "neutralism," that is, to a position of subservience to Soviet policies hiding behind a mask of independence. These pressures are especially felt in the economic sphere and in the mass communications media.

Soviet build-up of naval and missile power in the Murmansk-Kola area, according to Scandinavian analysts, has a definite expansionist character. It could well be that the Kremlin is developing a far-flung Scandinavian strategy, a "North European pincer movement" in the event of a confrontation with the West.

MOSCOW REAPS FRUIT OF DETENTE

After the fall of South Vietnam, some of our most vocal pundits were pleased to see that there was no undue jubilation in Moscow over the U.S. defeat in Indochina. On the contrary, Brezhnev rants repeatedly that he adheres to a detente policy with the United States. Indeed, why shouldn't he?

He has been rather explicit about wanting more detente and more trade. While sending tanks, armored vehicles and other war materiel to North Vietnam, to the United States he sends "Belarus" tractors at \$8,000 a piece, a price somewhat lower than that of comparative American tractors.

Brezhnev also has called for both a giant summit meeting to sign an agreement on "cooperation and security" in Europe and a summit conference with President Ford to sign a second agreement limiting strategic arms. So, Comrade Brezhnev has done quite well with detente.

The United States may still be a strong power, but, as Col. Halsti says, its power no longer is its own.

President Ford would do well to reassess not only U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, but toward the USSR as well. Such concepts as "detente," "peaceful coexistence" and "accommodation" mean one thing to us, quite another to the Russians. When will the American leadership finally learn this?

There is no return to our traditional isolationism, as some in the Congress would like to see happen. The world has long become too small for this luxury. We also are not rapacious aggressors, as we are pictured in the Communist media. Indeed, some rapaciousness and aggressiveness may be the precise prescription needed to restore our vision in ourselves and thus to be able to employ our God-given strength to promote freedom of individual and nation in a world equally beset by skepticism, weariness and tawdry, two-bit materialistic solutions such as Marxism.

THE DESPAIRING WEST AND THE CONFIDENT EAST

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

About a week after the signing of the Paris Accord in 1973, Pat Buchanan, President Nixon's speechwriter, asked me in Washington's University Club, "Well, Doc, what do you think?" My response was, "Pat, I give the three free nations two to three years before the communist takeover." Though two-thirds accurate so far, this prediction was, of course, no product of any uncanny prescience but rather an educated guess based on perceptions afforded by captive nations genetic analysis, some appreciation of the classical ways of communist psycho-political warfare, the severe compromises engendered by the Paris agreement, and the confused attitude of the majority of our people who had been exposed to a succession of policy vagaries and errors extending back to the 50's.¹ By and large, we failed for some time to comprehend the revolutionary warfare being waged by the communist syndicate, and as late as 1970 an Asianization, rather than a Vietnamization, policy was the wiser course both for our troop withdrawals and a secure Southeast Asia.² However, it is not intended here to rehash this sad episode of U.S. policy; instead, our aim is to place its results in accurate perspective and dwell on detente and its prospects for the future.

TWO NEW CAPTIVE NATIONS

On the occasion of the 17th Observance of Captive Nations Week—July 13-19—it can only be with sadness and a deep sense of tragedy that we realistically view South Vietnam and Cambodia as the most recent additions to the already long list of captive nations. Some analysts are already indulging in all sorts of spurious semantic distinctions and rationalizations about a united Vietnam, coalition

¹ See writer's *Do You Know The Captive Nations? Who's Next—South Vietnam?*, USGPO, Washington, D.C. 1972; also *On The Threshold of New Captive Nations*, USGPO, 1973.

² Author's "Asianization—Not Vietnamization—Is the Winning Concept." *The WACL Bulletin*, Korea, September 1970.

governments, intra-communist rivalry and so forth, but the glaring fact is that two free and determined national entities have fallen under the cover of communist domination. To believe otherwise is the height of naiveté. Perspectival reason and some homework on the cumulative causation of expansive, imperialist communist power, with its ultimate center in Moscow, would alas demonstrate the empirical, historical dominoism involved in this process. Our familiar scorecard of captive nations depicts this process in chronological form and lays a basis for the perennial question that trends and developments continue to justify:

**THE CAPTIVE NATIONS—WHO'S NEXT?
Country, people, and year of Communist domination**

Armenia	1920	Bulgaria	1946
Azerbaijan	1920	Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats,	
Byelorussia	1920	Slovenians, etc.)	1946
Cossackia	1920	Poland	1947
Georgia	1920	Romania	1947
Idel-Ural	1920	Czecho-Slovakia	1948
North Caucasia	1920	North Korea	1948
Ukraine	1920	Hungary	1949
Far Eastern Republic	1922	East Germany	1949
Turkestan	1922	Mainland China	1949
Mongolia	1924	Tibet	1951
Estonia	1940	North Vietnam	1954
Latvia	1940	Cuba	1960
Lithuania	1940	Cambodia	1975
Albania	1946	South Vietnam	1975

WHO'S NEXT?

Laos? Thailand? Republic of China? South Korea? Philippines? Portugal?

The above is source for despair enough. Nonetheless, any sober politico-economic analysis of the current world situation can lead only to one tentative conclusion: an increasingly despairing West, including Japan, and a progressively confident East, meaning the totalitarian communist regimes, including Cuba. The sharp, growing contrasts of relative stability in the East and instability in the West are punctuated almost daily by self-assured statements on growth, systemic superiority, and controlled progress in the former and grave observations on zero-growth, dwindling faith in institutions, and extensive disintegration in the latter. Doomsday utterances about the decline of Western civilization, another pervasive Great Depression, uncontrolled in-

flation, financial collapse, uncertainty about the comparative strength of democratic government, and general social upheaval clearly reflect the spreading despair in the West and also an unquestionable source of expansive confidence in the East. In all of this, equally clear is the already evident necessity for a basic reassessment and redirection of our basic policy toward the East, primarily toward the Soviet Union itself.

This writer shares none of the grim, doomsday outlooks concerning the West and, with some understanding of the captive nations, notably those in the USSR, devaluates considerably the stability imputed to the totalitarian, communist regimes. On their own, by fair, pragmatic decisions the democracies of the West can and will cope with the paramount politico-economic problems confronting them, but if the concatenational nature of these problems continues to be minimized and overlooked, the risk of failure will rise markedly and a disaster course will become more discernible, providing needless substantiation for the doomsday coterie.

In short examples, our costs in Vietnam would have been meager had the USSR and Red China not invested heavily in the fraternal venture, and the proliferation of these costs domestically has affected us to this day. In the Mideast the concatenation of cumulative events and costs, involving Soviet arms, guidance on oil strategy, precipitation of the Yom Kippur War, and further deep involvement in Syria and the course of peace negotiations, reaches into the generation of the West's acute energy and financial problems, affecting, whether he's aware of it or not, the pinched economic state of every laboring American. If, as the Institute of International Social Research discloses, isolationism has risen in this country so that one in every five Americans believes our problems can basically be solved independently of this concatenative effect, the East has gained as a consequence in terms of its political warfare policy of "peaceful coexistence."³ There is nothing easier to handle than ostriches with heads in the sand. Plainly, "interdependence" on the international scale has little meaning if the concatenative effect of forces and events in different parts of the world is scarcely recognized, reaching well into the USSR itself. In great measure, one of the ultimate sources of our costly problems is imperial Moscow and its bid for world supremacy.

³ Richard E. Rotman. "Uncertainties Cause Americans To Turn From World Concern," *The Washington Post*, July 6, 1974.

If the Cold War, in reality and not rhetoric, is supposed to be receding, this certainly doesn't show in the deepening instabilities of major Free World areas. However, what is beginning to show more clearly is the fact that the patchwork diplomacy of detente, as currently pursued, is nothing but a shifting facade for Cold War operations, with us paying a far higher price than Moscow. In the Far East, Russian-backed North Korea has stepped up its military and subversive pressures on the Republic of Korea; Japan still smarting from our diplomatic insults in '71, faces internal communist pressure with undoubted backstage assists from Moscow; our loyal ally, the Republic of China, fears a sell-out by us to Peking whose cool, psychological stance aims at the so-called solution of the "Taiwan problem"; the spectre of Red China's reconciliation with Moscow hovers over the area and beyond; and a European Security Conference, long advanced by Moscow, is about to consecrate Russian hegemony over the post-war East European bloc, in short, Moscow's outer empire.

This grim picture of instability, uncertainty, stress on the defensive, and doubt about American leadership in the Free World extends to the Mideast, Western Europe and Latin America. Moscow's hand in the Yom Kippur war, its support of the PLO, its long-known strategy on oil, its arms flows to Syria, Egypt and others, and its skillful play on frictions in the turbulent Mideast area are manifestations of traditional expansionist involvements of Moscow that possess all the earmarks of Cold War and its objectives of excluding American influence in the area and thus reducing its power image in the world at large. It would be a tragic historic irony if the extinction of Israel were the result of the compromising efforts of an American Secretary of State bearing a Jewish heritage. Moving toward Western Europe, it is patently evident that NATO has been seriously weakened by the mismanaged Cyprus affair, the Greek upheaval, the financial and economic crisis in Italy, the turn of events in Portugal, and the surge on the part of indigenous, large communist parties in France, Italy and Portugal to enter coalition governments. Led by Suslov and others, Moscow is highly active in cultivating the opportunities for a Finlandization of Western Europe, and the security problems for NATO loom greater than ever before. In Cuba, Peru and Latin America generally, Moscow's presence and influence grow substantially.⁴

⁴ See James D. Theberge. *The Soviet Presence in Latin America*, New York, 1974, p. 38.

MAKINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL WATERGATE?

In terms of principles, ideals, our tradition of accepting challenges with candor and truth, and dutifully informing the American people the nature and basic source of the threat to our security, the foregoing and more seem to suggest the makings of an international Watergate. Perhaps nowhere is this more pointed than in our relations with the USSR. As one excellent presentation stresses "The Soviet Union does not accept the 'ideological coexistence' and there is no reason why the West should compromise its own fundamental values and ideas."⁵ With application to the Soviet Union, the necessary linkage of detente and human rights assumes far greater significance and practical import than it could possibly anywhere else in the world. And this for several reasons. One is the continual and unrelenting threat posed by Moscow to our national security and that of other significant parts of the Free World. Two is the unique and peculiar composition of this contrived state, a land empire-state which, with the exception of the lower-scaled Peoples' Republic of China, has no comparability anywhere. And the third essential reason resides in Moscow's long and continuous record of the cruel suppression of human and national rights, which, taken in toto, far exceeds in magnitude and extent the totalitarian records of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and others.

Among countless, similar experiences, it was the writer's pleasure to appear last summer on the *Today Show* in New York, discussing detente and the USSR. Mention is made of this because of the characteristic obscurantism of the interviewer, who, after being told the rudimentary facts about the various nations in the Soviet Union, their subjection to economic imperio-colonialism, etc., continued on his own merry, preconceptual, and fallacious way to lump all the various distinct and different nations and peoples in the USSR as either "Russians" or "the Soviet people." This type of obscurantism is, unfortunately, widespread throughout the media and is also found at the highest levels of our government. There is little evidence to show that Dr. Kissinger understands appreciatively this essential fact. Needless to say, no matter how one defines "detente," if the object of the term is falsely and poorly understood, the content of the relationship can scarcely be maximally beneficial to us. The perpetuation of conceptual errors with regard to the USSR can only insure some error in judgment, policy and deed, and certainly forecloses

⁵ *Detente: An Evaluation*. Subcommittee on Arms Control. U.S. Senate, GPO, Washington, 1973, p. 3.

the seizure of opportunities contributory to the advancement of our interests. Thus the prospect of an international Watergate based on false conception and a myriad of tenuous deals with the prime, proxying Cold War aggressor.

It should be emphasized that the essential ideas and observations set forth here stem from a fundamental captive nations genetico-analysis founded in the empirical evolution of Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union from 1917 to the present. What is of poignant significance is the striking parallelism that has evolved in the current period between the salient thoughts and messages of Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov and other Russian and non-Russian intellectuals and the content and conclusions of the long-established captive nations structure of analysis. As I pointed out elsewhere, "In calling for the withdrawal of Russian power to the national borders of Russia and the renunciation of Marxism-Leninism they, and countless behind them in the USSR, are in essence calling for the freedom of the crucial non-Russian nations in the USSR, the surcease of Russian imperio-colonialism, and the open admission of the bankruptcy of Marxist philosophy in the whole area of the captive nations."^a In fitting tribute to the two Russian intellectuals, it should also be emphasized that it has been many decades since any leading Russian voice expressed itself in behalf of the national self-determination and freedom of the non-Russian nations and peoples in the USSR. Kerevsky went to his grave muttering the old Holy Mother Russian Empire complex.

As a further indication of the atmospherics of an international Watergate, as construed above, the growing, critical discussion on "detente" reveal considerable confusion as to its nature and intent, so much so that all sorts of characterizations are assigned to it, ranging from "fraud" to "our last hope for peace." The word is certainly another addition in the long succession of foreign policy slogans. However, the views expressed on our side appear to fall into three categories: (1) the dictionary definition of relaxation of tensions, (2) the subjectivist view, as given by the late General Abrams and others, of reactions, euphoric or otherwise, to objective circumstances, and (3) the instrumentalist view of Secretary of State Kissinger and others, interpreting detente purely as a process.

Placing aside the psychosomatic notions of detente, it is not unreasonable to accept with some qualification the definition of Dr.

^a *The Illusions of Detente*. Remarks of Hon. Edward J. Derwinski, USGPO, 1974, p. 1.

Kissinger: "Detente is a process of managing relations with a potentially hostile country in order to preserve peace." As a point of departure, the acceptance invites a number of observations that are fundamental to the efficacy of the process itself. One, of course, is how does the opposing party view the same process. The evidence is more than abundant to show that Moscow views "detente" as an important conduit for its fixed policy of "peaceful coexistence" which, unmistakably and unequivocally, means systemic ideo-political warfare against American "capitalism," "imperialism" and the rest of it.⁷ It is noteworthy that Moscow's apologists, such as Boris N. Ponomarev, who in 1974 headed the so-called parliamentarians of the USSR in a visit here, always coupled "peaceful coexistence" with "detente." Detente may be purely a process of management and negotiation for us—non-ethical, non-ideologic and pragmatic—but if we fail to comprehend Moscow's conception of it, we may find ourselves in a progressively insecure position both within and without.

Viewed in terms of the overall development of US-USSR relations the past 25 years, detente as a process is a technique advocated in the old policy of liberation but without statements of objectives and intentions other than "peace" and "building a structure of peace." It can also be validly interpreted as a forthright follow-up on early and long extended Soviet gestures of disarmament leading to the SALT talks, the balanced reduction of forces, all-European security, trade and cultural exchange. These gestures by Moscow were pushed in the 50's. In the so-called era of negotiation, not confrontation, detente as a process turns into a diplomatic offensive and confrontation on all of these Soviet-initiated fronts, necessarily adjusted to our domestic circumstances and conditions. If one overwhelming advantage at minimum cost might be realized by the process, it is the prospect of a purgative effect concerning much of the content of the process itself. Up to the Indo-China debacle it could be maintained that the pursuit of detente in Asia and in Eastern Europe hadn't violated any basic principle to which we as a nation subscribe. However, at the same time, it hasn't really advanced our basic principles, and as George Meany with much justification has pointed out: "We are not building lasting structures of peace. We are building castles of sand on the watery foundations of petty greed, wishful thinking, irresponsibility, self-indulgence, and plain old ignorance."⁸

⁷ See *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, Part 4, Hearings, Committee on Internal Security, USGPO, 1974, pp. 2422-2423.

⁸ *Statement on Political Aspects of Soviet-American Detente*, AFL-CIO, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, October 1, 1974, p. 20.

THE MYTHS OF CURRENT DETENTE

Actually, any process or movement in whatever sphere, logically presupposes certain conceptual assumptions, an existential framework for the execution of the process, alternative selected means for the process itself, and worthy objectives in addition to "peace." As concerns the USSR, it is in this area that detente as presently pursued is subject to serious question and total re-examination. Taking the full course of Russian political history, both in its Soviet Russian and USSR phases, a future account may well identify this period as a crucial zig-zag in Moscow's ascendancy to the status of prime global power. For, up till now, all of detente's contributions have been relatively minor, with scarcely any benefits of substance to us, and the basic issues are the same of a generation ago. Certainly, our ruling misconceptions of the USSR and its nature and drives have not changed in this period, and numerous myths thrive in detente.

In the recent period we've heard a great deal about the need for a conceptual breakthrough in nuclear arms control. A more fundamental conceptual breakthrough is needed in our understanding of the Soviet Union. The myth that the USSR is a nation-state, similar to ours, still persists. Although many others clinging to this myth can be cited, suffice it to mention that our Secretary of State subscribes to this myth, which would indicate an unfamiliarity with the origin and growth of this empire-state, not to mention its present multinational composition and pressures.⁹ This vital point has been concisely documented.¹⁰

When we're considering human rights in the USSR, the subject is not entirely parallel to that of civil rights and personal liberties which we enjoy in our country. This is shown in the three levels of dissidence in the USSR, namely civil rights and personal liberty across the Russian/non-Russian complex, the rights of Jews, Russians, Ukrainians and other different nationals to emigrate, and also the national rights of Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Georgians and others to their own cultures, language, religion and other national expressions, including their independence. Over half of the population in the USSR is non-Russian, and most of this part is divided into compact, distinctive nations. Ukraine, with close to 50 million, is the largest non-Russian nation not only in the USSR but also Eastern

⁹ E.g., Associated Press, March 25, 1974.

¹⁰ See Chapter 4 "Nations, Peoples and Countries in the USSR" and Chapter 5 "The ABC's on Russia and the USSR" in *USA and The Soviet Myth*, Old Greenwich, Conn., 1971.

Europe. Thus, to speak of a "Soviet nation," "Soviet people," "national minorities" or "ethnic groups" is to distort the multinational pattern of the USSR, as well as the real developments and aspirations of its numerous nations.

If the process of detente is pursued without a keen awareness of this multinational complexion of the USSR, we may find ourselves, by virtue of our economic contributions, guaranteeing the permanent captivity of the many nations in the USSR, in the end to our own disadvantage. The foundation of Moscow's power and world-wide ambitions rests in these resourceful captive nations within the USSR. Its domination over the captive nations in Central Europe is insured by this foundation being intact and solidified. The fundamental issue facing us is to what extent and degree will our economic aid and political indifference abet this solidification without exacting an increasing price aimed at an irreversible transformation of human and national rights, conditions and circumstances in this empire-state.

For nations that had been subverted, militarily conquered, and forcibly incorporated into the USSR from 1918 on, the current injection of the "non-interference in internal affairs" myth serves as a crude mockery to human and national rights. The abuse of this myth is an old Russian technique which Stalin, Vishinsky, Khrushchev and Brezhnev have frequently employed not only for the empire-state of the USSR but also, as the Brezhnev doctrine confirms, for its imperial extensions in Central Europe. If Moscow's domain were extended to the Atlantic, the same cry of mythical non-interference would be raised.

The detente process has generated a number of other myths that must be dissipated if the process is to work for our benefit, too. One is the fantastic notion that the external policy of a state can somehow be divorced from its internal, imperial policies. In a statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1951, Dean Acheson stressed the institutional nexus that has existed between Russia's politico-economic institutions and its imperialist expansionism over 500 years.¹¹ That classic statement holds today, for Moscow's external policy has always been fed by the oppressive internal policy of the empire. In addition, the euphoric notion that Moscow interprets detente as a sort of live-and-let-live policy has also been furthered by the current process, and is thoroughly discredited by Moscow's meaning of "peaceful coexistence." Moreover, as further fantasies generated by current

¹¹ *The Mutual Security Program*. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1951, pp. 11-12.

detente, the notions that communist ideology as a tool of penetration has waned in power and that the Kremlin totalitarians are humanized, de-Stalinized types seeking genuine peace are blatantly contradicted by evidences of intensified ideological activity both within the empire and without and the hyper-KGB activity in the USSR with swelling numbers of arrests and prison camps. In connection with Ukraine alone, over 560 known Ukrainian intellectuals have been incarcerated since 1970.¹²

THE ECONOMICO-POWER DILEMMA

Plainly, it is in the area of trade, long-term joint projects, and gradually enhanced economic involvements leading to a generalized economic interdependence that leverage is sought by the present detente process to curb Moscow's aggression by proxy in the Free World and to induce liberalizing tendencies with irreversible movement within the Soviet Union. It is even hoped that this purely tangible, materialist process will by sheer complex involvement on the economic front lead to a redirection and reallocation of resources from Moscow's steady military build-up and development. Increasing business contacts would presumably provide the pragmatic, cultural rub-off abetting internal liberalization, and long-term contractual commitments and projects-in-process would form our basis for treats of cut-off in the event Moscow fails to behave itself in Free World areas. In short, despite the strategicity of the trade deals (Kama River Truck complex, computer production, jumbo plane production—all to be the largest in the world, etc.), the suction of economic interdependence would, so to speak, lock in the Soviet Union in a "structure of peace" for a decade or more.

Any analyst conversant with the USSR economy can only view this theory—indeed, myth—of economic interdependence with the gravest doubt. First of all, if lessons of history are to be heeded, our trade with and investments in totalitarian powers with even more open societies in the past, such as Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, failed to produce permanent amity. Second, the planned nature of the USSR economy, the widespread KGB controls, the extensive CP surveillance, and the tightening-up processes already in vogue will undoubtedly produce systematic containment of our "business infiltrators" while the benefits of our advanced technology and know-how, not to mention bargain interim financing of all this, will

¹² See, e.g., *Ukrainian Intellectuals in Shackles*. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, 1972, pp. 17.

accrue to the Kremlin's maintenance of its top priorities, with emphasis on the military and its lagging needs to overcome deficiencies in other sectors of the economy. On these and other relevant aspects, including Moscow's economic strategy, background material is readily available in compact, perspectival form.¹³ When Dr. Kissinger states that instead of following autarchic policies, "in actuality the Soviet Union and its allies have come closer to acknowledging the reality of an interdependent world economy," he neither understands the traditional trade sieve of these totalitarian-controlled economies nor their temporary hunger for stepped-up productivity via the most advanced technology.¹⁴

Briefly, the dilemma of our position is in the timing of all this. Should we follow the simple mechanistic course of the present detente process and, hopefully, let "evolution" bring about the unstated or dubious low-keyed objectives of our foreign policy?¹⁵ Or, in the nature of a poltrade policy that would minimize our risks and avoid the expenditure of billions of dollars in beefing up an essentially technocratic, militaristic, and truly imperialistic economy, should we exact increasing prices for this economic aid with human and national rights concessions consonant with our own principles and civilized values? With nothing substantially changed in the imperio-totalitarian framework of the USSR, prudence and historical common sense would dictate necessarily the latter course. Even in this early phase it is becoming patently evident that a manageable policy is urgently needed to monitor our technological flow to the USSR in the interest of our own security.¹⁶

In view of the USSR's great hunger for capital and time, the emigration concession has been a pithy, initial price to ask for. Since it was accepted by us at the dubious figure of 60,000 per annum and across-the-board of nationals in the USSR—contrary to Kissinger's position—this measure of "liberalization" in the USSR should, despite Moscow's renunciation of it, be maintained by Congress. However, this is no reason for not pressing for far more proportionate poltrade

¹³ See Chapter 9, "The Russian Trade Trap" in *USA and The Soviet Myth*, 1971.

¹⁴ *Secretary Kissinger's Statement on U.S.-Soviet Relations*. Special Report No. 6, Department of State, September 1974, p. 4.

¹⁵ See President Richard Nixon, *Captive Nations Week, 1974, A Proclamation*, July 12, 1974.

¹⁶ Linda Hudak. "Soviet Trade: Profit v. Policy," *The Washington Post*, December 8, 1974.

concessions.¹⁷ They should include for the period ahead such objectives as: (a) the reunion of families and the elimination of extortionate Soviet duty taxes on relief packages; (b) in the spirit of religious freedom, the resurrection of the major Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches, which were genocided by Stalin; (c) as advanced by many prominent American scholars, consideration for the beginning of direct diplomatic relations with the national republics, Byelorussia and Ukraine for example (the '74 Summit agreement for the opening of a consulate in Kiev was a blunderous error); and (d) the surcease of psychiatric and labor camp incarceration of dissidents.

Indeed, in the wake of the Indo-China tragedy the time is now for a Select Committee on Captive Nations in Congress, with concentration on those in the USSR. Congress can and should take the lead in this massive education of our people about all the captive nations, especially those in the USSR. The greatest weakness and vulnerability of Moscow lies in the existence of these captive non-Russian nations within the USSR itself. Moscow knows this, but our leaders scarcely appreciate it. A growing and determined interest in them, at first strictly along politico-educational lines, would in itself signal to the Kremlin that we mean business in developing a genuine detente.

A genuine detente is one that permits competition for our traditional ideas and values on the terrain of an adversary who is firmly committed to ideologic, systemic warfare and global supremacy. To aid him by trade and deals of compromise in "solving" Free World problems virtually forecloses this competition without a poltrade policy aimed at the captive nations, particularly those in the USSR and a broader policy designed to intensify the predominant forces of nationalism within the USSR. Let us not forget that our past errors of concept and misdirected action in the region of the USSR saved Lenin's tyrannical regime and contributed to the demise of the independent non-Russian republics in the 20's, provided for the industrial foundations of the USSR in the 30's, rescued this empire-state from destruction and enabled it to extend its empire in Central Europe, Asia, and Cuba in the 40's and 50's, and under cover of "detente" tolerated its basic implementation of Hanoi's aggression in the 60's and 70's. The perpetuation and repetition of such errors, as evidenced in the present detente process and its euphoric effects, could lead to our own destruction. We, too, could become a captive nation. This is fundamentally the real ground for despair in the West and confidence in the East.

¹⁷ See Lev E. Dobriansky. "The Empire-State of USSR—Chief Object of Poltrade," testimony, *The Trade Reform Act*, Senate Finance Committee, April 4, 1974.

THE UKRAINIAN-JEWISH PROBLEM: A HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

By STEFAN T. POSSONY

EDITOR'S NOTE: The present article by Prof. Stefan T. Possony appeared in the Winter 1974 issue of *Plural Societies*, published by the Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies in The Hague, the Netherlands. Because of the importance of the subject matter and the international renown of the author who has made extensive research on this problem, we reprint the article with the special permission of Dr. W.A. Veenhoven, editor-in-chief of *Plural Societies*, and president of the Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies.

Discussions of Communist anti-Semitism invariably elicit comments on Ukrainian anti-Semitism. Supposedly anti-Semitism is widespread among the population and has been practiced by non-communist Ukrainian governments.¹

The question of Ukrainian anti-Semitism, and more generally of Jewish-Ukrainian relations, is interesting, since both the Jews and the Ukrainians have been living under oppression and are victims of the same oppression. To the extent that there is mutual hostility between the two ethnic groups, who have been cohabitating for many centuries, much of it must be attributed to the policies of the *tertius gaudens*, the Polish government during the 17th century and the Czarist and Communist governments of Russia subsequently.

Recent indicators suggest that anti-Semitism in Ukraine is growing weaker, as the resistance to rule from Moscow is becoming more determined and the nearly one million Jews still living in Ukraine are being recognized as fellow victims of Communist despotism. For this very reason, presumably, the anti-Semitic propaganda emanating from Moscow is given a Ukrainian coloration, in the hope that the traditional hostility can be kept going.

Insofar as the Jews are concerned, they seem to be persuaded, in an overwhelming majority, that the Ukrainians are incurably anti-Semitic. Hence Jewish organizations have repeatedly engaged in

¹I am grateful to Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, for his highly informative memorandum of 22 August 1974, "Statement on Jewish-Ukrainian Relations," which he allowed me to consult.

strong anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Thus, the traditional roles are reversed: the Jews who usually are the target of hostile propaganda are cast in the role of persecutors of the Ukrainians. This is not to say that Jewish propaganda against Czarist and Communist Russian anti-Semitism and against German Nazism was weak or non-existent. The difference is that the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis was an indisputable fact, while that of anti-Semitic persecution by Ukrainian governments is not; and that Communist Russian anti-Semitism which is real enough has been acknowledged only after much hesitation and delay, and somehow is but rarely taken seriously. Contrary to the legend, the Jews do not always recognize the dangers which threaten them.

Whether or not the anti-Semitism which is imputed to the Ukrainian "masses" is more intense and widespread than the anti-Semitism prevalent in other countries, cannot possibly be determined. But the problem is *not* whether there is friction or hostility between different ethnic groups living in close contact within the same territory. Friction and even hostility must be taken for granted under virtually all conditions and must be expected, especially during crisis situations, like famines, wars, civil wars, and revolutions. Given the turbulent history of Ukraine, especially since 1914, and given the presence of numerous Jews, it would be a miracle if anti-Semitism were absent. Hence the real question that must be applied to such situations is this: in view of existing inter-ethnic antagonism, what are the policies which the government adopts to limit and eliminate the trouble? Is the purpose to relax tension and rid the country of hostility or is it, to the contrary, to aggravate the tension, to perpetuate hostility, and to take advantage and exploit the conflict?

The Jews have been living in what is today the Ukrainian area since the first century. In the same area the Khazars converted to Judaism. A Jewish community has existed in Kiev since the end of the tenth century, and by the twelfth century Jewish traders throughout Ukraine served as links for commerce between Europe and the Middle East.

The tension between Jews and Ukrainians is usually traced back to the period of 1648 to 1654 when, after many centuries of good relations, Ukrainian Kozaks² under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky are said to have massacred between 100,000 and 250,000 Jews.

² Those Kozaks must be distinguished from the Russian Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks who served in the Russian army in a semi-autonomous status and were frequently used to suppress civil unrest.

Since at that time the Ukrainian population numbered at most six to seven million people, and since the Kozak army was small and engaged in mobile warfare, those figures are most certainly exaggerated. However, there was a large massacre at Lublin.³ Still, since hostilities were largely restricted to the countryside, the Jews in the cities, that is the majority, survived.

Khmelnysky's troops, known as the Zaporozhian Kozaks who had been at war almost incessantly for about 100 years against the Crimean Tatars, the Turks, the Poles and the Russians, were fighting Poland which by the mid-1600's was lording it over Ukraine. In the course of these hostilities, substantial numbers of Jews affiliated with the Polish regime were killed. The Polish nobility was using the Jews as estate managers and tax collectors, and in a unique and provocative arrangement even as custodians of Ukrainian Orthodox churches and monasteries. No wonder, the Kozaks regarded the Jews as their enemies.

Whether or not Khmelnysky was anti-Semitic, his main purpose was to fight the Poles. He went after the Ukrainians who were serving the Poles, just as much as after the Jews who were part of the enemy's establishment. In fact, Khmelnysky's forces also massacred Kozaks who were in the service of the Polish king and who refused to join the self-styled liberators. The situation is best described by the practice of Khmelnysky's troops "to hang on Greek Orthodox churches a pig, a rabbi and a Catholic priest".⁴

In brief, the Khmelnysky case is a poor foundation for a general indictment of Ukrainians as anti-Semites, especially since under the regime of Ivan Mazepa, who became *hetman* in 1696, the Jews and the Ukrainians again were on good terms. Indeed, if the stories about Khmelnysky were only half accurate, there should have been no Jews left in Ukraine.

Between 1760 and 1778, there were several Ukrainian uprisings against the Poles: this unrest was maneuvered by the Russians on *both* sides: the Ukrainians were fighting for their independence, while the Poles and the Russians wanted to dominate the Ukrainians. The Poles tried to impose Catholicism on Orthodox Ukrainians, and

³ Massacres were frequent during the period, which is that of the Thirty Years War. The massacre and sack of Magdeburg in 1631 was the most terrible. The outrage was perpetuated by troops under the command of Jan Tilly who is not blamed for the crime but is regarded as innocent.

⁴ Quoted by Joseph L. Lichten, "A Study of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts Sciences in the U.S.*, Vol. V, No. 2, 3, p. 1163.

the Russians were eager to put Ukrainian Catholics into the Orthodox Church. In this prolonged struggle, many Poles and many Ukrainians were killed and, of course, many Jews lost their lives, too.

The fact that Jewish casualties occurred does not by itself prove that those resulted from anti-Semitism. In an area where all ethnic and religious groups mutually hate one another, it would be ridiculous to expect that the Jews would not also be an object of hatred. In an area of conflict and war, the Jews will not be the only group to escape unscathed.

Under Catherine II all remnants of Ukrainian autonomy were destroyed, up to the point of banning the Ukrainian language. Hence the Ukrainians did not have a policy of their own, whether it be anti-Semitic or philo-Semitic. There were pogroms in Ukraine, just as in other parts of the Russian empire where Jews were to be found, and since most of the Jews were living in Ukraine, most of the pogroms took place in Ukraine. But pogroms did not arise spontaneously, they were ordered and organized from St. Petersburg, and more often than not executed by Russians dispatched to the target cities. In Western Ukraine which belonged to Austria and which by 1918 was populated by some five million Ukrainians, friction between Jews and Ukrainians was not lacking. It usually occurred as a by-product of the friction between Poles and Ukrainians. *But* there were *no* pogroms. If pogroms had been expressions of spontaneous popular anti-Semitism and if Ukrainians had been harbouring intense hatred against the Jews, excesses would have occurred in the Austrian parts of Ukraine. The pogroms were due to Czarist *policy*.

Since anti-Semitism was endemic in Eastern Europe, there is no need to argue an extreme position and to ignore, for example, such incidents as a Ukrainian decree of 1721, by *Hetman* Skoropadsky, expelling the Jews from the territory under his jurisdiction. Nor is it advisable to ignore atrocities which did occur. What must be rejected is an unwarranted tendency to generalize and indict the Ukrainian people as a whole. Most certainly, the Ukrainians did not, before 1917, display more anti-Semitism than other peoples in the area. By charging them with excessive anti-Semitism, the *Okhrana* and the Romanov court are white-washed.

Objective Jewish scholars who analyzed the problem rejected the notion that the Ukrainians are particularly prone to be anti-Semitic by convention and to indulge in violent anti-Semitic behavior. Joseph Lichten is one of those analysts, and Arnold Margolin is another.

The pogroms in Ukraine between December 1918 and April 1921 are the cause of another set of anti-Semitic accusations against the

Ukrainians. The facts which are not particularly in dispute are that more than 1,200 small and large pogroms took place and that approximately 60,000 Jews were killed.⁵ This means that slightly less than 50 persons were killed per pogrom. This is a plausible figure which may serve to evaluate the casualty estimates of the 1650 period.⁶

Dubnow implied repeatedly that Simon Petlura was responsible for the 1918-1921 pogroms, but he refrained from stating so in a forthright manner. In 1926, Petlura was assassinated by Sholem Schwarzbart because this individual "could not become reconciled to the thought that Simon Petlura, who was responsible for the wholesale massacres, had emigrated to France where he was strolling leisurely anticipating future heroic acts by his bloodthirsty gangs."⁷ This is charged language. But was the emotion justified? Was Petlura the guilty party? And was the Ukrainian government responsible?

Between March and November 1917, Russia, including Ukraine, was run by Prime Ministers Georgy Yevgenovich Lvov and Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky. Neither was ever accused of anti-Semitism. Their governments were wholeheartedly dedicated to democratic principles. Unfortunately, democracy had not yet been established, chaos prevailed, war continued, and in the end the forces striving for a democratic order were crushed by the Bolsheviks. The commitments to democracy had been premature.

Between April and September 1917, no less than 3429 pogroms were counted in Russia.⁸ This means that between the time of the overthrow of the Czar and Lenin's ascension to power nearly 4000 pogroms must have taken place.

The word "pogrom" is used here in the sense of its *usage of 1917*, namely, as denoting "disorder." The *Okhrana* no longer existed, consequently only its remnants could have instigated pogroms. Many of those disorders were non-political, some were little more than large scale looting, quite a few were connected with agrarian matters and were directed against landowners and aristocrats, and some were instigated by revolutionary parties.

⁵ Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, Vol. V, p. 844.

⁶ Between 1918 and 1921 Ukraine was the theater of very intensive multi-lateral warfare waged with large forces and punctuated by deliberate mass terrorism. If then "only" 60,000 casualties eventuated, the high estimates of the losses attributed to Khmel'nitsky must be vastly exaggerated.

⁷ Dubnow, *ibid.*, p. 845.

⁸ Matthew Stachiv, "Why the Jewish problem has been connected with Ukraine", *Ukrainians and Jews, a Symposium*, New York, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1966, p. 52.

The moderate Russian newspaper *Russkiya Vedomosti* on 1 October 1917 talked of the "unbridled mob, with its darkest animal instincts unleashed," which loots and pillages, and also "strikes and kills the *pomeshchik* or shopkeeper suspected of speculation. But the same fate awaits Jews, just because they are Jews, and *zemstvo* employees and members of various committees elected by that same mob."⁹

In a speech on 12 August 1917 to a conference of representatives of public organizations, Kerensky alluded to anti-Semitic outrages and linked them to outrages perpetrated against the Ukrainians, Finns, Swedes and Armenians. He added that this hatred, "like a disease, is transferred to us."

On 5 October 1917, *Rabochaya Gazeta*, a socialist newspaper, stated it seemed as though Jewish pogroms, "this dreadful nightmare of Czarist Russia, had disappeared forever." But after eight months of revolution, "the bloodstained specter of the Middle Ages hovers again over our land." "Several months of revolution are not enough to re-educate at once the masses who lived for centuries in darkness, under the yoke of lawlessness." The paper pointed out that as anarchy was growing throughout the country, "reaction" tried to destroy the revolution through "the poisoned weapon of an anti-Semitic campaign," which it described as reaction's "favorite means of duping the masses." But, the paper added, the Bolsheviks "throw demagogic slogans at the masses, unconcerned about the consequences of their propaganda," even though they know that "the aroused masses interpret and act upon their [Bolshevik] slogans in their own way." During the days of July 3-5, when the Bolsheviks attempted a coup, anti-Semitic speeches enjoyed no small success among the masses who followed the Bolsheviks. By October, 1917 Bolshevik agitation was creating "a pogrom mood which can easily degenerate into a Jewish pogrom." A few days after this warning, the Bolsheviks seized power, greatly helped by the mood they had carefully nurtured.¹⁰

Thus, anti-Semitism was rampant throughout Kerensky's Russia, but Kerensky, rightly so, is not held responsible for this pathology.

A similar type of anarchy prevailed in Ukraine between 1918 and 1921, except that the country additionally suffered from military occupation by the Germans and Austrians (April to November 1918), and that it found itself in the midst of a civil war. The Ukrainians

⁹ Robert Paul Browder and Aleksander F. Kerensky, *The Russian Provisional Government 1917, Documents*, Vol. III, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 1646.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 430 ff.

were fighting among themselves, and they fought for their independence against the Bolsheviks, against White Russian forces trying to reconstitute the old empire, and against, as well as with, the Poles who invaded the country in 1920. Furthermore, anarchist guerrillas operated independently and perpetrated numerous outrages, including anti-Jewish pogroms.

Within this chaos, the Jews did not behave as passive pawns. They were afraid of a Czarist restoration from which they expected bloody repression and they did not, save for exceptions, view Ukrainian independence with great optimism. On the other hand, there was no reason for them to assume, on the basis of the information available at that time, that the Bolsheviks would ultimately embrace anti-Semitism.

It is, of course, true that the Bolsheviks, like most other socialists, regarded the Jews as "capitalists" and through their programs of expropriations threatened Jewish livelihood. But since, in fact, there were very few Jewish capitalists and far less capitalists than socialists, few Jews were worried by this aspect. Not surprisingly, the majority regarded physical survival as their highest priority. Hence, on the whole, the Jews sided with the Bolsheviks and thus opened themselves to reprisals by anti-Bolshevik forces.

The so-called White Russian forces (i.e. more or less conservative and pro-Czarist elements) included the remnants of the *Okhrana*, the Czarist bureaucracy, and the Czarist officers corps. Many White Russian commanders and intelligence officers believed that the Jews were "behind" the Bolsheviks and were responsible for the revolution. Hence there was a conviction that if the revolution was to be suppressed, the Jews had to be massacred.

The prevalence of anti-Semitism in Ukraine at that period is indisputable, and independently operating Ukrainian insurgents repeatedly resorted to pogroms. But not all of the pogrom activity, which killed about 60,000 Jews,¹¹ can be attributed to Ukrainians, let alone to the Ukrainian people as a whole. The White Russian forces were largely Russian in composition and the Poles, obviously, were not Ukrainians. The anarchists were ethnically mixed. The Ukrainian people themselves were the foremost victims of the incessant pillaging and killing.

¹¹ Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, Vol. V, p. 844. According to Dubnow, there were 1236 pogroms, including 877 large ones, between December 1918 and April 1921. Despite his own figure of 60,000, he also wrote (p. 841): "Two million Jews found themselves in the raging fire of civil war, and were being exterminated physically." Dubnow overstated his point by a factor of 33.3.

The fact of the matter is that at that time there was no Ukrainian political party which had incorporated anti-Semitism into its platform. Only a minimum of the standard anti-Semitic literature existed in the Ukrainian language. With a few exceptions, the leaders of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917, which was aimed at independence, were persons who could be characterized as conservative and liberal nationalists and socialists. Most of the latter were associated with the social revolutionary party and the social democratic party (minus the Bolsheviks). Simon Petlura, the most powerful figure in the independent Ukrainian government and the commander of the Ukrainian army, was an internationally-minded social democrat. If he had been responsible for the pogroms, he necessarily would have been anti-Semitic socialist or socialist anti-Semite. It is to be noted that the literature which accuses Petlura of being a *pogromchik*, studiously fails to mention his political affiliation. For the matter, no one has yet proved that Petlura was responsible for ordering pogroms. Even if the troops under his command had been guilty, they could be charged only with a fraction of the outrages.

Whether Petlura and his associates did all they could to prevent pogroms is another matter. Obviously, they were unable to act in areas held by forces that were hostile to them. If Lvov and Kerensky could not keep order under less onerous conditions, Petlura and his friends who were confronted by a most chaotic situation in which anti-Semitism was a strong factor cannot be expected to have done better. It is, however, impossible to pronounce valid judgments about acts of omission. Hence to shed light on the subject it is necessary to review the *acts of commission* which must be attributed to the Ukrainian government.

After the Brest-Litovsk treaty of 9 February 1918 with Ukraine, the country was occupied till November 1918 by the Central Powers as "allies." It was ruled by Paul Skoropadsky, a Russified Ukrainian general (and descendant of an 18th century *hetman* accused of anti-Semitic leanings). He was supported by Ukrainian monarchists and ruled at the direction of the Germans. There was, during Paul Skoropadsky's time, no anti-Jewish legislation, nor have any excesses against the Jews been recorded.

As hostilities started among the various local contenders and the occupants were moving out, gradually pogroms began to occur.

On August 15, 1919, the Treasury of the Ukrainian government assigned money to the Ministry for Jewish Affairs, for the "purpose of assisting the poor Jewish population in the cities and places affected by pogroms." A decree was issued on 18 August 1919 for the purpose

of preventing further outrages. The government decreed that those guilty of having tolerated pogrom excesses should be court-martialed and be given "the severest penalty, including the death sentence."

On August 26, 1919, Petlura issued an order of the day ordering that "all those who are instigating you to pogroms be thrust out of the army, and as traitors to the fatherland be handed over to the court." They should be punished for their crimes with "the severest lawful penalty." In an appeal to the Ukrainian army of August 27, 1919 he made it clear that the "death sentence" should "overtake the perpetrators of pogroms and provocateurs." He castigated the *provocateurs* who pay criminal elements to incite Ukrainian "soldiers to all sorts of outrages and pogroms against the innocent Jewish population" in order to stamp the Ukrainians as "pogrommongers." Those provocateurs also are spending enormous sums of money "to split the Ukrainian and Jewish laboring masses." He praised the support which Jewish populations were giving the Ukrainian soldiers and invited the Jewish citizens to support the Ukrainian army and government wholeheartedly so that an independent Ukrainian republic could be built "in which each nationality will enjoy full rights and a peaceful life."

Petlura told the army that the Jews were oppressed and deprived of national freedom like the Ukrainians. They "cannot be alienated from us, they have of old always been with us, and they have shared with us their joys and sorrows." Since the Ukrainian army wanted to bring "brotherhood, equality, and freedom to all peoples of Ukraine," it "should not be a party in bringing a hard lot on the Jews. Whoever is guilty of permitting such heavy crime, is a traitor and an enemy of the country and must be thrust out of human society." He added that the many enemies of Ukraine, external as well as internal, are profitting from the pogroms because they use them as an argument to assert that Ukraine is "not worthy of an independent national existence."

Petlura's forces were later expelled by Bolsheviks and fled from Ukraine into Poland. They returned for a short while with the Polish army in 1920 and were pushed out again. Ultimately they were disbanded.

In this second phase of the war, the anti-pogrom policy was not changed. Whether Petlura's order was effective or not, whether forces under his command did disobey and organized pogroms, and whether the guilty *pogromchiks* were court-martialed, is a subject which still needs to be researched. As of now, no useful information on this question is known to the writer. The Ukrainian army was

hastily improvised and included many disparate elements, losing and gaining units through desertion and mutiny as the conflict was continuing. It would therefore be unwarranted to expect that Petlura's orders were obeyed unquestioningly or that he had full freedom to impose sanctions. There is little doubt that his control grew weaker as the end approached. If his forces engaged in pogroms, it would have been mostly during the last phase of their resistance. Arnold Margolin, a high-ranking Jewish witness, defended Petlura with respect to the pogroms which reportedly occurred during the collapse of Ukrainian defenses, on the self-evident ground that he had lost power. Margolin never doubted Petlura's motives.

It can be argued that Petlura issued his anti-pogrom order for political reasons only, and did not mean a word of it. Such a hypothesis should rest on some evidence which is still to be exhibited. If Petlura felt the political need to oppose pogroms, one basic reason must have been that he found it militarily inadvisable to antagonize the Jews. The chances are that he understood very well that Jewish support was one of the prerequisites of Ukrainian success. Thus, if he acted from political expediency, by the same token, it would have been utterly inexpedient for him to favor pogroms.

From its inception, the Ukrainian government included a minister for Jewish affairs. Jews were given high positions, for example, Margolin was a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and later became Ambassador to Great Britain. Solomon Goldelman, who at the age of 80 died in 1974 in Jerusalem, held high positions in the Ukrainian government. He defended that government's records to his dying days.

The government held elections on the basis of the proportionate system and a universal, equal, secret and direct ballot. The Central *Rada* (parliament) which resulted from elections included substantial numbers of Jewish representatives.¹²

The Ukrainian government was supported by various Jewish parties, including the Bund, the United Jewish Socialists, Poalei Zionists, and the Jewish People's Party. These parties did not break away from the government.

The single most significant fact is this: On 12 April 1918, the Central *Rada*, with Michael Hrushevsky as its president, promulgated a *statute on the personal-national autonomy of national minorities in*

¹² Arnold Margolin, "Excerpts from the book *Ukraina i Polityka Antanty: Zapisky Evreya i Grazhdanina*," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, Vol. VII, 1959, pp. 1479ff.

Ukraine. This autonomy was granted as an "inprescriptible right" to the Great Russians, Jews, and Poles residing within the Ukrainian National Republic, and it was offered to the White Ruthenians, Czechs, Moldavians, Germans, Tatars, Greeks and Bulgarians. Each of those nationalities was empowered to establish a national union, and every citizen was given the right to demand his inscription in the national register of the nationality to which he belongs. We skip analysis of the full text.¹³

This statute may not have been the last word on the subject, but it was the *first statute of its kind* (except for prewar experimentation with two or three *Länder* in Austria). Hrushevsky's autonomy statute was pretty much in line with the proposals Dubnow had worked out twenty and thirty years earlier. Apparently, Dubnow never heard about the statute. Otherwise it would be incomprehensible why he did not mention it in his criticism of the Ukrainian government. There can be no question about Dubnow's honesty, his historical knowledge, and his eagerness to get correct data and report accurately. It is almost inconceivable that he ignored the Ukrainian autonomy statute, of which *he* was the intellectual ancestor. Yet such was the case and the incident must be recorded as evidence of a Jewish prejudice which has been effectively exploited by the Communists.

According to Allen Dulles, late director of the CIA, Schwarzbart, the assassin of Petlura, was a Communist agent. This is most likely, because the Kremlin, more or less systematically, exterminated all top Ukrainian leaders who had managed to escape abroad. Furthermore, Ukrainian-Jewish rivalry was and is a major condition for the survival of the Bolshevik regime; and popular Petlura's murder by a Jew kept the pot boiling.

It should not go unrecorded that in 1961, Ukrainian-born Isaac Ben-Zvi, then President of Israel, who in 1905 organized a Jewish self-defense unit at Poltava to fight off pogroms, indicated that he held an objective view of the Ukrainian-Jewish relationship.¹⁴

Before World War II, Moscow pursued its traditional policy of inciting the Ukrainians against the Jews. For this purpose Stalin for many years used Lazar Kaganovich as the dictator of Ukraine. Kaganovich unflinchingly carried out the butcheries which Stalin

¹³ Solomon I. Goldelman, *Zhydivska natsionalna avtonomitya na Ukrayini 1917-1920*, Munich, Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR, 1963. Goldelman was a member of Poalei Zion.

¹⁴ Leo Helman, "Ukrainians and Jews," *Ukrainians and Jews*, p. 55. In 1962, B'nai B'rith gave an award to a Ukrainian officer who had prevented a pogrom during those turbulent times.

ordered for Ukraine. Since he was in charge of the "liquidation of the kulaks," an operation linked to a deliberately created famine in Ukraine, he was guilty of mass murder. Khrushchev accused Kaganovich, who was a Ukrainian Jew of being *both* anti-Ukrainian and anti-Semitic.¹⁵

Within a week after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, in 1941, a Ukrainian provisional government was established with Yaroslav Stetzko as premier. A great deal of propaganda has been directed against this provisional government which was accused of having supported Nazi anti-Semitic outrages. The fact is that this government never functioned. Stetzko as well as Stepan Bandera, who later became famous as a guerrilla leader and who also fell victim to assassination, were sent to a Nazi concentration camp within two weeks after its coming into existence. They stayed imprisoned till the end of 1944. Therefore, while the Ukrainians set up underground forces fighting against the Nazis, it is the Nazis, and they alone, who were responsible for the genocidal activities which took place in Ukraine during the time when it was occupied by the Wehrmacht. Many Jews were helped by Ukrainians to survive the Nazi ordeal. The Catholic Church of Ukraine, under the leadership of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, warned Ukrainians to stay away from all anti-Semitic actions and movements. He issued two pastoral letters condemning the Nazis for their persecution of the Jews. The Nazis punished scores of Ukrainians for having supported the Bandera movement and having sheltered Jews.¹⁶ Gestapo chief Heinrich Himmler wanted to arrest Sheptytsky but was, with great difficulty, persuaded to refrain from this action: the prelate enjoyed too much popularity among Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians, and had been a prisoner in Siberia 1914-1917.

It is, of course, true that there was a Ukrainian police which the Nazis used. Ukrainian soldiers were, in one way or the other, forced to serve the Nazis. Such elements were used against Ukrainians as well as against Jews and against anybody else in the area. No doubt, individual Ukrainians committed anti-Semitic crimes. This sort of argument can be spun out endlessly. There is no point to it, since no one denies the existence of anti-Semitism, least of all in an area

¹⁵ *Khrushchev Remembers*, 598f.

¹⁶ This evaluation follows the report by Kurt I. Lewin, son of Jechezkiel Lewin, Chief Rabbi of Lviv, who was killed in a Nazi-run prison. See Lewin, "Andreas Count Sheptytsky, Archbishop of Lviv, Metropolitan of Halych, and the Jewish Community in Galicia during the Second World War", *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, Vol. VII, 1959, pp. 1656 ff.

which, albeit temporarily, was controlled and propagandized by the Nazis. But outrages of this type cannot be ascribed to any Ukrainian leadership group or party because at that time, none supported or endorsed anti-Semitism, let alone genocide.

The best way to cut this argument short is to look at one particular statistic.

The records of Israel's War Crimes Investigations Office indicate that throughout occupied Europe some 95,000 Nazis and Nazi collaborators were directly connected with anti-Jewish measures, massacres, and deportations, including 45,000 Germans, 8,500 Austrians, 11,000 Balts, 7,500 Poles, 3,000 West Europeans, 9,000 Russians and Byelorussians, and 11,000 Ukrainians.

It should be observed that the Nazis occupied Austria for seven years, Poland for six, the Baltic countries and Western Europe for four, and areas of the USSR for three and one half years. At one time the Nazis held virtually the entire area of Ukraine and Byelorussia, but they never occupied for long more than a small fraction of the area inhabited by Great Russians. Consequently, if those figures are regarded as a sort of index to the prevalence of militant anti-Semitism, the Russian "quota" is understated. For a variety of reasons, the Baltic rate is probably overstated.¹⁷

The figures suggest that during World War II the incidence of murderous anti-Semitism was as follows:

Rate of Anti-Semitic War Criminality 1939-1945
(per 10,000 of population)

Balts	20	Poles	4
Austrians	10	Ukrainians	3
Russians & Byelorussians	8	West Europeans	0.5
Germans	6		

This table tells the story better than ten thousand words, except that it should not be forgotten that Jews, too, were forced to participate in the exterminations.

"Fret not thyself because of evildoers, neither be thou envious against the workers of iniquity.

"For they shall soon be cut down like the grass, and wither as the green herb."

(Psalm 37,1,2)

¹⁷ Unfortunately this listing gives no figures on Croats and Serbs.

SOLZHENITSYN AND HIS CONFRONTATION WITH THE KREMLIN

By STEPHEN S. CHORNEY

The universe has as many different centers as there are in it living beings. Each of us is a center of creation, and the universe is shattered when they hiss at you: "You are under arrest!"

(*The GULAG Archipelago 1918-1956*, p. 17.)
A. Solzhenitsyn

The manuscript of the sensational new book, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956*, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, was smuggled abroad and published in Paris in December, 1973. The Soviet Government organized and launched a blistering attack on the dissident author and called his book "an anti-Soviet lampoon sent abroad by Mr. Solzhenitsyn in the guise of a New Year gift."¹

Far from being a lampoon, *Gulag* is a meticulously documented account of the agony of millions of innocent people who, like Solzhenitsyn himself, were imprisoned in the countless Siberian concentration camps. European and Asian newspapers quickly began serializing Solzhenitsyn's book.

Shortly after that, on February 12, 1974, Solzhenitsyn was arrested and the next day, escorted by several Soviet secret police, he was taken to West Germany, shorn of his Soviet citizenship.

"It is not hopeless," he calmly told one reporter. "Even old trees, when they are transplanted, can take root in a new place."²

Western experts believe that physicist Andrey Sakharov and historian Roy Medvedev may be forced into exile for their praise of Solzhenitsyn's new book. Another defender, writer Vladimir Voinovich, a former railroad worker, has been expelled from the Soviet Writers Union for his public defense of exiled writer Solzhenitsyn.

Poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, who has been notably servile toward the Kremlin recently, sent a telegram to Leonid Brezhnev protesting

¹ *Time*, January 14, 1974.

² *Ibid.*

Solzhenitsyn's arrest and exile. Further, he refused the Writers Union's demand that he publicly denounce Solzhenitsyn.

Echoing one of Solzhenitsyn's recent appeals, Yevtushenko wrote:

In our timidity, let each of us make a choice whether to consciously remain a servant of falsehood or to cast off lies and become an honest man worthy of the respect of our children and contemporaries.²

To help Party activities counter the effect of *Gulag's* revelations, the Soviet authorities set *Gulag* into print. Thousands of copies of the book were distributed to top Party officials, newspaper editors and other ideological *apparatchiks*, who presumably will use them to better prepare their fraudulent rebuttals.

The Soviet Union has the mightiest army on earth, the greatest navy and the deadliest missiles. Yet the Soviet Union is afraid—afraid of a novelist, afraid of a man's ideas. How do you arrest an idea? How do you put truth in irons? They came too late for Solzhenitsyn. They should have seized him fifty years ago, before the boy learned to write.

For more than fifty years the Communist masters have labored to put out the fires of human freedom. They have made the press an instrument of propaganda; yet, whatever happens to Solzhenitsyn, his writings will be around to tell millions of people about the terrible slavery in the USSR.

Thanks to the press, the free world has learned about hundreds of courageous dissidents and their efforts, active not only in Russia but in the captive countries as well.

Joining Solzhenitsyn, prominent Soviet scholar Andrey Sakharov, historian Roy Medvedev, Ukrainian intellectuals Valentyn Moroz, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Mykhaylo Osadchy, Leonid Plyushch and many other courageous intellectuals in the Red Empire have recently demanded more freedom in spite of probable persecution and imprisonment. This is the sign that the patience of Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and other enslaved countries is nearing an end. The cup of their suffering is overflowing.

To be pointed out is that Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov and other Soviet dissidents have recognized the right of each nationality to enjoy freedom and independence.

On September 5, 1973, Solzhenitsyn wrote *A Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, which was not answered. However, after his exile, this *Letter* was published abroad. In it Solzhenitsyn criticizes Marxist

² *Ibid.*

ideology. He states that, in his opinion, the Kremlin authorities use outdated and primitive Marxism to suppress and destroy the non-Russian nationalities. He writes further that the Kremlin leaders make the mistake of supporting Marxism as official and compulsory Soviet ideology. He warns them to cease the struggle for ideological supremacy for it cannot but lead them to a confrontation and horrible war with China.

In his *Letter*, already a historical document, Solzhenitsyn also points out that they must cease their domination over the nations in Eastern Europe and give up their forcible control of the National Republics within the Soviet Union, underscoring that Russia's future is in the northeast of the country.

Solzhenitsyn's *The Letter to the Soviet Leaders* is one of the most important historical documents ever written by a Russian intellectual regarding the nationality problem in the Soviet Union.

Underlying the Kremlin's dilemma is *Gulag's* unanswerable challenge to the authority, indeed, the legitimacy of the post-Stalin regime. This challenge is implicit in Solzhenitsyn's call for the punishment of the more than 250,000 people that he estimates are guilty of the crimes he details in his book. Responsibility reaches far beyond former concentration camp guards. Thousands of Soviet bureaucrats in the entire present-day chain of command are equally culpable. Recalling the punishment inflicted on prisoners like himself, Solzhenitsyn writes of those accountable:

We must be generous and not shoot them... not grip their skulls in steel hands, not shut them up where they will lie on each other like baggage. No, none of that should be done. But the guilty must be tried and made to admit: "Yes, I was an executioner and a criminal."⁴

The confrontation of the Russian creative artist with the regime of his country goes back to the very beginning of modern Russian literature—to A. Radishchev—the author of *Putyeshestviye iz PETERSBURGA v MOSKVU* (A Voyage from Petersburg to Moscow), 1790, and his imprisonment by Catherine II, to A. Pushkin's censorship by Nicholas I, to A. Herzen's exile, to F. Dostoyevsky's death sentence (commuted on the scaffold to Siberian imprisonment), to the persecutions of L. Tolstoy and M. Gorky—all these and many, many more long before V. Lenin and his Soviet power took center stage to be succeeded by Joseph Stalin's paranoid dictatorship and the repressive regimes of Stalin's mediocre successors.

⁴ Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956*, YMCA Press, Paris, 1973, pp. 184-185

The roll of persecuted writers in Russia is the honor list of the Russian nation. After the fall of the Romanovs the list quickly lengthened—we can pick the names from Solzhenitsyn's 1967 letter demanding an end of Soviet censorship and the granting of freedom of creation and conscience to writers and artists... A. Akhmatova, B. Pasternak, I. Bunin, M. Bulgakov, O. Mandelshtam, A. Voloshin, N. Gumilev, N. Klyuev, Y. Zamyatin, M. Tsvetayeva, M. Vasilyev, B. Pilnyak, I. Babel, M. Zoshchenko, V. Grossman, N. Zabolotsky, and many others.

In 1937 many prominent Ukrainian intellectuals like M. Kulish, L. Kurbas, M. Irchan, H. Epik, M. Zerov, O. Shumsky and K. Maksymovych were executed in Siberia... There is no end to the list.

Many hundreds of innocent people vanished in Stalin's camps; only a few emerged, and these usually broken, twisted, living out the ragged remainder of their lives as government pensioners.⁵

And today, with Stalin's inferno behind them, the new "Red Czars" (Peking's admirable epithet for the current Soviet leaders) are busily compiling new lists, creating new persecutions.

Today, such Russian writers as A. Daniel (and Daniel's wife Larissa), A. Amalrik and I. Brodsky have been dispatched to Siberian concentration camps. Such brilliant Russian prose writers as Vasiliy Aksyonov, Alexander Bok and A. Gladilin find their works barred from publication.

Major Ukrainian writing talents like V. Moroz (also a talented historian), V. Chornovil, S. Karavansky, M. Osadchy, I. Kalynets and countless others also have found their fate in the life of limbo of the Siberian concentration camps. Publication of the works of the very well known Ukrainian poet M. Vinhranovsky and Ukrainian historian M. Brychevsky has been prohibited.

Yevgeniy Yevtushenko calls Solzhenitsyn "our only living classic," and the Hungarian Marxist critic and philosopher Gregory Lakacks wrote of him: "The heir of the best tendencies of socialist realism in its early stages, but also of great literature, of L. Tolstoy and F. Dostoyevsky."⁶

In bringing Roskolnikov to the understanding that "peace of mind could come only through full public confession of the crime, F.

⁵ Compare: *Solzhenitsyn. A Documentary Record*, Edited and with an Introduction by Leopold Labedz. Harper and Row, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1971, pp. IX-X. About Zoshchenko see also, *Major Soviet Writers. Essays in Criticism*, ed. by Edward J. Brown, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 110-320.

⁶ *Ibid.*

Dostoyevsky demonstrated his insight into the Russian psyche." In its own time, Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* performed a similar function for the nation.⁷

No other country persecutes its talent with such consistency and ferocity. To find a parallel one must go back to the Middle Ages in Europe or to the terrible times of the Reformation, when belief, religious belief as it was then defined, was the cause of the persecution or execution of many, including Galileo and Milton.

The reason for this spirit of obscurantist extremism lies at the heart of Russia's inability to coexist with original and creative minds, as Harrison Salisbury points out.⁸ For this problem is by no means confined to writers. The scientist in the USSR faces the same granite mindlessness of the Soviet regime.

Solzhenitsyn's father Isai was of ancient Russian peasant stock but had higher education. He first attended Kharkiv University in Ukraine.* Later he studied at the Philological Faculty of Moscow

* Enrolling at the university apparently brought some last-minute obstacle to this long-cherished dream. One of Solzhenitsyn's fictional characters of precisely his father's age and background was rejected at first because the authorities assumed that a boy with his name could only be Jewish. The young peasant had to produce proof that he was Orthodox Christian.

University. His studies were interrupted in 1914 with the outbreak of World War I. Volunteering for the army, he went directly to the German front, where he spent three years with the Grenadier Artillery Brigade.

Solzhenitsyn's mother was of similar background except that, by this time, her family was distinctly better off. Her father was half Ukrainian⁹ and had worked his way up from day laborer; according to the internal evidence of Solzhenitsyn's novels, he spoke broken Russian to the end of his days—ending up a farmer of considerable substance who used the most modern methods on his land in the fertile "black-earth" region. Solzhenitsyn's mother studied at what was called Higher Courses for Women (resembling a private American women's college).

In March, 1917, the Czarist regime collapsed and a few months after Solzhenitsyn's parents' marriage the bloody October Socialist Revolution broke out. Amid the furious eruptions of revolution and

⁷ Burg, David and Feifer, George. *Solzhenitsyn*. Stein and Day Publishers, New York, 1972, p. 175.

⁸ *Solzhenitsyn. A Documentary Record*, ed. by Labedz, p. XI.

⁹ Burg, David and Feifer, George. *Solzhenitsyn*, p. 15.

civil war, Solzhenitsyn's parents moved to Kislovodsk (Northern Caucasus), not far from both their parents' farms. Isai Solzhenitsyn went there to recuperate from wounds received at the front, taking a job as forester.

One day in June, 1918, he went hunting in the forest. While reloading his rifle it went off by accident, wounding him fatally. Several days later he died. Six months later, on December 11, 1918, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was born.

Solzhenitsyn's mother left Kislovodsk in 1924 for Rostov-on-Don, where she found work as a shorthand typist to sustain herself and her six-year-old child. "She worked hard, and as she grew older, she was more and more often ill," Solzhenitsyn was to remember. Alexander took over some of the household chores at an early age, including carrying in the firewood and the burden of acquiring provisions. Ration card in hand, the ten-year-old boy took his place in line at the permanently beleaguered food stores. The waiting consumed many hours, and demanded real physical endurance. Exasperated by chronic shortages, fearful that supplies might be exhausted before their turn came, exhausted themselves by the demands of the times, people often resorted to aggressive language and behavior. This was Alexander's first recorded encounter with the harsh side of Russian life.

Solzhenitsyn stressed in an interview the "extremely difficult" conditions in which his mother had reared him. Not allocated a room by the state, they were forced to pay dearly for "broken-down little huts" rented privately in Rostov. When a room was finally assigned them, it was part of a reconstructed stable.

I was always cold. There was a draft. The coal we used for heat was hard to get. Water had to be carried from afar. Actually, I learned only in an apartment what running water meant.¹⁰

In school Solzhenitsyn was one of the best pupils of his class. During Solzhenitsyn's school years, 1926 to 1936, every aspect of primary and secondary education was subject to fundamental change. Pedagogically, the early revolutionary practices of free discussion in class and a general permissiveness were abandoned; the schools were returned to the prerevolutionary *gymnasia's* tradition of discipline, with an unshakeable authority residing in the teacher. More important were radical changes themselves. In short, the schools were Stalinized.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

But in contrast to the ideological zigzags of the school, a reliable compass of ideas and attitudes could be found in the heritage of the intelligentsia. Free dissemination of ideas was already being fully suppressed in the 1920's but the old intelligentsia's humanitarian and humanist ideals had not been entirely snuffed out, and a boy who had contact with them—and was predisposed to assimilate them—could uncover here the sense of direction and purpose he needed. Solzhenitsyn's mother almost certainly belonged to the circle of those who remembered and admired, and this would explain much about Alexander's interests and development.

His father remained a permanent symbol in his thoughts. It was a symbol of innocence, passion, and pursuit of excellence—of a clean young life cut short before it fulfilled its promise. In 1972, Solzhenitsyn singled out his memory of his father—as he emphasized, only through photographs and the stories of his mother and others—for special mention. He was obviously still pained that the three decorations that he had left from World War I—"which in my childhood were considered the mark of a dangerous criminal"—had to be buried by mother and son lest they be found in a search. Solzhenitsyn also mentioned that his father's grave in a city near Kislovodsk had been leveled by tractors during the construction of a sports stadium.

My mother... never married again. fearing possible sternness toward me by a stepfather. When I grew up and was able to judge, I came to the conclusion that this sacrifice had been unjustified: in my opinion, sternness encountered at an early age is ordinarily only helpful for a boy!¹¹

From an early age his self-assertion—desire to write—fostered a goal unusual for a young boy.

A desire to write and an unconscious notion prompted by no one that for some reason I had to become a writer were aroused in me at a very early age—when I was nine or ten and could not possibly understand even what a writer was or for what purpose he wrote.¹²

Forty years later, when he had completed the three major novels which established his reputation, perceptive critics noticed a parallel between their structure and the works of Thomas Mann. Mann, too, began to write "horribly early," and, as one of his characters observed, quickly felt himself "set apart, in a curious sort of opposition to the nice, regular people." It was a separation caused by "a gulf of ironic sensibility, of knowledge, skepticism, disagreement be-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

tween you and the others"; and insofar as this gulf is essential to the process of observing and writing creatively, the young Alexander felt it too.¹³

In 1936 Solzhenitsyn was graduated from secondary school with outstanding final grades, and was accepted for the five-year course in physics and mathematics at Rostov University. In 1940, his high standing received impressive official recognition. He was awarded one of the first Stalin scholarships which were established throughout the country that year.

In 1939, during his third year of study of mathematics, he undertook a second—concurrent—university program in philology. For his own program Solzhenitsyn enrolled in correspondence courses in I.F.L.I.—Moscow's celebrated Institute of Philology, Literature, and Linguistics. The institute provided a solid curriculum and professional guidance for Solzhenitsyn's home study, to be tested by examinations in Moscow twice a year. He accomplished only a year and a half of that course.

Solzhenitsyn's coming of age coincided with the Great Purge, the bloodiest years of modern Russian history. "Russia was writhing," wrote poet Anna Akhmatova, "guiltless under steel-shod jackboots and the tires of Black Marias." In the wake of the show trials of Lenin's Old Guard, the makers of the revolution, the secret police shot over a million Soviet citizens outright and dispatched millions more to the killing cold and hunger of the concentration camps. Most intelligent Soviet citizens were well aware of the horror that enveloped them, but tried to thrust it from their minds in order to maintain their sanity and to concentrate on their own survival. Solzhenitsyn was one of the few who tried to understand,¹⁴ and his efforts to do so were the great secret of his intellectual life. Remarkably enough, he had been disturbed by political developments even in adolescence, and the novelist Lydia Chukovskaya, a good friend and a public defender of Solzhenitsyn, has written that "he solved the riddle of Stalin as a young man, earlier than others."¹⁵ Solzhenitsyn himself now tells his friends that he had begun to feel doubts about the Communist Party's infallibility even before 1937, when the purges raged to their insane peak.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 25-26, like Solzhenitsyn, the Ukrainian author M. Osadchy also described cruel methods of interrogation in Soviet prisons. See Osadchy's autobiographical work, *Bilmo* (Cataract), Dor-Varlag, Neufahrn, 1971.

¹⁴ In Ukraine there are more fighters for justice and freedom. See *Ferment in the Ukraine* ed. by Michael Browne, Crisis Press, Woodhaven, 1973.

¹⁵ Burg, David and Feifer, George. *Solzhenitsyn*, p. 32.

The adulation of Stalin as an omniscient and omnipotent leader was particularly repugnant to Solzhenitsyn. This is made explicit by a Solzhenitsyn character who says that he most loathed in Stalin the "self-important and didactic tone of his pronouncements. He is quite certain that he is cleverer than any other Russian and that he simply makes us happy when he gives us a chance to admire him."¹⁶

Still it was bloody 1937, when Solzhenitsyn was nineteen, that provided the "vital push," as he put it, to his thinking. He believed almost nothing of what he read about the trials and rationale of the purges, sensing that all the confessions were crude fabrications. He understood that the revolution, in which he then wholly believed, and his country, which he dearly loved, had careened agonizingly and incomprehensibly toward darkness.

Gleb Nerzhin, the central hero of *The First Circle*, is in many ways the most autobiographical character in all Solzhenitsyn's novels. Solzhenitsyn's friends say that Nerzhin's reflections on the purges are a kind of digest of thoughts they have heard Solzhenitsyn express about himself.

He was only twelve when he opened the vast pages of *Izvestia*, with which he could have covered himself from head to foot, and read the account of the trial of some engineer-wreckers. The boy disbelieved it straightaway. Gleb did not know why, couldn't grasp it in his mind, but he distinctly perceived that it was all a pack of lies. There were engineers in families he knew and he couldn't imagine these people wrecking rather than building. And when he was thirteen and fourteen, Gleb didn't dash outdoors when he'd done his homework, but sat down to read the newspapers. He knew the names and positions of party leaders, of Red Army commanders and of our ambassadors in every country and the foreign ambassadors in Moscow.

Gleb was only in the ninth grade when, one December morning, he pushed his way to a newspaper display and read that Kirov had been assassinated. And suddenly for some reason, as in a piercing ray of light, it was clear to him that it had been Stalin and no one else who had assassinated Kirov. Because only Stalin stood to gain by it.

Then these same old Bolsheviks who'd been carrying through the whole of the revolution, who saw their lives only in relation to it, began disappearing into oblivion by the dozens and the hundreds.

Solzhenitsyn had come to an early appreciation of the dangers of political curiosity. He even felt a premonition that it might suck him into prison. The suppression of his concern was not easy for him.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

He may have made himself put it aside while writing the pieces he would submit for publication but, as in Nerzhin's case, the inquisitive impulse was too strong to remain hidden.

In addition to mathematics, literature, politics, and an extra-curricular study of German, Solzhenitsyn was engaged in an independent survey of philosophy. The origins of European thought—of the complex of ideas that dominated his own thoughts and attitudes—interested him particularly, and he acquired a respectable first-hand acquaintance with the philosophers of classical antiquity. He also tried to penetrate to the inner core of the Marxism that dominated his country. He went to the philosophers who had inspired Marx, Engels and Lenin, reading Hegel and the French utopian socialists.

Apart from mathematics, the only interest that allowed him to express a full and open enthusiasm was the theater, and for a time he seriously considered an acting career, as a kind of middle ground between the abstract dryness of mathematics and the inherent dangers of chronicling his brutal times.

Just as Solzhenitsyn was finishing high school, a star of unusual magnitude appeared in Rostov. Yury Zavadsky, one of the best-known postrevolutionary actors and directors, was exiled from Moscow for an ideological "matter," but his relatively mild punishment allowed him to continue working at his profession in Rostov. He founded a theatrical studio there, and Solzhenitsyn became associated with it. Solzhenitsyn had already acted in school productions and found the time to become stage-struck. Before deciding to enter Rostov University, he applied for admission to Zavadsky's studio.

The studio was recognized as a full-fledged drama college with university-equivalent degrees. Competition for places was keen: the theater was then an outlet and an object of passion for many young boys and girls. But Solzhenitsyn passed the rigorous admission tests only to fail on a technicality. The doctors who screened successful candidates discovered a chronic throat catarrh, making his vocal chords unequal to the demands of a stage career.

Solzhenitsyn's disappointment was great; to this day, the theater has remained his passion after literature. As in youth, he still tends to see life in terms of stage confrontations in an endless psychological and historical drama. When released from imprisonment, his first plan was to shape his concentration camp experiences for the theater. Nor has he himself entirely abandoned all forms of acting. He mimics others with gusto and, more seriously, enjoys reading his own works before audiences. This he does with great intensity, pronouncing each

consonant meticulously. His voice falls just below the lower limits of melodrama, virtually obligatory when reading in Russia; but its most surprising quality is a youthful intensity that makes him seem very human.

Throughout his life, Solzhenitsyn's forceful personality attracted a circle of friends and admirers. As a teenager in Rostov he was welcome in the homes of the local intelligentsia. Parents encouraged their children to be in his company, and encouraged Solzhenitsyn himself to borrow their books. Two friendships were to play strong roles in his life, filling adult decades with sharp twists and ironic consequences.

Solzhenitsyn's last school years were spent with a small group of friends, all "young intellectuals" with a particular attraction for literature. The school's literature teacher, who was not much older than her pupils, acted as a kind patroness for the inner core, which numbered four or five boys and girls. Of this group, Solzhenitsyn was especially close with a boy his own age, whom he liked very much. He and Solzhenitsyn were classmates in school, after which the former, too, went on to Rostov University and completed his studies at the adjoining Faculty of Chemistry. For some reason Solzhenitsyn doesn't want to disclose his name.

Common intellectual and philosophical interests deepened their attachment. Solzhenitsyn and his friend spent some of their summer holidays together, as well as part of most days in Rostov. After earlier summer trips to the countryside by bicycle, the two set out in a small rowboat in the summer of 1939 and made their way several hundred kilometers down the Volga to Stalingrad.

They noticed that most farms suffered from the sullen indifference of their impressed workers. The two friends heard mutters from some of the farmers: hints of state-induced famine, police violence, and the sudden, seemingly senseless destruction of an age-old way of life. Or perhaps laments of lonely grandmothers whose children had been deported thousands of kilometers away in keeping with the policy to "destroy" the so-called rich farmer (*kulaks*) "as a class."

Mere traveling companions might have hesitated to listen to farmers' tales of misery. To take notice of anything that cast doubt on the peasantry's absolute well-being in their collective farms was virtually indulging in "anti-Soviet propaganda." But the two young men "told each other everything," as one of Solzhenitsyn's friends puts it now. Observant and intelligent, Solzhenitsyn's friend came from a background similar to Solzhenitsyn's and had read much the same literature and philosophy. The classmates not only shared a

deep affection for Russia, but also, by now, a conviction that it had recently lurched toward deep unhappiness. They knew that they were committing a crime in discussing the poverty of Stalin's thought and the plight of the peasantry. Solzhenitsyn later said that his path to barbed wire began with school-bench conversation with his best friend. But the shared danger only cemented the relationship.

The second important relationship of Solzhenitsyn's youth was with his future wife, Natalya Alekseyevna Reshetovskaya. They met at Rostov University, where she, like Solzhenitsyn's friend, was studying chemistry. They were married in the spring of 1940. Solzhenitsyn's junior by a year, she was highly attractive. She was born in Novocherkassk, a small Cossack town some forty kilometers northeast of Rostov. Like Solzhenitsyn, she never knew her father, a young, highly skilled engineer who was killed during the civil war. Like Solzhenitsyn's mother, Natalya's family belonged to the old Russian intelligentsia. However, music rather than literature was the Reshetovskaya's passion. Natalya studied the piano from early childhood and pursued her secondary education in Rostov's School of Music.

The married couple was very happy before the war suspended their happiness. Solzhenitsyn was graduated from the University in June, 1941, but his postgraduate studies were cut short by the event that changed the plans of virtually all Soviet citizens. On June 22, 1941, the country was plunged into war.

Not called up until October, 1941, Solzhenitsyn himself was still a civilian during the early Russian debacles which delivered the Wehrmacht swiftly to the outskirts of Moscow.

Solzhenitsyn was drafted from Morozovsk, and because of what he has called, without elaboration, "restrictions due to health," was assigned to a unit of horse transport. But since the young Rostov intellectual could not ride, he was appointed, together with other sick, elderly, and otherwise not fully fit Cossacks, to groom ninety horses. The intelligence, pride, and keen ambition of an autobiographical hero were subjected to just this trial in *The First Circle*.

The war broke out and Nerzhin found himself in a horse transport unit. Clumsy, choking with humiliation, he chased all over the pasture after the horses to bridle them or jump on their backs. He did not know how to ride, how to set up a harness, how to handle the hay with a pitchfork; and even a nail never failed to double up under his hammer, as if in belly laughter over his poor workmanship.

In mid-1942 Private Solzhenitsyn's request for transfer to the front reached a former front-line officer in his unit. He arranged

orders for the stable boy to begin a four-month training course in artillery. Solzhenitsyn's facility in applying mathematics to battle problems was noticed early in this training, and he became as outstanding a student in artillery as he had been at his university studies. Upon graduation from the training course in artillery he was sent to Gorky for further training in one of the artillery's most intellectually demanding branches: the new Science of Sound-ranging Reconnaissance.

He left Gorky a highly skilled artillery specialist, and followed his orders to what was militarily called the Orel Grouping of the Central Front.

"I was made a commander of an instrumental reconnaissance battery," he has written in *The Gulag Archipelago*, "and throughout 1943, 1944, and early 1945, I was constantly at the front line with my battery, marching from the town of Orel to Germany."

Official documents about Solzhenitsyn's war record confirm his steady competence under the heaviest fire. From the records of his battle activities and reports by Captain Melnikov, we read:

...it is clear that from 1942 until his arrest, i.e. until February 1945, Solzhenitsyn remained permanently on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, fought courageously for his country, repeatedly displayed personal heroism, and, by his example, inspired the personnel of the military unit of which he was in charge. In terms of discipline and merit on the battlefield, Solzhenitsyn's unit was the best in his subdivision.¹⁷

He was decorated twice for the highest personal bravery (Order of the Red Star and Order of the Patriotic War).

Solzhenitsyn's valor and military distinction were also attested to by his rapid advance in rank. By 1945, he had been promoted to the rank of captain, the equivalent of a British or American major, and, were he a party member, he might well have reached the rank of colonel.

In the summer of 1944, Solzhenitsyn's unit had fought through the marshes of Byelorussia into Poland. Solzhenitsyn was alive and well and—remarkably—enjoyed a visit by his wife at the front. Despite wartime travel restrictions, Natalya Reshetovskaya had managed to work her way through.

By late January, 1945, Solzhenitsyn with his battery had reached the outskirts of Koenigsberg. These were the first Soviet soldiers on German soil. The Third Reich's collapse was now already certain, with

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

this horrible war having swallowed twenty million lives, military and civilian—roughly a tenth of the population of the USSR.

Solzhenitsyn's friend also was now an officer, serving on a more northern front. But the communication between the two didn't stop during the war. They wrote long, thoughtful letters to each other. The two men reflected on their observations wholly freely. Their letters dealt with a wide range of personal subjects, as well as with their old philosophical, moral, and social concerns. They wrote about the war's horrors. They commented with disappointment and some sharpness about its conduct on their own side. The general policy, it struck them, was to save equipment, even ammunition, at the expense of lives. Moreover, terrible losses were often incurred by massive incompetence, caused in no little measure by Stalin's destruction of the flower of the officer corps in the late 1930's.

Although pleased and encouraged by Nazism's defeats, Solzhenitsyn and his friend touched on related themes in their correspondence. They alluded to inefficiency and waste, sloppiness and cruelty. Counter to the motto of the day—"War writes off everything"—they mentioned the awful insensitivity and stupidity which had led to disastrous and unnecessary sacrifices witnessed on their respective fronts.

Who was to blame? By 1944, both officers had matured into full-fledged anti-Stalinists. In their correspondence Solzhenitsyn spoke out against "Stalin's cult of personality," as a document put it, over a decade later.

The correspondence of both young officers was intercepted for many weeks, studied and recorded by the military censorship. Then the organization called *Smersh* was called in. *Smersh* (an acronym for "death to spies") had been established at the beginning of the war, largely by regrouping units of the infamous NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs).

When the team assigned to seize Solzhenitsyn arrived at his front, they found the headquarters of his brigade deep in East Prussia, on the outskirts of Königsberg. On February 25, 1945, brave artillery officer Solzhenitsyn was arrested. Escorted by *Smersh* officers he was brought to Moscow and imprisoned in Lubyanka prison. Here began that young Russian intellectual's inferno that he later described in his major works.

FREEDOM VERSUS OPPRESSION

By SLAVA STETZKO

(Address delivered at the plenary session of the World Youth Anti-Communist League Conference on April 22, 1975 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).

I greet you for those youth without freedom, who live thirsting for freedom, national independence and social justice for their nations and peoples, subjugated by Russian colonialism and Communism in the USSR and the satellite countries. Communism, the most barbaric and despotic exploitive form of nations and peoples, is the modern form of Russian imperial colonialism. It is only a camouflage for Russian neocolonialism, in particular for the benefit of the Third World.

Russian imperialists and Communists are spreading lies to the nations, especially to the Third World, the so-called developing nations, to the effect that they have created a new type of being—a Communist being; a new type of nation—a so-called Socialist nation; a new type of man in the USSR—a so-called Soviet person; a new type of super-national society—a so-called Soviet nation. Numerous Western so-called Sovietologists take in these lies of the Russian neocolonialists and Communists and bolster them with their own so-called scientific research. Sovietology is the study of Russian Communist lies about a system of various measures, involving methods of deceiving the Free World and designed to hide under the phraseology of Russian neocolonialism.

My modest aim: by short analyses of the spiritual creativity of the young generation of the subjugated nations and of the facts about the national fight for freedom, in particular the fight of the youth, to show that there is no socialist nation or Soviet nation, no so-called Communist or Socialist being, no so-called Soviet youth, no so-called Soviet person!

For two thousand years Christianity, the religion of Almighty God, has been trying to reeducate humanity, yet we have not become angels on Earth because that is not its final aim. If this is so, how could a false religion, a diabolical one—militant atheism and Communism—be able in a half century to change the nature of man?

Communism has not reeducated the youth of our nations since the 1920's—neither the Ukrainian nor Georgian nor Byelorussian nor Turkestanian nor Azerbaijanian nor those from the 1940's—the Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian—nor those from the 1945-subjugated nations—for example, East Germany, which in 1953 demonstrated by an uprising of the Berlin workers its anti-Communist attitude, or the Hungarians, who in 1956 through their heroic insurrection undermined the Russian domination, or the Czechs or Slovaks, who in 1968 demonstrated their anti-Russian and anti-Communist attitude, or the Bulgarians, Rumanians, Poles or Croatians.

The national liberation fight against Russia and against Communism of recent times (like that of Ukraine or Lithuania) can be broken down into three periods. One, 1942-1953, was a period of nationwide uprisings in Ukraine under the command of General Roman Shukhevych-Taras Chuprynka (the 25th anniversary of his heroic death in battle against the armies of the NKVD was commemorated in March this year by Ukrainians and ABN), who fought against Nazi Germany until 1944, as well as against Communism and Russia till 1953. The second period, 1953-1959, was an era of uprisings of several million prisoners inside the concentration camps, particularly the youth, who threatened to spread the national revolutionary flame to their mother countries. Khrushchev was forced to reorganize the concentration camps and to free a part of the prisoners, dispersing them throughout the subjugated nations of the USSR. The third period, from 1959 till today, is one which has seen the wonder of the reborn young generation, which has been nurtured on the deeds and blood of the many generations. Out of their spiritual creativity comes the freedom fight of the subjugated within the USSR and in the satellite countries.

I would like to speak to you with phrases taken from their works and with the facts of their fight... These are the best evidence of the bankruptcy of Communism in the countries behind the Iron Curtain!

Communism, as an idea and a life system, is completely bankrupt in those nations subjugated by it and Russian imperialism. It holds on only through the bayonets of the Russian neocolonialists and Communists bourgeois tyrants. The great tragedy of the world of our times is that when Communist and Russian imperialism faces collapse owing to the revolutionary struggle of the subjugated nations, the pressure of liberation nationalism, militant Christianity and religion in general, when this is so, then Communism and Russian imperialism is rescued by the U.S. and other states of the Free World

with economic help and a political balancing of power. It is rescued by Western societies corrupted by Communism.

It can happen that while Communism and Russian neocolonialism is finally destroyed in our subjugated countries, it will triumph in the West because of the absurd politics of its governments. Then the liberators of those under Communism and Russian neocolonialism will be our nations—then ours the task to rescue the Western countries from Communist tyranny. What an irony!

So long as trampled upon are nationalism, patriotism, heroic Christianity and religion in general, a morality based on it, a respect towards human beings made in the image of God and a respect for nations as "God's thoughts," all along with social justice, so long will there be no rebirth, morally, ideologically, culturally, socially and politically, of the West.

It is precisely these ideas and values that give strength to the youth of the nations subjugated by Russian neocolonialism and Communism.

Nationalism is an alternative to imperialism. It is a road different from that of Communism and capitalism and it rejects any class distinction, any exploitation of man by man, because all members of nations are brothers and sisters and help themselves in solidarity, fighting any kind of exploitation.

The crimes of Communism—the genocide, ethnocide, linguicide, the mass murder of all those who believe in God and in their nation, the exploitation and terror—all these are well known to you. In the Russian Empire with a Communist system, 60-80 million were killed, entire nations were destroyed in half a century. In Ukraine alone, in one year (1932-33), seven million peasants were killed by means of artificial starvation, many millions sent to concentration camps. The Hell of the suffering people of Vietnam right before our own eyes: all these call to Heaven for vengeance! Not TO Communism but FROM Communism are millions of poor Vietnamese peasants with their children, and old ones running away, while the world pretends not to notice. In the same way, the world is silent about the tragic heroism of the Kurds, who are slaughtered, animal-like, by the pro-Russian Iraq government, armed with modern Russian weapons.

And the world was silent when, in 1947, the Soviet Union, Communist Czechoslovakia and Communist Poland formed a pact against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in order to crush it with a concerted effort.

But the struggle goes on. Nationalism and Christianity triumph in the underground and in the battle against Communist tyranny.

If a group of young people from the Free World can embrace destructive anti-religious Communist ideas, then why cannot youth of the Free World become apostles of the ideas of the fighters for freedom, national independence, social justice for God and Fatherland, for the liberation anti-Communist and anti-capitalist nationalism of the youth which is subjugated by Russian neocolonialism and by the state capitalism of nations of the whole world? These are the ideas of Valentyn Moroz and Yuriy Shukhevych, two young national heroes of Ukraine!

Thus we raise today as the central political problem of our time the rights of nations and the struggle for national liberation, because the human rights of individuals have never been realized unless the precondition of national independence has first been realized.

The young people in our countries have renewed themselves and gained new life from the great idea of nationalism. "A nation," writes one dissident, "is a temple, the desecration of which constitutes the greatest of crimes... Denationalization is deheroization... de-Christianization, collectivization, colonialist industrialization, mass resettlements from village to city." And these constitute a destruction unprecedented in the history of nations, a destruction "whose catastrophic results have not yet been fully revealed."

These words summarize the position of the young generation in our countries so far as its program and outlook on the world are concerned. It is deeply rooted in traditional national spirituality, and these roots determine the quality and substance of freedom toward which the young fighters of the subjugated nations aspire. The national struggle is not being waged on the basis of philosophical materialism, but on its very opposite. In describing to you the ideals of these young people, I am not using my own words, but am quoting those of the representatives of the young generation.

This is what the young generation believes and teaches: "God has created man... When there is no God, there are no people... The basis of morality is the idea of God and the immortality of the soul... Spiritual life is the only genuine life... and the Church, the bearer of the spirit, must be preserved..." The young generation has rejected Marxist materialism; it has seen that only ethics motivated by religion have a lasting foundation. It is not by chance that one underground author in Ukraine writes: "We shall build the holy cathedral, send our spirit to heaven, and it will stand for centuries... How much did our ancestors have to sacrifice while inculcating in their children human ideas, beliefs, a selfless love of truth and respect for the gods of their ancestors..."

"It is impossible," writes another young writer, "to imagine traditional cultural treasures outside the church... A struggle against the church means a struggle against culture... How many times was the nation saved by the church alone?"

In the face of these and many similar revelations of the views of the young generation in the subjugated nations, are not the Sovietologists of most Western research institutions continually declaring their moral bankruptcy with their false and outmoded theses about the so-called "new" Communists and the so-called "Soviet" man?

In their literary, historical, philosophical and sociological works the persecuted young authors uphold the traditions of their nations and their own separate way of life.

One author writes, "The past is our greatest treasure, a spiritual shield, a highly tested experience. An individual who has only the present is like a tree without roots."

Another author asserts, "Our nation did not follow the 'Older Brother.' It chose a difficult, thorny spiritual path, but its own path."

"Spiritual slavery," says yet another author, "is the greatest national calamity; prosperity makes a man neither great nor happy. What does it all matter in comparison with freedom, with the life for which you strive, with the right to think! Wealth is to be found within ourselves, and not in money, property, or deeds. Conscience is the worst torturer."

Contradicting the thesis about the so-called Soviet fatherland, a spokesman for the young generation firmly declares: "One can choose one's friends and one's wife, but not one's fatherland... A human being has but one mother, or none at all."

After 40 years, these nations still hate the collective system, which suppresses man's sense of worth, individuality, and creative initiative, and which transforms people into a flock, each one a "small cog," as one writer puts it. One of the young poets, presently in prison, writes: "And the soil became a torment for Ukraine..."

Valentyn Moroz, defender of national principles, traditionalism, and the religious foundations of culture, compares the town of Kosmach, one of the oldest centers of Ukrainian culture, to Babylon: that is, the organic, natural, and national concept of world organization to that of the fusing-of-nations concept. Megalopolis, he writes, effaces individuality and kills freedom.

And Latvian Knut Skuenis writes: "Art is created by those who have a free mind."

Yet truth does not triumph by itself. It triumphs only when its bearers are ready to lay down their lives for it.

As Ivan Dzyuba said: "There are epochs when decisive battles are fought in the sphere of social morality and public conduct, when even the elementary human dignity resisting brutal terror can become a revolutionary force. Our age also belongs to such epochs..."

Valentyn Moroz continues: "It is possible to have great spiritual treasures, but they simply will not be noticed if they are not taken up by an heroically INFATUATED person and melted down in the furnace of his heroic infatuation..."

When Ivan Dzyuba issued a statement of repentance, Valentyn Moroz declared to the court, "Well, we shall fight. Just now as one signs a statement of repentance, just now is it necessary for some one to give an EXAMPLE OF FIRMNESS... The lot has fallen on me... It is a difficult mission. To sit behind bars is not easy for anyone. But not to respect oneself—that is more difficult yet. And therefore we shall fight!"

As is to be seen from the fact, the subjugated nations do possess those who believe in the idea of national liberation; they have the necessary apostles and bearers of such ideas. Events in the subjugated nations demonstrate the belief in nationalism to be an unconquerable force, an explosive, dynamic idea.

For example, on November 5, 1968, Vasyl Makukh, the father of two children, a fighter in the UPA and the OUN, and a long-term prisoner in Russian prisons and concentration camps, burned himself alive in Kiev with the cry, "Long live free Ukraine!"

In 1969, Czech student Jan Palach immolated himself in Prague, shouting, "It is better to die in flames than to live under the Russian colonial yoke."

In 1969, Ukrainian patriot Mykola Beryslavsky, 55, attempted self-immolation as a protest against Russification.

In 1972, Lithuanian nationalist Romas Kalanta, a student, immolated himself in Kaunas, Lithuania, with the exclamation, "Long live independent Lithuania."

The national idea is embodied in such concrete action, in a direct struggle of the subjugated people in their native lands and even in the concentration camps, as, for example, the much publicized hunger strike in Potma in March, 1972, in which Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Jewish and political prisoners of other nationalities participated; in street revolts and disturbances in Dnipropetrovsk and Dniprodzerzhinsk in 1972; in armed clashes of Georgian nationalists with Russian occupation detachments in Tiflis; and in armed clashes recently in Erivan, Armenia.

In June, 1971, a revolt broke out among the Kabardinians in the North Caucasus in the city of Nalchyk. In December, 1972, in Derbenti in Dagestan in the North Caucasus, armed kolkhoz workers forced the KGB to release the head of the kolkhoz who had given meat to starving peasants. In June, 1971, in Tyraspol, Moldavian students demonstrated for two days for the secession of Moldavia from the USSR and its annexation to Rumania. In 1972, disturbances between Jews and the KGB resulted in several deaths in Nalchyk.

In Estonia appeared the renowned letter of the representatives of Estonian intellectuals that defended the right of the Estonian people to independence and which warned that the time was coming when tanks will not be rolling down on Prague and Bratislava but on Moscow and Leningrad.

In Turkestan in May, 1969, Uzbeks, shouting, "Russians get out of Uzbekistan," rose up in the concentration camps. These disturbances spread across Tashkent and Bukhara. The famous struggle of the Crimean Tartars, defended by Ukrainian General Hryhorenko, is by now widely known throughout the world. The Armenian groups SHAND (In the Name of the Fatherland) and PAROS (Torch) fought in 1969 and 1970 for the independence and unity of Armenia, publishing periodicals and leaflets. Its members included students and workers.

Mass protests against Russification and religious persecution recently took place in Kaunas, Lithuania, as well. In Byelorussia the writer Bykov strongly protested the Russification of that country, and Byelorussian youth raised its voice in protest. An underground organization was founded by the Latvians in 1962, called the Baltic Federation. Its aims were to fight for the independence of the Baltic nations and to counteract the Russian occupants jointly with other Balts.

In Bulgaria and Rumania national resistance is constantly growing. In Hungary there were new student disturbances in 1973. In Poland a revolt of workers in 1971 was responsible for the toppling of Gomulka.

Constant Soviet and Communist propaganda remind even an elementary school pupil in Byelorussia or Azerbaijan or Estonia or Latvia of the complete contradiction between windy Communist rhetoric and the reality.

No wonder that the official ideology should have failed to stem the tide of nationalist forces. A recent Jewish emigrant from the USSR writes: "One of the major questions facing us is the national

question. The national forces are breaking the Communist empire apart."

Even Brezhnev denounces so-called "local patriotism" and relates it to "nationalism" in the economic sphere.

It must be underscored that the national liberation movements of the subjected nations are popular movements in which an active part is taken not only by students and intellectuals, but also by workers and collective farmers.

The so-called *samizdat* underground publishing organs from the subjugated countries also are proof of this. The *Ukrainian Herald*, the *Exodus* (dealing with Jewish affairs), the *Lithuanian Chronicle*, similar publications in Armenia, Georgia, Turkestan, and Latvia are all products of popular movements.

There are disturbances among the peasant youth, as confirmed by the Soviet press, while revolutionary attitudes have become the norm among former political prisoners.

In Dniprodzerzhinsk the workers of a metallurgical plant protested against the increase of work norms. Beginning in 1956 and up to 1974 there have been countless such examples. What is the heart of the matter?

The decisive factor, it must be emphasized, is that various social strata within the subjugated nations have joined in the struggle. The new slogan is not "land and freedom" but "sovereign rule, land and freedom."

Here it must be emphasized that mere political self-determination is not appropriate as a plan of mobilization for the subjugated peoples. The only rallying cry is national independence and complete separation from Russia. There is no other alternative. The disintegration of the empire and the re-establishment of independent national democratic states is the paramount goal.

The greatest achievement of our liberation struggle and a guarantee of our victory is the fact that the struggle for the soul of the subjugated nations has been taken up by the young generation, which comes mostly of parents who had grown up under the Bolshevik occupation. For this reason, it will be impossible to crush national aspirations, for, as a rule, the revolution of soldiers is preceded by the revolution of poets and the creators of spiritual values.

But some will still ask, "Is revolution really possible?" In the thermonuclear and technological age the most timely revolutionary concept is the liberation insurgent concept, which will destroy the empire and the system from within.

All these developments have established the fact that revolutionary struggle is possible, even in the totalitarian Russian imperialistic system. The courageous acts of Croatian nationalists have exposed the weakness of Yugoslavia as an artificial, forced, colonial structure in Europe.

Simultaneous and coordinated revolutionary uprisings on the part of the subjugated peoples are the surest road to liberation.

It is not an isolated incident that five years ago, on August 31, 1970, in a military court of the Baltic Military District, there ended a trial of an underground organization inside the Red Army whose branches extended to Poland, Azerbaijan, and other places.

The Russian usurpers are trying to counteract the liberation nationalism of the captive nations in various ways: by throwing hundreds of thousands of patriots and cultural workers into prisons and insane asylums, by using chemical and medical means to break down a man's will power, by assassinating fighters for national independence, by applying national and cultural genocide and Russification, by imposing a phantom-like concept of a so-called "Soviet" people, by mass deportations, and by artificially creating a new, unified system of economic geography in the empire.

Yet the spiritual and moral revolution is a fact; the preconditions for a political and military revolution exist.

There is no path to liberation other than the simultaneous national liberation revolutions of nations subjugated in the USSR, and guerrilla strategy is the only realistic one.

In the nuclear age, ideological, psychological and political warfare is becoming more intensive. In military technology and strategy this is reflected by the emergence of guerrilla warfare. Both Moscow and Peking are aware of this. Such awareness, however, is still lacking among the official circles of the West.

Unfortunately, not only does the West *not* appreciate the military potential of the captive nations in the Russian empire, to a large extent it also fails to notice the plight of these nations and the struggle of their freedom fighters.

Thus, an appeal from Ukraine, smuggled to the West, appeared in *The Daily Telegraph* on August 16, 1973. The appeal named 24 Ukrainian writers, artists, intellectuals, scholars, and religious leaders who had been sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment for their opposition to the Soviet system and domination of Ukraine by Moscow. The appeal also states that the USA and other capitalist countries are jointly if indirectly responsible for the use of terroristic measures against the freedom fighters in Ukraine and for the debauch

of a new wave of Stalinism in Ukraine and other Soviet republics. For exactly at the time of massive reprisals by the KGB, these western governments were making agreements with Russia without making any demands for the realization of national and human rights.

The appeal concludes with a demand for the immediate banning of the use of chemical and psychiatric treatment of political prisoners and the liberation of all political and religious prisoners. It is signed by the "Ukrainian National Liberation Front."

And so in conclusion, and in view of these alarming reports from the subjugated countries, we ask this conference:

- (1) To severely condemn and, together with us, urge the liquidation of all concentration camps throughout the Soviet Russian Empire.
- (2) To demand the release of all prisoners condemned and imprisoned for their national, political, and religious convictions.
- (3) To demand an end of the application of chemical and medical means of breaking the will power of political prisoners in order to extort statements of repentance from them.
- (4) To denounce vigorously the practice of confining fighters for national and human rights in insane asylums.
- (5) To demand an end to the persecution of believers in God and cultural leaders who defend the essence and spirituality of their own nation, without which a nation perishes.
- (6) To demand the withdrawal of Russian occupation forces and the Communist terror apparatus from the Russian-subjugated nations within the USSR and its satellites.
- (7) To demand a return of national sovereignty to all the nations subjugated by Russian imperialism and Communism in the USSR and the satellite states, as well as those nations enslaved in the artificial state of Yugoslavia.

We call upon the youth in the entire free world to join us in the protest against Russian and Communist crimes and for the defense of the imprisoned and persecuted fighters for human and national rights.

SOVIET IMAGE AT EXPO '74

By L. PAVLOVYCH

PLACE, IDEA AND REALIZATION

Spokane is a moderate-sized university town in the western part of Washington State. It has a population of about 220,000. Situated on the river of the same name, at the intersection of several freeways, highways and the Great Northern Railroad, it is a lovely commercial hub. Moreover, adding to its importance, is its central location between the rich wheat belt to the south and the abundant forests to the north, east and west.

But it was neither location nor natural riches that determined the site of EXPO '74. The credit belongs to a group of dynamic, imaginative residents who dearly wanted their fair city to host a World Fair with the theme "Men and Nature". Such an inviting theme quickly won the approval of City Hall and decisive support from the local Chamber of Commerce and individual businessmen. Later, both the faculty and students of Gonzaga University joined the ranks. And finally, with the benevolent cooperation of the state administration all legal and financial obstacles were overcome. EXPO '74 was born!

SITE OF EXPO '74

The city itself, with its islands and scenic river banks, provided a very attractive setting for the EXPO. Parking proved to be no problem because of the EXPO's downtown location. Once there, a monorail simplified visitor movement among the lively pavilions. A man-made lake, with its graceful bridges, further enhanced the beauty of the main pavilions.

An exotic combination of water and lights, trees and colorful flowerbeds created enchanting effects both day and night. A theater, an opera house and an open platform by the lake furnished entertainment for every taste. It was apparent that EXPO '74, as a whole, impressed even the most sophisticated observers, especially in the evening with its charm of multicolored lights. From the outside, everything harmonized nicely with the theme of EXPO '74 — a clean, esthetic synthesis of *human* efforts and nature's pristine beauty.

PARTICIPATION AND PARTICIPANTS

Besides the impressive U.S. and Soviet pavilions (to which we shall return later), Australia attracted considerable attention with its ultra-modern pavilion. Exhibits of the natural beauty of the country with its exotic animal world and unusual plants and flowers, plus examples of the modern architecture of its cities, reflected the distinctive features of the New Continent. Iran, with its comparatively large pavilion, tastefully exhibited more of its history than its environment. The pavilion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) featured a very interesting film in which its modern development and industrialization was depicted as a new face of ancient Chinese culture, techniques and life; a film of unforgettable beauty and of deep and proud patriotism. The Philippine pavilion exhibited examples of its local art and artifacts — a breathtaking hybridization of native culture with those of the Orient and the West. Japan flexed its industrial might and creativity against a background of an artfully arranged oriental landscape. West Germany presented many scenes of its industrial maturity with skillfully selected scenes of its natural beauty.

Despite such an abundance of exhibits there was a noticeable absence of new African nations, the People's Republic of China, the satellite states of Eastern Europe and the countries of South America. The little separate pavilion of Black Americans was full of themes alien to that of EXPO '74.

THE BIG TWO

Now let's return to the two largest pavilions—those of the USA and the USSR. Externally, the United States pavilion resembled a huge tent, thus indirectly accentuating the theme "Men in the Natural Environment." Under the "tent" to the right, a 90-foot wide movie screen with an amphitheatre showed excellent films every 45 minutes depicting the natural beauty of our country. Across from the entrance a huge pile, perhaps two stories high, of metallic scraps and junk—some pipes, old damaged cars, discarded washing machines, carts, bicycles, parts of broken motors, etc.—was topped by a large showy sign: "REUSEABLE." To the left, entrances to the exhibition proper. Both sides of the exhibition area were flanked with illuminated displays of pictures, statistics and graphics of damage done by men and technology to the various forms of natural life. There was everything—from insecticides to strip-mining, from uncontrolled and unregulated forest-cutting to excessive dam-building, from air pollution by

factories and refineries to water pollution by chemical and nuclear plants. But not only the problems, the remedies too were on display: ways and means to improve the situation, to fight pollution in the air, on the ground, in the water. And next to these were the names and portraits of great American presidents and congressional leaders who suggested, fought for, and voted for new corrective and preventive laws to limit spoilages, clean the air and water and prevent future contamination and pollution.

No attempt was made to distort the facts or to hide the truth. It was all there: the injury and the cures, the polluters and the conservers. The whole pavilion was designed around the theme of EXPO '74, "Man and Nature." Perhaps a bit too intellectual, not picturesque enough, certainly without propaganda, without the bright colors of professional advertising. Some visitors, accustomed to the ways of everyday business advertising—"cover the dark spots and underline only the bright ones"—sometimes felt a vague disappointment, i.e., "nothing unusual." And yet, in the same way, the unvarnished truth from A to Z was presented in all the pavilions of the northwestern states—Washington, Idaho, Montana. Even the commercial pavilion of American firms followed the same line: "the truth and nothing but the truth" and "as close to the theme of EXPO '74 as possible."

In sharp contrast the pavilion of the USSR presented the "unusual" and "everything but the truth." The site of this pavilion was the choicest in EXPO '74. Immediately upon crossing the bridge from the main gate, one saw over the pavilion's entrance a huge map of the USSR composed of neon light tubes with oversized letters: "USSR." One looked in vain for any mention of Ukraine or Byelorussia—both members of the United Nations. They were lost in "Russia," as average Americans erroneously call the USSR. On the right side of the entrance a sign on the wall declared that in the USSR "All the land belongs to the people—to the state...". Why, with the EXPO's environmental theme, would the Soviets display such an irrelevant and propagandistic slogan? Anyone who knows even a little about the structure of the Soviet government knows that their "state" means "communist party" and that in the USSR there is only the dictatorship of one party. The "people" don't own anything and have nothing to do with "the land" save to work forcibly in state or collective farms, as did their ancestors in serfdom 114 years ago under the Russian Czar *Batushka*. This sign—a pure lie and outright propaganda—was the motif of the whole Soviet display.

In the age of "detente," the Soviets have discovered the magic appeal of vodka and caviar. Consequently, the whole first floor of the Soviet pavilion consisted of a "Russian Restaurant." At a time when the whole world knows the Soviet regime has been buying American wheat and has trouble feeding its own population, this restaurant offered (at inflated prices) a Russian menu unabashedly comprised of American meat and vegetables. They even offered Ukrainian borshch under the more "attractive" name, "Moscow borshch."

Inside the pavilion itself, visitors were firstly "greeted" by an eight-foot aluminum bust of (you guessed it!) the world renowned "environmentalist," Vladimir Lenin, in the midst of a rich and colorful collection of precious and semi-precious minerals. Why Lenin and a collection of rocks were chosen as symbols of the EXPO '74 theme is not clear; unless the Soviets were cognizant of Lenin's active role in reducing the population of Ukraine, Russia, *et al.*, and thereby enriching the soil. In point of fact, Lenin was so busy hating and exterminating people that he scarcely had time to notice nature.

Several movies were busily cranking out fabrications of abundance and prosperity in the Soviet Union, with flashes of rich collective farms and comfortable, thriving cities. Other films, with their transparent anti-religious innuendoes, were intended to demonstrate the widespread enjoyment of religious freedoms in the USSR. Color films of newly-built cities in the deserts of Central Asia and in the waters of the Arctic—especially Norelsk—were accompanied by spoken commentaries on the fabulous progress and development of the USSR. But the producers of the film made no reference to Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* which described the origins of these cities—built by the forced labor of millions of Soviet political prisoners, most of whom died as a result of the inhuman conditions and malnutrition of Soviet slave camps. But then, we should be grateful for this very singular (albeit ghastly) interpretation of the theme "Men and Nature"...

After a thorough inspection of the book section in the pavilion, we could not find a single book on problems of pollution, the environment or on the relation of men to nature. Instead, with the exception of a few scientific volumes, the long rows were stacked with Marxist propaganda in the English and Russian languages. No novels or poetry books were to be seen. Completely missing was literature in the languages of the "sovereign" republics of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Estonia or any other enslaved nation. After a diligent search we

finally found a picture directly related to nature and animals: a picture of a man scrubbing a deer with a brush and soap.

SPIRIT OF DETENTE

Walking along the vast halls of the Soviet pavilion under the watchful gaze of Soviet KGB officials and American policemen (by the way, only the Soviet pavilion had such security), we looked for proof of goodwill and a spirit of detente, of relaxation of hostility, or of at least something related to the main theme of EXPO '74. Everywhere, from every picture and exhibit, from every word of explanation came the monotonous voice of unlimited Soviet propaganda — a voice of contempt, hostility and hatred. In so many smooth words all of it said: "Only in our Soviet country is everything the best; follow us on the way to the Soviet paradise." In the service of this abominable propaganda were mobilized all the resources of modern advertising—an endless tide of half-truths, lies and misinformation. Even in the gift shop Estonian sardines and Ukrainian carvings were sold as "Russian souvenirs."

GOOD-BYE, EXPO '74

We left EXPO '74 with distaste and disenchantment. We had witnessed an unconscionable abuse of American hospitality and goodwill. America had magnanimously invited the USSR to participate in a fair featuring man and his environment, a theme whose ultimate expression is that we are all one with the earth. The Soviets could come up with only crass communist propaganda and worn-out lies under the old Czarist slogan: "Our Mother Russia—Is leader of all the world."

Their eyes, alas, are turned inward.

BOOK REVIEWS

DROGA DO NIKĄD: *Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i jej likwidacja w Polsce* (Road to Nowhere: Activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Liquidation in Poland). By Antoni B. Szczesniak and Wiesław Z. Szota. Military Historical Institute. Published by the Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, 1973, pp. 588 (Polish).

The book under review is an official publication of the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of Poland, in which two authors succeeded in gathering a wealth of source material on Ukrainian-Polish relations from 1920-1948, evidently having had access to official archives and other documentation centers.

Such a work is not the easiest to review, for the contents contain both historical sequences and the interpretations and commentaries of the authors.

In enumerating all Ukrainian political parties and their leaders who were active in Western Ukraine, the authors indiscriminately dump them into the camp of the Ukrainian nationalists, a historical inaccuracy. Almost ninety percent of the material deals with the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The book provides the organizational structures of these organizations as well as the guerrilla warfare activities of UPA until the end of 1947. The book also contains photographs of such Ukrainian historical figures as Simon Petlura, Eugene Konovalets, Volodymyr Kubyovych and his collaborators in the Ukrainian Central Committee; Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka) and a number of other UPA leaders (and biographies), plus photos of the "Nachtigal" Battalion, which entered Lviv at the beginning of the German-Soviet war in June, 1941.

In addition, depicted are Polish military operations against the UPA, Gen. Karol Świerczewski, the Polish Defense Minister killed by the UPA, and Soviet, Polish and Czech officers who fought against the UPA. There also is a series of maps, diagrams and statistical data on the UPA, all giving body to the account of the fierce battle of the Ukrainian underground against the Polish Communist regime in the Curzon Line area.

The authors also discuss UVO and OUN activities in Western Ukraine, the assassination of Polish Minister of the Interior Bronisław Pieracki, the arrest and trial of Stepan Bandera, the OUN leader in Western Ukraine, the "pacification" by the Polish government of Western Ukraine, and the intervention of Metropolitan Sheptytsky in the cause of the Ukrainian people. About this great Ukrainian churchman, they write:

"Count Andrey Roman Sheptytsky was born in 1865 and died in 1944; he was archbishop, the Greek-Catholic metropolitan of Lviv and Halych, a member of the Austrian House of Lords (1901-1918), and a leading spokesman of

Ukrainian nationalism. He gained extensive popularity among his faithful, especially among the nationalists, primarily during the 'pacification' of Western Ukraine in 1930. Although ailing and half-paralyzed, he ordered a plane and flew to Warsaw. There he was treated cavalierly, received coldly and even with hostility; he returned home, and was acclaimed as fighter for justice. To the very end of his life he remained an ardent Ukrainian nationalist. Yet he, who was considered to be an uncrowned nationalist king, was a brother of the Polish general Stanislaw Sheptytsky and a grandson of Alexander Fredro" (p. 105).

The authors also dwell extensively on the policy of "normalization" by UNDO (the Ukrainian National Democratic Union), the events in Carpatho-Ukraine in 1938-39 and the development of Ukrainian cultural and political life in Western Ukraine; the arrival of the Bolsheviks in the fall of 1939, and the organizational life of Ukrainians in the Gouvernement General of Poland; the outbreak of the German-Soviet war and the participation of Ukrainians in the building of their Ukrainian state, including the proclamation of the Ukrainian state on June 30, 1941, by Yaroslav Stetzko, and the work of the Ukrainian "field groups" in Ukraine.

Regarding German policies in Ukraine, the authors say:

"The whole world was shocked to learn about the Hitlerite crimes committed at Babi Yar near Kiev, where 195,000 people were executed, and in the area of Rivne in 1941-42 when 99,000 civilians were murdered. In Ukraine the Germans murdered over 4 million of the civilian population" (p. 118).

Furthermore, the authors state that in 1941-42 the Nazi administrative and police apparatus ceased to take the OUN into account, inasmuch as Ukrainians were marked for extermination according to Nazi policy. On July 1, 1942, they go on, the Nazis killed Mykola Maksymchuk-Kardash, regional leader of the OUN in Volhynia, and on November 25, 1942, on a Kiev street they killed Dmytro Myron, member of the Supreme Council of the OUN and a national leader. Two brothers of Stepan Bandera, Oleksa and Vasyl, were murdered in a Nazi concentration camp. In 1942 the network of the OUN in "Distrikt Galicia" sustained mass arrests, for which the OUN retaliated, in November, 1942, killing two high Nazi officials. In turn, 100 Ukrainians were executed by the Gestapo on suspicion of collaborating with the OUN (Bandera) (pp. 118-119).

A substantial part of the work is devoted to the beginning of the *Polisia Sich* under the command of T. Bulba-Borovets and its alleged terroristic actions against the Polish population, and about the formation of UPA, the Ukrainian Division "SS Galicia" and the Ukrainian National Army under the command of Gen. Paul Shandruk, and the anti-Soviet struggle waged by these groups. The anti-religious bias of the authors is to be seen in the following:

"The clergy (Ukrainian) often contributed to the awakening of chauvinism and nationalism. A strong connection between the Greek-Catholic clergy and the OUN was especially noticeable during the war: the blessing given by Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Hitler and his armies, and to the 'government' of Stetzko as well, and also the participation of the clergy in the organization of 'SS Division Galicia'".

We also read that the "Virtuti Militari" order awarded to Gen. Shandruk by Gen. Wladyslaw Anders a few years after the war for meritorious service in the Polish army in 1939 evoked general indignation in Poland and in Polonia abroad.

In the fall of 1945, they write, Stepan Bandera and Mykola Lebed sent to Poland a representative, Chyzhevsky (Demyd), for the purpose of establishing a liaison via Czechoslovakia with Poland and then with the USSR.

On September 9, 1944, People's Poland and the Ukrainian SSR signed an agreement whereby 482,662 Ukrainians were "resettled" to the USSR. In a section titled "Resettlement Actions of Ukrainians to the USSR" (between October 15, 1944 and December 31, 1946) a number of localities are given from which Ukrainians were forcibly sent to the USSR.

In May, 1946, Bandera sent an instruction to the Ukrainian underground, suggesting that in view of the stabilizing conditions in Europe, OUN-UPA should taper off their activities. In the same vein, on July 24, 1946, Taras Chuprynka, in an "Order of the Day," informed UPA fighters that "the new methods of struggle are temporary" and that the liberation struggle would go on until a free and independent Ukraine be established.

The book gives a detailed biography of Chuprynka, concluding:

"In August, 1943, the 3rd Congress of the OUN elected him the leader of the Supreme Council of the OUN; in September, 1943, he took over the post of supreme commander of UPA, and in July, 1944, he assumed the function of secretary general of the UHVR. On February 9, 1946, by an UHVR decree he was made a general. Shukhevych was killed on March 5, 1950, in the village of Bilohorshcha, in the area of Lviv, in a combat encounter with a detachment of Soviet troops" (p. 142).

At the beginning of May, 1945, the OUN Supreme Council dispatched to the Curzon Line (*Zakerzonnia*) Yuriy Lopatynsky (Sheik) for the purpose of initiating negotiations with the Polish anti-Communist and anti-Nazi underground; a meeting took place on May 21, 1945, in Ruda Rorzaniecka, county of Tomaszów Lubelski. A year later, Lopatynsky was informed by Yaroslav Staruch (*Stiah*) and Petro Fedoriv (*Dalnych*) about the status of cooperation with WIN (*Wolność i niepodległość*—Freedom and Independence, a Polish anti-Communist underground). On May 18, 1956, at an estate of Mentke, near Hrubeshiv, a ten-hour conference of representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian undergrounds was held. It was decided, according to the authors, that "in areas where Ukrainian units are located, WIN units would not operate, unless they operated jointly with the UPA" pp. 340-341).

The strength of the UPA is assessed by the authors on the basis of vast propaganda material distributed among the population and the combat effectiveness of the UPA: "Their armed strength is great; they possess excellent arms, and they have among them German and Soviet officers (trained in both armies). Today they represent a force which we have to take into account. We must understand that the struggle with the Ukrainians lies only in the interest of the Soviets and we must end it" (p. 345).

UPA gained world attention when it ambushed and killed the Polish Defense Minister along with his staff. Gen. Karol Świerczewski was killed on March 28, 1947, when two UPA units, known by their code names as "Hryn" and "Stakh," attacked his convoy in the area of Jabłonek, on the road from Baligród to Cisna (p. 424). Even at that time, when UPA activities had been drastically reduced, its strength in what has become southeastern Poland consisted of 2,500 well-trained armed fighting men and over 200 Security Service men, with the entire OUN network amounting to 6,000 men and women. Against this underground

force the Polish Communist government deployed 20,000 army, security troops and police (p. 434).

At the end of June, 1947, as a result of a treaty between Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, several thousand troops from these countries began the final offensive against the UPA forces, which resulted in heavy losses on both sides. From June, 1945, to March, 1947, the UPA sustained 3,392 killed, including UPA fighters, OUN members and members of the "Self-Defense" organization (p. 421). On the Polish side—from 1945 to 1947—1,994 men of various formations were killed by the UPA, along with 603 party functionaries and 599 civilians.

From June to November of 1947 in Czechoslovakia the UPA lost 350 fighters (61 killed, 41 wounded and 248 captured).

At the same time the Polish government deported to the western and northern areas of Poland 95,846 Ukrainians from the province of Rzeszow and 44,728 from the province of Lublin; these Ukrainians had refused to be "repatriated" to the USSR.

The final liquidation of the UPA was hastened by the destruction of leading UPA battalion and company commanders and OUN district leaders. Of 23 such leaders, 13 were killed, 3 were arrested by the Czech security police and handed over to the Poles ("Zalizniak," "Burlaka" and "Kalynovych") 4 succeeded in escaping to the U.S. Zone of Germany ("Brodych," "Hromenko," "Kruk" and "Berkut") and 3 disappeared without a trace.

On September 16, 1947, in Rzeszow the Polish police arrested Petro Fedoriv (Dalnych), chief of the OUN-UPA Security Service (SB); on September 17, 1947, the Polish security forces surrounded a bunker near Monastyr, the hide-out of the country UPA-OUN leader, Yaroslav Staruch (Stiah) and his deputy for propaganda, Vasyl Halana (Orlan); after several hours of fighting, they both perished by detonating hand grenades inside the bunker. On March 2, 1948, Myroslav Onyshkevych (Orest), UPA terrain leader, was recognized and arrested on a street in Wroclaw and was sentenced to death on June 3, 1950, by a military tribunal in Warsaw (p. 467).

Toward the end of the book the authors express their concern about the activities of the Ukrainian emigration in Europe and America, the ABN and "Radio Free Europe," declaring all to be "agents of American intelligence services." They also mention the death of Danylo Skoropadsky in London and the assassinations of Dr. Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera (in Munich), failing to indicate, however, that the latter two leaders died at the hands of a Red spy.

The book contains a great number of errors, especially in identifying Ukrainian leaders. For instance, the director of the Ukrainian Institute in Berlin was Prof. Ivan Mirchuk, author of *Handbuch der Ukraine*, and not Dr. Petro Mirchuk, author of *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army*, published in Ukrainian in Munich, in 1953, which the authors frequently quote in their text.

They conclude that the overall objective of the OUN-UPA was the "establishment of a bourgeois Ukrainian independent state, which would include Soviet Ukraine, Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine, and parts of the Lemko Land and the province of Rzeszow as well" (p. 470).

The book is valuable because it contains a great mass of historical material. But at the same time it is highly biased and anti-Ukrainian, leading to distortions and tendentious interpretations and implications which detract considerably from any scholarly and academic pretensions.

New York, N.Y.

ROMAN S. HOLIAT

USSR AGRICULTURE ATLAS. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., December 1974, pp. 59.

The large format of this atlas, with text, tables, pictures and maps, makes the number of pages somewhat misleading. In regular book size the volume would be almost double. Systematically formed, the atlas is superbly done, covering all the essential data relevant to Soviet agriculture. Its contents are divided into four major sections: environment, technology, the system, and production. A thorough and comprehensive coverage is provided with detailed objectivity and a minimum of interpretative evaluation. Within the compass of this expert output the basic limits, structure, functions and possibilities of USSR agriculture are clearly and rigorously shown. The work is truly a commendable product and usable for a variety of purposes.

Charted concisely and clearly, the work begins with agriculture's role in the economy. USSR agriculture continues to account for more than one-fifth of the state's so-called GNP. More than one-quarter of the labor force, totaling over 100 million, remains in this sector. Showing meaningful comparisons throughout the work, it is helpfully pointed out that, in sharp contrast, U.S. agriculture accounts for less than four percent of GNP and employs only five percent of the labor force. In terms of consumption, the contrast is even sharper by virtue of the fact that nearly fifty percent of total USSR consumption of goods and services is in food, as compared to less than twenty percent in the U.S. This basic fact, along with inadequate carryover stocks in the USSR, accounts for a heavy, negative impact on Soviet living standards resulting from frequent failures in meeting production goals. Under Brezhnev, investment in agriculture has increased markedly from about 22% of total investment in 1965 to 28% in 1975. The current five-year plan allows for some 120 billion rubles of investment.

Replete with other essential data, this compact atlas shows that the USSR is almost consistently a net importer of agricultural commodities. Its agricultural imports make up about one-fifth of total imports. The empire-state's agricultural exports have not kept pace, dropping from 21% of total exports in 1960 to 11% in 1972. The USSR both exports and imports heavy volumes of grain and cotton to serve client states and to take advantage of different grades and types of these commodities. In discussing policy issues the contributors to this work observe that in recent decades the USSR's population, now above 250 million, has been fed adequately and the diet of most citizens has improved. It is generally agreed, however, that there is considerable room for diversification, particularly as concern meats, vegetables and fruits. The writers emphasize the pressing needs of USSR agriculture: adequate capital investment, improved balances in regional agricultural labor supply and a higher level of skills, increased organizational and managerial efficiency, and coping with enhanced pressures for more and better food and improved rural living conditions. As they stress, "A considerable gap remains between what the vast agricultural lands of the country can produce and what they do produce. If this gap is closed, the USSR may be able both to feed its own population and to help ease world food problems" (p. 6).

In its discussion on environment, the work deals with thermal and moisture resources, wintering conditions, precipitation, weather hazards, soils and agro-climatic regions. Generally, USSR agriculture does not benefit entirely from

its environmental conditions. Productive cropland is limited by cold in the north and aridity in the south. As depicted, more than 30% of the USSR is too cold for agriculture and an additional 40% is still colder to permit the cultivation of only hardy, early maturing crops. By contrast, only about 20% of the U.S. is constrained by this climatic factor. In addition, more than half of the arable land in the empire-state lacks adequate and reliable moisture, a problem not dissimilar in areas of the Great Plains and the West in the U.S.

Winterkill, brought about by intense cold, icing, thawing and refreezing, frequently destroys winter grain. According to the writers, the severest conditions are found in the Yakut ASSR, where winter lasts 7 to 9 months and temperatures dip often to -71°C . By sharp contrast, the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea is the warmest part of the USSR in winter. There the only wintry months are January and February, with temperatures above freezing. There, too, the wettest part of the USSR exists. Adequate precipitation is lacking in the steppes, stretching from Ukraine and the northern Caucasus into southwestern Siberia. It is generally acknowledged that adverse weather conditions were the primary cause of the poor harvest in 1972 that marked record grain imports by the USSR.

With essential detail the atlas also describes the various soils in the USSR. The most important are the *chernozems*, the naturally fertile black earth found in Ukraine and extending beyond the Urals into Central Asia. The black earth and chestnut soils amount to only 13% of the USSR area but account for more than 60% of its arable land. Regarding the last factor, about 27% of the total land area of the USSR is agricultural, and slightly more than one-third of this is arable. The rest is in orchard, pasture, meadow, vineyard and the like. Almost all of the 224 million hectares of arable land in the USSR are sown. By comparison arable land in the U.S. totals 186 million hectares, and less than three quarters of this is sown. The possibility for the expansion of arable land in the USSR is slim. Any net growth will entail considerable cost in irrigation and drainage.

Soviet agricultural productivity lags because of deficient technology, too. Compared with other industrialized states, the USSR ranks high in scientific agricultural knowledge and research, but when it comes to application, a marked deficiency coexists. In the use of fertilizers, for example, the supply was quintupled from 1960 to 1973, but in terms of nutrient content the quality of Soviet fertilizer is relatively low — 29.3 percent compared to the U.S. 40 percent in 1970. Improvement over the years since 1960 has been seen in the number of tractors and trucks, one-fourth of the U.S. total in 1960 to about one-half now. However, the life-span of their equipment is about one-half of the U.S. agricultural counterpart, this because of lower quality, more intensive use, and poorer maintenance and repair.

Soviet ideologues consistently avoid the institutional source of their agricultural deficiencies, namely "the system" itself, but as this work accurately shows, the state and collective farms are fundamentally responsible for poor performance and output. The entire blame cannot be placed, as the Kremlin is wont to do, on nature. In this area of organization, management, and planning the differences between the American and Soviet patterns are even greater than in the preceding instances. The state and collective farms still account for about 75% of agricultural production, while the embarrassing private plots account for the remainder on a sown acreage of 3% of the total. As stated, "The output

of the private sector per unit of both land and labor exceeds that of the socialized sector" (p. 36). In addition, Soviet agriculture still remains highly labor-intensive as against the capital-intensivity of U.S. agriculture. The factor of proportionality continues to be elusive where giant state farms with better technology, centralized control and economies of scale fail to meet optimum production expectations. Also, the pattern of rural settlement differs, where in the USSR the village still predominates and may develop into a near agro-grad, while in the U.S. dispersion and single-family units characterize rural settlement.

Completing the full picture of Soviet agriculture, the work presents an organizational chart which appropriately shows the importance of Communist Party control in this sector. Its added factual material discloses that in 1973 the rural population of the USSR amounted to 102 million, with Central Asia being outstanding in excess population in the rural areas. In contrast to developments elsewhere in the empire-state, the birth rate in Central Asia is the highest, and its rural population continues to grow rapidly. This fact has numerous implications for the future, including national-political ones. Moreover, a separate section devoted to private holdings cannot but leave the reader with the impression that more efficient agricultural production, greased by individual initiative, would result inevitably from a program of decollectivization, similar to those in Poland and Yugoslavia. In 1972, private farming supplied 34% of milk and meat, 36% of the vegetables, about 50% eggs and 62% of the potatoes. But here, too, the calculus of politico-economic rationality as against pure economic rationality comes into play, with broad possible ramifications for the so-called Union itself. This atlas, with its compact presentation, is invaluable for much of the food for thought its objective and factual material supplies.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

ANTIRELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION: A Study of Mass Persuasion. By David E. Powell. The MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1975, pp. 206.

Ever since the inception of the Soviet regime in what used to be Czarist Russia, the official policy of the government toward religion has been one of intolerance and open persecution.

Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union is a study dealing with the effects of the Kremlin's policies with respect to religion, and concerns itself with a perplexing query: Has this policy been successful and, if so, to what degree?

The Communist Party—the sole ruler, legislator, executive and judge of all life in the USSR—has set upon refashioning the political culture of all the peoples of the USSR.

This objective has been pursued assiduously by the Communist Party for the past fifty years, regardless of who may be sitting on top in the Kremlin. Towards that end it has created new political, economic and social institutions and has succeeded in transforming a once backward country into one of the world's great powers.

There is no denying that the regime has ushered in industrialization, urbanization, education and an improvement in the standard of living. This is, of

course, not a development unique with the USSR; the world at large has been making progress along these lines as well.

But unlike other modernizing governments, the Soviet Russian leaders have sought to go beyond institutional change in their search for modernity: they have tried to change the peoples themselves.

In this hothouse process of modernization, Soviet authorities have fervently believed that the secularization of society is a fundamental prerequisite for the creation of a new "Soviet man." To attain this objective the Soviet government has employed a great variety of measures, ranging from persuasion and indoctrination to restrictions, extra-legal pressures and overt or clandestine terror.

The author discusses all these measures and devotes considerable space to the attempts of the Communist Party to suppress the major religious denominations in the USSR—Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and Islamism—through state-enforced education, propaganda and agitation and through a vast anti-religious literature, the mass media, films and television.

Author Powell's analyses are based on official Soviet documents and scholarly research, both Soviet and Western. Specifically, he dwells on the programmed use of indoctrination in the schools and *ad hoc* lectures aimed at older audiences. Above all, he discusses extensively the introduction of secular equivalents for traditional religious rites, such as baptism, wedding and funeral rites, and the hammering of "scientific atheism" into the minds of the citizenry.

According to the author there were, as of 1964, a total of 64,000,000 believers in the USSR, the largest group among them being the Russian Orthodox faithful, who numbered 35 million. They were followed by 15 million Moslems, 5 million Old Believers, 4 million Evangelical Christian Baptists, 3.5 million Roman Catholics, 900,000 Lutherans, 500,000 Jews, 90,000 Calvinists and 10,000 Mennonites.

These statistics are, at best, guess-work. Although some spotty references are made to Ukraine, it is not clear whether the author incorporated some 5 million Ukrainian Catholics of the Eastern Rite into the Russian Orthodox group or whether he lumped them with the Roman Catholic group. It is to be recalled that in 1946 the Soviet government, with the assistance of the Russian Orthodox Church, officially liquidated the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, incorporating it into the Russian Orthodox Church against its will. In a chart on "Ukraine and Moldavia" the author reduces five diocesan sees of Lviv, Peremyshl, Stanyslaviv, Uzhorod and Mukachevo to one denominator of "Uniates."

Yet despite all these efforts of the Kremlin to eradicate religion from the minds and souls of people, the results are only limited. Large numbers of citizens continue to believe in God, and the feeble Soviet contention that believers are merely ignorant old women, does not begin to come to grips with the strength of religion. The same argument has been heard for half a century, which indicates that each new generation of the elderly provides a new generation of church-goers.

Antireligious propaganda is not only clumsy and primitive, it is also costly. Both believers and atheists openly state that the erosion of religious belief has given rise to a moral vacuum in Soviet society. Many churches teach the virtues of hard work, respect for law and order and the avoidance of excessive drinking, promiscuity and other debilitating practices. Moreover, the experience of churches in other countries demonstrates that religion can be socially progressive and an asset to the secular authorities.

The book is a valuable addition to the vast literature on the state of religion in the USSR, as it brings out quite vividly why the Kremlin's efforts to eradicate religion have failed in the past and will continue to fail in the future.

New York, N.Y.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

THE GREAT FRIENDSHIP: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities.
By Lowell Tillet. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969.
468 pp. including map, glossary and bibliography.

"The histories of the non-Russian peoples have been interpreted and reinterpreted to suit whatever happened to be the party line in Moscow or the changing needs of Soviet policy. Predicting the past, so to speak, on the non-Russian peoples could drive an honest historian insane", writes John Dornberg,¹ a keen observer of the USSR who spent two and a half years as a foreign correspondent in Moscow, and in October 1970 was expelled as "persona non grata."

The volume under review offers the clearest explanation to date of the process by which the Communist party directs scholarly activity in the field of "historical science" with the purpose of furthering its programs and long-range goals. To this end Soviet historians have been obliged to create the myth that friendly relations have always existed among the members of the "Soviet family" far back in the history of the Russian empire.

Contrary to previously published books,² Professor Tillet "has adopted a novel organization" of the immense material, framing skillfully the entire 422 pages of the text around the theme stated in the title—the mythical "great friendship" of the peoples inhabiting the USSR with the Russian people, and their "centuries-old strivings" for "union" with Russia, Czarist as well as Bolshevik. The author finished his book before the newest fabrication on the formation of "a new historical community of man—the Soviet people"—was officially promulgated in 1972 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. One can be sure that the revised edition of this excellent study will include an analysis of this newest (and most ridiculous) stage in the development of the myth.

The volume is divided into two unequal parts: Part I under the subtitle "The Making of an Historical Myth," comprising the first twelve chapters (280 pages), and Part II subtitled, "Supporting Arguments for the Friendship of Peoples" (Chapters 13 thru 18, 137 pages). It opens with a detailed map of the major non-Russian nationalities and ends with the author's conclusions (Chapter 19), culminating with a somewhat gloomy statement that by the end of the 1960's, "the party appears to be well pleased with... the accomplishments of Soviet historians, as indicated by the recent cordial relations between party and scholarly forces, and the lack of controversy." (p. 422)

¹ John Dornberg is the author of two books, *The New Tsars: Russia Under Stalin's Heirs*, published in 1972, and *Brezhnev: The Masks of Power*, published in Moscow; in October 1970 he was expelled from Moscow as "persona non grata."

² Such as *Rewriting Russian History*, edited by Cyril E. Black; *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* by Konstantin F. Shtepa; *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*, edited by John Keep.

Starting with an excellent analysis of the "anatomy of the myth" (pp. 14-17) and the early Soviet views on such crucial issues as Great Russian chauvinism and colonialism in Chapter 2, which opens with Lenin's famous quotation: "Scratch some Communist and you will find a Great Russian chauvinist," Prof. Tillet traces the making of the friendship myth during the various stages of its development from the mid-thirties (Chapter 3) through the war years (Chapter 4), the "*Zhdanovchina*" of the early post-war period (Chapter 5), the "thaw" in the mid-fifties (Chapter 10), up to the "friendship of peoples after 1957" (Chapter 12). On the basis of meticulous analyses of various histories of Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tadzikistan, Uzbekistan and others, published in the Soviet Union at various times, the author shows how under the party's prodding historical interpretations have been turned upside-down overnight: heroes become villains, conquests become "voluntary annexations," and the "blessings" of Russian cultural influence have been substituted for the harshness of Russian colonial rule.

"The first extensive party attack on non-Russian historians was the purge of Ukrainian 'nationalist' historians in the early 1930's, rightly states Prof. Tillet (p. 36), referring to Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevsky and the "Marxist historian" Matviy Yavorsky. The decree of the Sovnarkom and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of May 16, 1934 "marks a new intensification of the party's role in the writing and teaching of history," (p. 40). After an almost three-year search for the most satisfactory (to the party and Stalin-Zhdanov) textbook on the history of the Soviet Union, a new textbook, *A Short History of the U.S.S.R.*, edited by A. V. Shestakov, was published in the autumn of 1937, in which the issue of Great-Russian chauvinism and imperialism was simply "forgotten" and the "lesser evil" formula was introduced into the Soviet historiography. This formula "would be used ritualistically by Soviet historians until 1951, when it would be debated and discarded for a more positive interpretation" (p. 46).

One important role assigned to the Soviet historians is the strengthening of the party's nationality policy. By careful screening of thousands of books, articles, pamphlets and other historical writings published in the Soviet Union in a period of over thirty years, Prof. Tillet proves (although he does not state it explicitly) that Soviet historians of today have accepted the status of "court historians" of the Communist party, quite similar to the "court historians" of the Czars.

Readers who are interested in the study of Ukrainian-Russian relations or in the issue of so-called "Ukrainian 'bourgeois' nationalism" versus Great Russian chauvinism must be grateful to the author for his frequent and pertinent references to this subject throughout the whole volume. As a case in point, the role of *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Treaty of Pereyaslav as analyzed by Prof. Tillet in depth will be quite revealing to most American readers. And this perennial issue is still alive, as proved by the dismissal of Petro Shelest in 1973 for no other "sin" than for his book, *Our Soviet Ukraine*, which was vehemently denounced for "excessive attention" to the Ukrainian past and insufficient praise for the favorable impact on Ukraine of its union with Russia, first the Czarist (in the seventeenth century) and later with the Soviet (in 1922).

RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM: FROM IVAN THE GREAT TO THE REVOLUTION. By Taras Hunczak (ed.). 396 pp. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974.

In spite of the exaggerated claim of the editor that his symposium, as "a carefully researched and authoritative volume on the expansion of the Russian Empire," is "thereby... the first comprehensive history of Russian imperialism,"* (p. X), he has indeed given us the best presentation of that field.

The extensive coverage can be seen from the Table of Contents. After Hans Kohn's "Introduction" (pp. 3-17) follow these chapters: "The Origins of Russian Imperialism," by Henry K. Huttenbach (pp. 18-44); "Russian Imperialism Reconsidered," by Emanuel Sarkisyanz (pp. 45-81); "Pan-Slavism or Pan-Russianism," by the editor (pp. 82-105); "Russia and the Baltic," by Ragnhild Marie Hatton (pp. 106-130); "Russo-Polish Confrontation," by Walter Leitsch (pp. 131-166); "The Ukraine and Muscovite Expansion," by Henry B. Huttenbach (pp. 167-197); "Russian Domination in the Balkans," by Troian Stoianovich (pp. 198-238); "Russian Penetration of the Caucasus," by Firuz Kazamzadeh (pp. 239-263); "Russian Conquest and Colonization of Central Asia," by Geoffrey Wheeler (pp. 264-298); "Russian Designs on the Far East," by Sung-Hawn Chang (pp. 299-322).

The contents are to be criticized not so much for what they contain as for what is missing. Africa, mentioned very briefly, is more or less bypassed, pp. 12, 49, 59-60, 274; the Antarctic is not listed at all, and the Arctic is granted its only mentions on pp. 16, 21, 25, and 102. The Czechs appear on pp. 9-10, and Pan-Slavism on p. 63-64, 82-83, 87-88, 98, 236. But what of Benes and the whole sordid story of Munich? On the other hand, the chapter on Ukraine is rather good.

The editor also could have strengthened his work by exercising firmer editorial decisions. Numerous references in the "Notes" (pp. 323-368) are certainly extremely valuable, but Sarkisyanz's chapter has no references at all. Since most of the references are Russian (and other "foreign" studies), we would have appreciated more references to works in English; in that respect, a systematic bibliography would be quite helpful. Some references contain publishers, some do not—a serious problem when considering the need to secure such sources from foreign (and even domestic) publishers.

The editor cannot be criticized for using contributors mostly from abroad, although it might be interesting to learn why so few American specialists appear in his symposium.

* Among the several other studies covering this field, see: James Foote, *Russian and Soviet Imperialism* (Richmond, Surrey: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1972); Basil Dmytryshyn, Ed., *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1974), Companion volume: *Medieval Russia*, bibliography, pp. 485-497; Anthony T. Bouscaren, *Soviet Foreign Policy: A Pattern of Persistence* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962); Isaac Deutscher, *The Great Contest: Russia and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); Waldemar Gurian and others, eds., *Soviet Imperialism: Its Origins and Tactics* (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953); Ivo Lederer, ed., *Russian Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Hugh Seton-Watson, *The New Imperialism* (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour, 1962). There also are, of course, numerous specialized studies on the specific aspects of Russian and Soviet policy toward certain countries and areas.

All in all, in spite of these points, the publication is number one among similar works, since it is a concrete, objective historical chronicle based on wide researches.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

COMMUNISTS IN COALITION GOVERNMENTS. By Gerhart Niemeyer. Council Against Communist Aggression, 64 North Court Avenue, Orlando, Fla., 1974, 124 pp. (paper).

In the free world when a coalition at the helm of government collapses the participating parties do not exclude an eventual return to a new coalition. It is completely different with coalitions combining non-Communist with Communist parties. As soon as the Communists enter as political partners, the coalition ceases to be one of a continuing series and turns into a final one-way road to a definitive end—either a Communist dictatorship or exclusion of the Communists from further participation in the country's government.

There is no historical incidence of Communist cooperation within the limits of the traditional parliamentary pattern in which parties accept and expect alternations between participation in power and opposition. Coalitions with Communists follow a law of their own because Communist power strategy requires operation with and through allied non-Communist class elements and parties. The Communist doctrine regarding partnership with non-Communist forces and parties is part of an ideology in which every Communist is indoctrinated throughout his adult life.

A coalition between Communists and legitimate political groups requires the basis of some "common cause." The "common cause" (racial integrity, "Fascism"—which is about the same as Communism except that it is not expansive—"reaction," frequently offer themselves as the "common cause") is the lever by which the allies can be made to attach their loyalty to Communist direction. The alliance is strictly transitory since there can be no enduring community of interests between the Communists and any other group.

The legal base for the coalition is generally a "pact" which serves as the basis for a kind of police power by which elements unfavorable to Communists can be disciplined as "wreckers" or "saboteurs" if need and opportunity arises. "Joint action" enables the Communists to gain access to masses which would be unapproachable by party organization. "Joint organizations" and "joint action" can also be used to make Communist leadership acceptable to traditionally non-Communist strata. Ultimately, a "United Front" leaves the Communists with a base for the establishment of a Party dictatorship since it serves to remove the chief emotional, organizational, material, and legal obstacles to totalitarian Communist rule.

In addition to discussing the Communist doctrine regarding partnership with non-Communist forces and parties, Niemeyer describes what has happened in countries where coalition governments turned out to have provided the road to Communist dictatorship, countries where coalition ended in armed conflict (China, Spain, and Guatemala are representative cases), and countries where the Communists were ousted by coalition partners who recognized what they were up to and were in position to thwart the advance of totalitarianism.

Czechoslovakia is a prime example of the Communist method of political infiltration by coalition government. Niemeyer gives Czechoslovakia extended treatment because it has been regarded by Communists themselves as a model example of how to take over the sole power in a country with the help of non-Communist coalition parties. Popular masses were used to provide pressure by means of unified mass organizations which were open to Communist penetration and infiltration. These Judas organizations could be counted on to stage protest meetings, exploit "student" gullibility, demonstrate, and conduct strikes.

"Pressure from below" (described above) and "pressure from above" (utilization of organs vested with powers) were combined effectively to push anti-totalitarians step by step from their place in any share of power. The Communists used political coalition in keeping with their principle: "not to lose sight for a single moment of the aim of a complete socialist overthrow."

Czechoslovakia represents in its most finished form the pattern of Communist take-over through the politics of coalition government. Other East European countries were subjected to Communist dictatorship by similar methods with certain variations. Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria were ruled by coalition regimes established at Western insistence. France and Finland, by contrast, are examples wherein the Communists were forced into showdowns before they could complete all their preparations.

Though it has often been suggested that the ruin of Czechoslovakia in 1948 was unavoidable because the Red Army stood at the border, in the case of Finland the Red terror was even closer to the country's capital. Red Army units maintained bases within Finnish territory. The country's only Western neighbor was "neutral" Sweden. No help could be expected from the West. Nevertheless, the Finns managed to survive with a government of integrity. Finland serves as a living refutation of the thesis that the proximity of the Red Army reduces a country to helplessness *vis-a-vis* the machinations of its own Communists.

When the Communists lost 345 seats in municipal elections in 1947, reflecting the public's orientation to leftward waffling of the government, the Communists sought to activate preparations for a coup d'etat. The Communists based their organization on cells spread throughout the police, government offices, industry, army, and labor unions. The Reds initiated mob demonstrations and demands for concessions from the government. Shortly after the coup in Czechoslovakia, the Army's secret service discovered the elaborate plans for the take-over of Finland. Helsinki, fortunately, had a non-Communist chief of police who seized the machine guns assigned to the police which the Communists had intended to seize. The Communist Minister of the Interior demanded the release of the weapons. The country's president, a non-Communist, encouraged by the wave of anti-Communist indignation throughout the country and the weak support received by the Communist order for strikes and demonstrations, himself assumed police powers which normally belonged to the Minister of the Interior. The national radio was removed from Communist control, the state police apparatus was dissolved, Communist infiltrators were ousted from the minor government agencies, and Communist protest strikes were broken up.

In several countries the activities of the Communists in coalition governments led to the formation of armed resistance with an ensuing military showdown in which either the Communists or anti-Communists emerged as victors. This was the case in China, where in 1927 the Kuomintang turned against the Communists, and had nearly eliminated them by 1934. Following World War II the

United States policy opted for Communist dominance and helped the Communists obtain control of sufficient arms and territory to be victorious when the opposing forces were again in a showdown for control of China. This time the Red effort was successful in acquiring the mainland.

In Spain the Communists were ousted. In Guatemala, anti-Communist resistance formed an armed force outside the country and cleaned the Communists from the government when the regulars joined its noble cause. In Guatemala Communists were entrenched in the Presidency and other high government positions.

Niemeyer notes that the Communists seek to come to power within the framework of the legitimacy of a coalition. Even where, as in Romania, a Communist government was instituted by fiat backed by naked armed force, the Communists have an overwhelming urge to secure the appearances of having come to power within the framework and legitimacy of a coalition. For democrats, coalition government is a form of political being, but for Communists it is a one-way road to power. Therefore no coalition government can hope to tame the Communists. It will either be converted into a Communist dictatorship, or it will have to curb the Communists by means other than parliamentary coalition maneuvers.

The historical examples of a coalition government with the Communists show that it is utterly fallacious to believe that by bringing Communists into a coalition government hostility has been overcome and peace achieved through unity. Niemeyer points out that as far as democracy is concerned, we would do well to remember one rule at least: democratic polity is impossible in the absence of some basic agreement on goals, on political morality, and on the "rules of the game." On all such grounds, binding agreement with Communists is impossible.

Jackson, Mississippi

TOMMY W. ROGERS

THE DEATH OF STALIN. By Georges Bortoli. Translated from the French by Raymond Rosenthal. Prager, New York, 1975. Pp. 214, 14 p. illustr.

The title of this book is quite misleading. One would probably get the impression that this work deals solely with the events surrounding the demise of Joseph Stalin. It does, but to a much larger degree it gives the reader a panoramic, a wide-angle view of the times, its personalities and the conflicts found therein. Furthermore, rather than just the death of a man, we get a description and analysis of his personality, his style and the methods he used to attain his ends.

Georges Bortoli, a French journalist and author, though not in Moscow during the reign of Stalin, puts together a cogent account of the months preceding Stalin's death and the days shortly thereafter. This is done through interviews with primary sources and fine analyses of Soviet documents. Though one would have preferred more primary source material and more documentation, the facts presented in this work cannot be discarded as trivial or faulty.

For an introduction, Bertoli paints us a graphic picture of the "man of steel" as a spartan of a man. His rooms were bare and void of any amenities usually attributed to leaders of nations. His manners typified his rural Georgian

origins and were considered by many to be coarse and uncultured. He had no friends, he mistrusted everyone. Even to his family he was a stranger. He would meet with his daughter, Svetlana, only a few times a year and then it was more of a formal audience than a father-daughter relationship. Yakov, his eldest son, died in a German prison camp, for his father would not raise a finger to help him because of his contempt for POWs. Adding to his rough nature was the fact that he was a very devious and paranoid individual. His *dacha*—summer home—was a fortress. All his friends were under suspicion and no one could escape his paranoia. Nobody dared to feel safe under Stalin, for at any time the "man of steel" could turn against them and accuse them of being "enemies of the state." This was the trademark and tactic of the Premier in placing blame for the failures of the regime. Bertoli writes, "He would assign them (his associates) the most impossible, the most bloody tasks and then, with a single word, repudiate them, throwing them to the mob. And the mob was delighted to see that the great leader had been secretly on their side all along." One such campaign was in reaction to the so-called "Doctors' Plot", in which Stalin accused several Jewish physicians of murdering and injuring members of the Soviet hierarchy. The author brings out the fine details and magnificently spells out the fierceness and tyranny of the Stalinist mentality.

To add to the understanding of Stalin and his deeds, the book tries to depict the atmosphere and the conditions in the Soviet Union and further tries to elucidate the personalities associated with him. The book succeeds admirably on both counts and perhaps has its greatest strength in these two endeavors.

Bertoli describes the Soviet Union as the "other planet" veiled in secrecy, fear and repression. One did not know if their neighbors were informants or if they were going to be picked up by the secret police. To talk to a foreign journalist meant a certain bleak future. To voice a protest or an opinion would precipitate a still bleaker one. Foreign influence and cosmopolitanism were prohibited. "Mother Russia" was extolled, while a program of "Russification" subverted the many nationalities composing the Union. The arts, culture and science had to serve political ends, and as a result creativity was non-existent and the arts dismal. The Soviet Union, in every respect, personified Hobbes' "Leviathan"—a monolithic giant towering over its citizenry.

Commensurate with the bleak social and political atmosphere, the Soviet economy was just as gloomy. For the sake of heavy industry, consumer goods were sacrificed. The *kolkhozes*, which were to produce the agricultural miracle, were complete failures. In short, the Soviet utopia which was so lauded by the Communists was not so utopic after all. In fact it was the most brutal and evil "utopias" on the face of the earth. This did not bother Stalin.

The book gives an excellent description of the leaders of this utopia. Bertoli details them as strong-willed Communists, sincere, fierce and ruthless individuals, yet who undergo a radical metamorphosis whenever dealing with Stalin and become sniveling *aparatchiks*. Kosygin, the quiet, demure bureaucrat who relished power but who preferred to stay out of the limelight. Khrushchev, the energetic despot, who was sent to Ukraine to carry out the purges and institute reforms. Molotov—the hammer—whose name fitted him perfectly. Beria, the blood-thirstiest *aparatchik* of them all. Mikoyan, Malenkov, Bulganin, etc. all described as obedient to and commanded by the man whom they were all aspiring and even conspiring to replace.

The book culminates with the death of the "man of steel" and the twisted powerplays shortly thereafter. We get a description of the "revolt" against the personality cult of Stalin by his once subservient followers and now hopeful candidates. The last chapters are further extensions of the personalities and the dynamics of Soviet politics and the consequence associated with them. On this point, the author does not delve deeply into one of the most interesting aspects of the Stalinist era. The power struggles and the subsequent purges of Stalin would have topped off this work nicely, yet the author does not pursue this very interesting topic and therefore, ends the book quite abruptly.

Overall, this book gives a good presentation of the man—Stalin—his era and his politics. It especially gives the reader an insight into the personalities of Stalin and the Soviet elite.

New York University

GEORGE J. SIERANT

HRYPHORYJ SKOVORODA. Povne Zibrannya Tvoriv u Dvokh Tomakh (Full Collection of Works in Two Volumes). Akademiya Nauk Ukrayinskoyi RSR, Instytut Filosofiï. 2 Vols. Kiev. Naukova Dumka, 1973, pp. 533, 575.

Although the works of H. Skovoroda, distinguished philosopher, writer and educator, were published after his death, they were widely known during the author's life. In 1798, M. Antonovsky published (without acknowledging Skovoroda as the author) Skovoroda's treatise, *Narkiss*. In 1861, I. Lysenkov published selected works of the philosopher. This was followed by the publication in 1894 of D. Bahaliy's and in 1912 of V. Bonch-Bruevych's better and more complete editions. In 1961 the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR printed a collection of Skovoroda's works in two volumes containing all the writings of the philosopher. (The first volume included mainly works of a philosophical genre while the second consisted of literary works).

In the present edition we find Skovoroda's works appearing in their chronological order. The first volume encompasses philosophical and literary essays dating from the mid-fifties to the mid-seventies, while the second consists of philosophical treatises dating from the mid-seventies to Skovoroda's death. Both volumes are illustrated and accompanied by notes and comments. The second volume contains an index of names and a dictionary of incomprehensible and antiquated words. The editors claim that they have tried to preserve the original language of Skovoroda's texts. Only Greek and Latin or Church Slavonic letters have been replaced by corresponding letters of the Ukrainian alphabet. It is unfortunate that variant texts of the earlier editions are not included.

The above-mentioned 1961 publication contained mistakes in the poem "Dream" and in the Latin texts, all of which have been corrected in this new edition. The introductory article (pp. 11-57, Vol. I) includes a critical discussion of Skovoroda's philosophy and literary legacy, as well as of recent Soviet works about him. The authors of the introduction, V. Shynkaruk and I. Ivanyo, have not included Soviet scholarly publications of the 1920's, and the most significant Western studies (by D. Chyzhevsky, I. Mirchuk and V. Zenkovsky) have been excluded from consideration, their authors being branded as "nationalistic falsi-

ficators" (p. 13). It is clear that such criticism was made on political rather than scholarly grounds.

Despite all these shortcomings, this publication is recommended as the most complete edition of Skovoroda's works.

Rutgers University

EUGENE W. FEDORENKO

HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA. By Vladimir Dedijer, *et al.* Translator: Kordija Kveder. New York. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974, pp. 752, illus., maps, 24 cm.

This English translation of *Istorija Jugoslavije* was written by four Yugoslav historians: Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic and Milorad Emečić. It is a social, economic, cultural and political history of the Southern Slavs until the present. The work is divided into the four following parts: 1. The Rise and Fall of the Medieval States; 2. Life and Struggles within the Great Empires; 3. Struggle for National States and Modern Society, and 4. The Paths of Unification and the Struggle for Social Revolution. At the end, a chronology of events, 1945-1973, is added. It has an index, but not a bibliography.

In presenting the history of the country from the late Stone Age (Neolithic), it traces the Greek colonization, the Roman conquest, and the incursion of the barbaric tribes. It follows up with the Turkish conquest, the domination of the Hapsburgs and the Republic of Venice.

The author briefly relates the assassination in Sarajevo and the outbreak of World War I, with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the end of its domination over Yugoslavia. It is a turbulent history of the several brave nations living in Yugoslavia.

In Part Four, the paths of so-called unification and the struggle for "social revolution" are depicted. It does not have enough material dealing with the nationalities of this part of Europe, called the Balkans. It deals little with the Southern Slavs under the Hapsburgs, 1903-1914, the internal relations in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The Croats and Slovenes are not treated separately but in connection with the Serbs and the so-called Serbian revolution. Croatia, an independent state during the Second World War, deserves separate treatment. But the authors are university professors under Tito and are obeying the policy of its Chief of State.

In Austro-Hungarian times there were Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Dalmatia and Slovenia, all of which have the right to self-determination in modern times. The Dual Monarchy proclaimed this territory as a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The present name was adopted only in 1929 by its ruler, the absolute monarch.

Yugoslavia was invaded on April 6, 1941, by the German Nazi forces, and on November 11, 1943, the new government under Tito was formed, which repudiated the monarchy and adopted a new constitution, proclaiming on November 29, 1945, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which is still under Communist rule.

This book presents the Yugoslav Communist view of the history of this country, and this ought to be taken into consideration when reading.

Senior Librarian, Brooklyn Public Library

ALEXANDER SOKOLYSZYN

PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

I. UCCA RESOLUTION PRESENTED AT THE 8TH WACL CONFERENCE

Submitted by Dr. Walter Dushnyck, representing the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) at the 8th WACL Annual Conference, held on April 23-25, 1975, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Resolution No. 1

On behalf of and in the name of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, which represents over two million American citizens of Ukrainian origin, I have the honor and privilege to submit the following Resolution:

WHEREAS, Ukraine, a nation of 48 million people, which, losing its freedom and independence to Communist Russia in 1920 after a three-year period of independence, proclaimed on January 22, 1918 in Kiev, is today undergoing unbridled persecution and repression by the Soviet Russian Government, a fact which was officially recognized and confirmed by the U.S. Congress in its CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RESOLUTION of July 17, 1959, which subsequently became the law of the land known as Public Law 86-90; and

WHEREAS, the Soviet Russian government and its puppet government in Ukraine, known as the Ukrainian SSR, have been practicing systematically a ruthless policy of national, cultural and religious persecution and outright genocide on a scale unknown in mankind's history; and

WHEREAS, the Soviet Russian government in Moscow and its subsidiary branch in Kiev have been constantly denying the Ukrainian nation its God-given rights to freedom and national independence and self-determination, which rights are assured it by the Soviet constitution and the U.N. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, to which both the USSR Government and the Ukrainian SSR are signatories; and

WHEREAS, the Soviet Russian Government has been in the past and is now engaged in a virulent and relentless policy of Russifying the Ukrainian language, culture and traditions in its totalitarian attempt to merge the Ukrainian and other non-Russian nations of the USSR into one "Soviet people," that is a Russian people; and

WHEREAS, in 1965-66 and 1971-73, hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals, young Ukrainian men and women, were arrested, tried *in camera*, and sentenced to severe terms of imprisonment, exile, incarceration in "psychiatric wards" and concentration camps in defiance of all existing humane laws and the code of international justice.

NOW, THEREFORE, the 8th Annual WACL Conference unanimously decides:

1. To denounce Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism for its conquest and savage oppression of Ukraine, and the denial to the Ukrainian people of their right to national independence;

2. To condemn the Soviet Russian Government for its ruthless and inhuman persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals, as well as members of the Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Judaic and Islamic religions, and for its enforced Russification and destruction of the Ukrainian cultural and intellectual elite;

3. To appeal to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies to regard Soviet Russian repression in Ukraine and in other non-Russian countries of the USSR as a gross violation of the U.N. Charter and the U.N. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and brand the USSR as a violator of international justice, unworthy of membership in the world body.

Resolution No. 2

FOR RELEASE OF UKRAINIAN MEN AND WOMEN POLITICAL PRISONERS

WHEREAS, *Valentyn Moroz*, 39-year-old Ukrainian historian and author who was sentenced in November 1970 to nine years at hard labor and five years of exile from Ukraine, was on a hunger strike from July 1 to November 22, 1974 in protest against beatings and tortures inflicted upon him in the infamous Vladimir Prison, where he is reported now in solitary confinement; and

WHEREAS, *Leonid Plyushch*, 35-year-old Ukrainian mathematician and cybernetics specialist and former staff research member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science in Kiev, is being kept indefinitely in a "psychiatric ward" in Dnipropetrovsk, where he is being administered unregulated doses of drugs which are destroying his health; and

WHEREAS, seven Ukrainian women: *Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets* (6 years of imprisonment), *Stephania Shabatara* (5 years), *Nadia Svitlychny-Shumuk* (4 years), *Iryna Senyk* (6 years), *Nina Strokata-Karavansky* (4 years), *Odarka Husyak* (25 years) and *Maria Palchak* (death sentence commuted to 15 years imprisonment) are harshly punished and denied medical care, and are treated like common criminals; and

WHEREAS, *Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk*, a Ukrainian Catholic priest, and *George Vins*, Ukrainian Baptist leader, were both sentenced to 10 years at hard labor for engaging in "illegal religious activities,"

NOW, THEREFORE, the 8th WACL CONFERENCE unanimously decides:

To appeal to the U.N. Secretary General and to heads of states who are members of the WACL and to the International Red Cross in Geneva to prevail upon the Soviet Russian Government to release forthwith these Ukrainian patriots and allow them to restore their lives and to emigrate abroad if they so desire.

II. APPEAL

OF UKRAINIAN BICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

The observances marking the Bicentennial of the Independence of the United States of America have begun. Committees and associations dedicated to this great anniversary have sprung up throughout the nation. Innumerable organizations, ethnic groups, and city, state and federal administrations have been mobilized in preparation for a commemoration which may be the biggest in history.

Ukrainian groups in the U.S.A. also will participate in these celebrations. Towards that end local committees have already been established in some cities to make arrangements for these observances. Likewise, state committees are being formed, and a Ukrainian National Committee for the Bicentennial of the U.S.A. has been set up.

The National Committee was created at a meeting of representatives from various community organizations held on Saturday, March 1, 1975, in New York City. The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America's invitation to all Ukrainian national organizations to send their representatives to this meeting met with enthusiastic response. But those who were unable to attend the meeting are also invited to participate in a project which should encompass everyone. Our community as a united whole must contribute its active efforts to this undertaking. To make the Ukrainian identity distinguishable, the work of every individual and every group or organization is required—work marked by creative ideas, initiative and inspirational leadership.

The tasks ahead of us are immense and not much time is left. Only zealous collective efforts can make up for the lost time and lost opportunities. These tasks are twofold:

1. In conjunction with other Americans, to observe the anniversary of this great historical event, the American Revolution, which resulted in the establishment of an independent and unique state. The American Revolution was a turning point not only in the history of the American continent, but for the whole world. It generated a new reality on our globe with results felt to this very day. Our historians have the important task of documenting the arrival of our first settlers to this country and their spiritual and material contributions to its growth and development. As we participate in laboring and striving for the welfare and strengthening of this country, so should we participate in the observance of the Bicentennial of its Independence, for it was its declaration that made this country and our way of life possible. Thus, in all cities and states, on all levels, we will take an active part. As together we recreate the past and maintain the present, so shall we build the future United States together.

2. Parallel with these tasks, the Ukrainian community is to bear its share of support for the struggle of the Ukrainian people in the all-out battle of the peoples enslaved in the USSR against the reactionary forces and designs of Communism and Russian imperialism. The struggle against them is of global proportions: wherever a Ukrainian community and Ukrainians live, there is the struggle.

Toward the ultimate success of this struggle and fulfillment of our responsible role in it, we must meet two indispensable requirements:

- a) We must preserve and steadily strengthen our identity, our spiritual and cultural image, our national characteristics;

- b) We must strive to become a force to be reckoned with in the world and exert some control over events which are taking place around us.

We can best demonstrate our power by mass and active participation in the observances of the Bicentennial of American Independence, by the inclusion of each and every one of us in those events and actions which are already taking place, and by helping generate those which will take place in future decades.

Through the initiative of a number of organizations and individuals, Ukrainian books and materials will be prepared for the occasion. The Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee will coordinate this undertaking to preclude duplications and

shortcomings.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee will exert all necessary efforts to encourage and assure that the initiative and work of local organizations, societies and professional groups be integrated into a powerful national union representing us in the most favorable light.

Therefore, we call for full cooperation in all sectors: in the municipal and state celebrations, and in the manifestations organized jointly with other ethnic communities. It is important for us that our own events and manifestations emerge as laudably as possible.

Today the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee is in the stage of collecting information regarding all possibilities and all actions planned by others, information we shall take into consideration in planning our own programs. We appeal to all our individual and organizational supporters for full cooperation and support. The National Committee will cooperate with and will assist all our organizations in the cities and states. Our attention will be focused on events and manifestations of a national-political character, as well as those of a spiritual-cultural and community-organizational character.

We are fully aware of the great difficulties and needs ahead, but none of us doubts that through common will and effort, we will attain and exceed these objectives.

April, 1975

**UKRAINIAN BICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE
OF AMERICA**

**III. UCCA SUPPORTS PRESIDENT FORD
ON VIETNAMESE REFUGEES**

May 10, 1975

The Honorable
Gerald R. Ford
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

The Board of Directors of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, representing over 2 million American citizens of Ukrainian origin, meeting on Saturday, May 10, 1975 in New York City, unanimously decided to send you the following message:

The tragedy that befell South Vietnam and Cambodia, the two South-eastern countries which for over a decade were allies of the United States, is not only a tragedy of the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples, but the tragedy of all humanity. The wholesale execution of innocent peoples, the unabashed destruction of all existing institutions and uprooting of ancient civilizations of these countries by the Communists are unmistakable signs of what the Communists under the guidance of Moscow plan for the rest of the free world.

Failing militarily in Southeast Asia, the United States cannot escape its historical responsibility in providing humanitarian and relief assistance to these victims of Communist barbarism.

Therefore, we wholeheartedly support your farsighted and compassionate steps in appealing to our Congress and the American people to help absorb

150,000 Vietnamese refugees into the economy of our country. The United States is the leading nation among the countries of the world having traditionally opened its doors to the victims of persecution and oppression. As we approach the Bicentennial of the founding of our great nation, we cannot and must not forget that America was built by immigrants and refugees, who sought political as well as religious and economic freedom in this country.

Following World War II, the United States received hundreds of thousands of victims of Nazism and Communism, among them 100,000 Ukrainian displaced persons and refugees; in 1956 this country gave shelter to thousands of Hungarian freedom fighters, and in 1961, 650,000 Cuban refugees were admitted to this country. All have been integrated gainfully into our economy and have contributed greatly to the growth of our cultural and industrial development.

We pledge our unstinted support to your efforts in providing assistance to the Vietnamese refugees. Fully aware of our present economic situation, inflation and unemployment, we still believe that by accepting 150,000 Vietnamese refugees this country will not go bankrupt nor will there be additional hardships on the part of the American people.

Through our branches and member organizations we shall endeavor to find placement and housing opportunities for these hapless victims of Communist inhumanity, thus helping to fulfill our moral obligations to people who are our allies and who have been deprived of their ancestral homes for supporting our common cause of universal freedom and human decency.

**BOARD OF DIRECTORS
UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA**

IV. TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF HEROIC DEATH OF GENERAL TARAS CHUPRYNKA

On March 5, 1975 twenty-five years had elapsed since the heroic death of General Taras Chuprynka—Roman Shukhevych, Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Head of the Supreme Council of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and General Secretary of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), who died on the battlefield in an unequal struggle against Russian Communist invaders on March 5, 1950 in the village of Bilohorshcha, near Lviv.

In him the Ukrainian nation lost a man who cannot be forgotten. It has lost one of those knights by whom a nation lives, and who contributed to its building; who by their deeds mark the pathway and lead people through hardships and struggle to victory.

General Chuprynka—is a man in our modern history who to this day evokes a storm of hatred from imperialist Moscow. For he is the most expressive symbol of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for freedom and statehood and, as such, he will enter the annals of all of Ukraine.

General Chuprynka-Shukhevych from early youth dedicated his work, knowledge and his crystal-clear patriotism to the service of the Ukrainian people and their liberation. He was not only an all-Ukrainian patriot, but he was also an outstanding military leader and statesman. It was due to his organizational capabilities and his military genius that the UPA and the OUN could successfully

carry on an underground struggle from 1942 to 1950 against the two greatest powers of the time—Nazi Germany and Communist Russia.

And although General Chuprynka-Shukhevych fell on the battlefield, thus closing by his heroic death an era of armed resistance against the Russian occupier of Ukraine, the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people continues, even though under different circumstances. On the traditions of the heroic struggle of the UPA-OUN, which was directed by the late General Chuprynka-Shukhevych, new generations of unsubdued Ukrainians sprang up, which are carrying the torch. The current resistance movement in Ukraine, the powerful Ukrainian cultural and political renaissance could hardly be possible had there not been a Ukrainian underground movement directed by the late General Chuprynka-Shukhevych.

His name is well known not only among Ukrainian generations in Ukraine and among Ukrainians in the diaspora, but among the enemies as well, as attested to by the numerous writings of Ukrainian, Russian and Polish Communist authors.

The Executive Board of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America calls on all its Branches and National and Central Organizations, and the Ukrainian community at large to mark the anniversary of his heroic death with appropriate commemorative gatherings during this year of 1975.

The ideals of the liberation struggle, waged and led by the late General Chuprynka-Shukhevych, are deeply embedded in the Ukrainian people in enslaved Ukraine. It is, therefore, our duty to continue persuading the world that the ideals for which the Supreme UPA Commander died are the ideals of freedom and statehood for which the Ukrainian people will continue to strive until final victory is attained—a free, independent and sovereign Ukrainian State.

EXECUTIVE BOARD
UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"DETENTE," a compilation of testimonies. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 1975.

There are many interesting, thought-provoking testimonies in this compilation. For sharp contrasts of thought the reader should consult those of George Meany, AFL-CIO President, Hon. W. Averell Harriman, and George F. Kennan. The captive nations viewpoint is expressed by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky. It should be compared with that presented by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

As others, including Kennan and former Senator Fulbright, Rusk shows his perturbation over the Captive Nations Week Resolution. In appeasing the Russians, he observes, on page 214, "It might even be desirable to repeal such things as the captive nations resolution—which would break the Soviet Union up into some dozen independent nations; but then I shall never be running for elective office and may be somewhat out of touch with the needs of those who plan to do so." This reveals the depth of understanding of one who served as Secretary of State and actually thought that the Georgia in the USSR was a reference to his State of Georgia in the U.S. This is no exaggeration; it is well documented.

It is incomprehensible how any American can make a statement of this sort. The resolution is against empires—Russian, Chinese and others—and is for the independence of subjugated nations, particularly those in the USSR. Mr. Rusk finds this objectionable. More, aside from the objective merits of the idea, he deludes himself into thinking that the idea incorporated in the resolution rests for its validity with the fear of our representatives not being reelected. Even on this extraneous ground, if Rusk would run for office with the repeal of the resolution in mind, the constituents would display a keener common sense on this issue than he does. Kennan, Fulbright and others before him have manifested their irritation with this resolution. None could rationally justify his position, other than the spurious one of appeasing the Russian totalitarians. And this passes for the American character, which fortunately is thoroughly uncharacteristic of the American people.

"MOROZ AND BUKOVSKY," a statement by the Honorable Henry M. Jackson. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1975.

In sharp contrast to the above, this statement by Senator Jackson more accurately reflects the common sense of our people. Presented to the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners in New York, it supports the protest against the worsening plight of Valentyn Moroz, the Ukrainian historian, and Vladimir Bukovsky, the Moscow poet.

As the Senator rightly puts it, "We must not be cajoled into dismissing as domestic privileges the flagrant Soviet violations of fundamental human rights which the Soviet Union itself is pledged to uphold under international law." In short, the Senator explodes the typical Russian myth on non-interference in internal affairs which the Nixon Administration subscribed to in the Moscow agreement. Further, one could hardly disagree with the Senator's observation that "It is most important and appropriate that the American people and the U.S. Government make clear to the Soviet Union that a genuine detente includes greater respect for international standards of human decency."

"MRS. HALUN HAS A STORY TO TELL," an article by Robert K. Tweedell. *The Denver Post*, Denver, Colorado, May 4, 1974.

This interesting article was the result of a "walk-in visitation" on the part of a lady who had a story to relate. Mrs. Halun left Ukraine some 60 years ago, and now, as an American citizen, she had to tell her story of freedom and its precious values. The column concentrates on the absence of freedom in the USSR.

The cases of Leonid Plyushch and Valentyn Moroz are described. Also, the efforts of Soviet physicist Andrei D. Sakharov in behalf of the two are cited. The final sentence of this engaging piece reveals the tenor of the discussion and the message conveyed: "It takes an act of faith to affirm that a day will come when Mrs. Sonia Halun will no longer have to cry bitter tears because she has a freedom denied to others equally deserving—and that is what this is; an act of faith which reflects respect and admiration for a Ukrainian-American woman of principle and courage."

"A RARE RUSSIAN 'CONFESSION,'" an article by Mario Smiraldo. *The New York Times*, New York, March 23, 1975.

"Confession at Night," a play by the noted Soviet dramatist Aleksei Ar-buzov, is the focus of this informative article. The writer is a bit confused in identifying Ukrainians as Russians when he speaks of "Russians" in World War II being divided against themselves. He is thoroughly correct in saying that the play is unusual in admitting that the Germans were not totally evil and the Russians totally good.

On the matter of divided loyalty, the writer is on sound ground when he states, "It is a fact that the Ukrainians were a divided people during World War II, some of them looking to the German invaders as guarantors of Ukrainian nationalism and culture, which had been cruelly suppressed by Stalin before the war. Others collaborated with the enemy out of fear or greed." Indeed, the more one reflects over the Nazi treatment of the Ukrainian problem, the more one is amazed at the boundless political blunder committed by them, really surpassing all others in this century.

"SS. PETER AND PAUL UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, CELEBRATES GOLDEN JUBILEE," a tribute by the Honorable Charles J. Carney. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., July 17, 1974.

Congressman Charles J. Carney of Ohio pays fitting tribute to a church founded by a few Ukrainian-Americans who established themselves in Youngstown back in 1922. Congratulations are extended to the Rev. William Olynky, pastor, and Mr. John Bury, president of the parish council. Excerpts from the golden jubilee program are appended to the Representative's remarks.

Among these remarks, the legislator observes, "These dedicated families of the Orthodox Christian faith have come together as one, wonderful family-in-Christ, and their beautiful church stands as a symbol of their devotion to Almighty God." Fifty years of progress are duly recorded, with contributions made to the growth of America.

"YUZYK BLASTS BILL 22," a report by Julius Majerczyk. *The Ottawa Citizen*, Ottawa, Canada, March 17, 1975.

This report dwells on Senator Paul Yuzyk's condemnation of Quebec's proclamation of French as the province's official language and also the federal government's non-implementation of its multiculturalism policies. The occasion was a speech by the Senator to the men's club of August Israel Congregation. He has long been an advocate of multiculturalism in Canada.

The multicultural policy was launched by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1971. It includes financial assistance to ethnic groups, programs of interaction among Canada's ethnic groups and other related activities. The action taken by Quebec is obviously not in accord with this policy because of its exclusiveness. As the Senator correctly surmises, "It is in the interests of French-Canadians to know English. Canadians move around a lot. If you know only French and you can't find a job in Quebec, you're in trouble."

"PICKETS PROTEST RUSSIAN CHURCHMEN," an article by Pam Abbene. *The Pilot*, Boston, Massachusetts, March 7, 1975.

According to this account, both Lithuanian and Ukrainian American Catholics protested the arrival of three Russian churchmen at the Union Club in Boston. They charged that there is no religious freedom in the USSR. The Soviet religious apologists who recently toured the country have shamefacedly claimed that freedom of religion prevails in the USSR. Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev went even so far as to suggest that Ukrainian Catholics have willingly embraced Russian Orthodoxy.

The article quotes at length the release of the Boston Chapter of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and also its vice-president, Orest Szczudluk. Mr. Szczudluk declared, "We want the opportunity to bring our cross before the American public. These men are not true representatives of the church or religious in any way. They are agents of the government." An editorial in this

official organ of the Archdiocese of Boston highlights the points of the protestors and refers to the "painful experience of Ukrainian Cardinal Slipyj, Simas Kudirka and Alexander Solzhenitsyn..."

"A GOOD MAN—JOHN CAULEY," remarks by Senator Dole. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., April 30, 1974.

This retirement piece on John R. Cauley is significant here for his reminiscences which Senator included as part of his commendative remarks. Mr. Cauley was chief of the *Kansas City Star's* bureau in Washington. His experiences with presidents and secretaries of state produce a fascinating account, but the one with the then Vice President Nixon appears to be the most interesting of all. It concerns Captive Nations Week.

Regarding Nixon's visit, many things went awry. As Cauley puts it, "First, five days before Mr. Nixon departed, President Eisenhower issued a proclamation designating the third week in July as 'Captive Nations' week, during which free people would rededicate themselves and pray for the liberation of the enslaved people back of the Iron Curtain." The congressional resolution embraces far more than this, but to continue with the journalist's story. "When the vice-president arrived at the exhibit," he recounts, "Khrushchev was furious about the captive nations resolution, saying, 'It stinks and is provocative.'"

The journalist relates how later he talked with the vice-president. Referring to Nixon, Cauley states, "He said Khrushchev had almost knocked him out of the ring earlier and that it was important that he strike back." Concerning the captive nations resolution, it is a matter of record that Nixon didn't know how to retaliate on this score, and actually relied on the superficialities of the so-called kitchen debate.

"UKRAINIAN EASTER: PRAYERS FOR A HERITAGE," an article by Joan Papa. *Today, The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Philadelphia, Pa., March 30, 1975.

Highlighting this magazine is a colorful front page photo of a young student at a desk in a schoolroom with Ukraine blazoned on the desk in yellow and blue colors and two Ukrainian dolls on top of it. The article as titled above is featured below. Another photo of the gold-domed Ukrainian Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Philadelphia introduces the article inside. The theme of this excellent rendition is expressed in the sub-caption, "In preserving the traditions of their native land, the Ukrainians of Philadelphia also preserve a sense of community that is disappearing in America."

The writer covers a wide variety of topics, from *pysanky*, the Ukrainian Easter eggs, to Russification in Ukraine. She quotes the past experiences of several Philadelphians interviewed. One tells of witnessing her aunt tied to a pole and shot because of her opposition to the imposition of Russian rule in Ukraine. The attitude and thoughts of others are vividly described and well interlaced in an overall account of the Easter celebration.

"SALUTE TO THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE," remarks by Representative Edward Koch *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1974.

Congressman Edward Koch of New York has on several occasions supported the Ukrainian cause for independence in the Congress and beyond. In this statement he expresses his gratification over Moscow's admission that Ukrainian nationalism remains strong despite a prolonged crackdown on it by the KGB. He notes the Ukrainian Central Committee calling for intensified ideological indoctrination.

As he phrases it, "Every admission from Soviet authorities that their Ukrainian problem still exists is a monument to the resilient courage of the Ukrainian people." The Congressman recites a bit of history from the time Ukraine was absorbed into the Soviet Union in 1922. He concludes, "In this struggle Ukraine has the hopes and prayers of freedom-loving people the world over. I salute the Ukrainian people."

"UKRAINIAN EASTER," letters to the editor. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Philadelphia, Pa., April 27, 1975.

In response to the superb article described above, the letters of many grateful Philadelphians were published in this later issue. One by Dr. Peter G. Stercho, President of the Philadelphia Branch of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, expresses vividly the sentiments and reactions of the others. As in part he writes, "As a spokesman for Philadelphia's Ukrainian community, I was delighted to see such a fine piece of investigative reporting, accurately reflecting our traditions, our feelings towards the Soviet-oppressed homeland of the Ukrainian people, and our style in America."

"A STATEMENT BY BALTIC, UKRAINIAN AND CAUCASIAN PRISONERS," excerpts. *Latvian Information Bulletin*, Washington, D.C., October, 1974.

This periodical of the Latvian legation discloses essential parts of a statement, really a declaration, signed by 17 political prisoners of the indicated national backgrounds. The prisoners are confined in the Mordovian concentration camps southeast of Moscow. The declaration is addressed to the Soviet of Nationalities and accuses the Russian Communist Party and the Moscow government of violating the Soviet Constitution by pursuing a policy of Russification in the non-Russian republics of the USSR.

In part the declaration reads, "In the sphere of internal relations, the Communist policy is geared toward the fusion of the non-Russian nationalities with the Russian nation. The creation of the new Soviet nation which they advertise turns out to be in practice nothing but the old policy of Russification." Other parts of the declaration are equally forthright, including references to the right of secession as provided in article 17 of the USSR constitution. Such bona fide declarations smuggled out to the West cannot but reinforce the efforts of those meeting the threat posed by imperialist Moscow.

"UNDER THE MASK OF OBJECTIVITY," an article by Vitaly Donchuk, *Ra-duga*, USSR, September 1974.

As presented in the valuable *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, this article rails against Western and Ukrainian nationalist critics of the USSR. Research centers, special service units, propaganda media and other things are lumped together under this attack. The theoreticians and practitioners of anti-communism are ostensibly at work because of the USSR's great successes in foreign policy; their objective being to disrupt the present mild climate of international relations.

What appears to irritate the writer most was the refusal of UCCA, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, to accept the participation of so-called Ukrainian Soviet cultural activists in the unveiling of the Shevchenko monument in Washington. As he states it, "Had the UCCA genuinely wanted to honor the memory of the Prometheus of Ukrainian literature on a worldwide scale rather than with the intent of filthy speculations and insinuations, would it not have replied to the letter from 34 UkSSR cultural activists who wrote, in part: 'We would gladly take part in the festive ceremony of the unveiling of your monument, for Shevchenko and Ukraine are inseparable. We wish to honor the great Kobzar in a worthy manner...'"

The plain facts are that Shevchenko was honored in the most worthy manner of linking him with Washington and the idea of national independence. The so-called cultural activities, with CP blessings no doubt, failed to state that Shevchenko and *free* Ukraine are inseparable. The adjective means a chasmic difference. As to the future, the inscription on the monument symbolizes the hope of freedom for all captive nations, a worldwide value that inevitably will be realized in time.

"UKRAINIAN FESTIVAL ON ICE," a brochure. *The Crowley Corporation*, New

Those who saw the Ukrainian festival on ice agreed that it was an unusual extravaganza. Not all the performance items were Ukrainian, nor should they be, but the complete performance was an eye-opener for our American audience. Although the publicity in New York tended to Russianize the group, in Washington and elsewhere this was apparently corrected.

In this colorful brochure circulated at each performance the reader is presented with a historical background of the group, extending from 1960 and its origin in Kiev to the present, with a record of over 1500 performances within the USSR and beyond. As pointed out, "Eventually, all the hard work made its mark, and created for the Ukrainian Republic of the U.S.S.R. a unique and valued institution." "Snow Girl," "Morning in the Pine Forest," "Eastern Dance," the Cossack "Sunrise Over Hortitza" are but a few of the suggested themes expressed by the group in action.

"PROTESTERS BID SOVIETS FREE UKRAINIAN," a report by Jean Crafton.
Daily News, New York, September 30, 1974.

Reporting on a protest parade of some 10,000 Ukrainian Americans marching down Fifth Avenue in New York City and a rally of 3,000 at Bryant Park, this reporter captures the full spirit of the manifestation. Speakers at the rally included Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz and Congressman Edward Koch, who along with others called for the release of Valentyn Moroz and Leonid Plyushch. The Russification of Ukraine was widely deplored.

Dr. Walter Dushnyck, who managed the event, was quoted as saying that Vladimir Prison, where Moroz is kept prisoner, is "the severest prison in the Soviet Union." Attorney General Lefkowitz noted that Moroz had been "incarcerated for speaking the truth. We must do all we can through our government, officials in Washington and elsewhere to bring about the release of this man." Few may realize it, but the resolutions on human rights and our trade with the USSR as adopted by the rally and telegrams to Senators Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff reinforced their position on the emigration issue as the pressure for relenting was intensified by Secretary of State Kissinger and the Administration.

"IMPRISONED UKRAINIAN WOMEN," a statement by the Honorable Jonathan B. Bingham. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1975.

Added to the many congressional concerns expressed toward the Ukrainian problem is this one issued during this International Women's Year. The New York Congressman praises the Ukrainian National Women's League of America for its work in behalf of preserving the Ukrainian culture. Above all, he stresses their current efforts seeking the release of Ukrainian women in Soviet Russian prisons.

The Congressman pointedly declares, "In the light of the current celebration of International Women's Year, at a time when we strive not only for women's rights, but for the rights of all people, I urge the immediate release of these Ukrainian women and all who are imprisoned or otherwise persecuted for seeking to practice basic freedoms—freedom of speech and religion and freedom to emigrate." Representative Bingham has frequently spoken out for Ukrainian independence, Moroz and other issues.

"IN MOSCOW, THEY CALLED IT THE 'BIG KNIKSEN,'" an article by Garri Tabachnik. *The New York Times*, New York, N.Y., June 27, 1974.

Widely circulated by the Washington Committee for Soviet Jewry, this article emphasizes the curtsy of Soviet officials implied by the "Big Kniksen" nomer, in short, a play on the Russian word for curtsy. As he puts it, the self-satisfied Kremlin rulers "had gotten what they wanted. They had received the master of the White House in their Kremlin palaces." They roped him in for trade deals with only a pithy price to pay in terms of human and national rights.

Alluding to Jews and the various nationals in the USSR, the writer observes, "the Americans can take comfort in the fact that the prisoners in Soviet jails are now receiving American bread." With regard to the right to emigrate,

as provided for in the USSR constitution, he points out that a relative few were allowed to emigrate in order to gain the deals, but then all sorts of measured restrictions were imposed, such as payments for education fees, threat of loss of job and so forth. In brief, it pays to curtsy to the "Big Kniksen."

"ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE RUSSIAN AREA: PART III: THE UKRAINIAN-JEWISH PROBLEM," an article by Stefan T. Possony. *Plural Societies*, The Hague, The Netherlands, Winter 1974.

The tri-articles produced by this internationally prominent writer touch upon an extremely delicate subject in Eastern Europe. This third part of the series is exceptionally well done. It is well documented and is rigorously analytic throughout. It is a worthy addition to a long controversy on the subject of Ukrainian-Jewish relations and should be read by all analysts of the Soviet Union who are interested in advancing amicable relations between Ukrainian and Jewish groups.

In essence, the article shows that the claims of Ukrainian anti-Semitism have been blown out of all proportions. At the very outset, the writer states unequivocally "that the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis was an indisputable fact, while that of the Jews is not; and that Communist Russian anti-Semitism which is real enough has been acknowledged only after much hesitation and delay, and somehow is but rarely taken seriously." The article then proceeds in a very dispassionate and scientific manner to justify this observation.

The author traces the problem from the period of the Khazars down to the present. He finds, for example, the Khmelnytsky case a poor foundation for the general indictment of Ukrainians as anti-Semites. The Petlura case was even less indictable, and as the author shows Margolin, Solomon Goldelmann and others were Jewish leaders in the Petlura government. According to Allen Dulles, former CIA director, Schwarzbart, the assassin of Petlura, was a Communist agent. This and many other disclosures are featured in this extremely valuable article. The writer has made a very solid contribution to the literature on this vital subject.

"RECOGNIZING THE PLO," a letter to the editor by A. E. Tomkin. *Washington Star-News*, Washington, D.C., November 5, 1974.

The contents of this letter are striking. The writer rightly holds that the U.N., in its treatment of the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, set a precedent whereby a non-government group is regarded as a sovereign government. When it chose to hear Arafat, it did just that. Indeed, a Pandora's Box was opened.

He also quite accurately states that other national groups deserve the same treatment. As the writer states, "the Ukrainians have dissident groups both within and without the Soviet Union and will undoubtedly seek to be heard before the General Assembly of the United Nations." The same would apply to the Kurds, the Cypriote dissidents and others. Moves have already been made by certain Ukrainian groups in this direction.

**"ROSTROPOVICH AND WIFE HONORED BY INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE
FOR RIGHTS OF MAN,"** a release. *UCCA*, New York, April 18, 1975.

The renowned cellist Mstislav Rostropovich and his wife, Galina Vishnevskya, an opera singer, were honored by the League as recipients of its Human Rights Award and feted at a reception given by Mr. and Mrs. Leonard Bernstein of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra. Some 100 persons attended, drawn from New York's musical, cultural and political worlds. Rostropovich was harassed by Moscow for "crimes" such as giving refuge to his friend Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Among the guests were Dr. Valery Chalidze, a Georgian defector, Dr. Alexander Y. Volpin, Dr. Pavel Litvinov and other Russian intellectual defectors. Dr. Walter Dushnyck and his wife, Mary, respectively of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and the Ukrainian National Association, were among the invited guests. The League has frequently spoken out in behalf of Moroz, Plyushch and others.

"PERTH PLEA FOR SOVIET DISSIDENT," a report. *The West Australian*, Perth, Australia, November 19, 1974.

This report centers on the Canadian author and lecturer John Kolasky. He spoke in Perth, arousing interest in the case of Moroz and other Soviet dissidents. Kolasky recited his experiences in the USSR from 1963 to 1965, and held that he knew many of the Ukrainian dissidents. He also stressed that when he arrived in the USSR, he discovered that the system was not communist but Russian imperialist. Kolasky was a member of the Canadian Communist Party for 30 years.

"SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IS ALIVE AND STILL GROWING,"
an article by John Dornberg. *The Washington Star*, Washington, D.C.,

April 21, 1975.

For the past six months this writer, operating out of Munich, has been writing significant and timely articles on developments in the USSR. This extensive one shows the human rights movement expanding in the USSR. As he cogently states it, "Signs of dissent and disaffection among the USSR's more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups have become increasingly prevalent... Not only are Jewish, German, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Crimean Tartars militating for more rights and the freedom to emigrate, but dissent has spread to the USSR's Poles, Armenians, Georgians and Central Asian groups."

L.E.D.

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

I. UKRAINIAN LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES

New Resolutions on Ukraine in U.S. Congress.—During the months of March and April, 1975, Congressman Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania and a number of Congressmen from other states of the Union introduced in Congress three resolutions dealing with Ukraine.

The first Resolution, known as **H. Con. Res. 190**, was introduced on March 21, 1975, calling for President Ford to intervene with the Soviet government for the release of Valentyn Moroz and Leonid Plyushch. It reads:

WHEREAS two prominent Ukrainian intellectuals, Valentyn Moroz, a thirty-eight-year-old historian, and Leonid Plyushch, a thirty-four-year-old mathematician, are reportedly being subjected to physical harm in a Soviet prison only because of their continued pleas for constitutional rights of national identity, national language, and freer cultural expression: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress urge President Ford to utilize every appropriate means for the transmission of a request to the Government of the Soviet Union that it release from prison Mr. Moroz and Mr. Plyushch, and that it permit them and their immediate families to emigrate from the Soviet Union to the country of their choice.

On April 8, 1975, Congressman Flood, joined by several other Congressmen, introduced the second resolution, **H. Con. Res. 205**, calling on the President of the United States to intervene with the USSR to permit the concrete resurrection of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Church in Ukraine, which were destroyed during the Stalinist terror.

The resolution reads:

WHEREAS the Charter of the United Nations, as well as its Declaration of Human Rights, sets forth the objective of international cooperation "in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion..."; and

WHEREAS in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Article 124 unequivocally provides that "In order to insure to citizens freedom of conscience, freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens"; and

WHEREAS not just religious or civil repression but the genocide, the absolute physical extermination of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in a nation of over forty-five million brutally violates the basic civilized rights enunciated above: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the President of the United States of America shall take immediate and determined steps to—

(1) call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to permit the concrete resurrection of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in the largest non-Russian nation both within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in Eastern Europe; and

(2) utilize formal and informal contacts with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics officials in an effort to secure the freedom of religious worship in places of both churches that their own Constitution provides for; and

(3) raise in the General Assembly of the United Nations the issue of Stalin's liquidation of the two churches and its perpetuated effect on the posture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the light of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights.

On April 17, 1975, Congressman Flood, along with other House members from both parties, introduced a third resolution, **H. Res. 404**, calling on the President of the United States of America to designate January 22 of each year as "Ukrainian Independence Day." The resolution reads:

WHEREAS this nation occupies a significant geographic and economic largest non-Russian nation both in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in Eastern Europe; and

WHEREAS Ukraine, with a population of forty-seven million, is the position in the context of Eurasia, with prominent dimensions toward central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and central Europe; and

WHEREAS this second largest Slavic people with a national history extending back to the ninth century has made substantial contributions to world culture and today possesses immense potentialities and promise for further universal cultural advancement; and

WHEREAS in partial recognition of these cultural contributions toward civilization and peace, the Eighty-sixth Congress of these United States of America passed the Shevchenko Memorial resolution, leading to the erection of a statue of Taras Shevchenko, the poet of Ukraine, on public grounds in our Nation's Capital; and

WHEREAS the critical importance of this non-Russian nation in world affairs has been obliquely reflected in the original charter membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; that is, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, in the United Nations; and

WHEREAS the contemporary status of Ukraine has been reflected in the Captive Nations Week resolution passed by the Eighty-sixth Congress in July 1959, and signed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower into Public Law 86-90; and

WHEREAS for the past two decades the Congress, Governors of our major States, and mayors in our largest cities have consistently observed the indomitable spirit of independence and creative assertions of the Ukrainian people; and

WHEREAS the independent Ukrainian National Republic, which was established by democratic, popular vote and national self-determination on January 22, 1918, was one of the first to proclaim freedom for its people in the area of the traditional Russian Empire; and

WHEREAS in 1974 the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the unveiling of the Shevchenko statue by former President Eisenhower was observed here and in various parts of the country: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating January 22 of each year (the anniversary of the proclamation which declared Ukraine to be a free and independent republic) as Ukrainian Independence Day, and inviting the people of the United States to observe such a day with appropriate ceremonies.

(On January 23, 1975, Senator Richard S. Schweiker of Pennsylvania introduced an identical resolution in the U.S. Senate).

Co-sponsoring the Flood Resolutions were Congressmen Frank Annunzio, John H. Buchanan, James A. Burke, William R. Cotter, Edward J. Derwinski, Robert N. Giaimo, Benjamin A. Gilman, Edward I. Koch, Edward J. Patten, Robert A. Roe, Samuel S. Stratton, Richard F. Vander Veen, William F. Walsh and Leo C. Zeferetti.

UCCA Board of Directors Convenes in New York.—On May 10, 1975, the UCCA Board of Directors held a special session at the Ukrainian Institute of America in New York City, in which 70 representatives took part. The session was opened by UCCA President Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky and was chaired by UCCA Executive Vice President Joseph Lesawyer. Minutes from the last session of the Board were read by UCCA Secretary Ignatius M. Billinsky.

In his report on activities in Washington, Prof. Dobriansky informed the session on a number of steps he undertook in the implementation of UCCA projects, among them the three resolutions pending in Congress on Ukrainian matters, including those on Moroz and Plyushch, another on the resurrection of the Ukrainian churches in Ukraine, and a third on the Presidential Proclamation designating January 22 each year as "Ukrainian Independence Day."

Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, reported on his participation as UCCA representative at the 8th Annual Conference of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), held on April 21-26, 1975, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where he submitted two UCCA resolutions on oppressions in Ukraine and on the struggle of the Ukrainian people for freedom and independence.

Dr. Dushnyck also reported on his visits to Ukrainian communities in Curitiba and Prudentopolis, Brazil, and Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Subsequently, other UCCA officers presented their reports, namely, Ivan Wynnyk, head of the UCCA Auditing Committee, Mrs. Ulana Diachuk, UCCA Treasurer, and Ivan Bazarko, UCCA Executive Director.

Both Mr. Wynnyk and Mrs. Diachuk stressed the urgent need for funds to implement several publications of the UCCA, namely, *The Ukrainian Heritage in America* and *Ukrainians in America*, to be published in connection with the Bicentennial, and *Acts of Ukrainian Statehood*, which is being prepared now.

Mr. Bazarko reported on the progress of the renovation and remodeling of the UCCA-UNWLA building in New York City, which will commence as soon as final clearance from the New York City Buildings Department

has been received. He also reported that Mr. Andrew Mycio, head of the Ukrainian Plast Organization, will represent his organization at the Board of Directors, replacing Paul Dorozynsky, who tendered his letter of resignation.

Subsequently, reports on preparations for Ukrainian participation in the Bicentennial were given by members of the National Committee, namely, Yaroslav Haywas, Mr. Lesawyer, Mr. Wynnyk and Dr. Dushnyck.

Upon the proposal of the UCCA Executive Committee, the Board of Directors unanimously voted to hold the XIIth UCCA Congress on October 7, 8 and 9, 1976 in New York City.

Mrs. Ulana Celewych of Chicago reported on preparations of Ukrainian women to take part in the International Women's Year Conference, which will be held in Mexico City from June 19 to July 2, 1975.

On Prof. Dobriansky's proposal, the Board of Directors sent a telegram to President Ford, expressing full support in his efforts to help Vietnamese refugees.

Ukrainian Cultural Program for Foreign Guests in New York.—On March 2, 1975 a Ukrainian cultural program, sponsored by the UCCA, was held at the Ukrainian Institute of America for a select audience, which included Americans, foreign diplomats, professionals and leaders from various areas. At the conclusion, many guests stated they had learned much about a country they had heard about vaguely, but never knew quite well.

The program, opened on behalf of the UCCA by Dr. Walter Dushnyck, included recitations of Ukrainian poetry by student Roman Kyzyk; solo renditions by basso Stepan Shafarovsky, accompanied at the piano by Mme. Kalyna Andrienko; selections by the Ukrainian Bandura Ensemble; showing of colored slides taken on trips to Ukraine, with a running commentary by Dr. Joseph Oryshkevych.

"Who Are the Ukrainians?" was the subject of a brief talk by Mrs. Mary Dushnyck, in which the background of Ukraine, its contributions to world culture and its distinctiveness were delineated. At the conclusion, Ukraine's present status was assessed.

Distinguished guests presented by Mrs. Dushnyck included representatives from the U.N. Missions of Japan, Lebanon, Ghana and Uruguay; the South Vietnam Observer's Office to the U.N., and the Consulates of China (Taiwan), Haiti, Lithuania—Dr. and Mrs. A. Simutis, and Estonia—Dr. and Mrs. E. Jaakson.

Other prominent guests included U.S. Congressman Edward I. Koch; Howland Sargeant, President of Radio Liberty Committee, and Mrs. Sargeant with their two sons; Mr. and Mrs. Serge Jarvis (Lucy Jarvis is the famous National Broadcasting Company producer of documentary films, and Mr. Jarvis is a well known attorney born in Kiev); former U.S. diplomat Mr. E. Packer and Mrs. Packer, and Mr. and Mrs. J. Lampe of the Finlandia Foundation.

Following a reception the guests were taken on a tour of the Ukrainian Institute of America mansion.

Cue Magazine and Our Town noted the event.

U.S. Microbiologists Appeal to Soviet Academy for Strokata.—After a long and arduous debate during the annual convention of the American

Society of Microbiologists (ASM), the newly-elected ASM executive board agreed to send a letter to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, protesting the inhuman incarceration of Nina Strokata-Karavansky, Ukrainian microbiologist, according to a press release of the "Smoloskyp" Ukrainian Information Service.

The convention was held in New York City from April 28 to May 2, 1975, with the participation of some 9,000 microbiologists from around the world.

The protest letter was signed by most of the scientists attending the convention, said the UIS, including Dr. Helen R. Whiteley, newly-elected president, Dr. Robert F. Acker, executive director, Dr. R.W. Sarber, executive secretary, Dr. T.J. Carski, treasurer, and a group of Ukrainian American microbiologists who spearheaded the floor action in defense of Strokata—Dr. Andrew Zwarun, Maria Lieber and George Karpinsky.

Leaders of Bicentennial Committee Visit Hierarchs.—On May 8, 1975, the Most Reverend Ambrose Senyshyn, OSBM, Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the U.S.A., received a delegation of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee at the chancery in Philadelphia. Also present at the audience were the Most Reverend Basil H. Losten, Auxiliary Bishop, and Very Rev. Msgr. Robert Moskal. The delegation, headed by Committee Chairman Joseph Lesawyer, included the Very Rev. Msgr. Myroslav Charyna, Ivan Bazarko, Ivan Wynnyk, Dr. Peter G. Stercho and Dr. Ivan Skalchuk. During the audience a number of problems were discussed, including the establishment of a special honorary committee, the issuance of a wall calendar with church holidays and historical dates from the Ukrainian settlement in America; publication of a collective work on the Ukrainian immigration and its contributions to America's growth; large-scale Bicentennial manifestations in Washington, Philadelphia and New York in 1976, with the active participation of the Ukrainian churches; sale of special Ukrainian commemorative buttons on the third Sunday in September, 1975, and so forth.

Both Metropolitan Senyshyn and Bishop Losten were keenly interested in the Bicentennial preparations and assured the delegation of their active cooperation and support.

On May 14, 1975, a delegation of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee, consisting of Joseph Lesawyer, Ivan Bazarko, Mrs. Stephania Bukshowana and Dr. Walter Dushnyck, was received at a special audience by the Most Reverend Mstyslav Skrypnyk, Archbishop and Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A., at his chancery in Bound Brook, N.J. On that very day 33 years had elapsed since the consecration in Kiev of Metropolitan Skrypnyk as Bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. On this occasion, special congratulations were offered to the Metropolitan by the delegation.

In the course of the audience, members of the delegation apprised the Metropolitan about the work of the Ukrainian Bicentennial Committee, and invited him to become a member of the Honorary Committee, which is being formed; they also discussed at length the anticipated close cooperation of the Ukrainian churches with the Bicentennial Committee.

In discussing the arrival of the first Ukrainian settlers, it was pointed out that the most noted among them was Rev. Agapius Honcharenko, Ukrainian Orthodox priest, who arrived in New York in 1865. He later went to California, where he founded and edited *The Alaska Herald* in the English, Russian and Ukrainian languages. His grave and that of his wife are in Hayward, Calif. A possible transfer of their remains to the Ukrainian cemetery in Bound Brook, N.J., was also a topic of discussion.

Metropolitan Mstyslav informed his visitors that Henry Fisher, a patriot and herald of the American Revolution, who read the Proclamation of American Independence in Somerset County, New Jersey, is buried on the grounds of the Ukrainian Orthodox Metropolitanate in Bound Brook, N.J., and efforts are being made to have a monument in his honor erected in 1976.

The delegation presented a special letter to Metropolitan Mstyslav, enumerating several points which were discussed during the audience.

Intensive Summer Course in Ukrainian at Kent State University.—The program aims to serve the diverse needs of as many students as possible: the undergraduate student who wants to fulfill his language requirement; the graduate student who needs the language for research purposes; the student or faculty member who plans to participate in one of Kent State's overseas programs; and the individual motivated by nothing more than sheer intellectual curiosity.

An important thing to understand is that this is basically a self-instruction program: that is, it combines the study of text materials with listening to tapes, memorizing speech patterns, going through drills, and so forth. This self-study is **supplemented**, however, by practice sessions with a native-speaking tutor, (with times and places of meetings arranged to suit the convenience of all concerned). The student will meet four hours a day with the tutor—Monday through Friday.

Examinations are administered and grades assigned entirely by outside examiners. Outside examiners are prominent scholars who are experts in their particular languages. They come to Kent during exam week and examine each individual Critical Language student. The examinations are mostly oral.

This summer instruction will be along two tracks: regular and intensive. That is, the student may elect to do one quarter's work over the two concurrent five-week summer sessions, and is free to take other courses of his choosing; or the student may elect to cover an entire year's work—three quarters for twelve-quarter hours of credit—over the ten week period. If the student elects the intensive tract, no other courses may be taken, and the student will register for all three courses. He or she will be explicitly told that credit will be received only for the material covered as established by the above mentioned norms. Thus, if a student completes the material normally covered for the first two quarters, credit will only be given for this work, and the grade will be based on the student's proficiency.

The intensive course will also be available for a second year in the language. In this case, the student would sign up for three three-hour courses.

For more information write to the
Ukrainian Language
Critical Language Program
119 Bowman Hall
Kent State University
Kent, Ohio 44242

Ukrainian Medical Association Marks 25th Anniversary.—The Ukrainian Medical Association of North America (UMANA) marked its 25th anniversary during the association's 16th congress and 11th scientific conference, held at the Americana Hotel, May 23-25, 1975, in New York City. Dr. Achilles Chreptowsky of Chicago was elected president of UMANA for the next two years.

The scientific conference was divided into 12 sessions, dealing with topics on psychiatry, pediatrics, cancer research, internal medicine, athletic injuries, cardiology, and others. Some 120 doctors participated in that part of the jubilee, and a total of 23 papers was read.

Among the speakers was the world-famous cancer specialist, Dr. Leontiy Dmochowsky, from the Department of Virology at the University of Texas in Houston, and the prominent cardiologist, Dr. Yaroslav Barwinsky, from Winnipeg, Man. Dr. Dmochowsky's paper dealt with "Viruses and Human Breast Cancer—Present Accomplishments and Future Outlook," and Dr. Barwinsky spoke on "Surgical Management of Coronary Artery Disease." Three additional papers dealt with matters of the association: Dr. Wasyl Pluschtch—"History of Ukrainian Medicine"; Dr. Roman Osinchuk—"25 Years of the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America" and Dr. Paul Dzul—"Journal of the UMANA and Other Publications."

Outgoing President Dr. George Kushnir detailed the work of the executive board over the past two years, outlining the administrative, secretarial, organizing, student-related and public relations work of the association.

Joining Dr. Chreptowsky on the newly-elected UMANA executive board, are: Dr. Volodymyr Truchly, president-elect; Dr. T. Demus, first vice president; Dr. Nadia Charuk, second vice president; Dr. Stepan Woroch, third vice president in charge of community affairs; Dr. Myroslav Kolensky, secretary; Dr. O. Shandra, treasurer; Drs. Paul Pundij and R. Dykun, liaison officers with students in the U.S. and Canada; Dr. Maria Slyshyn-Fischer, archivist; Drs. M. Charkewycz, Myroslav Dragan and B. Dziuba—western, eastern and Canadian organizers, respectively; Drs. H. Scherbanuiuk, M. Holowatyj and A. Kicala, members.

Editor of the **Journal of the UMANA** is Dr. Paul Dzul, and its administrator is Dr. A. Gorchynsky.

The auditing board consists of Drs. George Kushnir, T. Hanushewsky and I. Kozij; the arbitration board includes Drs. T. Worobec, Bohdan Cewewycz and S. Woytowych.

Harvard Ukrainian Institute Awards Scholarships.—Two Ukrainian scholars and four graduate students specializing in Ukrainian area studies

are the recipients of fellowships and scholarships in the total amount of \$21,800 from the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

The awards for the academic year 1975-1976 consist of \$15,000 from the Institute's funds and \$6,800 from the Vladimir Jurkowsky Fund.

Dr. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, professor of history at the University of Alberta, is the recipient of a \$10,000 one-year fellowship for the completion of his work on the history of Ukrainian political thought of the XIXth century. Dr. Myroslava Znayenko of Rutgers University was awarded a \$1,000 scholarship to complete her bibliography of Ukrainian literary works translated into English. George Lieber, who is doing graduate work in Ukrainian history at Indiana University, was awarded a \$3,000 scholarship.

Awards from the Jurkowsky Fund, supplemented by \$1,000 from the Institute's funds, were made to three doctoral candidates: Natalia Pylypiuk, a Ph.D. candidate in Ukrainian literature at Harvard; Volodyslav Pleshchynsky, a Ph.D. candidate in Ukrainian history at Indiana University, and Frank Sysyn, a Ph.D. candidate in history at Harvard. No amounts were specified.

The committee, which reviewed more than 25 applications at a meeting on May 20, 1975, included Prof. Omelan Pritsak, Director of the Institute, Prof. Ihor Shevchenko and Dr. Orest Subtelny.

Ukrainians Elected to GOP Heritage Board.—Taras Szmagala of Cleveland was elected co-chairman of the executive board of the Republican National Heritage (Nationalities) Groups Division at the group's convention, held on May 16-18, 1975, in Washington, D.C. Also elected to the board were two other Ukrainians, John Shmorhun of Baltimore, Md., national secretary, and Prof. Mitchell Zadrozny of Chicago, Ill., member of the auditing board.

Rep. Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois was unanimously reelected chairman of the group.

The 14-member delegation of the Ukrainian National Republican Federation (UNRF) was led by Dr. Anthony Zukowsky, who was a member of the resolutions committee. On his proposal the body adopted a resolution which said that Ukraine and other captive nations in the USSR should be treated in the same manner as the satellite and Baltic states.

Attending the convention as an observer was Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the UCCA, who is honorary chairman of the UNRF.

Among the speakers addressing the convention was Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, Sen. William E. Brock (R. Tenn.) and Cleveland's Republican Mayor Ralph J. Perk.

President Gerald Ford hosted the delegates at a White House luncheon, during which he spoke on current events, including the recapture of the *Mayaguez*.

Second Ukrainian Festival in New Jersey.—On Saturday, June 7, 1975, the Second Ukrainian Festival was held in Holmdel, N.J., which drew a crowd of over 7000. It was one of the highest records in the six-year history of the Ethnic Heritage Festival series, sponsored by the New Jersey Highway Authority at the Garden State Arts Center.

The program, beginning in the early afternoon and ending late in the evening, included Ukrainian folk dances and choral and opera music.

Ukrainian culture was on display everywhere—from dress to buttons and posters of Valentyn Moroz and other Ukrainian political prisoners; from ceramics, embroidery and *pysanky* (Ukrainian Easter eggs) to paintings and sculptures of some 30 Ukrainian artists, and so forth.

The groups performing in the early program included: the "Kobza" girls ensemble of Passaic "Plast," under the direction of Andrew Farmiga; SUMA dancing ensemble from Passaic under the direction of Roman Stetkewych; the youthful *bandurist* capella from Hempstead, N.Y., under the direction of Rev. Kindzeriavyy-Pastukhiv; some 50 Plast and SUMA girls from New Jersey, performing *habilky* under the direction of Mrs. Ivanna Kononiv; a dance quartet from Montreal ("Syny Stepiv"), and the "Baturyn" band of Toronto under the baton of assistant director Volodymyr Brychun.

One of the most thrilling spectacles was the appearance of 300 performers—the "Prometheus" and "Dibrova" choirs and the "Baturyn" band, under the direction of Wasyl Kardash.

Performers in the second part of the program included: Andriy Dobriansky, bass-baritone of the Metropolitan Opera; Anna Kolesnik, mezzo-soprano; Martha Kokolska, soprano, both as a soloist and in a scene from the opera *Anna Yaroslavna* (composed by Antin Rudnytsky, libretto by L. Pollava), with the female part of the "Kobzar" choir from Philadelphia under the direction of Prof. A. Rudnytsky; concert violinists Dana and Yuriy Mazurkevich; the Roma Pryma-Bohachevsky Dance Ensemble and School of Ballet; Ukrainian Folk Dancing Ensemble of Peter Marunchak and "Syny Stepiv" from Montreal, and the Toronto ensembles. Piano accompaniment was provided by Prof. Ihor Sonevysky, Roman Stecura, Roksolana Hlasymovych and Nadia Brychun. The program was prepared by Volodymyr Kolesnik, assisted by Oksana Sobolta.

The Festival Committee, headed by Bohdan Chaikivsky, worked under the auspices of the UCCA State Coordinating Council.

Among scores of American political and civic leaders were New Jersey Mayors Kenneth Gibson of Newark, Robert Miller of Irvington and Robert Grasmere of Maplewood. Representing Governor Brendan Byrne was State Lottery Director Beatrice Tylutki.

Conference on American Slavs at Essex College in Baltimore.—A conference on "Slavic Americans in Maryland: Current Ethnic Issues," was held on Saturday, May 24, 1975, at Essex Community College in Baltimore, Md., which was attended by over seventy students and older people. Sponsored by the Polish Heritage Association and the Ukrainian Education Association, the conference was convened for discussion and delineation of areas of research in order to promote better knowledge of life, accomplishments, and problems of Slavic ethnic groups in this country, and was held in cooperation with Essex Community College.

The morning session was opened by Dr. Danuta Mostwin, Associate Professor of Social Work at the Catholic University in Washington, D.C., who dwelt on a number of problems relating to proper recognition of the national and cultural identity of American Slavs, which problems constituted severe handicaps in the progress of Slavic cultural and ethnic development in America.

Dr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, spoke on "The Slavic Ethnic Press: American Readers," tracing its history and projecting its future. Citing available sources, the speaker said that out of 903 non-English publications in America, a total of 278 (or 38.8%) were printed in various Slavic languages; of the total ethnic (non-English) circulation of 8,789,132, 1,484,035 (or 16.9%) were in Slavic languages. He concluded that the Slavic press as well as Slavic ethnic communities are here to stay.

"Slovak Identity in America" was discussed by Dr. Jozef A. Mikus, Chairman, Department of History at Georgian Court College in Lakewood, N.J. He dwelt on difficulties encountered by Americans of Slovak origin in advancing their cultural and ethnic values in America.

The afternoon session was opened by Dr. Vitaut Kipel, First Assistant, Sciences and Technology Division of the New York Public Library, who spoke on "Informing Public Library Readers about Slavic Groups and Organizations." He explained how Slavic ethnic communities can enhance their particular image by supplying public libraries with their literature, especially scholarly books.

Dr. Thaddeus V. Gromada, Coordinator of Ethnic Studies at Jersey City State College, spoke on "Enriching the Knowledge of Public School Teachers about Slavic Americans." He emphasized that ethnic communities have a very important task to perform, namely, to see that school teachers, be they of Slavic or non-Slavic origin, are well informed about activities of Slavic communities, as well as their goals and objectives in America.

The final point on the agenda was "Conclusions of Panelists: Research Areas Which Will Provide Better Knowledge of Slavic Americans," under the chairmanship of Hlib S. Hayuk, Assistant Professor of Geography at Towson State College, during which each speaker gave a brief summary of his or her presentation.

Cochairmen of the conference were Dr. Stanislaw E. Mostwin, Chairman of the Polish Heritage Association in Maryland, and Prof. Paul Fenchak, Chairman of the Ukrainian Education Association, who introduced the speakers.

Renata Babak, Ukrainian Defector from the Bolshoi, Makes Debut in New York.—Renata Babak, former Ukrainian mezzo-soprano with the Lviv and Bolshoi opera theaters, made her long-awaited debut before a record crowd at Carnegie Hall in New York City on Sunday, April 13, 1975. The nearly two-hour performance consisted of 19 selections of Western and Ukrainian classical music and two encores. Each number was greeted with rousing applause by the audience of nearly 3,000 persons, mostly Ukrainians.

Mme. Babak, who sang for ten years at the Bolshoi, sang in several languages, including Ukrainian, at the Carnegie Hall debut.

The concert was sponsored by the Ukrainian Studies Chair Fund in association with Matthews-Napal Ltd.

In November 1973, Mme. Babak defected to the West while performing with the Bolshoi at La Scala, in Milan, Italy. In her interview with Robert Sherman over radio station WQXR on April 8, 1975, Mme. Babak told how she was discriminated against in Moscow because of her Ukrainian name and how she was forced to sing under various aliases. Prior to her debut,

the New York press described her as the "first leading artist to defect from the Soviet Union."

President Ford Thanks UCCA for Support on Vietnam Refugees.—President Ford expressed his thanks to the UCCA for its support of the U.S. Government's efforts to aid in the resettlement of South Vietnamese refugees in this country.

In a letter to UCCA President Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, dated May 27, 1975, President Ford stated:

Dear Dr. Dobriansky:

Thank you for your telegram on behalf of the Board of Directors of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and in support of our efforts to aid the South Vietnamese refugees.

The United States has had a long tradition of opening its doors to displaced persons. As you stated so well in your message, you and your fellow members have a special understanding of why we must not forget that we are a country of immigrants. We have always been a humanitarian Nation. I am convinced that the vast majority of Americans share your belief that these refugees must be given an opportunity to live in freedom, and I am heartened to know that I have the support of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford (s)

OBITUARIES: a) **Prof. Basil Steciuk**, prominent Ukrainian philologist, scholar and educator, died in Jersey City, N.J. on April 9, 1975, of an apparent heart attack. He died on his way to his office at Seton Hall University where he taught classical languages. He was 65 years old.

Prof. Steciuk was born on March 18, 1910, in the village of Hnylychky, near the city of Zbarazh, Western Ukraine. He completed his secondary education in Ternopil and his higher education at the University of Lviv where he earned his Ph.D. in philology. He also held Ph.D. degrees in philosophy and education.

He taught first at the Lviv *gymnasium* of the Basilian Sisters, later at the Lviv University and during World War II and in the postwar years at various universities in Czecho-Slovakia and Germany, including the Ukrainian Free University and the University of Munich. Dr. Steciuk was the author of scores of scholarly works in the field of classical language and philology, including **Historical Grammar of the Latin Language**, which was a standard textbook for students of classical languages.

After five years in Berchtesgaden, Dr. Steciuk and his family came to the U.S. in 1950 and took up permanent residence here.

Prof. Steciuk taught for almost two decades at Seton Hall University and headed its Department of Classical Languages. Highly respected in scholarly circles, Prof. Steciuk was held in great esteem by his fellow professors and students alike.

Active in American and Ukrainian academic societies, Prof. Steciuk served for years as scientific secretary of the American branch of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, which he helped to establish, and the last two years as general secretary of the Society's Council. Twenty-two years

ago he was instrumental in launching the Ukrainian Cultural Courses at the Ukrainian National Association Resort "Soyuzivka" in Kerhonkson, N.Y. and served for 20 years as their director. Over 800 students graduated under his direction, enriching their knowledge of the Ukrainian language, history, literature and culture.

b) **Dr. Oles Babiy**, noted Ukrainian poet, died on March 2, 1975 in Chicago, Ill. at the age of 77. Born on March 17, 1897, he became active in Ukrainian political and cultural life, and took part, as an officer of the Ukrainian Galician Army, in the struggle for Ukraine's independence in 1917-1920, serving at one time as press officer of the Sichovi Striltsi Corps in Kiev. In the 1920's he was a member of the Ukrainian underground movement and took part in the constituent Congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929 in Vienna, Austria; for this he was sentenced to four years by a Polish court.

A poet and writer, he authored a number of poetry collections, such as **The Hutsul Battalion**, **Hatred and Love**, **Mirage of Happiness**, **Anger**, and others. He was a contributor to **Literaturno-Naukovy Visnyk** and **Visnyk** (Literary Scientific Herald and The Herald), both published by the late Dr. Dmytro Dontsov in Lviv, Ukraine.

c) **Maj. General Thomas A. Lane**, outstanding American military leader and writer, a friend of Ukrainians and other captive nations, died of cancer on April 20, 1975 at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C. at the age of 69.

Gen. Lane was born in Revere, Mass. in 1906. He received his early education in Revere and Boston, where his academic ability and military leadership earned him distinction. In 1928 he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, ranking third in a class of 261. He served his country across the world from the Panama Canal to the South Pacific and Japan during World War II under Gen. Douglas MacArthur. He was retired from active duty at his own request in 1962.

Gen. Lane was a soldier (U.S. Army Engineers), but he was also a great civic leader. He taught civil engineering and military history at West Point and at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. The retired general began an influential career as a syndicated columnist on public affairs with the **St. Louis Globe Democrat** and many other major newspapers. In addition, he was editor of an important journal, **Strategic Review**, and was the author of four books: **The Leadership of President Kennedy**, **War for the World**, **America on Trial: The War for Vietnam** and **The Breakdown of the Old Politics**. In columns, articles and books, Gen. Lane argued that the war in Vietnam would only stop when one side or the other won. And South Vietnam, he said, could not win as long as the U.S. prevented it from carrying the war to North Vietnam.

While he was deeply concerned about Vietnam, he was more concerned about general U.S. foreign policy, which seemed to him to be based not so much on detente as on profits.

Gen. Lane was also keenly aware of the enslavement of Ukraine. In 1972 he was one of the speakers addressing a huge Ukrainian protest rally at the Shevchenko statue in Washington, D.C. He frequently mentioned Ukrainians and their struggle for freedom in his columns. As President of the American Council for World Freedom (ACWF), of which the UCCA is

a member, he cooperated closely with UCCA leaders. In 1974 he was chairman of the 7th WACL Conference in Washington, D.C. It was on his proposal that the WACL executive board gave "Freedom Fighter" awards to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the late Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty and Valentyin Moroz. Above all, Gen. Lane advocated firm support to anti-Communist underground movements in the USSR and Communist China and recommended the recognition of anti-Communist governments-in-exile.

With his death world freedom fighters have lost a great supporter and inspirational leader.

II. UKRAINIANS IN THE DIASPORA

CANADA

Solzhenitsyn Pleads for Ukraine and Ukrainians.—In a Montreal broadcast on May 4, 1975, Russian Nobel Prize-winning novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn was critical of the West's "indifference" to the fate of such countries as Ukraine.

The writer was besieged by newsmen when he chose Montreal for his Orthodox Easter retreat, but he broke his silence in the message beamed overseas by the Ukrainian language section of Radio Canada International.

The three and a half-minute message, on tape, was carried later by the Montreal station CFMB's Ukrainian Time program, the first such broadcast by Solzhenitsyn in Canada. The tape was arranged by private contacts.

The writer reminded his listeners of the man-made famine of 1933 in Ukraine. "Six million peasants died then," he said, but "insensitive Europe ignored the tragedy of the Ukrainian people. Even the photographs of the dying villagers, taken by American photographer Tom Walker, were not printed by Western editors," he charged.

In his message, Solzhenitsyn called Ukrainian Canadians his "dear brothers" not in Christ alone but as blood relatives as well.

"My mother was almost entirely of Ukrainian origin. My grandfather, the only male member of the family after my father died, was a Ukrainian. His lively language and his perception of the world still resound in my memory. Thus, the fate of the Ukrainian people is not strange to me: I regard their fate as my own."

With over 600,000 Canadians of Ukrainian descent, and with more than 45 million Ukrainians in the USSR, Solzhenitsyn's message is significant.

His voice betrayed his deep feelings, stirred by his remarks about the Ukrainians, with whom he shared life in the concentration camps in the Soviet Union. He still hopes to see at least some of these friends, he said.

He criticized the West for continued insensitivity concerning the fate of other nationalities and countries, in the same manner as the West—"Europe and America"—had ignored the tragedy of Ukraine.

"The difficult situation of the West (in the face of the Soviet camp) has its roots exactly in that incomprehension of the fate of those peoples," Solzhenitsyn added.

Senator Yuzyk Elected to Canadian NATO Association.—Senator Paul Yuzyk of Winnipeg, Man., was elected a vice chairman of the executive board

of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, representing the Senate at the group's annual meeting held on May 1, 1975 at the Parliamentary Building in Ottawa.

Paul Langlois, Member of Parliament, was reelected chairman of the Association.

According to a communique from the Senate, the over 200 members of the Canadian Senate and House of Commons, attending the meeting, decided that the Canadian participation in NATO should be strengthened in the interest of peace and justice for all people and to contain the spread of Communism.

In a telegram, initiated by Sen. Yuzyk last year and signed by Sen. John Tunney (D., Calif.), chairman of the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information of the NATO Assembly, an appeal was made to Leonid Brezhnev for the release and hospitalization of Valentyn Moroz, prominent Ukrainian historian.

The 21st Session of the NATO Assembly will be held September 15-20, 1975, in Copenhagen, Denmark, and Sen. Yuzyk will be a member of the Canadian delegation to that session.

UNITED KINGDOM

Shelepin's Visit in England Protested.—When Alexander N. Shelepin, head of the Soviet Federation of Trade Unions and former chief of the KGB arrived on January 30, 1975 in Dusseldorf, West Germany, he cancelled his visit because of protests by Germans, Ukrainians and other groups in West Germany. He had also cancelled his previous visit in 1970 to Bavaria, when the Munich district attorney issued a summons for his arrest in connection with a murder charge.

When Shelepin arrived on April 1, 1975 in London as a guest of the British Trade Unions Council, many M.P.'s made statements saying that he was an "unwanted person." A large group of Ukrainians, Jews, Balts and other groups from Eastern Europe, gathered at Heathrow Airport, carrying protest posters and anti-Shelepin slogans. The Russian visitor was secretly whisked away, while a decoy was sent in another direction. At the TUC headquarters some 2,000 demonstrators carried placards and screamed epithets against the Russian leader. Amid shouts of "Give us the Butcher of Ukraine—Shelepin—Dead or Alive," and with over 300 policemen assigned to guard the TUC building, the conference between the British and Soviet trade unions leaders began. At the conclusion of the talks, Shelepin was again driven away secretly. The demonstrators, led by a man carrying a bloodstained shirt symbolizing the murder of Stepan Bandera, marched to the Soviet Embassy, where the protest action continued throughout the evening. According to the April 1, 1975 issue of the London *Evening News*, the demonstrators hurled a bottle and coins at Shelepin at the Soviet Embassy.

The evening television news reports gave priority to the demonstrations, as did written accounts by London dailies, such as *The Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily Mail*, *Evening Standard*, *Evening News* and *The Manchester Guardian*.

In a special article, *The Daily Telegraph* said that Shelepin's order to assassinate Stepan Bandera and Dr. Lev Rebet, had caused "shock in the West." The newspaper retold the sequence of events which led to Stashynsky's murder of the two Ukrainian nationalist leaders in 1959 and 1957, with a cyanide-loaded spray gun. Stashynsky, according to his own account in the West German court in Karlsruhe, was decorated by Shelepin. Stashynsky now lives under an assumed name in the United States, after serving eight years at hard labor in West Germany.

(After his return to the USSR, Shelepin, who once figured as a prominent contender for the post held now by Leonid Brezhnev, was removed on April 16, 1975, from the Communist Party's ruling Politburo in Moscow).

BRAZIL

WACL and WYACL Conferences Held in Rio de Janeiro.—From April 21 to 26, 1975, the sixth annual Conference of the World Youth Anti-Communist League (WYACL) and the eighth annual Conference of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) were held in Rio de Janeiro, with over 400 delegates and observers from all over the world participating.

Among them were 16 Ukrainian men and women, from Europe, Brazil, Argentina, Canada and the United States, who were delegates and observers at both conferences.

The conferences, held under the slogan "Liberation, Yes—Appeasement, No," consisted of plenary sessions and meetings of several working committees.

Among those addressing the plenary sessions were the following:

Ivahir de Freitas Garcia, representative of the Brazilian government; Faria Lima, Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro; Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, honorary president of the WACL; Alfredo Buzaid, former Minister of Justice of Brazil; Dr. Woo Jae Seung, secretary general of the WACL; Virgil Cheorghiu; Nicanor Fleitas, president, General Union of Workers, Paraguay; Dr. Carlo Barbieri Filho, newly-elected President of the WACL; and Yaroslav Stetzko, head of the ABN.

The Hon. Jesse Helms, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, one of the guest speakers at the plenary session of the conference, drew tumultuous applause when he declared that the present U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia is not the policy of the American people, who now oppose and will always oppose a policy of appeasement and detente with the Communist world.

A similar ovation was accorded to Dr. Walter H. Judd, former U.S. Congressman, who read the annual report of the WACL on behalf of Dr. Fred Schlafly, immediate past president of WACL, who could not attend the conference.

Mrs. Slava Stetzko, editor of *ABN Correspondence* and a member of the ABN executive committee in Munich, delivered an address at the plenary session of the WYACL Conference, describing the plight of the captive nations under Soviet Russian domination.

Mr. Yaroslav Stetzko, head of the OUN and the ABN, also delivered a major address in English at the plenary session of the WACL Conference, stressing the importance of the captive nations and their struggle against

Soviet Russian imperialism and for the independence of their nations.

Dr. Carlo Barbieri Filho, a young Brazilian anti-Communist leader, was elected President of the WACL for 1975, and Pedro Gomes of Sao Paulo was elected Chairman of the WYACL for 1975.

Ukrainian Representatives at WACL and WYACL Conferences.—The Ukrainian representatives at the WACL and WYACL Conferences included:

Yaroslav Stetzko and Mrs. Slava Stetzko, representing the ABN (Munich, Germany);

Dr. Walter Dushnyck, representing the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as an observer;

Ukrainian delegation: Paul Borushenko, head; Mrs. Maria Baylak, Mykhailo Baylak, Rev. Volodymyr Haneyko, Rev. Markian Nicholas Pentsak, Prof. Dmytro Zajciw and Oleh Shymansky—all from Brazil;

Ukrainian youth delegation: Roman Zwarych, head; Miss Christine Shashkevych and Miss Eugenia Kuzmovych (ABN), all from the U.S.;

Roman Malashchuk, the Canadian League for Ukraine's Liberation; Vasyl Kosiuk, president of the Ukrainian Central Representation in Argentina, who represented the Ukrainian Liberation Front, and Yarema Taurydsky, head of TUSM in Argentina.

Mr. Stetzko was reelected to the World Council of the WACL, and Mr. Zwarych was elected to the WYACL executive board.

Six resolutions were submitted by the Ukrainian group dealing with the enslavement of the Ukrainian people by Communist Russia and their struggle for national independence, which were unanimously accepted by both the WYACL and WACL Conferences. The UCCA resolutions, presented to the political and resolutions committee by Dr. Dushnyck, were seconded by the British delegation.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

OBITUARY: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China and a towering anti-Communist leader in Asia for almost half a century, died on April 5, 1975 in Taipei at the age of 88. Born on October 31, 1887, he rose to power and leadership of China after the bloody coup against the Communists in 1927, having previously served as chief of staff to Sun Yat-sen, the founder of modern China.

From 1928 to 1948 he ruled an uneasy and restive country, beset by domestic strife as well as by armed conflict with Japanese aggression. Nevertheless, Chiang was the visible symbol of China and a member of World War II's "Big Four"—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin—and his nation's supreme commander in World War II. In 1948, the Nationalist Chinese forces were defeated by the Chinese Communists under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Chiang's defeat was described by Chinese Nationalists and many Americans as a result of the abandonment of Chiang by the United States. He and his army and the government moved to Taiwan, where the new regime was strengthened and has been sustained effectively to this day. It retained not only its membership in the United Nations, but also its seat as a permanent member of the Security Council

until 1971, when Communist China was voted into the United Nations, displacing Chiang's government and winning by 1972 diplomatic recognition from all major powers, except the United States. And even the United States, as a result of President Nixon's visit to Peking, all but dropped the Taiwan government diplomatically.

But despite the ouster of Nationalist China from the U.N., the Taiwan government still has considerable support among the American people, in South and Central America, and elsewhere.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was well aware of Russian history and the conquest and domination of Ukraine by Moscow. He had received in private audiences Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the UCCA, and His Eminence Joseph Cardinal Slipyj, Archbishop-Major of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Also, he was the recipient of the "Shevchenko Freedom Award" from the UCCA in recognition of his service to universal freedom, the third head of state to receive this award, the other two being the late Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Letter of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek.—On the occasion of the death of President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, special condolences were sent to his widow by Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, President of UCCA and Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC). In her response, dated May 7, 1975, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek wrote:

Dear Professor Dobriansky:

I appreciate deeply your kind message of sympathy, which I have not been able to acknowledge until now due to pressure of work and correspondence.

Thank you especially for your tribute to my husband, the President. His crusade for freedom is, as you may have heard by now, carried on with determination by all of us here. His call to battle against Communist domination is intractable as ever and is continued without compromise.

Like the President, I am very much impressed by the exemplary courage of your Committee chaired by you to wage war against Communist tyranny in today's academic circles inundated with liberals and neoliberals who speak with forked tongue. I pray for every success of our cause.

With best wishes, yours sincerely

Madame Chiang Kai-shek (s)

III. IN CAPTIVE UKRAINE

Excessive Repressions of Non-Russian Prisoners Reported.—According to an interview with 11 Ukrainian, Jewish, Russian and Armenian political prisoners incarcerated in the Perm camp VS 389-35, received in New York by the press service of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Coun-

cil, Soviet Russian prison authorities are extremely harsh in their treatment of non-Russian inmates.

"The authorities employ additional repressive measures against non-Russian prisoners, which severely curtail their already limited privileges," charged Ivan Svitlychny, 46-year-old Ukrainian literary critic.

The group, in addition to Svitlychny, included Ukrainians: Zynoviy Antoniuk, Ihor Kalynets, Ivan Kandyba, and Evhen Pryshlak; Jews: Semen Gluzman, Yosef Meshener, Arye-Leib Khnoh and Lev Youngman; Vladimir Balakhanov, a Russian, and Bahrat Shakhverdian, an Armenian.

The political prisoners further discussed their daily lives in the penal camps, relationships between inmates of different nationalities, work conditions and feelings on their incarceration. They also discounted all the charges brought against them by the Soviet courts, and said that they are forbidden to use the term "political prisoners," but are referred to as "very dangerous persons" or "criminals" by the prison authorities.

Sentence Ukrainian Woman to 13 Years at Hard Labor.—Oksana Popovych, a self-trained historian and invalid, became the first woman to be sentenced during International Women's Year by a Soviet court. In February, 1975, she was sentenced to eight years in labor camps and five years of exile, according to information received by the "Smoloskyp" Ukrainian Information Service in Helsinki, Finland.

The district court of Ivano-Frankivsk charged her with "anti-Soviet agitation and disseminating samvydav literature," despite lack of evidence, said the UIS.

The court contended that her signature on a petition in defense of Svyatoslav Karavansky, written in December 1969, which was sent to the Soviet authorities of Ukraine, and her association with persons connected with the Moroz defense actions, constituted "anti-Soviet agitation."

Before the trial, the KGB treated Miss Popovych cruelly, denying her an urgently needed operation and medical aid. Born in 1928 in the city of Ivano-Frankivsk, Miss Popovych is related to the well-known Ukrainian writer, Les Martovych. In 1944 when the Red Army reoccupied Ukraine, she went back to high school. That same year, her school companion was executed for taking part in the Ukrainian liberation movement, while she was sentenced to ten years in concentration camps. In the camps she was assigned to hard labor units, and suffered severe injuries which left her an invalid.

In 1955 she returned to Ukraine, completed her secondary education and a two-year course in the German language. Barred from the university, Miss Popovych taught herself and became well-versed in history. She was forced to undergo an unsuccessful operation which confined her to a hospital for three months, but she was able to walk with the help of crutches. At the time of her arrest in November 1974, she was preparing for a second operation, which was barred by the KGB.

Ukrainian Women Prisoners For Human Rights.—Reports coming out of Labor Camp No. 3, Barishevo, Mordovian ASSR, indicate that five Ukrainian women political prisoners continue to confront the camp administration on the question of human rights of political prisoners, according to the "Smoloskyp" Information Service. These Ukrainian women political prisoners are Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, Stephanie Shabatura, Nina Strokata-

Karavanska, Iryna Senyk and Nadia Svitlychny-Shumuk. **The Chronicle of Current Events**, No. 34, reported that during 1973 they declared fifteen separate hunger strikes of up to seven days duration. Among these was a strike in protest against the camp administration's denial of Shabatura's right to paint and another protesting the cancellation of Strokata's visitation rights, as punishment. The review further reported that in April 1973, Shabatura, Stasiv, and Strokata appealed to officials to allow them to prepare in part, for the oncoming celebration of Easter, by going to confession, but they were refused. On December 10, 1974, the Ukrainian women presented demands to be granted the status of political prisoners. For this effort, Senyk, Svitlychna, and Strokata were placed in punitive isolation cells, Stasiv was deprived of her next visit by relatives (she was not put in a cell for reasons of health), while Shabatura was given a half-year in the camp prison (reportedly, she had rebuked a camp official).

Issue No. 33 of **The Chronicle** reported that Shabatura, Senyk, Strokata and Svitlychna sent individual letters to R.A. Rudenko, Procurator-General of the USSR, protesting the severity of their sentences and inhuman treatment, but no replies, as far as it is known, were received.

Arrest Members of Amnesty International.—An AP dispatch of April 18, 1975 from Moscow reported that the Soviet authorities have launched a sudden crackdown on the Soviet branch of Amnesty International. Citing Prof. Andrei Sakharov, it said that the KGB arrested Andrei Tverdokhlebov, in Moscow, and Mykola Rudenko in Kiev. Tverdokhlebov, 34, is one of three cofounders of the Soviet Human Rights Movement and is secretary of the Soviet branch of Amnesty International.

Mykola Rudenko, a Ukrainian writer, and his wife were questioned by security police in Kiev, but only he was detained. He was released after several days.

On June 3, 1975, several press agencies reported that Mr. Rudenko was expelled from the Union of Writers of Ukraine for his membership in Amnesty International. According to press reports, the official decision was handed down during a meeting of the Union of Writers of Ukraine on May 27, 1975, to which Rudenko was not invited. Furthermore, it is reported, he was put on trial on May 18, 1975, and charged with disseminating "false and slanderous literature about the Soviet Union." Apparently, he was not convicted, as he was reported as having been released.

Soviet Dissidents Appeal on Behalf of Plyushch.—A group of Soviet dissidents appealed to the International Red Cross to provide urgent help for mathematician Leonid Plyushch, who, they said, was being given insulin shock treatments in a psychiatric hospital, according to a Reuter's dispatch from Moscow on June 12, 1975.

In a telegram also addressed to international scientific and medical associations, the group said that the 36-year-old Plyushch was in serious condition in the Dnipropetrovsk hospital in Ukraine to which he has been confined indefinitely since 1973.

Leonid Plyushch, who was once an active member of the Soviet human rights movement, stood trial in 1972, charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." He reportedly has been given a series of debilitating drugs since last November.

Report Observance of "Memorial Day for Dead Prisoners" in Kiev.—According to terse information received by the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Rome, Italy, an unidentified "Ukrainian Democratic Movement" group in Kiev was planning to hold a "Memorial Day for Dead Prisoners" on Monday, June 16, 1975.

The brief report read: "In Ukraine, June 16, 1975 will be observed as a 'Day in Memory of Dead Prisoners.' Sources in Kiev request that Ukrainians outside the Soviet Union join in the observance in order to popularize it," said the message of the Ukrainian Democratic Movement. No other information about the observance or the request to Ukrainians abroad was received by the said press bureau.

Report Physical Improvement of Moroz.—Valentyn Moroz, 39-year-old Ukrainian historian, who last year was on a hunger strike in Vladimir Prison for 120 days in protest against inhuman treatment, is reported to have improved physically and is in better spirits, according to a report from the Committee for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz in Toronto. It was based on a report of Mrs. Raissa Moroz, who visited her husband on May 5, 1975, which information was received from Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's office, according to the Committee's report. It also said that news of the visit was confirmed by U.S. government officials and dissident sources in Moscow.

Mrs. Moroz said that her husband looked better than he did when she saw him on November 5, 1974, and his morale was better. He was also studying English in anticipation of possible emigration to the United States, where he was offered a position at Harvard University.

Despite his general improvement, prison authorities persistently demand that he consent to be transferred to the prison hospital. Moroz has refused to be moved apparently because he will lose his cellmate who is said to be a Ukrainian political prisoner. Mrs. Moroz said that her husband also fears that once he enters a hospital, he may be given the same treatment as experienced by Leonid Plyushch.

The Committee also said that Canadian officials contend that Moroz's improved condition is the result of the intense, worldwide campaign in his defense and his determination to live. They believe that actions on his behalf should continue until he is freed and allowed to emigrate to the West with his family.

(The June 21, 1975 issue of *The Ukrainian Weekly*, published in Jersey City, N.J., reported the following: "From a reliable private source, the *Svoboda* Press learned that Valentyn Moroz was transferred from his cell to a psychiatric ward, probably in the Vladimir Prison, where he has been confined since his arrest. The news could not yet be confirmed. Moroz is said to be slowly poisoned there with tainted foods and drugs...").

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